    [Senate Hearing 117-996]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 117-996

                     THE NOMINATION OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL
                     MICHAEL E. KURILLA, USA TO BE GENERAL
                      AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
                      COMMAND
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                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 8, 2022

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                 __________

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-385 PDF              WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    �
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    �
    �
    �		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
    � 		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                  C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                february 8, 2022

                                                                       Page

    The Nomination of: Lieutenant General Michael E. Kurilla, USA to      1
      be General and Commander, United States Central Command.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James............................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Kurilla, Lieutenant General Michael E., USA, to be General and        3
      Commander, United States Central Command.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    46

      Questions for the Record.......................................    62

      Nomination Reference and Report................................    75

      Biographical Sketch............................................    76

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    79

      Signature Page.................................................    82

                                     (iii)

                  This hearing is printed to include all available
                    information
                    requested or required to be inserted for the
                    record.

                                      (iv)

      THE NOMINATION OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. KURILLA, USA TO BE
              GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
    Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    consider the nomination of Lieutenant General Michael Kurilla
    for promotion to general and to be the next commander of U.S.
    Central Command.
        General, your nomination is well deserved, and I thank you
    for your willingness to lead in this very important position.
        We welcome your wife, Mary Paige, and daughter, Michelle,
    both of whom are here today, and we ought to welcome Sophie,
    who I am sure is glued to a television set someplace, watching
    her father. We thank them for their continued service to our
    Nation.
        You have led most recently as the Commanding General of the
    18th Airborne Corps, an experience that will serve you well in
    this new role. Your career spans nearly 34 years with
    distinguished service across multiple theaters and command at
    every level of our Nation's premier fighting forces. The
    country is fortunate to have leaders like yourself serving in
    uniform.
        If confirmed, the range of challenges you will need to
    address is significant. CENTCOM's geographic area of
    responsibility stretches from Northeast Africa, across the
    Middle East, to Central and South Asia, and the security
    challenges are similarly expansive.
        Perhaps most pressing is Iran's malign influence in the
    region. The United States' latest round of indirect
    negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
    Action, or JCPOA, has seen progress, but Iran's ongoing nuclear
    development threaten to derail any agreement.
        Simultaneously, Iranian-linked groups continue to mount
    drone and rocket attacks in the region, including against bases
    in Iraq and Syria with a United States military presence. These
    threats are growing, as are drone and missile attacks by
    Iranian-linked Houthis against the Gulf States. During today's
    hearing I would like to know your level of concern over rising
    tensions between the United States and Iran, and how you would
    advise responding to Iranian malign influence in the region.
        While the death of ISIS leader al-Qurayshi in a United
    States strike last week dealt a blow to the organization, ISIS
    remains a threat. Last month, ISIS militants seized a prison
    facility in Syria where thousands of ISIS detainees are held,
    leading to a days-long standoff requiring United States and
    Coalition air and ground support to the Syrian Democratic
    Forces (STF). Press reports indicate that up to 200 fighters
    may have escaped, and hundreds of people were killed. If you
    are confirmed, you will be responsible for helping ensure the
    STF and the Iraqi Government have the capacity and support
    needed to address the threat from ISIS and properly detain
    these prisoners.
        Of particular emphasis for this committee is a reformation
    of how CENTCOM and the Defense Department respond to civilian
    casualty incidents. It must be noted that CENTCOM's approach to
    this issue in recent years has not been adequate, and the DOD
    Inspector General and independent studies have highlighted
    important areas for change.
        Our military goes to great lengths to avoid civilian
    casualties, but when tragic errors occur, we have an obligation
    to be transparent, take responsibility, and do everything we
    can to learn from those mistakes and prevent future mistakes.
    As such, General, I hope you will share what steps you would
    take to ensure CENTCOM improves its openness and transparency
    with this committee and the public.
        Finally, turning to Afghanistan, we have transitioned to an
    ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism posture to continue to
    respond to threats from the region using assets based outside
    Afghanistan. Our 20-year mission there largely achieved the
    goal of significantly degrading al Qaeda and other terrorist
    groups, but the work is not finished.
        During testimony to this committee last October, the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy assessed that ISIS-K and al
    Qaeda have, in his words, the intent to conduct external
    operations, but neither has the ability to do so. To prevent
    terrorist groups from developing this ability, we must to
    continue to bolster our ``over the horizon'' capabilities. With
    that in mind, I would ask that you share the most important
    lessons learned from your time in Afghanistan, and how you
    would ensure CENTCOM can conduct optimal ``over the horizon''
    activities.
        Again, thank you, General, for your continued willingness
    to serve, and I look forward to your testimony.
        Let me now recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Kurilla, for your willingness to
    continue your distinguished career.
        General Kurilla, when confirmed, you will take command of a
    region where terrorist groups increasingly threaten U.S.
    personnel, partners, and the Homeland. Due to the Biden
    administration's disastrous withdrawal of the United States
    troops from Afghanistan last summer, Afghanistan is now back to
    pre-9/11 conditions. The Taliban controls the country, and it
    has already killed more than 100 former Afghan officials,
    soldiers, and Coalition partners, according to the United
    Nations.
        The Haqqanis, which are affiliated with the al Qaeda, have
    government positions and ISIS-K, which killed 13 United States
    servicemembers on August 26, is exploiting the vacuum that the
    Biden administration left behind.
        Elsewhere, the Iran-backed Houthis have launched deadly
    missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
    Emirates, threatening United States forces and our partners.
        Last month, ISIS launched a series of new attacks in Syria
    and in Iraq. Last week's successful operation against ISIS'
    leader shows that the counter-ISIS mission isn't over.
        I am concerned that things will get even worse if President
    Biden re-enters the failed 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which many
    of us here have urged him not to do. Iran will have received
    substantial sanctions relief. Iran will spend that windfall on
    terrorist proxies. That means more arms for Hezbollah, Hamas to
    attack Israel, more training for the Houthis to threaten our
    Arab friends, and more support for the Iraqi militias that
    target our personnel. Rejoining the Iran nuclear deal won't
    prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons capabilities. The
    deal's limitations expire in 2026, which is not that far off.
        So, all of these threats in the Middle East are getting
    worse, but we also have to prioritize threats from the Chinese
    Communist Party and Russia right now. Both of those adversaries
    are heavily invested in competition in the CENTCOM.
        So here is what I hope you will address today: What
    resources do you think we will need to counter these regional
    threats? What roles should our partners play, and how can we
    improve their capabilities? Perhaps most important, what can we
    do to ensure that our longtime regional partners stick with us
    in the escalating competition with China and Russia?
        General Kurilla, you have served with great honor in this
    CENTCOM region; you are very familiar with it, you are the
    right guy to do this, and we look forward to winning together.
        Thank you again. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        General Kurilla, your remarks, please.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. KURILLA, USA, TO BE
          GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        General Kurilla. Good morning.
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished
    members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is an honor
    to appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve
    as the next commander of the United States Central Command.
        Today, as always, I am humbled to serve the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and guardians, who
    defend our Nation at home and abroad every day; they are our
    Nation's best.
        Young me today is my amazing wife of 27 years, Mary Paige.
    Throughout my career, Mary Paige has been my best friend,
    partner, and enthusiastic advocate for our servicemembers and
    their families. She is the daughter of a Vietnam veteran and
    has known from a very young age, firsthand, the challenges and
    hardships that face our military families.
        I have two wonderful daughters. My oldest Michelle flew in
    late last night from Massachusetts, where she is a senior at
    Harvard University, double-majoring in Government and English.
    My youngest daughter Sophie is a sophomore at Tufts University,
    studying biology and at the lab at the New England Aquarium
    this afternoon, so she is watching from her dorm.
        My family has long understood that family readiness is a
    key component to operational readiness and we are grateful for
    the service of all of our military families.
        I am grateful to the President, Secretary of Defense,
    Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs for their confidence in
    me and to General Frank McKenzie's lifetime of service to the
    Nation.
        I thank the Congress, and especially this Committee, for
    its unwavering support of our military.
        This is a critical time for the 21 countries of Central
    Command. The United States faces a new era of strategic
    competition with China and Russia that is not confined to one
    geographical region and extends into the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility. The Middle East, Central and South Asia remain
    complex and dynamic environments. CENTCOM remains a dangerous
    theater with its own internal threats to American security.
        As the United States rightfully prioritizes competition
    with China, we must remain engaged in the Middle East and
    Central and South Asia. We must be clear eyed about the fact
    that the United States Central Command area of responsibility
    remains home to America's national interests.
        The region today presents a mixed picture. On one hand,
    there are signs of progress, such as normalization of Arab
    states with Israel that defeated the physical so-called
    Caliphate, the ending of the Gulf rift, and the continued
    support by longtime partners and allies; on the other hand,
    there are some vexing challenges: Iran's nuclear program,
    ballistic missile advancements, and its continued malign
    influence across the region.
        The CENTCOM theater is also burdened by civil war and
    humanitarian crisis. The area is home to 9 of the top-10 most
    dangerous, violent extremist organizations, including al Qaeda
    and ISIS, which are both reconstituting. All of these ill
    trends are accelerated by water scarcity and food insecurity.
        China has significantly increased its investment and
    influence in the region and Russia acts as a spoiler. If
    confirmed as the CENTCOM commander, I will protect American
    interests in the region with these challenges in mind.
        While we are no longer in Afghanistan, we must acknowledge
    and honor the sacrifice of the more than 1 million
    servicemembers, civilians, partners, and allies who answered
    the call and did their duty during the war, and we must never
    forget the ultimate sacrifice of those who gave their last full
    measure of devotion on the battlefield.
        If confirmed, I will work hand-in-hand with our diplomats
    to ensure that diplomacy is in the lead, while strengthening
    our relationship with military partners and allies. I will
    embrace technology, artificial intelligence, machine learning,
    and data-centric warfare to increase CENTCOM's competitive edge
    across all domains.
        If confirmed, by this body, I look forward to working with
    this committee and Congress, the senior leadership for the
    Department of Defense, and our partners and allies;
    furthermore, I will always remain transparent and candid with
    both, Congress and this committee.
        I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        As is required, there are a series of standard questions,
    which you may responded to appropriately.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflict of interest?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        General Kurilla. No, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.
        Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
    this committee when requested?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
    Committee to give your personal views, even if your views
    differ from the administration?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner, when
    requested by this committee, its subcommittees, or other
    appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the
    requestor regarding the basis for any good faith delay or
    denial in providing such records?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses
    and briefers, in response to congressional request?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        Again, let me commend you for your service to the Nation
    and the service of your family.
        We spoke before about the continuing crisis in Afghanistan
    and looking forward, the steps we have to take. There is, as
    you recognized, a humanitarian crisis that is becoming more and
    more severe, each moment. There is the persistent threat of al
    Qaeda and ISIS-K and other terrorist groups.
        What do you see as the challenges in Afghanistan and the
    surrounding region and can we cope with them ``over the
    horizon"?
        General Kurilla. Senator, as you identified, one of the
    challenges is the threat to the Homeland from al Qaeda and
    ISIS-K. They are reconstituting. The Taliban has not renounced
    al Qaeda. ISIS-K, with the release of the prisoners both, from
    the Bagram Prison and Pul-e-Charkhi, are in the process of
    reconstituting. While they have aspirations to attack the
    Homeland, they do not have the capability yet.
        Additionally, we have the humanitarian crisis in
    Afghanistan. I believe there are opportunities in the future of
    ways that we can work with, perhaps, the World Food Programme
    and others in the region, to help alleviate some of that burden
    on the humanitarian crisis.
        Chairman Reed. Now, in our regional response, we have to
    consider the position of Pakistan. They have been a very
    complicated partner, and sometimes not a partner.
        Do you have any comments on that relationship and what you
    would like to do to improve it?
        General Kurilla. Senator, we have not always seen eye-to-
    eye with Pakistan, but I do think we have a shared interest in
    regional stability and countering violent extremist
    organizations. One of the most violent is Tehrik-e-Taliban
    Pakistani, the TTP, which directly threatens Pakistan. Also,
    the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, threatens the migrants
    to push into, and refugees, to push into Pakistan. So, I think
    there is potentially some shared interests that we can work
    with them on counter VEOs and the humanitarian crisis.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you.
        Turning to Iran, as both myself and the ranking member
    pointed out, it presents a very, very serious challenge. There
    are talks underway to try to revive the JCPOA, but it is
    uncertain if that will happen. Their malign activities both,
    directly and through proxies, like the Houthis, are causing
    concern, especially attacks recently against the United Arab
    Emirates.
        Can you give us an idea of how you would approach this
    problem as you take command?
        General Kurilla. Senator, Iran is the number one
    destabilizing factor in the Middle East right now with their
    malign behavior. I think a going through our partners and
    allies and strengthening those with a united front from all the
    partners and allies is the best way to confront them.
        The United States policy of Iran cannot get a nuclear
    weapon, I believe that any enforceable agreement should make
    sure that they do not get a nuclear weapon.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        You also said in the advanced policy questions, and in your
    testimony, that we must invest in artificial intelligence and
    machine-learning platforms and programs to increase our ability
    to detect, defend, and respond to conventional Iranian military
    capabilities.
        Can you sketch, very quickly, what you would attempt to do?
        General Kurilla. Senator, right now in the 18th Airborne
    Corps, when James McConville, General McConville, the Chief of
    Staff of the Army, charged the 18th Corps to lead and
    artificial intelligence become an AI-enabled corps, we have
    taken a four-prong approach to that with the culture, data
    literacy, data governance and management, and our
    infrastructure; i.e., cloud computing and cloud computing on
    the edge. Then we take that and we do a quarterly exercise that
    uses artificial intelligence for target detection.
        Every quarter, from all six services participate. The last
    exercise had over 40 aircraft, and to include the Navy,
    participating with the Maritime Operations Center. It
    culminated in a Marine F-35 dropping a live, thousand-pound
    bomb on an artificially intelligence-derived grid that was one
    meter off from the surveyed grid. We do these exercises
    quarterly to improve the capability of the targeting ability of
    the Corps. I would look to take that, if confirmed, down to
    CENTCOM, and expound upon that.
        Chairman Reed. Would that also help us with our issues
    regarding ``over the horizon'' sort of suppression of
    terrorists in Afghanistan?
        General Kurilla. Senator, it has capabilities for both,
    counterterrorism, as well.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General. I am
    very confident that you will be confirmed and confident that
    you will lead with distinction.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In the past year, Iran and its proxies have escalated their
    regional aggression. Hamas launched more than 4,300 rockets at
    Israel during the May 2021 conflict. The Houthis have increased
    their attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. The U.A.E.
    and the Iran-backed militias in Iraq, routinely target United
    States personnel, property, and partners.
        All this happens while the Biden administration is focusing
    on returning to the flawed Iran deal, which could provide
    billions of dollars in sanctions relief for the Iranian regime.
        Now, General Kurilla, based on what you have observed of
    Iran in the past, would you expect Iran to spend at least some
    of that sanctions relief on its terrorist proxies, and if so,
    how would this affect the security of our forces in the CENTCOM
    region?
        General Kurilla. Senator, there is a risk with sanctions
    relief that Iran would use some of that money to support its
    proxies and terrorism in the region, and if it did, it could
    increase risk to our forces in the region.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. General Kurilla, I have visited for
    many, many times, our friend, Masoud Barzani in Erbil many
    times over the years. The Iraqi Kurds are among our most
    reliable partners in the region and I believe it is important
    to ensure continued and reliable support to our Kurdish
    friends, in coordination with the Iraqi Government.
        Do you agree that the continued and reliable support to the
    Kurdish Peshmerga would enhance our partnership and advance our
    mutual interests in the region, and can you share some insight
    on the value of our partnership with the Kurds, based on your
    personal experience, because you had that personal experience?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I have worked with our Kurdish
    partners and found them to be very reliable and very capable. I
    have worked with them since 2004, on my first tour in Iraq, and
    as recently as the counter-ISIS fight up in 2014. I have found
    them to be an incredibly capable and reliable partner.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
        All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I didn't realize we were still going in seniority order, so
    I appreciate that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Shaheen. Congratulations, Lieutenant----
        Chairman Reed. You have a cheering from the upper deck.
        Senator Shaheen. Yes. Well, General Kurilla, thank you for
    being here. Congratulations to you and your family on your
    nomination. We very much appreciate your willingness to serve.
        I understand that you are actually leaving directly from
    this hearing to be part of the task force overseeing the
    deployment to reinforce our NATO allies, because of Russia's
    buildup on the Ukrainian and Belarusian border.
        I wonder what you consider to be the biggest challenge of
    that deployment?
        General Kurilla. So, Senator, right now, we are in the
    process of deploying; and yes, I will be leaving right after
    the hearing to fly over to be a continued part of that
    deployment. I think the challenge is, obviously, moving
    transatlantic with the number of forces we have, our mission
    over there is to assure our NATO allies and detour Russian
    aggression against our NATO allies.
        Senator Shaheen. To what extent do you think Putin is
    hoping for an incident along the border to give him an excuse
    to go into Ukraine?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I could not begin to speak for
    Putin's thoughts, but I do know I am very concerned about a
    Russian incursion and invasion into Ukraine.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I want to switch to part of will be your AOR as CENTCOM
    commander. One of the things that I am very concerned about is
    what is happening in the ISIS detainee camps in Syria. The one
    at Al-Hol has 60,000 family members. It has become a hotbed for
    a potential radicalization of those family members there.
        Can you talk about what the strategy ought to be to address
    those detainee camps? I know, because you worked with the STF,
    that they have stated that they are not able to assume long-
    term responsibility for those detainees in those camps, so what
    should we be doing to address that?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe that there should be a
    whole-of-government approach and an international effort to
    both, assist the STF on the repatriation of some of these
    detainees. It is approximately 10,000 ISIS detainees at about
    two dozen different detention facilities. That is an ISIS army
    in waiting. We saw that in Hasaka, when they attacked the
    prison.
        We also have, as you noted, 60,000 family members; over 80
    percent are children, women and children in the Al-Hol camp. My
    concern there is the indoctrination that is happening there,
    and so there must be a whole-of-government approach and an
    international effort to support the STF on this.
        Senator Shaheen. This Committee, actually, as part of the
    Defense Authorization bill last year, passed a requirement to
    establish a detainee coordinator to help address how we respond
    in those camps and how we repatriate some of the detainees.
        Are you aware of that position and do you think that that
    would be helpful?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do think that would be helpful.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Hopefully, someone is listening to your testimony.
        I want to go to Iraq because we have seen a series of bomb
    and grenade attacks taking place over the last week in Baghdad
    and it is assumed that Iranian-backed militias are responsible
    for these incidents.
        So, how can we better hold Iran accountable for these kinds
    of attacks and ensure that our personnel and those Iraqis
    defending their country are protected?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe the key is that we have
    to make sure that we expose the Iranian malign behavior. I have
    found that anytime Iran's hand behind us is exposed, it is
    helpful.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        There was a recent report on a Special Operations-directed
    strike, targeting components of the Tabqa Dam in Syria, despite
    the dam being on the no-strike list. It is not clear to me how
    this happened; I haven't seen my reports investigating that.
        But will you commit to investigating what happened here and
    to reporting the results to Congress?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will, if confirmed.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Finally, we have a law called the Women, Peace and Security
    Act that is designed to try and ensure that women are involved
    in our operations and, particularly, in conflict areas. So, can
    you talk a little bit about how you see that law working in
    your area of responsibility and what we should be doing and how
    it could be helpful to what is happening in the Central
    Command.
        General Kurilla. Senator, the Women, Peace and Security Act
    of 2017, if confirmed, that is an area I would look to see how
    is CENTCOM employing that law. I think anytime you have women
    involved in conflict resolution and helping and assisting in
    the delivery and relief of relief, it is a good thing. So, I
    think, if confirmed, I would have to take a look at how that is
    being implemented.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I look forward to working
    with you on that and being helpful in any way I can.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Wicker, please?
        Senator Wicker. General, I think there is widespread
    agreement that you are the right man for the job. We need to
    get you back to your base and get your involved in that
    deployment. I am almost attempted to yield back my time so you
    can get on about that, but I am not quite convinced that I
    should do that.
        Let me ask you about money. We are now spending money for
    the Pentagon that was decided on more than a year ago, and that
    is because of our failure to have a Defense appropriation bill.
    We are about to do another continuing resolution. People in
    this town, from the administration, really to DOD, to the
    Congress seem to sort of view this as an inconvenience and a
    little bit of a lapse.
        How big of a problem is this, and I have got several
    questions, but is this merely an inconvenience or is CENTCOM
    really going to take a hit because we can't do our job?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I can't speak on behalf of
    CENTCOM, but I can tell you my personal experience in 18th
    Airborne Corps. When we have prolonged CRs, it affects
    readiness, it affects our ability to train, it affects our
    combat-training centers, our rotary wing flight hours. I have
    two armored brigade combat teams in the 18th Airborne Corps;
    they are very expensive to operate.
        It affects modernization. It can disrupt modernization. I
    have an armored brigade combat team that is in a year-long
    modernization window. They will emerge as the most modernized
    armored brigade combat team in the Army.
        The CRs can disrupt that. I don't know the impact if it was
    to take it all the way out through the year and then have a
    second armored brigade combat team that is going in the summer.
        Lastly, it can affect quality of life. It stops the
    prevention of new starts, such as military construction for
    barracks, motor pools and child development centers.
        Senator Wicker. I may be speaking to the choir about this
    in this room, but it seems when we bring this up, and any
    number of members of this committee bring it up, people nod and
    agree with you, and yet, we are just going to be quite relaxed
    next week about going to another continuing resolution.
        Let me ask you about the Stans that were formerly Soviet
    Republic, and I am looking at the map here, General, and I see
    Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and then
    the massive geographic area of Kazakhstan, which covers five
    time zones.
        Why are they important to us in the United States and what
    difference did it make in their leadership seeing how we left
    Afghanistan, in what I view as a major debacle?
        General Kurilla. Senator, they are very important. That is
    an area, also, that I think we compete with Russia and China. I
    think with the departure from Afghanistan, there is some
    security interests that we share with them, and that is, in
    terms of those that border on Afghanistan, particularly,
    Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, I think we have shared interests on
    the VEOs and areas that we could potentially partnership with
    them on the border security to prevent the expansion of the
    VEOs from coming into their area.
        Senator Wicker. But you haven't started this job yet, but
    you are anticipating that you will.
        Has the leadership of these five former Soviet Republics
    acting differently after seeing what happened last August in
    Kabul?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am not sure, and, if confirmed,
    that is an area that I would take a hard look at.
        Senator Wicker. If Russia invades Ukraine, how will that,
    in your judgment, affect how these five former Soviet Republics
    view their neighbor to the north and the United States?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe they would have some
    concerns with Russia invading Ukraine as that would look to
    expand, potentially, one of their former locations.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Well, good luck to you, and I am going to yield you a whole
    30 seconds to get back and get that deployment going.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Hirono, please?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your service. You have a lot of
    experience in your AOR.
        I start the questioning of all nominees to any positions in
    any of the committees I sit on, and these are the following two
    questions that I ask all nominees. Since you became a legal
    adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors
    or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a
    sexual nature?
        General Kurilla. No, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a settlement, related to this kind of conduct?
        General Kurilla. No, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. General, I am very concerned, along with
    other members of this committee, very concerned about the
    ongoing issue of the poor treatment of Afghan women and girls,
    especially since our withdrawal and the Taliban's return to
    power.
        Recently, President Biden appointed Rina Amiri, as United
    States special envoy for Afghan women, girls, and human rights,
    to spearhead an interagency effort to advance the rights of
    Afghan women and girls.
        As commander of Central Command, what do you see your role
    in supporting Ms. Amiri, USAID, and other agencies, in
    supporting the rights of Afghan women and girls?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, that is an area
    that I would look at to analyze how CENTCOM can be a part of a
    whole-of-government approach.
        Senator Hirono. I like the fact that you have used ``whole-
    of-government'' in your response to a number of questions. I
    think that is a very good idea, because ``whole-of-government''
    means, I would say, the active involvement of the State
    Department and, also, any of our allies.
        So, you know, I would be interested, if confirmed, how you
    will proceed in this area, since the fate of Afghan women and
    girls is something that weighs very heavily on a number of us
    and our challenges and getting or rescuing many of them out of
    the country remains very difficult.
        You mentioned Iran as being the number one destabilizing
    actor in the Middle East. Again, with the Iran whole-of-
    government approach and how to contain their malign activities
    and you said that when Iranian malign behavior is exposed, it
    is helpful.
        Can you just describe what you consider an example of
    Iranians malign behavior, which would be helpful to expose, and
    what do you mean by, it is helpful to expose such behavior?"
        General Kurilla. Senator, when we see the Iran proxies and
    those Iranian-aligned militia groups that are either firing
    rockets at our embassy in Iraq, they are firing at our troops
    inside of Syria. They support the Houthis and they are
    providing that technology to them, to fire ballistic missiles
    into the U.A.E. and into Saudi Arabia.
        When we exposed the Iranian hand behind that, it causes
    them to react.
        Senator Hirono. It causes who to react?
        General Kurilla. The Iranians to react.
        Senator Hirono. How would they react; would they pull back
    their----
        General Kurilla. Ma'am, they try and hide their behavior
    and it can cause them to not take action for a period of time;
    that is my experience, when I was down at CENTCOM.
        Senator Hirono. You were asked some questions regarding the
    JCPOA and that President Biden joined United States allies,
    France, Germany, the U.K., and Ireland in a statement noting
    that a return to a JCPOA would result in both, in sanctions
    lifting a law for enhanced regional partnerships and a reduced
    risk of a nuclear crisis that would derail regional diplomacy.
        What are your thoughts on a return to the JCPOA and would
    rejoining the agreement be a positive step in containing Iran's
    nuclear ambitions?
        As far as I am concerned, there is no question that our
    membership in the JCPOA enabled us to really track what Iran
    was doing. Would a return to the JCPOA really, greatly enhance
    efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am not aware of the exact
    details of the ongoing negotiations, but I am supportive of any
    enforceable agreement that limits Tehran's ability to gain
    nuclear weapons.
        Senator Hirono. I think a large part of that would be to
    have an agreement, such as a JCPOA, and, unfortunately, that is
    not where we are.
        If confirmed, how do you plan to work with partners and
    allies to confront the challenges presented by Iran?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, I will have to take
    a hard look at the partners and allies. Each one of them bring
    different capabilities. I think there is some opportunities in
    an integrated air-and-missile defense, particularly, with
    Israel, now under the CENTCOM area of responsibility, that they
    can do some partnerships in terms of increasing the capability.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        I would say that Israel would be a major partner in that
    effort.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Fischer, please?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, General, to you and your family, and thank you,
    sir, for your many years of service to this country.
        General, we read in the Washington Post about an Army
    review of the Afghanistan drawdown. The report highlights the
    extent to which the Biden administration's poor planning forced
    our servicemembers into an incredibly dangerous and an
    incredibly chaotic situation during that evacuation.
        I know that you are not responsible for this report, but,
    if confirmed, do I have your word that if future reports like
    this are completed, that this committee will learn about them
    from you and not from the morning paper?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        I wouldn't think that members of this committee would have
    to make a FOIA request in order to learn information that
    should be brought forward in a positive way to keep us informed
    so we can perform our oversight responsibilities.
        General, based on your prior experience that you have had
    in the region, your knowledge of the region, what do you assess
    to be the most significant challenges for CENTCOM to carry out
    an ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism strategy in
    Afghanistan?
        General Kurilla. Senator, ``over the horizon'' capability
    is extremely difficult, but not impossible. I think the biggest
    challenge for Afghanistan is that it is a landlocked country.
    We rely on another nation for an air line of communication to
    be able to enter Afghanistan. The distances required to fly ISR
    is great. We spend approximately two-thirds of the time flying
    there and getting back, versus over the target. So, it is a
    resource-intensive to be able to do the finding, and then the
    fixing, and then the finishing of those targets that you are
    going after.
        I think we need to reinvest in a lot of our intelligence
    capabilities, our human-intelligence capability that was lost
    during the withdrawal.
        Senator Fischer. Do you anticipate that we will have more
    success in the future on being able to find those partners on
    the ground?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, I will need to make
    an assessment of that.
        Senator Fischer. Do you know of any ongoing conversations
    about basing agreements with neighboring countries that would
    be helpful to us in being able to do ``over the horizon'' CT?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am not aware of any detailed
    discussions going on, but I know that there are discussions
    happening right now, that could ease the distances that are
    required.
        Senator Fischer. I would hope if you do, you would contact
    us so that we can keep up to date on the progress, or lack
    thereof, in this regard, because it is so vital to our
    commitments that we have and in Afghanistan and the needs that
    we have to meet in Afghanistan.
        I hope that you will do that review process. We heard from
    Secretary Kahl in October ISIS-K could generate the capability
    to attack our Homeland by April. That is not too far away from
    today. If there needs to be a change in strategy, if CENTCOM
    needs to be resourced differently, I would hope that you would
    bring that to our attention, as well.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        When you were speaking about partners and allies and our
    need for partners and allies, especially in dealing with Iran
    and their proxies, are there specific ways that you feel we
    could help our partners defend themselves with regard to
    missile and drone attacks?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe that is probably the
    area with some of the greatest opportunity in terms of working
    towards and integrated air and missile defense. The addition of
    Israel to the AOR, I think, will help with that.
        I think there are areas, also, in terms of cyber defense.
    We are collectively stronger together, when we work together,
    so there are areas there that each one brings unique
    capabilities in terms of that.
        Senator Fischer. From your comments, I would imagine that
    you would, then, be a strong advocate for providing Israel with
    the defensive means that they need?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        In recent years, Beijing has elevated the Middle East
    strategic significance by building commercial ports in
    Pakistan. They are beginning another port project in U.A.E.,
    which was halted by United States pressure.
        We try and rely for the Persian Gulf for nearly half its
    energy supply. Do you view countering the expansion of China's
    Belt and Road Initiative in the CENTCOM area responsibility as
    a fundamental priority?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do.
        Right now, 18 of 21 countries in the CENTCOM AOR have
    signed agreements, strategic agreements for Belt and Road
    Initiatives with China. China has increased their spending 360
    percent in the Middle East. So, I believe it is of great
    concern.
        What we have to do is expose their predatory practices,
    where they treat every country as a client or a customer; where
    we deal in relationships and we are partners and allies.
        Senator Gillibrand. So, how does countering China in the
    region balance against some of our other counterterrorism
    commitments with regional partners?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe we can do both.
        Senator Gillibrand. Reports last year emerged that Saudi
    Arabia purchased ballistic missiles from China, while also
    manufacturing its own ballistic weapons using Chinese
    technology.
        Are you concerned that China is forging technological
    relationships with countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to further
    enhance the ballistic missile capabilities of regional actors;
    also, do you have a broader concern that our traditional allies
    in CENTCOM should be shifting towards China as we potentially
    focus on other regions across the global?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am very concerned with China's
    military involvement, as well as, in terms of these agreements.
    Three of the top purchasers of their UAVs are out of the Middle
    East. The technological agreements they have with Huawei; five
    major Middle Eastern countries have also come into agreements
    with them, so I am very concerned with that.
        Senator Gillibrand. You will give us any guidance to the
    extent you need additional resources or authorities to address
    those concerns?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I would not hesitate to do that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        A recent NDAA-directed RAND study pointed out numerous
    shortcomings in the DOD's investigation in response to civilian
    casualties. It concluded a number of recommendations to improve
    DOD's internal and external process conducting tactical
    strikes. One specific issue RAND highlighted is the need for
    the Department of Defense to better engage with non-
    governmental organizations to develop a better situational
    assessment for civilian-casualty incidents.
        If confirmed, will you continue to prioritize effective
    CIVCAS response within your command and do we have your
    commitment that CENTCOM will improve and regulate and engage
    with NGOs on this issue?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        My last question. As the military shifts focus to great
    power competition, low-intensity conflicts in the Middle East
    may lose significant resources.
        Can you discuss how forced-planning concepts, like dynamic
    force employment, that is the ability to rapidly shift key U.S.
    military assets from one theater to the other, will allow the
    U.S. to divert resources from CENTCOM to meet the challenges
    faced by near-peer competitors, if necessary.
        General Kurilla. Senator, that is going to have to be--if
    confirmed, I would have to make an assessment of the impact of
    those DFEs. The challenge with counterterrorism efforts are
    that they do take time to develop the targets; it is finding
    the targets and fixing them. Dynamic Force Employment could
    come in for a finish, potentially, but, really, the effort goes
    into the findings and the fixing.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Well, thank you so much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla. Senator, thank you for your support for
    10th Mountain up in Fort Drum; part of 18th Airborne Corps.
        Senator Gillibrand. My pleasure and privilege.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla, first of all, I did enjoy our visit in my
    office and I can share with you that I do believe that you are
    the right man for the job right now, and I look forward to
    supporting your nomination.
        I would like to explore a little bit along the lines that
    Senator Fischer began, with regard to the ``over the horizon''
    capabilities. I think this is something that we have got to be
    able to explain in terms of the challenges here a little bit
    better.
        One item that we talked about was literally the number of
    units necessary to maintain surveillance over a particular
    area. Would you just take a minute or so and dive in a little
    bit deeper with regards to the challenges of ``over the
    horizon'' capabilities that we face with regard to Afghanistan.
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        So, just using an MQ-9 Reaper as an example, you have the
    normal ones with an extended range can go up to 30 hours of
    endurance. If it is taking you 10 hours to get to a target and
    10 hours to fly back, to be able to keep a single sensor over
    that target, you are going to have to have two and a half MQ-
    9s; one taking off every 10 hours, to be able to be over the
    target for just one sensor to be able to develop that target.
        In Afghanistan, when we were doing operations, sometimes I
    would have up to 12 sensors on a target to be able to follow
    individuals, develop the target.
        It is also used in civilian-casualty mitigation, because
    you are watching all the approaches to that target when you are
    taking a strike. So, it can be very resource intensive.
        Senator Rounds. I think that is the critical part here, is
    when we talk about ``over the horizon'' capabilities, it is
    extremely equipment intensive and it will take a huge amount of
    resources in order to be successful in the Afghanistan region.
        Your background is one of developing and moving ahead with
    regard to technologies. With regard to the 18th Airborne Corps,
    would you share a little bit about the challenges that you
    found in terms of bringing in and using the newest technology,
    including the threats of cybersecurity or cyberattacks, what
    you found you needed to do in order to keep the team up to
    speed, and talk just a little bit about with regard to
    artificial intelligence; the fact that this is not something in
    the future, but rather, something that we are faced with right
    now.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe it is the next
    revolution in military affairs.
        I find the biggest challenge is actually the data literacy
    and the education of our current force, and particularly, with
    kind of the older generation of us. It is really our younger
    generation does get a lot of this.
        The challenge you have is being able to, then, take this,
    and how do you fight with artificial intelligence. What we have
    discovered is that the human must be in the loop. An individual
    human augmented by artificial intelligence is far more
    effective than just artificial intelligence on its own right
    now.
        We do these quarterly exercises called ``Scarlet Dragon.''
    Every quarter, we will bring in all six services and we go
    through the process of how can we increase the scale and scope
    of targeting against a near-peer in a large-scale combat
    operation. We have found that we were able to exponentially
    increase that capability to sort through hundreds of targets,
    to pick the right targets, to be able to strike moving at
    machine to machine, and directly to an aircraft.
        Senator Rounds. Tell us how to integrate that with regard
    to the AOR that you are going to be responsible for. You now
    have Israel as a part of this AOR. They are an ally. They have
    significant capabilities.
        As you move forward, do you see some real opportunities
    here to coordinate with Israel with regard to cybersecurity,
    AI, and sort of, in an integrated defense program?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think there are tremendous
    opportunities to partner with, not just Israel, but with all
    the partners in the region, in terms of that.
        Senator Rounds. Can you talk a little bit about, with
    regard to Iran, the threats that you see with regard to
    cybersecurity threats emanating from Iran.
        General Kurilla. Senator, Iran has a very capable offensive
    cyber capability. We see that playing out in the CENTCOM region
    right now. So, I think the areas that we can work on is
    hardening our cyber defenses of our partners in the region.
        Senator Rounds. They talk about Iran having access to
    ransomware and, as such, since it is normally used by
    criminals, it is one way in which they can, perhaps, hide some
    of their activities.
        Would you agree that Iran is a threat, with regard to
    ransomware at this time?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do agree.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 10 seconds.
        Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
        Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        First, I want to compliment our colleague Senator
    Gillibrand; I thought her questions on China and China's
    growing influence in the region were very perceptive and
    important, and something that we often don't think much about.
        General, it is hard to ever utter the phrase
    ``cooperation'' and ``Taliban'' in the same sentence, but we
    have a common enemy in ISIS-K. The Taliban doesn't like them.
    We don't like them. They are a danger to us. They are a danger
    to them.
        Is there an opportunity for developing a kind of,
    compartmented relationship, if you will, with the Taliban, with
    regard to ISIS-K?
        We are able, we have been able to use the ALoC through
    Pakistan for ISR, but there has been no kinetic strike yet and
    there is some question as to what effect that would have on the
    relationship to the Taliban and Pakistan.
        The short question is, is there room for some relationship
    with the Taliban that could help us, and help them, with the
    problem of ISIS-K?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, that is an area
    that I would have to do a deep study on, but I do think, in my
    personal opinion, there are pragmatic instances where we could
    come together, going after ISIS-K, based on the threat to the
    Homeland.
        Senator King. Well, I would hope so, because as they say,
    the old saying is that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. So,
    there may be an opportunity there to deal with the threat of
    ISIS-K, which I think is very significant and growing.
        How do we assist with the humanitarian crisis in
    Afghanistan, without, at the same time, assisting the Taliban?
    Are there avenues to provide support that we can avail
    ourselves of that don't shore up the Taliban regime?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe the most important
    thing would be to make sure that it is transparent and it does
    not fall into the hands of the Taliban and is used as a, that
    they can weaponize it. I think an opportunity potentially
    exists with the U.N. food program. They are a very transparent
    and accountable organization. To be able to provide funding of
    relief, I also think working with Pakistan, they have a shared
    interest in that because of the refugees coming out of
    Afghanistan right now into Pakistan.
        Senator King. Moving to Iraq, there appears in recent
    years, or in the recent, last year or so, a decline of Iran's
    influence in Iraq with Sadr and with some of the militias.
        How do you assess the situation in Iraq; is there an
    opportunity for us to leave there or should we have to maintain
    a presence in order to offset Iran's influence?
        General Kurilla. Senator, we are in Iraq right now for the
    enduring defeat of ISIS and to maintain our strategic
    relationship with the Government of Iraq. I think that the
    partnership that we have with them on the enduring defeat of
    ISIS is very important. The Iraqi Security Forces do have a
    very capable force, but it is not, it can still grow and needs
    to develop so that it is self-sustaining for being able to go
    after ISIS.
        Senator King. As you mentioned earlier, one of our key
    allies there are the Iraqi Kurds, which have been reliable and
    capable allies throughout this entire process in the Middle
    East.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I have worked a lot with the
    Kurds and they are a very capable and reliable partner.
        Senator King. How do you assess the addition of Israel, the
    moving of Israel from EUCOM to CENTCOM in terms of your job and
    the ability to deal with the Middle East as a coherent entity?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think there is significant
    opportunity with the addition of Israel. It starts with the
    Abraham Accords, the normalization of relationships between
    Israel and Arab nations. We have both, Bahrain and the United
    Arab Emirates, and that has caused them to start talking. When
    you are talking, you are lowering the temperature in the room.
    There is talk of security cooperation, as well, and I think
    that is only a good thing.
        Senator King. Finally, in your military judgment, we have
    been having discussions about the JCPOA and whether to re-
    enter, and everybody is committed to Iran not achieving a
    nuclear weapon. In the absence of diplomacy or some kind of
    enforceable agreement, what are the military options,
    realistically, for eliminating Iran's nuclear capability?
        General Kurilla. Senator, my current job, I am not aware of
    the current military options. My only concern would be that you
    can never take away the intellectual knowledge that they have
    on how to increase their nuclear capability and then the
    reaction that Iran would have of any strike on them.
        [Pause.]
        Chairman Reed. Senator King, we cannot hear you and your
    time has expired. So, with your permission, let me recognize
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. General, welcome to the committee and
    congratulations on your nomination. It is a very important post
    in the long and illustrious posts that you have held over your
    distinguished career. Thank you for your service to our Nation.
        We have had a lot of talk about Iran this morning in the
    committee, in part, because Iran is the worst country in your
    region. They are the world's worst sponsor for state terrorism.
    They are behind almost every proxy war in the region, to say
    nothing of what they are doing in trying to obtain nuclear
    weapons.
        If it becomes clear that Iran is actively pursuing a
    nuclear weapon, does Central Command have the resources
    necessary, should the Commander in Chief, President Biden,
    direct a military strike against Iran?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, I would have to
    look at the mission and the resources required and I would come
    back to the chairman and the secretary if additional resources
    were required.
        Senator Cotton. Can you commit that you will do that and
    that you will give your best professional military judgment
    about what resources would be needed to carry out such a
    mission?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Senator King just spoke about Iran getting
    a nuclear weapon and how we all think that Iran should not have
    a nuclear weapon, and that is what President Obama frequently
    said in 2015, in defending the nuclear deal, that Iran, that he
    would not allow Iran to obtain the bomb. I think President
    Biden just said something similar.
        That leaves open the possibility that we would allow Iran
    to get right up to the threshold of getting a nuclear weapon;
    the proverbial turn of the screwdriver, if you will, the way a
    country like Japan is today. I mean, people worry about Japan
    being one step away from a nuclear weapon because Japan is not
    run by a bunch of crazed theocrats.
        It may be one thing to say the United States could live
    with an Iran that is one turn of the screwdriver away from
    getting a nuclear weapon. Can a country like Israel live under
    those circumstances, though, or what about Saudi Arabia or the
    other Arab nations in the region?
        General Kurilla. Senator, my concern would be Iran being a
    nuclear threshold state, that it could be very destabilizing to
    the region and cause others to attempt to work on their
    defense.
        Senator Cotton. But even if they don't have a nuclear
    weapon and don't have a demonstrated capability, if they are
    simply a nuclear threshold state, it would embolden them that
    much more; that is your point?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah. I think you are right about that.
        One incredibly emboldened action I have seen over the last
    couple of months is that Iran's proxies in Yemen are firing
    ballistic missiles and one-way drones into the Emirates and
    some of those are attacking bases where we have American
    troops.
        What do you make of this incredibly provocative and
    escalatory action coming out of Iran's Yemeni proxies?
        General Kurilla. Senator that is an example of Iranian
    malign behavior and aggressive behavior from their proxies in
    the region.
        Senator Cotton. Why do you think, so, they have been doing
    that to Saudi Arabia, in Southwestern and Western Saudi Arabia
    for a few years, why do you think in the last couple of months,
    those proxies in Yemen are now firing those missiles or drones
    all the way into the Emirates?
        General Kurilla. Senator, my personal opinion is part of
    that is because of the advances of the Giants Brigade down in
    Yemen took back areas like al-Shabwa Province from the Houthis,
    and that is their reaction back to the U.A.E.
        But I would have to have, if confirmed, do a deeper study
    on that.
        Senator Cotton. What would you do if you were sitting in
    Abu Dhabi and you had missiles and drones flying into your
    territory, just sort of hitting your bases or hitting the Burj
    Khalifa?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if I am the CENTCOM commander
    with forces there, I would use the Patriots and THAAD Systems
    that we have in the theater to shoot them down.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think we currently have enough of
    those systems in the region to protect, not only our allies,
    but in this case, again, it was our troops; our troops at bases
    in the Emirates?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think that one of the advances
    that we can look at doing is increasing the integrated air and
    missile defense in the region of our partners and allies to
    contribute to make sure that they are all integrated.
        Senator Cotton. I mean, based on the threat we have seen
    coming out of Yemen in these last couple months, I think it is
    going to be one of the most urgent priorities you face; both
    making sure we have the resources we need, but also working
    with our partners to help them.
        Because I don't think, as Iran is emboldened, I don't think
    this threat is going to increase; I think it is only going to
    increase. Again, we are just talking about it coming out of
    Yemen, not other places, where they are supplying proxies with
    similar missiles or drones.
        One final point. I kind of get irritated when I see reports
    about the F-22s and F-35s bombing insurgencies or, you know, in
    2017, I think we bombed a drug factory with an F-22.
        Can we do a better job about not using advanced fifth-
    generation aircraft to bomb low-threat first-generation
    targets?
        General Kurilla. Senator, as a military person, if that is
    the only asset available, I would use that asset.
        Senator Cotton. I got that. I would like to see better
    asset-planning, though, so those aircraft are directed towards
    countries like China with advanced air defenses and fifth-
    generation fighters, themselves, and older-generation aircraft
    are directed against ISIS and al Qaeda.
        General Kurilla. Certainly.
        Senator Cotton. One final question. There has also been a
    lot of talk about the ``over the horizon'' strike capacity in
    Afghanistan. I think that would be better termed ``over the
    rainbow'' strike capacity.
        How can we possibly be striking into Afghanistan without
    intelligence on the ground and when we are completely beholden
    to Pakistan for giving access to their airspace; it is a big
    problem, isn't it?
        General Kurilla. Senator, it is a challenge.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Good luck trying to conquer that
    challenge. We need you to.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. Congratulations, again.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        General, welcome to the committee and thank you for your
    services. Thanks to talking with me the other day, as we did on
    the phone, and answering my questions, as insightfully and
    forthrightly as you are doing here at the Committee. I look
    forward to visiting with you during your service in CENTCOM.
        As you and I discussed, I am very deeply concerned, in
    fact, frustrated and even angry about the slow pace of the
    evacuation of at-risk Afghanistan allies and, potentially,
    Americans from Afghanistan. We have been dwelling in this
    committee hearing mostly on the use of American power, our
    military power, but our credibility and power around the world
    depend on our keeping our word.
        We have given our word to the translators and interpreters
    and guards and drivers and all the Afghans who put their lives
    on the line to protect our troops and diplomats during the 20
    years of our engagement there in combat, and I worry about our
    credibility around the world and our credibility in the next
    struggle.
        Two of my sons have served. One was an infantry officer, a
    Marine Corps officer in Afghanistan. It took him 2 years to
    bring over his interpreter. The other was a Navy SEAL. I just
    want to say how grateful I am to the veterans groups for their
    support in the continuing effort to enable those at-risk,
    Afghan allies to come to this country.
        But I have been frustrated by, frankly, our State
    Department's seeming reluctance to be as engaged as it should
    be in this effort. A number of us colleagues have joined,
    Senator Graham, Senator Ernst, myself, Senator Cardin, in a
    measure called ``Honor Our Commitment,'' which would try to
    enable more of those at-risk, Afghan allies to come here.
        Let me ask you, what capacity do you think CENTCOM has to
    facilitate the continued evacuation of the Afghan allies who
    remain at risk in that country?
        I know it is winter there, as it is here. The airport has
    failings, but we are America; we can fly in and out of that
    airport. Can CENTCOM play a role in facilitating the evacuation
    of those at-risk, Afghan allies, if asked to do so?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe we have a moral
    obligation to help those at-risk Afghans to come out of
    Afghanistan. If confirmed, I commit to you to look at what
    options are available to be able to assist in that Department
    of State.
        Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to come back to the
    committee, I think it is implied in your answer, with such a
    plan and a description of the options and assets that could be
    made available?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Do you think that there is, there are necessary assets in
    CENTCOM right now, if you know, to support that kind of plan?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I would have to look at the
    current missions, if confirmed, look at the current missions
    assigned to CENTCOM, the resources allocated, and identify the
    risks associated against all of those, if that additional
    mission is applied, what resources, and does that place others
    at risk, or go back for additional resourcing for that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Well, I welcome your commitment to come to us with a plan
    and description of the assets that could be made available, and
    if necessary, additional assets that would be required. Thank
    you.
        Let me ask you a final question. When we are talking about
    defending against missiles and our allies that need those
    defenses, the Iron Dome is one very reliable and important
    means of Israel defending against its adversary's missiles.
    Would you agree that replenishment of the Iron Dome capacities
    of Israel is important to the security of that country and
    potentially our own?
        General Kurilla. Senator, you know, the U.S. Army just got
    two Iron Dome batteries that are going through testing and
    evaluation and I believe it has had about a 90 percent kill
    rate in terms of being able to knock down targets, but I do
    think the Iron Dome should be funded.
        Senator Blumenthal. That it should be funded and
    replenished for Israel, because, as you have absolutely
    correctly observed, it is a very reliable, defensive, emphasize
    defensive, mechanism.
        General Kurilla. It is, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, General. Good
    luck.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Ernst, please?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Kurilla, thank you so much for being here today and
    for your many, many years of service, and to Mary Paige, and to
    your daughters, as well, thank you for the love and support
    that you have given to General Kurilla.
        I am coming from a unique perspective here, in that,
    General Kurilla, I have had the opportunity to know you better
    than 25 years, closer to 30, and I have had the opportunity to
    watch your career and I am extremely impressed with the path
    that you have chosen and has been chosen for you. I am very
    excited about your opportunity to serve as our CENTCOM
    commander. While you can't assume confirmation, I absolutely
    can, because I will be supporting.
        We have talked about a number of issues today, and I will
    associate with so many of my colleagues in the threats that we
    are seeing around the globe. China's influence in CENTCOM,
    Russia's influence in CENTCOM, certainly, Iran, and then you
    also have all of the violent extremist organizations on your
    plate, as well.
        Senator Blumenthal's point, as far as those we have left
    behind in Afghanistan, that remains heavy on my heart, as well.
    So many of us are working to find opportunities to bring these
    folks out of Afghanistan and safely into, whether it is third
    countries or into the United States. So, I look forward to your
    partnership there.
        So, we have talked through so many of those issues, but
    beyond being tactically proficient and sound at your craft,
    which you are, there are other things that commanders do need
    to be concerned about, and that is the health and welfare of
    their soldiers. We all know and understand in the SOF community
    that humans are more important than hardware and you exhibited
    that in the 82nd Airborne with focusing on mental health and
    brain health and the checkup from the neck up.
        If you could talk a little bit about the importance of
    mental health and well-being of your soldiers and what you will
    do to continue those types of movements within CENTCOM.
        General Kurilla. Senator, thank you.
        Senator, one of the areas that we are trying to look at
    right now in terms of mental health, we know that anytime a
    soldier does a permanent change of station, that is a very
    high-stress environment, and so our medical professionals do a
    screening of, a full-evaluation screening of everyone coming
    into Fort Bragg right now, regardless of the unit. We identify
    those that are either moderate or high-risk, and they are able
    to talk to a mental health professional that day. Sometimes we
    can miss the transition from someone who is coming from one
    installation to another, and so, we start with there, and then
    we also make sure that they have the availability of the mental
    health professionals. Additionally, we have an ongoing effort
    right now, whether you are an E1 Private or an--Lieutenant
    General, that you must go get, talk to a behavioral health
    specialist annually, we do it for our teeth, annually, because
    you never know what someone is going to say behind closed
    doors. They might be able to talk about some challenges and
    issues they have, and if that saves one life, then it is worth
    it. So, we are working through that right now.
        Senator Ernst. By having every soldier and every officer do
    that, do you feel that that takes away the stigma of having
    those conversations?
        General Kurilla. One hundred percent, Senator. When they
    know that that individual has to go in behind there, you never
    know what someone is going to say behind closed doors. If they
    know that I even have to go behind there and talk to a
    behavioral health specialist that can only help reduce the
    stigma.
        Senator Ernst. Absolutely. I appreciate that and look
    forward to working with you on those efforts, as well.
        Again, there are so many challenges that exist across the
    spectrum. ``Over the horizon,'' I know, as we spoke the other
    day, you will go into the position, you know, you know, I am
    assuming confirmation for you, but going into your position,
    you will do an assessment and I believe that you will, at some
    point, come back to the committee, and if you need additional
    resources, you will absolutely let us know; is that correct?
        General Kurilla. Yes, it is, Senator.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. We look forward to that discussion.
        Again, I am going to yield back the last 30 seconds, but,
    General Kurilla, I know that you have the intestinal fortitude
    to move quickly and easily into this position. I wholly support
    your confirmation.
        God bless you. Thank you so much for your service to our
    great United States.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Senator Warren, please?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla, welcome to you and your family, and
    congratulations on your nomination.
        I would like to focus on one of the topics that you and I
    discussed when we met last week: civilian casualties. I think
    everyone in this room can agree that U.S. military operations
    kill far too many civilians. In the past 2 decades, the United
    States has killed tens of thousands of innocent people,
    including hundreds of women and children, across a half dozen
    countries in the Middle East in the Africa.
        Now, we will likely never know the true numbers, given the
    difficulty of accurate reporting and the Pentagon's failure to
    fully investigator reports of civilian harm. This has been the
    unfortunate reality of U.S. military operations, despite
    congressional oversight, despite dozens of watchdog groups
    raising the alarm, and despite documenting the harm, and
    despite DOD's own efforts and attempts at reform, designed to
    improve how it protects civilians.
        So, General, you have been nominated to lead the United
    States' military operations in an AOR that has even the lion's
    share of these casualties. Civilian casualties, obviously, they
    destroy the lives of those affected, and that alone, is reason
    enough for reforms.
        But, would you also agree that these civilian casualties
    harm our credibility abroad and fuel the very insurgencies that
    we are fighting against?
        General Kurilla. Senator, they do.
        Senator Warren. Good, I mean, that you recognize this.
        Do you want to say more about that?
        General Kurilla. Senator, every civilian casualty is a
    tragedy. I know there is a process right now down at CENTCOM,
    if confirmed, I would look to see how I can improve upon that
    process.
        Senator Warren. Well, you know, it is clear that we do need
    reforms and I am glad that you want to focus on this.
        But instead of tackling this problem head-on, the Pentagon
    has repeatedly weakened accountability for civilian casualties.
    Most recently, there was reporting from The New York Times that
    detailed a secretive U.S. task force that used loopholes in the
    law to sidestep safeguards that were designed to protect
    against civilian casualties. The Times also found that DOD
    prematurely dismissed many civilian casualty reports at the
    assessment phase, without doing basic due diligence, like
    internet searches or searches in Arabic.
        General, do you agree that any credible reports of civilian
    casualties deserve the Pentagon's full attention and thorough
    investigation?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do, and I think the Secretary
    of Defense's new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Plan of
    action that he has asked to come back in 90 days from 27 of
    January. If confirmed, I would look to be able to participate
    in that to make the process better.
        Senator Warren. Good. Well, I am glad to hear that you are
    committed to a full investigation. We will see what happens
    with the reforms.
        You know, it is clear that additional reforms are needed. I
    have ideas on that front. I am sure there are others; I am not
    alone on this.
        So, let me just see, I know we have a report coming out,
    but, General, if confirmed, will you commit to prioritizing
    reforms that will mitigate civilian casualties, resulting from
    U.S. operations and improving accountability and transparency
    at the Pentagon on this issue?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will.
        Senator Warren. Good. I really appreciate it, General, and
    I want to say thank you.
        You know, I have said it before, but it deserves repeating:
    the system is broken. We cannot accept the deaths of innocent
    civilians as just an unavoidable cost of warfare. It is long
    past time that DOD addresses the harms that U.S. military
    operations have caused and implement meaningful reforms that
    de-emphasize lethal force and prioritize civilian lives.
        I have already asked President Biden to incorporate these
    ideals into his upcoming counterterrorism review, but, General,
    if confirmed, I think you are going to have an opportunity to
    set the standard to protecting innocent lives and actually
    implement some real change here.
        So, I look forward to working with you. I hope we can make
    some improvements in this area. Thank you.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Let me recognize Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for being here. Congratulations on your
    nomination. I intend to support you, as well. I don't gamble,
    but I do bet from time to time, and that is when I am
    absolutely certain that I am going to win it. So, I have to
    agree with Senator Ernst; I have you will have strong support
    from this committee.
        I have one, or a couple of questions. One is within your
    current area of responsibility, but do you believe the decision
    to employ elements out of Fort Bragg to Poland and to Germany
    was a wise decision from a reassurance standpoint?
        General Kurilla. Senator, the mission we were given was to
    reassure our NATO allies and to detour Russian aggression
    against those NATO allies. So, we were deploying elements of
    the 18th Airborne Corps headquarters, the 82nd Airborne
    Division, and other elements of 18th Airborne Corps to Poland
    and Germany.
        Senator Tillis. A question, I don't know if it has been
    asked before, but within your future area of responsibility, do
    you have any concerns at all with the continued implementation
    of the vaccine mandate and readiness of our troops' strength?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I don't have any concerns with
    that right now.
        Senator Tillis. I did have a question related to what
    Senator Warren said, so just more curiosity, I don't know the
    answer to this, but do you have access to a body of knowledge
    that would say in the past years, that the United States has
    been responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of
    innocent civilians in this area of responsibility?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am not aware of the exact
    number.
        Senator Tillis. It would seem to me that it would be far
    less than that. One question that I have about it, at least in
    some of the after-action reports that I have seen, it appears
    as though ISIS, in particular, finds a way to embed itself in
    populations where they are putting maybe some innocent lives in
    harm's way, but do you agree that that tends to be a tactic of
    theirs and we are doing everything we can to be more surgical
    in our approach to taking out bad actors, but recognizing that
    innocent civilians are not something that our military is in
    the business of trying to do?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am, in my past experiences, I
    have seen these ISIS, al Qaeda, Taliban do hide among the
    population and we do our absolute best to try and not harm
    civilians.
        Senator Tillis. Well, we can always get better, and I do
    agree with some of Senator Warren's comment about how do we get
    better, but I also think that we have to recognize that we are
    talking about people, particularly in Afghanistan, where we are
    concerned with their reconstitution, either ISIS or al Qaeda,
    now in a breeding ground to, I think, potential attacks within
    that area of responsibility and within the Homeland.
        We heard public reports of 6 months to a year before we
    could actually have a threat on U.S. interests, either here or
    abroad. We have to continue to take that fight to them or they
    are going to take it to us.
        Would you agree with that?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        The timing, I would defer to the intelligence community on
    the exact time, because the conditions continue to change.
        Senator Tillis. I want to talk a little bit about Iran.
        Are you familiar with the Abraham Accords implementation?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am.
        Senator Tillis. Do you think that is a footprint that we
    should expand, and do you have any ideas on other countries
    that should be in the pipeline?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think it is a very good thing,
    because anytime we have countries that are talking, it is
    lowering the temperature in the room. It also goes to an
    economic growth and it creates job growth in some of these
    countries where you have a high large unemployment in some of
    these Arab countries.
        With Bahrain and U.A.E., right now, as members of the
    Abraham Accords, I think that is a very good thing. I would
    defer to, you know, having to understand the reasonings behind
    other countries, why they are not coming forward right now, but
    I do think there are opportunities going forward.
        Senator Tillis. You generally believe your job is going to
    be easier or harder if we just pass a CR, rather than
    appropriate authorities?
        General Kurilla. Senator, we need timely, accurate,
    predictable funding.
        Senator Tillis. What sorts of capabilities do you think you
    need, in addition to what you already have, for our own forces,
    but also for our partners in the area of responsibility?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I can really only speak on behalf
    of 18th Airborne Corps, but it does affect readiness. It can
    affect modernization and it can affect quality of life.
        Senator Tillis. One other question, just in, or not a
    question, just a reinforced point that was made by Senator
    Blumenthal. The one thing that I hope when you move into this
    role that I would like to get feedback on, is the extent to
    which CENTCOM can play a role in prioritizing those who want to
    get out of Afghanistan.
        We succeeded in getting several out, but it is only a
    fraction of nearly 800 cases, that in North Carolina, alone,
    that we are tracking. I believe that your engagement and the
    interagency activities, to make sure that we are prioritizing
    the most at-risk and those who have had a longstanding service
    as partners with the United States when we were in Afghanistan,
    I think that that is a role that I hope you will take seriously
    and assert because you have insights, you have background.
        I have a lot of servicemembers who are desperately calling
    our office and looking to get folks out and I hope I can get
    your commitment on making sure that you play an active role in
    that.
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla. Senator, thank you for your support for
    Fort Bragg.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tillis.
        Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Manchin.
        [Pause.]
        Chairman Reed. Senator, you are talking, but we cannot hear
    you. We have a technical complication.
        [Pause.]
        Chairman Reed. No, we cannot hear you, Senator.
        Do you want to recede for a moment and fix it and we will
    call on someone else?
        We still cannot hear you, Senator, so let me take the
    prerogative of asking if we can fix that and let me call on
    Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, can I pass for Senator
    Cramer?
        Chairman Reed. Absolutely.
        Senator Cramer, please?
        Senator Cramer. Anything I can do to help. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for your service and your willingness
    to step into this new role. Congratulations. I don't think you
    are going to have any trouble getting the job.
        You know, we have seen reports that the Houthi rebels in
    Yemen are firing missiles at U.A.E. at Al-Dhafra and there are
    some North Dakota airmen there, and these missiles that they
    are firing, of course, were designed and they were built in
    Iran.
        Do you think the Houthis brought those missiles from Iran
    or did Iran donate them to the cause?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe that Iran does fund the
    missiles that go into the Houthis----
        Senator Cramer. So, do we consider these attacks on our
    airmen to be Houthi attacks or Iranian attacks and, either way,
    do they demand a response, do you think?
        General Kurilla. Senator, Iran funds the Houthis. The
    Houthis were firing at the U.A.E. I cannot say if they
    definitively were firing at American servicemembers going
    forward. I am not aware of the intelligence behind it.
        Senator Cramer. All right. I want to spend just a minute,
    because, and by the way, I associate myself with several of my
    colleagues who have been asking about Afghanistan prioritizing
    this. I appreciate Senator Tillis' request of a commitment to
    do everything we can to prioritize more appropriately going
    forward and thank you for all that.
        So, I want to focus just for a minute or 2 on military
    sales and to U.A.E. The Trump administration, as you know,
    agreed to sell the U.A.E. some F-35s, but in May, the Biden
    administration, reportedly, put the sale on hold, due to
    concerns about the U.A.E.'s relationship with China.
        I know these things are complicated, and to be up front, I
    am more curious than I am committed to a position on this, so I
    would really like your views and your expertise.
        What are the benefits of selling U.A.E. some F-35s, in your
    view, if there are some, and then, of course, the opposite,
    what are the risks?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe the benefits are that
    you have a close partner that has a, it is a very capable
    equipment that serves as an offset to Iran.
        Senator Cramer. So, what is the downside and how can we
    mitigate any risks?
        General Kurilla. The downside is technology transfer that
    could be leaked. Can they safeguard the technologies, as the F-
    35 is an exquisite piece of military hardware?
        Senator Cramer. So, can we mitigate that, somehow, that
    concern? I share the concern, by the way.
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, that would be an
    area that I would have to make an assessment on with the State
    Department and others as they look at this.
        Senator Cramer. So, maybe just elaborate a little bit, and,
    you know, your answers are very concise and good. I appreciate
    that, but do countries like the U.A.E., or U.A.E. and other
    countries like them, do they have many options for these kinds
    of exquisite weapons systems and, particularly, if the U.S.
    refuses to sell them?
        General Kurilla. Of the F-35, no, but there are other
    capabilities that I believe they have looked at in the region
    and from other partners.
        Senator Cramer. Well, I appreciate, again, the efficiency
    of your answers. As I have said, I am curious. I am trying to
    gain my own perspective based on a lot of other people's
    perspectives, but I have to say on balance, I am concerned that
    we are allowing this relationship with the U.A.E. and the
    opportunities that it presents to slip away if we don't ask
    more questions of people like you.
        While I don't have a commitment, I certainly lean more
    toward trying to be the source of their exquisite weapons
    systems, rather than somebody else, and hopefully, we can
    mitigate.
        With that, I will yield my last minute, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you.
        Thank You, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cramer.
        We have a technical issue with our colleagues who are
    trying to participate on Webex, so we will recognize those who
    are here in person.
        Senator Sullivan, are you ready?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, congratulations. Thanks for your service. I really
    think it has been exceptional. I fully intend to support you.
        As you and I discussed, I have my own experience out in the
    CENTCOM AOR. I was recalled to active-duty at the end of 2004
    and was there as a staff officer to General Abizaid until the
    middle of 2006; so a year and a half.
        Have you had the opportunity to talk to General Abizaid or
    other CENTCOM commanders to get their advice, prior to this
    hearing?
        General Kurilla. Senator, pending confirmation, I plan on
    talking to several of them.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. I would strongly recommend that.
    General Abizaid, in my view, he is one of the most strategic
    thinkers we have had in our military in a long, long time.
        One of the things that I witnessed during that year and a
    half, a huge concern was the proliferation of EFPs and, you
    know, we were in Iraq on a regular basis; General Abizaid was.
    I was with him during that time and we saw this proliferation
    starting in Basra and into Baghdad.
        Can you describe very briefly what those were and what they
    did?
        General Kurilla. Senator, an explosively formed penetrator,
    or an EFP, had the capability to go through any of our military
    vehicles that we had at the time. I lost several friends and
    soldiers from them.
        Senator Sullivan. So, you lost soldiers under your command
    to the EFPs?
        General Kurilla. I have lost soldiers to EFPs, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. So, I don't think this is highlighted
    enough, General, but I am sorry that that happened to you. In
    2007, the then-Iranian ambassador to the U.N., Ambassador
    Zarif, who later became foreign minister, was quoted as saying,
    the Iranians did not provide any EFPs to anybody, Iraqi, Shia
    militias, and that the United States was lying and fabricating
    evidence about that.
        Who do we now know supplied Iraqi Shia militias, these EFPs
    that killed and wounded thousands of Americans?
        General Kurilla. Senator, they came from Iran.
        Senator Sullivan. So, Zarif was clearly lying?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. General, what do you think the Iranians
    learned during that period? What is the estimate that you have
    heard of how many were killed and wounded; the best and
    brightest, by the way, in our country, with regard to these
    EFPs that killed our soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am not sure of the exact
    number, but I believe it is around the number, somewhere around
    400.
        Senator Sullivan. Four hundred and several thousand
    wounded, correct?
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. What do you think the Iranians learned
    during that time, as they were killing our troops? Zarif was
    lying to the world and, yet, there didn't seem to be any kind
    of retaliation from the United States.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am not certain what they
    learned from that.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think it was good that there was
    no retaliation at the time or we didn't make them pay for the
    deaths of Americans?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think we were fighting the
    insurgency at the time. I can't presume to understand what the
    Iranians were thinking at the time.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me, I will just give you my sense. I
    think that they thought that they could kill Americans with
    impunity and not pay a price, and, to the contrary, the price
    that they were, they didn't pay, but they were actually
    rewarded with the JCPOA. Secretary of State John Kerry
    negotiated with Zarif; one of the many outrages, I think, under
    Kerry's tenure, to literally negotiate, almost become buddies
    with him. You saw this other thing that Kerry and Zarif were
    talking a couple of years ago where Kerry was providing what
    looked like classified information; literally, the guy with
    American blood on his hands to get the JCPOA.
        I talked to President Trump about this a number of times.
    Do you think that we were able to regain deterrence after the
    United States killed the Quds Force leader, Soleimani?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do.
        Senator Sullivan. Did you agree with that strike?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I don't think anyone, any
    adversary should be able to kill Americans with impunity. Given
    the intelligence, at the time, I would have taken the strike.
        Senator Sullivan. So, if you are confirmed, and I hope you
    will be confirmed, will you commit to this committee to work
    hard to keep that deterrence that I think we have actually----
        [Audio malfunction].
        Senator Sullivan. More specifically, if Iran tries to, or
    does kill Americans, the way they have a history in the past,
    doing that impunity, would your advice to the President be,
    make sure that there is retaliation, so they pay the price?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe my job is to provide
    options.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will have some more questions for the record. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan, and
    we notice----
        [Audio malfunction].
        Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Use a louder voice, so we can make sure we are heard.
        General, good to see you in person. We were have some
    technical difficulties, so I made a run down here to be able to
    ask these questions, personally, thank you for your
    distinguished record of service to our country.
        General, in November, the Department of Defense stood up
    the United States-Israel Operations Technology Working Group.
    It was an initiative that I certainly have been championing for
    the last few years and I believe that it is absolutely vital
    that the United States remain on the cutting edge of defense
    technology and development and working with the capable allies,
    like Israel, is really paramount to that effort.
        So, my question for you, sir, is, could you discuss how
    working in a collaborative fashion with CENTCOM allies, like
    Israel, on technological development, could help the United
    States, itself, stay at the forefront of defense innovation.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe Israel has some very
    unique capabilities. They have a culture of innovation in their
    country, so I do believe each country has some unique
    capabilities and working with all of them can help the United
    States.
        Senator Peters. We have heard in the last few weeks that
    the United States has announced plans to reroute $67 million of
    security assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces to support
    members of the military as Lebanon grapples with a severe
    financial crisis.
        Normally, the aid package will include livelihood support
    payments that will go directly to troops to help them weather
    the extreme economic conditions being faced in their country.
        General, can you discuss what the United States can do to
    support Lebanon during this time of political turmoil and, more
    broadly, why support of the Lebanese Armed Forces is actually
    important to the United States nationalism?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, that is an area
    that I would have to make an assessment, but I do know from my
    past experience, our relationship with the Lebanese Armed
    Forces, they are a multi-sect variant organizations that
    supports all of Lebanon and can act as a counterbalance to
    Hezbollah. They are an accountable organization and any
    military aid that we provided during my experience in the past,
    they were highly accountable for that.
        Senator Peters. General, the past month, we have seen
    continued escalation in the conflicts in Yemen with Houthi
    militias directly attacking the U.A.E. and the Saudi-led
    Coalition, continuing to pummel the Yemeni people into
    submission.
        What efforts have we been making to end this conflict and
    to bring a close to the world's worst humanitarian disaster
    that we have seen since World War II, so to this time, we have
    not succeeded. Moving forward, what can the U.S. and our allies
    do to bring about an end to the war, which is now entering its
    eighth year?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I don't believe there is any
    military solution for Yemen. There should be a negotiated
    settlement. I believe in supporting the U.N. and our own
    special envoy for Yemen.
        Senator Peters. Thank you for your answers.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters.
        Senator Scott, please?
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
        General, thanks for your service and thanks for being here
    with us.
        What lessons would you draw from policy and continued
    positions leading up to the deadly withdrawal of United States
    troops from Afghanistan and how would you apply them if you are
    confirmed to lead CENTCOM?
        General Kurilla. So, Senator, I know, and I applaud the
    Congress on the war commission that they are doing to identify
    the big lessons learned, strategically, over the last 20 years.
    I believe the Secretary of Defense right now also has an after-
    action review ongoing.
        If confirmed, as the CENTCOM commander, that is an area
    that I will go and assess those lessons learned and ensure that
    we apply them. Much like we have in the military since I was a
    second lieutenant, we, after every operation, we did an after-
    action review to say what can we get better, but we must learn
    from it.
        Senator Scott. General, under what circumstances would you
    be advising to cooperate militarily with the Taliban?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think areas that would have to
    be a pragmatic approach. If there was a threat to the Homeland
    from ISIS-K, which they are a rival, there is potentially an
    area there. I also think on the humanitarian crisis that is
    ongoing, look at ways that we can get the humanitarian relief
    to the people of Afghanistan that need it, and maybe not
    necessarily through the Taliban, but they would have to
    facilitate it, perhaps, through the World Food Programme,
    perhaps through Pakistan or others.
        Senator Scott. What is your view of the----
        Voice. Your mic, please, sir.
        Voice. It should be working.
        Senator Scott. Is it working now?
        Voice. Yeah.
        Senator Scott. Ah, that is better.
        Okay, what is your view of Israel's inclusion in CENTCOM
    and where do you see new opportunities to expand the
    cooperation between Israel and our other regional partners?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think there is significant
    opportunities with Israel's inclusion into the CENTCOM AOR. It
    starts with the Abraham Accords and the normalization of
    relationships between several of the countries in the AOR. I
    think there are opportunities for others, but those are
    individual decisions based on that.
        There are areas of security cooperation between Israel and
    other countries; particularly, in air and missile defense, and
    other security areas.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        What do you see, what do you think China's strategy in the
    Middle East is and so how is that completely different than
    ours?
        General Kurilla. So, Senator, China has economic interests
    and influence that they are looking to gain in the Middle East
    and the CENTCOM region. They have a Belt and Road Initiative
    agreements with 18 of the 21 countries in CENTCOM. They have
    increased their spending in the Middle East by 360 percent over
    the last year.
        I think what we need to do is show their predatory nature
    of these agreements. They treat every country as if they are a
    client or a customer, where we deal in relationships and we
    treat them as allies and partners.
        Senator Scott. What would you, what do you think we ought
    to be doing to counter that?
        General Kurilla. I think we strengthen those partnerships
    and allies to show them that we are still there for them.
        Senator Scott. Do you think that takes money?
        General Kurilla. It think it takes money. I think it takes
    a presence. I think it takes engagements.
        Senator Scott. All right. Thank you.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. General Kurilla, thank you, and
    congratulations on your nomination. I look forward to
    supporting you.
        Just to state some facts at the outset that I don't think
    have gotten enough attention, and this is, by the way, a thank
    you to the American military regarding the evacuation of
    Afghans. The United States military, in a very difficult
    environment, evacuated about 125,000 Afghans; 50,000 or so to
    third countries, mostly in the region, 76,000 to the United
    States.
        Of the 76,000 Afghans who had been evacuated to the United
    States, most came into Virginia Dulles Airport or into the
    Philadelphia Airport. I visited families at the Dulles Expo
    Center right near the airport as they were arriving, and then
    they were transitioned to eight military bases around the
    country; all of these heavily supported by the DOD. Three of
    the bases were in Virginia.
        As of today, 68,000 of the 76,000 Afghans have been
    resettled in communities across the United States with a multi-
    government, multi-agency effort; DOD, DHS, now the lead agency.
    NGO is participating in a significant way so that Afghans can
    begin a new chapter of life in the United States.
        I visited with Afghan families at each of the three bases
    in Virginia: Quantico, Fort Lee, and Fort Pickett. All those
    bases are now returned to their normal military operations and
    there are no more Afghans there. Last week, the DOD indicated
    that the remaining 8,000 Afghans would be resettled, likely by
    the middle part of this month.
        It has been an incredible effort to bring 76,000 Afghans
    here. In my visits with them, they express fear and anxiety,
    obviously, about the future and about the fate of loved ones in
    Afghanistan, but also deep, deep appreciation to the United
    States, to the U.S. military, to the opportunity that they are
    being afforded here to begin a new life, that is a safer life
    than the one they left.
        The burden is still on our shoulders, though, to make sure
    that this resettlement of Afghans in the United States is
    successful. Most of the Afghans in the United States are under
    a 2-year humanitarian parole that expires at the end of 2 years
    from their arrival here.
        Mr. Chair, it is my hope that as we get into the NDA
    discussion, much, as in the past, the committee has grappled
    with SIV issues for Afghans who have worked in tandem with the
    United States military. The committee might explore what we
    could do with respect to the humanitarian parolees in the
    United States. We talked about this yesterday. These matters
    are in the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, but it has
    been common for the Armed Services Committee to grapple with
    SIV issues to support our Afghan partners, and I would hope we
    would explore ways we could be of assistance.
        But the scale of the effort both, on the ground in
    Afghanistan, tragically leading to the death of 13 troops, the
    injury of another four or five dozen United States troops, and
    the deaths and injuries of hundreds of Afghans, you know, I
    don't like to say that I can improve upon scripture, but a
    powerful line in scripture is, greater love hath no man this,
    that he would lay down his life for his friends.
        I can improve on that. It is greater love to lay down your
    life for someone you don't even know. The fact that our 13
    troops tragically lost their lives, but in doing so, paved the
    way for 125,000 people to experience freedom and more security
    is a powerful thing and we will never forget their sacrifice.
        I want to ask you this question, does the United States
    have military forces in Iraq right now purely to assist the
    Iraqi Government in the ongoing mission to make sure that ISIS
    is defeated?
        General Kurilla. Senator, they do.
        Senator Kaine. In your view, is the Government of Iraq, a
    strong security partner of the United States in this mission?
        General Kurilla. Senator, the Iraqi Security Forces are a
    very strong partner in this. The Government of Iraq currently
    is forming after Muqtada al-Sadr gained the plurality of the
    last vote.
        Senator Kaine. Is the United States at work with Iraq?
        General Kurilla. No, sir.
        Senator Kaine. I would renew my request to my colleagues
    that the war authorization against the Government of Iraq, two
    of them, actually, one passed in 1991 and one passed in 2002,
    be repealed, since they are now a security partner and we are
    not at war with them.
        The last thing I will say, General, I would just encourage
    along the lines that Senator Peters asked, attention to the
    situation in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces has been a
    reliable partner for the United States and that is great. I
    think most accounts of Lebanon suggests that it is close to
    being on the verge of a collapsing state and that poses such
    significant danger in the region to Israel, to the Lebanese
    population, to other neighbors. The Armed Forces may be the one
    institution in that country where we can be a strong partner
    with other aspects of the Government, in or near collapse.
    Attention from CENTCOM to that important historical partner is
    something I would urge.
        I appreciate your service.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
        Did you have a comment?
        General Kurilla. No, I was just going to thank the Senator
    for his support for our three bases and the 18th Airborne Corps
    soldiers on up in Virginia: Fort Lee, Fort Eustis, and Fort
    Story.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Let me recognize Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, welcome. Welcome to you and your family and thank
    you for the time that you spent visiting with me last week; I
    really do appreciate that.
        We discussed China and how they are focused on getting
    customers and clients and the United States is focused on
    allies and relationships in the region. I would like for you to
    expand a little bit on how you are going to push back on China,
    particularly, as we discussed last week, with cyber and AI, how
    you are going to be able to do more with less and what new
    capabilities are on your tick list for what you need to counter
    what Beijing and Moscow are doing.
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, again, I would have
    to make an assessment of each of the countries and the area and
    the relationships and the inroads that China has made into each
    one of those countries and each one, I think, would be
    individualized based on that.
        Exposing the predatory nature of their lending is a big
    part of that. I am concerned with the inroads that Huawei has
    made into several of the countries as they look to do their
    infrastructure and we know the security concerns associated
    with that.
        Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that and I appreciate your
    comments about the 18 of the 21 countries and CENTCOM have done
    a BRI agreement with China.
        Talk a little bit about where you see that belt and road
    ending in military fusion and how that affects the task in
    front of you, if confirmed.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe right now, for China is
    the economic in the CENTCOM region, although, they do have
    their largest base outside of China in Djibouti, which is just
    across the Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen, and it is at a
    strategic choke point by the Bab-el-Mandeb, so that is very
    concerning. It allows them to do maintenance on some of their
    vessels while they are overseas.
        My concern would be any expansion of that into the CENTCOM
    AOR, if confirmed.
        Senator Blackburn. I have had the opportunity to visit our
    facilities and our presence in Djibouti, and it is of
    tremendous concern to me, as you see how China is trying to
    expand into that region. We have talked a good bit this morning
    about Afghanistan and this committee has put a good bit of
    attention on that.
        I want to come back and kind of finish off a couple of
    questions that have been presented to you. Are there any
    instances where you think we should be sharing intel with the
    Taliban, and if that is done, would you commit to informing us,
    even if it is in a classified setting, that that has occurred?
        General Kurilla. Senator, looking at the specific
    instances, I think it is a case-by-case basis, based on that
    with the Taliban and I will commit to sharing incidences with
    both, I will share it with the chairman and the oversight
    committees and the Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Blackburn. For those of us on this committee, we
    have continued to look at what happened in Afghanistan and for
    people like me that represent a major military post, and so
    many of our Tennesseeans are with Fort Campbell or they are
    posted at Fort Campbell or they have served, and to see how
    this has, how it took place, the debacle that it became, has
    been of tremendous concern.
        One other thing on that, with the Taliban takeover there in
    Afghanistan, how do you assess Pakistan's role in supporting
    the Taliban in Afghanistan and what is your assessment of how
    they are working to help get people that we are trying to get
    out of Afghanistan, how they are getting them out.
        General Kurilla. Well, Senator, first off, thank you for
    your support for the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell,
    one of our 18th Airborne Corps units.
        Senator, I am not aware right now of what Pakistan is doing
    in my current role to assist in getting out. I think that is an
    area that we could potentially work with Pakistan on. I think
    they are concerned about the regional stability in the area and
    the violent extremist organizations inside of Afghanistan. The
    Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the TPP, is a very violent
    organization that has done, killed tens of thousands of
    Pakistanis, so they have a vested interest and a security
    interest with us on that, as well as the humanitarian crisis
    inside of Afghanistan.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you for your service and thank you
    for being here with us today to answer the questions.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. I can hear you, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you very much.
        General Kurilla, first of all, thank you for your service
    and thank you for your attempt to continue to service and we
    appreciate it very much.
        Let me just ask you this. ISIS remains a threat in Syria,
    as we all know, and most of its activity is focused on re-
    establishing networks, assassinating and intimidating local
    leaders and Security Forces and extending its influences in
    rural areas throughout Eastern Syria and Iraq.
        So, my question to you will be, do you assess that the
    February 3 killing of ISIS leader Quraishi gave a significant
    blow to ISIS and the region and how do you plan to capitalize
    on the lack of leadership, if it did, really, truly break up
    their network?
        General Kurilla. Senator, anytime a leader of any terrorist
    organization is taken out, it causes the leadership to have to
    figure out who will take over. It generally, temporarily, sets
    them back. It depends on the capability of that leader that was
    in charge. But then, what it does, is also exposes that network
    as they communicate and try and find the next leader to replace
    them, and that provides opportunities.
        Senator Manchin. So, the intel, the opportunity of intel
    right now is probably a premium?
        General Kurilla. It is, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Let me say this. I want to also tell you,
    sir, I appreciate so much the efforts that you all have made to
    protect all civilians and we truly do. But we also know, I
    think Senator Tillis on both points, and Senator Warren, who is
    concerned, and we are all concerned, and Senator Tillis
    identifying that, basically, they embed themselves in. So, we
    know your job is difficult. We sympathize, but, also, we cannot
    allow these terrorist to go unchecked or undeterred, that is
    for sure.
        In the past, counting violent extreme groups with al Qaeda
    and the Islamic State was the top national security; both of
    which are critical challenges to the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility for decades.
        How do you assess the shift in resources, if China and
    Russia right now are taking the forefront in national security
    challenges facing the United States, that shift in resources
    would affect CENTCOM?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will have to look at the
    missions; if confirmed, look at the missions assigned to
    CENTCOM, the resources allocated, and the risks associated with
    each of those missions, and look at ways to mitigate that risk.
    One of the ways is partially through partnerships and allies
    that can make up some of that mitigation, and also through
    technology going forward.
        But then I would come back to both, the chairman, and the
    Secretary of Defense, and inform this committee of any
    additional resources required.
        Senator Manchin. Let me ask if you have any knowledge of
    the validity that China's talking points of partnering with the
    Taliban in Afghanistan, and if so, how are we going to counter
    that?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I know that the Taliban has
    reached out to China. That was an open source, but, if
    confirmed, that is an area that I will have to make a deep
    assessment of.
        Senator Manchin. Sir, national operations with CENTCOM, in
    West Virginia, the National Guard already has a strong
    connection with Qatar through our State Partnership Program. I
    think it was one of the first in the Middle East, and it might
    still be the only one. I am not sure.
        We also had multiple units rotate to the Middle East
    throughout our wars with both, Afghanistan and Iraq.
    Additionally, they were 50 percent of the total force of C-130s
    operated by Reserve component units and we have a large
    contingency of that also in West Virginia.
        Can you tell me how do you think, strategically, when
    employed, National Guard units in your area of responsibility.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I am observed, as the CENTCOM
    Chief of Staff, that our National Guard and our Reserve provide
    tremendous capability into the AOR and can also help offset the
    impact on the active-duty force, as well.
        Senator Manchin. So, in your planning and operations and
    defense and things of that, and security, you are using
    National Guard and their abilities, as basically, with your own
    forces?
        General Kurilla. Senator, we have used the National Guard
    in all of my experience in the Middle East.
        Senator Manchin. Well, let me say thank you. I appreciate
    very much.
        I yield back my time.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for
    being here.
        Let me ask you about disturbing reports in the Washington
    Post today. The headline is, Documents Reveal United States
    Military's Frustration With White House Diplomats Over
    Afghanistan Evacuation.
        The Washington Post has been able to see a 2,000 page Army
    investigative report. This committee has not been able to see
    that report. It has not, I don't think, been made public. The
    Post has it. Their reporting today begins this way: senior
    White House and State Department officials failed to grasp the
    Taliban's steady advance on Afghanistan's capital and resisted
    efforts by United States military leaders to prepare the
    evacuation of embassy personnel and allies weeks, weeks before
    Kabul's fall, placing American troops ordered to carry out the
    withdrawal in greater danger, according to sworn testimony from
    multiple commanders involved in the operation.
        General Farrell Sullivan goes on to say in his sworn
    testimony, in my opinion, the National Security Council to the
    White House was not seriously planning for an evacuation.
        Now, this report is disturbing for all kinds of reasons,
    not the least of which is it seems to directly contradict
    testimony that this committee has heard from, among others,
    General Milley, who had said that there was no way to have
    planned for or have anticipated the fall of Kabul. There was no
    way to have anticipated that anything like this would happen.
        In fact, what the Army report seems to say is that military
    commanders repeatedly and for weeks, if not months, warned the
    White House and other leadership that something like this was
    imminently foreseeable, there needed to be action taken, and
    the White House and the State Department did nothing.
        Here is my question to you, I understand this morning that,
    now, CENTCOM and OSD have taken position of this 2,000 page
    report. If you are confirmed, will you commit to releasing that
    full report to this committee?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I would defer to the Secretary of
    Defense and the Joint Staff on that.
        Senator Hawley. So, that is a no?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if it is within my authority to
    do so, I would, if confirmed.
        Senator Hawley. If confirmed, and if it is up to you, you
    would do it.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe it is publicly
    available.
        Senator Hawley. If confirmed, do you commit to provide to
    this committee in a timely manner, any other information
    requested about the withdrawal in Afghanistan, including
    intelligence reports, assessments, and other material that may
    be at CENTCOM?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will provide to the Secretary
    of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and oversight committees,
    whatever is required.
        Senator Hawley. The last part is the only part that I am
    interested in, the oversight committee.
        You would provide to this committee, intelligence reports,
    assessments, other information that we request on the
    withdrawal from Afghanistan?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will come before this committee
    and testify on those reports.
        Senator Hawley. That is not quite what I am asking. I am
    not asking about your testimony. I am asking you providing
    information that we directly request, that may be held at
    CENTCOM.
        Would you commit to us, if you are confirmed, to providing
    for us, information that may be held at CENTCOM, regarding the
    withdrawal from Afghanistan, intelligence reports, assessments,
    et cetera?
        General Kurilla. If it is within my authority to release, I
    would, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you.
        I just want to say for the record that this committee needs
    to have open, public hearings on this report. We need to have
    open, public hearings on what we have learned about what has
    happened in Afghanistan, and no more closed briefings behind
    closed doors that shut out the American public and the cameras
    that we see behind us.
        Frankly, this Committee's scarce interest in finding out
    what has happened in Afghanistan, I think, reflects badly on
    this Committee and it is time for the Members of this Committee
    to get serious about it.
        Let me ask you, General, the Secretary of Defense has
    designated China as the Department's pacing threat and the
    Indo-Pacific as its priority theater. Can I just ask you for a
    yes-or-no answer, do you agree with that assessment?
        General Kurilla. I do, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Great. If the Indo-Pacific is the priority
    theater, then it would follow that other theaters are, by
    definition, lower priorities; not unimportant, but if they are
    not the priority theaters, then other theaters are lower
    priorities, and that would include the Middle East, I would
    think.
        Do you agree with that, that the Middle East would be a
    lower-priority theater, as compared to the Indo-Pacific?
        General Kurilla. Per the 2018 NDS, that is accurate,
    Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Okay, and do you agree with that
    assessment?
        General Kurilla. I do, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. Good. Great.
        The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs wrote for the record,
    this is Admiral Grady that I am referring to, wrote for the
    record that DOD needs to do less in lower-priority theaters, so
    it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in
    the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase, of course, in
    the Defense budget.
        Do you agree with that assessment by the Vice Chairman?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I do.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        Let me shift to squarely, the AOR. Recent reports show that
    Israel and the U.A.E. are moving quickly to improve security
    and intelligence cooperation. You have been asked a little bit
    about that, I think, in earlier parts of today's hearing. That
    is a great example of the opportunities created by the Abraham
    Accords. I know that you have testified today that you
    understand the possibilities there. It is an example, I think,
    of something that CENTCOM can support in years ahead, now that
    Israel is part of your AOR, the CENTCOM AOR.
        If you are confirmed, here is my question, how would you
    plan to empower Israel and our Gulf partners to work together
    and to strengthen deterrence at the regional level against
    Iranian aggression?
        I see my time is expired, so I will let you answer that,
    General, and then I will return my time to the chair.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla. Senator, I think I would have to make an
    assessment of that to find the best method forward. I think it
    is by going to each individual country and making that
    assessment.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Duckworth, please?
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I would like to begin by disagreeing with my colleague from
    Missouri in saying that this committee has scant commitment to
    looking at what happened in Afghanistan; in fact, on a
    bipartisan basis, this committee passed the Afghanistan War
    Commission Act, which was set up, an entire commission to look
    at the entire 20 years of the war in Afghanistan, including the
    evacuation. It is also a provision for equal representation,
    equal opportunity for the Ranking Member and the Chairman of
    both, the majority and minority committees on SAF, on Foreign
    Relations, and on Intelligence, to appoint Committee Members,
    as well as the minority and majority leaders.
        I can't, I don't think it can be any more fair than that,
    and the fact that it passed on a bipartisan basis, I think
    makes it clear that this is going to move forward and there is
    a commitment, overall, on a bipartisan basis to look at
    everything that happened in Afghanistan.
        With that said, I would like to welcome you, General. Thank
    you. I want to apologize to you for cutting our call short the
    other day. You were very generous. It was one of those crazy
    days.
        I want to return to our discussion there, talking about the
    fact that after decades of focusing much of our budget and
    capability on CENTCOM, we are now shifting, rightly, towards
    the Indo-Pacific region; however, I do believe that CENTCOM
    remains a critical part of our overall strategy to push back
    against great power rivals, as senators on both sides of the
    aisle on this Committee have pointed out, given that Russian
    and Chinese attempts to grow their influence in the Middle
    East, as well as Iran's ongoing push to develop its nuclear
    capabilities.
        I was really pleased to see the emphasis that you placed on
    partnerships and coalitions in your written testimony, and we
    do agree that we must better integrate our partners into our
    operational planning and we must reinforce reviewing their
    capabilities, as the Coalition's capabilities. So, again, you
    know, go with your pacing item, so we have to look at what our
    partners can do.
        Yet, as we discussed on our call last week, capabilities
    are more than just military equipment. This is why I truly
    believe that engagement in exchange programs, such as our
    International Military Education Training, the IMET program, is
    to critical to success in the region.
        What opportunities, General, do you see for partner
    engagement and exchange programs, including IMET, to retain
    influence in the region and prevent potentially malign actors
    from gaining a toehold in the Middle East?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe IMET is one of our more
    powerful capabilities we have. When we bring foreign officers
    to the United States and we expose them to our democratic
    values, they understand us and they understand our society.
    That is very powerful in helping, because eventually they
    continue on up and become senior leaders in their respective
    countries.
        I think the partnership goes well beyond just military
    capability. It could also include intelligence. The one
    commodity we have a lot of is our intelligence capability and
    our challenge is sharing with every country in the CENTCOM AOR.
    We would like to do intelligence sharing, while still
    protecting our sources and methods that we use to get that
    intelligence. So, think that is an area that we can look to
    advance, as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        What reforms, if any, would help you to make these partner
    engagements and exchange programs more effective in Central
    Command?
        General Kurilla. Senator, my attempt would be to get an
    assessment going into CENTCOM. I really can't give you that
    right now. I would have to look at that, and I would be willing
    to come back and provide that to you.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you.
        We have already talked about the National Guard and the
    State Partnership for Peace program; although, that is not the
    only model. Central Command houses a unique program between the
    National Guard and the country of Israel. It is run at the
    National Guard Bureau level and the program allows Israel to
    tap into the Bureau's expertise across the National Guard's
    many missions and capabilities. It provides training
    opportunities for multiple National Guard units, including
    those from Illinois. This program was reaffirmed last year,
    after an initial 15 successful years and now falls under
    CENTCOM.
        Could you speak to the value of this program and how it
    would fit into your objectives for Central Command, if you are
    confirmed?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I would have to make an
    assessment of that and then come back to you.
        Senator Duckworth. Okay. Along with my partner across the
    aisle, Senator Cornyn, I fought to include a provision in last
    year's NDAA that pushes for a partnership between the National
    Guard and Taiwan. After reviewing my legislation, the National
    Guard Bureau believes that partnership with Israel provides the
    best model for a comprehensive engagement with Taiwan.
        If confirmed, once you have had a chance to review, would
    you make resources available within Central Command, either
    yourself or your staff and planners, to help implement a
    similar program between National Guard and Taiwan that is
    similar to the partnership with Israel, if requested?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I would have to make an
    assessment on that reference to Taiwan being in the INDOPACOM
    AOR.
        Senator Duckworth. Right. But if they came to you and said,
    hey, can you tell us how it works with Israel, would you be
    willing to share that information with----
        General Kurilla. Absolutely.
        Senator Duckworth.--Admiral Aquilino and the folks dealing
    with the Taiwan version?
        General Kurilla. Absolutely.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I look forward to you being confirmed and, again, I
    apologize for the abruptness of our call, the abruptness of
    this, but I look forward to working with you in the future.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Kelly, please?
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kurilla, congratulations on your nomination and
    thank you for being here today. You certainly have extensive
    experience and I know you have spent a significant amount of
    time in the CENTCOM AOR, so I know you understand some of the
    challenges that await you.
        I noticed that your former boss, General Votel, commended
    your engagement on adoption of technologies like artificial
    intelligence, calling you an early adopter, and emphasizing
    their applicability for Central Command.
        As chair of this committee's panel on emerging threats and
    capabilities, leveraging AI and other autonomy technologies, is
    something that I am very focused on. We often discuss this in
    the context of great power competition. But I believe these
    capabilities will be increasingly important in regions like the
    Middle East, where we no longer have the sizable military
    presence and advantage that we have had in recent decades.
        So, can you elaborate on how, if confirmed, you would
    leverage artificial intelligence and other emerging
    capabilities to address current challenges that we face in the
    region?
        General Kurilla. Senator, thank you for that.
        I believe artificial intelligence, when it enables a human,
    can exponentially increase the capability of several of the
    things that we do now. Particularly, where we are focused right
    now in the 18th Airborne Corps is in our targeting capability,
    where we can take large pieces of terrain and rapidly identify
    hundreds of targets, prioritize them based on a high-priority
    target list, that determines which ones we should strike with
    the resources that we have, and then that, then, goes back into
    our firing solutions and doing that. That happens in seconds,
    versus what would take hours, normally, or sometimes even days
    to be able to develop these targets, and it is doing it in real
    time at the edge, in our command post, and not being tied, just
    back into a garrison computing environment.
        We do this quarterly and we do it with all six services
    participating, and where we share that with all of them, in an
    attempt to make all the services better with our artificial
    intelligence. So, rising tides raise all boats.
        Senator Kelly. It would be great if you could come to us
    with some ideas of what you would need next. If you could think
    about what does AI on the battlefield look like a decade from
    now and let's make sure that we develop the tools so that it
    will be available.
        I want to move on to a couple other quick topics here. The
    Iraqi F-16 fighter force, they paid us $2 billion for these
    airplanes. The Arizona Air National Guard 162nd Fighter Wing in
    Tucson plays a very critical role in training these Iraqi
    pilots to fly these F-16s. The 162nd is uniquely qualified to
    do this because of the access to ranges and unmatched flying
    days per year in Southern Arizona, and the squadron also has
    decades of experience training foreign national pilots.
        General, what is your perspective on the value of the
    foreign-pilot training to our combatant commanders?
        General Kurilla. Senator, anytime we can get a partner to
    do something that we would do, that is a good thing, because it
    reduces the requirements and resources on us.
        Senator Kelly. I am also concerned about, you know, reports
    that the F-16 fleet faces, the Iraqi F-16 fleet faces some
    serious maintenance issues and readiness issues. So, could you
    report back to this committee on both, the status, if
    confirmed, the status of the Iraqi Air Force's F-16 fleet and
    actions needed to remedy any deficits.
        General Kurilla. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Kelly. Then, finally, General, as you know, Israel,
    which was once the purview of the European Command is now part
    of Central Command and you will oversee Central Command, if
    confirmed.
        While there are a number of challenges and opportunities
    facing Israel, one concrete action we can take is to support
    our ally is ensuring replenishment of the Iron Dome system,
    which was incredibly successful in the May 2020-2021 conflict,
    but also has been depleted.
        I am proud of the role that Arizona has played in
    developing this technology; the technology behind the Iron Dome
    system, and I believe it is important that we work quickly to
    ensure that it can remain operational, to protect Israeli
    civilians.
        What is the threat to Israel if the Iron Dome system is not
    replenished in a timely manner?
        General Kurilla. Senator, the Iron Dome is a very capable
    system. The Army currently has two batteries that is undergoing
    testing and evaluation.
        Israel does face a significant threat with literally
    hundreds of thousands of missiles both, in Hezbollah and both,
    in Hamas. So, what it does is it is a great defensive weapons
    system, so I am very supportive of the Iron Dome.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Well, let's make sure that we work
    together to ensure that we replenish and return Iron Dome to
    its full, operational capability.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        I have been informed that Senator Rosen is finishing up her
    questioning in another committee and will shortly be available
    by Webex. That will give me the opportunity, General, to ask
    one or two more questions.
        First, Russia has a significant footprint in Syria, Russia,
    now, is confronting NATO in Ukraine. But coming back to Syria,
    how do you project their role there, together with their
    pretensions with respect to Ukraine?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I believe that if Russia does
    invade Ukraine, they would not hesitate to be able to act as a
    spoiler in Syria, as well. Already, we see it as one of the
    most contested, electromagnetic spectrum environments that we
    are currently operating in. So, I believe there is, you know,
    they are a competitor of ours.
        Chairman Reed. So, when you assume command of the CENTCOM,
    you will be very sensitive to reactions within Syria by the
    Russians that may be a consequence of something happening in
    Ukraine; is that fair?
        General Kurilla. Absolutely, Senator.
        Again, I don't believe that Russia wants to go to war with
    us and I know that we don't want to go to war with Russia, so I
    would be very sensitive to that.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        I believe that Senator Rosen is available, so now via
    Webex, let me recognize Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Of course, thank you, Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding
    this hearing.
        I would also really like to thank you, General Kurilla, for
    meeting with me last week, for your lifetime of service, and
    your willingness to continue serving and leading the men and
    women of our services.
        As I have noted in previous hearings, as you and I have
    discussed, Iranian-backed militias are increasingly targeting
    United States installations and servicemembers in Iraq and
    Syria, via rocket and drone attacks. Iran, the world's leading
    state sponsor of terrorism continues to threaten the United
    States and allied interests in the Middle East and around the
    world, via not only its ballistic missile program, but also its
    support for Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic's multitude of
    terrorist proxies.
        So, General, can you discuss the threat of Iranian-backed
    militias in the Middle East post to our United States troops
    and our allies and how do you believe the U.S. should respond
    to their proliferation of attacks, how are you going to take on
    this challenge, if confirmed, and what is our ability to target
    them.
        Do you have everything you need?
        General Kurilla. Senator, I will not be able to make an
    assessment, if we have everything I need, until, if confirmed,
    to actually make that assessment.
        It is a big concern of the Iranian-aligned militia groups
    that are currently operating both, inside of Iraq and then
    other elements operating inside of Syria, going after our
    servicemembers. We should, I will always protect our people and
    I would take action against them if they took action against
    us.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        I want to also build on a little bit as we think about
    Israel's transfer to CENTCOM, because now that Israel is within
    CENTCOM's area of responsibility, it is my sincere hope that
    this transfer will potentiate even greater military cooperation
    between the United States and Israel through our shared goals,
    as well as cooperation between our Arab and Israeli partners.
        So, General, I want to follow-up on Senator King's
    question. If confirmed, how would you leverage the Abraham
    Accords to improve defense cooperation in the region, in
    furtherance of United States interests and do you have any
    plans to integrate the joint exercises with Israel and Arab
    states who have signed on to the normalization agreements?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, I will make an
    assessment of the best ways to increase the cooperation between
    Israel and our Arab partners in the region. I think only good
    comes out of that when they are talking. When you have
    countries talking, it lowers the temperature.
        Israel brings some very unique capabilities, in terms of
    their military component, that they believe they can share with
    their Arab partners in the region to increase both, the air and
    missile defense is a big area, based on the threat from Iran. I
    am a big fan of joint exercises, because I believe,
    collectively, rising tides raise all boats, when you make the
    elements train together, they get better.
        Senator Rosen. So, you definitely see a benefit to, and
    opportunities to Israel's inclusion in CENTCOM?
        General Kurilla. One hundred percent, ma'am.
        Senator Rosen. You spoke a little bit about Iranian
    incursion. What is your current assessment of CENTCOM's ability
    to respond to Iranian nuclear breakout and I know you are not
    confirmed yet, but what are the contingency plans you believe
    CENTCOM should be prepared to execute in order to prevent an
    Iranian nuclear weapons, any capability?
        General Kurilla. Senator, if confirmed, I would have to
    make an assessment of the current military capabilities and
    plans for any military action along those contingencies.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, and, of course, lots of terrorism
    in the region, and so we have to think about our future
    counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, and I have asked
    questions in previous hearings about our ability to conduct our
    counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, now that we no
    longer have a ``boots on the ground'' presence, and I would
    like to ask you a little bit about this, as well.
        So, General, if confirmed, how do you plan to execute an
    enduring counterterrorism strategy that will be able to address
    and counter the influence of violent, extremist organizations
    in Afghanistan and the region?
        General Kurilla. Senator, ``over the horizon''
    counterterrorism is difficult; it is not impossible. I think I
    have to make an assessment of the actual mission and then those
    resources to apply against it and highlight the risks and look
    for ways to mitigate that risk, either through basing
    additional resources, intelligence, assets, technology that can
    then increase the effectiveness of that counterterrorism.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        I see my time is just up, so I will submit this for the
    record, but I just wanted you to think about what the collapse
    of the Afghan Government, how it is going to affect ISIS, al
    Qaeda in Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula. I will submit
    these questions for the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        General, let me thank you and your family for a lifetime of
    distinguished and dedicated service to the Army and to the
    Nation, and I think you have persuaded all of us, I suspect,
    that you have the character, the experience, and the judgment
    to lead CENTCOM. I look forward to your confirmation.
        With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
        General Kurilla. Thank you, Chairman.
        [Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Michael
    E. Kurilla, USA by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
    answers supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)?
        Answer. The USCENTCOM commander exercises command and control over
    assigned forces and is directly responsible to the President and
    Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the
    preparedness of the command. Additionally, the commander organizes and
    provides authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces
    necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command by the Unified
    Command Plan signed by the President as well as those tasked from the
    National Command Authority through the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualify you to perform these duties?
        Answer. I have been honored to serve our Nation and our
    servicemembers and their families for 34 years. During that time, I
    have commanded at every level, from platoon to corps, serving in
    positions of leadership in combat and peacekeeping, and on operational
    deployments. I have commanded conventional and special operations
    forces and worked alongside allies and partners within the USCENTCOM
    area of responsibility (AOR).
        As the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff, Joint Special Operations Command
    Director of Operations and Assistant Commanding General, and the Joint
    Staff Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counterterrorism, I
    have worked extensively with the interagency, policy, and intelligence
    communities and with the embassy country teams throughout the USCENTCOM
    AOR.
        Along with formal military education, these experiences allowed me
    to develop a clear understanding of the manner in which the military
    instrument of power supports national strategic objectives, the
    importance of building relationships across the interagency and with
    regional allies and partners, and effective command and control at the
    combatant command level.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the USCENTCOM
    Commander?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am ready to assume command and will take
    the necessary additional steps to refine my understanding of critical
    issues within the region. If confirmed, I will consult with USCENTCOM
    Headquarters, Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD), interagency partners, and other key stakeholders to increase my
    knowledge of the AOR. While I am a strong proponent of continuous
    learning and self-improvement, I am not aware of significant gaps that
    would preclude me from performing the duties of the USCENTCOM commander
    to the standard expected by members of the command, the chain of
    command, and the American people.
                   major challenges problems, and priorities
        Question. If confirmed as the commander of USCENTCOM, you will be
    responsible for all the military operations in that region. These
    operations include deterring Iran, ensuring that terrorist groups
    cannot use Afghanistan as a base to attack the United States and our
    allies, ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and
    partnering with, and building the institutional capacity of, foreign
    security forces that promote the development of democratic values
    within the militaries of the region.
        In your view, what are the major challenges and opportunities that
    you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander of USCENTCOM?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment of the
    challenges and opportunities for USCENTCOM. This assessment will
    involve traveling to consult with allies, partners, and embassy country
    teams across the region. It will also include a thorough review of all
    USCENTCOM operations and capabilities and intelligence assessments for
    the region. In conducting this assessment, I will consult with the
    Joint Staff, OSD, interagency partners, and other key stakeholders.
        Once this assessment is complete, I will provide my insights and
    observations to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff on the major challenges and opportunities facing
    USCENTCOM. I will also share my insights with our defense oversight
    committees and other interested congressional members and staff.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges and problems?
        Answer. If confirmed, the assessment I will conduct will inform any
    plans to address these challenges and problems.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    and how would you define success and failure of your core missions in
    tangible terms?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize the objectives outlined in
    the National Defense Strategy and those directed by the President and
    Secretary of Defense. Success will be defined by USCENTCOM's ability to
    meet those objectives while protecting America's national security
    interests in the region.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that
    Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in your AOR complement the efforts
    of civilian agencies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with United States
    ambassadors and embassy country teams across the region to ensure our
    efforts complement and support a whole-of-government approach to
    advance U.S. national security objectives with the Department of State
    and U.S. diplomats in the lead. Our efforts to secure the region are
    strengthened when closely aligned with our diplomatic, economic,
    informational, intelligence, and humanitarian goals.
              national defense strategy and global posture review
        Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance prioritized the long-term,
    strategic competition with revisionist powers China and Russia as the
    primary challenge with which the United States must contend, while also
    recognizing the need to deter and counter rogue regimes like North
    Korea and Iran and move to a more resource-sustainable approach to
    counterterrorism. Implementing the NDS will require the Secretary of
    Defense and combatant commanders to carry out missions efficiently and
    make hard choices.
        What impact, if any, do you assess this strategy has on the
    operations and activities of USCENTCOM?
        Answer. The 2018 National Defense Strategy placed increased
    emphasis on operating with and developing the capabilities of allies
    and partners in the region to counter the increasing influence of China
    and Russia and deter aggression from Iran. The strategy also
    articulated a need to promote regional stability and freedom of access
    to global commons. President Biden's 2021 Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance amplifies the focus on China as the pacing challenge
    and Russia as a disruptor, as well as the global challenges posed by
    the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.
        If confirmed, I will evaluate the implications of the forthcoming
    2022 National Defense Strategy for the USCENTCOM AOR. As Secretary
    Austin has said publicly, the next NDS will advance the concept of
    integrated deterrence to address the compounding and concurrent
    challenges we face in the strategic environment. If confirmed, I will
    place emphasis on opportunities to build integrated deterrence
    approaches across domains in collaboration with our interagency and
    regional partners. This will require more meaningful integration of
    allies and partners into our theater-level defense planning to draw on
    our collective sources of strength.
        Finally, if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to fill capability
    gaps and create opportunities for the Joint Force through cooperation
    with allies and partners. Moreover, I will aim to align operations,
    activities, and investments within the USCENTCOM AOR in a manner which
    disciplines our approach to campaigning and preserves warfighting
    readiness for the Joint Force.
        Question. In what ways do you assess the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy has shaped United States force posture in the Middle East?
        Answer. The 2018 NDS recognized an increasingly complex global
    security environment and rightfully prioritized China and Russia as the
    most concerning challenges for the Department of Defense. And, while
    the NDS reprioritized the focus towards the INDOPACOM AOR, it
    acknowledged the continued challenges and threats emanating from the
    Middle East and aligned forces appropriately.
        Question. Given the hierarchy of prioritization on great power
    competition laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and in the
    Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, in what ways can
    USCENTCOM counter Russia's growing influence in the Middle East?
        Answer. I assess that the key to countering Russia's growing
    influence in USCENTCOM rests in developing and sustaining enduring
    coalitions and partnerships and working by, with, and through allies
    and partners. Moving forward, the command must continue to refine its
    country security cooperation plans to focus operations, activities,
    investments, and engagements on countering Russian influence. In
    addition to maintaining strong relationships and security cooperation,
    we must continue to expose malign Russian activities and highlight the
    risks and hidden costs our partners encounter when they pursue false
    Russian promises.
        Question. In what ways can USCENTCOM counter China's growing
    influence in the Middle East?
        Answer. China's growing ambition and exploitative behavior within
    the Middle East are best countered through enduring coalitions and
    partnerships. Constraining Chinese military, diplomatic, informational,
    and economic influence requires a whole-of-government approach that
    reinforces our commitments through operations, activities, investments,
    and engagements. Most importantly, we should contrast predatory Chinese
    activities that demonstrate Beijing's treatment of nations as ``clients
    and customers'' with the United States national commitment to
    partnerships and alliances. In so doing, the U.S. will remain the
    security partner of choice in the region.
        Question. What is your assessment of the GPR impacts on USCENTCOM's
    posture requirements? Please be specific.
        Answer. As part of my initial command assessment, I will evaluate
    the forces and assets required to accomplish the missions assigned to
    USCENTCOM and protect our national security interests in the region. A
    realignment of assets within the USCENTCOM AOR, whether in the
    maritime, ground, air, space, or cyber domain, may reduce U.S.
    capabilities in the region. It is therefore critical that we widen our
    circles of partner cooperation to address shared security challenges.
        This must also be analyzed against the forthcoming NDS and any
    subsequent reviews directed by the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The review directed DOD to conduct additional analysis on
    enduring posture requirements in the Middle East. If confirmed, what
    role would you expect to play in that review?
        Answer. If confirmed, and as part of my initial assessment, I will
    have a direct role in this process and provide my recommendations to
    the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
    the USCENTCOM requirements for missions assigned and USCENTCOM enduring
    posture requirements, as well as the risk associated with that posture.
                                  afghanistan
        Question. As the military mission in Afghanistan has concluded,
    what do you view as United States strategic interests in Afghanistan?
        Answer. In my view, the primary United States strategic interest in
    Afghanistan remains preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist
    safe-haven that threatens the United States Homeland. Additionally,
    enabling the continued relocation of American citizens, lawful
    permanent residents, and designated personnel from Afghanistan and
    supporting the State Department's continued diplomatic engagements with
    Afghanistan remain vital to United States national interests in
    Afghanistan.
        Question. Reflecting on the mission in Afghanistan, in your view,
    what are some of the major strategic missteps? How would you apply
    those lessons learned in future military operations?
        Answer. In my view, with the military mission in Afghanistan ending
    five months ago, we are in an early assessment period and the strategic
    implications of that war are not yet fully understood.
        I am aware that USCENTCOM is actively evaluating the strategic and
    operational impacts of the Afghanistan mission and providing its best
    military assessment and inputs to the Secretary of Defense-directed
    After Action Review. Additionally, I anticipate the recently
    established Afghanistan War Commission will contribute to identifying
    major strategic missteps, actionable recommendations, and lessons
    learned. If confirmed, I will ensure USCENTCOM operations and
    activities are fully informed by these findings.
        Question. In your view, what factors do you assess as leading to
    the Taliban's ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?
        Answer. While the Afghanistan War Commission represents an
    opportunity to analyze, identify, and understand the factors that led
    to the Taliban's return to power, it is clear, in my view, that the
    Taliban successfully exploited ethnic, tribal, religious, and political
    fissures within all levels of the Afghan Government.
        Any review must evaluate the underlying factors that led the Afghan
    National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) leaders and soldiers to
    lose the will to fight, particularly the failures of Afghan Government
    leadership.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the implications of the
    collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for
    future advise, train, and assist missions?
        Answer. I anticipate the Afghanistan War Commission will allow a
    full understanding of the factors that led to the dissolution of the
    ANDSF and the broader implications for our national security.
        Question. In your view, can the United States conduct effective
    ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without
    a partner force on the ground? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Over-the-Horizon-Counterterrorism (OTH-CT) operations are,
    in my experience, difficult but not impossible. Though a partner force
    on the ground significantly improves the effectiveness of counterterror
    operations, OTH-CT has many benefits. Most critically, through
    employment of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) assets, OTH-CT allows us the ability to degrade terrorist groups
    that pose a direct threat to the United States and our allies in places
    in which we lack physical access.
                                    pakistan
        Question. In your view, what do you consider to be the major
    challenges in the United States-Pakistan strategic relationship?
        Answer. Pakistan is a difficult but necessary partner. Our
    relationship has seen progress and improved over the last few years.
    The major challenges in the United States-Pakistan strategic
    relationship include regional tensions between two nuclear-capable
    powers, India and Pakistan, a tension which complicates our work toward
    regional stability. Adding to this complication are the pressures of
    territorial and resource disputes, growing Chinese, Russian, and
    Iranian influence, and a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan along
    Pakistan's western border. Lastly, Pakistan's reliance on Chinese
    economic and military support challenges American ties in the country.
        Question. What is your assessment of the strategic relationship
    between the United States and Pakistan? Do you assess that those
    strategic aims have changed as a result of the transition of United
    States forces from Afghanistan? If so, please describe the changes.
        Answer. The strategic relationship between the United States and
    Pakistan is complex, but necessary. We share an important partnership
    given the many areas in which our interests converge. Pakistan is a
    nuclear power that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese, Indian, and
    American geopolitical interests.
        Stability in South Asia region remains the most important mutual
    strategic interest for both the United States and Pakistan, and we must
    continue to constructively engage with Pakistani leadership to work
    towards achieving success on this mutual interest.
        While the United States remains Pakistan's partner of choice,
    China's influence in Pakistan is growing, this may increasingly
    challenge our relationship.
        The advancement of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, India, and China,
    has increased tension in the region and has regional security
    implications. Ambiguity or a miscalculation of the other side's
    capabilities or intentions could have catastrophic consequences.
        Question. In your opinion, what would you consider to be areas of
    shared strategic interest between the United States and Pakistan?
        Answer. In my view, the United States and Pakistan share a number
    of strategic interests, including regional stability and the threat
    posed by violent extremist organizations. Finally, both nations also
    share a concern of addressing the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    enhancing United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms
    of military-to-military relations?
        Answer. Primary among the avenues to continue enhancing the United
    States relationship with Pakistan is in the aera of counterterrorism
    partnership. If confirmed, I will evaluate the United States-Pakistan
    military-to-military relationships during my initial assessment of
    risks and opportunities in the region for such partnership
    opportunities. I will provide recommendations regarding this
    relationship to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff and, as requested, to our defense oversight committees
    and other interested congressional members and staff.
                                  central asia
        Question. What is your understanding of the role Russia and China
    are seeking to play in the Central Asian states? Do you assess that
    their strategic aims have changed following the end of the United
    States combat mission in Afghanistan?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Russia and China seek decisive
    roles in Central Asia. I assess the end of the United States combat
    mission in Afghanistan created a void in Central Asia that Russia and
    China will seek to fill. In particular, Russia and China are likely
    concerned over the potential for growth and expansion of violent
    extremists in Afghanistan with the US withdrawal and fall of the former
    government, and are therefore incentivized to increase influence in the
    country.
        In addition, Russia considers Central Asia as firmly within its
    sphere of influence and views the region as a security buffer against
    unwanted foreign interference, particularly on the part of the United
    States, Europe, and China. The recent crisis in Kazakhstan marked a
    major milestone for the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty
    Organization (CSTO) and demonstrates Moscow's intent to ensure the
    region remains stable and reliant on Russia as its sole security
    guarantor. Russia retains an advantage in the region through extensive
    bilateral engagement with all five Central Asian states leveraging
    social and historical ties, established intelligence networks, economic
    dependences, and military relationships.
        Meanwhile, Beijing seeks access to Central Asian natural resources
    to meet Chinese industrial demands, to expand the use of Central Asian
    transportation infrastructure and to counter perceived security
    threats. China invests in industry throughout the Central Asian region.
    Since 2016, China increased security engagement with the region
    bilaterally and through China-dominated security structures,
    exemplified by the Quadrilateral Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism
    that allows China to jointly patrol the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-China
    border region. Beijing does not want to be a regional security
    guarantor and is focused only on threats that directly affect China
    while capitalizing on Russia's approach to perceived threats across the
    region.
        Central Asian states will likely continue to maintain their
    relationships with the United States and allies, both as a hedge
    against excessive external influence, and as leverage to elicit
    advantages and concessions from Russia and China.
        Question. In your view, do you consider Central Asia as a place
    where the United States is in long-term strategic competition with
    Russia and China? If so, what can USCENTCOM do to tip the regional
    balance in favor of the United States?
        Answer. Yes, given that strategic competition with Russia and China
    remains a global priority, it is my view that Central Asia presents
    significant opportunities. Based on geography and history, Russia and
    China possess an outsized impact politically, economically, and
    militarily within Central Asian States. Influence and access to Central
    Asia requires that USCENTCOM participate in whole-of-government
    commitment to strengthen our relationships in Central Asia. Increased
    cooperation should continue to focus on areas where U.S. and partners'
    interests intersect.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the potential consequences for
    U.S. access and interests in the region if the United States does not
    actively engage with Central Asian partners?
        Answer. Advancing United States interests in the CENTCOM region
    requires active engagement with Central Asian partners. Given advanced
    Chinese and Russian influence, durable partnerships that benefit our
    mutual security assume increased importance.
        By contrast, curtailed engagement with Central Asian partners could
    cede American access and influence. Russia actively seeks to maintain
    influence in the region and endeavors to bolster its position as the
    perceived security provider of choice in Central Asia. Russia continues
    to foment the idea of United States abandonment of Central Asia in the
    aftermath of American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Similarly, China,
    through its calculated investments in the region, seeks economic
    advantage.
                                 iraq and syria
        Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by
    ISIS?
        Answer. In my view, ISIS remains a serious threat to United States
    interests. In 2021, ISIS maintained 17 publicly recognized branches and
    claimed responsibility for attacks in dozens of countries. While a loss
    of key leaders and a lack of resources have severely hindered the
    organization, ISIS sustains a capable threat to the security of the
    USCENTCOM AOR, as evidenced by the recent attack on the al-Hasakah
    detention facility. ISIS remains a learning, adaptable and committed
    organization with a dedicated core. Consistent pressure by the Iraqi
    Security Forces (ISF) in Iraq and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in
    Syria, enabled by United States and Coalition forces, prevents ISIS
    from expanding and conducting external attacks. Displaced persons and
    refugees are susceptible to exploitation and radicalization by ISIS.
    ISIS also seeks opportunities in Afghanistan where the group has gained
    considerable personnel and resources.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in Syria?
        Answer. The security situation in Syria is complex and tenuous.
    Syria's military and Pro-Regime Forces (PRF) have a decisive advantage
    over the remaining opposition groups and the Assad regime is positioned
    to end the civil war militarily. However, the underlying causes of the
    conflict, including political disenfranchisement, poverty, water
    scarcity, and economic instability, will likely persist beyond the
    conflict's end. Most critically, ISIS remains a threat to both the
    United States and partners in the region.
        Question. In your view, what are the United States national
    security objectives in Syria? To what extent does continued United
    States force presence in Syria support those objectives?
        Answer. The military's mission in Syria is to ensure the enduring
    defeat of ISIS. Although the so-called physical caliphate is
    territorially defeated, the group transitioned to an insurgency that
    poses a continued threat to the U.S. Homeland, our allies, and the
    stability of our regional partners. This continued threat is
    exemplified by recent attacks and attempts to free thousands of ISIS
    fighters from prisons in Syria.
        Our presence supports a whole-of-government approach to achieve
    other strategic objectives in Syria, including countering Iran and
    Russia. Tehran's military, paramilitary, and proxy involvement in Syria
    should be of concern, as it directly threatens Israel and Jordan, and
    risks dangerously escalating regional tensions. Lastly, our security
    presence allows for provision of humanitarian assistance by
    international and non-governmental organizations that would otherwise
    not be possible.
        Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
    be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
    what conditions do you believe should factor into decisions about
    United States troop levels in Syria?
        Answer. Mission requirements drive troop levels in all operations
    and there are always a series of operational factors that must be
    considered. Risk to force and risk to mission must be considered in
    locations such as Syria where minimal United States and partner force
    footprints exist. Any modification of troop levels should take into
    account the SDF's capability to prevent ISIS from reestablishing a base
    of operations.
        Question. What additional military steps, if any, should the United
    States be taking to advance the process for a political solution in
    Syria?
        Answer. While political solutions require a whole-of-government
    approach, from a military perspective, it is critical that USCENTCOM
    and Combined Task Force-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) continue
    to support our partner forces as they provide local military security
    and time and space for the continued development of local governance
    and security structures.
        Question. What role, if any, do you believe United States military
    advisors should play in transitioning Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) to
    conduct local security vice offensive operations to clear territory
    held by ISIS?
        Answer. U.S. military advisors play a critical role in the
    development of the SDF, to include in their ability to provide local
    security.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in Iraq?
        Answer. My assessment is that Iraq's security and political
    situation is fragile. Government formation is the national priority
    following the October 2021 elections that resulted in the Sadrist bloc
    gaining a plurality in the new Parliament. As the process continues,
    Iranian-aligned political parties and militia groups may escalate
    violence, particularly if they perceive diminishing opportunity to
    influence the course of government formation. ISIS in Iraq remains a
    credible threat to Iraqi security; the group uses complex attacks and
    subverts the local and provincial governments to grow its influence and
    expand its insurgency. Iran and its associated militias present the
    most direct threat to United States personnel and interests in Iraq.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
    strategy and objectives in Iraq?
        Answer. My understanding is that the primary United States
    objectives in Iraq include the enduring defeat of ISIS and maintenance
    of a strategic partnership with the Government of Iraq. The strategy
    relies on a whole-of-government approach, to include a military focus
    on the development of capable, self-reliant, and accountable security
    forces, supported by the Government of Iraq.
        Question. All United States forces in a combat role have
    transitioned from Iraq. Going forward, what do you envision to be the
    missions and size of the United States military presence in Iraq?
        Answer. Although United States and coalition forces have
    transitioned from combat, ISIS elements remain active with an ability
    to regenerate and reconstitute. If confirmed, my initial assessment
    will include an evaluation of force requirements based on the missions
    and tasks given to USCENTCOM by the President and Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What steps would you recommend for normalizing security
    assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the advisability and
    feasibility of normalizing security assistance to the Iraqi Security
    Forces in the coming years. I would do so in close consultation with
    Embassy Baghdad and the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force
    Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) and will provide my advice to the
    Secretary and Chairman to inform the interagency discussion and
    legislative considerations of authorities and funding. The Counter-ISIS
    Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) represents a crucial component of the
    United States whole-of-government approach to the enduring defeat of
    ISIS; any changes to this important funding source must be carefully
    analyzed to ensure our partner-based approach remains effective.
        Question. What do you see as the appropriate role for NATO in Iraq?
    What adjustments would you make, if any, to NATO's current mission in
    Iraq?
        Answer. If confirmed, a key component of my initial assessment will
    include an evaluation of the role for the NATO Mission in Iraq. If
    confirmed, I will maintain a collaborative approach with NATO
    headquarters to ensure our forces on the ground forces maintain their
    close relationships.
        Question. In your view, what should the United States do regarding
    the repatriation of ISIS prisoners currently detained by the Syrian
    Democratic Forces and the Government of Iraq?
        Answer. Repatriation is among the primary challenges USCENTCOM
    faces in Syria, as demonstrated by the recent ISIS attack on the al-
    Hasakah detention facility and subsequent SDF operations to recapture
    ISIS escapees. This issue requires a whole-of-government approach
    focused on engagement with allies and partners. The thousands of ISIS
    detainees of foreign descent represent an ISIS Army-in-waiting and, if
    confirmed, I will address this vulnerability together with interagency
    partners and allies.
                                      iran
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
    posed by Iran?
        Answer. Iran remains the primary and enduring threat in the
    USCENTCOM area of operations due to its use of its increasingly
    sophisticated military capabilities, broad proxy network, and periodic
    willingness to use force against the United States, our allies, and
    partner forces. Iran's rapidly expanding military capabilities enable
    it to coerce its neighbors, threaten international trade, and exploit
    instability throughout the region.
        Tehran's primary power projection tools are ballistic missiles,
    UAVs, and expanding maritime capabilities. Iran's missile inventory
    includes both medium-and short-range ballistic missiles capable of
    holding many regional targets at risk. Iranian surface-to-air missiles
    pose a significant threat to United States intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance assets operating in international airspace.
    Additionally, naval cruise missile technologies will strengthen Iran's
    Anti-Access Area Denial efforts and increase Tehran's ability to hold
    critical sea lines of communication at risk and threaten countries in
    the region with greater speed, precision, and lethality. Iran also
    leverages a network of proxy forces to advance its power base and build
    strategic depth. Iran repeatedly demonstrates a willingness to share
    advanced conventional weapons with Shia militant proxies and partners
    throughout the region.
        Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
    currently deployed to the USCENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
    necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful assessment of forces
    required in the region with consideration for the significant military
    capabilities and threats emanating from Iran. This assessment will
    examine force levels necessary to deter and, if necessary, respond to
    Iranian threats and assess risks and mitigating strategies.
        Question. What is your assessment of United States national
    security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in
    the Middle East?
        Answer. My assessment is that Iran's negative influence in the
    region continues to grow and is incompatible with United States
    national interests, as well as those of our allies and partners. Iran
    views the United States as its greatest enduring threat and continues a
    multifaceted approach to remove United States forces from the region
    while avoiding escalation into major conflict. The risk of
    miscalculation and escalation remains high.
        Question. If the United States returned to compliance with the
    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what concerns, if any,
    would you have for regional security?
        Answer. Iran is, in my view, the single biggest contributor to
    instability in the region and any agreement must fully prevent Iran
    from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Without knowledge of the specific
    terms of ongoing diplomatic negotiations, it is premature to assess the
    outcomes on regional security. Renewed negotiation efforts must
    consider the significant changes that have occurred in the security and
    geopolitical environments since the 2018 American withdrawal from the
    agreement.
        Question. What actions, if any, do you believe the United States
    and the international community could undertake to counter Iran's
    increasing conventional military capabilities?
        Answer. It is my view that together with the international
    community and our Middle East partners, the United States maintains a
    shared objective in countering Iran's proliferation of Advanced
    Conventional Weapons and its support to proxies. In addition to
    continued diplomatic engagement, I assess that USCENTCOM must continue
    its efforts to enhance interoperability with allies and partners to
    deter and, when required, defeat Iranian conventional military
    capability across multiple domains. Finally, we must continue investing
    in technology, to include Artificial Intelligence and machine learning
    platforms and programs, to increase our ability to detect, defend, and
    respond to conventional Iranian military capabilities.
        Question. In your view, what risks, if any, are associated with
    reducing United States military presence in the Middle East with
    respect to the threat posed by Iran?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether a reduction of U.S.
    force presence impacts our ability to achieve objectives for the region
    and undermines the assurances we provide allies and partners. Part of
    this assessment will address key areas in which partners, allies, or
    interagency elements can fill capability gaps or further enable
    efforts. It is my view that the current United States military posture
    in the Middle East serves as an important role in unifying a coalition
    of regional partners and provides a counterbalance to Iran's malign
    regional influence. If confirmed, I would ensure USCENTCOM continues to
    work hard in sustaining enduring military, security, and intelligence
    ties with our regional partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of the purpose and threat posed
    by Iran's ballistic missile program? To what extent is the United
    States and our partners in the region postured to counter the Iranian
    ballistic missile threat?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether United States and our
    partners' integrated air and missile defense capability is adequate to
    counter Iranian ballistic missile threats in the short term. I intend
    to prioritize working with regional partners on their air defense
    systems with the aim of fully integrating air and missile defense
    across the region.
        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should USCENTCOM play in
    countering Iran's support of international terrorism and proxy forces
    throughout the USCENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. It is my view that USCENTCOM should support a whole-of-
    government approach to countering Iran's support for international
    terrorism and proxy forces. The Iranian regime leverages the Iranian
    Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force in managing proxies in Yemen,
    Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon through the proliferation of advanced weapons
    technology and destabilizing actions.
        USCENTCOM will counter Iranian efforts with continued operations,
    activities, investments, engagements, and support to partners in the
    region.
                                     yemen
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
    in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen to the United States?
        Answer. My understanding is that al Qaeda's capabilities have been
    significantly weakened and appear to be on a declining trajectory. AQAP
    threatens the U.S. primarily through its ability to inspire lone actors
    to carryout high-profile attacks.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current United States
    strategy to counter AQAP and ISIS-Yemen?
        Answer. Yemen is a complex environment that will continue to
    evolve. If confirmed, I will use my initial assessment to evaluate our
    strategy and determine the resources and tools necessary to counter
    violent extremist organizations in Yemen. It is my view that a sound
    strategy requires close coordination with partners within DOD, the
    intelligence community, the interagency, and our allies and partners to
    assess and address threats emanating from Yemen.
        Question. In your view, what are the United States national
    security interests in Yemen?
        Answer. As I understand it, United Statesnational security
    interests in Yemen are to prevent an attack on the United States
    Homeland or United States allies and partners in the region, reduce
    human suffering resulting from the humanitarian disaster, promote
    regional stability, and protect global economic trade routes.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Iran-backed Houthi
    ballistic missile, unmanned aerial vehicle, and other threats emanating
    from Yemen to United States regional partners, U.S. interests, and
    freedom of navigation?
        Answer. It is my view that the Houthi threat to United States and
    partner interests in the region remains high. The risk to United States
    personnel, citizens, partners, and interests is substantial given the
    Houthis' capabilities to inflict harm and demonstrated willingness to
    conduct complex strikes against major urban areas, including Riyadh and
    Abu Dhabi.
        Question. What do you see as the implications of the Biden
    Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the
    Saudi-led coalition?
        Answer. I believe there is no purely military solution to the
    current crisis in Yemen. If confirmed, I will include in my initial
    assessment an evaluation of the current state of Saudi-led coalition
    operations in Yemen and will provide these insights and recommendations
    to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff and keep the Congress fully informed as requested.
        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States
    play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
        Answer. This is a question of national significance for elected
    officials and U.S. policymakers. It is my understanding the United
    States Government is working closely with the UN Special Representative
    (UNSR) and the UN Special Envoy for Yemen to support the ongoing
    diplomatic efforts to bring the Yemeni conflict to a negotiated end.
                                     egypt
        Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
    Egypt, including the Sinai Peninsula?
        Answer. Egypt's political and security situation is stable. Like
    most nations, Egypt faces domestic challenges, including a weak
    economy, poverty, and water scarcity. Sinai-based extremist threats are
    largely contained, and, with continued counterterrorism pressure, ISIS-
    Sinai should remain a manageable concern for Cairo. I assess the
    historically strong United States and Egyptian military-to-military
    relationship remains our most reliable option to assist and positively
    influence security with this critical regional partner.
        Question. What is your assessment of the United States-Egypt
    security relationship?
        Answer. The United States-Egypt security relationship is strong. If
    prioritized and resourced, this relationship will endure as a critical
    pillar of regional stability. Within this context, we should continue
    to share our values of accountability with our partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with
    respect to regional stability?
        Answer. Egypt's standing as the largest Arab nation and its
    strategic location at the nexus of North Africa and the Middle East
    means Cairo must remain a positive contributor to regional stability.
    Egypt's military routinely contributes to regional security,
    participating in multinational exercises and sustaining cooperation
    with the United States and other important partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of Egypt's counterterrorism
    operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, my initial assessment will include an
    evaluation of Egypt's counterterrorism operations. Egypt's effort to
    counter ISIS-Sinai made meaningful progress in 2021. If confirmed, I
    will continue efforts to support the development of Egyptian
    counterterrorism forces and our commitment to building a more capable,
    self-reliant, and accountable partner force.
        Question. How do you assess the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood,
    al Qaeda, and the ISIS affiliate Wilayat Sinai, respectively, to the
    security situation in Egypt and the stability of the Sisi Government?
    To what extent do you believe that countering each of these groups
    should be a focal point of United States engagement and strategy in
    Egypt?
        Answer. I assess the Sisi Government remains capable of degrading
    violent extremists in Egypt, including the Sinai. United States
    military efforts should be focused on groups, including al Qaeda and
    ISIS's Sinai affiliate, which pose threats to United States and
    regional security. The United States should continue to support the
    development of Egyptian counterterrorism forces into capable, self-
    reliant, and accountable forces.
                                    lebanon
        Question. What is your assessment of the Lebanese Armed Forces
    (LAF), including their ability to act as the sole guarantor of
    Lebanon's security and sovereignty?
        Answer. I assess that a lack of government funds since September
    2019, emanating from Lebanon's economic and political crises, resulted
    in a consistent decrease in LAF troops available for operations,
    thereby degrading LAF capabilities. If confirmed, I intend to seek
    opportunities to strengthen the partnership with the LAF and fully
    assess their capabilities.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the United
    States military in Lebanon?
        Answer. In my view, the appropriate role for the United States
    military in Lebanon is in providing security cooperation with the LAF.
    The U.S. military security cooperation relationship with the LAF is
    critical in Lebanon and has broader impacts for the region. Based on
    previous assignments, I understand that the LAF has a strong record of
    safeguarding U.S.-provided equipment, and the organization keeps
    meticulous records of such equipment.
        The LAF serves as a reliable United States security partner. The
    United States-LAF partnership is increasingly critical, given expanding
    influence by Lebanese Hizballah, Iran, Russia, and China, in the
    country. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities to strengthen our
    partnership with the LAF.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of United
    States security assistance provided to the LAF in recent years,
    including the ability of the LAF to appropriately utilize and maintain
    accountability of United States-provided equipment?
        Answer. United States security assistance to the LAF is critical to
    the continued stability of Lebanon and the region. The LAF has
    demonstrated the ability to avoid sectarianism while using and
    maintaining accountability of United States-provided equipment to
    enhance security in Lebanon. If confirmed, I will include in my initial
    assessment an evaluation of the effectiveness of United States security
    assistance provided to the LAF.
        Question. What is your assessment of the LAF's relationship with
    Hizballah?
        Answer. The LAF and Lebanese Hizballah are not in partnership with
    each other. The LAF remains the most trusted and only defense
    institution in Lebanon with diverse sects. The organization serves all
    the Lebanese people while Hizballah is a sectarian militia. While the
    organizations cooperate and deconflict operations when necessary to
    avoid directly antagonizing each other or infringing on each other's
    established territory, relations between the two are distant.
                              combating terrorism
        Question. In your view, within the USCENTCOM AOR, what do you
    consider to be the highest counterterrorism priorities?
        Answer. The highest priority for counterterrorism operations is
    protecting the Homeland, followed by mitigating threats to U.S.
    interests and those of our allies and partners in the region.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by ISIS, al
    Qaeda, and their associated forces to the United States Homeland and
    U.S. interests overseas?
        Answer. ISIS and al Qaeda remain a serious threat to the United
    States Homeland and U.S. interests overseas. Neither group has forsaken
    its ambitions, nor their direct hostility toward the United States.
    ISIS continues to encourage its networks, branches, and supporters to
    inspire, enable, or direct attacks worldwide. ISIS uses its media
    capabilities to preserve its global brand appeal despite territorial
    losses in Iraq and Syria.
        Al Qaeda remains avowedly hostile to the United States, with
    continued aspirations to attack the U.S. Homeland. Across the USCENTCOM
    AOR, al Qaeda is comprised of disparate groups with uneven centralized
    control, but still maintains its goals to attack U.S., allies, and
    partner interests across the region
        Question. What is your understanding of the Department's role in
    the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism in the USCENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. Within the whole-of-government approach to combatting
    terrorism, the Department of Defense sets policy for and implements the
    military component of national power to defeat our enemies and protect
    our interests and citizens. If confirmed, I will implement the military
    component of the counterterrorism strategy in the USCENTCOM AOR in
    close consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and Commander, USSOCOM.
        Question. Given your current knowledge of USCENTCOM operations and
    activities, do you believe the Command's resources are aligned in a
    manner consistent with counterterrorism priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment which
    will help me determine whether the resources provided to USCENTCOM are
    aligned with counterterrorism priorities. Defeating terrorists and
    preventing threats to the Homeland from the USCENTCOM AOR is the
    priority counterterrorism mission. Building partner capacity to address
    threats emanating from the region is necessary for long-term stability.
        Question. If confirmed, do you foresee any counterterrorism efforts
    in the USCENTCOM AOR that may be constrained due to the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy prioritization of long-term strategic competition with
    Russia and China over countering VEOs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess any impact of resourcing
    decisions on the ability of USCENTCOM to conduct counterterrorism
    operations. This will identify USCENTCOM's ability to achieve all its
    assigned missions, including counterterrorism, and will provide my
    insights, concerns, assessment of risk, and advice to the Secretary of
    Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and keep the Congress
    fully informed as requested.
        Question. To what extent, if any, do you consider the Muslim
    Brotherhood to constitute a terrorist threat within the USCENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. The Muslim Brotherhood constitutes a minimal threat to U.S.
    personnel and our military presence in the USCENTCOM AOR. The
    organization is more likely to focus on priorities internal to the
    countries in which it operates.
               building partner capacity and security assistance
        Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
    of authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. In
    your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the
    capacities of partner nations in the USCENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. Our strategic objectives should be designed to develop
    partner nation capabilities; optimize U.S. influence, access, and
    freedom of action; and, build a network of capable partners who will
    work together in stabilizing the region. All these actions are
    consistent with the National Defense Strategy and USCENTCOM Campaign
    Plan. Ultimately, we want partner nations who are capable, self-
    reliant, accountable, and interoperable with partner forces. Security
    cooperation is essential to conducting counterterrorism operations and
    promoting regional stability within the USCENTCOM AOR.
        Question. What would be your priorities, if confirmed, for building
    partner capacity, including institutional capacity, and other security
    cooperation efforts in the USCENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts that directly aid
    in establishing a capable network of allies and partners consistent
    with U.S. strategy and objectives. In general, this means undertaking
    efforts that increase interoperability at all levels, prioritizing
    equipment commonalities and common doctrine. We will remain focused on
    building forces that are capable, self-reliant, and accountable. At the
    institutional level, priorities include developing planning, logistics
    and sustainment, command and control, and sustainable resourcing.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate balance between
    efforts to build partnership capacity at the tactical and operational
    level and at the institutional and ministerial level?
        Answer. Partner capacity at the tactical, operational,
    institutional, and ministerial levels are inextricably linked and vital
    to the overall capabilities we strive to build. Before investing in
    partner capacity, we must first evaluate several conditions. It is
    critical that we ensure partners are willing and able to obligate the
    required resources and make appropriate organizational changes to
    implement capability at the tactical, operational, institutional, and
    ministerial levels. Developing a partner's institutional capacity is
    our ultimate goal and often the most challenging aspect of force
    development.
        Question. In your view, how should our security cooperation be
    modified, conditioned, or restricted with countries in which there is
    significant corruption at the institutional and ministerial level?
        Answer. Ultimately, the decision to restrict, condition, or modify
    security cooperation is a complex question involving U.S. laws and
    policy makers. If confirmed, I will execute security cooperation as
    directed in full compliance with Department of Defense policy guidance,
    directives, and authorities.
        If confirmed, I will provide military advice to policy makers,
    through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explaining the
    operational opportunities and risks to our national objectives
    presented by working with or restricting assistance to countries in a
    highly competitive FMS market.
        Question. In your view, how should USCENTCOM approach building
    partner capacity with host nation militaries that have been tasked to
    take on the role of police and internal security forces?
        I believe all forms of security assistance should be evalAnswer.
    uated and executed consistent with law and policy. Within the region,
    many defense forces carry a dual role of providing both internal and
    external security. Understanding the nature of those roles and
    authorities is critical to effectively building partner capacity.
                              civilian casualties
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure civilian casualty
    allegations are adequately and promptly investigated by USCENTCOM?
        Answer. USCENTCOM has a standardized process to assess civilian
    casualty allegations. If confirmed, I will review and, if necessary,
    improve USCENTCOM's processes for reporting and investigating
    allegations of civilian casualty incidents. Furthermore, I will serve
    as an active participant in the development of the Department's
    Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Plan, as directed by the
    Secretary of Defense on January 27, 2022.
        Question. Do you believe credible civilian casualty incidents
    should be independently investigated by personnel who are sufficiently
    removed from the unit or chain of command associated with the incident?
    Please be specific in your response.
        Answer. In my assessment, credible CIVCAS incidents should be
    investigated by personnel sufficiently removed from the chain of
    command and independent from the unit at the heart of the incident.
        Question. What is your understanding of USCENTCOM's obligation to
    report civilian casualty incidents to Congress?
        Answer. USCENTCOM will report civilian casualties to the Department
    of Defense in support of the Secretary of Defense's statutory
    obligation to report to Congress and be open and transparent with our
    oversight committees. If confirmed, I will ensure compliance with all
    Department policies and procedures for reporting civilian casualty
    incidents.
        Question. What is your understanding of USCENTCOM's current
    policies with respect to public transparency, and if confirmed, what
    policies would you seek to establish in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the fullest appropriate measure
    of transparency across USCENTCOM operations. This includes full
    compliance with departmental reporting requirements across all aspects
    of operations, including instances of civilian harm, as well as
    conducting regular media engagements and updates to congressional
    committees.
        Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
    to provide ex gratia payments when civilian casualties or other
    civilian harm result from U.S. military operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the applicable law and
    Department of Defense policies as set forth in Section 1213 of the
    Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act and the Under-
    Secretary of Defense's Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy
    Payments to Friendly Civilians for Injury or Loss. I will ensure
    USCENTCOM policies are clearly articulated and effectively implemented
    to comply with both the law and Department policy, including supporting
    the Secretary of Defense's reporting statutory requirements.
              strategic communications and information operations
        Question. Over the past decade, DOD has funded an increasing number
    of military information support operations and influence programs.
        What is your assessment of DOD's military information support
    operations, influence programs, and other information warfare efforts
    in the USCENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. The information environment is key terrain in USCENTCOM.
    USCENTCOM's military information support operations and information
    warfare programs advance U.S. interests in the AOR by offering
    information advantage in countering competitors and adversaries.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure
    information operations activities conducted by USCENTCOM comply with
    DOD guidance and are in support of military objectives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure information operations
    activities are well-coordinated, aligned with military objectives, and
    comply with department policy guidance. USCENTCOM provides quarterly
    and annual reports on all activities related to Information Operations.
    If confirmed, I will continue to employ these practices while complying
    with all regulatory requirements.
        Question. Do you believe USCENTCOM and other agencies within the
    United States Government are appropriately organized to respond
    effectively to the messaging and influence efforts of ISIS, al Qaeda,
    and other violent extremist groups?
        Answer. If confirmed, my intent is to conduct an initial
    assessment, which will specifically include an evaluation of USCENTCOM
    messaging and influence efforts to determine if they are appropriately
    organized to respond effectively to the messaging and influence efforts
    of violent extremist organizations.
        Question. Given that long-term strategic competition with China and
    Russia is a top-tier National Defense Strategy priority, what is
    USCENTCOM doing to counter Chinese and Russian strategic narratives
    across the AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment which
    will include an evaluation of USCENTCOM efforts to counter Chinese and
    Russian strategic narratives across the AOR.
        Question. In your view, is countering a violent extremist group's
    messaging an important aspect of counterterrorism? Which media
    platforms do you view as most conducive to disseminating violent
    extremist group's messaging, and what steps do you believe USCENTCOM
    could take to counter this messaging?
        Answer. Counter-messaging focused on extremist ideology is an
    important aspect of countering violent extremism. Social media channels
    are generally the most effective recruitment and coordination platform
    for violent extremist organizations within the USCENTCOM AOR. USCENTCOM
    regularly coordinates with the FBI and the Department of State Global
    Engagement Center to identify and report malign use of social media.
    Likewise, USCENTCOM works with the interagency to more effectively
    counter extremist recruiting, communication, and misinformation.
                           interagency collaboration
        Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
    general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies has played a significant role in the success of
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
    However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
    collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and
    elsewhere?
        Answer. The establishment of partnerships that integrated all
    instruments of national power at the tactical, operational, and
    strategic levels was essential to our campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq,
    and Syria, as well as our broader counterterrorism efforts in the last
    20 years. Through these collaborative partnerships, we learned lessons
    on the importance of information sharing, the value of pairing
    complementary authorities, and the criticality of bringing a range of
    organizational capabilities to bear on a problem. During service as
    both a general purpose force and special operation commander, I found
    that transparency, direct coordination, and development of a mutually
    agreed upon operational framework enabled success. It is imperative we
    carry these lessons forward and apply these constructs in future
    conflicts.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
    policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to
    incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources
    and care for victims of sexual assault. What is your view of the steps
    taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in USCENTCOM, including
    assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?
        Answer. The USCENTCOM climate and policies surrounding sexual
    assault prevention and response will be part of my initial command
    assessment. I take the prevention of and response to sexual assault
    against any person seriously. Sexual assault is abhorrent; it is not
    only against our values, but also harms military readiness. Sexual
    assault exists along a continuum of harm, so we must also ensure that
    we do not tolerate other types of behaviors, such as sexual harassment,
    that at times can escalate.
        If confirmed, I will work to ensure prevention and response is a
    top priority for all commanders and members of the USCENTCOM community.
    I will also ensure our efforts are properly resourced, and that all
    programs, policies, and training are supportive of Department's five
    lines of effort (LOEs), which include:
        1) prevention;
        2) victim assistance and advocacy;
        3) investigation;
        4) accountability; and
        5) assessment.
        Fundamentally, sexual assault is a safety and readiness issue, and
    will always receive my direct attention.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of USCENTCOM policies
    and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation
    for reporting the assault?
        Answer. As part of my initial command assessment, I will review
    both the adequacy of USCENTCOM policies and procedures for protecting
    victims of sexual assault from retaliation, but also the effectiveness
    of the training and implementation of such policies and procedures.
    Every leader and every member of the force must support a climate in
    which survivors can report these claims without fear of retaliation or
    blame for the unlawful actions of others.
        We all must encourage climates in which victims feel comfortable
    coming forward to report their experiences so they can connect with
    restorative care and aid in our efforts to hold offenders appropriately
    accountable. I will continue a zero-tolerance policy for any type of
    sexual assault, harassment or retaliation.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources in place in CENTCOM to investigate and respond to allegations
    of sexual assault?
        Answer. An important aspect of my initial command assessment will
    be the adequacy of the training, resources, and climate surrounding
    sexual assault prevention and response. While commanders have an
    absolute responsibility to address command climate issues, I also
    believe every member of our Armed Forces can contribute to an
    environment in which we make clear that sexual harassment and sexual
    assault are absolutely unacceptable. I will work hard to empower all
    members of our community with the necessary tools, skills, and
    abilities to ensure the safety of all. When confronted with instances
    of sexual assault, I will ensure that survivors receive the necessary
    support and treatment they require without fear of retaliation.
        Critical to sexual assault prevention is training for supervisors
    regarding incident response and the warning signs of retaliation.
    Indeed, training all members of the command to recognize retaliation is
    critical.
        I am committed to bringing to bear the resources required
    throughout the AOR to ensure thorough and complete investigations are
    conducted. I am also fully committed to survivor care and offender
    accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
    military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual
    misconduct?
        Answer. In my career, I have observed a strong willingness by
    military leaders to hold servicemembers appropriately accountable for
    sexual misconduct. Yet we are still not where we need to be and more
    must be done. Disciplined, fit, and cohesive teams can be built only
    upon a foundation of trust. Sexual misconduct destroys trust and the
    cohesion so necessary for a ready and lethal fighting force. I remain
    committed to bringing to bear the resources required in the AOR to
    ensure servicemembers responsible for sexual misconduct are held
    appropriately accountable.
        Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
    resources and programs in USCENTCOM to provide victims of sexual
    assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
        Answer. Congress has been a critical partner in helping the
    Department of Defense ensure we have a robust response system and the
    resources available for survivors. However, support to victims is an
    area in which we constantly must reevaluate and assess our
    effectiveness in helping ensure they have access restorative care. We
    must constantly reassess where we are; as such, I emphasize my support
    for Secretary Austin's initiatives surrounding sexual assault, to
    include survivor support. Commanders play a critical role in this
    capacity.
        The Department of Defense provides commanders with the many
    resources and programs to care for our personnel and their families. We
    continue to pursue the most useful tools that will expand our ability
    to support victims with quality medical, psychological, and legal help.
    Part of my initial command assessment will include issues surrounding
    services provided to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will
    ensure commanders and leaders at all levels within USCENTCOM are not
    only personally aware of all available resources but that they actively
    inform their subordinates of their availability.
        Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
    in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
        Answer. Taking care of our people is critical to effective
    leadership. If confirmed, I will ensure USCENTCOM continues to reduce,
    with the ultimate goal of eliminating, the crime of sexual assault.
        My strategic approach to sexual assault is ``prevention first.''
    However, if a sexual assault occurs, I have an unwavering commitment to
    survivor care and offender accountability.
        Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
    in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
    occurred?
        Answer. While leaders at every level are responsible for culture,
    organizational culture starts at the top. As I have for 34 years, I
    embrace the obligation to ensure our military culture reflects our core
    values and ethos. My commitment is, as it has long been, to building
    disciplined, fit, cohesive teams, wherein everyone is treated with
    dignity and respect. Those who volunteer to serve in uniform are our
    Nation's sons and daughters, and I am absolutely determined to ensure
    they can serve in environments in which they will be treated with
    dignity and respect.
        Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
    procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. The current sexual assault policies and procedures on
    restricted reporting are effective. This reporting option allow us to
    wholly commit to survivor care, while also supporting any desire for
    privacy.
        If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess current
    policies, procedures, and programs and to ensure senior level direction
    and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in
    USCENTCOM?
        If confirmed, I will initiate an assessment of policies,
    procedures, and programs to prevent and respond to sexual assaults
    within USCENTCOM. I am fully committed to the prevention of sexual
    assault throughout the organization. In the event of a sexual assault,
    however, I will ensure a timely, appropriate, and sensitive response
    and that survivors' resources commensurate with their needs. I will
    also fully commit to supporting Secretary Austin's initiatives
    regarding prevention of sexual assault and sexual harassment.
        Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
    the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
    responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
    and intend to implement as USCENTCOM Commander?
        Answer. It is my understanding that USCENTCOM has a robust program
    for prevention of sexual assault, inclusive of Sexual Assault
    Prevention and Response Stand-downs, team building events, values-based
    training, active bystander intervention, and leadership training
    sessions.
        USCENTCOM component commanders evaluate and report trends of sexual
    assault incidents. If confirmed, my goal will be the elimination of any
    incidents of sexual assault. I will also fully commit to supporting
    Secretary Austin's initiatives regarding prevention of sexual assault
    and sexual harassment.
                            relations with congress
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
    productive and mutually beneficial relationship between USCENTCOM and
    Congress, and in particular the congressional defense committees?
        Answer. Combatant commanders must maintain strong and transparent
    relationships with the defense committees. As a former USCENTCOM Chief
    of Staff, I am acutely aware of the mutual benefits of a robust
    Congressional Engagement Plan (CEP) that establishes an operational
    framework across the legislative year. If confirmed, I plan to execute
    a robust CEP, inclusive of quarterly calls with the chairs and ranking
    members of the defense committees. If confirmed, would also welcome
    member and staff visits to the USCENTCOM headquarters.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
    communications) and other information from the Department.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
    communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                           over the horizon targeting
        1. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Kurilla, after the United
    States-led military withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joseph Biden
    described counterterrorism in the country as pivoting to ``over the
    horizon'' capabilities. These capabilities will rely heavily on drone
    strikes. We also recently saw the use of Special Forces to target ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] leadership. If confirmed as U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, how do you intend to continue the
    counterterrorism mission without the use of conventional forces?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic
    initial assessment of the U.S. Central Command operational environment,
    inclusive of an analysis of the over the horizon counterterrorism
    strategy. I envision a whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy to
    complement over the horizon military operations. Such an approach will
    rely heavily on integration of the U.S. Intelligence Community and
    allies and partners throughout the U.S. Central Command area of
    operations. We must also work effectively across the interagency to
    counter violent extremism, address roots causes and terrorist ideology,
    and promote economic development and stability programs with the U.S.
    Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department
    of State.

        2. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Kurilla, as illustrated by
    the errant Kabul strike in August 2021, which killed 10 civilians, the
    over the horizon strategy comes with inherent challenges. If confirmed,
    what steps would you take to prevent civilian casualties resulting from
    the military's shift to ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism efforts?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Preventing civilian casualties is a
    priority for the Department of Defense and an inherent responsibility
    for all operational commanders. I look forward to supporting the
    Secretary of Defense's recent initiative to develop a Civilian Harm
    Mitigation and Response Plan, and, if confirmed, I will seek
    opportunities to strengthen processes to prevent civilian casualties.
        Over the horizon counterterrorism operations are difficult, but not
    impossible. Counterterrorism strikes that rely solely on over the
    horizon capabilities require the employment of additional airborne
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to reduce the
    risk of civilian casualties. In such operations, the risk of civilian
    casualties can be mitigated by close cooperation with the U.S.
    Intelligence Community, robust human intelligence, signals
    intelligence, partners on the ground, and a fusion of other
    intelligence capabilities.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                          cooperation with the taliban
        3. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Kurilla, based on your
    personal experience, what would be the impact on troops' morale if the
    United States shared military intelligence or cooperated militarily
    with the Taliban?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. There are limited situations in which
    military cooperation with the Taliban should be cautiously considered
    and conducted only after the requirements of Section 1213 of the Fiscal
    Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act are satisfied. For
    example, if we gain credible and specific intelligence of an imminent
    attack on our Homeland, Americans, or our allies that neither U.S.
    forces nor those of allies or partners are able to prevent, it may be
    advantageous to consider a limited sharing of sanitized intelligence
    with the Taliban if doing so may disrupt or prevent the attack. In such
    cases, which must be specific to threat, the possible advantages must
    be weighed against the risks. Based on my previous experience, I judge
    the vast majority of troops would understand the necessity of
    coordination with the Taliban in such a scenario, particularly if doing
    so saved the lives of Americans or those of our allies.

        4. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Kurilla, the United Nations
    has received ``credible allegations'' that more than 100 former Afghan
    Government officials, troops, and those who worked with coalition
    forces have been killed since the Taliban took control in mid-August,
    despite assurance from the terrorist group that they would remain
    unharmed. \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ https://www.foxnews.com/world/un-former-afghan-troops-
    officials-killed-taliban-takeover
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Is there any reason to believe that we can trust the Taliban to the
    extent that it would be advisable to share military intelligence or
    cooperate militarily with the Taliban, in your opinion?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. I do not trust the Taliban. There are
    limited situations in which military cooperation with the Taliban
    should be cautiously considered and conducted only after the
    requirements of Section 1213 of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense
    Authorization Act are satisfied. For example, if we gain credible and
    specific intelligence of an imminent attack on our Homeland, Americans,
    or our allies that neither U.S. forces nor those of allies or partners
    are able to prevent, it may be advantageous to consider a limited
    sharing of sanitized intelligence with the Taliban if doing so may
    disrupt or prevent the attack. In such cases, which must be specific to
    threat, the possible advantages must be weighed against the risks.

        5. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in the very unlikely
    situation that the United States shares military intelligence or
    cooperates militarily with the Taliban, are you familiar with section
    1213 of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, which
    requires notification to the Armed Services Committees, including the
    nature of the intelligence that was shared or military cooperation?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. I am familiar with section 1213 of the
    Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act. If confirmed, I
    will comply with all laws and regulations and support the Secretary of
    Defense in meeting the Department's notification requirements in
    accordance with the law.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                         communication interoperability
        6. Senator Tillis. Lieutenant General Kurilla, the Department of
    Defense continues to struggle with disparate communications systems
    that don't speak to one another nor allow for true interoperability.
    Lack of communication interoperability is exacerbated when working with
    partner nations. In your previous roles at U.S. Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM) and while commanding the 18th Airborne Corps you saw
    firsthand how the use of a non-proprietary software solution could
    overcome these interoperability challenges. Can this same solution be
    utilized by CENTCOM to provide and share a complete common operating
    picture to warfighters and international partners to shorten the time
    of information transfer to gain increased situational understanding of
    complex situations?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, I will analyze technical
    opportunities to increase situational understanding of complex
    situations across U.S. Central Command. To do so, I would prioritize
    building interoperability through coordination with the Joint Force and
    Service Chiefs and partners and allies operating in the U.S. Central
    Command area of operations.
        While it is my understanding that U.S. Central Command already
    leverages a mission partner network to share its common operating
    picture, I look forward to assessing opportunities to expand and
    improve these capabilities. Moreover, if confirmed, I am committed to
    leveraging emerging technologies, machine-to-machine communication,
    artificial intelligence, and data-centric operations within U.S.
    Central Command.
        It is my view that USCENTCOM is well-positioned to employ the Joint
    All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept to address data
    interoperability necessary to integrate joint and combined forces, and
    accelerate and improve decision-making.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                  afghanistan
        7. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do you believe the
    United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan was a strategic failure?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. While I believe it was a strategic
    failure, we are, in my view, still assessing the strategic implications
    of our withdrawal from Afghanistan. The conclusion to the war in
    Afghanistan offers many lessons and observations we must absorb with
    humility and apply across the force and toward future operations. I
    anticipate the ongoing review directed by the Secretary of Defense to
    examine the withdrawal from Afghanistan will offer critical lessons for
    future operations. In addition, I anticipate the independent
    congressional Afghanistan War Commission, chartered with an examination
    of the entire war, will also yield lessons learned from the withdrawal
    from Afghanistan applicable to the entire force.

        8. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, what lessons
    should we take away from the Afghanistan withdrawal debacle?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. In my view, we are still assessing the
    strategic implications of our withdrawal from Afghanistan for lessons
    we should humbly absorb and apply to future operations. I anticipate
    the Secretary of Defense-directed ongoing review of the withdrawal and
    other aspects of the final days of the war in Afghanistan by an
    independent panel will identify missteps and offer lessons learned for
    future campaigns. In addition, I anticipate the independent Afghanistan
    War Commission, chartered with an examination of the entire war will
    also yield insights from the withdrawal from Afghanistan that will
    apply to future operations.

        9. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, current CENTCOM
    Commander General Kenneth McKenzie said that without United States
    troops on the ground in Afghanistan, counterterrorism strikes would be
    harder, though not impossible, specifically noting that ``[t]he ranges
    will be greater, the resources will be greater, the risks will all be
    greater, but it will be possible to do those things.'' Do you agree
    with this assessment?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, I agree with General McKenzie's
    assessment. Over the horizon counterterrorism operations are difficult,
    but not impossible. Such strikes require increased aerial intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and introduce additional
    complexity and risk than do operations with U.S. forces on the ground.
    If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of over the horizon
    counterterrorism operations and evaluate ways to improve effectiveness
    and mitigate risk.

        10. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, what are the core
    requirements for a successful ``over-the-horizon'' counterterrorism
    campaign in Afghanistan?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Over the horizon counterterrorism
    relies on several capabilities to compensate for a lack of American
    military forces on the ground. If confirmed, I will seek to leverage a
    layered approach inclusive of multiple intelligence sources, refined
    target development, non-kinetic effects, and persistent surveillance.
        Successful over the horizon counterterrorism operations require
    skilled analysts and targeting experts to characterize a terrorist
    network, locate individual terrorists, and identify the presence and
    proximity of civilians. These operations require increased airborne
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to develop,
    track, and strike targets while mitigating the risk of civilian
    casualties.
        Over the horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan are
    particularly challenging; as Afghanistan is a landlocked country, we
    rely on neighboring nations to enter the country through the air; we
    must fly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets a great
    distance to the targeted area. Therefore, these operations require
    access, basing, and overflight agreements with partners in the region.

        11. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in response to an
    advance policy question for your confirmation hearing, you wrote, `` .
    . . through the employment of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) assets, OTH-CT [over the horizon-counterterrorism]
    allows us the ability to degrade terrorist groups that pose a direct
    threat to the United States and our allies in places in which we lack
    physical access.'' Do you believe that an over-reliance on ISR assets,
    coupled with a lack of physical access, could lead to an increase in
    strikes with high collateral damage to civilians?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, I will work diligently to
    mitigate both collateral damage and harm to civilians. Over the horizon
    counterterrorism strikes in areas where we lack U.S. physical presence
    rely heavily on aerial ISR assets. Such operations may increase the
    risk of harm to civilians if not properly resourced. Those risks,
    however, are reduced through expanded human intelligence networks on
    the ground, extensive rehearsals, in-depth target analysis, and
    substantial target development. If confirmed, I will assess U.S.
    Central Command's processes and procedures for OTH-CT to seek ways to
    mitigate these risks. Further, I anticipate the Department of Defense's
    Civilian Harm Mitigation Response and Plan will identify methods to
    drive down risks of civilian harm.

        12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in September
    2021, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated, ``[t]he Taliban has
    committed to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base
    for external operations that could threaten the United States or our
    allies, including al Qaeda and ISIS-K [ISIS-Khorasan Province].'' Do
    you believe the Taliban has fulfilled this commitment?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. I do not believe the Taliban is
    fulfilling its commitment to prevent terrorist groups from using
    Afghanistan as a base from which to threaten the United States or its
    allies.
        The Taliban has not renounced al Qaeda and al Qaeda continues its
    operations in Afghanistan. However, in an attempt to gain international
    legitimacy and support, the Taliban will minimize any relationship with
    al Qaeda.
        Conversely, the Taliban and ISIS-K are openly hostile with one
    another. ISIS-K continues efforts to terrorize the Afghan populace, but
    it is unclear to what extent the Taliban is able to constrain ISIS-K
    attack planning.
        Moving forward, if confirmed, I will work closely with the United
    States Intelligence Community to determine whether the Taliban fulfills
    its September 2021 commitment to prevent violent extremist groups
    including ISIS-K and al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base for
    external operations that may threaten the United States or our allies.

        13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, the most powerful
    faction of the Taliban government, known as the Haqqani Network,
    maintains ties to al Qaeda and to some elements of ISIS-K. The Haqqanis
    have directly the United States and its allies on multiple occasions,
    and in recent years, has held moretargeted United States hostages than
    any other terrorist group. If confirmed, what steps would you take to
    address the Haqqani threat?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. The Haqqani network is a United States
    State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization. The United
    States does not recognize the Taliban Government in Kabul, nor do we
    acknowledge any of its Haqqani members as legitimate.
        If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment of the U.S Central
    Command area of operations, to include an evaluation of all violent
    extremist groups and the risks they pose to Americans. This assessment
    will inform our approach, inclusive of United States interagency,
    allied, and partner efforts, to include the Haqqani network threat.
    Finally, if confirmed, I will work closely with the interagency to
    support the return of American hostages.

        14. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if the Biden
    administration rejoins the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
    do you anticipate any change in Iran's threat disposition or support
    for terrorism absent a follow-on agreement?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. In my view, Iran is the single biggest
    contributor to regional instability across the United States Central
    Command area of responsibility. Iran's increasingly sophisticated
    military capabilities, broad proxy network, and willingness to use
    force against the United States, our allies, and partner forces enable
    it to coerce its neighbors, threaten international trade, and exploit
    instability throughout the region.
        Without knowledge of the specific terms of ongoing diplomatic
    negotiations, it is difficult to assess any change to Iran's threat
    disposition or support for terrorism should the United States rejoin
    the JCPOA. Given Iran's historical support to terrorist activities and
    proxy forces, there is risk such destabilizing behavior will continue.

        15. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in recent months,
    Iranian proxies have escalated their aggression against United States
    partners. The recent Houthi attacks on United Arab Emirates (UAE) were
    particularly concerning. If confirmed, what steps would you take to
    address the Iranian-backed proxy threat in CENTCOM?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, I will assess whether the
    United States and partner integrated air and missile defense capability
    is adequate to counter Houthi ballistic missile, Unmanned Aerial
    Systems (UAS), and Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) threats to our
    forces and our allies and partners, to include the UAE. In addition to
    continued diplomatic engagement, if confirmed, I intend to prioritize
    working with regional partners to build a full range of operations,
    activities, investments, and engagements to address the threat of
    Iranian-backed proxies.
                     china in united states central command
        16. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in recent years,
    the People's Republic of China (PRC) has aggressively advanced their
    Belt and Road Initiative all over the globe, including throughout the
    Middle East. These include the Jizan Industrial Park in Saudi Arabia,
    Duqm Port Project in Oman, and the Khalifa Port and Khalifa Industrial
    Zone in UAE, to name a few. What is your assessment of the growing
    Chinese presence in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. China has significantly increased its
    economic, political, informational, and--to a lesser extent--military
    footprint in the Middle East in the past decade, becoming a major trade
    partner and external investor for many countries in the region.
    Approximately fifty percent of China's petroleum imports come from the
    Middle East. Just last year, Chinese investments in the Middle East
    increased by 360 percent. A total of 18 of the 21 United States Central
    Command countries have economic agreements with China under the Belt
    and Road Initiative (BRI).
        I assess that Chinese influence in the region will only expand in
    the coming years under BRI. To protect its access to more oil and
    natural gas in the Gulf region, Beijing's public policy is that the BRI
    creates ``oil roads'' that ensure a constant flow of energy from the
    Middle East to China. China also intends to rapidly expand its
    telecommunication networks in the region. Strategic competition with
    China is a global priority for the United States and Chinese influence
    in the region challenges American opportunities.

        17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in March of 2021,
    the PRC and Iran signed a 25-year, $400 billion deal for PRC
    investments in Iran in exchange for a regular supply of discounted oil.
    In recent years, China has strengthened its economic ties with the UAE
    and is now one of its largest trading partners as well as the largest
    consumer of Gulf oil. What steps must we take to ensure we remain the
    partner of choice in CENTCOM?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that constraining Chinese
    diplomatic, informational, military, and economic influence requires a
    whole-of-government approach that includes enduring coalitions and
    partnerships. If confirmed, I would focus on operations, activities,
    investments, and engagements in the U.S. Central Command region.
        Exposure of the risks associated with Chinese investment serves our
    interests. China offers predatory economic packages to states that give
    Beijing ownership over critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, our enduring
    relationships offer long-term mutual benefits. In calling out this
    rapacious behavior, we should contrast Chinese activities that
    demonstrate Beijing's treatment of nations as ``clients and customers''
    with the United States national commitment to partnerships and
    alliances.
        In addition, we should continue, and where appropriate expand,
    intelligence sharing, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military
    Financing, and International Military Education and Training programs.

        18. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, is the PRC taking
    any steps to protect its access to oil and natural gas in the Gulf
    region?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, given that almost half of Chinese
    oil comes from the United States Central Command area of
    responsibility, Beijing takes active measures to protect its access to
    oil and natural gas in the Gulf region. China views port facilities as
    the cornerstone of sea lane security and continued access to oil and
    natural gas, driving investment in shipping and port assets across the
    Middle East. Beijing looks to secure access to key maritime shipping
    routes and strategic choke points, including the Straits of Hormuz, Bab
    el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal through infrastructure development and
    other commercial agreements.
        To protect its access to more oil and natural gas in the Gulf
    region, China has expanded its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
    agreements with Gulf states. Beijing's public policy is that the BRI
    creates ``oil roads'' that ensure a constant flow of energy from the
    Middle East to China. Chinese port development projects in UAE, Oman,
    and Egypt provide Beijing with a chain of facilities strategically
    located in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Mediterranean
    Sea critical for maritime shipping.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if confirmed, how
    would you ensure the United States retains a competitive advantage in
    the region against the PRC?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that retaining a
    competitive advantage against the People's Republic of China in the
    United States Central Command area of responsibility requires a whole-
    of-government approach with diplomacy in the lead. If confirmed, I
    would implement a strategy that reinforces our commitments through
    operations, activities, investments, and engagements.
        Critical to this effort is increased regional integration and
    military interoperability through military security cooperation
    activities. Our continued military presence demonstrates our commitment
    to regional security and stability while maintaining our competitive
    advantage in the region against the People's Republic of China.
        If confirmed, I intend to contrast predatory Chinese activities
    that demonstrate Beijing's treatment of nations as ``clients and
    customers'' with the United States national commitment to partnerships
    and alliances. In doing so, the U.S. may remain the security partner of
    choice in the region.

        20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, given the recent
    shift in Department of Defense focus and resources toward United States
    Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), if confirmed, how would you ensure
    evolving threats in CENTCOM are adequately addressed?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, I intend to make an
    assessment of the full spectrum of missions, resources, opportunities,
    and risks within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility,
    inclusive of force posture, partnerships, and threats. This assessment
    will inform me of the best strategy to address evolving threats.
                           extremism in the military
        21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in the wake of
    the events on January 6, 2021, there has been a growing narrative in
    the media, and sadly amongst several of my colleagues here in Congress,
    that the military has a problem with extremism. This narrative stems
    from the fact that 81 veterans, 4 Reservists, and 1 Active Duty
    servicemember were charged with crimes as a result of their actions on
    January 6th. That is 81 veterans out of a population of 18 million, 4
    Reservists out of 810,000 currently serving in the National Guard or
    Reserve, and 1 Active Duty servicemember out of 1.3 million personnel
    on Active Duty. In your opinion, reflecting 30+ years of experience, do
    you believe the U.S. military has a problem with extremism?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Extremism, which is rare among the
    ranks, has no place in our military and violates our Constitutional
    oath. If confirmed, my focus will remain, as it has for 34 years, on
    building disciplined, fit, cohesive teams wherein everyone is treated
    with dignity and respect. Organizations in which all members feel
    valued and leaders know their servicemembers and seek indicators of
    destructive behavior are the greatest hedge against behavior contrary
    to our military values.
        We must be vigilant against extremism in the force. When warning
    signs are observed, they must be reported, investigated, and resolved
    through the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other administrative
    actions.

        22. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do you believe
    the narrative of extremism in the ranks, not supported by data, hurts
    morale in the U.S. military?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Statements characterizing the force
    should be based on accurate data. I believe servicemembers want to
    serve in disciplined, fit, and cohesive organizations in which every
    member trusts one another and leaders care for their troops. Such
    organizations are the best performing, the most combat capable, and
    have the highest morale.

        23. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do you believe
    the U.S. military is systemically racist?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Racism has no place in our military.
    When observed, it must be reported, thoroughly investigated, and then
    adjudicated. While incidents of racism occur and individual racists do
    serve in the military, I do not believe the U.S. military is
    systematically racist.
                                     energy
        24. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, oil and petroleum
    account for 80 percent of Iran's exports and proceeds fund around half
    of their annual budget. Prior to the JCPOA agreement under the Obama
    administration, Iran's oil exports dropped by more than half and its
    total trade by value fell by 50 percent according to the International
    Monetary Fund. In the aftermath of the JCPOA, Iran's crude exports have
    more than doubled, reaching a monthly peak of 2.5 million barrels per
    day in 2018. Do you believe Iran earning more money from oil exports
    increases or decreases its capability to conduct destabilizing activity
    in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR)?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Iran has a long history of using
    profits from oil exports to fund malign and destabilizing activity in
    the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Therefore, increased
    money from oil exports into Iran presents a risk of increased
    destabilizing activity in the region. However, Iran must never obtain a
    nuclear weapon. Enforceable agreements that limit Iran's nuclear
    capability are desirable.

        25. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how would you
    characterize the importance of energy in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. A free flow of energy and commerce
    through the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility is critical to
    regional stability, the global economy, and our national interests in
    the region.

        26. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do you believe
    the United States maintaining energy independence through domestic oil
    and natural gas production helps or hurts U.S. national security?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. In my view, energy independence helps
    U.S. national security as it reduces dependency and reliance on energy
    supplies from other nations.

        27. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do United States
    energy exports to allies and partners provide an effective hedge
    against their need to import Iranian oil?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. An increase in oil production from
    outside Iran decreases Iranian leverage and provides United States
    allies diverse options to meet global energy needs.
                                     israel
        28. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in September
    2021, CENTCOM assumed combatant command responsibility for United
    States Forces in the State of Israel. Will this further enable security
    cooperation between Israel and nations in the CENTCOM AOR?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that Israel's inclusion
    within the United States Central Command area of responsibility offers
    significant opportunities to enable security cooperation. In building
    partnerships and increasing dialogue with Arab neighbors, particularly
    the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this realignment allows for robust
    multilateral relationships capable of addressing shared security
    challenges.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                china and russia
        29. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how are
    unconventional or asymmetric approaches necessary in deterring Chinese
    regional disinformation in CENTCOM?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. U.S. Central Command possesses a
    variety of means to counter disinformation. In my view, our most
    effective strategy is through a whole-of-government approach, including
    Service Component Commanders and the network of Senior Defense
    Officials and Defense Attaches assigned to each embassy within the area
    of responsibility. These leaders provide timely and truthful
    information to our partners, building an enduring trust.
        If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment of the U.S.
    Central Command operational environment. This assessment will include
    an evaluation of Chinese disinformation throughout the region and the
    most effective approaches to countering Chinese disinformation to
    achieve an information advantage.

        30. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how does the
    United States mitigate Russia and China involvement in Afghanistan
    without a presence on the ground?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that mitigation of
    Russian and Chinese involvement in Afghanistan requires a whole-of-
    government strategy centered on the Central and South Asian states. The
    military component of this strategy is best accomplished by fostering
    strong security cooperation. Small United States investments in
    regional partner security cooperation with neighboring states may
    result in exponential strategic gains and offer a counterbalance to
    Russia and China.

        31. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if confirmed,
    how would you address Chinese propaganda or disinformation surrounding
    Afghanistan?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that countering Chinese
    propaganda requires an integrated interagency approach that also
    leverages allies and partners to provide credible local voices
    regarding events and issues in Afghanistan.
        If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment of the
    operational environment which will include a full evaluation of Chinese
    propaganda and disinformation throughout the area of operations, to
    include Beijing's messaging surrounding Afghanistan. This assessment
    will identify the best opportunities to counter this propaganda and
    disinformation.

        32. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if confirmed,
    how would you address Russian propaganda or disinformation surrounding
    Afghanistan?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that countering Russian
    propaganda requires an integrated interagency approach that also
    leverages allies and partners to provide credible local voices
    regarding events and issues in Afghanistan while also taking into
    account Russia's military presence in the region as well as its
    historical influence in, and ties to Afghanistan and the Central Asian
    states.
        If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment of the
    operational environment which will include a full evaluation of Russian
    propaganda and disinformation throughout the area of operations, to
    include Moscow's messaging surrounding Afghanistan. This assessment
    will identify the best opportunities to counter this propaganda and
    disinformation.

        33. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, what traditional
    CENTCOM partners have turned to Russia or China for equipment,
    training, or other military support?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Several CENTCOM partners, to include
    Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and UAE are engaging in largely
    transactional relationships with Russia and China for specific systems
    and capabilities. It is my view that a steady growth in Chinese and
    Russian arms trade agreements with traditional Middle Eastern partners
    represents a concerning trendline as nations look to fill urgent
    capability gaps.
        If confirmed, I will conduct an initial assessment of the U.S.
    Central Command operational environment. This assessment will include
    an evaluation of our Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military
    Financing, International Military Education and Training programs, and
    opportunities that exist to expand security cooperation.

        34. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how do we
    strategically address Beijing's policy of military-civil fusion while
    applying uniquely American competitive advantages?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. I assess that Beijing's policy of
    military-civil fusion is best addressed through a whole-of-government
    approach that reinforces our commitments through operations,
    activities, investments, and engagements in the U.S. Central Command
    region. For example, mutually beneficial enduring coalitions and
    agreements reveal the advantages of partnering with the United States.
    We cannot counter Chinese influence through military power alone. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with our colleagues at the Department of
    State, USAID, and throughout the interagency to strengthen diplomatic
    and economic efforts in the region.
        Communicating our values to the region must serve as an important
    component of this approach. For example, our messaging should contrast
    predatory Chinese activities that demonstrate Beijing's treatment of
    nations as ``clients and customers'' with the United States national
    commitment to partnerships and alliances. In so doing, the U.S. may
    take an important step toward remaining the security partner of choice
    in the region.

        35. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, what linkages do
    you see between the Belt and Road Initiative and military-civil fusion
    in the Middle East?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. The Belt and Road Initiative is making
    inroads into the Middle East, and China's diplomatic, informational,
    military, and economic activities are intrinsically linked.
    Additionally, Chinese military activities in the United States Central
    Command area of operations, including weapons sales, exercises, and
    basing agreements, support Beijing's intent to secure and sustain its
    economic interests.
                                     israel
        36. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how would you
    actively work with partner nations to integrate the Israel Defense
    Forces (IDF) into the regional security architecture?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, I will use my initial
    assessment to evaluate the best mechanisms and opportunities to bring
    the Israeli Defense Forces into an inclusive regional security
    framework. It is my view that the IDF could offer world-class military
    and economic capabilities to its neighbors in a mutually beneficial,
    enduring set of partnerships that bolsters regional security and
    stability.

        37. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, will you
    encourage already-established multinational exercises hosted by
    Israel's Arab partners like Egypt (Bright Star) and the UAE (Iron
    Union) to include Israel, and vice versa, will you encourage Israel to
    invite Arab partners to join their exercises (ex. Blue Flag)?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, if confirmed I will work closely
    with my diplomatic colleagues and regional partners to encourage
    Israeli and Arab participation in multinational exercises such as
    Bright Star, Iron Union, and Blue Flag. Based on recent multinational
    exercises, it is clear Israel's incorporation into exercises is a
    positive step towards advancing regional stability, sending a strong
    signal as a security partner to potential adversaries, and further
    normalizing relationships amongst all United States Central Command
    regional partners.

        38. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, what level of
    involvement do you believe Jerusalem should have in the area of
    responsibility in working groups, task forces, humanitarian missions,
    and multilateral exercises?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that nearly all
    multilateral bodies should welcome Israel. Recognizing that some Arab
    sensitivities may exist, if confirmed, I will work with my diplomatic
    colleagues to carefully address concerns of each partner and ensure
    existing working groups, task forces, humanitarian missions, and
    multilateral exercises employ a deliberate approach to inclusivity.
    Additionally, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
    United States Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian Authority, a
    Department of State position that coordinates with the Government of
    Israel and the Palestinian Authority to enhance security cooperation.

        39. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how can Israel
    be more integrated into regional maritime and air defense security?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Israel brings advanced maritime
    capabilities, air and missile defense capabilities, and expertise to
    the U.S. Central Command. I understand CENTCOM and its Service
    Components are making progress on including Israel into exercises with
    other regional partners. If confirmed, I intend to leverage this
    momentum with Israel and regional partners to better integrate Israeli
    capabilities to address regional security challenges.

        40. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do you think
    incorporating Israel into the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) makes
    sense?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. In my view, incorporation of Israel
    into the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) may bring considerable military
    capability and expertise to this critical regional partnership. With 34
    partner nations, the CMF, centered on adherence to the rules-based
    international order, is the world's largest maritime partnership. With
    shared interest in protecting maritime trade routes in the Gulf of
    Aden, Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea, Israel can add capabilities and
    capacity to the enduring CMF construct.

        41. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, of CMF's three
    separate task forces focused on maritime security, where do you feel
    Israeli participation may be most feasible?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my understanding that Combined
    Maritime Forces member nations conduct operations among the three Task
    Forces consistent with their national mandates and authorizations. Task
    Force 150 conducts counter illicit smuggling in the Gulf of Oman and
    Red Sea. Task Force 151 conducts counter-piracy operations in the
    region, primarily in the Gulf of Aden. Task Force 152 conducts maritime
    security operations in the Arabian Gulf.
        Israeli participation would likely make the most sense in Combined
    Task Force 150, given that its mission to counter illicit smuggling in
    the Gulf of Oman and Red Sea. However, if confirmed, as part of my
    initial command assessment, I will evaluate the capabilities, task
    forces, and multinational exercises within the Combined Maritime Forces
    to identify appropriate areas for the inclusion of Israeli forces.

        42. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if confirmed,
    how do you specifically plan to overcome the problem of distrust when
    it comes to intelligence sharing?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view, based on my experience,
    that distrust in the context of intelligence sharing is overcome
    through emphasis on incremental relationship building between security
    services. Additionally, each of our partners have their own national
    interests, as do we, when it comes to intelligence needs. Recognizing
    that trust in these areas is often accelerated with operational
    results, if confirmed, I will use my initial assessment to evaluate
    areas where confidence building measures can demonstrate value.
        Additionally, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the
    Intelligence Community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to
    ensure we have the authorities to share timely and relevant information
    with our partners, while at the same time asking our partners to do the
    same.
                                      iran
        43. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how prepared are
    American regional allies to counter Iran's proxy forces; furthermore,
    what resources are needed to enhance readiness for military
    alternatives should a diplomatic agreement with Tehran fail to
    materialize?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that Iran's proxy forces
    serve as a key destabilizer in the region. Our regional allies are
    involved in a constant effort to constrain these proxy forces. If
    confirmed, I will conduct a careful assessment of resources required to
    address this threat and evaluation of the unique capabilities that each
    partner nation can apply. This assessment will also examine force
    levels necessary to deter and, if necessary, respond to Iranian threats
    and assess risks and mitigating strategies.

        44. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, what steps is
    CENTCOM taking, in concert with regional partners, to defend against
    Iranian retaliation in a scenario of preventive military action by the
    United States and/or others against Iran's nuclear program?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my view that defense against any
    Iranian retaliation requires a multilateral, fully integrated response
    to address a range of Iranian capabilities, including ballistic and
    cruise missiles with precision guided systems, Unmanned Aerial Systems
    (UAS), maritime interdiction/attacks, cyber attacks, and attacks by
    proxy forces.
        If confirmed, as part of my initial assessment, I will review
    CENTCOM's defensive and contingency plans. I will evaluate whether we
    maintain an adequate posture and strategy to counter an Iranian
    retaliatory strike.

        45. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, do you believe
    that, if it became necessary, the IDF have the capability today to
    defend themselves against the rising threat of a nuclear Iran?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, as part of my initial
    command assessment, I will evaluate the IDF's ability to defend against
    the rising threat of a nuclear Iran. Additionally, I will remain
    consistent with United States policy of commitment to Israel's
    qualitative military edge.

        46. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if the IDF
    needed to act to destroy the Iranian nuclear program, could they set it
    back significantly?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. In my view, Iran gained significant
    technical expertise and knowledge in recent years in pursuit of nuclear
    capability. This expertise and knowledge cannot be completely
    eliminated through military action. A more complete answer to this
    question requires a higher level of classification than this document
    allows and additional consultation with our Israeli partners.

        47. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, could you give
    us CENTCOM's best estimate of how many precision-guided weapons
    Hezbollah now has in its arsenal?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. I am not aware of any unclassified
    CENTCOM estimates of the number of precision-guided weapons Hezbollah
    possesses. In my view, Hezbollah continues to build a large, capable
    arsenal of weapons that likely includes precision-guided and advanced
    conventional weapons.
        If confirmed, I will be prepared to address Hezbollah's order of
    battle, to include precision guided munitions program, in a classified
    forum.

        48. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how significant
    a threat do you see this Iranian precision-guided missile project being
    to United States interests, and what will you do to thwart it in
    Lebanon and elsewhere?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Iran's proliferation of guided weapon
    systems to surrogates, partners, and proxies across the region poses a
    direct, sustained, and expanding threat to United States forces,
    partners, and allies across the U.S. Central Command area of
    responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to
    support a whole-of-government strategy aimed at reducing this threat.
    This will include efforts to expose the Iranian complicity and
    involvement in supplying precision-guided munitions to proxies, as well
    as opportunities to build and strengthen allied and partner air and
    missile defense capabilities.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                       over-the-horizon counterterrorism
        49. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, General Kenneth
    McKenzie, the current commander of CENTCOM, testified that over-the-
    horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan will be
    ``difficult,'' but that they can be done and will allow us to achieve
    our counterterrorism objectives in that country. Do you agree with
    General McKenzie's testimony?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, I agree with General McKenzie's
    testimony statement.

        50. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller) Michael McCord wrote for the record that the
    Department expects over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in
    Afghanistan to cost ``considerably less than the cost of supporting and
    protecting thousands of troops in Afghanistan.'' Do you agree with
    Under Secretary McCord's assessment?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. In my current position I am not aware
    of the detailed cost estimates of over the horizon counterterrorism
    operations nor the cost of maintaining a United States force footprint
    in Afghanistan. Both of these costs would vary based on size, number of
    locations, and force protection requirements for each mission. However,
    in my view it is logical to assume that over the horizon
    counterterrorism operations would likely cost less than a large U.S.
    troop footprint.

        51. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if confirmed, will
    you commit to providing regular updates to Congress on the costs
    associated with over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in
    Afghanistan?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure
    transparency regarding United States Central Command operations,
    including costs associated with over the horizon counterterrorism
    operations in Afghanistan. This includes full compliance with
    departmental reporting requirements across all aspects of operations
    and updates to congressional committees.
                                 burden-sharing
        52. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, you testified in
    agreement with Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
    Christopher Grady that the Department of Defense needs to do less in
    lower-priority theaters, so it can focus more of its scarce resources
    on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase
    in the defense budget. Acknowledging there are certain missions only
    U.S. Forces can perform, would you agree that the United States should
    seek to rely on its allies and partners in the CENTCOM AOR as much as
    possible, so we can protect U.S. vital interests in the CENTCOM AOR,
    while simultaneously reducing United States force levels in that region
    and focusing more of the Department's scarce resources on China in the
    Indo-Pacific?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, I agree that the United States
    should seek to rely on its allies and partners in the United States
    Central Command area of responsibility to allow the Department of
    Defense to focus more intensely on China, the priority pacing
    challenge. If confirmed, as part of my initial command assessment, I
    will evaluate the missions assigned to U.S. Central Command, the
    resources allocated, and the associated risks to force and risk to
    mission given threats facing the region. While there are missions and
    capabilities that only U.S. forces can perform or provide, I will
    always look for ways that allies and partners can mitigate risks and
    fill capability needs.

        53. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, in what ways can we
    make better use of our allies--including NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] forces--and partners in the CENTCOM AOR, so we can
    protect U.S. vital interests in the CENTCOM AOR, while simultaneously
    reducing United States force levels in that region and focusing more of
    the Department's scarce resources on China in the Indo-Pacific?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. If confirmed, as part of my initial
    command assessment I will evaluate our operations with, and resources
    provided by, allies and partners in the region, including those in
    NATO. I intend for this assessment to identify complementary and
    supplementary capabilities that can be utilized in the U.S. Central
    Command area of responsibility. This could identify resources best
    provided by partners and allies.
                                 deterring iran
        54. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, former Acting
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
    Kathryn Wheelbarger has argued, ``Conventional forces are of limited
    use for deterring unconventional attacks'' by Iran or its proxies. She
    went on to argue, ``Countering the threat of militia attacks with
    aircraft carriers and other high-end assets places the U.S. on the
    strategic back foot and drives up costs.'' Do you agree with Ms.
    Wheelbarger's assessment? If not, please provide an explanation for
    your response.
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. I agree with Ms. Wheelbarger's
    assessment that aircraft carriers and other high-end assets are costly.
    Their use against Iranian proxies and unconventional attacks must be
    weighed carefully against global demands posed by China and Russia.
    Conversely, I disagree that conventional forces are of limited use in
    deterring unconventional attacks supported or directed by Iran. Proxy
    forces and unconventional attacks are part of Iran's strategic approach
    against the United States and our interests in the region; Iran
    routinely operates across the spectrum of warfare with an expectation
    that the U.S. will deliver a proportional response.
        Further, it is my view that Iran carefully monitors United States
    assets in the region and measures its use of conventional and
    unconventional forces based on its anticipation of a U.S. response.
    Therefore, conventional forces can serve as a credible deterrence to
    Iranian unconventional or proxy attacks by proxies based on its
    anticipation of how the United States will respond.
                            central command manning
        55. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how many forces are
    assigned to CENTCOM? Please provide an unclassified response.
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my understanding that
    approximately 5,200 uniformed personnel are assigned to U.S. Central
    Command, of which approximately 3,300 are stationed within the area of
    responsibility.

        56. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if you do not
    currently know how many forces are assigned to CENTCOM, do you commit
    to providing that information in a timely manner and unclassified
    format, if you are confirmed?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes.

        57. Senator Hawley. LTG Kurilla in addition to assigned forces, on
    the most recent date for which data is available, how many forces were
    allocated to CENTCOM? Please provide an unclassified response.
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my understanding that
    approximately 40,000 personnel are allocated to U.S. Central Command as
    of January 2022.

        58. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if you do not know
    how many forces were allocated to CENTCOM, in addition to assigned
    forces, on the most recent date for which data is available, do you
    commit to providing that information in a timely manner and
    unclassified format, if you are confirmed?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes.

        59. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, how many civilian
    personnel--including civilians classified as General Schedule and
    contractors--are assigned to CENTCOM? Please provide an unclassified
    response.
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. It is my understanding that there are
    approximately 360 Department of Defense General Schedule civilians, 418
    Defense Intelligence Agency civilians, and 1,431 contractors assigned
    to the U.S. Central Command headquarters. In addition, U.S. Central
    Command has approximately 1,500 civilians and approximately 9,300
    contractors overseas in direct support of operations in the U.S.
    Central Command area of responsibility.

        60. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, if you do not know
    how many civilian personnel--including civilians classified as General
    Schedule and contractors--are assigned to CENTCOM, do you commit to
    providing that information in a timely and unclassified format, if you
    are confirmed?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes.
                         china in u.s. central command
        61. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Kurilla, the CENTCOM AOR
    includes the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb. Are you concerned that
    Chinese forces in Djibouti or neighboring areas might try to prevent
    the United States from using these chokepoints to send reinforcements
    to the Indo-Pacific in a time of crisis or war?
        Lieutenant General Kurilla. Yes, I assess China would use all
    available options to hinder United States military operations in a time
    of crisis or war. The Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb represent
    vulnerabilities to our ability to move forces through the United States
    Central Command region and to the Indo-Pacific area of operations.
        If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough assessment of the U.S.
    Central command operational environment. This assessment will include
    an evaluation of risks to critical waterways and associated mitigation
    strategies.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Michael E.
    Kurilla, USA follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Michael E.
    Kurilla, USA, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
    time the nomination was referred, follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
    General Michael E. Kurilla, USA in connection with his
    nomination follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Lieutenant General Michael E. Kurilla,
    USA was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 15,
    2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
    The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 17,
    2022.]

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