[Senate Hearing 117-995]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-995
THE NOMINATIONS OF: DR. CELESTE ANN WALLANDER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; MS. MELISSA G. DALTON TO
BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC
AFFAIRS; AND DR. JOHN F. PLUMB TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
SPACE POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
January 13, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-384 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TIM KAINE, Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JONI ERNST, Iowa
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
MARK KELLY, Arizona JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
___________
january 13, 2022
Page
The Nominations of: Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander to be Assistant 1
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Ms.
Melissa G. Dalton to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs; and Dr. John F. Plumb
to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James............................................ 3
Witness Statements
Wallander, Dr. Celeste Ann, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of 4
Defense for International Security Affairs.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 43
Questions for the Record....................................... 63
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 69
Biographical Sketch............................................ 70
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 74
Signature Page................................................. 86
Dalton, Ms. Melissa G., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of 7
Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 86
Questions for the Record....................................... 99
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 102
Biographical Sketch............................................ 103
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 107
Signature Page................................................. 119
Plumb, Dr. John F., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 9
for Space Policy.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 119
Questions for the Record....................................... 146
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 152
Biographical Sketch............................................ 153
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 156
Signature Page................................................. 164
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATIONS OF: DR. CELESTE ANN WALLANDER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; MS. MELISSA G. DALTON TO
BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC
AFFAIRS; AND DR. JOHN F. PLUMB TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
SPACE POLICY
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. The Committee meets this morning to consider
the nominations of Dr. Celeste Wallander to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Ms.
Melissa Dalton to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, and Dr. John Plumb to
be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
I thank the nominees for their nominees for their long
careers of service to the United States and a willingness to
assume these important roles.
I would also like to welcome the colleagues and family
members who are here with us today.
Dr. Wallander, I welcome your guest, Professor Jeffrey
Anderson.
Ms. Dalton, I welcome your guest, Jason.
Dr. Plumb, I welcome your parents, John and Marie.
Dr. Wallander, you were nominated to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs. In this role,
you will be the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on
international security issues that relate to Europe, Russia,
the Middle East, and Africa. I would note your qualifications
and experience for this position, including your role as
president and CEO of the United States Russia Foundation,
Senior Director for Russian-Eurasian Affairs on the National
Security Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia during the Obama administration.
If confirmed, there are several challenges that will
require your immediate attention. Most pressing is Russia's
increasingly aggressive posture on the Ukrainian border.
Diplomatic meetings are being held as we speak, but this
relationship is likely to remain a point of contention.
I would ask that you share your assessment of United States
and multilateral efforts to train and equip the Ukrainian
Security Forces and what balance the Department should pursue
in near term, training and equipping needs, and the longer-term
defensive capability development.
Iran also remains a complex challenge for the Department.
Even as indirect negotiations to return to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, take place in Vienna
this month, Iranian-linked proxies continue to mount drone and
rocket attacks in the region, including against bases in Iraq
and Syria with a United States military presence.
I look forward to your testimony on how the Department of
Defense should respond to Iranian and malign influence in the
region, while preserving our continuing nuclear negotiations.
Ms. Dalton, you are nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. This
position is responsible for supervision of the Homeland Defense
activities of the Department of Defense, as well as defense
support of civil authorities, Arctic, and global resilience,
and also western hemispheric affairs.
You have decades of experience, including your current
role, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense
to Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, will serve your well in
this position. If confirmed, you will be responsible for
integrating the Department of Defense's Homeland Defense
activities to include efforts to protect critical
infrastructure and assisting in Homeland Defense matters for
U.S. Northern Command, other combatant commands, and the
National Guard.
I would like to know what you see as the major challenges
in the coming years with respect to these issues, including
protection of the Defense Industrial Base.
Additionally, you will be responsible for policy issues
relating to the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic; regions,
that have seen increased attention from Russia, China, Iran,
and other recent actors.
I look forward to your testimony on the appropriate role of
the Department of Defense in competing strategically in these
key regions.
Dr. Plumb, you are nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense to Space Policy. This is a new position that was
established in the fiscal year 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act to ensure dedicated policy oversight over the
newly created Space Force. You are well qualified for this
position, having managed Missile Defense and Space Policy
issues for the Defense Department during the Obama
administration, as well as holding an undergraduate degree in
physics and a doctorate in aerospace engineering.
As Section 955 of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA outlines, the
principal duty of the Assistant Secretary shall be overall
supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space
warfighting. I would highlight the word ``principal,'' because
the Department has undertaken a major reorganization of the
office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and has
realigned Nuclear Missile Defense, Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction, and Cybersecurity to your space portfolio.
Although similar in scope to earlier versions of this
position, there are major differences for your office,
including the disbanding of the Office of Nuclear Missile
Defense Policy, significant changes to the former Office of
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the movement of
Missile Defense to the Office of Space Policy; furthermore,
Cybersecurity, with all of its complexity, has been added to
your plate.
During today's hearing, I will ask for your views about
this reorganization and your plan to ensure that nuclear
deterrence, the bedrock of our national security, is not lost
in the shuffle; especially, as a new Nuclear Posture Review is
imminent and we continue to grapple with serious challenges
from China and Russia.
Thank you, again, to our nominees. I look forward to your
testimonies.
Now, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses for being with us for this session.
In 2021, our top military and intelligence leaders told
this Committee that the world is in the most dangerous and
complex position that it has been in our lifetimes and I agree
with it, and looking at what is happening across the world, you
have to agree.
In 2018, the National Defense Strategy, there is our book
that we, it served us very well as a blueprint. It provides a
roadmap to prioritize security to challenge. I know that they
are going to be re-doing this and upgrading it and all of that,
and I hope that we don't lose the value that it has been to us
before, because it is truly a masterpiece.
We have a lot of challenges in areas overseas. China's
military modernization continues at an alarming pace and the
massive growth in its arsenal of nuclear weapons and hypersonic
missiles clearly shows that they are watching in an
unprecedented strategy breakout.
Russia has built up well over 100,000 troops around Ukraine
and is ready for, yet, another invasion if Putin gives the
word. Russia also recently tested an anti-satellite missile,
creating a cloud of lethal debris that made astronauts scramble
for safety. This, again, shows Putin's blatant disregard for
established norms.
Meanwhile, Iran continues to fund global terrorism and
target American personnel and partners, and rampant inflation
is eating away at the defense budget. Not only our troops, A,
and the benefits, but also funding for training, maintenance,
and weapons acquisition. This administration seems unable and/
or unwilling to effectively respond to the growing dangers and
this paralysis damages U.S. credibility and undermines the
trust of our partners and allies.
Even know, the administration seems intent on ending
decades of all the security guarantees by watering down our
United States nuclear policies and exposing allies. I will have
the chance to pursue this a little bit during my time for
questioning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Now let me recognize Dr. Wallander for her testimony.
Doctor?
STATEMENT OF DR. CELESTE ANN WALLANDER, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Dr. Wallander. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as
you consider my nomination to serve as Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs.
I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, and
Under Secretary Kahl for their trust in my ability to serve in
this role. It is also a privilege to appear on this panel with
colleagues who have also been nominated for Assistant Secretary
roles. If confirmed, it would be my honor to work alongside
them and ensure coordination between the regional and
functional policy offices within the Department.
I would like to take a moment to thank my dad, who served
in the U.S. Navy, and is a retired Chicago police officer, and
my mom, who immigrated to the United States as a little girl
from Europe after World War II. They taught me the gift of
American citizenship and the duty to serve our country. I also
thank my husband Jeff and our children Nathaniel, Joseph, and
Genevieve, for their unshakeable love and support.
I am humbled by the prospect of returning to public
service. I served at the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2009 to 2012,
and then on the National Security Council staff as the Senior
Director for Russia and Central Asia from 2013 to 2017. These
roles equipped me with the skills to manage critical defense
relationships, navigate the interagency policy formation
process, and develop national security policy in response to
complex geopolitical contexts.
I have dedicated my career to both, studying and working
policy on European and Eurasian security, with a focus on
Russian foreign, military, and security affairs.
If confirmed, I would work to utilize my scholarly and
government experiences in the service of U.S. national
security.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs covers a broad portfolio that includes well
over 100 countries. ISA develops security policy and manages
defense and military relations. It stewards Department
resources to develop military capabilities, support security
cooperation programs, conduct foreign military sales, and
perform other key activities in those regions. I would be
honored to lead the talented professionals supporting this vast
portfolio should I be confirmed.
The regional portfolio presents some of the most difficult
defense challenges facing the United States. I appreciate that
Members of this Committee are closely tracking Russian threats
against Ukraine. As a private citizen, I have been deeply
concerned about Russian military concentrations.
If confirmed, I would develop policy and strategic options
for the Secretary to deter Russia, ensure appropriate response
to Russian aggression, and safeguard United States and
Transatlantic security.
I support the Biden administration's work to unite NATO on
deterrence and diplomacy, as well as provide continued
defensive, lethal assistance to Ukraine. I also support the
administration's close consultations with European allies and
partners on options for deterrence, as well as serious
consequences for Russia in the event of escalation.
If confirmed, I will be ready and able to advance the
Department's preparations for all contingencies. This will be
my top priority, if confirmed, and, I would immediately focus
on being briefed in detail about the current state of play.
I share the goals and commitments advanced in the Global
Posture Review, including an effective counterterrorism posture
in the Middle East and robust deterrence against Iran. Our
force protection mission is also essential, particularly, in
the face of attacks by Iranian proxies in Iraq.
If confirmed, I will also advance our strategy in Africa to
build partner capacity, strengthen African security
institutions, and counter violent extremist organizations.
I share Secretary Austin's view that China is the pacing
challenge for the Department. I also share his view that the
strength of our alliances and partnerships is one of our
greatest assets in that challenge, and all others.
If confirmed, I will prioritize these critical defense
partnerships in order to strengthen our security and deter our
adversaries.
The responsibilities of International Security Affairs
require thoughtful and sustained military diplomacy with our
allies and partners across the globe. I know that Members of
this Committee recognize the importance of this mission, and I
am personally invested in working with Congress to address
these shared challenges and opportunities. I appreciate your
longstanding bipartisan approach to national security issues
and would look forward to working in partnership with this
Committee and consulting regularly with Congress, if confirmed.
Thank you for considering my nomination, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The statement of Dr. Wallander follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander
Good morning Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Under
Secretary Kahl for their trust in my ability to serve in this role. It
is also a privilege to appear on this panel with esteemed colleagues
who have also been nominated for Assistant Secretary roles. If
confirmed, it would be my honor to work alongside them and ensure
coordination between the regional and functional policy offices within
the Department.
I would like to take a moment to thank my Dad, who served in the
U.S. Navy and is a retired Chicago police officer, and my Mom, who
immigrated to the United States as a little girl from Europe after
World War II. They taught me the gift of American citizenship, and the
duty to serve our country. I also thank my husband Jeff and our
children Nathaniel, Joseph, and Genevieve for their unshakeable love
and support.
I am humbled by the prospect of returning to public service and
rejoining OSD Policy. I previously served at the Pentagon as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from
2009 to 2012, and then on the National Security Council staff as the
Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia from 2013 to 2017. These
roles equipped me with the skills to manage critical defense
relationships, navigate the interagency policy formation process, and
develop national security policy in response to complex geopolitical
contexts.
I have dedicated my career to both studying and working policy on
European and Eurasian security, with a focus on Russian foreign,
military, and security affairs. If confirmed, I would work to utilize
my scholarly and government experiences in the service of U.S. national
security.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs covers a broad regional portfolio that includes well over 100
countries and develops security policy, manages defense and military
relations, and stewards Department resources to develop military
capabilities, support security cooperation programs, conduct foreign
military sales, and perform other key activities in those regions. I
would be honored to lead the talented professionals supporting this
vast portfolio should I be confirmed--working closely with Joint Staff
and Combatant Command colleagues, and representing the Department of
Defense within the interagency.
This regional portfolio presents some of the most difficult defense
challenges facing the United States. I appreciate that Members of this
Committee are closely tracking Russian threats against Ukraine. As a
private citizen, I too have been deeply concerned about public reports
regarding Russian military concentrations. If confirmed, I would
develop policy and strategic options for the Secretary to consider to
deter Russia, ensure appropriate response to Russian aggression, and
safeguard United States and Transatlantic security.
I support the Biden Administration's work to unite NATO on
deterrence and diplomacy, as well as provide continued defensive lethal
assistance to Ukraine. I also support the Administration's close
consultations with European allies and partners on options for
deterrence, as well as serious consequences for Russia in the event of
escalation. If confirmed, I will be ready and able to advance the
Department's preparations for all contingencies. This will be my top
priority, if confirmed, and, I would immediately focus on being briefed
in-detail about the current state-of-play.
I share the goals and commitments advanced in the Global Posture
Review, including an effective counterterrorism posture in the Middle
East and robust deterrence against Iran. Our force protection mission
is also essential, particularly in the face of attacks by Iranian
proxies in Iraq. If confirmed, I will also advance our strategy in
Africa to build partner capacity, strengthen African security
institutions, and counter violent extremist organizations.
This portfolio also contains some of the greatest opportunities for
American national security and our key defense interests. I share
Secretary Austin's view that China is the pacing challenge for the
Department. I also share his view that the strength of our alliances
and partnerships is one of our greatest assets--in that challenge, and
all others. If confirmed, I will prioritize these critical defense
partnerships in order to strengthen our security and deter our
adversaries.
The responsibilities of International Security Affairs require
thoughtful and sustained military diplomacy with our allies and
partners across the globe. I know that Members of this Committee
recognize the importance of this mission, and I am personally invested
in engaging with Congress to address these shared challenges and
opportunities. I appreciate your longstanding bipartisan approach to
national security issues and would look forward to working in
partnership with this Committee and consulting regularly with Congress,
if confirmed.
Thank you for considering my nomination and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Ms. Dalton, please?
STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA G. DALTON, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC
AFFAIRS
Ms. Dalton. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be considered as
President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.
I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, Deputy
Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Kahl for their trust and
confidence in me.
I wish to thank my family, friends, and mentors for their
encouragement, particularly, my husband and true north, Jason,
who is here today; my two amazing children, Jacob and Isabelle;
and my parents, Ann and Ravi.
My father chose to make this country his own as an
immigrant from India. He and my mother imbued within me a deep
respect for the foundational values of our great Nation. I come
from a family committed to public service and have been drawn
to it since I was 22 years old. I am honored by the prospect of
serving in this new capacity.
I began my career at the Defense Department as a civil
servant during the Bush administration and served for a decade
in several policy and intelligence roles. I then spent 6 years
at the bipartisan think tank, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. I was honored to return to OSD Policy
last January as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities as a member of the Biden-
Harris administration.
If confirmed, I would bring my experience as a defense
leader, thinker, and practitioner to the position.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Hemispheric Affairs, I would look forward to advancing enduring
Department priorities and new focus areas, such as Arctic
security and climate policy, if confirmed. My office would
prioritize issues that impact our homeland defense as the
Department's number one priority.
If confirmed, my priority would be defeating the COVID-19
pandemic, which remains the most immediate threat to U.S.
national security and to the health, safety, and readiness of
our servicemembers; in addition, if confirmed, I would ensure
DOD maintains resilience to execute our most critical national
security functions, and to provide continuity to other parts of
Government, in the face of all hazard threats. The resilience
of our critical infrastructure and capabilities at home
strengthens deterrence of potential adversary aggression and
enables a robust foreign policy abroad.
If confirmed, I would ensure DOD's unparalleled and
flexible capacity is leveraged effectively and appropriately in
support of Federal, State, and local leadership, law
enforcement, public health, and emergency management.
Under the updated OSD-Policy organization, Homeland Defense
and Hemispheric Affairs will also focus on Arctic security and
global resilience. The Arctic is a complex theater of growing
strategic importance. I appreciate this Committee's leadership
in prioritizing this region.
In addition, as Secretary Austin has stated, to keep the
Nation secure, we must tackle the existential threat of climate
change. Climate change already touches most of what the
Department does, and this threat will continue to have
implications for U.S. national security.
Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs is also the office
from which DOD supports civil authorities responding to extreme
weather events, including wildfires and hurricanes.
If confirmed, I would provide oversight of these distinct,
but also interrelated issues, as part of a whole-of-government
approach.
If confirmed, my office would unite policymaking on both
sides of the Southwest Border, bringing our defense
relationships with Central and South American neighbors under
the same policy oversight umbrella as our support to the
Department of Homeland Security and local partners on the
border. This organization will help us make better and more
holistic policy across these issues to address the drivers of
migration and effects in the Homeland as part of a whole-of-
government and whole-of-society approach.
More broadly, if confirmed, I would seek to forge even
deeper bonds with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, based on
principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment to
economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.
On the many issues in this portfolio, DOD plays a critical
supporting role to other departments and agencies.
If confirmed, I am committed to making sure that DOD
supports civil authorities to the best of our ability, without
compromising DOD's core missions and warfighting readiness. I
would also focus on building relationships and trust across
Government and reinforcing the strong tradition of healthy
civil-military relations in the Department and in our
democracy, to do this job as effectively as possible, if
confirmed.
I have deep appreciation for this Committee and its role in
the formation and oversight of our national security policy.
If confirmed, I commit to consulting with you regularly to
advance our Nation's priorities in an , bipartisan, and
cooperative spirit together.
Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Melissa Dalton
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee,
it is an honor to be considered as President Biden's nominee for
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric
Affairs. I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, Deputy
Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Kahl for their trust and
confidence in me.
I wish to thank my family, friends, and mentors for their
encouragement, particularly my husband and true north Jason, my two
amazing children Jacob and Isabelle, and my parents, Ann and Ravi. My
father chose to make this country his own as an immigrant from India.
He and my mother imbued within me a deep respect for the foundational
values of our great Nation. I come from a family committed to public
service and have been drawn to it since I was 22 years old. I am
honored by the prospect of serving in this new capacity.
I began my career at the Defense Department as a civil servant
during the Bush Administration and served for a decade in several
policy and intelligence roles. I then spent six years at the bipartisan
think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I was
honored to return to OSD Policy last January as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities as
a member of the Biden-Harris Administration. If confirmed, I would
bring my experience as a defense leader, thinker, and practitioner to
the position.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Hemispheric Affairs, I would look forward to advancing enduring
Department priorities and new focus areas, such as Arctic security and
climate policy, if confirmed. My office would prioritize issues that
impact our Homeland defense as the Department's number one priority. If
confirmed, my priority would be defeating the COVID-19 pandemic, which
remains the most immediate threat to U.S. national security and to the
health, safety, and readiness of our Service Members. In addition, if
confirmed, I would ensure DOD maintains resilience to execute our most
critical national security functions, and to provide continuity to
other parts of the government, in the face of all-hazard threats. The
resilience of our critical infrastructure and capabilities at home
strengthens deterrence of potential adversary aggression and enables a
robust foreign policy abroad. If confirmed, I would ensure DOD's
unparalleled and flexible capacity is leveraged effectively and
appropriately in support of Federal, State, and local leadership; law
enforcement; public health; and emergency management.
Under the updated OSD-Policy organization, Homeland Defense and
Hemispheric Affairs will also focus on Arctic security and global
resilience. The Arctic is a complex theater of growing strategic
importance. I appreciate this Committee's leadership in prioritizing
this region. In addition, as Secretary Austin has stated, to keep the
Nation secure, we must tackle the existential threat of climate change.
Climate change already touches most of what the Department does, and
this threat will continue to have implications for U.S. national
security. Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs is also the office
from which DOD supports civil authorities responding to extreme weather
events, including wildfires and hurricanes. If confirmed, I would
provide oversight of these distinct but also interrelated issues, as
part of a whole-of-government approach.
If confirmed, my office would unite policymaking on both sides of
the Southwest Border--bringing our defense relationships with Central
and South American neighbors under the same policy oversight umbrella
as our support to the Department of Homeland Security and local
partners on the border. This organization will help us make better and
more holistic policy across these issues to address the drivers of
migration and effects in the Homeland as part of a whole-of-government
and whole-of-society approach. More broadly, if confirmed, I would seek
to forge even deeper bonds with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, based
on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment to
economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.
On many of the issues in this portfolio, DOD plays a critical
supporting role to other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I am
committed to making sure that DOD supports civil authorities to the
best of our ability, without compromising DOD's core missions and
warfighting readiness. I would also focus on building relationships and
trust across government and reinforcing the strong tradition of healthy
civil-military relations in the Department and in our democracy, to do
this job as effectively as possible, if confirmed.
I have deep appreciation for this Committee and its role in the
formation and oversight of our national security policy. If confirmed,
I commit to consulting with you regularly to advance our Nation's
priorities in an active, bipartisan, and cooperative spirit together.
Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Dr. Plumb, please?
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of the
Committee, thank you. I am both, proud and humbled, to be
testifying before you today. I have always admired and
respected the thoughtful, bipartisan work of this Committee.
I would like to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin,
and Deputy Secretary Hicks for their trust in me and in my
ability to continue to serve the Nation, if confirmed as the
first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
I would like to thank, also, my parents, who are here
today, and my brother and sisters, and my wife and kids for
their love and support, that allows me to be here before you
today, and being here is, indeed, an honor.
I grew up in rural, Western New York, in a family for whom
service to country is a proud tradition. Both my grandfathers
were in the Army Air Corps during World War II.
My father was in the Army for the first 4 years of my life,
at Fort Richardson in Alaska. I have a brother and a sister who
serve in the Air Force, and as for me, I joined the Navy and
became a submarine officer.
Since leaving Active Duty, I have remained active in the
Navy Reserves for two decades. As a civilian, I have served in
these very halls as the military advisor to Senator Ken
Salazar. I have served in the Pentagon, and I have served on
the National Security Council staff.
If confirmed, I believe my lifetime of service has prepared
me to better advance and defend U.S. national security
interests, and to work with this Committee while doing so.
The ASD for Space Policy position appropriately elevates
the space portfolio within the Policy organization.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee
to ensure space receives the attention, the prioritization, and
the resources this critical domain demands. Space, nuclear
weapons, missile defenses, cyber, and the ability to detect and
stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are all
key to U.S. national security, and the integration of these
capabilities is essential for the era of strategic competition
the U.S. must now rise to meet.
As Members of this Committee are well aware, the security
environment facing the United States at this moment in history
is a challenging one. Secretary Austin has articulated that
China is the pacing challenge for the Department, and China's
behavior with its own strategic capabilities is a matter of
grave concern. From its kinetic anti-satellite weapon test in
2007 that created a persistent debris cloud, to the
uncontrolled reentry of a rocket stage last May, China has yet
to demonstrate that it is a responsible spacefaring nation.
In the cyber domain, the growing pace and scale of
cyberattacks from China far exceeds the bounds of traditional
statecraft. The Commander of United States Strategic Command
has expressed concern that China's nuclear forces are in the
midst of a strategic breakout. Reports of a hypersonic glide
vehicle test in August, via a fractional orbit bombardment
system, if true, are deeply troubling, and maybe most
troublesome of all is China's near, total lack of transparency
regarding its strategic capabilities, and its demonstrated
unwillingness to discuss them.
Russia also continues to present a challenge on multiple
fronts. Russian activities in space, including its destructive
ASAT test just this November, are an ongoing concern. Russia's
reliance on, and integration of, nuclear weapons throughout its
forces, from the tactical to strategic, is troubling. Russian
cyber activity includes State tolerance of cyber criminals and
State-sponsored weaponization of social media.
Amid all these problems, North Korea continues to expand
its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, while Iran's uranium
enrichment presents both, a nuclear proliferation and a
security challenge.
I understand the Department is diligently working to
strengthen our deterrence posture: modernizing our nuclear
deterrent, modernizing our infrastructure, improving our cyber
defenses and capabilities, and working to protect and defend
our interests, not just on Earth, but in space.
If confirmed, I will work to continue these efforts, while
seeking to incorporate our allies as fully as possible.
I firmly believe our allies provide a mutual, strategic
advantage that neither China, nor Russia could ever hope to
match.
I believe the U.S. is at its strongest and best when
national security is a bipartisan effort, and that is, the old
adage goes: Politics really should stop at the water's edge.
If confirmed, that is how I intend to approach the position
and its attendant responsibilities, and if confirmed, I commit
to working closely with this Committee to ensure U.S. national
security interests are advanced and defended.
Thank you once more for inviting me to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Dr. Plumb follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John F. Plumb
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of the Committee--
thank you. I am both proud and humbled to be testifying before you
today. I have always admired and respected the thoughtful, bipartisan
work of this Committee.
I would like to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Deputy
Secretary Hicks for their trust in me and in my ability to continue
serving the Nation if confirmed as the first Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy.
Thanks also to my parents, my brother and sisters, and my wife and
children for their love and support that allows me to be here before
you today, and being here is indeed an honor.
I grew up in rural Western New York, in a family for whom service
to country is a proud tradition. Both my grandfathers were in the Army
Air Corps during World War II. My father was in the Army for the first
four years of my life, stationed at what was then Fort Richardson in
Alaska. I have a brother and a sister who served in the Air Force. As
for me, I joined the Navy and became a submarine officer.
Since leaving Active Duty, I have remained active in the Navy
reserves for two decades. As a civilian, I have served in these very
halls as the military advisor to Senator Ken Salazar; I have served in
the Pentagon; and I've served on the National Security Council staff.
If confirmed, I believe my lifetime of service has prepared me to
better advance and defend U.S. national security interests, and to work
with this Committee while doing so.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy position
appropriately elevates the space portfolio within the Policy
organization. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this
Committee to ensure space receives the attention, prioritization, and
resources this critical domain demands. Space, nuclear weapons, missile
defenses, cyber, and the ability to detect and stop the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction are all key to U.S. national security.
The integration of these capabilities is essential for the era of
strategic competition the U.S. must now rise to meet.
As Members of this Committee are well aware, the security
environment facing the United States at this moment in history is a
challenging one. The Secretary has articulated that China is the pacing
challenge for the Department, and China's behavior with its own
strategic capabilities is a matter of grave concern. From its kinetic
anti-satellite weapon test in 2007 that created a persistent debris
cloud, to the uncontrolled reentry of a rocket stage last May, China
has not yet demonstrated that it is a responsible spacefaring nation.
In the cyber domain, the growing pace and scale of cyberattacks
from China far exceeds the bounds of traditional statecraft. The
Commander of United States Strategic Command has expressed concern that
China's nuclear forces are in the midst of a strategic breakout.
Reports of a hypersonic glide vehicle test in August via a fractional
orbit bombardment system, if true, are deeply troubling. Perhaps most
troublesome of all is the near-total lack of transparency by China
regarding its strategic capabilities, and its demonstrated
unwillingness to discuss them.
Russia also continues to present a challenge on multiple fronts.
Russian activities in space--including its destructive ASAT test in
November--are an ongoing concern. Russia's reliance on, and integration
of, nuclear weapons throughout its forces is problematic. Russian cyber
activity includes state tolerance of cyber criminals and state-
sponsored weaponization of social media.
Amid these growing problems, North Korea continues to expand its
nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, while Iran's uranium enrichment
presents both a nuclear proliferation and a security challenge.
I understand the Department is diligently working to strengthen our
deterrence posture - by modernizing our nuclear deterrent and
infrastructure; improving our cyber defenses and capabilities; and
working to protect and defend our interests not just on earth but in
space. If confirmed, I will work to continue these efforts while
seeking to incorporate our allies as fully as possible. Our allies
provide a mutual strategic advantage that neither China nor Russia can
ever hope to match.
I believe the United States is at its strongest and best when
national security is a bipartisan effort, and that--as the old adage
goes--politics should stop at the water's edge. If confirmed, that is
how I intend to approach the position and its attendant
responsibilities, and if confirmed, I commit to working closely with
this Committee to ensure U.S. national security interests are advanced
and defended.
Thank you once more for inviting me to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
I have a series of standard questions, which survey
nominees must respond to. You may answer together.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
Subcommittees and other appropriate Committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
this Committee when requested?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its Subcommittees, or other appropriate
Committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
regarding a basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses
and briefers in response to a congressional request?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Ms. Dalton, it was just announced this morning that the
President and Secretary Austin have directed the deployment of
approximately 1,000 military medical personnel to several
states, including the state of Rhode Island, to provide support
with the Omicron variant proliferation.
One of your responsibilities, as you have indicated, is to
cooperate the support, such as this, to states, to localities,
to the Northern Command, et cetera.
Are you concerned about the strain that the Defense Support
of Civil Authorities is placing on our Active forces and also
our National Guard?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for the question.
This terrible pandemic, unfortunately, has taken countless
lives over the last 2 years and it is the most immediate threat
to the United States and Americans, and so, I believe that the
National Guard has played a really important role in supporting
local medical authorities and in the development and production
of vaccines.
If confirmed, I would look forward to building upon these
efforts to support civil authorities, as appropriate, but as
you indicated, Senator, an important element of determining the
appropriate use of the DSCA authority is looking towards
warfighting readiness. The Secretary has made clear that the
number one pacing challenge for the Department is China.
So, I would look forward to applying that framework, if
confirmed.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much.
Dr. Wallander, you are being nominated for a very critical
position at the moment because of the situation on the
Ukrainian border. But you were, I believe, in the White House
on the National Security Council in 2014 when Russia moved into
the Crimea and Donbas.
Can you reflect about how those experiences will shape or
help your response in your analysis of these issues?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for your focus on this
critical issue for American and allied national security at
this time.
Russia has proven itself to be willing and able to use
multiple instruments in pursuit of its national security goals,
including preventing Ukraine from continuing the path of its
Euro-Atlantic aspirations. I believe that the lessons of 2014
were that the United States needs to be, first and foremost,
unified with our allies and partners, not only in Europe, but
globally, in order to provoke a unified front to the Kremlin
and make them understand that they cannot divide us. The second
lesson would be to rapidly develop ways to impose costs on the
Russian leadership and to support Ukraine in defense of its
territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Plumb, the office you are nominated to lead is nearly
identical to the Office of Global Strategic Affairs, which was
abolished in 2014, except that the Office of Nuclear and
Missile Defense Policy has now been abolished with the nuclear
policy mission being merged into an Office of Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction, now renamed: Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Policy.
If confirmed, and given our circumstances with Russia and
China, can you use this new arrangement to maintain our
critical strategic deterrence policy, and in that response, why
did we need such a reorganization?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you very much, Senator.
Just from the top, let me just say our nuclear deterrence
mission is absolutely critical. Secretary Austin has called it
the Department of Defense's number one priority. I fully agree
with that assessment.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our nuclear
deterrent is safe, strong, effective, and credible. As for the
ability to maintain the offices, so inside this office, the
Secretary transferred policy, in my experience, there are
individual offices. The offices move as a unit.
So, the Nuclear Weapons Policy Office remains intact; it is
now merged with the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Office. I think there is actually some advantage to having
those two offices in the same, underneath the same DESI-ship
because it requires them to coordinate with each other and be
aware of each other at a level that, perhaps, they weren't in
previous organizations.
The logic to the reorg, I guess, I would say I think there
is a good logic to it. I think the functional aspects of
Department of Defense need to be integrated as we approach the
adversaries, and, our near-peer adversaries are the same in all
domains: China and Russia, and so, for that, I think there is
good logic in making sure that those plans and approaches are
integrated. The adversary clearly sees us as a whole and not
stovepiped.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe, please?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have a question for each one of the witnesses, and so
I am going to ask for real fast responses and try to get to all
three of them, in fact, we will get to all three of them.
Dr. Plumb, five of my colleagues and I recently sent a
letter to senior administration officials expressing concern
that President Biden might pursue changes to a longstanding
United States nuclear declaratory policy, despite increasingly
give moves by China and Russia and the clear objectives,
objections that we have had from our allies.
Deputy Secretary Hicks agreed with our conclusion at her
confirmation hearing, stating, I don't believe that a no-first-
use policy is in the best interests of the United States.
Do you agree?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, thank you.
I agree with Deputy Secretary Hicks. I personally, do not
believe no-first-use is a good idea at this time, and I would
say taking the allies into consideration is absolutely
essential. My caveat here, of course, is declaratory policy is
the purview of the President.
Senator Inhofe. Well, and, yeah, because I think it was
pretty specific when she said, I don't believe no-first-use
policy is in the best interests of the United States.
Thank you very much.
Dr. Wallander, China is aggressively modernizing its
military and expanding its presence around the world and
particularly true in Africa. I can remember it wasn't too long
ago we didn't even have an AFRICOM and the continent was
divided into three different commands. That was not workable;
we didn't correct that, and so we have gotten a lot more
attention.
However, China is becoming a lot more aggressive in
Djibouti and other areas in there. General Townsend called it
the number one global power competition concern.
This has been a concern of mine for a long period of time.
Even at the time that we started its own dedicated command, but
nonetheless, the problem is still there, and know that AFRICOM
does not have the capabilities and resources to actually
address this, and I think that is a problem.
Do you agree that it is a problem that we lack resources in
taking care of the needs that we have in our allies in that
continent?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for your focus on the
issue of Chinese and Russian strategic competition, active in
Africa. I share your concern.
I, if confirmed, look forward to building on the existing
defense and security partnerships we have with our, with
countries in Africa, and I believe and agree with you that we
need to look at the resources, especially as China has pivoted
towards seeking military access and presence. Senator Inhofe.
All the way down through, and that is true.
I may come back if I have a minute, but, regardless, I look
forward to visiting with you with regularity on this subject.
Ms. Dalton, the year 2021 witnessed the surge in illegal
Southwest Border crossings and the Border Patrol recorded
174,000 encounters with illegal immigrants in November. That is
a record for that month.
President Biden and his spokesperson have both referred to
this as a crisis and I believe. I agree that it is a crisis.
I would like to ask if you agree that it is a crisis that
we are facing right now on our Southwest Border?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
challenge, and I agree with you that it is a serious situation
on the Southwest Border.
If confirmed, I would look forward to working as part of an
interagency effort both, in the Homeland context, working
closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice to address the challenge, and then also
working very closely with our Central and South American
partners upstream to address some of the drivers of migration,
I think.
Senator Inhofe. That is fine.
So, you agree that it is a crisis?
Ms. Dalton. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Shaheen. Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Let me begin by congratulating each of our nominees and
thanking for your willingness to serve.
I would like to begin with you, Dr. Plumb. I chair the
Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee and
I have supported the effort to transition the civil space
situation of awareness from the Space Force's 30th Space Wing
to the Department of Commerce. Unfortunately, I have to say
that the transition has been challenged by a lack of clarity on
the cost of that mission. There has not been a willingness on
the part of the agency to be forthcoming on the cost and that
puts us in a really difficult position, with respect to how
much money we need to try and appropriate for the Department of
Commerce.
So, if confirmed, will you commit to working with me to
improve the Department of Defense's transparency on this issue
so that we can better make that transition and ensure that the
funding is there that is going to be needed?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, thank you for that question.
I think space-traffic management is absolutely essential
and I do agree that it should be conducted by a civil agency
and not the Department of Defense. I will commit to you to help
discover the right amount of resources and training and
opportunities needed to make that shift.
It is a difficult shift, but I think it is needed.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Dr. Wallander, in your article ``NATO's Enemies Within,''
you stated that NATO actually faces new vulnerabilities as we
see some of its recent members that are drifting towards
authoritarianism; Hungary the one that comes most to mind.
But that gives Russia more insights into what is happening
at NATO at a very critical time.
So, can you talk about what your role might be and what the
appropriate role of the Department of Defense ought to be as we
look at what is happening with some of those countries in NATO.
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you. Thank you for reading my
article and thank you for highlighting the importance of NATO
as a military alliance, but a military alliance of democratic
countries. The strength of NATO lies in the defense and
military capabilities of its members, but also the quality of
its democratic governance of its members.
It is in that regard, if confirmed, I would focus on, as
the Defense Department does in its security and defense
partnerships with allies and partners, issues of democratic
governance, civilian control of the military.
The strong bond of NATO allies, that is part of what keeps
it strong, and as you note, limits the influence of Russian
corrupt political and business relationships.
Senator Shaheen. Would you agree that right now, given
Russia's threat to Ukraine, that that is particularly critical?
It was disappointing to hear the readout from the meeting
yesterday that Russia was suggesting that because we are not
willing to give them a veto threat over who joins NATO that it
is going to, it sounded like it encourages them to think about
invading Ukraine.
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I very much share your concern at
Russian threats and statements. I think we see the efforts of
Russia to prevent another aspirant country, Ukraine, which
seeks that democratic, Euro-Atlantic future and Russia
leverages, not just military capabilities, but political and
economic influence, to try to prevent that from happening.
If confirmed, I will focus on, again, not just defense
relationships and capabilities, but the quality of the
democratic transitions and governance.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
This question is really both for you and Ms. Dalton. As you
know, the Syrian democratic forces have stated that they are
not able to take long-term responsibility for ISIS detainees
and for the camps that currently house so many of the families
of those ISIS detainees. The one in Syria, Al-Hol, comes most
to mind with 60,000 women and children, who are family members
of ISIS fighters, and most assessments of what is happening
there suggests that that camp is a hotbed for radicalization of
the family members who are there.
So, do you believe that addressing the plight of those
detainees in Syria should be included in strategic planning
processes as we are looking at how we continue to address
potential threats from terrorism?
Ms. Dalton, I will ask you to respond first.
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
concern. It is an issue that I focused on in my prior
affiliation with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
Certainly, in my present position, I do believe that we
need to be looking at both, the security and the humanitarian
facets of this challenge set, and I am sure that that is the
approach that my colleagues working counterterrorism and
humanitarian affairs in the Department in the interagency are
taking. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Do you agree with that, Dr. Wallander?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I fully agree with what Ms. Dalton
said. I agree it is a combined security challenge and
humanitarian problem that we have to take seriously and work
through a whole-of-government approach to resolve.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Hopefully, we will see an ISIS
detainee coordinator appointed as this Committee and the NDAA
in 2020 requested.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Wicker, please?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
To our first witness, Doctor, how should we pronounce your
last name?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, however you like, but Wallander.
Senator Wicker. All right. Okay.
Well, Dr. Wallander, you were, you served in the
administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia,
Ukraine, and Eurasia Policy from 2009 to 2012; a very hot
issue, and then you moved over as Senior Director for Russia
and Central Asia from 2013 to 2017, which means you were right
there when Russia invaded the sovereign nation of Ukraine.
Do you think our policy, in response to that invasion, at
the time, was correct?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
extremely important question. I share your concern about this
long track record of Russian aggression against its neighbors,
including Ukraine.
I believe that our response in 2014 was too slow and too
incremental.
If confirmed, I would apply the lessons that I learned, and
I believe others in the United States national security
community, learned to better address Russia's ongoing and
heightened aggression against its neighbors.
Senator Wicker. I would go farther than you. You said it
was too slow and too incremental.
We really didn't provide them with any lethal weapons for
quite a period of time; is that correct?
Dr. Wallander. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. I noticed in answer to an earlier question,
you talk about a unified approach with Europe and imposing
costs. I do think I understand you to say that providing lethal
weapons to Ukraine would also be part of your approach, your
recommended approach to the President; is that correct?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Senator; that is correct.
Senator Wicker. Let me ask you, I appreciate the question
that the distinguished senator from Oklahoma asked about no-
first-use.
Do you think Russia would have invaded Ukraine in 2014 if
they had retained their nuclear capability, rather than giving
it up after the breakdown of the Soviet, the breakup of the
Soviet Union?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I think a full answer to your
question would depend on the trajectory of how Ukrainian
security and defense forces maintain control and modernization
of those forces. I think we have to count concerns about
proliferation in our assessment of that trajectory.
But I believe that, that was the correct course of action
to support non-proliferation at the time. The focus, if
confirmed, of our security and defense cooperation that I would
support would be Ukraine's conventional defense capabilities
and the enablers it needs to be able to counter the enormous
Russian threat.
Senator Wicker. You know, Dr. Wallander, I think we all
thought that at the time.
President Zelensky, the overwhelmingly elected President of
the sovereign nation of Ukraine, is in support of a cruise
initiative that the Senate may vote on today, which would
impose sanctions on Russian entities associated with the Nord
Stream 2 Pipeline.
It is a fact that Vladimir Putin has amassed some 100,000,
plus or minus, Russian troops on the border of the sovereign
Ukrainian nation; is that correct?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, that is correct, and I would add--
--
Senator Wicker. So, they have taken a very aggressive
action.
Does it seem to you, advisable, to take the advice of the
person who is in the hottest of hot seats, and that is the
President of the sovereign nation, and say, let's go ahead and
respond to this very aggressive action?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I am not fully aware of the
proposal that you are referring to, but I agree that the United
States needs multiple elements in its toolkit to include
sanctions, to include continued and probably enhanced
defensive, legal assistance to Ukraine, and to look at NATO
posture in Eastern Europe in order to defend and deter against
Russian aggression.
Senator Wicker. Well, we could do that.
Briefly, do you think adding two destroyers based in Rota,
to the four that we already have, would also be an effective
deterrent to Russia's aggressive ambitions?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I am not briefed on intelligence
assessments, but I will say from my understanding of publicly
available information, that the Russian presence and activities
in the Black Sea, in particular, are of significant concern.
If confirmed, I would want to look at the U.S. naval
presence and posture, along the lines of what you suggest.
Senator Wicker. If you could supplement that answer on the
record, I would appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal, please?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I join in thanking all of you for your service, your
previous service, and your willingness to serve in the future.
Ms. Wallander, I would like to continue the conversation
that you were having with Senator Wicker. Have there been
indications, so far as you are aware in, let's say the last
week, of increasing mobilization at various points, by the
Russian military in possible preparation for an engagement?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I will repeat. As a private
citizen, I don't have access to classified assessments;
however, I have been tracking the public information available
on the matters that you raise and it is my understanding that
there are some signs of continuing Russian redeployment of
forces from east in the country, further west, and that is a
matter of considerable concern. Not just forces, but heavy,
armored forces.
Senator Blumenthal. So, there are some indications that
this situation may be coming to a head?
Dr. Wallander. There is plenty of reason to assess,
Senator, that it is certainly not de-escalating and it may be
escalating.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think that the United States has
sent sufficient arms, particularly, Javelin anti-armor
weaponry, Stinger anti-aircraft weaponry? Do you think that we
can make clearer, not only our strong support for Ukraine, but
also provide the very specific weaponry needed by Ukraine to
defend itself?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I thank you for focusing on
Ukraine's defense needs to counter the Russian aggression.
I would like to thank this Committee and the Senate,
actually, in a bipartisan manner over many years, to support
Ukraine's defensive capabilities, because Ukraine is in a much
stronger position to be able to resist and fight against a
Russian invasion, should it happen.
To answer your question specifically, I think those are the
kinds of capabilities in it heightened threat environment that,
if confirmed, I would want to look at in order to enable
Ukraine to deal with this escalation of Russian capability that
we have discussed.
Senator Blumenthal. I assume that you want to do more than
look at it, because time is not on our side here. I would hope
that you would urge, as imminently as possible, in fact, even
before your confirmation, perhaps, that the United States take
more aggressive and strong action to bolster Ukrainian systems
with radar systems, with the Javelin anti-armor missiles, with
Stinger and other anti-aircraft missiles, and other capability
that will show Vladimir Putin that we mean business, because in
my view, that is the only sign that he will respect, other than
strong economic sanctions.
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I agree with you; those are core
requirements that Ukraine needs in the face of the force that
Russia has amassed.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you on a different topic,
Ms. Wallander. The United States, in its withdrawal from
Afghanistan promised, in fact, the President, himself, promised
that we would not leave behind our at-risk, Afghan allies, who
have stood by us over the 20 years of war and now have targets
on their back. Many of them are in hiding.
They are in desperate and dire straits, particularly,
during the approaching winter.
Has the United States done enough to enable those at-risk,
Afghan allies to evacuate? Shouldn't we be doing more?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I share your concern deeply with
what we have seen, and the fact that the United States was not
able, along with our partners who stepped up and really
supported the effort to evacuate and provide safe haven for
those individuals.
If confirmed, I commit to you that I will participate with
my interagency colleagues and with colleagues at the Defense
Department to ensure that we are doing everything possible to
assist those individuals and to find them safe haven and exit
from Afghanistan, if they desire.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for that answer.
I will look forward to submitting some additional questions
for the record on this topic.
My time has expired. But I welcome your commitment to do
everything possible. Right now, our country is doing far less
than everything possible and I hope that we will step up our
efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thanks, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Fischer, please?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before turning to my questions, I would like to speak to
some of my colleague's concerns about changes to our
declaratory policy that this administration is reportedly
considering.
I think it is important to remember that the Obama
administration rejected these changes in a far more benign
security environment than what we are currently seeing today.
With China's nuclear breakout and Russia amassing forces on
Ukraine's border, adopting a no-first-use, or sole-purpose
policy, would be irresponsible and it would strain relations
with our allies at the worst possible moment. As Senator
Blumenthal just said, we must show that we mean business; that
is what President Putin respects, and that applies in this
area, as well.
Dr. Plumb, in your response to the Committee's advanced
policy questions about establishing norms of behavior in space,
you acknowledge that Russian and Chinese behavior clearly
demonstrates that the prospect of establishing an effective
agreement is not realistic at this time.
Do you support a dual-track approach that involves
deploying the capabilities necessary to send credible,
deterrent messages to our adversaries, while continuing to work
with allies and partners to lay the foundation for future
discussion about responsible behavior in space?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
I think, just as the first ASD for Space Policy nominee, it
is a really essential piece of the work I hope to be able to
do, if confirmed.
There are two totally different facets there and I would
just say I agree with you on both. One is, I do think there is
a need for rules and for norms in space behavior. I hold some
deep kernel of hope that we could come to an agreement with
Russia and China on that in some not-too-distant future.
At the same time, nothing there would, in my mind, prevent
us, or preclude us, from pursuing both, offensive and defensive
capabilities to ensure that we can defend our own assets and
prevail in a conflict.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Also, can you talk about how
you view the relationship between nuclear modernization and
arms control? Sometimes you see these as competing priorities
and I view them, instead, as complementary, because without
modernization, our forces will become obsolete and our
adversaries will have no incentive to negotiate for any kind of
reductions.
So, what is your view on that?
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, again, Senator.
As we discussed on our phone call, I am fully onboard with
modernizing the nuclear triad. I think it is absolutely
essential, that our nuclear deterrent, which is the bedrock of
our deterrence, is safe, effective, and I want to say credible,
and I think modernization is part of that credibility.
As far as the relationship with arms control, arms control
is important. It is not, you don't do arms control to its own
end; arms control is to advance the national security of both,
or as many parties are involved in the talks, and I agree with
your assessment that if you have nothing to trade, there is no
incentive to be at the table.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Dr. Wallander, over the weekend, several reports suggested
the administration was considering cutting United States
presence in Europe as a bargaining chip in the upcoming
negotiations with Russia, and in response, the White House
issued a statement, explicitly rejecting this, stating, ``the
administration is not weighing cuts to troops in Europe.''
I assume you agree with this and would recommend against
cutting United States presence in Europe; is that accurate?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Senator; I do agree and would so
recommend, if confirmed.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome the nominees. I ask the following two initial
questions of all nominees before any of the Committees on which
I sit. So, I would like to ask you these questions en masse.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual behaviors or committed any verbal or
physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Senator Hirono. No.
Have you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement
related to this kind of conduct?
[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Senator Hirono. I have a question for Dr. Wallander. Last
year, the United States, Australia, and the U.K. entered into
an historic security alliance, the AUUKUS, which includes plans
to provide Australia with technology and support to build
nuclear-powered submarines, within the next few decades.
Additionally, this alliance will facilitate the sharing of
many more technologies, including artificial intelligence,
underwater systems, long-range strikes, cyber, and many others.
These types of agreements lead to enhance interoperability and
deepen cooperation among allies within the region.
From your perspective, how important are security alliances
like AUUKUS to United States national defense and how will this
alliance benefit United States security interests in the
INDOPACOM AOR?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I admire and fully support the
development of AUUKUS as a multilateral alliance for coping
with the challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific, specifically.
I would note that because the U.K. is one of the members of
that alliance, it is a great example of how Europe can join
with the United States and a regional country, Australia, to
cope with Indo-Pacific challenges, including China. I hope it
is the first, only the first instance of Europe taking
seriously and contributing to coping with the China challenge.
Senator Hirono. I agree with you that the cooperation or
the inclusion of U.K. in this kind of alliance that is much
more focused, I suppose, on China as a near-peer competitor to
us is very significant, because we are all in this together. It
is not just what is going on in Europe and what Russia is doing
with regard to Ukraine and whatever intentions Russia has.
These two countries are definitely our near-peer competitors.
Now, you will oversee security-cooperation programs and
defense strategies impacting many regions across the globe.
Can you tell me how you would approach these tasks?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for focusing on this
important question.
If confirmed, I would focus first on building on already
existing, strong alliances and allied partnerships, allied
relations and partnerships, which I want to highlight, we enjoy
not only in Europe, but in Eurasia with countries, such as
Georgia and in Africa and in the Middle East. So, there is
plenty of opportunity to build upon and expand as we cope with
multiple challenges, not just Russia and China, but ongoing
needs in the region, such as Iran, and countering violent
extremism in many regions.
Senator Hirono. Not to mention, North Korea.
So, I do have a question for Ms. Dalton. In the last week,
North Korea has tested two ballistic missiles off their east
coast. If confirmed, a key part of your responsibilities will
include developing policy and planning for Homeland Defense.
In 2019, Missile Defense Review identified the Homeland
Defense Radar Hawaii as a requirement for detecting and
discriminating against inbound missile threats from an
increasingly capable North Korea. In successive budget
requests, funding was zeroed out for HDRH-H Hawaii without any
capability to replace it.
If confirmed, how will you support policy to ensure Hawaii
is protected from missile threats from North Korea and
elsewhere going forward?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
concern. Insofar as Missile Defense of the Homeland, it is a
central area of focus for the ongoing Missile Defense Review
that Secretary Austin and senior defense officials are
currently conducting.
If confirmed, I would look forward to implementing the
findings of the MDR to ensure that the entirety of the United
States Homeland and its territories are protected from threats,
such as from North Korea.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
It is a continuing concern that the administration zeroes
out Homeland Defense Hawaii without any alternative.
I am totally open to any other ways that Hawaii can be
protected, and until then, you will know that I will continue
to push for HDR-H.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. Ms. Wallander, you testified that you think
President Obama's administration made mistakes in 2014 with the
invasion of Crimea and its annexation. You also say in both,
your opening statement and in question 97 of the advanced
questions for the record, that you support the continued
provision of defensive weapons systems to Ukraine.
But that, do you mean to rule out the possibility of
providing Ukraine with offensive weapons systems?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you.
That is a very good question because defense assistance
needs to be properly focused on the requirements of the partner
or ally. I am not read into classified assessments about the
balance of offensive and defensive capabilities that would be
appropriate for Ukrainian defense needs.
But I will say that I would not rule them out. I would want
to, if confirmed, be fully briefed on Russia's capabilities and
the threat it poses and Ukraine's requirements and take a
comprehensive look at what is necessary for Ukraine to be able
to defend its territory and its sovereignty.
Senator Cotton. Okay. So, you don't want to rule out the
potential forever providing Ukraine offensive weapons. You just
don't want to make a definitive statement on it, until
confirmed and read into the intelligence and the situation on
the ground?
Dr. Wallander. I think it would be, Senator, irresponsible,
to speculate without having full access to the classified
information and assessments.
Senator Cotton. I understand and appreciate that.
Would you consider Air Defense Artillery systems the kind
of systems that could protect Ukraine against all of those
Russian helicopters that are on its border, to be offensive or
a defensive weapon?
Dr. Wallander. I believe Air Defense systems to be
fundamentally defensive in nature, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Okay. If Russia decides to go for the
jugular and you have got Russian tanks and armed personnel
carriers rolling across Ukraine's borders, it would be nice for
Ukraine to have artillery systems to strike those forces while
they are still on Russian soil, wouldn't it?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I agree with you.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Artillery, that kind of artillery,
you would characterize as an offensive weapon, correct?
Dr. Wallander. I, Senator, I would----
Senator Cotton. I would.
Dr. Wallander. No, I am not disagreeing with you.
I think that what becomes important is how such
capabilities are deployed. They can be deployed in a more
defensive posture and a more offensive posture, which is always
one of the challenges.
I need not offer this to you, given your public service and
experience, so it could go either way, depending on the posture
and the operational utilization.
Senator Cotton. So, in 2014, we did not provide any kind of
lethal aid to Ukraine. It was reported at the time, and since
then, that President Obama thought it would be too provocative,
that he even said that we are not going to risk a nuclear war,
or World War III, over Ukraine.
In retrospect, do you think one of the specific mistakes
made in 2014 was not providing systems like Javelin anti-tank
weapons to Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I believe that one of the lessons I
have learned is that it would have been appropriate and
necessary to provide Ukraine with what it needed to defend its
territory, including the weapons you suggest.
Senator Cotton. Because the last administration provided
Ukraine with Javelins and we didn't have World War III, or
nuclear war, yet.
Dr. Wallander. Senator, you are correct.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Mr. Plumb, I have a question for you
about potential negotiations with Russia.
There have been some reports about the prospect of trading
away the Aegis Ashore system in Romania; either removing it or
reducing its presence as a bargaining chip with Russia. Some
arguments that those systems could destabilize more than
stabilize.
Would you support removing or reducing the Aegis Ashore
system in Romania?
Dr. Plumb. Thanks for that question, Senator.
I am unaware of that particular line of concern. I was
actually instrumental in the Obama administration in
establishing Aegis Ashore in Romania, and I guess I would say I
would be very hesitant to try to use it as a bargaining chip,
without understanding the full security context.
Senator Cotton. I understand. Not exactly in the Space
Policy domain, but it is complementary to a lot of those
efforts. Thank you.
Ms. Dalton, you will have responsibility, in part, for our
Southwest Border. Do you think it is a greater danger to the
American people's prosperity and security that there are a
hundred thousand Russians on Ukraine's border or two million
illegal migrants having crossed our Southwestern Border in the
last year?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting both of
these challenges and the scope of the security environment that
we find ourselves in at present.
If confirmed, I would look forward to alleging the
challenges specifically on the Southwest Border, working very
closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other
interagency counterparts and local authorities. As in
discussing with Senator Inhofe earlier, I do believe it is a
serious challenge.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you.
Well, I hope you get some bright ideas for how to solve
that problem, since it seems like most other parts of the
administration so far have failed in that challenge.
Thank you all.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Dalton, the recent Log4J, SolarWinds, and Treasury
Department hacks show how challenging cyber intrusions can be
on our national security and we will continue to see these
threats continue and elevate into 2022.
The office you are nominated for has, in the past, overseen
the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, DCIP.
Do you think DCIP is up to date in its ability to provide
solutions in the event of cyber or technological harm done to
our critical infrastructure; further, do you see ways where
DCIP can improve its work with the private sector and civilian
institutions?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
challenge, and this would be among the top priorities that I
would plan to tackle, if confirmed, in this portfolio, because
I do believe that we need to look at the appropriate
frameworks, policies, approaches, and tool sets to be able to
address state-based threats to our critical infrastructure
that, unfortunately, have been manifesting over the last number
of years.
So, if confirmed, I would certainly look forward to working
with the Department of Homeland Security, CYBERCOM, with, if
confirmed, Dr. Plumb's office, overseeing the DESI cyber policy
to ensure that we have the right approaches, to understand the
threat, and to be able to provide the appropriate level of
protection and resilience necessary to address that challenge.
Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. As a follow-up, can you speak to how
you view the staffing and personnel challenges that the
Government faces when it comes to cybersecurity and tech
expertise. I repeatedly heard about cybersecurity and tech
staffing deficiencies across Government agencies, including at
the DOD.
What plans do you have for improving the recruitment,
training, and retention of high-quality cyber and tech
expertise at the Department and will you work with my office on
issues regarding cyber and tech personnel?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this.
I know there have been a number of external studies looking
at this challenge, as well, the last number of years. I do
agree that we need to remain focused on bringing in talent from
academia, from the tech sector, more broadly, from the private
sector, to really build within our ranks. I think there is also
considerable capacity within the National Guard, given their
career day jobs, as well, that we could be better harnessing.
Absolutely, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with
you and your team to advance those goals.
Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Plumb, as ASD for Space Policy,
part of your duties will include coordinating our Space Policy
and other agencies. What is your strategy for coordinating with
our other agencies, like the State Department's Office of Space
Affairs, to ensure that we are maintaining our leadership and
promoting our values in space?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I absolutely think that promoting values in space,
including norms and rules of behavior, and helping lead the
international community towards that is important.
The State Department, in my view, they should be the lead
on these issues at the U.N., DOD, in support, and I have worked
closely with my State counterparts and across the interagency
to coordinate that type of messaging efforts.
Senator Gillibrand. I am concerned that our lack of
international agreements barring conventional weapons in space
has led to a space arms race that threaten our civil and
commercial space systems in space.
Will you play a role in developing international norms
about the use of weapons in space and add here to them while
developing this policy?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, thank you.
I do agree that the need for norms and rules of behavior in
space is absolutely essential. I think one of the issues that
make space unique is that destructive tests, like the Russians
have recently conducted, challenges access to all spacefaring
nations and we need to find ways to prevent that type of
problem.
Senator Gillibrand. How will your organization work across
the Department to effectively manage the threat of anti-
satellite capabilities demonstrated by our adversaries, as you
mentioned?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, I think that anti-satellite
capabilities, obviously, are on the tip of our minds right now,
based on the Russian tests recently. It is absolutely essential
to find a way through that.
I think one of the best ways the Department can pursue to
nullify that type of behavior is an architecture that is
resilient enough to withstand a blow to one or several
satellites. I think being able to reconstitute quickly and
having a resilient architecture makes the attractiveness of a
target much less, and I think that is a really important place
and I don't think we are moving fast enough, and we need to get
going.
Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Wallander, my last few moments. We
have heard reports of Russia conducting numerous cyberattacks
against Ukrainian citizens to include directly threatening
Ukrainian soldiers and their families through text messages.
What role can your office play in supporting the Ukrainian
Government in countering those malicious activities?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for highlighting that
Russian activities are not merely the apparent ones of
conventional military-force concentrations, but actually, cover
a spectrum of attacks and efforts to disable Ukrainian
resistance and resilience, itself.
If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Dr.
Plumb's team, if confirmed, and focusing on countering Russian
cyber operations, in which public reporting is, we have had
some success in the last few years, and we need to build on the
capabilities and the experience that DOD has already
implemented, in order to effectively help Ukraine resist those
kinds of attacks.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Wallander, I want to come to you. You were the Russian
Director at NSC at the time when things were happening in
Eastern Europe, much like they are right now, including
Russia's invasion of Crimea and the separatists that were
there, the formatting of the separatists in the Donbas.
So, what parallels, very quickly, do you see between that
time and currently what we are seeing with the Russian buildup
on the Ukrainian border?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for that question.
I think it is an extremely important question.
Very briefly, in 2014, the Russians tried to pretend it
wasn't Russian forces invading Crimea or infiltrating or
operating in the Donbas. They sought a form of implausible
deniability in order to invade Ukraine.
The difference is, right now, that facade of covert and
covert operation has been pulled away and what we are seeing is
direct threats and a direct amassing of Russian forces.
Senator Blackburn. Now, let me ask you this, following on
with that, when you look at Russian leadership and Russian
society, what parallels are you seeing between then and now?
Because, to us, it looks as if they are following much of
the same pattern.
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I agree with you, and it is very
concerning, because the Kremlin used its operations and its
falsehoods about Ukraine to ramp up Russian domestic anger at
Ukraine, at the United States, and NATO. We are exactly seeing
the same kind of efforts and operations to create that kind of
false narrative that Russia is defending itself against
American and NATO influence in Ukraine, when what Russia is
doing is assaulting Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Senator Blackburn. Well, I agree with you that what Putin
is trying to do is to test that resolve with NATO and with the
United States.
So, do you support a continued, robust EUCOM exercise
schedule to really support our allies and deter this
aggression?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I do. A robust exercise calendar
not only enhances interoperability and capabilities, and that
is important for deterrence and defense, but it signals that--
--
Senator Blackburn. But what about increasing our lethal
assistance, our cyber, our intel support, where are you there?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I believe that the heightened
Russian threat and its willingness to deploy those forces and
to saber-rattle requires a re-evaluation of Ukraine's defense
and military needs. If confirmed, I would focus on that and
take appropriate lessons.
Senator Blackburn. All right. The EFPs, I had the
opportunity to visit some of our Tennessee troops that were
there on an EFP mission in Poland.
Where, as the NSC Director for Russia at the time, did you
support the EFPs? Do you believe they should be supported
today? Should we continue this participation?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I do support that framework for
enhancing American presence and contributions to the security
and operations of our partners and allies, especially our
allies in the instance that you cite in Poland.
Senator Blackburn. Well, if Russia invades Ukraine, should
we establish more of the EFP battle groups and push further
south?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I agree with you that if Russia
further invades Ukraine, we need to reevaluate NATO posture,
including United States contributions to NATO posture, and I
would look at exactly the issues that you highlighted in your
question, because I think they are key.
In principle, I would support an increased American, at
least rotational presence in the region.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. I am going to run out of time, but
I did want to ask you about the parallels that you see between
Russian and Chinese interests in Ukraine, if you could speak to
that.
Dr. Wallander. Well, I believe, Senator, that Russia and
China share a priority goal of undermining the United States-
led network of norms and rules that govern global security and
ensure the security of so many countries.
While China may not have a direct stake in Russia's
aggression against Ukraine, I believe China watches carefully
when the United States and the international community do not
stand up to the principles of the U.N. charter and do not
defend the rights of countries to choose their own futures,
including their alliances.
Senator Blackburn. I will submit some questions to you and
Dr. Plumb, dealing with nuclear presence and Nuclear Posture
Review.
Thank you so much for your time today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Kaine, please?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe.
Congratulations to the nominees for your nominations; you
are all highly qualified for these positions.
A couple of items, Ms. Dalton; first, congrats on being a
UVA grad. There have been reports in the last day or so about
more instances of Havana Syndrome regarding American diplomats
who are currently in Geneva and Paris. The syndrome was first
reported in Havana. It has been reported as affecting diplomats
and other U.S. Governmental personnel around the globe and in
the DMV in Virginia.
The Secretary of State has spoken about this. Their law
enforcement agencies are involved, but I also know the DOD is
involved in trying, (A), to determine causes and solutions and
consequences. I think the, I would summarize the feelings of
the Committee Members on both, the Armed Services Committee and
the Foreign Relations Committee, I sit on both, not being happy
with the degree of information we have received about this or
progress we have made on it in the couple of years that we have
been talking about it.
I would hope that should you be confirmed with the
responsibility over both, Homeland Defense and Hemispheric
Affairs that you would be diligent in working with the
interagency process to determine what is going on and provide
options, certainly, within your line of command, but including
to Congress about what appropriate responses should be.
Do I have your commitment on that?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, yes, you do.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
Dr. Plumb, I want to ask you a question about, just growing
pangs with the Space Force and how we can manage those growing
pangs effectively.
In 2006, this Committee did a significant overhaul of much
of the Department's acquisition policies and we structured new
entities. There had been an Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, ATL, and we, instead,
created new Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering and
then Acquisition and Sustainment, and that split of the
responsibilities has led to some challenges, so lessons
learned, some growing pangs.
I think the Pentagon and others have tried to work through
those, but when you are making a structural change of that
kind, growing pangs are not unusual. The speed with which the
Department established Space Force could likely lead to similar
challenges.
Should you be confirmed, how will you try to ensure that
this important new component of our defense, especially as we
see peers engaging in activity that is threatening like the
Russian anti-satellite test, how can you work to try to
minimize growing pangs and maximize the quick effectiveness of
this new component of our military?
Dr. Plumb. So, thank you, Senator, for that question.
I will just commend the Committee on its creation of the
Space Force. I think the time is appropriate for a separate
service for space. Really, in the past several years, the
importance and value of space has increased substantially and
the threat to our assets in space has also increased
exponentially.
I think this issue of growing pangs, you can never get rid
of them, Senator, but I think helping ensure from a civilian
oversight piece that the laser focuses are on both, speed of
acquisition and making sure that we can counter threats as they
emerge and get past this problem of--this is a non-trivial
thing to say--the speed of the Pentagon and the speed of the
Pentagon processes does not match the speed of the threat right
now, and we need to work to fix that and that is a hard
problem.
As far as warfighting, it is a new domain and there are
going to be some growing pangs there. It has some similarities
to cyber operations, as well. It is new and it needs to mature,
and my goal is to help usher that along.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Dr. Plumb.
Then, Dr. Wallander, Senator Hirono asked you a question
about AUUKUS and I share her enthusiasm for closer cooperation
between the United States, Australia, and the U.K. in the Indo-
Pacific. Great allies and I think there are great things we can
do together.
But I will say, I was very disappointed in the rollout of
AUUKUS and the bizarre exclusion and, really, almost
humiliation of the French, who are a great security partner in
the United States and are also a significant Indo-Pacific
nation with a lot of equities in the Indo-Pacific.
You are not yet confirmed and not yet, sort of, in the
family on this, but I will say, I have made efforts to get to
the bottom of why AUUKUS was done in such a way that alienated
an ally and why couldn't it have been conceived in such a way
that would have included an ally and, thereby, made it more
effective. I have yet to get a good answer from the
administration about the breakdown that led to, in my view,
taking a great achievement and sort of souring it right out of
the gate.
So, I hope, should you be confirmed, you will, you know, be
mindful of the challenges that are created and look for
opportunities to work together, not just with Australia and the
U.K., but to include France in efforts in the Indo-Pacific,
because I think they have a lot of equity there and a lot of
value to add.
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I share your concern and you have
my commitment that, if confirmed, I will focus on all of our
important allied relationships, especially that of France,
because I agree with you about the value of that extraordinary
alliance.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Hawley, please?
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to all the nominees for being here. Congratulations
on your nominations.
Dr. Wallander, I enjoyed our conversation yesterday. Thanks
for your time.
Let me start with you and let me start with the situation
in Ukraine. You said when we spoke yesterday that you could
imagine advocating sending more United States forces to Europe
to reinforce NATO's eastern flank. I think you said the same
today in the hearing.
My question is, wouldn't this perpetuate a sense among
Europeans that they don't have to invest in their own
militaries, but can rely on us in a time of exigency, as this
may well soon be, in order to bail them out, for lack of a
better word, in their security commitments?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for that question.
With all of our focus on what the United States would do,
sometimes we don't elevate enough what we expect and need our
allies to do. As part of a package of looking at American force
posture and possible reinforcements to Europe, it would
absolutely have to come totally integrated with European NATO
member contributions in order to ensure we have the proper and
deterrence capabilities.
Senator Hawley. You can tell, I am sure, from what we
talked about yesterday and from my questions this morning that
I am skeptical of sending additional United States troops to
Europe for these reasons, but I appreciate your answer.
Let me ask you about NATO a little bit more broadly. Given
the challenges that we are facing globally, and most notably,
China's efforts to dominate Asia, do you think that this is the
time when it is prudent or advisable for the United States to
allow Ukraine to join NATO?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I share your larger concern about
the Chinese challenge and agree with you that we can't lose
focus on that. Any NSTA decisions we have to make about
European security has to be mindful to that.
I fully support NATO's open-door policy. NATO is stronger
if it is the alliance of strong, democratic countries with
capabilities and the democratic governance; that is the
hallmark of NATO.
If confirmed, I would support NATO's future membership,
Ukraine's future membership in NATO if it meets the conditions
and I would look forward to working with Ukrainian partners in
order to make sure they meet those standards.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about the NATO allies and
their spending commitments. We talked about this yesterday on
the phone.
A United States Ambassador to NATO, Julie Smith, sent me a
letter prior to her confirmation in which she agreed that our
NATO allies should spend more, I emphasize ``more'' than 2
percent of GDP on defense. The current Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, Admiral Grady, did the same. He agreed, for the
record, in response to my questions, that our NATO allies need
to spend more than 2 percent on defense.
When you and I spoke yesterday, we talked about this. I
asked you this question and you said that in your opinion, that
our allies should be spending more than 2 percent on defense. I
would just like to get you on the record on that, if I could.
In your view, can you confirm for us that you think, in
your opinion, it is time for our NATO allies to move beyond the
Wales Pledge and commit to increase defense spending above 2
percent.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
Let me ask you about the situation with burden-sharing,
again, back with in Europe. As I mentioned just a second ago, I
think one of the reasons our European allies, especially
Germany, have been slow to increase their spending is that they
think the United States will bail them out in difficult
situations.
Would you agree that our European allies are more likely to
increase their spending if the United States reduces its
overall force levels in the European theater?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I believe that our European allies
do key their contributions to an assessment of American
contributions. I think it is an interesting idea that a
reduction in American contributions would lead to an increase
in European contributions. I would want to ask the intelligence
community for past, sort of, evidence about the rise and fall
of contributions to give you a better answer.
My instinct is that persuasion and high expectations and
clear requirements are the motivator for European contributions
in common defense in NATO.
Senator Hawley. Just as thinking about it as a matter of
incentives, Dr. Wallander, do you think that we should at least
consider putting on the table, reducing our overall force
posture in Europe so that our allies feel incentivized to
defend themselves?
You and I talked about this on the phone, I mean, where I
am coming from on this is, that we can't, the United States of
America simply can't do it all at the same time.
We are facing a very acute challenge in the Indo-Pacific
theater from China. We can't maintain, in my own view, we can't
do what we need to do in that theater and maintain our current
posture in Europe. We are going to have to make some hard
choices somewhere, and they are hard choices, unless we are
going to spend $2 trillion a year on defense, which we are not
going to do and we shouldn't do.
So, with that backdrop, I mean, what is your view on
putting on the table with our European allies and say, listen,
we may need to consider an overall force-posture reduction in
Europe in order to meet our pressing security commitments
elsewhere, I mean, what do you think about that?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I believe that as they face the
heightened threat from Russia, this would not be the moment to
put a reduction in American commitment to NATO on the table.
But what I would favor, if confirmed, is looking at how the
United States can provide some of its advantages in enablers,
in weapons system, in security cooperation with allies to
ensure that we are properly resourcing the requirements in the
Indo-Pacific, as you rightly point to, and yet sustaining
defense and deterrence against Russia.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
I will have some questions for the record for the rest of
you. Thanks again.
Thank you, Dr. Wallander.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Let me now recognize, via Webex, Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wallander, you heard earlier in this hearing, Dr. Plumb
testified that he thought that the adoption of a no-first-use
policy in the current Nuclear Posture Review would not be in
the national security interest of the United States.
Do you agree with that conclusion?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I do, Senator.
Senator King. Second question. How would the allies react
to the adoption of a no-first-use policy, particularly, Japan,
and some of the Asia-Pacific allies?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for the important
question. That is a fundamental reason why I do not support a
no-first-use declaratory policy because I believe it would
create concerns about the credibility of American defense
commitments to our allies, in addition to possibly undermining
the credibility in the eyes of our adversaries.
Senator King. It could provoke some of those countries to
develop their own nuclear weapons, which is going in exactly
the opposite direction that we want in terms of
nonproliferation; isn't that correct?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, yes, I agree; that is another
reason.
Senator King. Second question on Ukraine. It seems to me
that everybody is trying to guess what is in Vladimir Putin's
mind, but by making these very public high-level demands about
membership in NATO and all the other things, he is setting up
these negotiations to fail and leaving himself very little
option, other than, either a humiliating retreat or invasion.
What do you make of this unusual negotiating strategy,
where you make demands that you know aren't going to be met,
and this is just a pretext for an invasion?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I share your analytical assessment
of the possible courses of action and the reasons for the
demands that Russia has made publicly, and it concerns me
greatly for Ukraine's security and, indeed, for European and
Euro-Atlantic security.
Senator King. Let me turn to Ms. Dalton for a question. Ms.
Dalton, this question is under attack and two people a day in
my home state of Maine are dying. The attack is transnational
drug shipments coming into this country that are literally
killing Americans at a record rate over the last couple of
years. It is an absolute tragedy.
Every year we have testimony [Audio malfunction.] We know
of shipments coming by sea to North America from Latin America,
but because of limitations on our capacity to react, we can
only interdict 25 percent of the shipments we know about. It
strikes me that this is one these things where it is falling in
the cracks between the Coast Guard and the Navy.
Would you commit to me to really take a serious look at the
allocation of resources so that we can do something about this,
what I consider an outrageous failure of the United States
Government, to interdict shipments of drugs into this country
that we know about?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting this
challenge. It is why I think it was really important that
President Biden's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
highlighted the threat of transnational criminal organizations
both, to U.S. national security interests, as well as to allies
and partners in our greater hemispheric region, which is why,
if confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with the
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and
other interagency counterparts to address this challenge.
I do believe that it is primarily a law enforcement
function to address this challenge, but I do believe that there
is an important role for the Department of Defense to play in
support of those operations.
Senator King. Well, if these were invaders headed for our
borders to kill people, we wouldn't view it as a law
enforcement function; we would view it as an invasion, as an
attack. People are dying as a result of this.
So, I hope you rethink--you mentioned law enforcement.
Somewhere, we have got to find the ships to stop these
shipments. To say it is law enforcement and, you know, the
Coast Guard doesn't have enough ships, that is not a
satisfactory answer. As long as I keep having this testimony
that we are only able to interdict 25 percent of the shipments
that we know about, I am not going to be satisfied, and I hope
you will rethink your answer and there will be an interagency
discussion about an adequate response to this.
Dr. Plumb, just in a few seconds left, I am very worried
that we are behind the curve on hypersonics. We are way behind
the curve on hypersonics.
Do you agree that this should be an urgent matter both, in
terms of the development of an offensive deterrent capacity,
but also a defensive capacity, because I don't think any of our
Missile Defense systems can cope with a 7,000-mile-an-hour
maneuverable missile.
Dr. Plumb. Senator, thanks for that question.
I agree, we are challenged by hypersonics defensively and
from an offensive standpoint, at least from public reporting,
it certainly appears that we are behind and need to focus on
this challenge.
Senator King. Well, I hope this is a ``hair on fire''
challenge about guarding our space.
Dr. Plumb, I really appreciate your answer.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I appreciate it
very much.
Dr. Wallander, do you foresee any positive or negative
impacts to our relations with the new German Government in the
event of sanctions imposed on companies involved with the
planning and construction of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for the question.
My understanding of the composition of the new German
Government is that there is a renewed skepticism of Russia and
its role in Europe and of, in particular, Russia's use of
energy as a coercive tool against Europe and Russia's other
neighbors.
If confirmed, I intend to fully explore the possibility,
the opportunity for a closer alignment of United States
assessment of Russia's use of energy and, in particular, as a
tool of coercion for our national security policy.
Senator Manchin. Do you believe or have any knowledge that
the German, the new German Government would honor its pledge to
halt the Nord Stream 2 certification in event of a Russian
invasion of Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I think we should take the German
Government at its word and hold it to its commitments.
If confirmed, that would be, I believe, one of my
supporting roles in a whole-of-Government, diplomatic approach
to our allies in coping with this crisis that Russia has
created.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Dr. Plumb, since the institution of the Space Force, I have
been concerned that we are going to leave our Space National
Guard forces behind as we are standing up this new force and
West Virginia has a very Active National Guard that we are very
proud of.
Are you supportive of a Space National Guard?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, thanks for that we.
I, myself, have been in the Reserves for 20 years and I am
both, proud of and fully aware of the capabilities that Reserve
and Guard functions can bring. I know that the Guard issue is
before the Congress. My own personal view is there is value in
Guard and Reserve support for the Space Policy.
Senator Manchin. How do you believe, sir that we could keep
that, the continuing to expand capabilities in space and also
keep equity between the Active and the Reserve component
resources, and we are not seeing much movement on that, and
that is what we are concerned about.
Dr. Plumb. Senator, I would need to, if confirmed, I would
like to look into this issue.
I do have friends that are in the Air National Guard that
do Space Force missions, so I do know that those units exist.
As far as the resource and balance, I would be happy to work
with the Committee and you to look into that for you.
Senator Manchin. Dr. Wallander, back to you, again.
I have long had concerns, I oppose the JCPOA, known as the
Iran Deal. I opposed that because I thought that any country
that we are submitting back in should earn the rewards, other
than, basically, and making them demonstrate their goodwill
before we give it to them on the front end.
So, my question would be, do you believe that, generally,
we should relax sanctions on Iran in the future before they
demonstrate if we are back in negotiations again?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I am not fully briefed on the
details of the negotiations, but to answer your question, I
believe that the importance of those kinds of negotiations and
agreements or if the parties meet the letter, strictly
speaking, of the agreement, so I would not be in favor of
relief on sanctions without full compliance of the terms of the
agreement.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Dr. Plumb, I think you might have
talked about this earlier, but the Russians and Chinese have a
need in demonstrating their capability of their anti-satellite
weapons. Given our military reliance upon satellites for
navigation, communication, this capability can severely weaken,
I believe, very, very much so, our military's ability to
respond effectively in the opening hours of a conflict.
So, how prepared do you assess that we are to protect
against these threats so that we won't be immobile?
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Senator.
The anti-satellite, kinetic, debris-cloud-causing tests
both, to China and Russia, are deeply disturbing and a concern
to me. I don't have the advantage of the classified briefings
on our ability to fight through a threat today.
What I will commit to you is that, if confirmed, I will
work to make sure that our architecture is more resilient so
that this type of attack is less attractive to an adversary.
Senator Manchin. Do you have any opinions on, basically,
what the Department of Defense could do to defend against
China, if they demonstrate their anti-satellite capabilities?
Dr. Plumb. Senator, there are a number of possibilities;
obviously, one possibility that I fully agree with, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Hicks said at the first National Space
Council meeting for the Biden administration, that the
Department of Defense is in favor of banning kinetic, anti-
satellite tests by all nations, so I think that would help.
I also think that making sure that we have constellations
that are resilient so that we are not entirely dependent on one
particular asset, would also be helpful. I imagine there are
any number of other operations at classified levels that I
would be happy to discuss with you, if confirmed.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Thanks to all of you, I appreciate your service to our
country.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good
to be here at the Committee, and congratulations to each of the
folks that are here testifying.
Dr. Wallander, you are assuming this position in the midst
of an incredibly tense situation in Eastern Europe and I would
kind of like to get your sense on how you believe our European
allies will respond to any kinetic actions by Russia. You know,
certainly, Europe is in the midst of a cold winter and reliance
on Russian Energy Resources make some European nations
vulnerable to Putin's aggression.
So, my question for you is, what role will access to
Russian energy play in determinations by key European allies,
such as Germany, France, and Italy, and others on whether or
not to directly or vigorously defend Ukrainian sovereignty?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for that question.
I think it is a very important one and it points to the
vulnerability created by depending on Russian energy supplies,
because Russia has proven itself to be very willing to use
cutoffs of supplies or cutbacks in supplies, which it is
currently doing, in order to send coercive messages.
That said, I have great confidence that our European allies
are confronting the scope and seriousness of Russian
aspirations, aggressive aspirations against Ukraine and Ukraine
and European and, therefore, global security.
If confirmed, I will press hard with them to face the
reality that dependence on Russian energy is a vulnerability
that needs to be mitigated so that all NATO members are able to
stand up effectively for our common defense and deterrence.
Senator Peters. Very good.
Ms. Dalton, over the last few years, I have had the
opportunity to learn more about how the Department of Defense
plans to performing counter, unmanned aircraft system
operations, including a visit that I had to the Proving Ground
in Yuma, Arizona, to witness some demonstrations of new
technology that is coming onboard.
This is an area of great concern to me, as Chairman of
Homeland Security Committee, and working with the Department of
Homeland Security and other assets, such as the Border Patrol,
the Coast Guard, and other parts of Homeland Security that is
facing this threat, and would need to work, in my mind, in a
cooperative way with the Department of Defense to fully utilize
such technologies and protect us here at home.
My question to you is, how can the Department of Defense
best position itself to assist the federal partners, such as
the Department of Homeland Security, to combat this very real
UAS threat?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for your leadership on this
important issue. I do believe that it is a growing challenge,
here in the Homelands.
If confirmed, I do believe that there is an opportunity for
some best practices and information-sharing, because the
Department is, frankly, facing some of these similar challenges
abroad from counter UAS threats from both, state and non-state
actors. So, I think it is an important opportunity to share
lessons and best practices and tool sets; obviously, a
different context here at home, but I would look forward to
working on that together.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Dr. Plumb, last year, a study commissioned by the U.S.
Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Air Force
Research Laboratory found that the United States is, and I am
going to quote them, is, ``woefully inadequate to compete for
global market share because China has cornered and dominated
the global space market.''
Now, that report goes on to say and, ``again, the United
States must develop new market enhancing tools to increase U.S.
commercial space activities, grow viable U.S. space companies,
and finance their growth.''
The Department of Defense would obviously play a vital role
in developing these tools. My question for you is, if
confirmed, what tools would you advise the Secretary of Defense
to create to promote a much more dynamic, domestic space
marketplace?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
I think that the growth of the commercial sector for space
in the United States is actually a driving economic engine for
the U.S. and the Department of Defense should be part of
ensuring that that continues. I do think the Department has a
problem when it comes to recognizing and then adopting into
their programs, innovative new technology from small
businesses, in particular. I am aware of a few efforts underway
inside the Space Force to fix that and I look forward to the
opportunity to try to enhance that and bring it along, if
confirmed.
Senator Peters. Well, we would hope then we would look
forward to working with you on that very important mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Tillis, please?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations to all of you on your nominations. I hope,
time provided, I get to ask you all questions, but I have to
start where we left off yesterday.
Dr. Wallander, thank you so much for your time. I thought
it was a very productive discussion. I intend to support all of
your nominations, unless you mess up here, but I don't think
that is going to happen.
Dr. Wallander, I want to go back to Russia and the
discussion that we had yesterday. With their current posture
and their focus on Ukraine. I am particularly interested with
the negotiations, which, to me, seem that they have drawn up an
untenable position for us to move towards. But there is some
discussion right now that maybe we should think about our
activities, maybe our operations' tempo, in terms of work we
are doing with some of our NATO partners and allies in that
area.
Do you think that that is productive to say that we would
actually, potentially reduce the current levels of activity or
why should that be on the table as a discussion for
negotiation?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I share your concern about the
messaging surrounding that reporting. I would highlight that
were Russia to cease its dangerous, destabilizing, and
problematic activities and exercises that, you know, right now
we are looking at the headlines, but this is a constant problem
of Russian activities in the Black Sea, the Baltic region, and
now the focus on Ukraine's borders. That would be a desirable
end state. If a negotiation were focused on Russia coming back
into compliance with its already existing commitments under the
conventional forces in Europe agreement, that could be a
positive for European security and Ukraine.
But I share your concern that starting from now, kind of
seeds what Russia, the dangerous activities that Russia has
already been engaged with, and I wouldn't support starting from
that base.
Senator Tillis. We also talked a little bit about Nord
Stream. We are going to have a vote later on sanctions. We have
a couple of proposals here. One is that sanctions would be
imposed once, if Russia invades Ukraine. The other one is to go
ahead and put them in place now.
What are the merits of either of those two proposals or
concerns that you would have where them?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I first want to make clear that I
fully support the availability of really serious sanctions in a
toolkit for dealing with Russia----
Senator Tillis. Do you think they work?
Ms. Wallander.--in the course of abilities.
Senator Tillis. There are some people here who think that
they don't work.
So, I mean, go ahead and continue with your answer with
that----
Dr. Wallander. So, it is a complicated question: what do
they work to achieve?
They don't, always. I think skepticism is well-merited and
behave to be modest in our understanding. That is why I would
emphasize sanctions as part of a toolkit. Sanctions, also, can
be used to reduce Russian capabilities to be able to coerce and
deploy coercive and aggressive threats against neighbors and
allies.
So, I am not fully read into the various proposals in which
the sequencing of them, but as a matter of policy, I support
the judiciousness of sanctions both, for ongoing erosion of
Russian capabilities and leverage, and as a deterrent, an
element of an effective deterrent.
Senator Tillis. I am not sure if you can answer this, but
just based on public reports from experts, do you believe that
if Ukraine decided to, or if Russia decided to invade Ukraine,
that their objectives would be swift and decisive?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I have a long career of studying
the Soviet and then the Russian military and it is my
assessment that the Ukrainians would fight admirably and well
and be quite effective in imposing enormous costs on Russian
military forces. But the signals we are hearing from the
Kremlin suggest exactly what you point to, which is a potential
for a decisive and swift military strike, and it is very
concerning.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Dr. Plumb, I am going to submit some questions for the
record, but in my capacity as Ranking Member on Personnel
Subcommittee, I look forward to working on things that we can
do to fill the gap.
You are going to have a, we have a resource problem in
terms of being able to compete with the private sector on the
best and brightest for cyberthreats. So, I look forward to
working with everyone in DOD that is focused on the issue.
Ms. Dalton, I am just going to submit a couple of questions
for the record on, particularly, China and Latin America. I
just got off of a conference call with a business here that is
trying to focus on rare earth mineral extractions and a number
of other things. There is a disturbing trend in South America
and Latin America with Chinese investment threatening, actually
even making what were already fragile supply chains more
fragile, but I will submit those for the record.
I look forward to supporting all of your nominations.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Let me recognize Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. There we go. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman Reed. Thank you for holding this
important hearing.
I want to thank the nominees for being here today, your
willingness to serve.
So, we will just get right into it about cybersecurity, of
course, our utmost, top of everybody's mind, and I would like
to focus particularly on NATO and cybersecurity, an issue I
raised with Admiral graded during his confirmation hearing, and
one that came up consistently when I had a chance to visit NATO
headquarters on a congressional delegation in November.
So, Dr. Wallander, as you know, cybersecurity is part of
NATO's core task of collective defense. Given rising threats of
cyberattacks, of course, we know from Russia and China, NATO's
efforts to protect allied networks and enhance resilience
across the alliance through information-sharing and joint
exercises, of course, has become more critical than ever.
So, again, Dr. Wallander, if confirmed, how would the
Department of Defense collaborate with our NATO allies to
prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyberattacks targeting our
critical infrastructure, our energy grids, our water grids, our
pipelines?
We know that we have seen cyberattacks in the past. What
would you be doing to collaborate with NATO, please?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, thank you for your question
highlighting this important aspect of NATO common defense and
the challenge to NATO security.
Many of our NATO allies were in the forefront and
recognizing Russia's use of a cyber domain for assault, and so
the partnership with those allies has proven very helpful in
the last couple of years as Russia has upped its activities in
this domain.
If confirmed, I would work with Dr. Plumb's office, if
confirmed, to make sure that we have both, the functional and
regional expertise to effectively engage with NATO allies in
order to make sure that we coordinate, not just government
resources, but one of the challenges that you know is that much
of the cyber infrastructure is private, is commercial.
Europe faces that challenge, just as the United States
does, so I think our best common practices are not just from
the Defense Department, but also it would require a whole-of-
government approach and coordination with the Department of
Homeland Security.
Senator Rosen. Yeah, I couldn't agree more. I sit on the
Homeland Security Committee. We just had a hearing just
recently with CISSA talking about how we would, how they are
planning to try to take care of some of these issues. So, I
hope you continue to work with them.
But I would like to move on, Dr. Wallander, to issues about
Iranian aggression, because they are still out there.
I have noted in previous hearings, Iranian-backed militias,
while they are increasingly targeting United States
installations and servicemembers in both, Iraq and Syria, via
rocket and drone attacks.
Iran, we don't have to, I can't say this enough, it is the
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. It continues to be
a threat to the United States and allied interests, via its
ballistic missile program and support for Hezbollah and other
terrorist proxies.
So, can you discuss the threat of Iranian-backed militias
in the Middle East, the threat they pose to our United States
troops and allies, and if confirmed, how would you use your
existing DOD authorities to target these malign groups and
proactively protect our personnel?
Dr. Wallander. Senator, I very much share your concern, and
a lot of our focus in public tends to be on Iran's nuclear
weapons program and that is, you know, concerning, but we can't
lose sight of the fact that Iran is actively supporting groups
that strike at American personnel installations and
capabilities in the region and undermine our ability to
responsibly implement counterterrorism missions in the region.
If confirmed, I will focus on the partner relations in the
region to work with them, to make sure that we are doing
everything necessary to counter Iran's activities, and to
undermine them, but also to do an evaluation within DOD to make
sure that we are properly resourced and postured. I would
cooperate with some of the other offices, in particular, those
involving Special Operations, the functional offices, and the
Department of Defense.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
I would like to move on to you, Ms. Dalton, about the DOD
cyber strategy. I understand, if confirmed, you will serve as
the Chief Civilian Supervisor to the Secretary of Defense on
cybersecurity.
Given the large number of Federal agencies responsible for
protecting the Homeland from cyberthreats, what would you
define is the Department of Defense's appropriate role in
addressing our Nation's cybersecurity, and, separately, if
confirmed, how would you strengthen that interagency
collaboration to ensure coordinated approach is going forward?
Ms. Dalton. Senator, thank you for highlighting the
critical challenge of cybersecurity and the Department's role.
The Department is the sector risk and management agency for the
Defense Industrial Base.
If confirmed, I would look forward to stewarding those
authorities, those responsibilities in close coordination with
the Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence
community, U.S. Cyber Command, and other components to protect
our critical infrastructure.
Our relationships with the private sector, critical supply
chains, all of these are, unfortunately, experiencing threats
and so ensuring we have the requisite protections and
resilience going forward will be a priority of mine.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, everybody, for participating here today.
Dr. Plumb, I want to talk to you a little bit more about
the anti-satellite missile tests that have been conducted by
the Chinese and the Russians. The test in 2007, you were asked
about it earlier. That kinetic kill vehicle put a debris field
from about a hundred miles, you know, probably all the way up
to a couple thousand miles.
On one of my space shuttle flights, I had to maneuver out
of the way of some of that debris and that was well over a
decade ago. Just this past November, the space station had to
move out of the way of that debris field. This is going to
become a continuing problem; thousands, I think, 2,000 pieces
of debris.
The Russians launched a test themselves, but I want to
focus a little bit on the Chinese capability. So, DOD had a
report that detailed China's emerging counter-space
capabilities, including satellite jammers, directed-energy
weapons, and these ground-based anti-satellite missiles, like
we saw in 2007 with the test.
So, what is your current assessment of China's emerging
counter-space capabilities, and, if confirmed, how is your
office going to address this emerging threat?
Dr. Plumb. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I will just say, I think you are spot-on; the Chinese
threat to our space assets is growing and it is troubling, and
it is in many different vectors. I think being able to counter
that, there is no one solution.
I think one of the advantages of integrating the different
policy offices that are functional under this ASD-ship, if
confirmed, would be the ability to more tightly interweave
cyber operations and counter-space operations, for example.
I would say the Chinese threat is possibly, in order to
successfully prevail in a campaign in a warfare campaign, we
need to have a resilient architecture that can handle some of
those attacks, because some of those attacks are sure to come.
I think calling out kinetic, destructive tests, in particular,
because those impose a long-term, enduring problem to all
spacefaring nations, including astronauts, would be helpful, as
well.
I think that there are, in the spectrum of warfare, we need
to be ready for kinetic attacks against these assets, as well.
We can't, it is a cross-domain problem, I guess, is what I am
trying to say. If we just think about space versus space, it
doesn't deal with the ground problem in a way that is
sufficient in my opinion.
Senator Kelly. Yeah, it is, in any conflict with a near-
peer adversary, it is clearly the high ground. We know the
importance of being able to maintain the high ground and this
is a place that we need to be present and capable and continue
to innovate.
So, thank you, I look forward to working with you after
your confirmation.
I want to just transition on a totally different subject to
Ms. Dalton for a second. As you may know, being from Arizona, I
represent over 370 miles of United States-Mexico border and, in
fact, I think I am the only member of this Committee that is in
a Southwest Border state. I have repeatedly called on the
administration to better resource DHS and the National Guard's
border mission to address the crisis at the border, and it is a
crisis.
We currently have over 2,400 National Guard troops deployed
to the United States-Mexico border by the Department of Defense
and another 1,300 by governors, including the Arizona governor.
But this isn't enough; clearly, it is not.
I mean, I have spent time at the border. I continue to hear
from law enforcement, especially sheriffs, but also mayors in
border communities, and my constituents on this issue. The
challenges should not fall on local communities; it is a crisis
and it is hard for them to manage.
The National Guard play a critical security role here,
well, in a lot of ways, right: responding to national
disasters, helping communities tackle COVID, supporting
security at our border. It is imperative that we give them the
tools that they need to do this work. The National Guard needs
to have those tools.
So, Ms. Dalton, do I have your commitment, and I think this
is an easy question, do I have your commitment to work with us
to ensure that those troops are well-resourced as they conduct
these missions at the United States-Mexico border?
Ms. Dalton. Yes, Senator, you do.
If confirmed, I would look forward to visiting Arizona and
the Southwest Border to better understand the challenge. Thank
you.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
Ms. Wallander, I have, I am going to submit the question
for the record. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
I want to thank the witnesses for their very thoughtful
testimony today and also for their willingness to serve, as
they served before.
With that, let me adjourn this hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander
by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) is the principal advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on
international security strategy and policy on issues of Defense
Department interest that relate to the nations and international
organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and Russia), the Middle East, Africa, and the Western
Hemisphere, and their governments and defense establishments; and for
oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military
Sales in these regions.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
ASD(ISA) under current regulations and practices?
Answer. The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, ASD (ISA), are outlined by DOD
Directive 5111.07. My role, if confirmed, would be to serve as the
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy with respect to defense policy and strategy for the
Middle East, Europe, Russia, and Africa. ASD (ISA) is responsible for
coordinating policies with the Joint Staff, representing the Department
in interagency deliberations, helping manage the Department's defense
relationships with foreign partners from the above regions, and
overseeing various security cooperation and assistance programs, among
other responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions would
you expect the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy to prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on the actions and
relationships under the purview of ASD (ISA). I am unaware of any
specific additional guidance the Secretary of Defense or Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for the ASD (ISA)
position.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you for this position?
Answer. I previously served at the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2009 to
2012, and later as the Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia at
the National Security Council staff from 2013 to 2017. While these
roles focused heavily on Russia and European security--which are a
crucial component of the ASD (ISA) portfolio--they equipped me more
broadly with the skills to manage critical defense relationships,
navigate the interagency policy formation process, and develop national
security policy in response to complex geopolitical contexts. I have
dedicated my career to studying and implementing policy related to
European and Eurasian security, specifically Russian foreign policy and
defense strategy. My career in and out of government in foreign and
security policy has also provided substantial exposure to an extensive
range of global security issues.
major challenges and priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, the specific priorities I would establish
will depend in large measure on the priorities of the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). These
priorities, among others, will in all likelihood include bolstering our
critical alliances while ensuring our allies contribute meaningfully to
our shared security objectives, strengthening United States credibility
and influence in key regions, confronting Russian and Iranian coercion
or aggression, defeating ISIS and other terrorist groups, and ensuring
that the Office of the USD(P) plays a meaningful and constructive role
within the Department's contributions to our national security.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, you
would confront if confirmed as ASD(ISA)?
Answer. From a general policy perspective, I believe the major
challenges include some of the issue areas above. It is often a
challenge amidst the daily demands and urgent crises to ensure we are
not only meeting immediate demands but also making progress on long-
term strategic objectives. Another challenge will be to support the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense and the
U.S. Government in resolving these and other issues--and pursuing
opportunities--amidst a range of resource constraints and reconciling
global priorities, trade-offs, and risks.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address each of these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would want to first examine the existing
management structure of the organization, as well as the assumptions
and timelines associated with meeting these challenges, before
providing an answer. Ultimately, prioritization and timelines of
confronting these challenges will depend on guidance from the Secretary
of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as
interagency consultations or Presidential determinations. Recognizing
that some of these challenges fall outside of the portfolio of the ASD
(ISA), if confirmed I would work with my colleagues across the
government to address these discrete threats with specific strategies,
consistent with a comprehensive global defense strategy and our
national interests.
detainee treatment and guantanamo bay
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense (DOD) Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014,
and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for the treatment of detainees
in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3; in DOD
Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program; and as
required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). The United States Government may
not subject any individuals in our custody to any treatment or
interrogation technique or approach that is not listed or authorized by
the Army Field Manual or any other DOD or Army directive, manual,
instruction, or other form of policy or guidance.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
detainee transfer process at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
Answer. As I understand the role, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs will play a coordinating
role with other elements of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy in the detainee transfer process for detainees held
at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
national defense strategy and interim national security strategic
guidance
Question. The 2018 NDS outlines the threats confronting the United
States: a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat
from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden
Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,
which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration.
Among these priorities is the requirement to ``promote a favorable
distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly
threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the
global commons, or dominating key regions''. The Administration has
initiated the process of preparing a new National Defense Strategy,
planned for issuance in 2022.
Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment,
including the most critical and enduring threats to the national
security of the United States and its allies?
Answer. Based on the security environment at the time, I believe
the 2018 NDS correctly identified strategic competitions with China and
with Russia as the primary challenges animating the global security
environment.
I believe the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
accurately articulates the breadth and scale of the challenges we face
and sets forth priorities to advance our vital national interests. The
threats are increasingly global in nature; the distribution of power
across the world is changing, creating new threats and opportunities;
the international order the United States helped establish is being
tested; and the ongoing revolution in technology underpins many of
these shifts.
Question. Do you support the national security priorities set out
in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, including for
regions within the ASD(ISA)'s purview?
Answer. Yes, I support these priorities. If confirmed, I would
expect to focus on the defense elements of implementation consistent
with Administration guidance.
Question. In your view, what global security developments since
2018 should be addressed as part of the new NDS?
Answer. I recognize the NDS process is nearing completion. The 2018
National Defense Strategy highlighted a number of regions and
challenges that either fall under ASD/ISA's portfolio, or closely
impact it, and continue to be relevant to the national security
landscape today. These include Russian and Iranian coercion or
aggression; China's efforts to improve its placement, access, and
leverage in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East; violent extremist
organizations and terrorism; and, overarching challenges to the
international order that the United States must work closely with its
allies and partners to address (e.g., effects of a changing climate and
the COVID pandemic).
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you
recommend for the Department's implementation of the 2018 NDS with
regard to the issues and regions in the ASD(ISA)'s purview, such as the
continuing threat of Russian aggression against Ukraine?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend identifying how DOD efforts
can be better integrated with those of other elements of national power
and alongside our allies and partners, in light of the guidance within
the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I
appreciate the vast number of bilateral defense relationships and
multilateral institutions ASD/ISA plays a direct role in and would work
within the Department to leverage them in NDS implementation.
Question. In your view, what are the key elements of strategic
deterrence in the 21st century?
Answer. As directed by Secretary Austin, the Department is working
to develop the concept of integrated deterrence. This involves bringing
all of our tools of national power to strengthen deterrence, including
leveraging our alliances and partnerships, taking a whole-of-government
approach, considering deterrence across the spectrum of conflict, and
considering all of our capabilities across domains and theaters.
Question. What is your assessment of the security cooperation
relationship between China and Russia, and what do you perceive to be
the potential for their joint military cooperation against the United
States in the context of both day-to-day strategic competition and in
conflict? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Russia and China collaborate in the economic, diplomatic,
and military/security arenas. While the two nations do not agree in
many ways, they both align when it suits them. Each poses different
challenges to the United States and has different motivations for its
actions. Both Russia and China seek to shape a world consistent with
their authoritarian model, gaining leverage over other nations'
economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Both nations undermine
global security and the rules-based order by undercutting such basic
values as liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. What they both
share is a preference for a world in which the United States and its
allies and partners are weaker, less unified, and less influential.
Together with allies and partners, the United States must be vigilant
and united in opposing their malign action and influence.
approaches to strategic competition
Question. The NDS references ``expanding the competitive space.''
The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for
strengthening U.S. ``enduring advantages'' to prevail in strategic
competition with near-peer rivals. Although their approaches differ,
both China and Russia have been successful in competing with the United
States below the threshold of armed conflict.
In your view, what are the distinctions between the military
capabilities and capacities the United States needs to prevail in day-
to-day strategic competition with Russia and the capabilities and
capacities it needs to deter Russia's use of military force to achieve
political objectives and, if necessary, prevail in a military conflict
with the Russia?
Answer. The Department's review of its National Defense Strategy
(NDS) will appropriately examine the United States military's approach,
roles, and capabilities as they relate to day-to-day strategic
competition, including with Russia. Warfighting credibility is critical
to underwriting deterrence and diplomacy. Many of the capabilities and
capacities needed for laying this foundation of warfighting deterrence
would also be applicable for day-to-day strategic competition. I
believe the Department must also develop new concepts and pursue
greater integration with allies and partners to advance U.S. vital
national interests.
Question. In your view, what enduring advantages vested in the
United States will enable it to prevail in the strategic competition
with Russia and with China?
Answer. I believe the United States benefits from a range of
enduring advantages, to include the strength of our democracy at home,
the American people, our robust economy, and the strong network of
alliances and partnerships that we have helped build and strengthen
over the course of decades. These strengths will help enable the United
States to protect and advance vital national interest in the strategic
competition with Russia and China.
Question. If confirmed, what policies and approaches would you
implement to sustain and strengthen those advantages?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to work with others in DOD, and
in concert with allies and partners, to creatively apply these
strengths to advance the Department priorities. For example, the
Department should consider ways to better collaborate with the private
sector, state, and local authorities to improve resilience in key
areas. The Department might also consider enhancing ally and partner
capabilities, improving interoperability, and collaborating to improve
their resilience strengthen their ability to help deter aggression and
resist coercion. Also, further prioritization of key challenges and
opportunities, increased clarity and shared understanding of
responsibilities and authorities across the U.S. Government departments
and agencies, and better integration of efforts can help to further
strengthen our collective ability to advance key national objectives.
Question. In your assessment, what new capabilities are needed for
the Joint Force to compete below the threshold of armed conflict?
Answer. I understand that the NDS Review is examining this issue in
detail. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure the
Joint Force continues to develop key capabilities for this challenge.
Question. If confirmed, what policies would you propose to counter
China's efforts to compete strategically below the threshold of armed
conflict in regions within the ASD(ISA)'s responsibility?
Answer. I understand that the NDS Review is closely examining this
issue. I believe that the Department should continue to frame military
efforts to compete strategically below the threshold of armed conflict
as one of many elements of competition undertaken as part of a whole-
of-government approach. The military should seek to integrate with
other instruments of national power, including diplomatic, economic,
and intelligence activities.
Question. Secretary Austin and other Biden Administration officials
have characterized China as America's national security ``pacing
threat.'' Given that reality, what tradeoffs do you foresee as
necessary to address threats other than those posed by China, most
notably threats from Russia?
Answer. I understand that this is a key question under examination
as part of the NDS Review. My view is that we need to make strategy-
driven choices across the near-, mid-, and long-term timeframes, as
well as across capability, capacity, and readiness.
The 2018 NDS also provides that ``effectively expanding the
competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency
to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts
of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland
Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law
enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address
areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.
Question. In your view, has the interagency been effective in a
whole-of-government effort to expand the competitive space? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that U.S. Departments and Agencies have made
notable progress in advancing national objectives by pitting U.S.
strengths against competitor weaknesses throughout the competitive
space. For example, diplomatic initiatives such as work in the Quad
format (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) provide a
strong example of how multilateral cooperation can be used to address
common security challenges. Another example is the Russian Influence
Group, co-chaired by United States European Command and the Department
of State, which identifies whole-of-government solutions to counter
Russian threat networks.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
have to better employ all dimensions of national power to expand the
competitive space?
Answer. I believe further prioritization of key challenges and
opportunities, increased clarity and shared understanding of
responsibilities and authorities across the U.S. Government Departments
and Agencies, and better information sharing and integration of efforts
can help to further strengthen our collective ability to advance key
national objectives.
africa
Question. In your view, what are the greatest threats to United
States national security interests in Africa, and what policy
objectives should the United States pursue to protect them?
Answer. The proliferation of violent extremist organizations
followed by China's increasing influence are the greatest threats to
United States national security interests in Africa. While we have
confronted violent extremist organizations, and continue to do so
through a whole-of-government approach, we need to do the same with
China with respect to United States national security interests in
Africa.
Question. In your view, what are the strategic objectives of China
and Russia in Africa?
Answer. Both China and Russia are seeking to increase their access
and influence on the continent. China is doing it primarily through
economic means and Russia through security. The People's Republic of
China's efforts in Africa include a range of diplomatic, economic, and
military engagements designed to cement influence and access. China
maintains its only permanent overseas military base in Djibouti, and
has expressed interest in building additional military installations
elsewhere on the continent. Economically, China pursues agreements with
African countries to expand its political influence and obtain access
to African markets and natural resources. China leverages its economic
influence across the continent to gain diplomatic support within the
United Nations and to dampen criticism over its own domestic policies.
Russia continues to leverage security assistance, defense materiel
sales, and the provision of Russian proxy actors (such as Russian
private military companies) as a means to increase leverage and
influence in Africa. These activities provide Russia with opportunities
to project power and influence into African states.
Question. In what ways, if any, do those strategic objectives
challenge or otherwise conflict with the strategic objectives of the
United States broadly, and DOD specifically?
Answer. In addition to undermining regional stability and security,
China and Russia seek to increase access and influence at the expense
of the United States. China and Russia seek to gain influence across
the continent by lowering the bar for human rights and good governance.
Question. What is your assessment of the United States strategy
with regard to strategic competition with China and Russia in Africa to
date?
Answer. The U.S. strategy must be a whole-of-government approach
that demonstrates an enduring commitment to the region's economic and
security development. We must take a more strategic approach to
identifying Chinese and Russia activities we find most threatening to
United States interests and prioritize countering those.
China prioritization of economic means necessitates the United
States Government to encourage or promote transparent business
practices amongst African nations. The United States strategy should
prioritize Chinese investments that pose a threat to United States
national security objectives and interests. If confirmed, I will look
to reinvigorate DOD's role in a whole-of-government approach to
strategic competition.
Russia requires a similar, holistic and integrated approach,
however the threat posed by Russian activity in Africa is substantially
different than in the Chinese context. Russia tends to lead in Africa
with offers of security contracts, which then give way to defense
materiel relationships, leading to a slow pivot by African militaries
from Western governments and Western military training and assistance
towards Russian capabilities. This risks boxing out the United States
and our Allies and partners. In some cases, Russia is also quite adept
at creating opportunity from tragedy, and exploiting countries in a
period of instability. DOD needs to be able to provide security
assistance in a timely fashion and remain the partner of choice for
African military security needs as a means to remain fully involved in
the continent.
Question. What do you believe to be the DOD role in achieving the
primary objectives of that strategy?
Answer. DOD's role in achieving the primary objectives of that
strategy are to build partner capacity, address threats with allies and
partners, and develop African nations to be exporters of security. The
presence of U.S. military personnel and assets demonstrates our
commitment to our allies and partners in the region and instills
confidence as they work to confront strategic competition on their own
terms.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of such efforts to
date?
Answer. While whole-of-government efforts to date have shown
promise, there remains much works to be done. With the support of
Congress, we will be better positioned to address strategic
competition. DOD's efforts are most successful when integrated into a
whole-of-government approach and, if confirmed, I will work with the
other departments and agencies to ensure unity of effort.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and our allies and partners, by ISIS, al Qaeda, and associated
violent extremist groups in Africa?
Answer. ISIS, al Qaeda, and associated violent extremist groups in
Africa remain a prominent threat to United States interests as well as
to our allies and partners in Africa. Maintaining pressure on these
violent extremist groups in Africa remains a key component of
mitigating this threat. If confirmed, I will align my office's effort
with that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity conflict to prioritize threats posed by these groups.
Question. Which groups do you assess to pose the greatest threat,
and why?
Answer. The ability of ISIS- and al Qaeda-aligned groups to utilize
familiar terrain and derive resources from the local populace increases
their ability to threaten United States interests. Ongoing instability
in the Sahel and Somalia are particularly worrisome and the two
dominant groups there, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and al-
Shabaab, pose threats to United States interests. Both of these groups
are associates or branches of al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has previously
stated its intent to target the United States Homeland.
Question. What is your view on the decision to remove the majority
of United States military forces out of Somalia to an ``over-the-
horizon'' posture?
Answer. I understand that the previous administration made the
decision to remove the majority of United States military forces out of
Somalia. It is my assessment that any decision on force posture should
be grounded in a firm understanding of U.S. policy objectives and a
reflection on the appropriate authorities and U.S. Government tools to
meet them. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in a review of
our approach to degrading violent extremist organizations that threaten
U.S. interests and regional stability.
Question. In your view, is an ``over-the-horizon'' approach to
counterterrorism able to effectively meet U.S. national security
interests in the region?
Answer. An ``over-the-horizon'' capability can be effective but it
is one aspect of a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism,
and it should be continuously assessed to ensure the posture approach
is appropriate to meet U.S. policy objectives. If confirmed, I would
support DOD continuing to work by, with, and through partners and
allies to bolster the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts.
Question. In your assessment, what are the political and security
implications of the involvement of Russian contract security forces,
such as the Wagner group, in volatile and brittle security situations
such as Mali and Libya?
Answer. Russian contract security forces provide some African
nations with a relatively low cost security alternative to address
their security needs. However, they come with a number of negative
consequences. Contracting for security leaves the security forces in
these countries underfunded and ill equipped to handle their nation's
longer-term security priorities. They also fuel instability by adding
proxy fighters and arms to already unstable situations. In Libya, for
example, contract personnel fought at the behest of one party in the
political divide, which served to prolong the conflict. Russian proxy
forces have also conducted human rights violations in Africa, according
to a UN report detailing abuses against civilians in the CAR. From a
United States national interest perspective these proxy forces also
increase Russian influence in the region, including in the information
and media space, often at the cost to United States or European
influence.
middle east
Question. In your view, what are the greatest threats to U.S.
national security interests in the Middle East and what policy
objectives should we pursue to protect them?
Answer. In my view, the greatest threats to United States national
security interests in the Middle East are from Iran and its proxies and
violent extremist organizations, including al-Qa'ida and ISIS. The
United States should address Iranian and Iranian-backed threats by
pursuing diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,
working with regional partners to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities, and responding to attacks from Iranian proxies on United
States forces. The United States should continue to work with our
allies and local vetted partner forces, including the Iraqi Security
Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, to prevent an ISIS resurgence.
Question. To what extent does achieving United States national
security interests in the Middle East require a continuous United
States military presence there, in your view?
Answer. United States national security interests require a
continuous military presence in the Middle East in order to defend the
Homeland from attacks by violent extremist organizations and rapidly
respond to contingencies. Our presence in the Middle East also allows
us to build the capacity of regional countries to take on a larger role
in maintaining regional stability over the long term. As Secretary
Austin said at the Manama Dialogue several weeks ago, no one should
doubt our resolve or our capabilities to defend ourselves, and all
those who work alongside us to keep the region secure.
Question. Are there any countries in which you would recommend
reducing U.S. troop presence? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the analysis
generated through DOD's Global Posture Review and consulting with the
Joint Staff to understand opportunities for more dynamic, agile, and
tailored deployments in the region, in coordination with allies and
partners.
Question. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power
competition?
Answer. The Middle East is an important theater for strategic
competition. The Middle East sits along key waterways for the movement
of global commerce, energy supplies, and military assets. China and
Russia are increasingly engaged in undermining the United States
position in the Middle East through weapon sales and infrastructure
projects, and have ambitions to establish military installations that
could undermine United States force protection and the security of U.S.
technology.
Question. What, in your opinion, should be DOD's role in efforts to
compete with Russia and China in the Middle East?
Answer. In my opinion, DOD's role in strategic competition in the
Middle East should be focused on supporting our partners in pursuing
shared security interests and in developing their own capabilities.
Doing so effectively will ensure that the United States remains the
security partner of choice in the region.
iraq and syria
Question. From a DOD standpoint, what must be done to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. To ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, I believe DOD
should, as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, focus on
supporting vetted local partner forces, including the Iraqi Security
Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), through training,
advice, and assistance with the objective of improving their ability to
independently manage the ISIS threat.
Question. What non-military efforts are necessary to sustain the
enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. The enduring defeat of ISIS cannot be achieved through
military means alone. As long as the underlying grievances that
facilitated ISIS's rapid expansion remain unaddressed, ISIS's ability
to reconstitute remains a threat. If confirmed, I would support a broad
United States whole-of-government approach in Iraq and Syria, including
civilian-led humanitarian and stabilization efforts to address these
underlying grievances, including local security, economic, and service
provision efforts.
Question. What are the key United States national security
interests in Syria and how would you describe the strategy to secure
them?
Answer. I believe the United States should remain focused on
practical and achievable goals in Syria, such as maintaining United
States military presence to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS and
working with the international community to promote and expand the
provision of life-saving humanitarian assistance and access. The United
States should also sustain existing ceasefires and support
international norms for human rights and accountability. These steps
are essential to establishing a foundation for a comprehensive
political solution to the conflict under auspices of the United Nations
that represents the will of the Syrian people.
Question. At this point in time, do you believe that a limited
United States military footprint in Syria and Iraq is important to
United States national security interests in Syria, Iraq and the
broader region? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that a United States military footprint in Iraq
and Syria is important to securing United States national security
interests in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region. The United States
military presence enables it to work with the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS and local vetted partner forces to achieve the enduring
defeat of ISIS. The U.S. military presence and support also enables
civilian-led humanitarian and stabilization efforts.
Question. What are the Russian Government's key strategic interests
and objectives in Syria and how successful have they been at
accomplishing them?
Answer. Russia has made clear that it intends to ensure a continued
a Russia-friendly regime in Syria by supporting Bashar al-Assad. This
support has enabled the Assad regime to continue its campaign of
violence against the Syrian people, including conducting human rights
abuses. Russia has not dedicated the resources that would demonstrate a
concerted effort to prevent an ISIS resurgence in Syria.
Question. What are the key United States national security
interests in Iraq and how would you describe the strategy to secure
them?
Answer. The key United States national security interests in Iraq
are ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and supporting a sovereign and
stable Iraq. It is my understating that the United States works to
secure these interests by advising, assisting, and enabling Iraqi
Security Forces as they lead in the fight against ISIS, advancing the
United States-Iraq strategic partnership, and supporting Iraq's
improved relations with regional states as a counterweight to Iran.
Question. Do you support the Administration's decision to
transition United States combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2021?
Answer. I support the Administration's decision, made in
consultation with the Government of Iraq, to transition from a combat
role to an advise, assist, and enabling role. It is my understanding
that the decision was made due to the increasing capabilities of the
Iraqi Security Forces in the fight against ISIS.
Question. How do you envision the missions and size of the U.S.
Military presence there going forward?
Answer. United States forces are in Iraq at the invitation of the
Iraqi Government; the future of the United States military presence in
Iraq will be dependent on the evolving needs of the Iraqi security
forces. If confirmed, I will work across the United States Government
and with our Iraqi and Coalition partners on the continued evolution of
our mission.
Question. How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq?
Answer. It is my understanding that Iran tries to increase its
political and military influence in Iraq by providing financial,
advisory, and other support to Iraqi Shia militia groups and their
associated political factions. Through this support, Iran uses Iraq as
a platform to undermine regional stability. Iran's support to these
militia groups threaten Iraqi sovereignty, stability, and the
prosperity of the Iraqi people.
Question. If confirmed, what strategy would you recommended to
limit Iranian malign influence?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working across the
Department of the Defense and with other departments and agencies on
implementing a whole-of-government approach to limiting Iranian malign
influence. There are no simple or single solutions to the challenge
posed by Iran-backed militias to Iraq's own sovereignty and security,
or the security of our forces. This whole-of-government strategy should
focus on bolstering Iraq's democratic institutions, increasing Iraq's
engagement with its Arab neighbors, and countering threats to United
States personnel.
Question. How would you characterize China's influence in Iraq?
Answer. Like in the rest of the Middle East, the People's Republic
of China continues to expand its interests and activities in Iraq,
especially economically through One Belt, One Road and other
initiatives but also militarily. Through these initiatives, Beijing
seeks to displace the United States as the premier partner in the
region. For example, the PRC is the largest market for Iraqi oil export
and Beijing has sold strike-capable unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to
Iraq.
Question. If confirmed, what strategy would you recommend to limit
Beijing's malign influence?
Answer. To counter China's malign activities, we must continue to
reinforce our long-standing partnerships in the region, including the
United States-Iraq relationship. If confirmed, I will work with my
colleagues in the Department and across the U.S. Government to continue
strengthening our partnership, and support the development of a secure,
stable, and independent Iraq.
Question. In your opinion, what is the appropriate role of NATO in
Iraq and in what ways, if any, would you recommend altering the current
NATO Mission Iraq?
Answer. It is my understanding that the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) is
a non-combat mission, focused on ministerial-level institutional
development and professional military education instructor training and
that NMI and Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) are distinct, but
complementary, missions. NMI's institutional development activities
help the Iraqi Security Institutions and Iraqi Security Forces
strengthen their capacity to defend Iraq's sovereignty, contributing to
Iraq's long-term security, stability, and prosperity. I support NMI's
efforts to improve Iraqi security institutions as these efforts enable
Iraq to secure its territory more effectively from threats such as
ISIS.
Question. Do you believe that Iranian and American interests in
Iraq converge to any extent? Please explain.
Answer. Iran and the United States have divergent interests in
Iraq. Iran, through its support for militia groups and other policies,
seeks to foment instability in Iraq, to make Iraq dependent on Iran,
and to use Iraq as a platform to threaten regional stability. In
contrast, the United States seeks to bolster the stability and
independence of the Iraqi Government so that it can maintain good
relations with its neighbors and advance the concerns of the Iraqi
people.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. The Iranian threat spans its military's conventional
capabilities, to include the region's largest ballistic missile force
and a naval force capable of threatening freedom of navigation in the
Strait of Hormuz, as well as unconventional capabilities including
armed unmanned aerial systems used for direct attacks. Iran also
proliferates advanced conventional weapons to militias across the
region that threaten United States forces and our regional partners.
Iran has also taken provocative steps to advance its nuclear program.
Question. If the United States were to return to compliance with
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what concerns, if any,
would you have for regional security? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Iran and its proxies have worked to undermine regional
security before, during, and after both the JCPOA and the Maximum
Pressure campaign. I understand that the Administration's goal is to
negotiate a mutual return to the JCPOA in order to put Iran's nuclear
program back in a box, and then use that agreement as a basis for
negotiating a longer, stronger deal that addresses Iran's other
destabilizing activities. If a mutual return to the JCPOA is achieved,
the United States will need to continue working with our allies and
partners to address Iran's destabilizing activities until a further
agreement can be reached.
Question. Do you assess that Iran desires to achieve a nuclear
weapons capability? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I agree with the United States Intelligence Community's
published assessment that Iran is not currently undertaking key nuclear
weapons development activities necessary to provide a nuclear device.
However, I remain concerned that Iran's leaders seek to retain the
option to pursue a nuclear weapons capability in the future.
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
United States security strategy with respect to Iran?
Answer. I understand that on the Iranian nuclear program the
Administration is pursuing a diplomacy first strategy in which the
State Department is working with United States Allies to put the
Iranian nuclear program back in a box. At the same time, the United
States is strengthening the capacity of our regional partners to
address Iran's destabilizing activities, deterring attacks by Iran and
its proxies on United States personnel, and if necessary, responding to
attacks by Iran or its proxies.
Question. What is the role of the U.S. Military in this strategy?
Answer. The Department of Defense through its calibrated regional
force presence builds the capacity of our regional partners to address
Iran's destabilizing activities, deters Iranian aggression, and, if
necessary, defends against and respond to Iranian or Iranian-backed
attacks.
Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
currently deployed to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Areas
of Responsibility (AOR) adequate to deter and, if necessary, respond to
threats posed by Iran?
Answer. The Department of Defense currently has a significant force
presence in the USCENTCOM AOR, and it is important to underline that
the theater is set not only with what the U.S. has pre-positioned, but
also what our allies and partners contribute and what we can rapidly
flow in. If confirmed, I will work with counterparts in the Joint Staff
to shape the evolution of the DOD mission as the Department
continuously evaluates the appropriate mix of forces to maintain
deterrence against Iran and demonstrate the capability to deploy at the
time and place of its choosing in response to real-time events.
Question. What is your assessment of United States national
security interests placed at risk by the growth of Iranian influence in
the Middle East?
Answer. Iran is a destabilizing actor who arms and supports proxies
that attack U.S. partners and interest in the region, including
transportation and energy infrastructure, as well as U.S. interests.
These activities threaten the lives of American civilians, military and
diplomatic personnel, the stability of global energy markets, and the
stability of partner governments. On top of that, Iran's nuclear
program also has profound implications for United States objectives
with regards to nuclear non-proliferation, both in the Middle East and
around the globe.
Question. How would you describe the strategy to counter Iran's
malign influence and other activities throughout the Middle East, and
more specifically, via Iran's proxy networks?
Answer. The United States strategy to counter Iranian malign
influence focuses on strengthening the capabilities of our regional
partners to defend themselves and their sovereignty. The United States
also mobilizes the broader international community to expose and
respond to Iran's destabilizing activities, while the United States
military deters, and if necessary, prepares to respond to attacks by
Iran and its proxies.
Question. Which office holder in Iran is more powerful, in your
view: the leader of the IRGC, or the Iranian president? Why?
Answer. The Iranian political system has multiple centers of power
to include the President and the leader of the IRGC. In the current
environment, the new Iranian President retains significant influence
and is close with the Supreme Leader, who is Iran's ultimate decision
maker.
yemen
Question. What are the United States national security interests in
Yemen?
Answer. The primary national security interest in Yemen remains
ensuring that groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
and ISIS-Yemen cannot maintain a safe haven from which to conduct
attacks against the United States Homeland. Additionally, the
aggressive actions taken by the Houthis--with support from Iran--
against United States partners contribute to instability in the Middle
East and threaten the territorial defense of our Gulf partners,
including Saudi Arabia. I believe it is in the national security
interest of the United States to secure a cessation of hostilities and
ultimately a political solution to end the conflict, which is the only
long-term solution to this crisis.
Question. What do you assess to be the strategic goals of Ansar
Allah?
Answer. The actions of Ansar Allah--also known as the Houthi
movement--are prohibiting efforts toward peace in Yemen, exacerbating
the dire humanitarian plight of the Yemeni people, and destabilizing
the region. The movement has opted to use tools of violence,
repression, and military force to impose its will and achieve its goal
of restoring the former Zaydi Shiite Islamic Imamate in Southwest
Arabia. Leaders in the movement have also expressed their intention to
control the two Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi
Arabia, signaling ambitions beyond Yemen's borders. I support the
renewed emphasis that the Biden Administration has placed on a two-
track approach in Yemen: diplomacy to end the war through a political
solution, and enhanced relief efforts to address the worsening
humanitarian situation.
Question. What do you assess to be Saudi Arabia's primary strategic
goals in Yemen?
Answer. Saudi Arabia's primary strategic goals in Yemen are to
reinstate the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government
(RoYG) in Sanaa, curtail Iran's malign influence in the country, and
deter the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.
Question. In your view, has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately
and proportionately to the threat it faces from the Houthis including
rocket and drone attacks on Saudi Arabian territory?
Answer. Houthi rebel cross-border attacks against the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia are persistent and deadly. Saudi Arabia maintains its
right to defend itself and protect its citizens and the innocent
civilians residing in the Kingdom, including the tens of thousands of
United States citizens, from the genuine security threats emanating
from Yemen and elsewhere in the region. Historically, Saudi Arabia's
conduct of its military campaign in Yemen raised serious concerns about
civilian casualties. If confirmed, I will work with interagency
partners to synchronize our actions and capabilities with those of our
regional partners towards an integrated deterrence approach that helps
to end the war in Yemen and mitigate harm to civilians. I will
emphasize adherence to the laws of armed conflict.
Question. In your view, what are the implications of the Biden
Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the
Saudi-led coalition and how do you define ``offensive support
operations''?
Answer. Ending the war in Yemen is in the national security
interest of the United States. A political resolution is the only long-
term means of bringing the war in Yemen to an end. President Biden
stated on February 4 at the State Department that all American support
for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms
sales, would end while underscoring United States commitment to push
for a diplomatic resolution to the Yemen war. In the June 2021,
consistent with the War Powers Resolution, President Biden stated that
``United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, continue to provide
military advice and limited information to regional forces for
defensive and training purposes only as they related to the Saudi-led
Coalition's campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.''
Question. To what extent do you believe Saudi Arabia and its
coalition partners have made progress in avoiding civilian casualties
and ensuring appropriate accountability when allegations of civilian
casualties arise?
Answer. Civilian casualties at any level are a serious concern. To
address this concern the Administration suspended two specific
munitions sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that are associated with
unacceptably high rates of civilian casualties in Yemen, and continues
to emphasize best practices for mitigating the risk of civilian harm in
its defense and military engagements with Saudi counterparts. The
Administration consults with many international and non-government
monitoring bodies to assess reports of civilian casualties in Yemen.
For example, the United Nations Civilian Impact Monitoring Project
released its 2021 third quarter update in November and recorded the
second lowest quarterly number of civilian causalities resulting from
Coalition airstrikes since CIMP began reporting in 2018.
Question. To what extent are the Houthis, supported by Iran, a
threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea?
Answer. The Houthis represent a threat to freedom of navigation in
the Red Sea due to their offensive actions in the maritime domain. As
the State Department said, these actions interfere with freedom of
navigation in the Red Sea and threaten international trade and regional
security. The materiel and technical support the Houthis receive from
Iran, including armed unmanned surface vehicles (USV), unmanned aerial
systems (UAS), and missiles, have enhanced the Houthis' lethal
capabilities over time.
Question. If confirmed, what U.S. policies and actions would you
recommend to address this threat?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for and support the efforts
of Department of Defense and interagency colleagues to address threats
to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea through maritime interdictions
of illicit weapons transfers where possible and through enhancing the
capabilities of regional United States partners to address those
threats themselves such as through improved counter-unmanned surface
vehicles, counter-unmanned aerial systems, and other maritime and air
defense capabilities. Economic sanctions and designations targeting
those individuals and businesses seeking to procure weapons from Iran
and oversee attacks threatening civilians and maritime infrastructure
are another important tool to address this threat.
Question. In your assessment, if United States support to Saudi
Arabia were reduced and arms sales limited, would Saudi Arabia seek
support from China and/or Russia? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important United States
security partner for cooperation in promoting regional stability,
security, and countering Iranian influence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
is under threat from Iran-backed militant groups and relies on United
States support to address those threats, including the provision of
maintenance, training, and early warning information sharing.
Competitors, like China and Russia, seek to exploit tensions between
the United States and its security partners. Saudi Arabia already buys
arms and weapons from China and Russia, signed a Defense Cooperation
Agreement with Russia last summer, and would likely turn further to
United States strategic competitors for additional support in the event
U.S. assistance were reduced. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the
United States remains the security partner of choice with the Kingdom
while keeping United States values, including human rights, at the
forefront of cooperation.
egypt
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Egypt and the United States-Egypt security relationship?
Answer. Egypt faces a number of security challenges, including
ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), ongoing instability in Libya, regional
tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and border
security threats. The strategic defense relationship between the United
States and Egypt, which has underpinned the broader bilateral
partnership for decades, helps Egypt meet these security challenges.
United States-provided security assistance to and security cooperation
with Egypt, focused on counterterrorism and border security, also
increases interoperability between our forces and helps to secure
regional stability in Africa and the Middle East.
Question. What role do the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
play in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty?
Answer. The MFO has provided reassurance to both Israel and Egypt
for 40 years by ensuring both parties adhere to the security provisions
of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace. The MFO presence and
organization provide Egypt and Israel a trusted mechanism to resolve
disputes, avoid conflict, and foster dialogue on shared security
concerns in the Sinai Peninsula.
Question. Should the United States. maintain its military
deployment to the MFO?
Answer. United States. contributions to the MFO anchor other
countries' contributions and bolster U.S. credibility as a leader in
diplomatic and security initiatives globally. If confirmed, I would
maintain DOD's commitment to the MFO and to supporting its mission.
Question. What would be the risks of reducing this commitment, in
your view?
Answer. Reductions in the number of United States authorized
personnel at the MFO could impact the MFO mission, the Egypt-Israel
peace treaty, and regional stability. If confirmed, I would ensure that
any possible changes to the level of U.S. support to the MFO would take
into consideration the above-mentioned potential impacts and would
include extensive consultation with others.
Question. In your view, should we continue to provide defense
articles and services purchased by the Egyptian military using United
States Foreign Military Financing funds?
Answer. United States Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is a central
element of the bilateral relationship, supports Egypt's legitimate
defense needs, and supports United States industry in helping to
modernize Egypt's military. United States FMF also supports efforts to
ensure Egypt is using our equipment in a manner that is consistent with
United States interests and values. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that United States FMF funds for Egypt continue to serve United States
national security interests and Egyptian defense needs.
Question. What is your assessment of Egypt's deepening ties with
Russia?
Answer. Egypt is diversifying its military cooperation with other
foreign partners, including Russia. These deepening ties have been
demonstrated in recent years through key leader engagements, military
drills, joint infrastructure projects, and Egypt's pursuit of Russian
military equipment, such as Su-35 fighter aircraft. Egypt's increasing
ties with Russia could hamper bilateral United States-Egyptian
cooperation and could trigger the Counter America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA). If confirmed, I would communicate these
concerns to Egyptian counterparts, as well as the risk that deepening
ties with Russia could pose to Egypt's national interests.
Question. Where do United States and Russian interests converge in
Egypt?
Answer. I understand that the Department of Defense is concerned by
deepening Egypt-Russia ties, in part because Russian goals and
activities are not consistent with United States interests in Egypt and
in the region. That being said, the United States and Russia do share a
common counter-terrorism interest in the Sinai, though we choose to
pursue this objective in very different ways.
Question. Where do they diverge?
Answer. The United States has an interest in a politically
inclusive, economically vibrant, and secure Egypt with a professional
military force that can protect its land and maritime borders and
counterterrorism in the Sinai, and that respects civilian control of
the military and human rights. Russia does not share those goals. If
confirmed, I would work to ensure that the United States remains
Egypt's partner of choice, as United States training, equipment, and
other materiel is better able to meet Egypt's security needs, mitigate
the risk of civilian harm, and ensure broader regional stability.
Question. What is your assessment of ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates'
relative strength in Sinai?
Answer. I assess that the Egyptian Government has made significant
progress in its counterterrorism fight in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt
still faces terrorist threats, however, and it is in the United States
interest to help Egypt confront terrorist threats in a manner that
reduces civilian harm and respects human rights.
Question. What type of support to Egypt do you assess to be
beneficial in countering these groups?
Answer. Egypt's counterterrorism operations have benefited from
United States-provided equipment and training. I expect that continued
support of this kind would benefit Egypt's counterterrorism fight. If
confirmed, I would work within DOD, with other departments and
agencies, and with Congress to ensure that U.S. support advances shared
counterterrorism objectives and is consistent with U.S. values.
Question. Do you have concerns about the implications of Egypt's
engagements with the Assad regime? Please explain.
Answer. I am concerned about any efforts to normalize relations
with the Assad regime, whether those efforts are undertaken in Cairo or
elsewhere. If confirmed, I would urge states in the region to consider
the atrocities that the Assad regime has and continues to inflict on
the Syrian people before they engage with the regime.
russia
Question. What challenges does Russia pose to United States
national security interests and what are the key principles and
policies that you believe must underpin a successful strategy to
protect U.S. interests?
Answer. Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence
and play a disruptive role on the world stage. It has invested heavily
in efforts meant to check our strengths and to prevent us from
defending our interests and allies around the world. Russia has also
consistently undermined international norms by violating the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, which
additionally threatens the regional stability of our Allies and
partners. The Russian Government's malign actions are underwritten by a
capable military that continues to pose a near-peer strategic challenge
to the United States.
Any successful strategy to counter Russia starts with reconfirming
our commitments to the international rules-based order and the rights
of all nations to determine their futures. In this endeavor we must
also ensure that our European Allies in particular are standing with us
shoulder to shoulder.
Question. In your opinion, what are the most effective ways to
deter Russia or Russian backed separatists from further aggression
against Ukraine?
Answer. Deterring Russia from further aggression against Ukraine
must be a whole-of-government effort combined with our Allies and
partners, similar to what Secretary Austin has termed integrated
deterrence. The Department of Defense has an important role to play in
bolstering Ukraine and deterring Russia militarily, but DOD's efforts
should buttress our national diplomacy and leverage one of our nation's
strongest advantages, our network of Allies and partners.
Question. In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to
counter Russian hybrid tactics?
Answer. The key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid
tactics undoubtedly involves a whole-of-government effort to defend
against, challenge, and deter these threats. In April 2021, the
Administration sanctioned Russia, conducted diplomatic expulsions and
introduced new visa restrictions and export controls for Russian
interference in the 2020 elections, the SolarWinds cyberattack, and
Russia's poisoning of Alexei Navalnyy. This effort required departments
and agencies involved in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and
financial issues to coordinate and synchronize response actions to
target Russian misbehavior and hold Moscow to account.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. efforts to counter such
tactics to date?
Answer. Russia relies upon hybrid tactics because they believe they
can apply force asymmetrically, and that the United States will
respond, but not in a way that will fundamentally hold Russian
interests at risk. To the extent that the United States, working with
Allies and partners, can make United States responses to Russian
hybrid/malign tactics more impactful and costly as a means to deter
this type of behavior, we should continue to explore these mechanisms.
Question. What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence
threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role
of the United States Government writ large, and DOD in particular, in
countering that threat?
Answer. Putin has presided over considerable growth of capabilities
in the cyber domain, in information operations and non-attributable
military capabilities in the form of Russian Private Military Companies
like Wagner. In using these capabilities, Putin is betting that the
United States will weather the blows and either not respond or respond
in a manner that does not inflict significant cost on Russia. Our
approach should seek to make clear that these tools are not viable for
any nation-state to use, and we should continue to hold him
accountable--in lock-step with our partners and allies. The Department
of Defense maintains significant capabilities in the information space,
considerable cyber capabilities, and other options to counter these
threats. If confirmed, I expect that DOD will continue to support
United States Government responses to Russian malign activities
alongside other law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and
financial Departments and Agencies.
Question. What do you view as the benefits and drawbacks of the
statutory limitations on military cooperation between the United States
and the Russia Federation?
Answer. Military cooperation should remain limited given Russia's
ongoing military aggression against Ukraine. Bilateral military
deconfliction with Russia, which plays an important role in reducing
tensions and the risk of miscalculation, should continue as a means to
prevent miscalculation and risk reduction, and must be carefully
distinguished from military cooperation.
Question. In your opinion, what advantages did Russia gain when it
violated and eventually abrogated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty?
Answer. Russia violated the Treaty because it sought to gain
military advantage against the United States and NATO while also
seeking to project a positive image in Europe as a constructive treaty-
compliant country. As a result, Russia has gained the ability to
produce and field more affordable and flexible intermediate range
ground-based systems integrated onto an already existing launcher
family (the Iskander system).
Question. What does the United States need to do to mitigate any
advantages Russia derived from this action?
Answer. My understanding is that the United States works through
the Strategic Stability Dialogue and the NATO-Russia Council to raise
its concerns about Russia's growing capabilities, and to explore ways
to improve European security. I will add that Russia's mendacity on our
attempts to address Russia's violation of the INF treaty over 6 years
leads us to be skeptical of the sincerity of Russia's approach to these
issues.
Question. In your view, are the integrated air and missile defense
capabilities of the United States in Europe adequate to address the
ballistic missile and advanced cruise missile threats from Russia, and
more specifically, do United States capabilities provide adequate air
base air defense?
Answer. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) plays an
important role in deterring and mitigating adversary anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Russia is investing in an A2/AD strategy
to impede our freedom of movement in Europe. If confirmed, I will work
with Department and other stakeholders and our NATO Allies to ensure we
have the right capabilities to address Russia's capabilities and ensure
our freedom of movement.
Question. From your perspective, what are the most effective ways
of deterring Russian aggression against its neighbors?
Answer. I will preface this by saying that our total commitment to
NATO and Article 5 mutual defense guarantee is vitally important. I
think we need to deal with Russia with a blend of Alliance unity, the
threat of economic action, credible military deterrence, and dialogue
with Russia's leaders when it is in our mutual interests. Not allowing
Russian rhetoric or diplomatic initiatives to cause rifts in the
Alliance is vital, and the Alliance should speak with one voice.
europe
Question. In your view, are current United States force posture,
investments, and engagements with partners and allies in Europe
adequate to meet United States objectives in the AOR?
Answer. The recently-published Global Posture Review (GPR) assessed
DOD's forces, footprint, and agreements in Europe and determined that,
with the adjustments announced and implemented over the past year,
current DOD posture and supported activities are sufficient to
accomplish regional objectives. In Europe, the GPR strengthens the
United States combat-credible deterrent against Russian aggression and
enables NATO forces to operate more effectively.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with stakeholders
across DOD, the U.S. Government, Allies, and partners to continue
identifying additional ways to enhance United States deterrence posture
in Europe, using the GPR as a framework for future posture decisions.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the
investments and activities carried out as part of the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI)?
Answer. Through such investments as pre-positioned equipment,
exercises to enhance interoperability with our Allies, and adjustments
to our force presence in Europe, EDI is achieving its goals of
enhancing the United States deterrence posture, increasing the
readiness and responsiveness of United States forces in Europe, and
supporting the collective defense and security of NATO Allies. It has
been a critical impetus in bolstering investment in security capability
and capacity of U.S. Allies and partners in the region.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to EDI
objectives or supporting investments, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work (with stakeholders across the
Department, U.S. Government, and Allies and partners) to determine what
adjustments should be considered in order to further improve critical
capabilities and U.S. and Allied readiness to ensure EDI investments
remain responsive and relevant to the current security environment.
Question. What is your view of Russia's military buildup in and
around Ukraine earlier this year?
Answer. Russia's aggressive military build-up in and near Ukraine
is a top concern for the United States and our NATO Allies and
partners. If Russia further invades Ukraine, the United States and our
Allies and partners should impose severe economic measures, increase
defense assistance to Ukraine, and work with NATO Allies to assess the
adequacy of the Alliance's military posture and capabilities in light
of Russian aggression in Europe.
Question. Is there more DOD should be doing to to bolster our
collective security, defend United States presence, deter Russia, and
reassure our European Allies and partners in the region?
Answer. The recommendations implemented from the recent Global
Posture Review strengthen the combat-credible deterrent against Russian
aggression and enable NATO forces to operate more effectively. Through
a combination of rotational and permanently-stationed forces, United
States capabilities in Europe--both conventional and nuclear--are a
tangible signal of the United States commitment to the collective
defense and security of the NATO Alliance.
In addition to the investments and pre-positioned equipment and
infrastructure enabled by EDI, our support and integration with NATO
activities, exercises, and security cooperation programs provide the
greatest deterrent to Russian adventurism and aggression. If confirmed,
I look forward to working with stakeholders across DOD, the U.S.
Government, Allies, and partners to continue identifying ways to
enhance United States deterrence posture in Europe, using the GPR as a
framework for future posture decisions. We are united with our NATO
Allies in making clear that any further aggression against Ukraine
would carry a very high price. If Russia decides to invade Ukraine
further, I am confident that the United States and NATO are well
positioned to take all necessary measures to ensure defense and
security of Allies.
Question. What is your view on the provision of assistance to
Ukraine, including lethal assistance?
Answer. I strongly support the provision of defensive lethal
assistance to ensure Ukraine has the equipment it needs to defend
itself. Ukraine also has critical non-lethal requirements, such as
secure communications equipment, as well as training and advisory
needs. These efforts all remain critical to help Ukraine's forces
preserve the country's territorial integrity and progress toward NATO
interoperability in the face of continued Russian aggression.
Question. If confirmed, will you continue and accelerate DOD's work
to help Ukraine develop critical deterrent capabilities?
Answer. Yes. I remain concerned about reports that Russia remains
postured for a further invasion into Ukraine, and United States
security assistance efforts should remain a top priority.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that assistance is delivered to Ukraine in an efficient manner?
Answer. If confirmed, I will actively assess if there is anything
more the Department can do to accelerate our assistance to Ukraine and
make adjustments as necessary.
Defender Europe 2021 and other exercises the United States conducts
with European Allies and partners illustrate our collective ability to
mobilize large forces rapidly to respond to a crisis.
Question. Do you support DOD maintaining the high level of
intensive and frequent exercises it has conducted in Europe in recent
years?
Answer. Given the rapid pace of emerging technologies and threats
across multiple domains, it is imperative that the United States and
Allied militaries work closely and frequently together to ensure the
highest level of readiness. Conducting intensive and frequent exercises
is key to demonstrating that the United States military and its Allies
are capable of rapidly deploying combat-credible forces in Europe to
deter Russian aggression and respond to emerging crises across all
domains.
Question. What is your opinion regarding the potential sale of new
F-16s to Turkey by the United States, would such a sale be a net
positive or negative for U.S. security interests and why, or why not?
Answer. I'm not aware of the specifics of any potential sales, but
I support Turkey, as a member of NATO, continuing its modernization
efforts for its F-16 fleet. I also see Turkey's interest in purchasing
United States equipment as a positive sign. I understand that Turkey is
a key contributor of F-16 capability to the Alliance, which is a net
positive for United States security interests, and I believe we would
want to enable them to continue making those contributions.
russian and united states strategic systems with respect to the north
atlantic treaty organization (nato)
Question. What is your assessment of the effects of Russian nuclear
modernization activities--particularly short range and intermediate
range nuclear systems--on the NATO alliance?
Answer. I am concerned by Russia's development and fielding of
systems that are not accountable under--and thus not constrained by--
the NEW START Treaty. These systems are designed to offset NATO and
U.S. conventional military advantages. Ultimately, they undermine
regional stability and threaten the security of our NATO Allies.
Question. Do you support the integration of nuclear dual-capability
on the F-35A aircraft?
Answer. Yes, I support a dual-capable F-35 as a critical part of
U.S. extended deterrence commitments and NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements. This capability contributes to the credibility of NATO's
nuclear forces, which is central to maintain deterrence.
Question. Russia has worked to develop a wide range of novel
nuclear capabilities, some of which analysts characterize as potential,
``first-strike weapons,'' such as the SARMAT heavy intercontinental
ballistic missile, the POSEIDON nuclear unmanned underwater vehicle,
and the so-called SKYFALL nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise
missile.
To what extent do you believe Russia's pursuit of such capabilities
undermines the security of NATO allies?
Answer. These systems, some of which are unconstrained by treaty,
undermine strategic stability and increase the likelihood of nuclear
use due to miscalculation.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend the United
States and NATO take to address this growing threat?
Answer. The United States should be willing to negotiate arms
control agreements to reduce or eliminate these capabilities, and
should review our defense and strategic capabilities to manage the
threat in the event that negotiations do not succeed.
Question. Over the past several years, the Intelligence Community
and a number of DOD officials have highlighted the substantial and
increasing disparity in the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons
as compared to those possessed by the United States.
What are your views on Russian tactical nuclear forces not covered
by the New START Treaty and whether existing arms control measures
adequately address these capabilities?
Answer. I believe that future arms control agreements with Russia
should include Russian non-strategic nuclear forces.
Question. What is your assessment of effects of the AEGIS Ashore
missile defense system on NATO allies and Russian perceptions?
Answer. Although Moscow regularly complains about the presence of
Aegis Ashore platforms in Romania and Poland, my understanding is that
these systems are not designed to defend against Russia's sophisticated
offensive missile capabilities. Rather, these two platforms are
designed to confront potential missile threats emanating from outside
Europe, such as Iran. NATO allies regularly cite the presence of Aegis
Ashore as among the most important aspects of the NATO Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) system.
nato
Question. The 2018 NDS provides that ``[m]utually beneficial
alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a
durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can
match.''
In your view, to what extent does adherence to the Wales summit
commitments on defense spending the Allies made in 2014 bolster the
effectiveness and credibility of NATO?
Answer. The Wales Defense Investment Pledge, including its 2
percent of GDP benchmark, is critical to the effectiveness and
credibility of NATO. To address the range of threats and emerging
challenges facing Allies, the Alliance must adapt and invest in new
capabilities. Without the investment in defense today, we will not have
the necessary capabilities and contributions tomorrow.
Question. In your opinion, are there other metrics that may provide
better insights into the health of the Alliance than the percentage of
Gross Domestic Product spent on defense?
Answer. NATO is a political and military alliance with the ultimate
purpose of guaranteeing the freedom and security of its members through
political and military means. The health of the Alliance should be
based on meeting this objective. That includes continued defense
spending and investment to meet important markers of sharing
responsibility for our common defense. Secretary General Stoltenberg
often highlights cash, capabilities and contributions. The Alliance
should also continue to promote democratic values that enable
productive consultations and cooperation on defense and security-
related issues.
Question. In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the
national security interests of the United States?
Answer. Yes. President Biden has made clear the transatlantic
alliance is the strong foundation on which our collective security and
our shared prosperity are built. United States commitment to NATO
Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is crucial to U.S.
strategic interests. This shared commitment and the values enshrined in
the Washington Treaty ensure NATO will remain the most successful
Alliance in history. NATO will remain critical to vital United States
interests, including deterring Russian aggression, competing with
China, and reducing the ability of violent extremist organizations to
threaten the United States Homeland and our Allies.
Question. What should be the major strategic objectives of the NATO
Alliance in the coming years?
Answer. The Alliance's major strategic objective remains
guaranteeing the safety and security of its members. This includes
deterring nuclear and non-nuclear aggression, defending Allied
populations and territory if deterrence fails, and projecting stability
beyond NATO's borders.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for
NATO in the coming five years?
Answer. The Alliance faces a range of challenges including
confronting an aggressive Russia and competing with an emboldened
People's Republic of China. The Alliance also must confront the ongoing
threat of terrorism and emerging challenges like cyber security and
climate change.
Question. What do you perceive to be the most important
improvements in capability that the Alliance must make to deal with the
current and future threats it faces?
Answer. The Alliance particularly strives to improve readiness, a
critical component of presenting a strong defense and deterrence.
Readiness requires Allies to invest in defense to procure, prepare, and
provide interoperable and ready forces and capabilities. NATO is also
increasing focus on Emerging Technologies. All this is crucial for
adapting to the changing security environment.
Question. In alignment with DOD's Joint All Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) concept, in June 2021 at the Brussels Summit, NATO
Allies pledged to enhance multi-domain operations.
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure NATO
Allies continue to progress in enhancing these capabilities--all with a
view to ensuring the Alliance can respond collectively to crisis in the
Euro-Atlantic area at the speed of relevance?
Answer. I understand Allies work together in numerous NATO channels
as well as nation-to-nation, to advance capabilities for joint
operations across domains, for example in areas of Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Command, Control, and
Communications (C3). If confirmed, I would engage with U.S. colleagues
and Alliance counterparts to continue and enhance the U.S. leadership
role in these areas.
Question. In your view, how can DOD best maintain the capabilities,
capacity, and readiness required to respond to crisis in Europe while
also engaging in credible day-to-day deterrence vis-a-vis our great
power competitors?
Answer. Capabilities for response to European crisis are actually a
key part of our day-to-day deterrence of great power competitors,
particularly Russia. The United States strives to maintain an array of
capabilities fitting for various theaters worldwide--including through
the recent Global Posture Review, which strengthened our force posture
in Europe. If confirmed, I would engage in DOD's continual review and
adjustment of our posture, as the evolving security environment
requires.
Question. How do you envision the update to NATO's strategic
concept will affect Alliance priorities?
Answer. The Strategic Concept sets the Alliance's strategy. It
outlines NATO's enduring purpose and specifies the elements of the
Alliance's approach to security. I would expect that the new Concept
will provide guidelines for NATO's political and military adaptation to
ensure the Alliance continues to be prepared to execute its core tasks
of Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security. I
would also expect it will put heightened focus on deterrence and
defense, and on addressing threats from Russia and challenges from the
People's Republic of China.
Question. If confirmed, how would you drive that discussion to
ensure alignment with DOD priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. interagency
colleagues, both civilian and military, to help shape a U.S. approach
to NATO's strategic concept discussions that advances those U.S./DOD
priorities. This would include consulting with Allies on, and sharing
U.S. conclusions from, the various recent U.S. strategic reviews.
Question. In December 2020, NATO reaffirmed the Allies'
longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance,'' and that, ``the strategic nuclear
forces of the United States are the supreme guarantee of the security
of the Alliance.'' Additionally, in remarks late last year, NATO's
current Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, echoed this point,
stating, ``A world where Russia, China, North Korea and others have
nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world.''
Do you agree that U.S. nuclear forces continue to serve as the
``supreme guarantee of the security'' of NATO?
Answer. Yes. For over 60 years, the presence of U.S. nuclear
weapons in NATO countries has successfully deterred aggression against
the Alliance. NATO's nuclear capabilities preserve peace, prevent
coercion, and deter aggression. They also provide an essential
political and military link between Europe and North America.
Question. Do you believe this principle requires the United States
to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in NATO countries?
Answer. Yes. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a
nuclear alliance, and as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat, I
believe U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries.
balkans
Question. What are the United States national security interests in
the Balkans?
Answer. The Balkans are a critical region for European security.
Our greatest national interest in the Western Balkans is to help
maintain peace in a region still haunted by wars fought less than three
decades ago. It is also in the United States' national security
interest to promote regional stability, encourage further Euro-Atlantic
integration, and facilitate stronger partnerships between regional
actors. The Balkan Peninsula is home to eight NATO Allies, including
the Alliance's four newest members--Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and
North Macedonia. Continuing our important work with these Allies to
modernize their armed forces and build interoperability with NATO will
facilitate greater burden sharing and pay dividends. The Balkan
Peninsula is also a focal point of our strategic competition with
Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), so it is important
that we remain engaged there.
Question. How would you describe the current threats to security
and stability in the Balkans?
Answer. Our Allies and partners on the Balkan peninsula must
contend with various threats to regional security and stability. These
range from conventional threats, such as Russian force build-up in the
Black Sea, to hybrid threats, such as disinformation, cyberattacks, and
Russia's use of energy as a tool of political manipulation. In the
Western Balkans, unconsolidated democratic institutions present a risk,
particularly in light of unresolvedunresolved grievances along ethnic
lines. For instance, ethnic separatism and challenges to the
institutions established by the Dayton Peace Accords threaten the
functionality and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
the slow pace of negotiations in the EU-led Brussels Dialogue is
preventing Serbia and Kosovo from normalizing relations or cooperating
on key issues like electricity distribution and regional commerce. The
PRC seeks corrupt and coercive economic and security inroads,
particularly through its One Belt One Road and other PRC-backed
projects that may increase Balkan countries' exposure to coercion and
affect the security of critical infrastructure.
Question. What do you see as the role of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR)
and what conditions should be met before that presence can be reduced
or eliminated, in your view?
Answer. KFOR remains an important facilitator of a safe and secure
environment for all citizens in Kosovo, which has been its critical
role nearly 23 years. KFOR's troop footprint has steadily decreased
over the past two decades based on NATO's assessment of the personnel
KFOR needs to maintain a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, and peaceful
Kosovo. Normalization between Serbia and Kosovo is an important and
necessary next step in achieving these aims.
Russia and China continue to invest in infrastructure and serve as
moneylender to nations across Europe--particularly in southeastern
Europe. Such investments may provide mechanisms for coercive power and
influence in European affairs.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend the
United States take to encourage our Balkan allies and partners to
resist such influence campaigns by Russia and China?
Answer. The United States continues to demonstrate to our Balkans
Allies and partners that the Euro-Atlantic path is the best route to
stability, security, and prosperity. We must continue diplomatic
engagement with Allies and partners on the long-term negative impacts
of disinformation and predatory investments from Russia and China and
the need to protect critical infrastructure. We would also continue our
assistance efforts to enhance resilience to malign influence through
continued development of countries' cyber defense capabilities,
particularly the most vulnerable. Russia and China are not interested
in European unity or NATO interoperability, and know their strategic
investments can drive wedges between European partners.
defense security cooperation
Question. In your view, what are the necessary and appropriate
strategic objectives that should underpin the Defense Department's
approach to building the capabilities of a partner nation's security
forces?
Answer. Security cooperation investments should be targeted to
advance broader goals to address shared current and future threats. DOD
building partner capacity efforts should focus on enhancing ally and
partner capabilities to effectively operate alongside and in lieu of
U.S. Forces to address shared national security challenges. The
forthcoming National Defense Strategy will further shape the strategic
objectives and integrated approach of DOD security cooperation.
Question. In the competition with near-peer rivals, what steps
would you recommend, if confirmed, to ensure that the United States is
taking a strategic approach to its security cooperation with allies and
partners?
Answer. Aligned with whole-of-government security sector assistance
efforts, Department of Defense security cooperation tools should
bolster ally and partner capabilities for defense and advance shared
national security interests through addressing regional security
challenges. DOD security cooperation, developed and executed in
coordination the State Department, serves to reinvigorate and modernize
U.S. alliances and partnerships, reinforcing a critical American
asymmetric advantage in competition with near-peer rivals.
cyber
Question. The 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy states that ``the Department
will work with U.S. allies and partners to strengthen cyber capacity,
expand combined cyberspace operations, and increase bi-directional
information sharing in order to advance our mutual interests.''
What do you perceive to be the role of the ASD(ISA) in
accomplishing these objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the implementation of the
Secretary's vision of Integrated Deterrence, which, as I understand it,
would incorporate cyber capabilities into all of our approaches,
including those with partners and allies. I would work closely with my
counterpart from ASD(Space), other OSD offices, the Services, the
combatant commands, and other departments and agencies as appropriate
to work with our partners and allies to strengthen their cybersecurity,
thereby lifting the opportunities we have for cyberspace operations and
secure information sharing.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to strengthen the role
between your office and other DOD organizations that contribute to
these objectives, such as United States Cyber Command, Cyber Policy,
and the Principal Cyber Advisor?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with my counterpart from
ASD(Space) as well as other DOD offices and organizations to coordinate
our approaches to cyber security capacity building, planning,
exercising, and operations with partners and allies.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD perspectives
on international cyber cooperation are coordinated within the
interagency and that DOD perspectives are included in high level
international engagements, such as in the June Biden-Putin summit?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to coordinating closely and
regularly with my counterpart from ASD(Space) to provide unified DOD
perspectives on international cyber cooperation in interagency
meetings. I would look for opportunities to raise cyber-related issues
when appropriate, and I will seek to contribute to a whole-of-
government approach to cyber cooperation with our partners and allies.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the ASD(ISA)?
Answer. There is no place for sexual harassment, gender
discrimination, or any other types of harassment within Policy. If
confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Under Secretary in
reviewing previous workforce surveys that would hopefully give me
insight into the Policy's culture to help understand its environment
and what actions need to be taken, if any. I am aware of the GAO's
report recommending steps the Department take to address sexual
harassment and assault among the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I
will support the Department's ongoing efforts to promote a culture of
dignity and respect, including a commitment to tackling sexual
harassment.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(ISA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take serious action immediately by
initiating an inquiry to gather all facts, conduct necessary
interviews, collect information, and address the complaint within the
specified guidelines of Federal statutes and Department of Defense
regulations and policies. If confirmed, I will work with the Under
Secretary to make clear to the ISA workforce that they deserve a
respectful workplace, equality and diversity matters always, and I will
work to support the Department's zero tolerance for harassment.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
cooperation with foreign militaries
1. Senator Hirono. Dr. Wallander, how do you plan to improve our
defense relationship with developing nations, so that they seek to
emulate the American model of civil-military relations, instead of an
authoritarian model of some of our peer competitors?
Dr. Wallander. The Department should use its unique security
cooperation toolkit combined with defense diplomacy efforts to lead
with U.S. interests and values in improving defense relations with
developing nations. Efforts to build capacity and improve
interoperability with allies and partners demonstrates U.S. commitment
to partners' needs, as well as the benefits of the U.S. model of civil-
military relations, in responding to their unique national security
requirements. We must demonstrate to Allies and partners the benefits
of a professional military force upholding the highest standard of
civil-military relations through U.S. security cooperation training,
capacity building, and key leader engagements. DOD institutional
capacity building activities enable partners to achieve common security
objectives in contrast to the authoritarian model of peer competitors'
transactional approaches with developing nations.
2. Senator Hirono. Dr. Wallander, how can the Department of Defense
better ensure that military arms sales and technology sharing are
vectored to the right partners and in the appropriate amounts?
Dr. Wallander. Arms sales and technology sharing are a key
component of the U.S. defense strategy. Many U.S. security cooperation
efforts buy down risk and ease burdens on U.S. forces by improving
partners' ability to provide for their own security, to contribute to
larger regional and combined security efforts, and/or support U.S.
operations. I recognize the need to balance Ally and partner
interoperability with protecting the U.S. warfighter's technical edge
and the need to ensure partners are responsibly using U.S. technology.
Technology security is a key enabler for security cooperation. Ally and
partner willingness to protect classified and other export-controlled
military and dual use technologies must be considered as part of any
transfer decision. Additionally, DOD experts on technology security
should implement safeguards to protect critical technology from illicit
transfers or irresponsible use.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
arctic
3. Senator King. Dr. Wallander, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
initiated multiple Service-level deep dives into the Arctic operational
environment, civil/economic considerations, threats in the region, and
the unique challenges the Arctic presents. What do you see as the top
priorities of effort for international security cooperation in the
region and impacts to DOD?
Dr. Wallander. A common theme in the Service Arctic strategies, the
DOD Arctic Strategy, and the National Strategy for the Arctic Region is
collaborating with Arctic Allies and partners. Another common theme is
increasing the Department's awareness of the operating environment--
from climate change to competitor activities. These two themes point to
a top priority for Arctic security: increasing cooperation and
developing a shared and accurate all-domain awareness. To that end, DOD
needs to work with Allies and partners to increase the Department's
ability to operate in the changing Arctic environment and meet U.S.
national objectives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
russian cyber capabilities
4. Senator Kelly. Dr. Wallander, early last year I asked now-Under
Secretary of Policy Colin Kahl about the SolarWinds hack and for his
perspective on how we should address vulnerabilities in our digital
architecture. I understand you are not a cyber expert, but as an expert
on Russia, what is your current assessment of Russian offensive cyber
capabilities?
Dr. Wallander. As I understand it, Russia is a sophisticated cyber
adversary that possesses advanced cyber capabilities. Russia conducts
cyber-espionage campaigns, has integrated cyber activities into its
military and national strategy, and has conducted disruptive cyber
operations outside the United States, including in Ukraine and Georgia.
It has also demonstrated its ability--and will--to conduct cyber-
enabled information operations to influence our population and
challenge our democratic processes. I expect Russia will continue its
efforts to shape the global narrative and exploit American networks,
which are threatening U.S. interests.
5. Senator Kelly. Dr. Wallander, why is Russia's willingness to use
cyber and other gray zone tactics against military and civilian targets
dangerous?
Dr. Wallander. It is concerning because, while Russia may be
deterred from engaging the United States and our allies in traditional
armed conflict, Russia might not be similarly deterred from engaging in
cyber operations to disrupt our government and commerce, challenge our
democratic processes, and threaten our critical infrastructure. I
believe Russia uses malicious cyber-enabled activities in an attempt to
undermine United States military advantage and pose long-term strategic
risk to the Nation as well as to our Allies and partners. Cyber
capabilities are a versatile tool of state power that can be employed
throughout the conflict spectrum for a variety of purposes.
6. Senator Kelly. Dr. Wallander, what can we do to better counter
these tactics?
Dr. Wallander. The Department of Defense is one part of a whole-of-
government effort to defend the Nation in cyberspace. DOD brings a
number of capabilities and authorities to bear in defending the Nation
from attacks in cyberspace. I believe DOD must work with allies,
partners, and the private sector to ensure an appropriate defensive
posture, minimize the impacts of malicious cyber activity, and reduce
the costs of Russia's malicious cyber activities against the United
States.
7. Senator Kelly. Dr. Wallander, if confirmed, how much emphasis
can we expect your office to place on addressing this threat?
Dr. Wallander. If confirmed, I will seek a comprehensive
understanding of how Russia is using all elements of its national
power, including its cyber capabilities, to advance its foreign policy
goals and challenge United States global interests and domestic
stability.
8. Senator Kelly. Dr. Wallander, what will the key lines of effort
be?
Dr. Wallander. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Administration's national security team to ensure we are developing an
approach that includes holding Russia accountable for its pattern of
malign behavior and actions in cyberspace. I expect the Department
would want to ensure that any approach to Russia should maintain the
United States' military edge; and I expect this would include investing
in the force posture and capabilities necessary to deter Russia from
attacking our Homeland or our allies through military means. Russia has
shown it has the ability and intent to target sources of American
strength. DOD must defend the American way of life, economy, people,
and democratic institutions from all states that would seek to
undermine them, including Russia.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
ships homeported in rota, spain
9. Senator Wicker. Dr. Wallander, the Commander of United States
European Command (EUCOM) and I have discussed the critical role the
forward based Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, play in deterring Russian
aggression. We have also noted the importance of adding two more ships
to the four already stationed there. What deterrence benefits would two
additional destroyers based in Rota provide?
Dr. Wallander. I am aware that DOD is committed to a European
posture that serves as a combat-credible deterrent against Russia and
enables NATO forces to operate more effectively, as reinforced in the
recent Global Posture Review. If confirmed, I would look forward to
reviewing, in consultation with the Joint Staff and Commander of United
States European Command, DOD's force laydown in Europe and reviewing
plans for any additional posture adjustment required to support United
States warfighting requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
africa
10. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Wallander, will reducing troops in
Africa make it harder to implement the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
with respects to countering China, Russia, the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), and al Qaeda?
Dr. Wallander. The ``by, with, and through'' partners approach to
achieving security and stability in Africa has largely proven effective
with a limited forward presence of U.S. Forces. U.S. security
cooperation activities also enhance partner force operations, which
achieve shared strategic objectives and build enduring relationships.
Key to this approach is a focus on building African partner nation
capabilities while supporting efforts of other international partners.
11. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Wallander, does ``over-the-horizon''
counterterrorism strategy in Somalia increase risk and decrease mission
effectiveness against al Shabaab?
Dr. Wallander. It is my understanding that the Department's
counterterrorism approach is adaptable and responsive to the nature of
the terrorist threat. Persistent presence and over the horizon
approaches each come with their own risks and benefits. An effective
counterterrorism strategy depends on not only U.S. capabilities but
strong relationships with allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to evaluating our approach in Somalia and our efforts against
al Shabaab.
12. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Wallander, what is your assessment of
China's military objectives in Africa and what is the primary way in
which these objectives threaten our national security?
Dr. Wallander. The PRC seeks to establish a more robust overseas
logistics and basing infrastructure in Africa that would allow the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) to project and sustain military power at
greater distances to protect its national interests. The PRC currently
uses commercial infrastructure to support its military operations
abroad, including PLA presence in other countries, such as its base in
Djibouti.
13. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Wallander, what are the specific
implications of a Chinese navy base on the Atlantic?
Dr. Wallander. A PLA naval base on the Atlantic, when combined with
a network of logistical support, could interfere with U.S. and ally
military operations, increase the risks of escalation outside of the
Indo-Pacific, and eventually could support PLA offensive operations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
defense strategy
14. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander has designated China as the
Department of Defense's pacing threat. In your personal opinion, do you
agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a ``yes'' or
``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of
the PRC as the Department's ``pacing'' challenge.
15. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's
priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the
Secretary's designation? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of
the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater as it relates to the
Department's efforts to address military challenges posed by the PRC; I
acknowledge the PRC also poses challenges in other theaters.
16. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, ``The PRC
[People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a
Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario.'' Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN concurred for the record
with Taiwan's designation as the Department's pacing scenario. In your
personal opinion, do you support the designation of a Taiwan
contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Please provide a
``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes. The PRC is the overall pacing challenge and the
noted scenario is a key pacing scenario. There are some elements of the
joint force that will pace themselves to Russia, given some of Russia's
unique capabilities.
17. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN testified that the
Department of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so
that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in
the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the U.S. defense
budget. In your personal opinion, do you agree with Admiral Grady's
testimony? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I agree the Department should align its
resources to its priorities, while also taking steps to manage the
risks associated with lower-priority issues.
18. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's
priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree that Europe
and the Middle East are therefore lower priority theaters than the
Indo-Pacific for the Department of Defense? Please provide a ``yes'' or
``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I believe the Department should prioritize the
challenges posed by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, it must be
able to simultaneously protect U.S. national security interests in
other theaters such as Europe and the Middle East. If confirmed, I will
work with colleagues across the Department to coordinate and implement
such an approach across the Department of Defense enterprise.
19. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, do you
agree that the Department of Defense needs to do less in Europe and the
Middle East, so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on
deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in
the U.S. defense budget? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I agree the Department should work closely with
allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and other theaters to
identify ways to address priority challenges in these regions. If
confirmed, I will support efforts to evaluate the Department's
approaches in Europe and the Middle East, including the opportunities
and challenges presented, and provide my recommendations through
established channels.
20. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, should
the United States seek to reduce United States Force levels in the
Middle East, so it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring
China in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I believe the Department should take a
sustainable and effective approach to United States Force posture in
the Middle East that ensures sufficient resources to deter China. I do
not view this as only a challenge of U.S. Force levels in specific
regions, but rather how we creatively and effectively integrate all
available tools and resources of the Department to protect U.S.
national security in each theater while strengthening our alliances and
partnerships to cooperatively address shared threats.
allied burden sharing
21. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, do you
believe we should press our European allies to take primary
responsibility for delivering lethal aid and other military support to
Ukraine, so the United States Military can focus on China in the Indo-
Pacific?
Dr. Wallander. I support United States security assistance efforts
alongside substantial security assistance from European allies,
including the provision of defensive lethal assistance, to build the
capacity of Ukraine's forces. I believe that carefully considered
provision of appropriate lethal assistance to Ukraine would not reduce
United States capabilities to meet the China challenge. I also believe
that the United States should continue to work with our European Allies
in support of Ukraine in the face of increasing Russian aggression. A
strong United States and European response to Russian aggression
demonstrates the strength of the U.S. network of allies and partners.
These efforts to support Ukraine are compatible with an appropriate
focus on challenges coming from China.
middle east force posture
22. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, do you
believe our Gulf partners should prioritize developing their air,
missile, and coastal defenses, so that the Department of Defense can
focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-
Pacific? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. Yes, I support developing the air, missile, and
coastal defense of Gulf partners and believe that the United States has
a strong security cooperation foundation upon which to continue this
work. I understand that the United States has encouraged Gulf partners
to invest heavily in their United States-origin air, missile, and
coastal defense systems.
23. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, what steps should the United
States take in order to ensure our Gulf partners develop their air,
missile, and coastal defenses as rapidly as possible?
Dr. Wallander. I understand that the United States has mutually
beneficial security cooperation relationships with the six countries of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Iraq. It works through
security cooperation programs to help these seven partner nations
develop their capabilities in air, missile, and coastal defenses.
Additionally, the United States has an extensive and ongoing program of
exercises to validate the ability to operate effectively with these
partner nations.
24. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, the Pentagon has reported to
Congress consistently over the years that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) consumes the vast majority of air-breathing intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) (that is, non-spaced based assets)
available across the Joint Force. As a result, other combatant commands
such as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) have had to live with substantial ISR shortfalls in their
theaters as they try to monitor China and Russia, in particular. In
your personal opinion, do you agree that as we try to monitor terrorist
groups in the Middle East, we should try to use the ISR assets already
available to CENTCOM rather than take assets from other combatant
commands? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. I agree that we must not fail to ensure sufficient
and appropriate capabilities are available to monitor China and Russia.
I am aware that DOD has a well-established process to annually prepare
the Global Force Management allocation plan, which assesses appropriate
alignment of capabilities across combatant commands; I support adhering
to this planning process, barring significant operational updates.
25. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, U.S. Forces, sensors, and
platforms vary in their relevance for over-the-horizon counterterrorism
operations. In your personal opinion, do you agree that an aircraft
carrier operating from the Arabian Sea is a relatively expensive and
inefficient way to conduct counterterrorism operations in the Middle
East? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. I agree that it is essential to ensure that DOD
properly aligns requirements with capabilities. If confirmed, I would
support evaluating creative and efficient solutions to resource the
enduring counterterrorism mission that would allow air craft carriers
to be focused towards missions for which they are uniquely suited, like
deterring our adversaries in priority theaters.
26. Senator Hawley. Dr. Wallander, when INDOPACOM is our priority
theater, and when strategic competition with China is the top priority
of our strategy, in your personal opinion, is the optimal use of our
limited fleet of aircraft carriers to operate in the Arabian Sea
monitoring terrorist groups in the Middle East? Please provide a
``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Wallander. I agree that it is essential for DOD to ensure the
right levels and types of resources so that the United States is able
to meet the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I would
work to support DOD's internal processes to assess strategic tradeoffs
related to appropriately and efficiently allocating the Department's
most high-demand, low density assets.
______
[The nomination reference of Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Celeste
Ann Wallander in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 1, 2022, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 16, 2022.]
______
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Melissa G. Dalton by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Hemispheric Affairs (ASD(HD&HA)) is responsible for the overall
supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Department of
Defense, as well as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),
defense continuity and mission assurance (DC&MA), Arctic and Global
Resilience policy, Western Hemispheric Affairs, and other matters.
What is your understanding of the scope and breadth of the duties
and functions of the ASD(HD&HA)?
Answer. My understanding is that the ASD(HD&HA) is the principal
civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) with primary oversight of
policy and planning related to DOD's homeland defense activities,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), defense continuity and
mission assurance (DC&MA), and Arctic and Global Resilience (A&GR) and
Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) matters. The ASD(HD&HA) serves as the
principal DOD representative for these assigned areas of responsibility
in engagements with interagency partners, the Congress, foreign allies
and partners, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and
private sector organizations.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have extensive experience and substantial background
serving in the national security community both in and outside of the
U.S. Government, including currently Performing the Duties of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities.
In this capacity, I am responsible for advising senior DOD leaders on
national security and defense strategy; the forces, contingency plans,
and associated posture necessary to implement the defense strategy;
nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security cooperation
plans and policies. My previous government service includes serving as
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; senior
advisor for force planning; policy advisor to the commander of the
International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan; and
country director for Lebanon and Syria in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)). I also served as an
intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Outside of
government, I served as a senior fellow and deputy director of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International
Security Program and director of the Cooperative Defense Project. My
research at CSIS focused on reinforcing the principled foundations of
U.S. defense strategy and military operations. Each of these roles has
prepared me with the functional and regional expertise needed to advise
senior DOD leaders on national security and defense strategy, including
ensuring that DOD's program and budget decisions support and advance
DOD's strategy and priorities.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions would
you expect the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy to prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on performing the duties of the
ASD(HD&HA) and any additional functions as directed by the Secretary or
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next ASD(HD&HA)?
Answer. The scope and scale of all-domain threats to the Homeland
have increased in parallel with increasing demands on defense resources
for support of civil authorities to address myriad challenges,
including the effects of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and
domestic extremism. The ASD(HD&HA) will need to ensure an integrated
approach to the defense of the Homeland in addition to the defense of
U.S. interests abroad. The ASD(HD&HA) will also need to advance
relationships with key partners, including bilateral relationships with
partners in the Western hemisphere as well as with partners in the
Federal Government, State and local governments, and the private
sector.
Question. What priorities and plans do you have, if confirmed, for
addressing each of these challenges, and on what timeline?
Answer. If confirmed as ASD(HD&HA), my focus from day one will be
to help the Secretary and USD(P) meet the Department's missions,
strengthen relationships and capabilities that maintain national
security, and prevent and respond to adversary threats. I would seek to
ensure that the Department's policies, plans, and resources are
appropriately prioritized and allocated.
relations with congress
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress
and the Office of the ASD(HD&HA)?
Answer. I recognize the importance and value of a constructive and
productive relationship with Congress. If confirmed, I will take a
proactive approach to routinize a dialogue on HD&HA issues and
priorities; this is a first step toward a mutually beneficial
relationship and partnership.
key relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the Department of Defense (DOD), the ASD(HD&HA), and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly with respect to
DOD's homeland defense activities and DSCA.
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD and DHS have close working
relationships on many issues, including Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA) missions associated with domestic disasters,
emergencies, and cyber incidents. The ASD(HD&HA) is the senior civilian
policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy for assigned areas of responsibility, including
homeland defense and DSCA, and serves as the principal DOD
representative on homeland defense and DSCA policy matters in
engagements with Federal partners such as DHS and the Congress, as well
as with State governments, local municipalities, and organizations in
the private sector.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the direction
and coordination with DHS of DOD homeland defense activities and DSCA.
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for coordinating the
integration of DOD homeland defense policies with DHS homeland security
policies, as well as coordinating on policy oversight of the planning
and execution of DSCA missions in support of DHS. If confirmed, my goal
would be to review the state of the DOD-DHS relationship and pursue
opportunities for improvement.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(HD&HA) and the Joint Staff.
Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating both
formally and informally, on a daily basis, with the Joint Staff
regarding the roles, capabilities, and readiness of the military
services and combatant commands to support DOD's homeland defense,
DSCA, Western Hemisphere, and other missions for which the ASD(HD&HA)
has policy responsibility.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(HD&HA) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating with the
Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that the Joint Force
has the necessary capabilities and resources, and is mission ready, to
support the execution of homeland defense, DSCA, Arctic, climate,
resilience, defense continuity and mission assurance, and Western
Hemisphere missions.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(HD&HA), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and The
Adjutants General of the states and territories, particularly with
respect to DOD's homeland defense activities and DSCA.
Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating with the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Directors of the Army
National Guard and Air National Guard particularly regarding the roles,
capabilities, and readiness of the Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard to support the execution of homeland defense and DSCA
missions.
The ASD(HD&HA) is also the principal DOD representative on homeland
defense and DSCA policy matters for engagement with State and
territorial governments, including State and territorial Adjutants
General. I understand the ASD(HD&HA) generally uses the National Guard
Bureau as the channel of communications with the States and territories
on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National
Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United
States.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(HD&HA) and the District of Columbia National Guard,
particularly with regard to activities in the District, including
responding to civil disturbances and support to national security
special events (NSSE)?
Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for developing, coordinating,
and overseeing the implementation of DOD policy for National Guard
personnel, including District of Columbia National Guard (DCNG)
personnel, participating in defense support of civil authorities
missions when the Secretary of Defense determines such participation is
necessary and appropriate.
When a request for DOD assistance is received, if confirmed as the
ASD, I will work with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau to develop options for the Secretary of Defense
to consider in responding to the request.
The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating advance planning for
potential DOD support of civilian law enforcement agencies. DOD
encourages civilian law enforcement agencies to work with DOD to plan
in advance of events and contingencies for DOD support.
national defense strategy (nds) and interim national security strategic
guidance
Question. The 2018 NDS shifts U.S. strategic priorities to focus on
a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from
rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden
Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,
which sets out the Administration's national security priorities. The
Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new National
Defense Strategy, which is planned to be completed in 2022.
Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current security environment,
including the most critical and enduring threats to the national
security of the United States and its allies?
Answer. Based on the security environment at the time, I believe
the 2018 NDS correctly identified strategic competition with China and
Russia as the primary challenges in the global security environment.
I believe the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
accurately articulates the breadth and scale of the challenges we face
and sets forth priorities to advance our vital national interests. The
threats are increasingly global in nature; democracies are increasingly
under siege based on the rise of populism and illiberal threats to the
rule of law; the distribution of power across the world is changing,
creating new challenges; the international order the United States
helped establish is being tested; and running beneath these trends is a
revolution in technology that brings opportunities and security
challenges. At the same time, the United States is facing a
proliferation of all-domain threats to the Homeland that will require
the United States to address vulnerabilities here at home.
As required by law, the Department is currently working on the NDS,
which has been shaped by the Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance, and will be aligned with the forthcoming National Security
Strategy.
Question. In particular, do you believe the 2018 NDS and the
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assess current
threats to the U.S. Homeland? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that the Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance accurately assesses the current threats to the U.S. Homeland,
and that the upcoming NDS also will appropriately address homeland
defense, including through an appreciation of how threats have evolved
since the 2018 NDS. For example, the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance states up front that our role in the world depends
upon our strength and vitality at home.
Question. In your view, are there developments since 2018 relating
to matters under the purview of the ASD(HD&HA) that should be addressed
as part of a new NDS?
Answer. In my view the scope and scale of all-domain threats to the
Homeland have increased. At the same time, the Department is facing
increasing demands on defense resources for DSCA missions to address a
range of challenges, including the effects of climate change,
pandemics, and domestic extremism. If confirmed as the ASD(HD&HA), my
focus will be to help the Secretary address these and other relevant
challenges.
defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
Question. The ASD(HD&HA) has primary responsibility within DOD for
DSCA. DOD has provided DSCA in response to numerous requests over the
last few years. This has included: requests from DHS for support to
Customs and Border Patrol along the southwestern border; requests from
DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for support in
addressing adverse weather and man-made disasters; supporting law
enforcement in response to civil unrest; and supporting DHS, FEMA and
the Department of Health and Human Services in response to the COVID-19
pandemic.
Please describe your general understanding of DOD's roles and
responsibilities in providing DSCA, particularly vis-`-vis the roles
and responsibilities of other federal agencies in responding to
domestic situations.
Answer. DOD plays a supporting role in the United States by
providing DSCA in support of lead Federal agencies. DOD's unique
capabilities and capacity can be leveraged when directed by the
President, or when the Secretary of Defense has approved a request for
assistance, under the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, or other legal
authority.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Responsible
Federal Agency with respect to DSCA?
Answer. The Responsible Federal Agency (or Lead Federal Agency) is,
consistent with the law, responsible for the mission that DOD may
support through DSCA. As such, the Responsible Federal Agency
determines what DOD capabilities or resources may be needed, requests
DSCA, collaborates with DOD in the execution of the DSCA mission, and,
when required by law, reimburses DOD for the support.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's current policies and
guidance ensure proper use and oversight of DOD resources for DSCA?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe DOD's current policies and guidance are
efficient, effective, and have ensured DOD's efforts through DSCA have
been proper and instrumental in saving and sustaining lives in the
aftermath of disasters, including as part of our nation's response to
COVID-19. If confirmed, I will work with DOD stakeholders to review
DOD's current policies and guidance and ensure that DSCA is effective,
efficient, and properly accountable.
Question. Do you believe that DOD has in place the policies and
processes to generate an accurate accounting of, and to secure full and
timely reimbursement for, the incremental costs of DSCA provided
pursuant to ``The Stafford Act''?
Answer. I believe DOD's policies and processes are efficient and
effective. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and other
DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD policies and guidance secure
appropriate reimbursement for DSCA provided pursuant to the Stafford
Act, the Economy Act, and other legal authority.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure both the accurate accounting of DOD's incremental costs and
proper and full reimbursement for such costs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and
other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD's policies and accounting
practices facilitate proper and full reimbursement of DSCA costs,
consistent with the statutory authority under which the support was
provided.
Question. Do you believe that DOD has in place the policies and
processes to generate an accurate accounting of, and to secure full and
timely reimbursement for the actual costs for DSCA provided pursuant to
``The Economy Act''?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and
other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD policies and guidance secure
appropriate reimbursement for DSCA provided pursuant to the Stafford
Act, the Economy Act, and other legal authority.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure both the accurate accounting of DOD's actual costs and proper
and full reimbursement for such costs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and
other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD policies and guidance secure
appropriate reimbursement for DSCA provided pursuant to the Stafford
Act, the Economy Act, and other legal authority.
Question. In your view, under what circumstances should DOD Support
of Civil Authorities be provided on a non-reimbursable basis? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. DOD should provide DSCA on a non-reimbursable basis only
when the law requires DOD to provide support on a non-reimbursable
basis or when providing support on a non-reimbursable basis is both
authorized by law and approved by the appropriate DOD official.
Question. What is your understanding of a military commander's
``immediate response authority'' for the conduct of DSCA?
Answer. Under immediate response authority, Federal military
commanders, Heads of DOD components, and responsible DOD civilian
officials may, in response to a request for assistance from a civil
authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not
permit approval from higher authority, provide an immediate response by
temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any
supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives,
prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the
United States. Support provided under the immediate response authority
should be provided on a reimbursable basis, where appropriate or
legally required, but will not be delayed or denied based on the
inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to
reimburse DOD.
I understand the immediate response authority does not permit
actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that
is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.
Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, would you seek to modify
the scope and breadth of this authority, and the process for using it?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with DOD stakeholders to review
DOD policies and guidance to consider whether any clarification of
immediate response authority is necessary to promote effectiveness,
efficiency, and accountability, consistent with the law.
Question. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, what types of DSCA
activities do you envision becoming more or less significant?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to be the most urgent
challenge facing the United States. DOD has an important supporting
role in our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, and has
contributed the efforts of thousands of military and civilian
personnel, equipment, and supplies to support this fight. I understand
that DOD's DSCA COVID-19-support activities are driven by the mission
needs of the lead Federal agency, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the lead Federal coordinating agency, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
Question. Are there any areas in which you believe DSCA has been
more or less effective during the COVID-19 pandemic?
Answer. It is my understanding that DSCA has been decisive to our
nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Thousands of military
personnel, including National Guard personnel from all 50 States, 3
territories, and the District of Columbia, supported COVID-19 relief
operations. Military personnel have augmented medical staff at
hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities; delivered
food to hard-hit communities; supported logistics efforts to supply
medical equipment and personal protection equipment; built alternate
care facilities; conducted community-based medical screening; and
conducted laboratory testing, among other tasks. DOD has also been a
major contributor in our nation's efforts to develop, produce, and
distribute COVID-19 vaccines. If confirmed, I will assess lessons
learned from these efforts to determine how DSCA can continue to best
support our nation's efforts to counter COVID-19.
Question. As the situation at the southwest border continues to
present challenges, what types of DSCA activities do you envision being
requested by DHS?
Answer. Security and management of the southwest border of the
United States is a dynamic and challenging mission. It is my
understanding that for more than a decade, DHS has relied upon DOD's
support to help detect and monitor migrant movements and drug-smuggling
activities, and to provide analysis and aerial support for U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. If confirmed, I would work closely with DHS to
understand DHS's requirements and capability and capacity gaps, and
help DHS tailor its requests for appropriate DOD support. I would also
work within DOD to ensure DHS receives appropriate DOD support, while
protecting military readiness and DOD's ability to conduct its national
defense missions.
Question. In your view, what factors should DOD consider in
evaluating such requests for additional DSCA along the southwest
border?
Answer. I would expect DOD would consider a number of factors in
analyzing and determining what support to provide in response to any
DSCA request. In addition to understanding the specific outcomes DSCA
would deliver, I understand the Department considers legality, whether
the request poses risk to DOD forces and other people, impact on DOD
resources and readiness, and whether it would be appropriate for
military personnel to provide the requested support.
Question. How do you assess the effectiveness of DOD's support
mission at the southwest border since 2018?
Answer. It is my impression that DHS considers DOD's provision of
southwest border support to DHS to have been effective. DHS has
requested DOD support at the southwest border for 18 of the last 22
years. However, if confirmed, I would work with DOD stakeholders and
DHS to assess the effectiveness of support to date and identify
opportunities for change or improvement.
combating terrorism roles and responsibilities
Question. In your view, what is the nature and extent of the
current threat to the U.S. Homeland from terrorist extremists, both
from outside the United States and from within the United States,
potentially with the support of foreign malign actors or their proxies?
Answer. Terrorism originating from both within and outside the
United States remains a persistent threat to our national security and
is increasingly complex. Terrorists and violent extremists, some
operating as proxies for foreign actors and nation states, have
expanded their objectives beyond threats to the population to attacking
our nation's critical infrastructure in an attempt to influence
decision making, disrupt force projection, and deny freedom of movement
in the Homeland. With respect to those matters assigned to the
ASD(HD&HA), if confirmed, I will continue close coordination with our
U.S. Government partners to ensure a whole-of-government approach to
the problem.
Question. What is your understanding of the nature and scope of
counter-terrorism and antiterrorism roles and responsibilities vested
in the ASD(HD&HA)?
Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is the Department's principal civilian
policy advisor for DOD global antiterrorism programs and support to
Federal law enforcement domestic counterterrorism efforts. In the
global antiterrorism role, the ASD(HD&HA) establishes DOD antiterrorism
policy, standards, and guidance to reduce the vulnerability of DOD
personnel, dependent family members, installations and other
facilities, and critical resources to terrorist acts. For domestic
counterterrorism policy, the ASD(HD&HA) leads the Department's
coordination with our Federal law enforcement partners to develop
national policies, plans, and programs for the prevention and
disruption of terrorist attacks.
Question. In your view, how do the responsibilities of the
ASD(HD&HA) for combatting terrorism relate to the counterterrorism
roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?
Answer. The domestic counterterrorism roles vested in the
ASD(HD&HA) are limited and remain in close coordination with the
overseas role of the ASD(SO/LIC). Specifically, the ASD(HD&HA) provides
policy guidance and interagency coordination for the Department's
support to Federal law enforcement agencies responding to domestic
incidents. This support is predominately indirect and limited to
offering Federal law enforcement partners DOD resources should they be
necessary during a domestic response.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that policies, plans, and programs for the prevention and
disruption of terrorist attacks on the Homeland are fully aligned, both
within DOD, and across the federal interagency?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my first objectives would be to build
my relationships with our interagency partners, particularly with the
Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
DHS; and the Intelligence Community. I would ensure DOD has developed
the appropriate policies, concepts, capabilities, and processes, and
actively collaborates, to protect the Homeland and ensure appropriate
DOD capabilities are available to support Homeland counterterrorism
efforts.
detainee treatment and guantanamo bay
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
19, 2014, and as required by section 1045 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Individuals
in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected
to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to
interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field
Manual.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
regard to the operation, management, and oversight of the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in formulating and implementing
policies applicable to the facility's detainee population?
Answer. Based on my current understanding, the ASD(HD&HA), in light
of the ASD(HD&HA)'s oversight of Western Hemisphere Affairs, will have
a coordinating role with other elements of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy in the operation, management, and
oversight of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and work
with U.S. Southern Command and other relevant parts of the Department
in formulating and implementing policies applicable to the Naval
Station.
Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
detainee transfer process?
Answer. Based on my current understanding, the ASD(HD&HA) does not
have a direct role in the detainee transfer process.
Question. Do you believe that the detention center at Guantanamo
Bay should be closed? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I support the Biden-Harris Administration's position that
the detention facility at Guantanamo should be closed. Until that time,
however, the Department must ensure the continued safe, humane, and
lawful care and treatment of detainees.
Question. If so, how would you propose to ensure the national
security against the threats posed by the detainees in law of war
detention there?
Answer. While I understand that this issue is not directly in the
ASD(HD&HA)'s remit, I have confidence in both the long-standing
Periodic Review Board process and the robust interagency transfer
procedures to ensure that relevant threats and national security issues
are considered before a detainee is transferred from the facility.
defense critical infrastructure protection
Question. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for overseeing DOD efforts
and programs to protect defense critical infrastructure in the United
States.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the
DOD under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection, both as a
Federal Department and as the designated Sector-Specific Agency for the
defense industrial base?
Answer. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 ``Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience,'' which replaced HSPD-7,
establishes U.S. Government policy, designates critical infrastructure
sectors (including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)), and requires
relevant departments and agencies to work in partnership with critical
infrastructure private sector officials to share threat information and
manage risks. Under the PPD-21 construct, DOD is the Sector Specific
Agency (SSA) for the DIB. HD&HA coordinates PPD-21-related efforts
across the Department and with interagency partners, and works with
private sector officials to integrate protection efforts using a whole-
of-nation approach.
Question. What do you view as the major challenges in the
protection of defense critical infrastructure?
Answer. The three biggest challenges that DOD faces in its efforts
to protect the critical infrastructure it relies on for mission success
are: 1) raising awareness and understanding of the threats to defense
critical infrastructure, which are highly complex, interconnected, and
interdependent; 2) forming and strengthening public-private
partnerships to ensure all parties understand how their actions affect
the security and resilience of others; and 3) changing mindsets and
behaviors to institutionalize critical infrastructure protection and
resilience into government and private sector cultures and practices.
Question. If confirmed, what risk management strategies would you
employ to mitigate the effects of attacks against defense critical
infrastructure and other key resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review existing critical
infrastructure protection programs with an eye toward synchronization
and integration. I would expect such a review to consider whether the
Department has the analytic tools, policy guidance, and information-
sharing platforms (within DOD and with Federal, State, local and
private sector partners) to support critical infrastructure planning.
defense continuity and mission assurance (dc&ma)
Question. The ASD(HD&HA) exercises primary responsibility for DOD
programs for Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance (DC&MA) in the
United States.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the
ASD(HD&HA) with respect to the DC&MA mission?
Answer. The DC&MA mission focuses on ensuring that DOD can continue
to execute its core functions and provide visible, cross-Departmental
leadership even in the face of potential severe disruption from
asymmetric threats, ongoing terrorist threats, and the increasing
challenges that natural hazards pose to our installations and
infrastructure. The ASD(HD&HA)'s role is to leverage department-wide
efforts to ensure that DOD focuses on ensuring that the people,
infrastructure, and Mission Essential Functions that are critical to
DOD's operations are prioritized, resilient, and protected. To
accomplish this, the ASD(HD&HA) has lead responsibility for policy
development and oversight for both mission assurance and continuity
policy, including by leveraging the ASD(HD&HA)'s position as co-chair
of DOD's Mission Assurance Coordination Board Executive Steering Group
to drive change across the Department and provide risk-management
options to the Secretary when required.
Question. The focus on DC&MA missions tends to be most acute after
a crisis. If confirmed, what would be your approach to prioritizing the
DC&MA missions on a routine and regular basis?
Answer. Ensuring DOD can execute its core functions and provide
visible leadership during a crisis requires taking steps ahead of a
crisis, in the steady state, to improve and ensure our posture and
resilience. If confirmed, I will take a proactive approach, in line
with the Federal Mission Resilience Strategy and DOD's mission
assurance policies, to help prepare for threats from adversaries and
natural hazards.
Answer. In your view, to what extent do the cybersecurity aspects
of the DC&MA mission overlap and require coordination with each of the
following:
Question. Cybersecurity capability and capacity to ensure that
combatant commanders' Operational Plans can be securely executed;
Answer. While cyber presents uniquely cross-cutting threats, DC&MA
is itself threat agnostic. If confirmed, I would work with combatant
commanders to emphasize the need for their operational and contingency
plans to address protection against all-domain threats. The enduring
need is to apply limited protective resources, whether cyber, physical,
or otherwise, to the priority infrastructure identified through the
mission assurance process. For cyber-specific threats in particular,
the ASD(HD&HA) must continue to work closely with cyber offices
throughout DOD, including, among others, the Office of the Principal
Cyber Advisor.
Question. The cybersecurity of Defense Critical Infrastructure;
Answer. I understand there is significant overlap between the DC&MA
mission and the DOD CIO-led DOD Cybersecurity Program, which prescribes
the cybersecurity requirements for DOD information technology,
including that relate to or are in Defense Critical Infrastructure. If
confirmed as the ASD(HD&HA), I will use my position as co-chair of the
Mission Assurance Coordination Board (MAC-B) and partner with the DOD
CIO to prioritize resources implementing MA decisions in a continuous
dynamic threat environment.
Question. The cybersecurity of the Defense Industrial Base;
Answer. I understand that in supporting DOD's role as DIB SRMA, the
ASD(HD&HA) actively coordinates PPD-21-related infrastructure efforts,
including cybersecurity efforts, with DOD, interagency, and private
sector partners. Section 1724 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the
Secretary of Defense to designate the DOD Principal Cyber Advisor as
the coordinating authority for cybersecurity issues relating to the
Defense Industrial Base. Section 1724 requires the Principal Cyber
Advisor, in this role, to synchronize, harmonize, de-conflict, and
coordinate all DOD policies and programs germane to DIB cybersecurity.
I understand that coordinates closely with OPCA.
Question. And the Strategic Weapons Systems cybersecurity programs?
Answer. I understand that the Strategic Cybersecurity Program (SCP)
is part of an array of Department activities that support the DC&MA
mission. If confirmed, I will continue to partner with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Director of
the National Security Agency to ensure the cybersecurity of Defense
Critical Infrastructure through complementary activities. If confirmed,
I will also evaluate opportunities to use the Mission Assurance
Coordination Board and associated venues to advance SCP efforts, as
appropriate.
relationship with u.s. northern command (northcom)
Question. U.S. Northern Command has the mission of conducting
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed
at the United States, its territories, and interests within the
Command's assigned area of responsibility, and, as directed by the
President or Secretary of Defense, to provide defense assistance to
civil authorities, including consequence management operations.
If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would coordinate homeland
defense and DSCA roles and responsibilities with the Commander,
NORTHCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander of
the North American Aerospace Defense Command and of U.S. Northern
Command, and the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to support the
efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Deputy Secretary,
and Secretary, particularly in the areas of homeland defense and DSCA
strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of
operations.
Question. How do you anticipate that the ASD(HD&HA) and the
NORTHCOM Commander will coordinate with other federal and State
entities in planning for responses to events that might require DOD
support?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Commander
of U.S. Northern Command and the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
to ensure that DOD support to Federal and State entities, when
required, is timely, coordinated, and effective. I would also work with
both Commanders and the Department's Federal and State partners to
ensure that the Department is prepared to provide support quickly,
effectively, and in a coordinated fashion that facilitates unity of
effort to save and sustain lives and relieve human suffering.
use of active duty and reserve personnel for homeland defense/posse
comitatus
Question. What is your understanding of the legal issues associated
with using military personnel--both active and reserve component
forces--in law enforcement and security roles within the United States?
Answer. In accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. Sec.
1385) and 10 U.S.C. Sec. 275, Active Duty military personnel -
including National Guard and other Reserve component personnel ordered
to Active Duty--are prohibited from directly participating in law
enforcement activities (e.g., search, seizure, and arrest), except in
cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by law.
National Guard personnel, when acting under the command and control
of their governors and adjutants general, are not subject to the
restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and 10 U.S.C. Sec.
275; therefore, National Guard personnel serving in a State Active Duty
status or in a full-time National Guard duty status under 32 U.S.C.
Sec. 502(f) may be used for security roles authorized under State law,
and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and applicable Federal laws.
Question. In your view, does the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), enacted
in law in 1879, retain its relevance in the present day?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Should the PCA be amended in some way to make it more
useful in the current environment? Please explain your answer.
Answer. In my opinion, current laws regarding the use of the Armed
Forces in support of civilian law enforcement and related activities
appear to be sufficient. If confirmed, I would carefully review these
laws and their effects and, if necessary, make appropriate
recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to civilian law
enforcement authorities investigating or responding to acts of domestic
extremism?
Answer. I believe it would be appropriate for DOD to remain in
support of civilian law enforcement investigating or responding to acts
of domestic extremism incidents, as authorized by law.
arctic and global resilience
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the
ASD(HD&HA) with respect to Arctic and Global Resilience policy?
Answer. My understanding of the responsibilities of the ASD(HD&HA)
with respect to Arctic and Global Resilience Policy is to advise and
support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense on the formulation,
implementation, and policy relating to the Arctic region, and global
resilience matters, including regarding the climate and energy. The
establishment of this new DASD office is responsive to the requirement
of Section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 that responsibility for the Arctic region be assigned to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere or any
other Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense the Secretary of Defense
considers appropriate, and also recognizes the growing importance of
cross-cutting global matters, including the climate and energy.
Question. What, in your view, are U.S. strategic objectives in the
Arctic?
Answer. In my view, the United States seeks a stable and open
Arctic that facilitates protection of the Homeland, enables economic
prosperity, and supports the international order as well as Allies and
partners. More specifically, U.S. defense interests in the Arctic
region include: defense of the Homeland; deterring strategic
competitors from undertaking malign or coercive activities in the
region; and ensuring that common domains remain free and open in
accordance with international law. I understand that the Department
views the Arctic in a global context, in which the ongoing work to
secure the Homeland (represented in the Arctic by the State of Alaska)
and to uphold the international rules-based order is consistent with
National Defense Strategy-driven efforts to advance U.S. global
priorities. Climate change is driving evolving conditions in the
Arctic, with impacts on security, economic prosperity, natural and
built infrastructure, human safety, and more. If confirmed, I will help
DOD support broader U.S. Government efforts to ensure a safe and secure
Arctic region, and ensure DOD works by, with, and through our Allies,
partners, indigenous communities, and other key stakeholders as
appropriate.
Question. What should DOD's role be in supporting the attainment of
those objectives?
Answer. The United States has a broad range of strategic interests
in the Arctic. DOD supports interagency efforts and leads efforts
relating to defense objectives in the Arctic. If confirmed, I am
committed to helping DOD build and implement the appropriate concepts,
capabilities, and relationships to achieve defense objectives in the
Arctic. In the Arctic, as appropriate, DOD will work with Allies and
partners to achieve common interests.
Question. In your view, what are the strategic objectives of China
and Russia in the Arctic?
Answer. As Russia and China seek to gain advantages in the Arctic
region, their actions are part of a global pattern. In my view, Russia
and China have different objectives in the Arctic, although there are
some areas of overlap as both seek to undermine freedom and the rules-
based international order around the world. If confirmed, I will assess
information available within DOD regarding Russian and Chinese
objectives in the Arctic and seek to improve and refine DOD's
understanding of this important topic.
Question. In what ways, if any, do those strategic objectives
conflict with the strategic objectives of the United States broadly,
and the Department of Defense specifically?
Answer. Just as the United States has enduring global interests,
our competitors have a global approach to undermining them. I am
committed to ensuring that DOD long-term strategic competition efforts
are harmonized so that we uphold the international rules-based order
and deter aggression in the Arctic and around the world with maximum
effect. If confirmed, I will direct further analysis of this important
set of issues to position DOD for maximum effectiveness in the pursuit
of U.S. strategic objectives.
Question. In your view, has the Department sufficiently integrated
and nested the Service-specific strategies for the Arctic under the
Department-wide Arctic Strategy?
Answer. The Department continues to work on the integration of
Service-specific strategies under the DOD Arctic Strategy. I understand
that all of the Services have released Arctic strategy documents in
recent years. If confirmed, I look forward to providing a leadership
role in developing and advancing DOD Arctic policies and strategies.
Question. In your view, does the U.S. military currently have the
appropriate capabilities and assets to support its strategic interests
in the Arctic?
Answer. The Department has identified a range of capability needs,
including: improved domain awareness systems; more robust
communications capabilities; increased Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance capabilities; and enhanced environmental modelling. In
addressing these capability needs, if confirmed, I will assess how DOD
can continue to balance consideration of investments for the Arctic
region with broader capability needs of the Joint Force as outlined in
the forthcoming 2022 NDS.
Question. Do you believe that climate change poses a risk to
national security, and if so, what steps would you recommend, if
confirmed, to ensure that DOD prioritizes and resources efforts to
address the climate resilience of DOD assets and capabilities?
Answer. Climate and environmental change will exacerbate existing
risks and pose new challenges to the U.S. Homeland and DOD missions and
operations, in addition to the security of our Allies and partners. If
confirmed, I will bring increased focus on the effects of climate
change on national security, DOD missions, and homeland defense and
factor these into our strategic planning, budgeting, resources, and
capability development processes. If confirmed, I will coordinate with
DOD counterparts as the Department develops comprehensive investment
strategies to minimize the security risks associated with the impacts
of climate change, including through adaptation and resiliency of DOD
operations, readiness, installations, equipment, infrastructure, and
force development.
latin america and the caribbean
Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security
interests in Latin America and the Caribbean?
Answer. Our security is directly tied to the security and
prosperity of our neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is
in our national security interest to protect the American people from
potential threats emanating from the region, and to promote prosperity,
democracy, and human rights in the Western Hemisphere. If confirmed, I
will support appropriate actions by the Department of Defense to
achieve these objectives as part of broader U.S. Government efforts.
Question. In your view, what would be the appropriate role for DOD
in addressing the sources of instability in the region, including
transnational criminal organizations, corruption, environmental
devastation, and the health crisis resulting from the COVID-19
pandemic?
Answer. I believe the Department of Defense should support
civilian-led, whole-of-government efforts and robust engagements with
our partners to address the challenges identified in the President's
Interim National Security Strategy. These challenges include
transnational criminal organizations, corruption, environmental
devastation, and the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Department can
support anti-corruption efforts through activities to strengthen
defense institutions, as well as strengthen partner military
professionalization and emphasize respect for human rights and
democratic principles.
Question. What is your assessment of the malign influence threat
from Russia, China, Iran and other actors in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and what should be the appropriate role for DOD in
countering that threat?
Answer. Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other malign actors in Latin
America and the Caribbean pose a threat to security, stability, and
prosperity within the region. If confirmed, I would recommend to the
Secretary that DOD should continue to support a civilian-led, whole-of-
government approach through robust engagements with our partners. I
also would recommend to the Secretary that DOD base these engagements
on the principles of transparency, recognition of sovereignty, and
respect for democratic norms and human rights.
Question. In some countries in Latin America, DOD plays an
important role in training, equipping, and providing assistance to
partner nation militaries. How should DOD coordinate its security
cooperation activities with security assistance efforts in those
countries led by other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State?
Answer. I understand the Department of Defense and the Department
of State have both formal coordination forums and regular, informal
engagements on security assistance and cooperation activities. The
Department of Defense advises the Department of State regarding partner
and ally military requirements, consistent with U.S. national security
policy. The Department of Defense also implements the Foreign Military
Sales program and certain Department of State security assistance
programs, consistent with State Department guidance, and coordinates
with the Department of State regarding Department of Defense programs.
I understand--and if confirmed, would affirm--the importance of
ensuring DOD activities align with broader U.S. foreign policy,
thorough coordination, collaboration, and consistent engagement with
the State Department and other interagency partners.
colombia
Question. U.S. assistance to Colombia over the past several years
has facilitated the marginalization of the FARC and other violent
revolutionary groups. More recently, however, violence has escalated,
placing implementation of the peace accord at risk.
Question. How do you define U.S. national security interests in
Colombia?
Answer. The United States has a vested interest in supporting a
democratic and stable Colombia that provides security for its citizens
and is at peace. It is in our national interest to continue supporting
Colombia's efforts to implement its peace accord, maintain internal
security, and expand its role as a regional and global security
exporter.
Question. What means of U.S. security assistance are appropriate
for the Colombian Government, given the challenges it faces?
Answer. For over two decades, the United States has made
significant investments in Colombia's counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency missions through security cooperation and defense
institution building. It is my understanding that U.S. security
assistance and cooperation programs continue to be effective in helping
to build the capabilities of Colombian security forces to disrupt and
defeat transnational criminal organizations and insurgent forces. If
confirmed, I would look into ways the Department can continue
supporting the Department of State's broader security assistance
programs, and would then make recommendations to the Secretary for any
required additional capabilities or authorities.
Question. In your view, what steps, if any, should the United
States take to address increased violence in Colombia, and to reduce
other risks to implementation of the peace accord?
Answer. Successfully ensuring that Colombia remains at peace will
require a significant willingness and financial commitment by the
Colombian Government over the coming decades. Colombia's security
forces, with the U.S. Government's support, will be critical in
extending security across the country. The Department should continue
to focus on strengthening the capacity of the Colombian military to
address internal threats posed by transnational criminal organization
and insurgent groups, including the ELN and FARC dissidents.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD efforts to promote human
rights and respect for the rule of law among Colombian security forces?
Answer. It is my understanding that one of the Department's primary
lines of effort with Colombia is to strengthen its defense ministry and
military through a well-established institutional capacity-building
program. Every DOD-funded security cooperation program with Colombia
includes a human rights training element. If confirmed, I would help
ensure that DOD continues to appropriately integrate human rights and
the rule of law into its bilateral engagements with Colombia.
Question. The Colombian military has become a security exporter
throughout the region due to its capabilities and expertise. In your
view, how should the United States work with Colombia regarding its
efforts as a source of stability, both regionally and internationally?
Answer. The Colombian military is one of our most willing and
capable strategic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, and is
the only country in the region that is a NATO Global Partner. Colombia
has been a force multiplier in the region for the past decade by
executing the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security (USCAP).
Through USCAP, Colombia trains Central American and Caribbean partner-
nation personnel in counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities.
Colombia has participated in NATO and European Union counter-piracy
missions off the coast of the Horn of Africa, and it has taken steps to
prepare itself for deployments as part of United Nations (UN) peace
operations. I support continued DOD partnership with Colombia to enable
its regional and global security activities and objectives.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the ASD(HD&HA)?
Answer. There is no place for sexual harassment, gender
discrimination, or any other types of harassment within the Department
of Defense, including the Office of the ASD(HD&HA). If confirmed, I
will work in partnership with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
in reviewing any existing workforce surveys that would give me insight
into the climate of the office and determine what actions, if any, need
to be taken in the Office of the ASD(HD&HA) to improve the environment.
I am aware of the GAO's report recommending additional measures the
Department take to address sexual harassment and assault among the
civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will support the Department's
ongoing efforts to promote a culture of dignity and respect, including
a commitment to dealing with sexual harassment.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(HD&HA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would take swift action by initiating a
review to gather facts and address the complaint consistent with
Federal statutes and Department of Defense regulations and policies. If
confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
to make clear to the HD&HA workforce that they deserve a respectful
workplace; equality, diversity, and inclusion are readiness priorities;
and any form of prohibited harassment will not be tolerated.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
drug interdiction
1. Senator King. Ms. Dalton, following up on my question regarding
the drug interdiction crisis facing the country, how will you, if
confirmed, seek to address the remaining approximately 75 percent of
ships carrying illicit drugs into the country and the organizations
responsible for these shipments? Please provide concrete plans to
address this issue.
Ms. Dalton. Combating drug trafficking requires a whole-of-
government approach and engagement with partner nations. I understand
the Department's counterdrug efforts primarily support U.S. Federal law
enforcement agencies that have responsibility for drug interdiction,
apprehension, investigation, and prosecution, and that the Department
also supports international partners in their efforts to disrupt the
activities of criminal organizations responsible for drug trafficking.
I expect the Department will continue to explore opportunities to
support the interdiction of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals
crossing into the United States, whether by air, sea, or land (the
predominant channel for drug trafficking into the United States). If
confirmed, I will also help DOD continue to support domestic and
international partners through security cooperation activities. I
understand DOD must balance the requirements of its defense missions
against requests for DOD to provide support to missions led by other
parts of the U.S. Government.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
national guard in cyber defense
2. Senator Manchin. Ms. Dalton, just this Tuesday, January 11,
2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency
(NSA) released a joint cybersecurity advisory of the increased
likelihood of Russian state-sponsored cyberattacks due to ongoing
tension with Ukraine. They warned of critical infrastructure being
especially at risk. Do you see any opportunities to further involve the
National Guard in cyber defense and defense of our critical
infrastructure?
Ms. Dalton. National Guard personnel have a presence in, and
familiarity with, thousands of U.S. communities, which is an advantage
that could be valuable in a variety of efforts to work closely with the
private sector to protect critical infrastructure. In addition,
National Guard personnel could contribute to the cybersecurity of such
critical infrastructure as part of a State response, at the direction
of the Governor. Under an appropriate mobilization authority, DOD also
may use National Guard personnel to conduct DOD missions regarding
cyber defense of defense critical infrastructure or as part of DOD's
support of a national response based on a request by the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency as the lead Federal agency.
3. Senator Manchin. Ms. Dalton, if so, what will you do, if
confirmed, to increase National Guard involvement in Cyber Defense?
Ms. Dalton. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander of U.S.
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and
the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to
understand how the National Guard could best support such efforts.
4. Senator Manchin. Ms. Dalton, are you familiar with a program
referred to as NITRO?
Ms. Dalton. I am aware that NITRO is a USCYBERCOM-National Guard
Bureau initiative. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
this program.
5. Senator Manchin. Ms. Dalton, will you commit to receiving a
briefing from U.S. Cyber Command and the National Guard Bureau and
their efforts to deploy this is each State and Territory, if confirmed?
I believe it's crucial to maintaining the security of our Global
Positioning System (GPS).
Ms. Dalton. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
china
6. Senator Tillis. Ms. Dalton, how do you characterize the national
security threat posed by a rising China in our hemisphere?
Ms. Dalton. As the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) interests
become increasingly global in nature, I expect it to seek increased
influence in the Western Hemisphere. At present, the PRC's engagement
in the region focuses primarily on diplomatic and economic priorities,
accompanied by efforts to develop military and security relationships
with some countries. The PRC has gained economic influence with Western
Hemisphere countries through sustained investment, which the PRC
routinely leverages to blunt international criticism of its domestic
practices and gain further access in our hemisphere. If confirmed, I
will focus closely on the PRC's activities in the hemisphere and work
closely with other U.S. Government interagency partners to respond
appropriately to any activities that may undermine U.S. national
security interests.
7. Senator Tillis. Ms. Dalton, what do you find most concerning?
Ms. Dalton. Given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist
Party, I am concerned when the PRC seeks to leverage its economic,
diplomatic, and military efforts to advance its strategic objectives.
Therefore, when I see PRC economic investment, I focus on whether that
investment will lead to a follow-on military presence or pose other
security risks to the United States and our allies and partners. For
example, the PRC has significantly increased its economic presence in
our hemisphere over the past decade, including through key
infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will work with U.S.
Government partners to address the PRC's concerning activities,
including by providing appropriate DOD contributions to U.S. security
cooperation activities with our partners.
8. Senator Tillis. Ms. Dalton, what should be the Department of
Defense (DOD) strategy for countering China's growing security
ambitions in the hemisphere?
Ms. Dalton. Despite the PRC's efforts to increase its influence, I
believe DOD remains the premier partner for defense cooperation
throughout the hemisphere. Sustaining security cooperation activities,
including in countering illicit trafficking and other transnational
threats, cyber cooperation, humanitarian and disaster response
capabilities, and other forms of engagement, must remain central to
sustaining DOD's robust network of partners in the region. If
confirmed, I will ensure that DOD integrates these activities into a
whole-of-government approach to advance U.S. interests in the
hemisphere.
u.s. southwest border
9. Senator Tillis. Ms. Dalton, what do you view as DOD's proper
role with respect to border security?
Ms. Dalton. The Department's proper role is to provide support when
requested, consistent with the law, by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Border
security is a mission of DHS and, consistent with the law, DHS may
request DOD assistance. I understand that, for a number of years, DHS
requested DOD assistance to help detect and monitor migrant movements
and drug-smuggling activities, and to provide analysis and aerial
support for U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
covid-19
10. Senator Tillis. Ms. Dalton, with the COVID-19 pandemic
continuing to be the most urgent challenge facing the United States,
what role do you foresee DOD playing in future COVID response and
vaccination efforts?
Ms. Dalton. I would expect, based on Secretary Austin's public
statements, that DOD will continue to provide support to the national
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It is my understanding that DOD has
provided critical support to our nation's fight against the COVID-19
pandemic domestically and globally. DOD has been a major contributor in
our nation's efforts to develop, produce, and distribute COVID-19
vaccines. In addition, military personnel continue to provide medical
staff support at local hospitals and contribute to our global efforts
to end the pandemic.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
defense strategy
11. Senator Hawley. Ms. Dalton, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing threat. In
your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation?
Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Ms. Dalton. Yes, I do agree that China is the Department's
``pacing'' challenge.
12. Senator Hawley. Ms. Dalton, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority
theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's
designation? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Ms. Dalton. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of the
Indo-Pacific as the priority theater with respect to the Department's
efforts to address the myriad military challenges posed by the PRC; it
is my belief that the PRC also poses challenges in other theaters.
13. Senator Hawley. Ms. Dalton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, ``The PRC
[People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a
Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario.'' Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN concurred for the record
with Taiwan's designation as the Department's pacing scenario. In your
personal opinion, do you support the designation of a Taiwan
contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Please provide a
``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Ms. Dalton. Yes. It is my belief that the PRC is the overall pacing
challenge for the Department, and the noted scenario is a key pacing
scenario. However, I am also aware that there are some elements of the
joint force that will pace themselves to Russia, given some of Russia's
unique capabilities.
14. Senator Hawley. Ms. Dalton, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN testified that the Department
of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so that it can
focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-
Pacific, barring a significant increase in the United States defense
budget. In your personal opinion, do you agree with Admiral Grady's
testimony? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Ms. Dalton. Yes, I agree the Department must manage the risks
associated with lower-priority issues while aligning its resources to
its higher priorities.
western hemisphere threats
15. Senator Hawley. Ms. Dalton, what steps do you believe the
Department of Defense should take, in coordination with the Department
of Homeland Security and other relevant agencies, in order to prepare
the American public for potential kinetic or cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure and other dual-use targets in the United States Homeland
in the event of conflict with China or Russia?
Ms. Dalton. Educating and preparing the American public in advance
of potential disruptions to our critical infrastructure, whether from a
foreign adversary or from natural disruptions like fire or extreme
weather, is a critical aspect of improving resilience and integrated
deterrence. DHS and the White House lead the way on this messaging to
the American public, State and local governments, and critical
industries. DOD supports the Administration's efforts.
16. Senator Hawley. Ms. Dalton, do you commit to inform Congress
within 30 days if China deploys or otherwise positions anti-ship, anti-
air, or other capabilities in the Western Hemisphere that could be used
to threaten American forces' freedom of operation in this region during
a time of crisis or conflict? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no''
response.
Ms. Dalton. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to inform Congress within
30 days if the United States learns that the PRC deploys or otherwise
positions anti-ship, anti-air, or other capabilities in the Western
Hemisphere that could be used to threaten U.S. forces' freedom of
operation in the Western Hemisphere during a time of crisis or
conflict. The Department of Defense annual report to Congress on
military and security developments involving the PRC describes ways in
which the PRC is seeking to develop the capability to project power
outside its borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC's growing
overseas interests and advance its foreign policy goals, including in
the Western Hemisphere.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Melissa G. Dalton
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Melissa G. Dalton, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Melissa G.
Dalton in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Ms. Melissa G. Dalton was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 1, 2022, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 1, 2022.]
______
[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. John F. Plumb by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 955 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) created the position of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD(SP)) whose principal duty
``shall be the overall supervision of policy of the Department of
Defense for space warfighting.'' You are the first person nominated for
Senate confirmation to this position.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the (ASD(SP))?
Answer. As required by statute, the primary duty of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD(SP)) is the overall
supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space
warfighting, pursuant to Section 138(b)(5) of Title 10, U.S.C. In
carrying out these responsibilities, the ASD(SP) advises and represents
the Secretary of Defense on national security space strategy, policy,
plans, capabilities, and operations to achieve national security
objectives. The ASD(SP) also has related implementation oversight
responsibilities. Additionally, as part of an ongoing reorganization,
the ASD(SP) will have similar advisory, representational, and
implementation oversight responsibilities regarding nuclear, missile
defense, cyber, and countering weapons of mass destruction policies,
strategies and programs. This reorganization will also designate
ASD(SP) as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense with
responsibility for, among other things, overseeing the development and
execution of the Cyber Posture Review and Defense Cyber Strategy.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities
do you expect the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) to
prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort
comprising the National Defense Strategy (NDS)?
Answer. The lines of effort from the 2018 NDS--building a more
ready and lethal force; strengthening alliances and partnerships; and
reforming DOD operations--remain very relevant to the space security
challenges facing the nation. If I am confirmed, I expect the USD(P)
will ask me to prioritize oversight and implementation of the reforms
in the national security space organization of recent years--such as
creation of the United States Space Force, the United States Space
Command, and the ASD(SP)--to advance those lines of effort and
strengthen integrated deterrence under the forthcoming National Defense
Strategy. Additionally, consistent with the ongoing reorganization of
the office, I expect he would task me to focus on achieving closer
integration in our approaches to the nuclear, missile defense, cyber,
space and countering weapons of mass destruction mission areas. Space
is a common element in each of these mission areas, and how we leverage
them together will be important to securing our overall national
security interests across all domains and regions.
Question. What background, experience, and expertise do you possess
that qualify you to serve as the ASD(SP), including in each of the
following areas:
Development of internationally-applicable space policy, rules, and
normative behaviors in space.
Answer. As a former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy, a former director for defense policy and strategy on
the National Security Council staff, and the current Chief of
Government Relations for the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center), I have substantial expertise working
on space policy, rules, and normative behaviors in space. My academic
background in physics and aerospace engineering combined with my hands-
on engineering experience across multiple disciplines as a submarine
officer has allowed me to apply a technical understanding of the
physics and engineering dynamics of spaceflight to help inform the
scope of possible policy solutions for the domain.
Question. The national security space policy process.
Answer. As a former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy, a former director for defense policy and strategy on
the National Security Council staff, and the current Chief of
Government Relations for the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center), I have substantial expertise working
on the national security space policy process. My academic background
in physics and aerospace engineering combined with my hands-on
engineering experience as a submarine officer has allowed me to bring a
technical understanding to the policy, technological, and programmatic
issues I have encountered during my career.
Question. The relationship between space, cyber, and nuclear
operations in terms of escalation dynamics.
Answer. As former Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy, former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy, and a former director for defense policy and strategy on
the National Security Council staff, and as a current United States
Navy Reserve Captain and current Chief of Government Relations for the
Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research and Development
Center), I have substantial expertise working at the intersection of
space, cyber, and nuclear operations. My education, engineering
experience, and previous roles in the national security community have
introduced me to the strategies, policies, technologies, and programs
that affect the escalation dynamics across these issue areas.
Question. Oversight of nuclear, missile defense, cyber, and
countering weapons of mass destruction policy.
Answer. As former Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy, former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy, and a former director for defense policy and strategy on
the National Security Council staff, and as a current United States
Navy Reserve Captain and current Chief of Government Relations for the
Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research and Development
Center), I have substantial expertise working at the intersection of
space, cyber, nuclear, missile defense, and countering weapons of mass
destruction policy.
4Question. What leadership and management experience do you possess
that you would apply to your service as ASD(SP), if confirmed?
Answer. During my service both in and outside of the U.S.
Government, I have had the privilege of leading and managing multiple
organizations in national security missions. In the Navy I have led
teams varying in size from a handful to several hundred. As a civilian
I have served as director for defense policy and strategy on the
National Security Council staff, where I led interagency deliberations
on national-level defense matters, working both internally and across
the national security apparatus to execute the President's national
security strategy. As a civilian at the Department of Defense, I served
as acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy,
leading the team responsible for implementation of the National
Security Space Strategy. Previously in the Department, I also served as
Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, where I
supported the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy in leading our team through the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review and the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Across all
of these roles, I have exercised inclusive decision-making, deliberate
communication, close collaboration throughout the U.S. Government and
with our allies, and, most importantly, leadership and management by
example.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the first ASD(SP)?
Answer. I see the major challenges for the first ASD(SP) centering
on the challenges of strengthening integrated deterrence, which
Secretary Austin has stated will be a cornerstone of the NDS and the
closely related Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. The
ASD(SP) must strengthen integration across the areas of space, nuclear,
cyber, missile defense, and countering WMD to sustain capability
advantages that underpin the power of the joint force globally and the
credibility of our commitments to defending national interests. To do
this, we must continue to adapt to the realities of conflict extending
to or originating in space; protect against increasingly space-capable
adversaries; undertake necessary modernizations of the nuclear
enterprise; modernize homeland missile defenses; strengthen integrated
air and missile defenses regionally; posture to defend forward in
cyberspace and be prepared to use our cyber capabilities on
operationally relevant timelines; and continue leading the world in
preventing further proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons.
Question. If confirmed, what plans would you implement to address
each of these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, my first focus will be to help implement the
Administration's National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and
Missile Defense Review, as well as the 2020 National Space Strategy. I
would anticipate those documents will provide important roadmaps, both
across the totality of national defense and with specific focus to
nuclear, missile defense, and space mission areas. I am also aware of
the National Defense Authorization Act requirements to conduct a Cyber
Posture Review this year. I believe that review will be very important
for assessing the evolution of threats and the progress of current
programs, and for developing plans to serve our interests over the next
several years. In each of these areas as well as in non-proliferation
and countering weapons of mass destruction, I would expect to work
closely with our allies and partners to develop complementary and
integrated plans to achieve our common objectives.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
for your tenure in office?
Answer. If confirmed, my overarching priority would be to approach
all of my responsibilities from the perspective of advancing and
assuring U.S. national security interests in an unprecedented era of
strategic competition. The ASD(SP) mission portfolio is broad, but each
of those missions are critical to sustaining the open international
system as we have known it for the past 75 years and assuring our
adversaries do not supplant it with one based on their authoritarian
models. I would therefore seek to integrate the DOD policy approach
across my portfolio to both strengthen our alliances and better deter
potential aggressors. From my previous experience working in
government, I know the sense of mission and national purpose our
military and career civil service have. If confirmed, I would also make
it a top priority to build an ASD Space Policy organization that
nurtures and leverages this tremendous source of national strength.
The Office of Nuclear and Missile Defense was eliminated in the
most recent re-organization with missile defense falling under the
Office of Space and Missile Defense and Nuclear Deterrence falling
under the Office of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Policy.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the nuclear deterrence mission is appropriately prioritized within the
Office of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Policy?
Answer. Our nuclear deterrent continues to serve an essential
purpose in U.S. national security strategy, as it has done for 70
years. Secretary Austin has testified that nuclear deterrence is the
Department's number one priority. If confirmed as ASD(SP), and
consistent with Secretary Austin's statement, I intend to advance the
Department's goals for integrated deterrence; maintaining our strategic
deterrent is critical to that strategy. This approach includes
leveraging the unique capabilities associated with our nuclear
deterrence so that they are given the priority needed to advance the
Department's deterrence and defense missions. (I understand that this
policy office will be titled ``Nuclear and CWMD Policy.'')
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to
ensure that nuclear and missile defense policies are appropriately
coordinated under the Policy office reorganization?
Answer. Missile defense and nuclear weapons policies are
complementary--the capabilities combine to strengthen deterrence. If
confirmed as ASD(SP), a core part of my responsibilities will involve
coordinating among the offices falling within my portfolio to ensure we
can protect our Homeland, defend U.S. national security interests,
deter attacks, and assure our allies. Such a responsibility entails
analyzing the threat environment, the relevant U.S., allied and partner
strategic capabilities (including but not limited to nuclear deterrence
and missile defense), how all these capabilities intersect with one
another, and our global security commitments, among many other
elements. This understanding would provide the foundation to carry out
a coherent approach that enables the United States to achieve its
national security policy and strategic objectives.
civilian control of the military
Question. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the
National Defense Strategy Commission observed, ``there is an imbalance
in civil-military relations on critical issues . . . Civilian voices
appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and
national security policy.''
Congress created the position of ASD(SP) to ensure civilian
oversight of a new branch of the armed services and Combatant Command.
What are you views on the purposes underpinning creation of the
position of the ASD(SP) and how would you effectuate those purposes, if
confirmed?
Answer. My understanding is Congress created the position of the
ASD(SP) to reinforce the important role of civilian oversight at a time
when the Nation was taking major steps to strengthen the military's
role in securing national security interests against growing threats in
space. The rapid emergence of these challenges in space security means
we must develop our policy and strategic approaches at the same time we
are organizing, training, and equipping forces and developing
operational plans to address those challenges. We are also developing
our understanding of how these dynamics affect national security across
other domains and other areas of national interest. I believe the
ASD(SP) has a key role in developing a holistic understanding and
approach that combines the best of our civilian and military
organizations. To that end, and if confirmed, I would expect to work
closely with the Chief of Space Operations, the Commander of the U.S.
Space Command and other leadership of the defense space enterprise. I
would also want to work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security to ensure close partnership and collaboration
between the defense and Intelligence Community components of the
national security space enterprise. Likewise, I would hope to
strengthen defense partnerships with civil agencies, commercial
industry, and our international allies and partners.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as ASD(SP) epitomizes the fundamental requirement for
civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution
and other laws?
Answer. Throughout my military service as a submariner in the U.S.
Navy and as a public servant with the Department of Defense, the
National Security Council, and the United States Senate, I have sworn
oaths to support and defend the Constitution. Civilian control of the
military is fundamental to the preservation of the freedoms enshrined
in that document. It is part of our national identity. If confirmed, I
will ensure a clear chain of command in my own organization and across
those I will oversee that reflects the will of the civilian leaders we
serve each day. I will ensure that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense always have the best advice of both the civilian and
military leadership regarding the matters for which I would be
responsible so that they can ensure the appropriate exercise of
civilian control. I will ensure that the organizations I have oversight
of comply with laws and regulation. And I will work with the
Congressional committees of jurisdiction to enable Congressional
oversight.
national defense strategy (nds) and interim national security strategic
guidance
Question. The 2018 NDS outlines that threats confronting the United
States: a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat
from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden
Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,
which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration.
Among these priorities is the requirement to ``promote a favorable
distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly
threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the
global commons or dominating key regions.'' The Administration has
initiated the process of preparing a new National Defense Strategy,
which is planned for issuance in 2022.
Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment,
including the most critical and enduring threats to the national
security of the United States and its allies?
Answer. I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identified strategic
competitions with China and with Russia as the primary challenges
animating the global security environment. The Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance similarly highlights these threats to the
international system, most urgently from China as well as from Russia,
while also noting the emerging, unconventional, and non-military
threats that continue to challenge national security, such as nuclear
and WMD proliferation and cyber threats. I expect that the 2022
National Defense Strategy will build on the 2018 NDS to reflect these
critical threats as well, and if confirmed, I will ensure the offices
in my purview will use the NDS as a guide to prioritize our security
challenges.
Question. What revisions or adjustments, if any, would you
recommend that the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS with
respect to space? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The 2018 NDS was right to highlight emerging challenges to
our most critical space assets, and to direct the prioritization of
investments in space resilience and reconstitution. The threats posed
by competitors in space have only become more acute since then.
Mission-assured space capabilities and the ability to protect our
forces from any adversary's hostile uses of space are foundational to a
successful deterrent, and the Secretary of Defense has made clear that
integrated deterrence is a focus of the forthcoming 2022 NDS. If
confirmed, I would work with the Defense space enterprise, the
Department's senior leadership, and Congress to prioritize investments
in the mission assurance of our space architecture, protect our forces
from hostile uses of space, work with our allies and partners to
promote norms of behavior to reduce miscalculation and escalation in
space, and leverage the talent and ingenuity of both our Defense space
workforce and the private sector to stay ahead of current and future
threats.
Question. The June 2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary outlines
four lines of effort to comport with the 2018 NDS, as follows: ``(1)
build a comprehensive military advantage in space; (2) integrate space
into national, joint, and combined operations; (3) shape the strategic
environment; and (4) cooperate with allies, partners, industry, and
other U.S. Government departments and agencies.'' Please explain your
views on each of these elements of the 2020 Defense Space Strategy
Summary.
Answer. I have reviewed the June 2020 Defense Strategy Summary, and
believe that its core elements remain valid, important, and align with
the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, as well as the
Administration's more recently released United States Space Priorities
Framework. I assess it will be important to sustain the focus on the
following elements in particular:
The first line of effort primarily focuses on the actions
that the U.S. Space Force should take as the organization responsible
for organizing, training, and equipping the preponderance of our space
forces. Across these efforts, a critical element I will focus on, if
confirmed, is ensuring that the U.S. is able to field resilient and
assured space capabilities to deter and counter hostile uses of space.
The second line of effort is the major focus of the U.S.
Space Command. Establishing the U.S. Space Command as a Unified
Combatant Command was an important step to enable the Department to
plan, exercise, and execute joint and combined space operations across
the spectrum of competition and conflict, in concert with operations
across all domains and in coordination with the other combatant
commanders. A specific focus of mine, if confirmed, will be realigning
operational authorities, updating rules of engagement, and improving
the integration of space operations and intelligence personnel in
military plans and staffs.
The third line of effort is focused on addressing the
challenges in space that arise from the lack of common understandings
about norms of responsible behavior. If confirmed, my focus on this
line of effort would be in shaping the strategic environment in ways
that enhance domain stability and reduce the potential for
miscalculations. This includes diplomatic work in partnership with the
Department of State, as international views about what constitutes
acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the space domain continue to
evolve. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department of
State and other interagency partners to advance international norms and
increase stability.
Finally, the fourth line of effort focuses on the
partnerships necessary to advance the first three lines of effort. I
believe relationships with allies and partners, as well as with
commercial entities, are integral to collective security. I anticipate
there is still important work to be done to advance our key
partnerships through enhanced information sharing, increased
programmatic collaboration, and developing combined operations. If
confirmed, partnerships in this domain will be a key focus of mine.
Question. In your view, is each element of the Strategy Summary
properly scoped?
Answer. In my view, the four lines of effort under the Defense
Strategy are appropriate. If confirmed, I will work to align the
Defense Space Strategy to the United States Space Priorities Framework,
as well as the forthcoming National Security Strategy and National
Defense Strategy.
Question. Should additional elements be added, in your view?
Answer. In my view, the four lines of effort are comprehensive.
There could be additional work to implement these efforts as new DOD
space-focused organizations, their leaders, and related activities and
capabilities grow and mature to adapt to the evolving complex space
security environment. If confirmed, I would work with the leadership of
the U.S. Space Force, U.S. Space Command, and other stakeholders to
support that implementation work.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate
each of these elements of the Strategy Summary?
Answer. The strategic environment continues to evolve rapidly. If
confirmed, I would review the strategic environment since the Defense
Space Strategy was published in June 2020, particularly the continued
growth of Chinese and Russian space and counterspace capabilities. I
would also review steps the United States has taken to improve the DOD
space enterprise to address the growing threats and challenges in the
domain. I would work to bolster U.S. resilience in the space domain,
ensuring space is integrated with and contributing to deterrence and
military effectiveness across all domains, and promoting norms of
responsible behavior in space. Because I am concerned the threat is
evolving faster than typical DOD processes can respond, I would work to
help the Department speed adoption of new capabilities. Finally, I
would ensure implementation of the Defense Space Strategy remains
aligned with the more recent United States Space Priorities Framework,
and National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, to
enhance unity of effort and synchronization of space activities across
the enterprise.
advances by russia and china in space
Question. What is your assessment of China's technological advances
in space activities in the last 10 years?
Answer. My understanding is that over the last decade, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) space enterprise has matured rapidly as a
result of the PRC's investment in all aspects of its space program,
from civil to military space applications. The most recent China
Military Power Report and other open source publications indicate that
the PRC has improved its capabilities in space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communications,
satellite navigation, as well as human space flight and robotic space
exploration. The PRC has also built an expansive ground support system,
including space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacturing, launch, command and
control (C2), and data downlink capabilities. Notably, during this
period, the PRC invested significant economic resources in the
development and testing of counterspace capabilities, such as direct-
ascent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy
capabilities, which can contest or deny an adversary's access to and
operations in the space domain during crisis or conflict.
Question. What threats does China pose--now and in the future--to
the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national
security posture?
Answer. I agree with Secretary Austin that China is the United
States' pacing challenge, including in the space domain. From the open
literature, I understand PRC military doctrine indicates that PRC
leadership views space as critical to modern warfare, and considers the
use of counterspace capabilities as both a means of reducing U.S.
military effectiveness and for winning future wars. As such, the PRC
military continues to acquire and develop a diverse set of counterspace
capabilities and related technologies, including ground-based and
space-based systems with kinetic and non-kinetic effects. My
understanding is that China's rapid development and operational focus
in the space domain constitutes the most significant security threat in
space to the United States, as well as to our allies and partners.
Question. What is your assessment of Russia's technological
advances in space activities in the last 10 years?
Answer. From open source material, I understand that Russia's space
program is robust but more narrowly focused than China's. Since at
least 2010, Russia has concluded that gaining and maintaining supremacy
in space will have a decisive impact on the outcome of future
conflicts. Russia has therefore embarked on major efforts to develop
space and counterspace activities as a means to gain an asymmetric
military advantage over the United States. Russia has developed and
tested a range of kinetic and non-kinetic options with reversible and
irreversible effects against adversary space assets. Specifically, I am
aware from United States Government and allied government statements
that Russia tested space-based anti-satellite systems in 2017 and 2020,
including in an orbit very close to a United States satellite. And,
just last November, Russia conducted a destructive, direct-ascent ASAT
test against one of its own satellites.
Question. What threats does Russia pose--now and in the future--to
the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national
security posture?
Answer. While China is the pacing threat in space, Russia is also a
major concern. Russia views space as a key enabler of United States
military power. The Russian military continues to develop and test
space and counterspace capabilities aimed at offsetting perceived
United States military advantage, and disrupting and destroying U.S.
and allied space capabilities in crisis and conflict. The growth of
Russia's counterspace arsenal appears to present a serious threat to
United States, allied, and partner space activities.
Question. In your view, what other countries or groups are
advancing technologically in space?
Answer. More than 30 countries--many of which are allies and
partners--currently invest in advanced space activities and associated
technologies. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, and the participants
in the European Space Agency (ESA), to name a few, continue to make
noteworthy advances in space technologies and partner with the United
States in civil, commercial, and national security domains. In term of
actors that pose national security concerns, Iran and North Korea
continue to pursue space and counterspace-related technologies and
capabilities that could threaten United States, ally, and partner
interests in space.
Question. How do each of these countries or groups affect ability
of the United States to use space as part of our national security
posture and why?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense
maintains and continues to build space-related partnerships with many
countries worldwide to enhance our national security posture and to
promote safe operations in space. These countries understand that rapid
increases in civil, commercial, and military space activities create
new economic opportunities and provide national security benefits
through new technologies and services. Additionally, these countries
recognize the use of space enhances collective security, and many
increasingly understand the emerging threats to the space domain from
strategic competitors like China and Russia. Maintaining and
strengthening space-related alliances and partnerships will likely be
critical to the Department's focus on integrated deterrence,
particularly by helping the United States to maintain a durable
strategic advantage over China, Russia, and regional powers like Iran
and North Korea.
norms of behavior in space
Question. Please explain your views on the ``Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies'' as it pertains
to the Department of Defense.
Answer. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, as well as the other three
core space treaties (i.e., the Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968; the
Liability Convention of 1972; and the Registration Convention of 1975),
form the basis and cornerstone of existing international space law. All
United States Government space operations, including operations
undertaken by the Department of Defense, should comply with applicable
international law, which, in addition to the four core space treaties,
includes the inherent right of self-defense under the United Nations
Charter.
Russia and China have proposed additional treaties, resolutions and
rules of behavior related to space through the U.N. Conference on
Disarmament.
Question. What is your understanding of these recent proposals and
what is your view of how each would affect the United States and its
national security interests in space?
Answer. My understanding is that the U.S. Government agrees with
establishing best practices, standards, and norms of behaviors in space
in order to create shared understanding between operators and nations
about what constitutes responsible behaviors and to reduce the
misperceptions or miscalculations leading to destabilizing behavior.
However, in my view, the Russian and Chinese proposals and concepts for
arms control, such as their co-sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention
of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of
Force Against Outer Space Objects, do not provide pragmatic, equitable,
or verifiable mechanisms that would enhance U.S. national security
interests. In light of their ongoing development and deployment of
weapons, most recently highlighted by Russia's reckless test of an
anti-satellite missile in November, which destroyed a satellite and
scattered debris across low Earth orbit, their proposals seem even more
disingenuous. I believe the U.S. should pursue a more sustainable path
with our allies and partners to underpin space security and the
peaceful use of space for all spacefaring nations.
The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, dated July 7, 2021
outlining the Department's tenets of responsible behavior in space as
to the following key objectives:
Operate in, from, to, and through space with due regard
to others and in a professional manner.
Limit the generation of long-lived debris.
Avoid the creation of harmful interference.
Maintain safe separation and safe trajectory.
Communicate and make notifications to enhance the safety
and stability of the domain.
26. What are your views on each of these objectives? Please explain
your answers.
Answer. Secretary Austin's July 7 memorandum on the ``Tenets of
Responsible Behavior in Space'' is a strong example of the Department
of Defense's commitment to lead in the responsible use of space and
stewardship of the space environment, as set out in President Biden's
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of March 2021, and the
United States Space Priorities Framework of December 2021. If
confirmed, I would seek to continue building upon last year's progress
to advance these tenets.
Question. What is your view on the nature and scope of the U.S.
responsibility to protect Space as a ``global common''?
Answer. (My understanding is that the term ``global commons'' is a
legal term that can have different meanings based upon the perspective
of the speaker. To avoid any confusion inherent in this term I will
address what I understand to be the underlying concept of this
question. Space activities are essential to our way of life. Access to,
and the use of, space are vital national interests. I agree with the
United States Space Priorities Framework's direction to the Department
to defend U.S. national security interests from the growing scope and
scale of counterspace threats and contribute to strategic stability
through multiple means, including increasing resiliency. Concurrently,
the long-term sustainability of the space domain is a shared interest
between all nations, which means that the DOD must balance the
protection of our national security interests with the responsible use
of space and stewardship of the space environment. One sustainability
problem of particular concern to me is that of long lived orbital
debris, which can reduce access to space as it accumulates over time. I
believe the United States, as a global leader, has a responsibility to
also lead on this issue in order to preserve assured access to space.
oversight of national security operations in space
Question. If confirmed, you would be the principal civilian
official responsible for oversight of the Department's operations in
space. Please describe your vision of the relationship and specific
oversight duties of the ASD(SP) with respect to each the following
organizations:
I see each of these close relationships as distinct, yet centered
on a common purpose of achieving strategic alignment toward sustaining
national security advantages in space. If confirmed, I would approach
these relationships in the following manner.
The U.S. Space Command;
Answer. The relationship with U.S. Space Command is most similar to
the relationships that other Assistant Secretaries of Defense who
report through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy have with
Combatant Commands. Although the chain of command runs from the
Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander, the role of the
Assistant Secretary as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense makes
this relationship key for ensuring the strategic objectives of civilian
leadership are reflected in space operations of the Joint Force.
Question. The U.S. Space Force;
Answer. The relationship with the U.S. Space Force is quite
different. The Chief of Space Operations reports to the Secretary of
Defense through the civilian Secretary of the Air Force. Additionally,
the organize, train, and equip activities of the Space Force follow
Department-wide guidance established and overseen by several other OSD
civilian officials. Thus, the civilian oversight responsibilities are
shared, with the ASD(SP) focusing on how Space Force activities
contribute to strategic advantage in space and integrated strategic
outcomes across national security policy objectives.
Question. Space activities with the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security; and
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security (USD(I&S) is a co-equal to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD(P)), oversees the military intelligence program (MIP)
budget, and exercises Secretary of Defense authority, direction, and
control related to the National Reconnaissance Office and other
military elements of the Intelligence Community. In this relationship,
the ASD(SP), in support to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense,
works with the USD(I&S), to ensure that space-related MIP investments
and space activities of the intelligence community advance DOD policy,
strategy, and plans to achieve national security objectives.
Question. Space activities with the intelligence community, and in
particular the National Reconnaissance Office.
Answer. The ASD(SP) does not exercise direct oversight of the
National Reconnaissance Office and other space elements of the
Intelligence Community, but should maintain a close partnership with
them, as part of the relationship with the USD(I&S). This is essential
to facilitate the unity of effort activities in space operations
between the DOD and Intelligence Community, and to realize strategic
synergies in DOD and IC space acquisition activities.
organization of the asd(sp)
Question. Section 955(b) of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA required a
study by a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) on
the organizational challenges of this position of ASD(SP). The study,
``Drawing the Oversight Constellation: Options for the ASD for Space
Policy,'' was completed by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in July
of 2020.
What are your views regarding the study's findings (as set forth in
table 3 of the CNA report) regarding the gaps and seams in oversight of
space activities in the Department of Defense?
Answer. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study considered a
number of options for how to structure the office of the ASD Space
Policy. As part of that work, CNA addressed gaps and seams across the
defense space enterprise, and considered how the different
organizational options might address those gaps and seams. I think the
CNA study was thorough in its approach and can continue to serve as an
important reference.
Question. What are your views regarding the study's findings (table
5 of the CNA report) regarding options for consideration by the ASD(SP)
relative to the degree of change in the organization of the office of
the ASD(SP) deemed necessary and appropriate?
Answer. In table 5, the CNA study identifies considerations for how
to structure an ASD(SP) office centered on the former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. I think the table identifies an
appropriate initial scope of issues where the office should have
interest and influence: strategy, policy, international relations,
plans, operations, programs, budget, and acquisition. In my view, a
policy-level ASD office requires sufficient expertise in each of those
issue areas to set strategic direction and provide oversight to ensure
follow-through along the strategic path.
space deterrence and classification of national security space
information
Question. In order for space deterrence to be effective, the
adversary must subjectively balance the cost penalties for actions
taken. However, most national security space programs are classified
and information about them withheld from public disclosure.
Do you believe the balance between space deterrence and withholding
national security space information from public disclosure needs to be
adjusted? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe it is important to think of space deterrence in
the broader context of deterring adversary aggression that threatens
U.S. vital national interests. Shaping adversary perceptions of U.S.
will and capability, includes, but is not limited to knowledge of
particular U.S. capabilities.
Question. If you believe this balance needs to be adjusted, what
specific actions would you take to effectuate that belief, if
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with leadership of the U.S.
Space Force, U.S. Space Command, and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security, among others to ensure classification
policies regarding defense and other national security space activities
are current and focused on protecting information that truly needs
protection in this era. Likewise, I would work with these stakeholders
to assess how we should update our policies and practices for
disclosure of classified information to enhance ally and partner
cooperation.
In response to section 1611 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, the
Department of Defense issued a report entitled, ``Report on Deterrence
in Space'' in January 2021. According to that report, ``Depending upon
an adversary's reliance on space, and on other factors, in-kind
response to threats against adversary space and counterspace systems
may be of limited utility in some situations, and response options in
other domains may be more appropriate and effective. The United States
draws upon the sum of its military capabilities as part of our broader
U.S. deterrence posture for the space domain as it does in all
domains.''
Question. Do you agree with this statement?
Answer. I agree that DOD must consider space-related deterrence
within the broader, integrated framework of deterrence. This means that
assured space capabilities and resilient space architectures may
contribute to deterrence of aggression in any domain. Other national
tools must also contribute to deterring attacks or other forms of
harmful interference against U.S. space capabilities. We must also work
with allies and partners to bring our collective strength to bear
against common challenges. My understanding is that the Department is
developing an integrated deterrence approach that seeks to prioritize
and align cross-domain options, coordinated strategic messaging, and
international alliances and partnerships, to help address the
deterrence challenge we face, including our increased reliance on space
for our way of life as well as support to military operations in all
domains, coupled with the vulnerability of our space architectures.
Question. In what types of scenarios would you expect this
statement to apply?
Answer. From a deterrence perspective, cross-domain military
response options should be tailored relative to our understanding of an
adversary's strategy, strengths, and vulnerabilities. Cross-domain
responses, as opposed to responses in space, enable the United States
to draw on the sum of its capabilities, and may be more appropriate and
effective if an adversary is not as reliant as the United States is on
space. Deterrence approaches must also be tailored to the specific
adversary, and must consider the adversary's motivations and ultimate
objectives, perceived benefits of attack, availability of alternate
courses of action outside the space domain, and the perceived
escalation risks.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views as to whether such a
cross domain response can increase or decrease escalation dynamics in a
conflict? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Any type of military response, whether in-domain or cross-
domain, would require the U.S. to manage escalation. The efficacy of
deterrence by military response is associated with multiple factors,
including the adversary's perception of the value of U.S. capabilities
and the credibility of U.S. will to employ said capabilities. An
effective cross-domain response, if employed, requires the adversary to
understand the action is intended as a response and not an escalation;
that understanding may require clear articulation by the United States
to prevent miscalculation. I share the concern that there is not a
broad understanding of escalation risks in the space domain. I believe
that more work must be done to build a set of shared space-related
international norms and best practices in order to reduce the risk of
miscalculation and escalation.
Question. Do you ascribe to the assertion of ``first mover
advantage'' in space and if so, how does that effect deterrence in
Space, in your view?
Answer. In any domain, the question of whether an aggressor or
defender has an advantage by moving first impacts deterrence. I am
concerned that China perceives itself at an overall disadvantage in
military competition with the United States, and views counterspace
operations as part of a strategic counterbalance to U.S. conventional
superiority. As a result, China's strategy against the United States
may well include attacks in space early in a conflict in order to
achieve strategic objectives. If confirmed, I would prioritize efforts
to increase resilience and reduce factors that contribute to
destabilizing perceptions of first mover advantage.
Question. How would you, if confirmed, overcome the ``first mover
advantage'' in Space?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support ensuring a resilient U.S.
space architecture by fielding assured space capabilities that serve to
deter adversary attacks by demonstrating it would be difficult,
expensive, and/or ineffective to degrade or destroy U.S. space
capabilities. These efforts will be critical to reducing any ``first
mover advantage'' in space. Resilient architectures and reconstitution
measures could also deter adversaries' initial attack or absorb losses
without significant degradation of U.S. capability. Finally, I would
also support development of norms that could help establish a better
shared understanding responsible behavior in space.
international security space cooperation
Question. Many U.S. allies and NATO partners are now developing
national security space doctrine.
If confirmed, how would you coordinate and integrate the efforts of
our allies and NATO countries to deter adversarial actions in space by
other nations?
Answer. It is essential that we work closely with allies and
partners in space. I am aware that the Department of Defense already
conducts numerous bilateral activities with allies and partners ranging
from development of space policies and strategies to developing
capabilities and plan. If confirmed, I would continue these efforts and
focus on improving our information sharing to enable progress. I would
also seek to engage at NATO to advance discussions on how the alliance
can support space as an operational domain.
use of commercial space systems for dod needs
Question. Commercial space systems have become an integral part of
the Department's use of space because they can offer lower cost and
innovative approaches than the government can achieve by itself.
However, little is known about over reliance on commercial systems for
critical defense functions such as ballistic missile warning or the
transmission of nuclear action messages. In particular, it is not clear
whether these commercial space systems would be deemed ``combatants''
in a time of conflict.
In your view, how should DOD balance taking advantage of commercial
innovation and lowering the cost of space operations, while ensuring
the Department does not become over-reliant on non-governmental
entities for the performance of critical defense functions?
Answer. Continuing to pursue opportunities to utilize commercial
innovation in space, such as proliferated constellations based on low
cost commodity components and rapid technical refresh, is important to
maintaining the U.S. competitive edge in space. However, it is also
important to have balance and maintain stringent mission assurance
requirements for the most critical national security space systems. For
experimental, or research and development programs, I believe the
Defense Innovation Unit, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and
the Space Force Space Enterprise Consortium are good examples of how
the Department can partner with newer commercial space providers
outside of the more rigorous DOD acquisition framework.
assured access to space
Question. The policy of ensuring that there is more than one
commercial provider of space launch services is the cornerstone of
DOD's objective of Assured Access to Space.
What are your views on the effect of section 2773 of title 10, U.S.
Code, as it relates to Assured Access to Space?
Answer. The longstanding statutory requirements regarding assured
access to space have ensured that DOD maintains two reliable options
for launches of national security payloads. The requirement has
bolstered competitiveness, strengthened the industrial base, and
provided flexibility that is critical to national security. If
confirmed, I would continue to support this requirement.
Question. What are your views on the benefits and risks associated
with combining contracts to acquire a satellite and launch it into
orbit, as compared to the standard block buy process currently used?
Answer. I believe DOD should maintain flexibility in satellite and
launch acquisition pathways to align with mission needs and national
security requirements. For the major National Security Space Launch
programs, I understand the Space Force's current five-year contract
period demonstrated a commitment to industry partnership that reduced
launch costs substantially and saved billions of dollars for major
mission systems. Likewise, DOD research and development activities can
benefit from having the flexibility to leverage delivery on orbit and
other commercial market options. It is important to be able to balance
the various cost, schedule, mission, and national security risks of a
given activity and be able to choose the appropriate option.
Question. Do you believe the Department should use allied or NATO
country launch services? Please explain your answer.
Answer. In accordance with U.S. law and policy, DOD uses U.S.
commercial launch services for its space lift requirements. While there
are no current requirements for using non-U.S. space launch
capabilities, if confirmed, I would encourage the Department to explore
opportunities for space cooperation and collaboration with NATO allies
and partner nations as appropriate.
consolidation of dod space activities
Question. Congress created the U.S. Space Force, in part to address
the extant ad hoc integration of space activities across the DOD, and
between DOD and the Intelligence Community, that often led to unhealthy
one-upmanship and in some cases the over-classification of essential
information.
Do you believe consolidating and integrating space activities is
important to the space mission of the DOD? If so, please provide some
specific examples of space activities as to which you perceive
consolidation and integration of activities would be particularly
beneficial.
Answer. Yes, in many cases. For example, in satellite
communications I understand the Space Force is assuming responsibility
for acquisition programs that used to be managed by the Navy. Likewise,
the Space Force is taking over responsibility for managing satellite
communications payloads on behalf of the Joint Force. Space Domain
Awareness is another area where consolidation can be beneficial.
Assigning the Commander of Space Command responsibility for global
sensor integration is a good example of how we can leverage
capabilities across the Joint Force to benefit multiple missions for
the Joint Force. If confirmed, I would support consolidation efforts
that strengthen unity of effort across DOD space missions.
Question. Do you believe there are activities in which
consolidation would be counterproductive? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. For example, there are space missions and activities
that are closely associated with the missions of the other Military
Services. We see this in the Navy's fleet defense mission, which
includes defense against threats from all domains. Some of that
capability, the Navy must provide itself, some of it will come from
other elements of the Joint Force. Likewise, the Army and Air Force
must remain aware of and prepared to defend themselves against threats
emanating from space. Space Force and Space Command both have important
roles, along with the other Military Services and Combatant Commands,
in helping define the Joint Force's approach to align roles, missions,
and capabilities in these areas. If confirmed, I would work to ensure
these consolidation decisions account for Joint Force and Military
Service-specific considerations.
dual use export controls as applied to space
Question. The Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA returned licensing for many
space systems from the Department of State, where they were licensed
under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, to the
Department of Commerce where they were regulated under the dual use
licensing system. DOD plays an active role in the licensing of dual use
space items through the interagency process. With the expanding
commercial use of space, this licensing process should enhance
innovation and the growth of the commercial space sector while
preventing adverse effects on national security.
What are your views on the licensing process for dual use export
controls on space-related items as they apply to ensuring the United
States maintains an innovative and competitive space industrial base?
Answer. The transition of many space systems and capabilities to
the Commerce Control List has contributed to the competitiveness of
U.S. industry in ways that also benefit national security, and without
making available to potential adversaries' capabilities they could not
otherwise acquire or produce themselves. DOD plays a key role in the
interagency licensing process that accounts for both aspects of the
national security interest: ensuring our industry remains competitive
and preventing critical capabilities from reaching our adversaries. If
confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with my interagency
counterparts and Congress to ensure the licensing process regarding
space systems and capabilities maintains appropriate balance across key
economic and national security interests.
space domain awareness and collision avoidance
Question. Space is increasingly becoming a congested domain of
operations, especially with proliferated commercial architectures in
low earth orbit. DOD manages not only the largest array of space domain
sensors on earth and in space but also tracks objects in space in order
to avoid collisions.
In your view is the management of space traffic and domain
awareness an appropriate role for the DOD? If so, please explain your
answer. If not, to which other executive branch department or agency
would you recommend these functions be transferred?
Answer. To my knowledge, due to its unique role as operator of the
world's most extensive and comprehensive source of space domain
awareness information, DOD has also provided space situational
awareness services to all space operators in the interest of
spaceflight safety for well over a decade. However, in my view, the
primary mission of the Department should be to operate national
security space assets and provide space support to the Joint Force.
While the DOD must maintain space domain awareness to carry out its
military missions, the space traffic management, or space traffic
coordination function would be better served if moved to a civil
agency, such as the Department of Commerce. This shift would allow the
DOD to properly refocus resources on defending the nation. I am aware
Commerce is already working toward a prototype space domain awareness
system in partnership with DOD and industry. If confirmed, I would
support such a transition of the space traffic management mission.
To avoid conjunctions, the Department maintains numerous sharing
agreements with other countries on space domain awareness. Russia and
China have had tests and collisions in space that have generated debris
affecting other countries' space operations. Yet, according to
testimony in a May 26, 2021 Strategic Force Subcommittee hearing,
Russia and China have not been responsive to outreach efforts when a
possible conjunction with one of their space systems has been
identified.
Question. If confirmed, what efforts would you propose to ensure
both countries acknowledge a conjunction message sent by the
Department?
Answer. As noted in the United States Space Priorities Framework,
the United States will continue to share space situational awareness
(SSA) information and provide basic spaceflight safety services to all
space operators. The Framework also indicates that the United States
will engage diplomatically with strategic competitors to enhance
stability in outer space. Sharing SSA information is a key element of
building shared understanding and protecting the space environment,
which supports space stability. If confirmed, I would continue to
pursue opportunities with my State Department counterparts to improve
the exchange of appropriate spaceflight safety information with the PRC
and Russia to reduce the risk of space object conjunctions, consistent
with the U.S. approach with over a hundred other countries, companies,
and international organizations.
integration of space with cyber space and nuclear escalation
Question. Space is an integral element of our nuclear deterrent and
national missile defense capability through its early warning and
communications satellites. Space and cyber space are considered
enabling elements of the United States' overall strategic posture and
are complimentary domains of operations where early phases of
escalation dynamics can occur relative to nuclear deterrence. A
thorough understanding of nuclear deterrence and its modernization,
cyber operations, and missile defense are considered essential to
performing the duties of the ASD(SP).
What are your views on the relationship between space, cyber space,
and nuclear escalation in the context of our Nation's strategic
posture?
Answer. The emergence of space and cyber as areas of strategic
competition has the potential to create new pathways for conflict
escalation that are uncertain and unpredictable given that there are
not well established norms informing the use of these capabilities.
U.S. asymmetric dependence on space and cyberspace as enabling elements
of conventional warfighting and strategic deterrence could encourage
adversaries to consider attacking these architectures, creating
escalation risks. This underscores the importance that our adversaries
understand our views on and approach to both domains. My understanding
is that the Department's emerging integrated deterrence strategy will
support this kind of approach, and ASD(SP) is uniquely postured to
support these efforts.
Question. How does modernization of U.S. nuclear capabilities
relate to the functions of the ASD(SP), in your view?
Answer. ASD(SP) will be responsible for nuclear deterrence policy
and will represent USD(P) in policy formulation and execution related
to the nuclear modernization program. Nuclear deterrence is the
Department's highest priority mission and, if confirmed, I look forward
to supporting this priority.
nuclear deterrence and modernization
Question. Former Secretary Carter has called our nuclear deterrent
the ``bedrock'' of every national security mission we undertake.
Do you agree with the assessment of the past four Secretaries of
Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and
that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national
security priority? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, I agree that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest
priority mission, and that we must continue to modernize our nuclear
triad to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed long-held American
doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear weapons to ``extreme
circumstances'' and the need to maintain the nation's nuclear triad of
land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities. The NPR also recommended the
development of a low-yield nuclear weapon to deter threats from Russia,
and potentially, the return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to
the Navy fleet.
Question. Do you agree with the 2018 NPR that nuclear weapons
should only be used under extreme circumstances to protect vital
interests? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Our nuclear forces play a unique role safeguarding our
national security, and ensuring the United States maintains a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is of vital importance for U.S.
national security. We must carefully evaluate the circumstances in
which we would consider employing nuclear weapons, and how we publicly
describe those circumstances.
In November 2020, NATO's Secretary General stated that, ``Simply
giving up our deterrent without any guarantees that others will do the
same is a dangerous option because a world where Russia, China, North
Korea and others have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a
safer world.''
Question. Do you agree that the world is a safer place due to the
existence of an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent and the extended
deterrence assurances we provide to our allies? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. A safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is
vital to our national security, and the security of our allies and
partners.
Over the past eight years, China, Russia, and North Korea all have
expanded and modernized their nuclear arsenals, and all are continuing
to do so.
Question. Given these actions and the increasing nuclear threat to
the United States and its allies, do you believe it prudent to
significantly alter U.S. use and deterrence policies that have worked
to deter nuclear aggression for more than 70 years?
Answer. Any changes to nuclear policy that the President may
consider should be carefully deliberated and communicated to U.S.
allies and partners, and should take into account their impact on U.S.
national security, the security of our allies and partners, and the
impact on our potential adversaries.
Consistent with past practices, I understand the Department is
conducting a deliberate strategy review in the context of the new
National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing
the Nuclear Posture Review conclusions and recommendations.
Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, would you propose such
policies be altered? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to fully understand the security
environment, including current and projected adversary capabilities and
security interests and concerns of U.S. allies and partners, before
considering any recommendations to alter nuclear policies.
Question. What is your understanding of the state of Russia's and
China's nuclear forces?
Answer. Russia is undertaking a large-scale nuclear modernization
program that covers both its strategic and non-strategic nuclear
forces. Compared to the United States, Russia has a large variety of
nuclear delivery systems, which it continues to expand through pursuit
of novel capabilities including nuclear-capable hypersonic glide
vehicles, among others. China has taken steps to develop a nuclear
triad and modernize its nuclear arsenal through expansion of its ICBM
silo fields, development of hypersonic glide vehicles, and development
of an SSBN fleet.
Question. Do you believe that Russia's and China's ongoing nuclear
modernization and expansion efforts pose an increasing threat to the
United States and its Allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization and
expansion continue to demonstrate the intent of both countries to
threaten the interests of the United States and our allies and
partners. Each has also pursued new nuclear delivery capabilities that
undermine global stability. Taken together, these developments have
increased complexity in the security environment and pose a significant
challenge to U.S., allied, and partner security interests.
The Commander of United States Strategic Command has referred to
reports of China's nuclear force expansion as ``breathtaking'' and
contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear peer to the United
States and Russia is a ``strategic breakout,'' which represents an
unprecedented threat to global stability.
Question. What are your views of this assessment?
Answer. Based on media reporting and unclassified commercial
imagery, it is clear that China is taking unprecedented steps to
modernize its nuclear forces and develop new delivery capabilities. I
am not familiar with all of the details of Admiral Richard's
assessment, but if confirmed, I look forward to working with Department
leadership to ensure our nuclear deterrence posture is sufficient to
ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and strong and
credible extended deterrence to our allies and partners.
Question. Given that China is developing a triad, expanding its
ICBM missile fields and recently tested an orbital vehicle that is
capable of delivering a nuclear payload, what is your assessment of its
minimal deterrence policy and no first use declaratory policy?
Answer. These capabilities are not consistent with China's historic
posture or its public messaging regarding this posture. Furthermore,
China's development of novel delivery systems undermines global
stability.
U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful lives.
These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the United
States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
Question. What is your understanding of the state of U.S. nuclear
forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production
capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?
Answer. As Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have
testified, nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission for the
Department. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
means sustaining and modernizing delivery systems, maintaining a modern
nuclear weapons production complex within the National Nuclear Security
Administration, and a robust NC3 architecture. All of these elements
have served their purpose well for the past seven decades.
Nevertheless, we are at a tipping point wherein each needs to be
modernized, with very little room for delay. If confirmed, I will
commit my support to the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces.
Question. In your view, is the sustainment and timely modernization
of the three legs of the nuclear triad, including the air-launched
cruise missile, essential for maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent?
Answer. Yes. As Secretary Austin has stated, our nuclear deterrent
is the Department's number one priority. While it remains effective
today it depends on aging weapons, aging delivery systems, aging
infrastructure, and an aging nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) architecture. Sustaining and modernizing our
deterrent is essential to ensuring it remains effective in the future.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Austin that modernizing the
Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical
national security priority? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. A modern, robust, and agile nuclear weapons complex,
developed in a cost-effective and judicious manner, is key to meeting
current nuclear modernization needs and also for being responsive to
future posture needs. We must invest in the DOE nuclear weapons complex
today to be able to achieve these goals.
Question. Admiral Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
recently reaffirmed the longstanding assessment of the Department of
Defense that extending the service life of the Minuteman III system is
no longer a cost-effective option for preserving the nation's
intercontinental ballistic missile force.
Do you agree with the Commander's assessment?
Answer. I understand that perpetually extending the life of legacy
systems is a challenge. While I am not familiar with the details of
Admiral Richard's assessment, if confirmed, I would look forward to
consulting with USSTRATCOM and the Air Force to understand the
implications of further life extending Minuteman III.
Question. Do you support the continued development of the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent is being
considered in the Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I look forward
to understanding the full scope of the GBSD program and will promote
modernization of the nuclear triad in the most cost-effective and
judicious manner.
Question. The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to
replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)--a system that
is 20 years past its retirement, under increasing threat from adversary
air defenses, and considered essential to maintaining the air leg of
the triad.
Do you support the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a replacement for
the aging ALCM?
Answer. I am committed to a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, and
the ALCM is an essential element of the air leg of the triad. If
confirmed, I look forward to thoroughly understanding and reviewing the
LRSO weapon and will promote modernization of the nuclear triad in the
most cost effective and judicious manner.
Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
the parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. The United States-UK Mutual Defense Agreement reflects a
vital, invaluable partnership that has bolstered U.S. national security
for over six decades and deepened the assurances we provide to our NATO
allies. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding the details of
the W93/Mark 7 program, the role it plays in our efforts to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and to carrying the
program out in a responsible and cost-effective manner.
Question. Do you believe that DOD or the Department of Energy
should de-scope or delay any of the ongoing programs to replace our
aging nuclear forces or efforts to rehabilitate or reestablish key
nuclear weapons sustainment and production capabilities?
Answer. The United States has reached the point where both our
nuclear forces and our infrastructure must be modernized to ensure a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the recommendations and
conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review to better understand the
status of these programs and their way forward. With that said, I share
Secretary Austin's view that we have now reached a tipping point at
which we must simultaneously overhaul our nuclear forces.
Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced
his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should
only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions.
Do you agree with this statement? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. While I believe the United States should continue to
lead global arms control efforts, any arms control agreement must
reciprocally reduce nuclear threats from other nuclear-armed powers.
Question. In your opinion, should the United States pursue arms
control and strategic stability talks with China while China is
undertaking this expansion of its nuclear arsenal?
Answer. Yes. Even as China expands its nuclear forces, the United
States should engage with China to address longstanding concerns over
its nuclear posture, including China's lack of transparency regarding
its strategy and doctrine. The United States should also pursue
dialogue with China to preserve strategic stability and minimize risk.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
Answer. The linkage between nuclear modernization and arms control
is a complex topic that I understand is being examined in the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR). If confirmed, I will seek to understand the range
of the NPR's considerations on this issue.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
China on nuclear weapons' reductions? Please explain your answers.
Answer. Any arms control approach must leave the United States and
its allies and partners more rather than less secure. That said, I
believe such considerations are highly context-specific and dependent
on the capabilities in question.
Question. If confirmed, do you believe there should be any
significant change in U.S. declaratory policy, including adopting a
``No First Use'' policy? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Any decision on declaratory policy should be made by the
President, in consultation with allies and the U.S. military, and
should be based on a deliberate, rigorous assessment of the security
environment and the need to maintain credible and effective deterrence.
At this time, I do not personally think a categorical ``no first use''
policy would be advisable for the United States given the current
security environment.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of a ``sole
purpose'' use doctrine with respect to our nuclear deterrence and
especially with respect to our extended deterrent?
Answer. Any decision on declaratory policy should be made by the
President, in consultation with allies and the U.S. military, and
should be based on a deliberate, rigorous assessment of the security
environment and the need to maintain credible and effective deterrence.
Question. Do you believe a change in declaratory policy could
destabilize the nuclear assurance doctrine of NATO with respect to its
nuclear and non-nuclear states?
Answer. I believe any change to declaratory policy--which would be
made by the President in consultation with allies and the U.S.
military, and should be based on a deliberate, rigorous assessment of
the security environment the need to maintain credible and effective
deterrence--would require extensive consultation with U.S. allies, both
in the run-up and following the decision, to preserve the assurances
that form the bedrock of the NATO alliance and our Indo-Pacific
alliances.
Question. Do you believe our NATO allies would be concerned about a
change in our declaratory policy?
Answer. Based on a review of public reporting, I understand that
allies have expressed concerns regarding any such change.
Question. Do you believe our Asian allies would be concerned about
a change in our declaratory policy?
Answer. Based on a review of public reporting, I understand that
allies have expressed concerns regarding any such change.
missile defense
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against United States forces, allies, and the U.S.
Homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR)
articulated existing U.S. policy on missile defense and endorsed
follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.
In your view, do you believe missile defense policy should be
limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?
Answer. I support longstanding U.S. policy to rely on strategic
deterrence to safeguard the United States against large-scale nuclear
missile threats from Russia and China, and to pursue homeland ballistic
missile defenses against nations like North Korea or Iran.
Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
threats, such as Russia and China?
Answer. These types of threats from Russia and China present
challenging problems. I agree that missile defenses cannot protect
every asset against every threat, and that this mission is only one
piece of an integrated deterrence and defense approach to protecting
against the growing number of advanced missile threats, both nuclear
and non-nuclear. I understand the Department is examining ways to
enhance its architecture against these threats, and if confirmed, I
would support continuing improvements to our homeland missile defense
architecture.
Question. The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking
threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne,
and space-based ``system of systems,'' with the constituent pieces
managed and sustained by multiple DOD components.
Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated
and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture
capable of supporting real-time operational decisions? If so, please
explain your answer. If not, please explain what steps you would take,
if confirmed, to improve global sensor integration.
Answer. An effective missile defense architecture requires
persistent and integrated battlespace awareness. Multi-domain sensors
support missile defense and other missions, providing real-time
detection, warning, tracking, and targeting information that is
critical to decision-makers and commanders during a crisis. If
confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure prioritization
of the integration of new and existing sensor capabilities to provide
the improved all domain awareness and informed decision making
necessary for missile defense.
Question. The cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program
with the replacement of the Next Generation Interceptor program has
resulted in a likely delay of at least 10 years before the deployment
of modernized ground-based interceptors for homeland ballistic missile
defense.
Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program and the
fielding of additional interceptors from this program, presuming the
program achieves its acquisition objectives?
Answer. I support the Department's March 2021 decision to commit to
the development of 20 additional Next Generation Interceptors by the
end of the decade. Defense of the Homeland is a top DOD priority, and
the Next Generation Interceptor is a key element of a more reliable and
effective homeland missile defense architecture. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure the Next Generation Interceptor acquisition plan
adequately addresses the threat, meets warfighter requirements, and
aligns with the Administration's policies.
Question. A Navy Aegis Destroyer was able to successfully intercept
an ICBM-class target, raising the possibility of using a system of
Homeland Defense layered between the Ground Based Interceptor at mid-
flight and the Aegis system for intercepts in the final phases of the
ICBM's trajectory.
In your view, would this layered approach require a change in
policy with respect to the types of interceptors used, the defended
area, and the specific threats each is deployed against?
Answer. Any decision to bolster homeland missile defense with new
or existing capabilities requires weighing a variety of factors, to
include cost and feasibility. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
the Department uses the congressionally-directed layered homeland
defense analysis to help determine the proper mix of capabilities to
defend the Homeland against limited ICBM threats, such as the threat
posed by North Korea.
Question. Missile and rocket attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed
proxies in the Middle East have highlighted the shortage of Theater
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TIAMD) assets available to protect
deployed U.S. forces. This same shortage is most acute in United States
European Command and INDOPACOM, where the missile threats are much more
sophisticated. Air defense units remain the highest-demand, lowest-
density forces in the Army.
In your view, should DOD expand its theater missile defense
capabilities (including improvements to existing systems or the
development of new systems), capacity (increased procurement of
existing systems), or both? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Each Area of Responsibility (AOR) is unique, posing
different issues and challenges. In general, the need for integrated
air and missile defense capabilities is growing in most theaters as
potential adversaries continue to develop and expand their missile
capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department
leaders, including the Joint Staff and the relevant Combatant Commands,
to help determine the most appropriate mixture of missile defense
capabilities and other posture requirements to maintain theater
readiness and ensure a strong deterrent.
Question. Do you believe the United States should encourage
regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense
capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the
burden on U.S. forces and requirements?
Answer. Yes. We face a dangerous era of sophisticated missile
threats, including advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
hypersonic missiles. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries
are pursuing anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategies that
leverage missile forces intended to inhibit and disrupt U.S. and allied
military freedom of maneuver. Allies and partners have the lead role in
their own sovereign defense, backstopped by mutual security treaty
obligations and other relationships with the United States. If
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and key partners to
increase their own Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
capabilities.
policy to counter weapons of mass destruction
Question. The office for which you have been nominated will
exercise primary strategy, policy and oversight responsibility for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)--nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons.
What do you believe are the principal challenges for this mission
relating to CWMD, and if confirmed, what would be your priorities for
reviewing and updating DOD's strategy and policy in this domain?
Answer. Secretary Austin has identified China as the current pacing
challenge for the Department. The current or potential WMD threats
emanating from Russia, North Korea, and Iran also pose a risk to our
national security. Our primary objectives must be to make sure that the
United States and our allies and partners are postured and prepared to
respond to WMD use and deter adversaries from acting against vital U.S.
interests, including by defending our allies from military aggression.
To achieve these objectives, one of my top priorities if confirmed will
be to update the Department's 2014 CWMD strategy.
Question. If confirmed, how would you integrate the Intelligence
Community into the CWMD mission?
Answer. I recognize and appreciate the critical role of the
Intelligence Community in the CWMD mission and its efforts to share
intelligence within the DOD, other Departments and Agencies, and with
partners and allies in support of CWMD efforts. If I am confirmed, I
will work with my counterpart in OUSD(I&S) to sustain and enhance IC
integration into the CWMD mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of your office in
regard to technology security matters related to multilateral arms
control, export control, and nonproliferation, and with which other DOD
components would you integrate your efforts in this regard, if
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will oversee the development and
implementation of CWMD strategy and policy guidance for the Department,
to include guidance pertaining to multilateral arms control, and
nonproliferation. In this role, I would work closely with the Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA), the OSD lead for the four
multilateral export control regimes and for technology security issues
associated with military and dual-use exports, as well as other DOD
components, Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment (A&S) and for Research and Engineering (R&E), the Joint
Staff, and the Military Departments. All of these DOD components have
important responsibilities related to technology security, to include
capability development, investment review, and monitoring and oversight
of DOD's weapons programs and arms control compliance. These efforts
are also whole-of-government, as such, I would sustain close
collaboration with the Department of State, the overall Federal lead
for multilateral arms control, export control, and nonproliferation, as
well as the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, which all have roles
in export control issues.
Question. The August 2016 revision of the Unified Command Plan
(UCP) transferred the mission for synchronizing global DOD operations
for countering WMD from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
What is your understanding of SOCOM's responsibilities for
synchronizing global DOD operations for countering WMD?
Answer. As I understand it, USSOCOM's mission serves as the global
synchronizer, coordinator, and advocate for the combatant commanders'
countering WMD activities and capabilities.
Question. What is your understanding of the oversight
responsibilities of the office for which you have been nominated with
regard to this mission change and how should those responsibilities
integrate with those of the ASD(SOLIC), in your view?
Answer. I understand that ASD(Space Policy) will have oversight
over the CWMD strategy and policy. As part of this portfolio, the
ASD(Space Policy) works in close collaboration with ASD(SOLIC) on the
range of countering WMD terrorism issues. ASD(Space Policy) will have
the lead for policy and strategy development and international
engagement on issues related to countering WMD terrorism, while
ASD(SOLIC) has the primary responsibility for matters related to
special operations forces' assigned to USSOCOM and its subordinate
commands. In the event we need to plan and execute a CWMD terrorism
response mission, ASD(SOLIC) will have the policy lead for mission
planning and execution, and ASD(Space Policy) will support.
Question. Against which threats and in which regions of the world
do you perceive the U.S. should focus its CWMD efforts?
Answer. Based on public information, it is clear that China,
Russia, and North Korea are all continuing efforts to modernize and
expand their WMD and/or delivery system capabilities, with direct
impacts for strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. If
confirmed, I will review the full range of DOD and intelligence
assessments regarding adversary WMD capabilities; we must focus our
CWMD efforts on those threats that pose the greatest risk to the United
States, our forward deployed forces, and our allies and partners. DOD
must also continue to support whole-of-government efforts to prevent
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and to address Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region, such as its missile program.
Finally, DOD must continue to contribute towards global initiatives to
prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD-related materials or
capabilities.
cooperative threat reduction program
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing and
overseeing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?
Answer. If confirmed, per the DOD CTR Programs' relevant governance
directives, I would issue policy guidance for the DOD CTR Program and
closely coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD/(NCB)) to oversee the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency's execution of the program. I would
also engage with U.S. interagency and international counterparts on
nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat reduction
strategies, activities, and opportunities in order to respond to the
evolving WMD landscape.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the CTR Program, including changes in legislative authorities,
programs, and funding?
Answer. For 30 years the DOD CTR Program's flexible authorities,
programs, funding and forward-leaning strategic guidance have allowed
it to respond to emerging WMD threats, and unexpected crises. I
understand that the OUSD Policy, in partnership with A&S and DTRA, is
reviewing the global WMD threat environment and assessing desired WMD
threat reduction outcomes over the next decade. If confirmed, I look
forward to receiving the results of this review, which will inform my
recommendations on potential changes to the DOD CTR Program's statutory
authorities, programs, and funding.
Question. What is your vision for the evolution of the CTR program
as it transitions away from Russia to countries outside the former
Soviet Union?
Answer. The DOD CTR Program ended its work in Russia in 2014; it
now reduces WMD threats in over 30 countries globally, including in
several former Soviet states. Russia's sophisticated and growing WMD
program, highlighted by its increasingly brazen use of chemical weapons
in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, continues to threaten
neighbors in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. DOD CTR's engagements have
helped many regional partners to develop core nonproliferation
capabilities and understanding, and I expect DOD CTR to continue to
work with key partners to mature those capabilities. The DOD CTR
Program has also expanded into the Indo-Pacific region, largely to
counter biological threats and the proliferation of WMD-applicable
goods transiting through the region to countries like Iran, Syria, and
the DPRK. In the future, I expect the DOD CTR Program to continue
operating in that region.
Question. In your view, what should be the relationship between the
CTR Program and DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program, with
regard to a focus on reducing biological threats?
Answer. My understanding is that the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program (CBDP) is under the jurisdiction of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
Programs (ASD/(NCB)), who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S). My understanding of the relationship
between the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and CBDP is
that CBDP focuses on developing the tools and other capabilities needed
to counter chemical and biological threats, and the DOD CTR Program
works to provide some of those tools to partner nations in order to
support their ability to prevent, detect, and report biological
threats. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD(NCB) to continue
coordinating those two efforts' biosecurity and biodefense activities,
achieving program efficiencies and improving the Department's overall
biological threat response capabilities.
Question. For years, the CTR program has been working with host
nations and their scientists to safely and securely operate high
containment facilities handling dangerous pathogens.
What are your views on the progress being made by this effort?
Answer. My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program's partners
have benefited from the assistance the DOD CTR Program has provided
them over the years to help consolidate and reduce collections of
pathogens, improve laboratory operations, and adopt internationally-
recognized biosafety and biosecurity practices.
Question. How could the CTR program's work in this regard be
integrated into a whole-of-government approach to a national biodefense
strategy?
Answer. The Department of Defense plays a critical role in
implementing the National Biodefense Strategy, and the DOD CTR Program
is one resource out of many that the Department leverages in its
biodefense efforts. My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program
routinely coordinates and deconflicts with other U.S. Government
departments and agencies to avoid duplication and leverage potential
synergies. If confirmed, I would encourage the DOD CTR Program to
continue such coordination.
Question. If confirmed, how would you integrate your efforts vis-a-
vis the CTR program with the work of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs?
Answer. My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program is managed by
three DOD entities, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) for Nuclear and CWMD (N/CWMD) Policy office, which issues and
oversees strategic policy guidance; the DASD for Threat Reduction and
Arms Control office in ASD(NCB), which provides programmatic oversight;
and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which executes activities.
Only the N/CWMD Policy office would fall under my responsibility, if I
am confirmed. If confirmed, I would continue to encourage the three DOD
entities to coordinate and cooperate in overseeing and implementing the
DOD CTR Program.
chemical and biological defense
Question. The office of the ASD(SP) is responsible for the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program of the Defense Department.
What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and
biological defense, and if confirmed, what would be your priorities for
the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program?
Answer. The ASD for Space Policy will coordinate with the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) but is not responsible for, nor
does it have oversight of, the CBDP. That responsibility is vested
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment--specifically, the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs (ASD/NCB), the Hon. Deborah Rosenblum. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with ASD Rosenblum as she leads
the DOD's research, development, and acquisition of capabilities to
protect the warfighter in defending against current and emerging
chemical and biological threats.
Question. In your view, how could the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program be better coordinated and integrated with efforts of
the CTR program focused on reducing biological threats?
Answer. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency executes program
development responsibilities of DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction
program as guided by the OUSD(Policy) to support threat reduction
efforts in partnership with likeminded allies and partners. The
Chemical and Biological Defense Program was created to develop
capabilities for the warfighter to fight and win in a chemical or
biological contest environment. If confirmed, I would work closely with
the ASD(NCB) to ensure these programs are coordinated and integrated.
During the first year of the COVID pandemic, the Joint Program
Office (JPO) for Chemical and Biological Defense obligated more than
$24 billion in interagency funding to develop, procure, and distribute
COVID vaccines and therapeutics.
Question. From your perspective, how could the JPO's successful
processes in this regard be applied in other contexts?
Answer. The Department of Defense supported national level efforts
to develop, procure, and distribute COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics
through the USG-led Operation Warp Speed. If confirmed, my
responsibilities as ASD(SP) will include developing strategies and
policies to enable the Joint Force to train and operate in a
biologically contaminated environment. I understand the Department is
conducting a Biodefense Posture Review (BPR) where Policy and A&S are
co-leading a DOD-wide effort to examine this very question (among other
issues). If confirmed, I look forward to updating the Committee as the
Department completes the BPR.
Question. Is there a continuing role for the JPO in regard to
COVID? If so, what would you envision that role to be?
Answer. The ASD for NCB, under the USD for A&S, has oversight of
the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Radiological
and Nuclear Defense (JPEO-CBRND), including their role in supporting
the Department's support to the COVID response. If confirmed, my
responsibilities as ASD for Space Policy would not include oversight of
the Department's role in the ongoing COVID response.
chemical demilitarization
Question. DOD Directive 5160.05E establishes DOD policy that ``the
Department of Defense shall be in full compliance'' with the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
In 2006, the Department announced that the United States would not meet
the extended deadline of April 2012 for destruction of its chemical
weapons stockpile, as required under the CWC. That deadline was then
adjusted to December 31, 2023.
Do you agree that the DOD and the U.S. Government should be in full
compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC,
including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile under the CWC?
Answer. I completely agree that United States should be in full
compliance with our obligations under the CWC and BWC. While, if
confirmed, I will not have direct oversight of this issue, I look
forward to working with my colleagues in OUSD(A&S) who oversee DOD
treaty compliance and the destruction of the remaining U.S. stockpile.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that the United States completes destruction of the U.S.
chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security, and
as close in time as practicable to the December 31, 2023 deadline?
Answer. I understand that, if confirmed, I will not have direct
oversight of the program to destroy the remaining U.S. stockpile of
chemical weapons. However, I will commit to working closely with
OUSD(A&S), which has responsibility for oversight and execution of the
program, on any areas where my future responsibilities and theirs
overlap or intersect. As I understand it, we are on track to eliminate
our remaining chemical weapons stockpile by December 31, 2023.
proliferation security initiative
Question. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an
international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related
materials.
If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program be
discontinued, sustained, or enhanced? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The PSI remains an essential tool in the U.S. and global
effort to counter the proliferation of WMD. It provides States with a
framework for strengthening WMD interdiction capabilities and builds
political will for counterproliferation efforts. If I am confirmed, I
will advocate to sustain DOD's role in PSI and, in cooperation with the
Department of State, advance its momentum throughout the world.
Question. Relationship Between Cyber and Information Operations
Answer. In the Defense Department, CYBERCOM is focused on technical
cyber missions and skills, while different organizations are
responsible for information operations, psychological and deception
operations, and electronic warfare. In addition, there are concerns
that DOD's focus on tactical and operational support to deployed forces
has resulted in neglect of strategic-level information operations.
Question. What are your views as to whether CYBERCOM should be
assigned responsibility for information operations in addition to cyber
operations?
Answer. All combatant commanders currently have some responsibility
and authority related to information operations, including Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I recognize, however, that there is a
particularly important need to ensure the effective integration of
information operations capabilities in the digital domain. If
confirmed, I will support continued efforts to integrate these
capabilities across the Department and empower USCYBERCOM to operate
most effectively against threats from overseas. I understand that the
Office of Cyber Policy will serve as the OSD Policy lead for both cyber
and electronic warfare issues.
Question. What changes do you think are necessary to improve the
DOD's ability to detect and counter information operations, both
defensively and offensively?
Answer. It is critical that the Department continue to harness the
insights gained from its intelligence and information collection to
inform whole-of-government efforts to detect and counter foreign
information operations, and support the conduct of DOD operations, when
appropriate. If confirmed, I will work with the Principal Information
Operations Advisor (PIOA) and other key DOD stakeholders to identify
and remedy any policy, organizational, authority, capabilities, or
other gaps or challenges that can improve the Department's ability to
detect and counter foreign information operations.
Question. What are your views on the recommendations of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence?
Answer. I generally agree with the Task Force on the need to
develop appropriate guidance for the development of a broad range of
offensive cyber options, but I recognize the significant complexity in
terms of the relationship between offensive cyber capabilities and
strategic deterrence. If confirmed, I will support the implementation
of the Secretary's vision of integrated deterrence and work to
appropriately incorporate current and new cyber capabilities with space
and other capabilities to provide, as Secretary Austin has stated,
``the right mix of technology, operational concepts and capabilities--
all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible
and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause.''
Question. In your view, how effective has the extant ``whole-of-
government'' approach been in combatting hostile information operations
directed against the United States, its allies, and interests?
Answer. Following the Russian Government's efforts to influence and
interfere in the 2016 United States election, the U.S. Government
recognized the increasingly critical need to combat hostile foreign
information operations directed against the United States and its
interests. I look forward to supporting the Department of Defense's
important role in these whole-of-government efforts to secure and
defend U.S. elections, which I understand have matured considerably in
the recent years. I will also support the Department's role in broader
efforts to combat foreign information operations as appropriate, with a
recognition of the key role of U.S. domestic agencies in many of these
efforts.
dual hatting of commander, cybercom
Question. In your view, should the arrangement whereby the
Commander, CYBERCOM is ``dual-hatted'' as the Director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) be maintained, modified, or ended? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may not terminate the dual-
hat arrangement without jointly certifying to Congress that the
specific conditions established in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2017 and 2020 have been met. If confirmed, I will
work closely with USCYBERCOM, the Joint Staff, and other key
stakeholders to ensure that any recommendation to the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the
``dual-hat'' arrangement is guided by the nature of the domain and the
national security and the operational effectiveness of the Department
of Defense, and comports with statutory requirements. I understand the
Department's superiority in the cyber domain depends on maintaining
speed, agility, and a unified effort across the spectrum of cyber
activities, and I am committed to ensuring that any decision regarding
the ``dual-hat'' arrangement protects our national security interests
and furthers the Department's success in cyberspace.
development of cyber capabilities
Question. CYBERCOM has depended heavily to date on NSA for
technology, equipment, capabilities, concepts of operations, and
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
In your view, is DOD properly organized and resourced to provide a
broad base of innovation and capability development in the cyber
domain? Please explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is undertaking
substantial efforts to ensure that it is well-positioned to develop and
acquire innovative offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. These
efforts include, for example, the Defense Innovation Unit's outreach
with leading commercial cybersecurity firms and United States Cyber
Command's commercial outreach, coordination with Intelligence Community
partners, and acquisition activities that support innovation and
capability development. These efforts will mature as the Department's
science, technology, and acquisition enterprises evolve to support
United States Cyber Command's operational needs. If confirmed, I will
work with the appropriate principal staff assistants and component
heads to ensure that the Department leverages opportunities to improve
the organization and resourcing of such activities as they emerge.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(SP) and the Department of Defense Chief Information
Officer, particularly with respect to DOD's cyber mission.
Answer. My understanding of DOD's cyber mission is that it is a
highly federated domain requiring collaboration among many officials
representing OSD offices, Defense Agencies, Combatant Commands,
Military Departments and other organizations. The ASD for Space Policy
is responsible for broad cyber policy and strategy matters while the
DOD Chief Information Officer is responsible for maintaining and
strengthening important technical capabilities such as cybersecurity;
national security systems; and command, control, and communication
systems. With regard to the relationship of these two officials, I
believe close collaboration on key issues such as the cybersecurity of
the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) and the Defense
Industrial Base, defending the nation, modernizing cryptographic
encryption, and strengthening the Department's electromagnetic spectrum
enterprise, are crucial to succeeding in the cyber mission area.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(SP) and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
Answer. I understand the ASD(SP) has responsibilities for
representing the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy in both interagency and international fora relating
to cyberspace, including those pertaining to USCYBERCOM missions and
responsibilities. I also understand that ASD(SP) participates in and
advises on the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE)
processes, including as they relate to cyberspace items pursuant to
USCYBERCOM's Enhanced Budget Control. Furthermore, the ASD(SP) provides
policy oversight for military programs, activities, authorities, and
associated cyberspace operations forces, including those of USCYBERCOM.
The Commander, USCYBERCOM reports directly to the Secretary of Defense
for operations.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the ASD(SP) and the Principal Cyber Advisors of the Military
Departments.
Answer. It is my understanding that the ASD(SP), dual-hatted as the
Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, is responsible for
ensuring the overall integration of activities that support the
Department's cyber operations and overseeing United States Cyber
Command. In such a role, the ASD(SP) works with and through the
military departments, combatant commands, and combat support agencies
to ensure the integration of research and development, acquisition,
intelligence, resourcing, and operational activities and the adequacy
of forces, capabilities, and support provided to United States Cyber
Command. The ASD(SP) therefore works closely with the Principal Cyber
Advisors of the Military Departments, ensuring alignment between the
Service-specific activities that they superintend and the priorities
and requirements of the broader cyber operations community, as
established in the Department's cyber strategy.
cyber operations
Question. The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
affirmed the authority of the Secretary of Defense to conduct military
activities and operations in cyberspace. Also in 2018, National
Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13), set forth the process
for reviewing and approving military cyber operations.
What is your view of the impact of these two developments on cyber
operations within the Department of Defense?
Answer. It is my understanding that these developments have made a
very positive contribution to national security by enabling the
Department of Defense to perform effectively its mission to disrupt
malicious cyber threats overseas before they reach our networks. I
appreciate the progress that the Department has made since 2018,
including with the help of Congress to clarify the Secretary of
Defense's authority to conduct cyberspace operations.
Question. Please describe your views on NSPM-13. Do you have any
recommendations for modifications to NSPM-13?
Answer. It is my understanding that the existing policy framework
for approving offensive cyber operations has resulted in well-
coordinated, risk-managed, and timely DOD cyber operations. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure continued transparency and
collaboration with interagency partners consistent with the existing
coordination process outlined in NSPM-13 or successor guidance. I look
forward to supporting any additional steps that would aid the
Department's efforts to conduct cyber operations in accordance with our
assigned missions at the speed of relevance.
The September 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy charges DOD to ``defend
forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war'' to
compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.
Question. What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission
Force in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace?
Answer. The Department of Defense brings a number of capabilities
and authorities to bear in defending the Nation from an attack in
cyberspace. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) conducts ``defend forward''
operations to disrupt malicious cyber activity at its source. There are
several ways that the Department and its CMF can ``defend forward'' in
cyberspace, including: 1) generating insights about threats outside
U.S. networks; 2) improving the defenses of interagency, industry, and
international partners by sharing DOD's unique insights on threat
actors; and 3) disrupting adversary cyber actors, when necessary.
Additionally, another department or agency may request DOD provide
defense support of civil authorities should a cyber-incident exceed
that department's or agency's capacity and/or capability.
Question. In what ways is this role distinct from those of the
homeland security and law enforcement communities?
Answer. The homeland security and law enforcement communities lead
the U.S. Government efforts to respond to malicious cyber activity that
is principally criminal in nature, such as ransomware. The Department
may play a supporting role in countering such criminal activity,
including by sharing information with the homeland security and law
enforcement communities.
Question. How will the ``defend forward, shape the day-to-day
competition, and prepare for war'' concepts deter and disrupt Russia
and China in cyberspace?
Answer. China and Russia are conducting persistent malicious cyber
campaigns to erode United States military advantages, threaten our
infrastructure, and undermine our economic prosperity. I believe the
Department must effectively counter these campaigns by taking proactive
action to: generate insights about the adversary's cyber operations and
capabilities; enable its interagency, industry, and international
partners to create better defenses; and acting, when necessary, to
disrupt adversary cyber actors and to halt malicious activities.
Question. In your view, how well postured is the DOD to meet the
goals outlined in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has made
substantial progress toward meeting the objectives of the 2018 DOD
Cyber Strategy, including through growth in cyber resources and
manpower and an increase in the maturity and capabilities of U.S. Cyber
Command. If confirmed, I look forward to building on those successes by
further improving the Department's ability to compete and win in
cyberspace and overseeing the upcoming Cyber Posture Review.
Question. What actions do you think need to be taken in the DOD to
address any gaps with the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with my
team and other DOD components to identify any gaps in strategy
implementation and to develop a plan of action for closing those gaps.
Question. What are your views on Hunt Forward missions and their
contribution to the 2018 Cyber Strategy?
Answer. I support USCYBERCOM's execution of Hunt Forward Operations
(HFOs). It is my understanding that HFOs are an important component of
DOD's efforts to implement the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy. HFOs are a
prime example of USCYBERCOM ``defending forward'' by conducting
defensive cyber operations on the networks of allies and partners
outside of the DOD Information Network (DODIN). I understand HFOs have
been an essential element of shaping day-to-day competition and allow
U.S. Cyber Mission Forces to hone their defensive skills by conducting
real-world defensive cyber operations on unfamiliar networks and
through exposure to adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures. As
such, HFOs are critical to preparing U.S. forces to better defend the
DODIN in future conflict.
cyber posture review
Question. DOD is conducting a mandatory cyber posture review. The
Committee believes that the previous posture review was a success
largely because the Principal Cyber Adviser and supporting cross
functional team tracked implementation tasks and progress, and reported
regularly to senior leaders.
What are your plans for conducting the cyber posture review, gap
analysis, and oversight of implementation?
Answer. I look forward to carrying out, if confirmed, a
comprehensive posture review of the Department's cyber enterprise. I
would expect a posture review will inform development of the
Department's cyber strategy and subsequent implementation efforts by
revealing the most critical posture, policy, and process gaps across
the Department's cyber enterprise. If confirmed, I will ensure that my
team and I work closely with the appropriate principal staff assistants
and component heads in the execution of such a posture review and
during concerted implementation efforts.
cyber security
Question. The ASD(SP) serves as the Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA)
to the Secretary of Defense and has primary responsibility for DOD
cyber policy.
What qualifications do you possess for performing the duties of the
PCA?
Answer. As a former principal director and acting DASD at the
Pentagon, director of defense policy and strategy on the National
Security Council staff, senior engineer at RAND (a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center), Chief of Government Relations at the
Aerospace Corporation (also a Federally Funded Research and Development
Center), and a United States Navy Reserve Captain, I have substantial
experience in the development of defense policy and programs. As a
Senior Engineer at RAND, I led a team for the Chief Information Officer
at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to examine FEMA cyber
maturity and develop tools and recommendations to improve that
maturity. At Aerospace I have directed and organized technical
briefings on cybersecurity threats to satellites. My education,
engineering experience, and previous roles in the national security
community have introduced me to a number of policy, technology, and
programmatic issues relevant to cyberspace operations, including at the
intersection of space, nuclear, and cyber forces and operations. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure effective execution of my
responsibilities relevant to cyber operations, policy, and programs. I
also have substantial experience in convening and collaborating with
partners across the defense community and participating in decision-
making processes and reforms for complex defense issues. If confirmed,
I expect that this experience will inform my advice to the Department's
senior leadership and enable my partnerships with appropriate combatant
commanders, component heads, and principal staff assistants.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the PCA in
supporting the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Defense and in
overseeing CYBERCOM?
Answer. As I understand it, the Principal Cyber Advisor to the
Secretary of Defense is responsible for: advising the Department's
senior leadership on matters relevant to cyber operations, forces,
policies, and programs; driving implementation of the Department's
cyber strategy; and overseeing United States Cyber Command in a manner
analogous to that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and United States Special
Operations Command. The Principal Cyber Advisor is not in the chain of
command but serves a critical role in overseeing and aligning United
States Cyber Command, its operations, and supporting activities within
the Military Services and the Intelligence Community in partnership
with the relevant principal staff assistants.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the PCA and the Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA),
between the cyber mission and the IO mission, and between the DOD
components assigned to execute the two missions?
Answer. As I understand it, the Principal Cyber Advisor to the
Secretary of Defense and the Principal Information Operations Advisor
work closely to ensure that forces, programs, processes, and policies
germane to different facets of information warfare interoperate
effectively. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Principal
Information Operations Advisor to mature the Department's ability to
execute these missions, especially where information is delivered
through cyber means or is used to pronounce the effect of cyber
operations.
The cyber and information operations missions have significant
overlap and synergies to the extent that cyber operations can be used
to deliver information as part of information operations. Information
operations can also enable or pronounce the effects of cyber
operations.
The components and forces responsible for each of these missions
span the combatant commands, the Services, and the Intelligence
Community. Depending on the organization in question, these components
and forces may be the same; others exhibit split responsibilities and
functions across the cyber and information operations missions.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate relationship and
division of responsibility between the Commander, NORTHCOM and the
Commander, CYBERCOM with respect to cyber support to civil authorities?
Answer. I understand that Commander, USNORTHCOM and Commander,
USCYBERCOM, have significant roles to play in protecting the Nation
from malicious cyber activity. If confirmed, I will work with my Joint
Staff colleagues to ensure that the Department approaches homeland
cybersecurity and resilience with a command and control structure
optimized for the cyber threats we are facing.
Question. If confirmed, what would you see as your role vis-a-vis
the newly established National Cyber Director?
Answer. I see the Department of Defense supporting the National
Cyber Director's efforts to coordinate cybersecurity strategy across
the government and partner with our commercial and international
partners to increase national cybersecurity and resilience.
Question. In your view, what role should the NCD play in the
planning, conduct, and oversight of DOD cyber operations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense is
granted sole authority, direction, and control over DOD operations,
including cyber operations that are executed in accordance with the
authority granted by the President. If confirmed, I will collaborate
with the NCD on the development of national cyber strategy, policy, and
campaigns, and will work closely with the NCD to integrate DOD cyber
operations into whole-of-government cyber planning. However, the
establishment of the NCD does not modify the authority or
responsibilities of the Secretary for the planning, conduct, and
execution of DOD cyber operations.
ransomware
Question. The United States has been rocked by a series of
significant ransomware attacks affecting critical infrastructure and
organizations. Attacks such as these have been facilitated or conducted
by large, sophisticated criminal enterprises that are permitted to
operate in the countries in which they are principally located.
Significant ransomware attacks could cause substantial damage to
critical infrastructure in peacetime or in a future crisis or conflict,
and therefore pose a clear national security threat. United States
Cyber Command is among the few government organizations with the
capabilities to directly diminish this threat and thereby establish a
degree of deterrence.
What are your views on the foreign-based ransomware threat from
large criminal organizations?
Answer. The United States has been subjected to an increasing
number of serious ransomware attacks facilitated by criminal
organizations located in countries whose governments have created
permissive environments for ransomware actors to operate. President
Biden, and Administration officials at various levels, have conveyed
that such ransomware attacks are not acceptable.
Question. What are your views on the role that the Cyber Mission
forces could play in imposing costs on such activities, as one aspect
of a larger, whole-of-government response?
Answer. The Department of Defense brings to bear unique authorities
and capabilities to support whole-of-government efforts to disrupt
ransomware actors and defend against ransomware attacks. I understand
that U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency are dedicating
people, technology, and expertise to generate insights and options to
disrupt ransomware threats at the source, before they reach our
networks. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department
continues to support whole-of-government efforts to counter ransomware
threats, including through robust sharing of information that can
enable our law enforcement partners as well as the Department of
Homeland Security.
cyber notifications
Question. Cyber notifications from the Department for sensitive
cyber military operations, as required by law, are critical for the
committee to perform adequate oversight of these operations.
If confirmed, do you commit to providing Congress with timely cyber
operations notifications that contain enough information in order for
Congress to perform adequate oversight of these operations?
Answer. Yes. I understand that DOD officials have worked with
Congress to update the format and depth of information in our
notifications for sensitive cyber military operations. If confirmed, I
commit to provide Congress with the timely information it requires to
perform its role.
Question. Are there other steps that you will take, if confirmed,
to help Congress perform oversight over these critical operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to identify steps
that would help Congress perform its role in a well-informed manner.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from
an employee of the Office of the ASD(SP)?
Answer. If confirmed, and if I was to receive or be made aware of a
complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination, I would take
immediate, serious action by initiating an inquiry to gather all facts,
conduct necessary interviews, collect information, and address the
complaint within the specified guidelines of Federal statutes and
Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I would
work with USD(P) to make clear to the workforce that they deserve a
respectful workplace, that equality and diversity matter, and that I
support the Department's zero tolerance policy.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
cooperation with foreign militaries
1. Senator Hirono. Dr. Plumb, the U.S. Space Force currently does
not have its own dedicated Reserve or Guard component, with those
members simply serving in that capacity in the Air National Guard. A
January 2020 study conducted by the Air Force recommended to the
Secretary of Defense the establishment of ``an independent Space
National Guard'' in order to increase the strength and agility of our
currently small force. A Space National Guard would also bring in
citizen guardians with private-sector experience. As the first
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, do you support the
establishment of a separate, Space National Guard?
Dr. Plumb. As a Naval reservist, I deeply appreciate the value that
the reserve components bring to the Joint Force. Reserve and National
Guard units and personnel provide strategic depth for U.S. space
operations today. When establishing the Space Force, Congress and the
Executive Branch alike emphasized the need for a lean, agile
organizational structure while prioritizing the development of space
capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the appropriate
organizational structure for the U.S. Space Force Reserve component in
order to achieve an agile and forward-looking organization able to
compete for the best talent and meet the needs of a 21st century
military service.
2. Senator Hirono. Dr. Plumb, what are your overall recommendations
for improving our Space Force's organization in order to attract and
maintain talent to ensure our competitive edge in the space domain?
Dr. Plumb. My understanding is that the organization of the Space
Force, including its approach to human capital management, is primarily
a Service responsibility. However, if confirmed, I will be ready to
work with General Raymond, the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), in
pursuing his goal to develop joint warfighters in world class teams.
The CSO's November 2020 ``Chief of Space Operations' Planning
Guidance'' includes a focus on diversity and inclusion, as well as
Information Age recruiting and retention. I agree with the CSO that one
way to strengthen our competitive edge is to provide developmental
opportunities for space professionals across all U.S. space sectors,
including national security, civil, and commercial, in order to
guarantee our strength as a nation. If confirmed, I will be ready to
work with the CSO if there are policy actions we can take to support
his efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
arctic
3. Senator King. Dr. Plumb, due to the Arctic's geographical
location and the lack of dedicated assets to the poles, the operational
environment holds several limitations to conducting space operations or
enabling terrestrial operations such as satellite communications
(SATCOM), imaging, remote sensing, space-based missile warning, etc.
What do you believe are the greatest limitations and what can be done
to shore up our Arctic space capabilities?
Dr. Plumb. The Arctic has particular importance for supporting
space operations. For example, the missile warning architecture
includes radar capabilities that are based in the Arctic that also
support space domain awareness. Satellite downlink sites in the Arctic
are critical to support polar communications. Also, geospatial
intelligence relies on polar orbiting satellites, and is particularly
important to understanding military and other activity in the Arctic as
well as measuring the impacts of climate change.
The Arctic has also been disadvantaged in terms of the availability
of some space services. Our satellite orbits are not necessarily
optimized to support the northernmost latitudes, making the region more
technologically disconnected than lower latitudes.
Historically, economics has limited the incentives commercial space
operators have for providing services to the Arctic, but this may be
changing as operators move toward proliferated constellations in
multiple orbital planes that can provide global services, including
satellite communications and internet services to remote areas. Shoring
up our Arctic space capabilities is a function of understanding both
how changing conditions in the Arctic will change the applications of
and demand for space-based services, as well as how the ongoing changes
in space economics may make new opportunities possible. If confirmed,
this is an area I would want DOD to focus on as it updates its Arctic
security strategy.
space
4. Senator King. Dr. Plumb, your position was originally created
with the Space Force to have a senior civilian performing oversight of
a new armed service, what do you think our policy should be with
respect to other countries that perform offensive maneuvers against our
satellites and space systems?
Dr. Plumb. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy will
play a key role in ensuring civilian oversight of the most sensitive
Department of Defense decisions related to space and the Space Force.
With respect to responding to countries that perform offensive
maneuvers against U.S. satellites and space systems, my understanding
is that U.S. policy has been consistent across administrations. The
United States Space Priorities Framework, released in December 2021,
reaffirms the position that the United States will defend its national
security interests from the growing scope and scale of space and
counterspace threats. The National Space Policy, issued in December
2020, states that any purposeful interference with or attack upon the
space systems of the United States or its allies that directly affects
national rights will be met with a deliberate response at a time,
place, manner, and domain of our choosing. Actions such as other
countries' offensive maneuvers against U.S. satellites and space
systems must not be considered in isolation, however, because they may
be part of a larger strategic situation. Therefore, any threats to our
satellites and space systems would need to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, and the response of the United States to any such situation
should be measured and tailored for the situation using the appropriate
instruments of national power.
5. Senator King. Dr. Plumb, multiple Services have a cadre of space
operations professionals and space enabled assets. What do you see as
the role of each of the individual Services (Space Force, Air Force,
Army, Marine Corps) under the space operations umbrella?
Dr. Plumb. Under the ``space operations umbrella,'' my
understanding is that there are two categories. First, the Space Force
is the Military Service that is tasked to organize, train, equip, and
present forces capable of preserving America's freedom of action in
space; enabling Joint Force lethality and effectiveness; and providing
independent options--in, from, and to space. The Space Force maintains,
protects, and expands the U.S. fleet of advanced military satellites
that form the backbone of U.S. global military operations. Second, and
separately, are the space cadre and capabilities developed to perform
domain-specific operations for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps. These domain-specific capabilities are more closely tied to the
specific roles and missions of the other Military Services and the
specialized expertise provided by their space cadres. Ultimately, this
approach across all Military Services enhances the lethality and unity
of effort of the Joint Force in multi-domain operations.
6. Senator King. Dr. Plumb, an issue that is frequently brought up
but rarely adequately addressed is the over classification of space
based and enabled systems and the stovepipes this creates. Can you
explain your approach to this problem that will protect our assets
while providing military commanders the best resources and a
synchronized intelligence picture?
Dr. Plumb. Security classification regarding space is a challenging
issue because of legacy practices, the continuing need to protect many
very sensitive capabilities and operations, and the need to integrate
space operations more closely with our allies and partners across the
Joint Force. A synchronized operations and intelligence picture
requires collaboration across multiple organizations, operators,
processes, and layers of classification. Increasingly, this also
includes commercial operators providing capabilities and services on
the open market that once were only available in classified government
systems. As space continues to become more integrated into other
domains, and space-based services more widely available, my approach,
if confirmed, will be to work with our classification and disclosure
officials to update, as appropriate, policies and guidance materials
and improve our ability to anticipate such changes so that we get ahead
of the pace of these changes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
integrating commercial technologies
7. Senator Peters. Dr. Plumb, the Space Force, Air Force, and the
rest of the DOD and IC [Intelligence Community] communities are
increasingly relying on commercial space services, data, and
applications. This trend has been beneficial in myriad ways in
supporting industry, creating dual-use technologies, and incorporating
technologies faster into DOD applications than ever before. What are
your plans to foster and improve DOD and IC capabilities and mission
success using commercial technologies and practices?
Dr. Plumb. For many space capabilities, commercial options are
increasingly able to meet military and intelligence needs while also
satisfying requirements for information and cyber security. If
confirmed, I plan to continue advancing policies that allow our forces
to leverage the rapid advances occurring in the commercial space
industry, which can save costs and deliver capability on shorter
timelines as compared with defense development programs.
human performance in space
8. Senator Peters. Dr. Plumb, the space environment is becoming
increasingly contested and congested. As space assets and activities
continue to proliferate, the one constant is the human operator. Given
the central importance of the human operator, what is your vision for a
research program to maximize human performance and resilience in space
operations and environments?
Dr. Plumb. My understanding is NASA has the responsibility for
human space flight, while DOD provides support to NASA missions, such
as through search and rescue capabilities. If confirmed I would want to
review the support DOD provides for NASA-sponsored human spaceflight
activities and see that such activities continue, as appropriate. These
activities contribute to U.S. leadership in human performance and
resilience in space operations and environments.
small launch
9. Senator Peters. Dr. Plumb, do you believe the Department is
leveraging the space launch ecosystem to the fullest, including
innovative small launch?
Dr. Plumb. My sense is the Department is actively leveraging both
the traditional forms of commercial space launch and innovative small
launch options in order to sustain competitiveness. I believe it is
important that the Department continues to do so.
responsive space architecture
10. Senator Peters. Dr. Plumb, what do you believe is needed from a
policy perspective to achieve a wider responsive space architecture?
Dr. Plumb. From a policy perspective, I think reliance on
commercial space launch is essential. The policy of requiring at least
two families of space launch vehicles capable of lifting national
security payloads to space has also proven to be a key to assured
access to space. Additionally, a policy of allowing other research and
development and demonstration activities to leverage other space launch
services appears to be providing incentives for additional private
investments in the launch sector, which also benefits the government.
11. Senator Peters. Dr. Plumb, what are the critical components
needed for this effort?
Dr. Plumb. In addition to continuing to leverage diversified
sources of commercial launch, it is also important to sustain a
regulatory environment that is conducive to competitiveness in
commercial space. In this respect, I think it is important for the
United States to establish a framework for civil oversight of space
traffic management to help ensure the long-run safety of space flight,
especially in low-Earth orbit, and sustainability of the space
environment.
competition for allies and partners in space
12. Senator Peters. Dr. Plumb, a recent study commissioned by the
Space Force describes how China is seeking to use its space technology
development to coerce new allies and partners as a part of their Belt
and Road Initiative. The report confirms that, ``Space infrastructure,
from launch to satellite imagery and telecommunications, is now part of
the OBOR [One Belt One Road] Initiative.'' In parallel, last year
General James H. Dickinson, USA, Commander of U.S. Space Command
(SPACECOM) testified to the Senate Armed Services Command that the
``bow wave of allies and partners who want come and be part of SPACECOM
and part of the space enterprise.'' These two narratives clearly linked
as space is undoubtedly a new arena in which we must compete with
China. In fact, our allies are telling us that they want to work with
us and NOT China when it comes to space. Do you agree that a robust,
diverse, and competitive space launch industry, which provides us the
ability to deploy space capabilities, is vital to both our own national
security and but also the collective security of our allies and
partners?
Dr. Plumb. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
china
13. Senator Tillis. Dr. Plumb, as you mentioned in your advance
policy question responses, China is the pacing threat in space, but
Russia is also a major concern. In light of recent events, can you
speak to Russia's capabilities in space and the threats they pose to
our national security posture?
Dr. Plumb. Russia has significant capabilities in space. I
understand that Russia is developing and fielding counterspace
capabilities, including electronic warfare, cyber, directed energy
weapons, and destructive anti-satellite weapons capable of holding U.S.
and allied and partner space capabilities at risk. We saw this in
November 2021 when Russia successfully--and irresponsibly--conducted a
destructive antisatellite (ASAT) missile test against one of its own
satellites, and subsequently made public threats about using such
capabilities against NATO satellites. As has been widely reported,
Russia also conducted non-destructive space-based ASAT tests in 2017
and 2020, including in an orbit very close to a United States
satellite.
More generally, the Director of National Intelligence's 2021 Annual
Threat Assessment described Russian strategic intentions and
capabilities as presenting an urgent and enduring threat to the ability
of the Department to achieve its desired conditions in space. From that
assessment and other open-source material, I understand that Russia is
integrating space capabilities, including positioning, navigation, and
timing; satellite communications; and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance into its military forces to enhance its warfighting
capabilities. We have seen Russia leverage these capabilities to
support its forces in Syria and they are likewise leveraging space to
support their forces that are posing a growing threat to Ukraine.
department of defense resourcing
14. Senator Tillis. Dr. Plumb, could you explain your understanding
of the current resourcing issues faced by DOD, specific to cyber and
space manpower?
Dr. Plumb. If confirmed, I am committed to assessing current
resourcing of the Cyber Mission Force and component personnel who
support the defense of the Department of Defense Information Network.
If confirmed, I intend to assess any persisting resource shortfalls as
part of the Cyber Posture Review and the statutorily required review of
cyber and information technology personnel.
As for space, I understand the U.S. Space Force is growing to a
rough end-strength of about 16,000 military and civilian personnel in
total. I know that the Chief of Space Operations, who has
responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping the Space Force,
has said he has many more applicants than positions, both for new
recruits and for transfers from the other Military Services.
I am also aware that both Space Force and Cyber Command personnel
receive training and experience that can make them competitive for
subsequent careers in the commercial world. It is important to ensure
that, as the Space Force and Cyber Command mature, they can both remain
competitive in retaining the top talent they develop.
15. Senator Tillis. Dr. Plumb, if confirmed, what will you do to
recruit and maintain talent in this field to meet the goals of the DOD
Cyber Strategy?
Dr. Plumb. Senior leadership of the Department of Defense has
identified the recruitment, cultivation, and retention of talent as
critical to U.S. national security. To improve its access to key
talent, I understand that the Department has established the Cyber
Excepted Service model for specific civilian job positions demanding
greater technical skills. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing and
refining implementation to ensure that components are appropriately
leveraging Cyber Excepted Service to fill those work roles. I also
understand that the Department is contemplating refined models for the
Military Services' provision of forces to U.S. Cyber Command, which
explore new training and career path models, to retain and maintain a
properly skilled military cyber work force. If confirmed, I look
forward to advancing these initiatives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
nuclear posture review
16. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Plumb, do you believe the current
program of record is sufficient to support full modernization of our
nuclear infrastructure?
Dr. Plumb. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest
priority mission and current efforts to modernize all three legs of the
nuclear triad and dual-capable aircraft are critical to maintaining
effective deterrence in today's evolving security environment.
17. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Plumb, do you agree that modernizing the
nuclear triad and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
complex is a critical national security priority?
Dr. Plumb. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest
priority mission and a modern, resilient, and agile nuclear weapons
complex, developed in a judicious, cost-effective manner, is critical
to maintaining effective deterrence in today's evolving security
environment. The United States must invest in the Department of
Energy's nuclear weapons complex today to be able to achieve this goal.
18. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Plumb, if major weapons programs are
funded and infrastructure, recapitalization, and maintenance starved,
will this funding imbalance circle back to weapons systems?
Dr. Plumb. Yes. Our nuclear infrastructure is at the very heart of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent and must be modernized and appropriately
resourced. If not, we risk undermining the ability to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible
extended deterrence.
china
19. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Plumb, what would be the immediate
challenges within your area of responsibility, if confirmed, by China's
rapid nuclear development?
Dr. Plumb. China appears to be engaged in an unprecedented
modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities. I understand
that these developments are being examined in DOD's ongoing Nuclear
Posture Review. If confirmed, I would examine the results of that
review to determine how best to contribute to and help implement its
conclusions.
20. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Plumb, can you describe the 5 and 10
year challenges of China's rapid nuclear development within your area
of responsibility, if confirmed?
Dr. Plumb. To my knowledge, China's rapid nuclear development is
one of many issues that the Nuclear Posture Review is undertaking. If
confirmed, I will study the conclusions of the review to help determine
the path forward. One clear challenge is the near-total lack of
transparency by China regarding its strategic capabilities, and its
demonstrated unwillingness to discuss them. The Administration has
rightly reiterated the importance of arms control in helping reduce
nuclear risks globally. But, with or without progress on this front, it
is critical that the United States maintain nuclear forces that are
capable of credibly and effectively deterring nuclear-armed adversaries
and that assure U.S. allies and partners in the face of a complex and
challenging security environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
defense strategy
21. Senator Hawley. Dr. Plumb, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing threat. In
your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation?
Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Plumb. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of
China as the pacing challenge for the Department.
22. Senator Hawley. Dr. Plumb, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority
theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's
designation? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Plumb. Yes, I agree that the Indo-Pacific should be the
priority theater, particularly as the Department addresses the military
challenge posed by China. I also acknowledge that, as an aspiring
global power, China also presents challenges in other theaters.
23. Senator Hawley. Dr. Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, ``The PRC
[People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a
Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario.'' Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN concurred for the record
with Taiwan's designation as the Department's pacing scenario. In your
personal opinion, do you support the designation of a Taiwan
contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Please provide a
``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Plumb. Yes. China is the Department's pacing challenge and a
Taiwan contingency should be the pacing scenario. There are elements of
the Joint Force for which the Department may regard Russia and its
unique capabilities as the pacing threat.
u.s. nuclear posture
24. Senator Hawley. Dr. Plumb, in your personal opinion, do you
think it is important for the United States to maintain limited nuclear
options--for instance, low-yield capabilities--in order to deter rivals
from using their own limited nuclear options for coercive or
operational effect? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Plumb. I understand that DOD's Nuclear Posture Review is
ongoing and, if confirmed, I look forward to examining its results on
this and other issues. With regard to low-yield capabilities, I
understand that the W76-2 is already deployed on U.S. ballistic missile
submarines. If confirmed I would work with the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command to understand the operational impacts of that
deployment and with the Intelligence Community to understand potential
adversary perceptions of that deployment.
25. Senator Hawley. Dr. Plumb, some have suggested cutting or
reducing the size of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg
of our nuclear triad. They have also suggested eliminating some of the
limited nuclear options in or planned for the American arsenal. In your
personal opinion, do you think it would be wise for the United States
to reduce the size or flexibility of United States nuclear forces at
the same time as Russia is modernizing its forces, including limited
nuclear options, and China is rapidly building out its own nuclear
arsenal? Please provide a ``yes'' or ``no'' response.
Dr. Plumb. I understand that DOD's Nuclear Posture Review is
ongoing and, if confirmed, I look forward to examining its results on
this and other issues. I personally agree with Secretary Austin and
Deputy Secretary Hicks' answers during their nomination hearings that
any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should only be taken
within the context of formal, verifiable arms control agreements, and
not unilaterally.
______
[The nomination reference of Dr. John F. Plumb follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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[The biographical sketch of Dr. John F. Plumb, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. John F.
Plumb in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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[The nomination of Dr. John F. Plumb was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Reed on February 1, 2022, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 1, 2022.]
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