

**THE NOMINATIONS OF: DR. CELESTE ANN  
WALLANDER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS; MS. MELISSA G. DALTON TO BE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AF-  
FAIRS; AND DR. JOHN F. PLUMB TO BE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
SPACE POLICY**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

January 13, 2022

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This hearing is printed to include all available information requested or required to be inserted for the record.

**THE NOMINATIONS OF: DR. CELESTE ANN WALLANDER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; MS. MELISSA G. DALTON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS; AND DR. JOHN F. PLUMB TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY**

THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 2022

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED**

Chairman REED. The Committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of Dr. Celeste Wallander to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Ms. Melissa Dalton to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, and Dr. John Plumb to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.

I thank the nominees for their long careers of service to the United States and a willingness to assume these important roles.

I would also like to welcome the colleagues and family members who are here with us today.

Dr. Wallander, I welcome your guest, Professor Jeffrey Anderson.

Ms. Dalton, I welcome your guest, Jason.

Dr. Plumb, I welcome your parents, John and Marie.

Dr. Wallander, you were nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In this role, you will be the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security issues that relate to Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa. I would note

your qualifications and experience for this position, including your role as president and CEO of the United States Russia Foundation, Senior Director for Russian-Eurasian Affairs on the National Security Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia during the Obama administration.

If confirmed, there are several challenges that will require your immediate attention. Most pressing is Russia's increasingly aggressive posture on the Ukrainian border. Diplomatic meetings are being held as we speak, but this relationship is likely to remain a point of contention.

I would ask that you share your assessment of United States and multilateral efforts to train and equip the Ukrainian Security Forces and what balance the Department should pursue in near term, training and equipping needs, and the longer-term defensive capability development.

Iran also remains a complex challenge for the Department. Even as indirect negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, take place in Vienna this month, Iranian-linked proxies continue to mount drone and rocket attacks in the region, including against bases in Iraq and Syria with a United States military presence.

I look forward to your testimony on how the Department of Defense should respond to Iranian and malign influence in the region, while preserving our continuing nuclear negotiations.

Ms. Dalton, you are nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. This position is responsible for supervision of the Homeland Defense activities of the Department of Defense, as well as defense support of civil authorities, Arctic, and global resilience, and also western hemispheric affairs.

You have decades of experience, including your current role, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense to Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, will serve you well in this position. If confirmed, you will be responsible for integrating the Department of Defense's Homeland Defense activities to include efforts to protect critical infrastructure and assisting in Homeland Defense matters for U.S. Northern Command, other combatant commands, and the National Guard.

I would like to know what you see as the major challenges in the coming years with respect to these issues, including protection of the Defense Industrial Base.

Additionally, you will be responsible for policy issues relating to the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic; regions, that have seen increased attention from Russia, China, Iran, and other recent actors.

I look forward to your testimony on the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in competing strategically in these key regions.

Dr. Plumb, you are nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense to Space Policy. This is a new position that was established in the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act to ensure dedicated policy oversight over the newly created Space Force. You are well qualified for this position, having managed Missile Defense and Space Policy issues for the Defense Department dur-

ing the Obama administration, as well as holding an undergraduate degree in physics and a doctorate in aerospace engineering.

As Section 955 of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA outlines, the principal duty of the Assistant Secretary shall be overall supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space warfighting. I would highlight the word “principal,” because the Department has undertaken a major reorganization of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and has realigned Nuclear Missile Defense, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Cybersecurity to your space portfolio.

Although similar in scope to earlier versions of this position, there are major differences for your office, including the disbanding of the Office of Nuclear Missile Defense Policy, significant changes to the former Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the movement of Missile Defense to the Office of Space Policy; furthermore, Cybersecurity, with all of its complexity, has been added to your plate.

During today’s hearing, I will ask for your views about this reorganization and your plan to ensure that nuclear deterrence, the bedrock of our national security, is not lost in the shuffle; especially, as a new Nuclear Posture Review is imminent and we continue to grapple with serious challenges from China and Russia.

Thank you, again, to our nominees. I look forward to your testimonies.

Now, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE**

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for being with us for this session.

In 2021, our top military and intelligence leaders told this Committee that the world is in the most dangerous and complex position that it has been in our lifetimes and I agree with it, and looking at what is happening across the world, you have to agree.

In 2018, the National Defense Strategy, there is our book that we, it served us very well as a blueprint. It provides a roadmap to prioritize security to challenge. I know that they are going to be re-doing this and upgrading it and all of that, and I hope that we don’t lose the value that it has been to us before, because it is truly a masterpiece.

We have a lot of challenges in areas overseas. China’s military modernization continues at an alarming pace and the massive growth in its arsenal of nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles clearly shows that they are watching in an unprecedented strategy breakout.

Russia has built up well over 100,000 troops around Ukraine and is ready for, yet, another invasion if Putin gives the word. Russia also recently tested an anti-satellite missile, creating a cloud of lethal debris that made astronauts scramble for safety. This, again, shows Putin’s blatant disregard for established norms.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to fund global terrorism and target American personnel and partners, and rampant inflation is eating away at the defense budget. Not only our troops, A, and the benefits, but also funding for training, maintenance, and weapons ac-

quisition. This administration seems unable and/or unwilling to effectively respond to the growing dangers and this paralysis damages U.S. credibility and undermines the trust of our partners and allies.

Even now, the administration seems intent on ending decades of all the security guarantees by watering down our United States nuclear policies and exposing allies. I will have the chance to pursue this a little bit during my time for questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Now let me recognize Dr. Wallander for her testimony. Doctor?

**STATEMENT OF DR. CELESTE ANN WALLANDER, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

Dr. WALLANDER. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Under Secretary Kahl for their trust in my ability to serve in this role. It is also a privilege to appear on this panel with colleagues who have also been nominated for Assistant Secretary roles. If confirmed, it would be my honor to work alongside them and ensure coordination between the regional and functional policy offices within the Department.

I would like to take a moment to thank my dad, who served in the U.S. Navy, and is a retired Chicago police officer, and my mom, who immigrated to the United States as a little girl from Europe after World War II. They taught me the gift of American citizenship and the duty to serve our country. I also thank my husband Jeff and our children Nathaniel, Joseph, and Genevieve, for their unshakeable love and support.

I am humbled by the prospect of returning to public service. I served at the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2009 to 2012, and then on the National Security Council staff as the Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia from 2013 to 2017. These roles equipped me with the skills to manage critical defense relationships, navigate the interagency policy formation process, and develop national security policy in response to complex geopolitical contexts.

I have dedicated my career to both, studying and working policy on European and Eurasian security, with a focus on Russian foreign, military, and security affairs.

If confirmed, I would work to utilize my scholarly and government experiences in the service of U.S. national security.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs covers a broad portfolio that includes well over 100 countries. ISA develops security policy and manages defense and military relations. It stewards Department resources to develop military capabilities, support security cooperation programs, conduct foreign military sales, and perform other key activities in those regions. I

would be honored to lead the talented professionals supporting this vast portfolio should I be confirmed.

The regional portfolio presents some of the most difficult defense challenges facing the United States. I appreciate that Members of this Committee are closely tracking Russian threats against Ukraine. As a private citizen, I have been deeply concerned about Russian military concentrations.

If confirmed, I would develop policy and strategic options for the Secretary to deter Russia, ensure appropriate response to Russian aggression, and safeguard United States and Transatlantic security.

I support the Biden administration's work to unite NATO on deterrence and diplomacy, as well as provide continued defensive, lethal assistance to Ukraine. I also support the administration's close consultations with European allies and partners on options for deterrence, as well as serious consequences for Russia in the event of escalation.

If confirmed, I will be ready and able to advance the Department's preparations for all contingencies. This will be my top priority, if confirmed, and, I would immediately focus on being briefed in detail about the current state of play.

I share the goals and commitments advanced in the Global Posture Review, including an effective counterterrorism posture in the Middle East and robust deterrence against Iran. Our force protection mission is also essential, particularly, in the face of attacks by Iranian proxies in Iraq.

If confirmed, I will also advance our strategy in Africa to build partner capacity, strengthen African security institutions, and counter violent extremist organizations.

I share Secretary Austin's view that China is the pacing challenge for the Department. I also share his view that the strength of our alliances and partnerships is one of our greatest assets in that challenge, and all others.

If confirmed, I will prioritize these critical defense partnerships in order to strengthen our security and deter our adversaries.

The responsibilities of International Security Affairs require thoughtful and sustained military diplomacy with our allies and partners across the globe. I know that Members of this Committee recognize the importance of this mission, and I am personally invested in working with Congress to address these shared challenges and opportunities. I appreciate your longstanding bipartisan approach to national security issues and would look forward to working in partnership with this Committee and consulting regularly with Congress, if confirmed.

Thank you for considering my nomination, and I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Dr. Wallander follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CELESTE ANN WALLANDER

Good morning Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Under Secretary Kahl for their trust in my ability to serve in this role. It is also a privilege to appear on this

panel with esteemed colleagues who have also been nominated for Assistant Secretary roles. If confirmed, it would be my honor to work alongside them and ensure coordination between the regional and functional policy offices within the Department.

I would like to take a moment to thank my Dad, who served in the U.S. Navy and is a retired Chicago police officer, and my Mom, who immigrated to the United States as a little girl from Europe after World War II. They taught me the gift of American citizenship, and the duty to serve our country. I also thank my husband Jeff and our children Nathaniel, Joseph, and Genevieve for their unshakeable love and support.

I am humbled by the prospect of returning to public service and rejoining OSD Policy. I previously served at the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2009 to 2012, and then on the National Security Council staff as the Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia from 2013 to 2017. These roles equipped me with the skills to manage critical defense relationships, navigate the interagency policy formation process, and develop national security policy in response to complex geopolitical contexts.

I have dedicated my career to both studying and working policy on European and Eurasian security, with a focus on Russian foreign, military, and security affairs. If confirmed, I would work to utilize my scholarly and government experiences in the service of U.S. national security.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs covers a broad regional portfolio that includes well over 100 countries and develops security policy, manages defense and military relations, and stewards Department resources to develop military capabilities, support security cooperation programs, conduct foreign military sales, and perform other key activities in those regions. I would be honored to lead the talented professionals supporting this vast portfolio should I be confirmed—working closely with Joint Staff and Combatant Command colleagues, and representing the Department of Defense within the interagency.

This regional portfolio presents some of the most difficult defense challenges facing the United States. I appreciate that Members of this Committee are closely tracking Russian threats against Ukraine. As a private citizen, I too have been deeply concerned about public reports regarding Russian military concentrations. If confirmed, I would develop policy and strategic options for the Secretary to consider to deter Russia, ensure appropriate response to Russian aggression, and safeguard United States and Transatlantic security.

I support the Biden Administration's work to unite NATO on deterrence and diplomacy, as well as provide continued defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine. I also support the Administration's close consultations with European allies and partners on options for deterrence, as well as serious consequences for Russia in the event of escalation. If confirmed, I will be ready and able to advance the Department's preparations for all contingencies. This will be my top priority, if confirmed, and, I would immediately focus on being briefed in-detail about the current state-of-play.

I share the goals and commitments advanced in the Global Posture Review, including an effective counterterrorism posture in the Middle East and robust deterrence against Iran. Our force protection mission is also essential, particularly in the face of attacks by Iranian proxies in Iraq. If confirmed, I will also advance our strategy in Africa to build partner capacity, strengthen African security institutions, and counter violent extremist organizations.

This portfolio also contains some of the greatest opportunities for American national security and our key defense interests. I share Secretary Austin's view that China is the pacing challenge for the Department. I also share his view that the strength of our alliances and partnerships is one of our greatest assets—in that challenge, and all others. If confirmed, I will prioritize these critical defense partnerships in order to strengthen our security and deter our adversaries.

The responsibilities of International Security Affairs require thoughtful and sustained military diplomacy with our allies and partners across the globe. I know that Members of this Committee recognize the importance of this mission, and I am personally invested in engaging with Congress to address these shared challenges and opportunities. I appreciate your longstanding bipartisan approach to national security issues and would look forward to working in partnership with this Committee and consulting regularly with Congress, if confirmed.

Thank you for considering my nomination and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.  
Ms. Dalton, please?

**STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA G. DALTON, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS**

Ms. DALTON. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be considered as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.

I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Kahl for their trust and confidence in me.

I wish to thank my family, friends, and mentors for their encouragement, particularly, my husband and true north, Jason, who is here today; my two amazing children, Jacob and Isabelle; and my parents, Ann and Ravi.

My father chose to make this country his own as an immigrant from India. He and my mother imbued within me a deep respect for the foundational values of our great Nation. I come from a family committed to public service and have been drawn to it since I was 22 years old. I am honored by the prospect of serving in this new capacity.

I began my career at the Defense Department as a civil servant during the Bush administration and served for a decade in several policy and intelligence roles. I then spent 6 years at the bipartisan think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I was honored to return to OSD Policy last January as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities as a member of the Biden-Harris administration.

If confirmed, I would bring my experience as a defense leader, thinker, and practitioner to the position.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, I would look forward to advancing enduring Department priorities and new focus areas, such as Arctic security and climate policy, if confirmed. My office would prioritize issues that impact our homeland defense as the Department's number one priority.

If confirmed, my priority would be defeating the COVID-19 pandemic, which remains the most immediate threat to U.S. national security and to the health, safety, and readiness of our servicemembers; in addition, if confirmed, I would ensure DOD maintains resilience to execute our most critical national security functions, and to provide continuity to other parts of Government, in the face of all hazard threats. The resilience of our critical infrastructure and capabilities at home strengthens deterrence of potential adversary aggression and enables a robust foreign policy abroad.

If confirmed, I would ensure DOD's unparalleled and flexible capacity is leveraged effectively and appropriately in support of Federal, State, and local leadership, law enforcement, public health, and emergency management.

Under the updated OSD-Policy organization, Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs will also focus on Arctic security and global resilience. The Arctic is a complex theater of growing strategic importance. I appreciate this Committee's leadership in prioritizing this region.

In addition, as Secretary Austin has stated, to keep the Nation secure, we must tackle the existential threat of climate change. Climate change already touches most of what the Department does, and this threat will continue to have implications for U.S. national security.

Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs is also the office from which DOD supports civil authorities responding to extreme weather events, including wildfires and hurricanes.

If confirmed, I would provide oversight of these distinct, but also interrelated issues, as part of a whole-of-government approach.

If confirmed, my office would unite policymaking on both sides of the Southwest Border, bringing our defense relationships with Central and South American neighbors under the same policy oversight umbrella as our support to the Department of Homeland Security and local partners on the border. This organization will help us make better and more holistic policy across these issues to address the drivers of migration and effects in the Homeland as part of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

More broadly, if confirmed, I would seek to forge even deeper bonds with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, based on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment to economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.

On the many issues in this portfolio, DOD plays a critical supporting role to other departments and agencies.

If confirmed, I am committed to making sure that DOD supports civil authorities to the best of our ability, without compromising DOD's core missions and warfighting readiness. I would also focus on building relationships and trust across Government and reinforcing the strong tradition of healthy civil-military relations in the Department and in our democracy, to do this job as effectively as possible, if confirmed.

I have deep appreciation for this Committee and its role in the formation and oversight of our national security policy.

If confirmed, I commit to consulting with you regularly to advance our Nation's priorities in an , bipartisan, and cooperative spirit together.

Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MELISSA DALTON

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be considered as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. I am grateful to President Biden, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Kahl for their trust and confidence in me.

I wish to thank my family, friends, and mentors for their encouragement, particularly my husband and true north Jason, my two amazing children Jacob and Isabelle, and my parents, Ann and Ravi. My father chose to make this country his own as an immigrant from India. He and my mother imbued within me a deep respect for the foundational values of our great Nation. I come from a family committed to public service and have been drawn to it since I was 22 years old. I am honored by the prospect of serving in this new capacity.

I began my career at the Defense Department as a civil servant during the Bush Administration and served for a decade in several policy and intelligence roles. I then spent six years at the bipartisan think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I was honored to return to OSD Policy last January as Prin-

cial Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities as a member of the Biden-Harris Administration. If confirmed, I would bring my experience as a defense leader, thinker, and practitioner to the position.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, I would look forward to advancing enduring Department priorities and new focus areas, such as Arctic security and climate policy, if confirmed. My office would prioritize issues that impact our Homeland defense as the Department's number one priority. If confirmed, my priority would be defeating the COVID-19 pandemic, which remains the most immediate threat to U.S. national security and to the health, safety, and readiness of our Service Members. In addition, if confirmed, I would ensure DOD maintains resilience to execute our most critical national security functions, and to provide continuity to other parts of the government, in the face of all-hazard threats. The resilience of our critical infrastructure and capabilities at home strengthens deterrence of potential adversary aggression and enables a robust foreign policy abroad. If confirmed, I would ensure DOD's unparalleled and flexible capacity is leveraged effectively and appropriately in support of Federal, State, and local leadership; law enforcement; public health; and emergency management.

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On many of the issues in this portfolio, DOD plays a critical supporting role to other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I am committed to making sure that DOD supports civil authorities to the best of our ability, without compromising DOD's core missions and warfighting readiness. I would also focus on building relationships and trust across government and reinforcing the strong tradition of healthy civil-military relations in the Department and in our democracy, to do this job as effectively as possible, if confirmed.

I have deep appreciation for this Committee and its role in the formation and oversight of our national security policy. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with you regularly to advance our Nation's priorities in an active, bipartisan, and cooperative spirit together.

Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

Dr. Plumb, please?

**STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, NOMINEE TO BE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY**

Dr. PLUMB. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of the Committee, thank you. I am both, proud and humbled, to be testifying before you today. I have always admired and respected the thoughtful, bipartisan work of this Committee.

I would like to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Deputy Secretary Hicks for their trust in me and in my ability to

continue to serve the Nation, if confirmed as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.

I would like to thank, also, my parents, who are here today, and my brother and sisters, and my wife and kids for their love and support, that allows me to be here before you today, and being here is, indeed, an honor.

I grew up in rural, Western New York, in a family for whom service to country is a proud tradition. Both my grandfathers were in the Army Air Corps during World War II.

My father was in the Army for the first 4 years of my life, at Fort Richardson in Alaska. I have a brother and a sister who serve in the Air Force, and as for me, I joined the Navy and became a submarine officer.

Since leaving Active Duty, I have remained active in the Navy Reserves for two decades. As a civilian, I have served in these very halls as the military advisor to Senator Ken Salazar. I have served in the Pentagon, and I have served on the National Security Council staff.

If confirmed, I believe my lifetime of service has prepared me to better advance and defend U.S. national security interests, and to work with this Committee while doing so.

The ASD for Space Policy position appropriately elevates the space portfolio within the Policy organization.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee to ensure space receives the attention, the prioritization, and the resources this critical domain demands. Space, nuclear weapons, missile defenses, cyber, and the ability to detect and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are all key to U.S. national security, and the integration of these capabilities is essential for the era of strategic competition the U.S. must now rise to meet.

As Members of this Committee are well aware, the security environment facing the United States at this moment in history is a challenging one. Secretary Austin has articulated that China is the pacing challenge for the Department, and China's behavior with its own strategic capabilities is a matter of grave concern. From its kinetic anti-satellite weapon test in 2007 that created a persistent debris cloud, to the uncontrolled reentry of a rocket stage last May, China has yet to demonstrate that it is a responsible spacefaring nation.

In the cyber domain, the growing pace and scale of cyberattacks from China far exceeds the bounds of traditional statecraft. The Commander of United States Strategic Command has expressed concern that China's nuclear forces are in the midst of a strategic breakout. Reports of a hypersonic glide vehicle test in August, via a fractional orbit bombardment system, if true, are deeply troubling, and maybe most troublesome of all is China's near, total lack of transparency regarding its strategic capabilities, and its demonstrated unwillingness to discuss them.

Russia also continues to present a challenge on multiple fronts. Russian activities in space, including its destructive ASAT test just this November, are an ongoing concern. Russia's reliance on, and integration of, nuclear weapons throughout its forces, from the tactical to strategic, is troubling. Russian cyber activity includes State

tolerance of cyber criminals and State-sponsored weaponization of social media.

Amid all these problems, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, while Iran's uranium enrichment presents both, a nuclear proliferation and a security challenge.

I understand the Department is diligently working to strengthen our deterrence posture: modernizing our nuclear deterrent, modernizing our infrastructure, improving our cyber defenses and capabilities, and working to protect and defend our interests, not just on Earth, but in space.

If confirmed, I will work to continue these efforts, while seeking to incorporate our allies as fully as possible.

I firmly believe our allies provide a mutual, strategic advantage that neither China, nor Russia could ever hope to match.

I believe the U.S. is at its strongest and best when national security is a bipartisan effort, and that is, the old adage goes: Politics really should stop at the water's edge.

If confirmed, that is how I intend to approach the position and its attendant responsibilities, and if confirmed, I commit to working closely with this Committee to ensure U.S. national security interests are advanced and defended.

Thank you once more for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Dr. Plumb follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JOHN F. PLUMB

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of the Committee—thank you. I am both proud and humbled to be testifying before you today. I have always admired and respected the thoughtful, bipartisan work of this Committee.

I would like to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Deputy Secretary Hicks for their trust in me and in my ability to continue serving the Nation if confirmed as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.

Thanks also to my parents, my brother and sisters, and my wife and children for their love and support that allows me to be here before you today, and being here is indeed an honor.

I grew up in rural Western New York, in a family for whom service to country is a proud tradition. Both my grandfathers were in the Army Air Corps during World War II. My father was in the Army for the first four years of my life, stationed at what was then Fort Richardson in Alaska. I have a brother and a sister who served in the Air Force. As for me, I joined the Navy and became a submarine officer.

Since leaving Active Duty, I have remained active in the Navy reserves for two decades. As a civilian, I have served in these very halls as the military advisor to Senator Ken Salazar; I have served in the Pentagon; and I've served on the National Security Council staff. If confirmed, I believe my lifetime of service has prepared me to better advance and defend U.S. national security interests, and to work with this Committee while doing so.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy position appropriately elevates the space portfolio within the Policy organization. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee to ensure space receives the attention, prioritization, and resources this critical domain demands. Space, nuclear weapons, missile defenses, cyber, and the ability to detect and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are all key to U.S. national security. The integration of these capabilities is essential for the era of strategic competition the U.S. must now rise to meet.

As Members of this Committee are well aware, the security environment facing the United States at this moment in history is a challenging one. The Secretary has articulated that China is the pacing challenge for the Department, and China's behavior with its own strategic capabilities is a matter of grave concern. From its ki-

netic anti-satellite weapon test in 2007 that created a persistent debris cloud, to the uncontrolled reentry of a rocket stage last May, China has not yet demonstrated that it is a responsible spacefaring nation.

In the cyber domain, the growing pace and scale of cyberattacks from China far exceeds the bounds of traditional statecraft. The Commander of United States Strategic Command has expressed concern that China's nuclear forces are in the midst of a strategic breakout. Reports of a hypersonic glide vehicle test in August via a fractional orbit bombardment system, if true, are deeply troubling. Perhaps most troublesome of all is the near-total lack of transparency by China regarding its strategic capabilities, and its demonstrated unwillingness to discuss them.

Russia also continues to present a challenge on multiple fronts. Russian activities in space—including its destructive ASAT test in November—are an ongoing concern. Russia's reliance on, and integration of, nuclear weapons throughout its forces is problematic. Russian cyber activity includes state tolerance of cyber criminals and state-sponsored weaponization of social media.

Amid these growing problems, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, while Iran's uranium enrichment presents both a nuclear proliferation and a security challenge.

I understand the Department is diligently working to strengthen our deterrence posture – by modernizing our nuclear deterrent and infrastructure; improving our cyber defenses and capabilities; and working to protect and defend our interests not just on earth but in space. If confirmed, I will work to continue these efforts while seeking to incorporate our allies as fully as possible. Our allies provide a mutual strategic advantage that neither China nor Russia can ever hope to match.

I believe the United States is at its strongest and best when national security is a bipartisan effort, and that—as the old adage goes—politics should stop at the water's edge. If confirmed, that is how I intend to approach the position and its attendant responsibilities, and if confirmed, I commit to working closely with this Committee to ensure U.S. national security interests are advanced and defended.

Thank you once more for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

I have a series of standard questions, which survey nominees must respond to. You may answer together.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its Subcommittees and other appropriate Committees of Congress receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this Committee when requested?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this Committee, its Subcommittees, or other appropriate Committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor regarding a basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such records?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established by this Committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses and briefers in response to a congressional request?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

Ms. Dalton, it was just announced this morning that the President and Secretary Austin have directed the deployment of approximately 1,000 military medical personnel to several states, including the state of Rhode Island, to provide support with the Omicron variant proliferation.

One of your responsibilities, as you have indicated, is to cooperate the support, such as this, to states, to localities, to the Northern Command, et cetera.

Are you concerned about the strain that the Defense Support of Civil Authorities is placing on our Active forces and also our National Guard?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for the question.

This terrible pandemic, unfortunately, has taken countless lives over the last 2 years and it is the most immediate threat to the United States and Americans, and so, I believe that the National Guard has played a really important role in supporting local medical authorities and in the development and production of vaccines.

If confirmed, I would look forward to building upon these efforts to support civil authorities, as appropriate, but as you indicated, Senator, an important element of determining the appropriate use of the DSCA authority is looking towards warfighting readiness. The Secretary has made clear that the number one pacing challenge for the Department is China.

So, I would look forward to applying that framework, if confirmed.

Chairman REED. Well, thank you very much.

Dr. Wallander, you are being nominated for a very critical position at the moment because of the situation on the Ukrainian border. But you were, I believe, in the White House on the National Security Council in 2014 when Russia moved into the Crimea and Donbas.

Can you reflect about how those experiences will shape or help your response in your analysis of these issues?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for your focus on this critical issue for American and allied national security at this time.

Russia has proven itself to be willing and able to use multiple instruments in pursuit of its national security goals, including preventing Ukraine from continuing the path of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. I believe that the lessons of 2014 were that the United States needs to be, first and foremost, unified with our allies and partners, not only in Europe, but globally, in order to provoke a unified front to the Kremlin and make them understand that they cannot divide us. The second lesson would be to rapidly develop ways to impose costs on the Russian leadership and to support Ukraine in defense of its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Chairman REED. Thank you.

Dr. Plumb, the office you are nominated to lead is nearly identical to the Office of Global Strategic Affairs, which was abolished in 2014, except that the Office of Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy has now been abolished with the nuclear policy mission being merged into an Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, now renamed: Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Policy.

If confirmed, and given our circumstances with Russia and China, can you use this new arrangement to maintain our critical strategic deterrence policy, and in that response, why did we need such a reorganization?

Dr. PLUMB. Thank you very much, Senator.

Just from the top, let me just say our nuclear deterrence mission is absolutely critical. Secretary Austin has called it the Department of Defense's number one priority. I fully agree with that assessment.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is safe, strong, effective, and credible. As for the ability to maintain the offices, so inside this office, the Secretary transferred policy, in my experience, there are individual offices. The offices move as a unit.

So, the Nuclear Weapons Policy Office remains intact; it is now merged with the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. I think there is actually some advantage to having those two offices in the same, underneath the same DESI-ship because it requires them to coordinate with each other and be aware of each other at a level that, perhaps, they weren't in previous organizations.

The logic to the reorg, I guess, I would say I think there is a good logic to it. I think the functional aspects of Department of Defense need to be integrated as we approach the adversaries, and, our near-peer adversaries are the same in all domains: China and Russia, and so, for that, I think there is good logic in making sure that those plans and approaches are integrated. The adversary clearly sees us as a whole and not stovepiped.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

Senator Inhofe, please?

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a question for each one of the witnesses, and so I am going to ask for real fast responses and try to get to all three of them, in fact, we will get to all three of them.

Dr. Plumb, five of my colleagues and I recently sent a letter to senior administration officials expressing concern that President Biden might pursue changes to a longstanding United States nuclear declaratory policy, despite increasingly give moves by China and Russia and the clear objectives, objections that we have had from our allies.

Deputy Secretary Hicks agreed with our conclusion at her confirmation hearing, stating, I don't believe that a no-first-use policy is in the best interests of the United States.

Do you agree?

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, thank you.

I agree with Deputy Secretary Hicks. I personally, do not believe no-first-use is a good idea at this time, and I would say taking the allies into consideration is absolutely essential. My caveat here, of course, is declaratory policy is the purview of the President.

Senator INHOFE. Well, and, yeah, because I think it was pretty specific when she said, I don't believe no-first-use policy is in the best interests of the United States.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Wallander, China is aggressively modernizing its military and expanding its presence around the world and particularly true in Africa. I can remember it wasn't too long ago we didn't even have an AFRICOM and the continent was divided into three different commands. That was not workable; we didn't correct that, and so we have gotten a lot more attention.

However, China is becoming a lot more aggressive in Djibouti and other areas in there. General Townsend called it the number one global power competition concern.

This has been a concern of mine for a long period of time. Even at the time that we started its own dedicated command, but nonetheless, the problem is still there, and know that AFRICOM does not have the capabilities and resources to actually address this, and I think that is a problem.

Do you agree that it is a problem that we lack resources in taking care of the needs that we have in our allies in that continent?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for your focus on the issue of Chinese and Russian strategic competition, active in Africa. I share your concern.

I, if confirmed, look forward to building on the existing defense and security partnerships we have with our, with countries in Africa, and I believe and agree with you that we need to look at the resources, especially as China has pivoted towards seeking military access and presence. Senator INHOFE. All the way down through, and that is true.

I may come back if I have a minute, but, regardless, I look forward to visiting with you with regularity on this subject.

Ms. Dalton, the year 2021 witnessed the surge in illegal Southwest Border crossings and the Border Patrol recorded 174,000 encounters with illegal immigrants in November. That is a record for that month.

President Biden and his spokesperson have both referred to this as a crisis and I believe. I agree that it is a crisis.

I would like to ask if you agree that it is a crisis that we are facing right now on our Southwest Border?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting this challenge, and I agree with you that it is a serious situation on the Southwest Border.

If confirmed, I would look forward to working as part of an inter-agency effort both, in the Homeland context, working closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice to address the challenge, and then also working very closely with our Central and South American partners upstream to address some of the drivers of migration, I think.

Senator INHOFE. That is fine.

So, you agree that it is a crisis?

Ms. DALTON. Yes, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SHAHEEN. Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Let me begin by congratulating each of our nominees and thanking for your willingness to serve.

I would like to begin with you, Dr. Plumb. I chair the Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee and I have supported the effort to transition the civil space situation of awareness from the Space Force's 30th Space Wing to the Department of Commerce. Unfortunately, I have to say that the transition has been challenged by a lack of clarity on the cost of that mission. There has not been a willingness on the part of the agency to be forthcoming on the cost and that puts us in a really difficult position, with respect to how much money we need to try and appropriate for the Department of Commerce.

So, if confirmed, will you commit to working with me to improve the Department of Defense's transparency on this issue so that we can better make that transition and ensure that the funding is there that is going to be needed?

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, thank you for that question.

I think space-traffic management is absolutely essential and I do agree that it should be conducted by a civil agency and not the Department of Defense. I will commit to you to help discover the right amount of resources and training and opportunities needed to make that shift.

It is a difficult shift, but I think it is needed.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Wallander, in your article "NATO's Enemies Within," you stated that NATO actually faces new vulnerabilities as we see some of its recent members that are drifting towards authoritarianism; Hungary the one that comes most to mind.

But that gives Russia more insights into what is happening at NATO at a very critical time.

So, can you talk about what your role might be and what the appropriate role of the Department of Defense ought to be as we look at what is happening with some of those countries in NATO.

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you. Thank you for reading my article and thank you for highlighting the importance of NATO as a military alliance, but a military alliance of democratic countries. The strength of NATO lies in the defense and military capabilities of its members, but also the quality of its democratic governance of its members.

It is in that regard, if confirmed, I would focus on, as the Defense Department does in its security and defense partnerships with allies and partners, issues of democratic governance, civilian control of the military.

The strong bond of NATO allies, that is part of what keeps it strong, and as you note, limits the influence of Russian corrupt political and business relationships.

Senator SHAHEEN. Would you agree that right now, given Russia's threat to Ukraine, that that is particularly critical? It was disappointing to hear the readout from the meeting yesterday that Russia was suggesting that because we are not willing to give them a veto threat over who joins NATO that it is going to, it sounded like it encourages them to think about invading Ukraine.

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I very much share your concern at Russian threats and statements. I think we see the efforts of Rus-

sia to prevent another aspirant country, Ukraine, which seeks that democratic, Euro-Atlantic future and Russia leverages, not just military capabilities, but political and economic influence, to try to prevent that from happening.

If confirmed, I will focus on, again, not just defense relationships and capabilities, but the quality of the democratic transitions and governance.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

This question is really both for you and Ms. Dalton. As you know, the Syrian democratic forces have stated that they are not able to take long-term responsibility for ISIS detainees and for the camps that currently house so many of the families of those ISIS detainees. The one in Syria, Al-Hol, comes most to mind with 60,000 women and children, who are family members of ISIS fighters, and most assessments of what is happening there suggests that that camp is a hotbed for radicalization of the family members who are there.

So, do you believe that addressing the plight of those detainees in Syria should be included in strategic planning processes as we are looking at how we continue to address potential threats from terrorism?

Ms. Dalton, I will ask you to respond first.

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting this concern. It is an issue that I focused on in my prior affiliation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Certainly, in my present position, I do believe that we need to be looking at both, the security and the humanitarian facets of this challenge set, and I am sure that that is the approach that my colleagues working counterterrorism and humanitarian affairs in the Department in the interagency are taking. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Do you agree with that, Dr. Wallander?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I fully agree with what Ms. Dalton said. I agree it is a combined security challenge and humanitarian problem that we have to take seriously and work through a whole-of-government approach to resolve.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Hopefully, we will see an ISIS detainee coordinator appointed as this Committee and the NDAA in 2020 requested.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator WICKER, please?

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.

To our first witness, Doctor, how should we pronounce your last name?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, however you like, but Wallander.

Senator WICKER. All right. Okay.

Well, Dr. Wallander, you were, you served in the administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Policy from 2009 to 2012; a very hot issue, and then you moved over as Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia from 2013 to 2017, which means you were right there when Russia invaded the sovereign nation of Ukraine.

Do you think our policy, in response to that invasion, at the time, was correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for highlighting this extremely important question. I share your concern about this long track record of Russian aggression against its neighbors, including Ukraine.

I believe that our response in 2014 was too slow and too incremental.

If confirmed, I would apply the lessons that I learned, and I believe others in the United States national security community, learned to better address Russia's ongoing and heightened aggression against its neighbors.

Senator WICKER. I would go farther than you. You said it was too slow and too incremental.

We really didn't provide them with any lethal weapons for quite a period of time; is that correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. That is correct, Senator.

Senator WICKER. I noticed in answer to an earlier question, you talk about a unified approach with Europe and imposing costs. I do think I understand you to say that providing lethal weapons to Ukraine would also be part of your approach, your recommended approach to the President; is that correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, Senator; that is correct.

Senator WICKER. Let me ask you, I appreciate the question that the distinguished senator from Oklahoma asked about no-first-use.

Do you think Russia would have invaded Ukraine in 2014 if they had retained their nuclear capability, rather than giving it up after the breakdown of the Soviet, the breakup of the Soviet Union?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I think a full answer to your question would depend on the trajectory of how Ukrainian security and defense forces maintain control and modernization of those forces. I think we have to count concerns about proliferation in our assessment of that trajectory.

But I believe that, that was the correct course of action to support non-proliferation at the time. The focus, if confirmed, of our security and defense cooperation that I would support would be Ukraine's conventional defense capabilities and the enablers it needs to be able to counter the enormous Russian threat.

Senator WICKER. You know, Dr. Wallander, I think we all thought that at the time.

President Zelensky, the overwhelmingly elected President of the sovereign nation of Ukraine, is in support of a cruise initiative that the Senate may vote on today, which would impose sanctions on Russian entities associated with the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline.

It is a fact that Vladimir Putin has amassed some 100,000, plus or minus, Russian troops on the border of the sovereign Ukrainian nation; is that correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, that is correct, and I would add—

Senator WICKER. So, they have taken a very aggressive action.

Does it seem to you, advisable, to take the advice of the person who is in the hottest of hot seats, and that is the President of the sovereign nation, and say, let's go ahead and respond to this very aggressive action?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I am not fully aware of the proposal that you are referring to, but I agree that the United States needs multiple elements in its toolkit to include sanctions, to include con-

tinued and probably enhanced defensive, legal assistance to Ukraine, and to look at NATO posture in Eastern Europe in order to defend and deter against Russian aggression.

Senator WICKER. Well, we could do that.

Briefly, do you think adding two destroyers based in Rota, to the four that we already have, would also be an effective deterrent to Russia's aggressive ambitions?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I am not briefed on intelligence assessments, but I will say from my understanding of publicly available information, that the Russian presence and activities in the Black Sea, in particular, are of significant concern.

If confirmed, I would want to look at the U.S. naval presence and posture, along the lines of what you suggest.

Senator WICKER. If you could supplement that answer on the record, I would appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.

Senator Blumenthal, please?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I join in thanking all of you for your service, your previous service, and your willingness to serve in the future.

Ms. Wallander, I would like to continue the conversation that you were having with Senator Wicker. Have there been indications, so far as you are aware in, let's say the last week, of increasing mobilization at various points, by the Russian military in possible preparation for an engagement?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I will repeat. As a private citizen, I don't have access to classified assessments; however, I have been tracking the public information available on the matters that you raise and it is my understanding that there are some signs of continuing Russian redeployment of forces from east in the country, further west, and that is a matter of considerable concern. Not just forces, but heavy, armored forces.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So, there are some indications that this situation may be coming to a head?

Dr. WALLANDER. There is plenty of reason to assess, Senator, that it is certainly not de-escalating and it may be escalating.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you think that the United States has sent sufficient arms, particularly, Javelin anti-armor weaponry, Stinger anti-aircraft weaponry? Do you think that we can make clearer, not only our strong support for Ukraine, but also provide the very specific weaponry needed by Ukraine to defend itself?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I thank you for focusing on Ukraine's defense needs to counter the Russian aggression.

I would like to thank this Committee and the Senate, actually, in a bipartisan manner over many years, to support Ukraine's defensive capabilities, because Ukraine is in a much stronger position to be able to resist and fight against a Russian invasion, should it happen.

To answer your question specifically, I think those are the kinds of capabilities in it heightened threat environment that, if confirmed, I would want to look at in order to enable Ukraine to deal with this escalation of Russian capability that we have discussed.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I assume that you want to do more than look at it, because time is not on our side here. I would hope that you would urge, as imminently as possible, in fact, even before your confirmation, perhaps, that the United States take more aggressive and strong action to bolster Ukrainian systems with radar systems, with the Javelin anti-armor missiles, with Stinger and other anti-aircraft missiles, and other capability that will show Vladimir Putin that we mean business, because in my view, that is the only sign that he will respect, other than strong economic sanctions.

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I agree with you; those are core requirements that Ukraine needs in the face of the force that Russia has amassed.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me ask you on a different topic, Ms. Wallander. The United States, in its withdrawal from Afghanistan promised, in fact, the President, himself, promised that we would not leave behind our at-risk, Afghan allies, who have stood by us over the 20 years of war and now have targets on their back. Many of them are in hiding.

They are in desperate and dire straits, particularly, during the approaching winter.

Has the United States done enough to enable those at-risk, Afghan allies to evacuate? Shouldn't we be doing more?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I share your concern deeply with what we have seen, and the fact that the United States was not able, along with our partners who stepped up and really supported the effort to evacuate and provide safe haven for those individuals.

If confirmed, I commit to you that I will participate with my interagency colleagues and with colleagues at the Defense Department to ensure that we are doing everything possible to assist those individuals and to find them safe haven and exit from Afghanistan, if they desire.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you for that answer.

I will look forward to submitting some additional questions for the record on this topic.

My time has expired. But I welcome your commitment to do everything possible. Right now, our country is doing far less than everything possible and I hope that we will step up our efforts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thanks, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Fischer, please?

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before turning to my questions, I would like to speak to some of my colleague's concerns about changes to our declaratory policy that this administration is reportedly considering.

I think it is important to remember that the Obama administration rejected these changes in a far more benign security environment than what we are currently seeing today. With China's nuclear breakout and Russia amassing forces on Ukraine's border, adopting a no-first-use, or sole-purpose policy, would be irresponsible and it would strain relations with our allies at the worst possible moment. As Senator Blumenthal just said, we must show that we mean business; that is what President Putin respects, and that applies in this area, as well.

Dr. Plumb, in your response to the Committee's advanced policy questions about establishing norms of behavior in space, you acknowledge that Russian and Chinese behavior clearly demonstrates that the prospect of establishing an effective agreement is not realistic at this time.

Do you support a dual-track approach that involves deploying the capabilities necessary to send credible, deterrent messages to our adversaries, while continuing to work with allies and partners to lay the foundation for future discussion about responsible behavior in space?

Dr. PLUMB. Thank you, Senator, for that question.

I think, just as the first ASD for Space Policy nominee, it is a really essential piece of the work I hope to be able to do, if confirmed.

There are two totally different facets there and I would just say I agree with you on both. One is, I do think there is a need for rules and for norms in space behavior. I hold some deep kernel of hope that we could come to an agreement with Russia and China on that in some not-too-distant future.

At the same time, nothing there would, in my mind, prevent us, or preclude us, from pursuing both, offensive and defensive capabilities to ensure that we can defend our own assets and prevail in a conflict.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. Also, can you talk about how you view the relationship between nuclear modernization and arms control? Sometimes you see these as competing priorities and I view them, instead, as complementary, because without modernization, our forces will become obsolete and our adversaries will have no incentive to negotiate for any kind of reductions.

So, what is your view on that?

Dr. PLUMB. Thanks, again, Senator.

As we discussed on our phone call, I am fully onboard with modernizing the nuclear triad. I think it is absolutely essential, that our nuclear deterrent, which is the bedrock of our deterrence, is safe, effective, and I want to say credible, and I think modernization is part of that credibility.

As far as the relationship with arms control, arms control is important. It is not, you don't do arms control to its own end; arms control is to advance the national security of both, or as many parties are involved in the talks, and I agree with your assessment that if you have nothing to trade, there is no incentive to be at the table.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you.

Dr. Wallander, over the weekend, several reports suggested the administration was considering cutting United States presence in Europe as a bargaining chip in the upcoming negotiations with Russia, and in response, the White House issued a statement, explicitly rejecting this, stating, "the administration is not weighing cuts to troops in Europe."

I assume you agree with this and would recommend against cutting United States presence in Europe; is that accurate?

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, Senator; I do agree and would so recommend, if confirmed.

Senator FISCHER. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer.

Senator HIRONO, please?

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the nominees. I ask the following two initial questions of all nominees before any of the Committees on which I sit. So, I would like to ask you these questions en masse.

Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual behaviors or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Senator HIRONO. No.

Have you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Senator HIRONO. I have a question for Dr. Wallander. Last year, the United States, Australia, and the U.K. entered into an historic security alliance, the AUUKUS, which includes plans to provide Australia with technology and support to build nuclear-powered submarines, within the next few decades.

Additionally, this alliance will facilitate the sharing of many more technologies, including artificial intelligence, underwater systems, long-range strikes, cyber, and many others. These types of agreements lead to enhance interoperability and deepen cooperation among allies within the region.

From your perspective, how important are security alliances like AUUKUS to United States national defense and how will this alliance benefit United States security interests in the INDOPACOM AOR?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I admire and fully support the development of AUUKUS as a multilateral alliance for coping with the challenge of China in the Indo-Pacific, specifically. I would note that because the U.K. is one of the members of that alliance, it is a great example of how Europe can join with the United States and a regional country, Australia, to cope with Indo-Pacific challenges, including China. I hope it is the first, only the first instance of Europe taking seriously and contributing to coping with the China challenge.

Senator HIRONO. I agree with you that the cooperation or the inclusion of U.K. in this kind of alliance that is much more focused, I suppose, on China as a near-peer competitor to us is very significant, because we are all in this together. It is not just what is going on in Europe and what Russia is doing with regard to Ukraine and whatever intentions Russia has. These two countries are definitely our near-peer competitors.

Now, you will oversee security-cooperation programs and defense strategies impacting many regions across the globe.

Can you tell me how you would approach these tasks?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for focusing on this important question.

If confirmed, I would focus first on building on already existing, strong alliances and allied partnerships, allied relations and partnerships, which I want to highlight, we enjoy not only in Europe, but in Eurasia with countries, such as Georgia and in Africa and

in the Middle East. So, there is plenty of opportunity to build upon and expand as we cope with multiple challenges, not just Russia and China, but ongoing needs in the region, such as Iran, and countering violent extremism in many regions.

Senator HIRONO. Not to mention, North Korea.

So, I do have a question for Ms. Dalton. In the last week, North Korea has tested two ballistic missiles off their east coast. If confirmed, a key part of your responsibilities will include developing policy and planning for Homeland Defense.

In 2019, Missile Defense Review identified the Homeland Defense Radar Hawaii as a requirement for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from an increasingly capable North Korea. In successive budget requests, funding was zeroed out for HDRH–H Hawaii without any capability to replace it.

If confirmed, how will you support policy to ensure Hawaii is protected from missile threats from North Korea and elsewhere going forward?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting this concern. Insofar as Missile Defense of the Homeland, it is a central area of focus for the ongoing Missile Defense Review that Secretary Austin and senior defense officials are currently conducting.

If confirmed, I would look forward to implementing the findings of the MDR to ensure that the entirety of the United States Homeland and its territories are protected from threats, such as from North Korea.

Senator HIRONO. Mr. Chairman, if I may?

It is a continuing concern that the administration zeroes out Homeland Defense Hawaii without any alternative.

I am totally open to any other ways that Hawaii can be protected, and until then, you will know that I will continue to push for HDR–H.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono.

Senator Cotton, please?

Senator COTTON. Ms. Wallander, you testified that you think President Obama's administration made mistakes in 2014 with the invasion of Crimea and its annexation. You also say in both, your opening statement and in question 97 of the advanced questions for the record, that you support the continued provision of defensive weapons systems to Ukraine.

But that, do you mean to rule out the possibility of providing Ukraine with offensive weapons systems?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you.

That is a very good question because defense assistance needs to be properly focused on the requirements of the partner or ally. I am not read into classified assessments about the balance of offensive and defensive capabilities that would be appropriate for Ukrainian defense needs.

But I will say that I would not rule them out. I would want to, if confirmed, be fully briefed on Russia's capabilities and the threat it poses and Ukraine's requirements and take a comprehensive look at what is necessary for Ukraine to be able to defend its territory and its sovereignty.

Senator COTTON. Okay. So, you don't want to rule out the potential forever providing Ukraine offensive weapons. You just don't want to make a definitive statement on it, until confirmed and read into the intelligence and the situation on the ground?

Dr. WALLANDER. I think it would be, Senator, irresponsible, to speculate without having full access to the classified information and assessments.

Senator COTTON. I understand and appreciate that.

Would you consider Air Defense Artillery systems the kind of systems that could protect Ukraine against all of those Russian helicopters that are on its border, to be offensive or a defensive weapon?

Dr. WALLANDER. I believe Air Defense systems to be fundamentally defensive in nature, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Okay. If Russia decides to go for the jugular and you have got Russian tanks and armed personnel carriers rolling across Ukraine's borders, it would be nice for Ukraine to have artillery systems to strike those forces while they are still on Russian soil, wouldn't it?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I agree with you.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Artillery, that kind of artillery, you would characterize as an offensive weapon, correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. I, Senator, I would—

Senator COTTON. I would.

Dr. WALLANDER. No, I am not disagreeing with you.

I think that what becomes important is how such capabilities are deployed. They can be deployed in a more defensive posture and a more offensive posture, which is always one of the challenges.

I need not offer this to you, given your public service and experience, so it could go either way, depending on the posture and the operational utilization.

Senator COTTON. So, in 2014, we did not provide any kind of lethal aid to Ukraine. It was reported at the time, and since then, that President Obama thought it would be too provocative, that he even said that we are not going to risk a nuclear war, or World War III, over Ukraine.

In retrospect, do you think one of the specific mistakes made in 2014 was not providing systems like Javelin anti-tank weapons to Ukraine?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I believe that one of the lessons I have learned is that it would have been appropriate and necessary to provide Ukraine with what it needed to defend its territory, including the weapons you suggest.

Senator COTTON. Because the last administration provided Ukraine with Javelins and we didn't have World War III, or nuclear war, yet.

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, you are correct.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Mr. Plumb, I have a question for you about potential negotiations with Russia.

There have been some reports about the prospect of trading away the Aegis Ashore system in Romania; either removing it or reducing its presence as a bargaining chip with Russia. Some arguments that those systems could destabilize more than stabilize.

Would you support removing or reducing the Aegis Ashore system in Romania?

Dr. PLUMB. Thanks for that question, Senator.

I am unaware of that particular line of concern. I was actually instrumental in the Obama administration in establishing Aegis Ashore in Romania, and I guess I would say I would be very hesitant to try to use it as a bargaining chip, without understanding the full security context.

Senator COTTON. I understand. Not exactly in the Space Policy domain, but it is complementary to a lot of those efforts. Thank you.

Ms. Dalton, you will have responsibility, in part, for our Southwest Border. Do you think it is a greater danger to the American people's prosperity and security that there are a hundred thousand Russians on Ukraine's border or two million illegal migrants having crossed our Southwestern Border in the last year?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting both of these challenges and the scope of the security environment that we find ourselves in at present.

If confirmed, I would look forward to alleging the challenges specifically on the Southwest Border, working very closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other interagency counterparts and local authorities. As in discussing with Senator Inhofe earlier, I do believe it is a serious challenge.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Thank you.

Well, I hope you get some bright ideas for how to solve that problem, since it seems like most other parts of the administration so far have failed in that challenge.

Thank you all.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Cotton.

Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Gillibrand.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Dalton, the recent Log4J, SolarWinds, and Treasury Department hacks show how challenging cyber intrusions can be on our national security and we will continue to see these threats continue and elevate into 2022.

The office you are nominated for has, in the past, overseen the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, DCIP.

Do you think DCIP is up to date in its ability to provide solutions in the event of cyber or technological harm done to our critical infrastructure; further, do you see ways where DCIP can improve its work with the private sector and civilian institutions?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting this challenge, and this would be among the top priorities that I would plan to tackle, if confirmed, in this portfolio, because I do believe that we need to look at the appropriate frameworks, policies, approaches, and tool sets to be able to address state-based threats to our critical infrastructure that, unfortunately, have been manifesting over the last number of years.

So, if confirmed, I would certainly look forward to working with the Department of Homeland Security, CYBERCOM, with, if confirmed, Dr. Plumb's office, overseeing the DESI cyber policy to ensure that we have the right approaches, to understand the threat,

and to be able to provide the appropriate level of protection and resilience necessary to address that challenge. Thank you.

Senator GILLIBRAND. As a follow-up, can you speak to how you view the staffing and personnel challenges that the Government faces when it comes to cybersecurity and tech expertise. I repeatedly heard about cybersecurity and tech staffing deficiencies across Government agencies, including at the DOD.

What plans do you have for improving the recruitment, training, and retention of high-quality cyber and tech expertise at the Department and will you work with my office on issues regarding cyber and tech personnel?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting this.

I know there have been a number of external studies looking at this challenge, as well, the last number of years. I do agree that we need to remain focused on bringing in talent from academia, from the tech sector, more broadly, from the private sector, to really build within our ranks. I think there is also considerable capacity within the National Guard, given their career day jobs, as well, that we could be better harnessing. Absolutely, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with you and your team to advance those goals.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Mr. Plumb, as ASD for Space Policy, part of your duties will include coordinating our Space Policy and other agencies. What is your strategy for coordinating with our other agencies, like the State Department's Office of Space Affairs, to ensure that we are maintaining our leadership and promoting our values in space?

Dr. PLUMB. Thank you for that question, Senator.

I absolutely think that promoting values in space, including norms and rules of behavior, and helping lead the international community towards that is important.

The State Department, in my view, they should be the lead on these issues at the U.N., DOD, in support, and I have worked closely with my State counterparts and across the interagency to coordinate that type of messaging efforts.

Senator GILLIBRAND. I am concerned that our lack of international agreements barring conventional weapons in space has led to a space arms race that threaten our civil and commercial space systems in space.

Will you play a role in developing international norms about the use of weapons in space and add here to them while developing this policy?

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, thank you.

I do agree that the need for norms and rules of behavior in space is absolutely essential. I think one of the issues that make space unique is that destructive tests, like the Russians have recently conducted, challenges access to all spacefaring nations and we need to find ways to prevent that type of problem.

Senator GILLIBRAND. How will your organization work across the Department to effectively manage the threat of anti-satellite capabilities demonstrated by our adversaries, as you mentioned?

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, I think that anti-satellite capabilities, obviously, are on the tip of our minds right now, based on the Russian tests recently. It is absolutely essential to find a way through that.

I think one of the best ways the Department can pursue to nullify that type of behavior is an architecture that is resilient enough to withstand a blow to one or several satellites. I think being able to reconstitute quickly and having a resilient architecture makes the attractiveness of a target much less, and I think that is a really important place and I don't think we are moving fast enough, and we need to get going.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Dr. Wallander, my last few moments. We have heard reports of Russia conducting numerous cyberattacks against Ukrainian citizens to include directly threatening Ukrainian soldiers and their families through text messages.

What role can your office play in supporting the Ukrainian Government in countering those malicious activities?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for highlighting that Russian activities are not merely the apparent ones of conventional military-force concentrations, but actually, cover a spectrum of attacks and efforts to disable Ukrainian resistance and resilience, itself.

If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Dr. Plumb's team, if confirmed, and focusing on countering Russian cyber operations, in which public reporting is, we have had some success in the last few years, and we need to build on the capabilities and the experience that DOD has already implemented, in order to effectively help Ukraine resist those kinds of attacks.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Blackburn.

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Wallander, I want to come to you. You were the Russian Director at NSC at the time when things were happening in Eastern Europe, much like they are right now, including Russia's invasion of Crimea and the separatists that were there, the formatting of the separatists in the Donbas.

So, what parallels, very quickly, do you see between that time and currently what we are seeing with the Russian buildup on the Ukrainian border?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for that question.

I think it is an extremely important question.

Very briefly, in 2014, the Russians tried to pretend it wasn't Russian forces invading Crimea or infiltrating or operating in the Donbas. They sought a form of implausible deniability in order to invade Ukraine.

The difference is, right now, that facade of covert and covert operation has been pulled away and what we are seeing is direct threats and a direct amassing of Russian forces.

Senator BLACKBURN. Now, let me ask you this, following on with that, when you look at Russian leadership and Russian society, what parallels are you seeing between then and now?

Because, to us, it looks as if they are following much of the same pattern.

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I agree with you, and it is very concerning, because the Kremlin used its operations and its falsehoods about Ukraine to ramp up Russian domestic anger at Ukraine, at

the United States, and NATO. We are exactly seeing the same kind of efforts and operations to create that kind of false narrative that Russia is defending itself against American and NATO influence in Ukraine, when what Russia is doing is assaulting Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Senator BLACKBURN. Well, I agree with you that what Putin is trying to do is to test that resolve with NATO and with the United States.

So, do you support a continued, robust EUCOM exercise schedule to really support our allies and deter this aggression?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I do. A robust exercise calendar not only enhances interoperability and capabilities, and that is important for deterrence and defense, but it signals that—

Senator BLACKBURN. But what about increasing our lethal assistance, our cyber, our intel support, where are you there?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I believe that the heightened Russian threat and its willingness to deploy those forces and to saber-rattle requires a re-evaluation of Ukraine's defense and military needs. If confirmed, I would focus on that and take appropriate lessons.

Senator BLACKBURN. All right. The EFPs, I had the opportunity to visit some of our Tennessee troops that were there on an EFP mission in Poland.

Where, as the NSC Director for Russia at the time, did you support the EFPs? Do you believe they should be supported today? Should we continue this participation?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I do support that framework for enhancing American presence and contributions to the security and operations of our partners and allies, especially our allies in the instance that you cite in Poland.

Senator BLACKBURN. Well, if Russia invades Ukraine, should we establish more of the EFP battle groups and push further south?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I agree with you that if Russia further invades Ukraine, we need to reevaluate NATO posture, including United States contributions to NATO posture, and I would look at exactly the issues that you highlighted in your question, because I think they are key.

In principle, I would support an increased American, at least rotational presence in the region.

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. I am going to run out of time, but I did want to ask you about the parallels that you see between Russian and Chinese interests in Ukraine, if you could speak to that.

Dr. WALLANDER. Well, I believe, Senator, that Russia and China share a priority goal of undermining the United States-led network of norms and rules that govern global security and ensure the security of so many countries.

While China may not have a direct stake in Russia's aggression against Ukraine, I believe China watches carefully when the United States and the international community do not stand up to the principles of the U.N. charter and do not defend the rights of countries to choose their own futures, including their alliances.

Senator BLACKBURN. I will submit some questions to you and Dr. Plumb, dealing with nuclear presence and Nuclear Posture Review.

Thank you so much for your time today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.

Senator Kaine, please?

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe.

Congratulations to the nominees for your nominations; you are all highly qualified for these positions.

A couple of items, Ms. Dalton; first, congrats on being a UVA grad. There have been reports in the last day or so about more instances of Havana Syndrome regarding American diplomats who are currently in Geneva and Paris. The syndrome was first reported in Havana. It has been reported as affecting diplomats and other U.S. Governmental personnel around the globe and in the DMV in Virginia.

The Secretary of State has spoken about this. Their law enforcement agencies are involved, but I also know the DOD is involved in trying, (A), to determine causes and solutions and consequences. I think the, I would summarize the feelings of the Committee Members on both, the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, I sit on both, not being happy with the degree of information we have received about this or progress we have made on it in the couple of years that we have been talking about it.

I would hope that should you be confirmed with the responsibility over both, Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs that you would be diligent in working with the interagency process to determine what is going on and provide options, certainly, within your line of command, but including to Congress about what appropriate responses should be.

Do I have your commitment on that?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, yes, you do.

Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.

Dr. Plumb, I want to ask you a question about, just growing pangs with the Space Force and how we can manage those growing pangs effectively.

In 2006, this Committee did a significant overhaul of much of the Department's acquisition policies and we structured new entities. There had been an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, ATL, and we, instead, created new Under Secretaries for Research and Engineering and then Acquisition and Sustainment, and that split of the responsibilities has led to some challenges, so lessons learned, some growing pangs.

I think the Pentagon and others have tried to work through those, but when you are making a structural change of that kind, growing pangs are not unusual. The speed with which the Department established Space Force could likely lead to similar challenges.

Should you be confirmed, how will you try to ensure that this important new component of our defense, especially as we see peers engaging in activity that is threatening like the Russian anti-satellite test, how can you work to try to minimize growing pangs and maximize the quick effectiveness of this new component of our military?

Dr. PLUMB. So, thank you, Senator, for that question.

I will just commend the Committee on its creation of the Space Force. I think the time is appropriate for a separate service for space. Really, in the past several years, the importance and value of space has increased substantially and the threat to our assets in space has also increased exponentially.

I think this issue of growing pangs, you can never get rid of them, Senator, but I think helping ensure from a civilian oversight piece that the laser focuses are on both, speed of acquisition and making sure that we can counter threats as they emerge and get past this problem of—this is a non-trivial thing to say—the speed of the Pentagon and the speed of the Pentagon processes does not match the speed of the threat right now, and we need to work to fix that and that is a hard problem.

As far as warfighting, it is a new domain and there are going to be some growing pangs there. It has some similarities to cyber operations, as well. It is new and it needs to mature, and my goal is to help usher that along.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Dr. Plumb.

Then, Dr. Wallander, Senator Hirono asked you a question about AUUKUS and I share her enthusiasm for closer cooperation between the United States, Australia, and the U.K. in the Indo-Pacific. Great allies and I think there are great things we can do together.

But I will say, I was very disappointed in the rollout of AUUKUS and the bizarre exclusion and, really, almost humiliation of the French, who are a great security partner in the United States and are also a significant Indo-Pacific nation with a lot of equities in the Indo-Pacific.

You are not yet confirmed and not yet, sort of, in the family on this, but I will say, I have made efforts to get to the bottom of why AUUKUS was done in such a way that alienated an ally and why couldn't it have been conceived in such a way that would have included an ally and, thereby, made it more effective. I have yet to get a good answer from the administration about the breakdown that led to, in my view, taking a great achievement and sort of souring it right out of the gate.

So, I hope, should you be confirmed, you will, you know, be mindful of the challenges that are created and look for opportunities to work together, not just with Australia and the U.K., but to include France in efforts in the Indo-Pacific, because I think they have a lot of equity there and a lot of value to add.

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I share your concern and you have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will focus on all of our important allied relationships, especially that of France, because I agree with you about the value of that extraordinary alliance.

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Senator Hawley, please?

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to all the nominees for being here. Congratulations on your nominations.

Dr. Wallander, I enjoyed our conversation yesterday. Thanks for your time.

Let me start with you and let me start with the situation in Ukraine. You said when we spoke yesterday that you could imagine advocating sending more United States forces to Europe to reinforce NATO's eastern flank. I think you said the same today in the hearing.

My question is, wouldn't this perpetuate a sense among Europeans that they don't have to invest in their own militaries, but can rely on us in a time of exigency, as this may well soon be, in order to bail them out, for lack of a better word, in their security commitments?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for that question.

With all of our focus on what the United States would do, sometimes we don't elevate enough what we expect and need our allies to do. As part of a package of looking at American force posture and possible reinforcements to Europe, it would absolutely have to come totally integrated with European NATO member contributions in order to ensure we have the proper and deterrence capabilities.

Senator HAWLEY. You can tell, I am sure, from what we talked about yesterday and from my questions this morning that I am skeptical of sending additional United States troops to Europe for these reasons, but I appreciate your answer.

Let me ask you about NATO a little bit more broadly. Given the challenges that we are facing globally, and most notably, China's efforts to dominate Asia, do you think that this is the time when it is prudent or advisable for the United States to allow Ukraine to join NATO?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I share your larger concern about the Chinese challenge and agree with you that we can't lose focus on that. Any NSTA decisions we have to make about European security has to be mindful to that.

I fully support NATO's open-door policy. NATO is stronger if it is the alliance of strong, democratic countries with capabilities and the democratic governance; that is the hallmark of NATO.

If confirmed, I would support NATO's future membership, Ukraine's future membership in NATO if it meets the conditions and I would look forward to working with Ukrainian partners in order to make sure they meet those standards.

Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you about the NATO allies and their spending commitments. We talked about this yesterday on the phone.

A United States Ambassador to NATO, Julie Smith, sent me a letter prior to her confirmation in which she agreed that our NATO allies should spend more, I emphasize "more" than 2 percent of GDP on defense. The current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Grady, did the same. He agreed, for the record, in response to my questions, that our NATO allies need to spend more than 2 percent on defense.

When you and I spoke yesterday, we talked about this. I asked you this question and you said that in your opinion, that our allies should be spending more than 2 percent on defense. I would just like to get you on the record on that, if I could.

In your view, can you confirm for us that you think, in your opinion, it is time for our NATO allies to move beyond the Wales Pledge and commit to increase defense spending above 2 percent.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, Senator, I do.

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you for that.

Let me ask you about the situation with burden-sharing, again, back with in Europe. As I mentioned just a second ago, I think one of the reasons our European allies, especially Germany, have been slow to increase their spending is that they think the United States will bail them out in difficult situations.

Would you agree that our European allies are more likely to increase their spending if the United States reduces its overall force levels in the European theater?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I believe that our European allies do key their contributions to an assessment of American contributions. I think it is an interesting idea that a reduction in American contributions would lead to an increase in European contributions. I would want to ask the intelligence community for past, sort of, evidence about the rise and fall of contributions to give you a better answer.

My instinct is that persuasion and high expectations and clear requirements are the motivator for European contributions in common defense in NATO.

Senator HAWLEY. Just as thinking about it as a matter of incentives, Dr. Wallander, do you think that we should at least consider putting on the table, reducing our overall force posture in Europe so that our allies feel incentivized to defend themselves?

You and I talked about this on the phone, I mean, where I am coming from on this is, that we can't, the United States of America simply can't do it all at the same time.

We are facing a very acute challenge in the Indo-Pacific theater from China. We can't maintain, in my own view, we can't do what we need to do in that theater and maintain our current posture in Europe. We are going to have to make some hard choices somewhere, and they are hard choices, unless we are going to spend \$2 trillion a year on defense, which we are not going to do and we shouldn't do.

So, with that backdrop, I mean, what is your view on putting on the table with our European allies and say, listen, we may need to consider an overall force-posture reduction in Europe in order to meet our pressing security commitments elsewhere, I mean, what do you think about that?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I believe that as they face the heightened threat from Russia, this would not be the moment to put a reduction in American commitment to NATO on the table.

But what I would favor, if confirmed, is looking at how the United States can provide some of its advantages in enablers, in weapons system, in security cooperation with allies to ensure that we are properly resourcing the requirements in the Indo-Pacific, as you rightly point to, and yet sustaining defense and deterrence against Russia.

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much.

I will have some questions for the record for the rest of you. Thanks again.

Thank you, Dr. Wallander.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hawley.

Let me now recognize, via Webex, Senator King.

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Wallander, you heard earlier in this hearing, Dr. Plumb testified that he thought that the adoption of a no-first-use policy in the current Nuclear Posture Review would not be in the national security interest of the United States.

Do you agree with that conclusion?

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I do, Senator.

Senator KING. Second question. How would the allies react to the adoption of a no-first-use policy, particularly, Japan, and some of the Asia-Pacific allies?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for the important question. That is a fundamental reason why I do not support a no-first-use declaratory policy because I believe it would create concerns about the credibility of American defense commitments to our allies, in addition to possibly undermining the credibility in the eyes of our adversaries.

Senator KING. It could provoke some of those countries to develop their own nuclear weapons, which is going in exactly the opposite direction that we want in terms of nonproliferation; isn't that correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, yes, I agree; that is another reason.

Senator KING. Second question on Ukraine. It seems to me that everybody is trying to guess what is in Vladimir Putin's mind, but by making these very public high-level demands about membership in NATO and all the other things, he is setting up these negotiations to fail and leaving himself very little option, other than, either a humiliating retreat or invasion.

What do you make of this unusual negotiating strategy, where you make demands that you know aren't going to be met, and this is just a pretext for an invasion?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I share your analytical assessment of the possible courses of action and the reasons for the demands that Russia has made publicly, and it concerns me greatly for Ukraine's security and, indeed, for European and Euro-Atlantic security.

Senator KING. Let me turn to Ms. Dalton for a question. Ms. Dalton, this question is under attack and two people a day in my home state of Maine are dying. The attack is transnational drug shipments coming into this country that are literally killing Americans at a record rate over the last couple of years. It is an absolute tragedy.

Every year we have testimony [Audio malfunction.] We know of shipments coming by sea to North America from Latin America, but because of limitations on our capacity to react, we can only interdict 25 percent of the shipments we know about. It strikes me that this is one these things where it is falling in the cracks between the Coast Guard and the Navy.

Would you commit to me to really take a serious look at the allocation of resources so that we can do something about this, what I consider an outrageous failure of the United States Government,

to interdict shipments of drugs into this country that we know about?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting this challenge. It is why I think it was really important that President Biden's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance highlighted the threat of transnational criminal organizations both, to U.S. national security interests, as well as to allies and partners in our greater hemispheric region, which is why, if confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and other interagency counterparts to address this challenge.

I do believe that it is primarily a law enforcement function to address this challenge, but I do believe that there is an important role for the Department of Defense to play in support of those operations.

Senator KING. Well, if these were invaders headed for our borders to kill people, we wouldn't view it as a law enforcement function; we would view it as an invasion, as an attack. People are dying as a result of this.

So, I hope you rethink—you mentioned law enforcement. Somewhere, we have got to find the ships to stop these shipments. To say it is law enforcement and, you know, the Coast Guard doesn't have enough ships, that is not a satisfactory answer. As long as I keep having this testimony that we are only able to interdict 25 percent of the shipments that we know about, I am not going to be satisfied, and I hope you will rethink your answer and there will be an interagency discussion about an adequate response to this.

Dr. Plumb, just in a few seconds left, I am very worried that we are behind the curve on hypersonics. We are way behind the curve on hypersonics.

Do you agree that this should be an urgent matter both, in terms of the development of an offensive deterrent capacity, but also a defensive capacity, because I don't think any of our Missile Defense systems can cope with a 7,000-mile-an-hour maneuverable missile.

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, thanks for that question.

I agree, we are challenged by hypersonics defensively and from an offensive standpoint, at least from public reporting, it certainly appears that we are behind and need to focus on this challenge.

Senator KING. Well, I hope this is a "hair on fire" challenge about guarding our space.

Dr. Plumb, I really appreciate your answer.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King.

Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Manchin, please.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I appreciate it very much.

Dr. Wallander, do you foresee any positive or negative impacts to our relations with the new German Government in the event of sanctions imposed on companies involved with the planning and construction of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for the question.

My understanding of the composition of the new German Government is that there is a renewed skepticism of Russia and its role

in Europe and of, in particular, Russia's use of energy as a coercive tool against Europe and Russia's other neighbors.

If confirmed, I intend to fully explore the possibility, the opportunity for a closer alignment of United States assessment of Russia's use of energy and, in particular, as a tool of coercion for our national security policy.

Senator MANCHIN. Do you believe or have any knowledge that the German, the new German Government would honor its pledge to halt the Nord Stream 2 certification in event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I think we should take the German Government at its word and hold it to its commitments.

If confirmed, that would be, I believe, one of my supporting roles in a whole-of-Government, diplomatic approach to our allies in coping with this crisis that Russia has created.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you.

Dr. Plumb, since the institution of the Space Force, I have been concerned that we are going to leave our Space National Guard forces behind as we are standing up this new force and West Virginia has a very Active National Guard that we are very proud of.

Are you supportive of a Space National Guard?

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, thanks for that we.

I, myself, have been in the Reserves for 20 years and I am both, proud of and fully aware of the capabilities that Reserve and Guard functions can bring. I know that the Guard issue is before the Congress. My own personal view is there is value in Guard and Reserve support for the Space Policy.

Senator MANCHIN. How do you believe, sir that we could keep that, the continuing to expand capabilities in space and also keep equity between the Active and the Reserve component resources, and we are not seeing much movement on that, and that is what we are concerned about.

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, I would need to, if confirmed, I would like to look into this issue.

I do have friends that are in the Air National Guard that do Space Force missions, so I do know that those units exist. As far as the resource and balance, I would be happy to work with the Committee and you to look into that for you.

Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Wallander, back to you, again.

I have long had concerns, I oppose the JCPOA, known as the Iran Deal. I opposed that because I thought that any country that we are submitting back in should earn the rewards, other than, basically, and making them demonstrate their goodwill before we give it to them on the front end.

So, my question would be, do you believe that, generally, we should relax sanctions on Iran in the future before they demonstrate if we are back in negotiations again?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I am not fully briefed on the details of the negotiations, but to answer your question, I believe that the importance of those kinds of negotiations and agreements or if the parties meet the letter, strictly speaking, of the agreement, so I would not be in favor of relief on sanctions without full compliance of the terms of the agreement.

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. Dr. Plumb, I think you might have talked about this earlier, but the Russians and Chinese have a need in demonstrating their capability of their anti-satellite weapons. Given our military reliance upon satellites for navigation, communication, this capability can severely weaken, I believe, very, very much so, our military's ability to respond effectively in the opening hours of a conflict.

So, how prepared do you assess that we are to protect against these threats so that we won't be immobile?

Dr. PLUMB. Thanks, Senator.

The anti-satellite, kinetic, debris-cloud-causing tests both, to China and Russia, are deeply disturbing and a concern to me. I don't have the advantage of the classified briefings on our ability to fight through a threat today.

What I will commit to you is that, if confirmed, I will work to make sure that our architecture is more resilient so that this type of attack is less attractive to an adversary.

Senator MANCHIN. Do you have any opinions on, basically, what the Department of Defense could do to defend against China, if they demonstrate their anti-satellite capabilities?

Dr. PLUMB. Senator, there are a number of possibilities; obviously, one possibility that I fully agree with, Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks said at the first National Space Council meeting for the Biden administration, that the Department of Defense is in favor of banning kinetic, anti-satellite tests by all nations, so I think that would help.

I also think that making sure that we have constellations that are resilient so that we are not entirely dependent on one particular asset, would also be helpful. I imagine there are any number of other operations at classified levels that I would be happy to discuss with you, if confirmed.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Thanks to all of you, I appreciate your service to our country.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.

Now, let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Peters.

Senator PETERS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be here at the Committee, and congratulations to each of the folks that are here testifying.

Dr. Wallander, you are assuming this position in the midst of an incredibly tense situation in Eastern Europe and I would kind of like to get your sense on how you believe our European allies will respond to any kinetic actions by Russia. You know, certainly, Europe is in the midst of a cold winter and reliance on Russian Energy Resources make some European nations vulnerable to Putin's aggression.

So, my question for you is, what role will access to Russian energy play in determinations by key European allies, such as Germany, France, and Italy, and others on whether or not to directly or vigorously defend Ukrainian sovereignty?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for that question.

I think it is a very important one and it points to the vulnerability created by depending on Russian energy supplies, because Russia has proven itself to be very willing to use cutoffs of supplies

or cutbacks in supplies, which it is currently doing, in order to send coercive messages.

That said, I have great confidence that our European allies are confronting the scope and seriousness of Russian aspirations, aggressive aspirations against Ukraine and Ukraine and European and, therefore, global security.

If confirmed, I will press hard with them to face the reality that dependence on Russian energy is a vulnerability that needs to be mitigated so that all NATO members are able to stand up effectively for our common defense and deterrence.

Senator PETERS. Very good.

Ms. Dalton, over the last few years, I have had the opportunity to learn more about how the Department of Defense plans to performing counter, unmanned aircraft system operations, including a visit that I had to the Proving Ground in Yuma, Arizona, to witness some demonstrations of new technology that is coming on-board.

This is an area of great concern to me, as Chairman of Homeland Security Committee, and working with the Department of Homeland Security and other assets, such as the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and other parts of Homeland Security that is facing this threat, and would need to work, in my mind, in a cooperative way with the Department of Defense to fully utilize such technologies and protect us here at home.

My question to you is, how can the Department of Defense best position itself to assist the federal partners, such as the Department of Homeland Security, to combat this very real UAS threat?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for your leadership on this important issue. I do believe that it is a growing challenge, here in the Homelands.

If confirmed, I do believe that there is an opportunity for some best practices and information-sharing, because the Department is, frankly, facing some of these similar challenges abroad from counter UAS threats from both, state and non-state actors. So, I think it is an important opportunity to share lessons and best practices and tool sets; obviously, a different context here at home, but I would look forward to working on that together.

Senator PETERS. Thank you.

Dr. Plumb, last year, a study commissioned by the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Air Force Research Laboratory found that the United States is, and I am going to quote them, is, "woefully inadequate to compete for global market share because China has cornered and dominated the global space market."

Now, that report goes on to say and, "again, the United States must develop new market enhancing tools to increase U.S. commercial space activities, grow viable U.S. space companies, and finance their growth."

The Department of Defense would obviously play a vital role in developing these tools. My question for you is, if confirmed, what tools would you advise the Secretary of Defense to create to promote a much more dynamic, domestic space marketplace?

Dr. PLUMB. Thank you, Senator, for that question.

I think that the growth of the commercial sector for space in the United States is actually a driving economic engine for the U.S. and the Department of Defense should be part of ensuring that that continues. I do think the Department has a problem when it comes to recognizing and then adopting into their programs, innovative new technology from small businesses, in particular. I am aware of a few efforts underway inside the Space Force to fix that and I look forward to the opportunity to try to enhance that and bring it along, if confirmed.

Senator PETERS. Well, we would hope then we would look forward to working with you on that very important mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Peters.

Senator Tillis, please?

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations to all of you on your nominations. I hope, time provided, I get to ask you all questions, but I have to start where we left off yesterday.

Dr. Wallander, thank you so much for your time. I thought it was a very productive discussion. I intend to support all of your nominations, unless you mess up here, but I don't think that is going to happen.

Dr. Wallander, I want to go back to Russia and the discussion that we had yesterday. With their current posture and their focus on Ukraine. I am particularly interested with the negotiations, which, to me, seem that they have drawn up an untenable position for us to move towards. But there is some discussion right now that maybe we should think about our activities, maybe our operations' tempo, in terms of work we are doing with some of our NATO partners and allies in that area.

Do you think that that is productive to say that we would actually, potentially reduce the current levels of activity or why should that be on the table as a discussion for negotiation?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I share your concern about the messaging surrounding that reporting. I would highlight that were Russia to cease its dangerous, destabilizing, and problematic activities and exercises that, you know, right now we are looking at the headlines, but this is a constant problem of Russian activities in the Black Sea, the Baltic region, and now the focus on Ukraine's borders. That would be a desirable end state. If a negotiation were focused on Russia coming back into compliance with its already existing commitments under the conventional forces in Europe agreement, that could be a positive for European security and Ukraine.

But I share your concern that starting from now, kind of seeds what Russia, the dangerous activities that Russia has already been engaged with, and I wouldn't support starting from that base.

Senator TILLIS. We also talked a little bit about Nord Stream. We are going to have a vote later on sanctions. We have a couple of proposals here. One is that sanctions would be imposed once, if Russia invades Ukraine. The other one is to go ahead and put them in place now.

What are the merits of either of those two proposals or concerns that you would have where them?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I first want to make clear that I fully support the availability of really serious sanctions in a toolkit for dealing with Russia—

Senator TILLIS. Do you think they work?

Ms. WALLANDER.—in the course of abilities.

Senator TILLIS. There are some people here who think that they don't work.

So, I mean, go ahead and continue with your answer with that—

Dr. WALLANDER. So, it is a complicated question: what do they work to achieve?

They don't, always. I think skepticism is well-merited and behave to be modest in our understanding. That is why I would emphasize sanctions as part of a toolkit. Sanctions, also, can be used to reduce Russian capabilities to be able to coerce and deploy coercive and aggressive threats against neighbors and allies.

So, I am not fully read into the various proposals in which the sequencing of them, but as a matter of policy, I support the judiciousness of sanctions both, for ongoing erosion of Russian capabilities and leverage, and as a deterrent, an element of an effective deterrent.

Senator TILLIS. I am not sure if you can answer this, but just based on public reports from experts, do you believe that if Ukraine decided to, or if Russia decided to invade Ukraine, that their objectives would be swift and decisive?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I have a long career of studying the Soviet and then the Russian military and it is my assessment that the Ukrainians would fight admirably and well and be quite effective in imposing enormous costs on Russian military forces. But the signals we are hearing from the Kremlin suggest exactly what you point to, which is a potential for a decisive and swift military strike, and it is very concerning.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you.

Dr. Plumb, I am going to submit some questions for the record, but in my capacity as Ranking Member on Personnel Subcommittee, I look forward to working on things that we can do to fill the gap.

You are going to have a, we have a resource problem in terms of being able to compete with the private sector on the best and brightest for cyberthreats. So, I look forward to working with everyone in DOD that is focused on the issue.

Ms. Dalton, I am just going to submit a couple of questions for the record on, particularly, China and Latin America. I just got off of a conference call with a business here that is trying to focus on rare earth mineral extractions and a number of other things. There is a disturbing trend in South America and Latin America with Chinese investment threatening, actually even making what were already fragile supply chains more fragile, but I will submit those for the record.

I look forward to supporting all of your nominations.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Tillis.

Let me recognize Senator Rosen, please.

Senator ROSEN. There we go. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman Reed. Thank you for holding this important hearing.

I want to thank the nominees for being here today, your willingness to serve.

So, we will just get right into it about cybersecurity, of course, our utmost, top of everybody's mind, and I would like to focus particularly on NATO and cybersecurity, an issue I raised with Admiral graded during his confirmation hearing, and one that came up consistently when I had a chance to visit NATO headquarters on a congressional delegation in November.

So, Dr. Wallander, as you know, cybersecurity is part of NATO's core task of collective defense. Given rising threats of cyberattacks, of course, we know from Russia and China, NATO's efforts to protect allied networks and enhance resilience across the alliance through information-sharing and joint exercises, of course, has become more critical than ever.

So, again, Dr. Wallander, if confirmed, how would the Department of Defense collaborate with our NATO allies to prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyberattacks targeting our critical infrastructure, our energy grids, our water grids, our pipelines?

We know that we have seen cyberattacks in the past. What would you be doing to collaborate with NATO, please?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, thank you for your question highlighting this important aspect of NATO common defense and the challenge to NATO security.

Many of our NATO allies were in the forefront and recognizing Russia's use of a cyber domain for assault, and so the partnership with those allies has proven very helpful in the last couple of years as Russia has upped its activities in this domain.

If confirmed, I would work with Dr. Plumb's office, if confirmed, to make sure that we have both, the functional and regional expertise to effectively engage with NATO allies in order to make sure that we coordinate, not just government resources, but one of the challenges that you know is that much of the cyber infrastructure is private, is commercial.

Europe faces that challenge, just as the United States does, so I think our best common practices are not just from the Defense Department, but also it would require a whole-of-government approach and coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.

Senator ROSEN. Yeah, I couldn't agree more. I sit on the Homeland Security Committee. We just had a hearing just recently with CISSA talking about how we would, how they are planning to try to take care of some of these issues. So, I hope you continue to work with them.

But I would like to move on, Dr. Wallander, to issues about Iranian aggression, because they are still out there.

I have noted in previous hearings, Iranian-backed militias, while they are increasingly targeting United States installations and servicemembers in both, Iraq and Syria, via rocket and drone attacks.

Iran, we don't have to, I can't say this enough, it is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. It continues to be a threat to the

United States and allied interests, via its ballistic missile program and support for Hezbollah and other terrorist proxies.

So, can you discuss the threat of Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East, the threat they pose to our United States troops and allies, and if confirmed, how would you use your existing DOD authorities to target these malign groups and proactively protect our personnel?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, I very much share your concern, and a lot of our focus in public tends to be on Iran's nuclear weapons program and that is, you know, concerning, but we can't lose sight of the fact that Iran is actively supporting groups that strike at American personnel installations and capabilities in the region and undermine our ability to responsibly implement counterterrorism missions in the region.

If confirmed, I will focus on the partner relations in the region to work with them, to make sure that we are doing everything necessary to counter Iran's activities, and to undermine them, but also to do an evaluation within DOD to make sure that we are properly resourced and postured. I would cooperate with some of the other offices, in particular, those involving Special Operations, the functional offices, and the Department of Defense.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you.

I would like to move on to you, Ms. Dalton, about the DOD cyber strategy. I understand, if confirmed, you will serve as the Chief Civilian Supervisor to the Secretary of Defense on cybersecurity.

Given the large number of Federal agencies responsible for protecting the Homeland from cyberthreats, what would you define as the Department of Defense's appropriate role in addressing our Nation's cybersecurity, and, separately, if confirmed, how would you strengthen that interagency collaboration to ensure coordinated approach is going forward?

Ms. DALTON. Senator, thank you for highlighting the critical challenge of cybersecurity and the Department's role. The Department is the sector risk and management agency for the Defense Industrial Base.

If confirmed, I would look forward to stewarding those authorities, those responsibilities in close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, U.S. Cyber Command, and other components to protect our critical infrastructure.

Our relationships with the private sector, critical supply chains, all of these are, unfortunately, experiencing threats and so ensuring we have the requisite protections and resilience going forward will be a priority of mine.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rosen.

Senator Kelly, please?

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, everybody, for participating here today.

Dr. Plumb, I want to talk to you a little bit more about the anti-satellite missile tests that have been conducted by the Chinese and the Russians. The test in 2007, you were asked about it earlier. That kinetic kill vehicle put a debris field from about a hundred

miles, you know, probably all the way up to a couple thousand miles.

On one of my space shuttle flights, I had to maneuver out of the way of some of that debris and that was well over a decade ago. Just this past November, the space station had to move out of the way of that debris field. This is going to become a continuing problem; thousands, I think, 2,000 pieces of debris.

The Russians launched a test themselves, but I want to focus a little bit on the Chinese capability. So, DOD had a report that detailed China's emerging counter-space capabilities, including satellite jammers, directed-energy weapons, and these ground-based anti-satellite missiles, like we saw in 2007 with the test.

So, what is your current assessment of China's emerging counter-space capabilities, and, if confirmed, how is your office going to address this emerging threat?

Dr. PLUMB. Thank you for that question, Senator.

I will just say, I think you are spot-on; the Chinese threat to our space assets is growing and it is troubling, and it is in many different vectors. I think being able to counter that, there is no one solution.

I think one of the advantages of integrating the different policy offices that are functional under this ASD-ship, if confirmed, would be the ability to more tightly interweave cyber operations and counter-space operations, for example.

I would say the Chinese threat is possibly, in order to successfully prevail in a campaign in a warfare campaign, we need to have a resilient architecture that can handle some of those attacks, because some of those attacks are sure to come. I think calling out kinetic, destructive tests, in particular, because those impose a long-term, enduring problem to all spacefaring nations, including astronauts, would be helpful, as well.

I think that there are, in the spectrum of warfare, we need to be ready for kinetic attacks against these assets, as well. We can't, it is a cross-domain problem, I guess, is what I am trying to say. If we just think about space versus space, it doesn't deal with the ground problem in a way that is sufficient in my opinion.

Senator KELLY. Yeah, it is, in any conflict with a near-peer adversary, it is clearly the high ground. We know the importance of being able to maintain the high ground and this is a place that we need to be present and capable and continue to innovate.

So, thank you, I look forward to working with you after your confirmation.

I want to just transition on a totally different subject to Ms. Dalton for a second. As you may know, being from Arizona, I represent over 370 miles of United States-Mexico border and, in fact, I think I am the only member of this Committee that is in a Southwest Border state. I have repeatedly called on the administration to better resource DHS and the National Guard's border mission to address the crisis at the border, and it is a crisis.

We currently have over 2,400 National Guard troops deployed to the United States-Mexico border by the Department of Defense and another 1,300 by governors, including the Arizona governor. But this isn't enough; clearly, it is not.

I mean, I have spent time at the border. I continue to hear from law enforcement, especially sheriffs, but also mayors in border communities, and my constituents on this issue. The challenges should not fall on local communities; it is a crisis and it is hard for them to manage.

The National Guard play a critical security role here, well, in a lot of ways, right: responding to national disasters, helping communities tackle COVID, supporting security at our border. It is imperative that we give them the tools that they need to do this work. The National Guard needs to have those tools.

So, Ms. Dalton, do I have your commitment, and I think this is an easy question, do I have your commitment to work with us to ensure that those troops are well-resourced as they conduct these missions at the United States-Mexico border?

Ms. DALTON. Yes, Senator, you do.

If confirmed, I would look forward to visiting Arizona and the Southwest Border to better understand the challenge. Thank you.

Senator KELLY. Thank you.

Ms. Wallander, I have, I am going to submit the question for the record. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kelly.

I want to thank the witnesses for their very thoughtful testimony today and also for their willingness to serve, as they served before.

With that, let me adjourn this hearing. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

##### DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of Defense Department interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia), the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, and their governments and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales in these regions.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(ISA) under current regulations and practices?

*Answer.* The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ASD (ISA), are outlined by DOD Directive 5111.07. My role, if confirmed, would be to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy with respect to defense policy and strategy for the Middle East, Europe, Russia, and Africa. ASD (ISA) is responsible for coordinating policies with the Joint Staff, representing the Department in inter-agency deliberations, helping manage the Department's defense relationships with foreign partners from the above regions, and overseeing various security cooperation and assistance programs, among other responsibilities.

*Question.* If confirmed, what additional duties and functions would you expect the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to prescribe for you?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would focus on the actions and relationships under the purview of ASD (ISA). I am unaware of any specific additional guidance the Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for the ASD (ISA) position.

*Question.* What background and experience do you possess that qualify you for this position?

*Answer.* I previously served at the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia from 2009 to 2012, and later as the Senior Director for Russia and Central Asia at the National Security Council staff from 2013 to 2017. While these roles focused heavily on Russia and European security—which are a crucial component of the ASD (ISA) portfolio—they equipped me more broadly with the skills to manage critical defense relationships, navigate the inter-agency policy formation process, and develop national security policy in response to complex geopolitical contexts. I have dedicated my career to studying and implementing policy related to European and Eurasian security, specifically Russian foreign policy and defense strategy. My career in and out of government in foreign and security policy has also provided substantial exposure to an extensive range of global security issues.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?

*Answer.* If confirmed, the specific priorities I would establish will depend in large measure on the priorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). These priorities, among others, will in all likelihood include bolstering our critical alliances while ensuring our allies contribute meaningfully to our shared security objectives, strengthening United States credibility and influence in key regions, confronting Russian and Iranian coercion or aggression, defeating ISIS and other terrorist groups, and ensuring that the Office of the USD(P) plays a meaningful and constructive role within the Department's contributions to our national security.

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, you would confront if confirmed as ASD(ISA)?

*Answer.* From a general policy perspective, I believe the major challenges include some of the issue areas above. It is often a challenge amidst the daily demands and urgent crises to ensure we are not only meeting immediate demands but also making progress on long-term strategic objectives. Another challenge will be to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Government in resolving these and other issues—and pursuing opportunities—amidst a range of resource constraints and reconciling global priorities, trade-offs, and risks.

*Question.* If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address each of these challenges?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would want to first examine the existing management structure of the organization, as well as the assumptions and timelines associated with meeting these challenges, before providing an answer. Ultimately, prioritization and timelines of confronting these challenges will depend on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as well as interagency consultations or Presidential determinations. Recognizing that some of these challenges fall outside of the portfolio of the ASD (ISA), if confirmed I would work with my colleagues across the government to address these discrete threats with specific strategies, consistent with a comprehensive global defense strategy and our national interests.

#### DETAINEE TREATMENT AND GUANTANAMO BAY

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense (DOD) Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92)?

*Answer.* Yes, I support the standards for the treatment of detainees in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3; in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program; and as required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92). The United States Government may not subject any individuals in our custody to any treatment or interrogation technique or approach that is not listed or authorized by the Army Field Manual or any other DOD or Army directive, manual, instruction, or other form of policy or guidance.

*Question.* What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in the detainee transfer process at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?

*Answer.* As I understand the role, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs will play a coordinating role with other elements of the Of-

office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the detainee transfer process for detainees held at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

*Question.* The 2018 NDS outlines the threats confronting the United States: a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration. Among these priorities is the requirement to “promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions”. The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new National Defense Strategy, planned for issuance in 2022.

Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

*Answer.* Based on the security environment at the time, I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identified strategic competitions with China and with Russia as the primary challenges animating the global security environment.

I believe the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately articulates the breadth and scale of the challenges we face and sets forth priorities to advance our vital national interests. The threats are increasingly global in nature; the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats and opportunities; the international order the United States helped establish is being tested; and the ongoing revolution in technology underpins many of these shifts.

*Question.* Do you support the national security priorities set out in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, including for regions within the ASD(ISA)’s purview?

*Answer.* Yes, I support these priorities. If confirmed, I would expect to focus on the defense elements of implementation consistent with Administration guidance.

*Question.* In your view, what global security developments since 2018 should be addressed as part of the new NDS?

*Answer.* I recognize the NDS process is nearing completion. The 2018 National Defense Strategy highlighted a number of regions and challenges that either fall under ASD/ISA’s portfolio, or closely impact it, and continue to be relevant to the national security landscape today. These include Russian and Iranian coercion or aggression; China’s efforts to improve its placement, access, and leverage in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East; violent extremist organizations and terrorism; and, overarching challenges to the international order that the United States must work closely with its allies and partners to address (e.g., effects of a changing climate and the COVID pandemic).

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you recommend for the Department’s implementation of the 2018 NDS with regard to the issues and regions in the ASD(ISA)’s purview, such as the continuing threat of Russian aggression against Ukraine?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would recommend identifying how DOD efforts can be better integrated with those of other elements of national power and alongside our allies and partners, in light of the guidance within the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I appreciate the vast number of bilateral defense relationships and multilateral institutions ASD/ISA plays a direct role in and would work within the Department to leverage them in NDS implementation.

*Question.* In your view, what are the key elements of strategic deterrence in the 21st century?

*Answer.* As directed by Secretary Austin, the Department is working to develop the concept of integrated deterrence. This involves bringing all of our tools of national power to strengthen deterrence, including leveraging our alliances and partnerships, taking a whole-of-government approach, considering deterrence across the spectrum of conflict, and considering all of our capabilities across domains and theaters.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the security cooperation relationship between China and Russia, and what do you perceive to be the potential for their joint military cooperation against the United States in the context of both day-to-day strategic competition and in conflict? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Russia and China collaborate in the economic, diplomatic, and military/security arenas. While the two nations do not agree in many ways, they both align when it suits them. Each poses different challenges to the United States and has

different motivations for its actions. Both Russia and China seek to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model, gaining leverage over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. Both nations undermine global security and the rules-based order by undercutting such basic values as liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. What they both share is a preference for a world in which the United States and its allies and partners are weaker, less unified, and less influential. Together with allies and partners, the United States must be vigilant and united in opposing their malign action and influence.

#### APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION

*Question.* The NDS references "expanding the competitive space." The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for strengthening U.S. "enduring advantages" to prevail in strategic competition with near-peer rivals. Although their approaches differ, both China and Russia have been successful in competing with the United States below the threshold of armed conflict.

In your view, what are the distinctions between the military capabilities and capacities the United States needs to prevail in day-to-day strategic competition with Russia and the capabilities and capacities it needs to deter Russia's use of military force to achieve political objectives and, if necessary, prevail in a military conflict with the Russia?

*Answer.* The Department's review of its National Defense Strategy (NDS) will appropriately examine the United States military's approach, roles, and capabilities as they relate to day-to-day strategic competition, including with Russia. Warfighting credibility is critical to underwriting deterrence and diplomacy. Many of the capabilities and capacities needed for laying this foundation of warfighting deterrence would also be applicable for day-to-day strategic competition. I believe the Department must also develop new concepts and pursue greater integration with allies and partners to advance U.S. vital national interests.

*Question.* In your view, what enduring advantages vested in the United States will enable it to prevail in the strategic competition with Russia and with China?

*Answer.* I believe the United States benefits from a range of enduring advantages, to include the strength of our democracy at home, the American people, our robust economy, and the strong network of alliances and partnerships that we have helped build and strengthen over the course of decades. These strengths will help enable the United States to protect and advance vital national interest in the strategic competition with Russia and China.

*Question.* If confirmed, what policies and approaches would you implement to sustain and strengthen those advantages?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would seek to work with others in DOD, and in concert with allies and partners, to creatively apply these strengths to advance the Department priorities. For example, the Department should consider ways to better collaborate with the private sector, state, and local authorities to improve resilience in key areas. The Department might also consider enhancing ally and partner capabilities, improving interoperability, and collaborating to improve their resilience strengthen their ability to help deter aggression and resist coercion. Also, further prioritization of key challenges and opportunities, increased clarity and shared understanding of responsibilities and authorities across the U.S. Government departments and agencies, and better integration of efforts can help to further strengthen our collective ability to advance key national objectives.

*Question.* In your assessment, what new capabilities are needed for the Joint Force to compete below the threshold of armed conflict?

*Answer.* I understand that the NDS Review is examining this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure the Joint Force continues to develop key capabilities for this challenge.

*Question.* If confirmed, what policies would you propose to counter China's efforts to compete strategically below the threshold of armed conflict in regions within the ASD(ISA)'s responsibility?

*Answer.* I understand that the NDS Review is closely examining this issue. I believe that the Department should continue to frame military efforts to compete strategically below the threshold of armed conflict as one of many elements of competition undertaken as part of a whole-of-government approach. The military should seek to integrate with other instruments of national power, including diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities.

*Question.* Secretary Austin and other Biden Administration officials have characterized China as America's national security "pacing threat." Given that reality, what tradeoffs do you foresee as necessary to address threats other than those posed by China, most notably threats from Russia?

Answer. I understand that this is a key question under examination as part of the NDS Review. My view is that we need to make strategy-driven choices across the near-, mid-, and long-term timeframes, as well as across capability, capacity, and readiness.

The 2018 NDS also provides that “effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.

*Question.* In your view, has the interagency been effective in a whole-of-government effort to expand the competitive space? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe that U.S. Departments and Agencies have made notable progress in advancing national objectives by pitting U.S. strengths against competitor weaknesses throughout the competitive space. For example, diplomatic initiatives such as work in the Quad format (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) provide a strong example of how multilateral cooperation can be used to address common security challenges. Another example is the Russian Influence Group, co-chaired by United States European Command and the Department of State, which identifies whole-of-government solutions to counter Russian threat networks.

*Question.* If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have to better employ all dimensions of national power to expand the competitive space?

Answer. I believe further prioritization of key challenges and opportunities, increased clarity and shared understanding of responsibilities and authorities across the U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, and better information sharing and integration of efforts can help to further strengthen our collective ability to advance key national objectives.

#### AFRICA

*Question.* In your view, what are the greatest threats to United States national security interests in Africa, and what policy objectives should the United States pursue to protect them?

Answer. The proliferation of violent extremist organizations followed by China’s increasing influence are the greatest threats to United States national security interests in Africa. While we have confronted violent extremist organizations, and continue to do so through a whole-of-government approach, we need to do the same with China with respect to United States national security interests in Africa.

*Question.* In your view, what are the strategic objectives of China and Russia in Africa?

Answer. Both China and Russia are seeking to increase their access and influence on the continent. China is doing it primarily through economic means and Russia through security. The People’s Republic of China’s efforts in Africa include a range of diplomatic, economic, and military engagements designed to cement influence and access. China maintains its only permanent overseas military base in Djibouti, and has expressed interest in building additional military installations elsewhere on the continent. Economically, China pursues agreements with African countries to expand its political influence and obtain access to African markets and natural resources. China leverages its economic influence across the continent to gain diplomatic support within the United Nations and to dampen criticism over its own domestic policies.

Russia continues to leverage security assistance, defense materiel sales, and the provision of Russian proxy actors (such as Russian private military companies) as a means to increase leverage and influence in Africa. These activities provide Russia with opportunities to project power and influence into African states.

*Question.* In what ways, if any, do those strategic objectives challenge or otherwise conflict with the strategic objectives of the United States broadly, and DOD specifically?

Answer. In addition to undermining regional stability and security, China and Russia seek to increase access and influence at the expense of the United States. China and Russia seek to gain influence across the continent by lowering the bar for human rights and good governance.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the United States strategy with regard to strategic competition with China and Russia in Africa to date?

Answer. The U.S. strategy must be a whole-of-government approach that demonstrates an enduring commitment to the region’s economic and security development. We must take a more strategic approach to identifying Chinese and Russia

activities we find most threatening to United States interests and prioritize countering those.

China prioritization of economic means necessitates the United States Government to encourage or promote transparent business practices amongst African nations. The United States strategy should prioritize Chinese investments that pose a threat to United States national security objectives and interests. If confirmed, I will look to reinvigorate DOD's role in a whole-of-government approach to strategic competition.

Russia requires a similar, holistic and integrated approach, however the threat posed by Russian activity in Africa is substantially different than in the Chinese context. Russia tends to lead in Africa with offers of security contracts, which then give way to defense materiel relationships, leading to a slow pivot by African militaries from Western governments and Western military training and assistance towards Russian capabilities. This risks boxing out the United States and our Allies and partners. In some cases, Russia is also quite adept at creating opportunity from tragedy, and exploiting countries in a period of instability. DOD needs to be able to provide security assistance in a timely fashion and remain the partner of choice for African military security needs as a means to remain fully involved in the continent.

*Question.* What do you believe to be the DOD role in achieving the primary objectives of that strategy?

*Answer.* DOD's role in achieving the primary objectives of that strategy are to build partner capacity, address threats with allies and partners, and develop African nations to be exporters of security. The presence of U.S. military personnel and assets demonstrates our commitment to our allies and partners in the region and instills confidence as they work to confront strategic competition on their own terms.

*Question.* How would you assess the effectiveness of such efforts to date?

*Answer.* While whole-of-government efforts to date have shown promise, there remains much work to be done. With the support of Congress, we will be better positioned to address strategic competition. DOD's efforts are most successful when integrated into a whole-of-government approach and, if confirmed, I will work with the other departments and agencies to ensure unity of effort.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and our allies and partners, by ISIS, al Qaeda, and associated violent extremist groups in Africa?

*Answer.* ISIS, al Qaeda, and associated violent extremist groups in Africa remain a prominent threat to United States interests as well as to our allies and partners in Africa. Maintaining pressure on these violent extremist groups in Africa remains a key component of mitigating this threat. If confirmed, I will align my office's effort with that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity conflict to prioritize threats posed by these groups.

*Question.* Which groups do you assess to pose the greatest threat, and why?

*Answer.* The ability of ISIS- and al Qaeda-aligned groups to utilize familiar terrain and derive resources from the local populace increases their ability to threaten United States interests. Ongoing instability in the Sahel and Somalia are particularly worrisome and the two dominant groups there, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and al-Shabaab, pose threats to United States interests. Both of these groups are associates or branches of al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has previously stated its intent to target the United States Homeland.

*Question.* What is your view on the decision to remove the majority of United States military forces out of Somalia to an "over-the-horizon" posture?

*Answer.* I understand that the previous administration made the decision to remove the majority of United States military forces out of Somalia. It is my assessment that any decision on force posture should be grounded in a firm understanding of U.S. policy objectives and a reflection on the appropriate authorities and U.S. Government tools to meet them. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in a review of our approach to degrading violent extremist organizations that threaten U.S. interests and regional stability.

*Question.* In your view, is an "over-the-horizon" approach to counterterrorism able to effectively meet U.S. national security interests in the region?

*Answer.* An "over-the-horizon" capability can be effective but it is one aspect of a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism, and it should be continuously assessed to ensure the posture approach is appropriate to meet U.S. policy objectives. If confirmed, I would support DOD continuing to work by, with, and through partners and allies to bolster the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts.

*Question.* In your assessment, what are the political and security implications of the involvement of Russian contract security forces, such as the Wagner group, in volatile and brittle security situations such as Mali and Libya?

Answer. Russian contract security forces provide some African nations with a relatively low cost security alternative to address their security needs. However, they come with a number of negative consequences. Contracting for security leaves the security forces in these countries underfunded and ill equipped to handle their nation's longer-term security priorities. They also fuel instability by adding proxy fighters and arms to already unstable situations. In Libya, for example, contract personnel fought at the behest of one party in the political divide, which served to prolong the conflict. Russian proxy forces have also conducted human rights violations in Africa, according to a UN report detailing abuses against civilians in the CAR. From a United States national interest perspective these proxy forces also increase Russian influence in the region, including in the information and media space, often at the cost to United States or European influence.

## MIDDLE EAST

*Question.* In your view, what are the greatest threats to U.S. national security interests in the Middle East and what policy objectives should we pursue to protect them?

Answer. In my view, the greatest threats to United States national security interests in the Middle East are from Iran and its proxies and violent extremist organizations, including al-Qa'ida and ISIS. The United States should address Iranian and Iranian-backed threats by pursuing diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, working with regional partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and responding to attacks from Iranian proxies on United States forces. The United States should continue to work with our allies and local vetted partner forces, including the Iraqi Security Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, to prevent an ISIS resurgence.

*Question.* To what extent does achieving United States national security interests in the Middle East require a continuous United States military presence there, in your view?

Answer. United States national security interests require a continuous military presence in the Middle East in order to defend the Homeland from attacks by violent extremist organizations and rapidly respond to contingencies. Our presence in the Middle East also allows us to build the capacity of regional countries to take on a larger role in maintaining regional stability over the long term. As Secretary Austin said at the Manama Dialogue several weeks ago, no one should doubt our resolve or our capabilities to defend ourselves, and all those who work alongside us to keep the region secure.

*Question.* Are there any countries in which you would recommend reducing U.S. troop presence? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the analysis generated through DOD's Global Posture Review and consulting with the Joint Staff to understand opportunities for more dynamic, agile, and tailored deployments in the region, in coordination with allies and partners.

*Question.* To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power competition?

Answer. The Middle East is an important theater for strategic competition. The Middle East sits along key waterways for the movement of global commerce, energy supplies, and military assets. China and Russia are increasingly engaged in undermining the United States position in the Middle East through weapon sales and infrastructure projects, and have ambitions to establish military installations that could undermine United States force protection and the security of U.S. technology.

*Question.* What, in your opinion, should be DOD's role in efforts to compete with Russia and China in the Middle East?

Answer. In my opinion, DOD's role in strategic competition in the Middle East should be focused on supporting our partners in pursuing shared security interests and in developing their own capabilities. Doing so effectively will ensure that the United States remains the security partner of choice in the region.

## IRAQ AND SYRIA

*Question.* From a DOD standpoint, what must be done to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS?

Answer. To ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, I believe DOD should, as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, focus on supporting vetted local partner forces, including the Iraqi Security Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), through training, advice, and assistance with the objective of improving their ability to independently manage the ISIS threat.

*Question.* What non-military efforts are necessary to sustain the enduring defeat of ISIS?

Answer. The enduring defeat of ISIS cannot be achieved through military means alone. As long as the underlying grievances that facilitated ISIS's rapid expansion remain unaddressed, ISIS's ability to reconstitute remains a threat. If confirmed, I would support a broad United States whole-of-government approach in Iraq and Syria, including civilian-led humanitarian and stabilization efforts to address these underlying grievances, including local security, economic, and service provision efforts.

*Question.* What are the key United States national security interests in Syria and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

Answer. I believe the United States should remain focused on practical and achievable goals in Syria, such as maintaining United States military presence to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS and working with the international community to promote and expand the provision of life-saving humanitarian assistance and access. The United States should also sustain existing ceasefires and support international norms for human rights and accountability. These steps are essential to establishing a foundation for a comprehensive political solution to the conflict under auspices of the United Nations that represents the will of the Syrian people.

*Question.* At this point in time, do you believe that a limited United States military footprint in Syria and Iraq is important to United States national security interests in Syria, Iraq and the broader region? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe that a United States military footprint in Iraq and Syria is important to securing United States national security interests in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region. The United States military presence enables it to work with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and local vetted partner forces to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS. The U.S. military presence and support also enables civilian-led humanitarian and stabilization efforts.

*Question.* What are the Russian Government's key strategic interests and objectives in Syria and how successful have they been at accomplishing them?

Answer. Russia has made clear that it intends to ensure a continued a Russia-friendly regime in Syria by supporting Bashar al-Assad. This support has enabled the Assad regime to continue its campaign of violence against the Syrian people, including conducting human rights abuses. Russia has not dedicated the resources that would demonstrate a concerted effort to prevent an ISIS resurgence in Syria.

*Question.* What are the key United States national security interests in Iraq and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

Answer. The key United States national security interests in Iraq are ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and supporting a sovereign and stable Iraq. It is my understating that the United States works to secure these interests by advising, assisting, and enabling Iraqi Security Forces as they lead in the fight against ISIS, advancing the United States-Iraq strategic partnership, and supporting Iraq's improved relations with regional states as a counterweight to Iran.

*Question.* Do you support the Administration's decision to transition United States combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2021?

Answer. I support the Administration's decision, made in consultation with the Government of Iraq, to transition from a combat role to an advise, assist, and enabling role. It is my understanding that the decision was made due to the increasing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces in the fight against ISIS.

*Question.* How do you envision the missions and size of the U.S. Military presence there going forward?

Answer. United States forces are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi Government; the future of the United States military presence in Iraq will be dependent on the evolving needs of the Iraqi security forces. If confirmed, I will work across the United States Government and with our Iraqi and Coalition partners on the continued evolution of our mission.

*Question.* How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq?

Answer. It is my understanding that Iran tries to increase its political and military influence in Iraq by providing financial, advisory, and other support to Iraqi Shia militia groups and their associated political factions. Through this support, Iran uses Iraq as a platform to undermine regional stability. Iran's support to these militia groups threaten Iraqi sovereignty, stability, and the prosperity of the Iraqi people.

*Question.* If confirmed, what strategy would you recommended to limit Iranian malign influence?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working across the Department of the Defense and with other departments and agencies on implementing a whole-of-government approach to limiting Iranian malign influence. There are no simple or single solutions to the challenge posed by Iran-backed militias to Iraq's own sovereignty and security, or the security of our forces. This whole-of-government strategy should

focus on bolstering Iraq's democratic institutions, increasing Iraq's engagement with its Arab neighbors, and countering threats to United States personnel.

*Question.* How would you characterize China's influence in Iraq?

*Answer.* Like in the rest of the Middle East, the People's Republic of China continues to expand its interests and activities in Iraq, especially economically through One Belt, One Road and other initiatives but also militarily. Through these initiatives, Beijing seeks to displace the United States as the premier partner in the region. For example, the PRC is the largest market for Iraqi oil export and Beijing has sold strike-capable unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to Iraq.

*Question.* If confirmed, what strategy would you recommend to limit Beijing's malign influence?

*Answer.* To counter China's malign activities, we must continue to reinforce our long-standing partnerships in the region, including the United States-Iraq relationship. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Department and across the U.S. Government to continue strengthening our partnership, and support the development of a secure, stable, and independent Iraq.

*Question.* In your opinion, what is the appropriate role of NATO in Iraq and in what ways, if any, would you recommend altering the current NATO Mission Iraq?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) is a non-combat mission, focused on ministerial-level institutional development and professional military education instructor training and that NMI and Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) are distinct, but complementary, missions. NMI's institutional development activities help the Iraqi Security Institutions and Iraqi Security Forces strengthen their capacity to defend Iraq's sovereignty, contributing to Iraq's long-term security, stability, and prosperity. I support NMI's efforts to improve Iraqi security institutions as these efforts enable Iraq to secure its territory more effectively from threats such as ISIS.

*Question.* Do you believe that Iranian and American interests in Iraq converge to any extent? Please explain.

*Answer.* Iran and the United States have divergent interests in Iraq. Iran, through its support for militia groups and other policies, seeks to foment instability in Iraq, to make Iraq dependent on Iran, and to use Iraq as a platform to threaten regional stability. In contrast, the United States seeks to bolster the stability and independence of the Iraqi Government so that it can maintain good relations with its neighbors and advance the concerns of the Iraqi people.

#### IRAN

*Question.* What is your assessment of the current military threat posed by Iran?

*Answer.* The Iranian threat spans its military's conventional capabilities, to include the region's largest ballistic missile force and a naval force capable of threatening freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as unconventional capabilities including armed unmanned aerial systems used for direct attacks. Iran also proliferates advanced conventional weapons to militias across the region that threaten United States forces and our regional partners. Iran has also taken provocative steps to advance its nuclear program.

*Question.* If the United States were to return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what concerns, if any, would you have for regional security? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Iran and its proxies have worked to undermine regional security before, during, and after both the JCPOA and the Maximum Pressure campaign. I understand that the Administration's goal is to negotiate a mutual return to the JCPOA in order to put Iran's nuclear program back in a box, and then use that agreement as a basis for negotiating a longer, stronger deal that addresses Iran's other destabilizing activities. If a mutual return to the JCPOA is achieved, the United States will need to continue working with our allies and partners to address Iran's destabilizing activities until a further agreement can be reached.

*Question.* Do you assess that Iran desires to achieve a nuclear weapons capability? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I agree with the United States Intelligence Community's published assessment that Iran is not currently undertaking key nuclear weapons development activities necessary to provide a nuclear device. However, I remain concerned that Iran's leaders seek to retain the option to pursue a nuclear weapons capability in the future.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the objectives of the United States security strategy with respect to Iran?

*Answer.* I understand that on the Iranian nuclear program the Administration is pursuing a diplomacy first strategy in which the State Department is working with

United States Allies to put the Iranian nuclear program back in a box. At the same time, the United States is strengthening the capacity of our regional partners to address Iran's destabilizing activities, deterring attacks by Iran and its proxies on United States personnel, and if necessary, responding to attacks by Iran or its proxies.

*Question.* What is the role of the U.S. Military in this strategy?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense through its calibrated regional force presence builds the capacity of our regional partners to address Iran's destabilizing activities, deters Iranian aggression, and, if necessary, defends against and respond to Iranian or Iranian-backed attacks.

*Question.* Are United States military forces and capabilities currently deployed to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Areas of Responsibility (AOR) adequate to deter and, if necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense currently has a significant force presence in the USCENTCOM AOR, and it is important to underline that the theater is set not only with what the U.S. has pre-positioned, but also what our allies and partners contribute and what we can rapidly flow in. If confirmed, I will work with counterparts in the Joint Staff to shape the evolution of the DOD mission as the Department continuously evaluates the appropriate mix of forces to maintain deterrence against Iran and demonstrate the capability to deploy at the time and place of its choosing in response to real-time events.

*Question.* What is your assessment of United States national security interests placed at risk by the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

*Answer.* Iran is a destabilizing actor who arms and supports proxies that attack U.S. partners and interest in the region, including transportation and energy infrastructure, as well as U.S. interests. These activities threaten the lives of American civilians, military and diplomatic personnel, the stability of global energy markets, and the stability of partner governments. On top of that, Iran's nuclear program also has profound implications for United States objectives with regards to nuclear non-proliferation, both in the Middle East and around the globe.

*Question.* How would you describe the strategy to counter Iran's malign influence and other activities throughout the Middle East, and more specifically, via Iran's proxy networks?

*Answer.* The United States strategy to counter Iranian malign influence focuses on strengthening the capabilities of our regional partners to defend themselves and their sovereignty. The United States also mobilizes the broader international community to expose and respond to Iran's destabilizing activities, while the United States military deters, and if necessary, prepares to respond to attacks by Iran and its proxies.

*Question.* Which office holder in Iran is more powerful, in your view: the leader of the IRGC, or the Iranian president? Why?

*Answer.* The Iranian political system has multiple centers of power to include the President and the leader of the IRGC. In the current environment, the new Iranian President retains significant influence and is close with the Supreme Leader, who is Iran's ultimate decision maker.

#### YEMEN

*Question.* What are the United States national security interests in Yemen?

*Answer.* The primary national security interest in Yemen remains ensuring that groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen cannot maintain a safe haven from which to conduct attacks against the United States Homeland. Additionally, the aggressive actions taken by the Houthis—with support from Iran—against United States partners contribute to instability in the Middle East and threaten the territorial defense of our Gulf partners, including Saudi Arabia. I believe it is in the national security interest of the United States to secure a cessation of hostilities and ultimately a political solution to end the conflict, which is the only long-term solution to this crisis.

*Question.* What do you assess to be the strategic goals of Ansar Allah?

*Answer.* The actions of Ansar Allah—also known as the Houthi movement—are prohibiting efforts toward peace in Yemen, exacerbating the dire humanitarian plight of the Yemeni people, and destabilizing the region. The movement has opted to use tools of violence, repression, and military force to impose its will and achieve its goal of restoring the former Zaydi Shiite Islamic Imamate in Southwest Arabia. Leaders in the movement have also expressed their intention to control the two Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, signaling ambitions beyond Yemen's borders. I support the renewed emphasis that the Biden Administration has placed on a two-track approach in Yemen: diplomacy to end the war through

a political solution, and enhanced relief efforts to address the worsening humanitarian situation.

*Question.* What do you assess to be Saudi Arabia's primary strategic goals in Yemen?

*Answer.* Saudi Arabia's primary strategic goals in Yemen are to reinstate the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (RoYG) in Sanaa, curtail Iran's malign influence in the country, and deter the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.

*Question.* In your view, has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately and proportionately to the threat it faces from the Houthis including rocket and drone attacks on Saudi Arabian territory?

*Answer.* Houthi rebel cross-border attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are persistent and deadly. Saudi Arabia maintains its right to defend itself and protect its citizens and the innocent civilians residing in the Kingdom, including the tens of thousands of United States citizens, from the genuine security threats emanating from Yemen and elsewhere in the region. Historically, Saudi Arabia's conduct of its military campaign in Yemen raised serious concerns about civilian casualties. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to synchronize our actions and capabilities with those of our regional partners towards an integrated deterrence approach that helps to end the war in Yemen and mitigate harm to civilians. I will emphasize adherence to the laws of armed conflict.

*Question.* In your view, what are the implications of the Biden Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the Saudi-led coalition and how do you define "offensive support operations"?

*Answer.* Ending the war in Yemen is in the national security interest of the United States. A political resolution is the only long-term means of bringing the war in Yemen to an end. President Biden stated on February 4 at the State Department that all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales, would end while underscoring United States commitment to push for a diplomatic resolution to the Yemen war. In the June 2021, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, President Biden stated that "United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, continue to provide military advice and limited information to regional forces for defensive and training purposes only as they related to the Saudi-led Coalition's campaign against the Houthis in Yemen."

*Question.* To what extent do you believe Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have made progress in avoiding civilian casualties and ensuring appropriate accountability when allegations of civilian casualties arise?

*Answer.* Civilian casualties at any level are a serious concern. To address this concern the Administration suspended two specific munitions sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that are associated with unacceptably high rates of civilian casualties in Yemen, and continues to emphasize best practices for mitigating the risk of civilian harm in its defense and military engagements with Saudi counterparts. The Administration consults with many international and non-government monitoring bodies to assess reports of civilian casualties in Yemen. For example, the United Nations Civilian Impact Monitoring Project released its 2021 third quarter update in November and recorded the second lowest quarterly number of civilian casualties resulting from Coalition airstrikes since CIMP began reporting in 2018.

*Question.* To what extent are the Houthis, supported by Iran, a threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea?

*Answer.* The Houthis represent a threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea due to their offensive actions in the maritime domain. As the State Department said, these actions interfere with freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and threaten international trade and regional security. The materiel and technical support the Houthis receive from Iran, including armed unmanned surface vehicles (USV), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and missiles, have enhanced the Houthis' lethal capabilities over time.

*Question.* If confirmed, what U.S. policies and actions would you recommend to address this threat?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will advocate for and support the efforts of Department of Defense and interagency colleagues to address threats to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea through maritime interdictions of illicit weapons transfers where possible and through enhancing the capabilities of regional United States partners to address those threats themselves such as through improved counter-unmanned surface vehicles, counter-unmanned aerial systems, and other maritime and air defense capabilities. Economic sanctions and designations targeting those individuals and businesses seeking to procure weapons from Iran and oversee attacks threatening civilians and maritime infrastructure are another important tool to address this threat.

*Question.* In your assessment, if United States support to Saudi Arabia were reduced and arms sales limited, would Saudi Arabia seek support from China and/or Russia? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important United States security partner for cooperation in promoting regional stability, security, and countering Iranian influence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is under threat from Iran-backed militant groups and relies on United States support to address those threats, including the provision of maintenance, training, and early warning information sharing. Competitors, like China and Russia, seek to exploit tensions between the United States and its security partners. Saudi Arabia already buys arms and weapons from China and Russia, signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Russia last summer, and would likely turn further to United States strategic competitors for additional support in the event U.S. assistance were reduced. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the United States remains the security partner of choice with the Kingdom while keeping United States values, including human rights, at the forefront of cooperation.

## EGYPT

*Question.* What is your assessment of the security situation in Egypt and the United States-Egypt security relationship?

*Answer.* Egypt faces a number of security challenges, including ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), ongoing instability in Libya, regional tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and border security threats. The strategic defense relationship between the United States and Egypt, which has underpinned the broader bilateral partnership for decades, helps Egypt meet these security challenges. United States-provided security assistance to and security cooperation with Egypt, focused on counterterrorism and border security, also increases interoperability between our forces and helps to secure regional stability in Africa and the Middle East.

*Question.* What role do the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) play in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty?

*Answer.* The MFO has provided reassurance to both Israel and Egypt for 40 years by ensuring both parties adhere to the security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace. The MFO presence and organization provide Egypt and Israel a trusted mechanism to resolve disputes, avoid conflict, and foster dialogue on shared security concerns in the Sinai Peninsula.

*Question.* Should the United States maintain its military deployment to the MFO?

*Answer.* United States contributions to the MFO anchor other countries' contributions and bolster U.S. credibility as a leader in diplomatic and security initiatives globally. If confirmed, I would maintain DOD's commitment to the MFO and to supporting its mission.

*Question.* What would be the risks of reducing this commitment, in your view?

*Answer.* Reductions in the number of United States authorized personnel at the MFO could impact the MFO mission, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and regional stability. If confirmed, I would ensure that any possible changes to the level of U.S. support to the MFO would take into consideration the above-mentioned potential impacts and would include extensive consultation with others.

*Question.* In your view, should we continue to provide defense articles and services purchased by the Egyptian military using United States Foreign Military Financing funds?

*Answer.* United States Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is a central element of the bilateral relationship, supports Egypt's legitimate defense needs, and supports United States industry in helping to modernize Egypt's military. United States FMF also supports efforts to ensure Egypt is using our equipment in a manner that is consistent with United States interests and values. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that United States FMF funds for Egypt continue to serve United States national security interests and Egyptian defense needs.

*Question.* What is your assessment of Egypt's deepening ties with Russia?

*Answer.* Egypt is diversifying its military cooperation with other foreign partners, including Russia. These deepening ties have been demonstrated in recent years through key leader engagements, military drills, joint infrastructure projects, and Egypt's pursuit of Russian military equipment, such as Su-35 fighter aircraft. Egypt's increasing ties with Russia could hamper bilateral United States-Egyptian cooperation and could trigger the Counter America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). If confirmed, I would communicate these concerns to Egyptian coun-

terparts, as well as the risk that deepening ties with Russia could pose to Egypt's national interests.

*Question.* Where do United States and Russian interests converge in Egypt?

Answer. I understand that the Department of Defense is concerned by deepening Egypt-Russia ties, in part because Russian goals and activities are not consistent with United States interests in Egypt and in the region. That being said, the United States and Russia do share a common counter-terrorism interest in the Sinai, though we choose to pursue this objective in very different ways.

*Question.* Where do they diverge?

Answer. The United States has an interest in a politically inclusive, economically vibrant, and secure Egypt with a professional military force that can protect its land and maritime borders and counterterrorism in the Sinai, and that respects civilian control of the military and human rights. Russia does not share those goals. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the United States remains Egypt's partner of choice, as United States training, equipment, and other materiel is better able to meet Egypt's security needs, mitigate the risk of civilian harm, and ensure broader regional stability.

*Question.* What is your assessment of ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates' relative strength in Sinai?

Answer. I assess that the Egyptian Government has made significant progress in its counterterrorism fight in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt still faces terrorist threats, however, and it is in the United States interest to help Egypt confront terrorist threats in a manner that reduces civilian harm and respects human rights.

*Question.* What type of support to Egypt do you assess to be beneficial in countering these groups?

Answer. Egypt's counterterrorism operations have benefited from United States-provided equipment and training. I expect that continued support of this kind would benefit Egypt's counterterrorism fight. If confirmed, I would work within DOD, with other departments and agencies, and with Congress to ensure that U.S. support advances shared counterterrorism objectives and is consistent with U.S. values.

*Question.* Do you have concerns about the implications of Egypt's engagements with the Assad regime? Please explain.

Answer. I am concerned about any efforts to normalize relations with the Assad regime, whether those efforts are undertaken in Cairo or elsewhere. If confirmed, I would urge states in the region to consider the atrocities that the Assad regime has and continues to inflict on the Syrian people before they engage with the regime.

#### RUSSIA

*Question.* What challenges does Russia pose to United States national security interests and what are the key principles and policies that you believe must underpin a successful strategy to protect U.S. interests?

Answer. Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage. It has invested heavily in efforts meant to check our strengths and to prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world. Russia has also consistently undermined international norms by violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, which additionally threatens the regional stability of our Allies and partners. The Russian Government's malign actions are underwritten by a capable military that continues to pose a near-peer strategic challenge to the United States.

Any successful strategy to counter Russia starts with reconfirming our commitments to the international rules-based order and the rights of all nations to determine their futures. In this endeavor we must also ensure that our European Allies in particular are standing with us shoulder to shoulder.

*Question.* In your opinion, what are the most effective ways to deter Russia or Russian backed separatists from further aggression against Ukraine?

Answer. Deterring Russia from further aggression against Ukraine must be a whole-of-government effort combined with our Allies and partners, similar to what Secretary Austin has termed integrated deterrence. The Department of Defense has an important role to play in bolstering Ukraine and deterring Russia militarily, but DOD's efforts should buttress our national diplomacy and leverage one of our nation's strongest advantages, our network of Allies and partners.

*Question.* In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics?

Answer. The key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics undoubtedly involves a whole-of-government effort to defend against, challenge, and deter these threats. In April 2021, the Administration sanctioned Russia, conducted

diplomatic expulsions and introduced new visa restrictions and export controls for Russian interference in the 2020 elections, the SolarWinds cyberattack, and Russia's poisoning of Alexei Navalnyy. This effort required departments and agencies involved in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and financial issues to coordinate and synchronize response actions to target Russian misbehavior and hold Moscow to account.

*Question.* What is your assessment of U.S. efforts to counter such tactics to date?

*Answer.* Russia relies upon hybrid tactics because they believe they can apply force asymmetrically, and that the United States will respond, but not in a way that will fundamentally hold Russian interests at risk. To the extent that the United States, working with Allies and partners, can make United States responses to Russian hybrid/malign tactics more impactful and costly as a means to deter this type of behavior, we should continue to explore these mechanisms.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the United States Government writ large, and DOD in particular, in countering that threat?

*Answer.* Putin has presided over considerable growth of capabilities in the cyber domain, in information operations and non-attributable military capabilities in the form of Russian Private Military Companies like Wagner. In using these capabilities, Putin is betting that the United States will weather the blows and either not respond or respond in a manner that does not inflict significant cost on Russia. Our approach should seek to make clear that these tools are not viable for any nation-state to use, and we should continue to hold him accountable—in lock-step with our partners and allies. The Department of Defense maintains significant capabilities in the information space, considerable cyber capabilities, and other options to counter these threats. If confirmed, I expect that DOD will continue to support United States Government responses to Russian malign activities alongside other law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and financial Departments and Agencies.

*Question.* What do you view as the benefits and drawbacks of the statutory limitations on military cooperation between the United States and the Russia Federation?

*Answer.* Military cooperation should remain limited given Russia's ongoing military aggression against Ukraine. Bilateral military deconfliction with Russia, which plays an important role in reducing tensions and the risk of miscalculation, should continue as a means to prevent miscalculation and risk reduction, and must be carefully distinguished from military cooperation.

*Question.* In your opinion, what advantages did Russia gain when it violated and eventually abrogated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?

*Answer.* Russia violated the Treaty because it sought to gain military advantage against the United States and NATO while also seeking to project a positive image in Europe as a constructive treaty-compliant country. As a result, Russia has gained the ability to produce and field more affordable and flexible intermediate range ground-based systems integrated onto an already existing launcher family (the Iskander system).

*Question.* What does the United States need to do to mitigate any advantages Russia derived from this action?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the United States works through the Strategic Stability Dialogue and the NATO–Russia Council to raise its concerns about Russia's growing capabilities, and to explore ways to improve European security. I will add that Russia's mendacity on our attempts to address Russia's violation of the INF treaty over 6 years leads us to be skeptical of the sincerity of Russia's approach to these issues.

*Question.* In your view, are the integrated air and missile defense capabilities of the United States in Europe adequate to address the ballistic missile and advanced cruise missile threats from Russia, and more specifically, do United States capabilities provide adequate air base air defense?

*Answer.* Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) plays an important role in deterring and mitigating adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Russia is investing in an A2/AD strategy to impede our freedom of movement in Europe. If confirmed, I will work with Department and other stakeholders and our NATO Allies to ensure we have the right capabilities to address Russia's capabilities and ensure our freedom of movement.

*Question.* From your perspective, what are the most effective ways of deterring Russian aggression against its neighbors?

*Answer.* I will preface this by saying that our total commitment to NATO and Article 5 mutual defense guarantee is vitally important. I think we need to deal with Russia with a blend of Alliance unity, the threat of economic action, credible military deterrence, and dialogue with Russia's leaders when it is in our mutual inter-

ests. Not allowing Russian rhetoric or diplomatic initiatives to cause rifts in the Alliance is vital, and the Alliance should speak with one voice.

## EUROPE

*Question.* In your view, are current United States force posture, investments, and engagements with partners and allies in Europe adequate to meet United States objectives in the AOR?

*Answer.* The recently-published Global Posture Review (GPR) assessed DOD's forces, footprint, and agreements in Europe and determined that, with the adjustments announced and implemented over the past year, current DOD posture and supported activities are sufficient to accomplish regional objectives. In Europe, the GPR strengthens the United States combat-credible deterrent against Russian aggression and enables NATO forces to operate more effectively.

*Question.* What changes, if any, would you recommend?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I look forward to working with stakeholders across DOD, the U.S. Government, Allies, and partners to continue identifying additional ways to enhance United States deterrence posture in Europe, using the GPR as a framework for future posture decisions.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the efficacy of the investments and activities carried out as part of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)?

*Answer.* Through such investments as pre-positioned equipment, exercises to enhance interoperability with our Allies, and adjustments to our force presence in Europe, EDI is achieving its goals of enhancing the United States deterrence posture, increasing the readiness and responsiveness of United States forces in Europe, and supporting the collective defense and security of NATO Allies. It has been a critical impetus in bolstering investment in security capability and capacity of U.S. Allies and partners in the region.

*Question.* What changes, if any, would you recommend to EDI objectives or supporting investments, if confirmed?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work (with stakeholders across the Department, U.S. Government, and Allies and partners) to determine what adjustments should be considered in order to further improve critical capabilities and U.S. and Allied readiness to ensure EDI investments remain responsive and relevant to the current security environment.

*Question.* What is your view of Russia's military buildup in and around Ukraine earlier this year?

*Answer.* Russia's aggressive military build-up in and near Ukraine is a top concern for the United States and our NATO Allies and partners. If Russia further invades Ukraine, the United States and our Allies and partners should impose severe economic measures, increase defense assistance to Ukraine, and work with NATO Allies to assess the adequacy of the Alliance's military posture and capabilities in light of Russian aggression in Europe.

*Question.* Is there more DOD should be doing to bolster our collective security, defend United States presence, deter Russia, and reassure our European Allies and partners in the region?

*Answer.* The recommendations implemented from the recent Global Posture Review strengthen the combat-credible deterrent against Russian aggression and enable NATO forces to operate more effectively. Through a combination of rotational and permanently-stationed forces, United States capabilities in Europe—both conventional and nuclear—are a tangible signal of the United States commitment to the collective defense and security of the NATO Alliance.

In addition to the investments and pre-positioned equipment and infrastructure enabled by EDI, our support and integration with NATO activities, exercises, and security cooperation programs provide the greatest deterrent to Russian adventurism and aggression. If confirmed, I look forward to working with stakeholders across DOD, the U.S. Government, Allies, and partners to continue identifying ways to enhance United States deterrence posture in Europe, using the GPR as a framework for future posture decisions. We are united with our NATO Allies in making clear that any further aggression against Ukraine would carry a very high price. If Russia decides to invade Ukraine further, I am confident that the United States and NATO are well positioned to take all necessary measures to ensure defense and security of Allies.

*Question.* What is your view on the provision of assistance to Ukraine, including lethal assistance?

*Answer.* I strongly support the provision of defensive lethal assistance to ensure Ukraine has the equipment it needs to defend itself. Ukraine also has critical non-lethal requirements, such as secure communications equipment, as well as training

and advisory needs. These efforts all remain critical to help Ukraine's forces preserve the country's territorial integrity and progress toward NATO interoperability in the face of continued Russian aggression.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you continue and accelerate DOD's work to help Ukraine develop critical deterrent capabilities?

Answer. Yes. I remain concerned about reports that Russia remains postured for a further invasion into Ukraine, and United States security assistance efforts should remain a top priority.

*Question.* If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that assistance is delivered to Ukraine in an efficient manner?

Answer. If confirmed, I will actively assess if there is anything more the Department can do to accelerate our assistance to Ukraine and make adjustments as necessary.

Defender Europe 2021 and other exercises the United States conducts with European Allies and partners illustrate our collective ability to mobilize large forces rapidly to respond to a crisis.

*Question.* Do you support DOD maintaining the high level of intensive and frequent exercises it has conducted in Europe in recent years?

Answer. Given the rapid pace of emerging technologies and threats across multiple domains, it is imperative that the United States and Allied militaries work closely and frequently together to ensure the highest level of readiness. Conducting intensive and frequent exercises is key to demonstrating that the United States military and its Allies are capable of rapidly deploying combat-credible forces in Europe to deter Russian aggression and respond to emerging crises across all domains.

*Question.* What is your opinion regarding the potential sale of new F-16s to Turkey by the United States, would such a sale be a net positive or negative for U.S. security interests and why, or why not?

Answer. I'm not aware of the specifics of any potential sales, but I support Turkey, as a member of NATO, continuing its modernization efforts for its F-16 fleet. I also see Turkey's interest in purchasing United States equipment as a positive sign. I understand that Turkey is a key contributor of F-16 capability to the Alliance, which is a net positive for United States security interests, and I believe we would want to enable them to continue making those contributions.

RUSSIAN AND UNITED STATES STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTH  
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

*Question.* What is your assessment of the effects of Russian nuclear modernization activities—particularly short range and intermediate range nuclear systems—on the NATO alliance?

Answer. I am concerned by Russia's development and fielding of systems that are not accountable under—and thus not constrained by—the NEW START Treaty. These systems are designed to offset NATO and U.S. conventional military advantages. Ultimately, they undermine regional stability and threaten the security of our NATO Allies.

*Question.* Do you support the integration of nuclear dual-capability on the F-35A aircraft?

Answer. Yes, I support a dual-capable F-35 as a critical part of U.S. extended deterrence commitments and NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. This capability contributes to the credibility of NATO's nuclear forces, which is central to maintain deterrence.

*Question.* Russia has worked to develop a wide range of novel nuclear capabilities, some of which analysts characterize as potential, "first-strike weapons," such as the SARMAT heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, the POSEIDON nuclear unmanned underwater vehicle, and the so-called SKYFALL nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile.

To what extent do you believe Russia's pursuit of such capabilities undermines the security of NATO allies?

Answer. These systems, some of which are unconstrained by treaty, undermine strategic stability and increase the likelihood of nuclear use due to miscalculation.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you recommend the United States and NATO take to address this growing threat?

Answer. The United States should be willing to negotiate arms control agreements to reduce or eliminate these capabilities, and should review our defense and strategic capabilities to manage the threat in the event that negotiations do not succeed.

*Question.* Over the past several years, the Intelligence Community and a number of DOD officials have highlighted the substantial and increasing disparity in the

number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons as compared to those possessed by the United States.

What are your views on Russian tactical nuclear forces not covered by the New START Treaty and whether existing arms control measures adequately address these capabilities?

Answer. I believe that future arms control agreements with Russia should include Russian non-strategic nuclear forces.

*Question.* What is your assessment of effects of the AEGIS Ashore missile defense system on NATO allies and Russian perceptions?

Answer. Although Moscow regularly complains about the presence of Aegis Ashore platforms in Romania and Poland, my understanding is that these systems are not designed to defend against Russia's sophisticated offensive missile capabilities. Rather, these two platforms are designed to confront potential missile threats emanating from outside Europe, such as Iran. NATO allies regularly cite the presence of Aegis Ashore as among the most important aspects of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.

#### NATO

*Question.* The 2018 NDS provides that “[m]utually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.”

In your view, to what extent does adherence to the Wales summit commitments on defense spending the Allies made in 2014 bolster the effectiveness and credibility of NATO?

Answer. The Wales Defense Investment Pledge, including its 2 percent of GDP benchmark, is critical to the effectiveness and credibility of NATO. To address the range of threats and emerging challenges facing Allies, the Alliance must adapt and invest in new capabilities. Without the investment in defense today, we will not have the necessary capabilities and contributions tomorrow.

*Question.* In your opinion, are there other metrics that may provide better insights into the health of the Alliance than the percentage of Gross Domestic Product spent on defense?

Answer. NATO is a political and military alliance with the ultimate purpose of guaranteeing the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. The health of the Alliance should be based on meeting this objective. That includes continued defense spending and investment to meet important markers of sharing responsibility for our common defense. Secretary General Stoltenberg often highlights cash, capabilities and contributions. The Alliance should also continue to promote democratic values that enable productive consultations and cooperation on defense and security-related issues.

*Question.* In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the national security interests of the United States?

Answer. Yes. President Biden has made clear the transatlantic alliance is the strong foundation on which our collective security and our shared prosperity are built. United States commitment to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is crucial to U.S. strategic interests. This shared commitment and the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty ensure NATO will remain the most successful Alliance in history. NATO will remain critical to vital United States interests, including deterring Russian aggression, competing with China, and reducing the ability of violent extremist organizations to threaten the United States Homeland and our Allies.

*Question.* What should be the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years?

Answer. The Alliance's major strategic objective remains guaranteeing the safety and security of its members. This includes deterring nuclear and non-nuclear aggression, defending Allied populations and territory if deterrence fails, and projecting stability beyond NATO's borders.

*Question.* In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for NATO in the coming five years?

Answer. The Alliance faces a range of challenges including confronting an aggressive Russia and competing with an emboldened People's Republic of China. The Alliance also must confront the ongoing threat of terrorism and emerging challenges like cyber security and climate change.

*Question.* What do you perceive to be the most important improvements in capability that the Alliance must make to deal with the current and future threats it faces?

*Answer.* The Alliance particularly strives to improve readiness, a critical component of presenting a strong defense and deterrence. Readiness requires Allies to invest in defense to procure, prepare, and provide interoperable and ready forces and capabilities. NATO is also increasing focus on Emerging Technologies. All this is crucial for adapting to the changing security environment.

*Question.* In alignment with DOD's Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept, in June 2021 at the Brussels Summit, NATO Allies pledged to enhance multi-domain operations.

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure NATO Allies continue to progress in enhancing these capabilities—all with a view to ensuring the Alliance can respond collectively to crisis in the Euro-Atlantic area at the speed of relevance?

*Answer.* I understand Allies work together in numerous NATO channels as well as nation-to-nation, to advance capabilities for joint operations across domains, for example in areas of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Command, Control, and Communications (C3). If confirmed, I would engage with U.S. colleagues and Alliance counterparts to continue and enhance the U.S. leadership role in these areas.

*Question.* In your view, how can DOD best maintain the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to respond to crisis in Europe while also engaging in credible day-to-day deterrence vis-à-vis our great power competitors?

*Answer.* Capabilities for response to European crisis are actually a key part of our day-to-day deterrence of great power competitors, particularly Russia. The United States strives to maintain an array of capabilities fitting for various theaters worldwide—including through the recent Global Posture Review, which strengthened our force posture in Europe. If confirmed, I would engage in DOD's continual review and adjustment of our posture, as the evolving security environment requires.

*Question.* How do you envision the update to NATO's strategic concept will affect Alliance priorities?

*Answer.* The Strategic Concept sets the Alliance's strategy. It outlines NATO's enduring purpose and specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security. I would expect that the new Concept will provide guidelines for NATO's political and military adaptation to ensure the Alliance continues to be prepared to execute its core tasks of Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security. I would also expect it will put heightened focus on deterrence and defense, and on addressing threats from Russia and challenges from the People's Republic of China.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you drive that discussion to ensure alignment with DOD priorities?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work with U.S. interagency colleagues, both civilian and military, to help shape a U.S. approach to NATO's strategic concept discussions that advances those U.S./DOD priorities. This would include consulting with Allies on, and sharing U.S. conclusions from, the various recent U.S. strategic reviews.

*Question.* In December 2020, NATO reaffirmed the Allies' longstanding position that, "as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance," and that, "the strategic nuclear forces of the United States are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance." Additionally, in remarks late last year, NATO's current Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, echoed this point, stating, "A world where Russia, China, North Korea and others have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world."

Do you agree that U.S. nuclear forces continue to serve as the "supreme guarantee of the security" of NATO?

*Answer.* Yes. For over 60 years, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries has successfully deterred aggression against the Alliance. NATO's nuclear capabilities preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. They also provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America.

*Question.* Do you believe this principle requires the United States to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in NATO countries?

*Answer.* Yes. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, and as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat, I believe U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries.

#### BALKANS

*Question.* What are the United States national security interests in the Balkans?

*Answer.* The Balkans are a critical region for European security. Our greatest national interest in the Western Balkans is to help maintain peace in a region still haunted by wars fought less than three decades ago. It is also in the United States' national security interest to promote regional stability, encourage further Euro-Atlantic integration, and facilitate stronger partnerships between regional actors. The

Balkan Peninsula is home to eight NATO Allies, including the Alliance's four newest members—Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Continuing our important work with these Allies to modernize their armed forces and build interoperability with NATO will facilitate greater burden sharing and pay dividends. The Balkan Peninsula is also a focal point of our strategic competition with Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), so it is important that we remain engaged there.

*Question.* How would you describe the current threats to security and stability in the Balkans?

*Answer.* Our Allies and partners on the Balkan peninsula must contend with various threats to regional security and stability. These range from conventional threats, such as Russian force build-up in the Black Sea, to hybrid threats, such as disinformation, cyberattacks, and Russia's use of energy as a tool of political manipulation. In the Western Balkans, unconsolidated democratic institutions present a risk, particularly in light of unresolved grievances along ethnic lines. For instance, ethnic separatism and challenges to the institutions established by the Dayton Peace Accords threaten the functionality and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the slow pace of negotiations in the EU-led Brussels Dialogue is preventing Serbia and Kosovo from normalizing relations or cooperating on key issues like electricity distribution and regional commerce. The PRC seeks corrupt and coercive economic and security inroads, particularly through its One Belt One Road and other PRC-backed projects that may increase Balkan countries' exposure to coercion and affect the security of critical infrastructure.

*Question.* What do you see as the role of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and what conditions should be met before that presence can be reduced or eliminated, in your view?

*Answer.* KFOR remains an important facilitator of a safe and secure environment for all citizens in Kosovo, which has been its critical role nearly 23 years. KFOR's troop footprint has steadily decreased over the past two decades based on NATO's assessment of the personnel KFOR needs to maintain a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic, and peaceful Kosovo. Normalization between Serbia and Kosovo is an important and necessary next step in achieving these aims.

Russia and China continue to invest in infrastructure and serve as moneylender to nations across Europe—particularly in southeastern Europe. Such investments may provide mechanisms for coercive power and influence in European affairs.

*Question.* If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend the United States take to encourage our Balkan allies and partners to resist such influence campaigns by Russia and China?

*Answer.* The United States continues to demonstrate to our Balkans Allies and partners that the Euro-Atlantic path is the best route to stability, security, and prosperity. We must continue diplomatic engagement with Allies and partners on the long-term negative impacts of disinformation and predatory investments from Russia and China and the need to protect critical infrastructure. We would also continue our assistance efforts to enhance resilience to malign influence through continued development of countries' cyber defense capabilities, particularly the most vulnerable. Russia and China are not interested in European unity or NATO interoperability, and know their strategic investments can drive wedges between European partners.

#### DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION

*Question.* In your view, what are the necessary and appropriate strategic objectives that should underpin the Defense Department's approach to building the capabilities of a partner nation's security forces?

*Answer.* Security cooperation investments should be targeted to advance broader goals to address shared current and future threats. DOD building partner capacity efforts should focus on enhancing ally and partner capabilities to effectively operate alongside and in lieu of U.S. Forces to address shared national security challenges. The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will further shape the strategic objectives and integrated approach of DOD security cooperation.

*Question.* In the competition with near-peer rivals, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to ensure that the United States is taking a strategic approach to its security cooperation with allies and partners?

*Answer.* Aligned with whole-of-government security sector assistance efforts, Department of Defense security cooperation tools should bolster ally and partner capabilities for defense and advance shared national security interests through addressing regional security challenges. DOD security cooperation, developed and executed in coordination the State Department, serves to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. al-

liances and partnerships, reinforcing a critical American asymmetric advantage in competition with near-peer rivals.

## CYBER

*Question.* The 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy states that “the Department will work with U.S. allies and partners to strengthen cyber capacity, expand combined cyberspace operations, and increase bi-directional information sharing in order to advance our mutual interests.”

What do you perceive to be the role of the ASD(ISA) in accomplishing these objectives?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will support the implementation of the Secretary’s vision of Integrated Deterrence, which, as I understand it, would incorporate cyber capabilities into all of our approaches, including those with partners and allies. I would work closely with my counterpart from ASD(Space), other OSD offices, the Services, the combatant commands, and other departments and agencies as appropriate to work with our partners and allies to strengthen their cybersecurity, thereby lifting the opportunities we have for cyberspace operations and secure information sharing.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you plan to strengthen the role between your office and other DOD organizations that contribute to these objectives, such as United States Cyber Command, Cyber Policy, and the Principal Cyber Advisor?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work closely with my counterpart from ASD(Space) as well as other DOD offices and organizations to coordinate our approaches to cyber security capacity building, planning, exercising, and operations with partners and allies.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD perspectives on international cyber cooperation are coordinated within the interagency and that DOD perspectives are included in high level international engagements, such as in the June Biden-Putin summit?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I commit to coordinating closely and regularly with my counterpart from ASD(Space) to provide unified DOD perspectives on international cyber cooperation in interagency meetings. I would look for opportunities to raise cyber-related issues when appropriate, and I will seek to contribute to a whole-of-government approach to cyber cooperation with our partners and allies.

## SEXUAL HARASSMENT

*Question.* In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the ASD(ISA)?

*Answer.* There is no place for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, or any other types of harassment within Policy. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Under Secretary in reviewing previous workforce surveys that would hopefully give me insight into the Policy’s culture to help understand its environment and what actions need to be taken, if any. I am aware of the GAO’s report recommending steps the Department take to address sexual harassment and assault among the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s ongoing efforts to promote a culture of dignity and respect, including a commitment to tackling sexual harassment.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(ISA)?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will take serious action immediately by initiating an inquiry to gather all facts, conduct necessary interviews, collect information, and address the complaint within the specified guidelines of Federal statutes and Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary to make clear to the ISA workforce that they deserve a respectful workplace, equality and diversity matters always, and I will work to support the Department’s zero tolerance for harassment.

## CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN MILITARIES

1. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Wallander, how do you plan to improve our defense relationship with developing nations, so that they seek to emulate the American model of civil-military relations, instead of an authoritarian model of some of our peer competitors?

Dr. WALLANDER. The Department should use its unique security cooperation toolkit combined with defense diplomacy efforts to lead with U.S. interests and values in improving defense relations with developing nations. Efforts to build capacity and improve interoperability with allies and partners demonstrates U.S. commitment to partners' needs, as well as the benefits of the U.S. model of civil-military relations, in responding to their unique national security requirements. We must demonstrate to Allies and partners the benefits of a professional military force upholding the highest standard of civil-military relations through U.S. security cooperation training, capacity building, and key leader engagements. DOD institutional capacity building activities enable partners to achieve common security objectives in contrast to the authoritarian model of peer competitors' transactional approaches with developing nations.

2. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Wallander, how can the Department of Defense better ensure that military arms sales and technology sharing are vectored to the right partners and in the appropriate amounts?

Dr. WALLANDER. Arms sales and technology sharing are a key component of the U.S. defense strategy. Many U.S. security cooperation efforts buy down risk and ease burdens on U.S. forces by improving partners' ability to provide for their own security, to contribute to larger regional and combined security efforts, and/or support U.S. operations. I recognize the need to balance Ally and partner interoperability with protecting the U.S. warfighter's technical edge and the need to ensure partners are responsibly using U.S. technology. Technology security is a key enabler for security cooperation. Ally and partner willingness to protect classified and other export-controlled military and dual use technologies must be considered as part of any transfer decision. Additionally, DOD experts on technology security should implement safeguards to protect critical technology from illicit transfers or irresponsible use.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

ARCTIC

3. Senator KING. Dr. Wallander, the Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated multiple Service-level deep dives into the Arctic operational environment, civil/economic considerations, threats in the region, and the unique challenges the Arctic presents. What do you see as the top priorities of effort for international security cooperation in the region and impacts to DOD?

Dr. WALLANDER. A common theme in the Service Arctic strategies, the DOD Arctic Strategy, and the National Strategy for the Arctic Region is collaborating with Arctic Allies and partners. Another common theme is increasing the Department's awareness of the operating environment—from climate change to competitor activities. These two themes point to a top priority for Arctic security: increasing cooperation and developing a shared and accurate all-domain awareness. To that end, DOD needs to work with Allies and partners to increase the Department's ability to operate in the changing Arctic environment and meet U.S. national objectives.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK KELLY

RUSSIAN CYBER CAPABILITIES

4. Senator KELLY. Dr. Wallander, early last year I asked now-Under Secretary of Policy Colin Kahl about the SolarWinds hack and for his perspective on how we should address vulnerabilities in our digital architecture. I understand you are not a cyber expert, but as an expert on Russia, what is your current assessment of Russian offensive cyber capabilities?

Dr. WALLANDER. As I understand it, Russia is a sophisticated cyber adversary that possesses advanced cyber capabilities. Russia conducts cyber-espionage campaigns, has integrated cyber activities into its military and national strategy, and has conducted disruptive cyber operations outside the United States, including in Ukraine and Georgia. It has also demonstrated its ability—and will—to conduct cyber-enabled information operations to influence our population and challenge our democratic processes. I expect Russia will continue its efforts to shape the global narrative and exploit American networks, which are threatening U.S. interests.

5. Senator KELLY. Dr. Wallander, why is Russia's willingness to use cyber and other gray zone tactics against military and civilian targets dangerous?

Dr. WALLANDER. It is concerning because, while Russia may be deterred from engaging the United States and our allies in traditional armed conflict, Russia might not be similarly deterred from engaging in cyber operations to disrupt our government and commerce, challenge our democratic processes, and threaten our critical infrastructure. I believe Russia uses malicious cyber-enabled activities in an attempt to undermine United States military advantage and pose long-term strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our Allies and partners. Cyber capabilities are a versatile tool of state power that can be employed throughout the conflict spectrum for a variety of purposes.

6. Senator KELLY. Dr. Wallander, what can we do to better counter these tactics?

Dr. WALLANDER. The Department of Defense is one part of a whole-of-government effort to defend the Nation in cyberspace. DOD brings a number of capabilities and

authorities to bear in defending the Nation from attacks in cyberspace. I believe DOD must work with allies, partners, and the private sector to ensure an appropriate defensive posture, minimize the impacts of malicious cyber activity, and reduce the costs of Russia's malicious cyber activities against the United States.

7. Senator KELLY. Dr. Wallander, if confirmed, how much emphasis can we expect your office to place on addressing this threat?

Dr. WALLANDER. If confirmed, I will seek a comprehensive understanding of how Russia is using all elements of its national power, including its cyber capabilities, to advance its foreign policy goals and challenge United States global interests and domestic stability.

8. Senator KELLY. Dr. Wallander, what will the key lines of effort be?

Dr. WALLANDER. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Administration's national security team to ensure we are developing an approach that includes holding Russia accountable for its pattern of malign behavior and actions in cyberspace. I expect the Department would want to ensure that any approach to Russia should maintain the United States' military edge; and I expect this would include investing in the force posture and capabilities necessary to deter Russia from attacking our Homeland or our allies through military means. Russia has shown it has the ability and intent to target sources of American strength. DOD must defend the American way of life, economy, people, and democratic institutions from all states that would seek to undermine them, including Russia.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER WICKER

SHIPS HOMEPORTED IN ROTA, SPAIN

9. Senator WICKER. Dr. Wallander, the Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM) and I have discussed the critical role the forward based Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, play in deterring Russian aggression. We have also noted the importance of adding two more ships to the four already stationed there. What deterrence benefits would two additional destroyers based in Rota provide?

Dr. WALLANDER. I am aware that DOD is committed to a European posture that serves as a combat-credible deterrent against Russia and enables NATO forces to operate more effectively, as reinforced in the recent Global Posture Review. If confirmed, I would look forward to reviewing, in consultation with the Joint Staff and Commander of United States European Command, DOD's force laydown in Europe and reviewing plans for any additional posture adjustment required to support United States warfighting requirements.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

AFRICA

10. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Wallander, will reducing troops in Africa make it harder to implement the National Defense Strategy (NDS) with respects to countering China, Russia, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and al Qaeda?

Dr. WALLANDER. The "by, with, and through" partners approach to achieving security and stability in Africa has largely proven effective with a limited forward presence of U.S. Forces. U.S. security cooperation activities also enhance partner force operations, which achieve shared strategic objectives and build enduring relationships. Key to this approach is a focus on building African partner nation capabilities while supporting efforts of other international partners.

11. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Wallander, does "over-the-horizon" counterterrorism strategy in Somalia increase risk and decrease mission effectiveness against al Shabaab?

Dr. WALLANDER. It is my understanding that the Department's counterterrorism approach is adaptable and responsive to the nature of the terrorist threat. Persistent presence and over the horizon approaches each come with their own risks and benefits. An effective counterterrorism strategy depends on not only U.S. capabilities but strong relationships with allies and partners. If confirmed, I look forward to evaluating our approach in Somalia and our efforts against al Shabaab.

12. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Wallander, what is your assessment of China's military objectives in Africa and what is the primary way in which these objectives threaten our national security?

Dr. WALLANDER. The PRC seeks to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure in Africa that would allow the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to project and sustain military power at greater distances to protect its national interests. The PRC currently uses commercial infrastructure to support its military operations abroad, including PLA presence in other countries, such as its base in Djibouti.

13. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Wallander, what are the specific implications of a Chinese navy base on the Atlantic?

Dr. WALLANDER. A PLA naval base on the Atlantic, when combined with a network of logistical support, could interfere with U.S. and ally military operations, increase the risks of escalation outside of the Indo-Pacific, and eventually could support PLA offensive operations.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

DEFENSE STRATEGY

14. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing threat. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of the PRC as the Department's "pacing" challenge.

15. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater as it relates to the Department's efforts to address military challenges posed by the PRC; I acknowledge the PRC also poses challenges in other theaters.

16. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, "The PRC [People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario." Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN concurred for the record with Taiwan's designation as the Department's pacing scenario. In your personal opinion, do you support the designation of a Taiwan contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes. The PRC is the overall pacing challenge and the noted scenario is a key pacing scenario. There are some elements of the joint force that will pace themselves to Russia, given some of Russia's unique capabilities.

17. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN testified that the Department of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget. In your personal opinion, do you agree with Admiral Grady's testimony? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I agree the Department should align its resources to its priorities, while also taking steps to manage the risks associated with lower-priority issues.

18. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree that Europe and the Middle East are therefore lower priority theaters than the Indo-Pacific for the Department of Defense? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I believe the Department should prioritize the challenges posed by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, it must be able to simultaneously protect U.S. national security interests in other theaters such as Europe and the Middle East. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the Department to co-

ordinate and implement such an approach across the Department of Defense enterprise.

19. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, do you agree that the Department of Defense needs to do less in Europe and the Middle East, so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I agree the Department should work closely with allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and other theaters to identify ways to address priority challenges in these regions. If confirmed, I will support efforts to evaluate the Department’s approaches in Europe and the Middle East, including the opportunities and challenges presented, and provide my recommendations through established channels.

20. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, should the United States seek to reduce United States Force levels in the Middle East, so it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I believe the Department should take a sustainable and effective approach to United States Force posture in the Middle East that ensures sufficient resources to deter China. I do not view this as only a challenge of U.S. Force levels in specific regions, but rather how we creatively and effectively integrate all available tools and resources of the Department to protect U.S. national security in each theater while strengthening our alliances and partnerships to cooperatively address shared threats.

#### ALLIED BURDEN SHARING

21. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, do you believe we should press our European allies to take primary responsibility for delivering lethal aid and other military support to Ukraine, so the United States Military can focus on China in the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. WALLANDER. I support United States security assistance efforts alongside substantial security assistance from European allies, including the provision of defensive lethal assistance, to build the capacity of Ukraine’s forces. I believe that carefully considered provision of appropriate lethal assistance to Ukraine would not reduce United States capabilities to meet the China challenge. I also believe that the United States should continue to work with our European Allies in support of Ukraine in the face of increasing Russian aggression. A strong United States and European response to Russian aggression demonstrates the strength of the U.S. network of allies and partners. These efforts to support Ukraine are compatible with an appropriate focus on challenges coming from China.

#### MIDDLE EAST FORCE POSTURE

22. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, in your personal opinion, do you believe our Gulf partners should prioritize developing their air, missile, and coastal defenses, so that the Department of Defense can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, I support developing the air, missile, and coastal defense of Gulf partners and believe that the United States has a strong security cooperation foundation upon which to continue this work. I understand that the United States has encouraged Gulf partners to invest heavily in their United States-origin air, missile, and coastal defense systems.

23. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, what steps should the United States take in order to ensure our Gulf partners develop their air, missile, and coastal defenses as rapidly as possible?

Dr. WALLANDER. I understand that the United States has mutually beneficial security cooperation relationships with the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Iraq. It works through security cooperation programs to help these seven partner nations develop their capabilities in air, missile, and coastal defenses. Additionally, the United States has an extensive and ongoing program of exercises to validate the ability to operate effectively with these partner nations.

24. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, the Pentagon has reported to Congress consistently over the years that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) consumes the

vast majority of air-breathing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) (that is, non-spaced based assets) available across the Joint Force. As a result, other combatant commands such as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) have had to live with substantial ISR shortfalls in their theaters as they try to monitor China and Russia, in particular. In your personal opinion, do you agree that as we try to monitor terrorist groups in the Middle East, we should try to use the ISR assets already available to CENTCOM rather than take assets from other combatant commands? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. WALLANDER. I agree that we must not fail to ensure sufficient and appropriate capabilities are available to monitor China and Russia. I am aware that DOD has a well-established process to annually prepare the Global Force Management allocation plan, which assesses appropriate alignment of capabilities across combatant commands; I support adhering to this planning process, barring significant operational updates.

25. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, U.S. Forces, sensors, and platforms vary in their relevance for over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations. In your personal opinion, do you agree that an aircraft carrier operating from the Arabian Sea is a relatively expensive and inefficient way to conduct counterterrorism operations in the Middle East? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. WALLANDER. I agree that it is essential to ensure that DOD properly aligns requirements with capabilities. If confirmed, I would support evaluating creative and efficient solutions to resource the enduring counterterrorism mission that would allow air craft carriers to be focused towards missions for which they are uniquely suited, like deterring our adversaries in priority theaters.

26. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Wallander, when INDOPACOM is our priority theater, and when strategic competition with China is the top priority of our strategy, in your personal opinion, is the optimal use of our limited fleet of aircraft carriers to operate in the Arabian Sea monitoring terrorist groups in the Middle East? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. WALLANDER. I agree that it is essential for DOD to ensure the right levels and types of resources so that the United States is able to meet the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I would work to support DOD’s internal processes to assess strategic tradeoffs related to appropriately and efficiently allocating the Department’s most high-demand, low density assets.

[The nomination reference of Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander follows:]

**NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT**

**PN730**

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
June 23, 2021.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Celeste Ann Wallander, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Robert Story Karem.

\_\_\_\_\_, 2021.  
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

**☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.**

\_\_\_\_\_  
[The biographical sketch of Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Celeste Ann Wallander****Education:**

- Reed College
  - September 1979 – May 1980
  - No degree, transferred to Northwestern University
- Northwestern University
  - September 1980 – June 1983
  - B.A. (summa cum laude)
- Yale University
  - September 1983 – May 1990
  - M.A. in Political Science May 1985
  - M.Phil. in Political Science May 1986
  - Ph.D. in Political Science May 1990

**Employment Record:**

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- The U.S. Russia Foundation, Washington D.C.
  - President and CEO
  - January 2017 - current
- WestExec Advisors, Washington D.C.
  - Senior Advisor
  - May 2018 – current
- National Security Council Staff, The White House, Washington D.C.
  - Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Russia and Central Asia
  - September 2013- January 2017
- Foreign Policy Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington D.C.
  - Transatlantic Fellow (non-resident)
  - Foreign Policy Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States
  - November 2012 – September 2013
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington D.C.
  - Senior Advisor to the USD(P)
  - September 2012 – August 2013
- Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), United States Department of Defense, Washington D.C.
  - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia Policy

- May 2009 – July 2012
- School of International Service, American University, Washington D.C.
  - Associate Professor and Director of the M.A. Program in Global Governance, Politics, and Security
  - January 2009 – September 2013 (on public service leave May 2009 July 2012)
- School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
  - Visiting Associate Professor and Director, Eurasia Strategy Project
  - August 2006 – January 2009
- Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.
  - Senior Associate (non-resident)
  - August 2006 - January 2009
- Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.
  - Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program; and Executive Director, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security
  - July 2001 – July 2006
- School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
  - Adjunct Associate Professor
  - September 2003 – December 2003
- Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.
  - Senior Fellow, European Studies
  - July 2000 – June 2001
- Harvard University, Cambridge MA
  - Associate Professor, Department of Government; Faculty Associate Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Davis Center for Russian Studies
  - July 1995 - June 2000
- Harvard University, Cambridge MA
  - Assistant Professor, Department of Government; Faculty Associate Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Davis Center for Russian Studies
  - July 1989 - July 2005

**Honors and Awards:**

- Federal Civilian Awards
  - Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course at the Air University (Maxwell AFB), March 2012 as the Office of the Secretary of Defense designated SES civilian candidate
  - Department of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service, January 2012
- Academic Awards

- Trustee Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003-2005. Named first CSIS Trustee Fellow by the CSIS Board of Trustees, chaired by Senator Sam Nunn
- National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1984-1987
- Sterling Prize Fellowship, Yale University, 1983-1984
- Phi Beta Kappa, 1983
- William M. McGovern Award in Political Science, Northwestern University, 1983
- Other Awards: Competitive Grants
  - Grants to support the Eurasian Strategy Project, from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict (2007-2009) and the MacArthur Foundation, Program on Global Security and Sustainability (2007-2008)
  - Grants to support project to support U.S. engagement with Ukraine for integration and democracy, from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (2004) and Smith Richardson Foundation (2004)
  - Grant to support a Russian-American military-to-military program, ARMD (American-Russian Military Dialogue), from the Donner Foundation (2003-2004)
  - Grant to support the Russia and Eurasia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict (2002-04)
  - Grants to support the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS), from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997-2007) and the MacArthur Foundation, Program on Global Security and Sustainability (1999-2007)
  - Center for International Affairs Faculty Research Fellowship, Spring 1997
  - National Council for Soviet and East European Research grant for research project "International Institutions and German-Russian Security Relations in the Post-Cold War European System," 1992-94

- German Marshall Fund Fellowship for Study of Germany by Younger U.S. Scholars for research project "International Institutions and German-Russian Security Relations in the Post-Cold War European System," 1992
- Milton Fund Award for research project "International Institutions and German-Russian Security Relations in the Post-Cold War European System," 1991-93
- Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Foundation Program in International Peace and Security Studies Fellowship, 1987-1989

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[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander in connection with her nomination follows:]

117<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
ROOM SR-228  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050  
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE  
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

**NOTE:** Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):**

Celeste Ann Wallander

2. **Position to which nominated:**

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

3. **Date of nomination:**

June 23, 2021

4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-**

line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

Reed College, September 1979 – May 1980. No degree, transferred to Northwestern University.

Northwestern University, September 1980 – June 1983. B.A. (summa cum laude) June 1983.

Yale University, September 1983 – May 1990. M.A. in Political Science May 1985; M.Phil. in Political Science May 1986; Ph.D. in Political Science May 1990.

**5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

President and CEO, The U.S.-Russia Foundation (January 2017 – current).  
Washington D.C.

Senior Advisor, WestExec Advisors (May 2018 – current). Washington D.C.

Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Russia and Central Asia,  
National Security Council Staff, The White House (September 2013- January  
2017). Washington D.C.

Transatlantic Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, German Marshall Fund of the United  
States (November 2012 – September 2013). Washington D.C.

Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, September 2012 – August  
2013. Washington D.C.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia Policy, International  
Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), United States  
Department of Defense (May 2009 –July 2012). Washington D.C.

Associate Professor and Director of the M.A. Program in Global Governance, Politics,  
and Security, School of International Service, American University (January 2009  
– September 2013). Washington D.C. (On unpaid Public Service Leave of  
Absence May 2009-July 2012).

**6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**

Participant, STRATCOM DEGRE 2021 Wargame, April 2021 (unpaid service)

Member, Defense Science Board Study on the Future of U.S. Military Superiority, 2018-2019 (unpaid service)

**7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**

President and CEO, The U.S.-Russia Foundation (January 2017 – current).  
Washington D.C. Ex officio non-voting Director.

Senior Advisor, WestExec Advisors (May 2018 – current). Washington D.C.  
Consultant.

**8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):**

Member, Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (current)

Member, American Political Science Association (current)

Member, Atlantic Council of the United States (current)

Member, Council on Foreign Relations (current)

Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies (current)

Member, International Studies Association

Member, Women in International Security

Member, Montgomery County Road Runners Club (current)

Treasurer, local Girl Scouts of America. Volunteer, with term ending 2011.

Coach, Girls on the Run of Montgomery County Maryland. Volunteer, with term ending 2009.

Treasurer and Den Mother, local Boys Scouts of America. Volunteer, with term ending 2004.

Member, Parent Teachers Student Association (Montgomery County Maryland, Whitman H.S., Pyle M.S., Burning Tree E.S.)

Member, The Loisach Group (German-American Strategic Dialogue) of the George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (current)

Member, Russia Council of the World Economic Forum, 2018-2019 term

Member, Defense Science Board Study on the Future of U.S. Military Superiority, 2018-2019

Research Associate, Carter Center of Emory University, 1988-1989

Visiting Scholar, Berkeley-Stanford Program Soviet International Behavior, 1987-1988

**9. Political affiliations and activities:**

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):**

**NA**

- b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:**

I volunteered on the Foreign Policy working group for the Pete Buttigieg Democratic primary campaign 2019-2020

I volunteered on the Foreign Policy working group for the Joe Biden/Kamala Harris general Presidential election campaign 2020.

**c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:**

Hilary Clinton General Election President 07/26/2016 \$100.00  
 Hilary Clinton General Election President 11/08/2016 \$150.00  
 Dan Baer Primary House 8/8/2017 \$500.00  
 Dan Baer Primary Senate 4/16/2019 \$500.00  
 Elissa Slotkin Primary House 9/29/2019 \$250.00  
 Evelyn Farkas Primary House 12/19/2019 \$100.00  
 Pete Buttigieg Primary President 2/4/2020 \$516.45  
 Joe Biden Primary President 5/31/2020 \$1000.00  
 Joe Biden Primary President 6/4/20 \$1000.00  
 Elissa Slotkin General House 8/18/2020 \$250.00  
 Tom Malinowski General House 8/18/2020 \$250.00  
 Joe Biden/Kamala Harris General President 9/24/2020 \$1000.00  
 Joe Biden/Kamala Harris General President 10/13/2020 \$1000.00

**10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):**

Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course at the Air University (Maxwell AFB), March 2012  
 as the Office of the Secretary of Defense designated SES civilian candidate  
 Department of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service, January 2012  
 Grants to support the Eurasian Strategy Project, from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict (2007-2009) and the MacArthur Foundation, Program on Global Security and Sustainability (2007-2008)  
 Trustee Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003-2005. Named first CSIS Trustee Fellow by the CSIS Board of Trustees, chaired by Senator Sam Nunn  
 Grants to support project to support U.S. engagement with Ukraine for integration and democracy, from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (2004) and Smith Richardson Foundation (2004)  
 Grant to support a Russian-American military-to-military program, ARMD (American-Russian Military Dialogue), from the Donner Foundation (2003-2004)  
 Grant to support the Russia and Eurasia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict (2002-04)  
 Grants to support the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS),

from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Program on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997-2007) and the MacArthur Foundation, Program on Global Security and Sustainability (1999-2007)

Center for International Affairs Faculty Research Fellowship, Spring 1997

National Council for Soviet and East European Research grant for research project "International Institutions and German-Russian Security Relations in the Post-Cold War European System," 1992-94

German Marshall Fund Fellowship for Study of Germany by Younger U.S. Scholars for research project "International Institutions and German-Russian Security Relations in the Post-Cold War European System," 1992

Milton Fund Award for research project "International Institutions and German-Russian Security Relations in the Post-Cold War European System," 1991-93

Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Foundation Program in International Peace and Security Studies Fellowship, 1987-1989

National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1984-1987

Sterling Prize Fellowship, Yale University, 1983-1984

Phi Beta Kappa, 1983

William M. McGovern Award in Political Science, Northwestern University, 1983

11. **Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):**

**Publications:**

**Books:**

*Russia Watch: Essays in Honor of George Kolt.* Co-editor with Eugene Rumer. Washington DC: CSIS Press, 2007.

*Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine.* Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004. Co-editor with Robert Legvold; author of chapter 2, "Economics and security in Russia's foreign policy and the implications for Ukraine and Belarus;" co-author (with Robert Legvold) of the introduction, "Economics and Security in the Post-Soviet Space," and the conclusion.

*Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.

*Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Co-editor with Helga Haftendorn and Robert O. Keohane; co-author (with Helga Haftendorn and Robert Keohane) of chapter one, "Introduction;" co-author (with Robert Keohane) of chapter two, "Risk, threat, and security institutions;" co-author (with Helga Haftendorn and Robert Keohane) of

chapter twelve, "Conclusion."

*The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. Editor; author of chapter one, "The sources of Russian conduct after the cold war: theories, frameworks, and approaches," and chapter nine, "Ideas, interests, and institutions in Russian foreign policy."

Scholarly articles and chapters:

- "Russia," in *Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis*, edited by Daniel Moran (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011)
- "Global Challenges and Russian Foreign Policy," in *Twenty-First Century Russian Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past*, edited by Robert Legvold (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007)
- "Russian Politics and HIV/AIDS: the Institutional and Leadership Sources of an Inadequate Policy," in *HIV/AIDS in Eurasia*, edited by Judyth Twigg, (New York: Palgrave, 2007)
- "Silk Road, Great Game, or Soft-Underbelly? The New U.S.-Russia Relationship and Implications for Eurasia," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 3, Number 3, September 2003, pp. 91-103.
- "Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 137-177.
- "Lost and Found: Gorbachev's New Thinking," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 117-129.
- "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 705-736.
- "Interests and the Wall of Ideas: Germany's Eastern Trade Policy after Unification," (with Jeffrey J. Anderson), *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 30, no. 6 (December 1997), pp. 675-698.
- "Conflict resolution and peace operations in the former Soviet Union: is there a role for security institutions?" in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, edited by Karen Dawisha (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
- "Soviet security strategies toward Europe: After the Wall, with their backs up against it" (with Jane E. Prokop), in *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
- "International institutions and modern security strategies" *Problems of Communism*, vol. 41, no. 1-2 (January-April 1992): pp. 44-63.
- "Opportunity, incrementalism, and learning in the extension and retraction of Soviet global commitments," *Security Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 514-542.
- "Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1990s," in *Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

"Third-world conflict in Soviet military thought: does the 'new thinking' grow prematurely grey?" *World Politics*, Vol. 42 (October 1989), pp. 31-63.

Public interest publications:

- "NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 4 (July-August 2018), pp. 70-81.
- "Cancellation of Putin Summit Reaffirms Obama's Russia Strategy," *Transatlantic Take*, German Marshall Fund of the United States, <http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/09/04/cancellation-of-putin-summit-reaffirms-obamas-russia-strategy/>, 4 September 2013.
- "Mutually Assured Stability: Establishing US-Russia Security Relations for a New Century," *Beyond the Reset Series*, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council of the United States, July 2013.
- "Testing Russia at the G8," *German Marshall Fund of the United States*, <http://blog.gmfus.org/author/cwallander/>, 11 June 2013
- "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: the revenge of the Soviet military," *www.foreignpolicy.com*, 4 December 2012
- "Rocket Science 101: Why we need to cooperate with Russia on missile defense," *www.foreignpolicy.com*, 8 October 2012
- "Russia: the Domestic Sources of a Less-than-Grand Strategy," in *Strategic Asia 2007-2008: Domestic Politics, Internal Change, and Grand Strategy*, edited by Ashley Tellis and Michael Willis, (Seattle WA: The National Bureau for Asian Research, 2007)
- "The Russian Political System and U.S. National Interests," in *Defending the Gains? Transatlantic Responses When Democracy is Under Threat*, edited by Esther Brimmer, (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2007), pp. 89-106
- "Russian Transimperialism and its Implications," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, number 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 107-122.
- "Sovereign Football: A Political Fable," *Moscow Times*, 29 September 2006.
- "Suspended Animation: The U.S. and Russia after the G-8," *Current History* (October 2006), pp. 315-320.
- "In Belarus, fear and hope collide," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 March 2006.
- "How not to convert gas to power," *International Herald Tribune*, 6 January 2006.
- "Borderlands and the value of academic research for policy: a case study," *Asia Policy*, January 2006 (Number 1), pp. 35-41.
- "Russian Policy and HIV/AIDS" *Policy Memo Series #389, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, (<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "Russian views on nonproliferation," *Policy Memo Series #371 (December 2005), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, (<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "May 9th and Russia: Past, Present, and Future," Policy Memo Series #366 (July 2005), *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, (<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)

- "Challenge and Opportunity: A U.S. Strategy on Ukraine," *Ukraine Strategy Background Paper*, (June 2005).  
([http://www.csis.org/ruseura/050628\\_usstratonukraine.pdf](http://www.csis.org/ruseura/050628_usstratonukraine.pdf))
- "Russia and HIV/AIDS: Opportunities for Leadership and Cooperation," (with Stephen J. Morrison) *Report of the CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Brookings/CSIS Joint Delegation to Russia*, February 20-26, 2005, CSIS, (May 2005).  
(<http://www.csis.org/hivaidrussia/hivaidrussiainreport.pdf>)
- "Ukraine's Election: The Role of One International NGO," (May 2005).  
([http://www.csis.org/ruseura/pubs/0502\\_UkrainesElection\\_English.pdf](http://www.csis.org/ruseura/pubs/0502_UkrainesElection_English.pdf))
- "What President Putin Should Say to President Bush in Bratislava," *Policy Memo Series #361 (February 2005), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*,  
(<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "Helping Russia Cope with AIDS," *Policy Memo Series #352 (November 2004), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*,  
(<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "Russia: Power in Weakness?" (with Eugene B. Rumer), *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, no. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 57-73.
- "U.S.-Russian Relations: Between Realism and Reality," *Current History* (October 2003), pp. 307-312.
- "Business is Business: Russia, Trade, and the 'Axis of Evil'," *In the National Interest*, Vol. 1, Issue 13 (4 December 2002), <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/>. Revised version of "Russia's Interest in Trading with the 'Axis of Evil'," *Policy Memo Series #248 (October 2002), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*,  
(<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "NATO's Price," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (November-December 2002), pp. 2-8.
- "Russia's HIV/AIDS Crisis: Confronting the Present and Facing the Future," (with Sarah Grisin), *CSIS Task Force Report*, (October 2002).
- "Russia and NATO," *Russia Watch*, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, (April 2002), pp. 2-4.
- "The U.S. and Russia: building the basis for a mature relationship," *Russia Business Watch*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2002).
- "Russia's Strategic Priorities," *Arms Control Today*, (January-February 2002), pp. 4-6.
- "The Security Implications of HIV/AIDS in Russia," (with Sarah E. Mendelson and Julie Sawyer), *Policy Memo Series #245 (February 2002), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, (<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "The Russia-NATO Relationship: is it worth another try?" *Policy Memo Series #219 (December 2001), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*,  
(<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "Russia's Relationship with China after September 11," *Policy Memo Series #214 (December 2001), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*,  
(<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "European Security Integration, NATO, and Russia," *Policy Memo Series #207 (November 2001), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*,  
(<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)

- "Russia's Foreign Policy Objectives in Asia, China's Role, and Implications for Taiwan," *Taiwan Straits Research Project Working Paper*, (Washington DC; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001).
- "Playground Patrol," *The Washington Post*, 17 September 2001, p. A27
- "The Multiple Dimensions of Russian Threat Assessment," *Policy Memo Series #199 (April 2001)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, (<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm>)
- "An Overview of Bush Administration Policy on Russia," *Policy Memo Series #187 (April 2001)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Council on Foreign Relations
- "Make Russia a Better Neighbor," (with Anatol Lieven) *New York Times*, 14 March 2001, p. A25.
- "Securitizing Russia's Debt," *Policy Memo Series #185 (January 2001)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Council on Foreign Relations
- "Russia's New Security Policy and the Ballistic Missile Defense Debate," *Current History*, Vol. 99, no. 639 (October 2000), pp. 339-344.
- "Russian Policy and the Potential for Agreement on Revising the ABM Treaty," *Policy Memo Series #134 (May 2000)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "Repairing Relations with Russia through NATO," *Policy Memo Series #127 (May 2000)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "Wary of the West: Russian security doctrine at the millennium," *Arms Control Today*, (March 2000), pp. 7-12
- "The Dynamics of U.S.-Russian Relations: A Critical Perspective," *Policy Memo Series #111 (March 2000)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "Russian National Security Policy in 2000," *Policy Memo Series #102 (January 2000)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "Russian-U.S. relations in the Post-Post Cold War world," *Policy Memo Series #70 (October 1999)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "Russian foreign policy in the wake of the Kosovo crisis," U.S. Relations with Russia, Twenty-Fifth conference of the Aspen Institute Congressional Program, Berlin, 17-21 August 1999.
- "Russia's role," *The Washington Post*, 8 April 1999, p. A31.
- "Russia, Kosovo, and security cooperation," *Policy Memo Series #58 (April 1999)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "International institutions and Russian security cooperation," *Policy Memo Series #48 (December 1998)*, *Program on New Approaches to Russia Security*, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University
- "The Russian National Security Concept: a Liberal-Statist Synthesis," *Policy Memo*

- Series #30 (July 1998), Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University*
- "Security in an era without enemies," (with Robert O. Keohane), *Los Angeles Times*, 6 May 1998.
- "The economization, rationalization, and normalization of Russian Foreign Policy," U.S. Relations with Russia, Twenty-First conference of the Aspen Institute Congressional Program, Dresden, 18-22 August 1997.
- "The Russian-NATO relationship: what should it achieve? what can't it achieve?" *WIS Words*, vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1997.
- "NATO Enlargement to the East," *Peace*, vol. XIII, issue 1, pp. 6-7.
- "Coming into focus: understanding Russia's security interests" *Harvard International Review*, (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 14-15, 61-62.
- "Why Russia belongs in NATO," *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 December 1996, p. 19.

12. **Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).**

No written formal speeches

**COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**NOTE:** In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple "yes" or "no" response is appropriate.

13. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?**

Yes

14. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?**

Yes

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes

18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes

19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes

15

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[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 26<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2021

[The nomination of Dr. Celeste Ann Wallander was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 1, 2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 16, 2022.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Melissa G. Dalton by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES****DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS**

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs (ASD(HD&HA)) is responsible for the overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense, as well as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), defense continuity and mission assurance (DC&MA), Arctic and Global Resilience policy, Western Hemispheric Affairs, and other matters.

What is your understanding of the scope and breadth of the duties and functions of the ASD(HD&HA)?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the ASD(HD&HA) is the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) with primary oversight of policy and planning related to DOD's homeland defense activities, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), defense continuity and mission assurance (DC&MA), and Arctic and Global Resilience (A&GR) and Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) matters. The ASD(HD&HA) serves as the principal DOD representative for these assigned areas of responsibility in engagements with interagency partners, the Congress, foreign allies and partners, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and private sector organizations.

*Question.* What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

*Answer.* I have extensive experience and substantial background serving in the national security community both in and outside of the U.S. Government, including currently Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. In this capacity, I am responsible for advising senior DOD leaders on national security and defense strategy; the forces, contingency plans, and associated posture necessary to implement the defense strategy; nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security cooperation plans and policies. My previous government service includes serving as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; senior advisor for force planning; policy advisor to the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan; and country director for Lebanon and Syria in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP). I also served as an intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Outside of government, I served as a senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International

Security Program and director of the Cooperative Defense Project. My research at CSIS focused on reinforcing the principled foundations of U.S. defense strategy and military operations. Each of these roles has prepared me with the functional and regional expertise needed to advise senior DOD leaders on national security and defense strategy, including ensuring that DOD's program and budget decisions support and advance DOD's strategy and priorities.

*Question.* If confirmed, what additional duties and functions would you expect the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to prescribe for you?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will focus on performing the duties of the ASD(HD&HA) and any additional functions as directed by the Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASD(HD&HA)?

*Answer.* The scope and scale of all-domain threats to the Homeland have increased in parallel with increasing demands on defense resources for support of civil authorities to address myriad challenges, including the effects of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and domestic extremism. The ASD(HD&HA) will need to ensure an integrated approach to the defense of the Homeland in addition to the defense of U.S. interests abroad. The ASD(HD&HA) will also need to advance relationships with key partners, including bilateral relationships with partners in the Western hemisphere as well as with partners in the Federal Government, State and local governments, and the private sector.

*Question.* What priorities and plans do you have, if confirmed, for addressing each of these challenges, and on what timeline?

*Answer.* If confirmed as ASD(HD&HA), my focus from day one will be to help the Secretary and USD(P) meet the Department's missions, strengthen relationships and capabilities that maintain national security, and prevent and respond to adversary threats. I would seek to ensure that the Department's policies, plans, and resources are appropriately prioritized and allocated.

#### RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress and the Office of the ASD(HD&HA)?

*Answer.* I recognize the importance and value of a constructive and productive relationship with Congress. If confirmed, I will take a proactive approach to routinize a dialogue on HD&HA issues and priorities; this is a first step toward a mutually beneficial relationship and partnership.

#### KEY RELATIONSHIPS

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the Department of Defense (DOD), the ASD(HD&HA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), particularly with respect to DOD's homeland defense activities and DSCA.

*Answer.* It is my understanding that DOD and DHS have close working relationships on many issues, including Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions associated with domestic disasters, emergencies, and cyber incidents. The ASD(HD&HA) is the senior civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for assigned areas of responsibility, including homeland defense and DSCA, and serves as the principal DOD representative on homeland defense and DSCA policy matters in engagements with Federal partners such as DHS and the Congress, as well as with State governments, local municipalities, and organizations in the private sector.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role would you play in the direction and coordination with DHS of DOD homeland defense activities and DSCA.

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would be responsible for coordinating the integration of DOD homeland defense policies with DHS homeland security policies, as well as coordinating on policy oversight of the planning and execution of DSCA missions in support of DHS. If confirmed, my goal would be to review the state of the DOD-DHS relationship and pursue opportunities for improvement.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(HD&HA) and the Joint Staff.

*Answer.* The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating both formally and informally, on a daily basis, with the Joint Staff regarding the roles, capabilities, and

readiness of the military services and combatant commands to support DOD's homeland defense, DSCA, Western Hemisphere, and other missions for which the ASD(HD&HA) has policy responsibility.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(HD&HA) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that the Joint Force has the necessary capabilities and resources, and is mission ready, to support the execution of homeland defense, DSCA, Arctic, climate, resilience, defense continuity and mission assurance, and Western Hemisphere missions.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(HD&HA), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and The Adjutants General of the states and territories, particularly with respect to DOD's homeland defense activities and DSCA.

Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Directors of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard particularly regarding the roles, capabilities, and readiness of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard to support the execution of homeland defense and DSCA missions.

The ASD(HD&HA) is also the principal DOD representative on homeland defense and DSCA policy matters for engagement with State and territorial governments, including State and territorial Adjutants General. I understand the ASD(HD&HA) generally uses the National Guard Bureau as the channel of communications with the States and territories on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(HD&HA) and the District of Columbia National Guard, particularly with regard to activities in the District, including responding to civil disturbances and support to national security special events (NSSE)?

Answer. The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DOD policy for National Guard personnel, including District of Columbia National Guard (DCNG) personnel, participating in defense support of civil authorities missions when the Secretary of Defense determines such participation is necessary and appropriate.

When a request for DOD assistance is received, if confirmed as the ASD, I will work with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to develop options for the Secretary of Defense to consider in responding to the request.

The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for coordinating advance planning for potential DOD support of civilian law enforcement agencies. DOD encourages civilian law enforcement agencies to work with DOD to plan in advance of events and contingencies for DOD support.

#### NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS) AND INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

*Question.* The 2018 NDS shifts U.S. strategic priorities to focus on a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which sets out the Administration's national security priorities. The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new National Defense Strategy, which is planned to be completed in 2022.

Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current security environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

Answer. Based on the security environment at the time, I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identified strategic competition with China and Russia as the primary challenges in the global security environment.

I believe the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately articulates the breadth and scale of the challenges we face and sets forth priorities to advance our vital national interests. The threats are increasingly global in nature; democracies are increasingly under siege based on the rise of populism and illiberal threats to the rule of law; the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new challenges; the international order the United States helped establish is being tested; and running beneath these trends is a revolution in technology that brings opportunities and security challenges. At the same time, the United States

is facing a proliferation of all-domain threats to the Homeland that will require the United States to address vulnerabilities here at home.

As required by law, the Department is currently working on the NDS, which has been shaped by the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, and will be aligned with the forthcoming National Security Strategy.

*Question.* In particular, do you believe the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assess current threats to the U.S. Homeland? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe that the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assesses the current threats to the U.S. Homeland, and that the upcoming NDS also will appropriately address homeland defense, including through an appreciation of how threats have evolved since the 2018 NDS. For example, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states up front that our role in the world depends upon our strength and vitality at home.

*Question.* In your view, are there developments since 2018 relating to matters under the purview of the ASD(HD&HA) that should be addressed as part of a new NDS?

*Answer.* In my view the scope and scale of all-domain threats to the Homeland have increased. At the same time, the Department is facing increasing demands on defense resources for DSCA missions to address a range of challenges, including the effects of climate change, pandemics, and domestic extremism. If confirmed as the ASD(HD&HA), my focus will be to help the Secretary address these and other relevant challenges.

#### DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

*Question.* The ASD(HD&HA) has primary responsibility within DOD for DSCA. DOD has provided DSCA in response to numerous requests over the last few years. This has included: requests from DHS for support to Customs and Border Patrol along the southwestern border; requests from DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for support in addressing adverse weather and man-made disasters; supporting law enforcement in response to civil unrest; and supporting DHS, FEMA and the Department of Health and Human Services in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Please describe your general understanding of DOD's roles and responsibilities in providing DSCA, particularly vis-à-vis the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies in responding to domestic situations.

*Answer.* DOD plays a supporting role in the United States by providing DSCA in support of lead Federal agencies. DOD's unique capabilities and capacity can be leveraged when directed by the President, or when the Secretary of Defense has approved a request for assistance, under the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, or other legal authority.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the role of the Responsible Federal Agency with respect to DSCA?

*Answer.* The Responsible Federal Agency (or Lead Federal Agency) is, consistent with the law, responsible for the mission that DOD may support through DSCA. As such, the Responsible Federal Agency determines what DOD capabilities or resources may be needed, requests DSCA, collaborates with DOD in the execution of the DSCA mission, and, when required by law, reimburses DOD for the support.

*Question.* Do you believe that the Department's current policies and guidance ensure proper use and oversight of DOD resources for DSCA? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe DOD's current policies and guidance are efficient, effective, and have ensured DOD's efforts through DSCA have been proper and instrumental in saving and sustaining lives in the aftermath of disasters, including as part of our nation's response to COVID-19. If confirmed, I will work with DOD stakeholders to review DOD's current policies and guidance and ensure that DSCA is effective, efficient, and properly accountable.

*Question.* Do you believe that DOD has in place the policies and processes to generate an accurate accounting of, and to secure full and timely reimbursement for, the incremental costs of DSCA provided pursuant to "The Stafford Act"?

*Answer.* I believe DOD's policies and processes are efficient and effective. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD policies and guidance secure appropriate reimbursement for DSCA provided pursuant to the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and other legal authority.

*Question.* If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure both the accurate accounting of DOD's incremental costs and proper and full reimbursement for such costs?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD's policies and accounting practices facilitate proper and full reimbursement of DSCA costs, consistent with the statutory authority under which the support was provided.

*Question.* Do you believe that DOD has in place the policies and processes to generate an accurate accounting of, and to secure full and timely reimbursement for the actual costs for DSCA provided pursuant to "The Economy Act"?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD policies and guidance secure appropriate reimbursement for DSCA provided pursuant to the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and other legal authority.

*Question.* If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure both the accurate accounting of DOD's actual costs and proper and full reimbursement for such costs?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Comptroller and other DOD stakeholders to ensure that DOD policies and guidance secure appropriate reimbursement for DSCA provided pursuant to the Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and other legal authority.

*Question.* In your view, under what circumstances should DOD Support of Civil Authorities be provided on a non-reimbursable basis? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* DOD should provide DSCA on a non-reimbursable basis only when the law requires DOD to provide support on a non-reimbursable basis or when providing support on a non-reimbursable basis is both authorized by law and approved by the appropriate DOD official.

*Question.* What is your understanding of a military commander's "immediate response authority" for the conduct of DSCA?

*Answer.* Under immediate response authority, Federal military commanders, Heads of DOD components, and responsible DOD civilian officials may, in response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States. Support provided under the immediate response authority should be provided on a reimbursable basis, where appropriate or legally required, but will not be delayed or denied based on the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to reimburse DOD.

I understand the immediate response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.

*Question.* If confirmed, how, if at all, would you seek to modify the scope and breadth of this authority, and the process for using it?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with DOD stakeholders to review DOD policies and guidance to consider whether any clarification of immediate response authority is necessary to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability, consistent with the law.

*Question.* As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, what types of DSCA activities do you envision becoming more or less significant?

*Answer.* The COVID-19 pandemic continues to be the most urgent challenge facing the United States. DOD has an important supporting role in our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, and has contributed the efforts of thousands of military and civilian personnel, equipment, and supplies to support this fight. I understand that DOD's DSCA COVID-19-support activities are driven by the mission needs of the lead Federal agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the lead Federal coordinating agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

*Question.* Are there any areas in which you believe DSCA has been more or less effective during the COVID-19 pandemic?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that DSCA has been decisive to our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Thousands of military personnel, including National Guard personnel from all 50 States, 3 territories, and the District of Columbia, supported COVID-19 relief operations. Military personnel have augmented medical staff at hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities; delivered food to hard-hit communities; supported logistics efforts to supply medical equipment and personal protection equipment; built alternate care facilities; conducted community-based medical screening; and conducted laboratory testing, among other tasks. DOD has also been a major contributor in our nation's efforts to develop, produce, and distribute COVID-19 vaccines. If confirmed, I will assess lessons

learned from these efforts to determine how DSCA can continue to best support our nation's efforts to counter COVID-19.

*Question.* As the situation at the southwest border continues to present challenges, what types of DSCA activities do you envision being requested by DHS?

*Answer.* Security and management of the southwest border of the United States is a dynamic and challenging mission. It is my understanding that for more than a decade, DHS has relied upon DOD's support to help detect and monitor migrant movements and drug-smuggling activities, and to provide analysis and aerial support for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. If confirmed, I would work closely with DHS to understand DHS's requirements and capability and capacity gaps, and help DHS tailor its requests for appropriate DOD support. I would also work within DOD to ensure DHS receives appropriate DOD support, while protecting military readiness and DOD's ability to conduct its national defense missions.

*Question.* In your view, what factors should DOD consider in evaluating such requests for additional DSCA along the southwest border?

*Answer.* I would expect DOD would consider a number of factors in analyzing and determining what support to provide in response to any DSCA request. In addition to understanding the specific outcomes DSCA would deliver, I understand the Department considers legality, whether the request poses risk to DOD forces and other people, impact on DOD resources and readiness, and whether it would be appropriate for military personnel to provide the requested support.

*Question.* How do you assess the effectiveness of DOD's support mission at the southwest border since 2018?

*Answer.* It is my impression that DHS considers DOD's provision of southwest border support to DHS to have been effective. DHS has requested DOD support at the southwest border for 18 of the last 22 years. However, if confirmed, I would work with DOD stakeholders and DHS to assess the effectiveness of support to date and identify opportunities for change or improvement.

#### COMBATING TERRORISM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

*Question.* In your view, what is the nature and extent of the current threat to the U.S. Homeland from terrorist extremists, both from outside the United States and from within the United States, potentially with the support of foreign malign actors or their proxies?

*Answer.* Terrorism originating from both within and outside the United States remains a persistent threat to our national security and is increasingly complex. Terrorists and violent extremists, some operating as proxies for foreign actors and nation states, have expanded their objectives beyond threats to the population to attacking our nation's critical infrastructure in an attempt to influence decision making, disrupt force projection, and deny freedom of movement in the Homeland. With respect to those matters assigned to the ASD(HD&HA), if confirmed, I will continue close coordination with our U.S. Government partners to ensure a whole-of-government approach to the problem.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the nature and scope of counterterrorism and antiterrorism roles and responsibilities vested in the ASD(HD&HA)?

*Answer.* The ASD(HD&HA) is the Department's principal civilian policy advisor for DOD global antiterrorism programs and support to Federal law enforcement domestic counterterrorism efforts. In the global antiterrorism role, the ASD(HD&HA) establishes DOD antiterrorism policy, standards, and guidance to reduce the vulnerability of DOD personnel, dependent family members, installations and other facilities, and critical resources to terrorist acts. For domestic counterterrorism policy, the ASD(HD&HA) leads the Department's coordination with our Federal law enforcement partners to develop national policies, plans, and programs for the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks.

*Question.* In your view, how do the responsibilities of the ASD(HD&HA) for combatting terrorism relate to the counterterrorism roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?

*Answer.* The domestic counterterrorism roles vested in the ASD(HD&HA) are limited and remain in close coordination with the overseas role of the ASD(SO/LIC). Specifically, the ASD(HD&HA) provides policy guidance and interagency coordination for the Department's support to Federal law enforcement agencies responding to domestic incidents. This support is predominately indirect and limited to offering Federal law enforcement partners DOD resources should they be necessary during a domestic response.

*Question.* If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that policies, plans, and programs for the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks on the Homeland are fully aligned, both within DOD, and across the federal interagency?

*Answer.* If confirmed, one of my first objectives would be to build my relationships with our interagency partners, particularly with the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; DHS; and the Intelligence Community. I would ensure DOD has developed the appropriate policies, concepts, capabilities, and processes, and actively collaborates, to protect the Homeland and ensure appropriate DOD capabilities are available to support Homeland counterterrorism efforts.

#### DETAINEE TREATMENT AND GUANTANAMO BAY

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92)?

*Answer.* Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and as required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

*Question.* What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in regard to the operation, management, and oversight of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in formulating and implementing policies applicable to the facility's detainee population?

*Answer.* Based on my current understanding, the ASD(HD&HA), in light of the ASD(HD&HA)'s oversight of Western Hemisphere Affairs, will have a coordinating role with other elements of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the operation, management, and oversight of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and work with U.S. Southern Command and other relevant parts of the Department in formulating and implementing policies applicable to the Naval Station.

*Question.* What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in the detainee transfer process?

*Answer.* Based on my current understanding, the ASD(HD&HA) does not have a direct role in the detainee transfer process.

*Question.* Do you believe that the detention center at Guantanamo Bay should be closed? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I support the Biden-Harris Administration's position that the detention facility at Guantanamo should be closed. Until that time, however, the Department must ensure the continued safe, humane, and lawful care and treatment of detainees.

*Question.* If so, how would you propose to ensure the national security against the threats posed by the detainees in law of war detention there?

*Answer.* While I understand that this issue is not directly in the ASD(HD&HA)'s remit, I have confidence in both the long-standing Periodic Review Board process and the robust interagency transfer procedures to ensure that relevant threats and national security issues are considered before a detainee is transferred from the facility.

#### DEFENSE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

*Question.* The ASD(HD&HA) is responsible for overseeing DOD efforts and programs to protect defense critical infrastructure in the United States.

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the DOD under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection, both as a Federal Department and as the designated Sector-Specific Agency for the defense industrial base?

*Answer.* Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience," which replaced HSPD-7, establishes U.S. Government policy, designates critical infrastructure sectors (including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)), and requires relevant departments and agencies to work in partnership with critical infrastructure private sector officials to share threat information and manage risks. Under the PPD-21 construct, DOD is the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the DIB. HD&HA coordinates PPD-21-related efforts across the Department and with inter-

agency partners, and works with private sector officials to integrate protection efforts using a whole-of-nation approach.

*Question.* What do you view as the major challenges in the protection of defense critical infrastructure?

*Answer.* The three biggest challenges that DOD faces in its efforts to protect the critical infrastructure it relies on for mission success are: 1) raising awareness and understanding of the threats to defense critical infrastructure, which are highly complex, interconnected, and interdependent; 2) forming and strengthening public-private partnerships to ensure all parties understand how their actions affect the security and resilience of others; and 3) changing mindsets and behaviors to institutionalize critical infrastructure protection and resilience into government and private sector cultures and practices.

*Question.* If confirmed, what risk management strategies would you employ to mitigate the effects of attacks against defense critical infrastructure and other key resources?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will review existing critical infrastructure protection programs with an eye toward synchronization and integration. I would expect such a review to consider whether the Department has the analytic tools, policy guidance, and information-sharing platforms (within DOD and with Federal, State, local and private sector partners) to support critical infrastructure planning.

#### DEFENSE CONTINUITY AND MISSION ASSURANCE (DC&MA)

*Question.* The ASD(HD&HA) exercises primary responsibility for DOD programs for Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance (DC&MA) in the United States.

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the ASD(HD&HA) with respect to the DC&MA mission?

*Answer.* The DC&MA mission focuses on ensuring that DOD can continue to execute its core functions and provide visible, cross-Departmental leadership even in the face of potential severe disruption from asymmetric threats, ongoing terrorist threats, and the increasing challenges that natural hazards pose to our installations and infrastructure. The ASD(HD&HA)'s role is to leverage department-wide efforts to ensure that DOD focuses on ensuring that the people, infrastructure, and Mission Essential Functions that are critical to DOD's operations are prioritized, resilient, and protected. To accomplish this, the ASD(HD&HA) has lead responsibility for policy development and oversight for both mission assurance and continuity policy, including by leveraging the ASD(HD&HA)'s position as co-chair of DOD's Mission Assurance Coordination Board Executive Steering Group to drive change across the Department and provide risk-management options to the Secretary when required.

*Question.* The focus on DC&MA missions tends to be most acute after a crisis. If confirmed, what would be your approach to prioritizing the DC&MA missions on a routine and regular basis?

*Answer.* Ensuring DOD can execute its core functions and provide visible leadership during a crisis requires taking steps ahead of a crisis, in the steady state, to improve and ensure our posture and resilience. If confirmed, I will take a proactive approach, in line with the Federal Mission Resilience Strategy and DOD's mission assurance policies, to help prepare for threats from adversaries and natural hazards.

*Answer.* In your view, to what extent do the cybersecurity aspects of the DC&MA mission overlap and require coordination with each of the following:

*Question.* Cybersecurity capability and capacity to ensure that combatant commanders' Operational Plans can be securely executed;

*Answer.* While cyber presents uniquely cross-cutting threats, DC&MA is itself threat agnostic. If confirmed, I would work with combatant commanders to emphasize the need for their operational and contingency plans to address protection against all-domain threats. The enduring need is to apply limited protective resources, whether cyber, physical, or otherwise, to the priority infrastructure identified through the mission assurance process. For cyber-specific threats in particular, the ASD(HD&HA) must continue to work closely with cyber offices throughout DOD, including, among others, the Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor.

*Question.* The cybersecurity of Defense Critical Infrastructure;

*Answer.* I understand there is significant overlap between the DC&MA mission and the DOD CIO-led DOD Cybersecurity Program, which prescribes the cybersecurity requirements for DOD information technology, including that relate to or are in Defense Critical Infrastructure. If confirmed as the ASD(HD&HA), I will use my position as co-chair of the Mission Assurance Coordination Board (MAC-B) and partner with the DOD CIO to prioritize resources implementing MA decisions in a continuous dynamic threat environment.

*Question.* The cybersecurity of the Defense Industrial Base;

*Answer.* I understand that in supporting DOD's role as DIB SRMA, the ASD(HD&HA) actively coordinates PPD-21-related infrastructure efforts, including cybersecurity efforts, with DOD, interagency, and private sector partners. Section 1724 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Secretary of Defense to designate the DOD Principal Cyber Advisor as the coordinating authority for cybersecurity issues relating to the Defense Industrial Base. Section 1724 requires the Principal Cyber Advisor, in this role, to synchronize, harmonize, de-conflict, and coordinate all DOD policies and programs germane to DIB cybersecurity. I understand that coordinates closely with OPCA.

*Question.* And the Strategic Weapons Systems cybersecurity programs?

*Answer.* I understand that the Strategic Cybersecurity Program (SCP) is part of an array of Department activities that support the DC&MA mission. If confirmed, I will continue to partner with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Director of the National Security Agency to ensure the cybersecurity of Defense Critical Infrastructure through complementary activities. If confirmed, I will also evaluate opportunities to use the Mission Assurance Coordination Board and associated venues to advance SCP efforts, as appropriate.

#### RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND (NORTHCOM)

*Question.* U.S. Northern Command has the mission of conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the Command's assigned area of responsibility, and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to provide defense assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations.

If confirmed, how do you anticipate you would coordinate homeland defense and DSCA roles and responsibilities with the Commander, NORTHCOM?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and of U.S. Northern Command, and the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Deputy Secretary, and Secretary, particularly in the areas of homeland defense and DSCA strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.

*Question.* How do you anticipate that the ASD(HD&HA) and the NORTHCOM Commander will coordinate with other federal and State entities in planning for responses to events that might require DOD support?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to ensure that DOD support to Federal and State entities, when required, is timely, coordinated, and effective. I would also work with both Commanders and the Department's Federal and State partners to ensure that the Department is prepared to provide support quickly, effectively, and in a coordinated fashion that facilitates unity of effort to save and sustain lives and relieve human suffering.

#### USE OF ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE PERSONNEL FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE/POSSE COMITATUS

*Question.* What is your understanding of the legal issues associated with using military personnel—both active and reserve component forces—in law enforcement and security roles within the United States?

*Answer.* In accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) and 10 U.S.C. § 275, Active Duty military personnel – including National Guard and other Reserve component personnel ordered to Active Duty—are prohibited from directly participating in law enforcement activities (e.g., search, seizure, and arrest), except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by law.

National Guard personnel, when acting under the command and control of their governors and adjutants general, are not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act and 10 U.S.C. § 275; therefore, National Guard personnel serving in a State Active Duty status or in a full-time National Guard duty status under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) may be used for security roles authorized under State law, and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and applicable Federal laws.

*Question.* In your view, does the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), enacted in law in 1879, retain its relevance in the present day?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Should the PCA be amended in some way to make it more useful in the current environment? Please explain your answer.

Answer. In my opinion, current laws regarding the use of the Armed Forces in support of civilian law enforcement and related activities appear to be sufficient. If confirmed, I would carefully review these laws and their effects and, if necessary, make appropriate recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense.

*Question.* Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to civilian law enforcement authorities investigating or responding to acts of domestic extremism?

Answer. I believe it would be appropriate for DOD to remain in support of civilian law enforcement investigating or responding to acts of domestic extremism incidents, as authorized by law.

#### ARCTIC AND GLOBAL RESILIENCE

*Question.* What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the ASD(HD&HA) with respect to Arctic and Global Resilience policy?

Answer. My understanding of the responsibilities of the ASD(HD&HA) with respect to Arctic and Global Resilience Policy is to advise and support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense on the formulation, implementation, and policy relating to the Arctic region, and global resilience matters, including regarding the climate and energy. The establishment of this new DASD office is responsive to the requirement of Section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 that responsibility for the Arctic region be assigned to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere or any other Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate, and also recognizes the growing importance of cross-cutting global matters, including the climate and energy.

*Question.* What, in your view, are U.S. strategic objectives in the Arctic?

Answer. In my view, the United States seeks a stable and open Arctic that facilitates protection of the Homeland, enables economic prosperity, and supports the international order as well as Allies and partners. More specifically, U.S. defense interests in the Arctic region include: defense of the Homeland; deterring strategic competitors from undertaking malign or coercive activities in the region; and ensuring that common domains remain free and open in accordance with international law. I understand that the Department views the Arctic in a global context, in which the ongoing work to secure the Homeland (represented in the Arctic by the State of Alaska) and to uphold the international rules-based order is consistent with National Defense Strategy-driven efforts to advance U.S. global priorities. Climate change is driving evolving conditions in the Arctic, with impacts on security, economic prosperity, natural and built infrastructure, human safety, and more. If confirmed, I will help DOD support broader U.S. Government efforts to ensure a safe and secure Arctic region, and ensure DOD works by, with, and through our Allies, partners, indigenous communities, and other key stakeholders as appropriate.

*Question.* What should DOD's role be in supporting the attainment of those objectives?

Answer. The United States has a broad range of strategic interests in the Arctic. DOD supports interagency efforts and leads efforts relating to defense objectives in the Arctic. If confirmed, I am committed to helping DOD build and implement the appropriate concepts, capabilities, and relationships to achieve defense objectives in the Arctic. In the Arctic, as appropriate, DOD will work with Allies and partners to achieve common interests.

*Question.* In your view, what are the strategic objectives of China and Russia in the Arctic?

Answer. As Russia and China seek to gain advantages in the Arctic region, their actions are part of a global pattern. In my view, Russia and China have different objectives in the Arctic, although there are some areas of overlap as both seek to undermine freedom and the rules-based international order around the world. If confirmed, I will assess information available within DOD regarding Russian and Chinese objectives in the Arctic and seek to improve and refine DOD's understanding of this important topic.

*Question.* In what ways, if any, do those strategic objectives conflict with the strategic objectives of the United States broadly, and the Department of Defense specifically?

Answer. Just as the United States has enduring global interests, our competitors have a global approach to undermining them. I am committed to ensuring that DOD long-term strategic competition efforts are harmonized so that we uphold the international rules-based order and deter aggression in the Arctic and around the world with maximum effect. If confirmed, I will direct further analysis of this important

set of issues to position DOD for maximum effectiveness in the pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives.

*Question.* In your view, has the Department sufficiently integrated and nested the Service-specific strategies for the Arctic under the Department-wide Arctic Strategy?

*Answer.* The Department continues to work on the integration of Service-specific strategies under the DOD Arctic Strategy. I understand that all of the Services have released Arctic strategy documents in recent years. If confirmed, I look forward to providing a leadership role in developing and advancing DOD Arctic policies and strategies.

*Question.* In your view, does the U.S. military currently have the appropriate capabilities and assets to support its strategic interests in the Arctic?

*Answer.* The Department has identified a range of capability needs, including: improved domain awareness systems; more robust communications capabilities; increased Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and enhanced environmental modelling. In addressing these capability needs, if confirmed, I will assess how DOD can continue to balance consideration of investments for the Arctic region with broader capability needs of the Joint Force as outlined in the forthcoming 2022 NDS.

*Question.* Do you believe that climate change poses a risk to national security, and if so, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD prioritizes and resources efforts to address the climate resilience of DOD assets and capabilities?

*Answer.* Climate and environmental change will exacerbate existing risks and pose new challenges to the U.S. Homeland and DOD missions and operations, in addition to the security of our Allies and partners. If confirmed, I will bring increased focus on the effects of climate change on national security, DOD missions, and homeland defense and factor these into our strategic planning, budgeting, resources, and capability development processes. If confirmed, I will coordinate with DOD counterparts as the Department develops comprehensive investment strategies to minimize the security risks associated with the impacts of climate change, including through adaptation and resiliency of DOD operations, readiness, installations, equipment, infrastructure, and force development.

#### LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

*Question.* In your view, what are the U.S. national security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean?

*Answer.* Our security is directly tied to the security and prosperity of our neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is in our national security interest to protect the American people from potential threats emanating from the region, and to promote prosperity, democracy, and human rights in the Western Hemisphere. If confirmed, I will support appropriate actions by the Department of Defense to achieve these objectives as part of broader U.S. Government efforts.

*Question.* In your view, what would be the appropriate role for DOD in addressing the sources of instability in the region, including transnational criminal organizations, corruption, environmental devastation, and the health crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic?

*Answer.* I believe the Department of Defense should support civilian-led, whole-of-government efforts and robust engagements with our partners to address the challenges identified in the President's Interim National Security Strategy. These challenges include transnational criminal organizations, corruption, environmental devastation, and the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Department can support anti-corruption efforts through activities to strengthen defense institutions, as well as strengthen partner military professionalization and emphasize respect for human rights and democratic principles.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the malign influence threat from Russia, China, Iran and other actors in Latin America and the Caribbean, and what should be the appropriate role for DOD in countering that threat?

*Answer.* Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other malign actors in Latin America and the Caribbean pose a threat to security, stability, and prosperity within the region. If confirmed, I would recommend to the Secretary that DOD should continue to support a civilian-led, whole-of-government approach through robust engagements with our partners. I also would recommend to the Secretary that DOD base these engagements on the principles of transparency, recognition of sovereignty, and respect for democratic norms and human rights.

*Question.* In some countries in Latin America, DOD plays an important role in training, equipping, and providing assistance to partner nation militaries. How

should DOD coordinate its security cooperation activities with security assistance efforts in those countries led by other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State?

Answer. I understand the Department of Defense and the Department of State have both formal coordination forums and regular, informal engagements on security assistance and cooperation activities. The Department of Defense advises the Department of State regarding partner and ally military requirements, consistent with U.S. national security policy. The Department of Defense also implements the Foreign Military Sales program and certain Department of State security assistance programs, consistent with State Department guidance, and coordinates with the Department of State regarding Department of Defense programs. I understand—and if confirmed, would affirm—the importance of ensuring DOD activities align with broader U.S. foreign policy, thorough coordination, collaboration, and consistent engagement with the State Department and other interagency partners.

#### COLOMBIA

*Question.* U.S. assistance to Colombia over the past several years has facilitated the marginalization of the FARC and other violent revolutionary groups. More recently, however, violence has escalated, placing implementation of the peace accord at risk.

*Question.* How do you define U.S. national security interests in Colombia?

Answer. The United States has a vested interest in supporting a democratic and stable Colombia that provides security for its citizens and is at peace. It is in our national interest to continue supporting Colombia's efforts to implement its peace accord, maintain internal security, and expand its role as a regional and global security exporter.

*Question.* What means of U.S. security assistance are appropriate for the Colombian Government, given the challenges it faces?

Answer. For over two decades, the United States has made significant investments in Colombia's counternarcotics and counterinsurgency missions through security cooperation and defense institution building. It is my understanding that U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs continue to be effective in helping to build the capabilities of Colombian security forces to disrupt and defeat transnational criminal organizations and insurgent forces. If confirmed, I would look into ways the Department can continue supporting the Department of State's broader security assistance programs, and would then make recommendations to the Secretary for any required additional capabilities or authorities.

*Question.* In your view, what steps, if any, should the United States take to address increased violence in Colombia, and to reduce other risks to implementation of the peace accord?

Answer. Successfully ensuring that Colombia remains at peace will require a significant willingness and financial commitment by the Colombian Government over the coming decades. Colombia's security forces, with the U.S. Government's support, will be critical in extending security across the country. The Department should continue to focus on strengthening the capacity of the Colombian military to address internal threats posed by transnational criminal organization and insurgent groups, including the ELN and FARC dissidents.

*Question.* What is your assessment of DOD efforts to promote human rights and respect for the rule of law among Colombian security forces?

Answer. It is my understanding that one of the Department's primary lines of effort with Colombia is to strengthen its defense ministry and military through a well-established institutional capacity-building program. Every DOD-funded security cooperation program with Colombia includes a human rights training element. If confirmed, I would help ensure that DOD continues to appropriately integrate human rights and the rule of law into its bilateral engagements with Colombia.

*Question.* The Colombian military has become a security exporter throughout the region due to its capabilities and expertise. In your view, how should the United States work with Colombia regarding its efforts as a source of stability, both regionally and internationally?

Answer. The Colombian military is one of our most willing and capable strategic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, and is the only country in the region that is a NATO Global Partner. Colombia has been a force multiplier in the region for the past decade by executing the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security (USCAP). Through USCAP, Colombia trains Central American and Caribbean partner-nation personnel in counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities. Colombia has participated in NATO and European Union counter-piracy missions off the coast of the Horn of Africa, and it has taken steps to prepare itself for deployments as part of United Nations (UN) peace operations. I support continued DOD partner-

ship with Colombia to enable its regional and global security activities and objectives.

#### SEXUAL HARASSMENT

*Question.* In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the ASD(HD&HA)?

*Answer.* There is no place for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, or any other types of harassment within the Department of Defense, including the Office of the ASD(HD&HA). If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in reviewing any existing workforce surveys that would give me insight into the climate of the office and determine what actions, if any, need to be taken in the Office of the ASD(HD&HA) to improve the environment. I am aware of the GAO’s report recommending additional measures the Department take to address sexual harassment and assault among the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will support the Department’s ongoing efforts to promote a culture of dignity and respect, including a commitment to dealing with sexual harassment.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(HD&HA)?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would take swift action by initiating a review to gather facts and address the complaint consistent with Federal statutes and Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to make clear to the HD&HA workforce that they deserve a respectful workplace; equality, diversity, and inclusion are readiness priorities; and any form of prohibited harassment will not be tolerated.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from indi-

vidual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

DRUG INTERDICTION

1. Senator KING. Ms. Dalton, following up on my question regarding the drug interdiction crisis facing the country, how will you, if confirmed, seek to address the remaining approximately 75 percent of ships carrying illicit drugs into the country and the organizations responsible for these shipments? Please provide concrete plans to address this issue.

Ms. DALTON. Combating drug trafficking requires a whole-of-government approach and engagement with partner nations. I understand the Department's counterdrug efforts primarily support U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies that have responsibility for drug interdiction, apprehension, investigation, and prosecution, and that the Department also supports international partners in their efforts to disrupt the activities of criminal organizations responsible for drug trafficking. I expect the Department will continue to explore opportunities to support the interdiction of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals crossing into the United States, whether by air, sea, or land (the predominant channel for drug trafficking into the United States). If confirmed, I will also help DOD continue to support domestic and international partners through security cooperation activities. I understand DOD must balance the requirements of its defense missions against requests for DOD to provide support to missions led by other parts of the U.S. Government.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

NATIONAL GUARD IN CYBER DEFENSE

2. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Dalton, just this Tuesday, January 11, 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) released a joint cybersecurity advisory of the increased likelihood of Russian state-sponsored cyberattacks due to ongoing tension with Ukraine. They warned of critical infrastructure being especially at risk. Do you see any opportunities to further involve the National Guard in cyber defense and defense of our critical infrastructure?

Ms. DALTON. National Guard personnel have a presence in, and familiarity with, thousands of U.S. communities, which is an advantage that could be valuable in a variety of efforts to work closely with the private sector to protect critical infrastructure. In addition, National Guard personnel could contribute to the cybersecurity of such critical infrastructure as part of a State response, at the direction of the Governor. Under an appropriate mobilization authority, DOD also may use National Guard personnel to conduct DOD missions regarding cyber defense of defense critical infrastructure or as part of DOD's support of a national response based on a request by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as the lead Federal agency.

3. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Dalton, if so, what will you do, if confirmed, to increase National Guard involvement in Cyber Defense?

Ms. DALTON. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to understand how the National Guard could best support such efforts.

4. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Dalton, are you familiar with a program referred to as NITRO?

Ms. DALTON. I am aware that NITRO is a USCYBERCOM–National Guard Bureau initiative. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this program.

5. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Dalton, will you commit to receiving a briefing from U.S. Cyber Command and the National Guard Bureau and their efforts to deploy this in each State and Territory, if confirmed? I believe it's crucial to maintaining the security of our Global Positioning System (GPS).

Ms. DALTON. Yes.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS

CHINA

6. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Dalton, how do you characterize the national security threat posed by a rising China in our hemisphere?

Ms. DALTON. As the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) interests become increasingly global in nature, I expect it to seek increased influence in the Western Hemisphere. At present, the PRC's engagement in the region focuses primarily on diplomatic and economic priorities, accompanied by efforts to develop military and security relationships with some countries. The PRC has gained economic influence with Western Hemisphere countries through sustained investment, which the PRC routinely leverages to blunt international criticism of its domestic practices and gain further access in our hemisphere. If confirmed, I will focus closely on the PRC's activities in the hemisphere and work closely with other U.S. Government interagency partners to respond appropriately to any activities that may undermine U.S. national security interests.

7. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Dalton, what do you find most concerning?

Ms. DALTON. Given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party, I am concerned when the PRC seeks to leverage its economic, diplomatic, and military efforts to advance its strategic objectives. Therefore, when I see PRC economic investment, I focus on whether that investment will lead to a follow-on military presence or pose other security risks to the United States and our allies and partners. For example, the PRC has significantly increased its economic presence in our hemisphere over the past decade, including through key infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will work with U.S. Government partners to address the PRC's concerning activities, including by providing appropriate DOD contributions to U.S. security cooperation activities with our partners.

8. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Dalton, what should be the Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for countering China's growing security ambitions in the hemisphere?

Ms. DALTON. Despite the PRC's efforts to increase its influence, I believe DOD remains the premier partner for defense cooperation throughout the hemisphere. Sustaining security cooperation activities, including in countering illicit trafficking and other transnational threats, cyber cooperation, humanitarian and disaster response capabilities, and other forms of engagement, must remain central to sustaining DOD's robust network of partners in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD integrates these activities into a whole-of-government approach to advance U.S. interests in the hemisphere.

U.S. SOUTHWEST BORDER

9. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Dalton, what do you view as DOD's proper role with respect to border security?

Ms. DALTON. The Department's proper role is to provide support when requested, consistent with the law, by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Border security is a mission of DHS and, consistent with the law, DHS may request DOD assistance. I understand that, for a number of years, DHS requested DOD assistance to help detect and monitor migrant movements and drug-smuggling activities, and to provide analysis and aerial support for U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

COVID-19

10. Senator TILLIS. Ms. Dalton, with the COVID-19 pandemic continuing to be the most urgent challenge facing the United States, what role do you foresee DOD playing in future COVID response and vaccination efforts?

Ms. DALTON. I would expect, based on Secretary Austin's public statements, that DOD will continue to provide support to the national response to the COVID-19

pandemic. It is my understanding that DOD has provided critical support to our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic domestically and globally. DOD has been a major contributor in our nation's efforts to develop, produce, and distribute COVID-19 vaccines. In addition, military personnel continue to provide medical staff support at local hospitals and contribute to our global efforts to end the pandemic.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

DEFENSE STRATEGY

11. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Dalton, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing threat. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Ms. DALTON. Yes, I do agree that China is the Department's "pacing" challenge.

12. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Dalton, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Ms. DALTON. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater with respect to the Department's efforts to address the myriad military challenges posed by the PRC; it is my belief that the PRC also poses challenges in other theaters.

13. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Dalton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, "The PRC [People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario." Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN concurred for the record with Taiwan's designation as the Department's pacing scenario. In your personal opinion, do you support the designation of a Taiwan contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Ms. DALTON. Yes. It is my belief that the PRC is the overall pacing challenge for the Department, and the noted scenario is a key pacing scenario. However, I am also aware that there are some elements of the joint force that will pace themselves to Russia, given some of Russia's unique capabilities.

14. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Dalton, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN testified that the Department of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the United States defense budget. In your personal opinion, do you agree with Admiral Grady's testimony? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Ms. DALTON. Yes, I agree the Department must manage the risks associated with lower-priority issues while aligning its resources to its higher priorities.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE THREATS

15. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Dalton, what steps do you believe the Department of Defense should take, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and other relevant agencies, in order to prepare the American public for potential kinetic or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and other dual-use targets in the United States Homeland in the event of conflict with China or Russia?

Ms. DALTON. Educating and preparing the American public in advance of potential disruptions to our critical infrastructure, whether from a foreign adversary or from natural disruptions like fire or extreme weather, is a critical aspect of improving resilience and integrated deterrence. DHS and the White House lead the way on this messaging to the American public, State and local governments, and critical industries. DOD supports the Administration's efforts.

16. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Dalton, do you commit to inform Congress within 30 days if China deploys or otherwise positions anti-ship, anti-air, or other capabilities in the Western Hemisphere that could be used to threaten American forces' freedom of operation in this region during a time of crisis or conflict? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Ms. DALTON. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to inform Congress within 30 days if the United States learns that the PRC deploys or otherwise positions anti-ship, anti-air,

or other capabilities in the Western Hemisphere that could be used to threaten U.S. forces' freedom of operation in the Western Hemisphere during a time of crisis or conflict. The Department of Defense annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the PRC describes ways in which the PRC is seeking to develop the capability to project power outside its borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC's growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy goals, including in the Western Hemisphere.

[The nomination reference of Ms. Melissa G. Dalton follows:]

**NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT**

**PN1019**

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
August 10, 2021.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Melissa Griffin Dalton, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Kenneth P. Rapuano.

\_\_\_\_\_, 2021.  
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

**The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.**

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Melissa G. Dalton, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Bio**  
**Melissa G. Dalton**

**Education:**

- Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
  - o 2005-2007
  - o Master of Arts, International Relations
- University of Virginia
  - o 1999-2003
  - o Bachelor of Arts, Foreign Affairs

**Employment Record:**

Summer 2002

U.S. Department of State Intern, Washington, DC

- Provided research support to International Women's Issues fact sheets on Afghanistan and Latin America

Summer-Fall 2003

Temp Agency, Charlottesville, VA

- Receptionist and staff assistant at local real estate company

November 2003-July 2005

Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC

Intelligence Officer

- Produced intelligence products based on all-source analysis of key developments in the Middle East in support of U.S. defense officials and warfighters.

Summer 2006

America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST), Damascus, Syria

English Teacher

- Volunteered to teach English language to Syrian scholarship students from economically disadvantaged families during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.

July 2007-February 2010

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC

Levant Director, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

- Developed U.S. defense policy for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), rebuilding the Lebanese military after thirty years of Syrian occupation.

February 2010-August 2010

International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan  
Special Assistant to Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A

- Prepared Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A, for weekly meetings with the U.S. President, the U.S. National Security Council, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, President Karzai, the Afghan National Security Council, and Afghan Security Shura. Wrote read ahead materials to inform the Commander's presentations and briefed him accordingly.
- As a detailee from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), served as primary policy analyst and liaison on the Commander's Initiatives Group to the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and OSD. Wrote and collaborated on numerous U.S. interagency papers related to Afghanistan and Pakistan security and the NATO ISAF civil-military campaign.

August 2010-January 2012

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC

Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

- Served as Under Secretary Michèle Flournoy's civilian liaison to 800-member organization, conveying guidance, offering recommendations, and facilitating policy initiatives. • Advised the Under Secretary on a wide-range of sensitive foreign policy issues and internal management of OUSDP affairs.
- Reviewed correspondence and packages from 800-member organization for the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, concerning functional and regional affairs, and recommended appropriate action to the Under Secretary.
- Prepared the Under Secretary for her engagement in Deputies' National Security Council meetings and managed preparations for other senior policy leadership engagement in the U.S. national security interagency.
- Drafted sensitive correspondence and policy papers for the Under Secretary to inform her communications with the Secretary of Defense and other national security leaders.

February 2012-February 2013

Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Washington, DC

Visiting Fellow

- As a detailee from DoD on an Intergovernmental Personnel Act rotation, researched and wrote several Middle East policy papers and reports on topics including the implications of the Arab Spring for U.S. foreign policy and the consequences of a nuclear Iran for U.S. and regional security.

March 2013-September 2014

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC

Senior Advisor for Force Planning, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Provided analytic and policy recommendations to the Department of Defense (DoD)'s  
2013

- Strategic Choices and Management Review, 2013 Program Budget Review Process, and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on U.S. defense strategy, force posture, and force capabilities.
- Spearheaded drafting and coordination for DoD's Fiscal Year 2016-2020 defense planning guidance, signed by the Secretary of Defense. Guidance provided classified, strategic direction for DoD Components' programs and budgets.
- Led and advised a QDR working group on the Middle East, directing formulation of strategic objectives and policy options to support senior leaders in the QDR process. • Seconded as a senior advisor to the stand up of a new OSD-Policy office focused on security cooperation and provided policy advice on the strategic plans for the office.

September 2014-April 2015  
 Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC  
 International Affairs Fellow

- Conducted a research project analyzing the risks and benefits of placing conditions on U.S. security assistance to foreign partners. Developed a policy framework to guide decision making on when U.S. policymakers should use conditionality on security assistance.
- Hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies for the CFR IAF year.

April 2015-January 2021  
 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC  
 Director, Cooperative Defense Project; Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program (2018-2021)

- Led the Cooperative Defense Project (CDP), including project fundraising; research and analysis; writing major reports, op-eds, and policy briefs; convening public and private events with key stakeholders across U.S. and foreign governments, industry, NGOs, think tanks, and media; and supervising a research associate and intern.
- Researched, analyzed, wrote, and published major reports via CSIS and outside publishers on U.S. defense strategy, U.S. military force posture, security cooperation, gray zone and irregular warfare.
- Advised Director of the International Security Program on a broad range of strategic and management issues for the 45-member organization, including research agenda, personnel, budget, communications, donor development, and work stream.
- Managed daily operations of the International Security Program, including supervision of over 30 junior staff, and oversee a total annual budget of \$7 million.
- Appointed by Member of Congress to and served on Congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group in 2019 to survey U.S. diplomatic and military strategy and operations in Syria.

Prior CSIS Positions from 2015-2018:  
 • Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, International Security Program (2017-2018)

- Senior Fellow & Chief of Staff, International Security Program (2016-2017)
- Fellow & Chief of Staff, International Security Program (2015-2016)

2015-2020

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC  
Unpaid Independent Consultant

- Provided advice to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

August 2019-July 2020

National Security Action, Washington, DC

FP2021 Issue Co-Lead, Consultant

- Engaged over 130 stakeholders across the Democratic defense community to identify areas of convergence and key priorities for a future Democratic defense agenda; curated those ideas into a policy paper circulated and briefed to Democratic national security leadership.

January 2020-June 2020

Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC

Professor

- Taught Comparative Foreign Policy course to Executive Master of International Relations students.

July 2020-January 2021

Biden-Harris Transition Team

Volunteer

- Provided research to and managed team of staff preparing for stand up of Defense Agency Review Team

January 2021-Present

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

- Advise the Secretary of Defense and other senior defense leaders on national security and defense strategy; the forces, contingency plans, and associated posture necessary to implement the defense strategy; nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy; and security cooperation plans and policies.
- Lead development of the National Defense Strategy review, Nuclear Posture Review, and Global Posture Review.
- Ensure that the Department of Defense (DoD)'s program and budget decisions support and advance senior DoD leaders' strategic direction, especially as articulated in defense planning guidance.

#### Honors and Awards:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Exceptional Civilian Service Award, 2014 and 2011
- OSD Special Act Award, 2014, 2010, and 2009
- OSD Award for Excellence, 2009
- Global War on Terrorism Civilian Service Medal, 2011
- Center for Strategic and International Studies Baumgartner Employee Recognition – President's Award, 2015
- Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, 2014-2015

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Melissa G. Dalton in connection with her nomination follows:]

117<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
ROOM SR-228  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050  
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE  
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

**NOTE:** Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

**BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC**

**1. Name (Include any former names you have used):**

Melissa Griffin Dalton  
Maiden Name: Melissa Griffin Singh

**2. Position to which nominated:**

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security Affairs

**3. Date of nomination:**

10 August 2021

**4. Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college,**

**university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):**

Oakton High School, Vienna, Virginia, 1995-1999, High School Diploma, June 1999

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1999-2003, Bachelor of Arts, May 2003

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2005-2007, Master of Arts, May 2007

**5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

August 2010-January 2012  
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC  
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

February 2012-February 2013  
Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Washington, DC  
Visiting Fellow

March 2013-September 2014  
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC  
Senior Advisor for Force Planning, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

September 2014-April 2015  
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC  
International Affairs Fellow  
(served fellowship year at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC)

April 2015-January 2021  
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC  
Director, Cooperative Defense Project; Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program  
Prior CSIS Positions:  
• Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, International Security Program  
• Senior Fellow & Chief of Staff, International Security Program  
• Fellow & Chief of Staff, International Security Program

2015-2020  
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC  
Unpaid Independent Consultant  
(served as an advisor to OSD-Policy/Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities office)

August 2019-July 2020  
National Security Action, Washington, DC  
FP2021 Issue Co-Lead, Consultant

January 2020-June 2020  
Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, at the Center for  
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC  
Professor

July 2020-January 2021  
Biden-Harris Transition Team  
Volunteer

January 2021-Present  
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

**6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**

N/A

**7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**

N/A

**8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):**

Council on Foreign Relations Member, 2019-Present

Girl Scouts of the Nation's Capital Member, Troop 50124 Leader, 2019-Present

Girl Security Board of Advisors Member, 2020

Council on Foreign Relations Term Member, 2012-2017

Blue Ridge Mountain Rescue Group, Appalachian Search and Rescue Conference,  
2000-2003

**9. Political affiliations and activities:**

**a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):**

N/A

**b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:**

Volunteered on the policy teams for the 2012 Obama campaign, 2016 Clinton campaign, and 2020 Biden-Harris campaign

**c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:**

Joe Biden Act Blue - \$2,300, August 22, 2020  
Biden Victory Fund - \$500, July 9, 2020  
Joe Biden Act Blue - \$2,800, March 16, 2020  
Hillary Clinton, \$2,700, October 25, 2016  
Hillary Clinton - \$1,550, February 26, 2016  
Hillary Clinton - \$250, January 31, 2016

**10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees,**

**honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):**

Center for Strategic and International Studies Baumgartner Employee Recognition, President's Award, 2015

Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, 2014-2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Exceptional Civilian Service Award, 2014 and 2011;

OSD Special Act Award, 2014, 2010, 2009;

Global War on Terrorism Civilian Service Medal, 2011;

OSD Award for Excellence, 2009

**11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):**

Evolving UAE Military and Foreign Security Cooperation: Path Toward Military Professionalism, January 2021,  
<https://carnegie-mec.org/2021/01/12/evolving-uae-military-and-foreign-security-cooperation-path-toward-military-professionalism-pub-83549>

Reengaging the Middle East, "Adapting U.S. Defense Posture in the Middle East for New Priorities," (book chapter) Brookings Institution Press, 2020

To Compete, Invest in People: Retaining U.S. Defense Enterprise's Technical Workforce, November 2020,  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/compete-invest-people-retaining-us-defense-enterprises-technical-workforce>

Reinforcing Institutional Integrity in an Election Year: The Role of US Federal Forces, October 2020  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/reinforcing-institutional-integrity-election-year-role-us-federal-forces>

Buttressing Institutional Integrity in an Election Year, October 2020,  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/buttressing-institutional-integrity-election-year>

Providers or Enforcers? The Duality of Security Forces' Roles in Covid-19 Response Efforts, October 2020

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/providers-or-enforcers-duality-security-forces-roles-covid-19-response-efforts>

Playing Politics: International Security Assistance and the Lebanese's Military's Changing Role, September 2020,

<https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/09/07/playing-politics-international-security-sector-assistance-and-lebanese-military-s-changing-role-pub-82663>

Partners, Not Proxies: Capacity Building in Hybrid Warfare, May 2020

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/partners-not-proxies-capacity-building-hybrid-warfare>

Mapping Stabilizing in Post-Peace Accord Colombia, May 2020

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/mapping-stabilization-post-peace-accord-colombia>

Pursuing Effective and Conflict-Aware Stabilization: Lessons from Beyond the Beltway, April 2020

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/pursuing-effective-and-conflict-aware-stabilization-lessons-beyond-beltway>

The Evolution of Tunisia's Military and the Role of Foreign Security Sector Assistance, April 2020,

<https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/04/29/evolution-of-tunisia-s-military-and-role-of-foreign-security-sector-assistance-pub-81602>

Colombia at a Stabilization Crossroads, March 2020

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/colombia-stabilization-crossroads>

Soleimani Strike: Necessary Debate and New Frontiers for the Use of Force, January 2020,

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/soleimani-strike-necessary-debate-and-new-frontiers-use-force>

Reimagining Stabilization in Lebanon, November 2019

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/reimagining-stabilization-lebanon>

"Syria Study Group Final Report," (U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC), September 2019.

<https://www.usip.org/syria-study-group-final-report>

"Human Rights in a Shifting Landscape: Recommendations for Congress," (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), September 2019.  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/human-rights-shifting-landscape-recommendations-congress>

"By Other Means: Part II: Adapting to Compete in the Gray Zone," (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), August 2019.  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-ii-adapting-compete-gray-zone>

"Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation in Action for Security Sector Assistance," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), August 2019.

Pursuing Effective and Conflict-Aware Stabilization: Partnering for Success, April 2019  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/pursuing-effective-and-conflict-aware-stabilization-partnering-success>

"Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability for U.S. Security Sector Assistance," (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), April 2019.

Pursuing Effective and Conflict-Aware Stabilization: Framing and Constructing a Roadmap, January 2019  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/pursuing-effective-and-conflict-aware-stabilization-framing-and-constructing-roadmap>

"Access for What: Elevating Civilian Protection and Quality Access for Humanitarian Action in Syria," (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), December 2018.

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12. **Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).**

N/A

**COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**NOTE:** In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple "yes" or "no" response is appropriate.

13. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?**

Yes

14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?

Yes

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes

18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes

19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes

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[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 18 day of August, 2021

[The nomination of Ms. Melissa G. Dalton was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 1, 2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 1, 2022.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. John F. Plumb by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

## DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* Section 955 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) created the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD(SP)) whose principal duty “shall be the overall supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space warfighting.” You are the first person nominated for Senate confirmation to this position.

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the (ASD(SP))?

*Answer.* As required by statute, the primary duty of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (ASD(SP)) is the overall supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space warfighting, pursuant to Section 138(b)(5) of Title 10, U.S.C. In carrying out these responsibilities, the ASD(SP) advises and represents the Secretary of Defense on national security space strategy, policy, plans, capabilities, and operations to achieve national security objectives. The ASD(SP) also has related implementation oversight responsibilities. Additionally, as part of an ongoing reorganization, the ASD(SP) will have similar advisory, representational, and implementation oversight responsibilities regarding nuclear, missile defense, cyber, and countering weapons of mass destruction policies, strategies and programs. This reorganization will also designate ASD(SP) as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for, among other things, overseeing the development and execution of the Cyber Posture Review and Defense Cyber Strategy.

*Question.* If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities do you expect the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort comprising the National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

*Answer.* The lines of effort from the 2018 NDS—building a more ready and lethal force; strengthening alliances and partnerships; and reforming DOD operations—remain very relevant to the space security challenges facing the nation. If I am confirmed, I expect the USD(P) will ask me to prioritize oversight and implementation of the reforms in the national security space organization of recent years—such as creation of the United States Space Force, the United States Space Command, and the ASD(SP)—to advance those lines of effort and strengthen integrated deterrence under the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Additionally, consistent with the ongoing reorganization of the office, I expect he would task me to focus on achieving closer integration in our approaches to the nuclear, missile defense, cyber, space and countering weapons of mass destruction mission areas. Space is a common element in each of these mission areas, and how we leverage them together will be impor-

tant to securing our overall national security interests across all domains and regions.

*Question.* What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that qualify you to serve as the ASD(SP), including in each of the following areas:

Development of internationally-applicable space policy, rules, and normative behaviors in space.

*Answer.* As a former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, a former director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council staff, and the current Chief of Government Relations for the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), I have substantial expertise working on space policy, rules, and normative behaviors in space. My academic background in physics and aerospace engineering combined with my hands-on engineering experience across multiple disciplines as a submarine officer has allowed me to apply a technical understanding of the physics and engineering dynamics of spaceflight to help inform the scope of possible policy solutions for the domain.

*Question.* The national security space policy process.

*Answer.* As a former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, a former director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council staff, and the current Chief of Government Relations for the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), I have substantial expertise working on the national security space policy process. My academic background in physics and aerospace engineering combined with my hands-on engineering experience as a submarine officer has allowed me to bring a technical understanding to the policy, technological, and programmatic issues I have encountered during my career.

*Question.* The relationship between space, cyber, and nuclear operations in terms of escalation dynamics.

*Answer.* As former Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, and a former director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council staff, and as a current United States Navy Reserve Captain and current Chief of Government Relations for the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), I have substantial expertise working at the intersection of space, cyber, and nuclear operations. My education, engineering experience, and previous roles in the national security community have introduced me to the strategies, policies, technologies, and programs that affect the escalation dynamics across these issue areas.

*Question.* Oversight of nuclear, missile defense, cyber, and countering weapons of mass destruction policy.

*Answer.* As former Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, and a former director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council staff, and as a current United States Navy Reserve Captain and current Chief of Government Relations for the Aerospace Corporation (a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), I have substantial expertise working at the intersection of space, cyber, nuclear, missile defense, and countering weapons of mass destruction policy.

*Question.* What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as ASD(SP), if confirmed?

*Answer.* During my service both in and outside of the U.S. Government, I have had the privilege of leading and managing multiple organizations in national security missions. In the Navy I have led teams varying in size from a handful to several hundred. As a civilian I have served as director for defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council staff, where I led interagency deliberations on national-level defense matters, working both internally and across the national security apparatus to execute the President's national security strategy. As a civilian at the Department of Defense, I served as acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, leading the team responsible for implementation of the National Security Space Strategy. Previously in the Department, I also served as Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, where I supported the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in leading our team through the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Across all of these roles, I have exercised inclusive decision-making, deliberate communication, close collaboration throughout the U.S. Government and with our allies, and, most importantly, leadership and management by example.

## MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the first ASD(SP)?

*Answer.* I see the major challenges for the first ASD(SP) centering on the challenges of strengthening integrated deterrence, which Secretary Austin has stated will be a cornerstone of the NDS and the closely related Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. The ASD(SP) must strengthen integration across the areas of space, nuclear, cyber, missile defense, and countering WMD to sustain capability advantages that underpin the power of the joint force globally and the credibility of our commitments to defending national interests. To do this, we must continue to adapt to the realities of conflict extending to or originating in space; protect against increasingly space-capable adversaries; undertake necessary modernizations of the nuclear enterprise; modernize homeland missile defenses; strengthen integrated air and missile defenses regionally; posture to defend forward in cyberspace and be prepared to use our cyber capabilities on operationally relevant timelines; and continue leading the world in preventing further proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

*Question.* If confirmed, what plans would you implement to address each of these challenges?

*Answer.* If confirmed, my first focus will be to help implement the Administration's National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review, as well as the 2020 National Space Strategy. I would anticipate those documents will provide important roadmaps, both across the totality of national defense and with specific focus to nuclear, missile defense, and space mission areas. I am also aware of the National Defense Authorization Act requirements to conduct a Cyber Posture Review this year. I believe that review will be very important for assessing the evolution of threats and the progress of current programs, and for developing plans to serve our interests over the next several years. In each of these areas as well as in non-proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction, I would expect to work closely with our allies and partners to develop complementary and integrated plans to achieve our common objectives.

*Question.* If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for your tenure in office?

*Answer.* If confirmed, my overarching priority would be to approach all of my responsibilities from the perspective of advancing and assuring U.S. national security interests in an unprecedented era of strategic competition. The ASD(SP) mission portfolio is broad, but each of those missions are critical to sustaining the open international system as we have known it for the past 75 years and assuring our adversaries do not supplant it with one based on their authoritarian models. I would therefore seek to integrate the DOD policy approach across my portfolio to both strengthen our alliances and better deter potential aggressors. From my previous experience working in government, I know the sense of mission and national purpose our military and career civil service have. If confirmed, I would also make it a top priority to build an ASD Space Policy organization that nurtures and leverages this tremendous source of national strength.

The Office of Nuclear and Missile Defense was eliminated in the most recent reorganization with missile defense falling under the Office of Space and Missile Defense and Nuclear Deterrence falling under the Office of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Policy.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the nuclear deterrence mission is appropriately prioritized within the Office of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Policy?

*Answer.* Our nuclear deterrent continues to serve an essential purpose in U.S. national security strategy, as it has done for 70 years. Secretary Austin has testified that nuclear deterrence is the Department's number one priority. If confirmed as ASD(SP), and consistent with Secretary Austin's statement, I intend to advance the Department's goals for integrated deterrence; maintaining our strategic deterrent is critical to that strategy. This approach includes leveraging the unique capabilities associated with our nuclear deterrence so that they are given the priority needed to advance the Department's deterrence and defense missions. (I understand that this policy office will be titled "Nuclear and CWMD Policy.")

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to ensure that nuclear and missile defense policies are appropriately coordinated under the Policy office reorganization?

*Answer.* Missile defense and nuclear weapons policies are complementary—the capabilities combine to strengthen deterrence. If confirmed as ASD(SP), a core part of my responsibilities will involve coordinating among the offices falling within my

portfolio to ensure we can protect our Homeland, defend U.S. national security interests, deter attacks, and assure our allies. Such a responsibility entails analyzing the threat environment, the relevant U.S., allied and partner strategic capabilities (including but not limited to nuclear deterrence and missile defense), how all these capabilities intersect with one another, and our global security commitments, among many other elements. This understanding would provide the foundation to carry out a coherent approach that enables the United States to achieve its national security policy and strategic objectives.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

*Question.* In its 2018 report, *Providing for the Common Defense*, the National Defense Strategy Commission observed, “there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues . . . Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.”

Congress created the position of ASD(SP) to ensure civilian oversight of a new branch of the armed services and Combatant Command. What are your views on the purposes underpinning creation of the position of the ASD(SP) and how would you effectuate those purposes, if confirmed?

*Answer.* My understanding is Congress created the position of the ASD(SP) to reinforce the important role of civilian oversight at a time when the Nation was taking major steps to strengthen the military’s role in securing national security interests against growing threats in space. The rapid emergence of these challenges in space security means we must develop our policy and strategic approaches at the same time we are organizing, training, and equipping forces and developing operational plans to address those challenges. We are also developing our understanding of how these dynamics affect national security across other domains and other areas of national interest. I believe the ASD(SP) has a key role in developing a holistic understanding and approach that combines the best of our civilian and military organizations. To that end, and if confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the Chief of Space Operations, the Commander of the U.S. Space Command and other leadership of the defense space enterprise. I would also want to work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to ensure close partnership and collaboration between the defense and Intelligence Community components of the national security space enterprise. Likewise, I would hope to strengthen defense partnerships with civil agencies, commercial industry, and our international allies and partners.

*Question.* If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as ASD(SP) epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

*Answer.* Throughout my military service as a submariner in the U.S. Navy and as a public servant with the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the United States Senate, I have sworn oaths to support and defend the Constitution. Civilian control of the military is fundamental to the preservation of the freedoms enshrined in that document. It is part of our national identity. If confirmed, I will ensure a clear chain of command in my own organization and across those I will oversee that reflects the will of the civilian leaders we serve each day. I will ensure that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense always have the best advice of both the civilian and military leadership regarding the matters for which I would be responsible so that they can ensure the appropriate exercise of civilian control. I will ensure that the organizations I have oversight of comply with laws and regulation. And I will work with the Congressional committees of jurisdiction to enable Congressional oversight.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS) AND INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

*Question.* The 2018 NDS outlines that threats confronting the United States: a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration. Among these priorities is the requirement to “promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons or dominating key regions.” The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new *National Defense Strategy*, which is planned for issuance in 2022.

Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most

critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

Answer. I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identified strategic competitions with China and with Russia as the primary challenges animating the global security environment. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance similarly highlights these threats to the international system, most urgently from China as well as from Russia, while also noting the emerging, unconventional, and non-military threats that continue to challenge national security, such as nuclear and WMD proliferation and cyber threats. I expect that the 2022 National Defense Strategy will build on the 2018 NDS to reflect these critical threats as well, and if confirmed, I will ensure the offices in my purview will use the NDS as a guide to prioritize our security challenges.

*Question.* What revisions or adjustments, if any, would you recommend that the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS with respect to space? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The 2018 NDS was right to highlight emerging challenges to our most critical space assets, and to direct the prioritization of investments in space resilience and reconstitution. The threats posed by competitors in space have only become more acute since then. Mission-assured space capabilities and the ability to protect our forces from any adversary's hostile uses of space are foundational to a successful deterrent, and the Secretary of Defense has made clear that integrated deterrence is a focus of the forthcoming 2022 NDS. If confirmed, I would work with the Defense space enterprise, the Department's senior leadership, and Congress to prioritize investments in the mission assurance of our space architecture, protect our forces from hostile uses of space, work with our allies and partners to promote norms of behavior to reduce miscalculation and escalation in space, and leverage the talent and ingenuity of both our Defense space workforce and the private sector to stay ahead of current and future threats.

*Question.* The June 2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary outlines four lines of effort to comport with the 2018 NDS, as follows: "(1) build a comprehensive military advantage in space; (2) integrate space into national, joint, and combined operations; (3) shape the strategic environment; and (4) cooperate with allies, partners, industry, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies." Please explain your views on each of these elements of the 2020 Defense Space Strategy Summary.

Answer. I have reviewed the June 2020 Defense Strategy Summary, and believe that its core elements remain valid, important, and align with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, as well as the Administration's more recently released United States Space Priorities Framework. I assess it will be important to sustain the focus on the following elements in particular:

- The first line of effort primarily focuses on the actions that the U.S. Space Force should take as the organization responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the preponderance of our space forces. Across these efforts, a critical element I will focus on, if confirmed, is ensuring that the U.S. is able to field resilient and assured space capabilities to deter and counter hostile uses of space.
- The second line of effort is the major focus of the U.S. Space Command. Establishing the U.S. Space Command as a Unified Combatant Command was an important step to enable the Department to plan, exercise, and execute joint and combined space operations across the spectrum of competition and conflict, in concert with operations across all domains and in coordination with the other combatant commanders. A specific focus of mine, if confirmed, will be realigning operational authorities, updating rules of engagement, and improving the integration of space operations and intelligence personnel in military plans and staffs.
- The third line of effort is focused on addressing the challenges in space that arise from the lack of common understandings about norms of responsible behavior. If confirmed, my focus on this line of effort would be in shaping the strategic environment in ways that enhance domain stability and reduce the potential for miscalculations. This includes diplomatic work in partnership with the Department of State, as international views about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the space domain continue to evolve. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department of State and other interagency partners to advance international norms and increase stability.
- Finally, the fourth line of effort focuses on the partnerships necessary to advance the first three lines of effort. I believe relationships with allies and partners, as well as with commercial entities, are integral to collective security. I anticipate there is still important work to be done to advance our key partnerships through enhanced information sharing, increased programmatic collabora-

tion, and developing combined operations. If confirmed, partnerships in this domain will be a key focus of mine.

*Question.* In your view, is each element of the Strategy Summary properly scoped?

Answer. In my view, the four lines of effort under the Defense Strategy are appropriate. If confirmed, I will work to align the Defense Space Strategy to the United States Space Priorities Framework, as well as the forthcoming National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

*Question.* Should additional elements be added, in your view?

Answer. In my view, the four lines of effort are comprehensive. There could be additional work to implement these efforts as new DOD space-focused organizations, their leaders, and related activities and capabilities grow and mature to adapt to the evolving complex space security environment. If confirmed, I would work with the leadership of the U.S. Space Force, U.S. Space Command, and other stakeholders to support that implementation work.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate each of these elements of the Strategy Summary?

Answer. The strategic environment continues to evolve rapidly. If confirmed, I would review the strategic environment since the Defense Space Strategy was published in June 2020, particularly the continued growth of Chinese and Russian space and counterspace capabilities. I would also review steps the United States has taken to improve the DOD space enterprise to address the growing threats and challenges in the domain. I would work to bolster U.S. resilience in the space domain, ensuring space is integrated with and contributing to deterrence and military effectiveness across all domains, and promoting norms of responsible behavior in space. Because I am concerned the threat is evolving faster than typical DOD processes can respond, I would work to help the Department speed adoption of new capabilities. Finally, I would ensure implementation of the Defense Space Strategy remains aligned with the more recent United States Space Priorities Framework, and National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, to enhance unity of effort and synchronization of space activities across the enterprise.

#### ADVANCES BY RUSSIA AND CHINA IN SPACE

*Question.* What is your assessment of China's technological advances in space activities in the last 10 years?

Answer. My understanding is that over the last decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) space enterprise has matured rapidly as a result of the PRC's investment in all aspects of its space program, from civil to military space applications. The most recent China Military Power Report and other open source publications indicate that the PRC has improved its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communications, satellite navigation, as well as human space flight and robotic space exploration. The PRC has also built an expansive ground support system, including space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacturing, launch, command and control (C2), and data downlink capabilities. Notably, during this period, the PRC invested significant economic resources in the development and testing of counterspace capabilities, such as direct-ascent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities, which can contest or deny an adversary's access to and operations in the space domain during crisis or conflict.

*Question.* What threats does China pose—now and in the future—to the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national security posture?

Answer. I agree with Secretary Austin that China is the United States' pacing challenge, including in the space domain. From the open literature, I understand PRC military doctrine indicates that PRC leadership views space as critical to modern warfare, and considers the use of counterspace capabilities as both a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness and for winning future wars. As such, the PRC military continues to acquire and develop a diverse set of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including ground-based and space-based systems with kinetic and non-kinetic effects. My understanding is that China's rapid development and operational focus in the space domain constitutes the most significant security threat in space to the United States, as well as to our allies and partners.

*Question.* What is your assessment of Russia's technological advances in space activities in the last 10 years?

Answer. From open source material, I understand that Russia's space program is robust but more narrowly focused than China's. Since at least 2010, Russia has concluded that gaining and maintaining supremacy in space will have a decisive impact on the outcome of future conflicts. Russia has therefore embarked on major efforts to develop space and counterspace activities as a means to gain an asymmetric military advantage over the United States. Russia has developed and tested a range of

kinetic and non-kinetic options with reversible and irreversible effects against adversary space assets. Specifically, I am aware from United States Government and allied government statements that Russia tested space-based anti-satellite systems in 2017 and 2020, including in an orbit very close to a United States satellite. And, just last November, Russia conducted a destructive, direct-ascent ASAT test against one of its own satellites.

*Question.* What threats does Russia pose—now and in the future—to the ability of the United States to use space as part of our national security posture?

Answer. While China is the pacing threat in space, Russia is also a major concern. Russia views space as a key enabler of United States military power. The Russian military continues to develop and test space and counterspace capabilities aimed at offsetting perceived United States military advantage, and disrupting and destroying U.S. and allied space capabilities in crisis and conflict. The growth of Russia's counterspace arsenal appears to present a serious threat to United States, allied, and partner space activities.

*Question.* In your view, what other countries or groups are advancing technologically in space?

Answer. More than 30 countries—many of which are allies and partners—currently invest in advanced space activities and associated technologies. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, and the participants in the European Space Agency (ESA), to name a few, continue to make noteworthy advances in space technologies and partner with the United States in civil, commercial, and national security domains. In terms of actors that pose national security concerns, Iran and North Korea continue to pursue space and counterspace-related technologies and capabilities that could threaten United States, ally, and partner interests in space.

*Question.* How do each of these countries or groups affect ability of the United States to use space as part of our national security posture and why?

Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense maintains and continues to build space-related partnerships with many countries worldwide to enhance our national security posture and to promote safe operations in space. These countries understand that rapid increases in civil, commercial, and military space activities create new economic opportunities and provide national security benefits through new technologies and services. Additionally, these countries recognize the use of space enhances collective security, and many increasingly understand the emerging threats to the space domain from strategic competitors like China and Russia. Maintaining and strengthening space-related alliances and partnerships will likely be critical to the Department's focus on integrated deterrence, particularly by helping the United States to maintain a durable strategic advantage over China, Russia, and regional powers like Iran and North Korea.

#### NORMS OF BEHAVIOR IN SPACE

*Question.* Please explain your views on the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” as it pertains to the Department of Defense.

Answer. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, as well as the other three core space treaties (i.e., the Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968; the Liability Convention of 1972; and the Registration Convention of 1975), form the basis and cornerstone of existing international space law. All United States Government space operations, including operations undertaken by the Department of Defense, should comply with applicable international law, which, in addition to the four core space treaties, includes the inherent right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter.

Russia and China have proposed additional treaties, resolutions and rules of behavior related to space through the U.N. Conference on Disarmament.

*Question.* What is your understanding of these recent proposals and what is your view of how each would affect the United States and its national security interests in space?

Answer. My understanding is that the U.S. Government agrees with establishing best practices, standards, and norms of behaviors in space in order to create shared understanding between operators and nations about what constitutes responsible behaviors and to reduce the misperceptions or miscalculations leading to destabilizing behavior. However, in my view, the Russian and Chinese proposals and concepts for arms control, such as their co-sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, do not provide pragmatic, equitable, or verifiable mechanisms that would enhance U.S. national security interests. In light of their ongoing development and deployment of weapons, most recently highlighted by Rus-

sia's reckless test of an anti-satellite missile in November, which destroyed a satellite and scattered debris across low Earth orbit, their proposals seem even more disingenuous. I believe the U.S. should pursue a more sustainable path with our allies and partners to underpin space security and the peaceful use of space for all spacefaring nations.

The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, dated July 7, 2021 outlining the Department's tenets of responsible behavior in space as to the following key objectives:

- Operate in, from, to, and through space with due regard to others and in a professional manner.
- Limit the generation of long-lived debris.
- Avoid the creation of harmful interference.
- Maintain safe separation and safe trajectory.
- Communicate and make notifications to enhance the safety and stability of the domain.

26. What are your views on each of these objectives? Please explain your answers.

Answer. Secretary Austin's July 7 memorandum on the "Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space" is a strong example of the Department of Defense's commitment to lead in the responsible use of space and stewardship of the space environment, as set out in President Biden's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of March 2021, and the United States Space Priorities Framework of December 2021. If confirmed, I would seek to continue building upon last year's progress to advance these tenets.

*Question.* What is your view on the nature and scope of the U.S. responsibility to protect Space as a "global common"?

Answer. (My understanding is that the term "global commons" is a legal term that can have different meanings based upon the perspective of the speaker. To avoid any confusion inherent in this term I will address what I understand to be the underlying concept of this question. Space activities are essential to our way of life. Access to, and the use of, space are vital national interests. I agree with the United States Space Priorities Framework's direction to the Department to defend U.S. national security interests from the growing scope and scale of counterspace threats and contribute to strategic stability through multiple means, including increasing resiliency. Concurrently, the long-term sustainability of the space domain is a shared interest between all nations, which means that the DOD must balance the protection of our national security interests with the responsible use of space and stewardship of the space environment. One sustainability problem of particular concern to me is that of long lived orbital debris, which can reduce access to space as it accumulates over time. I believe the United States, as a global leader, has a responsibility to also lead on this issue in order to preserve assured access to space.

#### OVERSIGHT OF NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN SPACE

*Question.* If confirmed, you would be the principal civilian official responsible for oversight of the Department's operations in space. Please describe your vision of the relationship and specific oversight duties of the ASD(SP) with respect to each the following organizations:

I see each of these close relationships as distinct, yet centered on a common purpose of achieving strategic alignment toward sustaining national security advantages in space. If confirmed, I would approach these relationships in the following manner.

The U.S. Space Command;

Answer. The relationship with U.S. Space Command is most similar to the relationships that other Assistant Secretaries of Defense who report through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy have with Combatant Commands. Although the chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander, the role of the Assistant Secretary as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense makes this relationship key for ensuring the strategic objectives of civilian leadership are reflected in space operations of the Joint Force.

*Question.* The U.S. Space Force;

Answer. The relationship with the U.S. Space Force is quite different. The Chief of Space Operations reports to the Secretary of Defense through the civilian Secretary of the Air Force. Additionally, the organize, train, and equip activities of the Space Force follow Department-wide guidance established and overseen by several other OSD civilian officials. Thus, the civilian oversight responsibilities are shared, with the ASD(SP) focusing on how Space Force activities contribute to strategic advantage in space and integrated strategic outcomes across national security policy objectives.

*Question.* Space activities with the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security; and

*Answer.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) is a co-equal to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), oversees the military intelligence program (MIP) budget, and exercises Secretary of Defense authority, direction, and control related to the National Reconnaissance Office and other military elements of the Intelligence Community. In this relationship, the ASD(SP), in support to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense, works with the USD(I&S), to ensure that space-related MIP investments and space activities of the intelligence community advance DOD policy, strategy, and plans to achieve national security objectives.

*Question.* Space activities with the intelligence community, and in particular the National Reconnaissance Office.

*Answer.* The ASD(SP) does not exercise direct oversight of the National Reconnaissance Office and other space elements of the Intelligence Community, but should maintain a close partnership with them, as part of the relationship with the USD(I&S). This is essential to facilitate the unity of effort activities in space operations between the DOD and Intelligence Community, and to realize strategic synergies in DOD and IC space acquisition activities.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE ASD(SP)

*Question.* Section 955(b) of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA required a study by a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) on the organizational challenges of this position of ASD(SP). The study, "Drawing the Oversight Constellation: Options for the ASD for Space Policy," was completed by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in July of 2020.

What are your views regarding the study's findings (as set forth in table 3 of the CNA report) regarding the gaps and seams in oversight of space activities in the Department of Defense?

*Answer.* The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study considered a number of options for how to structure the office of the ASD Space Policy. As part of that work, CNA addressed gaps and seams across the defense space enterprise, and considered how the different organizational options might address those gaps and seams. I think the CNA study was thorough in its approach and can continue to serve as an important reference.

*Question.* What are your views regarding the study's findings (table 5 of the CNA report) regarding options for consideration by the ASD(SP) relative to the degree of change in the organization of the office of the ASD(SP) deemed necessary and appropriate?

*Answer.* In table 5, the CNA study identifies considerations for how to structure an ASD(SP) office centered on the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. I think the table identifies an appropriate initial scope of issues where the office should have interest and influence: strategy, policy, international relations, plans, operations, programs, budget, and acquisition. In my view, a policy-level ASD office requires sufficient expertise in each of those issue areas to set strategic direction and provide oversight to ensure follow-through along the strategic path.

#### SPACE DETERRENCE AND CLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE INFORMATION

*Question.* In order for space deterrence to be effective, the adversary must subjectively balance the cost penalties for actions taken. However, most national security space programs are classified and information about them withheld from public disclosure.

Do you believe the balance between space deterrence and withholding national security space information from public disclosure needs to be adjusted? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe it is important to think of space deterrence in the broader context of deterring adversary aggression that threatens U.S. vital national interests. Shaping adversary perceptions of U.S. will and capability, includes, but is not limited to knowledge of particular U.S. capabilities.

*Question.* If you believe this balance needs to be adjusted, what specific actions would you take to effectuate that belief, if confirmed?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would work with leadership of the U.S. Space Force, U.S. Space Command, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, among others to ensure classification policies regarding defense and other national security space activities are current and focused on protecting information that truly needs protection in this era. Likewise, I would work with these stakeholders to as-

sess how we should update our policies and practices for disclosure of classified information to enhance ally and partner cooperation.

In response to section 1611 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, the Department of Defense issued a report entitled, "Report on Deterrence in Space" in January 2021. According to that report, "Depending upon an adversary's reliance on space, and on other factors, in-kind response to threats against adversary space and counterspace systems may be of limited utility in some situations, and response options in other domains may be more appropriate and effective. The United States draws upon the sum of its military capabilities as part of our broader U.S. deterrence posture for the space domain as it does in all domains."

*Question.* Do you agree with this statement?

*Answer.* I agree that DOD must consider space-related deterrence within the broader, integrated framework of deterrence. This means that assured space capabilities and resilient space architectures may contribute to deterrence of aggression in any domain. Other national tools must also contribute to deterring attacks or other forms of harmful interference against U.S. space capabilities. We must also work with allies and partners to bring our collective strength to bear against common challenges. My understanding is that the Department is developing an integrated deterrence approach that seeks to prioritize and align cross-domain options, coordinated strategic messaging, and international alliances and partnerships, to help address the deterrence challenge we face, including our increased reliance on space for our way of life as well as support to military operations in all domains, coupled with the vulnerability of our space architectures.

*Question.* In what types of scenarios would you expect this statement to apply?

*Answer.* From a deterrence perspective, cross-domain military response options should be tailored relative to our understanding of an adversary's strategy, strengths, and vulnerabilities. Cross-domain responses, as opposed to responses in space, enable the United States to draw on the sum of its capabilities, and may be more appropriate and effective if an adversary is not as reliant as the United States is on space. Deterrence approaches must also be tailored to the specific adversary, and must consider the adversary's motivations and ultimate objectives, perceived benefits of attack, availability of alternate courses of action outside the space domain, and the perceived escalation risks.

*Question.* If confirmed, what are your views as to whether such a cross domain response can increase or decrease escalation dynamics in a conflict? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Any type of military response, whether in-domain or cross-domain, would require the U.S. to manage escalation. The efficacy of deterrence by military response is associated with multiple factors, including the adversary's perception of the value of U.S. capabilities and the credibility of U.S. will to employ said capabilities. An effective cross-domain response, if employed, requires the adversary to understand the action is intended as a response and not an escalation; that understanding may require clear articulation by the United States to prevent miscalculation. I share the concern that there is not a broad understanding of escalation risks in the space domain. I believe that more work must be done to build a set of shared space-related international norms and best practices in order to reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

*Question.* Do you ascribe to the assertion of "first mover advantage" in space and if so, how does that effect deterrence in Space, in your view?

*Answer.* In any domain, the question of whether an aggressor or defender has an advantage by moving first impacts deterrence. I am concerned that China perceives itself at an overall disadvantage in military competition with the United States, and views counterspace operations as part of a strategic counterbalance to U.S. conventional superiority. As a result, China's strategy against the United States may well include attacks in space early in a conflict in order to achieve strategic objectives. If confirmed, I would prioritize efforts to increase resilience and reduce factors that contribute to destabilizing perceptions of first mover advantage.

*Question.* How would you, if confirmed, overcome the "first mover advantage" in Space?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would support ensuring a resilient U.S. space architecture by fielding assured space capabilities that serve to deter adversary attacks by demonstrating it would be difficult, expensive, and/or ineffective to degrade or destroy U.S. space capabilities. These efforts will be critical to reducing any "first mover advantage" in space. Resilient architectures and reconstitution measures could also deter adversaries' initial attack or absorb losses without significant degradation of U.S. capability. Finally, I would also support development of norms that could help establish a better shared understanding responsible behavior in space.

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SPACE COOPERATION

*Question.* Many U.S. allies and NATO partners are now developing national security space doctrine.

If confirmed, how would you coordinate and integrate the efforts of our allies and NATO countries to deter adversarial actions in space by other nations?

*Answer.* It is essential that we work closely with allies and partners in space. I am aware that the Department of Defense already conducts numerous bilateral activities with allies and partners ranging from development of space policies and strategies to developing capabilities and plan. If confirmed, I would continue these efforts and focus on improving our information sharing to enable progress. I would also seek to engage at NATO to advance discussions on how the alliance can support space as an operational domain.

## USE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE SYSTEMS FOR DOD NEEDS

*Question.* Commercial space systems have become an integral part of the Department's use of space because they can offer lower cost and innovative approaches than the government can achieve by itself. However, little is known about over-reliance on commercial systems for critical defense functions such as ballistic missile warning or the transmission of nuclear action messages. In particular, it is not clear whether these commercial space systems would be deemed "combatants" in a time of conflict.

In your view, how should DOD balance taking advantage of commercial innovation and lowering the cost of space operations, while ensuring the Department does not become over-reliant on non-governmental entities for the performance of critical defense functions?

*Answer.* Continuing to pursue opportunities to utilize commercial innovation in space, such as proliferated constellations based on low cost commodity components and rapid technical refresh, is important to maintaining the U.S. competitive edge in space. However, it is also important to have balance and maintain stringent mission assurance requirements for the most critical national security space systems. For experimental, or research and development programs, I believe the Defense Innovation Unit, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Space Force Space Enterprise Consortium are good examples of how the Department can partner with newer commercial space providers outside of the more rigorous DOD acquisition framework.

## ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE

*Question.* The policy of ensuring that there is more than one commercial provider of space launch services is the cornerstone of DOD's objective of Assured Access to Space.

What are your views on the effect of section 2773 of title 10, U.S. Code, as it relates to Assured Access to Space?

*Answer.* The longstanding statutory requirements regarding assured access to space have ensured that DOD maintains two reliable options for launches of national security payloads. The requirement has bolstered competitiveness, strengthened the industrial base, and provided flexibility that is critical to national security. If confirmed, I would continue to support this requirement.

*Question.* What are your views on the benefits and risks associated with combining contracts to acquire a satellite and launch it into orbit, as compared to the standard block buy process currently used?

*Answer.* I believe DOD should maintain flexibility in satellite and launch acquisition pathways to align with mission needs and national security requirements. For the major National Security Space Launch programs, I understand the Space Force's current five-year contract period demonstrated a commitment to industry partnership that reduced launch costs substantially and saved billions of dollars for major mission systems. Likewise, DOD research and development activities can benefit from having the flexibility to leverage delivery on orbit and other commercial market options. It is important to be able to balance the various cost, schedule, mission, and national security risks of a given activity and be able to choose the appropriate option.

*Question.* Do you believe the Department should use allied or NATO country launch services? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* In accordance with U.S. law and policy, DOD uses U.S. commercial launch services for its space lift requirements. While there are no current requirements for using non-U.S. space launch capabilities, if confirmed, I would encourage

the Department to explore opportunities for space cooperation and collaboration with NATO allies and partner nations as appropriate.

#### CONSOLIDATION OF DOD SPACE ACTIVITIES

*Question.* Congress created the U.S. Space Force, in part to address the extant ad hoc integration of space activities across the DOD, and between DOD and the Intelligence Community, that often led to unhealthy one-upmanship and in some cases the over-classification of essential information.

Do you believe consolidating and integrating space activities is important to the space mission of the DOD? If so, please provide some specific examples of space activities as to which you perceive consolidation and integration of activities would be particularly beneficial.

*Answer.* Yes, in many cases. For example, in satellite communications I understand the Space Force is assuming responsibility for acquisition programs that used to be managed by the Navy. Likewise, the Space Force is taking over responsibility for managing satellite communications payloads on behalf of the Joint Force. Space Domain Awareness is another area where consolidation can be beneficial. Assigning the Commander of Space Command responsibility for global sensor integration is a good example of how we can leverage capabilities across the Joint Force to benefit multiple missions for the Joint Force. If confirmed, I would support consolidation efforts that strengthen unity of effort across DOD space missions.

*Question.* Do you believe there are activities in which consolidation would be counterproductive? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Yes. For example, there are space missions and activities that are closely associated with the missions of the other Military Services. We see this in the Navy's fleet defense mission, which includes defense against threats from all domains. Some of that capability, the Navy must provide itself, some of it will come from other elements of the Joint Force. Likewise, the Army and Air Force must remain aware of and prepared to defend themselves against threats emanating from space. Space Force and Space Command both have important roles, along with the other Military Services and Combatant Commands, in helping define the Joint Force's approach to align roles, missions, and capabilities in these areas. If confirmed, I would work to ensure these consolidation decisions account for Joint Force and Military Service-specific considerations.

#### DUAL USE EXPORT CONTROLS AS APPLIED TO SPACE

*Question.* The Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA returned licensing for many space systems from the Department of State, where they were licensed under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, to the Department of Commerce where they were regulated under the dual use licensing system. DOD plays an active role in the licensing of dual use space items through the interagency process. With the expanding commercial use of space, this licensing process should enhance innovation and the growth of the commercial space sector while preventing adverse effects on national security.

What are your views on the licensing process for dual use export controls on space-related items as they apply to ensuring the United States maintains an innovative and competitive space industrial base?

*Answer.* The transition of many space systems and capabilities to the Commerce Control List has contributed to the competitiveness of U.S. industry in ways that also benefit national security, and without making available to potential adversaries' capabilities they could not otherwise acquire or produce themselves. DOD plays a key role in the interagency licensing process that accounts for both aspects of the national security interest: ensuring our industry remains competitive and preventing critical capabilities from reaching our adversaries. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with my interagency counterparts and Congress to ensure the licensing process regarding space systems and capabilities maintains appropriate balance across key economic and national security interests.

#### SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE

*Question.* Space is increasingly becoming a congested domain of operations, especially with proliferated commercial architectures in low earth orbit. DOD manages not only the largest array of space domain sensors on earth and in space but also tracks objects in space in order to avoid collisions.

In your view is the management of space traffic and domain awareness an appropriate role for the DOD? If so, please explain your answer. If not, to which other executive branch department or agency would you recommend these functions be transferred?

Answer. To my knowledge, due to its unique role as operator of the world's most extensive and comprehensive source of space domain awareness information, DOD has also provided space situational awareness services to all space operators in the interest of spaceflight safety for well over a decade. However, in my view, the primary mission of the Department should be to operate national security space assets and provide space support to the Joint Force. While the DOD must maintain space domain awareness to carry out its military missions, the space traffic management, or space traffic coordination function would be better served if moved to a civil agency, such as the Department of Commerce. This shift would allow the DOD to properly refocus resources on defending the nation. I am aware Commerce is already working toward a prototype space domain awareness system in partnership with DOD and industry. If confirmed, I would support such a transition of the space traffic management mission.

To avoid conjunctions, the Department maintains numerous sharing agreements with other countries on space domain awareness. Russia and China have had tests and collisions in space that have generated debris affecting other countries' space operations. Yet, according to testimony in a May 26, 2021 Strategic Force Subcommittee hearing, Russia and China have not been responsive to outreach efforts when a possible conjunction with one of their space systems has been identified.

*Question.* If confirmed, what efforts would you propose to ensure both countries acknowledge a conjunction message sent by the Department?

Answer. As noted in the United States Space Priorities Framework, the United States will continue to share space situational awareness (SSA) information and provide basic spaceflight safety services to all space operators. The Framework also indicates that the United States will engage diplomatically with strategic competitors to enhance stability in outer space. Sharing SSA information is a key element of building shared understanding and protecting the space environment, which supports space stability. If confirmed, I would continue to pursue opportunities with my State Department counterparts to improve the exchange of appropriate spaceflight safety information with the PRC and Russia to reduce the risk of space object conjunctions, consistent with the U.S. approach with over a hundred other countries, companies, and international organizations.

#### INTEGRATION OF SPACE WITH CYBER SPACE AND NUCLEAR ESCALATION

*Question.* Space is an integral element of our nuclear deterrent and national missile defense capability through its early warning and communications satellites. Space and cyber space are considered enabling elements of the United States' overall strategic posture and are complimentary domains of operations where early phases of escalation dynamics can occur relative to nuclear deterrence. A thorough understanding of nuclear deterrence and its modernization, cyber operations, and missile defense are considered essential to performing the duties of the ASD(SP).

What are your views on the relationship between space, cyber space, and nuclear escalation in the context of our Nation's strategic posture?

Answer. The emergence of space and cyber as areas of strategic competition has the potential to create new pathways for conflict escalation that are uncertain and unpredictable given that there are not well established norms informing the use of these capabilities. U.S. asymmetric dependence on space and cyberspace as enabling elements of conventional warfighting and strategic deterrence could encourage adversaries to consider attacking these architectures, creating escalation risks. This underscores the importance that our adversaries understand our views on and approach to both domains. My understanding is that the Department's emerging integrated deterrence strategy will support this kind of approach, and ASD(SP) is uniquely postured to support these efforts.

*Question.* How does modernization of U.S. nuclear capabilities relate to the functions of the ASD(SP), in your view?

Answer. ASD(SP) will be responsible for nuclear deterrence policy and will represent USD(P) in policy formulation and execution related to the nuclear modernization program. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority mission and, if confirmed, I look forward to supporting this priority.

#### NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND MODERNIZATION

*Question.* Former Secretary Carter has called our nuclear deterrent the "bedrock" of every national security mission we undertake.

Do you agree with the assessment of the past four Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes, I agree that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission, and that we must continue to modernize our nuclear triad to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed long-held American doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear weapons to "extreme circumstances" and the need to maintain the nation's nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities. The NPR also recommended the development of a low-yield nuclear weapon to deter threats from Russia, and potentially, the return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the Navy fleet.

*Question.* Do you agree with the 2018 NPR that nuclear weapons should only be used under extreme circumstances to protect vital interests? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Our nuclear forces play a unique role safeguarding our national security, and ensuring the United States maintains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is of vital importance for U.S. national security. We must carefully evaluate the circumstances in which we would consider employing nuclear weapons, and how we publicly describe those circumstances.

In November 2020, NATO's Secretary General stated that, "Simply giving up our deterrent without any guarantees that others will do the same is a dangerous option because a world where Russia, China, North Korea and others have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world."

*Question.* Do you agree that the world is a safer place due to the existence of an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent and the extended deterrence assurances we provide to our allies? Please explain your answer.

Answer. A safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is vital to our national security, and the security of our allies and partners.

Over the past eight years, China, Russia, and North Korea all have expanded and modernized their nuclear arsenals, and all are continuing to do so.

*Question.* Given these actions and the increasing nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, do you believe it prudent to significantly alter U.S. use and deterrence policies that have worked to deter nuclear aggression for more than 70 years?

Answer. Any changes to nuclear policy that the President may consider should be carefully deliberated and communicated to U.S. allies and partners, and should take into account their impact on U.S. national security, the security of our allies and partners, and the impact on our potential adversaries.

Consistent with past practices, I understand the Department is conducting a deliberate strategy review in the context of the new National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Nuclear Posture Review conclusions and recommendations.

*Question.* If confirmed, how, if at all, would you propose such policies be altered? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to fully understand the security environment, including current and projected adversary capabilities and security interests and concerns of U.S. allies and partners, before considering any recommendations to alter nuclear policies.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the state of Russia's and China's nuclear forces?

Answer. Russia is undertaking a large-scale nuclear modernization program that covers both its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Compared to the United States, Russia has a large variety of nuclear delivery systems, which it continues to expand through pursuit of novel capabilities including nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles, among others. China has taken steps to develop a nuclear triad and modernize its nuclear arsenal through expansion of its ICBM silo fields, development of hypersonic glide vehicles, and development of an SSBN fleet.

*Question.* Do you believe that Russia's and China's ongoing nuclear modernization and expansion efforts pose an increasing threat to the United States and its Allies? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization and expansion continue to demonstrate the intent of both countries to threaten the interests of the United States and our allies and partners. Each has also pursued new nuclear delivery capabilities that undermine global stability. Taken together, these developments have increased complexity in the security environment and pose a significant challenge to U.S., allied, and partner security interests.

The Commander of United States Strategic Command has referred to reports of China's nuclear force expansion as "breathtaking" and contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear peer to the United States and Russia is a "strategic breakout," which represents an unprecedented threat to global stability.

*Question.* What are your views of this assessment?

*Answer.* Based on media reporting and unclassified commercial imagery, it is clear that China is taking unprecedented steps to modernize its nuclear forces and develop new delivery capabilities. I am not familiar with all of the details of Admiral Richard's assessment, but if confirmed, I look forward to working with Department leadership to ensure our nuclear deterrence posture is sufficient to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and strong and credible extended deterrence to our allies and partners.

*Question.* Given that China is developing a triad, expanding its ICBM missile fields and recently tested an orbital vehicle that is capable of delivering a nuclear payload, what is your assessment of its minimal deterrence policy and no first use declaratory policy?

*Answer.* These capabilities are not consistent with China's historic posture or its public messaging regarding this posture. Furthermore, China's development of novel delivery systems undermines global stability.

U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the United States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the state of U.S. nuclear forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?

*Answer.* As Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have testified, nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission for the Department. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent means sustaining and modernizing delivery systems, maintaining a modern nuclear weapons production complex within the National Nuclear Security Administration, and a robust NC3 architecture. All of these elements have served their purpose well for the past seven decades. Nevertheless, we are at a tipping point wherein each needs to be modernized, with very little room for delay. If confirmed, I will commit my support to the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces.

*Question.* In your view, is the sustainment and timely modernization of the three legs of the nuclear triad, including the air-launched cruise missile, essential for maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent?

*Answer.* Yes. As Secretary Austin has stated, our nuclear deterrent is the Department's number one priority. While it remains effective today it depends on aging weapons, aging delivery systems, aging infrastructure, and an aging nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Sustaining and modernizing our deterrent is essential to ensuring it remains effective in the future.

*Question.* Do you agree with Secretary Austin that modernizing the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Yes. A modern, robust, and agile nuclear weapons complex, developed in a cost-effective and judicious manner, is key to meeting current nuclear modernization needs and also for being responsive to future posture needs. We must invest in the DOE nuclear weapons complex today to be able to achieve these goals.

*Question.* Admiral Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, recently reaffirmed the longstanding assessment of the Department of Defense that extending the service life of the Minuteman III system is no longer a cost-effective option for preserving the nation's intercontinental ballistic missile force.

Do you agree with the Commander's assessment?

*Answer.* I understand that perpetually extending the life of legacy systems is a challenge. While I am not familiar with the details of Admiral Richard's assessment, if confirmed, I would look forward to consulting with USSTRATCOM and the Air Force to understand the implications of further life extending Minuteman III.

*Question.* Do you support the continued development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I understand the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent is being considered in the Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding the full scope of the GBSD program and will promote modernization of the nuclear triad in the most cost-effective and judicious manner.

*Question.* The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)—a system that is 20 years past its retirement, under increasing threat from adversary air defenses, and considered essential to maintaining the air leg of the triad.

Do you support the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a replacement for the aging ALCM?

*Answer.* I am committed to a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the ALCM is an essential element of the air leg of the triad. If confirmed, I look forward to thoroughly understanding and reviewing the LRSSO weapon and will promote modernization of the nuclear triad in the most cost effective and judicious manner.

*Question.* Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and the parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* The United States-UK Mutual Defense Agreement reflects a vital, invaluable partnership that has bolstered U.S. national security for over six decades and deepened the assurances we provide to our NATO allies. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding the details of the W93/Mark 7 program, the role it plays in our efforts to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and to carrying the program out in a responsible and cost-effective manner.

*Question.* Do you believe that DOD or the Department of Energy should de-scope or delay any of the ongoing programs to replace our aging nuclear forces or efforts to rehabilitate or reestablish key nuclear weapons sustainment and production capabilities?

*Answer.* The United States has reached the point where both our nuclear forces and our infrastructure must be modernized to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the recommendations and conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review to better understand the status of these programs and their way forward. With that said, I share Secretary Austin's view that we have now reached a tipping point at which we must simultaneously overhaul our nuclear forces.

*Question.* During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions.

Do you agree with this statement? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Yes. While I believe the United States should continue to lead global arms control efforts, any arms control agreement must reciprocally reduce nuclear threats from other nuclear-armed powers.

*Question.* In your opinion, should the United States pursue arms control and strategic stability talks with China while China is undertaking this expansion of its nuclear arsenal?

*Answer.* Yes. Even as China expands its nuclear forces, the United States should engage with China to address longstanding concerns over its nuclear posture, including China's lack of transparency regarding its strategy and doctrine. The United States should also pursue dialogue with China to preserve strategic stability and minimize risk.

*Question.* In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?

*Answer.* The linkage between nuclear modernization and arms control is a complex topic that I understand is being examined in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). If confirmed, I will seek to understand the range of the NPR's considerations on this issue.

*Question.* Do you believe that the United States should consider accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or China on nuclear weapons' reductions? Please explain your answers.

*Answer.* Any arms control approach must leave the United States and its allies and partners more rather than less secure. That said, I believe such considerations are highly context-specific and dependent on the capabilities in question.

*Question.* If confirmed, do you believe there should be any significant change in U.S. declaratory policy, including adopting a "No First Use" policy? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Any decision on declaratory policy should be made by the President, in consultation with allies and the U.S. military, and should be based on a deliberate, rigorous assessment of the security environment and the need to maintain credible and effective deterrence. At this time, I do not personally think a categorical "no first use" policy would be advisable for the United States given the current security environment.

*Question.* In your view, what would be the impact of a "sole purpose" use doctrine with respect to our nuclear deterrence and especially with respect to our extended deterrent?

Answer. Any decision on declaratory policy should be made by the President, in consultation with allies and the U.S. military, and should be based on a deliberate, rigorous assessment of the security environment and the need to maintain credible and effective deterrence.

*Question.* Do you believe a change in declaratory policy could destabilize the nuclear assurance doctrine of NATO with respect to its nuclear and non-nuclear states?

Answer. I believe any change to declaratory policy—which would be made by the President in consultation with allies and the U.S. military, and should be based on a deliberate, rigorous assessment of the security environment the need to maintain credible and effective deterrence—would require extensive consultation with U.S. allies, both in the run-up and following the decision, to preserve the assurances that form the bedrock of the NATO alliance and our Indo-Pacific alliances.

*Question.* Do you believe our NATO allies would be concerned about a change in our declaratory policy?

Answer. Based on a review of public reporting, I understand that allies have expressed concerns regarding any such change.

*Question.* Do you believe our Asian allies would be concerned about a change in our declaratory policy?

Answer. Based on a review of public reporting, I understand that allies have expressed concerns regarding any such change.

#### MISSILE DEFENSE

*Question.* The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against United States forces, allies, and the U.S. Homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) articulated existing U.S. policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

In your view, do you believe missile defense policy should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?

Answer. I support longstanding U.S. policy to rely on strategic deterrence to safeguard the United States against large-scale nuclear missile threats from Russia and China, and to pursue homeland ballistic missile defenses against nations like North Korea or Iran.

*Question.* If so, what role do you believe integrated air and missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger threats, such as Russia and China?

Answer. These types of threats from Russia and China present challenging problems. I agree that missile defenses cannot protect every asset against every threat, and that this mission is only one piece of an integrated deterrence and defense approach to protecting against the growing number of advanced missile threats, both nuclear and non-nuclear. I understand the Department is examining ways to enhance its architecture against these threats, and if confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture.

*Question.* The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and space-based “system of systems,” with the constituent pieces managed and sustained by multiple DOD components.

Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture capable of supporting real-time operational decisions? If so, please explain your answer. If not, please explain what steps you would take, if confirmed, to improve global sensor integration.

Answer. An effective missile defense architecture requires persistent and integrated battlespace awareness. Multi-domain sensors support missile defense and other missions, providing real-time detection, warning, tracking, and targeting information that is critical to decision-makers and commanders during a crisis. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure prioritization of the integration of new and existing sensor capabilities to provide the improved all domain awareness and informed decision making necessary for missile defense.

*Question.* The cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program with the replacement of the Next Generation Interceptor program has resulted in a likely delay of at least 10 years before the deployment of modernized ground-based interceptors for homeland ballistic missile defense.

Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program and the fielding of additional interceptors from this program, presuming the program achieves its acquisition objectives?

*Answer.* I support the Department's March 2021 decision to commit to the development of 20 additional Next Generation Interceptors by the end of the decade. Defense of the Homeland is a top DOD priority, and the Next Generation Interceptor is a key element of a more reliable and effective homeland missile defense architecture. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Next Generation Interceptor acquisition plan adequately addresses the threat, meets warfighter requirements, and aligns with the Administration's policies.

*Question.* A Navy Aegis Destroyer was able to successfully intercept an ICBM-class target, raising the possibility of using a system of Homeland Defense layered between the Ground Based Interceptor at mid-flight and the Aegis system for intercepts in the final phases of the ICBM's trajectory.

In your view, would this layered approach require a change in policy with respect to the types of interceptors used, the defended area, and the specific threats each is deployed against?

*Answer.* Any decision to bolster homeland missile defense with new or existing capabilities requires weighing a variety of factors, to include cost and feasibility. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department uses the congressionally-directed layered homeland defense analysis to help determine the proper mix of capabilities to defend the Homeland against limited ICBM threats, such as the threat posed by North Korea.

*Question.* Missile and rocket attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East have highlighted the shortage of Theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TIAMD) assets available to protect deployed U.S. forces. This same shortage is most acute in United States European Command and INDOPACOM, where the missile threats are much more sophisticated. Air defense units remain the highest-demand, lowest-density forces in the Army.

In your view, should DOD expand its theater missile defense capabilities (including improvements to existing systems or the development of new systems), capacity (increased procurement of existing systems), or both? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Each Area of Responsibility (AOR) is unique, posing different issues and challenges. In general, the need for integrated air and missile defense capabilities is growing in most theaters as potential adversaries continue to develop and expand their missile capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department leaders, including the Joint Staff and the relevant Combatant Commands, to help determine the most appropriate mixture of missile defense capabilities and other posture requirements to maintain theater readiness and ensure a strong deterrent.

*Question.* Do you believe the United States should encourage regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements?

*Answer.* Yes. We face a dangerous era of sophisticated missile threats, including advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries are pursuing anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategies that leverage missile forces intended to inhibit and disrupt U.S. and allied military freedom of maneuver. Allies and partners have the lead role in their own sovereign defense, backstopped by mutual security treaty obligations and other relationships with the United States. If confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and key partners to increase their own Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities.

#### POLICY TO COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

*Question.* The office for which you have been nominated will exercise primary strategy, policy and oversight responsibility for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

What do you believe are the principal challenges for this mission relating to CWMD, and if confirmed, what would be your priorities for reviewing and updating DOD's strategy and policy in this domain?

*Answer.* Secretary Austin has identified China as the current pacing challenge for the Department. The current or potential WMD threats emanating from Russia, North Korea, and Iran also pose a risk to our national security. Our primary objectives must be to make sure that the United States and our allies and partners are postured and prepared to respond to WMD use and deter adversaries from acting against vital U.S. interests, including by defending our allies from military aggression. To achieve these objectives, one of my top priorities if confirmed will be to update the Department's 2014 CWMD strategy.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you integrate the Intelligence Community into the CWMD mission?

Answer. I recognize and appreciate the critical role of the Intelligence Community in the CWMD mission and its efforts to share intelligence within the DOD, other Departments and Agencies, and with partners and allies in support of CWMD efforts. If I am confirmed, I will work with my counterpart in OUSD(I&S) to sustain and enhance IC integration into the CWMD mission.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the role of your office in regard to technology security matters related to multilateral arms control, export control, and nonproliferation, and with which other DOD components would you integrate your efforts in this regard, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will oversee the development and implementation of CWMD strategy and policy guidance for the Department, to include guidance pertaining to multilateral arms control, and nonproliferation. In this role, I would work closely with the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), the OSD lead for the four multilateral export control regimes and for technology security issues associated with military and dual-use exports, as well as other DOD components, Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) and for Research and Engineering (R&E), the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments. All of these DOD components have important responsibilities related to technology security, to include capability development, investment review, and monitoring and oversight of DOD's weapons programs and arms control compliance. These efforts are also whole-of-government, as such, I would sustain close collaboration with the Department of State, the overall Federal lead for multilateral arms control, export control, and nonproliferation, as well as the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, which all have roles in export control issues.

*Question.* The August 2016 revision of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) transferred the mission for synchronizing global DOD operations for countering WMD from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

What is your understanding of SOCOM's responsibilities for synchronizing global DOD operations for countering WMD?

Answer. As I understand it, USSOCOM's mission serves as the global synchronizer, coordinator, and advocate for the combatant commanders' countering WMD activities and capabilities.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the oversight responsibilities of the office for which you have been nominated with regard to this mission change and how should those responsibilities integrate with those of the ASD(SOLIC), in your view?

Answer. I understand that ASD(Space Policy) will have oversight over the CWMD strategy and policy. As part of this portfolio, the ASD(Space Policy) works in close collaboration with ASD(SOLIC) on the range of countering WMD terrorism issues. ASD(Space Policy) will have the lead for policy and strategy development and international engagement on issues related to countering WMD terrorism, while ASD(SOLIC) has the primary responsibility for matters related to special operations forces' assigned to USSOCOM and its subordinate commands. In the event we need to plan and execute a CWMD terrorism response mission, ASD(SOLIC) will have the policy lead for mission planning and execution, and ASD(Space Policy) will support.

*Question.* Against which threats and in which regions of the world do you perceive the U.S. should focus its CWMD efforts?

Answer. Based on public information, it is clear that China, Russia, and North Korea are all continuing efforts to modernize and expand their WMD and/or delivery system capabilities, with direct impacts for strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. If confirmed, I will review the full range of DOD and intelligence assessments regarding adversary WMD capabilities; we must focus our CWMD efforts on those threats that pose the greatest risk to the United States, our forward deployed forces, and our allies and partners. DOD must also continue to support whole-of-government efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and to address Iran's destabilizing activities in the region, such as its missile program. Finally, DOD must continue to contribute towards global initiatives to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD-related materials or capabilities.

#### COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

*Question.* If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing and overseeing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?

Answer. If confirmed, per the DOD CTR Programs' relevant governance directives, I would issue policy guidance for the DOD CTR Program and closely coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) to oversee the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's execution

of the program. I would also engage with U.S. interagency and international counterparts on nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat reduction strategies, activities, and opportunities in order to respond to the evolving WMD landscape.

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTR Program, including changes in legislative authorities, programs, and funding?

*Answer.* For 30 years the DOD CTR Program's flexible authorities, programs, funding and forward-leaning strategic guidance have allowed it to respond to emerging WMD threats, and unexpected crises. I understand that the OUSD Policy, in partnership with A&S and DTRA, is reviewing the global WMD threat environment and assessing desired WMD threat reduction outcomes over the next decade. If confirmed, I look forward to receiving the results of this review, which will inform my recommendations on potential changes to the DOD CTR Program's statutory authorities, programs, and funding.

*Question.* What is your vision for the evolution of the CTR program as it transitions away from Russia to countries outside the former Soviet Union?

*Answer.* The DOD CTR Program ended its work in Russia in 2014; it now reduces WMD threats in over 30 countries globally, including in several former Soviet states. Russia's sophisticated and growing WMD program, highlighted by its increasingly brazen use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, continues to threaten neighbors in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. DOD CTR's engagements have helped many regional partners to develop core non-proliferation capabilities and understanding, and I expect DOD CTR to continue to work with key partners to mature those capabilities. The DOD CTR Program has also expanded into the Indo-Pacific region, largely to counter biological threats and the proliferation of WMD-applicable goods transiting through the region to countries like Iran, Syria, and the DPRK. In the future, I expect the DOD CTR Program to continue operating in that region.

*Question.* In your view, what should be the relationship between the CTR Program and DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program, with regard to a focus on reducing biological threats?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD/(NCB)), who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S). My understanding of the relationship between the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and CBDP is that CBDP focuses on developing the tools and other capabilities needed to counter chemical and biological threats, and the DOD CTR Program works to provide some of those tools to partner nations in order to support their ability to prevent, detect, and report biological threats. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD(NCB) to continue coordinating those two efforts' biosecurity and biodefense activities, achieving program efficiencies and improving the Department's overall biological threat response capabilities.

*Question.* For years, the CTR program has been working with host nations and their scientists to safely and securely operate high containment facilities handling dangerous pathogens.

What are your views on the progress being made by this effort?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program's partners have benefited from the assistance the DOD CTR Program has provided them over the years to help consolidate and reduce collections of pathogens, improve laboratory operations, and adopt internationally-recognized biosafety and biosecurity practices.

*Question.* How could the CTR program's work in this regard be integrated into a whole-of-government approach to a national biodefense strategy?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense plays a critical role in implementing the National Biodefense Strategy, and the DOD CTR Program is one resource out of many that the Department leverages in its biodefense efforts. My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program routinely coordinates and deconflicts with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to avoid duplication and leverage potential synergies. If confirmed, I would encourage the DOD CTR Program to continue such coordination.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you integrate your efforts vis-à-vis the CTR program with the work of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the DOD CTR Program is managed by three DOD entities, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Nuclear and CWMD (N/CWMD) Policy office, which issues and oversees strategic policy guidance; the DASD for Threat Reduction and Arms Control office in ASD(NCB), which provides programmatic oversight; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,

which executes activities. Only the N/CWMD Policy office would fall under my responsibility, if I am confirmed. If confirmed, I would continue to encourage the three DOD entities to coordinate and cooperate in overseeing and implementing the DOD CTR Program.

#### CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

*Question.* The office of the ASD(SP) is responsible for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program of the Defense Department.

What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and biological defense, and if confirmed, what would be your priorities for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program?

*Answer.* The ASD for Space Policy will coordinate with the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) but is not responsible for, nor does it have oversight of, the CBDP. That responsibility is vested within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment—specifically, the ASD for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD/NCB), the Hon. Deborah Rosenblum. If confirmed, I look forward to working with ASD Rosenblum as she leads the DOD's research, development, and acquisition of capabilities to protect the warfighter in defending against current and emerging chemical and biological threats.

*Question.* In your view, how could the Chemical and Biological Defense Program be better coordinated and integrated with efforts of the CTR program focused on reducing biological threats?

*Answer.* The Defense Threat Reduction Agency executes program development responsibilities of DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program as guided by the OUSD(Policy) to support threat reduction efforts in partnership with likeminded allies and partners. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program was created to develop capabilities for the warfighter to fight and win in a chemical or biological contest environment. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD(NCB) to ensure these programs are coordinated and integrated.

During the first year of the COVID pandemic, the Joint Program Office (JPO) for Chemical and Biological Defense obligated more than \$24 billion in interagency funding to develop, procure, and distribute COVID vaccines and therapeutics.

*Question.* From your perspective, how could the JPO's successful processes in this regard be applied in other contexts?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense supported national level efforts to develop, procure, and distribute COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics through the USG-led Operation Warp Speed. If confirmed, my responsibilities as ASD(SP) will include developing strategies and policies to enable the Joint Force to train and operate in a biologically contaminated environment. I understand the Department is conducting a Biodefense Posture Review (BPR) where Policy and A&S are co-leading a DOD-wide effort to examine this very question (among other issues). If confirmed, I look forward to updating the Committee as the Department completes the BPR.

*Question.* Is there a continuing role for the JPO in regard to COVID? If so, what would you envision that role to be?

*Answer.* The ASD for NCB, under the USD for A&S, has oversight of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defense (JPÉO-CBRND), including their role in supporting the Department's support to the COVID response. If confirmed, my responsibilities as ASD for Space Policy would not include oversight of the Department's role in the ongoing COVID response.

#### CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

*Question.* DOD Directive 5160.05E establishes DOD policy that "the Department of Defense shall be in full compliance" with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In 2006, the Department announced that the United States would not meet the extended deadline of April 2012 for destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, as required under the CWC. That deadline was then adjusted to December 31, 2023.

Do you agree that the DOD and the U.S. Government should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC, including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC?

*Answer.* I completely agree that United States should be in full compliance with our obligations under the CWC and BWC. While, if confirmed, I will not have direct oversight of this issue, I look forward to working with my colleagues in OUSD(A&S) who oversee DOD treaty compliance and the destruction of the remaining U.S. stockpile.

*Question.* If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that the United States completes destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security, and as close in time as practicable to the December 31, 2023 deadline?

*Answer.* I understand that, if confirmed, I will not have direct oversight of the program to destroy the remaining U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons. However, I will commit to working closely with OUSD(A&S), which has responsibility for oversight and execution of the program, on any areas where my future responsibilities and theirs overlap or intersect. As I understand it, we are on track to eliminate our remaining chemical weapons stockpile by December 31, 2023.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

*Question.* The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related materials.

If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program be discontinued, sustained, or enhanced? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* The PSI remains an essential tool in the U.S. and global effort to counter the proliferation of WMD. It provides States with a framework for strengthening WMD interdiction capabilities and builds political will for counterproliferation efforts. If I am confirmed, I will advocate to sustain DOD's role in PSI and, in cooperation with the Department of State, advance its momentum throughout the world.

*Question.* Relationship Between Cyber and Information Operations

*Answer.* In the Defense Department, CYBERCOM is focused on technical cyber missions and skills, while different organizations are responsible for information operations, psychological and deception operations, and electronic warfare. In addition, there are concerns that DOD's focus on tactical and operational support to deployed forces has resulted in neglect of strategic-level information operations.

*Question.* What are your views as to whether CYBERCOM should be assigned responsibility for information operations in addition to cyber operations?

*Answer.* All combatant commanders currently have some responsibility and authority related to information operations, including Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I recognize, however, that there is a particularly important need to ensure the effective integration of information operations capabilities in the digital domain. If confirmed, I will support continued efforts to integrate these capabilities across the Department and empower USCYBERCOM to operate most effectively against threats from overseas. I understand that the Office of Cyber Policy will serve as the OSD Policy lead for both cyber and electronic warfare issues.

*Question.* What changes do you think are necessary to improve the DOD's ability to detect and counter information operations, both defensively and offensively?

*Answer.* It is critical that the Department continue to harness the insights gained from its intelligence and information collection to inform whole-of-government efforts to detect and counter foreign information operations, and support the conduct of DOD operations, when appropriate. If confirmed, I will work with the Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA) and other key DOD stakeholders to identify and remedy any policy, organizational, authority, capabilities, or other gaps or challenges that can improve the Department's ability to detect and counter foreign information operations.

*Question.* What are your views on the recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence?

*Answer.* I generally agree with the Task Force on the need to develop appropriate guidance for the development of a broad range of offensive cyber options, but I recognize the significant complexity in terms of the relationship between offensive cyber capabilities and strategic deterrence. If confirmed, I will support the implementation of the Secretary's vision of integrated deterrence and work to appropriately incorporate current and new cyber capabilities with space and other capabilities to provide, as Secretary Austin has stated, "the right mix of technology, operational concepts and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause."

*Question.* In your view, how effective has the extant "whole-of-government" approach been in combatting hostile information operations directed against the United States, its allies, and interests?

*Answer.* Following the Russian Government's efforts to influence and interfere in the 2016 United States election, the U.S. Government recognized the increasingly critical need to combat hostile foreign information operations directed against the United States and its interests. I look forward to supporting the Department of Defense's important role in these whole-of-government efforts to secure and defend

U.S. elections, which I understand have matured considerably in the recent years. I will also support the Department's role in broader efforts to combat foreign information operations as appropriate, with a recognition of the key role of U.S. domestic agencies in many of these efforts.

#### DUAL HATTING OF COMMANDER, CYBERCOM

*Question.* In your view, should the arrangement whereby the Commander, CYBERCOM is "dual-hatted" as the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) be maintained, modified, or ended? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement without jointly certifying to Congress that the specific conditions established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2017 and 2020 have been met. If confirmed, I will work closely with USCYBERCOM, the Joint Staff, and other key stakeholders to ensure that any recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the "dual-hat" arrangement is guided by the nature of the domain and the national security and the operational effectiveness of the Department of Defense, and comports with statutory requirements. I understand the Department's superiority in the cyber domain depends on maintaining speed, agility, and a unified effort across the spectrum of cyber activities, and I am committed to ensuring that any decision regarding the "dual-hat" arrangement protects our national security interests and furthers the Department's success in cyberspace.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF CYBER CAPABILITIES

*Question.* CYBERCOM has depended heavily to date on NSA for technology, equipment, capabilities, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

In your view, is DOD properly organized and resourced to provide a broad base of innovation and capability development in the cyber domain? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the Department is undertaking substantial efforts to ensure that it is well-positioned to develop and acquire innovative offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. These efforts include, for example, the Defense Innovation Unit's outreach with leading commercial cybersecurity firms and United States Cyber Command's commercial outreach, coordination with Intelligence Community partners, and acquisition activities that support innovation and capability development. These efforts will mature as the Department's science, technology, and acquisition enterprises evolve to support United States Cyber Command's operational needs. If confirmed, I will work with the appropriate principal staff assistants and component heads to ensure that the Department leverages opportunities to improve the organization and resourcing of such activities as they emerge.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(SP) and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, particularly with respect to DOD's cyber mission.

*Answer.* My understanding of DOD's cyber mission is that it is a highly federated domain requiring collaboration among many officials representing OSD offices, Defense Agencies, Combatant Commands, Military Departments and other organizations. The ASD for Space Policy is responsible for broad cyber policy and strategy matters while the DOD Chief Information Officer is responsible for maintaining and strengthening important technical capabilities such as cybersecurity; national security systems; and command, control, and communication systems. With regard to the relationship of these two officials, I believe close collaboration on key issues such as the cybersecurity of the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) and the Defense Industrial Base, defending the nation, modernizing cryptographic encryption, and strengthening the Department's electromagnetic spectrum enterprise, are crucial to succeeding in the cyber mission area.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(SP) and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).

*Answer.* I understand the ASD(SP) has responsibilities for representing the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in both interagency and international fora relating to cyberspace, including those pertaining to USCYBERCOM missions and responsibilities. I also understand that ASD(SP) participates in and advises on the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) processes, including as they relate to cyberspace items pursuant to USCYBERCOM's Enhanced Budget Control. Furthermore, the ASD(SP) provides policy oversight for military programs, activities, authorities, and associated cyber-

space operations forces, including those of USCYBERCOM. The Commander, USCYBERCOM reports directly to the Secretary of Defense for operations.

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship between the ASD(SP) and the Principal Cyber Advisors of the Military Departments.

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the ASD(SP), dual-hatted as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, is responsible for ensuring the overall integration of activities that support the Department's cyber operations and overseeing United States Cyber Command. In such a role, the ASD(SP) works with and through the military departments, combatant commands, and combat support agencies to ensure the integration of research and development, acquisition, intelligence, resourcing, and operational activities and the adequacy of forces, capabilities, and support provided to United States Cyber Command. The ASD(SP) therefore works closely with the Principal Cyber Advisors of the Military Departments, ensuring alignment between the Service-specific activities that they superintend and the priorities and requirements of the broader cyber operations community, as established in the Department's cyber strategy.

#### CYBER OPERATIONS

*Question.* The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act affirmed the authority of the Secretary of Defense to conduct military activities and operations in cyberspace. Also in 2018, National Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13), set forth the process for reviewing and approving military cyber operations.

What is your view of the impact of these two developments on cyber operations within the Department of Defense?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that these developments have made a very positive contribution to national security by enabling the Department of Defense to perform effectively its mission to disrupt malicious cyber threats overseas before they reach our networks. I appreciate the progress that the Department has made since 2018, including with the help of Congress to clarify the Secretary of Defense's authority to conduct cyberspace operations.

*Question.* Please describe your views on NSPM-13. Do you have any recommendations for modifications to NSPM-13?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the existing policy framework for approving offensive cyber operations has resulted in well-coordinated, risk-managed, and timely DOD cyber operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure continued transparency and collaboration with interagency partners consistent with the existing coordination process outlined in NSPM-13 or successor guidance. I look forward to supporting any additional steps that would aid the Department's efforts to conduct cyber operations in accordance with our assigned missions at the speed of relevance.

The September 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy charges DOD to "defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war" to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain.

*Question.* What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense brings a number of capabilities and authorities to bear in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) conducts "defend forward" operations to disrupt malicious cyber activity at its source. There are several ways that the Department and its CMF can "defend forward" in cyberspace, including: 1) generating insights about threats outside U.S. networks; 2) improving the defenses of interagency, industry, and international partners by sharing DOD's unique insights on threat actors; and 3) disrupting adversary cyber actors, when necessary. Additionally, another department or agency may request DOD provide defense support of civil authorities should a cyber-incident exceed that department's or agency's capacity and/or capability.

*Question.* In what ways is this role distinct from those of the homeland security and law enforcement communities?

*Answer.* The homeland security and law enforcement communities lead the U.S. Government efforts to respond to malicious cyber activity that is principally criminal in nature, such as ransomware. The Department may play a supporting role in countering such criminal activity, including by sharing information with the homeland security and law enforcement communities.

*Question.* How will the "defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war" concepts deter and disrupt Russia and China in cyberspace?

*Answer.* China and Russia are conducting persistent malicious cyber campaigns to erode United States military advantages, threaten our infrastructure, and undermine our economic prosperity. I believe the Department must effectively counter

these campaigns by taking proactive action to: generate insights about the adversary's cyber operations and capabilities; enable its interagency, industry, and international partners to create better defenses; and acting, when necessary, to disrupt adversary cyber actors and to halt malicious activities.

*Question.* In your view, how well postured is the DOD to meet the goals outlined in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the Department has made substantial progress toward meeting the objectives of the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy, including through growth in cyber resources and manpower and an increase in the maturity and capabilities of U.S. Cyber Command. If confirmed, I look forward to building on those successes by further improving the Department's ability to compete and win in cyberspace and overseeing the upcoming Cyber Posture Review.

*Question.* What actions do you think need to be taken in the DOD to address any gaps with the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with my team and other DOD components to identify any gaps in strategy implementation and to develop a plan of action for closing those gaps.

*Question.* What are your views on Hunt Forward missions and their contribution to the 2018 Cyber Strategy?

*Answer.* I support USCYBERCOM's execution of Hunt Forward Operations (HFOs). It is my understanding that HFOs are an important component of DOD's efforts to implement the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy. HFOs are a prime example of USCYBERCOM "defending forward" by conducting defensive cyber operations on the networks of allies and partners outside of the DOD Information Network (DODIN). I understand HFOs have been an essential element of shaping day-to-day competition and allow U.S. Cyber Mission Forces to hone their defensive skills by conducting real-world defensive cyber operations on unfamiliar networks and through exposure to adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures. As such, HFOs are critical to preparing U.S. forces to better defend the DODIN in future conflict.

#### CYBER POSTURE REVIEW

*Question.* DOD is conducting a mandatory cyber posture review. The Committee believes that the previous posture review was a success largely because the Principal Cyber Adviser and supporting cross functional team tracked implementation tasks and progress, and reported regularly to senior leaders.

What are your plans for conducting the cyber posture review, gap analysis, and oversight of implementation?

*Answer.* I look forward to carrying out, if confirmed, a comprehensive posture review of the Department's cyber enterprise. I would expect a posture review will inform development of the Department's cyber strategy and subsequent implementation efforts by revealing the most critical posture, policy, and process gaps across the Department's cyber enterprise. If confirmed, I will ensure that my team and I work closely with the appropriate principal staff assistants and component heads in the execution of such a posture review and during concerted implementation efforts.

#### CYBER SECURITY

*Question.* The ASD(SP) serves as the Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) to the Secretary of Defense and has primary responsibility for DOD cyber policy.

What qualifications do you possess for performing the duties of the PCA?

*Answer.* As a former principal director and acting DASD at the Pentagon, director of defense policy and strategy on the National Security Council staff, senior engineer at RAND (a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), Chief of Government Relations at the Aerospace Corporation (also a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), and a United States Navy Reserve Captain, I have substantial experience in the development of defense policy and programs. As a Senior Engineer at RAND, I led a team for the Chief Information Officer at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to examine FEMA cyber maturity and develop tools and recommendations to improve that maturity. At Aerospace I have directed and organized technical briefings on cybersecurity threats to satellites. My education, engineering experience, and previous roles in the national security community have introduced me to a number of policy, technology, and programmatic issues relevant to cyberspace operations, including at the intersection of space, nuclear, and cyber forces and operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure effective execution of my responsibilities relevant to cyber operations, policy, and programs. I also have substantial experience in convening and collaborating with partners across the defense community and participating in decision-making processes and reforms for complex defense issues. If confirmed, I expect that this experience will

inform my advice to the Department's senior leadership and enable my partnerships with appropriate combatant commanders, component heads, and principal staff assistants.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the role of the PCA in supporting the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Defense and in overseeing CYBERCOM?

Answer. As I understand it, the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense is responsible for: advising the Department's senior leadership on matters relevant to cyber operations, forces, policies, and programs; driving implementation of the Department's cyber strategy; and overseeing United States Cyber Command in a manner analogous to that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and United States Special Operations Command. The Principal Cyber Advisor is not in the chain of command but serves a critical role in overseeing and aligning United States Cyber Command, its operations, and supporting activities within the Military Services and the Intelligence Community in partnership with the relevant principal staff assistants.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the relationship between the PCA and the Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA), between the cyber mission and the IO mission, and between the DOD components assigned to execute the two missions?

Answer. As I understand it, the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Principal Information Operations Advisor work closely to ensure that forces, programs, processes, and policies germane to different facets of information warfare interoperate effectively. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Principal Information Operations Advisor to mature the Department's ability to execute these missions, especially where information is delivered through cyber means or is used to pronounce the effect of cyber operations.

The cyber and information operations missions have significant overlap and synergies to the extent that cyber operations can be used to deliver information as part of information operations. Information operations can also enable or pronounce the effects of cyber operations.

The components and forces responsible for each of these missions span the combatant commands, the Services, and the Intelligence Community. Depending on the organization in question, these components and forces may be the same; others exhibit split responsibilities and functions across the cyber and information operations missions.

*Question.* What is your view of the appropriate relationship and division of responsibility between the Commander, NORTHCOM and the Commander, CYBERCOM with respect to cyber support to civil authorities?

Answer. I understand that Commander, USNORTHCOM and Commander, USCYBERCOM, have significant roles to play in protecting the Nation from malicious cyber activity. If confirmed, I will work with my Joint Staff colleagues to ensure that the Department approaches homeland cybersecurity and resilience with a command and control structure optimized for the cyber threats we are facing.

*Question.* If confirmed, what would you see as your role vis-à-vis the newly established National Cyber Director?

Answer. I see the Department of Defense supporting the National Cyber Director's efforts to coordinate cybersecurity strategy across the government and partner with our commercial and international partners to increase national cybersecurity and resilience.

*Question.* In your view, what role should the NCD play in the planning, conduct, and oversight of DOD cyber operations?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense is granted sole authority, direction, and control over DOD operations, including cyber operations that are executed in accordance with the authority granted by the President. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the NCD on the development of national cyber strategy, policy, and campaigns, and will work closely with the NCD to integrate DOD cyber operations into whole-of-government cyber planning. However, the establishment of the NCD does not modify the authority or responsibilities of the Secretary for the planning, conduct, and execution of DOD cyber operations.

#### RANSOMWARE

*Question.* The United States has been rocked by a series of significant ransomware attacks affecting critical infrastructure and organizations. Attacks such as these have been facilitated or conducted by large, sophisticated criminal enterprises that are permitted to operate in the countries in which they are principally located. Significant ransomware attacks could cause substantial damage to critical infrastructure in peacetime or in a future crisis or conflict, and therefore pose a

clear national security threat. United States Cyber Command is among the few government organizations with the capabilities to directly diminish this threat and thereby establish a degree of deterrence.

What are your views on the foreign-based ransomware threat from large criminal organizations?

Answer. The United States has been subjected to an increasing number of serious ransomware attacks facilitated by criminal organizations located in countries whose governments have created permissive environments for ransomware actors to operate. President Biden, and Administration officials at various levels, have conveyed that such ransomware attacks are not acceptable.

*Question.* What are your views on the role that the Cyber Mission forces could play in imposing costs on such activities, as one aspect of a larger, whole-of-government response?

Answer. The Department of Defense brings to bear unique authorities and capabilities to support whole-of-government efforts to disrupt ransomware actors and defend against ransomware attacks. I understand that U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency are dedicating people, technology, and expertise to generate insights and options to disrupt ransomware threats at the source, before they reach our networks. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department continues to support whole-of-government efforts to counter ransomware threats, including through robust sharing of information that can enable our law enforcement partners as well as the Department of Homeland Security.

#### CYBER NOTIFICATIONS

*Question.* Cyber notifications from the Department for sensitive cyber military operations, as required by law, are critical for the committee to perform adequate oversight of these operations.

If confirmed, do you commit to providing Congress with timely cyber operations notifications that contain enough information in order for Congress to perform adequate oversight of these operations?

Answer. Yes. I understand that DOD officials have worked with Congress to update the format and depth of information in our notifications for sensitive cyber military operations. If confirmed, I commit to provide Congress with the timely information it requires to perform its role.

*Question.* Are there other steps that you will take, if confirmed, to help Congress perform oversight over these critical operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to identify steps that would help Congress perform its role in a well-informed manner.

#### SEXUAL HARASSMENT

*Question.* In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(SP)?

Answer. If confirmed, and if I was to receive or be made aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination, I would take immediate, serious action by initiating an inquiry to gather all facts, conduct necessary interviews, collect information, and address the complaint within the specified guidelines of Federal statutes and Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I would work with USD(P) to make clear to the workforce that they deserve a respectful workplace, that equality and diversity matter, and that I support the Department’s zero tolerance policy.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their re-

spective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN MILITARIES

1. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Plumb, the U.S. Space Force currently does not have its own dedicated Reserve or Guard component, with those members simply serving in that capacity in the Air National Guard. A January 2020 study conducted by the Air Force recommended to the Secretary of Defense the establishment of “an independent Space National Guard” in order to increase the strength and agility of our currently small force. A Space National Guard would also bring in citizen guardians with private-sector experience. As the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, do you support the establishment of a separate, Space National Guard?

Dr. PLUMB. As a Naval reservist, I deeply appreciate the value that the reserve components bring to the Joint Force. Reserve and National Guard units and personnel provide strategic depth for U.S. space operations today. When establishing the Space Force, Congress and the Executive Branch alike emphasized the need for a lean, agile organizational structure while prioritizing the development of space capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the appropriate organizational structure for the U.S. Space Force Reserve component in order to achieve an agile and forward-looking organization able to compete for the best talent and meet the needs of a 21st century military service.

2. Senator HIRONO. Dr. Plumb, what are your overall recommendations for improving our Space Force’s organization in order to attract and maintain talent to ensure our competitive edge in the space domain?

Dr. PLUMB. My understanding is that the organization of the Space Force, including its approach to human capital management, is primarily a Service responsibility. However, if confirmed, I will be ready to work with General Raymond, the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), in pursuing his goal to develop joint warfighters

in world class teams. The CSO's November 2020 "Chief of Space Operations' Planning Guidance" includes a focus on diversity and inclusion, as well as Information Age recruiting and retention. I agree with the CSO that one way to strengthen our competitive edge is to provide developmental opportunities for space professionals across all U.S. space sectors, including national security, civil, and commercial, in order to guarantee our strength as a nation. If confirmed, I will be ready to work with the CSO if there are policy actions we can take to support his efforts.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

ARCTIC

3. Senator KING. Dr. Plumb, due to the Arctic's geographical location and the lack of dedicated assets to the poles, the operational environment holds several limitations to conducting space operations or enabling terrestrial operations such as satellite communications (SATCOM), imaging, remote sensing, space-based missile warning, etc. What do you believe are the greatest limitations and what can be done to shore up our Arctic space capabilities?

Dr. PLUMB. The Arctic has particular importance for supporting space operations. For example, the missile warning architecture includes radar capabilities that are based in the Arctic that also support space domain awareness. Satellite downlink sites in the Arctic are critical to support polar communications. Also, geospatial intelligence relies on polar orbiting satellites, and is particularly important to understanding military and other activity in the Arctic as well as measuring the impacts of climate change.

The Arctic has also been disadvantaged in terms of the availability of some space services. Our satellite orbits are not necessarily optimized to support the northernmost latitudes, making the region more technologically disconnected than lower latitudes.

Historically, economics has limited the incentives commercial space operators have for providing services to the Arctic, but this may be changing as operators move toward proliferated constellations in multiple orbital planes that can provide global services, including satellite communications and internet services to remote areas. Shoring up our Arctic space capabilities is a function of understanding both how changing conditions in the Arctic will change the applications of and demand for space-based services, as well as how the ongoing changes in space economics may make new opportunities possible. If confirmed, this is an area I would want DOD to focus on as it updates its Arctic security strategy.

SPACE

4. Senator KING. Dr. Plumb, your position was originally created with the Space Force to have a senior civilian performing oversight of a new armed service, what do you think our policy should be with respect to other countries that perform offensive maneuvers against our satellites and space systems?

Dr. PLUMB. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy will play a key role in ensuring civilian oversight of the most sensitive Department of Defense decisions related to space and the Space Force. With respect to responding to countries that perform offensive maneuvers against U.S. satellites and space systems, my understanding is that U.S. policy has been consistent across administrations. The United States Space Priorities Framework, released in December 2021, reaffirms the position that the United States will defend its national security interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace threats. The National Space Policy, issued in December 2020, states that any purposeful interference with or attack upon the space systems of the United States or its allies that directly affects national rights will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing. Actions such as other countries' offensive maneuvers against U.S. satellites and space systems must not be considered in isolation, however, because they may be part of a larger strategic situation. Therefore, any threats to our satellites and space systems would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and the response of the United States to any such situation should be measured and tailored for the situation using the appropriate instruments of national power.

5. Senator KING. Dr. Plumb, multiple Services have a cadre of space operations professionals and space enabled assets. What do you see as the role of each of the individual Services (Space Force, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps) under the space operations umbrella?

Dr. PLUMB. Under the “space operations umbrella,” my understanding is that there are two categories. First, the Space Force is the Military Service that is tasked to organize, train, equip, and present forces capable of preserving America’s freedom of action in space; enabling Joint Force lethality and effectiveness; and providing independent options—in, from, and to space. The Space Force maintains, protects, and expands the U.S. fleet of advanced military satellites that form the backbone of U.S. global military operations. Second, and separately, are the space cadre and capabilities developed to perform domain-specific operations for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. These domain-specific capabilities are more closely tied to the specific roles and missions of the other Military Services and the specialized expertise provided by their space cadres. Ultimately, this approach across all Military Services enhances the lethality and unity of effort of the Joint Force in multi-domain operations.

6. Senator KING. Dr. Plumb, an issue that is frequently brought up but rarely adequately addressed is the over classification of space based and enabled systems and the stovepipes this creates. Can you explain your approach to this problem that will protect our assets while providing military commanders the best resources and a synchronized intelligence picture?

Dr. PLUMB. Security classification regarding space is a challenging issue because of legacy practices, the continuing need to protect many very sensitive capabilities and operations, and the need to integrate space operations more closely with our allies and partners across the Joint Force. A synchronized operations and intelligence picture requires collaboration across multiple organizations, operators, processes, and layers of classification. Increasingly, this also includes commercial operators providing capabilities and services on the open market that once were only available in classified government systems. As space continues to become more integrated into other domains, and space-based services more widely available, my approach, if confirmed, will be to work with our classification and disclosure officials to update, as appropriate, policies and guidance materials and improve our ability to anticipate such changes so that we get ahead of the pace of these changes.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GARY PETERS

##### INTEGRATING COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGIES

7. Senator PETERS. Dr. Plumb, the Space Force, Air Force, and the rest of the DOD and IC [Intelligence Community] communities are increasingly relying on commercial space services, data, and applications. This trend has been beneficial in myriad ways in supporting industry, creating dual-use technologies, and incorporating technologies faster into DOD applications than ever before. What are your plans to foster and improve DOD and IC capabilities and mission success using commercial technologies and practices?

Dr. PLUMB. For many space capabilities, commercial options are increasingly able to meet military and intelligence needs while also satisfying requirements for information and cyber security. If confirmed, I plan to continue advancing policies that allow our forces to leverage the rapid advances occurring in the commercial space industry, which can save costs and deliver capability on shorter timelines as compared with defense development programs.

##### HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN SPACE

8. Senator PETERS. Dr. Plumb, the space environment is becoming increasingly contested and congested. As space assets and activities continue to proliferate, the one constant is the human operator. Given the central importance of the human operator, what is your vision for a research program to maximize human performance and resilience in space operations and environments?

Dr. PLUMB. My understanding is NASA has the responsibility for human space flight, while DOD provides support to NASA missions, such as through search and rescue capabilities. If confirmed I would want to review the support DOD provides for NASA-sponsored human spaceflight activities and see that such activities continue, as appropriate. These activities contribute to U.S. leadership in human performance and resilience in space operations and environments.

##### SMALL LAUNCH

9. Senator PETERS. Dr. Plumb, do you believe the Department is leveraging the space launch ecosystem to the fullest, including innovative small launch?

Dr. PLUMB. My sense is the Department is actively leveraging both the traditional forms of commercial space launch and innovative small launch options in order to sustain competitiveness. I believe it is important that the Department continues to do so.

#### RESPONSIVE SPACE ARCHITECTURE

10. Senator PETERS. Dr. Plumb, what do you believe is needed from a policy perspective to achieve a wider responsive space architecture?

Dr. PLUMB. From a policy perspective, I think reliance on commercial space launch is essential. The policy of requiring at least two families of space launch vehicles capable of lifting national security payloads to space has also proven to be a key to assured access to space. Additionally, a policy of allowing other research and development and demonstration activities to leverage other space launch services appears to be providing incentives for additional private investments in the launch sector, which also benefits the government.

11. Senator PETERS. Dr. Plumb, what are the critical components needed for this effort?

Dr. PLUMB. In addition to continuing to leverage diversified sources of commercial launch, it is also important to sustain a regulatory environment that is conducive to competitiveness in commercial space. In this respect, I think it is important for the United States to establish a framework for civil oversight of space traffic management to help ensure the long-run safety of space flight, especially in low-Earth orbit, and sustainability of the space environment.

#### COMPETITION FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN SPACE

12. Senator PETERS. Dr. Plumb, a recent study commissioned by the Space Force describes how China is seeking to use its space technology development to coerce new allies and partners as a part of their Belt and Road Initiative. The report confirms that, "Space infrastructure, from launch to satellite imagery and telecommunications, is now part of the OBOR [One Belt One Road] Initiative." In parallel, last year General James H. Dickinson, USA, Commander of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) testified to the Senate Armed Services Command that the "bow wave of allies and partners who want come and be part of SPACECOM and part of the space enterprise." These two narratives clearly linked as space is undoubtedly a new arena in which we must compete with China. In fact, our allies are telling us that they want to work with us and NOT China when it comes to space. Do you agree that a robust, diverse, and competitive space launch industry, which provides us the ability to deploy space capabilities, is vital to both our own national security and but also the collective security of our allies and partners?

Dr. PLUMB. Yes.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS

##### CHINA

13. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Plumb, as you mentioned in your advance policy question responses, China is the pacing threat in space, but Russia is also a major concern. In light of recent events, can you speak to Russia's capabilities in space and the threats they pose to our national security posture?

Dr. PLUMB. Russia has significant capabilities in space. I understand that Russia is developing and fielding counterspace capabilities, including electronic warfare, cyber, directed energy weapons, and destructive anti-satellite weapons capable of holding U.S. and allied and partner space capabilities at risk. We saw this in November 2021 when Russia successfully—and irresponsibly—conducted a destructive antisatellite (ASAT) missile test against one of its own satellites, and subsequently made public threats about using such capabilities against NATO satellites. As has been widely reported, Russia also conducted non-destructive space-based ASAT tests in 2017 and 2020, including in an orbit very close to a United States satellite.

More generally, the Director of National Intelligence's 2021 Annual Threat Assessment described Russian strategic intentions and capabilities as presenting an urgent and enduring threat to the ability of the Department to achieve its desired conditions in space. From that assessment and other open-source material, I understand that Russia is integrating space capabilities, including positioning, navigation, and timing; satellite communications; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance into its military forces to enhance its warfighting capabilities. We have seen Russia leverage these capabilities to support its forces in Syria and they are like-

wise leveraging space to support their forces that are posing a growing threat to Ukraine.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCING

14. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Plumb, could you explain your understanding of the current resourcing issues faced by DOD, specific to cyber and space manpower?

Dr. PLUMB. If confirmed, I am committed to assessing current resourcing of the Cyber Mission Force and component personnel who support the defense of the Department of Defense Information Network. If confirmed, I intend to assess any persisting resource shortfalls as part of the Cyber Posture Review and the statutorily required review of cyber and information technology personnel.

As for space, I understand the U.S. Space Force is growing to a rough end-strength of about 16,000 military and civilian personnel in total. I know that the Chief of Space Operations, who has responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping the Space Force, has said he has many more applicants than positions, both for new recruits and for transfers from the other Military Services.

I am also aware that both Space Force and Cyber Command personnel receive training and experience that can make them competitive for subsequent careers in the commercial world. It is important to ensure that, as the Space Force and Cyber Command mature, they can both remain competitive in retaining the top talent they develop.

15. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Plumb, if confirmed, what will you do to recruit and maintain talent in this field to meet the goals of the DOD Cyber Strategy?

Dr. PLUMB. Senior leadership of the Department of Defense has identified the recruitment, cultivation, and retention of talent as critical to U.S. national security. To improve its access to key talent, I understand that the Department has established the Cyber Excepted Service model for specific civilian job positions demanding greater technical skills. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing and refining implementation to ensure that components are appropriately leveraging Cyber Excepted Service to fill those work roles. I also understand that the Department is contemplating refined models for the Military Services' provision of forces to U.S. Cyber Command, which explore new training and career path models, to retain and maintain a properly skilled military cyber work force. If confirmed, I look forward to advancing these initiatives.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

16. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Plumb, do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support full modernization of our nuclear infrastructure?

Dr. PLUMB. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority mission and current efforts to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad and dual-capable aircraft are critical to maintaining effective deterrence in today's evolving security environment.

17. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Plumb, do you agree that modernizing the nuclear triad and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex is a critical national security priority?

Dr. PLUMB. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority mission and a modern, resilient, and agile nuclear weapons complex, developed in a judicious, cost-effective manner, is critical to maintaining effective deterrence in today's evolving security environment. The United States must invest in the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons complex today to be able to achieve this goal.

18. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Plumb, if major weapons programs are funded and infrastructure, recapitalization, and maintenance starved, will this funding imbalance circle back to weapons systems?

Dr. PLUMB. Yes. Our nuclear infrastructure is at the very heart of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and must be modernized and appropriately resourced. If not, we risk undermining the ability to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence.

## CHINA

19. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Plumb, what would be the immediate challenges within your area of responsibility, if confirmed, by China's rapid nuclear development?

Dr. PLUMB. China appears to be engaged in an unprecedented modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities. I understand that these developments are being examined in DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I would examine the results of that review to determine how best to contribute to and help implement its conclusions.

20. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Plumb, can you describe the 5 and 10 year challenges of China's rapid nuclear development within your area of responsibility, if confirmed?

Dr. PLUMB. To my knowledge, China's rapid nuclear development is one of many issues that the Nuclear Posture Review is undertaking. If confirmed, I will study the conclusions of the review to help determine the path forward. One clear challenge is the near-total lack of transparency by China regarding its strategic capabilities, and its demonstrated unwillingness to discuss them. The Administration has rightly reiterated the importance of arms control in helping reduce nuclear risks globally. But, with or without progress on this front, it is critical that the United States maintain nuclear forces that are capable of credibly and effectively deterring nuclear-armed adversaries and that assure U.S. allies and partners in the face of a complex and challenging security environment.

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 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

## DEFENSE STRATEGY

21. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Plumb, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing threat. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. PLUMB. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin's designation of China as the pacing challenge for the Department.

22. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Plumb, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. PLUMB. Yes, I agree that the Indo-Pacific should be the priority theater, particularly as the Department addresses the military challenge posed by China. I also acknowledge that, as an aspiring global power, China also presents challenges in other theaters.

23. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, "The PRC [People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario." Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady, USN concurred for the record with Taiwan's designation as the Department's pacing scenario. In your personal opinion, do you support the designation of a Taiwan contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. PLUMB. Yes. China is the Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency should be the pacing scenario. There are elements of the Joint Force for which the Department may regard Russia and its unique capabilities as the pacing threat.

## U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE

24. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Plumb, in your personal opinion, do you think it is important for the United States to maintain limited nuclear options—for instance, low-yield capabilities—in order to deter rivals from using their own limited nuclear options for coercive or operational effect? Please provide a "yes" or "no" response.

Dr. PLUMB. I understand that DOD's Nuclear Posture Review is ongoing and, if confirmed, I look forward to examining its results on this and other issues. With regard to low-yield capabilities, I understand that the W76-2 is already deployed on U.S. ballistic missile submarines. If confirmed I would work with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command to understand the operational impacts of that de-

ployment and with the Intelligence Community to understand potential adversary perceptions of that deployment.

25. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Plumb, some have suggested cutting or reducing the size of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg of our nuclear triad. They have also suggested eliminating some of the limited nuclear options in or planned for the American arsenal. In your personal opinion, do you think it would be wise for the United States to reduce the size or flexibility of United States nuclear forces at the same time as Russia is modernizing its forces, including limited nuclear options, and China is rapidly building out its own nuclear arsenal? Please provide a “yes” or “no” response.

Dr. PLUMB. I understand that DOD’s Nuclear Posture Review is ongoing and, if confirmed, I look forward to examining its results on this and other issues. I personally agree with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks’ answers during their nomination hearings that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should only be taken within the context of formal, verifiable arms control agreements, and not unilaterally.

[The nomination reference of Dr. John F. Plumb follows:]

#### NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

**PN956**

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
August 4, 2021.

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

John F. Plumb, of New York, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense. (New Position)

\_\_\_\_\_, 2021.  
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Dr. John F. Plumb, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Bio**  
**John F. Plumb**

**Education:**

- University of Notre Dame
  - 1988-1992
  - Bachelor of Science in Physics
- University of Colorado at Boulder
  - 1992-1993
  - Master of Science in Physics
- Prospective Nuclear Engineer Officer school
  - Summer 1997
  - Qualified as Engineer Officer on US Navy nuclear powered submarines
- University of Colorado at Boulder
  - 2000-2003
  - Ph.D. Aerospace Engineering
- Naval War College, College of Distance Education
  - 2003-2005
  - Command and Staff Diploma / Joint Professional Military Education I

**Employment Record:**

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- University of Colorado, Boulder, CO
  - Graduate Teaching Assistant / Research Assistant
  - August 1992 – December 1993
- United States Navy, multiple locations as ordered
  - Submarine Officer
  - December 1993 – June 2000
- University of Colorado, Boulder, CO
  - Graduate Research Assistant / Post-doctoral Researcher
  - August 2000 – August 2004
- ARINC Incorporated, Annapolis, MD
  - Engineer
  - September 2004 – December 2004
- US Senate, office of US Senator Ken Salazar, Washington, DC
  - Congressional Science and Technology Fellow
  - January 2005 – December 2005
  - Personal staff / Military Legislative Assistant
  - January 2006 – March 2009
- Department of Defense, Washington, DC

- Principal Director, Nuclear & Missile Defense Policy
- April 2009- September 2012
- Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy
- September 2012- May 2013
- Director, Defense Policy & Strategy, National Security Council
- May 2013- May 2015
- John Plumb for Congress, Lakewood, NY
  - Congressional Candidate, NY 23
  - June 2015-November 2016
- RAND, Washington, DC and San Francisco, CA
  - Senior Engineer
  - May 2017 – August 2020
- Aerospace Corporation, Lakewood, NY (remote) and Crystal City, VA
  - Principal Director, Chief of Government Relations
  - August 2020 – present
- US Navy Reserves, multiple locations as ordered
  - Submarine Officer (current rank: Captain / O-6)
  - August 2000 – present

**Honors and Awards:**

- Military Awards
  - Legion of Merit
  - Meritorious Service Medal (3 awards)
  - Navy Commendation Medal (2 awards)
  - Army Commendation Medal
  - Navy Achievement Medal (5 awards)
  - Navy Expeditionary Medal
  - National Defense Service Medal
  - Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
  - Global War on Terror Service Medal
  - Armed Forces Reserve Medal
  - Navy Expert Pistol Marksmanship Medal
  - Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation Ribbon
  - Navy Artic Service Ribbon
  - Navy Sea Service Deployment Ribbon
  - Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon
  - Navy Rifle Ribbon with Sharpshooter Device
  - Submarine Warfare Insignia pin (“dolphins”)
- Federal Civilian Awards
  - Office of the Secretary of Defense Exceptional Public Service Award
  - Department of State Superior Honor Award
  - Secretary of Energy Achievement Award

- Academic Awards
  - University of Notre Dame Student Leadership Award
  - I was a Congressional Science and Technology Fellow in 2005; my fellowship was administered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). For my fellowship, I worked in the office of Senator Ken Salazar.
- Other Awards
  - Naval Submarine League Outstanding Achievement Award

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[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. John F. Plumb in connection with his nomination follows:]

117<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, 2020 – 2021  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
ROOM SR-228  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050  
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE  
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of “yes”, “no”, or “not applicable” is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

**NOTE:** Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

**BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC**

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):**
  - John Francis Plumb.
  - My high school nickname was Milt Plumb (used 1984-1988).
2. **Position to which nominated:**
  - Assistant Secretary of Defense Space Policy
3. **Date of nomination:**
  - 05 August 2021
4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-**

**line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):**

- Randolph Central School, high school, 1985-1988, New York State Regents diploma, June 1988.
- University of Notre Dame, university, 1988-1992, Bachelor of Science in Physics, May 1992
- University of Colorado at Boulder, university, 1992-1993, Master of Science in Physics, December 1993
- Naval Nuclear Power Training Pipeline (January 1994- May 1995):
  - Naval Nuclear Power School, military technical school, January-June 1994
  - Nuclear Power Training Unit Ballston Spa, military technical school, July 1994- January 1995
  - Submarine Officer Basic Course, military technical school, February 1995- May 1995
- Prospective Nuclear Engineer Officer School, military technical school, summer 1997 (dates estimated), resulting in qualifying as an Engineer Officer for US Navy Submarines
- University of Colorado at Boulder, university, 2000-2003, Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering, December 2003.
- Naval War College, military college, 2003-2005 via their College of Distance Education, completed Joint Professional Military Education I and was awarded the Command and Staff diploma in January 2005 for doing so.

**5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

**CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT**

- April 2009-September 2012: Principal Director, Nuclear & Missile Defense Policy, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Pentagon.
- September 2012-May 2013: Acting DASD for Space Policy, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Pentagon
- May 2013- May 2015: Director, Defense Policy & Strategy, National Security Council Staff, the White House. (I was detailed from OSD Policy to the National Security Council staff.)
- June 2015-November 2016: Democratic Congressional candidate, New York's 23<sup>rd</sup> congressional district.
- May 2017 – August 2020: Senior Engineer, Rand Corporation (a federally funded research & development center, FFRDC). Location of work: Washington, DC from May 2017-August 2017. San Francisco, CA from September 2017-July 2020.

- August 2020- present: Principal Director, Chief of Government Relations, Aerospace Corporation (also an FFRDC). Office location: Crystal City, Virginia (work has been primarily remote due to COVID).

**MILITARY EMPLOYMENT (US NAVY RESERVES)**

I am an active member of the US Navy Reserves, with the current rank of Captain (O-6). For the past ten years my reserve employment has been:

- Dec 2009 – Nov 2012, Executive Officer, Navy Reserve Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Operations & Plans, N3/N5, the Pentagon. (I was the Operations Officer prior to becoming the Executive Officer.)
  - Dec 2012 – Nov 2014, Commanding Officer, Navy Reserve Undersea Warfare Operations Detachment AA, Naval Operational Support Center Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
  - Dec 2014 – Nov 2016, Commanding Officer, Navy Reserve US Fleet Forces Maritime Operations Center, Newport Detachment, Naval Operational Support Center Newport, Rhode Island.
  - Dec 2016 – Nov 2018, Commanding Officer, Navy Reserve Carrier Strike Group FOUR Force Protection, Norfolk Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia.
  - Dec 2018 – Nov 2019, Training Officer, Navy Reserve Commander Naval Forces Korea Headquarters, Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, California.
  - Dec 2019 – present, Commanding Officer, Navy Reserve Undersea Warfare Operations Pacific Headquarters, Naval Base Point Loma, San Diego, California.
6. **Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**
- I was employed as Senate staff in the office of US Senator Ken Salazar from Jan 2006 through the Senator's departure in early 2009 (I was mobilized for Operation Enduring Freedom in 2007).
  - I worked in the office of Senator Salazar as a Congressional Science & Technology Fellow in 2005.
  - I was an active duty Navy Submarine officer from 1993-2000, and have been an officer in the Navy Reserves since 2000.
7. **Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**
- As a member of Eight Point Properties, LLC I own a 1/3 share of a vacation property. Property is not rented, does not generate income, and has no mortgage.

**8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):**

As a member of Eight Point Properties, LLC I own a 1/3 share of a vacation property. Property is not rented, does not generate income, and has no mortgage.

I do not have now nor have I had responsibilities to any of the following organizations beyond simply being a member.

Current memberships:

- My wife and I are registered parishioners of Holy Trinity Catholic Church in Georgetown.
- We are members of the National Zoo.
- We are members of the Chautauqua Lake Yacht Club on Chautauqua Lake in rural Western New York.

Prior memberships:

- The American Legion.
- Veterans of Foreign Wars.
- I have been a member/patron of the Washington Ballet, the Hirshhorn Museum, and the Phillips Collection.
- I was a member of the DC-based Picnic Theatre Company from 2012-2014.
- My wife and I were registered parishioners of Saint Agnes Catholic Church in San Francisco.
- We were also members of the San Francisco Zoo and the California Academy of Sciences San Francisco Science Museum.

**9. Political affiliations and activities:**

- a. **If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):**
- I was a candidate for the US House of Representatives in New York's 23<sup>rd</sup> Congressional district from 2015-2016 for the November 2016 election.

**b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:**

- In 2016 I ran for the US House of Representatives in New York's 23<sup>rd</sup> Congressional district and was in charge of my own campaign.

**c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:**

Date	Candidate/Committee	Amount
9/30/2016	John Plumb	\$3,144
12/22/2017	Daniel Helmer	\$100
7/20/2019	Ilhan Omar	\$100
9/23/2019	Nick Colvin	\$100
11/22/2019	Evelyn Farkas	\$100
4/21/2020	Evelyn Farkas	\$100
8/13/2020	Joe Biden	\$1,000
8/29/2020	Sara Gideon	\$250
8/29/2020	Jaime Harrison	\$250
8/29/2020	Joe Biden	\$500
9/18/2020	Joe Biden	\$500
9/29/2020	Joe Biden	\$1,000
10/1/2020	Theresa Greenfield	\$500
10/19/2020	Joe Biden	\$500
11/7/2020	Raphael Warnock	\$500
11/8/2020	Raphael Warnock	\$500
11/10/2020	Fair Fight PAC	\$100

**10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):**

- Military decorations include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal (3 awards), Navy Commendation Medal (2 awards), Army Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal (5 awards), Navy Expeditionary Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terror Service Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, Navy Expert Pistol Marksmanship Medal, Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation Ribbon, Navy Arctic Service Ribbon, Navy Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon, and the Navy Rifle Ribbon with

Sharpshooter Device. I earned my submarine warfare insignia pin (my "dolphins") as a junior officer onboard the USS San Juan (SSN-751).

- Civilian service awards include the Office of the Secretary of Defense Exceptional Public Service Award, the Department of State Superior Honor Award, and the Secretary of Energy Achievement Award.
- I was an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Congressional Science and Technology Fellow in 2005. For my fellowship, I worked in the office of Senator Ken Salazar.
- Naval Submarine League Outstanding Achievement Award
- University of Notre Dame Student Leadership Award

**11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):**

I have four publications to my name based on my Global Positioning System (GPS) research for my Ph.D.:

- Larson, Kristine & Plumb, John & Zwally, H. & Abdalati, Waleed. (2001). Analysis of GPS Data Collected on the Greenland Ice Sheet. *Polar Geography* 25(1): 22-40. DOI: 10.1080/10889370109377703.
- Plumb, John & Larson, Kristine & White, Joe & Powers, Edward & Beard, Ronald. (2002). Stability and Error Analysis for Absolutely Calibrated Geodetic GPS Receivers. Proceedings of the 34<sup>th</sup> Annual Precise Time and Time Interval Meeting. Institute of Navigation.
- Plumb, John & Larson, Kristine & White, Joe & Powers, Edward. (2005). Absolute Calibration of a Geodetic Time Transfer System. *IEEE Transactions on Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics and Frequency Control* 52(11): 1904 - 1911. DOI: 10.1109/TUFFC.2005.1561658.
- Plumb, John & Larson, Kristine. (2005). Long-term comparisons between two-way satellite and geodetic time transfer systems. *IEEE Transactions on Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics and Frequency Control* 52(11): 1912 - 1918. DOI: 10.1109/TUFFC.2005.1561659.

I authored several policy papers and op-eds as part of my campaign for congress:

- Day by Day Trump is Making America Less Secure. March 30, 2016. War on the Rocks.
- Growing Our Rural Economies: Protecting the Jobs We Have and Creating New Ones. September 13, 2016. JohnPlumbforCongress.com
- Combating ISIS and Defeating Radical Islamic Extremism. September 13, 2016. JohnPlumbforCongress.com

- Ending the Opioid Epidemic. October 5, 2016.  
JohnPlumbforCongress.com
- Keeping Our Promises to Our Rural Veterans. October 12, 2016.  
JohnPlumbforCongress.com
- Fixing Our Broken Political System. October 18, 2016,  
JohnPlumbforCongress.com
- 220 Years Ago George Washington Warned us About Trump. October 21,  
2016. The Hill.

**12. Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).**

- I have delivered no formal speeches relevant to the ASD Space Policy position. However, I have had two public, recorded appearances that are relevant to the position:
  - 1) On March 3, 2021 I was interviewed by WashingtonExec on the value of the National Space Council.
  - 2) On November 18, 2020 I gave a virtual presentation to the Martz-Kohl Observatory titled "*Space Traffic Management: Preventing Satellite Collisions in Space.*"

**COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.**

- 13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?**
- yes
- 14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?**
- yes


15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?
  - yes
16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?
  - yes
17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?
  - yes
18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
  - yes
19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?
  - yes

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[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

**I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.**

  
\_\_\_\_\_

This 19 day of August, 2021

\_\_\_\_\_

[The nomination of Dr. John F. Plumb was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 1, 2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 1, 2022.]

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