[Senate Hearing 117-994]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-994
THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER
W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 8, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-383 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
�JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
�
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
�
�
� Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
� John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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december 8, 2021
Page
The Nomination of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN for 1
Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 2
Witness Statements
Grady, Admiral Christopher W., USN for Reappointment to the Grade 3
of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 39
Questions for the Record....................................... 80
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 102
Biographical Sketch............................................ 103
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 107
Signature Page................................................. 111
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
Wednesday, December 8, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the
nomination of Admiral Christopher Grady to be Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Thank you, Admiral, for your continued service and
willingness to lead in this important position.
I would also like to welcome your wife Christine. We are
grateful to your family for their sacrifice and continued
support of your service to the nation.
You have served most recently as the Commander of Fleet
Forces Command, which included responsibility for STRATCOM's
sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. That experience, along with
your distinguished career of service across multiple theaters
and command at all levels, will serve you well in this new
role.
I would also note that you were born in Newport, Rhode
Island, and are a native of Middletown, Rhode Island, which
makes this a very pleasant experience.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. As we consider this nomination, we must keep
in mind that the United States is engaged in a strategic
competition with China and Russia. These near-peer rivals do
not accept U.S. global leadership or the international norms
that have helped keep the peace for the better part of a
century. This strategic competition is likely to intensify due
to shifts in the military balance of power and diverging
visions of governance between China and Russia and the West.
This competition is also unfolding amidst a global pandemic,
climate change, and the emergence of highly disruptive
technologies.
Further, the Defense Department must continue to recruit
and retain high-caliber individuals, while restoring readiness
and pursuing new high-end capabilities for the force. The
interconnected nature of these challenges will drive how the
Department and the military services adapt to achieve their
missions.
Admiral Grady, if confirmed as Vice Chairman, you will be
working closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Milley, to address each of these issues, and I hope you
will share your views on them with the Committee.
In addition, as Vice Chairman, you will serve a key role in
the interagency process that often requires working closely
with senior policymakers within the Department and at the
National Security Council on critical national security issues.
In light of the strategic challenges I referenced earlier, the
Committee looks forward to hearing your thoughts on the
effectiveness of the interagency process.
Finally, the Vice Chairman is assigned a number of specific
responsibilities within the Department. First, the Vice
Chairman oversees the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the
JROC, which reviews requirements for acquisition programs to
ensure they are reasonable and necessary. Second, as a senior
member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Vice Chairman plays
a central role in ensuring the U.S. safely maintains its
nuclear weapons stockpile. Lastly, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Vice Chairman often partner to lead the
Department in addressing policy challenges that require the
integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.
I look forward to hearing how you will prioritize and
execute each of these critical functions, if confirmed as the
Vice Chairman.
Thank you, again, for your willingness to serve our Nation,
and I look forward to your testimony.
Now, let me now recognize the ranking member, Senator
Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Grady, thank you for your decades of standing watch
over our security, and for your continued willingness, as well
as your family's willingness, to continue your service in this
direction.
For the past 3 years, this Committee has used the 2018
National Defense Strategy to help guide our oversight and
legislative direction. I always like to comment that this is
something that works. Many things don't work around here, but
this does. It started off with an equal representation of
Democrats and Republicans and has been a great guide for us.
China continues to modernize its military at an alarming
pace. On November 15, Russia tested an anti-satellite missile,
shattering a satellite into 1500 pieces of lethal debris that
made astronauts scramble for safety.
Even more dangerously, Russia is postured to attack Ukraine
in what could be the largest invasion we have seen since World
War II. We have got to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine now
to deter a Russian attack. Every day President Biden waits, he
makes an attack more likely.
Finally, the administration added to the problem with the
botched evacuation of American citizens and allies from
Afghanistan that we still recall, we remember, and we regret.
This disaster shatters U.S. credibility and determines the
trust of partners and allies; the same partners and allies who
are supposed to be our biggest advantage over our adversaries.
While the world gets more dangerous, the administration
foolishly wants to cut defense spending. Thankfully, this
year's NDAA, with its great success, I have to say, last night
in the House, is bringing this back to where it should be.
Admiral Grady you will be critical to helping this nation
maintain an effective nuclear deterrent and accelerate adoption
of advanced technology like the hypersonic weapons, advanced
materials, and artificial intelligence to meet warfighter
requirements.
It is very rare and the American people are now catching on
that we really are not in a position to be the number one in
everything anymore, as it was ever since World War II. So, I
consider ourselves right now, and as I have mentioned to you,
Admiral, to be in the greatest threatened position that we have
been in as a nation. So, you have got your work cut out for
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Admiral Grady, you are recognized for your statement.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Grady. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, good morning to
you all.
It is a great honor to appear before you today as President
Biden's nominee to assume the duties as the twelfth Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I want to thank the
President, Secretary Austin, Chairman Milley, Secretary Del
Toro, CNO Gilday for their trust and confidence. I think it is
important that I also recognize General Hyten and his wife
Laura for their extraordinary service to our nation and to our
servicemembers and to their families.
I would also like to acknowledge the passing of your
colleague, a great American senator, Senator Dole, and really
to acknowledge his military service and support to our nation
as a member of the greatest generation.
Of course, I want to thank all of you for your stalwart
support for our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, our marines,
our coast guardsmen, and our guardians, who defend our nation
at home, and abroad, far forward, around the world every day.
Joining me today is my wife Christine, who has been my
partner and my confidant and my rock since I was at Hansen. She
has been the model of family and service and strength; service
and strength to those families, to the communities we serve,
and, indeed, to the nation. I would say that Christine is also
the singular reason that our three sons, Nick, Luke, and Paul,
who could not join us today, are, indeed, the men that they
are; men, in whom I am very proud, and men who always step up
to their responsibilities as sons, husbands, and citizens.
I firmly believe that family readiness directly contributes
to operational readiness. I have always said that a stronger
family means a stronger fleet, and after 37 years of service, I
can competently say that it is because of our families and
their service and their sacrifice, that we continue to be the
most powerful military the world has ever known.
I truly appreciate this Committee's leadership in this new
era of strategic competition; it is an extraordinarily complex
and dynamic environment, where we are faced with overt
challenges to the international rules-based order and our
national security in every domain, from the seabed, to the
space, to cyberspace, the land domain, the air domain, and all.
In this, we compete alongside our allies and partners every
day in a multiworld; a world that is multiregional,
multilateral, multidomain, multivector, multiphase, multilevel,
and multiauthority. It is the speed of information, the
arsenals of sophisticated, asymmetric, conventional, and
nuclear weapons, and the destructive ability of our competitors
to attack below the threshold of armed conflict, that have
changed the character of that competition. So now, more than
ever, global integration is essential and integrated deterrence
in those multidomains, leveraging all elements of national
power across the whole-of-government and with our allies and
partners, it is absolutely critical.
Here, I would say that there is no such thing as a fair
fight. Our competitors are moving fast and we must move faster.
I have always viewed things through two lenses in my 37 years:
the fleet and the foundry. The fleet is the fight and how we
integrate into the Joint Force and the foundry is what enables
that fight, and I believe that speed and urgency are required
in both. We will get faster, by leveraging our competitive
advantages.
First, our unrivaled industrial base that I believe truly
is borne of our innovative and open society.
Secondly, our many allies and partners, with whom we are
stronger together. Third, our servicemen and women who are
always resolute, ready, and lethal on arrival; they truly are
the center of the universe.
So, if confirmed, I look forward to working with this
Committee and the Congress, the senior leadership in the
Department of Defense, the interagency team, industry, and our
allies and partners to ensure that the center of the universe
never goes into a fair fight.
Once again, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear
before you today and I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral, I have a series of questions that are required for
all senior nominees. Please respond appropriately.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Grady. No, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
this Committee when requested?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the administration?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees, and to consult with the requester regarding the
basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such
records?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional request?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Admiral, you are assuming a tremendously important role, if
confirmed, in our Defense Department. One of the significant
roles is the chair of Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
which will put you in the position of helping us deliver,
rapidly, the most appropriate new weapon systems for the
forces.
As we discussed during the office call, JROC sometimes is
subject to parochialism, that it is a service ratification,
rather than a joint analysis of what is available and what
should be available to all the services.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the
joint view overcomes the parochial view?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
The JROC is one of the key mechanisms and duties that I
will fulfill, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, and I believe
it is, perhaps, one of the most important things that happens
in the Pentagon.
Building on the momentum set by my predecessors, especially
General Selva and General Hyten, I think that the key to the
JROC is that it is threat and risk based, and that we move
beyond validating, as you say, a certain system, but addressing
threat- and risk-based gaps to ensure that the best system is
brought forward and not necessarily the best widget.
If we go from a threat-based perspective to close those
gaps and then we work to go faster, I think we will achieve the
true potential of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Chairman Reed. In that regard, the services have,
obviously, interests that they zealously guard. How will you
sort of litigate or mediate between the services?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Well, I think it is going to be fact based and data based,
and so we will, if confirmed, making sure that the JROC
operates on a disciplined and analytical basis to bring the
data to the table that says that this is the right decision or
not.
But, certainly, important dialogue with the services, via
the vice chiefs, in the JROC process will be important so that
I understand all of those various perspectives. But it has to
be data informed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Acquisition programs sometimes
fail due to requirements that are technically unachievable at
any reasonable course or timeline. Other programs have
requirements that don't appreciate commonly understood advances
in global, commercial technology. Then there is always the
tendency to build a Swiss Army Knife when a simpler blade would
be appropriate.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
requirements for new systems are technically realistic, but
also will push the envelope forward, but are technically
realistic?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
If confirmed, having a broader understanding of the wider
possibilities that the technology database can provide us will
be important. So those relationships with the Defense
Industrial Base would be important, not just at my level, but I
believe through the vice chairman, the vice chiefs of each of
the services and throughout the larger apparatus of the
Pentagon.
The JROC will help with that, as will other mechanisms
within the JROC process that allow us to cast that wide net to
ensure that we have the systems that we need and that we can
get past just sticking with an existing widget.
I think, also, too, you mentioned a great point about
simplicity. We do have a tendency to Christmas-tree things a
little bit too much and so, simplicity can be sublime in many
perspectives. From a technology perspective, we should look for
that.
Chairman Reed. Then a related question is, as the system is
being developed, there is also a tendency for a sort of a
``creep in measure'' acquisition program, where they try to do
more than they were even intended to do.
How will you look and guard that?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
This gets straight to the discipline process that the JROC
has to ensure. So, strong leadership in the JROC and
consultation with my colleagues on the panel has to ensure a
very disciplined approach to that so that we don't get that
mission creep, which becomes very parochial, at some times, as
you move forward.
Chairman Reed. One, at least, perspective on the future is
that the real differential will come with artificial
intelligence, quantum computing, not simply the physical
platform.
Do you anticipate being able to develop platforms that can
quickly adapt to changing software, changing aspects of this
quantum and AI world?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
I think that is going to be an important element of any new
system that we bring to the table; that ability to get past a
very hardware-oriented weapon system development to one that is
software oriented, such that you can have the, we will save the
mainframe, but then spin in new technologies in an app-based
approach, which will allow us to get to the speed that I think
we all want in our weapon system acquisition process.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just get a couple of things on the record, and I
already know the answer to this, and I think most people do
here, also, but it is important that we, I think, get it down
at the very beginning so there is no misunderstanding.
Our nuclear modernization, this goes back to General Hyten,
a quote that he had. He said, I look at our nuclear
capabilities, our triad, our modernization program are the
minimum essential capabilities required to defend this nation.
We have to defend against the most existential threat and
Russia and China and their capabilities are very important. So,
to me, those are the minimum essential capabilities that we
have to build, and even at the highest rate, it will still be
just roughly 6 percent of the overall defense budget. I think
we can afford that security.
So, I would ask you the question just to get you on the
record and to saying that we know the answer anyway, and that
is, General Hyten, that the most modernizing each, he was
talking about modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and
the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA Nuclear
Weapons Complex is a critical, national security priority.
Do you agree?
Admiral Grady. Senator, I do. A modernized and fully ready
nuclear deterrent is one of the number one priorities of the
Department and, if confirmed, I would seek to ensure that.
Senator Inhofe. I know you will and, however, that has
become somewhat controversial in the past. We have to know
where we are coming from.
Lastly, I would ask, is it your intention to continue
General Hyten's efforts to reform the JROC process to move
faster and adopt advanced technologies that help meet
warfighting requirements?
I know that you had responded to a discussion of this with
our chairman, but I would like to get your assurance as to what
we would do with JROC.
Admiral Grady. Sir, the efficacy of the JROC and the
momentum that it is on now is extremely positive, and, if
confirmed, it would be my goal to bend the curve and to go even
faster to focus on the threat and the risks, to close those
gaps, and to move as quickly as possible to get the tools to
the center of the universe, our warfighters, as fast as
possible.
Senator Inhofe. Excellent. I know that is true.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Admiral Grady. Thank you for
your service and your wife and your family's service, as well,
and congratulations on your nomination. I look forward to
working with you, if confirmed.
You have served as Commander of the Navy 6th Fleet, which
is responsible for naval activities in Europe, and so I know
that you have been witness to Russia's increasing aggression in
the Black Sea and other areas of Europe.
I know that the unclassified Global Posture Review for
Europe emphasized a combat credible deterrent against Russia
and enabling NATO forces to operate more effectively.
Now, I am pleased that the Biden administration has removed
the cap on forces in Germany, active-duty forces and it is
committed to maintaining a presence in Europe. But as I talk to
some of our European allies, one of the things they have been
pressing for is more U.S. forward-deployed troops in Europe.
Did you think that is something we should be considering
now and how do you view that in the long term?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
I think our posture and presence in Europe is very, very
important and we should listen to our allies and partners,
insofar as we want to work with them and be stronger together.
So, I think as part of the Global Posture Review, it is
important that we balance all of those requirements and where
we need to operate.
I would tell you that as the 6th Fleet Commander, you
mentioned my very best day was when I had a ship in the High
North, a ship in the Baltic, a ship in the Black Sea, a ship in
the East Med, and on a really good day, I may have had one in
the Gulf of Guinea. That is challenging, as you know, but that
gives the President and the Secretary of Defense many options
to work with our allies and partners and to pursue our
objectives with NATO and in Europe.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
As you know, we have a Women, Peace and Security Act that
has been in the process of being implemented since it was
signed in 2017.
As you think about your experience, how have you seen
women's participation in the military positively affect what
our goals are, particularly in places where it is women, like
the Middle East, where women are very important as we are
talking to populations and communities that are reluctant to
speak with men?
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am, a very important issue, and I
think a very important issue that advances the cause of
democracy, too.
My own personal experience, first, within the Navy, my
first ship, the USS Cole, was an integrated ship. I can just
offer to you that having 51 percent of the marines eligible to
serve in the military for us really helped make the Navy
better.
I think that idea that we can bring everyone to the table,
especially our mothers, our daughters, and our sisters going
forward, just makes us stronger. So, the initiative that you
spoke of is one worthy of support.
Senator Shaheen. Well, as you know, most regional and
functional combatant commands have hired full-time gender
advisors to integrate gender perspectives into our planning and
I just wondered, if confirmed, how will you implement Women,
Peace and Security within the Joint Staff?
Admiral Grady. Yes, thank you.
The role of a gender advisor is a way to attack a very
significant issue, and, if confirmed, I look forward to
leveraging those advisors who can make me think better and
smarter about the issues that you raise. So, I look forward to,
if confirmed, understanding that ecosystem and helping advance
that cause going forward; again, we want to bring everybody to
the table, to get the advantage of all of their thinking. It is
also a part of creating the safe and secure work environment
for all of our sailors, and soldiers, airmen, Marine, Coast
Guardsmen, and guardians.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I would argue that it is important to our mission, wherever
we are operating in the world, as well. I will look forward to
talking to you a year from now to hear what you have done to
implement the Act within the Joint Staff.
I want to raise another concern about what is happening
with ISIS. The headlines, ISIS has faded from the headlines,
yet we know we have several very large camps that continue to
be in Syria and Iraq that have women and children who are
detainees from the war against ISIS and who have the potential
to be radicalized and create a further issue with terrorists in
the future.
What is the military's role or does the military have a
role in supporting folks in these camps and what should we be
thinking about as we are looking at the future of places like
Al-Hol, which has 94 percent of its occupants are women and
children, but we know they are already becoming radicalized?
Admiral Grady. Yes. You know, the issue of ISIS, as an
example of violent, extremist organizations is one that we can
just never take our eye off the ball. It is one in which if we
beat them here, they are going to squeeze and pop out somewhere
over here and we are going to have to continue to beat them.
So, the military piece of it is reactive in some respects,
but it can also help to create the conditions on the ground for
better conditions and to help with those conditions that will
not allow radicalization to continue. So, I think the military
has a role in that.
We need to beat them first. We do that and then help create
those conditions on the ground that are safe and secure, such
that radicalization doesn't occur.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Before I recognize Senator Fischer, since a quorum is now
present, I ask the Committee to consider three civilian
nominations and a list of 1,772 pending military nominations.
First, I ask the Committee to consider the nominations of
Mr. John B. Sherman to be Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense; Mr. Ashish S. Vazirani, to be the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and Ms.
Carrie F. Ricci to be General Counsel of the Department of the
Army.
Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations to
the Senate?
Senator Inhofe. So moved.
Chairman Reed. All in favor, say aye.
The motion carries.
Finally, I ask the Committee to consider a list of 1,772
pending military nominations. Of these nominations, 21
nominations are 1 day short of the Committee's requirement that
nominations be in committee for 7 days before we report them
out.
No objection has been raised to these nominations and I
recommend the Committee waive the 7-day rule in order to permit
the confirmation of these nominations before the Senate
recesses for the holiday recess.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 1,772
pending military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Inhofe. So moved.
Chairman Reed. All in favor, say aye.
The motion carries.
Senator Fischer, please?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral, to you and your wife this morning.
I appreciate the discussion that you and I had earlier
about the importance of modernizing our nuclear enterprise and
that you view nuclear deterrence as the Department's highest
priority, which you reaffirmed today to the ranking member.
We are seeing Russia and China continue to expand their
arsenals. Russia is pursuing a variety of novel, nuclear
systems and China is conducting a strategic breakout that the
current STRATCOM Commander, Admiral Richard, characterized as
breathtaking.
What is your view of China's nuclear expansion and what
implications do you think this has for us?
Admiral Grady. I think that China's breakout is, as Admiral
Richard has called it, is, indeed, spectacular and, indeed,
breathtaking. So, therefore, we need to be postured to address
that issue. We need to think about how we would proceed with
deterrence, particularly, deterrence now against two peer
competitors and who need to be deterred in two different ways.
Deterrence, then, I think builds on that strong nuclear
triad that we just talked about. So, the modernization of the
nuclear triad will be the underpinning of that deterrence
effort against two nuclear competitors.
Senator Fischer. Overall, do you believe that the growth of
Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals reinforces the need to
modernize our nuclear deterrent, including each leg of the
triad?
Admiral Grady. Absolutely, I do, Senator.
We need to have that responsive, flexible, and survivable
triad across the three legs if we are going to meet the
challenges of two nuclear peer competitors.
Senator Fischer. You know, we continue to hear calls to
pause or to defer modernization programs, despite repeated
testimony from STRATCOM Commanders and others that there is no
room for additional delay. Last year Admiral Richard testified
that, quote, many of the modernization and sustainment efforts
necessary to ensure deterrence, viability have zero schedule
margin and are late to need, end quote.
Can you give us your view of the modernization schedule? I
know you are particularly familiar with the need to replace the
Ohio-class submarine.
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
I agree with Admiral Richard that there is no more margin
to surge. Service life extension programs across the nuclear
triad, we have kind of tapped that ability out now, and so now
it is time to move forward.
Speaking to the Ohio-class submarine, we have service life
extended them, I think, to the extent now where it would be a
challenge to do it any further. Just look at hull strength as
an example; I mean, we can't go past the physics of metallurgy
at some point. So, at any rate, I think if you look at just the
Ohio-class SSBN, as an example, there is no more margin left in
terms of service life extension.
Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine and I, along with Senator
Shaheen, we were at Minot earlier this year and we looked at
the maintenance work that has to be done on the 1970s-era ICBMs
that we have. These are remarkable systems; they have lasted a
long time, but as you just referenced with submarines, things
don't last forever.
When you hear about the GBSD program and the fact that it
is important to continue that, the fact the study shows it is
cheaper to have GBSD than the current Minuteman program that we
have.
Does that just reinforce your position on that leg of the
triad or do you think it needs to be studied even further?
Admiral Grady. Well, first of all, thanks for going out and
visiting the airmen out at Minot.
Senator Fischer. Great guys. Great people.
Admiral Grady. Their ability to maintain that system and
have it as peak, operational readiness, really does speak to
the center of the universe that we talked about.
But I do believe that as we think about GBSD, the timeline
there, at a certain point, it costs more to maintain than it
does to re-modernize and we are approaching that.
Senator Fischer. I think this last study shows that we have
approached it. It is $38 billion cheaper to go with GBSD than
to extend the life of the Minuteman. Thank you.
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Blumenthal, please?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your service and your family, as
well. Thanking for the conversations we had not long ago.
I am delighted that you share my commitment to making sure
that we maintain our superiority in undersea warfare and that
we continue, not only with the Ohio-class replacement, now
being built at Electric Boat, the Columbia-class, but also the
Virginia-class attack submarine, two submarines a year, which
is vital to maintain that superiority. I hope you continue to
agree and, perhaps, visit Electric Boat.
Admiral Grady. Senator, I certainly do agree.
As we look across all of the domains, the undersea domain
is one that I think we still have a significant superiority in
and we want to maintain that and maybe even build it even
better.
I have been to Electric Boat several times, both in Quonset
Point and in Connecticut, and it is spectacular with that and
Defense Industrial Base can do, and I applaud the efforts of
the folks at Electric Boat for what they are doing.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
I want to talk a little bit about a topic that may not be
covered by anyone else here: the Afghanistan evacuation and
settlement efforts, which very much involve the military.
Although we have no military presence in Afghanistan, there are
somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 guests, as they are called,
now on our military bases.
I recently visited Quantico, Virginia. The United States
Marine Corps is doing an excellent job. I am really so much in
admiration of the work that they are doing there, and I am sure
the other branches of service at our other bases.
But these bases were supposed to be closed, literally, this
week, and they are going to continue into February, March,
perhaps beyond, because of the insufficient support for the
resettlement efforts. Fortunately, we will see more resources
going into it.
But I am also concerned about the evacuation of our at-risk
Afghan allies, interpreters, translators, security guards,
drivers; all the people who stood by us and helped protect our
troops and diplomats. I have called for an evacuation czar,
because I have found that it was, and remains a lot of
insufficient coordination, even finger-pointing.
Could you give me your views on whether we should be doing
more, as I believe, to help with evacuation efforts through
charter flights and resources that we, the United States still
has there, even though we have no military or diplomatic
presence.
Admiral Grady. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
I think, first, thanks for going down to Quantico and
seeing the team down there; they are doing really good work. I
think it is that kind of good work under General VanHerck's
leadership is one of the things that the military does very
well: logistics and movement and that kind of thing. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working with General
VanHerck to finish that mission.
As to your point of folks that may be at risk still on the
ground, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with the
CENTCOM Commander, on what are the right ways to finish that
mission, as well. It would be an important element of our
discussions on going forward and concluding, finally, what we
are doing in that part of the world with Afghanistan.
Senator Blumenthal. I think you have put it really
correctly, that it is a matter of completing the mission and
honoring our commitment for the men and women and their
families who put their lives on the line and now they have
targets on their back because they sided with us in that
conflict. So, I hope to continue working with you.
Finally, let me just ask your views on classification.
Yesterday, I joined my colleagues in a classified briefing on
the Ukraine situation. Obviously, we can't talk about it in
this setting, except to say it was deeply sobering, maybe scary
is the right word for it. My feeling was, as hearing that
briefing, as it is so often after such classified briefings,
that the American people should hear what we heard.
For much of what was said in that briefing, it could be
told to the American people without compromising sources or
methods or other kinds of necessary assets or resources. I
think there is too much classification, in short.
Do you have a view on that point?
Admiral Grady. Sir, thanks.
We talked a little bit about that in the phone call, and I
would say, in general, we tend to overclassify and that we
should work harder not to. I think there are several good
reasons for that. One is the transparency that we have with the
citizens that we serve to explain what we are trying to do.
Secondly, is being able to work with our allies and partners.
As an example, my 2nd Fleet Commander, his Deputy is a
Canadian officer, and sometimes I have to ask him to leave when
we are talking about what we are doing in the Atlantic. So, we
are working very hard to overcome those barriers.
I think the third reason is that type of classification,
when things are overclassified, prevents us from integrating
and synchronizing better because there are artificial barriers
that we put up in our way.
So, in the end, I think we need to work hard to always push
that down, the classification down, but still remaining
sensitive to sources and methods that you correctly pointed
out. Thank you for taking that brief; it is indeed, sobering.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Admiral Grady.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Rounds, please?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I enjoyed visiting with you a few weeks ago in my
office and I thank you and your family for 37 years of faithful
service to our country. I appreciate your willingness to serve
in this very critical position.
One of the items that we discussed at that time was your
responsive on the principal cyber advisor positions that
Congress has required in the last year's NDAA. I appreciated
hearing how much you valued having an independent subject-
matter expert with no day-to-day management responsibilities
who, in your words, could speak truth to power regarding cyber
activity throughout the departments, and I thank you for that,
sir.
On a related topic, and I think this is something that we
don't spend enough time discussing and making clear, the vice
chairman now leads the Joint Staff's Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations Cross Functional Team and is the senior designated
official for electromagnetic spectrum operations in the
Department of Defense. That is a very valuable asset.
A number of senators came together during the development
of the bipartisan infrastructure bill to literally block
efforts to provide critical electromagnetic spectrum for
auction; meaning, taking it out of the Department of Defense's
perspective and putting it up for sale. So far, a number of us
have succeeded, but there have been additional legislative
threats to DOD's spectrum in the 3100 to 3450MHz band.
The reason why I ask this question is I think it is
important if you could share with the Committee in this
recognizable, unclassified forum, how you would view an attempt
to auction spectrum in this band with respect to maintaining
the capabilities that keep this country safe every day,
recognizing a lot of people out there think that spectrum
should be made available for telecommunications for everybody,
and yet it is critical that the Department of Defense maintain
a certain amount of this spectrum in a very, very specified
area.
Can you give us your views on that and how you would go
about sharing with other members of the United States
Senate and House, how critical this is.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I very much
enjoyed that discussion. We talked a little bit about this.
The management of the electromagnetic spectrum to the
Department of Defense is absolutely critical. We operate in
there. We have critical activities that we do within that
spectrum and within that domain.
I think what you want from us, sir, is to be able to come
forward to you and lay out the risks and the challenges of
sell-off and to do it in a data-based and a threat-based way so
that when you go into that very significant policy decision,
well informed as to the challenges and risks that it might
impose on our sailors, and the center of the universe, and the
soldiers, and the airmen, and that going forward.
So, we need to bring to you, the arguments for or against,
pros and cons, so that we can make a very threat-based and
formed discussion. It is a significant issue, though, for sure.
Senator Rounds. One of the challenges, and I think Senator
Blumenthal mentioned it, is the overclassification of
information. Would you commit to providing a classified brief
to the members of this committee and members of other key
committees to discuss the danger of taking such actions,
without a very stringent approval process?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Regarding the revision of the National Defense Strategy, I
wonder if you could comment on the force-sizing construct. Two
major planning assumptions have been overcome by events and now
they seem to be critically flawed: the force-sizing construct
to fight one war at a time and the planning and investment and
capabilities geared for short wars.
I know the strategy was driven by affordability, but in my
view, this probably does not make strategic sense now, given
the activity, investments, and behavior of China and Russia.
How do you see this issue?
Admiral Grady. I think as we look forward to that force-
sizing construct that you call out, it has to be one that is
informed by current conditions and current threats. So, if
confirmed, I would look forward to being a part of that
discussion.
But, certainly, the world gets a vote. The enemy gets a
vote on how we look forward to sizing the force.
It will be a balance of capability and capacity. It will be
a balance of being there when we need to be there. So, we need
to bring all of those things together, based on the current
situations and, indeed, the projected situation that we see in
the future.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Admiral, the position that you have been nominated for is
critical and it is time-sensitive that we move forward in
filling this position. I think you are the right person for the
job. I look forward to supporting your nomination.
I would hope, Mr. Chairman that we are able to move as
quickly as possible in filling that position.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Kaine, please?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, congratulations to you.
I will just tell my colleagues, the Grady family is very
beloved in Hampton Roads, Virginia. They are currently on their
third posting into Norfolk, and I very much appreciate your
long service.
Also, to tell my colleagues, if you read his biography,
something real sticks out: he is the recipient of the ``Old
Salt'' Award. I didn't know what that was, but I was intrigued
and I researched it.
The ``Old Salt'' Award in the Navy is the award given to
the longest-serving, surface warfare officer.
He inherited that when Admiral Davidson retired, so that is
just an additional attribute to the years of service in your
longevity in serving the country.
Admiral Grady, Senator Wicker and I, we have been engaged
in a months' long debate with the DOD about moving forward with
block buy of the LPD and LHA amphibious ships. This block buy
was authorized by the fiscal year 2021 NDAA and also by the
Defense Appropriations bill.
As you know, block buy provisions often yield significant
savings in the past, but the Department has stalled on the
block buy and cited a desire to, quote, undertake an additional
study of amphibious ship requirements.
Senator Wicker and I asked the Marine Corps if their
amphibious ship requirements have changed in recent months and
we were told that they had not. So, I am a little bit unclear
what agency is participating in this review.
As we continue to study the requirement that the Marine
Corps states has not changed, China is moving forward with the
construction equivalent of a class of warships similar to the
LPD and LHA; they are Type 71 and 75 classes, respectively. So,
at least China believes that this class of warship isn't
obsolete.
In your current role as Fleet Forces Command, have you been
involved in any recent studies on the number of overall
requirements for the LPD and LHA amphibious ships and are you
aware of any developments that would suggest we halt or slow
construction of this class of amphibious ship?
Admiral Grady. Sure. A couple of issues there. The first
is, the block buy is a really efficient way to subgenerate that
demand signal to the Defense Industrial Base, and as you say,
it is a very efficient way to go, so I thank the Committee's
support for that.
Amphibious warships and the renaissance that is underway in
amphibious warfare now is growing and palpable. So, the naval
integration between what the Commandant and the CNO are trying
to do has a lot of momentum right now going forward.
Those are great ships that you talked about; they do
provide amazing capability and capacity to the fleet commanders
and to the combatant commanders going forward. I think the
level of discussion right now between the CNO and the
Commandant, and, of course, I would want to speak with them,
but, if confirmed, I would like to be part of that dialogue.
But I think the discussion there is how do we take all the
tenets of naval integration and push forward, particularly, as
we bring our marines out of the desert and bring them back
aboard ships. What will that look like? What is the force
generated, what are we going to force-generate going forward?
This question about how many amphibs that we need,
particularly the big decks, will be essential and part of that.
So, if confirmed, I look forward to being a participant in that
discussion.
Senator Kaine. I look forward to working with you on that
one.
Your role as vice chairman has a lot of different,
important components and one is you had the Council on
Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and
Communications, or NC3. That is commonly referred to as the
fourth leg of the nuclear triad.
Have you participated in exercises using the NC3 system,
and give us your assessment on its, you know, is it robust
enough or do we need to do more to make that system robust to
protect it against cyberattacks, et cetera.
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
I do agree that the NC3 could be very well considered the
kind of fourth leg of the triad. As you know, I am the Navy's
component to STRATCOM, so all the SSBNs and ``Take Charge and
Move Out'' aircraft work for me. So, I am very, very involved
in the NC3 dialogue and discussion that is going forward.
Just 2 weeks ago, I concluded my sixth ``Global Lightning,
Global Thunder'' exercise in which we exercised NC3 across the
nuclear triad. I think I agree with the STRATCOM Commander and,
if confirmed, I look forward to working with him and the Dep
Sec Def for that matter, on this issue.
That is, that across the 200-or-so systems that we have, it
is working, but it could be better, and it could, but it is
safe, secure, and reliable now, but we need to think about
taking it into the future against the threats in all domains,
including cyber. Again, if confirmed, I would look forward to
working with Dep Sec Def and the STRATCOM Commander to ensure
that happens.
Senator Kaine. Thanks very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. Admiral, welcome, and thank you for almost
4 decades of service to our nation.
As you know, based on our conversation before your hearing,
I am very concerned about the military's culture in what I see
as a lack of focus on warfighting. The state of professional
military education is one of my top concerns.
In September, two war college professors wrote an op-ed in
City Journal that said, quote, war colleges no longer teach
warfighting.
This is consistent, unfortunately, with cautions I have
heard from field-grade officers and war college students who
warn that war colleges care more about academic accreditation
and growing junior foreign policy walks than about building
war-winning leaders. These students have expressed their
frustrations and fear that we are in danger of ceding what they
called ``intellectual overmatch'' to Russia and China.
I would note that it appears that the Joint Staff seems to
agree. They released a memo 18 months ago that called for
renewed war college focus on lethality. These two professors,
though, claim that this guidance has since been, quote, lost in
a maze of bureaucracy.
Could you talk to me, Admiral, about your plans to
implement the findings of that memo.
Admiral Grady. Senator, thank you and thanks for the
discussion a couple of weeks ago.
First, I am a big fan of joint, professional military
education. For me, in my experience at National War College and
my interactions with the Naval War College, as an example, the
key for JPME is to go beyond the tactical to the operational
and the strategic. I think that is where we need to center our
war colleges going forward.
There is an element of policy, but how does the military
fit within the follows pieces of the diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic?
But the real power of the war colleges and JPME, really, at
large, is to ensure that we bridge that gap from the tactical
to the strategic. So, if, if confirmed, and going forward, I
would look forward to working with the services to discuss
that, to ensure that there is the appropriate focus on
warfighting and lethality.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Could I get your commitment to follow-up on a progress
report on that by May?
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
You know, when I first ran for office, I guess almost 10
years ago now, a nice elderly lady asked me if I was the one
who had gotten out of the Army not too long ago.
I said, yes, and I was running for Congress now, and I
said, yes.
She said, why would you leave the country's most respected
institution for the country's least-respected institution?
I wish that wasn't the case about Congress, but I have
always been proud that it is the case about our military.
Therefore, I viewed with alarm, the annual Reagan National
Defense Survey, which recently found a staggering 25 percent
collapse in American trust in the military.
In the past 11 months, my office has been filled with
hundreds of concerns from servicemembers across the services
who say they believe that senior DOD leadership has been
politicized and inappropriate and unprofessional ways. Their
complaints include, and these are their words, not mine: one,
counter-extremism training that draws blanket condemnation of
troops who privately hold conservative views; two, training to
fight things like the weather, rather than China's growing
military; and, three, so-called diversity training that has
taken on blatantly political, even racist, tones, including
forcing servicemembers to segregate themselves by race or
promoting based on skin color, sexual orientation and gender,
rather than operational excellence and achievement.
Do you think it is fair to say that some of these policies,
which are quite controversial, have contributed to that 25
percent decline in trust in our military?
Admiral Grady. Sir, I, too, am disappointed and alarmed by
that number. I read the same report that you did, and that is
concerning to me as someone who has dedicated 37 years to this
and take great pride in what we are able to do.
I think the key issue here is what you expect of us, and
that is that you expect us to remain apolitical and to provide
our best military advice. I think that is the key issue and
everything we do needs to be revolved around that central
concept.
Senator Cotton. Well, Admiral, what we have consistently
heard from many of those servicemembers who have reached out to
us is that they feel that they are being presented with highly
politicized training modules. They voice their concerns or
objections and then their chain of command will accuse them of
acting in a political fashion, so they find themselves in a
catch-22.
Let me just give you one example of something that seems a
bit strange to me. Marine base Quantico recently posted a job
listing for a diversity, equity-inclusion officer for a salary
of $144,000 a year; more than triple the median household
income in Arkansas, also close to what a base commander makes.
I mean, do you think that we should be paying $144,000 to a
diversity, equity-inclusion officer at Quantico? Is this the
kind of thing that might cause Americans to lose confidence in
the priorities of DOD leadership?
Admiral Grady. I don't have the context for, in which that
billet was advertised. I do think we need to have important
discussions about things like that.
To the pay scale, I really can't comment on what that job
is being asked to do. But, again, I think the idea that you
need from us is to be apolitical.
I want to go back to something that you mentioned that your
preamble there, sir, if I could, and that is that the concern
on the part of the members who have communicated with you that
they could not voice their views.
I think the role of commanders is to create that open
dialogue and have that ability to discuss things and that there
should be no reprisals for that kind of thing. So, going
forward, we need to make sure that we have that environment,
that safe environment where people can have that open dialogue
and that discussion.
Senator Cotton. Yeah, my time has expired.
I will just say that what we expect of you and all the
senior military leaders is to address these cultural
challenges. We have also spoken before the hearing about my
concerns on the surface of the Navy and its cultural challenge
in the report that I released with Congressman Gallagher and a
few other Navy veterans.
We can write laws in this institution. We can pass budgets,
but no organization can really thrive and make change without
dynamic leadership. That is why they always said that
leadership was the most important element of combat power. So,
we are counting on you and other senior leaders to help address
some of these cultural challenges. Hopefully, win back the
quarter of the American people who say they have lost trust in
our military. That is what I expect to see and that is what we
will be monitoring in the years ahead.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator King, please?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to re-emphasize the line of questioning that
Senator Kaine began with, and that is nuclear command and
control.
We always talk about the triad. I think it is a quad.
Without the modernization of nuclear command and control, and
not only modernization, but ongoing modernization because the
cyber threat is constantly evolving. Without that
modernization, the rest of the triad could be rendered useless
and therefore, not credible, and therefore, not a deterrent.
So, I hope you will focus very intensely on the upgrades
necessary to command and control systems. I think you have said
that that is your intention, but please reiterate it for me.
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
What we see in the cyber domain across all of our weapons
systems has to be addressed. We talked a lot about our ability
to defend our networks.
The ultimate network to defend is the NC3 network and we
are going to have to be able to do that in cyber. So, if
confirmed, it would be a high priority of mine to continue the
momentum started to that.
Senator King. Thank you.
I just returned this morning from the Norwegian Embassy on
a conference on the Arctic. One of the issues that came up was
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2007, the
Russians, there is a famous picture of the Russians planting a
Russian flag at the North Pole under the Arctic Ocean, and to
me, it symbolizes our failure to be at the table when we are
resolving disputes with regard to the maritime domain.
Is it your professional military opinion that it would be
in the national interests of this country to accede to the law
of the Sea Treaty?
Admiral Grady. It is, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you.
I hope the record will show how readily you answered that
question. I didn't have to pry it out of you.
I think it is very important and I think it is something we
should bring up before this body, once again, because we are,
our national security is being compromised, whether it is the
South China Sea or the Arctic or other areas in the maritime
area.
Now, one of your roles will be as the chair of Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. Again, recently, I
was at a dinner with some prominent figures in the technology
field and they pointed out that because of the length of time
it takes to develop our weapons systems, they are literally
obsolete the day they go into service. In some cases, they are
years out of it.
I know that we are always focused in the procurement area
on money and on cost but talk to me about the importance of
time. The technology is advancing so fast today that if it
takes a dozen years to develop a new airframe or a new
maritime, a new ship, or a new weapons system, we are just
sunk. Not to use the naval term, but time has to be an
essential part of this process.
Admiral Grady. Absolutely, sir.
I will just use a Navy term: Speed to the fleet. You don't,
as you say, you don't want to take forever to get it to the
sailor. So, I think there are several things that we need to
do. First, although, what I would offer to you is, if
confirmed, speed will be, and urgency, will be part of the JROC
process, and in this, I believe I am building on the great
momentum that General Hyten and General Selva set for the JROC.
I think one of the challenges, though, is that we are risk
averse, so that we need to consider whether, and adopt a
strategy, if you will, that will allow a little that will allow
test a little and learn a lot. If there is failure there, then
we can --
Senator King. Well, in briefings that I have been in, one
of the reasons given for the speed with which the Chinese have
achieved what they have in hypersonics is that they are willing
to fail.
Admiral Grady. Uh-huh.
Senator King. They are willing to run tests and learn from
failure and we seem to be, as you say, risk-averse, and
therefore, much slower in our development process.
Admiral Grady. I would agree with you. That risk aversion,
I think, was borne of, in a period of time, perhaps in the late
1990s, early 1990s, when we didn't have any peer competitors;
that is not the case now. So, we have to be able to fail to
learn faster. Failure doesn't mean malfeasance or laziness or
any of that, but it means iterating and going faster.
Senator King. One other area, and one I hope you will
emphasize, is that I think, frankly, we have been slow on is
directed energy.
Admiral Grady. Uh-huh.
Senator King. We have a very expensive missile defense
infrastructure that is designed to hit a bullet with a bullet
and those bullets cost tens of millions of dollars.
Do you believe that directed energy is a promising
technology that should be pursued more aggressively?
Admiral Grady. I do, Senator.
As you correctly point out, that is a terrible exchange
ratio for us. If we can get to the point where a drop of fuel
means a bullet that is where we need to be.
So, a pursuit, if confirmed, pursuit of directed energy and
some of the other technologies that we have talked about, that
would be high on my list. But that directed energy, then, would
be folded into an integrated network of capabilities that we
can bring to the fight.
Senator King. But it is not going to happen unless somebody
pushes it and I hope that you will be that person.
Admiral Grady. Aye, sir.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Blackburn, please?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Grady. We appreciate your time. I
appreciated your phone call before Thanksgiving.
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn. We are grateful for your service.
I want to talk with you about the role of the vice chairman
within the Nuclear Posture Review. In the past, the Joint Staff
served in co-leadership roles with the Sec Def and, presumably,
this was the way that it ensured the best military insight,
intel insight, and advice available to make certain that that
was part of the analysis.
In this year's SASC NDAA, we included a codification of
that practice for the Biden administration's first MPR and, of
course, we are trying to push that on across the finish line at
this point.
So, is the vice chairman a co-chair of the administration's
ongoing MPR?
Admiral Grady. The vice chairman is an advisor to that
process now.
Senator Blackburn. Okay, and according to a Pentagon press
briefing that occurred last month, DOD will conclude its MPR
early next year; is that accurate?
Admiral Grady. I believe so.
Senator Blackburn. Okay, and, if confirmed, do you believe
that you will have adequate time to contribute to the MPR?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I believe I will have an
opportunity to help shape the MPR going forward. I have had a
little bit of that opportunity as the Commander of the naval
forces piece, but I look forward to being a part of that
process going forward.
Senator Blackburn. Do you think that we should change the
pace and the time of the MPR and do it more frequently?
Admiral Grady. I think it should be conditions based. I
think the timing and tempo of many of the policy reviews seems
adequate to me right now; however, the world gets a vote in
those kinds of things and I suspect that should there be large-
scale changes in the international security environment, we
would then go back and look at the seminal documents that guide
our thinking.
Senator Blackburn. Do you think the aggressiveness of China
in this field, the work that they are doing in hypersonics, the
aggressiveness of Russia would mean that we would need to
change time and tempo?
Admiral Grady. It could. I think that as they are two peer
competitors, particularly in the nuclear space, then we have to
spend a lot of time focusing on their intentions and what they
are doing going forward.
Certainly, deterrence, as an example, with two nuclear
competitors is different than that with one, which is why the
current MPR that is coming forward is such an important
document, and I think well timed, based on what we are seeing
with China.
Senator Blackburn. Well, I do think that it is, and when we
talk about terms like ``no-first-use'' and ``sole purpose''
that enters into that, and it is of concern that our nuclear
capabilities are at their lowest since the early 1960s when we
first began building a triad. All the systems that comprise our
nuclear forces are decades past their intended design lives. We
are currently the only nuclear-armed country without the
capability to produce a single, new nuclear weapon.
So, do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of our nuclear
infrastructure?
Admiral Grady. I do and I thank the Committee's support for
that as we work our way forward through modernizing the nuclear
triad and all of the associated infrastructure that goes with
it. So, I thank you for your support on that.
Senator Blackburn. Well, talking about that associated
infrastructure, what are your concerns with respect to DOD, but
then also with respect to NNSA and their capabilities?
Admiral Grady. NNSA are fantastic partners within the DOE,
with the Department of Defense. They are kind of our battle
buddies in this effort to modernize our nuclear triad. So,
ensuring that we work closely together and that we are
integrated and as we move forward to ensure that the
infrastructure that supports that nuclear triad keeps pace,
that will be, if confirmed, will be an important relationship
that I would hope to seek with NNSA and with the larger nuclear
enterprise.
Senator Blackburn. I have a couple of more questions for
you on this, on infrastructure and recapitalization,
modernization. But in the interests of time, I will submit
those to you for written answers.
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Warren, please?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Grady, for being here today.
Congratulations on your nomination.
So, in August, a U.S. drone strike killed 10 Afghan
civilians, including 7 children and 1 employee of the U.S.-
based NGO after water containers were mistaken for potential
explosives.
Just a few weeks ago you probably saw The New York Times
revealed that in 2019, the military covered up an air strike
that killed approximately 70 women and children in Syria and
was flagged as a potential war crime.
Unfortunately, these are far from isolated instances.
Independent watchdog groups estimate that in the past 20 years,
U.S. air and drone strikes have killed thousands of innocent
civilians in places like Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, and the
true toll may never be known because of the difficulty of
accurate reporting and the military's consistent
underreporting.
So, let me just start with kind of a baseline here,
Admiral. Would you agree that the rates of civilian casualties
are unacceptably high?
Admiral Grady. Senator, I would agree that civilian
casualties under any circumstances are totally unacceptable and
that you should demand from us better.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that answer very much,
Admiral.
You know, but here is the thing, despite this terrible loss
of innocent life, no meaningful reform or change has been
implemented. For years, DOD has turned a blind eye to civilian
casualties and has also failed to distribute exportation of
money that Congress has authorized for survivors.
This is just wrong, and I don't know how we can continue to
view a system that kills thousands of innocent civilians and
simply accept it as a cost of doing business. Any system that
does that, in my view, is fundamentally broken.
Now, The New York Times also report that DOD investigates
reports of civilian casualties only when, and this is the
quote, there is a potential for high media attention or a
concern with outcry from the local community or government.
So, let me ask you this, Admiral, would you also agree that
DOD investigating only high-profile or potentially news-worthy
cases of civilian casualties is a barrier to meaningful
accountability?
Admiral Grady. I think the issue that you raise on
accountability is one that you should hold us to the highest
standard for.
I will give you my personal experience on that. As a strike
group commander for 10 months in the Arabian Gulf, we dropped a
million pounds of bombs. I had to explain every single one of
those and whether they met ground commander's intent. That
level of accountability is something that you should demand
from us.
Senator Warren. Do you believe, based on that, that reform
is needed to reduce the rates of civilian casualties caused by
U.S. military operations?
Admiral Grady. I think every civilian casualty is a
tragedy, but it is very dangerous and hard work that we do and
we apply lessons learned each time to try to get better to
forestall that. But, again, hold us accountable and we will fix
it.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that, Admiral, because
that is the point: We need to get better on this, and it is
about accountability.
I have already asked this Committee to investigate
operations that result in civilian casualties and to suggest
reforms that can prevent these tragedies. But you don't have to
wait for us to act. The Pentagon has an opportunity to do
exactly that without a specific mandate from Congress, so it
can and should start that today.
I look forward to working with you on this.
Admiral Grady. Aye, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis, please?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Grady, thank you for being here. Congratulations on
your nomination.
I want to talk a little bit about European posture with the
circumstances in Ukraine or with Russia, near Ukraine right
now, it seems like we have a hotspot there and a real clear and
present threat. I know that we have worked on improving our
European posture since the Russian I mean vacation of Ukraine
back in 2014 and I think we have more work to do. We have the
Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany and I think we have re-
establishing V Corps over in Poland.
But what more do we need to do in terms of pushing
resources in that region that seems to be continually under
threat, and I am kind of curious about your anti-access/area-
denial. What other priorities should we place there, and I
guess in answering that question, we have got priorities in
other points of the globe.
So, where does, how are you going to balance scarce
resources? What would be your priorities when you are confirmed
with respect to European posture, but also, other threats that
are equally concerning?
Admiral Grady. The challenges in the European area of
operations are significant, as you pointed out, sir. I think
the first thing we need to think about is working with our
allies and partners there and leveraging the great strengthen
that is the NATO alliance. We are certainly stronger together
in that regard.
The resource challenge that you discuss is strong,
significant. Certainly, the pacing threat is in China and we
need to, then, balance how we are going to address our presence
and posture in INDOPACOM and the challenges there with how we
are going to balance those in Europe.
So, again, I think the key here will be a threat-based and
resource-informed discussion, but then leveraging the
flexibility and maneuvering that we have as a military to leave
us options to move quickly where we need to be. I think a big
part of that is working with our allies and our partners.
You asked me a question about A2/AD. These challenges are
significant. We could talk for a long time, I suppose, at a
higher classification level in the Western Pacific, as an
example, but to your point in Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean
is also a very challenging area to work, as is the Strait of
Hormuz. As the vice chairman and working within the JROC, it
will be a priority of mine to bring those and close those A2/AD
gaps and bring those capabilities to the force as quickly as
possible in all of the AORs around the country, the East Med is
an example to your question about EUCOM.
Senator Tillis. Yeah, I want to talk a little bit about
NATO. The NATO 2030, there is some promise in there. They seem
to reference China as a threat that our NATO allies and
partners should take seriously.
But what is your sense of NATO working with them?
I get the sense, I have the pleasure of serving as the co-
chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group. The sense that I get
is that we still do not have a complete consensus among some of
our NATO allies with respect to the threat of Russia.
What can you tell me that would give me optimism that there
is a growing sense of resolve that we all need to act and
recognize the threat?
Admiral Grady. In my dealings with my NATO partners, and I
will go back to my time as the 6th Fleet Commander when I was
STRIKFORNATO. I thought there was a growing realization,
particularly, of the Russian threat and the challenges that we
would need to meet as a NATO alliance and the strength that the
Transatlantic Alliance that would be important to that.
To your question about a growing understanding of China and
the threats that that posed, I similarly felt the same, and so
my dialogues at my level, and, if confirmed, going forward with
the vice chairman of the U.K. and France, in particular, will
be to talk about what China is doing in their part of the
world. Certainly, if you look at the One Belt One Road
initiative and challenges in Europe or if you look at the 5(g)
and Huawei and how that challenges what we want to do with our
allies and partners, that growing realization is there and I am
pretty confident that we can work together to meet those
challenges.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
I have some other questions I will submit for the record.
But thank you, I look forward to supporting your nomination.
Admiral Grady. Aye, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
We are approaching a vote at 11:30, so I would ask my
colleagues to add here to the 5-minute limit as much as
possible.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Grady, normally, I start each nomination hearing
with a series of questions related to a nominee's fitness for
service, however, based on the severity of the ongoing water
contamination crisis at Pearl Harbor, I am going to submit
those questions for the record.
I am not sure how familiar you or my colleagues are with
the Red Hill Fuel Storage Facility, but it is a huge complex
that I liken to the Hoover Dam. Red Hill has 20 massive
underground fuel storage tanks built into the side of a
mountain that holds 250 million gallons of fuel to support
military operations across the Indo-Pacific. These tanks serve
as a strategic war reserve in the event of crisis.
Red Hill sits 100 feet directly above Oahu's aquifer, which
is the source of drinking water for all of Honolulu and the
surrounding area, threatening the safety of our clean drinking
water.
While there have been ongoing issues with leaks at Red Hill
since 2014, a series of recent, preventable accidents have led
to the contamination of the Navy's water system and put the
community at risk. At this moment, around 100,000 military
servicemembers, their families, contractors, and other
residents are impacted. Over 2,800 families have been displaced
to temporary housing only weeks before the holidays and
thousands of others are being forced to use bottled water.
This is not just a short-term matter to resolve the
drinking water problem, which the Navy must do expeditiously,
but also a long-term question about the Department's plans for
a strategic fuel storage. On Monday, I joined Governor Ige and
the Hawaii delegation in calling for the Navy to immediately
suspend operations at Red Hill while they confront and remedy
this crisis.
Governor Ige then directed the Navy to cease operations at
Red Hill and de-fuel all the tanks. The Department of Defense
needs to provide answers to the citizens of Hawaii and the
nation as a whole about how it can safely protect the aquifer
while still storing the required fuel reserve for national
security, even if that means ultimately moving the fuel
elsewhere.
In the past week, I have spoken with the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander of
INDOPACOM multiple times about how to resolve this crisis. It
is paramount that the Navy understands that Oahu needs safe
drinking water; that is the top priority and I will continue to
work with the congressional delegation and the governor do
whatever is necessary to make that happen.
Admiral, once confirmed, I would like a commitment from you
that Red Hill will be a top priority both, solving the short-
term contamination issue and developing a credible, long-term
plan for the storage or for the strategic war reserve needs.
I would also like your commitment to prioritize restoring
the community's confidence in the military. You can imagine the
community's confidence has been badly shaken by how the
military has handled this water-contamination crisis.
INDOPACOM is our country's priority theater and in DOD's
budgeting and infrastructure decisions need to more strongly
reflect that reality.
Admiral, can I get your commitment that, if confirmed, that
you will make Red Hill now, and going forward, a priority, a
top priority?
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am. The safety of our citizens, our
Navy families, our military families is of the highest
importance and you have my commitment that, if confirmed, I
will work with my very close colleague, Chris Aquilino and Sam
Paparo to ensure that we move forward appropriately both,
first, and primarily on the safety of our citizens, but then on
the logistics implications going forward.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Sullivan, please?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, good to see you again. I appreciated our meeting
and I look forward to supporting your confirmation quickly.
Let me just begin, why do you think the White House left
this seat open?
My understanding is they had names back in January for the
American people. I am quite concerned. We don't have a vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have all these
challenges that we are facing as a nation; Russia is looking
like it is trying to possibly invade Ukraine. Xi Jinping is
very aggressive towards Taiwan and we don't even have a vice
chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Why do you think it took so long to put your name up before
this Committee?
Admiral Grady. Sir, I am not privy to the process by which
the nomination worked its way through the process. I will just
say I am happy to be sitting here now and, if confirmed, look
forward to working with you.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it is part of a broader
trend, a ``dereliction of duty'' trend as it relates to the
military and this White House, this President; they don't seem
to prioritize the military. The vice chairman position is open
right now. That didn't have to happen. (Indiscernible--1:23:25)
doesn't certainly help our national security.
I have been raising this issue a lot. The President's
budget, does double-digit increases in terms of almost every
federal agency, with the exception of two. Two get cuts,
significant cuts, if you keep it for inflation-adjusted cuts:
the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security. Dead last.
Again, there is not a prioritization of the military. Do
you think, what do you think that Xi Jinping or Putin see when
they see a budget request like this from this President's White
House?
Do you think that that gives them encouragement that we are
cutting our defense spending?
Admiral Grady. I think that as we look at their budgets,
they look at ours and they try and attempt to draw conclusions
from that on our way forward.
Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion, do you think at
this moment in time, cutting our defense budget is a good idea
for national security or a bad idea, in your personal opinion?
Admiral Grady. I think that there are many significant
national security challenges around the world and that you need
a Department of Defense budget that was able to meet those
challenges, not just now but going forward.
Senator Sullivan. Does cutting the Department's budget do
that, in your personal opinion?
Admiral Grady. Yeah, I think there is, there are risks and
challenges there that we need to face and that we need to have
the appropriate funding level to do that.
Senator Sullivan. You are not answering my question.
With respect, do you think that cutting the Defense budget
does that? I need just a yes or no, personal opinion.
Admiral Grady. I think that stable and predictable and
adequate funding is important and that it needs to keep pace
with the threat and inflation.
Senator Sullivan. This doesn't, does it?
Admiral Grady. This is challenging.
Senator Sullivan. This doesn't.
Let me just be more specific. This budget, and the request
from the Navy, actually shrinks the fleet. It commissions four
new ships, retires eight. Do you think shrinking the U.S. Navy
Fleet is something that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist
Party would welcome or would be against, the U.S. Navy Fleet
shrinking, which is what this budget or this President does?
What do you think the Chinese think of that?
Admiral Grady. I think the Chinese look at an isolated
shrinking of the budget as a positive thing.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, I do, too.
Well, fortunately, this Committee rebuked the President and
others and we put forward what the National Security
Commission, and bipartisan by the way, recommended: to increase
Defense spending 3 to 5 percent, per year; a real budget, a
real increase of inflation adjustment. That is what this
Committee responsibly did and we certainly hope that as we look
forward to appropriating, that we will do that.
Let me ask one final question and then I will have a number
for you that I am going to submit for the record.
There has been a dramatic, and you and I talked about this,
trust in the military in terms of a decline, actually
plummeting. The Reagan National Defense Survey says that for
the first time ever, a minority of Americans, only 45 percent,
report having a great deal of trust and confidence in the
military. This is down from 70 percent in 2018, a 3-year drop.
Why do you think that is happening?
Admiral Grady. Well, first, I am disappointed to see that
number.
Senator Sullivan. So, am I.
Admiral Grady. Someone who has served for 37 years, I take
great pride in what I do and what our servicemen do every day.
That is disturbing.
I think the key for us to help combat that is to be as
transparent in what we do and be as apolitical as we can
possibly be.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. The Under
Secretary of Defense, number three position in the Pentagon, he
said one of his priorities in his confirmation hearing was to,
quote, stamp out systemic racism within the ranks.
Do you think the military is a systematically racist
institution in your experience and do you think that having
senior officials say that kind of thing is actually one of the
things that undermines trust?
Admiral Grady. I think it is really important that we have
discussions about anything that challenges the safe and secure
working environment for our force. That is a commander's
business to do that and racism is part of that.
I will give you my personal experience. Every time I do a
fleet-unit visit, whether it is an airplane, a squadron, or a
submarine, I ask these questions. We work really hard to have
that dialogue, that important dialogue that we need to have
about racism. We all agree that there is no place for it in our
military.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will submit more questions for the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Peters, please?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Admiral, and congratulations on your
nomination and I thank you for being here today and offering
some of your thoughts.
Admiral, in advance testimony, you expressed concern with
both, state and non-state actors' ability to successfully
execute large-scale influence operations against the United
States and its partners, and, certainly, I share those concerns
and we have a lot of evidence on an almost daily basis.
I want to kind of hear your views on organizing our
information warfare capabilities. This is a wide-scoping issue,
I understand, but information clearly is a domain and a
warfighting function with a very strong human dimension to it,
as well, but we should never exceed the need for some
overarching guidance, planning, and authorities when it comes
to all of this.
So, my question to you is, would the Joint Force be more
effective, and by extension, perhaps more resilient, if
information warfare fell under a single entity, such as a
functional component and command?
Admiral Grady. Yeah. First, I agree with you, sir, on the
challenge on information warfare face presents to us in the
modern realities of warfare going forward. Winning and
dominating in the information space is going to be just as
important as in the military or the diplomatic or the law fare
or the economic. So, going forward, we are going to have to do,
and work very hard to ensure that that happens.
I think the best response from an information perspective,
though, is that to answer your question directly, is that it
should be integrated across what all of our, we will use the
COCOM's as an example, has to be integrated in everything they
do from the ground up. It can't be something that is bolted on,
on the bottom.
My discussions with my colleagues who are fleet commanders
or who are combatant commanders now, I think they get that and
so I think as the vice chairman, if confirmed, it would be my
job to help encourage that integration baked in from the bottom
as equally as important as what we do from the tactical to the
strategic.
Senator Peters. Well, and as we look at malign influence
and information warfare, there is certainly vulnerabilities in
government that can turn some of our neighbors and our allies
into targets of opportunity for financially motivated cyber
criminals. State-sponsored actors certainly linked to China, to
Russia, and Iran, are conducting extensive cyber espionage
operations, information operations.
My question for you is, do you believe that security
assistance should include cybersecurity assistance to help our
partners protect their critical infrastructure or to enhance
their resiliency against this sophisticated information warfare
that we are seeing across the globe?
Admiral Grady. Yeah, Senator.
First, you are stronger together with our allies and
partners; one of those great competitive advantages that we
have. So, in the cyber realm, then, working together within
cyber to meet those threats that you have pointed out, is
incredibly important.
So, I do think that there are venues for us to help and to
learn from them, as well, in the cyber domain going forward.
Senator Peters. Great. Well, thank you.
A discussion of great power competition tends to emphasize
capabilities and resources that prepare for, potentially, armed
conflict. But what I would like you to address a little bit how
we would employ our military instrument of power against a
broad spectrum of non-military threats. We have already talked
about cyber and information warfare, but I believe that
irregular warfare architecture represents, perhaps, a
proactive-shaping process through competition and generates
some options if tensions escalate or if deterrence fails.
So, my question for you is how should the Joint Force be
competing actively in this environment while deterring
escalation and shaping theaters in a way that will help us,
should deterrence fail?
Admiral Grady. So, I think there are several elements to
that. One, working with our allies and our partners is
absolutely critical; so, that is one. Two, there is a value to
being there and to being able to work with them as the
situations arise. Things like theater-security cooperation,
which allows us to train together, to exercise together, things
like the IMET program would allow us to share best practices
and democratic values are important.
Then to your point about boots on the ground, perhaps, I
will use the CV as an example. They do fantastic work around
the world helping share those cultural values and helping us
learn about the battle space that we are going to operate in.
Then at the higher end, you know, irregular warfare, whether it
be SOF or something else, it is absolutely critical to
everything we do and it is across all phases, from pre-conflict
to post-conflict.
Senator Peters. Well, very good.
When I served in the Navy Reserve, I served in a CV
battalion, so I appreciate you bringing up the CVs.
Admiral Grady. Certainly.
Senator Peters. Thank you, again, for your answers,
Admiral.
Admiral Grady. Aye.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Scott, please?
Senator Scott. I am going to let Senator Hawley take my
time.
Chairman Reed. Senator Hawley, please?
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Scott. That is kind of you.
Admiral, I am going to come back to something you said
earlier. You talked about China being the pacing threat and
INDOPACOM being the pacing theater. With that in mind, let me
just point out that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
continues to grow rapidly, but the resources that are available
to the Department to counter and deter that threat are not.
Given that, is it fair to say that DOD needs to be doing
less in lower-priority theaters so it can use its scarce
resources to do more to do what we need to do to deter China in
the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Grady. Yeah, I think it gets to that reimburse-
balance yes that we were talking about, sir, and so, certainly,
if the pacing threat is in the INDOPACOM theater, then working
with the combatant commander, Admiral Aquilino, my close
colleague, it will be important to provide him the resources he
needs to help shape that environment and make those priority-
based discussions based on the threat.
Senator Hawley. Are you concerned that the Global Posture
Review released last week doesn't name a single region where
DOD plans to do less?
Admiral Grady. Not part of the process to build the Global
Posture Review. What I do like about the Global Posture Review
is that it provides a disciplined framework to have those
priority-based discussions that you talked about. So, I think
that is a great promise of the GPR going forward.
Senator Hawley. So, you are not concerned is the answer to
my question?
Admiral Grady. I think that there is room for us to work
within the disciplined process that they lay out to have
further discussions about those priorities, challenges that you
referenced.
Senator Hawley. Well, I just want to say that I am very
concerned by the Global Posture Review. The overwhelming
message, I think, sent by the review is that our posture abroad
doesn't require any changes at all. The posture, the review
doesn't recommend any major changes.
I think that is a big mistake. We cannot continue to do
what we are doing and adequately deter China in Asia.
Let me ask you about our force-planning construct in the
2018 NDS. That shifted that construct, the NDS shifted focus
from maintaining our ability to fight and win two regional wars
to fighting and winning a single war against a great power.
Senator Rounds was asking you about this earlier.
Do you agree with the forced plan and construct used in the
2018 NDS?
Admiral Grady. I think as we work on the NDS, and, if
confirmed, I look forward to being part of the next NDS. I
think we are going to have to look really hard at that forced
plan and construct; its conditions base, its threat base, in a
situation, as I say, the world gets a vote, and we are going to
have to look at that that means with two peer competitors and
how we are going to adjust that.
Senator Hawley. Well, let me ask it to you this way. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin wrote to me earlier
this year. I am quoting her now, I believe that the force plan
and construct should prioritize and focus on China unless and
until the security environment changes dramatically. She goes
on, the threat China poses to Taiwan should be a priority for
the force-planning construct.
Do you agree with Dr. Karlin?
Admiral Grady. I haven't had a chance to sit down with Dr.
Karlin to talk about that, but I do agree that the pacing
threat and the challenges that we most face is in the INDOPACOM
region.
Senator Hawley. With regard to the force plan and
construct, Dr. Karlin also wrote, and I am quoting her again,
while the U.S. military will invariably need to juggle other
challenges simultaneously, it would need to reprioritize those,
should a conflict with China arise.
Do you agree with that, that the U.S. military will need to
reprioritize other challenges, for instance, in Europe, should
the conflict with China arise, so that we can focus on the
pacing threat?
Admiral Grady. If a new conflict arises, we are going to
have to provide all that we can to win that conflict.
Senator Hawley. You think that China should be the
priority, even in the event of simultaneous conflicts?
Admiral Grady. Again, conditions-based --
Senator Hawley. Well, I don't know what that means. With
all due respect, Admiral, you said that several times now and,
frankly, you are evading my questions. You haven't given me a
straight answer on any of my questions yet.
I have asked you about the Global Posture Review
repeatedly. I have asked you about the 2018 NDS.
So far, you haven't answered me on any of them. So, let's
try for a yes or a no. Let me just back up and let's try again.
The 2018 NDS, the force plan and construct used in that is
shifting away from multiple conflicts to winning one great
power conflict, do you agree with that, yes or no?
Admiral Grady. I agree that it needs to be reviewed.
Senator Hawley. So, that sounds like you don't agree with
it currently and you think it is subject to revision; is that
right?
Admiral Grady. So, what I offer, Senator, is that going
forward, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, I will have an
ability to help contribute to that dialogue as we look at the
force-planning construct going forward.
Senator Hawley. Well, I will tell you this, if I can't get
any further clarity from you on this, if your position is, in
fact, you want to abandon the 2018 NDS and force posture, you
won't be confirmed with my vote.
Let me ask you about the situation in Taiwan. Taiwan needs
to be able to feel cost-effective and resilient asymmetrical
defense capabilities as quickly as possible in order to
strength their deterrence against a Chinese invasion.
Do you agree with that?
Admiral Grady. I agree that asymmetric tools that they can
bring to that fight would be a great value.
Senator Hawley. My time is expired.
I am going to have a number more questions for you,
Admiral, for the record, and, frankly, I am disappointed in
your answers today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Now, let me recognize via Webex, Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate very much
and also enjoyed our conversation that we had before
Thanksgiving, and congratulations on your nomination. I am sure
you are going to be confirmed, sir, without any problems.
With that hope, I would like to know a little bit, you
know, first of all, we do an awful lot of the training in West
Virginia and we have had tremendous opportunity to work with
special ops and we are hoping that you are looking into that,
that some of the other service, branches of the service can use
or look at our state from the standpoint of the effectiveness
and the cost-effectiveness, especially, and a location, being
so close to D.C.
I don't know if you have had a chance to visit some of the
operations we have; if not, we would like to bring you and show
you what we have been able to develop here.
Admiral Grady. Senator, I have not had the opportunity to
visit the facilities that you discussed, but, if confirmed, I
would look forward to spending some time with those troops
there.
Senator Manchin. We would love to get you out as quickly as
we could, sir. That would be great.
I was pleased to read about the focus you have towards
interoperability. I know we touched on it briefly, and this has
been in your advanced questions. Interoperability with our
allies is something that I am sure you spent quite a bit of
time designing, implementing as Commander of the U.S. Fleet
Forces.
Can you describe some of those experiences and tell us how
you plan to expand that with all of our allies.
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator. Thanks.
The key issue for me as the Fleet Forces Commander or as
6th Fleet and STRIKFORNATO was to build interoperability so
that we could fight together, but not interoperability for
interoperability's sake, but interoperability for integration
so we could work better, we could fight better together
immediately. Interoperating is one thing; integration is where
we need to go and work and train together.
So, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, it will be a high
priority of me to work with our allies and partners on
interoperability as it leads to integration and then our
ability to fight and win together.
Senator Manchin. Sir, also, Cyber Command and Space Command
are two of the combatant commands that influence nearly every
weapon and support system in our inventory. Tell me, if you
will, your plan to resource each of them as the challenges and
capabilities in each domain increases.
Admiral Grady. Yeah. Sir, thank you.
Working within the space domain is absolutely critical and
a very high priority. It underpins everything we do as a
military, just as our military underpins what we need to do in
space.
So, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, space, as a domain,
and it is important to recognize that it is a domain like
everything else, will be a high priority for me going forward,
if confirmed.
Senator Manchin. I am going to ask you a hypothetical
question because I know, sir, it might be a little bit out of
your domain, but with what we see going on in China and Taiwan
and the South China Sea and also what we see going on now with
Russia and Ukraine, do you have any comments or any thoughts on
that, that would be kind of helpful in our deliberations?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
I think, you know, if you start with Russia in Crimea and
with Ukraine, it is a very dangerous and destabilizing
situation that we are working our way through. It is important
for us to ensure that we work with our NATO partners and
continue to recognize the challenges that are faced by Russian
activity in that area of the world.
Then remain rock solid in our commitment to Ukrainian
sovereignty, to Ukrainian self-determination and their larger
goals of, ultimately, perhaps moving forward with alliances and
whatnot.
I think in the Western Pacific the challenges are equally
as important. As we have discussed, that is the pacing threat
in the Pacific, and in INDOPACOM, and we are going to have to
meet those on a detail basis; again, two peer competitors, we
are going to have to balance those going forward.
Senator Manchin. Very quickly on the other one, sir, as a
commander, I am interested to hear about any concerns that you
may have in logistical capabilities or the capacity to surge
necessary combat power to any part of the region, but if--in
regions, that if we needed to combat a North Korean or a near-
peer aggression, what would be your thoughts on that and how
you think we could meet those concerns.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir. I think contested logistics is an
incredibly important part of our theory of the fight going
forward. I think that is why we recognize it as one of the four
pillars of the new joint warfighting construct.
So, contested logistics, whether it allows us to fight in
Korea or in the Indo-Pacific, or even in Europe, is going to be
incredibly important to what we do. We are pretty good at
logistics, but there is room to improve and that is why it is
such an important pillar of the joint warfighting construct.
Senator Manchin. Let me thank you again for your service
and also your continued willingness to serve and I look forward
to voting for your confirmation, sir. Thank you.
Admiral Grady. Aye, sir. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Scott, please?
Senator Scott. Well, first, Admiral Grady, it is nice to
see a Navy guy do well.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
Senator Scott. Congratulations on your nomination and
thanks for your willingness to serve.
So, I think we talked about this the other day. My top
concern is both, Communist China and Russia. My first question
is, without disclosing any classified information, what
examples can you provide that show that this administration is
doing everything it can to prepare the U.S. to deter and
potentially defeat these adversaries in the field, in any field
they make challenges in.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
I think a really good example of deterrence is our ability
to work with our allies and partners in a very robust exercise
and training series. I will just use my most recent example,
where we did the large-scale exercise within the department of
Navy that was a global, the first global large-scale exercise
that we have done that crossed the spectrum that crossed the
globe from INDOPACOM all the way into Europe.
That demonstration of credible combat capability on a
globally integrated basis, which was the value of LSE, I think,
is a really good example of how we can continue to press
deterrence and to demonstrate that credible combat capabilities
that underpins that deterrence.
Senator Scott. Thanks.
Do you agree that we have seen Communist China
significantly increase its use of aggressive military tactics
since President Biden took office and do you agree that
Communist China's behaviors, especially what we are watching in
Taiwan, have grown more bold this year?
Admiral Grady. I think Communist China's activities have
been relatively consistent over the last few years and are
certainly, and particularly the rhetoric is something that we
have to recognize and address.
Senator Scott. As we talked the other day, I introduced the
Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which would eliminate the
ambiguity we--it basically says, you know, we are going to
defend Taiwan. One, do you agree with that, and, two, would it
make your job easier if it was clear exactly what your
obligations are?
Admiral Grady. I think that the one China policy, the
Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiques and the six
assurances, I think that has done a really good job of just
maintaining the status quo, which is peace, which is solving
that challenge in Taiwan on a, not a unilateral way, and so
this escrow was important.
Going forward, a policy change, I think would be one that
would have to be based on the rhetoric and risk that China is
presenting, and, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, I look
forward to helping shape that and shape our thinking on that as
we press forward.
Senator Scott. Do you believe that General Secretary Xi
fears a U.S. reaction from the U.S., you know, with regard to
his continuing aggression towards Taiwan, and even other
countries in Asia?
Admiral Grady. I think that, and I can't speak for what is
in his head, but I suspect that the credible and capable
military that is forward more Admiral Aquilino's leadership is
one that should give him pause, that we are prepared and
positioned to do what we need to.
Senator Scott. For decades, the U.S. has reserved the right
to preemptively use our nuclear weapons in the event our
national security requires it. You know, do you believe that we
should keep that option open or abandon it?
Admiral Grady. I think that options are always good and
keeping all options on the table for the present is important.
Senator Scott. Do you have any concerns about China's focus
on their, and success in their hypersonic missiles?
Admiral Grady. Absolutely. It is an area that my
predecessor discussed at great length and they are moving very,
very quickly in hypersonics and a very challenging weapons
system and one in which we need to keep pace, if not,
overmatch.
Senator Scott. So, what do you think when Congress doesn't
pass the National Defense Authorization Act and continues to do
continuing resolutions, rather than pass a budget, how does it
impact our military readiness?
Admiral Grady. That is a great question, sir.
The continuing resolutions are super challenging, as you
know. They eliminate our ability to move with flexibility. They
stop new starts, our ability to invest in new weapons systems.
They have a human cost that goes with them.
Let me go back to the one I just mentioned, because it
links, synchronizes with your question, and that is a CR would
prevent us from advancing on new initiatives like the Army and
the Air Force program on hypersonic. So, CRs are very
disruptive and challenging for the service to work forward and
work through.
Senator Scott. So, how many ships do you think the Navy
needs to be able to guarantee freedom of the seas for ourselves
and our allies and our partners?
Admiral Grady. First, you know, I appreciate the law that
says 355. That is important and I understand that. Presence
matters. Capability matters. But so does, and capacity matters.
So, I think there is this balance between capacity and
capability as we seek to meet the law of 355, and so going
forward, you know, we will try to work to get to the 355,
because that is what the law says, but in the meantime, as we
work to get there and try to get there as fast as we can, we
have to balance capability and capacity, and there are some
other things that we can bring to the table in addition to the
capacity piece.
Senator Scott. Thanks, Admiral.
Thank you, Chair Reed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
We have four individuals on the Webex, but we also have a
vote. So, I will, at this point, Admiral, recess for 10 minutes
so that I can vote and also that I can allow my colleagues to
have a chance to question you.
So, the Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing back to order and
recognize Senator Rosen, via Webex.
Senator Rosen?
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member
Inhofe, for holding this hearing.
I would really like to thank Admiral Grady for meeting with
me recently, for your lifetime of service and your willingness
to continue to serve.
I wrote this down from your opening statement, I really
liked it when you said: Stronger families means a stronger
fleet. I think that that is really a terrific quote and I may
use that from time to time. I will credit you with that,
Admiral.
But I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity now. As
we discussed in our last meeting last month, cyberattacks are
becoming one of the central security threats to the U.S. and,
of course, to all of our partners. Our allies are essential to
ensuring U.S. cybersecurity, because we rely on them to do
threat-hunting, enable early warning, to harden our own
collective defenses.
As you well know, cyber defense is part of NATO's core task
of collective defense. So, given the rise in threats of
cyberattacks from both, state and non-state actors, NATO
efforts to protect allied networks and enhance resilience
across the alliance, well, it is just more critical than ever,
which is why I raised the subject when I met with NATO
leadership in Brussels just before Thanksgiving.
So, Admiral Grady, what do you see as the significant
cyberthreats that NATO alliance is facing and can you
specifically describe the cyberthreat our European allies face
from Russia and how, if confirmed, you would advise and support
our allies in combatting this cyber aggression.
Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Cyber is a domain that is increasingly active, increasingly
contested, and increasingly competitive. I think for our NATO
allies, they recognize that, and so working together with them
to face those challenges in this increasingly competitive
domain is important.
You know, we tend to think about warfare as something that
has a start point and an endpoint and I think cyber is one that
tells us that there is a lot happening in the gray zone that we
have to think about even before conflict starts. Indeed,
conflict could kick off in cyber before anything else.
I think another piece of the cyber challenge that we face
is how we work within the whole-of-government and with
industry. Even in our own country, all we have to look at are
attacks on meat-packing plants and railroads and those kinds of
things to know that we have to be good partners, certainly with
our allies and partners at NATO and beyond, but, of course,
with our industrial base partners and the rest of society,
because that is, in fact, what is happening now in the gray-
zone world that we live in.
Senator Rosen. Yeah, I couldn't agree more. This is an area
that is going to become an increasing threat to all of us
around the world, and so we really have to think about our
cyber readiness because our nation is really grappling in the
aftermath of unprecedented cyberattacks. In the U.S., we are
expected to face a shortage of 3.4 million skilled technical
workers (indiscernible--1:54:55). Those workers help us to
address these threats. There are particularly large gaps in
cybersecurity.
DOD continues to face challenges addressing requirements
for certain key scale areas, such as those in cyber and STEM
fields. To help address the shortfall, inspire future
generations of talent, last year's NDAA, Senator Brown, Peters,
Blackburn, and I introduced a bipartisan bill to help our
Junior ROTC, young men and women have a STEM training and
education track. So, that is great.
This year's NDAA, again, I worked with Senator Blackburn to
create a civilian cyber reserve which will also help address
cyber defense personnel needs.
So, Admiral, if confirmed, how will you recruit and train
personnel in these critical cybersecurity and STEM field,
networking, hardware, software, all of it, so that we can
really surge up and address these challenges that we know are
going to be increasing day after day?
Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator, and thank you for your
leadership on that initiative.
Just a quick shout-out on the JROTC and how important that
is for the health of the force going forward and then the STEM
education that you and I talked about how critical that is and
the key element of that is getting to our youngsters sooner
than later, is important, and you and I talked about that.
Concepts like a civilian cyber reserve, you know, you and I
talked about this. You know, in my view, if you are willing to
serve your country, if you can pass a security clearance, but
you may not look like me, I don't care. If you can come and you
can serve and you can help us win in cyber, whether as in the
civilian cyber reserve or some other form, we need to encourage
that because that is an area that we know we have to win. We
know our adversaries are throwing a lot at it and we just have
to outpace that.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you.
I want to be sure that the DOD maintains our technical
superiority and I am going to do everything I can to help
enforce that, grow that with you.
So, thank you. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Tuberville, please?
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You saved the best for last.
[Laughter.]
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Admiral, for being here and
your wife, and your service.
I am excited about you being in this position. I think you
will bring a lot to who we are and what we are. You know, I
hear about all these rockets and tanks and all that. I came
from a team atmosphere of 40 years and I have been all around
the world since I have had this job now for 12 months and I
have seen how dangerous it is.
If we are going to survive, not just our country, but the
world, our military is going to have to do it for us. It is not
all the bells and whistles; it is the Jimmy Joes and Janes.
My concern is how do we build that best military? How do we
build the values and morals and educate these young men and
women, because we are finding less and less, obviously, that we
will take in the military. What we have total, I think is close
to 2.5 million people, Reservists, active-duty.
I just want to get your thoughts on that. I like what you
told me back when we met about drug testing kids. You know, we
are becoming more of a liberal society in things that we do,
but we cannot allow that to creep into our military, because
what they do means life and death, you know, to them,
themselves, to people around them, and also the survival of who
we are in the free world.
So, I hope you would bring, and I know you will bring a lot
of that to the Joint Chiefs to let that pass on down from the
people that you work with. So, talk a little bit about, you
know, structuring, you know, our military from this point on.
We have a great military. I think there are some things
that we need to maybe correct, but we still got to build that
fighting machine.
Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
You and I talked at great length about how Xs and Os are
important, but Johnny and Joe and Jane are more important.
Senator Tuberville. Right.
Admiral Grady. The center of the universe, our soldiers,
our sailors, our airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
guardians, it is important that we don't forget that that is
what it is all about and setting them up for success to win and
to not go into that fair fight is absolutely critical.
You and I also talked about the sailors and the servicemen
that were getting into the Navy now. As I told you, sir, I am
super impressed with who we get now. They are different than
when you and I were growing up, but they are just as good, and
I am supremely confident that we can ensure that they stay that
way going forward.
You know, drug testing is a really important policy and it
is a very successful policy. We have a zero tolerance for that
kind of thing and that will continue so that we can maintain
that lethal, credible, warfighting edge that you expect us to
have going forward, built on the center of the universe, our
servicemembers.
Senator Tuberville. Well, thank you.
I know you will do a great job. I look forward to you being
a huge part of what we do and working with you for the next few
years, oh, and Merry Christmas. It is almost here. Thank you.
Admiral Grady. Aye, aye, sir. Thank you.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Admiral, thank you for your testimony and thank you for 40
years of service, you, and your Christine and your family, and
I look forward to your speedy confirmation.
With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
Admiral Grady. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Admiral Christopher W.
Grady, USN by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and responsibilities
Question. Section 154 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides
that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to such other duties as may be
prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the
approval of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, other provisions of
law and Department of Defense issuances assign to the Vice Chairman a
breadth of duties and responsibilities.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the
nation's second-highest ranking military officer and member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for overseeing joint military
requirements, providing advice and recommendations, and performing
other duties as directed by the Chairman.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform the Vice Chairman's duties and responsibilities?
Answer. I have been honored to serve our nation for 37 years. I
believe my command experiences as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces
Command, Naval and Joint Forces Maritime Component Command Strategic
Command, Naval Forces Northern Command, Commander, Sixth Fleet,
Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO, Commander, Naval Surface
Forces Atlantic, as well as the director of the Maritime Operations
Center for the Pacific Fleet have prepared me for the duties and
responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
particularly the role that the Vice Chairman plays in managing military
requirements.
Multiple global deployments, service in senior Joint Staff and
OPNAV staff billets, including on the National Security Council in the
White House, and command of a Carrier Strike Group have also prepared
me to work collaboratively across the joint force, the interagency,
whole of government, and closely with our allies and partner nations.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take
to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I believe I am prepared to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief. I will
continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful and diverse insight to
ensure our military forces are positioned to serve our nation.
Question. What other duties do you anticipate the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs would prescribe for you, if confirmed?
Answer. The Chairman, General Milley, has indicated he does not
intend to expand the Vice Chairman's duties beyond what is stipulated
in statute.
If confirmed, I expect to continue to emphasize efforts to
strengthen the readiness of our military and reform Department business
practices for increased effectiveness and affordability.
Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities that should be
assigned to the Vice Chairman, in your view?
Answer. I do not believe there are any additional duties to assign
to the Vice Chairman, beyond those stipulated in statute. If confirmed,
I will work with the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff, if
necessary, to ensure the Joint Staff's effectiveness.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the
Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate
that we are a nation under civilian control; it is one of the
foundational principles of our great nation. If confirmed as the Vice
Chairman, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are
aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our
civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is a bedrock
principle of our country, and I will do everything in my power to
ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.
deputy secretary of defense
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in
addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the
integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.
If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the
Deputy Secretary of Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work hand-in-hand with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to foster and build a strong and collaborative
relationship. Activities will include participation in multiple
meetings each week on critical issues for the Joint Force and the
nation, both senior leader forums that provide guidance to the
Department, and issue-focused engagements to advance new opportunities
and stem emerging challenges.
Question. If confirmed, how would you expect responsibilities to be
allocated between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and yourself as co-
chairs of the Deputy's Management Action Group?
Answer. I view the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a close and
complementary partner in managing the agenda and execution of the
Deputy's Management Action Group. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of issues to
include the full range of strategy, policy, resourcing, and management
issues impacting the Department.
Question. In your view, can the Deputy's Management Action Group be
more effective in ensuring that issues with resource management, and
broad policy implications are addressed in a manner that aligns with
the Secretary of Defense's priorities and the Department's planning and
programming schedule? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Deputy's Management Action Group is a critical forum
for sharing information, creating alignment across civilian and
military components, exercising effective civilian control and
oversight of the Department, and making decisions on major issues. One
way to make this forum more effective is to identify additional lower-
level forums which are working on issues that would benefit from a
higher-level review to broaden information sharing, remove obstacles,
and bring decisions to closure.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Our military's challenge over the coming years is to fully
transform and adapt in the context of a constantly evolving threat
environments our nation faces from our pacing threats Russia and
especially China. As we transform, we must also set a high priority on
maintaining our close cooperation with our allies and partners to
address various security challenges and increase our collective
strength. Also, while our focus must be on our pacing threats, we still
face challenges from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist
organizations. In order to effectively address all the threats we face,
we must continue to modernize our military, and, maintain its readiness
to engage anywhere and anytime our nation's leaders choose.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work alongside the Chairman,
combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure we are effectively
executing the strategy our nation's leaders set out.
The Joint Staff will collaborate with interagency partners and
Congress to assess the global security challenges and provide a
flexible, agile Joint Force that leverages fresh concepts and robust
capabilities to offer the broadest possible set of operational options
to decision-makers.
Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff performs functions
that overlap with those of other DOD components, what would be your
approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those
redundancies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to ensure that
the Joint Staff continues to identify and mitigate unnecessary
redundancies consistent with law and policy.
the joint chiefs of staff
Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
fiscal year 2017 made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code,
concerning the service of members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the
Chairman) as military advisors to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. What is your assessment of the authorities and process by
which members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide
military advice and opinions to the President, National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the
Department of Defense?
Answer. Existing authorities and processes facilitate the flow and
exchange of advice and opinions to senior leaders. If confirmed, I will
work with the Chairman to facilitate any member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, either individually or collectively, in providing their advice
directly to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security
Council, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. Additionally, I will
foster a collaborative environment that promotes respect for dissent
and strengthens our national security in a very complex security
environment.
Question. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would always
provide your best military advice to the President, the National
Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of
the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions differ
from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
national defense strategy and interim national security strategic
guidance
Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) focused United
States strategic priorities on a rising China, an aggressive Russia,
and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In
March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), which sets out the national
security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has
initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, which is to be completed
in 2022.
15. Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the INSSG accurately
assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical
and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
its allies?
Answer. Yes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Joint Force provided their best military advice during the development
of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The INSSG provides
adequate guidance until the release of the 2022 NDS. Both have
accurately assessed the strategic environment and articulated the
position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power
competition.
Question. Do you support the national security priorities set out
in the 2018 NDS and INSSG?
Answer. Yes, I support the national security priorities set out in
the 2018 NDS and INSSG. They provide necessary strategic direction to
the Joint Force. The Secretary's emphasis on China as the pacing threat
is aligned with both documents. The shift from a Counter-Violent
Extremist Organization focus to one centered around what the 2018 NDS
referred to as Great Power Competition was an important shift for the
Joint Force. The 2018 NDS' emphasis on Allies and Partners and Reform
were also important pillars that the 2022 NDS and NMS will continue
building upon.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to make to the 2018 NDS or in the Department's
implementation of the 2018 NDS and INSSG?
Answer. If confirmed, I would want to first thoroughly review the
strategy development work already under way for the 2022 NDS and 2022
National Military Strategy (NMS). Based on that review, I would make an
assessment and offer any recommendations that seemed appropriate and in
alignment with the Administration's strategic direction, as currently
laid out in the INSSG and in the soon to be released National Security
Strategy (NSS).
Question. In your view, do the 2018 NDS and INSSG correctly specify
the priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can
achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic
environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?
Answer. Yes, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), as amplified
in the INSSG, correctly prioritizes the Department of Defense's
mission. China and Russia's growing capabilities pose the greatest risk
to our nation and strategic stability. China and Russia pose truly
existential challenges that we must address in defense of the Homeland,
in the emerging domains of space and cyber, in the conduct of contested
logistics, and across all dimensions of national security.
Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the
Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and
resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security
objectives identified by the 2018 NDS and INSSG?
Answer. Combatant Command Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and
Operational Plans (OPLANs) are necessary but not sufficient to capture
the full scope of operations across the globe. In response, the Joint
Force has developed Global Integration Frameworks (GIFs) for each of
the priority challenges. GIFs use the capstone OPLAN to prioritize
military objectives across the globe, identify global campaigning
activities, and achieve the NDS's and INSSG national security
objectives.
Question. If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the
missions, responsibilities, and force structure allocated to the
Combatant Commands, best to implement the 2018 NDS and INSSG? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. The DOD consistently seeks to improve our combatant
commands' ability to achieve military objectives in support of National
Security aims. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to review
the relevant studies regarding combatant commands' roles and missions,
consider how we might further global integration to best address the
global nature of the challenges we face in the 21st century, and offer
my recommendations accordingly.
national military strategy
Question. The Committee remains concerned that the processes for
translating the explicit and implicit priorities reflected in the
National Military Strategy into the budget proposals submitted by the
military services are not as effective as they need to be.
21. In your view, does the Defense Planning Guidance consistently
and clearly set priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the
National Military Strategy and the Joint Military Net Assessment?
Answer. Yes, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) consistently and
clearly sets priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the
National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Military Net Assessment
(JMNA).
Question. In your view are the Chairman's Annual Joint Assessment
and Annual Program Assessment effective in aligning service budget
proposals with joint priorities?
Answer. Yes. That does not mean there is no room for improvement.
If confirmed, through these documents, chairmanship of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, and co-chairmanship of the Deputy's
Management Action Group, I will encourage all elements of the Joint
Force to continually assess opportunities to improve our ability to
efficiently and effectively invest in emerging and modern capabilities
and technologies that truly address our greatest threats and
challenges.
Question. What are your views on the current version of the Joint
Warfighting Concept as it supports the National Military Strategy?
Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) is an important
document for the Joint Force. It provides a vision of the future Joint
Force and describes how that Force must fight in order to be
successful. Through learning and experimentation, the JWC will serve as
an important roadmap to modernize capabilities and address gaps.
dod readiness
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD--
across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training--
to execute the NDS, INSSG, and Combatant Commanders' associated
operational plans?
Answer. I am confident today we can protect the homeland, meet our
alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any
potential adversary. With stable, predictable, adequate, and timely
funding, we are working to improve readiness and modernization across
the joint force in order to increase our lethality, flexibility, and
resilience.
Question. In what specific ways have the Combatant Commands
utilized their increased budgetary authority to foster readiness
recovery?
Answer. The Services are leading the charge in utilizing their
increased budget authority to foster readiness recovery. The increased
budgetary authority granted to restore core readiness was necessary and
an important step. The Combatant Commands' role continues to highlight
to the Services areas of critical concern for mission execution. The
Combatant Commanders have been staunch resources and readiness
advocates to their service partners.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant
Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to
their readiness to execute operational plans in furtherance of the NDS
and INSSG?
Answer. Restoring warfighting readiness, both current and future,
is a key priority of the 2018 NDS and INSSG. With stable, predictable,
adequate, and timely funding, we have been able to address risk in
force readiness and are restoring capability to respond to
contingencies. The Joint Force continues to face challenges in
rebuilding future readiness, and, looking out to 2025, the ability to
project power and achieve superiority in multiple domains. Our
competitive advantage has eroded over time because of two decades of
continuous operations exacerbated by sequestration and fiscal
uncertainty. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding
we can continue to improve readiness and build the future force that
maintains our competitive advantage.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in restoring joint
force readiness?
Answer. Our nation faces very real and significant challenges, and
we must continue to invest in the future. Stable, predictable,
adequate, and timely funding help us maintain our qualitative and
quantitative competitive advantage. Additionally, we must recapture our
ability to go faster than our adversaries and take informed risks to
maintain our competitive advantage. This includes inserting speed into
acquisition, research and development, and our technology and
innovation processes to ensure capabilities are delivered faster. If
confirmed, as the JROC Chairman and DMAG Co-Chair, I will advocate for
these efforts to ensure we continue to improve joint readiness and the
developing and fielding of warfighting capabilities.
national defense budget
Question. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy
Commission recommended that Congress increase the defense budget at an
average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Do you believe that sustained real growth in the defense budget is
necessary to achieve the aims of the existing NDS without incurring
significant risk?
Answer. Yes. I believe sustained real growth in the face of
evolving long term economic pressure is necessary to achieve the aims
of the existing NDS without incurring buying power risk to fiscal year
2022 dollars. The Department's $715 Billion budget requires hard
choices in terms of prioritization, but it is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the current NDS. If confirmed, I will be an advocate
for stable, predictable, adequate and timely defense budgets.
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of the DOD budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the proposed budget against
the National Defense Strategy's required tasks, missions, and
capabilities. PB22 supports a more lethal, ready, and partnered force
by funding efforts to modernize capabilities, expand warfighting
capacity, and restore readiness.
use of military force
Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making
recommendations to the President for the use of military force?
Answer. Recommendations on the use of military force should be
consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, such
recommendations should consider the probability of success, cost in
terms of casualties, and strategic risk.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force
and the rules of engagement?
Answer. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to
use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the
President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on
the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, provide
sufficient authority for the Department to conduct counterterrorism
operations and activities as necessary and appropriate to protect U.S.
national security interests?
Answer. I agree that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force provides a legal basis for operations against violent extremist
organizations and is consistent with the policies of current and past
administrations expressed in the report on the Legal and Policy
Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related
National Security Operations.
Question. In your view, what operational factors should Congress
take into consideration in assessing whether a ``new'' Authorization
for the Use of Military Force is needed at this time? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. I believe the current Authorized Use of Military Force
(AUMF) is sufficient in providing legal basis for the Department's
current counterterrorism activities. However, I support Congress
considering, as the President has stated, the terrorist threat as it
exists today versus the threat that existed when the 2001 AUMF was
enacted.
Updating the AUMF may improve our approach to counterterrorism by
aligning our resources to evolving threats, but there are also risks to
changing an authority which is sufficient and works. A new AUMF must
account for all terrorist organizations which threaten U.S. national
interests and provide the latitude for the U.S. to use both kinetic and
non-kinetic capabilities of the Joint Force to ensure the safety of
these interests. As the President has pointed out, the U.S. will lead
first with diplomacy and leverage America's unmatched network of
alliances and partnerships.
Question. In your view, are existing policies and processes for
determining if and when the forces of other nations are eligible for
Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces adequate and appropriate?
Answer. Yes. In all cases where U.S. forces are authorized to use
force to defend foreign forces or individuals in the context of armed
conflict, or a significant threat from an organized armed group, the
authorization comes from the President, whether expressly or implicitly
in authorizing or directing U.S. forces to participate in multinational
military operations. The Secretary of Defense approves military orders
(rules of engagement) implementing that authorization, and in many
instances the Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for
identifying and designating specific foreign forces or individuals to
be defended.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. Section
163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct that
communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and
the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be transmitted through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and may assign duties to the
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary in performing their
command function.
Do you believe that these provisions of law enact a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate
civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. The chain of command originates with the President and
runs through the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to the
commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will be dedicated
to participating in the decision-making process and executing lawful
orders as given by my civilian leadership.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
established under title 10, U.S. Code?
Answer. Normally, our armed forces operate under the established
Title 10 chain of command. There may be instances for the President to
establish other temporary command relationships for certain sensitive
military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S.
military personnel are still accountable to the Title 10 chain of
command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Furthermore, our armed forces must act consistent with the law of war
in all military operations.
alliances and partnerships
Question. The 2018 NDS and INSSG stress that mutually beneficial
alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition
with, deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic
competitors.
What is your view of the continuing strength of our current
alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners
have in the United States to meet its obligations? What do you see as
the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in enhancing
that trust?
Answer. From a Joint Force perspective, confidence and trust in the
U.S. military among our Allies and Partners remains strong. We continue
to be actively engaged and synchronized with our Allies and Partners in
our operations around the globe. The role of the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely suited to complement the Chairman's
engagements with Allies and Partners to reassure them of the U.S.
commitment to a rules based international order.
I will continue, and expand as necessary, the Vice Chairman's role
in direct bilateral consultations on key issues of importance with my
counterparts. These consultations could take the form of Counterpart
Visits, less formal office calls on the margins of other Ally and
Partner visits to the United States, traveling to Ally and Partner
countries for engagements with their leadership and staff, or direct
phone calls.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant
commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Joint Force, through
the execution of our Global Campaign Plans, continues to strengthen
alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new
opportunities for international cooperation.
Specifically, the Joint Force does this through close consultation
and coordination with Allies and Partners in a number of routine
bilateral and multilateral relationships that include, but are not
limited to, our key Allies in the Indo-Pacific, NATO Allies, the FVEY
nations, the Quad, ASEAN's Defense Ministers Meeting-plus framework,
and Coalition partners. These fora enable us to engage and collaborate
with our Allies and Partners to achieve mutual military objectives and
desired strategic effects related to competition with China and Russia,
while enabling their capabilities to counter violent extremist
organizations. Most importantly, within bilateral engagements and
multilateral fora, we increase our communications and take action to
include Allies and Partners earlier in our planning processes to enable
their national enterprises greater opportunity for integration and
collaboration.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the
military leaders of the Armed Forces of other nations, international
consultative forums, and processes for enhancing interoperability
between Allies and Partners?
Answer. Allies and Partners are critical in responding to mutual
threats, preserving our shared interests, shaping the strategic
environment, and are one of the greatest asymmetric advantages the
United States has over potential adversaries. In my career, I have had
the opportunity to meet and get to know military leaders from many of
our Ally and Partner Armed Forces.
I am familiar with, and will support as necessary, the Chairman's
regular consultations and meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of
Defense (CHOD) in several multilateral fora such as the NATO Military
Committee in Chiefs of Defense Sessions and others. These consultations
are essential to enhancing interoperability between Allies and
Partners.
Question. In your view, what kinds of activities or engagements
with Allies and Partners are most effective at enhancing those
relationships and in case of crisis and conflict are most likely to
elicit their defense cooperation and support?
Answer. Building and enhancing relationships with Allies and
Partners is a continuous activity, and the Joint Force is best served
by a comprehensive relationship-based approach. Key leader engagements
are vital, as are exercises and training, personnel exchanges,
partnering for technology development, and a host of other security
cooperation activities. Of course, the appropriate frequency and scope
of each activity will depend upon the relationship in question, the
goals set by policymakers, as well as the specific campaign,
contingency, and crisis action plans our commanders have in place.
defense security cooperation
Question. DOD supports a wide range of programs and activities
including foreign military sales, security assistance to build the
capabilities of foreign security forces, exercises and training events,
military-to-military exchanges, and partnering to develop key
technological capabilities.
Do you believe the Department of Defense has an effective security
cooperation strategy for long-term strategic competition with near-peer
rivals?
Answer. Yes, I believe the DOD has an effective security
cooperation approach for long term strategic competition with near peer
rivals. Our existing security cooperation programs and activities, as
led and managed by OSD Policy, DSCA, the Joint Staff J5/J7, and the
Combatant Commanders are critical in bolstering the network of
alliances and partnerships necessary to compete with near-peer rivals.
Security Cooperation success depends in large part on collaboration
with our interagency counterparts under the guidance of documents like
the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), to ensure
that DOD's security cooperation activities support U.S. foreign policy
objectives more broadly.
Question. What should be the primary objectives of Department of
Defense security cooperation programs and activities, in your view?
Answer. The primary objectives of DOD security cooperation actions
and activities employed by Combatant Commanders are to build and
develop allied and partner security capability and capacity for self-
defense and multinational operations. These same activities provide the
Joint Force with the access and relationships necessary to promote
access and shared security interests.
Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
resourced to execute security cooperation programs and activities
effectively? If not, what changes would you recommend, if confirmed?
Answer. The DOD is well organized to execute security cooperation
through a network of experts in the Combatant Commands and Services, at
U.S. Embassies, within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and
elsewhere. While it is clear the DOD cannot rely on enormous
investments in the national security forces of other governments to
guarantee the security of the American people, it is also apparent that
security cooperation activities often pay large dividends.
If confirmed, I aim to collaborate with all stake holders to assess
and evaluate our security cooperation programs to ensure they meet the
needs of our operational commanders and are achieving the goals our
national security policy makers.
the defense acquisition board (dab)
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a
member of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the DOD acquisition
system's senior advisory board. The DAB reviews and advises the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on Major Defense
Acquisition Programs--the most complex and expensive DOD acquisition
projects.
What is your understanding of the Vice Chairman's role as a member
of the DAB?
Answer. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the senior advisory
board for defense acquisitions in the Department of Defense. The board
is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment and includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Service Secretaries, and a number of Under Secretaries of
Defense. The DAB plays an important role in the Defense Acquisition
System. Members of this board are responsible for approving the Major
Defense Acquisition Programs and serve as the most important executive
review of critical acquisition projects that have large impacts on the
capacity and capabilities of the force.
If confirmed, I intend to work in close partnership with the
Board's members to assure alignment with the stated goals of the
Chairman's Planning Guidance and National Military Strategy.
Question. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman's role in the DAB
should be modified to enhance the Board's effectiveness? If so, how?
Answer. Not at this time, but I will look for opportunities to
increase the flexibility and the speed at which we acquire systems and
warfighting capabilities.
joint requirements oversight council (jroc) and the joint capabilities
integration and development system (jcids)
Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) established the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) as ``the principal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs on joint military capabilities or joint performance
requirements'' enabling the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to
the Chairman without the concurrence of the members of the JROC.
If confirmed, do you intend to take full advantage of your
authority as the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to the
Chairman and the Secretary of Defense for capabilities that derive from
commercial technology and technology developed in DOD organizations
independently of the military services?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by Congress
in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with the active
support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I anticipate
that in the current technological environment the entities that procure
capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from technologies
that derive from the Services, private industry, and other DOD
organizations.
Question. If confirmed, do you intend to exercise this authority to
establish requirements for joint capabilities, such as Joint All-Domain
Command and Control?
Answer. Yes, I will exercise the capability requirements authority.
Modern warfare demands unprecedented levels of interoperability,
integrated systems-of-systems kill chains, and joint command and
control, for which no single Service is responsible.
Question. Do you believe that this problem can be addressed through
the JROC requirements process?
Answer. Yes, the requirements for such joint capabilities can and
should be addressed through the JROC.
Born out of numerous failures in interoperability, the JROC and its
requirements process were created to enforce interoperability between
critical systems across the joint force.
Question. If confirmed, what other steps would you recommend to
address this deficiency?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support my predecessor's
efforts to seek consensus on issues for which no single Service has
responsibility and work to address those issues through the JROC
Strategic Directives. I also support the use of the Joint Warfighting
Concept to assign matters of Joint interest to a lead Service with an
appropriate supporting Joint Staff directorate.
Question. Do you believe the JROC has responsibility to ensure that
the services are meeting their joint warfighting obligation with their
assigned roles and missions?
Answer. The JROC's responsibilities, as established in Title 10
Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by assessing
joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any gaps, and
validating joint military requirements. It is incumbent on the Services
to achieve their joint warfighting obligations, and to inform the JROC
when they are unable to do so.
Currently, strategic capability gaps derived from exercises and
experiments as they are applied to helping refine the Joint Warfighting
Concept are being used by the JROC to deliver strategic direction and
joint capability requirements to the Services.
Question. Do you agree this is an effective methodology for
providing strategic direction to the Services?
Answer. JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) are aligned to Joint
Concepts and focus on cross-cutting capabilities that the Joint
Warfighter of the future will need to satisfy the strategic guidance
within the NDS. JSDs achieve this by setting clear and strategic
requirements to ensure interoperability across the Joint Force.
Question. What is your understanding of how this strategic
direction is to be enforced by the Department to ensure the Services
fulfill joint capability requirements?
Answer. JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) will inform the Chairman's
Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).
In turn, the directives will inform Service POMs and the development of
the President's Budget. I support the current plan that each year the
JROC--including the Vice Chairman and each of the Services--will assess
how the Services are progressing in meeting the JSD requirements.
Question. With respect to Integrated Air and Missile defense, do
you believe the JROC should play a role in ensuring the Joint Force has
the ability to protect itself in the near term and future from
supersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?
Answer. Yes. The JROC's responsibilities, as established in Title
10 Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by
assessing joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any
gaps, and validating joint military requirements. This responsibility
exists across all domains and all capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you take to ensure this
capability is developed and fielded?
Answer. The JROC will continue to monitor and manage the progress
of the program through its established bodies and processes to include
validation of changes to requirements documents and the annual
Capability Portfolio Management Review.
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and the Assault
Breaker II initiative from DARPA are two prominent examples of joint
capabilities in development for which there is no obvious transition
path. In the case of JADC2, the Joint Staff is taking the lead in
coordinating development.
Question. In your view, is this an important issue? If so, do you
have thoughts about how to address it if you are confirmed?
Answer. JADC2 is an important developing joint capability, critical
to the success of the Department. JADC2 is not a joint product or
program of record but rather a capability delivery framework to
modernize and accelerate the fielding of material and non-material C2
capabilities. DSD stood up the JADC2 Cross-Functional Team (CFT) to
oversee implementation of the Secretary's JADC2 Strategy. The CFT has
been charged with highlighting ``best of breed'' capabilities and
ensuring the possible transition or integration of joint C2
initiatives. If confirmed, I will aggressively monitor CFT progress to
assure timely introduction of these important capabilities to the joint
force.
Commercial industry investment in research and development exceeds
that of DOD and the technology emerging from industry is expected to
drive military capabilities globally. For this reason, some recommend
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E) should be made a member of the JROC.
Question. Currently, USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E serve in the
JROC in prominent advisory roles. What are your views on adding the
USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member?
Answer. I believe that it is important for the JROC to provide the
military's findings on future requirements from a warfighting
perspective. There is wisdom in Congress' creation of a cross-Service
body to perform this function. Indeed, the JROC's current composition
of voting members includes General/Flag Officers from each service
component. USD(R&E) has an important responsibility for the advancement
of technology and innovation throughout the DOD, and is invited to
participate in every JROC meeting. The JROC values the recommendations
of all its advisors, taking them into serious consideration. While I do
not currently see a need to add USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member, it is
also critical to retain USD(R&E)'s contribution as an advisory member.
Question. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman, as the Chairman of
the JROC, should work to develop requirements based on technological
opportunities emerging from the private sector and DOD advanced
research organizations, such as DARPA and the Strategic Capabilities
Office?
Answer. Yes. Title 10 Section 181 charges the JROC to identify new
joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and
concepts of operation. In the current technological environment, it
would be impossible to fulfill this mission without direct engagement
with advanced research organizations and awareness of private-sector
innovation. USD(R&E) provides a critical link to these emerging
technological opportunities.
Question. In your opinion, does the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD
(A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, possess the technical
expertise and capacity to identify mature, high-payoff technologies
that should form the basis for new military requirements?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, is the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD
(A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, able to effectively
assess whether requirements proposed by the military services are
technically realistic?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed the Secretary of
Defense to ``ensure that analytical organizations within the Department
of Defense, such as the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, provide resources and expertise in operations research,
systems analysis, and cost estimation to the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council to assist the Council'' in generating and approving
requirements. Despite this mandate, the Joint Staff still lacks
operations research-related expertise and capacity.
In your opinion, has this mandate has been fulfilled? Please
explain.
Answer. Yes. While the JROC still relies on CAPE for cost
assessment and program evaluation, expertise resident within the Joint
Staff J8 Functional Capability Boards support operations research and
systems analysis. Additional cost estimation expertise within the JROC
would be duplicative of CAPE, which already serves in an advisory role
to the JROC.
Question. In your view, should the JROC have its own operations
research and systems analysis staff?
Answer. No. The Joint Staff J8 provides operations research and
systems analysis support to the JROC via the Functional Capabilities
Boards.
Question. According to Section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, ``The
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, in the case of a recommendation
[of a requirement] by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary that is approved by the Secretary, oversight information with
respect to such recommendation that is produced as a result of the
activities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is made
available in a timely fashion to the congressional defense
committees.''
Do you commit, if confirmed, to provide such information to
Congress when requested?
Answer. If confirmed, yes.
Question. The JCIDS process was established partially to address
overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs. JCIDS is
intended to provide the information the JROC needs to identify the
capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed
by the joint warfighter.
In your view, is the JCIDS process effective in providing
information the JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the
future needs of the joint force?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How does the JROC intersect with the Deputy's Management
Action Group (DMAG) and to what degree and how does that intersection
allow enforcement of JROC strategic direction to the Services?
Answer. The VCJCS serves as Chairman of the JROC and as a co-chair
of the DMAG. These combined roles provide the opportunity to provide
advice to policy-makers based in the analysis and findings of the JROC,
and to present recommendations that align DMAG actions with JROC
strategic direction, in particular by deepening the alignment between
requirements and budgeting.
Question. If confirmed, how would you drive the development and
articulation of future joint concepts from which each Military
Service's concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition
processes will derive?
Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept is a framework to align Joint
Force requirements and guide future acquisition decisions. The findings
of this concept provide the basis for JROC requirements and strategic
directives. If confirmed, through the ongoing Functional Capabilities
Board processes, I will continue to review Joint Force capabilities and
capability requirement gaps and prioritize efforts.
Question. In your view, does DOD have the requisite modeling,
simulation, and analytic capabilities to develop and assess future
joint concepts, and the associated capabilities and force structure?
Answer. Our data, infrastructure, policy, tools, and staffs are
challenged to keep pace with the ideas, concepts, and capabilities
shaping our planning and programming. Fortunately, the Department has
recognized these challenges and established an Analysis Working Group
(AWG), co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman. The AWG is
led by OSD (CAPE), OSD (Policy), Joint Staff J7 and J8, and the Chief
Data Officer (CDO) and is working these challenges in conjunction with
the Services and other key stakeholders in the Department.
Question. If confirmed, what is your view on the appropriate role
of Combatant Commanders in the JCIDS process? How would you improve the
effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and
long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?
Answer. It is a team effort. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors
to the JROC when matters related to their area of responsibility or
function are under consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical
role in developing requirements and identifying capability gaps. The
Combatant Commanders specifically identify risks and evaluate their
Global Campaign Plan objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the
Capability Gap Assessment processes.
If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider
input from the Combatant Commanders. I will evaluate the needs of the
Combatant Commanders, the realities of Service budgets, and the
priorities of DOD leadership before determining any necessary
adjustments to improve effectiveness.
Question. In your view, are the JROC and JCIDS processes sufficient
to identify where opportunities for multi-Service collaboration exist,
or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of a
related acquisition program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the
structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?
Answer. No, not at this time.
Question. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities
enacted in Section 804 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA seek to speed
fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS
process.
What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS
process?
Answer. Not using JCIDS creates three issues that impact joint
interoperability: vital program interoperability may be impacted;
proper program prioritization may be missed, slowing down vital
warfighting capability reaching the Joint Force; and efforts may be
duplicated across the services when procuring vital warfighting
equipment.
If confirmed, I intend to continue efforts between the Joint Staff
and USD (A&S) to incorporate Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) into the
JCIDS process in order to address these concerns while maintaining
Congress's intent to increase the speed and efficiency of the
requirements process.
Question. What is your opinion of DOD's initial efforts to use
section 804 authorities?
Answer. Use of section 804 authorities has been successful. From my
perspective, as Commander, Fleet Forces Command, I am pleased to see
the depth and breadth of activities looking to accelerate the delivery
of warfighting capabilities to the force. If confirmed, I will continue
to work with key stakeholders to evaluate the use of 804 authorities
and provide feedback as necessary.
aircraft
Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization
programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical,
strategic, and tanker fleets will continue to increase. Aging aircraft
require ever-increasing maintenance, which incurs ever-increasing
costs. Nonetheless, readiness levels continue to decline.
What are your views on balancing current aircraft capacity and
future capability to meet expected threats?
Answer. It is critical to continue acquiring and modernizing our
5th generation fighter platforms for potential operations against near-
peer competitors. However, adapting the force we have today, while we
design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges requires a mix of
capabilities within the Tactical Fighter portfolio. In the short term,
recapitalizing a portion of our 4th generation aircraft fleet provides
essential capacity to improve readiness and meet Joint Force demands
while we field new 5th generation aircraft, modernize our existing 5th
generation aircraft, and develop new technologies to maintain the Joint
Forces competitive advantage.
nuclear policy
Question. Do you agree with the assessment of the past five
Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest
priority mission and that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a
critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. I believe nuclear deterrence is the Department's
highest priority mission. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
U.S. nuclear deterrent is the only effective way to counter that
threat. Modernizing our nuclear forces is a critical national security
priority.
WQuestion. hat is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons
and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and
the defense of allies?
Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons have long played an important role in
deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attack against the United States, our
forces deployed abroad, and our allies. An effective U.S. nuclear
deterrent is critical to maintaining strategic stability. That same
nuclear deterrent adds extra pause between nuclear-armed adversary's
decisions to start a conventional conflict.
Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based
nuclear delivery systems is consistent with an effective deterrent
posture in an era of increasing nuclear threats to the United States
and its allies?
Answer. Yes. The flexible, survivable, and responsive nuclear triad
has underpinned strategic deterrence for more than 60 years and is the
bedrock of our national defense. It remains essential to ensure no
adversary believes it can ever employ nuclear weapons for any reason,
under any circumstances against the United States or our Allies or
partners without risking devastating consequences.
Question. Do you believe the U.S. should maintain an effective
intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of responding to
strategic attacks and of sufficient size to ensure that the United
States could not be disarmed by an adversary's first strike?
Answer. Yes. Our pacing threats are pursuing a diversified set of
advanced nuclear weapons systems. The size and geographic dispersion of
the ICBM force presents an intractable targeting problem that
complicates a first-use attack. A maintained, modernized, and highly
responsive, ICBM force is a crucial component of the Triad.
Question. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that
the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear
forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on
alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any
given time.
Do you agree with that conclusion? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. The threat environment has grown increasingly complex.
The alert posture we maintain is a critical deterrent and necessary to
address current and future threats.
Question. Do you believe that the alert levels for the
intercontinental ballistic missile force should be reduced, potentially
requiring the United States to completely absorb a large-scale nuclear
strike before it will be able to respond?
Answer. No. ICBMs complicate an adversary's targeting and decision
calculus. Without ICBMs on alert, China would be able to instantly
adopt a counterforce strategy, and it would give Russian nuclear forces
the strategic upper hand.
Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has referred to
reports of China's nuclear force expansion as ``breathtaking'' and
contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. and
Russia is a ``strategic breakout,'' which represents an unprecedented
threat to global stability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. Yes.
. What is your understanding of how Russia and China have expanded
and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?
Answer. The United States has never faced the challenge of two
near-peer nuclear armed nations such as China and Russia. China is
rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear capabilities. This
includes construction of missile silos that could launch nuclear
weapons once completed. Russia is also advancing its already
considerable nuclear capabilities and continues to develop and field
nuclear capable weapons and systems not accountable under the New START
Treaty.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?
Answer. Yes. The expansion and modernization of Russia's nuclear
arsenal indicates a willingness to employ nuclear coercion as a means
of advancing their military and foreign policy goals. Russia's
significant expansion in non-strategic nuclear weapons exacerbates this
concern. These weapons are not accountable under New START. The
potential employment of these weapons poses miscalculation risk. Russia
may miscalculate the capability and resolve of the United States and
our allies to deter and defend against Russian limited nuclear use.
Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
Answer. Yes, I agree with that assessment.
Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of ``no
first use''?
Answer. A fully functional nuclear triad, in any capacity, creates
a challenging security environment for the United States and its Allies
and partners. As China's nuclear doctrine evolves under this reality,
it is crucial that we maintain an understanding of how China intends to
adhere to a ``no first use'' policy. The United States nuclear
deterrent must remain whole and modernized to meet this potential
threat.
Question. Do you support the policy of ``no first use'', i.e., a
commitment that the United States will never use nuclear weapons first
in a future conflict?
Answer. From a military perspective, I do believe in giving the
President as many options as possible, and that maintaining calculated
ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I would not
advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary's decision-
making, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their reliance
on nuclear capabilities.
Question. Do you support the policy that the sole purpose of
nuclear weapons is only to deter against other nations' nuclear
weapons?
Answer. I believe that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates
an adversary's decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change
that would simplify an adversary's decision-making, particularly if our
adversaries increase their reliance on nuclear capabilities.
Question. What is your understanding of allies' perspectives on
potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear
declaratory policy?
Answer. I believe our alliances are our strategic center of
gravity. Any potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy must
be carefully crafted and communicated to ensure that we maintain close
alignment with our allies.
Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our allies have
been called one of the U.S. most important and most effective tools for
stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
Question. The extended nuclear deterrence assurances the United
States provides to its allies have been called one of the U.S. most
important and most effective tools for stemming the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence assurances are
effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to pursue their
own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?
Answer. Yes. Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our
allies are one of the most important and effective tools for stemming
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
A number of recent press reports have highlighted NATO and allied
concerns regarding the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
assurances, and some--particularly South Korea--have seen increased
calls to develop their own independent nuclear deterrent as a means of
offsetting reduced confidence in U.S. assurances.
Question. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation
will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear
deterrence assurances?
Answer. Yes. Effectively assuring our Allies of the credibility of
extended nuclear deterrence mitigates the risk of nuclear
proliferation. Our alliances are one of our greatest strategic
advantages, and if confirmed, I look forward to closely engaging with
our Allies on these issues.
Question. Do you believe China or Russia would view U.S. adoption
of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy as
credible?
Answer. No, I do not.
Question. What are your views of changing our declaratory policy
for NATO with respect to Britain and France and their declaratory
policy?
Answer. U.S. nuclear forces, along with the independent strategic
forces of the UK and France, remain the supreme security guarantee of
NATO Allies. This force is an essential component of the Trans-Atlantic
military link that should be maintained to preserve peace, prevent
coercion, and deter aggression. It is important to maintain Alliance
cohesion and unity regarding declaratory policy.
Question. Prior to the current iteration, the Joint Staff has
played a significant leadership role in the conduct of each incoming
presidential administration's Nuclear Posture Review. In structuring
its own review, the current administration elected to diverge from past
practice, and removed the Joint Staff from its typical co-chair
position.
If confirmed, what do you understand will be your role as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff in the ongoing Nuclear Posture
Review?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fulfill my duties and responsibilities
as the Vice Chairman to ensure the military equities of the Joint Force
are adequately considered and represented when presented to the
Secretary of Defense and the President. These equities include the
military's perspective on the current and projected threat environment,
and military advice on the implications of potential policy decisions,
including nuclear strategy, posture, and acquisition programs.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a significant
leadership role in future Nuclear Posture Reviews?
Answer. Yes.
nuclear modernization
Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. As a
member of the Council, you will work closely with the National Nuclear
Security Administration to coordinate policies and align resources for
DOD and Department of Energy nuclear programs.
If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the work of the
Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) enduring priority is
maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear weapon
stockpile able to deter adversaries and assure Allies and global
security partners. Close collaboration between the DOD and our National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) partners has proven successful
in sustaining legacy weapons and moving forward with critical
modernization efforts.
Continued success is contingent on building a robust and resilient
infrastructure to include plutonium pit production, uranium and lithium
processing, and increased non-nuclear production capabilities.
Maintaining confidence in our weapons hinges on having the necessary
modern facilities and skilled workforce to sustain the deterrent force.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the membership and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to foster the strong inter-
agency partnership and would not recommend any changes to the
membership or responsibilities of the NWC.
Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program
provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are
needed?
Answer. Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has
developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify
the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons
testing. The program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-
scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support
for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the
Stockpile Stewardship mission.
Question. U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful
lives. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the
United States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
What is your understanding of the state of U.S. nuclear forces, its
global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture,
and the supporting weapons sustainment and production capabilities
within the National Nuclear Security Administration?
Answer. Although our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and
effective, we have greatly exceeded their intended design life and they
are showing their age. Deferred modernization has removed margin and
there is no longer room for delay. Diminished and outdated DOD
industrial base capability to service and deliver nuclear platforms and
NNSA production capabilities and infrastructure, some of which date
back to the Manhattan Project, exacerbate this challenge.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad,
including delivery systems, warheads, command and control systems, and
infrastructure?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to
mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will ``age
out'' simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to keep senior leadership
across the Department informed and engaged on the transition from
legacy to modernized nuclear delivery platforms and weapons. I believe
such engagement is necessary to hold ourselves accountable for
addressing these risks in a coherent and responsible manner.
Question. More specifically, do you support the following DOD
modernization programs of record? Please be specific.
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
B-21 Bomber
Columbia-class Submarine
Modernization of the ground, air and space based Nuclear
Command, Control and Communications Systems (NC3)
Production capabilities to produce cryptographic products
for NC3
Long Range Stand Off Weapon
Sea Launched Cruise Missile
Upgrades to the B-52 to include radar, engines,
electronic warfare, survivable long wave frequency waveforms, Family of
Advanced Line of Sight Terminals
Addition of nuclear capability to the F-35A aircraft
While I support DOD nuclear modernization programs of record, the
Nuclear Posture Review will conclude how the programs of record will
support our strategy going forward. I recognize there is a lot of risk
in executing these programs concurrently, but I believe these programs
are necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear
deterrent in an increasingly complex security environment. If
confirmed, I commit to helping the Department manage the transition
risk appropriately.
Question. Do you support the following National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) modernization programs of record? Please be
specific.
Answer.
W80-4 warhead
W87-1 warhead
W93 warhead
B61-12 gravity bomb
B83 gravity bomb life extension
The capability to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per
year
Modernizing the production capability for depleted
uranium and lithium
Restoring the production capability to produce high
enriched uranium for defense needs
I fully support the W80-4 warhead required to support the Long-
Range Stand-Off cruise missile, the W87-1 warhead required to maintain
the land leg of the nuclear deterrent with GBSD, the W93 warhead
required to modernize the sea leg and potentially alleviate over-
reliance on a single warhead, and the B61-12 gravity bomb which
consolidates four weapon types and provides our Allies confidence in
our extended deterrence.
I am open to the possibility of forgoing a life extension of the
B83 gravity bomb if there are more effective ways to replace the
capability it provides. I support the need to produce at least 80
plutonium pits per year and the modernization of production capability
for lithium and depleted and high enriched uranium to enable
modernization of our aging stockpile.
Question. What are your greatest concerns with respect to the DOD
and NNSA modernization programs?
Answer. My greatest concerns with the DOD and NNSA modernization
programs are: 1) ensuring sufficient investment across the U.S.
industrial base to execute the modernization programs and enable
responsiveness to address unforeseen challenges; and 2) maintaining
necessary funding to develop, produce, and sustain a modernized nuclear
force and stockpile.
nuclear command, control, and communications
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as
the co-chair of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership
Command, Control, and Communications System.
If confirmed, how would you use this role to advocate for the
modernization of NC3 systems?
Answer. If confirmed, modernization of Nuclear Command, Control,
and Communications (NC3) would remain a top priority. As co-chair of
the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications
Systems, I would work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national
objectives, are adequately resourced, and stay synchronized with senior
leader and continuity of government communications efforts.
Additionally, as chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), I would work closely with CDR USSTRATCOM and the Services to
ensure efficient validation of NC3 modernization requirements and
advocate for the rapid delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities that
empower our triad of nuclear capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to assess the
cyber security of the NC3 system on an enduring basis?
Answer. Section 1651 of the 2018 NDAA requires the Commanders of
USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM to submit an annual joint assessment of the
cyber resilience of the nuclear command and control system to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to Congress. If
confirmed, as a co-chair for the Council on Oversight of the National
Leadership Command, Control, and Communication System, I will review
the NDAA-mandated report for action prior to providing it to Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role on the Joint Staff
for NC3 operations?
Answer. If confirmed, my role as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff would include duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the
approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, I would act to
support the Chairman as he exercises approval authority for the CDR
USSTRATCOM recommended changes to Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3) systems that affect the operational configuration
of the National Military Command System (NMCS).
Question. In your view, should senior leaders across the Executive
Branch regularly take part in NC3 exercises and, if so, why?
Answer. Yes. The Department is supportive of senior advisors to the
President participating in, or observing, large-scale exercises
involving nuclear command, control, and communications systems.
Participation at this level would enhance support to the President
during the nuclear decision-making process.
missile defense
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland
continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified
existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to
improve U.S. capability.
If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what
priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities
for the homeland?
Answer. If confirmed, my top priority is the improvement of the
U.S. missile defense architecture by ensuring the full integration of a
persistent and integrated network of sensors. These sensors provide
real-time detection, tracking, and targeting information that is
critical to policymakers during a crisis. The existing DOD global
network of sensors on land, at sea, and in the air and space domains is
highly complex and must be improved to increase operational awareness
and decision making. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to
ensure this element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is
prioritized.
Question. What are your views on the relationship between missile
defense and nuclear deterrence?
Answer. Missile Defense is a key piece of our integrated deterrence
strategy. United States policy for defense of the Homeland requires a
commitment to stay ahead of rogue nation missile threats while
continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more
sophisticated Russian and Chinese ICBMs. A robust and credible, layered
missile defense system paired with our conventional and nuclear force
capabilities provides the ability to deter strategic attacks and impose
costs against any potential adversary.
Question. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy
should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea
and Iran?
Answer. Yes. I believe U.S. homeland missile defense policy should
remain focused on defending against comparatively limited state
ballistic missile attacks from rouge nations like North Korea and Iran.
To address the threat of a comprehensive and technologically
sophisticated strategic missile attack by China or Russia, the United
States should continue to rely on the same strategy it has employed for
more than half a century--i.e., nuclear deterrence.
Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
threats, such as Russia and China?
Answer. Defending the U.S. homeland against non-strategic missile
attacks by pacing threats such as China or Russia remains a difficult
problem. U.S. missile defenses cannot defend against every threat. It
is simply one of many tools in our toolkit to protect against the
growing number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department
is examining ways to enhance its missile defense architecture against
conventional missile threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing
improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture.
Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program,
and once deployed, the regular testing of it?
Answer. Yes. I support the Department's decision to move forward
with development and future testing of the Next Generation Interceptor
(NGI), as well as the additional on-going efforts to enhance the
effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense System
(GMD). GMD protects the United States homeland against limited ICBM
threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support efforts to
ensure that the homeland missile defense architecture remains effective
as one of the important components to our integrated deterrence
approach.
Question. Do you support using Aegis Destroyers as a layer of our
homeland defense architecture?
Answer. Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or
existing capabilities will require weighing a variety of factors such
as cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability
against the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure the Joint Force has the proper mix of capabilities to
defend the homeland.
Question. Do you support a layered and dispersed missile defense
architecture for the defense of Guam, and if so, why?
Answer. Yes. I agree with the INDOPACOM Commander that ensuring
Guam has sufficient defenses is critical. Active missile defenses that
enable INDOPACOM to sustain military operations during a conflict are
one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If
confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right
combination of capabilities to defend Guam, including active missile
defenses, to enhance the U.S. regional deterrence and defense posture,
assure allies and partners, and increase readiness to contribute to a
free and open Indo-Pacific region.
Question. Do you support a long range homeland defense radar
capability in Hawaii?
Answer. Hawaii, as well as the rest of the United States, is
protected against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea and, if
confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to support continued improvements
to our homeland missile defense architecture, including our missile
defense sensor network. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing
Department assessments that inform future budget decisions and
potential siting locations of any additional sensors.
The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat
missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and
space-based system of systems, with the constituent pieces managed and
sustained by a number of different DOD components.
Question. Do you believe these various systems are appropriately
integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat
picture capable of supporting real-time operational decisions?
Answer. Yes, but there is still room for improved integration. A
strategy supporting layered networks of dispersed terrestrial/space-
based sensors integrated with layered kinetic and non-kinetic weapon
systems provide our best and most cost-effective defense. I believe we
took an important step towards improving our integration of these
critical but often disparate or multi-mission sensors by assigning
USSPACECOM as our Global Sensor Manager. If confirmed, I will endeavor
to improve our ability to seamlessly integrate our networks across all
domains and regions to enable a ``best sensor, best shooter''
capability.
Question. In your view, is a space-based sensor layer a required
``next step'' in enabling a wide variety of missile defense
capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced
threats?
Answer. Yes. A space-based sensor network can monitor, detect and
track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe--
they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by
the geographic constraints imposed on terrestrial sensors. Space
sensors can provide ``birth to death'' tracking of advanced missile
threats and enable a layered defense architecture that can engage
threats in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of threat missile
flight.
Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase
intercept and space-based intercept programs?
Answer. U.S. policy is to hedge against unexpected adversary
developments by investing in advanced technology so the United States,
its allies, and its partners can defend against strategies of coercion
or attack. I believe we should examine and exploit every practical
opportunity to detect, disrupt, and destroy a missile threat prior to
and during all phases of its flight. If confirmed, I will advocate for
investing in advanced technologies that contribute to a flexible,
layered, and cost-effective missile defense architecture that improves
the overall likelihood of successfully countering offensive missile
attacks.
Question. What is your understanding of DOD's efforts to develop
and implement operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to
the governance and utilization of such programs? If confirmed, what
would you do to address this issue?
Answer. I believe the Department must invest in advanced
technologies to meet the increasingly complex threats posed by larger
missile inventories and improved countermeasures. If confirmed, I will
review appropriate operational concepts and polices that govern the
utilization of any advanced defensive technologies.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is being considered as a
fifth initiative for strategic direction from the JROC.
Question. In your view, why is it important that IAMD become a
fifth initiative and do you support this going forward?
Answer. Over time, the JROC should provide strategic direction on
the requirements for each of the key capabilities for the future Joint
Force. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is certainly a
critically important capability and therefore an essential topic for
JROC action.
nuclear enterprise review
Question. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a
comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to
adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior
leadership. The review culminated in numerous recommendations to
address concerns identified. Responsibility for monitoring the
implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to
the Military Services.
Do you believe the Military Services are maintaining the
appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by
the Nuclear Enterprise Review?
Answer. Yes. I believe the Services remain actively engaged in
addressing the items identified in the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review.
arms control
Question. Do you support the New START Treaty, and if so, why?
Answer. Yes, I support the New START Treaty (NST). NST provides
much needed stability and an avenue of cooperation for the U.S.-Russia
political-military relationship. More importantly, the mutually
verifiable constraints in types and numbers of nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems agreed to in NST have facilitated drastic
reductions in both U.S. and Russian weapon arsenals since 2011.
Question. What are your views on the potential for arms control
measures to address the security threat from Russia's tactical nuclear
forces, which are not covered by strategic arms control agreements?
Answer. I applaud verifiable arms control as a method to reduce
nuclear risks. Certainly, Russia's numerical advantage in non-strategic
nuclear forces is a concern and a priority for any bilateral arms
control initiatives. I believe this is a prudent approach that will
maintain strategic stability with Russia and help to achieve the
Administration's goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.
Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced
his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should
only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions. Do you
agree with this statement?
Answer. Yes, there is no evidence that unilateral disarmament by
the United States would inspire Russia or China to reciprocate. It
would only weaken the U.S. position for future arms control
negotiations.
Question. Do you support additional efforts for nuclear arms
control? If so, with which countries, and in what specific areas, and
why?
Answer. Yes. I believe arms control advances U.S. national security
interests. If confirmed, I would support efforts to negotiate
multilateral agreements that are verifiable and that make the United
States and its allies and partners more safe and secure. Russia and
China are near-peer countries of interest for arms control efforts due
to their ongoing nuclear weapon modernization and expansion.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
China on nuclear weapons' reductions?
Answer. The U.S. must carefully consider our Arms Control options
and what systems and capabilities we are willing to accept limitations
on. Options that are considered must be reciprocal, verifiable, enhance
strategic stability, mitigate the risk of strategic escalation, and
enhance U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
Answer. Russia and China are expanding and modernizing their
nuclear weapon stockpiles. As Secretary Austin has stated, our nuclear
triad is long past the point where it must be modernized. If we do not
modernize our nuclear forces, we may not be able to negotiate from a
position of credibility and strength in future treaty negotiations.
Question. Do you believe it is important to have a strategic
stability dialogue with China, and if so, why?
Answer. Yes. Strategic stability dialogues help participants
understand each other's nuclear doctrine and national security
interests and helps to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculation that
can lead to unintended escalation. Historically, China has resisted any
formal discussion of strategic issues and the lack of transparency
surrounding its nuclear forces and doctrine remains a significant
concern. Any dialogue which enables open and frank discussions can help
participants better understand each other's respective risk
perceptions, increase transparency, and reduce nuclear risks.
Question. What are your views with respect to long range prompt
strike weapons and strategic stability?
Answer. Developing and fielding long range prompt strike
capabilities is critically important. If confirmed, I would work with
the Department, the interagency, and allies and partners to assess
opportunities to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of
conflict.
space program
Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
both economically and militarily--from the Global Positioning System on
which many industries and military capabilities rely, to the missile
warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our strategic
competitors--China and Russia--are engaged in a concerted effort to
leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the
space warfighting domain.
In your view, how would you characterize the level of risk China
and Russia pose to U.S. space-based assets?
Answer. Risk to U.S. space-based assets from China and Russia
continues to increase and expand. Over the past two decades, Russia and
China have continued to improve their space weapons capabilities and
enacted military reforms to better integrate space, cyberspace, and
electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military
operations. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's ``Challenges
to Security in Space Report,'' both Russia and China have potential
counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today. Both nations
will continue to develop, exercise, and integrate these capabilities
into war plans. We must improve our space-based capabilities'
resilience and protection in the face of these advancing threats.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in improving situational awareness of space and
appropriately prioritizing the protection of U.S. space-based assets?
Answer. We must expand our allied and commercial partnerships in
Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We must ensure joint requirements
drive toward adoption of common data standards and machine-to-machine
interfaces/automation. Improvements in SSA will enable us to better
determine intent, provide positive attribution of space events, and
enable the employment of defensive and offensive space control
capabilities within clearly laid out authorities.
Space systems that support strategic warning and communications
must remain a top priority. Many of our other space systems provide
services, which have elements critical to our national civil, economic,
and military interests. In recognition of this, we must pursue
protection capabilities and techniques, which maximize flexibility,
allowing us to respond to adversary threats against any U.S. or allied
space system.
Question. In your view, what are your greatest concerns as the
Space Force continues to operationalize across the DOD for the
development of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel, and facilities?
Answer. The Space Force exists to address threats and challenges in
space and enable effective warfighting and deterrence operations in all
domains. My greatest concern is that space has become a contested
domain and the United States must move faster than the threat. China
and Russia are making significant advances in their space capabilities
that will continue to challenge our access and freedom of maneuver in
space. If confirmed, I would prioritize the development and fielding of
a more robust and resilient space architecture, including doctrine,
organization, training materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities.
Question. What are your views on how to best achieve deterrence in
space when so many space control systems are highly classified?
Answer. It is difficult to achieve deterrence when numerous systems
remain highly classified, limiting communication with the public and
our partners. If confirmed, I would work with the Department, the IC,
and Congress to identify programs and systems, or discreet areas of
programs or systems that could be appropriate for reclassification.
Question. As Space Force is the title 10 provider of forces and
capabilities to the combatant commands for space operations, do you
believe they should be developing a tactical ISR space capability no
different than other services and their military doctrine and
capabilities?
Answer. It is within the scope of Space Force's authorities to
provide Tactical ISR to support the warfighter. The National
Reconnaissance Office meets most of the strategic and operational needs
for space-based ISR. That does not mean that there is not a need for
additional ISR capacity. In those cases, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) will need to ensure that the overall space-
based ISR architecture is examined to ensure needs are appropriately
met and capabilities from the interagency and private sector are
considered and leveraged.
Question. Do you believe the Chief of Space Operations in their
title 10 role should be the principal force design architect for space
systems and operations?
Answer. Yes. Designating the CSO as the principal force design
architect is essential to efficiently and effectively moving toward a
more resilient space architecture that will meet warfighter
requirements and be available to those warfighters across the spectrums
of competition and conflict.
Question. The reason for the creation of the space force was to
consolidate disparate space capabilities while balancing the need of
other services to utilize space within their doctrine and operations.
Do you support that objective?
Answer. Yes. I support that objective.
Question. If confirmed, do you support moving the Space Development
Agency to the Space Force?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
technology and mission support is incorporated into Space Development
Agency products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk
levels? What particular challenges do you perceive to increasing
collaboration between the private sector and DOD in the acquisition of
space systems and launch options?
Answer. The U.S. commercial space sector leads the world in the
innovation of space systems. From design to mission execution, DOD must
properly leverage this relationship to meet ever-increasing challenges
in the space domain. If confirmed, I will ensure that we incorporate
commercial capabilities where appropriate, with calculated, acceptable
risk levels, through my role on the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council. Further, if confirmed, I will work with partners inside and
outside of government to identify barriers to deepen collaboration in
this important sector.
Question. What role should the JROC have in the Intelligence
Community capabilities in Space given that the DOD is responsible for
defending the capability during conflict?
Answer. The DOD and IC partner closely to establish joint
priorities within the space domain. The JROC serves a vital function to
endorse future IC space-based requirements. This close partnership is
critical to ensuring DOD space-based ISR architecture is resilient and
survivable.
access to radio frequency spectrum
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that the Department continues to have access to the radio
frequency spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?
Answer. Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority is of critical
importance to the national security of the nation. To ensure
superiority, we must have an integrated approach to governance that
effectively prioritizes EMS through DOD requirements, resourcing,
workforce, and operations. If confirmed, I will work with all
stakeholders--including the Chief Information Officer and appropriate
combatant commands--to ensure the Joint Force is positioned to conduct
operations.
Question. Are you concerned about recent actions taken by the FCC
to supporting licensing ground operations in spectrum band close to the
GPS signal? Please be specific.
Answer. GPS signal is of great consequence to the Department of
Defense and our national security. If confirmed, I am committed to
reviewing the status of these recent actions and potential implications
for the Joint Force and providing my best military advice.
Question. Are you concerned about recent actions to have the DOD
vacate portions of the 3.1-3.45 MHz spectrum, and if so, why? Please be
specific on implications for force readiness.
Answer. Yes, this is an area of concern for me. Frequency bands of
dual use can adversely impact DOD operations, from training and
readiness to real-world operations. Cooperation between the Department
and Industry is required to balance public and private concerns. If
confirmed, I look forward to providing leadership on these crucial
dual-use questions.
information operations
Question. The Committee remains concerned that, five years after
the Russian Federation first successfully executed an aggressive,
large-scale influence operation against the United States and our
European allies, the Department of Defense does not yet have an
effective management structure or strategy for information warfare that
integrates across cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and
information operations that is conducted at the strategic level.
Do you share this concern? If not, why not?
Answer. I am concerned about state and non-state actors' capability
to successfully execute large-scale influence operations against the
United States, our Allies, and Partners. The information domain is a
complex theater of modern operations that requires close study and a
deep understanding. If confirmed, I will be supportive of all efforts
to assure our competitiveness and protect our vital national interests.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, in your view, could the Vice
Chairman take to help solve this important problem that handicaps our
ability to deter and compete with adversaries?
Answer. An era of strategic competition requires us to address a
number of significant challenges and rapidly evolving threats. Our
current and future warfighting capabilities must be measured against
their ability to address and outpace those threats. Specifically, to
deter our adversaries we need to clearly communicate, through both what
we say and what we do--that if they attack the United States or our
Allies they will fail to achieve their objectives and they will incur
costs that far exceed any gains they can achieve. If confirmed, I will
advocate for opportunities to apply speed, innovation, technology, and
integration in how we manage acquisitions and develop and deploy
existing and new warfighting capabilities.
Question. What are your views on whether there is a need to
operationally integrate all of the elements of information warfare?
Answer. Similar to the integration of air, land, sea, space, and
cyberspace operations, the integration of elements of information
warfare is not unique to any one command. If confirmed, I will help the
Chairman ensure that each Combatant Command has the necessary resident
authorities and guidance to execute their UCP missions.
I will seek to improve the integration of all information
capabilities and activities against all problem sets during
competition, crisis, and conflict. If confirmed, I will help the Joint
Force in its effort to revamp its operations and planning doctrine to
holistically integrate and synchronize the Information Warfare elements
across joint force operations. This intentional process will assure
unity of effort.
cybersecurity
Question. The United States has been rocked by a series of
significant ransomware attacks affecting critical infrastructure and
organizations. These attacks have been facilitated or conducted by
large, sophisticated criminal enterprises that are tolerated, or even
encouraged by, the leadership of the countries from which they operate.
These ransomware enterprises could cause substantial damage to critical
infrastructure in peacetime or in a future crisis or conflict, and
therefore pose a clear national security threat. These enterprises may
be beyond the reach of law enforcement and unaffected by at least some
forms of sanctions. United States Cyber Command is among the few
government organizations with the authorities and capabilities to
directly diminish this threat and thereby establish a degree of
deterrence.
What are your views on the foreign-based ransomware threat from
large criminal organizations?
Answer. Ransomware threats emanating from criminal organizations
present a significant threat to the United States. They have the
potential to disrupt the daily activities of the American people as
well as threaten the military's ability to execute its mission. If
confirmed, I will take an active role in supporting the
Administration's whole of government counter ransomware campaign.
Question. What are your views on the role that the Cyber Mission
forces could play in imposing costs on such activities, as one aspect
of a larger, whole-of-government response?
Answer. USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Forces possess unique authorities,
training, and capabilities to support the U.S. Government's response to
counter ransomware threats. The Department continues to support the
U.S. whole of government effort to impose costs through the disruption
of ransomware actors and their networks.
DOD is conducting a mandatory cyber posture review. The Committee
believes that the previous posture review was a success largely because
the Principal Cyber Adviser and supporting cross functional team
tracked implementation tasks and progress, and reported regularly to
senior leaders.
Question. What role do you believe the Joint Staff should play in
the cyber posture review, gap analysis, and oversight of
implementation?
Answer. I believe that the Joint Staff should continue to
proactively support the Principal Cyber Advisor's Office in the
development and implementation of the cyber posture review.
It is widely expected that adversaries will conduct cyber-attacks
on U.S. critical infrastructure in conflict and even in crises prior to
kinetic warfare. It is also commonly assumed that the United States
would respond accordingly, so that adversaries do not perceive that
there is a gap in our deterrence capabilities. However, the Cyber
Solarium Commission, whose members included DOD and other senior
executive branch officials, explicitly rejected the targeting of
adversary critical infrastructure, on the grounds that it would be
immoral and contrary to the laws of armed conflict.
Question. In your view, is it necessary for adversaries to know
that the United States can and will respond reciprocally to cyber-
attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure?
Answer. Adversaries need to know that the United States takes
cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructure very seriously and that we
reserve the right to respond to these attacks at the time, place, and
in the domain of our choosing.
Question. If confirmed, will you review existing policy,
requirements, and capabilities to achieve this deterrence capability?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed. I anticipate that the Department will
take a holistic review of our cyber policies, requirements, and
capabilities in line with the development and release of the new
National Defense Strategy, Cyber Posture Review, and Defense Cyber
Strategy.
At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in 2017 two
former senior government officials with extensive cyber expertise, in
consultation with members of a Defense Science Board cyber task force,
produced a report that recommended a near-term ending of the dual-hat
arrangement whereby the Command of United States Cyber Command also
serves as the Director of the National Security Agency. The report
presented substantive arguments that splitting these positions would be
in the interest of both organizations.
Question. What are your views as to whether the ``dual hatting'' of
the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National
Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?
Answer. The ``dual hat'' configuration between U.S. Cyber Command
and the National Security Agency remains fit for purpose and should be
maintained.
Question. In your opinion, are the conditions for ending the dual
hat established in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act close to being met?
Answer. NSA intelligence capabilities remain critical to the Title
10 Cyber mission. Any decision on this topic requires a deliberate,
step-by-step assessment, which is informed by CYBERCOM and NSA's
combined efforts over the last two years. Previous assessments
conducted in response to the 2017 Conditions predate the adversaries
increase in scale, scope, and sophistication of cyber activity we have
experienced over the last 2 years. Any decision based on dated,
incomplete analysis will undermine military effectiveness and create
unacceptable risk to the United States national security interests.
Question. Do you think that the positions should be split if those
conditions are met?
Answer. When Congress authorized the establishment of USCYBERCOM as
a Unified Combatant Command, the Secretary of Defense directed the
Department of Defense to undertake an assessment of the conditions
under which a split could possibly occur, the associated operational
implications and an assessment of the required distribution of
resources. In the absence of up-to-date analysis of the current
operational relationships among NSA, CYBERCOM, the other combatant
commands and foreign intelligence community, as well as the current
cyber threat, I need to defer a final position on this question.
Moreover, I have absolute faith in the professionalism and
objectivity of the CYBERCOM CDR/DIRNSA to provide strategic direction
and make balanced and objective decisions without prejudice towards his
Title 10 or Title 50 responsibilities.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation
operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked
C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial
intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and
biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies is
occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.
In your opinion, what are the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these
key technologies?
Answer. In developing next generation operational capabilities,
three leading challenges often addressed are the adequate protection of
our intellectual property, insufficient integration between civilian
and defense industry, and cultural risk aversion that leads to a lack
of agility in the development of key technologies.
Question. In your view, has DOD properly integrated and
synchronized investments in these technologies across all components?
Answer. We have made good progress recently, but need to do much
more. American innovators--both within the military and outside--are
achieving path-breaking technological advances, but the Joint Force's
absorption of these advances is too limited. The Joint Warfighting
Concept has driven new processes to align the services towards
strategic competition and defeating peer and near-peer adversaries.
These new processes should be continued and strengthened to make the
Joint Force more capable in the coming years.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Department is
balancing revolutionary capability advancements as compared to ``quick
win'' incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?
Answer. The Department balances revolutionary capability
developments with rapidly fielded advancements through focused analysis
and assessment. This enables DOD to make informed tradeoffs and
decisions where there are uncertainties associated with increasing
adversary military capabilities, changes in the strategic environment,
and emerging technologies for future military operations.
Question. In your opinion, is DOD doing enough to identify new
technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply
them to military and national security purposes? What are the
challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the
private sector and DOD?
Answer. The DOD has multiple initiatives within the defense
research enterprise specifically focused on identifying commercial
technologies currently in the private sector that have potential uses
for national security and warfighter purposes. The establishment of the
Innovation Steering Group this year has helped in mapping the
innovation ecosphere. Many organizations exist to drive rapid
technology development and commercial sector partnership. If confirmed,
I will continue to leverage the Innovation Steering Group to set
priorities for innovation in the DOD.
Question. In your view, are there steps that should be taken to
ensure that the Department has the research and testing infrastructure
and equipment to maintain pace with, or surpass the investments being
made in emerging technology by our peer adversaries?
Answer. Test infrastructure recapitalization has been one of the
lines of effort for the Innovation Steering Group. The effort to
identify areas of improvement and possible solutions to bring the
facilities up to commercial standards is important work that needs to
continue. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and the relevant DOD
stakeholders to ensure the test community collects operationally
relevant data as early as possible during system development, by using
a combined testing approach.
One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to
develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the
warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly
transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation, and
ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to
the warfighter.
Question. What are the challenges you perceive to effectively
transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of
record?
Answer. Transitioning technologies into programs of record must be
a consideration at the beginning of any development effort.
Successfully transitioning technologies requires many different
collaborators (e.g., acquisition community, warfighting community,
industry) and includes explicit agreements with the Services up front.
New DOD initiatives like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve are
aimed to achieve this goal. If confirmed, I will continue to support
the work of the organizations within the DOD innovation ecosphere that
strive to achieve this goal.
Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, what specific steps will
you take to ensure that all of the Military Services are benefitting
more quickly and directly from research being performed across the
defense research enterprise?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and Congress to continue development
of rapid prototyping and rapid fielding efforts, in order to decrease
the time it takes to get innovative technologies from research labs
into the hands of the warfighter. It is important to understand that
classification concerns can stifle the dissemination of important
scientific research. Ensuring appropriate level of classification can
help to breakdown stove-piping of information.
joint officer management
Question. If confirmed, what modifications to law and policy would
you suggest to provide DOD and the Military Services the force
management and talent management tools necessary to recruit, develop,
sustain, and retain a 21st century joint, All-Volunteer Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies
required to maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. I
believe the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA talent management strategies moved
the Department in the right direction through the enhancement of
constructive service credit, alternative promotion authority, and
reordering of a promotion list based on merit. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with OSD and the Service Chiefs as we implement these
authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a
ready force.
Question. In your opinion, are current DOD and Military Service
procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending
the President's nomination for promotion or assignment sufficient to
enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the President?
Answer. Yes, the Services thoroughly evaluate officer
qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available
adverse or reportable information, and each service has a rigorous
process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to
the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or
assignment process?
Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and
reasonable for the officers involved.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
Fiscal Year 2017 modifications to the JQO system?
Answer. The two significant modifications from the Fiscal Year 2017
NDAA provided the Department additional flexibility in the Joint
Qualification System. The expansion of the ``joint matters'' definition
ensures the ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers
making contributions to the development and achievement of strategic
objectives. Additionally, the reduced statutory tour length required
for joint duty credit provides the Services additional flexibility in
officer assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones.
Given the timing of the change, along with standard tour lengths,
additional time is needed to have a full picture of the overall impact
of the tour length reduction.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
eligibility for promotion to General/Flag officer rank, consistent with
the operational and professional demands of Service line officers?
Answer. Yes. Although careers are tightly managed to Service-
specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint
tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification enhance an
officer's perspective and knowledge to perform at the GO/FO level.
Question. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to
JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that military officers are
able to attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership
experience and adequate professional development?
Answer. The existing joint officer qualification requirements
provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the
skills necessary for successful service at the operational and
strategic levels. I do not believe additional modification to the JQO
system is necessary at this time.
Question. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better
to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?
Answer. Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to
incorporate Reserve Component officers. In 2018, the Reserve policy was
adjusted to increase joint qualification opportunities for Reserve
Component officers. I do not recommend changing the JQO system with
respect to the Reserve Component.
Question. In your view, should the requirement to be a JQO be
eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and
assignment?
Answer. No. Meeting the JQO requirement enhances the ability of
senior officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the
operational and strategic levels. Officers who meet the requirement
provide benefit to the Services, joint organizations, and the
Department, and this requirement should be maintained.
Question. In your opinion, should more be done to improve the JQO
system given the substantial resources invested in developing officers
to lead or support joint forces? In your view, is there another system
that would be more effective?
Answer. No, not at this time. The changes made by the Fiscal Year
2017 NDAA have greatly benefited our development of JQOs and provided a
balance between the needs of the Services and joint missions.
Question. Do you consider the board selection process required by
section 156 to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an
officer to serve in this critical joint position?
Answer. Yes, the board selection process is both effective and
efficient, and typically runs no more than one or two days. Since each
Military Department has their own personnel system, the process to
convene a joint selection board can present challenges. However, in
order to conduct a joint selection board, the planning and preparation
begins well in advance with each Service providing qualified candidates
for consideration.
Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint
process that could improve the selection board processes used by the
Military Services?
Answer. The Department incorporated the Services' best practices
into the joint selection board processes. Further, the Services
continually review their board processes to incorporate best practices
and improve with each iteration.
Question. Would you support expanding application of the process
employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look into this issue, but at this time
I do not have an informed opinion.
joint professional military education (jpme)
Question. The 2018 NDS asserts that JPME has stagnated--that it
focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of
lethality and ingenuity.
Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States,
now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will
officers need to succeed in strategic competition against the nation's
adversaries?
Answer. Military leaders will require exceptional competence in
joint warfighting, and demonstrate flexibility, toughness, and ability
to think through uncertainty. Future leaders will need to conceive,
design, and implement strategies and campaigns that integrate global
capabilities to defeat competitors in contests we have not yet even
imagined, and respond to activities short of armed conflict in domains
that are already being contested. Key attributes of Joint Officers will
include highly developed critical thinking and problem-solving skills
while operating with ambiguity, rising above disrupted communications,
ensuring resiliency, and always demonstrating irreproachable ethical
conduct.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
enhance DOD's JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and
development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the
intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound
judgment to lead the joint force in a transregional, multi-functional,
multi-domain ``Whole of Government'' environment?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to oversee JPME
curriculum development that educates future joint force leaders to
build the attributes of strategic thinking, advising, and planning.
This curriculum will not only be threat informed, but it will also
provide joint leaders an understanding of transregional, multi-
functional, and multi-domain environment to be experts on the
operational level of war. To enable this study, Service institutions
require broader instruction in classified environments with the
appropriate facilities to enable this education.
Question. In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of
Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type
Memorandum-19-001, address the JPME concerns documented in the 2018
NDS? What does this program add to the current PME system?
Answer. We need to delineate between ``strategists''--those who can
imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the ``strategically-
minded''--those who can effectively execute strategy through campaigns
and operations. The former are rare and the new Defense Strategic
Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals. The NDS language
refers to the latter, the development of which is a responsibility of
the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of this program has
promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring its success.
dod senior official education and training
Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag
officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the
advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and
technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the
scientific and technical civilian workforce?
Answer. Yes, but I am concerned about our ability to continue to
attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the
National Defense Strategy. To do that, in addition to investing in our
servicemembers, we must compete with the public and private sectors for
talent in some very small talent pools. It is essential we attract and
develop talent with expertise in quantum computing, AI/ML, space,
cyber, and data science, for example, to maintain competitive
advantage.
Question. Do you believe the career paths for General/Flag officers
and SES with technical skills are sufficient to ensure that DOD and its
components can develop capability performance requirements that will
counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex
acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not,
what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?
Answer. Yes, we have an incredibly talented workforce, but we must
continue to evolve as our industrial and technology bases evolve. If
confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to ensure our senior joint
leaders continue to receive the training and development required to be
successful.
Question. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES
assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to
serve in acquisition programs? Do established tour lengths enable and
empower senior leaders so assigned to manage effectively the long-term
acquisition programs under their purview? If not, what changes do you
believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the senior
leaders assigned to such positions and duties?
Answer. Yes, we have a very robust acquisition corps with
Department level priorities engaging our general/flag officers at
strategic levels of implementation. Our tour lengths are designed to
ensure long-term acquisition systems are managed in an effective and
efficient manner. In my judgment, the Department's biggest civilian
workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the
highest quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense
Strategy. To do that, we must compete with the public and private
sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer
of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's
defense to prospective employees. If confirmed, I will work with the
Joint Staff, OSD, and other DOD stakeholders to ensure our senior
leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they
need to continue do so.
Question. Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the
Military Services have in place sufficient ethics training and
resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the
training, advice, and assistance needed to perform their duties in an
ethical manner? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to
provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and
assistance they need to ``play the ethical midfield.'' The ability to
make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader
Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to
all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is
laid at the outset of these individuals' careers and is further
developed and reinforced in formal education and training throughout
their careers.
joint operations
Question. Military operations are increasingly joint: the Marine
Corps plans to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of Navy
ships; the Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities;
and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement
capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.
In your view, which other Military Service doctrines and
capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy in joint
operations?
Answer. Globally conducted Joint operations require integration of
the space and cyberspace domains. Both domains offer opportunities to
build synergy and asymmetric advantage in joint operations. U.S. Space
Command and U.S. Cyber Command are working to operationalize our
advantages in these critical domains.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you propose to
increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish
missions and tasks in support of joint operations, to include
logistical operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would increase emphasis on interdependence
and interoperability through joint training at the tactical and
operational levels of warfare to strengthen our ability to conduct
joint operations. I would also consider developing joint readiness
goals, objectives, and metrics to achieve statutory guidance and assess
synchronization of Service goals and objectives to ensure proper
alignment with DOD goals and objectives.
Question. In your opinion, what are the most critical shortfalls in
capabilities to support the joint force?
Answer. Emerging technologies being developed and employed by our
pacing threats have altered the operating environment on a global scale
at an unrelenting pace. These challenges require lethal and non-lethal
capabilities that are interoperable across all Services and allow us
the ability to share information faster than our adversaries.
Question. Do you believe the respective services are on the correct
path to modernize and overcome those shortfalls?
Answer. The Services have aligned their modernization efforts with
the objectives outlined in the National Defense Strategy. If properly
funded and executed, the Services' modernization efforts place the
Department on a trajectory to achieve these objectives.
Question. How would you use your unilateral authority as Chairman
of the JROC if needed to correct such shortfalls?
Answer. If confirmed, I will only utilize this unilateral authority
when absolutely necessary. It would be my role to build consensus among
the members in assuring our warfighters are the most lethal they can be
in these changing times. My position is to lead the Council in the
review and decision with regard to the critical warfighting gaps facing
the Joint Force. The goal is to reach consensus, when able, through
subordinate level discussions, and by making deliberate decisions among
the JROC members regarding requirements to close or mitigate these
capability gaps. I will strive to reach consensus amongst the JROC
members in all decisions, however, any dissenting position will be made
clear to the Chairman as a matter of course. From what I understand,
this seldom, if ever, has been the case for a JROC decision.
Question. There has been much discussion about the importance of
networking and connecting Service capabilities across air, land, and
sea platforms operating across multiple domains.
What is your understanding of how DOD intends to execute joint
airborne battle management in a high-end fight?
Answer. Executing joint airborne battle management command and
control relies on two main elements: 1) timely (speed of relevance)
decision-quality information, and 2) effective communication defined as
Commander's intent via machine-to-machine and/or verbal authority. The
Department is focusing on JADC2, the USAF's contribution of ABMS, the
Navy's Project Overmatch, and the Army's Project Convergence, to
deliver target quality tracks in order to rapidly complete the Find,
Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA) targeting cycle, ultimately
for the high-end fight.
Question. What is DOD doing to make machine-to-machine command and
control, across multiple domains, a reality?
Answer. The Joint Staff J6 conducted a study of all AI and Machine
Learning tools across the entire Department to identify tools that can
be used as enterprise solutions across single, multiple, or all-
domains. Some of these programs and initiatives include: the Artificial
Intelligence Data Accelerator Initiative (ADA), Advancing Analytics
Platform (ADVANA), and Service and Joint Staff efforts to develop and
demonstrate JADC2. Their study and research will help identify tools
the DOD can leverage for multi- and all-domain C2.
Question. In your view, are the Services doing enough to ensure
airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer
competitors?
Answer. Yes, but they can do more. Interoperable and resilient
airborne tactical data links are the bedrock for achieving victory
against a peer competitor. Ongoing cryptographic modernization efforts
across the family of data links as well as the incorporation of
advanced capabilities will allow the Joint Force to field a more
resilient capability in the face of peer competitors.
Question. In your view, how successful has the Joint Staff and the
Department of Defense been at developing and refining the joint
operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?
Answer. The Joint Staff and the Department of Defense has been
successful at developing joint operational concepts. The Joint Force
has developed a threat-informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to
address future great power conflict. The JWC is a global concept that
describes an operational approach to defend the U.S. and maintain
overmatch defeat strategic adversaries.
The JWC guides how the U.S. will organize, train, educate, and
equip the future Joint Force, and it communicates a Department-wide
campaign of learning informed through coordination with Services,
Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Future JWC efforts include developing, testing, and maturing JWC ideas
through Joint and Service training, exercises, experiments, and
doctrine development.
If confirmed, I will do my part to accelerate JWC development
efforts to ensure the future Joint Force will have the appropriate
personnel, training, equipment, and doctrine in place to deter war and,
if necessary, win future wars.
Question. Do you think that there needs to be a different or
tailored joint operational concept for the European and Indo-Pacific
theaters? Why or why not?
Answer. No, I do not. Ultimately, we have one joint force that will
need to adapt to all threats environment to achieve national security
objectives. If confirmed, I will use my role to ensure a common
approach to joint operations in both the European and Indo-Pacific
theaters, and to further tailor the joint force to respond
appropriately to changing threats and environments.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
Question. Demand for ISR capabilities of every kind has grown
exponentially in recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational
awareness and targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all
of the geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements
that are not being met.
What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets
across the Combatant Commands?
Answer. Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. To
meet competing demands, the Department reviews the combatant commands'
standing and emerging requirements and routinely reprioritizes capacity
to meet warfighter needs. This global force management process is led
by the Joint Staff, but also takes into account services and force
provider considerations to meet command requirements while balancing
risk and readiness challenges. The disposition of ISR across the
commands is constantly changing in order to keep pace with our dynamic
geopolitical situation. If confirmed, I look forward to participating
in the global force management process and working to support the
Chairman as he makes recommendations to the Secretary for allocation
decisions.
Question. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in
both the capability and availability of ISR assets? If confirmed, what
steps would you take to correct these deficiencies?
Answer. The appetite for ISR capacity continues to grow beyond the
Department's currently fielded, and even planned availability. Even a
large increase in ISR inventory will not mitigate shortfalls.
Additional capacity will require investments in mechanics, operators,
analysts, linguists, and expanded basing options. In order to mitigate
the shortfalls and better equip our commands with the intelligence
support they need, I believe we require an approach that provides
broader investments in platforms, sensors, command and control,
architecture, and analytics that can penetrate and survive in high-
threat, denied environments. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
to build on Gen Hyten's commitment to reform the JROC process.
As the Vice, if confirmed, I would serve as head of the Joint
Requirements Council (JROC), helping to define and prioritize the
capabilities the Joint Force needs, to include ISR. Additionally, I
would sit on a number of different Pentagon committees that review
budgets, acquisitions, force design, and force development.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR program, which has focused historically on
accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass
destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has
expanded its focus to other countries. As part of this expansion, the
CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and
capabilities, including biological surveillance and early warning, and
encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce proliferation
threats.
In your view, how could coordination of the CTR program across U.S.
Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
Department) be improved?
Answer. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is a
critical and effective effort that contributes to the safety and
security of the United States and our allies and partners. It is
imperative that national governments have capabilities to counter WMD
threats. Proliferation is a global problem that cannot be resolved by
the United States alone. The Joint Force and DOD will continue to
collaborate across the interagency to ensure a whole of government
approach in the application of the CTR program. DOS, DOE, and the CDC
are part of the planning process to determine CTR priorities on a
recurring basis.
Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemicals documented
recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR resources are allocated
to biological programs.
Question. Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
accurately reflects the current threat?
Answer. Yes. The current focus on biological programs resulted from
a surge designed to address specific threats, to include the need for
increased partner detection capabilities and security of sensitive
biological facilities. The Department reviews threats on an annual
basis and reprioritizes activity when required. CTR's capabilities and
authority to work directly with our partners' civilian and military
establishments provides flexibility to adapt to changes in the
operating environment.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the
allocation of CTR resources? If so, what adjustments would you
recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review CTR resource allocations and
make recommendations as appropriate to policy-makers to ensure CTR
efforts are supportive of our national Counter WMD strategies and
Combatant Command plans. CTR efforts will continue to be synchronized
with interagency partners who have different roles, authorities, and
responsibilities in countering WMD threats.
violent extremist organizations (veos)
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism
strategy and the role of DOD in supporting that strategy?
Answer. The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism provides a
holistic, whole of government approach to countering violent extremist
organizations (VEOs). The DOD is involved in several lines of effort
including a leading role in strengthening the counterterrorism
abilities of international partners and conducting military operations
overseas to disrupt terrorist networks.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by VEOs?
Answer. The 2018 National Strategy for Counter Terrorism will take
time to realize results. Given the long-term horizon to counter violent
extremism, the Department will measure effectiveness based on trends
associated with the strategic objectives. For example, we continue to
successfully diminish the capacity of terrorists to directly attack the
homeland. However, we struggle as an interagency to effectively curtail
radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of some organizations. If
confirmed, I'll work with the Chairman and interagency to routinely
assess our progress of the strategy to address violent extremist
threats and identify areas for adaptation.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
and its associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent
the underlying causes of extremism be a component of our
counterterrorism strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the joint stakeholders and
agencies to monitor our strategic measures of effectiveness in order to
ensure we are working towards a desired end state with the
understanding that progress will require strategic patience. Efforts to
prevent underlying causes of extremism are key components of our
counterterrorism strategy, especially as we prioritize resources and
focus to threats against the U.S. homeland and other national
interests.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
promote a more resource sustainable approach to counterterrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing evaluation of
DOD's counter-terrorism campaigns in USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM.
This approach seeks to balance resources and outcomes. This force
optimization will enable more effective operations to defeat trans-
regional threat networks. I will continue to advocate for improved
collaboration and integration within the DOD, interagency, and our
multinational allies and partners to maximize resource sustainable
approaches to CT.
countering isis in iraq and syria
Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by
ISIS?
Answer. ISIS remains one of the primary transnational terrorist
threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas. ISIS
continues to encourage its networks, branches, and supporters to
inspire, enable, direct, and conduct attacks worldwide and will use
their media capability to preserve global brand appeal despite
territorial losses. ISIS is likely exercising patience and adapting to
its restrained operational environment to pursue their goal of
establishing a global caliphate. Inspired attacks are the principal
method ISIS is projecting power globally as CT pressure in the region
and plot disruption in Western countries have temporarily limited their
ability to resource external networks.
Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security
objectives in Syria? To what extent does continued U.S. force presence
in Syria support those objectives?
Answer. The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring
defeat of ISIS. We continue to work by, with, and through our partners
and allies. U.S. immediate priorities in Syria include:
Expand humanitarian access
Sustain the campaign against ISIS in partnership with the
Syrian Democratic Forces
Support international norms to promote human rights and
accountability
Sustain local ceasefires across Syria
These priorities are the necessary building blocks for eventual
progress on the political track to end the Syrian conflict. U.S. and
Coalition forces enable the second priority, to sustain the partner-
based campaign against ISIS.
Question. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied
to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what
conditions do you believe should factor into decisions about U.S. troop
levels in Syria?
Answer. U.S. forces have drawn down to a minimal presence in Syria
to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. U.S. and
Coalition forces should remain in Syria until partner force capacity
and will is sufficient to defeat ISIS without significant external
support. Any future troop level or capabilities changes would have to
be assessed based on the progress of our partner-based strategy. A
partner-based approach provides an effective and efficient way to
counter ISIS while minimizing risk to U.S. forces, and it presents the
best long-term solution to ensure ISIS remains territorially defeated
when U.S. forces depart.
Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy
and objectives in Iraq?
Answer. The U.S. military strategy seeks the enduring defeat of
ISIS, by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish
Peshmerga forces. To achieve this objective, the coalition provides
advice, assistance, and intelligence to the Iraqi Security Forces in
support of their defeat of ISIS operations.
Question. The Administration announced the transition of combat
forces from Iraq. Going forward, what do you envision to be the
missions and size of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?
Answer. In accordance with the Joint Communique and July 2021
Strategic Dialogue, CJTF-OIR is transitioning to an advise and assist
role aimed at supporting the Iraqi Security Forces in their defeat-ISIS
campaign. U.S. forces remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi
government. We do not foresee significant changes to our current force
posture in Iraq.
Question. What steps would you recommend for normalizing security
assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?
Answer. To normalize security assistance to the ISF, the DOD is
enacting a plan of action that will occur in three conditions-based
phases:
Phase 1 calls for the appointment of a Senior Defense
Official/Defense Attache which is complete.
Phase 2 will transition tasks from CJTF-OIR to OSC-I
which transitions activities from CJTF-OIR to a normalized Security
Cooperation Office.
Phase 3 will seek implementation of permanent OSC-I
billeting/staffing. This will be conditions based and characterized by
the cessation of major combat operations against ISIS and the
implementation of a Joint Manpower Validation Board to source
requirements for OSC-I with permanent staffing.
At the end of these phases, the Senior Defense Official/Defense
Attache and Security Cooperation Construct will be fully normalized
with permanent manning and stable, reliable funding streams that
support long-term U.S. national security interests in Iraq.
Question. In your view, what should the United States do regarding
the repatriation of ISIS prisoners currently detained by the Syrian
Democratic Forces?
Answer. It is critical to leverage all appropriate military and
diplomatic levers to address the threat of ISIS. In my current
capacity, I do not have access to information to fully assess this
issue. If confirmed, I would work to understand the specifics and
provide my best military advice.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap)
Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security
interests in Yemen?
Answer. Three U.S. National Security interests exist in Yemen:
Denying a safe haven for AQAP and ISIS affiliates to plan
and execute attacks against the U.S., our allies, and interests.
Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-
Mandeb and Red Sea--the Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global
commerce and energy.
Reducing malign Iranian influence--Iranian shipments of
arms to the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and
civilian infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability
across the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.
To protect these interests, the U.S. military supports diplomatic
efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen by supporting Saudi Arabian
armed forces to defend their territory and protect their citizens from
Iran-backed Houthi attacks. Furthermore, a small number of U.S.
deployed forces advise, assist, and train partner forces to conduct
counter-terror operations.
Question. What do you see as the implications of the Biden
Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the
Saudi-led coalition?
Answer. There is not a military solution to ending the conflict in
Yemen. I support U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen Lenderking's attempts to
facilitate an UN-brokered diplomatic resolution. However, as President
Biden indicated in his policy statement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
faces a persistent threat from Iranian-supplied cross-border attacks by
the Houthis. U.S. Joint Forces continue to help Saudi Arabia defend its
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its people.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States
play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
Answer. Consistent with the decision to cease military support for
offensive operations by the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen, the U.S.
provides military training and intelligence support to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to defend against Houthi cross-border (unmanned aerial
vehicle, ballistic missile and unmanned maritime) attacks. The U.S.'s
chief role is supporting the international diplomatic efforts to end
the conflict in Yemen.
Question. What threat do the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation
in Bab al-Mandeb, in your view, and what can the U.S. do to mitigate
that threat more effectively?
Answer. The Houthis possess Iranian supplied missiles, explosive-
laden unmanned maritime vessels, mines, and armed/explosive unmanned
aerial vehicles which pose a threat to freedom of navigation in the Bab
al-Mandeb and Red Sea. The Houthis have demonstrated a willingness to
attack military and commercial vessels as evidenced by the Houthi
attempted attacks against USS Mason and USS Ponce in 2016, as well as
commercial vessels in Jeddah Port, Saudi Arabia in 2020.
Working with the international community to halt the illicit supply
of arms to the Houthis, in accordance with UN Security Council
Resolution 2216, is an important step toward maintaining freedom of
navigation. For example, USS Monterey and USS Winston Churchill both
seized Iranian-provided arms headed to the Iranian-backed Houthis. The
U.S. Joint Force works with partner nation militaries to implement this
UNSCR, all toward facilitating a swift end to the conflict in Yemen. To
that end, the U.S. military supports these diplomatic and international
efforts, led by Special Presidential Envoy Lenderking, to create a
lasting and effective peace in Yemen.
Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb and
Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global commerce and energy. We
must reduce the malign Iranian influence--Iranian shipments of arms to
the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and civilian
infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability across the
Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.
afghanistan
Question. Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do
you see as some of the major strategic missteps? How would you apply
those lessons learned in future military operations?
Answer. It is clear the war in Afghanistan did not end on the terms
we wanted. However, every servicemember and civilian who served there
for the past 20 years protected our country from attack by terrorists.
For that they should be forever proud, and we should be forever
grateful.
Understanding our engagement in Afghanistan will take time and
thoughtful analysis of key questions; there are many lessons learned.
The Department of Defense is committed to doing the work to fully
understand our 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.
Question. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban's
ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?
Answer. This issue requires significant analysis, research, and
understanding to gain more clarity. As we study this matter, it will be
absolutely critical to understand strategic lessons of our involvement
in Afghanistan and integrate and apply lessons-learned with respect to
our doctrine and training. If confirmed, I will be committed to
carefully reviewing this matter to ensure we learn and improve from
this experience.
Question. In your opinion, what are the implications of the
collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for
future advise, train and assist missions?
Answer. Our experience in Afghanistan provides key lessons on how
we establish priorities for future train, advise, and assist missions,
and match those to the resources required; how we take account of
regional and local politics and conflict dynamics; how we study and re-
evaluate a country's institutional and logistical capacity to absorb
our assistance; and especially how we cultivate a sense of local
ownership and accountability.
Question. As the military mission in Afghanistan has concluded,
what do you view as U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan?
Answer. The President has made clear that the primary vital
national interest in Afghanistan is to make sure Afghanistan can never
be used again to launch an attack on our homeland.
Question. Can the United States conduct effective ``over the
horizon'' counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without a partner
force on the ground? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The United States conducts counterterrorism operations all
over the world in places where we do not have a partner force on the
ground. We are actively setting the conditions in coordination with
partners in the region to ensure we remain situationally aware and are
postured to mitigate and neutralize developing terrorist threat
streams. Further details on this issue need to be discussed in a
classified setting.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran is our nation's most formidable threat in the CENTCOM
AOR. Iran`s conventional military strategy is primarily based on
deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an attacker. It also
cultivates non-state violent proxies and militias to project power and
build regional influence. Iran's primary military capabilities are
missiles, UAVs, naval forces, and unconventional forces.
Iran also holds the region's largest surface-to-surface missile
(SSM) arsenal, including both ballistic and cruise missiles that serve
as its primary strategic deterrent. SSMs in Iran's inventory have a
range of up to 1300 miles. Further, Iran's naval forces are the Arabian
Gulf's strongest and feature many small boats and naval mines to
complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
maintains ties to Shia militia groups across the region to advance
Iran's interests. Iran-backed proxies give Iran unconventional options
for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and
globally. The IRGC-QF also has longstanding ties to select Sunni
groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban.
Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security
and territorial defense.
Iranian leaders likely seek to avoid direct conventional conflict
with a superior military force but maintain capabilities to impose
significant cost through retaliatory strikes and covert proxy attacks.
Question. Are U.S. military forces and capabilities currently
deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if necessary,
respond to threats posed by Iran?
Answer. It is critical for the United States to deter aggressive
and destabilizing actions by Iran and to maintain the capability and
capacity to respond to credible threats in the region when necessary.
In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to
adequately assess the position of military forces in the CENTCOM AOR.
If confirmed, this is an issue I would work to understand further.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. national security
interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle
East?
Answer. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information
to adequately assess the growth and impact of Iranian influence in the
Middle East. If confirmed, I would work with the appropriate Combatant
Commands to assess the specific impacts of Iranian influence in the
region.
Question. If the U.S. relieved sanctions on Iran, do you assess
that there is a risk that Iran would use that sanctions relief to
further its malign activities in the region?
Answer. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information
to adequately assess the impact of sanctions relief on Iran's malign
activities in the region. If confirmed, this is an issue I would work
to understand further.
china
Question. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship
with China?
Answer. The Department of Defense is taking a concerted approach to
position for long-term competition with the People's Republic of China
(PRC). This approach prioritizes China as the Department of Defense's
(DOD) primary pacing challenge. Simultaneously, DOD seeks a
constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the
People's Liberation Army that helps set U.S.-PRC relations on a path of
transparency and non-aggression and welcomes collaboration when
interests align, for instance on climate change.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should be the
objectives of U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue? What are the
limitations on this kind of dialogue?
Answer. DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC
prioritize crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and
limited cooperation in areas where national interests align, in order
to advance a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense
relationship with the PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted
in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.
Our increasingly competitive relationship with the PRC requires we
maintain regular communication channels to prevent crisis and ensure
pathways for timely communications so we can communicate with the PLA
should a crisis occur.
I support dialogue that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors
inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain insight
into China's strategic intent; manage differences; and cooperate in
areas where national interests align.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
erosion of U.S. advantages?
Answer. The PRC's long-term goal is to create an entirely self-
reliant defense-industrial sector--fused with a strong civilian
industrial and technology sector--that can provide the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) with a ``world class military'' by 2049. In the
interim, China's objective is to meet two intermediate military
modernization milestones: 1) accelerate integrated development of
mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization related to a
potential Taiwan contingency by 2027, and 2) complete all military
modernization goals as outlined by the CCP by 2035
Concerning to me is that the PRC is investing in, and acquiring,
technologies that will be foundational for future military innovations
including artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, and
quantum computing. I agree with this assessment and, if confirmed, I
will continue to monitor and address these issues.
Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
presence overseas, including installations like its bases in Djibouti
and across Africa, as well as other infrastructure projects across the
Indian Ocean?
Answer. The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas
logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and
sustain military power at greater distances globally, based on the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) China's base in Djibouti and its military
presence in Africa enable forward deployment of PLA forces and support
military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral
and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a
military logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the
U.S. military, interests, and other assets. China's military presence
is also furthered enabled through its peacekeeping operations in
Africa.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic and military
implications for the United States of China's Belt and Road Initiative?
What are the strategic and military implications for other countries in
the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. China uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to support
its strategy of national rejuvenation by expanding global
transportation and trade linkages. This works to support its
development and deepen economic integration with nations along its
periphery including the Indo-Pacific region. The PRC's overseas
development and security interests under BRI drive the PRC towards
expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those interests.
The PRC attempts to use the economic influence it accrues in the
Indo-Pacific region through BRI to encourage participating countries to
support Beijing's priorities and objectives on a range of other matters
including its diplomatic, economic, and military objectives in the
region.
Question. The smaller number of nuclear weapons possessed by China
relative to the United States and Russia is often cited as an
impediment to nuclear arms control talks with China.
What are the strategic implications of the rapid modernization of
Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to at least double by 2030, and
what approach should the United States take to address those
implications, in your view?
Answer. We will soon find ourselves faced with two nuclear peer
nations. Given the current state of our defense industrial base for
nuclear delivery platforms and the condition of some of the National
Nuclear Security Administration's production capabilities and
infrastructure, we must begin preparing for this challenge now. To do
so, I believe we must continue executing our current nuclear
modernization programs, evaluate whether current programs of record are
sufficient to fill any potential deterrence gaps, and engage China in
discussions on strategic stability issues and arms control.
Question. What do you think could motivate China to participate in
nuclear arms control negotiations in a genuine and meaningful way?
Answer. Consistent strategic messaging from key U.S. and
international political leaders for China to not just follow
international norms in the area of nuclear arms control, but to
participate in substantive discussions on risk reduction and strategic
stability.
Question. In your view, with the rapid development in both quantity
and quality of Chinese nuclear capabilities, how does U.S. nuclear
posture, and nuclear doctrine need to change to account for the
existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors?
Answer. I understand the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will
formulate a strategy for deterring both China and Russia. If confirmed,
I look forward to supporting the Chairman in providing his military
advice on how U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine may need to change to
account for the existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic
competitors.
Question. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both
increase, do you assess that we have adequate military and national
security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese leadership
to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation?
Answer. U.S. leadership has the ability to communicate with senior
PRC and PLA leadership. These channels could be used to deescalate
tension in the bilateral relationship and mitigate the threat of rapid
strategic escalation during a crisis.
u.s. capabilities and force posture in europe
Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
shortfalls in the current joint force that present a challenge to
addressing threats in Europe? If so, what specific enhancements would
you recommend to joint force capabilities and force posture in Europe
in each military domain?
Answer. We should continue to enhance our long-range precision
fires, undersea and anti-submarine warfare, integrated air and missile
defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities. In terms of infrastructure, storage for prepositioned
equipment and munitions, airfield upgrades, and capacity for joint
reception, staging, and onward integration remain priorities. These are
not solely U.S. issues, and we will explore with our Allies and
partners, bilaterally and through NATO, how they can leverage and align
our respective investments to meet our shared requirements.
Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
critical infrastructure in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), such as
command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile
attack?
Answer. Air and missile defense is a priority for us globally and
in Europe. Adversaries are aggressively developing and fielding
advanced air and missile capabilities with increased capacity,
representing a threat to NATO and partner nations within the USEUCOM
AOR. With NATO and partner support, USEUCOM has Land, Air, and Maritime
capabilities to defend against missile threats.
However, NATO and USEUCOM require a credible, Integrated Air and
Missile Defense capability, to include a robust command and control
architecture capable of creating a fully integrated air and missile
threat picture able to transition from peace through crisis to
conflict. This will enable effective operations against combined
attacks involving aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and
hypersonic vehicles.
We are continuing to improve our air and missile defense capability
and capacity in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Right now, we are
fielding new short-range air defense systems to Army units in Germany,
and the Air Force just activated an F-35 squadron in the United
Kingdom. Multinational exercises like ASTRAL KNIGHT and FORMIDABLE
SHIELD are building not only U.S. readiness but are enhancing our
ability to defend against air and missile threats in conjunction with
Allies and partners.
Question. Do Chinese investments in European infrastructure pose
threats to U.S. operations there? What other Chinese activities or
investments should be cause for concern with regard to our security and
that of our Allies and partners in Europe?
Answer. Chinese investments in European infrastructure do pose a
threat to U.S. operations in Europe. The United States and our European
allies and partners should be alert to Chinese malign influence,
particularly with regard to 5G technology and financial investment in
critical infrastructure, including port and rail facilities, that could
impact U.S. or alliance military planning, mobility, and enablement.
Allies should also be aware of China's opaque economic practices and
coercion that create inroads to European infrastructure.
Question. In your view, do large-scale military exercises such as
DEFENDER EUROPE 2021 serve to reassure Allies and deter adversaries
such as Russia? Do you support continuing a robust level of exercises
with our European Allies and partners?
Answer. Combined, complex training with our Allies and partners
builds readiness and improves interoperability. At the same time, these
exercises demonstrate to Allies and adversaries our capability to
command and control operations across all domains and multiple
continents. They allow us to validate the same processes and procedures
we would use in the event of a crisis in Europe, and at scales that
stress the system and enable real growth. Collectively, they are
concrete displays of U.S. and Allied resolve and capacity to impose
costs on potential aggressors.
Question. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan helped build
interoperability with numerous NATO Allies and partners. What are ways
we can maintain that level of interoperability going forward?
Answer. Combined exercises are interoperability laboratories that
test our ability to shoot, move, and communicate with Allies and
partners under pressure. The enduring presence of U.S. forces builds
mutual familiarity between our forces and those of our host countries
in Europe. We support efforts by NATO and U.S. European Command to
define interoperability objectives and promote interoperability through
training and exercises, equipment standardization, and NATO Centers of
Excellence and NATO's multinational command and control structures.
Question. What is your assessment of military-to-military relations
with Turkey at present?
Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with our strategic
ally Turkey remains as strong, and we continue to work every day
bilaterally and through NATO to address a range of issues vital to both
of our national interests. Areas of divergence between our two
countries are primarily in political channels, and the Turkish military
has signaled a willingness to focus on the positive aspects of our
relationship to address our mutual concerns related to regional
instability and the threats posed by U.S. competitors. Relations
between the Turkish Armed Forces and the U.S. military remain close,
professional, and complementary, as evidenced by our recent
coordination in Afghanistan, and we will continue to build upon this
cooperation in several key regions.
Although our two countries do not always agree, Turkey continues to
contribute positively to a variety of NATO missions to include Baltic
Air Policing and support for Bomber Task Force missions. It is evident
that Turkey's military capability and geographic location make it a key
stakeholder in U.S. responses to regional events and within the NATO
Alliance. Therefore, it is critical the U.S. military continue to
execute and advocate for fundamental security cooperation activities
with Turkey such as Professional Military Education, exercises, and
Foreign Military Sales. These actions directly advance U.S. interests
by preventing the deterioration of an ally's military capabilities,
strengthen NATO interoperability, and help enable U.S. force projection
with access to key regions in support steady-state operations and
contingences.
russia
Question. In your view, which aspects of U.S. and NATO force
posture in Europe are most effective in deterring Russian aggression
and mitigating threats to our NATO Allies and partners? What has worked
in the past? Are there additional measures that the U.S. and NATO
should consider?
Answer. Deterring Russian aggression and supporting NATO's defense
of the Euro Atlantic area remain as challenges facing USEUCOM. These
complex and interrelated challenges require coordination with other
U.S. Government Agencies, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, allies
and partners in Europe. Russia's ``malign influence campaign'' seeks to
confound our coordination efforts and weaken the Alliance's integrity.
If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Commander, U.S.
European Command, other combatant commanders and interagency
stakeholders to establish credible deterrence to Russian aggression and
ensure it's a collective NATO alliance responsibility.
Continued integration with DOD efforts to address global
requirements is essential to address trans-regional threats that span
the conflict spectrum. Synchronized efforts by the combatant commands,
overseen by OSD and the Joint Staff, are crucial to our success. We
will continue to work closely with Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and the Joint Staff to
streamline the development and fielding of warfighting capabilities and
concepts.
Further, I will continue advocating for resourcing solutions to
address emerging requirements such as: enhanced and expanded
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine
and undersea warfare; Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD);
hypersonics; cyber operations and a secure, resilient Information
Technology theater infrastructure.
Question. Russia has taken provocative action in the Black Sea
region over the past year, including a military buildup around Ukraine
and threats to Allied warships in the sea.
Are there additional efforts the U.S. military should undertake
with Black Sea Allies and partners to advance our security interests
and deter Russia?
Answer. The U.S. military must continue to work with our allies and
partners--especially those bordering the Black Sea--to ensure that
norms and activities are maintained with respect to the rules-based
order. Efforts are already in place to increase interoperability,
improve maritime domain awareness, and strengthen allied and partner
capability to resist Russian coercion and deter malign influence in the
region. If confirmed, I would ensure these ongoing efforts continue,
and accelerated wherever possible.
Question. Given advances in Russian attack submarine capability
what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to
maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare? What are the
different capabilities that are necessary to address this in different
parts of the world such as the North Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea,
and elsewhere?
Answer. A robust Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capability
requires investment in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
(IUSS) that uses the Fixed Surveillance System (FSS), Fixed Distributed
System (FDS), and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). A robust
presence of fast attack submarines, guided-missile cruisers and
destroyers, and Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft are
instrumental in maintaining U.S. advantages in undersea warfare. We
must maintain acoustic superiority.
Question. In your assessment, does DOD currently have a mature
joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
sufficient capacity to overcome advanced Russian anti-access, area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or
capacity are required in Europe to ensure U.S. forces are able to
achieve operational freedom of maneuver?
Answer. We are making progress on a new Joint Warfighting Concept
focused on ways the Joint Force can maintain a global advantage to
project power and defend critical infrastructure. As Russia increases
quantity and quality of advanced A2AD capabilities, the Joint Force
requires new capabilities and increased capacity to defend our
logistics infrastructure, our static bases, and forward positioned
forces against the A2AD threat. Without modernization the United
States' critical power projection platforms and bases, along with
forward deployed forces, would be under threat from advanced Russian
capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of EUCOM and NATO's readiness to
detect, deter, and respond to Russian influence operations, including
in the cyber domain?
Answer. Russian malign influence is not only a regional problem; it
is global in nature. The scale and scope of this problem impacts each
of the combatant commands, the IC, the interagency along with our
allies and partners. EUCOM's continued engagement and leadership in a
variety of counter Russian influence venues has been essential to
recognizing and responding to malign Russian Activity. The dynamic
information environment requires us to constantly upgrade our
approaches to detect this activity.
Question. In your view, what additional military and non-military
capabilities are required for the United States to counter effectively
Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?
Answer. Additional information operations capability would benefit
EUCOM in countering Russian's malign influence campaign. If confirmed,
I will look very closely at our capabilities and capacity, especially
counter Russian hybrid operations across the spectrum of conflict.
nato alliance
Question. In your view, how important is the NATO Alliance to
advancing U.S. national security interests?
Answer. Our commitment to NATO and particularly our obligations
under Article 5, are crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Article 5
obligations are the linchpin of defense and deterrence against
adversaries threatening the U.S. homeland and our vital interests in
Europe. NATO's strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion
to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks.
Question. How important is NATO's Concept for the Deterrence and
Defense of the Euroatlantic Area to the U.S. from an operational
perspective? What other NATO priorities will the Joint Staff emphasize
most in coming years?
Answer. Operationally, maintaining Alliance momentum on the
implementation of NATO's Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the
Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) is vitally important. The delivery in
September of SACEUR's AOR--Wide Strategic Plan provides military
strategic direction to respond through the coordinated delivery of
national, regional, and AOR-wide multi-domain effects to prevent a
crisis from deepening. The Joint Staff will now emphasize further
implementation through the on-going development of the DDA family of
subordinate strategic and regional plans through the coming years. The
development of those plans will lead us to a force structure that is
responsive and fit for purpose. Most importantly, DDA implementation
facilitates alignment between NATO and U.S. plans and activities.
Question. How important is the update to NATO's Strategic Concept
for the NATO Military Committee?
Answer. Anchoring NATO's continued military adaptation in an
updated Strategic Concept is very important to the NATO Military
Committee. The Military Committee's agreements on Deterrence and
Defense need to be central to the Strategic Concept. These include
agreement on the threats, agreement on NATO's purpose across the
spectrum of competition and conflict, and agreement on how to manage
deterrence and defense in the 21st Century. The Strategic Concept will
also need to address China and their systematic challenges to the
rules-based international order and relevance to Alliance security will
also need to be addressed in the next Strategic Concept.
Question. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in the
strategic competition with Russia and China?
Answer. While Russia remains NATO's immediate primary concern, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) presents a growing challenge, not
least because it aims to complete military modernization by 2035 and
transform the People's Liberation Army into a ``world-class'' military
by the end of 2049. Since Beijing likely seeks to develop a security
cooperation architecture that would rival the Alliance, the Alliance
must take account of not only Russia's direct military impact on Euro-
Atlantic security but also the PRC's potential military influence on
the Euro-Atlantic area.
Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, what actions would you recommend to maintain momentum on the
capabilities, readiness, and military mobility of the NATO Alliance in
order to deter aggression?
Answer. The Alliance has created significant momentum through its
ongoing military adaptation as part of the implementation of the
Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area and SACEUR's AOR--Wide
Strategic Plan. These efforts, coupled with the NATO Readiness
Initiative (NRI), directly build critical capabilities and improve
readiness across the Alliance. If confirmed, I will continue to push
for full implementation of the DDA and SASP to solidify these efforts,
and emphasize the importance of NRI as a culture of readiness for the
Alliance.
If confirmed, I will also encourage synchronization and cooperation
with the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation mobility projects, which
will be critical in improving and enhancing military mobility in the
European AOR. The recent approval of the EU Administrative Arrangement
negotiating mandate is an important step forward in this effort.
Question. As recently as the June 2021 Summit, NATO Allies have
declared `` . . . that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance.'' The alliance's Secretary General
reiterated this point at the recent meeting of defense ministers in
October, stating that a `` . . . world where Russia, China, and
countries like North Korea have nuclear weapons, but NATO has none, is
simply not a safer world.''
In you view, should NATO remain a nuclear alliance as long as
nuclear weapons exist?
Answer. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is a key component of the
Alliance's deterrence and defense and must remain its highest priority
mission for deterrence and defense.
Question. Do you believe that the forward deployment of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component of NATO's nuclear
posture?
Answer. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to the
deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible
capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible
demonstration of Alliance unity.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe underpin the deterrence
of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible capabilities
to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration
of Alliance unity. Therefore, there is a continuing requirement for
U.S. nuclear weapons' deployment within NATO.
Question. At the NATO Summit in Brussels this past year, Allies
pledged to ``ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force
architecture'' to meet deterrence and defense needs. How do you
envision NATO Allies' military efforts aligning with the U.S. Army's
Multi Domain Task Force?
Answer. The U.S. Army's tenants for Multi-Domain Operations
parallel similar concepts found in NATO's Military Strategy, the
Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA),
SACEUR's AOR-wide Strategic Plan and the associated subordinate family
of DDA plans, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, all centered
on the development and adaptation of the Alliance's Military Instrument
of Power. Therefore, we envision that calibrated force posture, multi-
domain formations, and the integration of capabilities in all domains
will align with the Alliance's development of multi-domain operations
concepts and force architecture.
the korean peninsula
Question. How would you assess the continuing value of the U.S.-
South Korea alliance to U.S. national security interests?
Answer. For nearly 70 years, the United States-ROK alliance has
been a core pillar of the U.S national security architecture in
Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the North Korean
threat since 1953. It plays an integral role in managing potential
tensions in the region. The United States-ROK Alliance has also
strengthened our collective security, economic ties, and societal
relationships.
Question. Do you believe it important that the United States and
the Republic of Korea resolve fairly and amicably their negotiation of
a new Special Measures Agreement for 2020 and beyond? If so, why?
Answer. The ROK and the United States ratified the Special Measure
Agreement in August. This new agreement will contribute to long-term
stability of our force posture in Korea for years to come. I welcome
this historic agreement.
Question. In your assessment, what is the value of combined joint
exercises for maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces on the Korean
Peninsula?
Answer. Exercises and training are the routine activities of
militaries around the world. The U.S. military conducts exercises and
training at multiple echelons, at home and in every Geographic
Combatant Command region of the globe. Each exercise or training event
on the Korean Peninsula is agreed upon by both the United States and
South Korea as an integral part of maintaining combined forces
warfighting readiness to fight tonight.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's missile
capabilities?
Answer. We will continue to monitor the situation regarding DPRK
missile capabilities in order to protect U.S. interests and the
security of our allies and partners. The Department of Defense remains
postured to detect and respond to North Korean missile threats but must
continue to improve regional interoperability, pursue improvements in
allied missile defense capabilities, and adapt existing and emerging
capabilities--particularly omnidirectional threats like cruise
missiles--to strengthen our defenses. We must prioritize the next
generation of advanced ground and space-based sensors to better detect,
track, and discriminate enemy missile warheads and concurrently develop
an effective, robust layered missile defense system to ensure defense
of our homeland and forces abroad.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
weapons technology?
Answer. The United States, in close coordination with allies and
partners, has a vital interest in limiting the reach of the DPRK's
dangerous weapons programs and proliferation activities. Addressing
this issue will take a whole of government approach to ensure North
Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology. Furthermore,
the United States will continue to work closely with all countries and
jurisdictions to promote full implementation of DPRK-related U.N.
Security Council resolutions.
Question. If South Korea and North Korea were able to negotiate a
peace deal, how do you assess that would impact U.S. force posture on
the peninsula as well as the legal status of the UN force?
Answer. While the Department of Defense supports diplomatic efforts
to engage North Korea, U.S. force posture is a critical backstop to our
diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, and maintain our ability to defend the ROK. We constantly
assess our force posture to ensure that we are calibrated against the
current threat as it evolves. The threat and our Alliance commitments
will continue to be our guiding principles.
general/flag officer reductions
Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed DOD to reduce the
number of general and flag officer (G/FO) billets by 110 by 2022.
What is your understanding of the progress Joint Staff has made in
reducing its number of G/FO in accordance with Department-wide plans?
Answer. The Joint Force will successfully meet the requirements of
the NDAAs; however, emerging requirements may require future
adjustments to GO/FO positions.
The Joint Staff contributed to an approximate 10% SES reduction in
that time. Additionally, the Joint Staff scheduled and identified by-
year reductions throughout CY22. The Joint Staff also identified 78
General Officer/Flag Officer positions for reduction in conjunction
with the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. To date, the Joint Pool reduced from
310 positions to 280 positions and plans will reduce further to 232 by
December 31, 2022. In coordination with this reduction and Fiscal Year
2017 NDAA, there is a plan to establish an Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) account of not more than 30 billets.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure the Joint Staff is successful in meeting these reduction
mandates on time?
Answer. The Joint Staff is on track to meet the reduction mandates
on time. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman, Combatant Commanders, and leaders of Defense Activities to
ensure we remain on track. The Department has established a General
Officer/Flag Officer reduction plan timeline for each position
identified for removal. The Joint Staff reviews the plan regularly and
provides updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a
quarterly basis, or more frequently as needed. Regarding SES
management, if confirmed, I will continue to execute the DOD SES
Reduction Plan to meet the goals of the Department while ensuring the
mission and integrity of the Joint Force.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including
previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the
Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States'
security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to
ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal
certainty in the world's largest maneuver space.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime
disputes such as in the Indo-Pacific region and the Arctic?
Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility
and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we
do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes
are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and
that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we
undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we
are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other
Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland))
understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of
utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of
their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United
States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean and is also working to
secure international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights
on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the
other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.
guantanamo bay naval station
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee
Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
114-92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government
may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any
treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and
listed in the Army Field Manual.
Question. Fewer than forty detainees remain at the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility
at Guantanamo?
Answer. The detention facility at Guantanamo is DOD's only long-
term law of war detention facility. The continued use of this facility
is ultimately a policy decision.
The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section
1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, is conducted ``to determine whether
certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing
significant threat to the security of the United States such that their
continued detention is warranted''.
Question. Do you support the PRB process and the continued transfer
of detainees to other countries based on the PRB's determinations,
subject to the restrictions currently in law?
Answer. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by
section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), is conducted ``to determine whether certain individuals
detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to
the security of the United States such that their continued detention
is warranted.'' Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support the
PRB process, subject to existing legal restrictions.
Question. In your view, what standard should apply to medical care
provided to detainees at Guantanamo?
Answer. I believe that DOD should continue to provide adequate and
humane care for detainees consistent with the standards of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and, to the extent
practicable, medical treatment guided by standards similar to those
applied to U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay.
insider threat
Question. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider
threats--attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD
personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information
critical to national security. The National Insider Threat Task Force
published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework in November
2018.
In your view, has DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency (DCSA), better postured the Department to deter, detect, and
mitigate insider threats before they reach a critical point and
potentially harm national security.
Answer. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the question of
implementing the newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and
Security Agency (DCSA) has not been my responsibility. If confirmed, I
will review the issue as required.
Question. What can the Department do to ensure that senior leaders
in each DOD Component--not only the intelligence or counterintelligence
communities--are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities,
information from insider threats as a core mission objective?
Answer. The insider threat is a challenging problem that all senior
leaders in DOD must be aware of. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
Command, I worked diligently with subordinate commanders to ensure we
took an active role in this protecting our people, facilities and
critical information from the insider threat. This was Commander's
Business. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman, the Combatant
Commanders and the Services in all manners possible to continue with
this approach.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
acquisition process
1. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, historically, the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and requirements processes
have been based largely on ``bottom-up'' initiatives and proposals from
the military services, and focused on individual weapons systems,
platforms, and other major systems rather than the joint operational
missions assigned to joint commanders. However, modern warfare against
near-peer competitor's demands, and technology today enables, a much
higher level of jointness and integration across domains, service
capabilities, and platforms to accomplish complex missions. It is no
longer acceptable for the services to engineer and deliver systems and
capabilities that are not interoperable and expect the combatant
commander to somehow find ways to integrate them.
Further, this ``joint'' space between and across the services, the
operational domains, and the collection of platforms and systems
produced by the Department of Defense acquisition process is not
``owned'' by any service, nor are there acquisition and sustainment
organizations designated to produce, deploy, and maintain joint
solutions to these joint problems and requirements.
In multiple places in your answers to the committee's advance
policy questions, you expressed the view that it is important for the
Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek
``consensus'' among the JROC service members. Where consensus on
important requirements and technology opportunities is elusive,
however, would you intend to exercise your authority as the principal
requirements advisor to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense to make
recommendations on your own?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will strive for a data informed
process to drive integration, speed, and consensus with respect to
joint requirements and, if necessary, exercise all appropriate
authorities available to me as Chair of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council.
2. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, do you think that the Department's
requirements process and practices should be more oriented on missions
and somewhat less on individual weapons systems and platforms? If so,
how might that be accomplished?
Admiral Grady. Traditional military activities are expanding,
especially in domains like cyber and space, which are all inherently
joint. But there remain traditional military missions that must account
for the Joint Force and its fielded weapons and platforms. The
Combatant Commands assist the Joint Staff in ensuring that these
mission-oriented requirements processes remain accounted for. We need
to ensure that requirements are concept driven and threat informed in
order to generate inherently joint mission capabilities that fill gaps
at speed.
domain control
3. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, historically, too, the military
services have neglected missions that are critically important for the
joint force but are not high priorities for the specific services to
which they are assigned. Examples include mine warfare in the Navy,
theater missile defense in the Army, and close-air support in the Air
Force.
It is widely believed that prevailing in the ongoing military
competition depends on achieving unprecedented levels of
interoperability and agility to create novel ``kill webs'' on demand,
as reflected in the Joint All Domain Command and Control initiative,
and the corresponding service initiatives (Advanced Battle Management
System (ABMS), Convergence, and Overmatch).
Congress is on the threshold of enacting the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, which includes multiple
provisions to establish ``mission manager'' pilot programs--to test
concepts for managing missions in addition to individual programs. One
model for this concept is the existing Integrated Air and Missile
Defense Office (IAMDO) within the Joint Staff. What is your view of the
IAMDO model of mission management?
Admiral Grady. While this model has been effective, it is executed
using existing Department resources, often competing with the
Departments ability to conduct traditional management roles. If
confirmed, I will remain committed to leveraging existing constructs,
as well as considering alternatives to uphold the Department of
Defense's commitment to deliver the right capabilities at the right
time in support of the Joint Force.
4. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, what is your view of the idea of
mission managers?
Admiral Grady. The JROC shifted from approving Services
capabilities to a true collaborative structure designed to validate
joint requirements. If confirmed, I welcome any oversight of cross-
service capabilities. Services organize train and equip to fill
combatant command requirements. Occasionally, there is duplication of
effort and having a mission manager focused on joint requirements is
important.
5. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, in your view, is there a potential
role for existing or new acquisition and sustainment organizations to
develop and transition capabilities to meet requirements of joint
combatant commanders for which no service is responsible and no service
is likely to commit internal manpower and funding to satisfy?
Admiral Grady. Joint Combatant Commander requirements are addressed
through rapid acquisitions processes such as Joint Urgent Operational
Need. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress, OSD, and
the Services to streamline and evolve acquisition processes to meet
joint warfighter requirements.
technology advances
6. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, it is also widely acknowledged
that, because a preponderance of technological innovation is produced
by commercial industry and largely available for purchase by any
nations, it is imperative for DOD to quickly adopt and adapt
technology, developed outside of the Department that may not be
appropriately prioritized by the military services. How would you try
to evolve the JROC requirements process to improve the Department's
exploitation of commercially developed technology advances?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by
Congress in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with
the active support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I
anticipate that in the current technological environment the entities
that procure capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from
technologies that derive from the Services, private industry, and other
DOD organizations.
7. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, in your view, does the technology
exist to enable joint commanders to orchestrate sensors, processing,
decision aids, command functions, and engagement systems to rapidly
detect, locate, identify, track, and engage large numbers of mobile,
time-sensitive targets across all domains and relevant systems and
platforms?
Admiral Grady. This is a complex challenge. While many of the
technologies described above exist, additional research, concept and
capability development, organizational, and cultural change are
necessary for the Joint Force to succeed in applying associated
technologies to generate the desired effects. Additional concerted work
by the Department, Joint Staff, the Services, Congress, leading
technologists, and others is required to fully leverage the
opportunities presented by emerging technologies around this mission.
8. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, how would you characterize the
cultural and organizational obstacles to achieving this capability?
Admiral Grady. Cultural and organizational obstacles arise in
response to reshaping the force around full adoption of semi-autonomous
warfighting systems. Culturally, members of units which focus on
traditional warfighting roles, such as aviation, may resist having
these roles replaced by semi-autonomous systems. Commanders may develop
unique approaches to command and control which could further challenge
traditional organizational constructs such as domain-centric functional
component commands. Employment of large quantities of expendable
systems further challenge cultural norms, such as the risk aversion to
platform loss. The software-driven continuous capability development of
these systems requires additional adjustments in acquisitions policy,
and efforts to more tightly couple operator feedback into the
development process. In addition, we must develop and train our
operational force on the responsible use of artificial intelligence and
work to overcome cultural aversions to teaming with semi-autonomous
systems.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
sexual harassment
9. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, as part of my responsibility as a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
of Defense I will be asking you the same two questions that I ask
nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a
legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or
committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Admiral Grady. No.
10. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, have you ever faced discipline,
or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Admiral Grady. No.
aligning military service acquisition decisions with combatant
commander requirements
11. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, there has been general
recognition that at times the current DOD acquisition process does not
provide combatant commanders with the required resources to fulfill
critical operational needs arising from cross-service, joint missions.
This is especially evident at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). If
confirmed as Vice Chairman, you will play a significant role in
overseeing how DOD prioritizes joint military requirements. How do you
plan to approach your role as arbiter of what the military services
should prioritize to ensure INDOPACOM has the joint capabilities needed
to compete with and deter China?
Admiral Grady. We must prioritize delivering resources and
capabilities to INDOPACOM at speed. I will approach that process by
ensuring we always start with a firm understanding of the threat and
the risk to mission and risk to force. I am committed to collaborating
with Combatant Commanders and Services to achieve this.
12. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the Strategic Capabilities
Office (SCO) is responsible for rapidly acquiring and deploying
technology to counter emerging threats. If confirmed, how will you
ensure the military services support the SCO's mission, which
ultimately helps combatant commanders like INDOPACOM?
Admiral Grady. The Services are responsible for manning, training,
equipping, and providing ready forces to the Combatant Commanders, who
in turn are responsible for executing DOD strategy across their
respective geographic and functional areas of responsibility. If
confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders
to support transitioning SCO rapid technology projects into warfighting
capabilities to counter emerging threats.
results of the department of defense's global posture review
13. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, earlier this week, DOD released
the results of its Global Posture Review. In the Indo-Pacific, the
Review directed additional cooperation with allies and partners on
initiatives to confront Chinese military aggression and North Korean
threats, with a focus on enhancing infrastructure. Do you agree that
infrastructure improvements in the region must include projects in the
Freely Associated States, which are strategically located in the second
island chain?
Admiral Grady. Yes, infrastructure improvements should include the
Freely Associated States. The Freely Associated States extend from the
third island chain and into the second island chain. They provide the
United States with access and overflight to maintain freedom of
maneuver in the region. Infrastructure improvements will promote
economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated
States, in line with the intent of the Compacts of Free Association.
14. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the Compacts of Free Association
are set to expire in 2023 and 2024--how important is it for the United
States to extend these treaties?
Admiral Grady. The Compacts are of great importance to both the
Federated States of Micronesia and the United States. A failure to
extend the Compacts will limit the self-sufficiency and self-government
of the Freely Associated States, restrict U.S. freedom of maneuver, and
create gaps that the PRC will exploit to undermine U.S. strategic
interests in the Indo-Pacific.
military to military communication with chinese officials
15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, during a recent summit,
Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping agreed to high-level conversations
between senior military officials from both countries in the coming
months to establish guardrails and avoid potential miscalculations
which could lead to war. How important is it to have regular, open
lines of communication with senior Chinese military officials to avoid
miscalculation and clarify intentions?
Admiral Grady. Our increasingly competitive relationship with the
PRC necessitates that we maintain regular communication channels to
help avoid crisis and that we establish direct pathways for
communication so we have a timely method to engage with the PLA should
a crisis occur. Attempting to establish those pathways once a crisis
begins is too late.
DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritize crisis
prevention and management, risk reduction, and limited cooperation in
areas where national interests align, in order to advance a
constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the
PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accordance with the
statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.
I support dialog that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors that
are inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain
insight into China's strategic intent; manage differences; and
cooperate in limited areas where national interests align.
16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, would you be in favor of a
United States and China ``hot line'', similar to the one we still have
with Russia, to prevent an accidental or inadvertent war?
Admiral Grady. Yes, a ``hot line'' with China would be useful, but
U.S.--China competition is significantly more complex than the U.S.--
Soviet competition of the cold war. We need a comprehensive set of
tools for reducing risk, and DOD will support the interagency to
implement the President's guidance on establishing guardrails and means
of communication with China.
size and composition of the navy's future fleet and shipyard upgrades
17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, your experience as
the Navy's most senior surface warfare officer will likely be very
influential in the ongoing discussions about the size and composition
of the future fleet and the plan to upgrade our four public shipyards.
What are your views on the size and composition of the Navy's future
fleet?
Admiral Grady. I believe a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and
unmanned platforms is the most effective and affordable way to meet the
security demands of our Nation. Analysis confirms that numbers are not
the only factor--the right balance of capability and capacity must be
brought to bear in order achieve the combat effectiveness needed from
our Navy's fleet.
18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the Navy is in the beginning of
a 20-year plan to upgrade our four public shipyards--do you think that
time horizon needs to be compressed to ensure the future fleet is
maintained at a high State of readiness?
Admiral Grady. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
(SIOP) and its steady funding stream is critical to our ability to
clear maintenance backlogs, improve readiness rates, and sustain new
platforms. Having the flexibility to execute funding earlier, within
the 20-year plan could prove advantageous, but, as custodians of this
funding, we should be careful not to induce risk to SIOP execution.
climate adaptation plan
19. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, DOD recently released its
Climate Adaptation Plan, which lays out how operations, planning
activities, business processes, and resource allocation decisions will
include climate change considerations. If confirmed, how do you plan to
implement the Climate Adaptation Plan's lines of effort to ensure the
Department is incorporating these considerations in all of its future
acquisition and planning processes?
Admiral Grady. Climate change is altering our operating
environment. If confirmed, I will work to enhance our infrastructure
and supply chains, making them more resilient. Adapting our platforms
and installations for the effects of a changing climate will help keep
the force ready, mitigate the impacts of major weather events, and
provide tactical advantage by reducing dependencies and demand on long
distance, intricate supply chains.
homeland defense radar--hawaii
20. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
identified the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-H) as a requirement
for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from
an increasingly capable North Korea. In successive budget requests,
including this year, DOD zeroed out funding for HDR-H, which, without
an adequate alternative, will put Hawaii at risk in the near future. If
confirmed, how would you ensure Hawaii is protected from missile
threats from North Korea and elsewhere going forward?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed I would work through the JROC in order
to provide strategic direction on the requirements for each of the key
capabilities for the future Joint Force including the HDR-H. Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is a critically important capability and
therefore an essential topic for JROC action. If confirmed, I look
forward to reviewing Department assessments that inform future budget
decisions. I will also work with INDOPACOM to support continued
improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture, including
our missile defense sensor network.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
military training opportunities in west virginia
21. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, one of the priorities I didn't
have a chance to bring up in our meeting was the need to invest in
training venues that can support full mission profile exercises that
allow our troops to train back home exactly like they would if deployed
against a near peer adversary. U.S. Special Operations Command and the
Marine Corps have been the leaders in seeking out those types of
engagements, and most recently my office has been working with them to
identify venues in West Virginia that could benefit the Joint Force as
a whole. Especially on the East Coast where training space is severally
limited in availability. As we transition from our primary focus on the
Middle-East, West Virginia's terrain and population density, coupled
with its proximity to our Tier One commands and rotary wing assets make
it operationally and fiscally appealing to our Special Operation Forces
for near-peer full mission profiles. As you consider future range
training area management and programs to meet current and future
shortfalls, tell me how I can best work with you and your staff to
identify venues in West Virginia needed to meet the forecasted joint
training requirements?
Admiral Grady. Live ranges as well as virtual and constructive
means to support training are vitally important to ensuring the combat
effectiveness of the force. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with you and the rest of the SASC members, to ensure we provide the
very best training venues for our forces.
interoperability between the services
22. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, I was pleased to read about the
focus you have toward interoperability in your advance policy
questions. From the creation of pilot programs and acquisition of
assets to deployment into the hands of our warfighters the Department
of Defense, our industry partners, and allies around the globe have to
maintain a mindset of joint interoperability. General John Hyten
recognized this as the Vice Chairman, specifically in our acquisition
and emerging technology research. How do you plan to continue and
expand the joint mindset as we're procuring and developing tomorrow's
technology?
Admiral Grady. This is best achieved with the active support of the
Services and their role in the JROC. This includes applying the
expertise and capabilities of OUSD(R&E) to ensure we are fully
leveraging speed, innovation, and technology. If confirmed I will
foster relationships with all stakeholders to ensure our laser-like
focus on maintaining overmatch against our pacing threats in all
domains. If confirmed I will also further exercise the capability
requirements authority to expand the joint mindset. Modern warfare
demands unprecedented levels of interoperability, integrated systems-
of-systems kill chains, and joint command and control, for which no
single Service is responsible.
23. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, interoperability with our
allies is something I'm sure you've spent a great deal of time
designing and implementing as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces, can you
describe some of those experiences and tell us how you plan to expand
them with all our allies?
Admiral Grady. I'll provide two examples of helping to improve
allied interoperability from my time as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces,
one that focuses on the Force Development strategic horizon and another
that focuses on the Force Employment strategic horizon.
U.S. Fleet Forces and Joint Forces Command Norfolk has a meaningful
relationship with the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of
Excellence--a NATO-accredited multi-national military think tank that
facilitates the sharing of collective international experience,
expertise, and best practices, critical to operations in the North
Atlantic. The alignment of U.S. Fleet Forces and Joint Forces Command
Norfolk catalyzed the development of modern warfighting capabilities in
the North Atlantic, increasing interoperability with our NATO allies
and readiness across the joint force. If confirmed, I will continue to
support similar efforts facilitated by the Joint Staff. For example,
The Joint Staff has a longstanding relationship with NATO Allied
Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA. The J-7 facilitates the
Multinational Capability Development Campaign, a community of allies
and partners that shares Force Development best practices,
methodologies, and frameworks in order to improve the ability of joint
multinational and coalition partners to plan and operate together.
Finally, 22 nations invest in bilateral partnerships with the Joint
Staff through posting of senior liaison officers throughout Joint Staff
directorates. All of these opportunities ensure the Joint Force is
consistently working to ensure cooperation with key Allies and
Partners.
The recent deployment of the UK HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike
Group is a great example of how we are interoperable with our allies
along the Force Employment strategic horizon. The Queen Elizabeth
deployment involved coordinating operations with four different
Combatant Commands. This level of operational interoperability was
enabled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's role as the U.S.
Joint Force Global Integrator. If confirmed, I will support the Joint
Force's continuing efforts to expand operational interoperability with
our allies and partners. The primary mechanism for this effort is the
U.S. planning process focused on Consolidated Strategic Opportunities,
where we seek to synchronize in time, space, and purpose U.S. global
operations with our allies and partners.
24. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, U.S. Cyber Command and U.S.
Space Command are two combatant commands that influence nearly every
weapon and support system in our inventory, can you tell me how you
plan to resource each of them as the challenges to our capabilities in
these domains increase?
Admiral Grady. The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget requested
increased investment in these domains, dedicating $20.6B toward Space
and $10.4B toward the Cyber domain. CYBERCOM and SPACECOM execute the
Department's strategy in these critical warfighting domains, and if
confirmed I will continue to support the timely and relevant resourcing
of cyber and space capabilities to enable unfettered Joint Force
operations in all domains.
capabilities and logistics
25. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, the political, domestic, and
military landscape that each commander has to manage is more taxing on
personnel and resources today than ever before. In light of this, we
often hear of the need for more advanced weaponry, training, and other
enablers to support a defensive and future offensive need. However, we
don't hear a lot about the logistics capacity being able to support and
sustain those resources across the globe that a commander views as
mission critical. As a commander, I am interested to hear about any
concerns you may have in logistical capability or capacity to surge
necessary combat power to the region if needed to combat a North Korean
or near peer aggression?
Admiral Grady. Logistics is the principal enabler to sustain a
combat credible joint force. In the event of contingency operations in
a contested environment against a near-peer adversary our current
posture and capabilities would be challenged in supporting our forces.
We must look to diversify our distribution methods and locations to
sustain the Joint Force. Our allies, partners, and commercial logistics
providers are the key to offsetting these challenges. The joint force
will require a combination of access and agreements with like-minded
allies and partners to establish the nodes required to sustain forces
in a contested environment.
26. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, what critical vulnerabilities
do you anticipate seeing in the Indo-Pacific region in order to
safeguard the supply lines needed to support military efforts as well
as to safeguard regional stability from agitators like North Korea and
China?
Admiral Grady. Our strategic lift capacity is stretched in most
fights. Distributed operations required to support operations against a
near peer adversary will require new approaches with enhanced
capabilities. Existing service programs begin to address this gap, but
trans-loading and logistics movement from strategic lift to intra-
theater lift continues to pose some vulnerability to the joint force.
Waterborne platforms must be able to operate in austere seaports under
increased threat, and they must be interoperable for delivery of
materiel over-the-shore, and flexible enough to transfer materiel at
sea. Commercial logistics providers providing unique contract
capabilities, can be force-multipliers, and ongoing exercises are
providing helpful insight to their capabilities and limitations.
Integration of the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics in support of
the Joint Warfighting Concept will provide a better site picture for
evolving requirements, authorities, and organizational concepts to
support a highly effective joint force.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
indo-pacific partnerships
27. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, our ability to execute
operational plans and leverage combat power in the Indo-Pacific is
predicated on our ability to project and sustain the Joint Force across
the broad spans of that region. The elements of access, basing, and
overflight to forward locations are essential to position and employ
combat capability and remain globally responsive to emerging
requirements. Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy
and provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential
adversaries. What opportunities exist to enhance engagement with
partners and allies and establish new relationships to improve our
access in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Grady. The ability to work with partner nations in the
Indo-Pacific is crucial; first, to show solidarity with allies and
deter would be aggressors; and second, to provide an agile,
distributed, forward based force that can project power and minimize
losses in the event of conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to
engage with partner nations at all levels across the region in
bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and military training
exercises, which offer the chance to enhance interoperability and
integration, build relationships, show solidarity, and demonstrate
support of the international rules-based order.
28. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, if you are confirmed, one of
your responsibilities will include representing the military in the
National Security Council deputies' meetings. How would you approach
these interagency discussions, especially with regard to developing our
alliances and partnerships?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I look forward to providing advice on
how to best leverage military tools such as defense diplomacy, security
cooperation, exercises, and engagements to facilitate State
Department's diplomacy. At any given time, my familiarity with the
Chairman's regular meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of Defense
(CHODs) and other multilateral defense engagements will allow me to
provide insight as to the perspective of our Allies and Partners on any
issue as well as offer their potential reaction and/or support on
courses of action being deliberated by the National Security Council.
In times of crisis, unique military advice I would provide on behalf of
the Chairman to the National Security Council would be centered on our
warfighting capabilities that deter our adversaries or compel them to
cease malign behavior. America's extensive global defense alliances and
partnerships and our ability to integrate military operations with
like-minded nations will factor heavily into the advice I would be able
to provide.
29. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, what whole of government
opportunities do you see for improving our most strategically important
overseas relationships?
Admiral Grady. Our relationships with allies and partners remain
the single most important approach to support the rules based
international order. The Joint Force's role in maintaining, improving,
and expanding these relationships are organized by the National
Security Council to support whole of government activities to achieve
outcomes aligned to national interests. One of the greatest
opportunities to improve relationships with our allies and partners is
whole of government coordinated strategic messaging that allows us to
speak with one voice as a community of likeminded nations with shared
interests and values. For example, the Quad, which is expressly not a
Defense-centric grouping, provides us incredible opportunities to
cooperate with Australia, India, and Japan to address some of the most
complex issues of our day, including climate change, counterterrorism,
infrastructure development, critical emerging technologies, maritime
security, combating cyber threats, and humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief.
strategic logistics
30. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, the role of logistics in
deterrence is often understated. I am proud of this committee's work
implementing the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, but we cannot forget
logistics and strategy are inextricably linked. Effective deterrence
requires effective logistics. What role can U.S. Transportation Command
play in the formulation of our strategic deterrent in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Grady. USTRANSCOM (USTC) plays multiple roles in sustaining
strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. USTC continually
demonstrates the ability to project and sustain military power over
trans-oceanic distances in support of the National Defense Strategy.
The ability of USTC to control and rapidly shift assets anywhere in the
world to address emerging and high priority needs is foundational to
global responsiveness and strategic reach. USTC is responsible for
leading the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to
support planning and operations across all domains and supports
USINDOPACOM by helping set global posture (infrastructure, equipment,
and forces), as well as advocating for access, basing, and overflight
(ABO) permissions from partner nations. USTC's mobility posture enables
the critical ABO necessary in wartime and essential to any global
response, as recently demonstrated during the Afghan Non-Combatant
Evacuation Operation (NEO). Additionally, USTC continues to support
USINDOPACOM to establish and grow strategic partnership with Indo-
Pacific nations that will increases interoperability, expands training
opportunities, increases airlift options for allies and partners, and
leads to greater cooperation and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.
31. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, one of your
roles will include overseeing joint military requirements. How would
you approach coordinating logistics and sustainment requirements across
the military services, to eliminate redundancy and inefficiency and
improve effectiveness in how the different military services are
attempting to overcome the ``tyranny of distance'' in the Indo-Pacific
region?
Admiral Grady. The JROC has in the last year, begun a capability
portfolio management review process (CPMR) which is not only exploring
Combatant Command identified capability gaps, but also exploring our
Joint Warfighting Concept required capabilities. These CPMRs are
looking at what our Joint Force has now, how well the Force is meeting
our requirements, and at how we build the Joint Force for the future.
Addressing inefficacies, redundancies and capability gaps in our
logistics and sustainment portfolios will be a top priority if I am
confirmed.
australia, united kingdom, united states trilateral security pact
32. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, this weekend, I spoke with
Admiral John Aquilino about the Australia, United Kingdom, United
States--or ``AUKUS''--trilateral security pact. I am impressed by
Australia's bold commitment to building nuclear-powered submarines as
we look to enhance our shared ability to tackle the threats of the 21st
century together. We must begin the hard work to operationalize this
historic security pact to match our ally's resolve and enhance our
competitive edge in the Indo-Pacific. What steps can be taken to help
accelerate the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS,
and if confirmed, will you commit to taking any steps available to
rapidly develop these platforms?
Admiral Grady. The AUKUS trilateral security pact and the agreement
to help Australia build nuclear-powered submarines is an excellent
example of the impact we can have when working closely with our allies
and partners. If confirmed, I am fully committed to working with the
Navy, Naval Reactors and the Department of Energy to see the security
pact and the submarine program successfully executed in the most
expeditious manner possible.
33. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, will you also commit to
working with Admiral Aquilino and the Joint Staff to expand the
capabilities of the Australian submarine force to help shape, deter,
and respond to potential threats in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
nuclear policy
34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, five of my colleagues and I
recently sent a letter to senior administration officials expressing
concern that President Joseph Biden may pursue changes to long-standing
U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, despite increasingly aggressive moves
by China and Russia and clear objections from our allies. What is your
best military advice on whether the United States should adopt a ``no
first use'' or ``sole-purpose'' declaratory policy?
Admiral Grady. From a military perspective, I do believe in giving
the President as many options as possible, and that maintaining
calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I
would not advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary's
decisionmaking, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their
reliance on nuclear capabilities.
35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, what is your understanding of
allies' perspectives on potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or
sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy?
Admiral Grady. I believe our alliances are our strategic center of
gravity. The extended nuclear deterrence guarantees we provide to our
allies have been called one of the most important and effective tools
for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any
potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy should be carefully
crafted in consultation with allies.
36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, in your view, should the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remain a nuclear alliance as long
as nuclear weapons exist?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, do you believe that the forward
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component
of NATO's nuclear posture?
Admiral Grady. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to
deterrence, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if
deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance
unity.
38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
highlighted the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a hedge against
an uncertain future security environment. Considering China's massive
ongoing nuclear breakout, and Russia's increasingly aggressive
behaviors, do you believe it is prudent for the United States to
continue to maintain this role for its nuclear weapons in order to
reduce the risks to the United States and its allies from a worsening
international security environment?
Admiral Grady. The speed at which China is modernizing its nuclear
forces is deeply concerning which contributes to uncertainty and
potential miscalculation. There are benefits to having the deterrent
serve as a hedge. If confirmed, I will advocate for a modern US nuclear
deterrent that can flexibly and credibly deter both Russia and China in
a rapidly changing and dynamic security environment.
39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
outlined a separate hedging strategy that would rely on a responsive
and reliable nuclear weapons production infrastructure capable of
producing new and additional weapons. However, more than a decade
later, DOD is still unable to rely on the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) infrastructure as a viable hedging strategy due
to its declining condition. If confirmed, will you support accelerating
the modernization of NNSA's aging nuclear weapons production
infrastructure as a hedge against future risks?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will support the modernization of
NNSA's infrastructure and will work with my Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC) colleagues to determine the most effective way to do so.
missile defense
40. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the last review of roles and
missions regarding missile defense occurred at Key West in March 1948.
The realm of missile defense has evolved significantly since then and
has expanded both in terms of threat and defensive capability. Do you
believe a review of roles and missions regarding missile defense is
necessary?
Admiral Grady. Yes. Missile defense has become an increasingly
complex warfighting function that spans the entirety of the joint
force, touches numerous warfighting domains and often crosses combatant
command areas of responsibility. As a joint force, we must be able to
seamlessly integrate multi-mission sensors, battle management systems,
active defensive systems as well as offensive capabilities to deter,
and if necessary, defeat missile threats. I believe the Department must
continue to re-evaluate not only our missile defense capabilities, but
also whether we have the correct roles, responsibilities, and
authorities to effectively develop, field and employ those systems.
41. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, this committee has received
significant testimony regarding the threat that China's rapid military
growth and modernization poses to U.S. citizens and military forces in
Guam, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) reinforced the
criticality of this issue when it placed defense of Guam at the top of
its unfunded requirement list last year. Do you feel that our missile
defense forces in the Pacific are adequate to defend major military
bases in Japan and Guam from advanced Chinese ballistic and cruise
missiles?
Admiral Grady. China is designing and fielding advanced missiles
for land and maritime targets, with both conventional and nuclear
warheads, and doing so at a record pace. We must have the capability to
project forces forward in a conflict, and to counter missile
capabilities from any country that would employ them against us,
including China.
A comprehensive defense mission against such missile threats
requires leveraging networked partners and integrating capabilities
across the spectrum of operations. Numerous capability and capacity
gaps do exist, and I look forward to working with the Department
leadership and your committee to quickly field solutions that are both
effective and affordable.
42. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, INDOPACOM has stated that its
preferred defense solution for Guam is an Aegis Ashore based sensor-
shooter architecture since there are no real alternatives that provide
an equivalent level of capability and modularity in a reasonable
timeframe given the threat. Do you believe there are available, cost-
effective alternatives to an Aegis Ashore based system that could
provide Guam with an equivalent sensor-shooter capability on an
operationally relevant timeframe?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we continue to
explore new and existing technology options that can reliably and
affordably provide homeland defense capabilities and capacity as we
prioritize resources and capabilities to the Indo-Pacific region.
43. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, what would be your
priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities against cruise and
hypersonic missiles?
Admiral Grady. China and Russia have fielded thousands of advanced
cruise missiles and possess the industrial base to rapidly produce
more. They routinely demonstrate the ability to launch cruise missiles
from land, sea, air, and subsurface platforms in coordinated and
structured attacks. Cruise missiles deliver lethal effects by flying at
lower altitudes, along unpredictable trajectories, while remaining
within earth's atmosphere.
Iran and North Korea have considerable investments in their cruise
missile programs as well. For example, North Korea is advancing its
land attack cruise missile program, along with anti-ship cruise
missiles that provide Pyongyang the ability to threaten the United
States, our allies, and our partners.
Hypersonic weapons, particularly those observed recently,
incorporate the speed of ballistic missiles with the maneuvering
capabilities of a cruise missile. While the speed of the hypersonic
missiles offers its own challenge, their real advantage lies in the
enhanced maneuverability and unpredictable flight paths they offer,
which make them more difficult to track and target than traditional
missiles.
If confirmed, I look forward to working as the Chairman of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to ensure requirements are
prioritized among the Services and Agencies and that they are properly
resourced to field affordable capability and capacity against these
challenging threats.
space
44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the Space Force mission is to
protect and defend U.S. space assets as well as use the high ground of
space to ensure our warfighters in other domains cannot only compete,
but win. We don't want a fair fight, and space is essential to making
sure it's not fair. Do you agree that the Space Force, as part of its
title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip should be a
first among equals as the chief architect for space?
Admiral Grady. I agree. The Space Force is responsible for defining
the operational architecture needed to accomplish its assigned
missions.
45. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, how important
is it for Services to transfer missions and people to the Space Force?
Admiral Grady. It is vitally important to meeting the Space Force
mission that we continue the process of successfully integrating units
and capabilities into the Space Force.
46. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, does this promote efficiency and
effectiveness or should each Service have its own ``organic'' space
capabilities?
Admiral Grady. The preponderance of space forces within the DOD
resides with the Space Force, which does promote efficiency and
effectiveness. However, the other Services will continue to retain some
organic space expertise to ensure that space is properly integrated
into doctrine and operations. Some space capabilities directly tied to
their domain-specific platforms and missions, such as ship-based
systems, will remain with the other Services as well. As the department
develops future space systems and missions they will be approved,
assigned, and resourced in accordance with standard DOD processes
47. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, please explain why being the
``first mover'' in the space domain means and why our current space
architecture is considered strategically unstable--or in fact
encourages rapid escalation?
Admiral Grady. The current State of the U.S. space architecture is
vulnerable to attack because it relies on a small number of critically
important satellites. An adversary's well-placed and well-timed ``first
move'' kinetic or non-kinetic attack on a small number of key
satellites could cause great harm to our ability to execute a military
response to aggression.
48. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, should there be a conflict in
space or a related domain, what are your views on the importance of
unity of command as compared to unity of effort between DOD and
Intelligence Community assets, both in space and on the ground?
Admiral Grady. As in any other domain, unity of command of space
activities is essential for effective and efficient execution. The
capabilities and effects that those activities provide to warfighters
and decisionmakers are fundamentally enabled by unity of effort. The
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community have a long
history of collaborating in fielding and operating space capabilities
that support U.S. leadership and preeminence in space. As adversaries
increasingly threaten U.S. freedom of action in space, the DOD and IC
must continue their collaboration in order to maintain a competitive
advantage, prevail against foreign aggression, counter emergent
threats, and achieve unified action. This collaboration will transform
and strengthen the critical DOD and IC partnership in response to
growing space threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
w76-2
49. Senator Cotton. Admiral Grady, earlier this year Admiral
Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before
the House Armed Services Committee that ``The deployment of the W76-2
makes nuclear weapon use less likely. Specifically, W76-2 deployment
will raise the nuclear threshold by helping to ensure that potential
adversaries perceive no possible advantages in limited nuclear use--
making nuclear weapon employment less likely. The W76-2 provides
deterrence and assurance through tailored response options in vast
operating areas where forward basing may not be possible. Further, the
W76-2 provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
survivability, and serve as a valuable hedge against future nuclear
``break out'' scenarios. It also offers a timely response option able
to penetrate adversary defenses and does not require host nation
support to provide deterrent effect. Limited U.S. response options,
provided by the W76-2, ensure a more credible deterrent to limited
attack against the U.S., allies, and partners rather than relying
primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. Without this
capability, adversaries may perceive an advantage at lower levels of
conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.'' Do you agree with
Admiral Richard's views on the W76-2? Please elaborate as to the extent
you agree or disagree.
Admiral Grady. I agree with Admiral Richard's explanation of the
W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead. I would
add that we do not need to match China or Russia capability-for-
capability. What we need is a range of credible low-yield nuclear
response options to convince potential adversaries that we will deny
them the objectives they seek and impose costs that far outweigh those
benefits they can achieve if they initiate limited nuclear use. The
low-yield W76-2 provides a prompt, survivable strike option against
targets that are heavily defended against air-delivered strikes. These
unique capabilities enhance the U.S. ability to offer a credible
nuclear response of limited nuclear strike, thereby strengthening
deterrence and allied assurance.
nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile
50. Senator Cotton. Admiral Grady, earlier this year Admiral
Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before
the House Armed Services Committee that ``The nuclear-armed sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is intended to deny potential
adversaries any mistaken confidence limited nuclear employment would
provide an advantage over the U.S., its allies, and partners. SLCM-N
will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an assured
response capability. It does not require host nation support and
provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability.
The SLCM-N will provide assurance to our allies and partners through
tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward basing
may not be possible. Limited U.S. response options, such as the SLCM-N,
is intended to provide a more credible deterrent to limited attack
against the U.S., allies, and partners rather than relying primarily on
the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. It will enhance our
ability to tailor deterrence and assurance while expanding the range of
credible U.S. options.'' Do you agree with Admiral Richard's views on
SLCM-N? Please elaborate as to the extent you agree or disagree.
Admiral Grady. Yes, I do agree with Admiral Richard, and I support
the continued development of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile. I believe SLCM-N would enhance deterrence, raising the
threshold for the use of low yield nuclear weapons by our adversaries.
Additionally, SLCM-N would enhance our ability to provide extended
deterrence to our Allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, without the
need to ask our allies and partners to host more nuclear weapons.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
congressional oversight
51. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, senior leaders at the
Department of Defense periodically appear before the Senate Armed
Services Committee to provide information to senators and answer their
questions. This critical oversight function depends on forthright
answers to challenging questions. I found your answers to my questions,
and those of some of my colleagues, to be evasive and indirect. When
you are asked to give your personal opinion, I expect you to give your
personal opinion directly. In future appearances before this committee,
will you commit to providing your personal opinion in a direct manner?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
readiness
52. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, over several years this
committee has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness--across
each of our services--to levels that would enable our success in a
conflict. We've had some success, but there is still a lot of work to
do. If you have not done so already, I recommend that every senior
defense leader read T.R. Fehrenbach's ``This Kind of War'', which
provides a cautionary tale of our Nation's failure to adequately fund
and train our Armed Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were
steep and American service members paid with their lives. If confirmed,
you will invariably make decisions that directly or indirectly impact
readiness. Accordingly, will you commit--if confirmed--to work with
this committee and within the Department on further bolstering military
readiness to ensure the failures we endured in the Korean War never
happen again?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
budget
53. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe a $25 billion
increase in the Department of Defense's budget, above what President
Biden deemed sufficient in his fiscal year 2022 budget, puts us in a
stronger position to compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat
China?
Admiral Grady. Additional funding would enable the Department to
further modernize and deliver relevant capabilities to counter China
while further reducing risk.
54. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe that a future
Department of Defense budget that fails to even keep pace with
inflation would be adequate to address the security challenges we will
likely face?
Admiral Grady. I believe that sustaining the buying power of our
funded programs is a critical part of ensuring the successful execution
of our long-term investments in our defense infrastructure in support
of the National Security Strategy.
55. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, the National Defense Strategy
Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Secretaries of
Defense, and the previous and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have all stated the need for sustained 3-5 percent annual real
growth to the Defense budget to implement the National Defense Strategy
(NDS), increase readiness, and advance long-overdue modernization.
Further emphasizing the need for consistent and increased funding, the
NDS Commission report stated, ``America is very near the point of
strategic insolvency, where its `means' are badly out of alignment with
its `ends'.'' This critical situation is negatively compounded by the
Biden administration's dismal defense topline that does not keep pace
with inflation. With these facts in mind, and understanding your
ability to influence the budget will be limited to future year
submissions, will you commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget
vice a budget-driven strategy?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the
Department delivers strategy-driven budgets that are shaped by
strategic guidance in order to deter and, if necessary, defeat
aggressors. I look forward to working with OSD and Congress to achieve
these ends.
great power competition in the arctic
56. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, given the National Defense
Strategy's focus on great power competition and increased Russia and
Chinese activity in the Arctic, do you believe the Arctic is an
emerging front-line for great power competition and rivalry? Please
elaborate.
Admiral Grady. DOD recognizes that increased Russian and Chinese
activity in the Arctic is challenging the international rules-based
order. Russia views itself as a great polar power and regulates
maritime operations in the Northern Sea Route in a manner contrary to
international law. Meanwhile, while China is not an Arctic nation, it
is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine
international rules and norms. The Arctic is a rapidly evolving
security environment where the Joint Force must prepare to respond
promptly and effectively to contingencies.
57. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, can you explain why our
adversaries would want to limit our presence and power projection
capabilities in the Arctic region?
Admiral Grady. Russia seeks to limit U.S. and allied presence and
influence in the region because it views the Arctic as a strategic base
of natural resources, seeks to develop its waterways as a major
international shipping route, and sees the region as integral to its
security. Militarily, Moscow is particularly concerned with protecting
the ballistic missile submarines that are homeported in the Arctic and
with ensuring its Northern Fleet's ability to navigate throughout the
European Arctic and North Atlantic; it has taken steps to deploy
coastal-and air-defense systems to secure those goals. Economically,
the Kremlin seeks to turn the Northern Sea Route--which runs along the
Russian northern coast--into a major maritime shipping route, and to
develop fossil fuel extraction projects in the region.
In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy that
promoted a ``Polar Silk Road'' and declared China to be a ``near-Arctic
State.'' This strategy calls on Beijing to preserve its access to
abundant natural resources and sea lines of communication in the region
and highlights the PRC's icebreaker vessels and research stations as
integral to this strategy's implementation. Since 2015, Beijing has
pushed its state-owned enterprises to secure agreements to trade rare
earth metals with countries such as Greenland, which is believed to
host a quarter of the world's rare earth reserves. Beijing's expanding
Arctic interests have created new opportunities for China-Russia
engagement and probably will motivate the PRC to attempt to limit our
presence and power projection capabilities in the Arctic.
58. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, what power
projection capability gaps currently exist that inhibit our ability to
effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic to compete with
Russia and China in the northern latitudes?
Admiral Grady. As DOD examines the attributes of Joint Force
capabilities, posture, operations, and activities necessary for
deterrence in the Arctic, it will do so in a strategy-driven and
resource-informed way. Determinations will be made on the basis of U.S.
interests, National Defense Strategy goals and priorities, DOD's Arctic
objectives, and emerging threats in the Arctic and other key theaters
of competition. We have important work to do along with Canada to
modernize sensor coverage of North America to support Arctic awareness.
We also need to look for ways to improve Command, Control,
Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability above 65 degrees North latitude. The
Coast Guard and Navy are also working together in an integrated program
office to develop and field the Polar Security Cutter, and Coast Guard
is working through a 4-year service life extension of the icebreaker
Polar Star to ensure polar access through delivery of the Polar
Security Cutter in 2025.
59. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, will you commit to visiting
Alaska with me in your first year to see first-hand the opportunities
for the U.S. military offered by my great State?
Admiral Grady. Yes
60. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, the fiscal year 2022 NDAA will
include the Arctic Security Initiative (ASI), a bipartisan provision
that requires the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander to conduct
an independent assessment of the resources, posture, and activities
required to meet U.S. defense policy objectives in the Artic. ASI will
also authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish the Arctic
Security Initiative. Will you commit to supporting the NORTHCOM
Commander's independent assessment and the establishment of ASI?
Admiral Grady. Artic security is critically important and if
confirmed I look forward to working with NORTHCOM on this matter.
department of defense bureaucracy
61. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, General John Hyten, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has repeatedly stated his
growing concern over the Department of Defense's inability to ``move
fast'' when compared to China and Russia due to agency bureaucracy and
risk-aversion. Do you agree that our existing bureaucratic processes
may disadvantage us compared to China and Russia?
Admiral Grady. Yes. If confirmed, I will prioritize opportunities
where the Department can streamline processes, reduce bureaucracy, and
become more efficient in order to outpace the continuously evolving
challenges posed by China and Russia.
62. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, if our existing bureaucratic
processes may disadvantage us compared to China and Russia, what is
your personal opinion on how to address this?
Admiral Grady. There are benefits and challenges with our existing
processes and there is room for improvement. We must get better
managing program and acquisition risk and inserting speed in our
processes. This includes empowering and developing our workforce--the
workforce of today and of the future--and it means developing a more
resilient defense industrial base that can meet the needs of the
Department. We also need to assess how we can better leverage
technology, innovation, and industry partnerships, trade schools, and
academia to field and develop capabilities that outpace our security
challenges.
63. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, are there
certain entities within the Department of Defense that are preventing
us from ``moving fast'' as General Hyten described?
Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will absolutely look for ways to
carry on Gen. Hyten's hard work to ``move fast'' and will not be silent
when I see bureaucratic processes or entities impeding our ability to
move rapidly.
64. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, how can
Congress help the Department of Defense remove structural or procedural
impediments to ``moving fast''?
Admiral Grady. congressional oversight is incredibly important, and
I think we have to get more comfortable with leveraging and applying
learning and opportunities when failures occur in programs with
promising technological breakthroughs. The ability to learn from these
exploratory, hypothesis testing, or uncertain and complex process
``failures'' is crucial to the delivery of advanced warfighting
capabilities especially as we look at hypersonic capabilities.
transforming the joint requirements oversight council
65. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, as the Vice Chairman, you
would chair the JROC, which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs uses as an
advisory council to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on
requirements prioritization and the conformance of programs and budgets
to priorities established both in strategic plans and those identified
by the combatant commands. Former Vice Chairman General Hyten advocated
that the JROC needed to be more fixated on near-term capability gaps
and indicated that upcoming JROC guidance would focus on allowing
lower-level officials flexibility in how they tackle acquisition
issues. This past May he said, ``[t]hey have to be given the
responsibility, the authority and the funding flexibility to make
decisions, put money where it needs to be, and go fast because
otherwise we will not be able to keep up with our adversaries.'' Do you
share General Hyten's concerns?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
66. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, if you share General Hyten's
concerns, what is your personal opinion on how to address them?
Admiral Grady. I believe General Hyten and the Vice Chiefs have set
the stage to address the JROC's concerns with respect to going faster
while maintaining oversight and moving at a rate that paces or outpaces
our adversaries. I will continue to address this concern as the JROC
Chair. I will address this by continuing to apply the JROC's charter of
providing Strategic Directives that enable Service funding flexibility
to address capability gaps within their portfolios. This practice will
continue in concert with OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) as critical advisors
to the JROC process.
joint pacific alaskan range complex and military training opportunities
in alaska
67. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, the JROC is creating a revised
joint warfighting concept called ``expanded maneuver'' and its next
strategic directive will provide the services with a unified integrated
air and missile defense (IAMD) vision. The JROC has already approved a
strategic directive for four areas--joint fires, contested logistics,
joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and information
advantage. General Hyten believes the JROC will be challenged to
develop ``expanded maneuver'' since there is a lack of ``good campaign
level modelling across all domains, including space and cyber that show
how all these things fit together across the board.'' Can you explain
the relationship between training, modeling, and concept development?
Admiral Grady. The Joint Warfighting Concept and expanded maneuver
are foundational concepts designed to address gaps with respect to
future warfighting challenges. While aspirational, these concepts will
continually evolve based on experimentation, training, modeling and
simulation, additional concept development, and applying what we learn.
Modeling and simulation create the operational environment for
experimentation to occur. Both current and future force models should
blend all five warfighting domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, all
dimensions of warfare (conventional, irregular, and nuclear), across
the spectrum of conflict to best represent how a campaign would unfold.
68. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, how many ranges in the United
States allow the Joint Force to exercise all domains concurrently?
Admiral Grady. Currently, there is no single physical range that
allows the Joint Force to exercise all domains concurrently. Exercising
the Joint Force across all domains will need to be accomplished through
the modernization of live ranges and the further development and
fielding of systems that provide realistic virtual and constructive
environments. More efforts, like INDOPACOM's Pacific Multi-Domain
Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC), which includes the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), will be required to train
to and integrate all domain operations.
69. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, how important is it to the
Joint Staff to have training ranges capable of employing the full
capabilities of equipment like 5th-generation fighters to test and
refine new doctrine and operating concepts?
Admiral Grady. The Joint Force requires improvements to live,
virtual, and constructive training infrastructure in order to create
realistic training environments and stress the full capabilities of the
Joint Force. New systems like 5th generation fighters and new units
like the Marine Littoral Regiment or Army Multi-Domain Task Force need
training ranges that have the capacity and scale to integrate
capabilities across all domains. Current training infrastructure
permits the Joint Force to either integrate capabilities across the
traditional domains of air, land and sea together or the newly
recognized domains of space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic
spectrum individually. Training infrastructure and ranges, like the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), require modernization to
enable the Joint Force to train and prepare for conflict with a peer
adversary across all domains. This modernization will need to include
the integration of virtual and constructive means that enable the Joint
Force to further test and evaluate warfighting concepts, techniques,
and procedures, while concealing the full capabilities of current and
emerging systems.
future recruitment and retention concerns
70. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, I would like to get your
thoughts on an issue that I view with increasingly deep concern, an
issue that serves as the foundation for our military now and into the
future. The issue I am referencing is the recruitment and retention of
a highly talented, All Volunteer Joint Force. Let me cite a few metrics
that are driving this concern. First, the recently published Reagan
National Defense Survey indicates that trust in the military has fallen
from 70 percent in November 2018 to a dismal 45 percent in November
2021. That is concerning. Second, a recently released Harvard Kennedy
School Youth Poll reported results that indicate the majority of young
Americans do not believe the United States is an exceptional country.
This is equally concerning. And, third, the National Commission on
Military, National, and Public Service detailed in their report to
Congress that only 29 percent of the population is eligible to serve in
the Armed Forces. I think you can see where I'm going with this.
Overlap this decreasing propensity to service with the few that are
even eligible to do so, and it appears we are headed toward a very
uncertain future for recruiting and retaining a highly talented, All
Volunteer Joint Force. How are we going to recruit and retain service
members into an institution that a growing number of Americans do not
trust, to serve a country that they do not believe is exceptional?
Admiral Grady. National service--both military and civilian--is one
of the core tenants of our country. Addressing challenges with respect
to recruitment and retention is a multifaceted challenge that will
require focused leadership and attention from the Services and across
the broader Department and key stakeholders to ensure access to talent.
Part of my personal philosophy is that a strong family means a stronger
fleet and to achieve this I would prioritize how we can 1) work to
restore trust by; remaining an apolitical institution, being the
world's best, most lethal fighting force, and being open and
accountable fiscal stewards of taxpayer dollars, 2) explore stronger
partnerships with the broader population to include industry, academia
and trade schools, and especially the communities which host our
installations, 3) create a safe, secure, and productive working
environment for the sons and daughters of America. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Department and collaborating with all
stakeholders to also raise awareness about the incredible career
opportunities that exist in the military for professional, technical,
skilled and craft labor.
71. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, what ideas do you have for
both the Department and Congress to work together to reverse these
concerning trends?
Admiral Grady. The U.S. military must continue to engage with the
whole of American society to increase understanding of the Department
of Defense roles and responsibilities and enhance the military's access
to a wide array of talent. Defense leaders, as well as our many
talented service members, must continue to engage with American society
and effectively publicize to our fellow citizens the important and
unique role the military has in protecting and defending the Nation.
If confirmed, I look forward to assessing more specific
opportunities to address these challenges and leverage opportunities.
systemic racism
72. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe that systemic
racism exists within the Department of Defense?
Admiral Grady. I do not believe the Department of Defense is a
fundamentally racist organization. I do recognize that racial and
ethnic biases still exist, and service members continue to experience
and report racial/ethnic discrimination. This harms the readiness and
lethality of the Joint Force and we must do better to address this and
foster greater unity among all service members.
purpose and mission of the u.s. military
73. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, what is the purpose and
mission of the U.S. military?
Admiral Grady. The military's enduring mission is to defend the
United States and its interests. We do this by providing combat-
credible military forces needed to deter war, and if deterrence fails,
win wars.
engagements with reporters and authors
74. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, I believe it is important for
senior leaders in the Department of Defense to engage with the media
and the American people. I also believe that senior leaders must
exercise discretion in deciding whether or not to talk to an individual
reporter or author. Recent books featuring alleged statements and
recollections of senior Department of Defense leaders have caused
unnecessary controversy that distracts from our focus on China, Russia,
and other threats around the world. Will you commit to not sit for
interviews with authors or journalists writing books about events
occurring while you are still in uniform?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
size of the u.s. navy
75. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe that in both
the short-and long-term, the Navy must increase the number of ships in
the fleet to effectively compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat
China?
Admiral Grady. First, I appreciate Congress' direction to achieve a
355 ship Navy, as written into law. Further, I believe a balanced,
hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned platforms is an effective and
affordable way to meet the security demands of our Nation. Analysis
confirms that ship numbers is just one of many factors required to
achieve the correct balance of capability and capacity needed in order
to achieve the combat effectiveness required of our Navy's fleet.
pacific deterrence initiative
76. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, will you commit to support the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and aligning the Department of
Defense's funding process for PDI with that used for the European
Deterrence Initiative?
Admiral Grady. I am committed to supporting the PDI and ensuring
the Department's investments on a global scale are optimized to deter,
and if necessary, defeat, any strategic competitor, with China as the
pacing threat. If confirmed, I look forward to working with OSD and
Congress to balance resources toward modernization, operations, and
readiness to effectively address these threats.
taiwan
77. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe the United
States should use its leverage as Taiwan's largest arms supplier to
ensure it acquires equipment and weapons to execute an asymmetric
defense doctrine?
Admiral Grady. The Department continues to engage our Taiwan
counterparts to ensure we share the same definition of asymmetric
defense and share the same understanding of the PRC Most Likely Course
of Action. If confirmed, I will continue to support an emphasis of
asymmetric acquisitions.
78. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe the United
States presently has the will, capability, and capacity to contest a
Chinese amphibious invasion, blockade, quarantine, or air assault
against Taiwan?
Admiral Grady. The U.S. military is ready, willing, and able to
carry out our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
national nuclear security administration infrastructure
79. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, if major weapons life
extension programs are funded, but infrastructure, recapitalization,
and maintenance are starved, what sort of impacts can we expect to see
unfold?
Admiral Grady. Nuclear modernization cannot occur without resilient
and modern infrastructure and supporting workforce. This includes key
scientific and manufacturing infrastructure capabilities necessary to
modernize the surveil the nuclear deterrent. The NNSA is one of the
Department's most important relationships. I am firmly committed to
working with NNSA's leadership, the national laboratories, and the
production complex to ensure the delivery of military requirements. The
nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of our national security. To that
end, I support modernizing and recapitalizing NNSA's critically
important infrastructure. This will require sustained funding and
support over time. Without a modern and resilient infrastructure and
workforce, we will be challenged to modernize the nuclear deterrent.
80. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, what modernization impacts
can we anticipate for the key secondaries group of capabilities--
enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and lithium--if recapitalization
program funding for infrastructure modernization is decreased?
Admiral Grady. Infrastructure investments, including those that
underpin key weapons materials and components, are necessary for
modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Without sufficient
investments in these areas, modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile
will not be possible which will directly impact DOD's ability to field
effective U.S. nuclear forces. If confirmed, I will continue to
encourage a strong partnership between the DOD and the National Nuclear
Security Administration through the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure
these investments remain sufficient.
china
81. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, how can our policy toward
maintaining Taiwan's freedom be less ``one dimensional'' in the sense
that we incorporate more than just DOD operations plans and incorporate
a more whole-of-government approach?
Admiral Grady. Our competition with China and our policy toward
Taiwan are multi-dimensional. Integrated deterrence is not just about
taking a multi-domain approach using our military instruments of power,
but also taking a multi-domain, whole-of-government approach that
brings our diplomatic, economic, and other instruments of national
power to bear in support of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
the DOD continues to support the interagency effort toward an
integrated, whole-of-government approach. The United States will not be
able to fully deter the PRC if we continue to rely on military posture
alone. We must leverage trade, commerce, treasury, diplomatic, and
other intergovernmental tools in order to create the conditions for
deterrence. We must also leverage our worldwide network of Alliances to
further this effort.
82. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, of all the qualitative and
quantitative investments China has made in their nuclear arsenal, which
concern you the most?
Admiral Grady. I remain most concerned about China's aggressive
pursuit of an increasingly capable and viable nuclear triad, which
includes advanced delivery platforms. The People's Liberation Army Navy
already has operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
providing a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Chinese also
continue to pursue long range aircraft capable of delivering air-
launched ballistic missiles. Finally, open press has reported on the
construction of hundreds of new missile silos, and on a new fractional-
orbit hypersonic system which represents a highly advanced weapons
delivery platform. Taken together, the elements of China's emerging
triad are problematic and raise concerns about their intentions and
nuclear doctrine.
83. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, given the scope and scale of
China's investment in their nuclear forces, what can we infer about
their intentions and nuclear doctrine?
Admiral Grady. Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to
expand and diversify its nuclear forces. For example, last year the DOD
estimated that the PRC had a nuclear warhead stockpile in the low 200's
and projected it to at least double over the next decade. Since then,
Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion, which may enable the PRC
to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and perhaps as
many as 1,000 warheads by 2030. These warheads and delivery platforms
likely equal the effectiveness, reliability and survivability of
similar platforms currently under development in the United States.
These developing capabilities span the range from tactical to strategic
and demonstrate an approach that seeks to undermine credible U.S.
deterrence.
Given these facts, combined with PLA documents describing a future
combat style characterized by integrated joint operations under a
unified command, I would infer that China is seeking to expand its
options in terms of nuclear doctrine and strategy. These could include
combining and integrating their conventional and nuclear capabilities
into their warfighting doctrine. They could pursue this approach to
nullify U.S. deterrence strategy, which as you are aware includes the
extended deterrence strategy for our allies.
84. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, in light of China's ongoing
nuclear force expansion, do you believe it is prudent to scale back any
aspect of the current U.S. nuclear modernization plan?
Admiral Grady. No. I believe that would be a dangerous course of
action. China is not the only nation pursuing nuclear force expansion.
Russia is also expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal. Given
the aging State of every leg of our nuclear triad, as well as the
systems we rely on to execute nuclear command and control, it is
imperative that existing modernization efforts continue and that we
remain open to innovative and prudent ways to ensure the capabilities
of our nuclear enterprise can meet the challenges of an uncertain
future. A credible modern nuclear force provides the foundation for
strategic deterrence. With multiple competitors either expanding or
developing their own capabilities, we must remain mindful that any
reduction in our nuclear forces would undermine strategic deterrence
and potentially invite adventurism by nations equipped with a modern
nuclear arsenal.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
defense strategy, force planning, and force posture
85. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing
threat. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's
designation? Why or why not?
Admiral Grady. I agree with the Secretary's designation. Beijing
aims to achieve ``the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation'' by
2049 to match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace U.S.
alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and
revise the international order to be more advantageous to Beijing's
authoritarian system and national interests. PRC leaders have
emphasized strengthening the PLA into a ``world-class'' military as an
essential part of this strategy to expand Beijing's national power. To
that end, the PRC continues to strengthen its ability to project power
globally, coerce Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes,
and counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along its
periphery.
86. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's
priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the
Secretary's designation? Why or why not?
Admiral Grady. Yes, I do. A geostrategic struggle between the free
international rules-based order and a repressive world order is
occurring in the Indo-Pacific region. This region, which stretches from
the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States,
represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the
world. There is a historical precedence for U.S. interests in a free
and open Indo-Pacific, and some of our strongest defense alliances are
in this region--Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.
87. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, ``The PRC
[People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a
Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario.'' In your personal opinion,
do you agree with the designation of a Taiwan contingency as the
Department's pacing scenario? Why or why not?
Admiral Grady. I agree with the Assistant Secretary. The Taiwan
issue does present the pacing scenario in the West Pacific. Supporting
our allies and partners in this region against an increasingly
aggressive PRC is key to the maintenance of the current international
rules-based order and ability to address the parameters of the Taiwan
scenario postures us to be able to effectively respond to a wide array
of potential scenarios in the western Pacific.
88. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command Admiral John Aquilino, and former Commander of U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command Phil Davidson, among others, have testified that the
U.S. military must maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait
accompli against Taiwan in order to strengthen our ability to deter
such a contingency. In your personal opinion, do you agree that the
U.S. military must maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait
accompli against Taiwan?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
89. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary Austin wrote earlier
this year that a ``combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is
instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter, and if necessary,
deny a fait accompli scenario.'' Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen
Hicks, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin,
and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs
Ely Ratner have since reaffirmed the Secretary's emphasis on denial, as
have INDOPACOM Commander Admiral John Aquilino and former INDOPACOM
Commander Admiral Philip Davidson. Indeed, Secretary Karlin went so far
as to write, ``I believe strongly that deterrence by denial should be
prioritized when it comes to China, and Taiwan in particular.
Deterrence by cost-imposition or deterrence by punishment can
complement but should not supplant deterrence by denial when it comes
to deterring China.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree that
deterrence by denial is the best approach to deterring a Chinese fait
accompli against Taiwan?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
90. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
agree that combat-credible forces forward are instrumental to the U.S.
military's ability to deny a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
91. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command Admiral John Aquilino testified earlier this year that the
threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is ``much closer to us than most
think'' and that this threat could materialize well before 2035. Former
Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson went
even further, testifying that the threat of a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan is ``manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next 6
years.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree that the threat of a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan is one we must be concerned about in this
decade, not just in the 2030's or later?
Admiral Grady. I respect Admiral Aquilino and Admiral Davidson's
assessments. The People's Liberation Army's rate of growth in both
capacity and capability has outpaced our projections for years. It is
reasonable to assume that China could achieve a level of military means
within the next decade that could embolden them to military action
against Taiwan. The Joint Force needs to continue to act with allies
and partners to ensure that cross-strait tension does not result in
military conflict and remain committed to our obligations under the
Taiwan Relations Act.
92. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, given the increasingly urgent
threat of a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, do you commit to
prioritize efforts to maintain the U.S. military's ability to defeat a
Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, if you are confirmed?
Admiral Grady. Yes, I am committed to prioritizing efforts to
maintain the U.S. military's ability to prevent a Chinese fait accompli
against Taiwan and most importantly to ensure that cross-strait tension
does not result in military conflict.
93. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, many of the Department of
Defense's most important modernization programs will not produce
results at scale until the 2030's. In your personal opinion, what
concrete steps should the Department of Defense take to strengthen
deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prior to 2030?
Admiral Grady. I believe it's important to recognize that while we
are modernizing our force, we currently have significant deterrent
capabilities postured in the region, and we are adjusting that posture
to enhance those capabilities even further. Taiwan, along with our
other allies and partners, are also making adjustments to their own
force posture. We are, and will, continue to assist our allies and
partners in bolstering their own deterrent capabilities. If confirmed,
I look forward to seeking opportunities to accelerate the development
and delivery of capabilities to this critically important region.
94. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
agree that the Department of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority
theaters so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring
China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the U.S.
defense budget?
Admiral Grady. We must always start with the threat. This should
drive our global posture and allocation of resources to ensure we are
positioned to deter adversaries and win conflicts if deterrence fails.
If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to ensure our
resource priorities are aligned to address threats in a highly dynamic
and rapidly changing security environment.
95. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mara Karlin sent me the following earlier this year: ``I believe that
the force planning construct should prioritize and focus on China
unless and until the security environment changes dramatically'' and
that ``the threat China poses to Taiwan should be a priority'' for the
force planning construct. In your personal opinion, do you agree with
Secretary Karlin's statement?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
allied and partner burden-sharing
96. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
agree that Taiwan needs to field cost-effective and resilient
asymmetric defense capabilities as quickly as possible in order to
strengthen deterrence against a Chinese invasion?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
97. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
agree that Taiwan's acquisition and deployment of asymmetric defense
capabilities is essential not just for strengthening deterrence against
a Chinese invasion, but also for reducing operational risk to American
Forces who may be sent to help Taiwan repel such an invasion?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
98. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
agree that it is critical for Taiwan to prioritize acquisition of cost-
effective and resilient asymmetric defense capabilities?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
99. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith
wrote the following to me prior to her confirmation: ``I have long
argued that NATO's defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP [gross
domestic product] ought to be a floor, not a ceiling. It is my view
that allies should treat it as such and invest according. That is
because the world is not unipolar anymore. The security environment has
changed dramatically since the Wales Pledge was drafted.'' In your
personal opinion, do you agree with Ambassador Smith that our NATO
allies should be increasing defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP?
Admiral Grady. Yes, 2 percent should be the floor and not the
ceiling with respect to NATO defense spending.
military personnel policy
100. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, do you commit to ensuring that
DOD and the military services adhere to a forthright and clear process
of evaluating requests for religious exemption requests for the COVID-
19 vaccination, if you are confirmed?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
101. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, do you commit to ensuring that
all exemption requests are evaluated on a case by case basis, as well
as involving your key advisors on spiritual issues--your chaplains--at
all stages of decisionmaking when a request for a religious exemption
is involved--and particularly at the final stage, as is ordinarily the
case with other accommodation requests, if you are confirmed?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
102. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, do you commit to providing my
office and offices of other Members of Congress with requested
information regarding the religious accommodation process and relevant
records in a thorough and timely manner, if you are confirmed?
Admiral Grady. Yes.
103. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, are
you concerned that a failure to fairly and even-handedly consider
religious exemption requests could result in the loss of high-quality
service members who have devoted their lives to serving our county,
thereby creating a national security risk?
Admiral Grady. The military has established and documented
processes and procedures to consider exemptions. The COVID outbreak on
USS Theodore Roosevelt highlighted the impact that an infectious
disease outbreak can have on lethality and combat readiness. The tragic
loss of a member of the crew who died of COVID is now almost completely
preventable with the use of vaccines. Each of us who volunteers to
serve in uniform commits to complying with applicable regulations, and
I respect the right of Service members to choose to pursue alternative
careers if they believe they cannot comply with a lawful order. While I
regret that some service members will choose to leave the service
instead of getting vaccinated against COVID-19, current data shows that
the numbers of those leaving will not be significant enough to present
a national security risk.
______
[The nomination reference of Admiral Christopher W. Grady,
USN follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[TThe biographical sketch of Admiral Christopher W. Grady,
USN, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Admiral
Christopher W. Grady, USN in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on December 14, 2021,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2021.]
[all]