

THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER
W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

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THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Wednesday, December 8, 2021

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. Let me call the hearing to order.

Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the nomination of Admiral Christopher Grady to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thank you, Admiral, for your continued service and willingness to lead in this important position.

I would also like to welcome your wife Christine. We are grateful to your family for their sacrifice and continued support of your service to the nation.

You have served most recently as the Commander of Fleet Forces Command, which included responsibility for STRATCOM's sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. That experience, along with your distinguished career of service across multiple theaters and command at all levels, will serve you well in this new role.

I would also note that you were born in Newport, Rhode Island, and are a native of Middletown, Rhode Island, which makes this a very pleasant experience.

[Laughter.]

Chairman REED. As we consider this nomination, we must keep in mind that the United States is engaged in a strategic competition with China and Russia. These near-peer rivals do not accept U.S. global leadership or the international norms that have helped keep the peace for the better part of a century. This strategic competition is likely to intensify due to shifts in the military balance of power and diverging visions of governance between China and Russia and the West. This competition is also unfolding amidst a

global pandemic, climate change, and the emergence of highly disruptive technologies.

Further, the Defense Department must continue to recruit and retain high-caliber individuals, while restoring readiness and pursuing new high-end capabilities for the force. The interconnected nature of these challenges will drive how the Department and the military services adapt to achieve their missions.

Admiral Grady, if confirmed as Vice Chairman, you will be working closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Milley, to address each of these issues, and I hope you will share your views on them with the Committee.

In addition, as Vice Chairman, you will serve a key role in the interagency process that often requires working closely with senior policymakers within the Department and at the National Security Council on critical national security issues. In light of the strategic challenges I referenced earlier, the Committee looks forward to hearing your thoughts on the effectiveness of the interagency process.

Finally, the Vice Chairman is assigned a number of specific responsibilities within the Department. First, the Vice Chairman oversees the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC, which reviews requirements for acquisition programs to ensure they are reasonable and necessary. Second, as a senior member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Vice Chairman plays a central role in ensuring the U.S. safely maintains its nuclear weapons stockpile. Lastly, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman often partner to lead the Department in addressing policy challenges that require the integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.

I look forward to hearing how you will prioritize and execute each of these critical functions, if confirmed as the Vice Chairman.

Thank you, again, for your willingness to serve our Nation, and I look forward to your testimony.

Now, let me now recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Grady, thank you for your decades of standing watch over our security, and for your continued willingness, as well as your family's willingness, to continue your service in this direction.

For the past 3 years, this Committee has used the 2018 National Defense Strategy to help guide our oversight and legislative direction. I always like to comment that this is something that works. Many things don't work around here, but this does. It started off with an equal representation of Democrats and Republicans and has been a great guide for us.

China continues to modernize its military at an alarming pace. On November 15, Russia tested an anti-satellite missile, shattering a satellite into 1500 pieces of lethal debris that made astronauts scramble for safety.

Even more dangerously, Russia is postured to attack Ukraine in what could be the largest invasion we have seen since World War II. We have got to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine now to

deter a Russian attack. Every day President Biden waits, he makes an attack more likely.

Finally, the administration added to the problem with the botched evacuation of American citizens and allies from Afghanistan that we still recall, we remember, and we regret. This disaster shatters U.S. credibility and determines the trust of partners and allies; the same partners and allies who are supposed to be our biggest advantage over our adversaries.

While the world gets more dangerous, the administration foolishly wants to cut defense spending. Thankfully, this year's NDAA, with its great success, I have to say, last night in the House, is bringing this back to where it should be.

Admiral Grady you will be critical to helping this nation maintain an effective nuclear deterrent and accelerate adoption of advanced technology like the hypersonic weapons, advanced materials, and artificial intelligence to meet warfighter requirements.

It is very rare and the American people are now catching on that we really are not in a position to be the number one in everything anymore, as it was ever since World War II. So, I consider ourselves right now, and as I have mentioned to you, Admiral, to be in the greatest threatened position that we have been in as a nation. So, you have got your work cut out for you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Admiral Grady, you are recognized for your statement.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral GRADY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, good morning to you all.

It is a great honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to assume the duties as the twelfth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I want to thank the President, Secretary Austin, Chairman Milley, Secretary Del Toro, CNO Gilday for their trust and confidence. I think it is important that I also recognize General Hyten and his wife Laura for their extraordinary service to our nation and to our servicemembers and to their families.

I would also like to acknowledge the passing of your colleague, a great American senator, Senator Dole, and really to acknowledge his military service and support to our nation as a member of the greatest generation.

Of course, I want to thank all of you for your stalwart support for our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, our marines, our coast guardsmen, and our guardians, who defend our nation at home, and abroad, far forward, around the world every day.

Joining me today is my wife Christine, who has been my partner and my confidant and my rock since I was at Hansen. She has been the model of family and service and strength; service and strength to those families, to the communities we serve, and, indeed, to the nation. I would say that Christine is also the singular reason that

our three sons, Nick, Luke, and Paul, who could not join us today, are, indeed, the men that they are; men, in whom I am very proud, and men who always step up to their responsibilities as sons, husbands, and citizens.

I firmly believe that family readiness directly contributes to operational readiness. I have always said that a stronger family means a stronger fleet, and after 37 years of service, I can competently say that it is because of our families and their service and their sacrifice, that we continue to be the most powerful military the world has ever known.

I truly appreciate this Committee's leadership in this new era of strategic competition; it is an extraordinarily complex and dynamic environment, where we are faced with overt challenges to the international rules-based order and our national security in every domain, from the seabed, to the space, to cyberspace, the land domain, the air domain, and all.

In this, we compete alongside our allies and partners every day in a multiworld; a world that is multiregional, multilateral, multidomain, multivector, multiphase, multilevel, and multiauthority. It is the speed of information, the arsenals of sophisticated, asymmetric, conventional, and nuclear weapons, and the destructive ability of our competitors to attack below the threshold of armed conflict, that have changed the character of that competition. So now, more than ever, global integration is essential and integrated deterrence in those multidomains, leveraging all elements of national power across the whole-of-government and with our allies and partners, it is absolutely critical.

Here, I would say that there is no such thing as a fair fight. Our competitors are moving fast and we must move faster. I have always viewed things through two lenses in my 37 years: the fleet and the foundry. The fleet is the fight and how we integrate into the Joint Force and the foundry is what enables that fight, and I believe that speed and urgency are required in both. We will get faster, by leveraging our competitive advantages.

First, our unrivaled industrial base that I believe truly is borne of our innovative and open society.

Secondly, our many allies and partners, with whom we are stronger together. Third, our servicemen and women who are always resolute, ready, and lethal on arrival; they truly are the center of the universe.

So, if confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee and the Congress, the senior leadership in the Department of Defense, the interagency team, industry, and our allies and partners to ensure that the center of the universe never goes into a fair fight.

Once again, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral, I have a series of questions that are required for all senior nominees. Please respond appropriately.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

Chairman REED. Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Admiral GRADY. No, Senator.

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of congress receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this Committee when requested?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

Chairman REED. Do you agree, when asked before this Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views differ from the administration?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees, and to consult with the requester regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such records?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established by this Committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses and briefers in response to congressional request?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Admiral, you are assuming a tremendously important role, if confirmed, in our Defense Department. One of the significant roles is the chair of Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which will put you in the position of helping us deliver, rapidly, the most appropriate new weapon systems for the forces.

As we discussed during the office call, JROC sometimes is subject to parochialism, that it is a service ratification, rather than a joint analysis of what is available and what should be available to all the services.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the joint view overcomes the parochial view?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

The JROC is one of the key mechanisms and duties that I will fulfill, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, and I believe it is, perhaps, one of the most important things that happens in the Pentagon.

Building on the momentum set by my predecessors, especially General Selva and General Hyten, I think that the key to the JROC is that it is threat and risk based, and that we move beyond validating, as you say, a certain system, but addressing threat- and

risk-based gaps to ensure that the best system is brought forward and not necessarily the best widget.

If we go from a threat-based perspective to close those gaps and then we work to go faster, I think we will achieve the true potential of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

Chairman REED. In that regard, the services have, obviously, interests that they zealously guard. How will you sort of litigate or mediate between the services?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Well, I think it is going to be fact based and data based, and so we will, if confirmed, making sure that the JROC operates on a disciplined and analytical basis to bring the data to the table that says that this is the right decision or not.

But, certainly, important dialogue with the services, via the vice chiefs, in the JROC process will be important so that I understand all of those various perspectives. But it has to be data informed.

Chairman REED. Thank you. Acquisition programs sometimes fail due to requirements that are technically unachievable at any reasonable course or timeline. Other programs have requirements that don't appreciate commonly understood advances in global, commercial technology. Then there is always the tendency to build a Swiss Army Knife when a simpler blade would be appropriate.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that requirements for new systems are technically realistic, but also will push the envelope forward, but are technically realistic?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

If confirmed, having a broader understanding of the wider possibilities that the technology database can provide us will be important. So those relationships with the Defense Industrial Base would be important, not just at my level, but I believe through the vice chairman, the vice chiefs of each of the services and throughout the larger apparatus of the Pentagon.

The JROC will help with that, as will other mechanisms within the JROC process that allow us to cast that wide net to ensure that we have the systems that we need and that we can get past just sticking with an existing widget.

I think, also, too, you mentioned a great point about simplicity. We do have a tendency to Christmas-tree things a little bit too much and so, simplicity can be sublime in many perspectives. From a technology perspective, we should look for that.

Chairman REED. Then a related question is, as the system is being developed, there is also a tendency for a sort of a "creep in measure" acquisition program, where they try to do more than they were even intended to do.

How will you look and guard that?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

This gets straight to the discipline process that the JROC has to ensure. So, strong leadership in the JROC and consultation with my colleagues on the panel has to ensure a very disciplined approach to that so that we don't get that mission creep, which becomes very parochial, at some times, as you move forward.

Chairman REED. One, at least, perspective on the future is that the real differential will come with artificial intelligence, quantum computing, not simply the physical platform.

Do you anticipate being able to develop platforms that can quickly adapt to changing software, changing aspects of this quantum and AI world?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

I think that is going to be an important element of any new system that we bring to the table; that ability to get past a very hardware-oriented weapon system development to one that is software oriented, such that you can have the, we will save the mainframe, but then spin in new technologies in an app-based approach, which will allow us to get to the speed that I think we all want in our weapon system acquisition process.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Inhofe?

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just get a couple of things on the record, and I already know the answer to this, and I think most people do here, also, but it is important that we, I think, get it down at the very beginning so there is no misunderstanding.

Our nuclear modernization, this goes back to General Hyten, a quote that he had. He said, I look at our nuclear capabilities, our triad, our modernization program are the minimum essential capabilities required to defend this nation. We have to defend against the most existential threat and Russia and China and their capabilities are very important. So, to me, those are the minimum essential capabilities that we have to build, and even at the highest rate, it will still be just roughly 6 percent of the overall defense budget. I think we can afford that security.

So, I would ask you the question just to get you on the record and to saying that we know the answer anyway, and that is, General Hyten, that the most modernizing each, he was talking about modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA Nuclear Weapons Complex is a critical, national security priority.

Do you agree?

Admiral GRADY. Senator, I do. A modernized and fully ready nuclear deterrent is one of the number one priorities of the Department and, if confirmed, I would seek to ensure that.

Senator INHOFE. I know you will and, however, that has become somewhat controversial in the past. We have to know where we are coming from.

Lastly, I would ask, is it your intention to continue General Hyten's efforts to reform the JROC process to move faster and adopt advanced technologies that help meet warfighting requirements?

I know that you had responded to a discussion of this with our chairman, but I would like to get your assurance as to what we would do with JROC.

Admiral GRADY. Sir, the efficacy of the JROC and the momentum that it is on now is extremely positive, and, if confirmed, it would be my goal to bend the curve and to go even faster to focus on the threat and the risks, to close those gaps, and to move as quickly as possible to get the tools to the center of the universe, our warfighters, as fast as possible.

Senator INHOFE. Excellent. I know that is true.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Shaheen, please?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Admiral Grady. Thank you for your service and your wife and your family's service, as well, and congratulations on your nomination. I look forward to working with you, if confirmed.

You have served as Commander of the Navy 6th Fleet, which is responsible for naval activities in Europe, and so I know that you have been witness to Russia's increasing aggression in the Black Sea and other areas of Europe.

I know that the unclassified Global Posture Review for Europe emphasized a combat credible deterrent against Russia and enabling NATO forces to operate more effectively.

Now, I am pleased that the Biden administration has removed the cap on forces in Germany, active-duty forces and it is committed to maintaining a presence in Europe. But as I talk to some of our European allies, one of the things they have been pressing for is more U.S. forward-deployed troops in Europe.

Did you think that is something we should be considering now and how do you view that in the long term?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

I think our posture and presence in Europe is very, very important and we should listen to our allies and partners, insofar as we want to work with them and be stronger together. So, I think as part of the Global Posture Review, it is important that we balance all of those requirements and where we need to operate.

I would tell you that as the 6th Fleet Commander, you mentioned my very best day was when I had a ship in the High North, a ship in the Baltic, a ship in the Black Sea, a ship in the East Med, and on a really good day, I may have had one in the Gulf of Guinea. That is challenging, as you know, but that gives the President and the Secretary of Defense many options to work with our allies and partners and to pursue our objectives with NATO and in Europe.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

As you know, we have a Women, Peace and Security Act that has been in the process of being implemented since it was signed in 2017.

As you think about your experience, how have you seen women's participation in the military positively affect what our goals are, particularly in places where it is women, like the Middle East, where women are very important as we are talking to populations and communities that are reluctant to speak with men?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma'am, a very important issue, and I think a very important issue that advances the cause of democracy, too.

My own personal experience, first, within the Navy, my first ship, the USS Cole, was an integrated ship. I can just offer to you that having 51 percent of the marines eligible to serve in the military for us really helped make the Navy better.

I think that idea that we can bring everyone to the table, especially our mothers, our daughters, and our sisters going forward, just makes us stronger. So, the initiative that you spoke of is one worthy of support.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, as you know, most regional and functional combatant commands have hired full-time gender advisors to integrate gender perspectives into our planning and I just wondered, if confirmed, how will you implement Women, Peace and Security within the Joint Staff?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, thank you.

The role of a gender advisor is a way to attack a very significant issue, and, if confirmed, I look forward to leveraging those advisors who can make me think better and smarter about the issues that you raise. So, I look forward to, if confirmed, understanding that ecosystem and helping advance that cause going forward; again, we want to bring everybody to the table, to get the advantage of all of their thinking. It is also a part of creating the safe and secure work environment for all of our sailors, and soldiers, airmen, Marine, Coast Guardsmen, and guardians.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

I would argue that it is important to our mission, wherever we are operating in the world, as well. I will look forward to talking to you a year from now to hear what you have done to implement the Act within the Joint Staff.

I want to raise another concern about what is happening with ISIS. The headlines, ISIS has faded from the headlines, yet we know we have several very large camps that continue to be in Syria and Iraq that have women and children who are detainees from the war against ISIS and who have the potential to be radicalized and create a further issue with terrorists in the future.

What is the military's role or does the military have a role in supporting folks in these camps and what should we be thinking about as we are looking at the future of places like Al-Hol, which has 94 percent of its occupants are women and children, but we know they are already becoming radicalized?

Admiral GRADY. Yes. You know, the issue of ISIS, as an example of violent, extremist organizations is one that we can just never take our eye off the ball. It is one in which if we beat them here, they are going to squeeze and pop out somewhere over here and we are going to have to continue to beat them.

So, the military piece of it is reactive in some respects, but it can also help to create the conditions on the ground for better conditions and to help with those conditions that will not allow radicalization to continue. So, I think the military has a role in that.

We need to beat them first. We do that and then help create those conditions on the ground that are safe and secure, such that radicalization doesn't occur.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Before I recognize Senator Fischer, since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to consider three civilian nominations and a list of 1,772 pending military nominations.

First, I ask the Committee to consider the nominations of Mr. John B. Sherman to be Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense; Mr. Ashish S. Vazirani, to be the Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and Ms. Carrie F. Ricci to be General Counsel of the Department of the Army.

Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations to the Senate?

Senator INHOFE. So moved.

Chairman REED. All in favor, say aye.

The motion carries.

Finally, I ask the Committee to consider a list of 1,772 pending military nominations. Of these nominations, 21 nominations are 1 day short of the Committee's requirement that nominations be in committee for 7 days before we report them out.

No objection has been raised to these nominations and I recommend the Committee waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the confirmation of these nominations before the Senate recesses for the holiday recess.

Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 1,772 pending military nominations to the Senate?

Senator INHOFE. So moved.

Chairman REED. All in favor, say aye.

The motion carries.

Senator FISCHER, please?

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Admiral, to you and your wife this morning.

I appreciate the discussion that you and I had earlier about the importance of modernizing our nuclear enterprise and that you view nuclear deterrence as the Department's highest priority, which you reaffirmed today to the ranking member.

We are seeing Russia and China continue to expand their arsenals. Russia is pursuing a variety of novel, nuclear systems and China is conducting a strategic breakout that the current STRATCOM Commander, Admiral Richard, characterized as breathtaking.

What is your view of China's nuclear expansion and what implications do you think this has for us?

Admiral GRADY. I think that China's breakout is, as Admiral Richard has called it, is, indeed, spectacular and, indeed, breathtaking. So, therefore, we need to be postured to address that issue. We need to think about how we would proceed with deterrence, particularly, deterrence now against two peer competitors and who need to be deterred in two different ways.

Deterrence, then, I think builds on that strong nuclear triad that we just talked about. So, the modernization of the nuclear triad will be the underpinning of that deterrence effort against two nuclear competitors.

Senator FISCHER. Overall, do you believe that the growth of Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals reinforces the need to modernize our nuclear deterrent, including each leg of the triad?

Admiral GRADY. Absolutely, I do, Senator.

We need to have that responsive, flexible, and survivable triad across the three legs if we are going to meet the challenges of two nuclear peer competitors.

Senator FISCHER. You know, we continue to hear calls to pause or to defer modernization programs, despite repeated testimony from STRATCOM Commanders and others that there is no room

for additional delay. Last year Admiral Richard testified that, quote, many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary to ensure deterrence, viability have zero schedule margin and are late to need, end quote.

Can you give us your view of the modernization schedule? I know you are particularly familiar with the need to replace the *Ohio*-class submarine.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma'am.

I agree with Admiral Richard that there is no more margin to surge. Service life extension programs across the nuclear triad, we have kind of tapped that ability out now, and so now it is time to move forward.

Speaking to the *Ohio*-class submarine, we have service life extended them, I think, to the extent now where it would be a challenge to do it any further. Just look at hull strength as an example; I mean, we can't go past the physics of metallurgy at some point. So, at any rate, I think if you look at just the *Ohio*-class SSBN, as an example, there is no more margin left in terms of service life extension.

Senator FISCHER. Senator Kaine and I, along with Senator Shaheen, we were at Minot earlier this year and we looked at the maintenance work that has to be done on the 1970s-era ICBMs that we have. These are remarkable systems; they have lasted a long time, but as you just referenced with submarines, things don't last forever.

When you hear about the GBSD program and the fact that it is important to continue that, the fact the study shows it is cheaper to have GBSD than the current Minuteman program that we have.

Does that just reinforce your position on that leg of the triad or do you think it needs to be studied even further?

Admiral GRADY. Well, first of all, thanks for going out and visiting the airmen out at Minot.

Senator FISCHER. Great guys. Great people.

Admiral GRADY. Their ability to maintain that system and have it as peak, operational readiness, really does speak to the center of the universe that we talked about.

But I do believe that as we think about GBSD, the timeline there, at a certain point, it costs more to maintain than it does to re-modernize and we are approaching that.

Senator FISCHER. I think this last study shows that we have approached it. It is \$38 billion cheaper to go with GBSD than to extend the life of the Minuteman. Thank you.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer.

Senator Blumenthal, please?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral, for your service and your family, as well. Thanking for the conversations we had not long ago.

I am delighted that you share my commitment to making sure that we maintain our superiority in undersea warfare and that we continue, not only with the *Ohio*-class replacement, now being built at Electric Boat, the *Columbia*-class, but also the *Virginia*-class attack submarine, two submarines a year, which is vital to maintain

that superiority. I hope you continue to agree and, perhaps, visit Electric Boat.

Admiral GRADY. Senator, I certainly do agree.

As we look across all of the domains, the undersea domain is one that I think we still have a significant superiority in and we want to maintain that and maybe even build it even better.

I have been to Electric Boat several times, both in Quonset Point and in Connecticut, and it is spectacular with that and Defense Industrial Base can do, and I applaud the efforts of the folks at Electric Boat for what they are doing.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

I want to talk a little bit about a topic that may not be covered by anyone else here: the Afghanistan evacuation and settlement efforts, which very much involve the military. Although we have no military presence in Afghanistan, there are somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 guests, as they are called, now on our military bases.

I recently visited Quantico, Virginia. The United States Marine Corps is doing an excellent job. I am really so much in admiration of the work that they are doing there, and I am sure the other branches of service at our other bases.

But these bases were supposed to be closed, literally, this week, and they are going to continue into February, March, perhaps beyond, because of the insufficient support for the resettlement efforts. Fortunately, we will see more resources going into it.

But I am also concerned about the evacuation of our at-risk Afghan allies, interpreters, translators, security guards, drivers; all the people who stood by us and helped protect our troops and diplomats. I have called for an evacuation czar, because I have found that it was, and remains a lot of insufficient coordination, even finger-pointing.

Could you give me your views on whether we should be doing more, as I believe, to help with evacuation efforts through charter flights and resources that we, the United States still has there, even though we have no military or diplomatic presence.

Admiral GRADY. Yes. Thank you, Senator.

I think, first, thanks for going down to Quantico and seeing the team down there; they are doing really good work. I think it is that kind of good work under General VanHerck's leadership is one of the things that the military does very well: logistics and movement and that kind of thing. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with General VanHerck to finish that mission.

As to your point of folks that may be at risk still on the ground, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with the CENTCOM Commander, on what are the right ways to finish that mission, as well. It would be an important element of our discussions on going forward and concluding, finally, what we are doing in that part of the world with Afghanistan.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I think you have put it really correctly, that it is a matter of completing the mission and honoring our commitment for the men and women and their families who put their lives on the line and now they have targets on their back because they sided with us in that conflict. So, I hope to continue working with you.

Finally, let me just ask your views on classification. Yesterday, I joined my colleagues in a classified briefing on the Ukraine situation. Obviously, we can't talk about it in this setting, except to say it was deeply sobering, maybe scary is the right word for it. My feeling was, as hearing that briefing, as it is so often after such classified briefings, that the American people should hear what we heard.

For much of what was said in that briefing, it could be told to the American people without compromising sources or methods or other kinds of necessary assets or resources. I think there is too much classification, in short.

Do you have a view on that point?

Admiral GRADY. Sir, thanks.

We talked a little bit about that in the phone call, and I would say, in general, we tend to overclassify and that we should work harder not to. I think there are several good reasons for that. One is the transparency that we have with the citizens that we serve to explain what we are trying to do. Secondly, is being able to work with our allies and partners.

As an example, my 2nd Fleet Commander, his Deputy is a Canadian officer, and sometimes I have to ask him to leave when we are talking about what we are doing in the Atlantic. So, we are working very hard to overcome those barriers.

I think the third reason is that type of classification, when things are overclassified, prevents us from integrating and synchronizing better because there are artificial barriers that we put up in our way.

So, in the end, I think we need to work hard to always push that down, the classification down, but still remaining sensitive to sources and methods that you correctly pointed out. Thank you for taking that brief; it is indeed, sobering.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Admiral Grady.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Rounds, please?

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I enjoyed visiting with you a few weeks ago in my office and I thank you and your family for 37 years of faithful service to our country. I appreciate your willingness to serve in this very critical position.

One of the items that we discussed at that time was your response on the principal cyber advisor positions that Congress has required in the last year's NDAA. I appreciated hearing how much you valued having an independent subject-matter expert with no day-to-day management responsibilities who, in your words, could speak truth to power regarding cyber activity throughout the departments, and I thank you for that, sir.

On a related topic, and I think this is something that we don't spend enough time discussing and making clear, the vice chairman now leads the Joint Staff's Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Cross Functional Team and is the senior designated official for electromagnetic spectrum operations in the Department of Defense. That is a very valuable asset.

A number of senators came together during the development of the bipartisan infrastructure bill to literally block efforts to provide critical electromagnetic spectrum for auction; meaning, taking it out of the Department of Defense's perspective and putting it up for sale. So far, a number of us have succeeded, but there have been additional legislative threats to DOD's spectrum in the 3100 to 3450MHz band.

The reason why I ask this question is I think it is important if you could share with the Committee in this recognizable, unclassified forum, how you would view an attempt to auction spectrum in this band with respect to maintaining the capabilities that keep this country safe every day, recognizing a lot of people out there think that spectrum should be made available for telecommunications for everybody, and yet it is critical that the Department of Defense maintain a certain amount of this spectrum in a very, very specified area.

Can you give us your views on that and how you would go about sharing with other members of the United States Senate and House, how critical this is.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I very much enjoyed that discussion. We talked a little bit about this.

The management of the electromagnetic spectrum to the Department of Defense is absolutely critical. We operate in there. We have critical activities that we do within that spectrum and within that domain.

I think what you want from us, sir, is to be able to come forward to you and lay out the risks and the challenges of sell-off and to do it in a data-based and a threat-based way so that when you go into that very significant policy decision, well informed as to the challenges and risks that it might impose on our sailors, and the center of the universe, and the soldiers, and the airmen, and that going forward.

So, we need to bring to you, the arguments for or against, pros and cons, so that we can make a very threat-based and formed discussion. It is a significant issue, though, for sure.

Senator ROUNDS. One of the challenges, and I think Senator Blumenthal mentioned it, is the overclassification of information. Would you commit to providing a classified brief to the members of this committee and members of other key committees to discuss the danger of taking such actions, without a very stringent approval process?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.

Regarding the revision of the National Defense Strategy, I wonder if you could comment on the force-sizing construct. Two major planning assumptions have been overcome by events and now they seem to be critically flawed: the force-sizing construct to fight one war at a time and the planning and investment and capabilities geared for short wars.

I know the strategy was driven by affordability, but in my view, this probably does not make strategic sense now, given the activity, investments, and behavior of China and Russia.

How do you see this issue?

Admiral GRADY. I think as we look forward to that force-sizing construct that you call out, it has to be one that is informed by current conditions and current threats. So, if confirmed, I would look forward to being a part of that discussion.

But, certainly, the world gets a vote. The enemy gets a vote on how we look forward to sizing the force.

It will be a balance of capability and capacity. It will be a balance of being there when we need to be there. So, we need to bring all of those things together, based on the current situations and, indeed, the projected situation that we see in the future.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.

Admiral, the position that you have been nominated for is critical and it is time-sensitive that we move forward in filling this position. I think you are the right person for the job. I look forward to supporting your nomination.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman that we are able to move as quickly as possible in filling that position.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rounds.

Senator KAINE, please?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, congratulations to you.

I will just tell my colleagues, the Grady family is very beloved in Hampton Roads, Virginia. They are currently on their third posting into Norfolk, and I very much appreciate your long service.

Also, to tell my colleagues, if you read his biography, something real sticks out: he is the recipient of the "Old Salt" Award. I didn't know what that was, but I was intrigued and I researched it.

The "Old Salt" Award in the Navy is the award given to the longest-serving, surface warfare officer.

He inherited that when Admiral Davidson retired, so that is just an additional attribute to the years of service in your longevity in serving the country.

Admiral Grady, Senator Wicker and I, we have been engaged in a months' long debate with the DOD about moving forward with block buy of the LPD and LHA amphibious ships. This block buy was authorized by the fiscal year 2021 NDAA and also by the Defense Appropriations bill.

As you know, block buy provisions often yield significant savings in the past, but the Department has stalled on the block buy and cited a desire to, quote, undertake an additional study of amphibious ship requirements.

Senator Wicker and I asked the Marine Corps if their amphibious ship requirements have changed in recent months and we were told that they had not. So, I am a little bit unclear what agency is participating in this review.

As we continue to study the requirement that the Marine Corps states has not changed, China is moving forward with the construction equivalent of a class of warships similar to the LPD and LHA; they are Type 71 and 75 classes, respectively. So, at least China believes that this class of warship isn't obsolete.

In your current role as Fleet Forces Command, have you been involved in any recent studies on the number of overall requirements for the LPD and LHA amphibious ships and are you aware of any

developments that would suggest we halt or slow construction of this class of amphibious ship?

Admiral GRADY. Sure. A couple of issues there. The first is, the block buy is a really efficient way to subgenerate that demand signal to the Defense Industrial Base, and as you say, it is a very efficient way to go, so I thank the Committee's support for that.

Amphibious warships and the renaissance that is underway in amphibious warfare now is growing and palpable. So, the naval integration between what the Commandant and the CNO are trying to do has a lot of momentum right now going forward.

Those are great ships that you talked about; they do provide amazing capability and capacity to the fleet commanders and to the combatant commanders going forward. I think the level of discussion right now between the CNO and the Commandant, and, of course, I would want to speak with them, but, if confirmed, I would like to be part of that dialogue. But I think the discussion there is how do we take all the tenets of naval integration and push forward, particularly, as we bring our marines out of the desert and bring them back aboard ships. What will that look like? What is the force generated, what are we going to force-generate going forward?

This question about how many amphibs that we need, particularly the big decks, will be essential and part of that. So, if confirmed, I look forward to being a participant in that discussion.

Senator KAINE. I look forward to working with you on that one.

Your role as vice chairman has a lot of different, important components and one is you had the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications, or NC3. That is commonly referred to as the fourth leg of the nuclear triad.

Have you participated in exercises using the NC3 system, and give us your assessment on its, you know, is it robust enough or do we need to do more to make that system robust to protect it against cyberattacks, et cetera.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator.

I do agree that the NC3 could be very well considered the kind of fourth leg of the triad. As you know, I am the Navy's component to STRATCOM, so all the SSBNs and "Take Charge and Move Out" aircraft work for me. So, I am very, very involved in the NC3 dialogue and discussion that is going forward.

Just 2 weeks ago, I concluded my sixth "Global Lightning, Global Thunder" exercise in which we exercised NC3 across the nuclear triad. I think I agree with the STRATCOM Commander and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with him and the Dep Sec Def for that matter, on this issue.

That is, that across the 200-or-so systems that we have, it is working, but it could be better, and it could, but it is safe, secure, and reliable now, but we need to think about taking it into the future against the threats in all domains, including cyber. Again, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with Dep Sec Def and the STRATCOM Commander to ensure that happens.

Senator KAINE. Thanks very much.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Senator Cotton, please?

Senator COTTON. Admiral, welcome, and thank you for almost 4 decades of service to our nation.

As you know, based on our conversation before your hearing, I am very concerned about the military's culture in what I see as a lack of focus on warfighting. The state of professional military education is one of my top concerns.

In September, two war college professors wrote an op-ed in City Journal that said, quote, war colleges no longer teach warfighting.

This is consistent, unfortunately, with cautions I have heard from field-grade officers and war college students who warn that war colleges care more about academic accreditation and growing junior foreign policy walks than about building war-winning leaders. These students have expressed their frustrations and fear that we are in danger of ceding what they called "intellectual overmatch" to Russia and China.

I would note that it appears that the Joint Staff seems to agree. They released a memo 18 months ago that called for renewed war college focus on lethality. These two professors, though, claim that this guidance has since been, quote, lost in a maze of bureaucracy.

Could you talk to me, Admiral, about your plans to implement the findings of that memo.

Admiral GRADY. Senator, thank you and thanks for the discussion a couple of weeks ago.

First, I am a big fan of joint, professional military education. For me, in my experience at National War College and my interactions with the Naval War College, as an example, the key for JPME is to go beyond the tactical to the operational and the strategic. I think that is where we need to center our war colleges going forward.

There is an element of policy, but how does the military fit within the follows pieces of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic?

But the real power of the war colleges and JPME, really, at large, is to ensure that we bridge that gap from the tactical to the strategic. So, if, if confirmed, and going forward, I would look forward to working with the services to discuss that, to ensure that there is the appropriate focus on warfighting and lethality.

Senator COTTON. Thank you.

Could I get your commitment to follow-up on a progress report on that by May?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Senator COTTON. Thank you.

You know, when I first ran for office, I guess almost 10 years ago now, a nice elderly lady asked me if I was the one who had gotten out of the Army not too long ago.

I said, yes, and I was running for Congress now, and I said, yes.

She said, why would you leave the country's most respected institution for the country's least-respected institution?

I wish that wasn't the case about Congress, but I have always been proud that it is the case about our military. Therefore, I viewed with alarm, the annual Reagan National Defense Survey, which recently found a staggering 25 percent collapse in American trust in the military.

In the past 11 months, my office has been filled with hundreds of concerns from servicemembers across the services who say they believe that senior DOD leadership has been politicized and inappropriate and unprofessional ways. Their complaints include, and these are their words, not mine: one, counter-extremism training that draws blanket condemnation of troops who privately hold conservative views; two, training to fight things like the weather, rather than China's growing military; and, three, so-called diversity training that has taken on blatantly political, even racist, tones, including forcing servicemembers to segregate themselves by race or promoting based on skin color, sexual orientation and gender, rather than operational excellence and achievement.

Do you think it is fair to say that some of these policies, which are quite controversial, have contributed to that 25 percent decline in trust in our military?

Admiral GRADY. Sir, I, too, am disappointed and alarmed by that number. I read the same report that you did, and that is concerning to me as someone who has dedicated 37 years to this and take great pride in what we are able to do.

I think the key issue here is what you expect of us, and that is that you expect us to remain apolitical and to provide our best military advice. I think that is the key issue and everything we do needs to be revolved around that central concept.

Senator COTTON. Well, Admiral, what we have consistently heard from many of those servicemembers who have reached out to us is that they feel that they are being presented with highly politicized training modules. They voice their concerns or objections and then their chain of command will accuse them of acting in a political fashion, so they find themselves in a catch-22.

Let me just give you one example of something that seems a bit strange to me. Marine base Quantico recently posted a job listing for a diversity, equity-inclusion officer for a salary of \$144,000 a year; more than triple the median household income in Arkansas, also close to what a base commander makes.

I mean, do you think that we should be paying \$144,000 to a diversity, equity-inclusion officer at Quantico? Is this the kind of thing that might cause Americans to lose confidence in the priorities of DOD leadership?

Admiral GRADY. I don't have the context for, in which that billet was advertised. I do think we need to have important discussions about things like that.

To the pay scale, I really can't comment on what that job is being asked to do. But, again, I think the idea that you need from us is to be apolitical.

I want to go back to something that you mentioned that your preamble there, sir, if I could, and that is that the concern on the part of the members who have communicated with you that they could not voice their views.

I think the role of commanders is to create that open dialogue and have that ability to discuss things and that there should be no reprisals for that kind of thing. So, going forward, we need to make sure that we have that environment, that safe environment where people can have that open dialogue and that discussion.

Senator COTTON. Yeah, my time has expired.

I will just say that what we expect of you and all the senior military leaders is to address these cultural challenges. We have also spoken before the hearing about my concerns on the surface of the Navy and its cultural challenge in the report that I released with Congressman Gallagher and a few other Navy veterans.

We can write laws in this institution. We can pass budgets, but no organization can really thrive and make change without dynamic leadership. That is why they always said that leadership was the most important element of combat power. So, we are counting on you and other senior leaders to help address some of these cultural challenges. Hopefully, win back the quarter of the American people who say they have lost trust in our military. That is what I expect to see and that is what we will be monitoring in the years ahead.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Cotton.

Senator King, please?

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to re-emphasize the line of questioning that Senator Kaine began with, and that is nuclear command and control.

We always talk about the triad. I think it is a quad. Without the modernization of nuclear command and control, and not only modernization, but ongoing modernization because the cyber threat is constantly evolving. Without that modernization, the rest of the triad could be rendered useless and therefore, not credible, and therefore, not a deterrent.

So, I hope you will focus very intensely on the upgrades necessary to command and control systems. I think you have said that that is your intention, but please reiterate it for me.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator, absolutely.

What we see in the cyber domain across all of our weapons systems has to be addressed. We talked a lot about our ability to defend our networks.

The ultimate network to defend is the NC3 network and we are going to have to be able to do that in cyber. So, if confirmed, it would be a high priority of mine to continue the momentum started to that.

Senator KING. Thank you.

I just returned this morning from the Norwegian Embassy on a conference on the Arctic. One of the issues that came up was the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2007, the Russians, there is a famous picture of the Russians planting a Russian flag at the North Pole under the Arctic Ocean, and to me, it symbolizes our failure to be at the table when we are resolving disputes with regard to the maritime domain.

Is it your professional military opinion that it would be in the national interests of this country to accede to the law of the Sea Treaty?

Admiral GRADY. It is, Senator.

Senator KING. Thank you.

I hope the record will show how readily you answered that question. I didn't have to pry it out of you.

I think it is very important and I think it is something we should bring up before this body, once again, because we are, our national security is being compromised, whether it is the South China Sea or the Arctic or other areas in the maritime area.

Now, one of your roles will be as the chair of Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. Again, recently, I was at a dinner with some prominent figures in the technology field and they pointed out that because of the length of time it takes to develop our weapons systems, they are literally obsolete the day they go into service. In some cases, they are years out of it.

I know that we are always focused in the procurement area on money and on cost but talk to me about the importance of time. The technology is advancing so fast today that if it takes a dozen years to develop a new airframe or a new maritime, a new ship, or a new weapons system, we are just sunk. Not to use the naval term, but time has to be an essential part of this process.

Admiral GRADY. Absolutely, sir.

I will just use a Navy term: Speed to the fleet. You don't, as you say, you don't want to take forever to get it to the sailor. So, I think there are several things that we need to do. First, although, what I would offer to you is, if confirmed, speed will be, and urgency, will be part of the JROC process, and in this, I believe I am building on the great momentum that General Hyten and General Selva set for the JROC.

I think one of the challenges, though, is that we are risk averse, so that we need to consider whether, and adopt a strategy, if you will, that will allow a little that will allow test a little and learn a lot. If there is failure there, then we can —

Senator KING. Well, in briefings that I have been in, one of the reasons given for the speed with which the Chinese have achieved what they have in hypersonics is that they are willing to fail.

Admiral GRADY. Uh-huh.

Senator KING. They are willing to run tests and learn from failure and we seem to be, as you say, risk-averse, and therefore, much slower in our development process.

Admiral GRADY. I would agree with you. That risk aversion, I think, was borne of, in a period of time, perhaps in the late 1990s, early 1990s, when we didn't have any peer competitors; that is not the case now. So, we have to be able to fail to learn faster. Failure doesn't mean malfeasance or laziness or any of that, but it means iterating and going faster.

Senator KING. One other area, and one I hope you will emphasize, is that I think, frankly, we have been slow on is directed energy.

Admiral GRADY. Uh-huh.

Senator KING. We have a very expensive missile defense infrastructure that is designed to hit a bullet with a bullet and those bullets cost tens of millions of dollars.

Do you believe that directed energy is a promising technology that should be pursued more aggressively?

Admiral GRADY. I do, Senator.

As you correctly point out, that is a terrible exchange ratio for us. If we can get to the point where a drop of fuel means a bullet that is where we need to be.

So, a pursuit, if confirmed, pursuit of directed energy and some of the other technologies that we have talked about, that would be high on my list. But that directed energy, then, would be folded into an integrated network of capabilities that we can bring to the fight.

Senator KING. But it is not going to happen unless somebody pushes it and I hope that you will be that person.

Admiral GRADY. Aye, sir.

Senator KING. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King.

Senator Blackburn, please?

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral Grady. We appreciate your time. I appreciated your phone call before Thanksgiving.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma'am.

Senator BLACKBURN. We are grateful for your service.

I want to talk with you about the role of the vice chairman within the Nuclear Posture Review. In the past, the Joint Staff served in co-leadership roles with the Sec Def and, presumably, this was the way that it ensured the best military insight, intel insight, and advice available to make certain that that was part of the analysis.

In this year's SASC NDAA, we included a codification of that practice for the Biden administration's first MPR and, of course, we are trying to push that on across the finish line at this point.

So, is the vice chairman a co-chair of the administration's ongoing MPR?

Admiral GRADY. The vice chairman is an advisor to that process now.

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay, and according to a Pentagon press briefing that occurred last month, DOD will conclude its MPR early next year; is that accurate?

Admiral GRADY. I believe so.

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay, and, if confirmed, do you believe that you will have adequate time to contribute to the MPR?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I believe I will have an opportunity to help shape the MPR going forward. I have had a little bit of that opportunity as the Commander of the naval forces piece, but I look forward to being a part of that process going forward.

Senator BLACKBURN. Do you think that we should change the pace and the time of the MPR and do it more frequently?

Admiral GRADY. I think it should be conditions based. I think the timing and tempo of many of the policy reviews seems adequate to me right now; however, the world gets a vote in those kinds of things and I suspect that should there be large-scale changes in the international security environment, we would then go back and look at the seminal documents that guide our thinking.

Senator BLACKBURN. Do you think the aggressiveness of China in this field, the work that they are doing in hypersonics, the aggressiveness of Russia would mean that we would need to change time and tempo?

Admiral GRADY. It could. I think that as they are two peer competitors, particularly in the nuclear space, then we have to spend

a lot of time focusing on their intentions and what they are doing going forward.

Certainly, deterrence, as an example, with two nuclear competitors is different than that with one, which is why the current MPR that is coming forward is such an important document, and I think well timed, based on what we are seeing with China.

Senator BLACKBURN. Well, I do think that it is, and when we talk about terms like “no-first-use” and “sole purpose” that enters into that, and it is of concern that our nuclear capabilities are at their lowest since the early 1960s when we first began building a triad. All the systems that comprise our nuclear forces are decades past their intended design lives. We are currently the only nuclear-armed country without the capability to produce a single, new nuclear weapon.

So, do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of our nuclear infrastructure?

Admiral GRADY. I do and I thank the Committee’s support for that as we work our way forward through modernizing the nuclear triad and all of the associated infrastructure that goes with it. So, I thank you for your support on that.

Senator BLACKBURN. Well, talking about that associated infrastructure, what are your concerns with respect to DOD, but then also with respect to NNSA and their capabilities?

Admiral GRADY. NNSA are fantastic partners within the DOE, with the Department of Defense. They are kind of our battle buddies in this effort to modernize our nuclear triad. So, ensuring that we work closely together and that we are integrated and as we move forward to ensure that the infrastructure that supports that nuclear triad keeps pace, that will be, if confirmed, will be an important relationship that I would hope to seek with NNSA and with the larger nuclear enterprise.

Senator BLACKBURN. I have a couple of more questions for you on this, on infrastructure and recapitalization, modernization. But in the interests of time, I will submit those to you for written answers.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma’am.

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.

Senator Warren, please?

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral Grady, for being here today. Congratulations on your nomination.

So, in August, a U.S. drone strike killed 10 Afghan civilians, including 7 children and 1 employee of the U.S.-based NGO after water containers were mistaken for potential explosives.

Just a few weeks ago you probably saw The New York Times revealed that in 2019, the military covered up an air strike that killed approximately 70 women and children in Syria and was flagged as a potential war crime.

Unfortunately, these are far from isolated instances. Independent watchdog groups estimate that in the past 20 years, U.S. air and drone strikes have killed thousands of innocent civilians in places like Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, and the true toll may never be

known because of the difficulty of accurate reporting and the military's consistent underreporting.

So, let me just start with kind of a baseline here, Admiral. Would you agree that the rates of civilian casualties are unacceptably high?

Admiral GRADY. Senator, I would agree that civilian casualties under any circumstances are totally unacceptable and that you should demand from us better.

Senator WARREN. I appreciate that answer very much, Admiral.

You know, but here is the thing, despite this terrible loss of innocent life, no meaningful reform or change has been implemented. For years, DOD has turned a blind eye to civilian casualties and has also failed to distribute exportation of money that Congress has authorized for survivors.

This is just wrong, and I don't know how we can continue to view a system that kills thousands of innocent civilians and simply accept it as a cost of doing business. Any system that does that, in my view, is fundamentally broken.

Now, The New York Times also report that DOD investigates reports of civilian casualties only when, and this is the quote, there is a potential for high media attention or a concern with outcry from the local community or government.

So, let me ask you this, Admiral, would you also agree that DOD investigating only high-profile or potentially news-worthy cases of civilian casualties is a barrier to meaningful accountability?

Admiral GRADY. I think the issue that you raise on accountability is one that you should hold us to the highest standard for.

I will give you my personal experience on that. As a strike group commander for 10 months in the Arabian Gulf, we dropped a million pounds of bombs. I had to explain every single one of those and whether they met ground commander's intent. That level of accountability is something that you should demand from us.

Senator WARREN. Do you believe, based on that, that reform is needed to reduce the rates of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military operations?

Admiral GRADY. I think every civilian casualty is a tragedy, but it is very dangerous and hard work that we do and we apply lessons learned each time to try to get better to forestall that. But, again, hold us accountable and we will fix it.

Senator WARREN. Well, I appreciate that, Admiral, because that is the point: We need to get better on this, and it is about accountability.

I have already asked this Committee to investigate operations that result in civilian casualties and to suggest reforms that can prevent these tragedies. But you don't have to wait for us to act. The Pentagon has an opportunity to do exactly that without a specific mandate from Congress, so it can and should start that today.

I look forward to working with you on this.

Admiral GRADY. Aye, ma'am.

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Warren.

Senator Tillis, please?

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Grady, thank you for being here. Congratulations on your nomination.

I want to talk a little bit about European posture with the circumstances in Ukraine or with Russia, near Ukraine right now, it seems like we have a hotspot there and a real clear and present threat. I know that we have worked on improving our European posture since the Russian invasion of Ukraine back in 2014 and I think we have more work to do. We have the Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany and I think we have re-establishing V Corps over in Poland.

But what more do we need to do in terms of pushing resources in that region that seems to be continually under threat, and I am kind of curious about your anti-access/area-denial. What other priorities should we place there, and I guess in answering that question, we have got priorities in other points of the globe.

So, where does, how are you going to balance scarce resources? What would be your priorities when you are confirmed with respect to European posture, but also, other threats that are equally concerning?

Admiral GRADY. The challenges in the European area of operations are significant, as you pointed out, sir. I think the first thing we need to think about is working with our allies and partners there and leveraging the great strength that is the NATO alliance. We are certainly stronger together in that regard.

The resource challenge that you discuss is strong, significant. Certainly, the pacing threat is in China and we need to, then, balance how we are going to address our presence and posture in INDOPACOM and the challenges there with how we are going to balance those in Europe.

So, again, I think the key here will be a threat-based and resource-informed discussion, but then leveraging the flexibility and maneuvering that we have as a military to leave us options to move quickly where we need to be. I think a big part of that is working with our allies and our partners.

You asked me a question about A2/AD. These challenges are significant. We could talk for a long time, I suppose, at a higher classification level in the Western Pacific, as an example, but to your point in Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean is also a very challenging area to work, as is the Strait of Hormuz. As the vice chairman and working within the JROC, it will be a priority of mine to bring those and close those A2/AD gaps and bring those capabilities to the force as quickly as possible in all of the AORs around the country, the East Med is an example to your question about EUCOM.

Senator TILLIS. Yeah, I want to talk a little bit about NATO. The NATO 2030, there is some promise in there. They seem to reference China as a threat that our NATO allies and partners should take seriously.

But what is your sense of NATO working with them?

I get the sense, I have the pleasure of serving as the co-chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group. The sense that I get is that we still do not have a complete consensus among some of our NATO allies with respect to the threat of Russia.

What can you tell me that would give me optimism that there is a growing sense of resolve that we all need to act and recognize the threat?

Admiral GRADY. In my dealings with my NATO partners, and I will go back to my time as the 6th Fleet Commander when I was STRIKFORNATO. I thought there was a growing realization, particularly, of the Russian threat and the challenges that we would need to meet as a NATO alliance and the strength that the Transatlantic Alliance that would be important to that.

To your question about a growing understanding of China and the threats that that posed, I similarly felt the same, and so my dialogues at my level, and, if confirmed, going forward with the vice chairman of the U.K. and France, in particular, will be to talk about what China is doing in their part of the world. Certainly, if you look at the One Belt One Road initiative and challenges in Europe or if you look at the 5(g) and Huawei and how that challenges what we want to do with our allies and partners, that growing realization is there and I am pretty confident that we can work together to meet those challenges.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you.

I have some other questions I will submit for the record. But thank you, I look forward to supporting your nomination.

Admiral GRADY. Aye, sir.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Tillis.

We are approaching a vote at 11:30, so I would ask my colleagues to add here to the 5-minute limit as much as possible.

Senator HIRONO, please?

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Grady, normally, I start each nomination hearing with a series of questions related to a nominee's fitness for service, however, based on the severity of the ongoing water contamination crisis at Pearl Harbor, I am going to submit those questions for the record.

I am not sure how familiar you or my colleagues are with the Red Hill Fuel Storage Facility, but it is a huge complex that I liken to the Hoover Dam. Red Hill has 20 massive underground fuel storage tanks built into the side of a mountain that holds 250 million gallons of fuel to support military operations across the Indo-Pacific. These tanks serve as a strategic war reserve in the event of crisis.

Red Hill sits 100 feet directly above Oahu's aquifer, which is the source of drinking water for all of Honolulu and the surrounding area, threatening the safety of our clean drinking water.

While there have been ongoing issues with leaks at Red Hill since 2014, a series of recent, preventable accidents have led to the contamination of the Navy's water system and put the community at risk. At this moment, around 100,000 military servicemembers, their families, contractors, and other residents are impacted. Over 2,800 families have been displaced to temporary housing only weeks before the holidays and thousands of others are being forced to use bottled water.

This is not just a short-term matter to resolve the drinking water problem, which the Navy must do expeditiously, but also a long-term question about the Department's plans for a strategic fuel

storage. On Monday, I joined Governor Ige and the Hawaii delegation in calling for the Navy to immediately suspend operations at Red Hill while they confront and remedy this crisis.

Governor Ige then directed the Navy to cease operations at Red Hill and de-fuel all the tanks. The Department of Defense needs to provide answers to the citizens of Hawaii and the nation as a whole about how it can safely protect the aquifer while still storing the required fuel reserve for national security, even if that means ultimately moving the fuel elsewhere.

In the past week, I have spoken with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander of INDOPACOM multiple times about how to resolve this crisis. It is paramount that the Navy understands that Oahu needs safe drinking water; that is the top priority and I will continue to work with the congressional delegation and the governor do whatever is necessary to make that happen.

Admiral, once confirmed, I would like a commitment from you that Red Hill will be a top priority both, solving the short-term contamination issue and developing a credible, long-term plan for the storage or for the strategic war reserve needs.

I would also like your commitment to prioritize restoring the community's confidence in the military. You can imagine the community's confidence has been badly shaken by how the military has handled this water-contamination crisis.

INDOPACOM is our country's priority theater and in DOD's budgeting and infrastructure decisions need to more strongly reflect that reality.

Admiral, can I get your commitment that, if confirmed, that you will make Red Hill now, and going forward, a priority, a top priority?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma'am. The safety of our citizens, our Navy families, our military families is of the highest importance and you have my commitment that, if confirmed, I will work with my very close colleague, Chris Aquilino and Sam Paparo to ensure that we move forward appropriately both, first, and primarily on the safety of our citizens, but then on the logistics implications going forward.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono.

Senator Sullivan, please?

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, good to see you again. I appreciated our meeting and I look forward to supporting your confirmation quickly.

Let me just begin, why do you think the White House left this seat open?

My understanding is they had names back in January for the American people. I am quite concerned. We don't have a vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have all these challenges that we are facing as a nation; Russia is looking like it is trying to possibly invade Ukraine. Xi Jinping is very aggressive towards Taiwan and we don't even have a vice chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Why do you think it took so long to put your name up before this Committee?

Admiral GRADY. Sir, I am not privy to the process by which the nomination worked its way through the process. I will just say I am happy to be sitting here now and, if confirmed, look forward to working with you.

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, I think it is part of a broader trend, a “dereliction of duty” trend as it relates to the military and this White House, this President; they don’t seem to prioritize the military. The vice chairman position is open right now. That didn’t have to happen. (Indiscernible—1:23:25) doesn’t certainly help our national security.

I have been raising this issue a lot. The President’s budget, does double-digit increases in terms of almost every federal agency, with the exception of two. Two get cuts, significant cuts, if you keep it for inflation-adjusted cuts: the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. Dead last.

Again, there is not a prioritization of the military. Do you think, what do you think that Xi Jinping or Putin see when they see a budget request like this from this President’s White House?

Do you think that that gives them encouragement that we are cutting our defense spending?

Admiral GRADY. I think that as we look at their budgets, they look at ours and they try and attempt to draw conclusions from that on our way forward.

Senator SULLIVAN. In your personal opinion, do you think at this moment in time, cutting our defense budget is a good idea for national security or a bad idea, in your personal opinion?

Admiral GRADY. I think that there are many significant national security challenges around the world and that you need a Department of Defense budget that was able to meet those challenges, not just now but going forward.

Senator SULLIVAN. Does cutting the Department’s budget do that, in your personal opinion?

Admiral GRADY. Yeah, I think there is, there are risks and challenges there that we need to face and that we need to have the appropriate funding level to do that.

Senator SULLIVAN. You are not answering my question.

With respect, do you think that cutting the Defense budget does that? I need just a yes or no, personal opinion.

Admiral GRADY. I think that stable and predictable and adequate funding is important and that it needs to keep pace with the threat and inflation.

Senator SULLIVAN. This doesn’t, does it?

Admiral GRADY. This is challenging.

Senator SULLIVAN. This doesn’t.

Let me just be more specific. This budget, and the request from the Navy, actually shrinks the fleet. It commissions four new ships, retires eight. Do you think shrinking the U.S. Navy Fleet is something that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party would welcome or would be against, the U.S. Navy Fleet shrinking, which is what this budget or this President does? What do you think the Chinese think of that?

Admiral GRADY. I think the Chinese look at an isolated shrinking of the budget as a positive thing.

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, I do, too.

Well, fortunately, this Committee rebuked the President and others and we put forward what the National Security Commission, and bipartisan by the way, recommended: to increase Defense spending 3 to 5 percent, per year; a real budget, a real increase of inflation adjustment. That is what this Committee responsibly did and we certainly hope that as we look forward to appropriating, that we will do that.

Let me ask one final question and then I will have a number for you that I am going to submit for the record.

There has been a dramatic, and you and I talked about this, trust in the military in terms of a decline, actually plummeting. The Reagan National Defense Survey says that for the first time ever, a minority of Americans, only 45 percent, report having a great deal of trust and confidence in the military. This is down from 70 percent in 2018, a 3-year drop.

Why do you think that is happening?

Admiral GRADY. Well, first, I am disappointed to see that number.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, am I.

Admiral GRADY. Someone who has served for 37 years, I take great pride in what I do and what our servicemen do every day. That is disturbing.

I think the key for us to help combat that is to be as transparent in what we do and be as apolitical as we can possibly be.

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask one final question. The Under Secretary of Defense, number three position in the Pentagon, he said one of his priorities in his confirmation hearing was to, quote, stamp out systemic racism within the ranks.

Do you think the military is a systematically racist institution in your experience and do you think that having senior officials say that kind of thing is actually one of the things that undermines trust?

Admiral GRADY. I think it is really important that we have discussions about anything that challenges the safe and secure working environment for our force. That is a commander's business to do that and racism is part of that.

I will give you my personal experience. Every time I do a fleet-unit visit, whether it is an airplane, a squadron, or a submarine, I ask these questions. We work really hard to have that dialogue, that important dialogue that we need to have about racism. We all agree that there is no place for it in our military.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will submit more questions for the record.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.

Senator Peters, please?

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Admiral, and congratulations on your nomination and I thank you for being here today and offering some of your thoughts.

Admiral, in advance testimony, you expressed concern with both, state and non-state actors' ability to successfully execute large-scale influence operations against the United States and its partners, and, certainly, I share those concerns and we have a lot of evidence on an almost daily basis.

I want to kind of hear your views on organizing our information warfare capabilities. This is a wide-scoping issue, I understand, but information clearly is a domain and a warfighting function with a very strong human dimension to it, as well, but we should never exceed the need for some overarching guidance, planning, and authorities when it comes to all of this.

So, my question to you is, would the Joint Force be more effective, and by extension, perhaps more resilient, if information warfare fell under a single entity, such as a functional component and command?

Admiral GRADY. Yeah. First, I agree with you, sir, on the challenge on information warfare face presents to us in the modern realities of warfare going forward. Winning and dominating in the information space is going to be just as important as in the military or the diplomatic or the law fare or the economic. So, going forward, we are going to have to do, and work very hard to ensure that that happens.

I think the best response from an information perspective, though, is that to answer your question directly, is that it should be integrated across what all of our, we will use the COCOM's as an example, has to be integrated in everything they do from the ground up. It can't be something that is bolted on, on the bottom.

My discussions with my colleagues who are fleet commanders or who are combatant commanders now, I think they get that and so I think as the vice chairman, if confirmed, it would be my job to help encourage that integration baked in from the bottom as equally as important as what we do from the tactical to the strategic.

Senator PETERS. Well, and as we look at malign influence and information warfare, there is certainly vulnerabilities in government that can turn some of our neighbors and our allies into targets of opportunity for financially motivated cyber criminals. State-sponsored actors certainly linked to China, to Russia, and Iran, are conducting extensive cyber espionage operations, information operations.

My question for you is, do you believe that security assistance should include cybersecurity assistance to help our partners protect their critical infrastructure or to enhance their resiliency against this sophisticated information warfare that we are seeing across the globe?

Admiral GRADY. Yeah, Senator.

First, you are stronger together with our allies and partners; one of those great competitive advantages that we have. So, in the cyber realm, then, working together within cyber to meet those threats that you have pointed out, is incredibly important.

So, I do think that there are venues for us to help and to learn from them, as well, in the cyber domain going forward.

Senator PETERS. Great. Well, thank you.

A discussion of great power competition tends to emphasize capabilities and resources that prepare for, potentially, armed conflict. But what I would like you to address a little bit how we would employ our military instrument of power against a broad spectrum of non-military threats. We have already talked about cyber and information warfare, but I believe that irregular warfare architecture represents, perhaps, a proactive-shaping process through competi-

tion and generates some options if tensions escalate or if deterrence fails.

So, my question for you is how should the Joint Force be competing actively in this environment while deterring escalation and shaping theaters in a way that will help us, should deterrence fail?

Admiral GRADY. So, I think there are several elements to that. One, working with our allies and our partners is absolutely critical; so, that is one. Two, there is a value to being there and to being able to work with them as the situations arise. Things like theater-security cooperation, which allows us to train together, to exercise together, things like the IMET program would allow us to share best practices and democratic values are important.

Then to your point about boots on the ground, perhaps, I will use the CV as an example. They do fantastic work around the world helping share those cultural values and helping us learn about the battle space that we are going to operate in. Then at the higher end, you know, irregular warfare, whether it be SOF or something else, it is absolutely critical to everything we do and it is across all phases, from pre-conflict to post-conflict.

Senator PETERS. Well, very good.

When I served in the Navy Reserve, I served in a CV battalion, so I appreciate you bringing up the CVs.

Admiral GRADY. Certainly.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, again, for your answers, Admiral.

Admiral GRADY. Aye.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Peters.

Senator Scott, please?

Senator SCOTT. I am going to let Senator Hawley take my time.

Chairman REED. Senator Hawley, please?

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Scott. That is kind of you.

Admiral, I am going to come back to something you said earlier. You talked about China being the pacing threat and INDOPACOM being the pacing theater. With that in mind, let me just point out that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan continues to grow rapidly, but the resources that are available to the Department to counter and deter that threat are not.

Given that, is it fair to say that DOD needs to be doing less in lower-priority theaters so it can use its scarce resources to do more to do what we need to do to deter China in the Indo-Pacific?

Admiral GRADY. Yeah, I think it gets to that reimburse-balance yes that we were talking about, sir, and so, certainly, if the pacing threat is in the INDOPACOM theater, then working with the combatant commander, Admiral Aquilino, my close colleague, it will be important to provide him the resources he needs to help shape that environment and make those priority-based discussions based on the threat.

Senator HAWLEY. Are you concerned that the Global Posture Review released last week doesn't name a single region where DOD plans to do less?

Admiral GRADY. Not part of the process to build the Global Posture Review. What I do like about the Global Posture Review is that it provides a disciplined framework to have those priority-

based discussions that you talked about. So, I think that is a great promise of the GPR going forward.

Senator HAWLEY. So, you are not concerned is the answer to my question?

Admiral GRADY. I think that there is room for us to work within the disciplined process that they lay out to have further discussions about those priorities, challenges that you referenced.

Senator HAWLEY. Well, I just want to say that I am very concerned by the Global Posture Review. The overwhelming message, I think, sent by the review is that our posture abroad doesn't require any changes at all. The posture, the review doesn't recommend any major changes.

I think that is a big mistake. We cannot continue to do what we are doing and adequately deter China in Asia.

Let me ask you about our force-planning construct in the 2018 NDS. That shifted that construct, the NDS shifted focus from maintaining our ability to fight and win two regional wars to fighting and winning a single war against a great power. Senator Rounds was asking you about this earlier.

Do you agree with the forced plan and construct used in the 2018 NDS?

Admiral GRADY. I think as we work on the NDS, and, if confirmed, I look forward to being part of the next NDS. I think we are going to have to look really hard at that forced plan and construct; its conditions base, its threat base, in a situation, as I say, the world gets a vote, and we are going to have to look at that that means with two peer competitors and how we are going to adjust that.

Senator HAWLEY. Well, let me ask it to you this way. The Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin wrote to me earlier this year. I am quoting her now, I believe that the force plan and construct should prioritize and focus on China unless and until the security environment changes dramatically. She goes on, the threat China poses to Taiwan should be a priority for the force-planning construct.

Do you agree with Dr. Karlin?

Admiral GRADY. I haven't had a chance to sit down with Dr. Karlin to talk about that, but I do agree that the pacing threat and the challenges that we most face is in the INDOPACOM region.

Senator HAWLEY. With regard to the force plan and construct, Dr. Karlin also wrote, and I am quoting her again, while the U.S. military will invariably need to juggle other challenges simultaneously, it would need to reprioritize those, should a conflict with China arise.

Do you agree with that, that the U.S. military will need to reprioritize other challenges, for instance, in Europe, should the conflict with China arise, so that we can focus on the pacing threat?

Admiral GRADY. If a new conflict arises, we are going to have to provide all that we can to win that conflict.

Senator HAWLEY. You think that China should be the priority, even in the event of simultaneous conflicts?

Admiral GRADY. Again, conditions-based —

Senator HAWLEY. Well, I don't know what that means. With all due respect, Admiral, you said that several times now and, frankly, you are evading my questions. You haven't given me a straight answer on any of my questions yet.

I have asked you about the Global Posture Review repeatedly. I have asked you about the 2018 NDS.

So far, you haven't answered me on any of them. So, let's try for a yes or a no. Let me just back up and let's try again.

The 2018 NDS, the force plan and construct used in that is shifting away from multiple conflicts to winning one great power conflict, do you agree with that, yes or no?

Admiral GRADY. I agree that it needs to be reviewed.

Senator HAWLEY. So, that sounds like you don't agree with it currently and you think it is subject to revision; is that right?

Admiral GRADY. So, what I offer, Senator, is that going forward, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, I will have an ability to help contribute to that dialogue as we look at the force-planning construct going forward.

Senator HAWLEY. Well, I will tell you this, if I can't get any further clarity from you on this, if your position is, in fact, you want to abandon the 2018 NDS and force posture, you won't be confirmed with my vote.

Let me ask you about the situation in Taiwan. Taiwan needs to be able to feel cost-effective and resilient asymmetrical defense capabilities as quickly as possible in order to strength their deterrence against a Chinese invasion.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral GRADY. I agree that asymmetric tools that they can bring to that fight would be a great value.

Senator HAWLEY. My time is expired.

I am going to have a number more questions for you, Admiral, for the record, and, frankly, I am disappointed in your answers today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hawley.

Now, let me recognize via Webex, Senator Manchin.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate very much and also enjoyed our conversation that we had before Thanksgiving, and congratulations on your nomination. I am sure you are going to be confirmed, sir, without any problems.

With that hope, I would like to know a little bit, you know, first of all, we do an awful lot of the training in West Virginia and we have had tremendous opportunity to work with special ops and we are hoping that you are looking into that, that some of the other service, branches of the service can use or look at our state from the standpoint of the effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness, especially, and a location, being so close to D.C.

I don't know if you have had a chance to visit some of the operations we have; if not, we would like to bring you and show you what we have been able to develop here.

Admiral GRADY. Senator, I have not had the opportunity to visit the facilities that you discussed, but, if confirmed, I would look forward to spending some time with those troops there.

Senator MANCHIN. We would love to get you out as quickly as we could, sir. That would be great.

I was pleased to read about the focus you have towards interoperability. I know we touched on it briefly, and this has been in your advanced questions. Interoperability with our allies is something that I am sure you spent quite a bit of time designing, implementing as Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces.

Can you describe some of those experiences and tell us how you plan to expand that with all of our allies.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator. Thanks.

The key issue for me as the Fleet Forces Commander or as 6th Fleet and STRIKFORNATO was to build interoperability so that we could fight together, but not interoperability for interoperability's sake, but interoperability for integration so we could work better, we could fight better together immediately. Interoperating is one thing; integration is where we need to go and work and train together.

So, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, it will be a high priority of me to work with our allies and partners on interoperability as it leads to integration and then our ability to fight and win together.

Senator MANCHIN. Sir, also, Cyber Command and Space Command are two of the combatant commands that influence nearly every weapon and support system in our inventory. Tell me, if you will, your plan to resource each of them as the challenges and capabilities in each domain increases.

Admiral GRADY. Yeah. Sir, thank you.

Working within the space domain is absolutely critical and a very high priority. It underpins everything we do as a military, just as our military underpins what we need to do in space.

So, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, space, as a domain, and it is important to recognize that it is a domain like everything else, will be a high priority for me going forward, if confirmed.

Senator MANCHIN. I am going to ask you a hypothetical question because I know, sir, it might be a little bit out of your domain, but with what we see going on in China and Taiwan and the South China Sea and also what we see going on now with Russia and Ukraine, do you have any comments or any thoughts on that, that would be kind of helpful in our deliberations?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator. Thank you.

I think, you know, if you start with Russia in Crimea and with Ukraine, it is a very dangerous and destabilizing situation that we are working our way through. It is important for us to ensure that we work with our NATO partners and continue to recognize the challenges that are faced by Russian activity in that area of the world.

Then remain rock solid in our commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty, to Ukrainian self-determination and their larger goals of, ultimately, perhaps moving forward with alliances and whatnot.

I think in the Western Pacific the challenges are equally as important. As we have discussed, that is the pacing threat in the Pacific, and in INDOPACOM, and we are going to have to meet those on a detail basis; again, two peer competitors, we are going to have to balance those going forward.

Senator MANCHIN. Very quickly on the other one, sir, as a commander, I am interested to hear about any concerns that you may have in logistical capabilities or the capacity to surge necessary combat power to any part of the region, but if—in regions, that if we needed to combat a North Korean or a near-peer aggression, what would be your thoughts on that and how you think we could meet those concerns.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir. I think contested logistics is an incredibly important part of our theory of the fight going forward. I think that is why we recognize it as one of the four pillars of the new joint warfighting construct.

So, contested logistics, whether it allows us to fight in Korea or in the Indo-Pacific, or even in Europe, is going to be incredibly important to what we do. We are pretty good at logistics, but there is room to improve and that is why it is such an important pillar of the joint warfighting construct.

Senator MANCHIN. Let me thank you again for your service and also your continued willingness to serve and I look forward to voting for your confirmation, sir. Thank you.

Admiral GRADY. Aye, sir. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Manchin.

Senator Scott, please?

Senator SCOTT. Well, first, Admiral Grady, it is nice to see a Navy guy do well.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

Senator SCOTT. Congratulations on your nomination and thanks for your willingness to serve.

So, I think we talked about this the other day. My top concern is both, Communist China and Russia. My first question is, without disclosing any classified information, what examples can you provide that show that this administration is doing everything it can to prepare the U.S. to deter and potentially defeat these adversaries in the field, in any field they make challenges in.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

I think a really good example of deterrence is our ability to work with our allies and partners in a very robust exercise and training series. I will just use my most recent example, where we did the large-scale exercise within the department of Navy that was a global, the first global large-scale exercise that we have done that crossed the spectrum that crossed the globe from INDOPACOM all the way into Europe.

That demonstration of credible combat capability on a globally integrated basis, which was the value of LSE, I think, is a really good example of how we can continue to press deterrence and to demonstrate that credible combat capabilities that underpins that deterrence.

Senator SCOTT. Thanks.

Do you agree that we have seen Communist China significantly increase its use of aggressive military tactics since President Biden took office and do you agree that Communist China's behaviors, especially what we are watching in Taiwan, have grown more bold this year?

Admiral GRADY. I think Communist China's activities have been relatively consistent over the last few years and are certainly, and

particularly the rhetoric is something that we have to recognize and address.

Senator SCOTT. As we talked the other day, I introduced the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which would eliminate the ambiguity we—it basically says, you know, we are going to defend Taiwan. One, do you agree with that, and, two, would it make your job easier if it was clear exactly what your obligations are?

Admiral GRADY. I think that the one China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiques and the six assurances, I think that has done a really good job of just maintaining the status quo, which is peace, which is solving that challenge in Taiwan on a, not a unilateral way, and so this escrow was important.

Going forward, a policy change, I think would be one that would have to be based on the rhetoric and risk that China is presenting, and, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, I look forward to helping shape that and shape our thinking on that as we press forward.

Senator SCOTT. Do you believe that General Secretary Xi fears a U.S. reaction from the U.S., you know, with regard to his continuing aggression towards Taiwan, and even other countries in Asia?

Admiral GRADY. I think that, and I can't speak for what is in his head, but I suspect that the credible and capable military that is forward more Admiral Aquilino's leadership is one that should give him pause, that we are prepared and positioned to do what we need to.

Senator SCOTT. For decades, the U.S. has reserved the right to preemptively use our nuclear weapons in the event our national security requires it. You know, do you believe that we should keep that option open or abandon it?

Admiral GRADY. I think that options are always good and keeping all options on the table for the present is important.

Senator SCOTT. Do you have any concerns about China's focus on their, and success in their hypersonic missiles?

Admiral GRADY. Absolutely. It is an area that my predecessor discussed at great length and they are moving very, very quickly in hypersonics and a very challenging weapons system and one in which we need to keep pace, if not, overmatch.

Senator SCOTT. So, what do you think when Congress doesn't pass the National Defense Authorization Act and continues to do continuing resolutions, rather than pass a budget, how does it impact our military readiness?

Admiral GRADY. That is a great question, sir.

The continuing resolutions are super challenging, as you know. They eliminate our ability to move with flexibility. They stop new starts, our ability to invest in new weapons systems. They have a human cost that goes with them.

Let me go back to the one I just mentioned, because it links, synchronizes with your question, and that is a CR would prevent us from advancing on new initiatives like the Army and the Air Force program on hypersonic. So, CRs are very disruptive and challenging for the service to work forward and work through.

Senator SCOTT. So, how many ships do you think the Navy needs to be able to guarantee freedom of the seas for ourselves and our allies and our partners?

Admiral GRADY. First, you know, I appreciate the law that says 355. That is important and I understand that. Presence matters. Capability matters. But so does, and capacity matters.

So, I think there is this balance between capacity and capability as we seek to meet the law of 355, and so going forward, you know, we will try to work to get to the 355, because that is what the law says, but in the meantime, as we work to get there and try to get there as fast as we can, we have to balance capability and capacity, and there are some other things that we can bring to the table in addition to the capacity piece.

Senator SCOTT. Thanks, Admiral.

Thank you, Chair Reed.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.

We have four individuals on the Webex, but we also have a vote. So, I will, at this point, Admiral, recess for 10 minutes so that I can vote and also that I can allow my colleagues to have a chance to question you.

So, the Committee stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman REED. Let me call the hearing back to order and recognize Senator Rosen, via Webex.

Senator Rosen?

Senator ROSEN. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing.

I would really like to thank Admiral Grady for meeting with me recently, for your lifetime of service and your willingness to continue to serve.

I wrote this down from your opening statement, I really liked it when you said: Stronger families means a stronger fleet. I think that that is really a terrific quote and I may use that from time to time. I will credit you with that, Admiral.

But I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity now. As we discussed in our last meeting last month, cyberattacks are becoming one of the central security threats to the U.S. and, of course, to all of our partners. Our allies are essential to ensuring U.S. cybersecurity, because we rely on them to do threat-hunting, enable early warning, to harden our own collective defenses.

As you well know, cyber defense is part of NATO's core task of collective defense. So, given the rise in threats of cyberattacks from both, state and non-state actors, NATO efforts to protect allied networks and enhance resilience across the alliance, well, it is just more critical than ever, which is why I raised the subject when I met with NATO leadership in Brussels just before Thanksgiving.

So, Admiral Grady, what do you see as the significant cyberthreats that NATO alliance is facing and can you specifically describe the cyberthreat our European allies face from Russia and how, if confirmed, you would advise and support our allies in combatting this cyber aggression.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.

Cyber is a domain that is increasingly active, increasingly contested, and increasingly competitive. I think for our NATO allies, they recognize that, and so working together with them to face those challenges in this increasingly competitive domain is important.

You know, we tend to think about warfare as something that has a start point and an endpoint and I think cyber is one that tells us that there is a lot happening in the gray zone that we have to think about even before conflict starts. Indeed, conflict could kick off in cyber before anything else.

I think another piece of the cyber challenge that we face is how we work within the whole-of-government and with industry. Even in our own country, all we have to look at are attacks on meat-packing plants and railroads and those kinds of things to know that we have to be good partners, certainly with our allies and partners at NATO and beyond, but, of course, with our industrial base partners and the rest of society, because that is, in fact, what is happening now in the gray-zone world that we live in.

Senator ROSEN. Yeah, I couldn't agree more. This is an area that is going to become an increasing threat to all of us around the world, and so we really have to think about our cyber readiness because our nation is really grappling in the aftermath of unprecedented cyberattacks. In the U.S., we are expected to face a shortage of 3.4 million skilled technical workers (indiscernible—1:54:55). Those workers help us to address these threats. There are particularly large gaps in cybersecurity.

DOD continues to face challenges addressing requirements for certain key scale areas, such as those in cyber and STEM fields. To help address the shortfall, inspire future generations of talent, last year's NDAA, Senator Brown, Peters, Blackburn, and I introduced a bipartisan bill to help our Junior ROTC, young men and women have a STEM training and education track. So, that is great.

This year's NDAA, again, I worked with Senator Blackburn to create a civilian cyber reserve which will also help address cyber defense personnel needs.

So, Admiral, if confirmed, how will you recruit and train personnel in these critical cybersecurity and STEM field, networking, hardware, software, all of it, so that we can really surge up and address these challenges that we know are going to be increasing day after day?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, Senator, and thank you for your leadership on that initiative.

Just a quick shout-out on the JROTC and how important that is for the health of the force going forward and then the STEM education that you and I talked about how critical that is and the key element of that is getting to our youngsters sooner than later, is important, and you and I talked about that.

Concepts like a civilian cyber reserve, you know, you and I talked about this. You know, in my view, if you are willing to serve your country, if you can pass a security clearance, but you may not look like me, I don't care. If you can come and you can serve and you can help us win in cyber, whether as in the civilian cyber reserve or some other form, we need to encourage that because that is an area that we know we have to win. We know our adversaries are throwing a lot at it and we just have to outpace that.

Senator ROSEN. Well, thank you.

I want to be sure that the DOD maintains our technical superiority and I am going to do everything I can to help enforce that, grow that with you.

So, thank you. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rosen.

Senator Tuberville, please?

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You saved the best for last.

[Laughter.]

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you, Admiral, for being here and your wife, and your service.

I am excited about you being in this position. I think you will bring a lot to who we are and what we are. You know, I hear about all these rockets and tanks and all that. I came from a team atmosphere of 40 years and I have been all around the world since I have had this job now for 12 months and I have seen how dangerous it is.

If we are going to survive, not just our country, but the world, our military is going to have to do it for us. It is not all the bells and whistles; it is the Jimmy Joes and Janes.

My concern is how do we build that best military? How do we build the values and morals and educate these young men and women, because we are finding less and less, obviously, that we will take in the military. What we have total, I think is close to 2.5 million people, Reservists, active-duty.

I just want to get your thoughts on that. I like what you told me back when we met about drug testing kids. You know, we are becoming more of a liberal society in things that we do, but we cannot allow that to creep into our military, because what they do means life and death, you know, to them, themselves, to people around them, and also the survival of who we are in the free world.

So, I hope you would bring, and I know you will bring a lot of that to the Joint Chiefs to let that pass on down from the people that you work with. So, talk a little bit about, you know, structuring, you know, our military from this point on.

We have a great military. I think there are some things that we need to maybe correct, but we still got to build that fighting machine.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, sir.

You and I talked at great length about how Xs and Os are important, but Johnny and Joe and Jane are more important.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Right.

Admiral GRADY. The center of the universe, our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and guardians, it is important that we don't forget that that is what it is all about and setting them up for success to win and to not go into that fair fight is absolutely critical.

You and I also talked about the sailors and the servicemen that were getting into the Navy now. As I told you, sir, I am super impressed with who we get now. They are different than when you and I were growing up, but they are just as good, and I am supremely confident that we can ensure that they stay that way going forward.

You know, drug testing is a really important policy and it is a very successful policy. We have a zero tolerance for that kind of thing and that will continue so that we can maintain that lethal, credible, warfighting edge that you expect us to have going forward, built on the center of the universe, our servicemembers.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Well, thank you.

I know you will do a great job. I look forward to you being a huge part of what we do and working with you for the next few years, oh, and Merry Christmas. It is almost here. Thank you.

Admiral GRADY. Aye, aye, sir. Thank you.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.

Admiral, thank you for your testimony and thank you for 40 years of service, you, and your Christine and your family, and I look forward to your speedy confirmation.

With that, I will adjourn the hearing.

Admiral GRADY. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. Section 154 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, other provisions of law and Department of Defense issuances assign to the Vice Chairman a breadth of duties and responsibilities.

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the nation's second-highest ranking military officer and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for overseeing joint military requirements, providing advice and recommendations, and performing other duties as directed by the Chairman.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the Vice Chairman's duties and responsibilities?

Answer. I have been honored to serve our nation for 37 years. I believe my command experiences as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Naval and Joint Forces Maritime Component Command Strategic Command, Naval Forces Northern Command, Commander, Sixth Fleet, Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic, as well as the director of the Maritime Operations Center for the Pacific Fleet have prepared me for the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly the role that the Vice Chairman plays in managing military requirements.

Multiple global deployments, service in senior Joint Staff and OPNAV staff billets, including on the National Security Council in the White House, and command of a Carrier Strike Group have also prepared me to work collaboratively across the joint force, the interagency, whole of government, and closely with our allies and partner nations.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. I believe I am prepared to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief. I will continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful and diverse insight to ensure our military forces are positioned to serve our nation.

Question. What other duties do you anticipate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would prescribe for you, if confirmed?

Answer. The Chairman, General Milley, has indicated he does not intend to expand the Vice Chairman's duties beyond what is stipulated in statute.

If confirmed, I expect to continue to emphasize efforts to strengthen the readiness of our military and reform Department business practices for increased effectiveness and affordability.

Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Vice Chairman, in your view?

Answer. I do not believe there are any additional duties to assign to the Vice Chairman, beyond those stipulated in statute. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff, if necessary, to ensure the Joint Staff's effectiveness.

Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

Answer. The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate that we are a nation under civilian control; it is one of the foundational principles of our great nation. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our country, and I will do everything in my power to ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.

If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work hand-in-hand with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to foster and build a strong and collaborative relationship. Activities will include participation in multiple meetings each week on critical issues for the Joint Force and the nation, both senior leader forums that provide guidance to the Department, and issue-focused engagements to advance new opportunities and stem emerging challenges.

Question. If confirmed, how would you expect responsibilities to be allocated between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and yourself as co-chairs of the Deputy's Management Action Group?

Answer. I view the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a close and complementary partner in managing the agenda and execution of the Deputy's Management Action Group. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of issues to include the full range of strategy, policy, resourcing, and management issues impacting the Department.

Question. In your view, can the Deputy's Management Action Group be more effective in ensuring that issues with resource management, and broad policy implications are addressed in a manner that aligns with the Secretary of Defense's priorities and the Department's planning and programming schedule? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The Deputy's Management Action Group is a critical forum for sharing information, creating alignment across civilian and military components, exercising effective civilian control and oversight of the Department, and making decisions on major issues. One way to make this forum more effective is to identify additional lower-level forums which are working on issues that would benefit from a higher-level review to broaden information sharing, remove obstacles, and bring decisions to closure.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Our military's challenge over the coming years is to fully transform and adapt in the context of a constantly evolving threat environments our nation faces from our pacing threats Russia and especially China. As we transform, we must also set a high priority on maintaining our close cooperation with our allies and partners to address various security challenges and increase our collective strength. Also,

while our focus must be on our pacing threats, we still face challenges from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. In order to effectively address all the threats we face, we must continue to modernize our military, and, maintain its readiness to engage anywhere and anytime our nation's leaders choose.

Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work alongside the Chairman, combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure we are effectively executing the strategy our nation's leaders set out.

The Joint Staff will collaborate with interagency partners and Congress to assess the global security challenges and provide a flexible, agile Joint Force that leverages fresh concepts and robust capabilities to offer the broadest possible set of operational options to decision-makers.

Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff performs functions that overlap with those of other DOD components, what would be your approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to ensure that the Joint Staff continues to identify and mitigate unnecessary redundancies consistent with law and policy.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017 made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code, concerning the service of members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) as military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Question. What is your assessment of the authorities and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?

Answer. Existing authorities and processes facilitate the flow and exchange of advice and opinions to senior leaders. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to facilitate any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either individually or collectively, in providing their advice directly to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. Additionally, I will foster a collaborative environment that promotes respect for dissent and strengthens our national security in a very complex security environment.

Question. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would always provide your best military advice to the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions differ from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) focused United States strategic priorities on a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, which is to be completed in 2022.

15. Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the INSSG accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

Answer. Yes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Force provided their best military advice during the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The INSSG provides adequate guidance until the release of the 2022 NDS. Both have accurately assessed the strategic environment and articulated the position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power competition.

Question. Do you support the national security priorities set out in the 2018 NDS and INSSG?

Answer. Yes, I support the national security priorities set out in the 2018 NDS and INSSG. They provide necessary strategic direction to the Joint Force. The Secretary's emphasis on China as the pacing threat is aligned with both documents. The shift from a Counter-Violent Extremist Organization focus to one centered around what the 2018 NDS referred to as Great Power Competition was an impor-

tant shift for the Joint Force. The 2018 NDS' emphasis on Allies and Partners and Reform were also important pillars that the 2022 NDS and NMS will continue building upon.

Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make to the 2018 NDS or in the Department's implementation of the 2018 NDS and INSSG?

Answer. If confirmed, I would want to first thoroughly review the strategy development work already under way for the 2022 NDS and 2022 National Military Strategy (NMS). Based on that review, I would make an assessment and offer any recommendations that seemed appropriate and in alignment with the Administration's strategic direction, as currently laid out in the INSSG and in the soon to be released National Security Strategy (NSS).

Question. In your view, do the 2018 NDS and INSSG correctly specify the priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?

Answer. Yes, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), as amplified in the INSSG, correctly prioritizes the Department of Defense's mission. China and Russia's growing capabilities pose the greatest risk to our nation and strategic stability. China and Russia pose truly existential challenges that we must address in defense of the Homeland, in the emerging domains of space and cyber, in the conduct of contested logistics, and across all dimensions of national security.

Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives identified by the 2018 NDS and INSSG?

Answer. Combatant Command Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and Operational Plans (OPLANs) are necessary but not sufficient to capture the full scope of operations across the globe. In response, the Joint Force has developed Global Integration Frameworks (GIFs) for each of the priority challenges. GIFs use the capstone OPLAN to prioritize military objectives across the globe, identify global campaigning activities, and achieve the NDS's and INSSG national security objectives.

Question. If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the missions, responsibilities, and force structure allocated to the Combatant Commands, best to implement the 2018 NDS and INSSG? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The DOD consistently seeks to improve our combatant commands' ability to achieve military objectives in support of National Security aims. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to review the relevant studies regarding combatant commands' roles and missions, consider how we might further global integration to best address the global nature of the challenges we face in the 21st century, and offer my recommendations accordingly.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Question. The Committee remains concerned that the processes for translating the explicit and implicit priorities reflected in the National Military Strategy into the budget proposals submitted by the military services are not as effective as they need to be.

21. In your view, does the Defense Planning Guidance consistently and clearly set priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the National Military Strategy and the Joint Military Net Assessment?

Answer. Yes, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) consistently and clearly sets priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).

Question. In your view are the Chairman's Annual Joint Assessment and Annual Program Assessment effective in aligning service budget proposals with joint priorities?

Answer. Yes. That does not mean there is no room for improvement. If confirmed, through these documents, chairmanship of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and co-chairmanship of the Deputy's Management Action Group, I will encourage all elements of the Joint Force to continually assess opportunities to improve our ability to efficiently and effectively invest in emerging and modern capabilities and technologies that truly address our greatest threats and challenges.

Question. What are your views on the current version of the Joint Warfighting Concept as it supports the National Military Strategy?

Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) is an important document for the Joint Force. It provides a vision of the future Joint Force and describes how that Force must fight in order to be successful. Through learning and experimentation,

the JWC will serve as an important roadmap to modernize capabilities and address gaps.

DOD READINESS

Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to execute the NDS, INSSG, and Combatant Commanders’ associated operational plans?

Answer. I am confident today we can protect the homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any potential adversary. With stable, predictable, adequate, and timely funding, we are working to improve readiness and modernization across the joint force in order to increase our lethality, flexibility, and resilience.

Question. In what specific ways have the Combatant Commands utilized their increased budgetary authority to foster readiness recovery?

Answer. The Services are leading the charge in utilizing their increased budget authority to foster readiness recovery. The increased budgetary authority granted to restore core readiness was necessary and an important step. The Combatant Commands’ role continues to highlight to the Services areas of critical concern for mission execution. The Combatant Commanders have been staunch resources and readiness advocates to their service partners.

Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to their readiness to execute operational plans in furtherance of the NDS and INSSG?

Answer. Restoring warfighting readiness, both current and future, is a key priority of the 2018 NDS and INSSG. With stable, predictable, adequate, and timely funding, we have been able to address risk in force readiness and are restoring capability to respond to contingencies. The Joint Force continues to face challenges in rebuilding future readiness, and, looking out to 2025, the ability to project power and achieve superiority in multiple domains. Our competitive advantage has eroded over time because of two decades of continuous operations exacerbated by sequestration and fiscal uncertainty. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding we can continue to improve readiness and build the future force that maintains our competitive advantage.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in restoring joint force readiness?

Answer. Our nation faces very real and significant challenges, and we must continue to invest in the future. Stable, predictable, adequate, and timely funding help us maintain our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage. Additionally, we must recapture our ability to go faster than our adversaries and take informed risks to maintain our competitive advantage. This includes inserting speed into acquisition, research and development, and our technology and innovation processes to ensure capabilities are delivered faster. If confirmed, as the JROC Chairman and DMAG Co-Chair, I will advocate for these efforts to ensure we continue to improve joint readiness and the developing and fielding of warfighting capabilities.

NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET

Question. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress increase the defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Do you believe that sustained real growth in the defense budget is necessary to achieve the aims of the existing NDS without incurring significant risk?

Answer. Yes. I believe sustained real growth in the face of evolving long term economic pressure is necessary to achieve the aims of the existing NDS without incurring buying power risk to fiscal year 2022 dollars. The Department’s \$715 Billion budget requires hard choices in terms of prioritization, but it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the current NDS. If confirmed, I will be an advocate for stable, predictable, adequate and timely defense budgets.

Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of the DOD budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the proposed budget against the National Defense Strategy’s required tasks, missions, and capabilities. PB22 supports a more lethal, ready, and partnered force by funding efforts to modernize capabilities, expand warfighting capacity, and restore readiness.

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President for the use of military force?

Answer. Recommendations on the use of military force should be consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, such recommendations should consider the probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and strategic risk.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement?

Answer. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.

Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, provide sufficient authority for the Department to conduct counterterrorism operations and activities as necessary and appropriate to protect U.S. national security interests?

Answer. I agree that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides a legal basis for operations against violent extremist organizations and is consistent with the policies of current and past administrations expressed in the report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations.

Question. In your view, what operational factors should Congress take into consideration in assessing whether a "new" Authorization for the Use of Military Force is needed at this time? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe the current Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF) is sufficient in providing legal basis for the Department's current counterterrorism activities. However, I support Congress considering, as the President has stated, the terrorist threat as it exists today versus the threat that existed when the 2001 AUMF was enacted.

Updating the AUMF may improve our approach to counterterrorism by aligning our resources to evolving threats, but there are also risks to changing an authority which is sufficient and works. A new AUMF must account for all terrorist organizations which threaten U.S. national interests and provide the latitude for the U.S. to use both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities of the Joint Force to ensure the safety of these interests. As the President has pointed out, the U.S. will lead first with diplomacy and leverage America's unmatched network of alliances and partnerships.

Question. In your view, are existing policies and processes for determining if and when the forces of other nations are eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces adequate and appropriate?

Answer. Yes. In all cases where U.S. forces are authorized to use force to defend foreign forces or individuals in the context of armed conflict, or a significant threat from an organized armed group, the authorization comes from the President, whether expressly or implicitly in authorizing or directing U.S. forces to participate in multinational military operations. The Secretary of Defense approves military orders (rules of engagement) implementing that authorization, and in many instances the Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for identifying and designating specific foreign forces or individuals to be defended.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary in performing their command function.

Do you believe that these provisions of law enact a clear and effective chain of command?

Answer. Yes.

Question. In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. The chain of command originates with the President and runs through the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to the commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will be dedicated to participating in the decision-making process and executing lawful orders as given by my civilian leadership.

Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?

Answer. Normally, our armed forces operate under the established Title 10 chain of command. There may be instances for the President to establish other temporary command relationships for certain sensitive military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S. military personnel are still accountable to the Title 10 chain of command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, our armed forces must act consistent with the law of war in all military operations.

ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Question. The 2018 NDS and INSSG stress that mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition with, deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic competitors.

What is your view of the continuing strength of our current alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners have in the United States to meet its obligations? What do you see as the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in enhancing that trust?

Answer. From a Joint Force perspective, confidence and trust in the U.S. military among our Allies and Partners remains strong. We continue to be actively engaged and synchronized with our Allies and Partners in our operations around the globe. The role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely suited to complement the Chairman's engagements with Allies and Partners to reassure them of the U.S. commitment to a rules based international order.

I will continue, and expand as necessary, the Vice Chairman's role in direct bilateral consultations on key issues of importance with my counterparts. These consultations could take the form of Counterpart Visits, less formal office calls on the margins of other Ally and Partner visits to the United States, traveling to Ally and Partner countries for engagements with their leadership and staff, or direct phone calls.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Joint Force, through the execution of our Global Campaign Plans, continues to strengthen alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new opportunities for international cooperation.

Specifically, the Joint Force does this through close consultation and coordination with Allies and Partners in a number of routine bilateral and multilateral relationships that include, but are not limited to, our key Allies in the Indo-Pacific, NATO Allies, the FVEY nations, the Quad, ASEAN's Defense Ministers Meeting-plus framework, and Coalition partners. These fora enable us to engage and collaborate with our Allies and Partners to achieve mutual military objectives and desired strategic effects related to competition with China and Russia, while enabling their capabilities to counter violent extremist organizations. Most importantly, within bilateral engagements and multilateral fora, we increase our communications and take action to include Allies and Partners earlier in our planning processes to enable their national enterprises greater opportunity for integration and collaboration.

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the military leaders of the Armed Forces of other nations, international consultative forums, and processes for enhancing interoperability between Allies and Partners?

Answer. Allies and Partners are critical in responding to mutual threats, preserving our shared interests, shaping the strategic environment, and are one of the greatest asymmetric advantages the United States has over potential adversaries. In my career, I have had the opportunity to meet and get to know military leaders from many of our Ally and Partner Armed Forces.

I am familiar with, and will support as necessary, the Chairman's regular consultations and meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) in several multilateral fora such as the NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defense Sessions and others. These consultations are essential to enhancing interoperability between Allies and Partners.

Question. In your view, what kinds of activities or engagements with Allies and Partners are most effective at enhancing those relationships and in case of crisis and conflict are most likely to elicit their defense cooperation and support?

Answer. Building and enhancing relationships with Allies and Partners is a continuous activity, and the Joint Force is best served by a comprehensive relationship-based approach. Key leader engagements are vital, as are exercises and training, personnel exchanges, partnering for technology development, and a host of other security cooperation activities. Of course, the appropriate frequency and scope of each

activity will depend upon the relationship in question, the goals set by policymakers, as well as the specific campaign, contingency, and crisis action plans our commanders have in place.

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION

Question. DOD supports a wide range of programs and activities including foreign military sales, security assistance to build the capabilities of foreign security forces, exercises and training events, military-to-military exchanges, and partnering to develop key technological capabilities.

Do you believe the Department of Defense has an effective security cooperation strategy for long-term strategic competition with near-peer rivals?

Answer. Yes, I believe the DOD has an effective security cooperation approach for long term strategic competition with near peer rivals. Our existing security cooperation programs and activities, as led and managed by OSD Policy, DSCA, the Joint Staff J5/J7, and the Combatant Commanders are critical in bolstering the network of alliances and partnerships necessary to compete with near-peer rivals. Security Cooperation success depends in large part on collaboration with our interagency counterparts under the guidance of documents like the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), to ensure that DOD's security cooperation activities support U.S. foreign policy objectives more broadly.

Question. What should be the primary objectives of Department of Defense security cooperation programs and activities, in your view?

Answer. The primary objectives of DOD security cooperation actions and activities employed by Combatant Commanders are to build and develop allied and partner security capability and capacity for self-defense and multinational operations. These same activities provide the Joint Force with the access and relationships necessary to promote access and shared security interests.

Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and resourced to execute security cooperation programs and activities effectively? If not, what changes would you recommend, if confirmed?

Answer. The DOD is well organized to execute security cooperation through a network of experts in the Combatant Commands and Services, at U.S. Embassies, within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and elsewhere. While it is clear the DOD cannot rely on enormous investments in the national security forces of other governments to guarantee the security of the American people, it is also apparent that security cooperation activities often pay large dividends.

If confirmed, I aim to collaborate with all stake holders to assess and evaluate our security cooperation programs to ensure they meet the needs of our operational commanders and are achieving the goals our national security policy makers.

THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION BOARD (DAB)

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the DOD acquisition system's senior advisory board. The DAB reviews and advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on Major Defense Acquisition Programs—the most complex and expensive DOD acquisition projects.

What is your understanding of the Vice Chairman's role as a member of the DAB?

Answer. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the senior advisory board for defense acquisitions in the Department of Defense. The board is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and a number of Under Secretaries of Defense. The DAB plays an important role in the Defense Acquisition System. Members of this board are responsible for approving the Major Defense Acquisition Programs and serve as the most important executive review of critical acquisition projects that have large impacts on the capacity and capabilities of the force.

If confirmed, I intend to work in close partnership with the Board's members to assure alignment with the stated goals of the Chairman's Planning Guidance and National Military Strategy.

Question. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman's role in the DAB should be modified to enhance the Board's effectiveness? If so, how?

Answer. Not at this time, but I will look for opportunities to increase the flexibility and the speed at which we acquire systems and warfighting capabilities.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (JROC) AND THE JOINT CAPABILITIES
INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (JCIDS)

Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as “the principal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on joint military capabilities or joint performance requirements” enabling the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to the Chairman without the concurrence of the members of the JROC.

If confirmed, do you intend to take full advantage of your authority as the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense for capabilities that derive from commercial technology and technology developed in DOD organizations independently of the military services?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by Congress in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with the active support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I anticipate that in the current technological environment the entities that procure capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from technologies that derive from the Services, private industry, and other DOD organizations.

Question. If confirmed, do you intend to exercise this authority to establish requirements for joint capabilities, such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control?

Answer. Yes, I will exercise the capability requirements authority. Modern warfare demands unprecedented levels of interoperability, integrated systems-of-systems kill chains, and joint command and control, for which no single Service is responsible.

Question. Do you believe that this problem can be addressed through the JROC requirements process?

Answer. Yes, the requirements for such joint capabilities can and should be addressed through the JROC.

Born out of numerous failures in interoperability, the JROC and its requirements process were created to enforce interoperability between critical systems across the joint force.

Question. If confirmed, what other steps would you recommend to address this deficiency?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support my predecessor’s efforts to seek consensus on issues for which no single Service has responsibility and work to address those issues through the JROC Strategic Directives. I also support the use of the Joint Warfighting Concept to assign matters of Joint interest to a lead Service with an appropriate supporting Joint Staff directorate.

Question. Do you believe the JROC has responsibility to ensure that the services are meeting their joint warfighting obligation with their assigned roles and missions?

Answer. The JROC’s responsibilities, as established in Title 10 Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by assessing joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any gaps, and validating joint military requirements. It is incumbent on the Services to achieve their joint warfighting obligations, and to inform the JROC when they are unable to do so.

Currently, strategic capability gaps derived from exercises and experiments as they are applied to helping refine the Joint Warfighting Concept are being used by the JROC to deliver strategic direction and joint capability requirements to the Services.

Question. Do you agree this is an effective methodology for providing strategic direction to the Services?

Answer. JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) are aligned to Joint Concepts and focus on cross-cutting capabilities that the Joint Warfighter of the future will need to satisfy the strategic guidance within the NDS. JSDs achieve this by setting clear and strategic requirements to ensure interoperability across the Joint Force.

Question. What is your understanding of how this strategic direction is to be enforced by the Department to ensure the Services fulfill joint capability requirements?

Answer. JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) will inform the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). In turn, the directives will inform Service POMs and the development of the President’s Budget. I support the current plan that each year the JROC—including the Vice Chairman and each of the Services—will assess how the Services are progressing in meeting the JSD requirements.

Question. With respect to Integrated Air and Missile defense, do you believe the JROC should play a role in ensuring the Joint Force has the ability to protect itself

in the near term and future from supersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?

Answer. Yes. The JROC's responsibilities, as established in Title 10 Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by assessing joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any gaps, and validating joint military requirements. This responsibility exists across all domains and all capabilities.

Question. If confirmed, what action would you take to ensure this capability is developed and fielded?

Answer. The JROC will continue to monitor and manage the progress of the program through its established bodies and processes to include validation of changes to requirements documents and the annual Capability Portfolio Management Review.

Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and the Assault Breaker II initiative from DARPA are two prominent examples of joint capabilities in development for which there is no obvious transition path. In the case of JADC2, the Joint Staff is taking the lead in coordinating development.

Question. In your view, is this an important issue? If so, do you have thoughts about how to address it if you are confirmed?

Answer. JADC2 is an important developing joint capability, critical to the success of the Department. JADC2 is not a joint product or program of record but rather a capability delivery framework to modernize and accelerate the fielding of material and non-material C2 capabilities. DSD stood up the JADC2 Cross-Functional Team (CFT) to oversee implementation of the Secretary's JADC2 Strategy. The CFT has been charged with highlighting "best of breed" capabilities and ensuring the possible transition or integration of joint C2 initiatives. If confirmed, I will aggressively monitor CFT progress to assure timely introduction of these important capabilities to the joint force.

Commercial industry investment in research and development exceeds that of DOD and the technology emerging from industry is expected to drive military capabilities globally. For this reason, some recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) should be made a member of the JROC.

Question. Currently, USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E serve in the JROC in prominent advisory roles. What are your views on adding the USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member?

Answer. I believe that it is important for the JROC to provide the military's findings on future requirements from a warfighting perspective. There is wisdom in Congress' creation of a cross-Service body to perform this function. Indeed, the JROC's current composition of voting members includes General/Flag Officers from each service component. USD(R&E) has an important responsibility for the advancement of technology and innovation throughout the DOD, and is invited to participate in every JROC meeting. The JROC values the recommendations of all its advisors, taking them into serious consideration. While I do not currently see a need to add USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member, it is also critical to retain USD(R&E)'s contribution as an advisory member.

Question. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman, as the Chairman of the JROC, should work to develop requirements based on technological opportunities emerging from the private sector and DOD advanced research organizations, such as DARPA and the Strategic Capabilities Office?

Answer. Yes. Title 10 Section 181 charges the JROC to identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of operation. In the current technological environment, it would be impossible to fulfill this mission without direct engagement with advanced research organizations and awareness of private-sector innovation. USD(R&E) provides a critical link to these emerging technological opportunities.

Question. In your opinion, does the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, possess the technical expertise and capacity to identify mature, high-payoff technologies that should form the basis for new military requirements?

Answer. Yes.

Question. In your view, is the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, able to effectively assess whether requirements proposed by the military services are technically realistic?

Answer. Yes.

Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed the Secretary of Defense to "ensure that analytical organizations within the Department of Defense, such as the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, provide resources and expertise in operations research, systems analysis, and cost estimation to the Joint Require-

ments Oversight Council to assist the Council” in generating and approving requirements. Despite this mandate, the Joint Staff still lacks operations research-related expertise and capacity.

In your opinion, has this mandate has been fulfilled? Please explain.

Answer. Yes. While the JROC still relies on CAPE for cost assessment and program evaluation, expertise resident within the Joint Staff J8 Functional Capability Boards support operations research and systems analysis. Additional cost estimation expertise within the JROC would be duplicative of CAPE, which already serves in an advisory role to the JROC.

Question. In your view, should the JROC have its own operations research and systems analysis staff?

Answer. No. The Joint Staff J8 provides operations research and systems analysis support to the JROC via the Functional Capabilities Boards.

Question. According to Section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, “The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, in the case of a recommendation [of a requirement] by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary that is approved by the Secretary, oversight information with respect to such recommendation that is produced as a result of the activities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is made available in a timely fashion to the congressional defense committees.”

Do you commit, if confirmed, to provide such information to Congress when requested?

Answer. If confirmed, yes.

Question. The JCIDS process was established partially to address overlap and duplication in Military Services’ programs. JCIDS is intended to provide the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.

In your view, is the JCIDS process effective in providing information the JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of the joint force?

Answer. Yes.

Question. How does the JROC intersect with the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) and to what degree and how does that intersection allow enforcement of JROC strategic direction to the Services?

Answer. The VCJCS serves as Chairman of the JROC and as a co-chair of the DMAG. These combined roles provide the opportunity to provide advice to policy-makers based in the analysis and findings of the JROC, and to present recommendations that align DMAG actions with JROC strategic direction, in particular by deepening the alignment between requirements and budgeting.

Question. If confirmed, how would you drive the development and articulation of future joint concepts from which each Military Service’s concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition processes will derive?

Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept is a framework to align Joint Force requirements and guide future acquisition decisions. The findings of this concept provide the basis for JROC requirements and strategic directives. If confirmed, through the ongoing Functional Capabilities Board processes, I will continue to review Joint Force capabilities and capability requirement gaps and prioritize efforts.

Question. In your view, does DOD have the requisite modeling, simulation, and analytic capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, and the associated capabilities and force structure?

Answer. Our data, infrastructure, policy, tools, and staffs are challenged to keep pace with the ideas, concepts, and capabilities shaping our planning and programming. Fortunately, the Department has recognized these challenges and established an Analysis Working Group (AWG), co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman. The AWG is led by OSD (CAPE), OSD (Policy), Joint Staff J7 and J8, and the Chief Data Officer (CDO) and is working these challenges in conjunction with the Services and other key stakeholders in the Department.

Question. If confirmed, what is your view on the appropriate role of Combatant Commanders in the JCIDS process? How would you improve the effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?

Answer. It is a team effort. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors to the JROC when matters related to their area of responsibility or function are under consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical role in developing requirements and identifying capability gaps. The Combatant Commanders specifically identify risks and evaluate their Global Campaign Plan objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the Capability Gap Assessment processes.

If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the Combatant Commanders. I will evaluate the needs of the Combatant Com-

manders, the realities of Service budgets, and the priorities of DOD leadership before determining any necessary adjustments to improve effectiveness.

Question. In your view, are the JROC and JCIDS processes sufficient to identify where opportunities for multi-Service collaboration exist, or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of a related acquisition program?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?

Answer. No, not at this time.

Question. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities enacted in Section 804 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA seek to speed fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS process.

What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS process?

Answer. Not using JCIDS creates three issues that impact joint interoperability: vital program interoperability may be impacted; proper program prioritization may be missed, slowing down vital warfighting capability reaching the Joint Force; and efforts may be duplicated across the services when procuring vital warfighting equipment.

If confirmed, I intend to continue efforts between the Joint Staff and USD (A&S) to incorporate Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) into the JCIDS process in order to address these concerns while maintaining Congress's intent to increase the speed and efficiency of the requirements process.

Question. What is your opinion of DOD's initial efforts to use section 804 authorities?

Answer. Use of section 804 authorities has been successful. From my perspective, as Commander, Fleet Forces Command, I am pleased to see the depth and breadth of activities looking to accelerate the delivery of warfighting capabilities to the force. If confirmed, I will continue to work with key stakeholders to evaluate the use of 804 authorities and provide feedback as necessary.

AIRCRAFT

Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleets will continue to increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, which incurs ever-increasing costs. Nonetheless, readiness levels continue to decline.

What are your views on balancing current aircraft capacity and future capability to meet expected threats?

Answer. It is critical to continue acquiring and modernizing our 5th generation fighter platforms for potential operations against near-peer competitors. However, adapting the force we have today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges requires a mix of capabilities within the Tactical Fighter portfolio. In the short term, recapitalizing a portion of our 4th generation aircraft fleet provides essential capacity to improve readiness and meet Joint Force demands while we field new 5th generation aircraft, modernize our existing 5th generation aircraft, and develop new technologies to maintain the Joint Forces competitive advantage.

NUCLEAR POLICY

Question. Do you agree with the assessment of the past five Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. I believe nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority mission. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is the only effective way to counter that threat. Modernizing our nuclear forces is a critical national security priority.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and the defense of allies?

Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons have long played an important role in deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attack against the United States, our forces deployed abroad, and our allies. An effective U.S. nuclear deterrent is critical to maintaining strategic stability. That same nuclear deterrent adds extra pause between nuclear-armed adversary's decisions to start a conventional conflict.

Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based nuclear delivery systems is consistent with an effective deterrent posture in an era of increasing nuclear threats to the United States and its allies?

Answer. Yes. The flexible, survivable, and responsive nuclear triad has underpinned strategic deterrence for more than 60 years and is the bedrock of our na-

tional defense. It remains essential to ensure no adversary believes it can ever employ nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances against the United States or our Allies or partners without risking devastating consequences.

Question. Do you believe the U.S. should maintain an effective intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of responding to strategic attacks and of sufficient size to ensure that the United States could not be disarmed by an adversary's first strike?

Answer. Yes. Our pacing threats are pursuing a diversified set of advanced nuclear weapons systems. The size and geographic dispersion of the ICBM force presents an intractable targeting problem that complicates a first-use attack. A maintained, modernized, and highly responsive, ICBM force is a crucial component of the Triad.

Question. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.

Do you agree with that conclusion? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. The threat environment has grown increasingly complex. The alert posture we maintain is a critical deterrent and necessary to address current and future threats.

Question. Do you believe that the alert levels for the intercontinental ballistic missile force should be reduced, potentially requiring the United States to completely absorb a large-scale nuclear strike before it will be able to respond?

Answer. No. ICBMs complicate an adversary's targeting and decision calculus. Without ICBMs on alert, China would be able to instantly adopt a counterforce strategy, and it would give Russian nuclear forces the strategic upper hand.

Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has referred to reports of China's nuclear force expansion as "breathtaking" and contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. and Russia is a "strategic breakout," which represents an unprecedented threat to global stability.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Answer. Yes.

What is your understanding of how Russia and China have expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?

Answer. The United States has never faced the challenge of two near-peer nuclear armed nations such as China and Russia. China is rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear capabilities. This includes construction of missile silos that could launch nuclear weapons once completed. Russia is also advancing its already considerable nuclear capabilities and continues to develop and field nuclear capable weapons and systems not accountable under the New START Treaty.

Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the United States and its allies?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?

Answer. Yes. The expansion and modernization of Russia's nuclear arsenal indicates a willingness to employ nuclear coercion as a means of advancing their military and foreign policy goals. Russia's significant expansion in non-strategic nuclear weapons exacerbates this concern. These weapons are not accountable under New START. The potential employment of these weapons poses miscalculation risk. Russia may miscalculate the capability and resolve of the United States and our allies to deter and defend against Russian limited nuclear use.

Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?

Answer. Yes, I agree with that assessment.

Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of "no first use"?

Answer. A fully functional nuclear triad, in any capacity, creates a challenging security environment for the United States and its Allies and partners. As China's nuclear doctrine evolves under this reality, it is crucial that we maintain an understanding of how China intends to adhere to a "no first use" policy. The United States nuclear deterrent must remain whole and modernized to meet this potential threat.

Question. Do you support the policy of "no first use", i.e., a commitment that the United States will never use nuclear weapons first in a future conflict?

Answer. From a military perspective, I do believe in giving the President as many options as possible, and that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change that would simplify

an adversary's decision-making, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their reliance on nuclear capabilities.

Question. Do you support the policy that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is only to deter against other nations' nuclear weapons?

Answer. I believe that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary's decision-making, particularly if our adversaries increase their reliance on nuclear capabilities.

Question. What is your understanding of allies' perspectives on potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy?

Answer. I believe our alliances are our strategic center of gravity. Any potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy must be carefully crafted and communicated to ensure that we maintain close alignment with our allies.

Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our allies have been called one of the U.S. most important and most effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.

Question. The extended nuclear deterrence assurances the United States provides to its allies have been called one of the U.S. most important and most effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.

Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence assurances are effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to pursue their own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?

Answer. Yes. Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our allies are one of the most important and effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.

A number of recent press reports have highlighted NATO and allied concerns regarding the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence assurances, and some—particularly South Korea—have seen increased calls to develop their own independent nuclear deterrent as a means of offsetting reduced confidence in U.S. assurances.

Question. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear deterrence assurances?

Answer. Yes. Effectively assuring our Allies of the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence mitigates the risk of nuclear proliferation. Our alliances are one of our greatest strategic advantages, and if confirmed, I look forward to closely engaging with our Allies on these issues.

Question. Do you believe China or Russia would view U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy as credible?

Answer. No, I do not.

Question. What are your views of changing our declaratory policy for NATO with respect to Britain and France and their declaratory policy?

Answer. U.S. nuclear forces, along with the independent strategic forces of the UK and France, remain the supreme security guarantee of NATO Allies. This force is an essential component of the Trans-Atlantic military link that should be maintained to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. It is important to maintain Alliance cohesion and unity regarding declaratory policy.

Question. Prior to the current iteration, the Joint Staff has played a significant leadership role in the conduct of each incoming presidential administration's Nuclear Posture Review. In structuring its own review, the current administration elected to diverge from past practice, and removed the Joint Staff from its typical co-chair position.

If confirmed, what do you understand will be your role as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff in the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fulfill my duties and responsibilities as the Vice Chairman to ensure the military equities of the Joint Force are adequately considered and represented when presented to the Secretary of Defense and the President. These equities include the military's perspective on the current and projected threat environment, and military advice on the implications of potential policy decisions, including nuclear strategy, posture, and acquisition programs.

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a significant leadership role in future Nuclear Posture Reviews?

Answer. Yes.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. As a member of the Council, you will work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration to coordi-

nate policies and align resources for DOD and Department of Energy nuclear programs.

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council?

Answer. The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) enduring priority is maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear weapon stockpile able to deter adversaries and assure Allies and global security partners. Close collaboration between the DOD and our National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) partners has proven successful in sustaining legacy weapons and moving forward with critical modernization efforts.

Continued success is contingent on building a robust and resilient infrastructure to include plutonium pit production, uranium and lithium processing, and increased non-nuclear production capabilities. Maintaining confidence in our weapons hinges on having the necessary modern facilities and skilled workforce to sustain the deterrent force.

Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the membership and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapons Council?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to foster the strong inter-agency partnership and would not recommend any changes to the membership or responsibilities of the NWC.

Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are needed?

Answer. Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons testing. The program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.

Question. U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the United States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.

What is your understanding of the state of U.S. nuclear forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?

Answer. Although our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective, we have greatly exceeded their intended design life and they are showing their age. Deferred modernization has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay. Diminished and outdated DOD industrial base capability to service and deliver nuclear platforms and NNSA production capabilities and infrastructure, some of which date back to the Manhattan Project, exacerbate this challenge.

Question. Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, command and control systems, and infrastructure?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will "age out" simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to keep senior leadership across the Department informed and engaged on the transition from legacy to modernized nuclear delivery platforms and weapons. I believe such engagement is necessary to hold ourselves accountable for addressing these risks in a coherent and responsible manner.

Question. More specifically, do you support the following DOD modernization programs of record? Please be specific.

- Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
- B-21 Bomber
- Columbia-class Submarine
- Modernization of the ground, air and space based Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Systems (NC3)
- Production capabilities to produce cryptographic products for NC3
- Long Range Stand Off Weapon
- Sea Launched Cruise Missile
- Upgrades to the B-52 to include radar, engines, electronic warfare, survivable long wave frequency waveforms, Family of Advanced Line of Sight Terminals
- Addition of nuclear capability to the F-35A aircraft

While I support DOD nuclear modernization programs of record, the Nuclear Posture Review will conclude how the programs of record will support our strategy

going forward. I recognize there is a lot of risk in executing these programs concurrently, but I believe these programs are necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent in an increasingly complex security environment. If confirmed, I commit to helping the Department manage the transition risk appropriately.

Question. Do you support the following National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) modernization programs of record? Please be specific.

Answer.

- W80–4 warhead
- W87–1 warhead
- W93 warhead
- B61–12 gravity bomb
- B83 gravity bomb life extension
- The capability to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year
- Modernizing the production capability for depleted uranium and lithium
- Restoring the production capability to produce high enriched uranium for defense needs

I fully support the W80–4 warhead required to support the Long-Range Stand-Off cruise missile, the W87–1 warhead required to maintain the land leg of the nuclear deterrent with GBSB, the W93 warhead required to modernize the sea leg and potentially alleviate over-reliance on a single warhead, and the B61–12 gravity bomb which consolidates four weapon types and provides our Allies confidence in our extended deterrence.

I am open to the possibility of forgoing a life extension of the B83 gravity bomb if there are more effective ways to replace the capability it provides. I support the need to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year and the modernization of production capability for lithium and depleted and high enriched uranium to enable modernization of our aging stockpile.

Question. What are your greatest concerns with respect to the DOD and NNSA modernization programs?

Answer. My greatest concerns with the DOD and NNSA modernization programs are: 1) ensuring sufficient investment across the U.S. industrial base to execute the modernization programs and enable responsiveness to address unforeseen challenges; and 2) maintaining necessary funding to develop, produce, and sustain a modernized nuclear force and stockpile.

NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the co-chair of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System.

If confirmed, how would you use this role to advocate for the modernization of NC3 systems?

Answer. If confirmed, modernization of Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) would remain a top priority. As co-chair of the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems, I would work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national objectives, are adequately resourced, and stay synchronized with senior leader and continuity of government communications efforts. Additionally, as chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), I would work closely with CDR USSTRATCOM and the Services to ensure efficient validation of NC3 modernization requirements and advocate for the rapid delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities that empower our triad of nuclear capabilities.

Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to assess the cyber security of the NC3 system on an enduring basis?

Answer. Section 1651 of the 2018 NDAA requires the Commanders of USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM to submit an annual joint assessment of the cyber resilience of the nuclear command and control system to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to Congress. If confirmed, as a co-chair for the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communication System, I will review the NDAA-mandated report for action prior to providing it to Congress.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role on the Joint Staff for NC3 operations?

Answer. If confirmed, my role as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would include duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, I would act to support the Chairman as he exercises approval authority for the CDR USSTRATCOM recommended changes to Nuclear Command,

Control, and Communications (NC3) systems that affect the operational configuration of the National Military Command System (NMCS).

Question. In your view, should senior leaders across the Executive Branch regularly take part in NC3 exercises and, if so, why?

Answer. Yes. The Department is supportive of senior advisors to the President participating in, or observing, large-scale exercises involving nuclear command, control, and communications systems. Participation at this level would enhance support to the President during the nuclear decision-making process.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?

Answer. If confirmed, my top priority is the improvement of the U.S. missile defense architecture by ensuring the full integration of a persistent and integrated network of sensors. These sensors provide real-time detection, tracking, and targeting information that is critical to policymakers during a crisis. The existing DOD global network of sensors on land, at sea, and in the air and space domains is highly complex and must be improved to increase operational awareness and decision making. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure this element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is prioritized.

Question. What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and nuclear deterrence?

Answer. Missile Defense is a key piece of our integrated deterrence strategy. United States policy for defense of the Homeland requires a commitment to stay ahead of rogue nation missile threats while continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese ICBMs. A robust and credible, layered missile defense system paired with our conventional and nuclear force capabilities provides the ability to deter strategic attacks and impose costs against any potential adversary.

Question. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?

Answer. Yes. I believe U.S. homeland missile defense policy should remain focused on defending against comparatively limited state ballistic missile attacks from rouge nations like North Korea and Iran. To address the threat of a comprehensive and technologically sophisticated strategic missile attack by China or Russia, the United States should continue to rely on the same strategy it has employed for more than half a century—i.e., nuclear deterrence.

Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger threats, such as Russia and China?

Answer. Defending the U.S. homeland against non-strategic missile attacks by pacing threats such as China or Russia remains a difficult problem. U.S. missile defenses cannot defend against every threat. It is simply one of many tools in our toolkit to protect against the growing number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department is examining ways to enhance its missile defense architecture against conventional missile threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture.

Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program, and once deployed, the regular testing of it?

Answer. Yes. I support the Department's decision to move forward with development and future testing of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), as well as the additional on-going efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD). GMD protects the United States homeland against limited ICBM threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support efforts to ensure that the homeland missile defense architecture remains effective as one of the important components to our integrated deterrence approach.

Question. Do you support using Aegis Destroyers as a layer of our homeland defense architecture?

Answer. Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or existing capabilities will require weighing a variety of factors such as cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability against the potential added benefit to security. If con-

firmed, I will work to ensure the Joint Force has the proper mix of capabilities to defend the homeland.

Question. Do you support a layered and dispersed missile defense architecture for the defense of Guam, and if so, why?

Answer. Yes. I agree with the INDOPACOM Commander that ensuring Guam has sufficient defenses is critical. Active missile defenses that enable INDOPACOM to sustain military operations during a conflict are one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right combination of capabilities to defend Guam, including active missile defenses, to enhance the U.S. regional deterrence and defense posture, assure allies and partners, and increase readiness to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

Question. Do you support a long range homeland defense radar capability in Hawaii?

Answer. Hawaii, as well as the rest of the United States, is protected against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea and, if confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to support continued improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture, including our missile defense sensor network. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing Department assessments that inform future budget decisions and potential siting locations of any additional sensors.

The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and space-based system of systems, with the constituent pieces managed and sustained by a number of different DOD components.

Question. Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture capable of supporting real-time operational decisions?

Answer. Yes, but there is still room for improved integration. A strategy supporting layered networks of dispersed terrestrial/space-based sensors integrated with layered kinetic and non-kinetic weapon systems provide our best and most cost-effective defense. I believe we took an important step towards improving our integration of these critical but often disparate or multi-mission sensors by assigning USSPACECOM as our Global Sensor Manager. If confirmed, I will endeavor to improve our ability to seamlessly integrate our networks across all domains and regions to enable a “best sensor, best shooter” capability.

Question. In your view, is a space-based sensor layer a required “next step” in enabling a wide variety of missile defense capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced threats?

Answer. Yes. A space-based sensor network can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe—they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the geographic constraints imposed on terrestrial sensors. Space sensors can provide “birth to death” tracking of advanced missile threats and enable a layered defense architecture that can engage threats in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of threat missile flight.

Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase intercept and space-based intercept programs?

Answer. U.S. policy is to hedge against unexpected adversary developments by investing in advanced technology so the United States, its allies, and its partners can defend against strategies of coercion or attack. I believe we should examine and exploit every practical opportunity to detect, disrupt, and destroy a missile threat prior to and during all phases of its flight. If confirmed, I will advocate for investing in advanced technologies that contribute to a flexible, layered, and cost-effective missile defense architecture that improves the overall likelihood of successfully countering offensive missile attacks.

Question. What is your understanding of DOD’s efforts to develop and implement operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of such programs? If confirmed, what would you do to address this issue?

Answer. I believe the Department must invest in advanced technologies to meet the increasingly complex threats posed by larger missile inventories and improved countermeasures. If confirmed, I will review appropriate operational concepts and policies that govern the utilization of any advanced defensive technologies.

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is being considered as a fifth initiative for strategic direction from the JROC.

Question. In your view, why is it important that IAMD become a fifth initiative and do you support this going forward?

Answer. Over time, the JROC should provide strategic direction on the requirements for each of the key capabilities for the future Joint Force. Integrated Air and

Missile Defense (IAMD) is certainly a critically important capability and therefore an essential topic for JROC action.

NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEW

Question. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The review culminated in numerous recommendations to address concerns identified. Responsibility for monitoring the implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to the Military Services.

Do you believe the Military Services are maintaining the appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Answer. Yes. I believe the Services remain actively engaged in addressing the items identified in the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review.

ARMS CONTROL

Question. Do you support the New START Treaty, and if so, why?

Answer. Yes, I support the New START Treaty (NST). NST provides much needed stability and an avenue of cooperation for the U.S.-Russia political-military relationship. More importantly, the mutually verifiable constraints in types and numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems agreed to in NST have facilitated drastic reductions in both U.S. and Russian weapon arsenals since 2011.

Question. What are your views on the potential for arms control measures to address the security threat from Russia's tactical nuclear forces, which are not covered by strategic arms control agreements?

Answer. I applaud verifiable arms control as a method to reduce nuclear risks. Certainly, Russia's numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear forces is a concern and a priority for any bilateral arms control initiatives. I believe this is a prudent approach that will maintain strategic stability with Russia and help to achieve the Administration's goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions. Do you agree with this statement?

Answer. Yes, there is no evidence that unilateral disarmament by the United States would inspire Russia or China to reciprocate. It would only weaken the U.S. position for future arms control negotiations.

Question. Do you support additional efforts for nuclear arms control? If so, with which countries, and in what specific areas, and why?

Answer. Yes. I believe arms control advances U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I would support efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements that are verifiable and that make the United States and its allies and partners more safe and secure. Russia and China are near-peer countries of interest for arms control efforts due to their ongoing nuclear weapon modernization and expansion.

Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or China on nuclear weapons' reductions?

Answer. The U.S. must carefully consider our Arms Control options and what systems and capabilities we are willing to accept limitations on. Options that are considered must be reciprocal, verifiable, enhance strategic stability, mitigate the risk of strategic escalation, and enhance U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners.

Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?

Answer. Russia and China are expanding and modernizing their nuclear weapon stockpiles. As Secretary Austin has stated, our nuclear triad is long past the point where it must be modernized. If we do not modernize our nuclear forces, we may not be able to negotiate from a position of credibility and strength in future treaty negotiations.

Question. Do you believe it is important to have a strategic stability dialogue with China, and if so, why?

Answer. Yes. Strategic stability dialogues help participants understand each other's nuclear doctrine and national security interests and helps to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculation that can lead to unintended escalation. Historically, China has resisted any formal discussion of strategic issues and the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear forces and doctrine remains a significant concern.

Any dialogue which enables open and frank discussions can help participants better understand each other's respective risk perceptions, increase transparency, and reduce nuclear risks.

Question. What are your views with respect to long range prompt strike weapons and strategic stability?

Answer. Developing and fielding long range prompt strike capabilities is critically important. If confirmed, I would work with the Department, the interagency, and allies and partners to assess opportunities to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict.

SPACE PROGRAM

Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space, both economically and militarily—from the Global Positioning System on which many industries and military capabilities rely, to the missile warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our strategic competitors—China and Russia—are engaged in a concerted effort to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain.

In your view, how would you characterize the level of risk China and Russia pose to U.S. space-based assets?

Answer. Risk to U.S. space-based assets from China and Russia continues to increase and expand. Over the past two decades, Russia and China have continued to improve their space weapons capabilities and enacted military reforms to better integrate space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military operations. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Challenges to Security in Space Report," both Russia and China have potential counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today. Both nations will continue to develop, exercise, and integrate these capabilities into war plans. We must improve our space-based capabilities' resilience and protection in the face of these advancing threats.

Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in improving situational awareness of space and appropriately prioritizing the protection of U.S. space-based assets?

Answer. We must expand our allied and commercial partnerships in Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We must ensure joint requirements drive toward adoption of common data standards and machine-to-machine interfaces/automation. Improvements in SSA will enable us to better determine intent, provide positive attribution of space events, and enable the employment of defensive and offensive space control capabilities within clearly laid out authorities.

Space systems that support strategic warning and communications must remain a top priority. Many of our other space systems provide services, which have elements critical to our national civil, economic, and military interests. In recognition of this, we must pursue protection capabilities and techniques, which maximize flexibility, allowing us to respond to adversary threats against any U.S. or allied space system.

Question. In your view, what are your greatest concerns as the Space Force continues to operationalize across the DOD for the development of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities?

Answer. The Space Force exists to address threats and challenges in space and enable effective warfighting and deterrence operations in all domains. My greatest concern is that space has become a contested domain and the United States must move faster than the threat. China and Russia are making significant advances in their space capabilities that will continue to challenge our access and freedom of maneuver in space. If confirmed, I would prioritize the development and fielding of a more robust and resilient space architecture, including doctrine, organization, training materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

Question. What are your views on how to best achieve deterrence in space when so many space control systems are highly classified?

Answer. It is difficult to achieve deterrence when numerous systems remain highly classified, limiting communication with the public and our partners. If confirmed, I would work with the Department, the IC, and Congress to identify programs and systems, or discreet areas of programs or systems that could be appropriate for reclassification.

Question. As Space Force is the title 10 provider of forces and capabilities to the combatant commands for space operations, do you believe they should be developing a tactical ISR space capability no different than other services and their military doctrine and capabilities?

Answer. It is within the scope of Space Force's authorities to provide Tactical ISR to support the warfighter. The National Reconnaissance Office meets most of the

strategic and operational needs for space-based ISR. That does not mean that there is not a need for additional ISR capacity. In those cases, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will need to ensure that the overall space-based ISR architecture is examined to ensure needs are appropriately met and capabilities from the interagency and private sector are considered and leveraged.

Question. Do you believe the Chief of Space Operations in their title 10 role should be the principal force design architect for space systems and operations?

Answer. Yes. Designating the CSO as the principal force design architect is essential to efficiently and effectively moving toward a more resilient space architecture that will meet warfighter requirements and be available to those warfighters across the spectrums of competition and conflict.

Question. The reason for the creation of the space force was to consolidate disparate space capabilities while balancing the need of other services to utilize space within their doctrine and operations. Do you support that objective?

Answer. Yes. I support that objective.

Question. If confirmed, do you support moving the Space Development Agency to the Space Force?

Answer. Yes, I do.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial technology and mission support is incorporated into Space Development Agency products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels? What particular challenges do you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD in the acquisition of space systems and launch options?

Answer. The U.S. commercial space sector leads the world in the innovation of space systems. From design to mission execution, DOD must properly leverage this relationship to meet ever-increasing challenges in the space domain. If confirmed, I will ensure that we incorporate commercial capabilities where appropriate, with calculated, acceptable risk levels, through my role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Further, if confirmed, I will work with partners inside and outside of government to identify barriers to deepen collaboration in this important sector.

Question. What role should the JROC have in the Intelligence Community capabilities in Space given that the DOD is responsible for defending the capability during conflict?

Answer. The DOD and IC partner closely to establish joint priorities within the space domain. The JROC serves a vital function to endorse future IC space-based requirements. This close partnership is critical to ensuring DOD space-based ISR architecture is resilient and survivable.

ACCESS TO RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues to have access to the radio frequency spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?

Answer. Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority is of critical importance to the national security of the nation. To ensure superiority, we must have an integrated approach to governance that effectively prioritizes EMS through DOD requirements, resourcing, workforce, and operations. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders—including the Chief Information Officer and appropriate combatant commands—to ensure the Joint Force is positioned to conduct operations.

Question. Are you concerned about recent actions taken by the FCC to supporting licensing ground operations in spectrum band close to the GPS signal? Please be specific.

Answer. GPS signal is of great consequence to the Department of Defense and our national security. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the status of these recent actions and potential implications for the Joint Force and providing my best military advice.

Question. Are you concerned about recent actions to have the DOD vacate portions of the 3.1–3.45 MHz spectrum, and if so, why? Please be specific on implications for force readiness.

Answer. Yes, this is an area of concern for me. Frequency bands of dual use can adversely impact DOD operations, from training and readiness to real-world operations. Cooperation between the Department and Industry is required to balance public and private concerns. If confirmed, I look forward to providing leadership on these crucial dual-use questions.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. The Committee remains concerned that, five years after the Russian Federation first successfully executed an aggressive, large-scale influence operation

against the United States and our European allies, the Department of Defense does not yet have an effective management structure or strategy for information warfare that integrates across cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and information operations that is conducted at the strategic level.

Do you share this concern? If not, why not?

Answer. I am concerned about state and non-state actors' capability to successfully execute large-scale influence operations against the United States, our Allies, and Partners. The information domain is a complex theater of modern operations that requires close study and a deep understanding. If confirmed, I will be supportive of all efforts to assure our competitiveness and protect our vital national interests.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, in your view, could the Vice Chairman take to help solve this important problem that handicaps our ability to deter and compete with adversaries?

Answer. An era of strategic competition requires us to address a number of significant challenges and rapidly evolving threats. Our current and future warfighting capabilities must be measured against their ability to address and outpace those threats. Specifically, to deter our adversaries we need to clearly communicate, through both what we say and what we do—that if they attack the United States or our Allies they will fail to achieve their objectives and they will incur costs that far exceed any gains they can achieve. If confirmed, I will advocate for opportunities to apply speed, innovation, technology, and integration in how we manage acquisitions and develop and deploy existing and new warfighting capabilities.

Question. What are your views on whether there is a need to operationally integrate all of the elements of information warfare?

Answer. Similar to the integration of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace operations, the integration of elements of information warfare is not unique to any one command. If confirmed, I will help the Chairman ensure that each Combatant Command has the necessary resident authorities and guidance to execute their UCP missions.

I will seek to improve the integration of all information capabilities and activities against all problem sets during competition, crisis, and conflict. If confirmed, I will help the Joint Force in its effort to revamp its operations and planning doctrine to holistically integrate and synchronize the Information Warfare elements across joint force operations. This intentional process will assure unity of effort.

CYBERSECURITY

Question. The United States has been rocked by a series of significant ransomware attacks affecting critical infrastructure and organizations. These attacks have been facilitated or conducted by large, sophisticated criminal enterprises that are tolerated, or even encouraged by, the leadership of the countries from which they operate. These ransomware enterprises could cause substantial damage to critical infrastructure in peacetime or in a future crisis or conflict, and therefore pose a clear national security threat. These enterprises may be beyond the reach of law enforcement and unaffected by at least some forms of sanctions. United States Cyber Command is among the few government organizations with the authorities and capabilities to directly diminish this threat and thereby establish a degree of deterrence.

What are your views on the foreign-based ransomware threat from large criminal organizations?

Answer. Ransomware threats emanating from criminal organizations present a significant threat to the United States. They have the potential to disrupt the daily activities of the American people as well as threaten the military's ability to execute its mission. If confirmed, I will take an active role in supporting the Administration's whole of government counter ransomware campaign.

Question. What are your views on the role that the Cyber Mission forces could play in imposing costs on such activities, as one aspect of a larger, whole-of-government response?

Answer. USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Forces possess unique authorities, training, and capabilities to support the U.S. Government's response to counter ransomware threats. The Department continues to support the U.S. whole of government effort to impose costs through the disruption of ransomware actors and their networks.

DOD is conducting a mandatory cyber posture review. The Committee believes that the previous posture review was a success largely because the Principal Cyber Adviser and supporting cross functional team tracked implementation tasks and progress, and reported regularly to senior leaders.

Question. What role do you believe the Joint Staff should play in the cyber posture review, gap analysis, and oversight of implementation?

Answer. I believe that the Joint Staff should continue to proactively support the Principal Cyber Advisor's Office in the development and implementation of the cyber posture review.

It is widely expected that adversaries will conduct cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure in conflict and even in crises prior to kinetic warfare. It is also commonly assumed that the United States would respond accordingly, so that adversaries do not perceive that there is a gap in our deterrence capabilities. However, the Cyber Solarium Commission, whose members included DOD and other senior executive branch officials, explicitly rejected the targeting of adversary critical infrastructure, on the grounds that it would be immoral and contrary to the laws of armed conflict.

Question. In your view, is it necessary for adversaries to know that the United States can and will respond reciprocally to cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure?

Answer. Adversaries need to know that the United States takes cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructure very seriously and that we reserve the right to respond to these attacks at the time, place, and in the domain of our choosing.

Question. If confirmed, will you review existing policy, requirements, and capabilities to achieve this deterrence capability?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed. I anticipate that the Department will take a holistic review of our cyber policies, requirements, and capabilities in line with the development and release of the new National Defense Strategy, Cyber Posture Review, and Defense Cyber Strategy.

At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in 2017 two former senior government officials with extensive cyber expertise, in consultation with members of a Defense Science Board cyber task force, produced a report that recommended a near-term ending of the dual-hat arrangement whereby the Command of United States Cyber Command also serves as the Director of the National Security Agency. The report presented substantive arguments that splitting these positions would be in the interest of both organizations.

Question. What are your views as to whether the "dual hatting" of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?

Answer. The "dual hat" configuration between U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency remains fit for purpose and should be maintained.

Question. In your opinion, are the conditions for ending the dual hat established in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act close to being met?

Answer. NSA intelligence capabilities remain critical to the Title 10 Cyber mission. Any decision on this topic requires a deliberate, step-by-step assessment, which is informed by CYBERCOM and NSA's combined efforts over the last two years. Previous assessments conducted in response to the 2017 Conditions predate the adversaries increase in scale, scope, and sophistication of cyber activity we have experienced over the last 2 years. Any decision based on dated, incomplete analysis will undermine military effectiveness and create unacceptable risk to the United States national security interests.

Question. Do you think that the positions should be split if those conditions are met?

Answer. When Congress authorized the establishment of USCYBERCOM as a Unified Combatant Command, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of Defense to undertake an assessment of the conditions under which a split could possibly occur, the associated operational implications and an assessment of the required distribution of resources. In the absence of up-to-date analysis of the current operational relationships among NSA, CYBERCOM, the other combatant commands and foreign intelligence community, as well as the current cyber threat, I need to defer a final position on this question.

Moreover, I have absolute faith in the professionalism and objectivity of the CYBERCOM CDR/DIRNSA to provide strategic direction and make balanced and objective decisions without prejudice towards his Title 10 or Title 50 responsibilities.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION

Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; ar-

tificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

In your opinion, what are the most significant challenges (e.g., technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these key technologies?

Answer. In developing next generation operational capabilities, three leading challenges often addressed are the adequate protection of our intellectual property, insufficient integration between civilian and defense industry, and cultural risk aversion that leads to a lack of agility in the development of key technologies.

Question. In your view, has DOD properly integrated and synchronized investments in these technologies across all components?

Answer. We have made good progress recently, but need to do much more. American innovators—both within the military and outside—are achieving path-breaking technological advances, but the Joint Force’s absorption of these advances is too limited. The Joint Warfighting Concept has driven new processes to align the services towards strategic competition and defeating peer and near-peer adversaries. These new processes should be continued and strengthened to make the Joint Force more capable in the coming years.

Question. What is your understanding of how the Department is balancing revolutionary capability advancements as compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?

Answer. The Department balances revolutionary capability developments with rapidly fielded advancements through focused analysis and assessment. This enables DOD to make informed tradeoffs and decisions where there are uncertainties associated with increasing adversary military capabilities, changes in the strategic environment, and emerging technologies for future military operations.

Question. In your opinion, is DOD doing enough to identify new technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to military and national security purposes? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD?

Answer. The DOD has multiple initiatives within the defense research enterprise specifically focused on identifying commercial technologies currently in the private sector that have potential uses for national security and warfighter purposes. The establishment of the Innovation Steering Group this year has helped in mapping the innovation ecosphere. Many organizations exist to drive rapid technology development and commercial sector partnership. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Innovation Steering Group to set priorities for innovation in the DOD.

Question. In your view, are there steps that should be taken to ensure that the Department has the research and testing infrastructure and equipment to maintain pace with, or surpass the investments being made in emerging technology by our peer adversaries?

Answer. Test infrastructure recapitalization has been one of the lines of effort for the Innovation Steering Group. The effort to identify areas of improvement and possible solutions to bring the facilities up to commercial standards is important work that needs to continue. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and the relevant DOD stakeholders to ensure the test community collects operationally relevant data as early as possible during system development, by using a combined testing approach.

One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation, and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to the warfighter.

Question. What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of record?

Answer. Transitioning technologies into programs of record must be a consideration at the beginning of any development effort. Successfully transitioning technologies requires many different collaborators (e.g., acquisition community, warfighting community, industry) and includes explicit agreements with the Services up front. New DOD initiatives like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve are aimed to achieve this goal. If confirmed, I will continue to support the work of the organizations within the DOD innovation ecosphere that strive to achieve this goal.

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, what specific steps will you take to ensure that all of the Military Services are benefitting more quickly and directly from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and Congress to continue development of rapid prototyping and rapid fielding efforts, in order to decrease the time it takes to get innovative tech-

nologies from research labs into the hands of the warfighter. It is important to understand that classification concerns can stifle the dissemination of important scientific research. Ensuring appropriate level of classification can help to breakdown stove-piping of information.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. If confirmed, what modifications to law and policy would you suggest to provide DOD and the Military Services the force management and talent management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a 21st century joint, All-Volunteer Force?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies required to maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. I believe the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA talent management strategies moved the Department in the right direction through the enhancement of constructive service credit, alternative promotion authority, and reordering of a promotion list based on merit. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD and the Service Chiefs as we implement these authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a ready force.

Question. In your opinion, are current DOD and Military Service procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending the President's nomination for promotion or assignment sufficient to enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President?

Answer. Yes, the Services thoroughly evaluate officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable information, and each service has a rigorous process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.

Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or assignment process?

Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and reasonable for the officers involved.

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Fiscal Year 2017 modifications to the JQO system?

Answer. The two significant modifications from the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA provided the Department additional flexibility in the Joint Qualification System. The expansion of the "joint matters" definition ensures the ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making contributions to the development and achievement of strategic objectives. Additionally, the reduced statutory tour length required for joint duty credit provides the Services additional flexibility in officer assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones. Given the timing of the change, along with standard tour lengths, additional time is needed to have a full picture of the overall impact of the tour length reduction.

Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and eligibility for promotion to General/Flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service line officers?

Answer. Yes. Although careers are tightly managed to Service-specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification enhance an officer's perspective and knowledge to perform at the GO/FO level.

Question. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership experience and adequate professional development?

Answer. The existing joint officer qualification requirements provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the skills necessary for successful service at the operational and strategic levels. I do not believe additional modification to the JQO system is necessary at this time.

Question. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?

Answer. Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to incorporate Reserve Component officers. In 2018, the Reserve policy was adjusted to increase joint qualification opportunities for Reserve Component officers. I do not recommend changing the JQO system with respect to the Reserve Component.

Question. In your view, should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?

Answer. No. Meeting the JQO requirement enhances the ability of senior officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the operational and strategic lev-

els. Officers who meet the requirement provide benefit to the Services, joint organizations, and the Department, and this requirement should be maintained.

Question. In your opinion, should more be done to improve the JQO system given the substantial resources invested in developing officers to lead or support joint forces? In your view, is there another system that would be more effective?

Answer. No, not at this time. The changes made by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA have greatly benefited our development of JQOs and provided a balance between the needs of the Services and joint missions.

Question. Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156 to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to serve in this critical joint position?

Answer. Yes, the board selection process is both effective and efficient, and typically runs no more than one or two days. Since each Military Department has their own personnel system, the process to convene a joint selection board can present challenges. However, in order to conduct a joint selection board, the planning and preparation begins well in advance with each Service providing qualified candidates for consideration.

Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint process that could improve the selection board processes used by the Military Services?

Answer. The Department incorporated the Services' best practices into the joint selection board processes. Further, the Services continually review their board processes to incorporate best practices and improve with each iteration.

Question. Would you support expanding application of the process employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?

Answer. If confirmed, I will look into this issue, but at this time I do not have an informed opinion.

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME)

Question. The 2018 NDS asserts that JPME has stagnated—that it focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.

Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will officers need to succeed in strategic competition against the nation's adversaries?

Answer. Military leaders will require exceptional competence in joint warfighting, and demonstrate flexibility, toughness, and ability to think through uncertainty. Future leaders will need to conceive, design, and implement strategies and campaigns that integrate global capabilities to defeat competitors in contests we have not yet even imagined, and respond to activities short of armed conflict in domains that are already being contested. Key attributes of Joint Officers will include highly developed critical thinking and problem-solving skills while operating with ambiguity, rising above disrupted communications, ensuring resiliency, and always demonstrating irreproachable ethical conduct.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to enhance DOD's JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound judgment to lead the joint force in a transregional, multi-functional, multi-domain "Whole of Government" environment?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to oversee JPME curriculum development that educates future joint force leaders to build the attributes of strategic thinking, advising, and planning. This curriculum will not only be threat informed, but it will also provide joint leaders an understanding of transregional, multi-functional, and multi-domain environment to be experts on the operational level of war. To enable this study, Service institutions require broader instruction in classified environments with the appropriate facilities to enable this education.

Question. In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type Memorandum-19-001, address the JPME concerns documented in the 2018 NDS? What does this program add to the current PME system?

Answer. We need to delineate between "strategists"—those who can imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the "strategically-minded"—those who can effectively execute strategy through campaigns and operations. The former are rare and the new Defense Strategic Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals. The NDS language refers to the latter, the development of which is a responsibility of the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of this program has promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring its success.

DOD SENIOR OFFICIAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the scientific and technical civilian workforce?

Answer. Yes, but I am concerned about our ability to continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense Strategy. To do that, in addition to investing in our servicemembers, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent in some very small talent pools. It is essential we attract and develop talent with expertise in quantum computing, AI/ML, space, cyber, and data science, for example, to maintain competitive advantage.

Question. Do you believe the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES with technical skills are sufficient to ensure that DOD and its components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?

Answer. Yes, we have an incredibly talented workforce, but we must continue to evolve as our industrial and technology bases evolve. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to ensure our senior joint leaders continue to receive the training and development required to be successful.

Question. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in acquisition programs? Do established tour lengths enable and empower senior leaders so assigned to manage effectively the long-term acquisition programs under their purview? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the senior leaders assigned to such positions and duties?

Answer. Yes, we have a very robust acquisition corps with Department level priorities engaging our general/flag officers at strategic levels of implementation. Our tour lengths are designed to ensure long-term acquisition systems are managed in an effective and efficient manner. In my judgment, the Department's biggest civilian workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense Strategy. To do that, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's defense to prospective employees. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, OSD, and other DOD stakeholders to ensure our senior leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they need to continue to do so.

Question. Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services have in place sufficient ethics training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance needed to perform their duties in an ethical manner? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and assistance they need to "play the ethical midfield." The ability to make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is laid at the outset of these individuals' careers and is further developed and reinforced in formal education and training throughout their careers.

JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. Military operations are increasingly joint: the Marine Corps plans to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of Navy ships; the Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.

In your view, which other Military Service doctrines and capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy in joint operations?

Answer. Globally conducted Joint operations require integration of the space and cyberspace domains. Both domains offer opportunities to build synergy and asymmetric advantage in joint operations. U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command are working to operationalize our advantages in these critical domains.

Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you propose to increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of joint operations, to include logistical operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I would increase emphasis on interdependence and interoperability through joint training at the tactical and operational levels of warfare to strengthen our ability to conduct joint operations. I would also consider devel-

oping joint readiness goals, objectives, and metrics to achieve statutory guidance and assess synchronization of Service goals and objectives to ensure proper alignment with DOD goals and objectives.

Question. In your opinion, what are the most critical shortfalls in capabilities to support the joint force?

Answer. Emerging technologies being developed and employed by our pacing threats have altered the operating environment on a global scale at an unremitting pace. These challenges require lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are interoperable across all Services and allow us the ability to share information faster than our adversaries.

Question. Do you believe the respective services are on the correct path to modernize and overcome those shortfalls?

Answer. The Services have aligned their modernization efforts with the objectives outlined in the National Defense Strategy. If properly funded and executed, the Services' modernization efforts place the Department on a trajectory to achieve these objectives.

Question. How would you use your unilateral authority as Chairman of the JROC if needed to correct such shortfalls?

Answer. If confirmed, I will only utilize this unilateral authority when absolutely necessary. It would be my role to build consensus among the members in assuring our warfighters are the most lethal they can be in these changing times. My position is to lead the Council in the review and decision with regard to the critical warfighting gaps facing the Joint Force. The goal is to reach consensus, when able, through subordinate level discussions, and by making deliberate decisions among the JROC members regarding requirements to close or mitigate these capability gaps. I will strive to reach consensus amongst the JROC members in all decisions, however, any dissenting position will be made clear to the Chairman as a matter of course. From what I understand, this seldom, if ever, has been the case for a JROC decision.

Question. There has been much discussion about the importance of networking and connecting Service capabilities across air, land, and sea platforms operating across multiple domains.

What is your understanding of how DOD intends to execute joint airborne battle management in a high-end fight?

Answer. Executing joint airborne battle management command and control relies on two main elements: 1) timely (speed of relevance) decision-quality information, and 2) effective communication defined as Commander's intent via machine-to-machine and/or verbal authority. The Department is focusing on JADC2, the USAF's contribution of ABMS, the Navy's Project Overmatch, and the Army's Project Convergence, to deliver target quality tracks in order to rapidly complete the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA) targeting cycle, ultimately for the high-end fight.

Question. What is DOD doing to make machine-to-machine command and control, across multiple domains, a reality?

Answer. The Joint Staff J6 conducted a study of all AI and Machine Learning tools across the entire Department to identify tools that can be used as enterprise solutions across single, multiple, or all-domains. Some of these programs and initiatives include: the Artificial Intelligence Data Accelerator Initiative (ADA), Advancing Analytics Platform (ADVANA), and Service and Joint Staff efforts to develop and demonstrate JADC2. Their study and research will help identify tools the DOD can leverage for multi- and all-domain C2.

Question. In your view, are the Services doing enough to ensure airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer competitors?

Answer. Yes, but they can do more. Interoperable and resilient airborne tactical data links are the bedrock for achieving victory against a peer competitor. Ongoing cryptographic modernization efforts across the family of data links as well as the incorporation of advanced capabilities will allow the Joint Force to field a more resilient capability in the face of peer competitors.

Question. In your view, how successful has the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense been at developing and refining the joint operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?

Answer. The Joint Staff and the Department of Defense has been successful at developing joint operational concepts. The Joint Force has developed a threat-informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address future great power conflict. The JWC is a global concept that describes an operational approach to defend the U.S. and maintain overmatch defeat strategic adversaries.

The JWC guides how the U.S. will organize, train, educate, and equip the future Joint Force, and it communicates a Department-wide campaign of learning informed

through coordination with Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Future JWC efforts include developing, testing, and maturing JWC ideas through Joint and Service training, exercises, experiments, and doctrine development.

If confirmed, I will do my part to accelerate JWC development efforts to ensure the future Joint Force will have the appropriate personnel, training, equipment, and doctrine in place to deter war and, if necessary, win future wars.

Question. Do you think that there needs to be a different or tailored joint operational concept for the European and Indo-Pacific theaters? Why or why not?

Answer. No, I do not. Ultimately, we have one joint force that will need to adapt to all threats environment to achieve national security objectives. If confirmed, I will use my role to ensure a common approach to joint operations in both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, and to further tailor the joint force to respond appropriately to changing threats and environments.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) CAPABILITIES

Question. Demand for ISR capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being met.

What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets across the Combatant Commands?

Answer. Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. To meet competing demands, the Department reviews the combatant commands' standing and emerging requirements and routinely reprioritizes capacity to meet warfighter needs. This global force management process is led by the Joint Staff, but also takes into account services and force provider considerations to meet command requirements while balancing risk and readiness challenges. The disposition of ISR across the commands is constantly changing in order to keep pace with our dynamic geopolitical situation. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the global force management process and working to support the Chairman as he makes recommendations to the Secretary for allocation decisions.

Question. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in both the capability and availability of ISR assets? If confirmed, what steps would you take to correct these deficiencies?

Answer. The appetite for ISR capacity continues to grow beyond the Department's currently fielded, and even planned availability. Even a large increase in ISR inventory will not mitigate shortfalls. Additional capacity will require investments in mechanics, operators, analysts, linguists, and expanded basing options. In order to mitigate the shortfalls and better equip our commands with the intelligence support they need, I believe we require an approach that provides broader investments in platforms, sensors, command and control, architecture, and analytics that can penetrate and survive in high-threat, denied environments. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to build on Gen Hyten's commitment to reform the JROC process.

As the Vice, if confirmed, I would serve as head of the Joint Requirements Council (JROC), helping to define and prioritize the capabilities the Joint Force needs, to include ISR. Additionally, I would sit on a number of different Pentagon committees that review budgets, acquisitions, force design, and force development.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM

Question. The CTR program, which has focused historically on accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has expanded its focus to other countries. As part of this expansion, the CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.

In your view, how could coordination of the CTR program across U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State Department) be improved?

Answer. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is a critical and effective effort that contributes to the safety and security of the United States and our allies and partners. It is imperative that national governments have capabilities to counter WMD threats. Proliferation is a global problem that cannot be resolved by the United States alone. The Joint Force and DOD will continue to collaborate across the interagency to ensure a whole of government approach in the application of the CTR program. DOS, DOE, and the CDC are part of the planning process to determine CTR priorities on a recurring basis.

Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemicals documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR resources are allocated to biological programs.

Question. Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs accurately reflects the current threat?

Answer. Yes. The current focus on biological programs resulted from a surge designed to address specific threats, to include the need for increased partner detection capabilities and security of sensitive biological facilities. The Department reviews threats on an annual basis and reprioritizes activity when required. CTR's capabilities and authority to work directly with our partners' civilian and military establishments provides flexibility to adapt to changes in the operating environment.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the allocation of CTR resources? If so, what adjustments would you recommend?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review CTR resource allocations and make recommendations as appropriate to policy-makers to ensure CTR efforts are supportive of our national Counter WMD strategies and Combatant Command plans. CTR efforts will continue to be synchronized with interagency partners who have different roles, authorities, and responsibilities in countering WMD threats.

VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS (VEOS)

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the role of DOD in supporting that strategy?

Answer. The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism provides a holistic, whole of government approach to countering violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The DOD is involved in several lines of effort including a leading role in strengthening the counterterrorism abilities of international partners and conducting military operations overseas to disrupt terrorist networks.

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by VEOs?

Answer. The 2018 National Strategy for Counter Terrorism will take time to realize results. Given the long-term horizon to counter violent extremism, the Department will measure effectiveness based on trends associated with the strategic objectives. For example, we continue to successfully diminish the capacity of terrorists to directly attack the homeland. However, we struggle as an interagency to effectively curtail radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of some organizations. If confirmed, I'll work with the Chairman and interagency to routinely assess our progress of the strategy to address violent extremist threats and identify areas for adaptation.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy and its associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the underlying causes of extremism be a component of our counterterrorism strategy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the joint stakeholders and agencies to monitor our strategic measures of effectiveness in order to ensure we are working towards a desired end state with the understanding that progress will require strategic patience. Efforts to prevent underlying causes of extremism are key components of our counterterrorism strategy, especially as we prioritize resources and focus to threats against the U.S. homeland and other national interests.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to promote a more resource sustainable approach to counterterrorism?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing evaluation of DOD's counterterrorism campaigns in USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM. This approach seeks to balance resources and outcomes. This force optimization will enable more effective operations to defeat trans-regional threat networks. I will continue to advocate for improved collaboration and integration within the DOD, interagency, and our multinational allies and partners to maximize resource sustainable approaches to CT.

COUNTERING ISIS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by ISIS?

Answer. ISIS remains one of the primary transnational terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas. ISIS continues to encourage its networks, branches, and supporters to inspire, enable, direct, and conduct attacks worldwide and will use their media capability to preserve global brand appeal despite territorial losses. ISIS is likely exercising patience and adapting to its restrained operational environment to pursue their goal of establishing a global caliphate. Inspired attacks are the principal method ISIS is projecting power globally as CT pressure in the region and plot disruption in Western countries have temporarily limited their ability to resource external networks.

Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security objectives in Syria? To what extent does continued U.S. force presence in Syria support those objectives?

Answer. The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring defeat of ISIS. We continue to work by, with, and through our partners and allies. U.S. immediate priorities in Syria include:

- Expand humanitarian access
- Sustain the campaign against ISIS in partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces
- Support international norms to promote human rights and accountability
- Sustain local ceasefires across Syria

These priorities are the necessary building blocks for eventual progress on the political track to end the Syrian conflict. U.S. and Coalition forces enable the second priority, to sustain the partner-based campaign against ISIS.

Question. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what conditions do you believe should factor into decisions about U.S. troop levels in Syria?

Answer. U.S. forces have drawn down to a minimal presence in Syria to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. U.S. and Coalition forces should remain in Syria until partner force capacity and will is sufficient to defeat ISIS without significant external support. Any future troop level or capabilities changes would have to be assessed based on the progress of our partner-based strategy. A partner-based approach provides an effective and efficient way to counter ISIS while minimizing risk to U.S. forces, and it presents the best long-term solution to ensure ISIS remains territorially defeated when U.S. forces depart.

Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy and objectives in Iraq?

Answer. The U.S. military strategy seeks the enduring defeat of ISIS, by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces. To achieve this objective, the coalition provides advice, assistance, and intelligence to the Iraqi Security Forces in support of their defeat of ISIS operations.

Question. The Administration announced the transition of combat forces from Iraq. Going forward, what do you envision to be the missions and size of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?

Answer. In accordance with the Joint Communique and July 2021 Strategic Dialogue, CJTF–OIR is transitioning to an advise and assist role aimed at supporting the Iraqi Security Forces in their defeat-ISIS campaign. U.S. forces remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. We do not foresee significant changes to our current force posture in Iraq.

Question. What steps would you recommend for normalizing security assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?

Answer. To normalize security assistance to the ISF, the DOD is enacting a plan of action that will occur in three conditions-based phases:

- Phase 1 calls for the appointment of a Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache which is complete.
- Phase 2 will transition tasks from CJTF–OIR to OSC–I which transitions activities from CJTF–OIR to a normalized Security Cooperation Office.
- Phase 3 will seek implementation of permanent OSC–I billeting/staffing. This will be conditions based and characterized by the cessation of major combat operations against ISIS and the implementation of a Joint Manpower Validation Board to source requirements for OSC–I with permanent staffing.

At the end of these phases, the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache and Security Cooperation Construct will be fully normalized with permanent manning and stable, reliable funding streams that support long-term U.S. national security interests in Iraq.

Question. In your view, what should the United States do regarding the repatriation of ISIS prisoners currently detained by the Syrian Democratic Forces?

Answer. It is critical to leverage all appropriate military and diplomatic levers to address the threat of ISIS. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to fully assess this issue. If confirmed, I would work to understand the specifics and provide my best military advice.

YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)

Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?

Answer. Three U.S. National Security interests exist in Yemen:

- Denying a safe haven for AQAP and ISIS affiliates to plan and execute attacks against the U.S., our allies, and interests.

- Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea—the Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global commerce and energy.
- Reducing malign Iranian influence—Iranian shipments of arms to the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and civilian infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability across the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.

To protect these interests, the U.S. military supports diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen by supporting Saudi Arabian armed forces to defend their territory and protect their citizens from Iran-backed Houthi attacks. Furthermore, a small number of U.S. deployed forces advise, assist, and train partner forces to conduct counter-terror operations.

Question. What do you see as the implications of the Biden Administration’s decision to cease offensive support operations to the Saudi-led coalition?

Answer. There is not a military solution to ending the conflict in Yemen. I support U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen Lenderking’s attempts to facilitate an UN-brokered diplomatic resolution. However, as President Biden indicated in his policy statement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a persistent threat from Iranian-supplied cross-border attacks by the Houthis. U.S. Joint Forces continue to help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its people.

Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?

Answer. Consistent with the decision to cease military support for offensive operations by the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen, the U.S. provides military training and intelligence support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to defend against Houthi cross-border (unmanned aerial vehicle, ballistic missile and unmanned maritime) attacks. The U.S.’s chief role is supporting the international diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Yemen.

Question. What threat do the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation in Bab al-Mandeb, in your view, and what can the U.S. do to mitigate that threat more effectively?

Answer. The Houthis possess Iranian supplied missiles, explosive-laden unmanned maritime vessels, mines, and armed/explosive unmanned aerial vehicles which pose a threat to freedom of navigation in the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea. The Houthis have demonstrated a willingness to attack military and commercial vessels as evidenced by the Houthi attempted attacks against USS *Mason* and USS *Ponce* in 2016, as well as commercial vessels in Jeddah Port, Saudi Arabia in 2020.

Working with the international community to halt the illicit supply of arms to the Houthis, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216, is an important step toward maintaining freedom of navigation. For example, USS *Monterey* and USS *Winston Churchill* both seized Iranian-provided arms headed to the Iranian-backed Houthis. The U.S. Joint Force works with partner nation militaries to implement this UNSCR, all toward facilitating a swift end to the conflict in Yemen. To that end, the U.S. military supports these diplomatic and international efforts, led by Special Presidential Envoy Lenderking, to create a lasting and effective peace in Yemen.

Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global commerce and energy. We must reduce the malign Iranian influence—Iranian shipments of arms to the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and civilian infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability across the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do you see as some of the major strategic missteps? How would you apply those lessons learned in future military operations?

Answer. It is clear the war in Afghanistan did not end on the terms we wanted. However, every servicemember and civilian who served there for the past 20 years protected our country from attack by terrorists. For that they should be forever proud, and we should be forever grateful.

Understanding our engagement in Afghanistan will take time and thoughtful analysis of key questions; there are many lessons learned. The Department of Defense is committed to doing the work to fully understand our 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.

Question. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban’s ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?

Answer. This issue requires significant analysis, research, and understanding to gain more clarity. As we study this matter, it will be absolutely critical to under-

stand strategic lessons of our involvement in Afghanistan and integrate and apply lessons-learned with respect to our doctrine and training. If confirmed, I will be committed to carefully reviewing this matter to ensure we learn and improve from this experience.

Question. In your opinion, what are the implications of the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for future advise, train and assist missions?

Answer. Our experience in Afghanistan provides key lessons on how we establish priorities for future train, advise, and assist missions, and match those to the resources required; how we take account of regional and local politics and conflict dynamics; how we study and re-evaluate a country's institutional and logistical capacity to absorb our assistance; and especially how we cultivate a sense of local ownership and accountability.

Question. As the military mission in Afghanistan has concluded, what do you view as U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan?

Answer. The President has made clear that the primary vital national interest in Afghanistan is to make sure Afghanistan can never be used again to launch an attack on our homeland.

Question. Can the United States conduct effective "over the horizon" counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without a partner force on the ground? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The United States conducts counterterrorism operations all over the world in places where we do not have a partner force on the ground. We are actively setting the conditions in coordination with partners in the region to ensure we remain situationally aware and are postured to mitigate and neutralize developing terrorist threat streams. Further details on this issue need to be discussed in a classified setting.

IRAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat posed by Iran?

Answer. Iran is our nation's most formidable threat in the CENTCOM AOR. Iran's conventional military strategy is primarily based on deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an attacker. It also cultivates non-state violent proxies and militias to project power and build regional influence. Iran's primary military capabilities are missiles, UAVs, naval forces, and unconventional forces.

Iran also holds the region's largest surface-to-surface missile (SSM) arsenal, including both ballistic and cruise missiles that serve as its primary strategic deterrent. SSMs in Iran's inventory have a range of up to 1300 miles. Further, Iran's naval forces are the Arabian Gulf's strongest and feature many small boats and naval mines to complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC—QF) maintains ties to Shia militia groups across the region to advance Iran's interests. Iran-backed proxies give Iran unconventional options for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and globally. The IRGC—QF also has longstanding ties to select Sunni groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban. Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security and territorial defense.

Iranian leaders likely seek to avoid direct conventional conflict with a superior military force but maintain capabilities to impose significant cost through retaliatory strikes and covert proxy attacks.

Question. Are U.S. military forces and capabilities currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?

Answer. It is critical for the United States to deter aggressive and destabilizing actions by Iran and to maintain the capability and capacity to respond to credible threats in the region when necessary. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to adequately assess the position of military forces in the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, this is an issue I would work to understand further.

Question. What is your assessment of U.S. national security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

Answer. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to adequately assess the growth and impact of Iranian influence in the Middle East. If confirmed, I would work with the appropriate Combatant Commands to assess the specific impacts of Iranian influence in the region.

Question. If the U.S. relieved sanctions on Iran, do you assess that there is a risk that Iran would use that sanctions relief to further its malign activities in the region?

Answer. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to adequately assess the impact of sanctions relief on Iran's malign activities in the region. If confirmed, this is an issue I would work to understand further.

CHINA

Question. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

Answer. The Department of Defense is taking a concerted approach to position for long-term competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This approach prioritizes China as the Department of Defense's (DOD) primary pacing challenge. Simultaneously, DOD seeks a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the People's Liberation Army that helps set U.S.-PRC relations on a path of transparency and non-aggression and welcomes collaboration when interests align, for instance on climate change.

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should be the objectives of U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue? What are the limitations on this kind of dialogue?

Answer. DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritize crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and limited cooperation in areas where national interests align, in order to advance a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.

Our increasingly competitive relationship with the PRC requires we maintain regular communication channels to prevent crisis and ensure pathways for timely communications so we can communicate with the PLA should a crisis occur.

I support dialogue that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain insight into China's strategic intent; manage differences; and cooperate in areas where national interests align.

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the erosion of U.S. advantages?

Answer. The PRC's long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can provide the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a “world class military” by 2049. In the interim, China's objective is to meet two intermediate military modernization milestones: 1) accelerate integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization related to a potential Taiwan contingency by 2027, and 2) complete all military modernization goals as outlined by the CCP by 2035

Concerning to me is that the PRC is investing in, and acquiring, technologies that will be foundational for future military innovations including artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, and quantum computing. I agree with this assessment and, if confirmed, I will continue to monitor and address these issues.

Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military presence overseas, including installations like its bases in Djibouti and across Africa, as well as other infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?

Answer. The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances globally, based on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China's base in Djibouti and its military presence in Africa enable forward deployment of PLA forces and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military, interests, and other assets. China's military presence is also furthered enabled through its peace-keeping operations in Africa.

Question. What is your assessment of the strategic and military implications for the United States of China's Belt and Road Initiative? What are the strategic and military implications for other countries in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. China uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by expanding global transportation and trade linkages. This works to support its development and deepen economic integration with nations along its periphery including the Indo-Pacific region. The PRC's overseas development and security interests under BRI drive the PRC towards expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those interests.

The PRC attempts to use the economic influence it accrues in the Indo-Pacific region through BRI to encourage participating countries to support Beijing's priorities

and objectives on a range of other matters including its diplomatic, economic, and military objectives in the region.

Question. The smaller number of nuclear weapons possessed by China relative to the United States and Russia is often cited as an impediment to nuclear arms control talks with China.

What are the strategic implications of the rapid modernization of Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to at least double by 2030, and what approach should the United States take to address those implications, in your view?

Answer. We will soon find ourselves faced with two nuclear peer nations. Given the current state of our defense industrial base for nuclear delivery platforms and the condition of some of the National Nuclear Security Administration's production capabilities and infrastructure, we must begin preparing for this challenge now. To do so, I believe we must continue executing our current nuclear modernization programs, evaluate whether current programs of record are sufficient to fill any potential deterrence gaps, and engage China in discussions on strategic stability issues and arms control.

Question. What do you think could motivate China to participate in nuclear arms control negotiations in a genuine and meaningful way?

Answer. Consistent strategic messaging from key U.S. and international political leaders for China to not just follow international norms in the area of nuclear arms control, but to participate in substantive discussions on risk reduction and strategic stability.

Question. In your view, with the rapid development in both quantity and quality of Chinese nuclear capabilities, how does U.S. nuclear posture, and nuclear doctrine need to change to account for the existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors?

Answer. I understand the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will formulate a strategy for deterring both China and Russia. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Chairman in providing his military advice on how U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine may need to change to account for the existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors.

Question. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both increase, do you assess that we have adequate military and national security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese leadership to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation?

Answer. U.S. leadership has the ability to communicate with senior PRC and PLA leadership. These channels could be used to deescalate tension in the bilateral relationship and mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation during a crisis.

U.S. CAPABILITIES AND FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current joint force that present a challenge to addressing threats in Europe? If so, what specific enhancements would you recommend to joint force capabilities and force posture in Europe in each military domain?

Answer. We should continue to enhance our long-range precision fires, undersea and anti-submarine warfare, integrated air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. In terms of infrastructure, storage for prepositioned equipment and munitions, airfield upgrades, and capacity for joint reception, staging, and onward integration remain priorities. These are not solely U.S. issues, and we will explore with our Allies and partners, bilaterally and through NATO, how they can leverage and align our respective investments to meet our shared requirements.

Question. In your assessment, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack?

Answer. Air and missile defense is a priority for us globally and in Europe. Adversaries are aggressively developing and fielding advanced air and missile capabilities with increased capacity, representing a threat to NATO and partner nations within the USEUCOM AOR. With NATO and partner support, USEUCOM has Land, Air, and Maritime capabilities to defend against missile threats.

However, NATO and USEUCOM require a credible, Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability, to include a robust command and control architecture capable of creating a fully integrated air and missile threat picture able to transition from peace through crisis to conflict. This will enable effective operations against combined attacks involving aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and hypersonic vehicles.

We are continuing to improve our air and missile defense capability and capacity in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Right now, we are fielding new short-range air defense systems to Army units in Germany, and the Air Force just activated an F-35 squadron in the United Kingdom. Multinational exercises like ASTRAL KNIGHT and FORMIDABLE SHIELD are building not only U.S. readiness but are enhancing our ability to defend against air and missile threats in conjunction with Allies and partners.

Question. Do Chinese investments in European infrastructure pose threats to U.S. operations there? What other Chinese activities or investments should be cause for concern with regard to our security and that of our Allies and partners in Europe?

Answer. Chinese investments in European infrastructure do pose a threat to U.S. operations in Europe. The United States and our European allies and partners should be alert to Chinese malign influence, particularly with regard to 5G technology and financial investment in critical infrastructure, including port and rail facilities, that could impact U.S. or alliance military planning, mobility, and enablement. Allies should also be aware of China's opaque economic practices and coercion that create inroads to European infrastructure.

Question. In your view, do large-scale military exercises such as DEFENDER EUROPE 2021 serve to reassure Allies and deter adversaries such as Russia? Do you support continuing a robust level of exercises with our European Allies and partners?

Answer. Combined, complex training with our Allies and partners builds readiness and improves interoperability. At the same time, these exercises demonstrate to Allies and adversaries our capability to command and control operations across all domains and multiple continents. They allow us to validate the same processes and procedures we would use in the event of a crisis in Europe, and at scales that stress the system and enable real growth. Collectively, they are concrete displays of U.S. and Allied resolve and capacity to impose costs on potential aggressors.

Question. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan helped build interoperability with numerous NATO Allies and partners. What are ways we can maintain that level of interoperability going forward?

Answer. Combined exercises are interoperability laboratories that test our ability to shoot, move, and communicate with Allies and partners under pressure. The enduring presence of U.S. forces builds mutual familiarity between our forces and those of our host countries in Europe. We support efforts by NATO and U.S. European Command to define interoperability objectives and promote interoperability through training and exercises, equipment standardization, and NATO Centers of Excellence and NATO's multinational command and control structures.

Question. What is your assessment of military-to-military relations with Turkey at present?

Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with our strategic ally Turkey remains as strong, and we continue to work every day bilaterally and through NATO to address a range of issues vital to both of our national interests. Areas of divergence between our two countries are primarily in political channels, and the Turkish military has signaled a willingness to focus on the positive aspects of our relationship to address our mutual concerns related to regional instability and the threats posed by U.S. competitors. Relations between the Turkish Armed Forces and the U.S. military remain close, professional, and complementary, as evidenced by our recent coordination in Afghanistan, and we will continue to build upon this cooperation in several key regions.

Although our two countries do not always agree, Turkey continues to contribute positively to a variety of NATO missions to include Baltic Air Policing and support for Bomber Task Force missions. It is evident that Turkey's military capability and geographic location make it a key stakeholder in U.S. responses to regional events and within the NATO Alliance. Therefore, it is critical the U.S. military continue to execute and advocate for fundamental security cooperation activities with Turkey such as Professional Military Education, exercises, and Foreign Military Sales. These actions directly advance U.S. interests by preventing the deterioration of an ally's military capabilities, strengthen NATO interoperability, and help enable U.S. force projection with access to key regions in support steady-state operations and contingencies.

RUSSIA

Question. In your view, which aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture in Europe are most effective in deterring Russian aggression and mitigating threats to our NATO Allies and partners? What has worked in the past? Are there additional measures that the U.S. and NATO should consider?

Answer. Deterring Russian aggression and supporting NATO's defense of the Euro Atlantic area remain as challenges facing USEUCOM. These complex and interrelated challenges require coordination with other U.S. Government Agencies, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, allies and partners in Europe. Russia's "malign influence campaign" seeks to confound our coordination efforts and weaken the Alliance's integrity.

If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Commander, U.S. European Command, other combatant commanders and interagency stakeholders to establish credible deterrence to Russian aggression and ensure it's a collective NATO alliance responsibility.

Continued integration with DOD efforts to address global requirements is essential to address trans-regional threats that span the conflict spectrum. Synchronized efforts by the combatant commands, overseen by OSD and the Joint Staff, are crucial to our success. We will continue to work closely with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and the Joint Staff to streamline the development and fielding of warfighting capabilities and concepts.

Further, I will continue advocating for resourcing solutions to address emerging requirements such as: enhanced and expanded Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine and undersea warfare; Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD); hypersonics; cyber operations and a secure, resilient Information Technology theater infrastructure.

Question. Russia has taken provocative action in the Black Sea region over the past year, including a military buildup around Ukraine and threats to Allied warships in the sea.

Are there additional efforts the U.S. military should undertake with Black Sea Allies and partners to advance our security interests and deter Russia?

Answer. The U.S. military must continue to work with our allies and partners—especially those bordering the Black Sea—to ensure that norms and activities are maintained with respect to the rules-based order. Efforts are already in place to increase interoperability, improve maritime domain awareness, and strengthen allied and partner capability to resist Russian coercion and deter malign influence in the region. If confirmed, I would ensure these ongoing efforts continue, and accelerated wherever possible.

Question. Given advances in Russian attack submarine capability what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare? What are the different capabilities that are necessary to address this in different parts of the world such as the North Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and elsewhere?

Answer. A robust Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capability requires investment in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) that uses the Fixed Surveillance System (FSS), Fixed Distributed System (FDS), and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). A robust presence of fast attack submarines, guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, and Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft are instrumental in maintaining U.S. advantages in undersea warfare. We must maintain acoustic superiority.

Question. In your assessment, does DOD currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to overcome advanced Russian anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in Europe to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver?

Answer. We are making progress on a new Joint Warfighting Concept focused on ways the Joint Force can maintain a global advantage to project power and defend critical infrastructure. As Russia increases quantity and quality of advanced A2AD capabilities, the Joint Force requires new capabilities and increased capacity to defend our logistics infrastructure, our static bases, and forward positioned forces against the A2AD threat. Without modernization the United States' critical power projection platforms and bases, along with forward deployed forces, would be under threat from advanced Russian capabilities.

Question. What is your assessment of EUCOM and NATO's readiness to detect, deter, and respond to Russian influence operations, including in the cyber domain?

Answer. Russian malign influence is not only a regional problem; it is global in nature. The scale and scope of this problem impacts each of the combatant commands, the IC, the interagency along with our allies and partners. EUCOM's continued engagement and leadership in a variety of counter Russian influence venues has been essential to recognizing and responding to malign Russian Activity. The dynamic information environment requires us to constantly upgrade our approaches to detect this activity.

Question. In your view, what additional military and non-military capabilities are required for the United States to counter effectively Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?

Answer. Additional information operations capability would benefit EUCOM in countering Russian's malign influence campaign. If confirmed, I will look very closely at our capabilities and capacity, especially counter Russian hybrid operations across the spectrum of conflict.

NATO ALLIANCE

Question. In your view, how important is the NATO Alliance to advancing U.S. national security interests?

Answer. Our commitment to NATO and particularly our obligations under Article 5, are crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Article 5 obligations are the linchpin of defense and deterrence against adversaries threatening the U.S. homeland and our vital interests in Europe. NATO's strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks.

Question. How important is NATO's Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euroatlantic Area to the U.S. from an operational perspective? What other NATO priorities will the Joint Staff emphasize most in coming years?

Answer. Operationally, maintaining Alliance momentum on the implementation of NATO's Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) is vitally important. The delivery in September of SACEUR's AOR—Wide Strategic Plan provides military strategic direction to respond through the coordinated delivery of national, regional, and AOR-wide multi-domain effects to prevent a crisis from deepening. The Joint Staff will now emphasize further implementation through the ongoing development of the DDA family of subordinate strategic and regional plans through the coming years. The development of those plans will lead us to a force structure that is responsive and fit for purpose. Most importantly, DDA implementation facilitates alignment between NATO and U.S. plans and activities.

Question. How important is the update to NATO's Strategic Concept for the NATO Military Committee?

Answer. Anchoring NATO's continued military adaptation in an updated Strategic Concept is very important to the NATO Military Committee. The Military Committee's agreements on Deterrence and Defense need to be central to the Strategic Concept. These include agreement on the threats, agreement on NATO's purpose across the spectrum of competition and conflict, and agreement on how to manage deterrence and defense in the 21st Century. The Strategic Concept will also need to address China and their systematic challenges to the rules-based international order and relevance to Alliance security will also need to be addressed in the next Strategic Concept.

Question. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in the strategic competition with Russia and China?

Answer. While Russia remains NATO's immediate primary concern, the People's Republic of China (PRC) presents a growing challenge, not least because it aims to complete military modernization by 2035 and transform the People's Liberation Army into a "world-class" military by the end of 2049. Since Beijing likely seeks to develop a security cooperation architecture that would rival the Alliance, the Alliance must take account of not only Russia's direct military impact on Euro-Atlantic security but also the PRC's potential military influence on the Euro-Atlantic area.

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what actions would you recommend to maintain momentum on the capabilities, readiness, and military mobility of the NATO Alliance in order to deter aggression?

Answer. The Alliance has created significant momentum through its ongoing military adaptation as part of the implementation of the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area and SACEUR's AOR—Wide Strategic Plan. These efforts, coupled with the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), directly build critical capabilities and improve readiness across the Alliance. If confirmed, I will continue to push for full implementation of the DDA and SASP to solidify these efforts, and emphasize the importance of NRI as a culture of readiness for the Alliance.

If confirmed, I will also encourage synchronization and cooperation with the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation mobility projects, which will be critical in improving and enhancing military mobility in the European AOR. The recent approval of the EU Administrative Arrangement negotiating mandate is an important step forward in this effort.

Question. As recently as the June 2021 Summit, NATO Allies have declared "... that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." The alliance's Secretary General reiterated this point at the recent meeting of defense

ministers in October, stating that a “ . . . world where Russia, China, and countries like North Korea have nuclear weapons, but NATO has none, is simply not a safer world.”

In your view, should NATO remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist?

Answer. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is a key component of the Alliance’s deterrence and defense and must remain its highest priority mission for deterrence and defense.

Question. Do you believe that the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component of NATO’s nuclear posture?

Answer. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to the deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance unity.

Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Answer. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe underpin the deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance unity. Therefore, there is a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons’ deployment within NATO.

Question. At the NATO Summit in Brussels this past year, Allies pledged to “ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force architecture” to meet deterrence and defense needs. How do you envision NATO Allies’ military efforts aligning with the U.S. Army’s Multi Domain Task Force?

Answer. The U.S. Army’s tenants for Multi-Domain Operations parallel similar concepts found in NATO’s Military Strategy, the Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), SACEUR’s AOR-wide Strategic Plan and the associated subordinate family of DDA plans, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, all centered on the development and adaptation of the Alliance’s Military Instrument of Power. Therefore, we envision that calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and the integration of capabilities in all domains will align with the Alliance’s development of multi-domain operations concepts and force architecture.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Question. How would you assess the continuing value of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. For nearly 70 years, the United States–ROK alliance has been a core pillar of the U.S. national security architecture in Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the North Korean threat since 1953. It plays an integral role in managing potential tensions in the region. The United States–ROK Alliance has also strengthened our collective security, economic ties, and societal relationships.

Question. Do you believe it important that the United States and the Republic of Korea resolve fairly and amicably their negotiation of a new Special Measures Agreement for 2020 and beyond? If so, why?

Answer. The ROK and the United States ratified the Special Measure Agreement in August. This new agreement will contribute to long-term stability of our force posture in Korea for years to come. I welcome this historic agreement.

Question. In your assessment, what is the value of combined joint exercises for maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. Exercises and training are the routine activities of militaries around the world. The U.S. military conducts exercises and training at multiple echelons, at home and in every Geographic Combatant Command region of the globe. Each exercise or training event on the Korean Peninsula is agreed upon by both the United States and South Korea as an integral part of maintaining combined forces warfighting readiness to fight tonight.

Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea’s missile capabilities?

Answer. We will continue to monitor the situation regarding DPRK missile capabilities in order to protect U.S. interests and the security of our allies and partners. The Department of Defense remains postured to detect and respond to North Korean missile threats but must continue to improve regional interoperability, pursue improvements in allied missile defense capabilities, and adapt existing and emerging capabilities—particularly omnidirectional threats like cruise missiles—to strengthen our defenses. We must prioritize the next generation of advanced ground and space-based sensors to better detect, track, and discriminate enemy missile warheads and concurrently develop an effective, robust layered missile defense system to ensure defense of our homeland and forces abroad.

Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology?

Answer. The United States, in close coordination with allies and partners, has a vital interest in limiting the reach of the DPRK's dangerous weapons programs and proliferation activities. Addressing this issue will take a whole of government approach to ensure North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology. Furthermore, the United States will continue to work closely with all countries and jurisdictions to promote full implementation of DPRK-related U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Question. If South Korea and North Korea were able to negotiate a peace deal, how do you assess that would impact U.S. force posture on the peninsula as well as the legal status of the UN force?

Answer. While the Department of Defense supports diplomatic efforts to engage North Korea, U.S. force posture is a critical backstop to our diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and maintain our ability to defend the ROK. We constantly assess our force posture to ensure that we are calibrated against the current threat as it evolves. The threat and our Alliance commitments will continue to be our guiding principles.

GENERAL/FLAG OFFICER REDUCTIONS

Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed DOD to reduce the number of general and flag officer (G/FO) billets by 110 by 2022.

What is your understanding of the progress Joint Staff has made in reducing its number of G/FO in accordance with Department-wide plans?

Answer. The Joint Force will successfully meet the requirements of the NDAAs; however, emerging requirements may require future adjustments to GO/FO positions.

The Joint Staff contributed to an approximate 10% SES reduction in that time. Additionally, the Joint Staff scheduled and identified by-year reductions throughout CY22. The Joint Staff also identified 78 General Officer/Flag Officer positions for reduction in conjunction with the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. To date, the Joint Pool reduced from 310 positions to 280 positions and plans will reduce further to 232 by December 31, 2022. In coordination with this reduction and Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, there is a plan to establish an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account of not more than 30 billets.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure the Joint Staff is successful in meeting these reduction mandates on time?

Answer. The Joint Staff is on track to meet the reduction mandates on time. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Combatant Commanders, and leaders of Defense Activities to ensure we remain on track. The Department has established a General Officer/Flag Officer reduction plan timeline for each position identified for removal. The Joint Staff reviews the plan regularly and provides updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a quarterly basis, or more frequently as needed. Regarding SES management, if confirmed, I will continue to execute the DOD SES Reduction Plan to meet the goals of the Department while ensuring the mission and integrity of the Joint Force.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

Answer. Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States' security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal certainty in the world's largest maneuver space.

Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the Indo-Pacific region and the Arctic?

Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Rus-

sia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean and is also working to secure international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL STATION

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?

Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

Question. Fewer than forty detainees remain at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo?

Answer. The detention facility at Guantanamo is DOD's only long-term law of war detention facility. The continued use of this facility is ultimately a policy decision.

The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, is conducted "to determine whether certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States such that their continued detention is warranted".

Question. Do you support the PRB process and the continued transfer of detainees to other countries based on the PRB's determinations, subject to the restrictions currently in law?

Answer. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), is conducted "to determine whether certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States such that their continued detention is warranted." Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support the PRB process, subject to existing legal restrictions.

Question. In your view, what standard should apply to medical care provided to detainees at Guantanamo?

Answer. I believe that DOD should continue to provide adequate and humane care for detainees consistent with the standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and, to the extent practicable, medical treatment guided by standards similar to those applied to U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.

INSIDER THREAT

Question. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information critical to national security. The National Insider Threat Task Force published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework in November 2018.

In your view, has DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), better postured the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they reach a critical point and potentially harm national security.

Answer. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the question of implementing the newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) has not been my responsibility. If confirmed, I will review the issue as required.

Question. What can the Department do to ensure that senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the intelligence or counterintelligence communities—are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities, information from insider threats as a core mission objective?

Answer. The insider threat is a challenging problem that all senior leaders in DOD must be aware of. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, I worked dili-

gently with subordinate commanders to ensure we took an active role in this protecting our people, facilities and critical information from the insider threat. This was Commander's Business. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman, the Combatant Commanders and the Services in all manners possible to continue with this approach.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes, if confirmed.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

ACQUISITION PROCESS

1. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, historically, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and requirements processes have been based largely on "bottom-up" initiatives and proposals from the military services, and focused on individual weapons systems, platforms, and other major systems rather than the joint operational missions assigned to joint commanders. However, modern warfare against near-peer competitor's demands, and technology today enables, a much higher level of jointness and integration across domains, service capabilities, and platforms to accomplish complex missions. It is no longer acceptable for the services

to engineer and deliver systems and capabilities that are not interoperable and expect the combatant commander to somehow find ways to integrate them.

Further, this “joint” space between and across the services, the operational domains, and the collection of platforms and systems produced by the Department of Defense acquisition process is not “owned” by any service, nor are there acquisition and sustainment organizations designated to produce, deploy, and maintain joint solutions to these joint problems and requirements.

In multiple places in your answers to the committee’s advance policy questions, you expressed the view that it is important for the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek “consensus” among the JROC service members. Where consensus on important requirements and technology opportunities is elusive, however, would you intend to exercise your authority as the principal requirements advisor to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense to make recommendations on your own?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I will strive for a data informed process to drive integration, speed, and consensus with respect to joint requirements and, if necessary, exercise all appropriate authorities available to me as Chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

2. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, do you think that the Department’s requirements process and practices should be more oriented on missions and somewhat less on individual weapons systems and platforms? If so, how might that be accomplished?

Admiral GRADY. Traditional military activities are expanding, especially in domains like cyber and space, which are all inherently joint. But there remain traditional military missions that must account for the Joint Force and its fielded weapons and platforms. The Combatant Commands assist the Joint Staff in ensuring that these mission-oriented requirements processes remain accounted for. We need to ensure that requirements are concept driven and threat informed in order to generate inherently joint mission capabilities that fill gaps at speed.

DOMAIN CONTROL

3. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, historically, too, the military services have neglected missions that are critically important for the joint force but are not high priorities for the specific services to which they are assigned. Examples include mine warfare in the Navy, theater missile defense in the Army, and close-air support in the Air Force.

It is widely believed that prevailing in the ongoing military competition depends on achieving unprecedented levels of interoperability and agility to create novel “kill webs” on demand, as reflected in the Joint All Domain Command and Control initiative, and the corresponding service initiatives (Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), Convergence, and Overmatch).

Congress is on the threshold of enacting the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, which includes multiple provisions to establish “mission manager” pilot programs—to test concepts for managing missions in addition to individual programs. One model for this concept is the existing Integrated Air and Missile Defense Office (IAMDO) within the Joint Staff. What is your view of the IAMDO model of mission management?

Admiral GRADY. While this model has been effective, it is executed using existing Department resources, often competing with the Departments ability to conduct traditional management roles. If confirmed, I will remain committed to leveraging existing constructs, as well as considering alternatives to uphold the Department of Defense’s commitment to deliver the right capabilities at the right time in support of the Joint Force.

4. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, what is your view of the idea of mission managers?

Admiral GRADY. The JROC shifted from approving Services capabilities to a true collaborative structure designed to validate joint requirements. If confirmed, I welcome any oversight of cross-service capabilities. Services organize train and equip to fill combatant command requirements. Occasionally, there is duplication of effort and having a mission manager focused on joint requirements is important.

5. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, in your view, is there a potential role for existing or new acquisition and sustainment organizations to develop and transition capabilities to meet requirements of joint combatant commanders for which no service

is responsible and no service is likely to commit internal manpower and funding to satisfy?

Admiral GRADY. Joint Combatant Commander requirements are addressed through rapid acquisitions processes such as Joint Urgent Operational Need. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress, OSD, and the Services to streamline and evolve acquisition processes to meet joint warfighter requirements.

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

6. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, it is also widely acknowledged that, because a preponderance of technological innovation is produced by commercial industry and largely available for purchase by any nations, it is imperative for DOD to quickly adopt and adapt technology, developed outside of the Department that may not be appropriately prioritized by the military services. How would you try to evolve the JROC requirements process to improve the Department's exploitation of commercially developed technology advances?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by Congress in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with the active support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I anticipate that in the current technological environment the entities that procure capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from technologies that derive from the Services, private industry, and other DOD organizations.

7. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, in your view, does the technology exist to enable joint commanders to orchestrate sensors, processing, decision aids, command functions, and engagement systems to rapidly detect, locate, identify, track, and engage large numbers of mobile, time-sensitive targets across all domains and relevant systems and platforms?

Admiral GRADY. This is a complex challenge. While many of the technologies described above exist, additional research, concept and capability development, organizational, and cultural change are necessary for the Joint Force to succeed in applying associated technologies to generate the desired effects. Additional concerted work by the Department, Joint Staff, the Services, Congress, leading technologists, and others is required to fully leverage the opportunities presented by emerging technologies around this mission.

8. Senator REED. Admiral Grady, how would you characterize the cultural and organizational obstacles to achieving this capability?

Admiral GRADY. Cultural and organizational obstacles arise in response to reshaping the force around full adoption of semi-autonomous warfighting systems. Culturally, members of units which focus on traditional warfighting roles, such as aviation, may resist having these roles replaced by semi-autonomous systems. Commanders may develop unique approaches to command and control which could further challenge traditional organizational constructs such as domain-centric functional component commands. Employment of large quantities of expendable systems further challenge cultural norms, such as the risk aversion to platform loss. The software-driven continuous capability development of these systems requires additional adjustments in acquisitions policy, and efforts to more tightly couple operator feedback into the development process. In addition, we must develop and train our operational force on the responsible use of artificial intelligence and work to overcome cultural aversions to teaming with semi-autonomous systems.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

9. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, as part of my responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department of Defense I will be asking you the same two questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Admiral GRADY. No.

10. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, have you ever faced discipline, or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

Admiral GRADY. No.

ALIGNING MILITARY SERVICE ACQUISITION DECISIONS WITH COMBATANT COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS

11. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, there has been general recognition that at times the current DOD acquisition process does not provide combatant commanders with the required resources to fulfill critical operational needs arising from cross-service, joint missions. This is especially evident at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). If confirmed as Vice Chairman, you will play a significant role in overseeing how DOD prioritizes joint military requirements. How do you plan to approach your role as arbiter of what the military services should prioritize to ensure INDOPACOM has the joint capabilities needed to compete with and deter China?

Admiral GRADY. We must prioritize delivering resources and capabilities to INDOPACOM at speed. I will approach that process by ensuring we always start with a firm understanding of the threat and the risk to mission and risk to force. I am committed to collaborating with Combatant Commanders and Services to achieve this.

12. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) is responsible for rapidly acquiring and deploying technology to counter emerging threats. If confirmed, how will you ensure the military services support the SCO's mission, which ultimately helps combatant commanders like INDOPACOM?

Admiral GRADY. The Services are responsible for manning, training, equipping, and providing ready forces to the Combatant Commanders, who in turn are responsible for executing DOD strategy across their respective geographic and functional areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders to support transitioning SCO rapid technology projects into warfighting capabilities to counter emerging threats.

RESULTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW

13. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, earlier this week, DOD released the results of its Global Posture Review. In the Indo-Pacific, the Review directed additional cooperation with allies and partners on initiatives to confront Chinese military aggression and North Korean threats, with a focus on enhancing infrastructure. Do you agree that infrastructure improvements in the region must include projects in the Freely Associated States, which are strategically located in the second island chain?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, infrastructure improvements should include the Freely Associated States. The Freely Associated States extend from the third island chain and into the second island chain. They provide the United States with access and overflight to maintain freedom of maneuver in the region. Infrastructure improvements will promote economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated States, in line with the intent of the Compacts of Free Association.

14. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, the Compacts of Free Association are set to expire in 2023 and 2024—how important is it for the United States to extend these treaties?

Admiral GRADY. The Compacts are of great importance to both the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States. A failure to extend the Compacts will limit the self-sufficiency and self-government of the Freely Associated States, restrict U.S. freedom of maneuver, and create gaps that the PRC will exploit to undermine U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.

MILITARY TO MILITARY COMMUNICATION WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS

15. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, during a recent summit, Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping agreed to high-level conversations between senior military officials from both countries in the coming months to establish guardrails and avoid potential miscalculations which could lead to war. How important is it to have regular, open lines of communication with senior Chinese military officials to avoid miscalculation and clarify intentions?

Admiral GRADY. Our increasingly competitive relationship with the PRC necessitates that we maintain regular communication channels to help avoid crisis and that we establish direct pathways for communication so we have a timely method to engage with the PLA should a crisis occur. Attempting to establish those pathways once a crisis begins is too late.

DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritize crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and limited cooperation in areas where national interests align, in order to advance a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accord-

ance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.

I support dialog that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors that are inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain insight into China's strategic intent; manage differences; and cooperate in limited areas where national interests align.

16. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, would you be in favor of a United States and China "hot line", similar to the one we still have with Russia, to prevent an accidental or inadvertent war?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, a "hot line" with China would be useful, but U.S.—China competition is significantly more complex than the U.S.—Soviet competition of the cold war. We need a comprehensive set of tools for reducing risk, and DOD will support the interagency to implement the President's guidance on establishing guardrails and means of communication with China.

SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE NAVY'S FUTURE FLEET AND SHIPYARD UPGRADES

17. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, your experience as the Navy's most senior surface warfare officer will likely be very influential in the ongoing discussions about the size and composition of the future fleet and the plan to upgrade our four public shipyards. What are your views on the size and composition of the Navy's future fleet?

Admiral GRADY. I believe a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned platforms is the most effective and affordable way to meet the security demands of our Nation. Analysis confirms that numbers are not the only factor—the right balance of capability and capacity must be brought to bear in order achieve the combat effectiveness needed from our Navy's fleet.

18. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, the Navy is in the beginning of a 20-year plan to upgrade our four public shipyards—do you think that time horizon needs to be compressed to ensure the future fleet is maintained at a high State of readiness?

Admiral GRADY. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) and its steady funding stream is critical to our ability to clear maintenance backlogs, improve readiness rates, and sustain new platforms. Having the flexibility to execute funding earlier, within the 20-year plan could prove advantageous, but, as custodians of this funding, we should be careful not to induce risk to SIOP execution.

CLIMATE ADAPTATION PLAN

19. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, DOD recently released its Climate Adaptation Plan, which lays out how operations, planning activities, business processes, and resource allocation decisions will include climate change considerations. If confirmed, how do you plan to implement the Climate Adaptation Plan's lines of effort to ensure the Department is incorporating these considerations in all of its future acquisition and planning processes?

Admiral GRADY. Climate change is altering our operating environment. If confirmed, I will work to enhance our infrastructure and supply chains, making them more resilient. Adapting our platforms and installations for the effects of a changing climate will help keep the force ready, mitigate the impacts of major weather events, and provide tactical advantage by reducing dependencies and demand on long distance, intricate supply chains.

HOMELAND DEFENSE RADAR—HAWAII

20. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Grady, the 2019 Missile Defense Review identified the Homeland Defense Radar—Hawaii (HDR-H) as a requirement for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from an increasingly capable North Korea. In successive budget requests, including this year, DOD zeroed out funding for HDR-H, which, without an adequate alternative, will put Hawaii at risk in the near future. If confirmed, how would you ensure Hawaii is protected from missile threats from North Korea and elsewhere going forward?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed I would work through the JROC in order to provide strategic direction on the requirements for each of the key capabilities for the future Joint Force including the HDR-H. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is a critically important capability and therefore an essential topic for JROC action. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing Department assessments that inform future budget decisions. I will also work with INDOPACOM to support continued improve-

ments to our homeland missile defense architecture, including our missile defense sensor network.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

MILITARY TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES IN WEST VIRGINIA

21. Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Grady, one of the priorities I didn't have a chance to bring up in our meeting was the need to invest in training venues that can support full mission profile exercises that allow our troops to train back home exactly like they would if deployed against a near peer adversary. U.S. Special Operations Command and the Marine Corps have been the leaders in seeking out those types of engagements, and most recently my office has been working with them to identify venues in West Virginia that could benefit the Joint Force as a whole. Especially on the East Coast where training space is severally limited in availability. As we transition from our primary focus on the Middle-East, West Virginia's terrain and population density, coupled with its proximity to our Tier One commands and rotary wing assets make it operationally and fiscally appealing to our Special Operation Forces for near-peer full mission profiles. As you consider future range training area management and programs to meet current and future shortfalls, tell me how I can best work with you and your staff to identify venues in West Virginia needed to meet the forecasted joint training requirements?

Admiral GRADY. Live ranges as well as virtual and constructive means to support training are vitally important to ensuring the combat effectiveness of the force. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and the rest of the SASC members, to ensure we provide the very best training venues for our forces.

INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN THE SERVICES

22. Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Grady, I was pleased to read about the focus you have toward interoperability in your advance policy questions. From the creation of pilot programs and acquisition of assets to deployment into the hands of our warfighters the Department of Defense, our industry partners, and allies around the globe have to maintain a mindset of joint interoperability. General John Hyten recognized this as the Vice Chairman, specifically in our acquisition and emerging technology research. How do you plan to continue and expand the joint mindset as we're procuring and developing tomorrow's technology?

Admiral GRADY. This is best achieved with the active support of the Services and their role in the JROC. This includes applying the expertise and capabilities of OUSD(R&E) to ensure we are fully leveraging speed, innovation, and technology. If confirmed I will foster relationships with all stakeholders to ensure our laser-like focus on maintaining overmatch against our pacing threats in all domains. If confirmed I will also further exercise the capability requirements authority to expand the joint mindset. Modern warfare demands unprecedented levels of interoperability, integrated systems-of-systems kill chains, and joint command and control, for which no single Service is responsible.

23. Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Grady, interoperability with our allies is something I'm sure you've spent a great deal of time designing and implementing as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces, can you describe some of those experiences and tell us how you plan to expand them with all our allies?

Admiral GRADY. I'll provide two examples of helping to improve allied interoperability from my time as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces, one that focuses on the Force Development strategic horizon and another that focuses on the Force Employment strategic horizon.

U.S. Fleet Forces and Joint Forces Command Norfolk has a meaningful relationship with the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence—a NATO-accredited multi-national military think tank that facilitates the sharing of collective international experience, expertise, and best practices, critical to operations in the North Atlantic. The alignment of U.S. Fleet Forces and Joint Forces Command Norfolk catalyzed the development of modern warfighting capabilities in the North Atlantic, increasing interoperability with our NATO allies and readiness across the joint force. If confirmed, I will continue to support similar efforts facilitated by the Joint Staff. For example, The Joint Staff has a longstanding relationship with NATO Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA. The J-7 facilitates the Multinational Capability Development Campaign, a community of allies and partners that shares Force Development best practices, methodologies, and frameworks in order to improve the ability of joint multinational and coalition part-

ners to plan and operate together. Finally, 22 nations invest in bilateral partnerships with the Joint Staff through posting of senior liaison officers throughout Joint Staff directorates. All of these opportunities ensure the Joint Force is consistently working to ensure cooperation with key Allies and Partners.

The recent deployment of the UK HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group is a great example of how we are interoperable with our allies along the Force Employment strategic horizon. The Queen Elizabeth deployment involved coordinating operations with four different Combatant Commands. This level of operational interoperability was enabled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's role as the U.S. Joint Force Global Integrator. If confirmed, I will support the Joint Force's continuing efforts to expand operational interoperability with our allies and partners. The primary mechanism for this effort is the U.S. planning process focused on Consolidated Strategic Opportunities, where we seek to synchronize in time, space, and purpose U.S. global operations with our allies and partners.

24. Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Grady, U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command are two combatant commands that influence nearly every weapon and support system in our inventory, can you tell me how you plan to resource each of them as the challenges to our capabilities in these domains increase?

Admiral GRADY. The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget requested increased investment in these domains, dedicating \$20.6B toward Space and \$10.4B toward the Cyber domain. CYBERCOM and SPACECOM execute the Department's strategy in these critical warfighting domains, and if confirmed I will continue to support the timely and relevant resourcing of cyber and space capabilities to enable unfettered Joint Force operations in all domains.

CAPABILITIES AND LOGISTICS

25. Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Grady, the political, domestic, and military landscape that each commander has to manage is more taxing on personnel and resources today than ever before. In light of this, we often hear of the need for more advanced weaponry, training, and other enablers to support a defensive and future offensive need. However, we don't hear a lot about the logistics capacity being able to support and sustain those resources across the globe that a commander views as mission critical. As a commander, I am interested to hear about any concerns you may have in logistical capability or capacity to surge necessary combat power to the region if needed to combat a North Korean or near peer aggression?

Admiral GRADY. Logistics is the principal enabler to sustain a combat credible joint force. In the event of contingency operations in a contested environment against a near-peer adversary our current posture and capabilities would be challenged in supporting our forces. We must look to diversify our distribution methods and locations to sustain the Joint Force. Our allies, partners, and commercial logistics providers are the key to offsetting these challenges. The joint force will require a combination of access and agreements with like-minded allies and partners to establish the nodes required to sustain forces in a contested environment.

26. Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Grady, what critical vulnerabilities do you anticipate seeing in the Indo-Pacific region in order to safeguard the supply lines needed to support military efforts as well as to safeguard regional stability from agitators like North Korea and China?

Admiral GRADY. Our strategic lift capacity is stretched in most fights. Distributed operations required to support operations against a near peer adversary will require new approaches with enhanced capabilities. Existing service programs begin to address this gap, but trans-loading and logistics movement from strategic lift to intratheater lift continues to pose some vulnerability to the joint force. Waterborne platforms must be able to operate in austere seaports under increased threat, and they must be interoperable for delivery of materiel over-the-shore, and flexible enough to transfer materiel at sea. Commercial logistics providers providing unique contract capabilities, can be force-multipliers, and ongoing exercises are providing helpful insight to their capabilities and limitations. Integration of the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics in support of the Joint Warfighting Concept will provide a better site picture for evolving requirements, authorities, and organizational concepts to support a highly effective joint force.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TAMMY DUCKWORTH

INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIPS

27. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, our ability to execute operational plans and leverage combat power in the Indo-Pacific is predicated on our ability to project and sustain the Joint Force across the broad spans of that region. The elements of access, basing, and overflight to forward locations are essential to position and employ combat capability and remain globally responsive to emerging requirements. Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy and provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential adversaries. What opportunities exist to enhance engagement with partners and allies and establish new relationships to improve our access in the Indo-Pacific?

Admiral GRADY. The ability to work with partner nations in the Indo-Pacific is crucial; first, to show solidarity with allies and deter would be aggressors; and second, to provide an agile, distributed, forward based force that can project power and minimize losses in the event of conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to engage with partner nations at all levels across the region in bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and military training exercises, which offer the chance to enhance interoperability and integration, build relationships, show solidarity, and demonstrate support of the international rules-based order.

28. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, if you are confirmed, one of your responsibilities will include representing the military in the National Security Council deputies' meetings. How would you approach these interagency discussions, especially with regard to developing our alliances and partnerships?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I look forward to providing advice on how to best leverage military tools such as defense diplomacy, security cooperation, exercises, and engagements to facilitate State Department's diplomacy. At any given time, my familiarity with the Chairman's regular meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) and other multilateral defense engagements will allow me to provide insight as to the perspective of our Allies and Partners on any issue as well as offer their potential reaction and/or support on courses of action being deliberated by the National Security Council. In times of crisis, unique military advice I would provide on behalf of the Chairman to the National Security Council would be centered on our warfighting capabilities that deter our adversaries or compel them to cease malign behavior. America's extensive global defense alliances and partnerships and our ability to integrate military operations with like-minded nations will factor heavily into the advice I would be able to provide.

29. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, what whole of government opportunities do you see for improving our most strategically important overseas relationships?

Admiral GRADY. Our relationships with allies and partners remain the single most important approach to support the rules based international order. The Joint Force's role in maintaining, improving, and expanding these relationships are organized by the National Security Council to support whole of government activities to achieve outcomes aligned to national interests. One of the greatest opportunities to improve relationships with our allies and partners is whole of government coordinated strategic messaging that allows us to speak with one voice as a community of likeminded nations with shared interests and values. For example, the Quad, which is expressly not a Defense-centric grouping, provides us incredible opportunities to cooperate with Australia, India, and Japan to address some of the most complex issues of our day, including climate change, counterterrorism, infrastructure development, critical emerging technologies, maritime security, combating cyber threats, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

STRATEGIC LOGISTICS

30. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, the role of logistics in deterrence is often understated. I am proud of this committee's work implementing the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, but we cannot forget logistics and strategy are inextricably linked. Effective deterrence requires effective logistics. What role can U.S. Transportation Command play in the formulation of our strategic deterrent in the Indo-Pacific?

Admiral GRADY. USTRANSCOM (USTC) plays multiple roles in sustaining strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. USTC continually demonstrates the ability to project and sustain military power over trans-oceanic distances in support of the National Defense Strategy. The ability of USTC to control and rapidly shift assets anywhere in the world to address emerging and high priority needs is

foundational to global responsiveness and strategic reach. USTC is responsible for leading the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to support planning and operations across all domains and supports USINDOPACOM by helping set global posture (infrastructure, equipment, and forces), as well as advocating for access, basing, and overflight (ABO) permissions from partner nations. USTC's mobility posture enables the critical ABO necessary in wartime and essential to any global response, as recently demonstrated during the Afghan Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). Additionally, USTC continues to support USINDOPACOM to establish and grow strategic partnership with Indo-Pacific nations that will increase interoperability, expands training opportunities, increases airlift options for allies and partners, and leads to greater cooperation and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

31. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, one of your roles will include overseeing joint military requirements. How would you approach coordinating logistics and sustainment requirements across the military services, to eliminate redundancy and inefficiency and improve effectiveness in how the different military services are attempting to overcome the "tyranny of distance" in the Indo-Pacific region?

Admiral GRADY. The JROC has in the last year, begun a capability portfolio management review process (CPMR) which is not only exploring Combatant Command identified capability gaps, but also exploring our Joint Warfighting Concept required capabilities. These CPMRs are looking at what our Joint Force has now, how well the Force is meeting our requirements, and at how we build the Joint Force for the future. Addressing inefficiencies, redundancies and capability gaps in our logistics and sustainment portfolios will be a top priority if I am confirmed.

AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES TRILATERAL SECURITY PACT

32. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, this weekend, I spoke with Admiral John Aquilino about the Australia, United Kingdom, United States—or "AUKUS"—trilateral security pact. I am impressed by Australia's bold commitment to building nuclear-powered submarines as we look to enhance our shared ability to tackle the threats of the 21st century together. We must begin the hard work to operationalize this historic security pact to match our ally's resolve and enhance our competitive edge in the Indo-Pacific. What steps can be taken to help accelerate the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS, and if confirmed, will you commit to taking any steps available to rapidly develop these platforms?

Admiral GRADY. The AUKUS trilateral security pact and the agreement to help Australia build nuclear-powered submarines is an excellent example of the impact we can have when working closely with our allies and partners. If confirmed, I am fully committed to working with the Navy, Naval Reactors and the Department of Energy to see the security pact and the submarine program successfully executed in the most expeditious manner possible.

33. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Grady, will you also commit to working with Admiral Aquilino and the Joint Staff to expand the capabilities of the Australian submarine force to help shape, deter, and respond to potential threats in the Indo-Pacific region?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

NUCLEAR POLICY

34. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, five of my colleagues and I recently sent a letter to senior administration officials expressing concern that President Joseph Biden may pursue changes to long-standing U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, despite increasingly aggressive moves by China and Russia and clear objections from our allies. What is your best military advice on whether the United States should adopt a "no first use" or "sole-purpose" declaratory policy?

Admiral GRADY. From a military perspective, I do believe in giving the President as many options as possible, and that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary's decisionmaking, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their reliance on nuclear capabilities.

35. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, what is your understanding of allies' perspectives on potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy?

Admiral GRADY. I believe our alliances are our strategic center of gravity. The extended nuclear deterrence guarantees we provide to our allies have been called one of the most important and effective tools for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy should be carefully crafted in consultation with allies.

36. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, in your view, should the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist? Admiral GRADY. Yes.

37. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, do you believe that the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component of NATO's nuclear posture?

Admiral GRADY. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance unity.

38. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a hedge against an uncertain future security environment. Considering China's massive ongoing nuclear breakout, and Russia's increasingly aggressive behaviors, do you believe it is prudent for the United States to continue to maintain this role for its nuclear weapons in order to reduce the risks to the United States and its allies from a worsening international security environment?

Admiral GRADY. The speed at which China is modernizing its nuclear forces is deeply concerning which contributes to uncertainty and potential miscalculation. There are benefits to having the deterrent serve as a hedge. If confirmed, I will advocate for a modern US nuclear deterrent that can flexibly and credibly deter both Russia and China in a rapidly changing and dynamic security environment.

39. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review outlined a separate hedging strategy that would rely on a responsive and reliable nuclear weapons production infrastructure capable of producing new and additional weapons. However, more than a decade later, DOD is still unable to rely on the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) infrastructure as a viable hedging strategy due to its declining condition. If confirmed, will you support accelerating the modernization of NNSA's aging nuclear weapons production infrastructure as a hedge against future risks?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I will support the modernization of NNSA's infrastructure and will work with my Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) colleagues to determine the most effective way to do so.

MISSILE DEFENSE

40. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, the last review of roles and missions regarding missile defense occurred at Key West in March 1948. The realm of missile defense has evolved significantly since then and has expanded both in terms of threat and defensive capability. Do you believe a review of roles and missions regarding missile defense is necessary?

Admiral GRADY. Yes. Missile defense has become an increasingly complex warfighting function that spans the entirety of the joint force, touches numerous warfighting domains and often crosses combatant command areas of responsibility. As a joint force, we must be able to seamlessly integrate multi-mission sensors, battle management systems, active defensive systems as well as offensive capabilities to deter, and if necessary, defeat missile threats. I believe the Department must continue to re-evaluate not only our missile defense capabilities, but also whether we have the correct roles, responsibilities, and authorities to effectively develop, field and employ those systems.

41. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, this committee has received significant testimony regarding the threat that China's rapid military growth and modernization poses to U.S. citizens and military forces in Guam, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) reinforced the criticality of this issue when it placed defense of Guam at the top of its unfunded requirement list last year. Do you feel that our

missile defense forces in the Pacific are adequate to defend major military bases in Japan and Guam from advanced Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles?

Admiral GRADY. China is designing and fielding advanced missiles for land and maritime targets, with both conventional and nuclear warheads, and doing so at a record pace. We must have the capability to project forces forward in a conflict, and to counter missile capabilities from any country that would employ them against us, including China.

A comprehensive defense mission against such missile threats requires leveraging networked partners and integrating capabilities across the spectrum of operations. Numerous capability and capacity gaps do exist, and I look forward to working with the Department leadership and your committee to quickly field solutions that are both effective and affordable.

42. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, INDOPACOM has stated that its preferred defense solution for Guam is an Aegis Ashore based sensor-shooter architecture since there are no real alternatives that provide an equivalent level of capability and modularity in a reasonable timeframe given the threat. Do you believe there are available, cost-effective alternatives to an Aegis Ashore based system that could provide Guam with an equivalent sensor-shooter capability on an operationally relevant timeframe?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we continue to explore new and existing technology options that can reliably and affordably provide homeland defense capabilities and capacity as we prioritize resources and capabilities to the Indo-Pacific region.

43. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities against cruise and hypersonic missiles?

Admiral GRADY. China and Russia have fielded thousands of advanced cruise missiles and possess the industrial base to rapidly produce more. They routinely demonstrate the ability to launch cruise missiles from land, sea, air, and subsurface platforms in coordinated and structured attacks. Cruise missiles deliver lethal effects by flying at lower altitudes, along unpredictable trajectories, while remaining within earth's atmosphere.

Iran and North Korea have considerable investments in their cruise missile programs as well. For example, North Korea is advancing its land attack cruise missile program, along with anti-ship cruise missiles that provide Pyongyang the ability to threaten the United States, our allies, and our partners.

Hypersonic weapons, particularly those observed recently, incorporate the speed of ballistic missiles with the maneuvering capabilities of a cruise missile. While the speed of the hypersonic missiles offers its own challenge, their real advantage lies in the enhanced maneuverability and unpredictable flight paths they offer, which make them more difficult to track and target than traditional missiles.

If confirmed, I look forward to working as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to ensure requirements are prioritized among the Services and Agencies and that they are properly resourced to field affordable capability and capacity against these challenging threats.

SPACE

44. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, the Space Force mission is to protect and defend U.S. space assets as well as use the high ground of space to ensure our warfighters in other domains cannot only compete, but win. We don't want a fair fight, and space is essential to making sure it's not fair. Do you agree that the Space Force, as part of its title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip should be a first among equals as the chief architect for space?

Admiral GRADY. I agree. The Space Force is responsible for defining the operational architecture needed to accomplish its assigned missions.

45. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, how important is it for Services to transfer missions and people to the Space Force?

Admiral GRADY. It is vitally important to meeting the Space Force mission that we continue the process of successfully integrating units and capabilities into the Space Force.

46. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, does this promote efficiency and effectiveness or should each Service have its own "organic" space capabilities?

Admiral GRADY. The preponderance of space forces within the DOD resides with the Space Force, which does promote efficiency and effectiveness. However, the

other Services will continue to retain some organic space expertise to ensure that space is properly integrated into doctrine and operations. Some space capabilities directly tied to their domain-specific platforms and missions, such as ship-based systems, will remain with the other Services as well. As the department develops future space systems and missions they will be approved, assigned, and resourced in accordance with standard DOD processes

47. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, please explain why being the “first mover” in the space domain means and why our current space architecture is considered strategically unstable—or in fact encourages rapid escalation?

Admiral GRADY. The current State of the U.S. space architecture is vulnerable to attack because it relies on a small number of critically important satellites. An adversary’s well-placed and well-timed “first move” kinetic or non-kinetic attack on a small number of key satellites could cause great harm to our ability to execute a military response to aggression.

48. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Grady, should there be a conflict in space or a related domain, what are your views on the importance of unity of command as compared to unity of effort between DOD and Intelligence Community assets, both in space and on the ground?

Admiral GRADY. As in any other domain, unity of command of space activities is essential for effective and efficient execution. The capabilities and effects that those activities provide to warfighters and decisionmakers are fundamentally enabled by unity of effort. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community have a long history of collaborating in fielding and operating space capabilities that support U.S. leadership and preeminence in space. As adversaries increasingly threaten U.S. freedom of action in space, the DOD and IC must continue their collaboration in order to maintain a competitive advantage, prevail against foreign aggression, counter emergent threats, and achieve unified action. This collaboration will transform and strengthen the critical DOD and IC partnership in response to growing space threats.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON

W76–2

49. Senator COTTON. Admiral Grady, earlier this year Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that “The deployment of the W76–2 makes nuclear weapon use less likely. Specifically, W76–2 deployment will raise the nuclear threshold by helping to ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantages in limited nuclear use—making nuclear weapon employment less likely. The W76–2 provides deterrence and assurance through tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward basing may not be possible. Further, the W76–2 provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and serve as a valuable hedge against future nuclear “break out” scenarios. It also offers a timely response option able to penetrate adversary defenses and does not require host nation support to provide deterrent effect. Limited U.S. response options, provided by the W76–2, ensure a more credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., allies, and partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. Without this capability, adversaries may perceive an advantage at lower levels of conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.” Do you agree with Admiral Richard’s views on the W76–2? Please elaborate as to the extent you agree or disagree.

Admiral GRADY. I agree with Admiral Richard’s explanation of the W76–2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead. I would add that we do not need to match China or Russia capability-for-capability. What we need is a range of credible low-yield nuclear response options to convince potential adversaries that we will deny them the objectives they seek and impose costs that far outweigh those benefits they can achieve if they initiate limited nuclear use. The low-yield W76–2 provides a prompt, survivable strike option against targets that are heavily defended against air-delivered strikes. These unique capabilities enhance the U.S. ability to offer a credible nuclear response of limited nuclear strike, thereby strengthening deterrence and allied assurance.

NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

50. Senator COTTON. Admiral Grady, earlier this year Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before the House Armed Services

Committee that “The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is intended to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence limited nuclear employment would provide an advantage over the U.S., its allies, and partners. SLCM-N will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an assured response capability. It does not require host nation support and provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability. The SLCM-N will provide assurance to our allies and partners through tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward basing may not be possible. Limited U.S. response options, such as the SLCM-N, is intended to provide a more credible deterrent to limited attack against the U.S., allies, and partners rather than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.” Do you agree with Admiral Richard’s views on SLCM-N? Please elaborate as to the extent you agree or disagree.

Admiral GRADY. Yes, I do agree with Admiral Richard, and I support the continued development of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. I believe SLCM-N would enhance deterrence, raising the threshold for the use of low yield nuclear weapons by our adversaries. Additionally, SLCM-N would enhance our ability to provide extended deterrence to our Allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, without the need to ask our allies and partners to host more nuclear weapons.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

51. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, senior leaders at the Department of Defense periodically appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee to provide information to senators and answer their questions. This critical oversight function depends on forthright answers to challenging questions. I found your answers to my questions, and those of some of my colleagues, to be evasive and indirect. When you are asked to give your personal opinion, I expect you to give your personal opinion directly. In future appearances before this committee, will you commit to providing your personal opinion in a direct manner?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

READINESS

52. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, over several years this committee has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness—across each of our services—to levels that would enable our success in a conflict. We’ve had some success, but there is still a lot of work to do. If you have not done so already, I recommend that every senior defense leader read T.R. Fehrenbach’s “This Kind of War”, which provides a cautionary tale of our Nation’s failure to adequately fund and train our Armed Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were steep and American service members paid with their lives. If confirmed, you will invariably make decisions that directly or indirectly impact readiness. Accordingly, will you commit—if confirmed—to work with this committee and within the Department on further bolstering military readiness to ensure the failures we endured in the Korean War never happen again?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

BUDGET

53. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, do you believe a \$25 billion increase in the Department of Defense’s budget, above what President Biden deemed sufficient in his fiscal year 2022 budget, puts us in a stronger position to compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat China?

Admiral GRADY. Additional funding would enable the Department to further modernize and deliver relevant capabilities to counter China while further reducing risk.

54. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, do you believe that a future Department of Defense budget that fails to even keep pace with inflation would be adequate to address the security challenges we will likely face?

Admiral GRADY. I believe that sustaining the buying power of our funded programs is a critical part of ensuring the successful execution of our long-term investments in our defense infrastructure in support of the National Security Strategy.

55. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, the National Defense Strategy Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Secretaries of Defense, and the previous

and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all stated the need for sustained 3–5 percent annual real growth to the Defense budget to implement the National Defense Strategy (NDS), increase readiness, and advance long-overdue modernization. Further emphasizing the need for consistent and increased funding, the NDS Commission report stated, “America is very near the point of strategic insolvency, where its ‘means’ are badly out of alignment with its ‘ends.’” This critical situation is negatively compounded by the Biden administration’s dismal defense topline that does not keep pace with inflation. With these facts in mind, and understanding your ability to influence the budget will be limited to future year submissions, will you commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget vice a budget-driven strategy?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Department delivers strategy-driven budgets that are shaped by strategic guidance in order to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggressors. I look forward to working with OSD and Congress to achieve these ends.

GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC

56. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, given the National Defense Strategy’s focus on great power competition and increased Russia and Chinese activity in the Arctic, do you believe the Arctic is an emerging front-line for great power competition and rivalry? Please elaborate.

Admiral GRADY. DOD recognizes that increased Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic is challenging the international rules-based order. Russia views itself as a great polar power and regulates maritime operations in the Northern Sea Route in a manner contrary to international law. Meanwhile, while China is not an Arctic nation, it is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms. The Arctic is a rapidly evolving security environment where the Joint Force must prepare to respond promptly and effectively to contingencies.

57. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, can you explain why our adversaries would want to limit our presence and power projection capabilities in the Arctic region?

Admiral GRADY. Russia seeks to limit U.S. and allied presence and influence in the region because it views the Arctic as a strategic base of natural resources, seeks to develop its waterways as a major international shipping route, and sees the region as integral to its security. Militarily, Moscow is particularly concerned with protecting the ballistic missile submarines that are homeported in the Arctic and with ensuring its Northern Fleet’s ability to navigate throughout the European Arctic and North Atlantic; it has taken steps to deploy coastal-and air-defense systems to secure those goals. Economically, the Kremlin seeks to turn the Northern Sea Route—which runs along the Russian northern coast—into a major maritime shipping route, and to develop fossil fuel extraction projects in the region.

In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and declared China to be a “near-Arctic State.” This strategy calls on Beijing to preserve its access to abundant natural resources and sea lines of communication in the region and highlights the PRC’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to this strategy’s implementation. Since 2015, Beijing has pushed its state-owned enterprises to secure agreements to trade rare earth metals with countries such as Greenland, which is believed to host a quarter of the world’s rare earth reserves. Beijing’s expanding Arctic interests have created new opportunities for China-Russia engagement and probably will motivate the PRC to attempt to limit our presence and power projection capabilities in the Arctic.

58. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, what power projection capability gaps currently exist that inhibit our ability to effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic to compete with Russia and China in the northern latitudes?

Admiral GRADY. As DOD examines the attributes of Joint Force capabilities, posture, operations, and activities necessary for deterrence in the Arctic, it will do so in a strategy-driven and resource-informed way. Determinations will be made on the basis of U.S. interests, National Defense Strategy goals and priorities, DOD’s Arctic objectives, and emerging threats in the Arctic and other key theaters of competition. We have important work to do along with Canada to modernize sensor coverage of North America to support Arctic awareness. We also need to look for ways to improve Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability above 65 degrees North latitude. The Coast Guard and Navy are also working together in an integrated program office to develop and field the Polar Security Cutter, and Coast Guard is working through

a 4-year service life extension of the icebreaker Polar Star to ensure polar access through delivery of the Polar Security Cutter in 2025.

59. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, will you commit to visiting Alaska with me in your first year to see first-hand the opportunities for the U.S. military offered by my great State?

Admiral GRADY. Yes

60. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, the fiscal year 2022 NDAA will include the Arctic Security Initiative (ASI), a bipartisan provision that requires the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander to conduct an independent assessment of the resources, posture, and activities required to meet U.S. defense policy objectives in the Arctic. ASI will also authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish the Arctic Security Initiative. Will you commit to supporting the NORTHCOM Commander's independent assessment and the establishment of ASI?

Admiral GRADY. Arctic security is critically important and if confirmed I look forward to working with NORTHCOM on this matter.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUREAUCRACY

61. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, General John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has repeatedly stated his growing concern over the Department of Defense's inability to "move fast" when compared to China and Russia due to agency bureaucracy and risk-aversion. Do you agree that our existing bureaucratic processes may disadvantage us compared to China and Russia?

Admiral GRADY. Yes. If confirmed, I will prioritize opportunities where the Department can streamline processes, reduce bureaucracy, and become more efficient in order to outpace the continuously evolving challenges posed by China and Russia.

62. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, if our existing bureaucratic processes may disadvantage us compared to China and Russia, what is your personal opinion on how to address this?

Admiral GRADY. There are benefits and challenges with our existing processes and there is room for improvement. We must get better managing program and acquisition risk and inserting speed in our processes. This includes empowering and developing our workforce—the workforce of today and of the future—and it means developing a more resilient defense industrial base that can meet the needs of the Department. We also need to assess how we can better leverage technology, innovation, and industry partnerships, trade schools, and academia to field and develop capabilities that outpace our security challenges.

63. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, are there certain entities within the Department of Defense that are preventing us from "moving fast" as General Hyten described?

Admiral GRADY. If confirmed, I will absolutely look for ways to carry on Gen. Hyten's hard work to "move fast" and will not be silent when I see bureaucratic processes or entities impeding our ability to move rapidly.

64. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, how can Congress help the Department of Defense remove structural or procedural impediments to "moving fast"?

Admiral GRADY. congressional oversight is incredibly important, and I think we have to get more comfortable with leveraging and applying learning and opportunities when failures occur in programs with promising technological breakthroughs. The ability to learn from these exploratory, hypothesis testing, or uncertain and complex process "failures" is crucial to the delivery of advanced warfighting capabilities especially as we look at hypersonic capabilities.

TRANSFORMING THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

65. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, as the Vice Chairman, you would chair the JROC, which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs uses as an advisory council to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on requirements prioritization and the conformance of programs and budgets to priorities established both in strategic plans and those identified by the combatant commands. Former Vice Chairman General Hyten advocated that the JROC needed to be more fixated on near-term capability gaps and indicated that upcoming JROC guidance would focus on allowing lower-level officials flexibility in how they tackle acquisition issues. This past May he said, "[t]hey have to be given the responsibility, the authority and the funding flexibility

to make decisions, put money where it needs to be, and go fast because otherwise we will not be able to keep up with our adversaries.” Do you share General Hyten’s concerns?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

66. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, if you share General Hyten’s concerns, what is your personal opinion on how to address them?

Admiral GRADY. I believe General Hyten and the Vice Chiefs have set the stage to address the JROC’s concerns with respect to going faster while maintaining oversight and moving at a rate that paces or outpaces our adversaries. I will continue to address this concern as the JROC Chair. I will address this by continuing to apply the JROC’s charter of providing Strategic Directives that enable Service funding flexibility to address capability gaps within their portfolios. This practice will continue in concert with OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) as critical advisors to the JROC process.

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKAN RANGE COMPLEX AND MILITARY TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES IN ALASKA

67. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, the JROC is creating a revised joint warfighting concept called “expanded maneuver” and its next strategic directive will provide the services with a unified integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) vision. The JROC has already approved a strategic directive for four areas—joint fires, contested logistics, joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and information advantage. General Hyten believes the JROC will be challenged to develop “expanded maneuver” since there is a lack of “good campaign level modelling across all domains, including space and cyber that show how all these things fit together across the board.” Can you explain the relationship between training, modeling, and concept development?

Admiral GRADY. The Joint Warfighting Concept and expanded maneuver are foundational concepts designed to address gaps with respect to future warfighting challenges. While aspirational, these concepts will continually evolve based on experimentation, training, modeling and simulation, additional concept development, and applying what we learn. Modeling and simulation create the operational environment for experimentation to occur. Both current and future force models should blend all five warfighting domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, all dimensions of warfare (conventional, irregular, and nuclear), across the spectrum of conflict to best represent how a campaign would unfold.

68. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, how many ranges in the United States allow the Joint Force to exercise all domains concurrently?

Admiral GRADY. Currently, there is no single physical range that allows the Joint Force to exercise all domains concurrently. Exercising the Joint Force across all domains will need to be accomplished through the modernization of live ranges and the further development and fielding of systems that provide realistic virtual and constructive environments. More efforts, like INDOPACOM’s Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC), which includes the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), will be required to train to and integrate all domain operations.

69. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, how important is it to the Joint Staff to have training ranges capable of employing the full capabilities of equipment like 5th-generation fighters to test and refine new doctrine and operating concepts?

Admiral GRADY. The Joint Force requires improvements to live, virtual, and constructive training infrastructure in order to create realistic training environments and stress the full capabilities of the Joint Force. New systems like 5th generation fighters and new units like the Marine Littoral Regiment or Army Multi-Domain Task Force need training ranges that have the capacity and scale to integrate capabilities across all domains. Current training infrastructure permits the Joint Force to either integrate capabilities across the traditional domains of air, land and sea together or the newly recognized domains of space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum individually. Training infrastructure and ranges, like the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), require modernization to enable the Joint Force to train and prepare for conflict with a peer adversary across all domains. This modernization will need to include the integration of virtual and constructive means that enable the Joint Force to further test and evaluate warfighting concepts, techniques, and procedures, while concealing the full capabilities of current and emerging systems.

FUTURE RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION CONCERNS

70. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, I would like to get your thoughts on an issue that I view with increasingly deep concern, an issue that serves as the foundation for our military now and into the future. The issue I am referencing is the recruitment and retention of a highly talented, All Volunteer Joint Force. Let me cite a few metrics that are driving this concern. First, the recently published Reagan National Defense Survey indicates that trust in the military has fallen from 70 percent in November 2018 to a dismal 45 percent in November 2021. That is concerning. Second, a recently released Harvard Kennedy School Youth Poll reported results that indicate the majority of young Americans do not believe the United States is an exceptional country. This is equally concerning. And, third, the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service detailed in their report to Congress that only 29 percent of the population is eligible to serve in the Armed Forces. I think you can see where I'm going with this. Overlap this decreasing propensity to service with the few that are even eligible to do so, and it appears we are headed toward a very uncertain future for recruiting and retaining a highly talented, All Volunteer Joint Force. How are we going to recruit and retain service members into an institution that a growing number of Americans do not trust, to serve a country that they do not believe is exceptional?

Admiral GRADY. National service—both military and civilian—is one of the core tenants of our country. Addressing challenges with respect to recruitment and retention is a multifaceted challenge that will require focused leadership and attention from the Services and across the broader Department and key stakeholders to ensure access to talent. Part of my personal philosophy is that a strong family means a stronger fleet and to achieve this I would prioritize how we can 1) work to restore trust by; remaining an apolitical institution, being the world's best, most lethal fighting force, and being open and accountable fiscal stewards of taxpayer dollars, 2) explore stronger partnerships with the broader population to include industry, academia and trade schools, and especially the communities which host our installations, 3) create a safe, secure, and productive working environment for the sons and daughters of America. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department and collaborating with all stakeholders to also raise awareness about the incredible career opportunities that exist in the military for professional, technical, skilled and craft labor.

71. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, what ideas do you have for both the Department and Congress to work together to reverse these concerning trends?

Admiral GRADY. The U.S. military must continue to engage with the whole of American society to increase understanding of the Department of Defense roles and responsibilities and enhance the military's access to a wide array of talent. Defense leaders, as well as our many talented service members, must continue to engage with American society and effectively publicize to our fellow citizens the important and unique role the military has in protecting and defending the Nation.

If confirmed, I look forward to assessing more specific opportunities to address these challenges and leverage opportunities.

SYSTEMIC RACISM

72. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, do you believe that systemic racism exists within the Department of Defense?

Admiral GRADY. I do not believe the Department of Defense is a fundamentally racist organization. I do recognize that racial and ethnic biases still exist, and service members continue to experience and report racial/ethnic discrimination. This harms the readiness and lethality of the Joint Force and we must do better to address this and foster greater unity among all service members.

PURPOSE AND MISSION OF THE U.S. MILITARY

73. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, what is the purpose and mission of the U.S. military?

Admiral GRADY. The military's enduring mission is to defend the United States and its interests. We do this by providing combat-credible military forces needed to deter war, and if deterrence fails, win wars.

ENGAGEMENTS WITH REPORTERS AND AUTHORS

74. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, I believe it is important for senior leaders in the Department of Defense to engage with the media and the American people. I also believe that senior leaders must exercise discretion in deciding whether or not

to talk to an individual reporter or author. Recent books featuring alleged statements and recollections of senior Department of Defense leaders have caused unnecessary controversy that distracts from our focus on China, Russia, and other threats around the world. Will you commit to not sit for interviews with authors or journalists writing books about events occurring while you are still in uniform?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

SIZE OF THE U.S. NAVY

75. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, do you believe that in both the short-and long-term, the Navy must increase the number of ships in the fleet to effectively compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat China?

Admiral GRADY. First, I appreciate Congress' direction to achieve a 355 ship Navy, as written into law. Further, I believe a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned platforms is an effective and affordable way to meet the security demands of our Nation. Analysis confirms that ship numbers is just one of many factors required to achieve the correct balance of capability and capacity needed in order to achieve the combat effectiveness required of our Navy's fleet.

PACIFIC DETERRENCE INITIATIVE

76. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, will you commit to support the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and aligning the Department of Defense's funding process for PDI with that used for the European Deterrence Initiative?

Admiral GRADY. I am committed to supporting the PDI and ensuring the Department's investments on a global scale are optimized to deter, and if necessary, defeat, any strategic competitor, with China as the pacing threat. If confirmed, I look forward to working with OSD and Congress to balance resources toward modernization, operations, and readiness to effectively address these threats.

TAIWAN

77. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, do you believe the United States should use its leverage as Taiwan's largest arms supplier to ensure it acquires equipment and weapons to execute an asymmetric defense doctrine?

Admiral GRADY. The Department continues to engage our Taiwan counterparts to ensure we share the same definition of asymmetric defense and share the same understanding of the PRC Most Likely Course of Action. If confirmed, I will continue to support an emphasis of asymmetric acquisitions.

78. Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral Grady, do you believe the United States presently has the will, capability, and capacity to contest a Chinese amphibious invasion, blockade, quarantine, or air assault against Taiwan?

Admiral GRADY. The U.S. military is ready, willing, and able to carry out our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION INFRASTRUCTURE

79. Senator BLACKBURN. Admiral Grady, if major weapons life extension programs are funded, but infrastructure, recapitalization, and maintenance are starved, what sort of impacts can we expect to see unfold?

Admiral GRADY. Nuclear modernization cannot occur without resilient and modern infrastructure and supporting workforce. This includes key scientific and manufacturing infrastructure capabilities necessary to modernize the surveil the nuclear deterrent. The NNSA is one of the Department's most important relationships. I am firmly committed to working with NNSA's leadership, the national laboratories, and the production complex to ensure the delivery of military requirements. The nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of our national security. To that end, I support modernizing and recapitalizing NNSA's critically important infrastructure. This will require sustained funding and support over time. Without a modern and resilient infrastructure and workforce, we will be challenged to modernize the nuclear deterrent.

80. Senator BLACKBURN. Admiral Grady, what modernization impacts can we anticipate for the key secondaries group of capabilities—enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and lithium—if recapitalization program funding for infrastructure modernization is decreased?

Admiral GRADY. Infrastructure investments, including those that underpin key weapons materials and components, are necessary for modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Without sufficient investments in these areas, modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile will not be possible which will directly impact DOD's ability to field effective U.S. nuclear forces. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage a strong partnership between the DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration through the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure these investments remain sufficient.

CHINA

81. Senator BLACKBURN. Admiral Grady, how can our policy toward maintaining Taiwan's freedom be less "one dimensional" in the sense that we incorporate more than just DOD operations plans and incorporate a more whole-of-government approach?

Admiral GRADY. Our competition with China and our policy toward Taiwan are multi-dimensional. Integrated deterrence is not just about taking a multi-domain approach using our military instruments of power, but also taking a multi-domain, whole-of-government approach that brings our diplomatic, economic, and other instruments of national power to bear in support of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the DOD continues to support the interagency effort toward an integrated, whole-of-government approach. The United States will not be able to fully deter the PRC if we continue to rely on military posture alone. We must leverage trade, commerce, treasury, diplomatic, and other intergovernmental tools in order to create the conditions for deterrence. We must also leverage our worldwide network of Alliances to further this effort.

82. Senator BLACKBURN. Admiral Grady, of all the qualitative and quantitative investments China has made in their nuclear arsenal, which concern you the most?

Admiral GRADY. I remain most concerned about China's aggressive pursuit of an increasingly capable and viable nuclear triad, which includes advanced delivery platforms. The People's Liberation Army Navy already has operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines providing a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Chinese also continue to pursue long range aircraft capable of delivering air-launched ballistic missiles. Finally, open press has reported on the construction of hundreds of new missile silos, and on a new fractional-orbit hypersonic system which represents a highly advanced weapons delivery platform. Taken together, the elements of China's emerging triad are problematic and raise concerns about their intentions and nuclear doctrine.

83. Senator BLACKBURN. Admiral Grady, given the scope and scale of China's investment in their nuclear forces, what can we infer about their intentions and nuclear doctrine?

Admiral GRADY. Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to expand and diversify its nuclear forces. For example, last year the DOD estimated that the PRC had a nuclear warhead stockpile in the low 200's and projected it to at least double over the next decade. Since then, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion, which may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and perhaps as many as 1,000 warheads by 2030. These warheads and delivery platforms likely equal the effectiveness, reliability and survivability of similar platforms currently under development in the United States. These developing capabilities span the range from tactical to strategic and demonstrate an approach that seeks to undermine credible U.S. deterrence.

Given these facts, combined with PLA documents describing a future combat style characterized by integrated joint operations under a unified command, I would infer that China is seeking to expand its options in terms of nuclear doctrine and strategy. These could include combining and integrating their conventional and nuclear capabilities into their warfighting doctrine. They could pursue this approach to nullify U.S. deterrence strategy, which as you are aware includes the extended deterrence strategy for our allies.

84. Senator BLACKBURN. Admiral Grady, in light of China's ongoing nuclear force expansion, do you believe it is prudent to scale back any aspect of the current U.S. nuclear modernization plan?

Admiral GRADY. No. I believe that would be a dangerous course of action. China is not the only nation pursuing nuclear force expansion. Russia is also expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal. Given the aging State of every leg of our nuclear triad, as well as the systems we rely on to execute nuclear command and con-

trol, it is imperative that existing modernization efforts continue and that we remain open to innovative and prudent ways to ensure the capabilities of our nuclear enterprise can meet the challenges of an uncertain future. A credible modern nuclear force provides the foundation for strategic deterrence. With multiple competitors either expanding or developing their own capabilities, we must remain mindful that any reduction in our nuclear forces would undermine strategic deterrence and potentially invite adventurism by nations equipped with a modern nuclear arsenal.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

DEFENSE STRATEGY, FORCE PLANNING, AND FORCE POSTURE

85. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing threat. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Why or why not?

Admiral GRADY. I agree with the Secretary's designation. Beijing aims to achieve "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by 2049 to match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and revise the international order to be more advantageous to Beijing's authoritarian system and national interests. PRC leaders have emphasized strengthening the PLA into a "world-class" military as an essential part of this strategy to expand Beijing's national power. To that end, the PRC continues to strengthen its ability to project power globally, coerce Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes, and counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along its periphery.

86. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's designation? Why or why not?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, I do. A geostrategic struggle between the free international rules-based order and a repressive world order is occurring in the Indo-Pacific region. This region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. There is a historical precedence for U.S. interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific, and some of our strongest defense alliances are in this region—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.

87. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, "The PRC [People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario." In your personal opinion, do you agree with the designation of a Taiwan contingency as the Department's pacing scenario? Why or why not?

Admiral GRADY. I agree with the Assistant Secretary. The Taiwan issue does present the pacing scenario in the West Pacific. Supporting our allies and partners in this region against an increasingly aggressive PRC is key to the maintenance of the current international rules-based order and ability to address the parameters of the Taiwan scenario postures us to be able to effectively respond to a wide array of potential scenarios in the western Pacific.

88. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino, and former Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Phil Davidson, among others, have testified that the U.S. military must maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan in order to strengthen our ability to deter such a contingency. In your personal opinion, do you agree that the U.S. military must maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

89. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Secretary Austin wrote earlier this year that a "combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter, and if necessary, deny a fait accompli scenario." Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner have since reaffirmed the Secretary's emphasis on denial, as have INDOFACOM Com-

mander Admiral John Aquilino and former INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Philip Davidson. Indeed, Secretary Karlin went so far as to write, “I believe strongly that deterrence by denial should be prioritized when it comes to China, and Taiwan in particular. Deterrence by cost-imposition or deterrence by punishment can complement but should not supplant deterrence by denial when it comes to deterring China.” In your personal opinion, do you agree that deterrence by denial is the best approach to deterring a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

90. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you agree that combat-credible forces forward are instrumental to the U.S. military’s ability to deny a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

91. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino testified earlier this year that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is “much closer to us than most think” and that this threat could materialize well before 2035. Former Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson went even further, testifying that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is “manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next 6 years.” In your personal opinion, do you agree that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is one we must be concerned about in this decade, not just in the 2030’s or later?

Admiral GRADY. I respect Admiral Aquilino and Admiral Davidson’s assessments. The People’s Liberation Army’s rate of growth in both capacity and capability has outpaced our projections for years. It is reasonable to assume that China could achieve a level of military means within the next decade that could embolden them to military action against Taiwan. The Joint Force needs to continue to act with allies and partners to ensure that cross-strait tension does not result in military conflict and remain committed to our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

92. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, given the increasingly urgent threat of a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, do you commit to prioritize efforts to maintain the U.S. military’s ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, if you are confirmed?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, I am committed to prioritizing efforts to maintain the U.S. military’s ability to prevent a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan and most importantly to ensure that cross-strait tension does not result in military conflict.

93. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, many of the Department of Defense’s most important modernization programs will not produce results at scale until the 2030’s. In your personal opinion, what concrete steps should the Department of Defense take to strengthen deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prior to 2030?

Admiral GRADY. I believe it’s important to recognize that while we are modernizing our force, we currently have significant deterrent capabilities postured in the region, and we are adjusting that posture to enhance those capabilities even further. Taiwan, along with our other allies and partners, are also making adjustments to their own force posture. We are, and will, continue to assist our allies and partners in bolstering their own deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to seeking opportunities to accelerate the development and delivery of capabilities to this critically important region.

94. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you agree that the Department of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget?

Admiral GRADY. We must always start with the threat. This should drive our global posture and allocation of resources to ensure we are positioned to deter adversaries and win conflicts if deterrence fails. If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to ensure our resource priorities are aligned to address threats in a highly dynamic and rapidly changing security environment.

95. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin sent me the following earlier this year: “I believe that the force planning construct should prioritize and focus on China unless and until the security environment changes dramatically” and that “the threat China poses to Taiwan should be a priority” for the force planning construct. In your personal opinion, do you agree with Secretary Karlin’s statement?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

ALLIED AND PARTNER BURDEN-SHARING

96. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you agree that Taiwan needs to field cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense capabilities as quickly as possible in order to strengthen deterrence against a Chinese invasion?
Admiral GRADY. Yes.

97. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you agree that Taiwan's acquisition and deployment of asymmetric defense capabilities is essential not just for strengthening deterrence against a Chinese invasion, but also for reducing operational risk to American Forces who may be sent to help Taiwan repel such an invasion?
Admiral GRADY. Yes.

98. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you agree that it is critical for Taiwan to prioritize acquisition of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense capabilities?
Admiral GRADY. Yes.

99. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith wrote the following to me prior to her confirmation: "I have long argued that NATO's defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] ought to be a floor, not a ceiling. It is my view that allies should treat it as such and invest according. That is because the world is not unipolar anymore. The security environment has changed dramatically since the Wales Pledge was drafted." In your personal opinion, do you agree with Ambassador Smith that our NATO allies should be increasing defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP?

Admiral GRADY. Yes, 2 percent should be the floor and not the ceiling with respect to NATO defense spending.

MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY

100. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, do you commit to ensuring that DOD and the military services adhere to a forthright and clear process of evaluating requests for religious exemption requests for the COVID-19 vaccination, if you are confirmed?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

101. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, do you commit to ensuring that all exemption requests are evaluated on a case by case basis, as well as involving your key advisors on spiritual issues—your chaplains—at all stages of decisionmaking when a request for a religious exemption is involved—and particularly at the final stage, as is ordinarily the case with other accommodation requests, if you are confirmed?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

102. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, do you commit to providing my office and offices of other Members of Congress with requested information regarding the religious accommodation process and relevant records in a thorough and timely manner, if you are confirmed?

Admiral GRADY. Yes.

103. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, are you concerned that a failure to fairly and even-handedly consider religious exemption requests could result in the loss of high-quality service members who have devoted their lives to serving our county, thereby creating a national security risk?

Admiral GRADY. The military has established and documented processes and procedures to consider exemptions. The COVID outbreak on USS Theodore Roosevelt highlighted the impact that an infectious disease outbreak can have on lethality and combat readiness. The tragic loss of a member of the crew who died of COVID is now almost completely preventable with the use of vaccines. Each of us who volunteers to serve in uniform commits to complying with applicable regulations, and I respect the right of Service members to choose to pursue alternative careers if they believe they cannot comply with a lawful order. While I regret that some service members will choose to leave the service instead of getting vaccinated against COVID-19, current data shows that the numbers of those leaving will not be significant enough to present a national security risk.

[The nomination reference of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN1328

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
November 1, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 154 and 601:

To Be Admiral

Adm. Christopher W. Grady, 8461

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]



**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER WATSON GRADY
U.S. NAVY**

23 MAY 1984 Ensign
23 MAY 1986 Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 SEP 1988 Lieutenant
01 NOV 1994 Lieutenant Commander
01 AUG 1999 Commander
01 APR 2006 Captain
01 FEB 2012 Designated Rear Admiral (lower half)
 while serving in billets commensurate
 with that grade
01 MAR 2013 Rear Admiral (lower half)
01 AUG 2015 Rear Admiral
28 OCT 2016 Vice Admiral
04 MAY 2018 Admiral, service continuous to date



<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Naval War College, Newport, RI (Assistant to Special Events)	MAY 1984	JUL 1984
Surface Warfare School, Newport, RI (DUINS)	JUL 1984	OCT 1984
Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA (DUINS)	NOV 1984	JAN 1985
USS MOOSBRUGGER (DD 980) (Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer)	JAN 1985	AUG 1987
Joint Staff (Intern, J5)	AUG 1987	SEP 1988
Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense (Aide)	SEP 1988	MAR 1989
National Defense University Transition Planning Committee (Special Assistant to the Chairman)	APR 1989	SEP 1989
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Assistant Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations)	SEP 1989	OCT 1990
Surface Warfare School, Newport, RI (DUINS)	OCT 1990	MAY 1991
USS PRINCETON (CG 59) (Combat Systems Officer)	MAY 1991	MAY 1994
Georgetown University (Student)	MAY 1994	JUN 1995
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Assistant Branch Head) (N52)	JUN 1995	JUN 1997
Mine Countermeasures Rotational Crew Echo (Commanding Officer)	JUN 1997	AUG 1999

**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER WATSON GRADY
U.S. NAVY**

<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES (CONT'D)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Mine Countermeasures Requirements Officer) (N85)	AUG 1999	DEC 1999
Office of Legislative Affairs (Executive Assistant)	DEC 1999	MAR 2002
USS COLE (DDG 67) (Commanding Officer)	MAR 2002	JUL 2004
White House (Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council)	JUL 2004	AUG 2006
National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, DC (Student)	AUG 2006	JUN 2007
Destroyer Squadron TWENTY TWO (Commander)	JUL 2007	JUN 2009
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations)	JUN 2009	OCT 2011
U.S. Pacific Fleet (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Training, and Readiness) (N3/N7)	OCT 2011	JAN 2014
Carrier Strike Group ONE (Commander)	JAN 2014	JUL 2015
Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Commander)	JUL 2015	OCT 2016
U.S. SIXTH Fleet (Commander)/Task Force SIX (Commander)/Striking and Support Forces NATO (Commander)/U.S. Naval Forces Europe (Deputy Commander)/U.S. Naval Forces Africa (Deputy Commander)/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Europe	OCT 2016	APR 2018
U.S. Fleet Forces Command (Commander)	MAY 2018	JAN 2021
U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Commander) (previously Fleet Forces Command)	JAN 2021	MAY 2021
U.S. Fleet Forces Command (Commander)	MAY 2021	TO DATE

**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER WATSON GRADY
U.S. NAVY**

MEDALS AND AWARDS

Defense Superior Service Medal	Navy "E" Ribbon with three "E's"
Legion of Merit	Navy Expeditionary Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars	National Defense Service Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal	Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat "V" and three Gold Stars	Southwest Asia Service Medal
Joint Service Achievement Medal	Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award	Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars	Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars
	Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait)

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

BS (History) University of Notre Dame, 1984
 MS (Foreign Affairs) Georgetown University, 1995
 MS (National Security Strategy) National War College, 2007
 Designated Surface Warfare Officer, 1986
 Designated Joint Qualified Officer, 2007
 CAPSTONE 2013-1

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

German

**TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER WATSON GRADY
U.S. NAVY**

SUMMARY OF JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignments</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Rank</u>
White House (Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council)	JUL 04 – AUG 06	CDR/ CAPT

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[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN in connection with his nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2021 -- 2022
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. Name (Include any former names you have used):
Grady, Christopher W.
2. Position to which nominated:
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
3. Date of nomination: 1 November 2021
4. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the Committee by the applicable agency/department/board):
NONE

5. **Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**

NONE

6. **Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held, in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations):**

NONE

7. **Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements, in addition to those listed in the service record extract and biographical provided to the Committee by the agency or department):**

The University of Notre Dame Rev. William Corby C.S.C. Award for distinguished military service. The Corby Award is conferred annually on a Notre Dame alumnus for distinguished service in the armed forces.

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

8. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?**

YES

9. Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate Committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?

YES

10. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?

YES

11. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

YES

12. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

YES

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

YES

14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

YES

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?


YES

7

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein, and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. W. Grady", written over a horizontal line.

This 1st day of November, 2021

[The nomination of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on December 14, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2021.]