    [Senate Hearing 117-994]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                          S. Hrg. 117-994

                  THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER
                    W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
                    THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE
                    CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 8, 2021

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                          U.S GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-383 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    �JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    �
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    �
    �
    �		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
    � 		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                december 8, 2021

                                                                       Page
    The Nomination of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN for               1
      Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman
      of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Grady, Admiral Christopher W., USN for Reappointment to the Grade     3
      of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
      Staff.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    39

      Questions for the Record.......................................    80

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   102

      Biographical Sketch............................................   103

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   107

      Signature Page.................................................   111

                                     (iii)

                  This hearing is printed to include all available
                    information
                    requested or required to be inserted for the
                    record.

                                      (iv)

     THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN FOR REAPPOINTMENT
    TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
                                     STAFF

                          Wednesday, December 8, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn,
    Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
        Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the
    nomination of Admiral Christopher Grady to be Vice Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Thank you, Admiral, for your continued service and
    willingness to lead in this important position.
        I would also like to welcome your wife Christine. We are
    grateful to your family for their sacrifice and continued
    support of your service to the nation.
        You have served most recently as the Commander of Fleet
    Forces Command, which included responsibility for STRATCOM's
    sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. That experience, along with
    your distinguished career of service across multiple theaters
    and command at all levels, will serve you well in this new
    role.
        I would also note that you were born in Newport, Rhode
    Island, and are a native of Middletown, Rhode Island, which
    makes this a very pleasant experience.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Reed. As we consider this nomination, we must keep
    in mind that the United States is engaged in a strategic
    competition with China and Russia. These near-peer rivals do
    not accept U.S. global leadership or the international norms
    that have helped keep the peace for the better part of a
    century. This strategic competition is likely to intensify due
    to shifts in the military balance of power and diverging
    visions of governance between China and Russia and the West.
    This competition is also unfolding amidst a global pandemic,
    climate change, and the emergence of highly disruptive
    technologies.
        Further, the Defense Department must continue to recruit
    and retain high-caliber individuals, while restoring readiness
    and pursuing new high-end capabilities for the force. The
    interconnected nature of these challenges will drive how the
    Department and the military services adapt to achieve their
    missions.
        Admiral Grady, if confirmed as Vice Chairman, you will be
    working closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    General Milley, to address each of these issues, and I hope you
    will share your views on them with the Committee.
        In addition, as Vice Chairman, you will serve a key role in
    the interagency process that often requires working closely
    with senior policymakers within the Department and at the
    National Security Council on critical national security issues.
    In light of the strategic challenges I referenced earlier, the
    Committee looks forward to hearing your thoughts on the
    effectiveness of the interagency process.
        Finally, the Vice Chairman is assigned a number of specific
    responsibilities within the Department. First, the Vice
    Chairman oversees the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the
    JROC, which reviews requirements for acquisition programs to
    ensure they are reasonable and necessary. Second, as a senior
    member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Vice Chairman plays
    a central role in ensuring the U.S. safely maintains its
    nuclear weapons stockpile. Lastly, the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense and the Vice Chairman often partner to lead the
    Department in addressing policy challenges that require the
    integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.
        I look forward to hearing how you will prioritize and
    execute each of these critical functions, if confirmed as the
    Vice Chairman.
        Thank you, again, for your willingness to serve our Nation,
    and I look forward to your testimony.
        Now, let me now recognize the ranking member, Senator
    Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Grady, thank you for your decades of standing watch
    over our security, and for your continued willingness, as well
    as your family's willingness, to continue your service in this
    direction.
        For the past 3 years, this Committee has used the 2018
    National Defense Strategy to help guide our oversight and
    legislative direction. I always like to comment that this is
    something that works. Many things don't work around here, but
    this does. It started off with an equal representation of
    Democrats and Republicans and has been a great guide for us.
        China continues to modernize its military at an alarming
    pace. On November 15, Russia tested an anti-satellite missile,
    shattering a satellite into 1500 pieces of lethal debris that
    made astronauts scramble for safety.
        Even more dangerously, Russia is postured to attack Ukraine
    in what could be the largest invasion we have seen since World
    War II. We have got to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine now
    to deter a Russian attack. Every day President Biden waits, he
    makes an attack more likely.
        Finally, the administration added to the problem with the
    botched evacuation of American citizens and allies from
    Afghanistan that we still recall, we remember, and we regret.
    This disaster shatters U.S. credibility and determines the
    trust of partners and allies; the same partners and allies who
    are supposed to be our biggest advantage over our adversaries.
        While the world gets more dangerous, the administration
    foolishly wants to cut defense spending. Thankfully, this
    year's NDAA, with its great success, I have to say, last night
    in the House, is bringing this back to where it should be.
        Admiral Grady you will be critical to helping this nation
    maintain an effective nuclear deterrent and accelerate adoption
    of advanced technology like the hypersonic weapons, advanced
    materials, and artificial intelligence to meet warfighter
    requirements.
        It is very rare and the American people are now catching on
    that we really are not in a position to be the number one in
    everything anymore, as it was ever since World War II. So, I
    consider ourselves right now, and as I have mentioned to you,
    Admiral, to be in the greatest threatened position that we have
    been in as a nation. So, you have got your work cut out for
    you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Admiral Grady, you are recognized for your statement.

          STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHRISTOPHER W. GRADY, USN FOR
     REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN
                      OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

        Admiral Grady. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished
    Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, good morning to
    you all.
        It is a great honor to appear before you today as President
    Biden's nominee to assume the duties as the twelfth Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I want to thank the
    President, Secretary Austin, Chairman Milley, Secretary Del
    Toro, CNO Gilday for their trust and confidence. I think it is
    important that I also recognize General Hyten and his wife
    Laura for their extraordinary service to our nation and to our
    servicemembers and to their families.
        I would also like to acknowledge the passing of your
    colleague, a great American senator, Senator Dole, and really
    to acknowledge his military service and support to our nation
    as a member of the greatest generation.
        Of course, I want to thank all of you for your stalwart
    support for our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, our marines,
    our coast guardsmen, and our guardians, who defend our nation
    at home, and abroad, far forward, around the world every day.
        Joining me today is my wife Christine, who has been my
    partner and my confidant and my rock since I was at Hansen. She
    has been the model of family and service and strength; service
    and strength to those families, to the communities we serve,
    and, indeed, to the nation. I would say that Christine is also
    the singular reason that our three sons, Nick, Luke, and Paul,
    who could not join us today, are, indeed, the men that they
    are; men, in whom I am very proud, and men who always step up
    to their responsibilities as sons, husbands, and citizens.
        I firmly believe that family readiness directly contributes
    to operational readiness. I have always said that a stronger
    family means a stronger fleet, and after 37 years of service, I
    can competently say that it is because of our families and
    their service and their sacrifice, that we continue to be the
    most powerful military the world has ever known.
        I truly appreciate this Committee's leadership in this new
    era of strategic competition; it is an extraordinarily complex
    and dynamic environment, where we are faced with overt
    challenges to the international rules-based order and our
    national security in every domain, from the seabed, to the
    space, to cyberspace, the land domain, the air domain, and all.
        In this, we compete alongside our allies and partners every
    day in a multiworld; a world that is multiregional,
    multilateral, multidomain, multivector, multiphase, multilevel,
    and multiauthority. It is the speed of information, the
    arsenals of sophisticated, asymmetric, conventional, and
    nuclear weapons, and the destructive ability of our competitors
    to attack below the threshold of armed conflict, that have
    changed the character of that competition. So now, more than
    ever, global integration is essential and integrated deterrence
    in those multidomains, leveraging all elements of national
    power across the whole-of-government and with our allies and
    partners, it is absolutely critical.
        Here, I would say that there is no such thing as a fair
    fight. Our competitors are moving fast and we must move faster.
    I have always viewed things through two lenses in my 37 years:
    the fleet and the foundry. The fleet is the fight and how we
    integrate into the Joint Force and the foundry is what enables
    that fight, and I believe that speed and urgency are required
    in both. We will get faster, by leveraging our competitive
    advantages.
        First, our unrivaled industrial base that I believe truly
    is borne of our innovative and open society.
        Secondly, our many allies and partners, with whom we are
    stronger together. Third, our servicemen and women who are
    always resolute, ready, and lethal on arrival; they truly are
    the center of the universe.
        So, if confirmed, I look forward to working with this
    Committee and the Congress, the senior leadership in the
    Department of Defense, the interagency team, industry, and our
    allies and partners to ensure that the center of the universe
    never goes into a fair fight.
        Once again, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear
    before you today and I look forward to your questions. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral, I have a series of questions that are required for
    all senior nominees. Please respond appropriately.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Admiral Grady. No, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.
        Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
    this Committee when requested?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
    Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
    differ from the administration?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees, and to consult with the requester regarding the
    basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such
    records?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate and provide any witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional request?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Admiral, you are assuming a tremendously important role, if
    confirmed, in our Defense Department. One of the significant
    roles is the chair of Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
    which will put you in the position of helping us deliver,
    rapidly, the most appropriate new weapon systems for the
    forces.
        As we discussed during the office call, JROC sometimes is
    subject to parochialism, that it is a service ratification,
    rather than a joint analysis of what is available and what
    should be available to all the services.
        If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the
    joint view overcomes the parochial view?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        The JROC is one of the key mechanisms and duties that I
    will fulfill, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, and I believe
    it is, perhaps, one of the most important things that happens
    in the Pentagon.
        Building on the momentum set by my predecessors, especially
    General Selva and General Hyten, I think that the key to the
    JROC is that it is threat and risk based, and that we move
    beyond validating, as you say, a certain system, but addressing
    threat- and risk-based gaps to ensure that the best system is
    brought forward and not necessarily the best widget.
        If we go from a threat-based perspective to close those
    gaps and then we work to go faster, I think we will achieve the
    true potential of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
        Chairman Reed. In that regard, the services have,
    obviously, interests that they zealously guard. How will you
    sort of litigate or mediate between the services?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Well, I think it is going to be fact based and data based,
    and so we will, if confirmed, making sure that the JROC
    operates on a disciplined and analytical basis to bring the
    data to the table that says that this is the right decision or
    not.
        But, certainly, important dialogue with the services, via
    the vice chiefs, in the JROC process will be important so that
    I understand all of those various perspectives. But it has to
    be data informed.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Acquisition programs sometimes
    fail due to requirements that are technically unachievable at
    any reasonable course or timeline. Other programs have
    requirements that don't appreciate commonly understood advances
    in global, commercial technology. Then there is always the
    tendency to build a Swiss Army Knife when a simpler blade would
    be appropriate.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    requirements for new systems are technically realistic, but
    also will push the envelope forward, but are technically
    realistic?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        If confirmed, having a broader understanding of the wider
    possibilities that the technology database can provide us will
    be important. So those relationships with the Defense
    Industrial Base would be important, not just at my level, but I
    believe through the vice chairman, the vice chiefs of each of
    the services and throughout the larger apparatus of the
    Pentagon.
        The JROC will help with that, as will other mechanisms
    within the JROC process that allow us to cast that wide net to
    ensure that we have the systems that we need and that we can
    get past just sticking with an existing widget.
        I think, also, too, you mentioned a great point about
    simplicity. We do have a tendency to Christmas-tree things a
    little bit too much and so, simplicity can be sublime in many
    perspectives. From a technology perspective, we should look for
    that.
        Chairman Reed. Then a related question is, as the system is
    being developed, there is also a tendency for a sort of a
    ``creep in measure'' acquisition program, where they try to do
    more than they were even intended to do.
        How will you look and guard that?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        This gets straight to the discipline process that the JROC
    has to ensure. So, strong leadership in the JROC and
    consultation with my colleagues on the panel has to ensure a
    very disciplined approach to that so that we don't get that
    mission creep, which becomes very parochial, at some times, as
    you move forward.
        Chairman Reed. One, at least, perspective on the future is
    that the real differential will come with artificial
    intelligence, quantum computing, not simply the physical
    platform.
        Do you anticipate being able to develop platforms that can
    quickly adapt to changing software, changing aspects of this
    quantum and AI world?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        I think that is going to be an important element of any new
    system that we bring to the table; that ability to get past a
    very hardware-oriented weapon system development to one that is
    software oriented, such that you can have the, we will save the
    mainframe, but then spin in new technologies in an app-based
    approach, which will allow us to get to the speed that I think
    we all want in our weapon system acquisition process.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
        Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me just get a couple of things on the record, and I
    already know the answer to this, and I think most people do
    here, also, but it is important that we, I think, get it down
    at the very beginning so there is no misunderstanding.
        Our nuclear modernization, this goes back to General Hyten,
    a quote that he had. He said, I look at our nuclear
    capabilities, our triad, our modernization program are the
    minimum essential capabilities required to defend this nation.
    We have to defend against the most existential threat and
    Russia and China and their capabilities are very important. So,
    to me, those are the minimum essential capabilities that we
    have to build, and even at the highest rate, it will still be
    just roughly 6 percent of the overall defense budget. I think
    we can afford that security.
        So, I would ask you the question just to get you on the
    record and to saying that we know the answer anyway, and that
    is, General Hyten, that the most modernizing each, he was
    talking about modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and
    the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA Nuclear
    Weapons Complex is a critical, national security priority.
        Do you agree?
        Admiral Grady. Senator, I do. A modernized and fully ready
    nuclear deterrent is one of the number one priorities of the
    Department and, if confirmed, I would seek to ensure that.
        Senator Inhofe. I know you will and, however, that has
    become somewhat controversial in the past. We have to know
    where we are coming from.
        Lastly, I would ask, is it your intention to continue
    General Hyten's efforts to reform the JROC process to move
    faster and adopt advanced technologies that help meet
    warfighting requirements?
        I know that you had responded to a discussion of this with
    our chairman, but I would like to get your assurance as to what
    we would do with JROC.
        Admiral Grady. Sir, the efficacy of the JROC and the
    momentum that it is on now is extremely positive, and, if
    confirmed, it would be my goal to bend the curve and to go even
    faster to focus on the threat and the risks, to close those
    gaps, and to move as quickly as possible to get the tools to
    the center of the universe, our warfighters, as fast as
    possible.
        Senator Inhofe. Excellent. I know that is true.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Admiral Grady. Thank you for
    your service and your wife and your family's service, as well,
    and congratulations on your nomination. I look forward to
    working with you, if confirmed.
        You have served as Commander of the Navy 6th Fleet, which
    is responsible for naval activities in Europe, and so I know
    that you have been witness to Russia's increasing aggression in
    the Black Sea and other areas of Europe.
        I know that the unclassified Global Posture Review for
    Europe emphasized a combat credible deterrent against Russia
    and enabling NATO forces to operate more effectively.
        Now, I am pleased that the Biden administration has removed
    the cap on forces in Germany, active-duty forces and it is
    committed to maintaining a presence in Europe. But as I talk to
    some of our European allies, one of the things they have been
    pressing for is more U.S. forward-deployed troops in Europe.
        Did you think that is something we should be considering
    now and how do you view that in the long term?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        I think our posture and presence in Europe is very, very
    important and we should listen to our allies and partners,
    insofar as we want to work with them and be stronger together.
    So, I think as part of the Global Posture Review, it is
    important that we balance all of those requirements and where
    we need to operate.
        I would tell you that as the 6th Fleet Commander, you
    mentioned my very best day was when I had a ship in the High
    North, a ship in the Baltic, a ship in the Black Sea, a ship in
    the East Med, and on a really good day, I may have had one in
    the Gulf of Guinea. That is challenging, as you know, but that
    gives the President and the Secretary of Defense many options
    to work with our allies and partners and to pursue our
    objectives with NATO and in Europe.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        As you know, we have a Women, Peace and Security Act that
    has been in the process of being implemented since it was
    signed in 2017.
        As you think about your experience, how have you seen
    women's participation in the military positively affect what
    our goals are, particularly in places where it is women, like
    the Middle East, where women are very important as we are
    talking to populations and communities that are reluctant to
    speak with men?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am, a very important issue, and I
    think a very important issue that advances the cause of
    democracy, too.
        My own personal experience, first, within the Navy, my
    first ship, the USS Cole, was an integrated ship. I can just
    offer to you that having 51 percent of the marines eligible to
    serve in the military for us really helped make the Navy
    better.
        I think that idea that we can bring everyone to the table,
    especially our mothers, our daughters, and our sisters going
    forward, just makes us stronger. So, the initiative that you
    spoke of is one worthy of support.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, as you know, most regional and
    functional combatant commands have hired full-time gender
    advisors to integrate gender perspectives into our planning and
    I just wondered, if confirmed, how will you implement Women,
    Peace and Security within the Joint Staff?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, thank you.
        The role of a gender advisor is a way to attack a very
    significant issue, and, if confirmed, I look forward to
    leveraging those advisors who can make me think better and
    smarter about the issues that you raise. So, I look forward to,
    if confirmed, understanding that ecosystem and helping advance
    that cause going forward; again, we want to bring everybody to
    the table, to get the advantage of all of their thinking. It is
    also a part of creating the safe and secure work environment
    for all of our sailors, and soldiers, airmen, Marine, Coast
    Guardsmen, and guardians.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I would argue that it is important to our mission, wherever
    we are operating in the world, as well. I will look forward to
    talking to you a year from now to hear what you have done to
    implement the Act within the Joint Staff.
        I want to raise another concern about what is happening
    with ISIS. The headlines, ISIS has faded from the headlines,
    yet we know we have several very large camps that continue to
    be in Syria and Iraq that have women and children who are
    detainees from the war against ISIS and who have the potential
    to be radicalized and create a further issue with terrorists in
    the future.
        What is the military's role or does the military have a
    role in supporting folks in these camps and what should we be
    thinking about as we are looking at the future of places like
    Al-Hol, which has 94 percent of its occupants are women and
    children, but we know they are already becoming radicalized?
        Admiral Grady. Yes. You know, the issue of ISIS, as an
    example of violent, extremist organizations is one that we can
    just never take our eye off the ball. It is one in which if we
    beat them here, they are going to squeeze and pop out somewhere
    over here and we are going to have to continue to beat them.
        So, the military piece of it is reactive in some respects,
    but it can also help to create the conditions on the ground for
    better conditions and to help with those conditions that will
    not allow radicalization to continue. So, I think the military
    has a role in that.
        We need to beat them first. We do that and then help create
    those conditions on the ground that are safe and secure, such
    that radicalization doesn't occur.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        My time is up.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Before I recognize Senator Fischer, since a quorum is now
    present, I ask the Committee to consider three civilian
    nominations and a list of 1,772 pending military nominations.
        First, I ask the Committee to consider the nominations of
    Mr. John B. Sherman to be Chief Information Officer of the
    Department of Defense; Mr. Ashish S. Vazirani, to be the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and Ms.
    Carrie F. Ricci to be General Counsel of the Department of the
    Army.
        Is there a motion to favorably report these nominations to
    the Senate?
        Senator Inhofe. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. All in favor, say aye.
        The motion carries.
        Finally, I ask the Committee to consider a list of 1,772
    pending military nominations. Of these nominations, 21
    nominations are 1 day short of the Committee's requirement that
    nominations be in committee for 7 days before we report them
    out.
        No objection has been raised to these nominations and I
    recommend the Committee waive the 7-day rule in order to permit
    the confirmation of these nominations before the Senate
    recesses for the holiday recess.
        Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 1,772
    pending military nominations to the Senate?
        Senator Inhofe. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. All in favor, say aye.
        The motion carries.
        Senator Fischer, please?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Admiral, to you and your wife this morning.
        I appreciate the discussion that you and I had earlier
    about the importance of modernizing our nuclear enterprise and
    that you view nuclear deterrence as the Department's highest
    priority, which you reaffirmed today to the ranking member.
        We are seeing Russia and China continue to expand their
    arsenals. Russia is pursuing a variety of novel, nuclear
    systems and China is conducting a strategic breakout that the
    current STRATCOM Commander, Admiral Richard, characterized as
    breathtaking.
        What is your view of China's nuclear expansion and what
    implications do you think this has for us?
        Admiral Grady. I think that China's breakout is, as Admiral
    Richard has called it, is, indeed, spectacular and, indeed,
    breathtaking. So, therefore, we need to be postured to address
    that issue. We need to think about how we would proceed with
    deterrence, particularly, deterrence now against two peer
    competitors and who need to be deterred in two different ways.
        Deterrence, then, I think builds on that strong nuclear
    triad that we just talked about. So, the modernization of the
    nuclear triad will be the underpinning of that deterrence
    effort against two nuclear competitors.
        Senator Fischer. Overall, do you believe that the growth of
    Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals reinforces the need to
    modernize our nuclear deterrent, including each leg of the
    triad?
        Admiral Grady. Absolutely, I do, Senator.
        We need to have that responsive, flexible, and survivable
    triad across the three legs if we are going to meet the
    challenges of two nuclear peer competitors.
        Senator Fischer. You know, we continue to hear calls to
    pause or to defer modernization programs, despite repeated
    testimony from STRATCOM Commanders and others that there is no
    room for additional delay. Last year Admiral Richard testified
    that, quote, many of the modernization and sustainment efforts
    necessary to ensure deterrence, viability have zero schedule
    margin and are late to need, end quote.
        Can you give us your view of the modernization schedule? I
    know you are particularly familiar with the need to replace the
    Ohio-class submarine.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
        I agree with Admiral Richard that there is no more margin
    to surge. Service life extension programs across the nuclear
    triad, we have kind of tapped that ability out now, and so now
    it is time to move forward.
        Speaking to the Ohio-class submarine, we have service life
    extended them, I think, to the extent now where it would be a
    challenge to do it any further. Just look at hull strength as
    an example; I mean, we can't go past the physics of metallurgy
    at some point. So, at any rate, I think if you look at just the
    Ohio-class SSBN, as an example, there is no more margin left in
    terms of service life extension.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine and I, along with Senator
    Shaheen, we were at Minot earlier this year and we looked at
    the maintenance work that has to be done on the 1970s-era ICBMs
    that we have. These are remarkable systems; they have lasted a
    long time, but as you just referenced with submarines, things
    don't last forever.
        When you hear about the GBSD program and the fact that it
    is important to continue that, the fact the study shows it is
    cheaper to have GBSD than the current Minuteman program that we
    have.
        Does that just reinforce your position on that leg of the
    triad or do you think it needs to be studied even further?
        Admiral Grady. Well, first of all, thanks for going out and
    visiting the airmen out at Minot.
        Senator Fischer. Great guys. Great people.
        Admiral Grady. Their ability to maintain that system and
    have it as peak, operational readiness, really does speak to
    the center of the universe that we talked about.
        But I do believe that as we think about GBSD, the timeline
    there, at a certain point, it costs more to maintain than it
    does to re-modernize and we are approaching that.
        Senator Fischer. I think this last study shows that we have
    approached it. It is $38 billion cheaper to go with GBSD than
    to extend the life of the Minuteman. Thank you.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Blumenthal, please?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral, for your service and your family, as
    well. Thanking for the conversations we had not long ago.
        I am delighted that you share my commitment to making sure
    that we maintain our superiority in undersea warfare and that
    we continue, not only with the Ohio-class replacement, now
    being built at Electric Boat, the Columbia-class, but also the
    Virginia-class attack submarine, two submarines a year, which
    is vital to maintain that superiority. I hope you continue to
    agree and, perhaps, visit Electric Boat.
        Admiral Grady. Senator, I certainly do agree.
        As we look across all of the domains, the undersea domain
    is one that I think we still have a significant superiority in
    and we want to maintain that and maybe even build it even
    better.
        I have been to Electric Boat several times, both in Quonset
    Point and in Connecticut, and it is spectacular with that and
    Defense Industrial Base can do, and I applaud the efforts of
    the folks at Electric Boat for what they are doing.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        I want to talk a little bit about a topic that may not be
    covered by anyone else here: the Afghanistan evacuation and
    settlement efforts, which very much involve the military.
    Although we have no military presence in Afghanistan, there are
    somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 guests, as they are called,
    now on our military bases.
        I recently visited Quantico, Virginia. The United States
    Marine Corps is doing an excellent job. I am really so much in
    admiration of the work that they are doing there, and I am sure
    the other branches of service at our other bases.
        But these bases were supposed to be closed, literally, this
    week, and they are going to continue into February, March,
    perhaps beyond, because of the insufficient support for the
    resettlement efforts. Fortunately, we will see more resources
    going into it.
        But I am also concerned about the evacuation of our at-risk
    Afghan allies, interpreters, translators, security guards,
    drivers; all the people who stood by us and helped protect our
    troops and diplomats. I have called for an evacuation czar,
    because I have found that it was, and remains a lot of
    insufficient coordination, even finger-pointing.
        Could you give me your views on whether we should be doing
    more, as I believe, to help with evacuation efforts through
    charter flights and resources that we, the United States still
    has there, even though we have no military or diplomatic
    presence.
        Admiral Grady. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
        I think, first, thanks for going down to Quantico and
    seeing the team down there; they are doing really good work. I
    think it is that kind of good work under General VanHerck's
    leadership is one of the things that the military does very
    well: logistics and movement and that kind of thing. If
    confirmed, I would look forward to working with General
    VanHerck to finish that mission.
        As to your point of folks that may be at risk still on the
    ground, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with the
    CENTCOM Commander, on what are the right ways to finish that
    mission, as well. It would be an important element of our
    discussions on going forward and concluding, finally, what we
    are doing in that part of the world with Afghanistan.
        Senator Blumenthal. I think you have put it really
    correctly, that it is a matter of completing the mission and
    honoring our commitment for the men and women and their
    families who put their lives on the line and now they have
    targets on their back because they sided with us in that
    conflict. So, I hope to continue working with you.
        Finally, let me just ask your views on classification.
    Yesterday, I joined my colleagues in a classified briefing on
    the Ukraine situation. Obviously, we can't talk about it in
    this setting, except to say it was deeply sobering, maybe scary
    is the right word for it. My feeling was, as hearing that
    briefing, as it is so often after such classified briefings,
    that the American people should hear what we heard.
        For much of what was said in that briefing, it could be
    told to the American people without compromising sources or
    methods or other kinds of necessary assets or resources. I
    think there is too much classification, in short.
        Do you have a view on that point?
        Admiral Grady. Sir, thanks.
        We talked a little bit about that in the phone call, and I
    would say, in general, we tend to overclassify and that we
    should work harder not to. I think there are several good
    reasons for that. One is the transparency that we have with the
    citizens that we serve to explain what we are trying to do.
    Secondly, is being able to work with our allies and partners.
        As an example, my 2nd Fleet Commander, his Deputy is a
    Canadian officer, and sometimes I have to ask him to leave when
    we are talking about what we are doing in the Atlantic. So, we
    are working very hard to overcome those barriers.
        I think the third reason is that type of classification,
    when things are overclassified, prevents us from integrating
    and synchronizing better because there are artificial barriers
    that we put up in our way.
        So, in the end, I think we need to work hard to always push
    that down, the classification down, but still remaining
    sensitive to sources and methods that you correctly pointed
    out. Thank you for taking that brief; it is indeed, sobering.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Admiral Grady.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Rounds, please?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, I enjoyed visiting with you a few weeks ago in my
    office and I thank you and your family for 37 years of faithful
    service to our country. I appreciate your willingness to serve
    in this very critical position.
        One of the items that we discussed at that time was your
    responsive on the principal cyber advisor positions that
    Congress has required in the last year's NDAA. I appreciated
    hearing how much you valued having an independent subject-
    matter expert with no day-to-day management responsibilities
    who, in your words, could speak truth to power regarding cyber
    activity throughout the departments, and I thank you for that,
    sir.
        On a related topic, and I think this is something that we
    don't spend enough time discussing and making clear, the vice
    chairman now leads the Joint Staff's Electromagnetic Spectrum
    Operations Cross Functional Team and is the senior designated
    official for electromagnetic spectrum operations in the
    Department of Defense. That is a very valuable asset.
        A number of senators came together during the development
    of the bipartisan infrastructure bill to literally block
    efforts to provide critical electromagnetic spectrum for
    auction; meaning, taking it out of the Department of Defense's
    perspective and putting it up for sale. So far, a number of us
    have succeeded, but there have been additional legislative
    threats to DOD's spectrum in the 3100 to 3450MHz band.
        The reason why I ask this question is I think it is
    important if you could share with the Committee in this
    recognizable, unclassified forum, how you would view an attempt
    to auction spectrum in this band with respect to maintaining
    the capabilities that keep this country safe every day,
    recognizing a lot of people out there think that spectrum
    should be made available for telecommunications for everybody,
    and yet it is critical that the Department of Defense maintain
    a certain amount of this spectrum in a very, very specified
    area.
        Can you give us your views on that and how you would go
        about sharing with other members of the United States
    Senate and House, how critical this is.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I very much
    enjoyed that discussion. We talked a little bit about this.
        The management of the electromagnetic spectrum to the
    Department of Defense is absolutely critical. We operate in
    there. We have critical activities that we do within that
    spectrum and within that domain.
        I think what you want from us, sir, is to be able to come
    forward to you and lay out the risks and the challenges of
    sell-off and to do it in a data-based and a threat-based way so
    that when you go into that very significant policy decision,
    well informed as to the challenges and risks that it might
    impose on our sailors, and the center of the universe, and the
    soldiers, and the airmen, and that going forward.
        So, we need to bring to you, the arguments for or against,
    pros and cons, so that we can make a very threat-based and
    formed discussion. It is a significant issue, though, for sure.
        Senator Rounds. One of the challenges, and I think Senator
    Blumenthal mentioned it, is the overclassification of
    information. Would you commit to providing a classified brief
    to the members of this committee and members of other key
    committees to discuss the danger of taking such actions,
    without a very stringent approval process?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Regarding the revision of the National Defense Strategy, I
    wonder if you could comment on the force-sizing construct. Two
    major planning assumptions have been overcome by events and now
    they seem to be critically flawed: the force-sizing construct
    to fight one war at a time and the planning and investment and
    capabilities geared for short wars.
        I know the strategy was driven by affordability, but in my
    view, this probably does not make strategic sense now, given
    the activity, investments, and behavior of China and Russia.
        How do you see this issue?
        Admiral Grady. I think as we look forward to that force-
    sizing construct that you call out, it has to be one that is
    informed by current conditions and current threats. So, if
    confirmed, I would look forward to being a part of that
    discussion.
        But, certainly, the world gets a vote. The enemy gets a
    vote on how we look forward to sizing the force.
        It will be a balance of capability and capacity. It will be
    a balance of being there when we need to be there. So, we need
    to bring all of those things together, based on the current
    situations and, indeed, the projected situation that we see in
    the future.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Admiral, the position that you have been nominated for is
    critical and it is time-sensitive that we move forward in
    filling this position. I think you are the right person for the
    job. I look forward to supporting your nomination.
        I would hope, Mr. Chairman that we are able to move as
    quickly as possible in filling that position.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Kaine, please?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, congratulations to you.
        I will just tell my colleagues, the Grady family is very
    beloved in Hampton Roads, Virginia. They are currently on their
    third posting into Norfolk, and I very much appreciate your
    long service.
        Also, to tell my colleagues, if you read his biography,
    something real sticks out: he is the recipient of the ``Old
    Salt'' Award. I didn't know what that was, but I was intrigued
    and I researched it.
        The ``Old Salt'' Award in the Navy is the award given to
    the longest-serving, surface warfare officer.
        He inherited that when Admiral Davidson retired, so that is
    just an additional attribute to the years of service in your
    longevity in serving the country.
        Admiral Grady, Senator Wicker and I, we have been engaged
    in a months' long debate with the DOD about moving forward with
    block buy of the LPD and LHA amphibious ships. This block buy
    was authorized by the fiscal year 2021 NDAA and also by the
    Defense Appropriations bill.
        As you know, block buy provisions often yield significant
    savings in the past, but the Department has stalled on the
    block buy and cited a desire to, quote, undertake an additional
    study of amphibious ship requirements.
        Senator Wicker and I asked the Marine Corps if their
    amphibious ship requirements have changed in recent months and
    we were told that they had not. So, I am a little bit unclear
    what agency is participating in this review.
        As we continue to study the requirement that the Marine
    Corps states has not changed, China is moving forward with the
    construction equivalent of a class of warships similar to the
    LPD and LHA; they are Type 71 and 75 classes, respectively. So,
    at least China believes that this class of warship isn't
    obsolete.
        In your current role as Fleet Forces Command, have you been
    involved in any recent studies on the number of overall
    requirements for the LPD and LHA amphibious ships and are you
    aware of any developments that would suggest we halt or slow
    construction of this class of amphibious ship?
        Admiral Grady. Sure. A couple of issues there. The first
    is, the block buy is a really efficient way to subgenerate that
    demand signal to the Defense Industrial Base, and as you say,
    it is a very efficient way to go, so I thank the Committee's
    support for that.
        Amphibious warships and the renaissance that is underway in
    amphibious warfare now is growing and palpable. So, the naval
    integration between what the Commandant and the CNO are trying
    to do has a lot of momentum right now going forward.
        Those are great ships that you talked about; they do
    provide amazing capability and capacity to the fleet commanders
    and to the combatant commanders going forward. I think the
    level of discussion right now between the CNO and the
    Commandant, and, of course, I would want to speak with them,
    but, if confirmed, I would like to be part of that dialogue.
    But I think the discussion there is how do we take all the
    tenets of naval integration and push forward, particularly, as
    we bring our marines out of the desert and bring them back
    aboard ships. What will that look like? What is the force
    generated, what are we going to force-generate going forward?
        This question about how many amphibs that we need,
    particularly the big decks, will be essential and part of that.
    So, if confirmed, I look forward to being a participant in that
    discussion.
        Senator Kaine. I look forward to working with you on that
    one.
        Your role as vice chairman has a lot of different,
    important components and one is you had the Council on
    Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and
    Communications, or NC3. That is commonly referred to as the
    fourth leg of the nuclear triad.
        Have you participated in exercises using the NC3 system,
    and give us your assessment on its, you know, is it robust
    enough or do we need to do more to make that system robust to
    protect it against cyberattacks, et cetera.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator.
        I do agree that the NC3 could be very well considered the
    kind of fourth leg of the triad. As you know, I am the Navy's
    component to STRATCOM, so all the SSBNs and ``Take Charge and
    Move Out'' aircraft work for me. So, I am very, very involved
    in the NC3 dialogue and discussion that is going forward.
        Just 2 weeks ago, I concluded my sixth ``Global Lightning,
    Global Thunder'' exercise in which we exercised NC3 across the
    nuclear triad. I think I agree with the STRATCOM Commander and,
    if confirmed, I look forward to working with him and the Dep
    Sec Def for that matter, on this issue.
        That is, that across the 200-or-so systems that we have, it
    is working, but it could be better, and it could, but it is
    safe, secure, and reliable now, but we need to think about
    taking it into the future against the threats in all domains,
    including cyber. Again, if confirmed, I would look forward to
    working with Dep Sec Def and the STRATCOM Commander to ensure
    that happens.
        Senator Kaine. Thanks very much.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Cotton, please?
        Senator Cotton. Admiral, welcome, and thank you for almost
    4 decades of service to our nation.
        As you know, based on our conversation before your hearing,
    I am very concerned about the military's culture in what I see
    as a lack of focus on warfighting. The state of professional
    military education is one of my top concerns.
        In September, two war college professors wrote an op-ed in
    City Journal that said, quote, war colleges no longer teach
    warfighting.
        This is consistent, unfortunately, with cautions I have
    heard from field-grade officers and war college students who
    warn that war colleges care more about academic accreditation
    and growing junior foreign policy walks than about building
    war-winning leaders. These students have expressed their
    frustrations and fear that we are in danger of ceding what they
    called ``intellectual overmatch'' to Russia and China.
        I would note that it appears that the Joint Staff seems to
    agree. They released a memo 18 months ago that called for
    renewed war college focus on lethality. These two professors,
    though, claim that this guidance has since been, quote, lost in
    a maze of bureaucracy.
        Could you talk to me, Admiral, about your plans to
    implement the findings of that memo.
        Admiral Grady. Senator, thank you and thanks for the
    discussion a couple of weeks ago.
        First, I am a big fan of joint, professional military
    education. For me, in my experience at National War College and
    my interactions with the Naval War College, as an example, the
    key for JPME is to go beyond the tactical to the operational
    and the strategic. I think that is where we need to center our
    war colleges going forward.
        There is an element of policy, but how does the military
    fit within the follows pieces of the diplomatic, informational,
    military, and economic?
        But the real power of the war colleges and JPME, really, at
    large, is to ensure that we bridge that gap from the tactical
    to the strategic. So, if, if confirmed, and going forward, I
    would look forward to working with the services to discuss
    that, to ensure that there is the appropriate focus on
    warfighting and lethality.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Could I get your commitment to follow-up on a progress
    report on that by May?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        You know, when I first ran for office, I guess almost 10
    years ago now, a nice elderly lady asked me if I was the one
    who had gotten out of the Army not too long ago.
        I said, yes, and I was running for Congress now, and I
    said, yes.
        She said, why would you leave the country's most respected
    institution for the country's least-respected institution?
        I wish that wasn't the case about Congress, but I have
    always been proud that it is the case about our military.
    Therefore, I viewed with alarm, the annual Reagan National
    Defense Survey, which recently found a staggering 25 percent
    collapse in American trust in the military.
        In the past 11 months, my office has been filled with
    hundreds of concerns from servicemembers across the services
    who say they believe that senior DOD leadership has been
    politicized and inappropriate and unprofessional ways. Their
    complaints include, and these are their words, not mine: one,
    counter-extremism training that draws blanket condemnation of
    troops who privately hold conservative views; two, training to
    fight things like the weather, rather than China's growing
    military; and, three, so-called diversity training that has
    taken on blatantly political, even racist, tones, including
    forcing servicemembers to segregate themselves by race or
    promoting based on skin color, sexual orientation and gender,
    rather than operational excellence and achievement.
        Do you think it is fair to say that some of these policies,
    which are quite controversial, have contributed to that 25
    percent decline in trust in our military?
        Admiral Grady. Sir, I, too, am disappointed and alarmed by
    that number. I read the same report that you did, and that is
    concerning to me as someone who has dedicated 37 years to this
    and take great pride in what we are able to do.
        I think the key issue here is what you expect of us, and
    that is that you expect us to remain apolitical and to provide
    our best military advice. I think that is the key issue and
    everything we do needs to be revolved around that central
    concept.
        Senator Cotton. Well, Admiral, what we have consistently
    heard from many of those servicemembers who have reached out to
    us is that they feel that they are being presented with highly
    politicized training modules. They voice their concerns or
    objections and then their chain of command will accuse them of
    acting in a political fashion, so they find themselves in a
    catch-22.
        Let me just give you one example of something that seems a
    bit strange to me. Marine base Quantico recently posted a job
    listing for a diversity, equity-inclusion officer for a salary
    of $144,000 a year; more than triple the median household
    income in Arkansas, also close to what a base commander makes.
        I mean, do you think that we should be paying $144,000 to a
    diversity, equity-inclusion officer at Quantico? Is this the
    kind of thing that might cause Americans to lose confidence in
    the priorities of DOD leadership?
        Admiral Grady. I don't have the context for, in which that
    billet was advertised. I do think we need to have important
    discussions about things like that.
        To the pay scale, I really can't comment on what that job
    is being asked to do. But, again, I think the idea that you
    need from us is to be apolitical.
        I want to go back to something that you mentioned that your
    preamble there, sir, if I could, and that is that the concern
    on the part of the members who have communicated with you that
    they could not voice their views.
        I think the role of commanders is to create that open
    dialogue and have that ability to discuss things and that there
    should be no reprisals for that kind of thing. So, going
    forward, we need to make sure that we have that environment,
    that safe environment where people can have that open dialogue
    and that discussion.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah, my time has expired.
        I will just say that what we expect of you and all the
    senior military leaders is to address these cultural
    challenges. We have also spoken before the hearing about my
    concerns on the surface of the Navy and its cultural challenge
    in the report that I released with Congressman Gallagher and a
    few other Navy veterans.
        We can write laws in this institution. We can pass budgets,
    but no organization can really thrive and make change without
    dynamic leadership. That is why they always said that
    leadership was the most important element of combat power. So,
    we are counting on you and other senior leaders to help address
    some of these cultural challenges. Hopefully, win back the
    quarter of the American people who say they have lost trust in
    our military. That is what I expect to see and that is what we
    will be monitoring in the years ahead.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator King, please?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to re-emphasize the line of questioning that
    Senator Kaine began with, and that is nuclear command and
    control.
        We always talk about the triad. I think it is a quad.
    Without the modernization of nuclear command and control, and
    not only modernization, but ongoing modernization because the
    cyber threat is constantly evolving. Without that
    modernization, the rest of the triad could be rendered useless
    and therefore, not credible, and therefore, not a deterrent.
        So, I hope you will focus very intensely on the upgrades
    necessary to command and control systems. I think you have said
    that that is your intention, but please reiterate it for me.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
        What we see in the cyber domain across all of our weapons
    systems has to be addressed. We talked a lot about our ability
    to defend our networks.
        The ultimate network to defend is the NC3 network and we
    are going to have to be able to do that in cyber. So, if
    confirmed, it would be a high priority of mine to continue the
    momentum started to that.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        I just returned this morning from the Norwegian Embassy on
    a conference on the Arctic. One of the issues that came up was
    the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2007, the
    Russians, there is a famous picture of the Russians planting a
    Russian flag at the North Pole under the Arctic Ocean, and to
    me, it symbolizes our failure to be at the table when we are
    resolving disputes with regard to the maritime domain.
        Is it your professional military opinion that it would be
    in the national interests of this country to accede to the law
    of the Sea Treaty?
        Admiral Grady. It is, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        I hope the record will show how readily you answered that
    question. I didn't have to pry it out of you.
        I think it is very important and I think it is something we
    should bring up before this body, once again, because we are,
    our national security is being compromised, whether it is the
    South China Sea or the Arctic or other areas in the maritime
    area.
        Now, one of your roles will be as the chair of Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. Again, recently, I
    was at a dinner with some prominent figures in the technology
    field and they pointed out that because of the length of time
    it takes to develop our weapons systems, they are literally
    obsolete the day they go into service. In some cases, they are
    years out of it.
        I know that we are always focused in the procurement area
    on money and on cost but talk to me about the importance of
    time. The technology is advancing so fast today that if it
    takes a dozen years to develop a new airframe or a new
    maritime, a new ship, or a new weapons system, we are just
    sunk. Not to use the naval term, but time has to be an
    essential part of this process.
        Admiral Grady. Absolutely, sir.
        I will just use a Navy term: Speed to the fleet. You don't,
    as you say, you don't want to take forever to get it to the
    sailor. So, I think there are several things that we need to
    do. First, although, what I would offer to you is, if
    confirmed, speed will be, and urgency, will be part of the JROC
    process, and in this, I believe I am building on the great
    momentum that General Hyten and General Selva set for the JROC.
        I think one of the challenges, though, is that we are risk
    averse, so that we need to consider whether, and adopt a
    strategy, if you will, that will allow a little that will allow
    test a little and learn a lot. If there is failure there, then
    we can --
        Senator King. Well, in briefings that I have been in, one
    of the reasons given for the speed with which the Chinese have
    achieved what they have in hypersonics is that they are willing
    to fail.
        Admiral Grady. Uh-huh.
        Senator King. They are willing to run tests and learn from
    failure and we seem to be, as you say, risk-averse, and
    therefore, much slower in our development process.
        Admiral Grady. I would agree with you. That risk aversion,
    I think, was borne of, in a period of time, perhaps in the late
    1990s, early 1990s, when we didn't have any peer competitors;
    that is not the case now. So, we have to be able to fail to
    learn faster. Failure doesn't mean malfeasance or laziness or
    any of that, but it means iterating and going faster.
        Senator King. One other area, and one I hope you will
    emphasize, is that I think, frankly, we have been slow on is
    directed energy.
        Admiral Grady. Uh-huh.
        Senator King. We have a very expensive missile defense
    infrastructure that is designed to hit a bullet with a bullet
    and those bullets cost tens of millions of dollars.
        Do you believe that directed energy is a promising
    technology that should be pursued more aggressively?
        Admiral Grady. I do, Senator.
        As you correctly point out, that is a terrible exchange
    ratio for us. If we can get to the point where a drop of fuel
    means a bullet that is where we need to be.
        So, a pursuit, if confirmed, pursuit of directed energy and
    some of the other technologies that we have talked about, that
    would be high on my list. But that directed energy, then, would
    be folded into an integrated network of capabilities that we
    can bring to the fight.
        Senator King. But it is not going to happen unless somebody
    pushes it and I hope that you will be that person.
        Admiral Grady. Aye, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Blackburn, please?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral Grady. We appreciate your time. I
    appreciated your phone call before Thanksgiving.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. We are grateful for your service.
        I want to talk with you about the role of the vice chairman
    within the Nuclear Posture Review. In the past, the Joint Staff
    served in co-leadership roles with the Sec Def and, presumably,
    this was the way that it ensured the best military insight,
    intel insight, and advice available to make certain that that
    was part of the analysis.
        In this year's SASC NDAA, we included a codification of
    that practice for the Biden administration's first MPR and, of
    course, we are trying to push that on across the finish line at
    this point.
        So, is the vice chairman a co-chair of the administration's
    ongoing MPR?
        Admiral Grady. The vice chairman is an advisor to that
    process now.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and according to a Pentagon press
    briefing that occurred last month, DOD will conclude its MPR
    early next year; is that accurate?
        Admiral Grady. I believe so.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and, if confirmed, do you believe
    that you will have adequate time to contribute to the MPR?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I believe I will have an
    opportunity to help shape the MPR going forward. I have had a
    little bit of that opportunity as the Commander of the naval
    forces piece, but I look forward to being a part of that
    process going forward.
        Senator Blackburn. Do you think that we should change the
    pace and the time of the MPR and do it more frequently?
        Admiral Grady. I think it should be conditions based. I
    think the timing and tempo of many of the policy reviews seems
    adequate to me right now; however, the world gets a vote in
    those kinds of things and I suspect that should there be large-
    scale changes in the international security environment, we
    would then go back and look at the seminal documents that guide
    our thinking.
        Senator Blackburn. Do you think the aggressiveness of China
    in this field, the work that they are doing in hypersonics, the
    aggressiveness of Russia would mean that we would need to
    change time and tempo?
        Admiral Grady. It could. I think that as they are two peer
    competitors, particularly in the nuclear space, then we have to
    spend a lot of time focusing on their intentions and what they
    are doing going forward.
        Certainly, deterrence, as an example, with two nuclear
    competitors is different than that with one, which is why the
    current MPR that is coming forward is such an important
    document, and I think well timed, based on what we are seeing
    with China.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I do think that it is, and when we
    talk about terms like ``no-first-use'' and ``sole purpose''
    that enters into that, and it is of concern that our nuclear
    capabilities are at their lowest since the early 1960s when we
    first began building a triad. All the systems that comprise our
    nuclear forces are decades past their intended design lives. We
    are currently the only nuclear-armed country without the
    capability to produce a single, new nuclear weapon.
        So, do you believe the current program of record is
    sufficient to support the full modernization of our nuclear
    infrastructure?
        Admiral Grady. I do and I thank the Committee's support for
    that as we work our way forward through modernizing the nuclear
    triad and all of the associated infrastructure that goes with
    it. So, I thank you for your support on that.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, talking about that associated
    infrastructure, what are your concerns with respect to DOD, but
    then also with respect to NNSA and their capabilities?
        Admiral Grady. NNSA are fantastic partners within the DOE,
    with the Department of Defense. They are kind of our battle
    buddies in this effort to modernize our nuclear triad. So,
    ensuring that we work closely together and that we are
    integrated and as we move forward to ensure that the
    infrastructure that supports that nuclear triad keeps pace,
    that will be, if confirmed, will be an important relationship
    that I would hope to seek with NNSA and with the larger nuclear
    enterprise.
        Senator Blackburn. I have a couple of more questions for
    you on this, on infrastructure and recapitalization,
    modernization. But in the interests of time, I will submit
    those to you for written answers.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Warren, please?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Admiral Grady, for being here today.
    Congratulations on your nomination.
        So, in August, a U.S. drone strike killed 10 Afghan
    civilians, including 7 children and 1 employee of the U.S.-
    based NGO after water containers were mistaken for potential
    explosives.
        Just a few weeks ago you probably saw The New York Times
    revealed that in 2019, the military covered up an air strike
    that killed approximately 70 women and children in Syria and
    was flagged as a potential war crime.
        Unfortunately, these are far from isolated instances.
    Independent watchdog groups estimate that in the past 20 years,
    U.S. air and drone strikes have killed thousands of innocent
    civilians in places like Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, and the
    true toll may never be known because of the difficulty of
    accurate reporting and the military's consistent
    underreporting.
        So, let me just start with kind of a baseline here,
    Admiral. Would you agree that the rates of civilian casualties
    are unacceptably high?
        Admiral Grady. Senator, I would agree that civilian
    casualties under any circumstances are totally unacceptable and
    that you should demand from us better.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that answer very much,
    Admiral.
        You know, but here is the thing, despite this terrible loss
    of innocent life, no meaningful reform or change has been
    implemented. For years, DOD has turned a blind eye to civilian
    casualties and has also failed to distribute exportation of
    money that Congress has authorized for survivors.
        This is just wrong, and I don't know how we can continue to
    view a system that kills thousands of innocent civilians and
    simply accept it as a cost of doing business. Any system that
    does that, in my view, is fundamentally broken.
        Now, The New York Times also report that DOD investigates
    reports of civilian casualties only when, and this is the
    quote, there is a potential for high media attention or a
    concern with outcry from the local community or government.
        So, let me ask you this, Admiral, would you also agree that
    DOD investigating only high-profile or potentially news-worthy
    cases of civilian casualties is a barrier to meaningful
    accountability?
        Admiral Grady. I think the issue that you raise on
    accountability is one that you should hold us to the highest
    standard for.
        I will give you my personal experience on that. As a strike
    group commander for 10 months in the Arabian Gulf, we dropped a
    million pounds of bombs. I had to explain every single one of
    those and whether they met ground commander's intent. That
    level of accountability is something that you should demand
    from us.
        Senator Warren. Do you believe, based on that, that reform
    is needed to reduce the rates of civilian casualties caused by
    U.S. military operations?
        Admiral Grady. I think every civilian casualty is a
    tragedy, but it is very dangerous and hard work that we do and
    we apply lessons learned each time to try to get better to
    forestall that. But, again, hold us accountable and we will fix
    it.
        Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate that, Admiral, because
    that is the point: We need to get better on this, and it is
    about accountability.
        I have already asked this Committee to investigate
    operations that result in civilian casualties and to suggest
    reforms that can prevent these tragedies. But you don't have to
    wait for us to act. The Pentagon has an opportunity to do
    exactly that without a specific mandate from Congress, so it
    can and should start that today.
        I look forward to working with you on this.
        Admiral Grady. Aye, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Tillis, please?
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Grady, thank you for being here. Congratulations on
    your nomination.
        I want to talk a little bit about European posture with the
    circumstances in Ukraine or with Russia, near Ukraine right
    now, it seems like we have a hotspot there and a real clear and
    present threat. I know that we have worked on improving our
    European posture since the Russian I mean vacation of Ukraine
    back in 2014 and I think we have more work to do. We have the
    Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany and I think we have re-
    establishing V Corps over in Poland.
        But what more do we need to do in terms of pushing
    resources in that region that seems to be continually under
    threat, and I am kind of curious about your anti-access/area-
    denial. What other priorities should we place there, and I
    guess in answering that question, we have got priorities in
    other points of the globe.
        So, where does, how are you going to balance scarce
    resources? What would be your priorities when you are confirmed
    with respect to European posture, but also, other threats that
    are equally concerning?
        Admiral Grady. The challenges in the European area of
    operations are significant, as you pointed out, sir. I think
    the first thing we need to think about is working with our
    allies and partners there and leveraging the great strengthen
    that is the NATO alliance. We are certainly stronger together
    in that regard.
        The resource challenge that you discuss is strong,
    significant. Certainly, the pacing threat is in China and we
    need to, then, balance how we are going to address our presence
    and posture in INDOPACOM and the challenges there with how we
    are going to balance those in Europe.
        So, again, I think the key here will be a threat-based and
    resource-informed discussion, but then leveraging the
    flexibility and maneuvering that we have as a military to leave
    us options to move quickly where we need to be. I think a big
    part of that is working with our allies and our partners.
        You asked me a question about A2/AD. These challenges are
    significant. We could talk for a long time, I suppose, at a
    higher classification level in the Western Pacific, as an
    example, but to your point in Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean
    is also a very challenging area to work, as is the Strait of
    Hormuz. As the vice chairman and working within the JROC, it
    will be a priority of mine to bring those and close those A2/AD
    gaps and bring those capabilities to the force as quickly as
    possible in all of the AORs around the country, the East Med is
    an example to your question about EUCOM.
        Senator Tillis. Yeah, I want to talk a little bit about
    NATO. The NATO 2030, there is some promise in there. They seem
    to reference China as a threat that our NATO allies and
    partners should take seriously.
        But what is your sense of NATO working with them?
        I get the sense, I have the pleasure of serving as the co-
    chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group. The sense that I get
    is that we still do not have a complete consensus among some of
    our NATO allies with respect to the threat of Russia.
        What can you tell me that would give me optimism that there
    is a growing sense of resolve that we all need to act and
    recognize the threat?
        Admiral Grady. In my dealings with my NATO partners, and I
    will go back to my time as the 6th Fleet Commander when I was
    STRIKFORNATO. I thought there was a growing realization,
    particularly, of the Russian threat and the challenges that we
    would need to meet as a NATO alliance and the strength that the
    Transatlantic Alliance that would be important to that.
        To your question about a growing understanding of China and
    the threats that that posed, I similarly felt the same, and so
    my dialogues at my level, and, if confirmed, going forward with
    the vice chairman of the U.K. and France, in particular, will
    be to talk about what China is doing in their part of the
    world. Certainly, if you look at the One Belt One Road
    initiative and challenges in Europe or if you look at the 5(g)
    and Huawei and how that challenges what we want to do with our
    allies and partners, that growing realization is there and I am
    pretty confident that we can work together to meet those
    challenges.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        I have some other questions I will submit for the record.
    But thank you, I look forward to supporting your nomination.
        Admiral Grady. Aye, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        We are approaching a vote at 11:30, so I would ask my
    colleagues to add here to the 5-minute limit as much as
    possible.
        Senator Hirono, please?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Grady, normally, I start each nomination hearing
    with a series of questions related to a nominee's fitness for
    service, however, based on the severity of the ongoing water
    contamination crisis at Pearl Harbor, I am going to submit
    those questions for the record.
        I am not sure how familiar you or my colleagues are with
    the Red Hill Fuel Storage Facility, but it is a huge complex
    that I liken to the Hoover Dam. Red Hill has 20 massive
    underground fuel storage tanks built into the side of a
    mountain that holds 250 million gallons of fuel to support
    military operations across the Indo-Pacific. These tanks serve
    as a strategic war reserve in the event of crisis.
        Red Hill sits 100 feet directly above Oahu's aquifer, which
    is the source of drinking water for all of Honolulu and the
    surrounding area, threatening the safety of our clean drinking
    water.
        While there have been ongoing issues with leaks at Red Hill
    since 2014, a series of recent, preventable accidents have led
    to the contamination of the Navy's water system and put the
    community at risk. At this moment, around 100,000 military
    servicemembers, their families, contractors, and other
    residents are impacted. Over 2,800 families have been displaced
    to temporary housing only weeks before the holidays and
    thousands of others are being forced to use bottled water.
        This is not just a short-term matter to resolve the
    drinking water problem, which the Navy must do expeditiously,
    but also a long-term question about the Department's plans for
    a strategic fuel storage. On Monday, I joined Governor Ige and
    the Hawaii delegation in calling for the Navy to immediately
    suspend operations at Red Hill while they confront and remedy
    this crisis.
        Governor Ige then directed the Navy to cease operations at
    Red Hill and de-fuel all the tanks. The Department of Defense
    needs to provide answers to the citizens of Hawaii and the
    nation as a whole about how it can safely protect the aquifer
    while still storing the required fuel reserve for national
    security, even if that means ultimately moving the fuel
    elsewhere.
        In the past week, I have spoken with the Secretary of the
    Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander of
    INDOPACOM multiple times about how to resolve this crisis. It
    is paramount that the Navy understands that Oahu needs safe
    drinking water; that is the top priority and I will continue to
    work with the congressional delegation and the governor do
    whatever is necessary to make that happen.
        Admiral, once confirmed, I would like a commitment from you
    that Red Hill will be a top priority both, solving the short-
    term contamination issue and developing a credible, long-term
    plan for the storage or for the strategic war reserve needs.
        I would also like your commitment to prioritize restoring
    the community's confidence in the military. You can imagine the
    community's confidence has been badly shaken by how the
    military has handled this water-contamination crisis.
        INDOPACOM is our country's priority theater and in DOD's
    budgeting and infrastructure decisions need to more strongly
    reflect that reality.
        Admiral, can I get your commitment that, if confirmed, that
    you will make Red Hill now, and going forward, a priority, a
    top priority?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am. The safety of our citizens, our
    Navy families, our military families is of the highest
    importance and you have my commitment that, if confirmed, I
    will work with my very close colleague, Chris Aquilino and Sam
    Paparo to ensure that we move forward appropriately both,
    first, and primarily on the safety of our citizens, but then on
    the logistics implications going forward.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Sullivan, please?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, good to see you again. I appreciated our meeting
    and I look forward to supporting your confirmation quickly.
        Let me just begin, why do you think the White House left
    this seat open?
        My understanding is they had names back in January for the
    American people. I am quite concerned. We don't have a vice
    chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have all these
    challenges that we are facing as a nation; Russia is looking
    like it is trying to possibly invade Ukraine. Xi Jinping is
    very aggressive towards Taiwan and we don't even have a vice
    chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Why do you think it took so long to put your name up before
    this Committee?
        Admiral Grady. Sir, I am not privy to the process by which
    the nomination worked its way through the process. I will just
    say I am happy to be sitting here now and, if confirmed, look
    forward to working with you.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it is part of a broader
    trend, a ``dereliction of duty'' trend as it relates to the
    military and this White House, this President; they don't seem
    to prioritize the military. The vice chairman position is open
    right now. That didn't have to happen. (Indiscernible--1:23:25)
    doesn't certainly help our national security.
        I have been raising this issue a lot. The President's
    budget, does double-digit increases in terms of almost every
    federal agency, with the exception of two. Two get cuts,
    significant cuts, if you keep it for inflation-adjusted cuts:
    the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
    Security. Dead last.
        Again, there is not a prioritization of the military. Do
    you think, what do you think that Xi Jinping or Putin see when
    they see a budget request like this from this President's White
    House?
        Do you think that that gives them encouragement that we are
    cutting our defense spending?
        Admiral Grady. I think that as we look at their budgets,
    they look at ours and they try and attempt to draw conclusions
    from that on our way forward.
        Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion, do you think at
    this moment in time, cutting our defense budget is a good idea
    for national security or a bad idea, in your personal opinion?
        Admiral Grady. I think that there are many significant
    national security challenges around the world and that you need
    a Department of Defense budget that was able to meet those
    challenges, not just now but going forward.
        Senator Sullivan. Does cutting the Department's budget do
    that, in your personal opinion?
        Admiral Grady. Yeah, I think there is, there are risks and
    challenges there that we need to face and that we need to have
    the appropriate funding level to do that.
        Senator Sullivan. You are not answering my question.
        With respect, do you think that cutting the Defense budget
    does that? I need just a yes or no, personal opinion.
        Admiral Grady. I think that stable and predictable and
    adequate funding is important and that it needs to keep pace
    with the threat and inflation.
        Senator Sullivan. This doesn't, does it?
        Admiral Grady. This is challenging.
        Senator Sullivan. This doesn't.
        Let me just be more specific. This budget, and the request
    from the Navy, actually shrinks the fleet. It commissions four
    new ships, retires eight. Do you think shrinking the U.S. Navy
    Fleet is something that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist
    Party would welcome or would be against, the U.S. Navy Fleet
    shrinking, which is what this budget or this President does?
    What do you think the Chinese think of that?
        Admiral Grady. I think the Chinese look at an isolated
    shrinking of the budget as a positive thing.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes, I do, too.
        Well, fortunately, this Committee rebuked the President and
    others and we put forward what the National Security
    Commission, and bipartisan by the way, recommended: to increase
    Defense spending 3 to 5 percent, per year; a real budget, a
    real increase of inflation adjustment. That is what this
    Committee responsibly did and we certainly hope that as we look
    forward to appropriating, that we will do that.
        Let me ask one final question and then I will have a number
    for you that I am going to submit for the record.
        There has been a dramatic, and you and I talked about this,
    trust in the military in terms of a decline, actually
    plummeting. The Reagan National Defense Survey says that for
    the first time ever, a minority of Americans, only 45 percent,
    report having a great deal of trust and confidence in the
    military. This is down from 70 percent in 2018, a 3-year drop.
        Why do you think that is happening?
        Admiral Grady. Well, first, I am disappointed to see that
    number.
        Senator Sullivan. So, am I.
        Admiral Grady. Someone who has served for 37 years, I take
    great pride in what I do and what our servicemen do every day.
    That is disturbing.
        I think the key for us to help combat that is to be as
    transparent in what we do and be as apolitical as we can
    possibly be.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. The Under
    Secretary of Defense, number three position in the Pentagon, he
    said one of his priorities in his confirmation hearing was to,
    quote, stamp out systemic racism within the ranks.
        Do you think the military is a systematically racist
    institution in your experience and do you think that having
    senior officials say that kind of thing is actually one of the
    things that undermines trust?
        Admiral Grady. I think it is really important that we have
    discussions about anything that challenges the safe and secure
    working environment for our force. That is a commander's
    business to do that and racism is part of that.
        I will give you my personal experience. Every time I do a
    fleet-unit visit, whether it is an airplane, a squadron, or a
    submarine, I ask these questions. We work really hard to have
    that dialogue, that important dialogue that we need to have
    about racism. We all agree that there is no place for it in our
    military.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will submit more questions for the record.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Peters, please?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, Admiral, and congratulations on your
    nomination and I thank you for being here today and offering
    some of your thoughts.
        Admiral, in advance testimony, you expressed concern with
    both, state and non-state actors' ability to successfully
    execute large-scale influence operations against the United
    States and its partners, and, certainly, I share those concerns
    and we have a lot of evidence on an almost daily basis.
        I want to kind of hear your views on organizing our
    information warfare capabilities. This is a wide-scoping issue,
    I understand, but information clearly is a domain and a
    warfighting function with a very strong human dimension to it,
    as well, but we should never exceed the need for some
    overarching guidance, planning, and authorities when it comes
    to all of this.
        So, my question to you is, would the Joint Force be more
    effective, and by extension, perhaps more resilient, if
    information warfare fell under a single entity, such as a
    functional component and command?
        Admiral Grady. Yeah. First, I agree with you, sir, on the
    challenge on information warfare face presents to us in the
    modern realities of warfare going forward. Winning and
    dominating in the information space is going to be just as
    important as in the military or the diplomatic or the law fare
    or the economic. So, going forward, we are going to have to do,
    and work very hard to ensure that that happens.
        I think the best response from an information perspective,
    though, is that to answer your question directly, is that it
    should be integrated across what all of our, we will use the
    COCOM's as an example, has to be integrated in everything they
    do from the ground up. It can't be something that is bolted on,
    on the bottom.
        My discussions with my colleagues who are fleet commanders
    or who are combatant commanders now, I think they get that and
    so I think as the vice chairman, if confirmed, it would be my
    job to help encourage that integration baked in from the bottom
    as equally as important as what we do from the tactical to the
    strategic.
        Senator Peters. Well, and as we look at malign influence
    and information warfare, there is certainly vulnerabilities in
    government that can turn some of our neighbors and our allies
    into targets of opportunity for financially motivated cyber
    criminals. State-sponsored actors certainly linked to China, to
    Russia, and Iran, are conducting extensive cyber espionage
    operations, information operations.
        My question for you is, do you believe that security
    assistance should include cybersecurity assistance to help our
    partners protect their critical infrastructure or to enhance
    their resiliency against this sophisticated information warfare
    that we are seeing across the globe?
        Admiral Grady. Yeah, Senator.
        First, you are stronger together with our allies and
    partners; one of those great competitive advantages that we
    have. So, in the cyber realm, then, working together within
    cyber to meet those threats that you have pointed out, is
    incredibly important.
        So, I do think that there are venues for us to help and to
    learn from them, as well, in the cyber domain going forward.
        Senator Peters. Great. Well, thank you.
        A discussion of great power competition tends to emphasize
    capabilities and resources that prepare for, potentially, armed
    conflict. But what I would like you to address a little bit how
    we would employ our military instrument of power against a
    broad spectrum of non-military threats. We have already talked
    about cyber and information warfare, but I believe that
    irregular warfare architecture represents, perhaps, a
    proactive-shaping process through competition and generates
    some options if tensions escalate or if deterrence fails.
        So, my question for you is how should the Joint Force be
    competing actively in this environment while deterring
    escalation and shaping theaters in a way that will help us,
    should deterrence fail?
        Admiral Grady. So, I think there are several elements to
    that. One, working with our allies and our partners is
    absolutely critical; so, that is one. Two, there is a value to
    being there and to being able to work with them as the
    situations arise. Things like theater-security cooperation,
    which allows us to train together, to exercise together, things
    like the IMET program would allow us to share best practices
    and democratic values are important.
        Then to your point about boots on the ground, perhaps, I
    will use the CV as an example. They do fantastic work around
    the world helping share those cultural values and helping us
    learn about the battle space that we are going to operate in.
    Then at the higher end, you know, irregular warfare, whether it
    be SOF or something else, it is absolutely critical to
    everything we do and it is across all phases, from pre-conflict
    to post-conflict.
        Senator Peters. Well, very good.
        When I served in the Navy Reserve, I served in a CV
    battalion, so I appreciate you bringing up the CVs.
        Admiral Grady. Certainly.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, again, for your answers,
    Admiral.
        Admiral Grady. Aye.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Scott, please?
        Senator Scott. I am going to let Senator Hawley take my
    time.
        Chairman Reed. Senator Hawley, please?
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Senator Scott. That is kind of you.
        Admiral, I am going to come back to something you said
    earlier. You talked about China being the pacing threat and
    INDOPACOM being the pacing theater. With that in mind, let me
    just point out that the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
    continues to grow rapidly, but the resources that are available
    to the Department to counter and deter that threat are not.
        Given that, is it fair to say that DOD needs to be doing
    less in lower-priority theaters so it can use its scarce
    resources to do more to do what we need to do to deter China in
    the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Grady. Yeah, I think it gets to that reimburse-
    balance yes that we were talking about, sir, and so, certainly,
    if the pacing threat is in the INDOPACOM theater, then working
    with the combatant commander, Admiral Aquilino, my close
    colleague, it will be important to provide him the resources he
    needs to help shape that environment and make those priority-
    based discussions based on the threat.
        Senator Hawley. Are you concerned that the Global Posture
    Review released last week doesn't name a single region where
    DOD plans to do less?
        Admiral Grady. Not part of the process to build the Global
    Posture Review. What I do like about the Global Posture Review
    is that it provides a disciplined framework to have those
    priority-based discussions that you talked about. So, I think
    that is a great promise of the GPR going forward.
        Senator Hawley. So, you are not concerned is the answer to
    my question?
        Admiral Grady. I think that there is room for us to work
    within the disciplined process that they lay out to have
    further discussions about those priorities, challenges that you
    referenced.
        Senator Hawley. Well, I just want to say that I am very
    concerned by the Global Posture Review. The overwhelming
    message, I think, sent by the review is that our posture abroad
    doesn't require any changes at all. The posture, the review
    doesn't recommend any major changes.
        I think that is a big mistake. We cannot continue to do
    what we are doing and adequately deter China in Asia.
        Let me ask you about our force-planning construct in the
    2018 NDS. That shifted that construct, the NDS shifted focus
    from maintaining our ability to fight and win two regional wars
    to fighting and winning a single war against a great power.
    Senator Rounds was asking you about this earlier.
        Do you agree with the forced plan and construct used in the
    2018 NDS?
        Admiral Grady. I think as we work on the NDS, and, if
    confirmed, I look forward to being part of the next NDS. I
    think we are going to have to look really hard at that forced
    plan and construct; its conditions base, its threat base, in a
    situation, as I say, the world gets a vote, and we are going to
    have to look at that that means with two peer competitors and
    how we are going to adjust that.
        Senator Hawley. Well, let me ask it to you this way. The
    Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin wrote to me earlier
    this year. I am quoting her now, I believe that the force plan
    and construct should prioritize and focus on China unless and
    until the security environment changes dramatically. She goes
    on, the threat China poses to Taiwan should be a priority for
    the force-planning construct.
        Do you agree with Dr. Karlin?
        Admiral Grady. I haven't had a chance to sit down with Dr.
    Karlin to talk about that, but I do agree that the pacing
    threat and the challenges that we most face is in the INDOPACOM
    region.
        Senator Hawley. With regard to the force plan and
    construct, Dr. Karlin also wrote, and I am quoting her again,
    while the U.S. military will invariably need to juggle other
    challenges simultaneously, it would need to reprioritize those,
    should a conflict with China arise.
        Do you agree with that, that the U.S. military will need to
    reprioritize other challenges, for instance, in Europe, should
    the conflict with China arise, so that we can focus on the
    pacing threat?
        Admiral Grady. If a new conflict arises, we are going to
    have to provide all that we can to win that conflict.
        Senator Hawley. You think that China should be the
    priority, even in the event of simultaneous conflicts?
        Admiral Grady. Again, conditions-based --
        Senator Hawley. Well, I don't know what that means. With
    all due respect, Admiral, you said that several times now and,
    frankly, you are evading my questions. You haven't given me a
    straight answer on any of my questions yet.
        I have asked you about the Global Posture Review
    repeatedly. I have asked you about the 2018 NDS.
        So far, you haven't answered me on any of them. So, let's
    try for a yes or a no. Let me just back up and let's try again.
        The 2018 NDS, the force plan and construct used in that is
    shifting away from multiple conflicts to winning one great
    power conflict, do you agree with that, yes or no?
        Admiral Grady. I agree that it needs to be reviewed.
        Senator Hawley. So, that sounds like you don't agree with
    it currently and you think it is subject to revision; is that
    right?
        Admiral Grady. So, what I offer, Senator, is that going
    forward, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, I will have an
    ability to help contribute to that dialogue as we look at the
    force-planning construct going forward.
        Senator Hawley. Well, I will tell you this, if I can't get
    any further clarity from you on this, if your position is, in
    fact, you want to abandon the 2018 NDS and force posture, you
    won't be confirmed with my vote.
        Let me ask you about the situation in Taiwan. Taiwan needs
    to be able to feel cost-effective and resilient asymmetrical
    defense capabilities as quickly as possible in order to
    strength their deterrence against a Chinese invasion.
        Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Grady. I agree that asymmetric tools that they can
    bring to that fight would be a great value.
        Senator Hawley. My time is expired.
        I am going to have a number more questions for you,
    Admiral, for the record, and, frankly, I am disappointed in
    your answers today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Now, let me recognize via Webex, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate very much
    and also enjoyed our conversation that we had before
    Thanksgiving, and congratulations on your nomination. I am sure
    you are going to be confirmed, sir, without any problems.
        With that hope, I would like to know a little bit, you
    know, first of all, we do an awful lot of the training in West
    Virginia and we have had tremendous opportunity to work with
    special ops and we are hoping that you are looking into that,
    that some of the other service, branches of the service can use
    or look at our state from the standpoint of the effectiveness
    and the cost-effectiveness, especially, and a location, being
    so close to D.C.
        I don't know if you have had a chance to visit some of the
    operations we have; if not, we would like to bring you and show
    you what we have been able to develop here.
        Admiral Grady. Senator, I have not had the opportunity to
    visit the facilities that you discussed, but, if confirmed, I
    would look forward to spending some time with those troops
    there.
        Senator Manchin. We would love to get you out as quickly as
    we could, sir. That would be great.
        I was pleased to read about the focus you have towards
    interoperability. I know we touched on it briefly, and this has
    been in your advanced questions. Interoperability with our
    allies is something that I am sure you spent quite a bit of
    time designing, implementing as Commander of the U.S. Fleet
    Forces.
        Can you describe some of those experiences and tell us how
    you plan to expand that with all of our allies.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator. Thanks.
        The key issue for me as the Fleet Forces Commander or as
    6th Fleet and STRIKFORNATO was to build interoperability so
    that we could fight together, but not interoperability for
    interoperability's sake, but interoperability for integration
    so we could work better, we could fight better together
    immediately. Interoperating is one thing; integration is where
    we need to go and work and train together.
        So, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, it will be a high
    priority of me to work with our allies and partners on
    interoperability as it leads to integration and then our
    ability to fight and win together.
        Senator Manchin. Sir, also, Cyber Command and Space Command
    are two of the combatant commands that influence nearly every
    weapon and support system in our inventory. Tell me, if you
    will, your plan to resource each of them as the challenges and
    capabilities in each domain increases.
        Admiral Grady. Yeah. Sir, thank you.
        Working within the space domain is absolutely critical and
    a very high priority. It underpins everything we do as a
    military, just as our military underpins what we need to do in
    space.
        So, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, space, as a domain,
    and it is important to recognize that it is a domain like
    everything else, will be a high priority for me going forward,
    if confirmed.
        Senator Manchin. I am going to ask you a hypothetical
    question because I know, sir, it might be a little bit out of
    your domain, but with what we see going on in China and Taiwan
    and the South China Sea and also what we see going on now with
    Russia and Ukraine, do you have any comments or any thoughts on
    that, that would be kind of helpful in our deliberations?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
        I think, you know, if you start with Russia in Crimea and
    with Ukraine, it is a very dangerous and destabilizing
    situation that we are working our way through. It is important
    for us to ensure that we work with our NATO partners and
    continue to recognize the challenges that are faced by Russian
    activity in that area of the world.
        Then remain rock solid in our commitment to Ukrainian
    sovereignty, to Ukrainian self-determination and their larger
    goals of, ultimately, perhaps moving forward with alliances and
    whatnot.
        I think in the Western Pacific the challenges are equally
    as important. As we have discussed, that is the pacing threat
    in the Pacific, and in INDOPACOM, and we are going to have to
    meet those on a detail basis; again, two peer competitors, we
    are going to have to balance those going forward.
        Senator Manchin. Very quickly on the other one, sir, as a
    commander, I am interested to hear about any concerns that you
    may have in logistical capabilities or the capacity to surge
    necessary combat power to any part of the region, but if--in
    regions, that if we needed to combat a North Korean or a near-
    peer aggression, what would be your thoughts on that and how
    you think we could meet those concerns.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir. I think contested logistics is an
    incredibly important part of our theory of the fight going
    forward. I think that is why we recognize it as one of the four
    pillars of the new joint warfighting construct.
        So, contested logistics, whether it allows us to fight in
    Korea or in the Indo-Pacific, or even in Europe, is going to be
    incredibly important to what we do. We are pretty good at
    logistics, but there is room to improve and that is why it is
    such an important pillar of the joint warfighting construct.
        Senator Manchin. Let me thank you again for your service
    and also your continued willingness to serve and I look forward
    to voting for your confirmation, sir. Thank you.
        Admiral Grady. Aye, sir. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Scott, please?
        Senator Scott. Well, first, Admiral Grady, it is nice to
    see a Navy guy do well.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        Senator Scott. Congratulations on your nomination and
    thanks for your willingness to serve.
        So, I think we talked about this the other day. My top
    concern is both, Communist China and Russia. My first question
    is, without disclosing any classified information, what
    examples can you provide that show that this administration is
    doing everything it can to prepare the U.S. to deter and
    potentially defeat these adversaries in the field, in any field
    they make challenges in.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        I think a really good example of deterrence is our ability
    to work with our allies and partners in a very robust exercise
    and training series. I will just use my most recent example,
    where we did the large-scale exercise within the department of
    Navy that was a global, the first global large-scale exercise
    that we have done that crossed the spectrum that crossed the
    globe from INDOPACOM all the way into Europe.
        That demonstration of credible combat capability on a
    globally integrated basis, which was the value of LSE, I think,
    is a really good example of how we can continue to press
    deterrence and to demonstrate that credible combat capabilities
    that underpins that deterrence.
        Senator Scott. Thanks.
        Do you agree that we have seen Communist China
    significantly increase its use of aggressive military tactics
    since President Biden took office and do you agree that
    Communist China's behaviors, especially what we are watching in
    Taiwan, have grown more bold this year?
        Admiral Grady. I think Communist China's activities have
    been relatively consistent over the last few years and are
    certainly, and particularly the rhetoric is something that we
    have to recognize and address.
        Senator Scott. As we talked the other day, I introduced the
    Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which would eliminate the
    ambiguity we--it basically says, you know, we are going to
    defend Taiwan. One, do you agree with that, and, two, would it
    make your job easier if it was clear exactly what your
    obligations are?
        Admiral Grady. I think that the one China policy, the
    Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiques and the six
    assurances, I think that has done a really good job of just
    maintaining the status quo, which is peace, which is solving
    that challenge in Taiwan on a, not a unilateral way, and so
    this escrow was important.
        Going forward, a policy change, I think would be one that
    would have to be based on the rhetoric and risk that China is
    presenting, and, if confirmed, as the vice chairman, I look
    forward to helping shape that and shape our thinking on that as
    we press forward.
        Senator Scott. Do you believe that General Secretary Xi
    fears a U.S. reaction from the U.S., you know, with regard to
    his continuing aggression towards Taiwan, and even other
    countries in Asia?
        Admiral Grady. I think that, and I can't speak for what is
    in his head, but I suspect that the credible and capable
    military that is forward more Admiral Aquilino's leadership is
    one that should give him pause, that we are prepared and
    positioned to do what we need to.
        Senator Scott. For decades, the U.S. has reserved the right
    to preemptively use our nuclear weapons in the event our
    national security requires it. You know, do you believe that we
    should keep that option open or abandon it?
        Admiral Grady. I think that options are always good and
    keeping all options on the table for the present is important.
        Senator Scott. Do you have any concerns about China's focus
    on their, and success in their hypersonic missiles?
        Admiral Grady. Absolutely. It is an area that my
    predecessor discussed at great length and they are moving very,
    very quickly in hypersonics and a very challenging weapons
    system and one in which we need to keep pace, if not,
    overmatch.
        Senator Scott. So, what do you think when Congress doesn't
    pass the National Defense Authorization Act and continues to do
    continuing resolutions, rather than pass a budget, how does it
    impact our military readiness?
        Admiral Grady. That is a great question, sir.
        The continuing resolutions are super challenging, as you
    know. They eliminate our ability to move with flexibility. They
    stop new starts, our ability to invest in new weapons systems.
    They have a human cost that goes with them.
        Let me go back to the one I just mentioned, because it
    links, synchronizes with your question, and that is a CR would
    prevent us from advancing on new initiatives like the Army and
    the Air Force program on hypersonic. So, CRs are very
    disruptive and challenging for the service to work forward and
    work through.
        Senator Scott. So, how many ships do you think the Navy
    needs to be able to guarantee freedom of the seas for ourselves
    and our allies and our partners?
        Admiral Grady. First, you know, I appreciate the law that
    says 355. That is important and I understand that. Presence
    matters. Capability matters. But so does, and capacity matters.
        So, I think there is this balance between capacity and
    capability as we seek to meet the law of 355, and so going
    forward, you know, we will try to work to get to the 355,
    because that is what the law says, but in the meantime, as we
    work to get there and try to get there as fast as we can, we
    have to balance capability and capacity, and there are some
    other things that we can bring to the table in addition to the
    capacity piece.
        Senator Scott. Thanks, Admiral.
        Thank you, Chair Reed.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
        We have four individuals on the Webex, but we also have a
    vote. So, I will, at this point, Admiral, recess for 10 minutes
    so that I can vote and also that I can allow my colleagues to
    have a chance to question you.
        So, the Committee stands in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing back to order and
    recognize Senator Rosen, via Webex.
        Senator Rosen?
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and Ranking Member
    Inhofe, for holding this hearing.
        I would really like to thank Admiral Grady for meeting with
    me recently, for your lifetime of service and your willingness
    to continue to serve.
        I wrote this down from your opening statement, I really
    liked it when you said: Stronger families means a stronger
    fleet. I think that that is really a terrific quote and I may
    use that from time to time. I will credit you with that,
    Admiral.
        But I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity now. As
    we discussed in our last meeting last month, cyberattacks are
    becoming one of the central security threats to the U.S. and,
    of course, to all of our partners. Our allies are essential to
    ensuring U.S. cybersecurity, because we rely on them to do
    threat-hunting, enable early warning, to harden our own
    collective defenses.
        As you well know, cyber defense is part of NATO's core task
    of collective defense. So, given the rise in threats of
    cyberattacks from both, state and non-state actors, NATO
    efforts to protect allied networks and enhance resilience
    across the alliance, well, it is just more critical than ever,
    which is why I raised the subject when I met with NATO
    leadership in Brussels just before Thanksgiving.
        So, Admiral Grady, what do you see as the significant
    cyberthreats that NATO alliance is facing and can you
    specifically describe the cyberthreat our European allies face
    from Russia and how, if confirmed, you would advise and support
    our allies in combatting this cyber aggression.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        Cyber is a domain that is increasingly active, increasingly
    contested, and increasingly competitive. I think for our NATO
    allies, they recognize that, and so working together with them
    to face those challenges in this increasingly competitive
    domain is important.
        You know, we tend to think about warfare as something that
    has a start point and an endpoint and I think cyber is one that
    tells us that there is a lot happening in the gray zone that we
    have to think about even before conflict starts. Indeed,
    conflict could kick off in cyber before anything else.
        I think another piece of the cyber challenge that we face
    is how we work within the whole-of-government and with
    industry. Even in our own country, all we have to look at are
    attacks on meat-packing plants and railroads and those kinds of
    things to know that we have to be good partners, certainly with
    our allies and partners at NATO and beyond, but, of course,
    with our industrial base partners and the rest of society,
    because that is, in fact, what is happening now in the gray-
    zone world that we live in.
        Senator Rosen. Yeah, I couldn't agree more. This is an area
    that is going to become an increasing threat to all of us
    around the world, and so we really have to think about our
    cyber readiness because our nation is really grappling in the
    aftermath of unprecedented cyberattacks. In the U.S., we are
    expected to face a shortage of 3.4 million skilled technical
    workers (indiscernible--1:54:55). Those workers help us to
    address these threats. There are particularly large gaps in
    cybersecurity.
        DOD continues to face challenges addressing requirements
    for certain key scale areas, such as those in cyber and STEM
    fields. To help address the shortfall, inspire future
    generations of talent, last year's NDAA, Senator Brown, Peters,
    Blackburn, and I introduced a bipartisan bill to help our
    Junior ROTC, young men and women have a STEM training and
    education track. So, that is great.
        This year's NDAA, again, I worked with Senator Blackburn to
    create a civilian cyber reserve which will also help address
    cyber defense personnel needs.
        So, Admiral, if confirmed, how will you recruit and train
    personnel in these critical cybersecurity and STEM field,
    networking, hardware, software, all of it, so that we can
    really surge up and address these challenges that we know are
    going to be increasing day after day?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, Senator, and thank you for your
    leadership on that initiative.
        Just a quick shout-out on the JROTC and how important that
    is for the health of the force going forward and then the STEM
    education that you and I talked about how critical that is and
    the key element of that is getting to our youngsters sooner
    than later, is important, and you and I talked about that.
        Concepts like a civilian cyber reserve, you know, you and I
    talked about this. You know, in my view, if you are willing to
    serve your country, if you can pass a security clearance, but
    you may not look like me, I don't care. If you can come and you
    can serve and you can help us win in cyber, whether as in the
    civilian cyber reserve or some other form, we need to encourage
    that because that is an area that we know we have to win. We
    know our adversaries are throwing a lot at it and we just have
    to outpace that.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you.
        I want to be sure that the DOD maintains our technical
    superiority and I am going to do everything I can to help
    enforce that, grow that with you.
        So, thank you. I see my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Tuberville, please?
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You saved the best for last.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Admiral, for being here and
    your wife, and your service.
        I am excited about you being in this position. I think you
    will bring a lot to who we are and what we are. You know, I
    hear about all these rockets and tanks and all that. I came
    from a team atmosphere of 40 years and I have been all around
    the world since I have had this job now for 12 months and I
    have seen how dangerous it is.
        If we are going to survive, not just our country, but the
    world, our military is going to have to do it for us. It is not
    all the bells and whistles; it is the Jimmy Joes and Janes.
        My concern is how do we build that best military? How do we
    build the values and morals and educate these young men and
    women, because we are finding less and less, obviously, that we
    will take in the military. What we have total, I think is close
    to 2.5 million people, Reservists, active-duty.
        I just want to get your thoughts on that. I like what you
    told me back when we met about drug testing kids. You know, we
    are becoming more of a liberal society in things that we do,
    but we cannot allow that to creep into our military, because
    what they do means life and death, you know, to them,
    themselves, to people around them, and also the survival of who
    we are in the free world.
        So, I hope you would bring, and I know you will bring a lot
    of that to the Joint Chiefs to let that pass on down from the
    people that you work with. So, talk a little bit about, you
    know, structuring, you know, our military from this point on.
        We have a great military. I think there are some things
    that we need to maybe correct, but we still got to build that
    fighting machine.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, sir.
        You and I talked at great length about how Xs and Os are
    important, but Johnny and Joe and Jane are more important.
        Senator Tuberville. Right.
        Admiral Grady. The center of the universe, our soldiers,
    our sailors, our airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
    guardians, it is important that we don't forget that that is
    what it is all about and setting them up for success to win and
    to not go into that fair fight is absolutely critical.
        You and I also talked about the sailors and the servicemen
    that were getting into the Navy now. As I told you, sir, I am
    super impressed with who we get now. They are different than
    when you and I were growing up, but they are just as good, and
    I am supremely confident that we can ensure that they stay that
    way going forward.
        You know, drug testing is a really important policy and it
    is a very successful policy. We have a zero tolerance for that
    kind of thing and that will continue so that we can maintain
    that lethal, credible, warfighting edge that you expect us to
    have going forward, built on the center of the universe, our
    servicemembers.
        Senator Tuberville. Well, thank you.
        I know you will do a great job. I look forward to you being
    a huge part of what we do and working with you for the next few
    years, oh, and Merry Christmas. It is almost here. Thank you.
        Admiral Grady. Aye, aye, sir. Thank you.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Admiral, thank you for your testimony and thank you for 40
    years of service, you, and your Christine and your family, and
    I look forward to your speedy confirmation.
        With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
        Admiral Grady. Thank you, sir.
        [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Admiral Christopher W.
    Grady, USN by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                          duties and responsibilities
        Question. Section 154 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
    position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides
    that the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed as a member of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to such other duties as may be
    prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the
    approval of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, other provisions of
    law and Department of Defense issuances assign to the Vice Chairman a
    breadth of duties and responsibilities.
        What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
    the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the
    nation's second-highest ranking military officer and member of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for overseeing joint military
    requirements, providing advice and recommendations, and performing
    other duties as directed by the Chairman.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that
    qualify you to perform the Vice Chairman's duties and responsibilities?
        Answer. I have been honored to serve our nation for 37 years. I
    believe my command experiences as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces
    Command, Naval and Joint Forces Maritime Component Command Strategic
    Command, Naval Forces Northern Command, Commander, Sixth Fleet,
    Commander, Striking and Support Forces NATO, Commander, Naval Surface
    Forces Atlantic, as well as the director of the Maritime Operations
    Center for the Pacific Fleet have prepared me for the duties and
    responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    particularly the role that the Vice Chairman plays in managing military
    requirements.
        Multiple global deployments, service in senior Joint Staff and
    OPNAV staff billets, including on the National Security Council in the
    White House, and command of a Carrier Strike Group have also prepared
    me to work collaboratively across the joint force, the interagency,
    whole of government, and closely with our allies and partner nations.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take
    to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of
    the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. I believe I am prepared to perform the duties and
    responsibilities of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief. I will
    continue to maintain an open mind for thoughtful and diverse insight to
    ensure our military forces are positioned to serve our nation.
        Question. What other duties do you anticipate the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs would prescribe for you, if confirmed?
        Answer. The Chairman, General Milley, has indicated he does not
    intend to expand the Vice Chairman's duties beyond what is stipulated
    in statute.
        If confirmed, I expect to continue to emphasize efforts to
    strengthen the readiness of our military and reform Department business
    practices for increased effectiveness and affordability.
        Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities that should be
    assigned to the Vice Chairman, in your view?
        Answer. I do not believe there are any additional duties to assign
    to the Vice Chairman, beyond those stipulated in statute. If confirmed,
    I will work with the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff, if
    necessary, to ensure the Joint Staff's effectiveness.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that your tenure as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the
    Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?
        Answer. The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate
    that we are a nation under civilian control; it is one of the
    foundational principles of our great nation. If confirmed as the Vice
    Chairman, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are
    aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our
    civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is a bedrock
    principle of our country, and I will do everything in my power to
    ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.
                          deputy secretary of defense
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in
    addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the
    integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.
        If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work hand-in-hand with the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense to foster and build a strong and collaborative
    relationship. Activities will include participation in multiple
    meetings each week on critical issues for the Joint Force and the
    nation, both senior leader forums that provide guidance to the
    Department, and issue-focused engagements to advance new opportunities
    and stem emerging challenges.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you expect responsibilities to be
    allocated between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and yourself as co-
    chairs of the Deputy's Management Action Group?
        Answer. I view the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a close and
    complementary partner in managing the agenda and execution of the
    Deputy's Management Action Group. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of issues to
    include the full range of strategy, policy, resourcing, and management
    issues impacting the Department.
        Question. In your view, can the Deputy's Management Action Group be
    more effective in ensuring that issues with resource management, and
    broad policy implications are addressed in a manner that aligns with
    the Secretary of Defense's priorities and the Department's planning and
    programming schedule? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The Deputy's Management Action Group is a critical forum
    for sharing information, creating alignment across civilian and
    military components, exercising effective civilian control and
    oversight of the Department, and making decisions on major issues. One
    way to make this forum more effective is to identify additional lower-
    level forums which are working on issues that would benefit from a
    higher-level review to broaden information sharing, remove obstacles,
    and bring decisions to closure.
                       major challenges and opportunities
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you will face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. Our military's challenge over the coming years is to fully
    transform and adapt in the context of a constantly evolving threat
    environments our nation faces from our pacing threats Russia and
    especially China. As we transform, we must also set a high priority on
    maintaining our close cooperation with our allies and partners to
    address various security challenges and increase our collective
    strength. Also, while our focus must be on our pacing threats, we still
    face challenges from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist
    organizations. In order to effectively address all the threats we face,
    we must continue to modernize our military, and, maintain its readiness
    to engage anywhere and anytime our nation's leaders choose.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work alongside the Chairman,
    combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure we are effectively
    executing the strategy our nation's leaders set out.
        The Joint Staff will collaborate with interagency partners and
    Congress to assess the global security challenges and provide a
    flexible, agile Joint Force that leverages fresh concepts and robust
    capabilities to offer the broadest possible set of operational options
    to decision-makers.
        Question. To the extent that the Joint Staff performs functions
    that overlap with those of other DOD components, what would be your
    approach, if confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those
    redundancies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to ensure that
    the Joint Staff continues to identify and mitigate unnecessary
    redundancies consistent with law and policy.
                           the joint chiefs of staff
        Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
    fiscal year 2017 made changes to section 151 of title 10, U. S. Code,
    concerning the service of members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the
    Chairman) as military advisors to the President, the National Security
    Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What is your assessment of the authorities and process by
    which members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) provide
    military advice and opinions to the President, National Security
    Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the
    Department of Defense?
        Answer. Existing authorities and processes facilitate the flow and
    exchange of advice and opinions to senior leaders. If confirmed, I will
    work with the Chairman to facilitate any member of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, either individually or collectively, in providing their advice
    directly to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security
    Council, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. Additionally, I will
    foster a collaborative environment that promotes respect for dissent
    and strengthens our national security in a very complex security
    environment.
        Question. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would always
    provide your best military advice to the President, the National
    Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of
    the Department of Defense, even when your advice and opinions differ
    from those of the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
       national defense strategy and interim national security strategic
                                    guidance
        Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) focused United
    States strategic priorities on a rising China, an aggressive Russia,
    and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In
    March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), which sets out the national
    security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has
    initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, which is to be completed
    in 2022.
        15. Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the INSSG accurately
    assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical
    and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
    its allies?
        Answer. Yes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
    Joint Force provided their best military advice during the development
    of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The INSSG provides
    adequate guidance until the release of the 2022 NDS. Both have
    accurately assessed the strategic environment and articulated the
    position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power
    competition.
        Question. Do you support the national security priorities set out
    in the 2018 NDS and INSSG?
        Answer. Yes, I support the national security priorities set out in
    the 2018 NDS and INSSG. They provide necessary strategic direction to
    the Joint Force. The Secretary's emphasis on China as the pacing threat
    is aligned with both documents. The shift from a Counter-Violent
    Extremist Organization focus to one centered around what the 2018 NDS
    referred to as Great Power Competition was an important shift for the
    Joint Force. The 2018 NDS' emphasis on Allies and Partners and Reform
    were also important pillars that the 2022 NDS and NMS will continue
    building upon.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
    you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff to make to the 2018 NDS or in the Department's
    implementation of the 2018 NDS and INSSG?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would want to first thoroughly review the
    strategy development work already under way for the 2022 NDS and 2022
    National Military Strategy (NMS). Based on that review, I would make an
    assessment and offer any recommendations that seemed appropriate and in
    alignment with the Administration's strategic direction, as currently
    laid out in the INSSG and in the soon to be released National Security
    Strategy (NSS).
        Question. In your view, do the 2018 NDS and INSSG correctly specify
    the priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can
    achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic
    environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?
        Answer. Yes, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), as amplified
    in the INSSG, correctly prioritizes the Department of Defense's
    mission. China and Russia's growing capabilities pose the greatest risk
    to our nation and strategic stability. China and Russia pose truly
    existential challenges that we must address in defense of the Homeland,
    in the emerging domains of space and cyber, in the conduct of contested
    logistics, and across all dimensions of national security.
        Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the
    Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and
    resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security
    objectives identified by the 2018 NDS and INSSG?
        Answer. Combatant Command Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and
    Operational Plans (OPLANs) are necessary but not sufficient to capture
    the full scope of operations across the globe. In response, the Joint
    Force has developed Global Integration Frameworks (GIFs) for each of
    the priority challenges. GIFs use the capstone OPLAN to prioritize
    military objectives across the globe, identify global campaigning
    activities, and achieve the NDS's and INSSG national security
    objectives.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes might you propose to the
    missions, responsibilities, and force structure allocated to the
    Combatant Commands, best to implement the 2018 NDS and INSSG? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. The DOD consistently seeks to improve our combatant
    commands' ability to achieve military objectives in support of National
    Security aims. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman to review
    the relevant studies regarding combatant commands' roles and missions,
    consider how we might further global integration to best address the
    global nature of the challenges we face in the 21st century, and offer
    my recommendations accordingly.
                           national military strategy
        Question. The Committee remains concerned that the processes for
    translating the explicit and implicit priorities reflected in the
    National Military Strategy into the budget proposals submitted by the
    military services are not as effective as they need to be.
        21. In your view, does the Defense Planning Guidance consistently
    and clearly set priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the
    National Military Strategy and the Joint Military Net Assessment?
        Answer. Yes, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) consistently and
    clearly sets priorities for joint capabilities that emerge from the
    National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Military Net Assessment
    (JMNA).
        Question. In your view are the Chairman's Annual Joint Assessment
    and Annual Program Assessment effective in aligning service budget
    proposals with joint priorities?
        Answer. Yes. That does not mean there is no room for improvement.
    If confirmed, through these documents, chairmanship of the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council, and co-chairmanship of the Deputy's
    Management Action Group, I will encourage all elements of the Joint
    Force to continually assess opportunities to improve our ability to
    efficiently and effectively invest in emerging and modern capabilities
    and technologies that truly address our greatest threats and
    challenges.
        Question. What are your views on the current version of the Joint
    Warfighting Concept as it supports the National Military Strategy?
        Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) is an important
    document for the Joint Force. It provides a vision of the future Joint
    Force and describes how that Force must fight in order to be
    successful. Through learning and experimentation, the JWC will serve as
    an important roadmap to modernize capabilities and address gaps.
                                 dod readiness
        Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD--
    across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training--
    to execute the NDS, INSSG, and Combatant Commanders' associated
    operational plans?
        Answer. I am confident today we can protect the homeland, meet our
    alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any
    potential adversary. With stable, predictable, adequate, and timely
    funding, we are working to improve readiness and modernization across
    the joint force in order to increase our lethality, flexibility, and
    resilience.
        Question. In what specific ways have the Combatant Commands
    utilized their increased budgetary authority to foster readiness
    recovery?
        Answer. The Services are leading the charge in utilizing their
    increased budget authority to foster readiness recovery. The increased
    budgetary authority granted to restore core readiness was necessary and
    an important step. The Combatant Commands' role continues to highlight
    to the Services areas of critical concern for mission execution. The
    Combatant Commanders have been staunch resources and readiness
    advocates to their service partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant
    Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to
    their readiness to execute operational plans in furtherance of the NDS
    and INSSG?
        Answer. Restoring warfighting readiness, both current and future,
    is a key priority of the 2018 NDS and INSSG. With stable, predictable,
    adequate, and timely funding, we have been able to address risk in
    force readiness and are restoring capability to respond to
    contingencies. The Joint Force continues to face challenges in
    rebuilding future readiness, and, looking out to 2025, the ability to
    project power and achieve superiority in multiple domains. Our
    competitive advantage has eroded over time because of two decades of
    continuous operations exacerbated by sequestration and fiscal
    uncertainty. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding
    we can continue to improve readiness and build the future force that
    maintains our competitive advantage.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in restoring joint
    force readiness?
        Answer. Our nation faces very real and significant challenges, and
    we must continue to invest in the future. Stable, predictable,
    adequate, and timely funding help us maintain our qualitative and
    quantitative competitive advantage. Additionally, we must recapture our
    ability to go faster than our adversaries and take informed risks to
    maintain our competitive advantage. This includes inserting speed into
    acquisition, research and development, and our technology and
    innovation processes to ensure capabilities are delivered faster. If
    confirmed, as the JROC Chairman and DMAG Co-Chair, I will advocate for
    these efforts to ensure we continue to improve joint readiness and the
    developing and fielding of warfighting capabilities.
                            national defense budget
        Question. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission recommended that Congress increase the defense budget at an
    average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
        Do you believe that sustained real growth in the defense budget is
    necessary to achieve the aims of the existing NDS without incurring
    significant risk?
        Answer. Yes. I believe sustained real growth in the face of
    evolving long term economic pressure is necessary to achieve the aims
    of the existing NDS without incurring buying power risk to fiscal year
    2022 dollars. The Department's $715 Billion budget requires hard
    choices in terms of prioritization, but it is sufficient to meet the
    requirements of the current NDS. If confirmed, I will be an advocate
    for stable, predictable, adequate and timely defense budgets.
        Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
    adequacy of the DOD budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the proposed budget against
    the National Defense Strategy's required tasks, missions, and
    capabilities. PB22 supports a more lethal, ready, and partnered force
    by funding efforts to modernize capabilities, expand warfighting
    capacity, and restore readiness.
                             use of military force
        Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making
    recommendations to the President for the use of military force?
        Answer. Recommendations on the use of military force should be
    consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, such
    recommendations should consider the probability of success, cost in
    terms of casualties, and strategic risk.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force
    and the rules of engagement?
        Answer. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to
    use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the
    President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on
    the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.
        Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
    including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, provide
    sufficient authority for the Department to conduct counterterrorism
    operations and activities as necessary and appropriate to protect U.S.
    national security interests?
        Answer. I agree that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
    Force provides a legal basis for operations against violent extremist
    organizations and is consistent with the policies of current and past
    administrations expressed in the report on the Legal and Policy
    Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related
    National Security Operations.
        Question. In your view, what operational factors should Congress
    take into consideration in assessing whether a ``new'' Authorization
    for the Use of Military Force is needed at this time? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. I believe the current Authorized Use of Military Force
    (AUMF) is sufficient in providing legal basis for the Department's
    current counterterrorism activities. However, I support Congress
    considering, as the President has stated, the terrorist threat as it
    exists today versus the threat that existed when the 2001 AUMF was
    enacted.
        Updating the AUMF may improve our approach to counterterrorism by
    aligning our resources to evolving threats, but there are also risks to
    changing an authority which is sufficient and works. A new AUMF must
    account for all terrorist organizations which threaten U.S. national
    interests and provide the latitude for the U.S. to use both kinetic and
    non-kinetic capabilities of the Joint Force to ensure the safety of
    these interests. As the President has pointed out, the U.S. will lead
    first with diplomacy and leverage America's unmatched network of
    alliances and partnerships.
        Question. In your view, are existing policies and processes for
    determining if and when the forces of other nations are eligible for
    Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces adequate and appropriate?
        Answer. Yes. In all cases where U.S. forces are authorized to use
    force to defend foreign forces or individuals in the context of armed
    conflict, or a significant threat from an organized armed group, the
    authorization comes from the President, whether expressly or implicitly
    in authorizing or directing U.S. forces to participate in multinational
    military operations. The Secretary of Defense approves military orders
    (rules of engagement) implementing that authorization, and in many
    instances the Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for
    identifying and designating specific foreign forces or individuals to
    be defended.
                                chain of command
        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. Section
    163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct that
    communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and
    the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be transmitted through the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and may assign duties to the
    Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary in performing their
    command function.
        Do you believe that these provisions of law enact a clear and
    effective chain of command?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate
    civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. The chain of command originates with the President and
    runs through the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to the
    commanders of the combatant commands. If confirmed, I will be dedicated
    to participating in the decision-making process and executing lawful
    orders as given by my civilian leadership.
        Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it
    appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
    command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
    established under title 10, U.S. Code?
        Answer. Normally, our armed forces operate under the established
    Title 10 chain of command. There may be instances for the President to
    establish other temporary command relationships for certain sensitive
    military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S.
    military personnel are still accountable to the Title 10 chain of
    command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
    Furthermore, our armed forces must act consistent with the law of war
    in all military operations.
                           alliances and partnerships
        Question. The 2018 NDS and INSSG stress that mutually beneficial
    alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition
    with, deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic
    competitors.
        What is your view of the continuing strength of our current
    alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners
    have in the United States to meet its obligations? What do you see as
    the role of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in enhancing
    that trust?
        Answer. From a Joint Force perspective, confidence and trust in the
    U.S. military among our Allies and Partners remains strong. We continue
    to be actively engaged and synchronized with our Allies and Partners in
    our operations around the globe. The role of the Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely suited to complement the Chairman's
    engagements with Allies and Partners to reassure them of the U.S.
    commitment to a rules based international order.
        I will continue, and expand as necessary, the Vice Chairman's role
    in direct bilateral consultations on key issues of importance with my
    counterparts. These consultations could take the form of Counterpart
    Visits, less formal office calls on the margins of other Ally and
    Partner visits to the United States, traveling to Ally and Partner
    countries for engagements with their leadership and staff, or direct
    phone calls.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant
    commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Joint Force, through
    the execution of our Global Campaign Plans, continues to strengthen
    alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage new
    opportunities for international cooperation.
        Specifically, the Joint Force does this through close consultation
    and coordination with Allies and Partners in a number of routine
    bilateral and multilateral relationships that include, but are not
    limited to, our key Allies in the Indo-Pacific, NATO Allies, the FVEY
    nations, the Quad, ASEAN's Defense Ministers Meeting-plus framework,
    and Coalition partners. These fora enable us to engage and collaborate
    with our Allies and Partners to achieve mutual military objectives and
    desired strategic effects related to competition with China and Russia,
    while enabling their capabilities to counter violent extremist
    organizations. Most importantly, within bilateral engagements and
    multilateral fora, we increase our communications and take action to
    include Allies and Partners earlier in our planning processes to enable
    their national enterprises greater opportunity for integration and
    collaboration.
        Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the
    military leaders of the Armed Forces of other nations, international
    consultative forums, and processes for enhancing interoperability
    between Allies and Partners?
        Answer. Allies and Partners are critical in responding to mutual
    threats, preserving our shared interests, shaping the strategic
    environment, and are one of the greatest asymmetric advantages the
    United States has over potential adversaries. In my career, I have had
    the opportunity to meet and get to know military leaders from many of
    our Ally and Partner Armed Forces.
        I am familiar with, and will support as necessary, the Chairman's
    regular consultations and meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of
    Defense (CHOD) in several multilateral fora such as the NATO Military
    Committee in Chiefs of Defense Sessions and others. These consultations
    are essential to enhancing interoperability between Allies and
    Partners.
        Question. In your view, what kinds of activities or engagements
    with Allies and Partners are most effective at enhancing those
    relationships and in case of crisis and conflict are most likely to
    elicit their defense cooperation and support?
        Answer. Building and enhancing relationships with Allies and
    Partners is a continuous activity, and the Joint Force is best served
    by a comprehensive relationship-based approach. Key leader engagements
    are vital, as are exercises and training, personnel exchanges,
    partnering for technology development, and a host of other security
    cooperation activities. Of course, the appropriate frequency and scope
    of each activity will depend upon the relationship in question, the
    goals set by policymakers, as well as the specific campaign,
    contingency, and crisis action plans our commanders have in place.
                          defense security cooperation
        Question. DOD supports a wide range of programs and activities
    including foreign military sales, security assistance to build the
    capabilities of foreign security forces, exercises and training events,
    military-to-military exchanges, and partnering to develop key
    technological capabilities.
        Do you believe the Department of Defense has an effective security
    cooperation strategy for long-term strategic competition with near-peer
    rivals?
        Answer. Yes, I believe the DOD has an effective security
    cooperation approach for long term strategic competition with near peer
    rivals. Our existing security cooperation programs and activities, as
    led and managed by OSD Policy, DSCA, the Joint Staff J5/J7, and the
    Combatant Commanders are critical in bolstering the network of
    alliances and partnerships necessary to compete with near-peer rivals.
    Security Cooperation success depends in large part on collaboration
    with our interagency counterparts under the guidance of documents like
    the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), to ensure
    that DOD's security cooperation activities support U.S. foreign policy
    objectives more broadly.
        Question. What should be the primary objectives of Department of
    Defense security cooperation programs and activities, in your view?
        Answer. The primary objectives of DOD security cooperation actions
    and activities employed by Combatant Commanders are to build and
    develop allied and partner security capability and capacity for self-
    defense and multinational operations. These same activities provide the
    Joint Force with the access and relationships necessary to promote
    access and shared security interests.
        Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
    resourced to execute security cooperation programs and activities
    effectively? If not, what changes would you recommend, if confirmed?
        Answer. The DOD is well organized to execute security cooperation
    through a network of experts in the Combatant Commands and Services, at
    U.S. Embassies, within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and
    elsewhere. While it is clear the DOD cannot rely on enormous
    investments in the national security forces of other governments to
    guarantee the security of the American people, it is also apparent that
    security cooperation activities often pay large dividends.
        If confirmed, I aim to collaborate with all stake holders to assess
    and evaluate our security cooperation programs to ensure they meet the
    needs of our operational commanders and are achieving the goals our
    national security policy makers.
                      the defense acquisition board (dab)
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a
    member of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the DOD acquisition
    system's senior advisory board. The DAB reviews and advises the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs--the most complex and expensive DOD acquisition
    projects.
        What is your understanding of the Vice Chairman's role as a member
    of the DAB?
        Answer. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the senior advisory
    board for defense acquisitions in the Department of Defense. The board
    is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Sustainment and includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, the Service Secretaries, and a number of Under Secretaries of
    Defense. The DAB plays an important role in the Defense Acquisition
    System. Members of this board are responsible for approving the Major
    Defense Acquisition Programs and serve as the most important executive
    review of critical acquisition projects that have large impacts on the
    capacity and capabilities of the force.
        If confirmed, I intend to work in close partnership with the
    Board's members to assure alignment with the stated goals of the
    Chairman's Planning Guidance and National Military Strategy.
        Question. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman's role in the DAB
    should be modified to enhance the Board's effectiveness? If so, how?
        Answer. Not at this time, but I will look for opportunities to
    increase the flexibility and the speed at which we acquire systems and
    warfighting capabilities.
    joint requirements oversight council (jroc) and the joint capabilities
                   integration and development system (jcids)
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) established the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) as ``the principal advisor to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs on joint military capabilities or joint performance
    requirements'' enabling the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to
    the Chairman without the concurrence of the members of the JROC.
        If confirmed, do you intend to take full advantage of your
    authority as the JROC Chairman to recommend requirements to the
    Chairman and the Secretary of Defense for capabilities that derive from
    commercial technology and technology developed in DOD organizations
    independently of the military services?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by Congress
    in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with the active
    support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I anticipate
    that in the current technological environment the entities that procure
    capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from technologies
    that derive from the Services, private industry, and other DOD
    organizations.
        Question. If confirmed, do you intend to exercise this authority to
    establish requirements for joint capabilities, such as Joint All-Domain
    Command and Control?
        Answer. Yes, I will exercise the capability requirements authority.
    Modern warfare demands unprecedented levels of interoperability,
    integrated systems-of-systems kill chains, and joint command and
    control, for which no single Service is responsible.
        Question. Do you believe that this problem can be addressed through
    the JROC requirements process?
        Answer. Yes, the requirements for such joint capabilities can and
    should be addressed through the JROC.
        Born out of numerous failures in interoperability, the JROC and its
    requirements process were created to enforce interoperability between
    critical systems across the joint force.
        Question. If confirmed, what other steps would you recommend to
    address this deficiency?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support my predecessor's
    efforts to seek consensus on issues for which no single Service has
    responsibility and work to address those issues through the JROC
    Strategic Directives. I also support the use of the Joint Warfighting
    Concept to assign matters of Joint interest to a lead Service with an
    appropriate supporting Joint Staff directorate.
        Question. Do you believe the JROC has responsibility to ensure that
    the services are meeting their joint warfighting obligation with their
    assigned roles and missions?
        Answer. The JROC's responsibilities, as established in Title 10
    Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by assessing
    joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any gaps, and
    validating joint military requirements. It is incumbent on the Services
    to achieve their joint warfighting obligations, and to inform the JROC
    when they are unable to do so.
        Currently, strategic capability gaps derived from exercises and
    experiments as they are applied to helping refine the Joint Warfighting
    Concept are being used by the JROC to deliver strategic direction and
    joint capability requirements to the Services.
        Question. Do you agree this is an effective methodology for
    providing strategic direction to the Services?
        Answer. JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) are aligned to Joint
    Concepts and focus on cross-cutting capabilities that the Joint
    Warfighter of the future will need to satisfy the strategic guidance
    within the NDS. JSDs achieve this by setting clear and strategic
    requirements to ensure interoperability across the Joint Force.
        Question. What is your understanding of how this strategic
    direction is to be enforced by the Department to ensure the Services
    fulfill joint capability requirements?
        Answer. JROC Strategic Directives (JSDs) will inform the Chairman's
    Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).
    In turn, the directives will inform Service POMs and the development of
    the President's Budget. I support the current plan that each year the
    JROC--including the Vice Chairman and each of the Services--will assess
    how the Services are progressing in meeting the JSD requirements.
        Question. With respect to Integrated Air and Missile defense, do
    you believe the JROC should play a role in ensuring the Joint Force has
    the ability to protect itself in the near term and future from
    supersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?
        Answer. Yes. The JROC's responsibilities, as established in Title
    10 Section 181, are to support the National Defense Strategy by
    assessing joint military capabilities, prioritizing efforts to fill any
    gaps, and validating joint military requirements. This responsibility
    exists across all domains and all capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, what action would you take to ensure this
    capability is developed and fielded?
        Answer. The JROC will continue to monitor and manage the progress
    of the program through its established bodies and processes to include
    validation of changes to requirements documents and the annual
    Capability Portfolio Management Review.
        Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and the Assault
    Breaker II initiative from DARPA are two prominent examples of joint
    capabilities in development for which there is no obvious transition
    path. In the case of JADC2, the Joint Staff is taking the lead in
    coordinating development.
        Question. In your view, is this an important issue? If so, do you
    have thoughts about how to address it if you are confirmed?
        Answer. JADC2 is an important developing joint capability, critical
    to the success of the Department. JADC2 is not a joint product or
    program of record but rather a capability delivery framework to
    modernize and accelerate the fielding of material and non-material C2
    capabilities. DSD stood up the JADC2 Cross-Functional Team (CFT) to
    oversee implementation of the Secretary's JADC2 Strategy. The CFT has
    been charged with highlighting ``best of breed'' capabilities and
    ensuring the possible transition or integration of joint C2
    initiatives. If confirmed, I will aggressively monitor CFT progress to
    assure timely introduction of these important capabilities to the joint
    force.
        Commercial industry investment in research and development exceeds
    that of DOD and the technology emerging from industry is expected to
    drive military capabilities globally. For this reason, some recommend
    that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
    (USD(R&E) should be made a member of the JROC.
        Question. Currently, USD (R&E), USD (A&S), and DOT&E serve in the
    JROC in prominent advisory roles. What are your views on adding the
    USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member?
        Answer. I believe that it is important for the JROC to provide the
    military's findings on future requirements from a warfighting
    perspective. There is wisdom in Congress' creation of a cross-Service
    body to perform this function. Indeed, the JROC's current composition
    of voting members includes General/Flag Officers from each service
    component. USD(R&E) has an important responsibility for the advancement
    of technology and innovation throughout the DOD, and is invited to
    participate in every JROC meeting. The JROC values the recommendations
    of all its advisors, taking them into serious consideration. While I do
    not currently see a need to add USD(R&E) as a voting JROC member, it is
    also critical to retain USD(R&E)'s contribution as an advisory member.
        Question. Do you believe that the Vice Chairman, as the Chairman of
    the JROC, should work to develop requirements based on technological
    opportunities emerging from the private sector and DOD advanced
    research organizations, such as DARPA and the Strategic Capabilities
    Office?
        Answer. Yes. Title 10 Section 181 charges the JROC to identify new
    joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and
    concepts of operation. In the current technological environment, it
    would be impossible to fulfill this mission without direct engagement
    with advanced research organizations and awareness of private-sector
    innovation. USD(R&E) provides a critical link to these emerging
    technological opportunities.
        Question. In your opinion, does the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD
    (A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, possess the technical
    expertise and capacity to identify mature, high-payoff technologies
    that should form the basis for new military requirements?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. In your view, is the JROC staff, with USD (R&E), USD
    (A&S), and DOT&E at the table to provide advice, able to effectively
    assess whether requirements proposed by the military services are
    technically realistic?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed the Secretary of
    Defense to ``ensure that analytical organizations within the Department
    of Defense, such as the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation, provide resources and expertise in operations research,
    systems analysis, and cost estimation to the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council to assist the Council'' in generating and approving
    requirements. Despite this mandate, the Joint Staff still lacks
    operations research-related expertise and capacity.
        In your opinion, has this mandate has been fulfilled? Please
    explain.
        Answer. Yes. While the JROC still relies on CAPE for cost
    assessment and program evaluation, expertise resident within the Joint
    Staff J8 Functional Capability Boards support operations research and
    systems analysis. Additional cost estimation expertise within the JROC
    would be duplicative of CAPE, which already serves in an advisory role
    to the JROC.
        Question. In your view, should the JROC have its own operations
    research and systems analysis staff?
        Answer. No. The Joint Staff J8 provides operations research and
    systems analysis support to the JROC via the Functional Capabilities
    Boards.
        Question. According to Section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, ``The
    Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, in the case of a recommendation
    [of a requirement] by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
    Secretary that is approved by the Secretary, oversight information with
    respect to such recommendation that is produced as a result of the
    activities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is made
    available in a timely fashion to the congressional defense
    committees.''
        Do you commit, if confirmed, to provide such information to
    Congress when requested?
        Answer. If confirmed, yes.
        Question. The JCIDS process was established partially to address
    overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs. JCIDS is
    intended to provide the information the JROC needs to identify the
    capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed
    by the joint warfighter.
        In your view, is the JCIDS process effective in providing
    information the JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the
    future needs of the joint force?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. How does the JROC intersect with the Deputy's Management
    Action Group (DMAG) and to what degree and how does that intersection
    allow enforcement of JROC strategic direction to the Services?
        Answer. The VCJCS serves as Chairman of the JROC and as a co-chair
    of the DMAG. These combined roles provide the opportunity to provide
    advice to policy-makers based in the analysis and findings of the JROC,
    and to present recommendations that align DMAG actions with JROC
    strategic direction, in particular by deepening the alignment between
    requirements and budgeting.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you drive the development and
    articulation of future joint concepts from which each Military
    Service's concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition
    processes will derive?
        Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept is a framework to align Joint
    Force requirements and guide future acquisition decisions. The findings
    of this concept provide the basis for JROC requirements and strategic
    directives. If confirmed, through the ongoing Functional Capabilities
    Board processes, I will continue to review Joint Force capabilities and
    capability requirement gaps and prioritize efforts.
        Question. In your view, does DOD have the requisite modeling,
    simulation, and analytic capabilities to develop and assess future
    joint concepts, and the associated capabilities and force structure?
        Answer. Our data, infrastructure, policy, tools, and staffs are
    challenged to keep pace with the ideas, concepts, and capabilities
    shaping our planning and programming. Fortunately, the Department has
    recognized these challenges and established an Analysis Working Group
    (AWG), co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman. The AWG is
    led by OSD (CAPE), OSD (Policy), Joint Staff J7 and J8, and the Chief
    Data Officer (CDO) and is working these challenges in conjunction with
    the Services and other key stakeholders in the Department.
        Question. If confirmed, what is your view on the appropriate role
    of Combatant Commanders in the JCIDS process? How would you improve the
    effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and
    long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?
        Answer. It is a team effort. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors
    to the JROC when matters related to their area of responsibility or
    function are under consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical
    role in developing requirements and identifying capability gaps. The
    Combatant Commanders specifically identify risks and evaluate their
    Global Campaign Plan objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the
    Capability Gap Assessment processes.
        If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider
    input from the Combatant Commanders. I will evaluate the needs of the
    Combatant Commanders, the realities of Service budgets, and the
    priorities of DOD leadership before determining any necessary
    adjustments to improve effectiveness.
        Question. In your view, are the JROC and JCIDS processes sufficient
    to identify where opportunities for multi-Service collaboration exist,
    or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of a
    related acquisition program?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the
    structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?
        Answer. No, not at this time.
        Question. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities
    enacted in Section 804 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA seek to speed
    fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS
    process.
        What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS
    process?
        Answer. Not using JCIDS creates three issues that impact joint
    interoperability: vital program interoperability may be impacted;
    proper program prioritization may be missed, slowing down vital
    warfighting capability reaching the Joint Force; and efforts may be
    duplicated across the services when procuring vital warfighting
    equipment.
        If confirmed, I intend to continue efforts between the Joint Staff
    and USD (A&S) to incorporate Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) into the
    JCIDS process in order to address these concerns while maintaining
    Congress's intent to increase the speed and efficiency of the
    requirements process.
        Question. What is your opinion of DOD's initial efforts to use
    section 804 authorities?
        Answer. Use of section 804 authorities has been successful. From my
    perspective, as Commander, Fleet Forces Command, I am pleased to see
    the depth and breadth of activities looking to accelerate the delivery
    of warfighting capabilities to the force. If confirmed, I will continue
    to work with key stakeholders to evaluate the use of 804 authorities
    and provide feedback as necessary.
                                    aircraft
        Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization
    programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical,
    strategic, and tanker fleets will continue to increase. Aging aircraft
    require ever-increasing maintenance, which incurs ever-increasing
    costs. Nonetheless, readiness levels continue to decline.
        What are your views on balancing current aircraft capacity and
    future capability to meet expected threats?
        Answer. It is critical to continue acquiring and modernizing our
    5th generation fighter platforms for potential operations against near-
    peer competitors. However, adapting the force we have today, while we
    design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges requires a mix of
    capabilities within the Tactical Fighter portfolio. In the short term,
    recapitalizing a portion of our 4th generation aircraft fleet provides
    essential capacity to improve readiness and meet Joint Force demands
    while we field new 5th generation aircraft, modernize our existing 5th
    generation aircraft, and develop new technologies to maintain the Joint
    Forces competitive advantage.
                                 nuclear policy
        Question. Do you agree with the assessment of the past five
    Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest
    priority mission and that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a
    critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. I believe nuclear deterrence is the Department's
    highest priority mission. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
    U.S. nuclear deterrent is the only effective way to counter that
    threat. Modernizing our nuclear forces is a critical national security
    priority.
        WQuestion. hat is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons
    and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and
    the defense of allies?
        Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons have long played an important role in
    deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attack against the United States, our
    forces deployed abroad, and our allies. An effective U.S. nuclear
    deterrent is critical to maintaining strategic stability. That same
    nuclear deterrent adds extra pause between nuclear-armed adversary's
    decisions to start a conventional conflict.
        Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based
    nuclear delivery systems is consistent with an effective deterrent
    posture in an era of increasing nuclear threats to the United States
    and its allies?
        Answer. Yes. The flexible, survivable, and responsive nuclear triad
    has underpinned strategic deterrence for more than 60 years and is the
    bedrock of our national defense. It remains essential to ensure no
    adversary believes it can ever employ nuclear weapons for any reason,
    under any circumstances against the United States or our Allies or
    partners without risking devastating consequences.
        Question. Do you believe the U.S. should maintain an effective
    intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of responding to
    strategic attacks and of sufficient size to ensure that the United
    States could not be disarmed by an adversary's first strike?
        Answer. Yes. Our pacing threats are pursuing a diversified set of
    advanced nuclear weapons systems. The size and geographic dispersion of
    the ICBM force presents an intractable targeting problem that
    complicates a first-use attack. A maintained, modernized, and highly
    responsive, ICBM force is a crucial component of the Triad.
        Question. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that
    the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear
    forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on
    alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any
    given time.
        Do you agree with that conclusion? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. The threat environment has grown increasingly complex.
    The alert posture we maintain is a critical deterrent and necessary to
    address current and future threats.
        Question. Do you believe that the alert levels for the
    intercontinental ballistic missile force should be reduced, potentially
    requiring the United States to completely absorb a large-scale nuclear
    strike before it will be able to respond?
        Answer. No. ICBMs complicate an adversary's targeting and decision
    calculus. Without ICBMs on alert, China would be able to instantly
    adopt a counterforce strategy, and it would give Russian nuclear forces
    the strategic upper hand.
        Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has referred to
    reports of China's nuclear force expansion as ``breathtaking'' and
    contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. and
    Russia is a ``strategic breakout,'' which represents an unprecedented
    threat to global stability.
        Do you agree with this assessment?
        Answer. Yes.
        . What is your understanding of how Russia and China have expanded
    and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?
        Answer. The United States has never faced the challenge of two
    near-peer nuclear armed nations such as China and Russia. China is
    rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear capabilities. This
    includes construction of missile silos that could launch nuclear
    weapons once completed. Russia is also advancing its already
    considerable nuclear capabilities and continues to develop and field
    nuclear capable weapons and systems not accountable under the New START
    Treaty.
        Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
    threat to the United States and its allies?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
    coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?
        Answer. Yes. The expansion and modernization of Russia's nuclear
    arsenal indicates a willingness to employ nuclear coercion as a means
    of advancing their military and foreign policy goals. Russia's
    significant expansion in non-strategic nuclear weapons exacerbates this
    concern. These weapons are not accountable under New START. The
    potential employment of these weapons poses miscalculation risk. Russia
    may miscalculate the capability and resolve of the United States and
    our allies to deter and defend against Russian limited nuclear use.
        Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
    double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
        Answer. Yes, I agree with that assessment.
        Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
    triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of ``no
    first use''?
        Answer. A fully functional nuclear triad, in any capacity, creates
    a challenging security environment for the United States and its Allies
    and partners. As China's nuclear doctrine evolves under this reality,
    it is crucial that we maintain an understanding of how China intends to
    adhere to a ``no first use'' policy. The United States nuclear
    deterrent must remain whole and modernized to meet this potential
    threat.
        Question. Do you support the policy of ``no first use'', i.e., a
    commitment that the United States will never use nuclear weapons first
    in a future conflict?
        Answer. From a military perspective, I do believe in giving the
    President as many options as possible, and that maintaining calculated
    ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I would not
    advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary's decision-
    making, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their reliance
    on nuclear capabilities.
        Question. Do you support the policy that the sole purpose of
    nuclear weapons is only to deter against other nations' nuclear
    weapons?
        Answer. I believe that maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates
    an adversary's decision calculus. I would not advocate for any change
    that would simplify an adversary's decision-making, particularly if our
    adversaries increase their reliance on nuclear capabilities.
        Question. What is your understanding of allies' perspectives on
    potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear
    declaratory policy?
        Answer. I believe our alliances are our strategic center of
    gravity. Any potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy must
    be carefully crafted and communicated to ensure that we maintain close
    alignment with our allies.
        Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our allies have
    been called one of the U.S. most important and most effective tools for
    stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
        Question. The extended nuclear deterrence assurances the United
    States provides to its allies have been called one of the U.S. most
    important and most effective tools for stemming the further
    proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
        Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence assurances are
    effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to pursue their
    own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?
        Answer. Yes. Extended nuclear deterrence assurances provided to our
    allies are one of the most important and effective tools for stemming
    the further proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies.
        A number of recent press reports have highlighted NATO and allied
    concerns regarding the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
    assurances, and some--particularly South Korea--have seen increased
    calls to develop their own independent nuclear deterrent as a means of
    offsetting reduced confidence in U.S. assurances.
        Question. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation
    will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear
    deterrence assurances?
        Answer. Yes. Effectively assuring our Allies of the credibility of
    extended nuclear deterrence mitigates the risk of nuclear
    proliferation. Our alliances are one of our greatest strategic
    advantages, and if confirmed, I look forward to closely engaging with
    our Allies on these issues.
        Question. Do you believe China or Russia would view U.S. adoption
    of a no-first-use or sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy as
    credible?
        Answer. No, I do not.
        Question. What are your views of changing our declaratory policy
    for NATO with respect to Britain and France and their declaratory
    policy?
        Answer. U.S. nuclear forces, along with the independent strategic
    forces of the UK and France, remain the supreme security guarantee of
    NATO Allies. This force is an essential component of the Trans-Atlantic
    military link that should be maintained to preserve peace, prevent
    coercion, and deter aggression. It is important to maintain Alliance
    cohesion and unity regarding declaratory policy.
        Question. Prior to the current iteration, the Joint Staff has
    played a significant leadership role in the conduct of each incoming
    presidential administration's Nuclear Posture Review. In structuring
    its own review, the current administration elected to diverge from past
    practice, and removed the Joint Staff from its typical co-chair
    position.
        If confirmed, what do you understand will be your role as Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff in the ongoing Nuclear Posture
    Review?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will fulfill my duties and responsibilities
    as the Vice Chairman to ensure the military equities of the Joint Force
    are adequately considered and represented when presented to the
    Secretary of Defense and the President. These equities include the
    military's perspective on the current and projected threat environment,
    and military advice on the implications of potential policy decisions,
    including nuclear strategy, posture, and acquisition programs.
        Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a significant
    leadership role in future Nuclear Posture Reviews?
        Answer. Yes.
                             nuclear modernization
        Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. As a
    member of the Council, you will work closely with the National Nuclear
    Security Administration to coordinate policies and align resources for
    DOD and Department of Energy nuclear programs.
        If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the work of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council?
        Answer. The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) enduring priority is
    maintaining a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear weapon
    stockpile able to deter adversaries and assure Allies and global
    security partners. Close collaboration between the DOD and our National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) partners has proven successful
    in sustaining legacy weapons and moving forward with critical
    modernization efforts.
        Continued success is contingent on building a robust and resilient
    infrastructure to include plutonium pit production, uranium and lithium
    processing, and increased non-nuclear production capabilities.
    Maintaining confidence in our weapons hinges on having the necessary
    modern facilities and skilled workforce to sustain the deterrent force.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to the membership and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapons Council?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to foster the strong inter-
    agency partnership and would not recommend any changes to the
    membership or responsibilities of the NWC.
        Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the
    nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are
    needed?
        Answer. Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has
    developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify
    the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons
    testing. The program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-
    scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support
    for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the
    Stockpile Stewardship mission.
        Question. U.S. nuclear forces are nearing the end of their useful
    lives. These capabilities must be updated over the next 20 years if the
    United States is to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
        What is your understanding of the state of U.S. nuclear forces, its
    global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture,
    and the supporting weapons sustainment and production capabilities
    within the National Nuclear Security Administration?
        Answer. Although our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and
    effective, we have greatly exceeded their intended design life and they
    are showing their age. Deferred modernization has removed margin and
    there is no longer room for delay. Diminished and outdated DOD
    industrial base capability to service and deliver nuclear platforms and
    NNSA production capabilities and infrastructure, some of which date
    back to the Manhattan Project, exacerbate this challenge.
        Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
    sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad,
    including delivery systems, warheads, command and control systems, and
    infrastructure?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to
    mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will ``age
    out'' simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to keep senior leadership
    across the Department informed and engaged on the transition from
    legacy to modernized nuclear delivery platforms and weapons. I believe
    such engagement is necessary to hold ourselves accountable for
    addressing these risks in a coherent and responsible manner.
        Question. More specifically, do you support the following DOD
    modernization programs of record? Please be specific.
          Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
          B-21 Bomber
          Columbia-class Submarine
          Modernization of the ground, air and space based Nuclear
    Command, Control and Communications Systems (NC3)
          Production capabilities to produce cryptographic products
    for NC3
          Long Range Stand Off Weapon
          Sea Launched Cruise Missile
          Upgrades to the B-52 to include radar, engines,
    electronic warfare, survivable long wave frequency waveforms, Family of
    Advanced Line of Sight Terminals
          Addition of nuclear capability to the F-35A aircraft
        While I support DOD nuclear modernization programs of record, the
    Nuclear Posture Review will conclude how the programs of record will
    support our strategy going forward. I recognize there is a lot of risk
    in executing these programs concurrently, but I believe these programs
    are necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear
    deterrent in an increasingly complex security environment. If
    confirmed, I commit to helping the Department manage the transition
    risk appropriately.
        Question. Do you support the following National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) modernization programs of record? Please be
    specific.
        Answer.
          W80-4 warhead
          W87-1 warhead
          W93 warhead
          B61-12 gravity bomb
          B83 gravity bomb life extension
          The capability to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per
    year
          Modernizing the production capability for depleted
    uranium and lithium
          Restoring the production capability to produce high
    enriched uranium for defense needs
        I fully support the W80-4 warhead required to support the Long-
    Range Stand-Off cruise missile, the W87-1 warhead required to maintain
    the land leg of the nuclear deterrent with GBSD, the W93 warhead
    required to modernize the sea leg and potentially alleviate over-
    reliance on a single warhead, and the B61-12 gravity bomb which
    consolidates four weapon types and provides our Allies confidence in
    our extended deterrence.
        I am open to the possibility of forgoing a life extension of the
    B83 gravity bomb if there are more effective ways to replace the
    capability it provides. I support the need to produce at least 80
    plutonium pits per year and the modernization of production capability
    for lithium and depleted and high enriched uranium to enable
    modernization of our aging stockpile.
        Question. What are your greatest concerns with respect to the DOD
    and NNSA modernization programs?
        Answer. My greatest concerns with the DOD and NNSA modernization
    programs are: 1) ensuring sufficient investment across the U.S.
    industrial base to execute the modernization programs and enable
    responsiveness to address unforeseen challenges; and 2) maintaining
    necessary funding to develop, produce, and sustain a modernized nuclear
    force and stockpile.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as
    the co-chair of the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership
    Command, Control, and Communications System.
        If confirmed, how would you use this role to advocate for the
    modernization of NC3 systems?
        Answer. If confirmed, modernization of Nuclear Command, Control,
    and Communications (NC3) would remain a top priority. As co-chair of
    the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications
    Systems, I would work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national
    objectives, are adequately resourced, and stay synchronized with senior
    leader and continuity of government communications efforts.
    Additionally, as chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    (JROC), I would work closely with CDR USSTRATCOM and the Services to
    ensure efficient validation of NC3 modernization requirements and
    advocate for the rapid delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities that
    empower our triad of nuclear capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to assess the
    cyber security of the NC3 system on an enduring basis?
        Answer. Section 1651 of the 2018 NDAA requires the Commanders of
    USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM to submit an annual joint assessment of the
    cyber resilience of the nuclear command and control system to the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to Congress. If
    confirmed, as a co-chair for the Council on Oversight of the National
    Leadership Command, Control, and Communication System, I will review
    the NDAA-mandated report for action prior to providing it to Congress.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your role on the Joint Staff
    for NC3 operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, my role as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff would include duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the
    approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, I would act to
    support the Chairman as he exercises approval authority for the CDR
    USSTRATCOM recommended changes to Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communications (NC3) systems that affect the operational configuration
    of the National Military Command System (NMCS).
        Question. In your view, should senior leaders across the Executive
    Branch regularly take part in NC3 exercises and, if so, why?
        Answer. Yes. The Department is supportive of senior advisors to the
    President participating in, or observing, large-scale exercises
    involving nuclear command, control, and communications systems.
    Participation at this level would enhance support to the President
    during the nuclear decision-making process.
                                missile defense
        Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
    ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
    but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland
    continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified
    existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to
    improve U.S. capability.
        If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what
    priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities
    for the homeland?
        Answer. If confirmed, my top priority is the improvement of the
    U.S. missile defense architecture by ensuring the full integration of a
    persistent and integrated network of sensors. These sensors provide
    real-time detection, tracking, and targeting information that is
    critical to policymakers during a crisis. The existing DOD global
    network of sensors on land, at sea, and in the air and space domains is
    highly complex and must be improved to increase operational awareness
    and decision making. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to
    ensure this element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is
    prioritized.
        Question. What are your views on the relationship between missile
    defense and nuclear deterrence?
        Answer. Missile Defense is a key piece of our integrated deterrence
    strategy. United States policy for defense of the Homeland requires a
    commitment to stay ahead of rogue nation missile threats while
    continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more
    sophisticated Russian and Chinese ICBMs. A robust and credible, layered
    missile defense system paired with our conventional and nuclear force
    capabilities provides the ability to deter strategic attacks and impose
    costs against any potential adversary.
        Question. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy
    should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea
    and Iran?
        Answer. Yes. I believe U.S. homeland missile defense policy should
    remain focused on defending against comparatively limited state
    ballistic missile attacks from rouge nations like North Korea and Iran.
    To address the threat of a comprehensive and technologically
    sophisticated strategic missile attack by China or Russia, the United
    States should continue to rely on the same strategy it has employed for
    more than half a century--i.e., nuclear deterrence.
        Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
    missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
    smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
    threats, such as Russia and China?
        Answer. Defending the U.S. homeland against non-strategic missile
    attacks by pacing threats such as China or Russia remains a difficult
    problem. U.S. missile defenses cannot defend against every threat. It
    is simply one of many tools in our toolkit to protect against the
    growing number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department
    is examining ways to enhance its missile defense architecture against
    conventional missile threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing
    improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture.
        Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program,
    and once deployed, the regular testing of it?
        Answer. Yes. I support the Department's decision to move forward
    with development and future testing of the Next Generation Interceptor
    (NGI), as well as the additional on-going efforts to enhance the
    effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense System
    (GMD). GMD protects the United States homeland against limited ICBM
    threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support efforts to
    ensure that the homeland missile defense architecture remains effective
    as one of the important components to our integrated deterrence
    approach.
        Question. Do you support using Aegis Destroyers as a layer of our
    homeland defense architecture?
        Answer. Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or
    existing capabilities will require weighing a variety of factors such
    as cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability
    against the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will
    work to ensure the Joint Force has the proper mix of capabilities to
    defend the homeland.
        Question. Do you support a layered and dispersed missile defense
    architecture for the defense of Guam, and if so, why?
        Answer. Yes. I agree with the INDOPACOM Commander that ensuring
    Guam has sufficient defenses is critical. Active missile defenses that
    enable INDOPACOM to sustain military operations during a conflict are
    one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If
    confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right
    combination of capabilities to defend Guam, including active missile
    defenses, to enhance the U.S. regional deterrence and defense posture,
    assure allies and partners, and increase readiness to contribute to a
    free and open Indo-Pacific region.
        Question. Do you support a long range homeland defense radar
    capability in Hawaii?
        Answer. Hawaii, as well as the rest of the United States, is
    protected against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea and, if
    confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to support continued improvements
    to our homeland missile defense architecture, including our missile
    defense sensor network. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing
    Department assessments that inform future budget decisions and
    potential siting locations of any additional sensors.
        The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat
    missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and
    space-based system of systems, with the constituent pieces managed and
    sustained by a number of different DOD components.
        Question. Do you believe these various systems are appropriately
    integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat
    picture capable of supporting real-time operational decisions?
        Answer. Yes, but there is still room for improved integration. A
    strategy supporting layered networks of dispersed terrestrial/space-
    based sensors integrated with layered kinetic and non-kinetic weapon
    systems provide our best and most cost-effective defense. I believe we
    took an important step towards improving our integration of these
    critical but often disparate or multi-mission sensors by assigning
    USSPACECOM as our Global Sensor Manager. If confirmed, I will endeavor
    to improve our ability to seamlessly integrate our networks across all
    domains and regions to enable a ``best sensor, best shooter''
    capability.
        Question. In your view, is a space-based sensor layer a required
    ``next step'' in enabling a wide variety of missile defense
    capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced
    threats?
        Answer. Yes. A space-based sensor network can monitor, detect and
    track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe--
    they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by
    the geographic constraints imposed on terrestrial sensors. Space
    sensors can provide ``birth to death'' tracking of advanced missile
    threats and enable a layered defense architecture that can engage
    threats in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of threat missile
    flight.
        Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase
    intercept and space-based intercept programs?
        Answer. U.S. policy is to hedge against unexpected adversary
    developments by investing in advanced technology so the United States,
    its allies, and its partners can defend against strategies of coercion
    or attack. I believe we should examine and exploit every practical
    opportunity to detect, disrupt, and destroy a missile threat prior to
    and during all phases of its flight. If confirmed, I will advocate for
    investing in advanced technologies that contribute to a flexible,
    layered, and cost-effective missile defense architecture that improves
    the overall likelihood of successfully countering offensive missile
    attacks.
        Question. What is your understanding of DOD's efforts to develop
    and implement operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to
    the governance and utilization of such programs? If confirmed, what
    would you do to address this issue?
        Answer. I believe the Department must invest in advanced
    technologies to meet the increasingly complex threats posed by larger
    missile inventories and improved countermeasures. If confirmed, I will
    review appropriate operational concepts and polices that govern the
    utilization of any advanced defensive technologies.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is being considered as a
    fifth initiative for strategic direction from the JROC.
        Question. In your view, why is it important that IAMD become a
    fifth initiative and do you support this going forward?
        Answer. Over time, the JROC should provide strategic direction on
    the requirements for each of the key capabilities for the future Joint
    Force. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is certainly a
    critically important capability and therefore an essential topic for
    JROC action.
                           nuclear enterprise review
        Question. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a
    comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to
    adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior
    leadership. The review culminated in numerous recommendations to
    address concerns identified. Responsibility for monitoring the
    implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD to
    the Military Services.
        Do you believe the Military Services are maintaining the
    appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by
    the Nuclear Enterprise Review?
        Answer. Yes. I believe the Services remain actively engaged in
    addressing the items identified in the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review.
                                  arms control
        Question. Do you support the New START Treaty, and if so, why?
        Answer. Yes, I support the New START Treaty (NST). NST provides
    much needed stability and an avenue of cooperation for the U.S.-Russia
    political-military relationship. More importantly, the mutually
    verifiable constraints in types and numbers of nuclear weapons and
    their delivery systems agreed to in NST have facilitated drastic
    reductions in both U.S. and Russian weapon arsenals since 2011.
        Question. What are your views on the potential for arms control
    measures to address the security threat from Russia's tactical nuclear
    forces, which are not covered by strategic arms control agreements?
        Answer. I applaud verifiable arms control as a method to reduce
    nuclear risks. Certainly, Russia's numerical advantage in non-strategic
    nuclear forces is a concern and a priority for any bilateral arms
    control initiatives. I believe this is a prudent approach that will
    maintain strategic stability with Russia and help to achieve the
    Administration's goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.
        Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced
    his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should
    only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
    agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions. Do you
    agree with this statement?
        Answer. Yes, there is no evidence that unilateral disarmament by
    the United States would inspire Russia or China to reciprocate. It
    would only weaken the U.S. position for future arms control
    negotiations.
        Question. Do you support additional efforts for nuclear arms
    control? If so, with which countries, and in what specific areas, and
    why?
        Answer. Yes. I believe arms control advances U.S. national security
    interests. If confirmed, I would support efforts to negotiate
    multilateral agreements that are verifiable and that make the United
    States and its allies and partners more safe and secure. Russia and
    China are near-peer countries of interest for arms control efforts due
    to their ongoing nuclear weapon modernization and expansion.
        Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
    accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
    power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
    China on nuclear weapons' reductions?
        Answer. The U.S. must carefully consider our Arms Control options
    and what systems and capabilities we are willing to accept limitations
    on. Options that are considered must be reciprocal, verifiable, enhance
    strategic stability, mitigate the risk of strategic escalation, and
    enhance U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners.
        Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling
    current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
    control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
        Answer. Russia and China are expanding and modernizing their
    nuclear weapon stockpiles. As Secretary Austin has stated, our nuclear
    triad is long past the point where it must be modernized. If we do not
    modernize our nuclear forces, we may not be able to negotiate from a
    position of credibility and strength in future treaty negotiations.
        Question. Do you believe it is important to have a strategic
    stability dialogue with China, and if so, why?
        Answer. Yes. Strategic stability dialogues help participants
    understand each other's nuclear doctrine and national security
    interests and helps to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculation that
    can lead to unintended escalation. Historically, China has resisted any
    formal discussion of strategic issues and the lack of transparency
    surrounding its nuclear forces and doctrine remains a significant
    concern. Any dialogue which enables open and frank discussions can help
    participants better understand each other's respective risk
    perceptions, increase transparency, and reduce nuclear risks.
        Question. What are your views with respect to long range prompt
    strike weapons and strategic stability?
        Answer. Developing and fielding long range prompt strike
    capabilities is critically important. If confirmed, I would work with
    the Department, the interagency, and allies and partners to assess
    opportunities to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of
    conflict.
                                 space program
        Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
    both economically and militarily--from the Global Positioning System on
    which many industries and military capabilities rely, to the missile
    warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our strategic
    competitors--China and Russia--are engaged in a concerted effort to
    leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the
    space warfighting domain.
        In your view, how would you characterize the level of risk China
    and Russia pose to U.S. space-based assets?
        Answer. Risk to U.S. space-based assets from China and Russia
    continues to increase and expand. Over the past two decades, Russia and
    China have continued to improve their space weapons capabilities and
    enacted military reforms to better integrate space, cyberspace, and
    electronic warfare into both offensive and defensive military
    operations. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's ``Challenges
    to Security in Space Report,'' both Russia and China have potential
    counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today. Both nations
    will continue to develop, exercise, and integrate these capabilities
    into war plans. We must improve our space-based capabilities'
    resilience and protection in the face of these advancing threats.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff in improving situational awareness of space and
    appropriately prioritizing the protection of U.S. space-based assets?
        Answer. We must expand our allied and commercial partnerships in
    Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We must ensure joint requirements
    drive toward adoption of common data standards and machine-to-machine
    interfaces/automation. Improvements in SSA will enable us to better
    determine intent, provide positive attribution of space events, and
    enable the employment of defensive and offensive space control
    capabilities within clearly laid out authorities.
        Space systems that support strategic warning and communications
    must remain a top priority. Many of our other space systems provide
    services, which have elements critical to our national civil, economic,
    and military interests. In recognition of this, we must pursue
    protection capabilities and techniques, which maximize flexibility,
    allowing us to respond to adversary threats against any U.S. or allied
    space system.
        Question. In your view, what are your greatest concerns as the
    Space Force continues to operationalize across the DOD for the
    development of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
    and education, personnel, and facilities?
        Answer. The Space Force exists to address threats and challenges in
    space and enable effective warfighting and deterrence operations in all
    domains. My greatest concern is that space has become a contested
    domain and the United States must move faster than the threat. China
    and Russia are making significant advances in their space capabilities
    that will continue to challenge our access and freedom of maneuver in
    space. If confirmed, I would prioritize the development and fielding of
    a more robust and resilient space architecture, including doctrine,
    organization, training materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    and facilities.
        Question. What are your views on how to best achieve deterrence in
    space when so many space control systems are highly classified?
        Answer. It is difficult to achieve deterrence when numerous systems
    remain highly classified, limiting communication with the public and
    our partners. If confirmed, I would work with the Department, the IC,
    and Congress to identify programs and systems, or discreet areas of
    programs or systems that could be appropriate for reclassification.
        Question. As Space Force is the title 10 provider of forces and
    capabilities to the combatant commands for space operations, do you
    believe they should be developing a tactical ISR space capability no
    different than other services and their military doctrine and
    capabilities?
        Answer. It is within the scope of Space Force's authorities to
    provide Tactical ISR to support the warfighter. The National
    Reconnaissance Office meets most of the strategic and operational needs
    for space-based ISR. That does not mean that there is not a need for
    additional ISR capacity. In those cases, the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) will need to ensure that the overall space-
    based ISR architecture is examined to ensure needs are appropriately
    met and capabilities from the interagency and private sector are
    considered and leveraged.
        Question. Do you believe the Chief of Space Operations in their
    title 10 role should be the principal force design architect for space
    systems and operations?
        Answer. Yes. Designating the CSO as the principal force design
    architect is essential to efficiently and effectively moving toward a
    more resilient space architecture that will meet warfighter
    requirements and be available to those warfighters across the spectrums
    of competition and conflict.
        Question. The reason for the creation of the space force was to
    consolidate disparate space capabilities while balancing the need of
    other services to utilize space within their doctrine and operations.
    Do you support that objective?
        Answer. Yes. I support that objective.
        Question. If confirmed, do you support moving the Space Development
    Agency to the Space Force?
        Answer. Yes, I do.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
    technology and mission support is incorporated into Space Development
    Agency products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk
    levels? What particular challenges do you perceive to increasing
    collaboration between the private sector and DOD in the acquisition of
    space systems and launch options?
        Answer. The U.S. commercial space sector leads the world in the
    innovation of space systems. From design to mission execution, DOD must
    properly leverage this relationship to meet ever-increasing challenges
    in the space domain. If confirmed, I will ensure that we incorporate
    commercial capabilities where appropriate, with calculated, acceptable
    risk levels, through my role on the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council. Further, if confirmed, I will work with partners inside and
    outside of government to identify barriers to deepen collaboration in
    this important sector.
        Question. What role should the JROC have in the Intelligence
    Community capabilities in Space given that the DOD is responsible for
    defending the capability during conflict?
        Answer. The DOD and IC partner closely to establish joint
    priorities within the space domain. The JROC serves a vital function to
    endorse future IC space-based requirements. This close partnership is
    critical to ensuring DOD space-based ISR architecture is resilient and
    survivable.
                       access to radio frequency spectrum
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    ensure that the Department continues to have access to the radio
    frequency spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?
        Answer. Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority is of critical
    importance to the national security of the nation. To ensure
    superiority, we must have an integrated approach to governance that
    effectively prioritizes EMS through DOD requirements, resourcing,
    workforce, and operations. If confirmed, I will work with all
    stakeholders--including the Chief Information Officer and appropriate
    combatant commands--to ensure the Joint Force is positioned to conduct
    operations.
        Question. Are you concerned about recent actions taken by the FCC
    to supporting licensing ground operations in spectrum band close to the
    GPS signal? Please be specific.
        Answer. GPS signal is of great consequence to the Department of
    Defense and our national security. If confirmed, I am committed to
    reviewing the status of these recent actions and potential implications
    for the Joint Force and providing my best military advice.
        Question. Are you concerned about recent actions to have the DOD
    vacate portions of the 3.1-3.45 MHz spectrum, and if so, why? Please be
    specific on implications for force readiness.
        Answer. Yes, this is an area of concern for me. Frequency bands of
    dual use can adversely impact DOD operations, from training and
    readiness to real-world operations. Cooperation between the Department
    and Industry is required to balance public and private concerns. If
    confirmed, I look forward to providing leadership on these crucial
    dual-use questions.
                             information operations
        Question. The Committee remains concerned that, five years after
    the Russian Federation first successfully executed an aggressive,
    large-scale influence operation against the United States and our
    European allies, the Department of Defense does not yet have an
    effective management structure or strategy for information warfare that
    integrates across cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and
    information operations that is conducted at the strategic level.
        Do you share this concern? If not, why not?
        Answer. I am concerned about state and non-state actors' capability
    to successfully execute large-scale influence operations against the
    United States, our Allies, and Partners. The information domain is a
    complex theater of modern operations that requires close study and a
    deep understanding. If confirmed, I will be supportive of all efforts
    to assure our competitiveness and protect our vital national interests.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, in your view, could the Vice
    Chairman take to help solve this important problem that handicaps our
    ability to deter and compete with adversaries?
        Answer. An era of strategic competition requires us to address a
    number of significant challenges and rapidly evolving threats. Our
    current and future warfighting capabilities must be measured against
    their ability to address and outpace those threats. Specifically, to
    deter our adversaries we need to clearly communicate, through both what
    we say and what we do--that if they attack the United States or our
    Allies they will fail to achieve their objectives and they will incur
    costs that far exceed any gains they can achieve. If confirmed, I will
    advocate for opportunities to apply speed, innovation, technology, and
    integration in how we manage acquisitions and develop and deploy
    existing and new warfighting capabilities.
        Question. What are your views on whether there is a need to
    operationally integrate all of the elements of information warfare?
        Answer. Similar to the integration of air, land, sea, space, and
    cyberspace operations, the integration of elements of information
    warfare is not unique to any one command. If confirmed, I will help the
    Chairman ensure that each Combatant Command has the necessary resident
    authorities and guidance to execute their UCP missions.
        I will seek to improve the integration of all information
    capabilities and activities against all problem sets during
    competition, crisis, and conflict. If confirmed, I will help the Joint
    Force in its effort to revamp its operations and planning doctrine to
    holistically integrate and synchronize the Information Warfare elements
    across joint force operations. This intentional process will assure
    unity of effort.
                                 cybersecurity
        Question. The United States has been rocked by a series of
    significant ransomware attacks affecting critical infrastructure and
    organizations. These attacks have been facilitated or conducted by
    large, sophisticated criminal enterprises that are tolerated, or even
    encouraged by, the leadership of the countries from which they operate.
    These ransomware enterprises could cause substantial damage to critical
    infrastructure in peacetime or in a future crisis or conflict, and
    therefore pose a clear national security threat. These enterprises may
    be beyond the reach of law enforcement and unaffected by at least some
    forms of sanctions. United States Cyber Command is among the few
    government organizations with the authorities and capabilities to
    directly diminish this threat and thereby establish a degree of
    deterrence.
        What are your views on the foreign-based ransomware threat from
    large criminal organizations?
        Answer. Ransomware threats emanating from criminal organizations
    present a significant threat to the United States. They have the
    potential to disrupt the daily activities of the American people as
    well as threaten the military's ability to execute its mission. If
    confirmed, I will take an active role in supporting the
    Administration's whole of government counter ransomware campaign.
        Question. What are your views on the role that the Cyber Mission
    forces could play in imposing costs on such activities, as one aspect
    of a larger, whole-of-government response?
        Answer. USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Forces possess unique authorities,
    training, and capabilities to support the U.S. Government's response to
    counter ransomware threats. The Department continues to support the
    U.S. whole of government effort to impose costs through the disruption
    of ransomware actors and their networks.
        DOD is conducting a mandatory cyber posture review. The Committee
    believes that the previous posture review was a success largely because
    the Principal Cyber Adviser and supporting cross functional team
    tracked implementation tasks and progress, and reported regularly to
    senior leaders.
        Question. What role do you believe the Joint Staff should play in
    the cyber posture review, gap analysis, and oversight of
    implementation?
        Answer. I believe that the Joint Staff should continue to
    proactively support the Principal Cyber Advisor's Office in the
    development and implementation of the cyber posture review.
        It is widely expected that adversaries will conduct cyber-attacks
    on U.S. critical infrastructure in conflict and even in crises prior to
    kinetic warfare. It is also commonly assumed that the United States
    would respond accordingly, so that adversaries do not perceive that
    there is a gap in our deterrence capabilities. However, the Cyber
    Solarium Commission, whose members included DOD and other senior
    executive branch officials, explicitly rejected the targeting of
    adversary critical infrastructure, on the grounds that it would be
    immoral and contrary to the laws of armed conflict.
        Question. In your view, is it necessary for adversaries to know
    that the United States can and will respond reciprocally to cyber-
    attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure?
        Answer. Adversaries need to know that the United States takes
    cyber-attacks on our critical infrastructure very seriously and that we
    reserve the right to respond to these attacks at the time, place, and
    in the domain of our choosing.
        Question. If confirmed, will you review existing policy,
    requirements, and capabilities to achieve this deterrence capability?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed. I anticipate that the Department will
    take a holistic review of our cyber policies, requirements, and
    capabilities in line with the development and release of the new
    National Defense Strategy, Cyber Posture Review, and Defense Cyber
    Strategy.
        At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in 2017 two
    former senior government officials with extensive cyber expertise, in
    consultation with members of a Defense Science Board cyber task force,
    produced a report that recommended a near-term ending of the dual-hat
    arrangement whereby the Command of United States Cyber Command also
    serves as the Director of the National Security Agency. The report
    presented substantive arguments that splitting these positions would be
    in the interest of both organizations.
        Question. What are your views as to whether the ``dual hatting'' of
    the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National
    Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?
        Answer. The ``dual hat'' configuration between U.S. Cyber Command
    and the National Security Agency remains fit for purpose and should be
    maintained.
        Question. In your opinion, are the conditions for ending the dual
    hat established in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization
    Act close to being met?
        Answer. NSA intelligence capabilities remain critical to the Title
    10 Cyber mission. Any decision on this topic requires a deliberate,
    step-by-step assessment, which is informed by CYBERCOM and NSA's
    combined efforts over the last two years. Previous assessments
    conducted in response to the 2017 Conditions predate the adversaries
    increase in scale, scope, and sophistication of cyber activity we have
    experienced over the last 2 years. Any decision based on dated,
    incomplete analysis will undermine military effectiveness and create
    unacceptable risk to the United States national security interests.
        Question. Do you think that the positions should be split if those
    conditions are met?
        Answer. When Congress authorized the establishment of USCYBERCOM as
    a Unified Combatant Command, the Secretary of Defense directed the
    Department of Defense to undertake an assessment of the conditions
    under which a split could possibly occur, the associated operational
    implications and an assessment of the required distribution of
    resources. In the absence of up-to-date analysis of the current
    operational relationships among NSA, CYBERCOM, the other combatant
    commands and foreign intelligence community, as well as the current
    cyber threat, I need to defer a final position on this question.
        Moreover, I have absolute faith in the professionalism and
    objectivity of the CYBERCOM CDR/DIRNSA to provide strategic direction
    and make balanced and objective decisions without prejudice towards his
    Title 10 or Title 50 responsibilities.
                      science, technology, and innovation
        Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
    or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
    military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
    identified ten key areas in which investment to develop next generation
    operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked
    C3; directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial
    intelligence (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and
    biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these technologies is
    occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.
        In your opinion, what are the most significant challenges (e.g.,
    technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these
    key technologies?
        Answer. In developing next generation operational capabilities,
    three leading challenges often addressed are the adequate protection of
    our intellectual property, insufficient integration between civilian
    and defense industry, and cultural risk aversion that leads to a lack
    of agility in the development of key technologies.
        Question. In your view, has DOD properly integrated and
    synchronized investments in these technologies across all components?
        Answer. We have made good progress recently, but need to do much
    more. American innovators--both within the military and outside--are
    achieving path-breaking technological advances, but the Joint Force's
    absorption of these advances is too limited. The Joint Warfighting
    Concept has driven new processes to align the services towards
    strategic competition and defeating peer and near-peer adversaries.
    These new processes should be continued and strengthened to make the
    Joint Force more capable in the coming years.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the Department is
    balancing revolutionary capability advancements as compared to ``quick
    win'' incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?
        Answer. The Department balances revolutionary capability
    developments with rapidly fielded advancements through focused analysis
    and assessment. This enables DOD to make informed tradeoffs and
    decisions where there are uncertainties associated with increasing
    adversary military capabilities, changes in the strategic environment,
    and emerging technologies for future military operations.
        Question. In your opinion, is DOD doing enough to identify new
    technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply
    them to military and national security purposes? What are the
    challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the
    private sector and DOD?
        Answer. The DOD has multiple initiatives within the defense
    research enterprise specifically focused on identifying commercial
    technologies currently in the private sector that have potential uses
    for national security and warfighter purposes. The establishment of the
    Innovation Steering Group this year has helped in mapping the
    innovation ecosphere. Many organizations exist to drive rapid
    technology development and commercial sector partnership. If confirmed,
    I will continue to leverage the Innovation Steering Group to set
    priorities for innovation in the DOD.
        Question. In your view, are there steps that should be taken to
    ensure that the Department has the research and testing infrastructure
    and equipment to maintain pace with, or surpass the investments being
    made in emerging technology by our peer adversaries?
        Answer. Test infrastructure recapitalization has been one of the
    lines of effort for the Innovation Steering Group. The effort to
    identify areas of improvement and possible solutions to bring the
    facilities up to commercial standards is important work that needs to
    continue. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and the relevant DOD
    stakeholders to ensure the test community collects operationally
    relevant data as early as possible during system development, by using
    a combined testing approach.
        One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to
    develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the
    warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly
    transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation, and
    ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to
    the warfighter.
        Question. What are the challenges you perceive to effectively
    transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of
    record?
        Answer. Transitioning technologies into programs of record must be
    a consideration at the beginning of any development effort.
    Successfully transitioning technologies requires many different
    collaborators (e.g., acquisition community, warfighting community,
    industry) and includes explicit agreements with the Services up front.
    New DOD initiatives like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve are
    aimed to achieve this goal. If confirmed, I will continue to support
    the work of the organizations within the DOD innovation ecosphere that
    strive to achieve this goal.
        Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman, what specific steps will
    you take to ensure that all of the Military Services are benefitting
    more quickly and directly from research being performed across the
    defense research enterprise?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense,
    the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and Congress to continue development
    of rapid prototyping and rapid fielding efforts, in order to decrease
    the time it takes to get innovative technologies from research labs
    into the hands of the warfighter. It is important to understand that
    classification concerns can stifle the dissemination of important
    scientific research. Ensuring appropriate level of classification can
    help to breakdown stove-piping of information.
                            joint officer management
        Question. If confirmed, what modifications to law and policy would
    you suggest to provide DOD and the Military Services the force
    management and talent management tools necessary to recruit, develop,
    sustain, and retain a 21st century joint, All-Volunteer Force?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess talent management strategies
    required to maintain our competitive advantage over our adversaries. I
    believe the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA talent management strategies moved
    the Department in the right direction through the enhancement of
    constructive service credit, alternative promotion authority, and
    reordering of a promotion list based on merit. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work with OSD and the Service Chiefs as we implement these
    authorities and assess the effects these programs have on maintaining a
    ready force.
        Question. In your opinion, are current DOD and Military Service
    procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending
    the President's nomination for promotion or assignment sufficient to
    enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
    of Defense, and the President?
        Answer. Yes, the Services thoroughly evaluate officer
    qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any available
    adverse or reportable information, and each service has a rigorous
    process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.
        Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to
    the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or
    assignment process?
        Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and
    reasonable for the officers involved.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
    Fiscal Year 2017 modifications to the JQO system?
        Answer. The two significant modifications from the Fiscal Year 2017
    NDAA provided the Department additional flexibility in the Joint
    Qualification System. The expansion of the ``joint matters'' definition
    ensures the ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers
    making contributions to the development and achievement of strategic
    objectives. Additionally, the reduced statutory tour length required
    for joint duty credit provides the Services additional flexibility in
    officer assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones.
    Given the timing of the change, along with standard tour lengths,
    additional time is needed to have a full picture of the overall impact
    of the tour length reduction.
        Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
    becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
    eligibility for promotion to General/Flag officer rank, consistent with
    the operational and professional demands of Service line officers?
        Answer. Yes. Although careers are tightly managed to Service-
    specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint
    tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification enhance an
    officer's perspective and knowledge to perform at the GO/FO level.
        Question. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to
    JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that military officers are
    able to attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership
    experience and adequate professional development?
        Answer. The existing joint officer qualification requirements
    provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the
    skills necessary for successful service at the operational and
    strategic levels. I do not believe additional modification to the JQO
    system is necessary at this time.
        Question. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better
    to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?
        Answer. Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to
    incorporate Reserve Component officers. In 2018, the Reserve policy was
    adjusted to increase joint qualification opportunities for Reserve
    Component officers. I do not recommend changing the JQO system with
    respect to the Reserve Component.
        Question. In your view, should the requirement to be a JQO be
    eliminated as a consideration in selecting officers for promotion and
    assignment?
        Answer. No. Meeting the JQO requirement enhances the ability of
    senior officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the
    operational and strategic levels. Officers who meet the requirement
    provide benefit to the Services, joint organizations, and the
    Department, and this requirement should be maintained.
        Question. In your opinion, should more be done to improve the JQO
    system given the substantial resources invested in developing officers
    to lead or support joint forces? In your view, is there another system
    that would be more effective?
        Answer. No, not at this time. The changes made by the Fiscal Year
    2017 NDAA have greatly benefited our development of JQOs and provided a
    balance between the needs of the Services and joint missions.
        Question. Do you consider the board selection process required by
    section 156 to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an
    officer to serve in this critical joint position?
        Answer. Yes, the board selection process is both effective and
    efficient, and typically runs no more than one or two days. Since each
    Military Department has their own personnel system, the process to
    convene a joint selection board can present challenges. However, in
    order to conduct a joint selection board, the planning and preparation
    begins well in advance with each Service providing qualified candidates
    for consideration.
        Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint
    process that could improve the selection board processes used by the
    Military Services?
        Answer. The Department incorporated the Services' best practices
    into the joint selection board processes. Further, the Services
    continually review their board processes to incorporate best practices
    and improve with each iteration.
        Question. Would you support expanding application of the process
    employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will look into this issue, but at this time
    I do not have an informed opinion.
                  joint professional military education (jpme)
        Question. The 2018 NDS asserts that JPME has stagnated--that it
    focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of
    lethality and ingenuity.
        Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United States,
    now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities will
    officers need to succeed in strategic competition against the nation's
    adversaries?
        Answer. Military leaders will require exceptional competence in
    joint warfighting, and demonstrate flexibility, toughness, and ability
    to think through uncertainty. Future leaders will need to conceive,
    design, and implement strategies and campaigns that integrate global
    capabilities to defeat competitors in contests we have not yet even
    imagined, and respond to activities short of armed conflict in domains
    that are already being contested. Key attributes of Joint Officers will
    include highly developed critical thinking and problem-solving skills
    while operating with ambiguity, rising above disrupted communications,
    ensuring resiliency, and always demonstrating irreproachable ethical
    conduct.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    enhance DOD's JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and
    development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the
    intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound
    judgment to lead the joint force in a transregional, multi-functional,
    multi-domain ``Whole of Government'' environment?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to oversee JPME
    curriculum development that educates future joint force leaders to
    build the attributes of strategic thinking, advising, and planning.
    This curriculum will not only be threat informed, but it will also
    provide joint leaders an understanding of transregional, multi-
    functional, and multi-domain environment to be experts on the
    operational level of war. To enable this study, Service institutions
    require broader instruction in classified environments with the
    appropriate facilities to enable this education.
        Question. In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of
    Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type
    Memorandum-19-001, address the JPME concerns documented in the 2018
    NDS? What does this program add to the current PME system?
        Answer. We need to delineate between ``strategists''--those who can
    imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the ``strategically-
    minded''--those who can effectively execute strategy through campaigns
    and operations. The former are rare and the new Defense Strategic
    Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals. The NDS language
    refers to the latter, the development of which is a responsibility of
    the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of this program has
    promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring its success.
                   dod senior official education and training
        Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag
    officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the
    advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and
    technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the
    scientific and technical civilian workforce?
        Answer. Yes, but I am concerned about our ability to continue to
    attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the
    National Defense Strategy. To do that, in addition to investing in our
    servicemembers, we must compete with the public and private sectors for
    talent in some very small talent pools. It is essential we attract and
    develop talent with expertise in quantum computing, AI/ML, space,
    cyber, and data science, for example, to maintain competitive
    advantage.
        Question. Do you believe the career paths for General/Flag officers
    and SES with technical skills are sufficient to ensure that DOD and its
    components can develop capability performance requirements that will
    counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex
    acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not,
    what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?
        Answer. Yes, we have an incredibly talented workforce, but we must
    continue to evolve as our industrial and technology bases evolve. If
    confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to ensure our senior joint
    leaders continue to receive the training and development required to be
    successful.
        Question. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES
    assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to
    serve in acquisition programs? Do established tour lengths enable and
    empower senior leaders so assigned to manage effectively the long-term
    acquisition programs under their purview? If not, what changes do you
    believe are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the senior
    leaders assigned to such positions and duties?
        Answer. Yes, we have a very robust acquisition corps with
    Department level priorities engaging our general/flag officers at
    strategic levels of implementation. Our tour lengths are designed to
    ensure long-term acquisition systems are managed in an effective and
    efficient manner. In my judgment, the Department's biggest civilian
    workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the
    highest quality talent necessary to achieve the National Defense
    Strategy. To do that, we must compete with the public and private
    sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer
    of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's
    defense to prospective employees. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Joint Staff, OSD, and other DOD stakeholders to ensure our senior
    leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they
    need to continue do so.
        Question. Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the
    Military Services have in place sufficient ethics training and
    resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the
    training, advice, and assistance needed to perform their duties in an
    ethical manner? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to
    provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and
    assistance they need to ``play the ethical midfield.'' The ability to
    make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader
    Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to
    all Joint and Service developmental efforts. The ethical foundation is
    laid at the outset of these individuals' careers and is further
    developed and reinforced in formal education and training throughout
    their careers.
                                joint operations
        Question. Military operations are increasingly joint: the Marine
    Corps plans to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of Navy
    ships; the Army and Air Force invest in counter-maritime capabilities;
    and both air and naval forces continue to develop and implement
    capabilities to defeat anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks.
        In your view, which other Military Service doctrines and
    capabilities offer the greatest opportunity for synergy in joint
    operations?
        Answer. Globally conducted Joint operations require integration of
    the space and cyberspace domains. Both domains offer opportunities to
    build synergy and asymmetric advantage in joint operations. U.S. Space
    Command and U.S. Cyber Command are working to operationalize our
    advantages in these critical domains.
        Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you propose to
    increase Service interdependence and interoperability to accomplish
    missions and tasks in support of joint operations, to include
    logistical operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would increase emphasis on interdependence
    and interoperability through joint training at the tactical and
    operational levels of warfare to strengthen our ability to conduct
    joint operations. I would also consider developing joint readiness
    goals, objectives, and metrics to achieve statutory guidance and assess
    synchronization of Service goals and objectives to ensure proper
    alignment with DOD goals and objectives.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the most critical shortfalls in
    capabilities to support the joint force?
        Answer. Emerging technologies being developed and employed by our
    pacing threats have altered the operating environment on a global scale
    at an unrelenting pace. These challenges require lethal and non-lethal
    capabilities that are interoperable across all Services and allow us
    the ability to share information faster than our adversaries.
        Question. Do you believe the respective services are on the correct
    path to modernize and overcome those shortfalls?
        Answer. The Services have aligned their modernization efforts with
    the objectives outlined in the National Defense Strategy. If properly
    funded and executed, the Services' modernization efforts place the
    Department on a trajectory to achieve these objectives.
        Question. How would you use your unilateral authority as Chairman
    of the JROC if needed to correct such shortfalls?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will only utilize this unilateral authority
    when absolutely necessary. It would be my role to build consensus among
    the members in assuring our warfighters are the most lethal they can be
    in these changing times. My position is to lead the Council in the
    review and decision with regard to the critical warfighting gaps facing
    the Joint Force. The goal is to reach consensus, when able, through
    subordinate level discussions, and by making deliberate decisions among
    the JROC members regarding requirements to close or mitigate these
    capability gaps. I will strive to reach consensus amongst the JROC
    members in all decisions, however, any dissenting position will be made
    clear to the Chairman as a matter of course. From what I understand,
    this seldom, if ever, has been the case for a JROC decision.
        Question. There has been much discussion about the importance of
    networking and connecting Service capabilities across air, land, and
    sea platforms operating across multiple domains.
        What is your understanding of how DOD intends to execute joint
    airborne battle management in a high-end fight?
        Answer. Executing joint airborne battle management command and
    control relies on two main elements: 1) timely (speed of relevance)
    decision-quality information, and 2) effective communication defined as
    Commander's intent via machine-to-machine and/or verbal authority. The
    Department is focusing on JADC2, the USAF's contribution of ABMS, the
    Navy's Project Overmatch, and the Army's Project Convergence, to
    deliver target quality tracks in order to rapidly complete the Find,
    Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA) targeting cycle, ultimately
    for the high-end fight.
        Question. What is DOD doing to make machine-to-machine command and
    control, across multiple domains, a reality?
        Answer. The Joint Staff J6 conducted a study of all AI and Machine
    Learning tools across the entire Department to identify tools that can
    be used as enterprise solutions across single, multiple, or all-
    domains. Some of these programs and initiatives include: the Artificial
    Intelligence Data Accelerator Initiative (ADA), Advancing Analytics
    Platform (ADVANA), and Service and Joint Staff efforts to develop and
    demonstrate JADC2. Their study and research will help identify tools
    the DOD can leverage for multi- and all-domain C2.
        Question. In your view, are the Services doing enough to ensure
    airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer
    competitors?
        Answer. Yes, but they can do more. Interoperable and resilient
    airborne tactical data links are the bedrock for achieving victory
    against a peer competitor. Ongoing cryptographic modernization efforts
    across the family of data links as well as the incorporation of
    advanced capabilities will allow the Joint Force to field a more
    resilient capability in the face of peer competitors.
        Question. In your view, how successful has the Joint Staff and the
    Department of Defense been at developing and refining the joint
    operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?
        Answer. The Joint Staff and the Department of Defense has been
    successful at developing joint operational concepts. The Joint Force
    has developed a threat-informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to
    address future great power conflict. The JWC is a global concept that
    describes an operational approach to defend the U.S. and maintain
    overmatch defeat strategic adversaries.
        The JWC guides how the U.S. will organize, train, educate, and
    equip the future Joint Force, and it communicates a Department-wide
    campaign of learning informed through coordination with Services,
    Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
    Future JWC efforts include developing, testing, and maturing JWC ideas
    through Joint and Service training, exercises, experiments, and
    doctrine development.
        If confirmed, I will do my part to accelerate JWC development
    efforts to ensure the future Joint Force will have the appropriate
    personnel, training, equipment, and doctrine in place to deter war and,
    if necessary, win future wars.
        Question. Do you think that there needs to be a different or
    tailored joint operational concept for the European and Indo-Pacific
    theaters? Why or why not?
        Answer. No, I do not. Ultimately, we have one joint force that will
    need to adapt to all threats environment to achieve national security
    objectives. If confirmed, I will use my role to ensure a common
    approach to joint operations in both the European and Indo-Pacific
    theaters, and to further tailor the joint force to respond
    appropriately to changing threats and environments.
       intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
        Question. Demand for ISR capabilities of every kind has grown
    exponentially in recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational
    awareness and targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all
    of the geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements
    that are not being met.
        What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets
    across the Combatant Commands?
        Answer. Demand for ISR continues to outpace available supply. To
    meet competing demands, the Department reviews the combatant commands'
    standing and emerging requirements and routinely reprioritizes capacity
    to meet warfighter needs. This global force management process is led
    by the Joint Staff, but also takes into account services and force
    provider considerations to meet command requirements while balancing
    risk and readiness challenges. The disposition of ISR across the
    commands is constantly changing in order to keep pace with our dynamic
    geopolitical situation. If confirmed, I look forward to participating
    in the global force management process and working to support the
    Chairman as he makes recommendations to the Secretary for allocation
    decisions.
        Question. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in
    both the capability and availability of ISR assets? If confirmed, what
    steps would you take to correct these deficiencies?
        Answer. The appetite for ISR capacity continues to grow beyond the
    Department's currently fielded, and even planned availability. Even a
    large increase in ISR inventory will not mitigate shortfalls.
    Additional capacity will require investments in mechanics, operators,
    analysts, linguists, and expanded basing options. In order to mitigate
    the shortfalls and better equip our commands with the intelligence
    support they need, I believe we require an approach that provides
    broader investments in platforms, sensors, command and control,
    architecture, and analytics that can penetrate and survive in high-
    threat, denied environments. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
    to build on Gen Hyten's commitment to reform the JROC process.
        As the Vice, if confirmed, I would serve as head of the Joint
    Requirements Council (JROC), helping to define and prioritize the
    capabilities the Joint Force needs, to include ISR. Additionally, I
    would sit on a number of different Pentagon committees that review
    budgets, acquisitions, force design, and force development.
                   cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
        Question. The CTR program, which has focused historically on
    accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass
    destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has
    expanded its focus to other countries. As part of this expansion, the
    CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and
    capabilities, including biological surveillance and early warning, and
    encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce proliferation
    threats.
        In your view, how could coordination of the CTR program across U.S.
    Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the
    Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
    Department) be improved?
        Answer. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is a
    critical and effective effort that contributes to the safety and
    security of the United States and our allies and partners. It is
    imperative that national governments have capabilities to counter WMD
    threats. Proliferation is a global problem that cannot be resolved by
    the United States alone. The Joint Force and DOD will continue to
    collaborate across the interagency to ensure a whole of government
    approach in the application of the CTR program. DOS, DOE, and the CDC
    are part of the planning process to determine CTR priorities on a
    recurring basis.
        Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemicals documented
    recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR resources are allocated
    to biological programs.
        Question. Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
    accurately reflects the current threat?
        Answer. Yes. The current focus on biological programs resulted from
    a surge designed to address specific threats, to include the need for
    increased partner detection capabilities and security of sensitive
    biological facilities. The Department reviews threats on an annual
    basis and reprioritizes activity when required. CTR's capabilities and
    authority to work directly with our partners' civilian and military
    establishments provides flexibility to adapt to changes in the
    operating environment.
        Question. If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the
    allocation of CTR resources? If so, what adjustments would you
    recommend?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review CTR resource allocations and
    make recommendations as appropriate to policy-makers to ensure CTR
    efforts are supportive of our national Counter WMD strategies and
    Combatant Command plans. CTR efforts will continue to be synchronized
    with interagency partners who have different roles, authorities, and
    responsibilities in countering WMD threats.
                     violent extremist organizations (veos)
        Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism
    strategy and the role of DOD in supporting that strategy?
        Answer. The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism provides a
    holistic, whole of government approach to countering violent extremist
    organizations (VEOs). The DOD is involved in several lines of effort
    including a leading role in strengthening the counterterrorism
    abilities of international partners and conducting military operations
    overseas to disrupt terrorist networks.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S.
    counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by VEOs?
        Answer. The 2018 National Strategy for Counter Terrorism will take
    time to realize results. Given the long-term horizon to counter violent
    extremism, the Department will measure effectiveness based on trends
    associated with the strategic objectives. For example, we continue to
    successfully diminish the capacity of terrorists to directly attack the
    homeland. However, we struggle as an interagency to effectively curtail
    radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of some organizations. If
    confirmed, I'll work with the Chairman and interagency to routinely
    assess our progress of the strategy to address violent extremist
    threats and identify areas for adaptation.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
    and its associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent
    the underlying causes of extremism be a component of our
    counterterrorism strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the joint stakeholders and
    agencies to monitor our strategic measures of effectiveness in order to
    ensure we are working towards a desired end state with the
    understanding that progress will require strategic patience. Efforts to
    prevent underlying causes of extremism are key components of our
    counterterrorism strategy, especially as we prioritize resources and
    focus to threats against the U.S. homeland and other national
    interests.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    promote a more resource sustainable approach to counterterrorism?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing evaluation of
    DOD's counter-terrorism campaigns in USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USINDOPACOM.
    This approach seeks to balance resources and outcomes. This force
    optimization will enable more effective operations to defeat trans-
    regional threat networks. I will continue to advocate for improved
    collaboration and integration within the DOD, interagency, and our
    multinational allies and partners to maximize resource sustainable
    approaches to CT.
                       countering isis in iraq and syria
        Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by
    ISIS?
        Answer. ISIS remains one of the primary transnational terrorist
    threats to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas. ISIS
    continues to encourage its networks, branches, and supporters to
    inspire, enable, direct, and conduct attacks worldwide and will use
    their media capability to preserve global brand appeal despite
    territorial losses. ISIS is likely exercising patience and adapting to
    its restrained operational environment to pursue their goal of
    establishing a global caliphate. Inspired attacks are the principal
    method ISIS is projecting power globally as CT pressure in the region
    and plot disruption in Western countries have temporarily limited their
    ability to resource external networks.
        Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security
    objectives in Syria? To what extent does continued U.S. force presence
    in Syria support those objectives?
        Answer. The U.S. military mission in Syria remains the enduring
    defeat of ISIS. We continue to work by, with, and through our partners
    and allies. U.S. immediate priorities in Syria include:
          Expand humanitarian access
          Sustain the campaign against ISIS in partnership with the
    Syrian Democratic Forces
          Support international norms to promote human rights and
    accountability
          Sustain local ceasefires across Syria
        These priorities are the necessary building blocks for eventual
    progress on the political track to end the Syrian conflict. U.S. and
    Coalition forces enable the second priority, to sustain the partner-
    based campaign against ISIS.
        Question. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied
    to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what
    conditions do you believe should factor into decisions about U.S. troop
    levels in Syria?
        Answer. U.S. forces have drawn down to a minimal presence in Syria
    to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. U.S. and
    Coalition forces should remain in Syria until partner force capacity
    and will is sufficient to defeat ISIS without significant external
    support. Any future troop level or capabilities changes would have to
    be assessed based on the progress of our partner-based strategy. A
    partner-based approach provides an effective and efficient way to
    counter ISIS while minimizing risk to U.S. forces, and it presents the
    best long-term solution to ensure ISIS remains territorially defeated
    when U.S. forces depart.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy
    and objectives in Iraq?
        Answer. The U.S. military strategy seeks the enduring defeat of
    ISIS, by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish
    Peshmerga forces. To achieve this objective, the coalition provides
    advice, assistance, and intelligence to the Iraqi Security Forces in
    support of their defeat of ISIS operations.
        Question. The Administration announced the transition of combat
    forces from Iraq. Going forward, what do you envision to be the
    missions and size of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?
        Answer. In accordance with the Joint Communique and July 2021
    Strategic Dialogue, CJTF-OIR is transitioning to an advise and assist
    role aimed at supporting the Iraqi Security Forces in their defeat-ISIS
    campaign. U.S. forces remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi
    government. We do not foresee significant changes to our current force
    posture in Iraq.
        Question. What steps would you recommend for normalizing security
    assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the coming years?
        Answer. To normalize security assistance to the ISF, the DOD is
    enacting a plan of action that will occur in three conditions-based
    phases:
          Phase 1 calls for the appointment of a Senior Defense
    Official/Defense Attache which is complete.
          Phase 2 will transition tasks from CJTF-OIR to OSC-I
    which transitions activities from CJTF-OIR to a normalized Security
    Cooperation Office.
          Phase 3 will seek implementation of permanent OSC-I
    billeting/staffing. This will be conditions based and characterized by
    the cessation of major combat operations against ISIS and the
    implementation of a Joint Manpower Validation Board to source
    requirements for OSC-I with permanent staffing.
        At the end of these phases, the Senior Defense Official/Defense
    Attache and Security Cooperation Construct will be fully normalized
    with permanent manning and stable, reliable funding streams that
    support long-term U.S. national security interests in Iraq.
        Question. In your view, what should the United States do regarding
    the repatriation of ISIS prisoners currently detained by the Syrian
    Democratic Forces?
        Answer. It is critical to leverage all appropriate military and
    diplomatic levers to address the threat of ISIS. In my current
    capacity, I do not have access to information to fully assess this
    issue. If confirmed, I would work to understand the specifics and
    provide my best military advice.
               yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula (aqap)
        Question. In your view, what are the U.S. national security
    interests in Yemen?
        Answer. Three U.S. National Security interests exist in Yemen:
          Denying a safe haven for AQAP and ISIS affiliates to plan
    and execute attacks against the U.S., our allies, and interests.
          Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-
    Mandeb and Red Sea--the Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global
    commerce and energy.
          Reducing malign Iranian influence--Iranian shipments of
    arms to the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and
    civilian infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability
    across the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.
        To protect these interests, the U.S. military supports diplomatic
    efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen by supporting Saudi Arabian
    armed forces to defend their territory and protect their citizens from
    Iran-backed Houthi attacks. Furthermore, a small number of U.S.
    deployed forces advise, assist, and train partner forces to conduct
    counter-terror operations.
        Question. What do you see as the implications of the Biden
    Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the
    Saudi-led coalition?
        Answer. There is not a military solution to ending the conflict in
    Yemen. I support U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen Lenderking's attempts to
    facilitate an UN-brokered diplomatic resolution. However, as President
    Biden indicated in his policy statement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
    faces a persistent threat from Iranian-supplied cross-border attacks by
    the Houthis. U.S. Joint Forces continue to help Saudi Arabia defend its
    sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its people.
        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States
    play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
        Answer. Consistent with the decision to cease military support for
    offensive operations by the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen, the U.S.
    provides military training and intelligence support to the Kingdom of
    Saudi Arabia to defend against Houthi cross-border (unmanned aerial
    vehicle, ballistic missile and unmanned maritime) attacks. The U.S.'s
    chief role is supporting the international diplomatic efforts to end
    the conflict in Yemen.
        Question. What threat do the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation
    in Bab al-Mandeb, in your view, and what can the U.S. do to mitigate
    that threat more effectively?
        Answer. The Houthis possess Iranian supplied missiles, explosive-
    laden unmanned maritime vessels, mines, and armed/explosive unmanned
    aerial vehicles which pose a threat to freedom of navigation in the Bab
    al-Mandeb and Red Sea. The Houthis have demonstrated a willingness to
    attack military and commercial vessels as evidenced by the Houthi
    attempted attacks against USS Mason and USS Ponce in 2016, as well as
    commercial vessels in Jeddah Port, Saudi Arabia in 2020.
        Working with the international community to halt the illicit supply
    of arms to the Houthis, in accordance with UN Security Council
    Resolution 2216, is an important step toward maintaining freedom of
    navigation. For example, USS Monterey and USS Winston Churchill both
    seized Iranian-provided arms headed to the Iranian-backed Houthis. The
    U.S. Joint Force works with partner nation militaries to implement this
    UNSCR, all toward facilitating a swift end to the conflict in Yemen. To
    that end, the U.S. military supports these diplomatic and international
    efforts, led by Special Presidential Envoy Lenderking, to create a
    lasting and effective peace in Yemen.
        Preserving the freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb and
    Red Sea is vital for the free flow of global commerce and energy. We
    must reduce the malign Iranian influence--Iranian shipments of arms to
    the Houthis have been used to attack Saudi citizens and civilian
    infrastructure as well as threaten the peace and stability across the
    Arabian Peninsula and surrounding maritime areas.
                                  afghanistan
        Question. Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do
    you see as some of the major strategic missteps? How would you apply
    those lessons learned in future military operations?
        Answer. It is clear the war in Afghanistan did not end on the terms
    we wanted. However, every servicemember and civilian who served there
    for the past 20 years protected our country from attack by terrorists.
    For that they should be forever proud, and we should be forever
    grateful.
        Understanding our engagement in Afghanistan will take time and
    thoughtful analysis of key questions; there are many lessons learned.
    The Department of Defense is committed to doing the work to fully
    understand our 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.
        Question. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban's
    ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?
        Answer. This issue requires significant analysis, research, and
    understanding to gain more clarity. As we study this matter, it will be
    absolutely critical to understand strategic lessons of our involvement
    in Afghanistan and integrate and apply lessons-learned with respect to
    our doctrine and training. If confirmed, I will be committed to
    carefully reviewing this matter to ensure we learn and improve from
    this experience.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the implications of the
    collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for
    future advise, train and assist missions?
        Answer. Our experience in Afghanistan provides key lessons on how
    we establish priorities for future train, advise, and assist missions,
    and match those to the resources required; how we take account of
    regional and local politics and conflict dynamics; how we study and re-
    evaluate a country's institutional and logistical capacity to absorb
    our assistance; and especially how we cultivate a sense of local
    ownership and accountability.
        Question. As the military mission in Afghanistan has concluded,
    what do you view as U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The President has made clear that the primary vital
    national interest in Afghanistan is to make sure Afghanistan can never
    be used again to launch an attack on our homeland.
        Question. Can the United States conduct effective ``over the
    horizon'' counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without a partner
    force on the ground? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The United States conducts counterterrorism operations all
    over the world in places where we do not have a partner force on the
    ground. We are actively setting the conditions in coordination with
    partners in the region to ensure we remain situationally aware and are
    postured to mitigate and neutralize developing terrorist threat
    streams. Further details on this issue need to be discussed in a
    classified setting.
                                      iran
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
    posed by Iran?
        Answer. Iran is our nation's most formidable threat in the CENTCOM
    AOR. Iran`s conventional military strategy is primarily based on
    deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an attacker. It also
    cultivates non-state violent proxies and militias to project power and
    build regional influence. Iran's primary military capabilities are
    missiles, UAVs, naval forces, and unconventional forces.
        Iran also holds the region's largest surface-to-surface missile
    (SSM) arsenal, including both ballistic and cruise missiles that serve
    as its primary strategic deterrent. SSMs in Iran's inventory have a
    range of up to 1300 miles. Further, Iran's naval forces are the Arabian
    Gulf's strongest and feature many small boats and naval mines to
    complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict.
        The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
    maintains ties to Shia militia groups across the region to advance
    Iran's interests. Iran-backed proxies give Iran unconventional options
    for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and
    globally. The IRGC-QF also has longstanding ties to select Sunni
    groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban.
    Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security
    and territorial defense.
        Iranian leaders likely seek to avoid direct conventional conflict
    with a superior military force but maintain capabilities to impose
    significant cost through retaliatory strikes and covert proxy attacks.
        Question. Are U.S. military forces and capabilities currently
    deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if necessary,
    respond to threats posed by Iran?
        Answer. It is critical for the United States to deter aggressive
    and destabilizing actions by Iran and to maintain the capability and
    capacity to respond to credible threats in the region when necessary.
    In my current capacity, I do not have access to information to
    adequately assess the position of military forces in the CENTCOM AOR.
    If confirmed, this is an issue I would work to understand further.
        Question. What is your assessment of U.S. national security
    interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle
    East?
        Answer. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information
    to adequately assess the growth and impact of Iranian influence in the
    Middle East. If confirmed, I would work with the appropriate Combatant
    Commands to assess the specific impacts of Iranian influence in the
    region.
        Question. If the U.S. relieved sanctions on Iran, do you assess
    that there is a risk that Iran would use that sanctions relief to
    further its malign activities in the region?
        Answer. In my current capacity, I do not have access to information
    to adequately assess the impact of sanctions relief on Iran's malign
    activities in the region. If confirmed, this is an issue I would work
    to understand further.
                                     china
        Question. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship
    with China?
        Answer. The Department of Defense is taking a concerted approach to
    position for long-term competition with the People's Republic of China
    (PRC). This approach prioritizes China as the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) primary pacing challenge. Simultaneously, DOD seeks a
    constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the
    People's Liberation Army that helps set U.S.-PRC relations on a path of
    transparency and non-aggression and welcomes collaboration when
    interests align, for instance on climate change.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
    China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should be the
    objectives of U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue? What are the
    limitations on this kind of dialogue?
        Answer. DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC
    prioritize crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and
    limited cooperation in areas where national interests align, in order
    to advance a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense
    relationship with the PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted
    in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.
        Our increasingly competitive relationship with the PRC requires we
    maintain regular communication channels to prevent crisis and ensure
    pathways for timely communications so we can communicate with the PLA
    should a crisis occur.
        I support dialogue that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors
    inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain insight
    into China's strategic intent; manage differences; and cooperate in
    areas where national interests align.
        Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
    increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
    program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
    erosion of U.S. advantages?
        Answer. The PRC's long-term goal is to create an entirely self-
    reliant defense-industrial sector--fused with a strong civilian
    industrial and technology sector--that can provide the Chinese
    Communist Party (CCP) with a ``world class military'' by 2049. In the
    interim, China's objective is to meet two intermediate military
    modernization milestones: 1) accelerate integrated development of
    mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization related to a
    potential Taiwan contingency by 2027, and 2) complete all military
    modernization goals as outlined by the CCP by 2035
        Concerning to me is that the PRC is investing in, and acquiring,
    technologies that will be foundational for future military innovations
    including artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, and
    quantum computing. I agree with this assessment and, if confirmed, I
    will continue to monitor and address these issues.
        Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
    presence overseas, including installations like its bases in Djibouti
    and across Africa, as well as other infrastructure projects across the
    Indian Ocean?
        Answer. The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas
    logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and
    sustain military power at greater distances globally, based on the Belt
    and Road Initiative (BRI) China's base in Djibouti and its military
    presence in Africa enable forward deployment of PLA forces and support
    military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral
    and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a
    military logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the
    U.S. military, interests, and other assets. China's military presence
    is also furthered enabled through its peacekeeping operations in
    Africa.
        Question. What is your assessment of the strategic and military
    implications for the United States of China's Belt and Road Initiative?
    What are the strategic and military implications for other countries in
    the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. China uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to support
    its strategy of national rejuvenation by expanding global
    transportation and trade linkages. This works to support its
    development and deepen economic integration with nations along its
    periphery including the Indo-Pacific region. The PRC's overseas
    development and security interests under BRI drive the PRC towards
    expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those interests.
        The PRC attempts to use the economic influence it accrues in the
    Indo-Pacific region through BRI to encourage participating countries to
    support Beijing's priorities and objectives on a range of other matters
    including its diplomatic, economic, and military objectives in the
    region.
        Question. The smaller number of nuclear weapons possessed by China
    relative to the United States and Russia is often cited as an
    impediment to nuclear arms control talks with China.
        What are the strategic implications of the rapid modernization of
    Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to at least double by 2030, and
    what approach should the United States take to address those
    implications, in your view?
        Answer. We will soon find ourselves faced with two nuclear peer
    nations. Given the current state of our defense industrial base for
    nuclear delivery platforms and the condition of some of the National
    Nuclear Security Administration's production capabilities and
    infrastructure, we must begin preparing for this challenge now. To do
    so, I believe we must continue executing our current nuclear
    modernization programs, evaluate whether current programs of record are
    sufficient to fill any potential deterrence gaps, and engage China in
    discussions on strategic stability issues and arms control.
        Question. What do you think could motivate China to participate in
    nuclear arms control negotiations in a genuine and meaningful way?
        Answer. Consistent strategic messaging from key U.S. and
    international political leaders for China to not just follow
    international norms in the area of nuclear arms control, but to
    participate in substantive discussions on risk reduction and strategic
    stability.
        Question. In your view, with the rapid development in both quantity
    and quality of Chinese nuclear capabilities, how does U.S. nuclear
    posture, and nuclear doctrine need to change to account for the
    existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors?
        Answer. I understand the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will
    formulate a strategy for deterring both China and Russia. If confirmed,
    I look forward to supporting the Chairman in providing his military
    advice on how U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine may need to change to
    account for the existence of two near-peer nuclear strategic
    competitors.
        Question. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both
    increase, do you assess that we have adequate military and national
    security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese leadership
    to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation?
        Answer. U.S. leadership has the ability to communicate with senior
    PRC and PLA leadership. These channels could be used to deescalate
    tension in the bilateral relationship and mitigate the threat of rapid
    strategic escalation during a crisis.
                 u.s. capabilities and force posture in europe
        Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
    shortfalls in the current joint force that present a challenge to
    addressing threats in Europe? If so, what specific enhancements would
    you recommend to joint force capabilities and force posture in Europe
    in each military domain?
        Answer. We should continue to enhance our long-range precision
    fires, undersea and anti-submarine warfare, integrated air and missile
    defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities. In terms of infrastructure, storage for prepositioned
    equipment and munitions, airfield upgrades, and capacity for joint
    reception, staging, and onward integration remain priorities. These are
    not solely U.S. issues, and we will explore with our Allies and
    partners, bilaterally and through NATO, how they can leverage and align
    our respective investments to meet our shared requirements.
        Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
    sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
    critical infrastructure in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), such as
    command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile
    attack?
        Answer. Air and missile defense is a priority for us globally and
    in Europe. Adversaries are aggressively developing and fielding
    advanced air and missile capabilities with increased capacity,
    representing a threat to NATO and partner nations within the USEUCOM
    AOR. With NATO and partner support, USEUCOM has Land, Air, and Maritime
    capabilities to defend against missile threats.
        However, NATO and USEUCOM require a credible, Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense capability, to include a robust command and control
    architecture capable of creating a fully integrated air and missile
    threat picture able to transition from peace through crisis to
    conflict. This will enable effective operations against combined
    attacks involving aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and
    hypersonic vehicles.
        We are continuing to improve our air and missile defense capability
    and capacity in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Right now, we are
    fielding new short-range air defense systems to Army units in Germany,
    and the Air Force just activated an F-35 squadron in the United
    Kingdom. Multinational exercises like ASTRAL KNIGHT and FORMIDABLE
    SHIELD are building not only U.S. readiness but are enhancing our
    ability to defend against air and missile threats in conjunction with
    Allies and partners.
        Question. Do Chinese investments in European infrastructure pose
    threats to U.S. operations there? What other Chinese activities or
    investments should be cause for concern with regard to our security and
    that of our Allies and partners in Europe?
        Answer. Chinese investments in European infrastructure do pose a
    threat to U.S. operations in Europe. The United States and our European
    allies and partners should be alert to Chinese malign influence,
    particularly with regard to 5G technology and financial investment in
    critical infrastructure, including port and rail facilities, that could
    impact U.S. or alliance military planning, mobility, and enablement.
    Allies should also be aware of China's opaque economic practices and
    coercion that create inroads to European infrastructure.
        Question. In your view, do large-scale military exercises such as
    DEFENDER EUROPE 2021 serve to reassure Allies and deter adversaries
    such as Russia? Do you support continuing a robust level of exercises
    with our European Allies and partners?
        Answer. Combined, complex training with our Allies and partners
    builds readiness and improves interoperability. At the same time, these
    exercises demonstrate to Allies and adversaries our capability to
    command and control operations across all domains and multiple
    continents. They allow us to validate the same processes and procedures
    we would use in the event of a crisis in Europe, and at scales that
    stress the system and enable real growth. Collectively, they are
    concrete displays of U.S. and Allied resolve and capacity to impose
    costs on potential aggressors.
        Question. The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan helped build
    interoperability with numerous NATO Allies and partners. What are ways
    we can maintain that level of interoperability going forward?
        Answer. Combined exercises are interoperability laboratories that
    test our ability to shoot, move, and communicate with Allies and
    partners under pressure. The enduring presence of U.S. forces builds
    mutual familiarity between our forces and those of our host countries
    in Europe. We support efforts by NATO and U.S. European Command to
    define interoperability objectives and promote interoperability through
    training and exercises, equipment standardization, and NATO Centers of
    Excellence and NATO's multinational command and control structures.
        Question. What is your assessment of military-to-military relations
    with Turkey at present?
        Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with our strategic
    ally Turkey remains as strong, and we continue to work every day
    bilaterally and through NATO to address a range of issues vital to both
    of our national interests. Areas of divergence between our two
    countries are primarily in political channels, and the Turkish military
    has signaled a willingness to focus on the positive aspects of our
    relationship to address our mutual concerns related to regional
    instability and the threats posed by U.S. competitors. Relations
    between the Turkish Armed Forces and the U.S. military remain close,
    professional, and complementary, as evidenced by our recent
    coordination in Afghanistan, and we will continue to build upon this
    cooperation in several key regions.
        Although our two countries do not always agree, Turkey continues to
    contribute positively to a variety of NATO missions to include Baltic
    Air Policing and support for Bomber Task Force missions. It is evident
    that Turkey's military capability and geographic location make it a key
    stakeholder in U.S. responses to regional events and within the NATO
    Alliance. Therefore, it is critical the U.S. military continue to
    execute and advocate for fundamental security cooperation activities
    with Turkey such as Professional Military Education, exercises, and
    Foreign Military Sales. These actions directly advance U.S. interests
    by preventing the deterioration of an ally's military capabilities,
    strengthen NATO interoperability, and help enable U.S. force projection
    with access to key regions in support steady-state operations and
    contingences.
                                     russia
        Question. In your view, which aspects of U.S. and NATO force
    posture in Europe are most effective in deterring Russian aggression
    and mitigating threats to our NATO Allies and partners? What has worked
    in the past? Are there additional measures that the U.S. and NATO
    should consider?
        Answer. Deterring Russian aggression and supporting NATO's defense
    of the Euro Atlantic area remain as challenges facing USEUCOM. These
    complex and interrelated challenges require coordination with other
    U.S. Government Agencies, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, allies
    and partners in Europe. Russia's ``malign influence campaign'' seeks to
    confound our coordination efforts and weaken the Alliance's integrity.
        If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman, Commander, U.S.
    European Command, other combatant commanders and interagency
    stakeholders to establish credible deterrence to Russian aggression and
    ensure it's a collective NATO alliance responsibility.
        Continued integration with DOD efforts to address global
    requirements is essential to address trans-regional threats that span
    the conflict spectrum. Synchronized efforts by the combatant commands,
    overseen by OSD and the Joint Staff, are crucial to our success. We
    will continue to work closely with Office of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) and the Joint Staff to
    streamline the development and fielding of warfighting capabilities and
    concepts.
        Further, I will continue advocating for resourcing solutions to
    address emerging requirements such as: enhanced and expanded
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine
    and undersea warfare; Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD);
    hypersonics; cyber operations and a secure, resilient Information
    Technology theater infrastructure.
        Question. Russia has taken provocative action in the Black Sea
    region over the past year, including a military buildup around Ukraine
    and threats to Allied warships in the sea.
        Are there additional efforts the U.S. military should undertake
    with Black Sea Allies and partners to advance our security interests
    and deter Russia?
        Answer. The U.S. military must continue to work with our allies and
    partners--especially those bordering the Black Sea--to ensure that
    norms and activities are maintained with respect to the rules-based
    order. Efforts are already in place to increase interoperability,
    improve maritime domain awareness, and strengthen allied and partner
    capability to resist Russian coercion and deter malign influence in the
    region. If confirmed, I would ensure these ongoing efforts continue,
    and accelerated wherever possible.
        Question. Given advances in Russian attack submarine capability
    what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to
    maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare? What are the
    different capabilities that are necessary to address this in different
    parts of the world such as the North Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea,
    and elsewhere?
        Answer. A robust Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) capability
    requires investment in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
    (IUSS) that uses the Fixed Surveillance System (FSS), Fixed Distributed
    System (FDS), and the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). A robust
    presence of fast attack submarines, guided-missile cruisers and
    destroyers, and Maritime Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft are
    instrumental in maintaining U.S. advantages in undersea warfare. We
    must maintain acoustic superiority.
        Question. In your assessment, does DOD currently have a mature
    joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
    sufficient capacity to overcome advanced Russian anti-access, area
    denial (A2/AD) capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or
    capacity are required in Europe to ensure U.S. forces are able to
    achieve operational freedom of maneuver?
        Answer. We are making progress on a new Joint Warfighting Concept
    focused on ways the Joint Force can maintain a global advantage to
    project power and defend critical infrastructure. As Russia increases
    quantity and quality of advanced A2AD capabilities, the Joint Force
    requires new capabilities and increased capacity to defend our
    logistics infrastructure, our static bases, and forward positioned
    forces against the A2AD threat. Without modernization the United
    States' critical power projection platforms and bases, along with
    forward deployed forces, would be under threat from advanced Russian
    capabilities.
        Question. What is your assessment of EUCOM and NATO's readiness to
    detect, deter, and respond to Russian influence operations, including
    in the cyber domain?
        Answer. Russian malign influence is not only a regional problem; it
    is global in nature. The scale and scope of this problem impacts each
    of the combatant commands, the IC, the interagency along with our
    allies and partners. EUCOM's continued engagement and leadership in a
    variety of counter Russian influence venues has been essential to
    recognizing and responding to malign Russian Activity. The dynamic
    information environment requires us to constantly upgrade our
    approaches to detect this activity.
        Question. In your view, what additional military and non-military
    capabilities are required for the United States to counter effectively
    Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?
        Answer. Additional information operations capability would benefit
    EUCOM in countering Russian's malign influence campaign. If confirmed,
    I will look very closely at our capabilities and capacity, especially
    counter Russian hybrid operations across the spectrum of conflict.
                                 nato alliance
        Question. In your view, how important is the NATO Alliance to
    advancing U.S. national security interests?
        Answer. Our commitment to NATO and particularly our obligations
    under Article 5, are crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Article 5
    obligations are the linchpin of defense and deterrence against
    adversaries threatening the U.S. homeland and our vital interests in
    Europe. NATO's strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion
    to collectively deter threats or respond to attacks.
        Question. How important is NATO's Concept for the Deterrence and
    Defense of the Euroatlantic Area to the U.S. from an operational
    perspective? What other NATO priorities will the Joint Staff emphasize
    most in coming years?
        Answer. Operationally, maintaining Alliance momentum on the
    implementation of NATO's Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the
    Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) is vitally important. The delivery in
    September of SACEUR's AOR--Wide Strategic Plan provides military
    strategic direction to respond through the coordinated delivery of
    national, regional, and AOR-wide multi-domain effects to prevent a
    crisis from deepening. The Joint Staff will now emphasize further
    implementation through the on-going development of the DDA family of
    subordinate strategic and regional plans through the coming years. The
    development of those plans will lead us to a force structure that is
    responsive and fit for purpose. Most importantly, DDA implementation
    facilitates alignment between NATO and U.S. plans and activities.
        Question. How important is the update to NATO's Strategic Concept
    for the NATO Military Committee?
        Answer. Anchoring NATO's continued military adaptation in an
    updated Strategic Concept is very important to the NATO Military
    Committee. The Military Committee's agreements on Deterrence and
    Defense need to be central to the Strategic Concept. These include
    agreement on the threats, agreement on NATO's purpose across the
    spectrum of competition and conflict, and agreement on how to manage
    deterrence and defense in the 21st Century. The Strategic Concept will
    also need to address China and their systematic challenges to the
    rules-based international order and relevance to Alliance security will
    also need to be addressed in the next Strategic Concept.
        Question. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in the
    strategic competition with Russia and China?
        Answer. While Russia remains NATO's immediate primary concern, the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) presents a growing challenge, not
    least because it aims to complete military modernization by 2035 and
    transform the People's Liberation Army into a ``world-class'' military
    by the end of 2049. Since Beijing likely seeks to develop a security
    cooperation architecture that would rival the Alliance, the Alliance
    must take account of not only Russia's direct military impact on Euro-
    Atlantic security but also the PRC's potential military influence on
    the Euro-Atlantic area.
        Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, what actions would you recommend to maintain momentum on the
    capabilities, readiness, and military mobility of the NATO Alliance in
    order to deter aggression?
        Answer. The Alliance has created significant momentum through its
    ongoing military adaptation as part of the implementation of the
    Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area and SACEUR's AOR--Wide
    Strategic Plan. These efforts, coupled with the NATO Readiness
    Initiative (NRI), directly build critical capabilities and improve
    readiness across the Alliance. If confirmed, I will continue to push
    for full implementation of the DDA and SASP to solidify these efforts,
    and emphasize the importance of NRI as a culture of readiness for the
    Alliance.
        If confirmed, I will also encourage synchronization and cooperation
    with the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation mobility projects, which
    will be critical in improving and enhancing military mobility in the
    European AOR. The recent approval of the EU Administrative Arrangement
    negotiating mandate is an important step forward in this effort.
        Question. As recently as the June 2021 Summit, NATO Allies have
    declared `` . . . that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
    remain a nuclear alliance.'' The alliance's Secretary General
    reiterated this point at the recent meeting of defense ministers in
    October, stating that a `` . . . world where Russia, China, and
    countries like North Korea have nuclear weapons, but NATO has none, is
    simply not a safer world.''
        In you view, should NATO remain a nuclear alliance as long as
    nuclear weapons exist?
        Answer. Yes. Nuclear deterrence is a key component of the
    Alliance's deterrence and defense and must remain its highest priority
    mission for deterrence and defense.
        Question. Do you believe that the forward deployment of U.S.
    nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component of NATO's nuclear
    posture?
        Answer. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to the
    deterrence of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible
    capabilities to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible
    demonstration of Alliance unity.
        Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
    nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
        Answer. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe underpin the deterrence
    of Russian limited nuclear use, provide NATO with credible capabilities
    to respond if deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration
    of Alliance unity. Therefore, there is a continuing requirement for
    U.S. nuclear weapons' deployment within NATO.
        Question. At the NATO Summit in Brussels this past year, Allies
    pledged to ``ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force
    architecture'' to meet deterrence and defense needs. How do you
    envision NATO Allies' military efforts aligning with the U.S. Army's
    Multi Domain Task Force?
        Answer. The U.S. Army's tenants for Multi-Domain Operations
    parallel similar concepts found in NATO's Military Strategy, the
    Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA),
    SACEUR's AOR-wide Strategic Plan and the associated subordinate family
    of DDA plans, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, all centered
    on the development and adaptation of the Alliance's Military Instrument
    of Power. Therefore, we envision that calibrated force posture, multi-
    domain formations, and the integration of capabilities in all domains
    will align with the Alliance's development of multi-domain operations
    concepts and force architecture.
                              the korean peninsula
        Question. How would you assess the continuing value of the U.S.-
    South Korea alliance to U.S. national security interests?
        Answer. For nearly 70 years, the United States-ROK alliance has
    been a core pillar of the U.S national security architecture in
    Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the North Korean
    threat since 1953. It plays an integral role in managing potential
    tensions in the region. The United States-ROK Alliance has also
    strengthened our collective security, economic ties, and societal
    relationships.
        Question. Do you believe it important that the United States and
    the Republic of Korea resolve fairly and amicably their negotiation of
    a new Special Measures Agreement for 2020 and beyond? If so, why?
        Answer. The ROK and the United States ratified the Special Measure
    Agreement in August. This new agreement will contribute to long-term
    stability of our force posture in Korea for years to come. I welcome
    this historic agreement.
        Question. In your assessment, what is the value of combined joint
    exercises for maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces on the Korean
    Peninsula?
        Answer. Exercises and training are the routine activities of
    militaries around the world. The U.S. military conducts exercises and
    training at multiple echelons, at home and in every Geographic
    Combatant Command region of the globe. Each exercise or training event
    on the Korean Peninsula is agreed upon by both the United States and
    South Korea as an integral part of maintaining combined forces
    warfighting readiness to fight tonight.
        Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
    take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's missile
    capabilities?
        Answer. We will continue to monitor the situation regarding DPRK
    missile capabilities in order to protect U.S. interests and the
    security of our allies and partners. The Department of Defense remains
    postured to detect and respond to North Korean missile threats but must
    continue to improve regional interoperability, pursue improvements in
    allied missile defense capabilities, and adapt existing and emerging
    capabilities--particularly omnidirectional threats like cruise
    missiles--to strengthen our defenses. We must prioritize the next
    generation of advanced ground and space-based sensors to better detect,
    track, and discriminate enemy missile warheads and concurrently develop
    an effective, robust layered missile defense system to ensure defense
    of our homeland and forces abroad.
        Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
    take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
    weapons technology?
        Answer. The United States, in close coordination with allies and
    partners, has a vital interest in limiting the reach of the DPRK's
    dangerous weapons programs and proliferation activities. Addressing
    this issue will take a whole of government approach to ensure North
    Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology. Furthermore,
    the United States will continue to work closely with all countries and
    jurisdictions to promote full implementation of DPRK-related U.N.
    Security Council resolutions.
        Question. If South Korea and North Korea were able to negotiate a
    peace deal, how do you assess that would impact U.S. force posture on
    the peninsula as well as the legal status of the UN force?
        Answer. While the Department of Defense supports diplomatic efforts
    to engage North Korea, U.S. force posture is a critical backstop to our
    diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean
    Peninsula, and maintain our ability to defend the ROK. We constantly
    assess our force posture to ensure that we are calibrated against the
    current threat as it evolves. The threat and our Alliance commitments
    will continue to be our guiding principles.
                        general/flag officer reductions
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA directed DOD to reduce the
    number of general and flag officer (G/FO) billets by 110 by 2022.
        What is your understanding of the progress Joint Staff has made in
    reducing its number of G/FO in accordance with Department-wide plans?
        Answer. The Joint Force will successfully meet the requirements of
    the NDAAs; however, emerging requirements may require future
    adjustments to GO/FO positions.
        The Joint Staff contributed to an approximate 10% SES reduction in
    that time. Additionally, the Joint Staff scheduled and identified by-
    year reductions throughout CY22. The Joint Staff also identified 78
    General Officer/Flag Officer positions for reduction in conjunction
    with the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. To date, the Joint Pool reduced from
    310 positions to 280 positions and plans will reduce further to 232 by
    December 31, 2022. In coordination with this reduction and Fiscal Year
    2017 NDAA, there is a plan to establish an Overseas Contingency
    Operations (OCO) account of not more than 30 billets.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    ensure the Joint Staff is successful in meeting these reduction
    mandates on time?
        Answer. The Joint Staff is on track to meet the reduction mandates
    on time. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the
    Chairman, Combatant Commanders, and leaders of Defense Activities to
    ensure we remain on track. The Department has established a General
    Officer/Flag Officer reduction plan timeline for each position
    identified for removal. The Joint Staff reviews the plan regularly and
    provides updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a
    quarterly basis, or more frequently as needed. Regarding SES
    management, if confirmed, I will continue to execute the DOD SES
    Reduction Plan to meet the goals of the Department while ensuring the
    mission and integrity of the Joint Force.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        Question. Officials of the Department of Defense, including
    previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for
    accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
        Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
    Convention on the Law of the Sea?
        Answer. Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the
    Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States'
    security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to
    ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal
    certainty in the world's largest maneuver space.
        Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession
    to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime
    disputes such as in the Indo-Pacific region and the Arctic?
        Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility
    and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we
    do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South
    China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes
    are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and
    that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we
    undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we
    are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other
    Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland))
    understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of
    utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of
    their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United
    States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean and is also working to
    secure international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights
    on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the
    other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.
                          guantanamo bay naval station
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
        Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
    Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
    2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee
    Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
    114-92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government
    may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any
    treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and
    listed in the Army Field Manual.
        Question. Fewer than forty detainees remain at the detention
    facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
        What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility
    at Guantanamo?
        Answer. The detention facility at Guantanamo is DOD's only long-
    term law of war detention facility. The continued use of this facility
    is ultimately a policy decision.
        The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section
    1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, is conducted ``to determine whether
    certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing
    significant threat to the security of the United States such that their
    continued detention is warranted''.
        Question. Do you support the PRB process and the continued transfer
    of detainees to other countries based on the PRB's determinations,
    subject to the restrictions currently in law?
        Answer. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by
    section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA), is conducted ``to determine whether certain individuals
    detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to
    the security of the United States such that their continued detention
    is warranted.'' Should I be confirmed, I will continue to support the
    PRB process, subject to existing legal restrictions.
        Question. In your view, what standard should apply to medical care
    provided to detainees at Guantanamo?
        Answer. I believe that DOD should continue to provide adequate and
    humane care for detainees consistent with the standards of Common
    Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and, to the extent
    practicable, medical treatment guided by standards similar to those
    applied to U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed at Naval Station
    Guantanamo Bay.
                                 insider threat
        Question. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider
    threats--attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD
    personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information
    critical to national security. The National Insider Threat Task Force
    published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework in November
    2018.
        In your view, has DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security
    Agency (DCSA), better postured the Department to deter, detect, and
    mitigate insider threats before they reach a critical point and
    potentially harm national security.
        Answer. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the question of
    implementing the newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and
    Security Agency (DCSA) has not been my responsibility. If confirmed, I
    will review the issue as required.
        Question. What can the Department do to ensure that senior leaders
    in each DOD Component--not only the intelligence or counterintelligence
    communities--are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities,
    information from insider threats as a core mission objective?
        Answer. The insider threat is a challenging problem that all senior
    leaders in DOD must be aware of. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces
    Command, I worked diligently with subordinate commanders to ensure we
    took an active role in this protecting our people, facilities and
    critical information from the insider threat. This was Commander's
    Business. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman, the Combatant
    Commanders and the Services in all manners possible to continue with
    this approach.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                              acquisition process
        1. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, historically, the Planning,
    Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and requirements processes
    have been based largely on ``bottom-up'' initiatives and proposals from
    the military services, and focused on individual weapons systems,
    platforms, and other major systems rather than the joint operational
    missions assigned to joint commanders. However, modern warfare against
    near-peer competitor's demands, and technology today enables, a much
    higher level of jointness and integration across domains, service
    capabilities, and platforms to accomplish complex missions. It is no
    longer acceptable for the services to engineer and deliver systems and
    capabilities that are not interoperable and expect the combatant
    commander to somehow find ways to integrate them.
        Further, this ``joint'' space between and across the services, the
    operational domains, and the collection of platforms and systems
    produced by the Department of Defense acquisition process is not
    ``owned'' by any service, nor are there acquisition and sustainment
    organizations designated to produce, deploy, and maintain joint
    solutions to these joint problems and requirements.
        In multiple places in your answers to the committee's advance
    policy questions, you expressed the view that it is important for the
    Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek
    ``consensus'' among the JROC service members. Where consensus on
    important requirements and technology opportunities is elusive,
    however, would you intend to exercise your authority as the principal
    requirements advisor to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense to make
    recommendations on your own?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will strive for a data informed
    process to drive integration, speed, and consensus with respect to
    joint requirements and, if necessary, exercise all appropriate
    authorities available to me as Chair of the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council.

        2. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, do you think that the Department's
    requirements process and practices should be more oriented on missions
    and somewhat less on individual weapons systems and platforms? If so,
    how might that be accomplished?
        Admiral Grady. Traditional military activities are expanding,
    especially in domains like cyber and space, which are all inherently
    joint. But there remain traditional military missions that must account
    for the Joint Force and its fielded weapons and platforms. The
    Combatant Commands assist the Joint Staff in ensuring that these
    mission-oriented requirements processes remain accounted for. We need
    to ensure that requirements are concept driven and threat informed in
    order to generate inherently joint mission capabilities that fill gaps
    at speed.
                                 domain control
        3. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, historically, too, the military
    services have neglected missions that are critically important for the
    joint force but are not high priorities for the specific services to
    which they are assigned. Examples include mine warfare in the Navy,
    theater missile defense in the Army, and close-air support in the Air
    Force.
        It is widely believed that prevailing in the ongoing military
    competition depends on achieving unprecedented levels of
    interoperability and agility to create novel ``kill webs'' on demand,
    as reflected in the Joint All Domain Command and Control initiative,
    and the corresponding service initiatives (Advanced Battle Management
    System (ABMS), Convergence, and Overmatch).
        Congress is on the threshold of enacting the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, which includes multiple
    provisions to establish ``mission manager'' pilot programs--to test
    concepts for managing missions in addition to individual programs. One
    model for this concept is the existing Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense Office (IAMDO) within the Joint Staff. What is your view of the
    IAMDO model of mission management?
        Admiral Grady. While this model has been effective, it is executed
    using existing Department resources, often competing with the
    Departments ability to conduct traditional management roles. If
    confirmed, I will remain committed to leveraging existing constructs,
    as well as considering alternatives to uphold the Department of
    Defense's commitment to deliver the right capabilities at the right
    time in support of the Joint Force.

        4. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, what is your view of the idea of
    mission managers?
        Admiral Grady. The JROC shifted from approving Services
    capabilities to a true collaborative structure designed to validate
    joint requirements. If confirmed, I welcome any oversight of cross-
    service capabilities. Services organize train and equip to fill
    combatant command requirements. Occasionally, there is duplication of
    effort and having a mission manager focused on joint requirements is
    important.

        5. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, in your view, is there a potential
    role for existing or new acquisition and sustainment organizations to
    develop and transition capabilities to meet requirements of joint
    combatant commanders for which no service is responsible and no service
    is likely to commit internal manpower and funding to satisfy?
        Admiral Grady. Joint Combatant Commander requirements are addressed
    through rapid acquisitions processes such as Joint Urgent Operational
    Need. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress, OSD, and
    the Services to streamline and evolve acquisition processes to meet
    joint warfighter requirements.
                              technology advances
        6. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, it is also widely acknowledged
    that, because a preponderance of technological innovation is produced
    by commercial industry and largely available for purchase by any
    nations, it is imperative for DOD to quickly adopt and adapt
    technology, developed outside of the Department that may not be
    appropriately prioritized by the military services. How would you try
    to evolve the JROC requirements process to improve the Department's
    exploitation of commercially developed technology advances?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I plan to execute the mission set by
    Congress in Title 10 Section 181. This mission is best achieved with
    the active support of the Services that make up the JROC membership. I
    anticipate that in the current technological environment the entities
    that procure capabilities to fulfill those requirements will draw from
    technologies that derive from the Services, private industry, and other
    DOD organizations.

        7. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, in your view, does the technology
    exist to enable joint commanders to orchestrate sensors, processing,
    decision aids, command functions, and engagement systems to rapidly
    detect, locate, identify, track, and engage large numbers of mobile,
    time-sensitive targets across all domains and relevant systems and
    platforms?
        Admiral Grady. This is a complex challenge. While many of the
    technologies described above exist, additional research, concept and
    capability development, organizational, and cultural change are
    necessary for the Joint Force to succeed in applying associated
    technologies to generate the desired effects. Additional concerted work
    by the Department, Joint Staff, the Services, Congress, leading
    technologists, and others is required to fully leverage the
    opportunities presented by emerging technologies around this mission.

        8. Senator Reed. Admiral Grady, how would you characterize the
    cultural and organizational obstacles to achieving this capability?
        Admiral Grady. Cultural and organizational obstacles arise in
    response to reshaping the force around full adoption of semi-autonomous
    warfighting systems. Culturally, members of units which focus on
    traditional warfighting roles, such as aviation, may resist having
    these roles replaced by semi-autonomous systems. Commanders may develop
    unique approaches to command and control which could further challenge
    traditional organizational constructs such as domain-centric functional
    component commands. Employment of large quantities of expendable
    systems further challenge cultural norms, such as the risk aversion to
    platform loss. The software-driven continuous capability development of
    these systems requires additional adjustments in acquisitions policy,
    and efforts to more tightly couple operator feedback into the
    development process. In addition, we must develop and train our
    operational force on the responsible use of artificial intelligence and
    work to overcome cultural aversions to teaming with semi-autonomous
    systems.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                               sexual harassment
        9. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, as part of my responsibility as a
    member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
    of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
    of Defense I will be asking you the same two questions that I ask
    nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a
    legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or
    committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Admiral Grady. No.

        10. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, have you ever faced discipline,
    or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Admiral Grady. No.
        aligning military service acquisition decisions with combatant
                             commander requirements
        11. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, there has been general
    recognition that at times the current DOD acquisition process does not
    provide combatant commanders with the required resources to fulfill
    critical operational needs arising from cross-service, joint missions.
    This is especially evident at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). If
    confirmed as Vice Chairman, you will play a significant role in
    overseeing how DOD prioritizes joint military requirements. How do you
    plan to approach your role as arbiter of what the military services
    should prioritize to ensure INDOPACOM has the joint capabilities needed
    to compete with and deter China?
        Admiral Grady. We must prioritize delivering resources and
    capabilities to INDOPACOM at speed. I will approach that process by
    ensuring we always start with a firm understanding of the threat and
    the risk to mission and risk to force. I am committed to collaborating
    with Combatant Commanders and Services to achieve this.

        12. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the Strategic Capabilities
    Office (SCO) is responsible for rapidly acquiring and deploying
    technology to counter emerging threats. If confirmed, how will you
    ensure the military services support the SCO's mission, which
    ultimately helps combatant commanders like INDOPACOM?
        Admiral Grady. The Services are responsible for manning, training,
    equipping, and providing ready forces to the Combatant Commanders, who
    in turn are responsible for executing DOD strategy across their
    respective geographic and functional areas of responsibility. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders
    to support transitioning SCO rapid technology projects into warfighting
    capabilities to counter emerging threats.
          results of the department of defense's global posture review
        13. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, earlier this week, DOD released
    the results of its Global Posture Review. In the Indo-Pacific, the
    Review directed additional cooperation with allies and partners on
    initiatives to confront Chinese military aggression and North Korean
    threats, with a focus on enhancing infrastructure. Do you agree that
    infrastructure improvements in the region must include projects in the
    Freely Associated States, which are strategically located in the second
    island chain?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, infrastructure improvements should include the
    Freely Associated States. The Freely Associated States extend from the
    third island chain and into the second island chain. They provide the
    United States with access and overflight to maintain freedom of
    maneuver in the region. Infrastructure improvements will promote
    economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated
    States, in line with the intent of the Compacts of Free Association.

        14. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the Compacts of Free Association
    are set to expire in 2023 and 2024--how important is it for the United
    States to extend these treaties?
        Admiral Grady. The Compacts are of great importance to both the
    Federated States of Micronesia and the United States. A failure to
    extend the Compacts will limit the self-sufficiency and self-government
    of the Freely Associated States, restrict U.S. freedom of maneuver, and
    create gaps that the PRC will exploit to undermine U.S. strategic
    interests in the Indo-Pacific.
           military to military communication with chinese officials
        15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, during a recent summit,
    Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping agreed to high-level conversations
    between senior military officials from both countries in the coming
    months to establish guardrails and avoid potential miscalculations
    which could lead to war. How important is it to have regular, open
    lines of communication with senior Chinese military officials to avoid
    miscalculation and clarify intentions?
        Admiral Grady. Our increasingly competitive relationship with the
    PRC necessitates that we maintain regular communication channels to
    help avoid crisis and that we establish direct pathways for
    communication so we have a timely method to engage with the PLA should
    a crisis occur. Attempting to establish those pathways once a crisis
    begins is too late.
        DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritize crisis
    prevention and management, risk reduction, and limited cooperation in
    areas where national interests align, in order to advance a
    constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the
    PLA. These exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accordance with the
    statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2000, as amended.
        I support dialog that enables us to challenge PRC behaviors that
    are inconsistent with the free and open international order; gain
    insight into China's strategic intent; manage differences; and
    cooperate in limited areas where national interests align.

        16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, would you be in favor of a
    United States and China ``hot line'', similar to the one we still have
    with Russia, to prevent an accidental or inadvertent war?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, a ``hot line'' with China would be useful, but
    U.S.--China competition is significantly more complex than the U.S.--
    Soviet competition of the cold war. We need a comprehensive set of
    tools for reducing risk, and DOD will support the interagency to
    implement the President's guidance on establishing guardrails and means
    of communication with China.
     size and composition of the navy's future fleet and shipyard upgrades
        17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, your experience as
    the Navy's most senior surface warfare officer will likely be very
    influential in the ongoing discussions about the size and composition
    of the future fleet and the plan to upgrade our four public shipyards.
    What are your views on the size and composition of the Navy's future
    fleet?
        Admiral Grady. I believe a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and
    unmanned platforms is the most effective and affordable way to meet the
    security demands of our Nation. Analysis confirms that numbers are not
    the only factor--the right balance of capability and capacity must be
    brought to bear in order achieve the combat effectiveness needed from
    our Navy's fleet.

        18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the Navy is in the beginning of
    a 20-year plan to upgrade our four public shipyards--do you think that
    time horizon needs to be compressed to ensure the future fleet is
    maintained at a high State of readiness?
        Admiral Grady. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
    (SIOP) and its steady funding stream is critical to our ability to
    clear maintenance backlogs, improve readiness rates, and sustain new
    platforms. Having the flexibility to execute funding earlier, within
    the 20-year plan could prove advantageous, but, as custodians of this
    funding, we should be careful not to induce risk to SIOP execution.
                            climate adaptation plan
        19. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, DOD recently released its
    Climate Adaptation Plan, which lays out how operations, planning
    activities, business processes, and resource allocation decisions will
    include climate change considerations. If confirmed, how do you plan to
    implement the Climate Adaptation Plan's lines of effort to ensure the
    Department is incorporating these considerations in all of its future
    acquisition and planning processes?
        Admiral Grady. Climate change is altering our operating
    environment. If confirmed, I will work to enhance our infrastructure
    and supply chains, making them more resilient. Adapting our platforms
    and installations for the effects of a changing climate will help keep
    the force ready, mitigate the impacts of major weather events, and
    provide tactical advantage by reducing dependencies and demand on long
    distance, intricate supply chains.
                         homeland defense radar--hawaii
        20. Senator Hirono. Admiral Grady, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
    identified the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-H) as a requirement
    for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from
    an increasingly capable North Korea. In successive budget requests,
    including this year, DOD zeroed out funding for HDR-H, which, without
    an adequate alternative, will put Hawaii at risk in the near future. If
    confirmed, how would you ensure Hawaii is protected from missile
    threats from North Korea and elsewhere going forward?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed I would work through the JROC in order
    to provide strategic direction on the requirements for each of the key
    capabilities for the future Joint Force including the HDR-H. Integrated
    Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is a critically important capability and
    therefore an essential topic for JROC action. If confirmed, I look
    forward to reviewing Department assessments that inform future budget
    decisions. I will also work with INDOPACOM to support continued
    improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture, including
    our missile defense sensor network.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                military training opportunities in west virginia
        21. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, one of the priorities I didn't
    have a chance to bring up in our meeting was the need to invest in
    training venues that can support full mission profile exercises that
    allow our troops to train back home exactly like they would if deployed
    against a near peer adversary. U.S. Special Operations Command and the
    Marine Corps have been the leaders in seeking out those types of
    engagements, and most recently my office has been working with them to
    identify venues in West Virginia that could benefit the Joint Force as
    a whole. Especially on the East Coast where training space is severally
    limited in availability. As we transition from our primary focus on the
    Middle-East, West Virginia's terrain and population density, coupled
    with its proximity to our Tier One commands and rotary wing assets make
    it operationally and fiscally appealing to our Special Operation Forces
    for near-peer full mission profiles. As you consider future range
    training area management and programs to meet current and future
    shortfalls, tell me how I can best work with you and your staff to
    identify venues in West Virginia needed to meet the forecasted joint
    training requirements?
        Admiral Grady. Live ranges as well as virtual and constructive
    means to support training are vitally important to ensuring the combat
    effectiveness of the force. If confirmed, I look forward to working
    with you and the rest of the SASC members, to ensure we provide the
    very best training venues for our forces.
                     interoperability between the services
        22. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, I was pleased to read about the
    focus you have toward interoperability in your advance policy
    questions. From the creation of pilot programs and acquisition of
    assets to deployment into the hands of our warfighters the Department
    of Defense, our industry partners, and allies around the globe have to
    maintain a mindset of joint interoperability. General John Hyten
    recognized this as the Vice Chairman, specifically in our acquisition
    and emerging technology research. How do you plan to continue and
    expand the joint mindset as we're procuring and developing tomorrow's
    technology?
        Admiral Grady. This is best achieved with the active support of the
    Services and their role in the JROC. This includes applying the
    expertise and capabilities of OUSD(R&E) to ensure we are fully
    leveraging speed, innovation, and technology. If confirmed I will
    foster relationships with all stakeholders to ensure our laser-like
    focus on maintaining overmatch against our pacing threats in all
    domains. If confirmed I will also further exercise the capability
    requirements authority to expand the joint mindset. Modern warfare
    demands unprecedented levels of interoperability, integrated systems-
    of-systems kill chains, and joint command and control, for which no
    single Service is responsible.

        23. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, interoperability with our
    allies is something I'm sure you've spent a great deal of time
    designing and implementing as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces, can you
    describe some of those experiences and tell us how you plan to expand
    them with all our allies?
        Admiral Grady. I'll provide two examples of helping to improve
    allied interoperability from my time as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces,
    one that focuses on the Force Development strategic horizon and another
    that focuses on the Force Employment strategic horizon.
        U.S. Fleet Forces and Joint Forces Command Norfolk has a meaningful
    relationship with the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of
    Excellence--a NATO-accredited multi-national military think tank that
    facilitates the sharing of collective international experience,
    expertise, and best practices, critical to operations in the North
    Atlantic. The alignment of U.S. Fleet Forces and Joint Forces Command
    Norfolk catalyzed the development of modern warfighting capabilities in
    the North Atlantic, increasing interoperability with our NATO allies
    and readiness across the joint force. If confirmed, I will continue to
    support similar efforts facilitated by the Joint Staff. For example,
    The Joint Staff has a longstanding relationship with NATO Allied
    Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA. The J-7 facilitates the
    Multinational Capability Development Campaign, a community of allies
    and partners that shares Force Development best practices,
    methodologies, and frameworks in order to improve the ability of joint
    multinational and coalition partners to plan and operate together.
    Finally, 22 nations invest in bilateral partnerships with the Joint
    Staff through posting of senior liaison officers throughout Joint Staff
    directorates. All of these opportunities ensure the Joint Force is
    consistently working to ensure cooperation with key Allies and
    Partners.
        The recent deployment of the UK HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike
    Group is a great example of how we are interoperable with our allies
    along the Force Employment strategic horizon. The Queen Elizabeth
    deployment involved coordinating operations with four different
    Combatant Commands. This level of operational interoperability was
    enabled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's role as the U.S.
    Joint Force Global Integrator. If confirmed, I will support the Joint
    Force's continuing efforts to expand operational interoperability with
    our allies and partners. The primary mechanism for this effort is the
    U.S. planning process focused on Consolidated Strategic Opportunities,
    where we seek to synchronize in time, space, and purpose U.S. global
    operations with our allies and partners.

        24. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, U.S. Cyber Command and U.S.
    Space Command are two combatant commands that influence nearly every
    weapon and support system in our inventory, can you tell me how you
    plan to resource each of them as the challenges to our capabilities in
    these domains increase?
        Admiral Grady. The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget requested
    increased investment in these domains, dedicating $20.6B toward Space
    and $10.4B toward the Cyber domain. CYBERCOM and SPACECOM execute the
    Department's strategy in these critical warfighting domains, and if
    confirmed I will continue to support the timely and relevant resourcing
    of cyber and space capabilities to enable unfettered Joint Force
    operations in all domains.
                           capabilities and logistics
        25. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, the political, domestic, and
    military landscape that each commander has to manage is more taxing on
    personnel and resources today than ever before. In light of this, we
    often hear of the need for more advanced weaponry, training, and other
    enablers to support a defensive and future offensive need. However, we
    don't hear a lot about the logistics capacity being able to support and
    sustain those resources across the globe that a commander views as
    mission critical. As a commander, I am interested to hear about any
    concerns you may have in logistical capability or capacity to surge
    necessary combat power to the region if needed to combat a North Korean
    or near peer aggression?
        Admiral Grady. Logistics is the principal enabler to sustain a
    combat credible joint force. In the event of contingency operations in
    a contested environment against a near-peer adversary our current
    posture and capabilities would be challenged in supporting our forces.
    We must look to diversify our distribution methods and locations to
    sustain the Joint Force. Our allies, partners, and commercial logistics
    providers are the key to offsetting these challenges. The joint force
    will require a combination of access and agreements with like-minded
    allies and partners to establish the nodes required to sustain forces
    in a contested environment.

        26. Senator Manchin. Admiral Grady, what critical vulnerabilities
    do you anticipate seeing in the Indo-Pacific region in order to
    safeguard the supply lines needed to support military efforts as well
    as to safeguard regional stability from agitators like North Korea and
    China?
        Admiral Grady. Our strategic lift capacity is stretched in most
    fights. Distributed operations required to support operations against a
    near peer adversary will require new approaches with enhanced
    capabilities. Existing service programs begin to address this gap, but
    trans-loading and logistics movement from strategic lift to intra-
    theater lift continues to pose some vulnerability to the joint force.
    Waterborne platforms must be able to operate in austere seaports under
    increased threat, and they must be interoperable for delivery of
    materiel over-the-shore, and flexible enough to transfer materiel at
    sea. Commercial logistics providers providing unique contract
    capabilities, can be force-multipliers, and ongoing exercises are
    providing helpful insight to their capabilities and limitations.
    Integration of the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics in support of
    the Joint Warfighting Concept will provide a better site picture for
    evolving requirements, authorities, and organizational concepts to
    support a highly effective joint force.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                           indo-pacific partnerships
        27. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, our ability to execute
    operational plans and leverage combat power in the Indo-Pacific is
    predicated on our ability to project and sustain the Joint Force across
    the broad spans of that region. The elements of access, basing, and
    overflight to forward locations are essential to position and employ
    combat capability and remain globally responsive to emerging
    requirements. Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy
    and provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential
    adversaries. What opportunities exist to enhance engagement with
    partners and allies and establish new relationships to improve our
    access in the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Grady. The ability to work with partner nations in the
    Indo-Pacific is crucial; first, to show solidarity with allies and
    deter would be aggressors; and second, to provide an agile,
    distributed, forward based force that can project power and minimize
    losses in the event of conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to
    engage with partner nations at all levels across the region in
    bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and military training
    exercises, which offer the chance to enhance interoperability and
    integration, build relationships, show solidarity, and demonstrate
    support of the international rules-based order.

        28. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, if you are confirmed, one of
    your responsibilities will include representing the military in the
    National Security Council deputies' meetings. How would you approach
    these interagency discussions, especially with regard to developing our
    alliances and partnerships?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I look forward to providing advice on
    how to best leverage military tools such as defense diplomacy, security
    cooperation, exercises, and engagements to facilitate State
    Department's diplomacy. At any given time, my familiarity with the
    Chairman's regular meetings with Allied and Partner Chiefs of Defense
    (CHODs) and other multilateral defense engagements will allow me to
    provide insight as to the perspective of our Allies and Partners on any
    issue as well as offer their potential reaction and/or support on
    courses of action being deliberated by the National Security Council.
    In times of crisis, unique military advice I would provide on behalf of
    the Chairman to the National Security Council would be centered on our
    warfighting capabilities that deter our adversaries or compel them to
    cease malign behavior. America's extensive global defense alliances and
    partnerships and our ability to integrate military operations with
    like-minded nations will factor heavily into the advice I would be able
    to provide.

        29. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, what whole of government
    opportunities do you see for improving our most strategically important
    overseas relationships?
        Admiral Grady. Our relationships with allies and partners remain
    the single most important approach to support the rules based
    international order. The Joint Force's role in maintaining, improving,
    and expanding these relationships are organized by the National
    Security Council to support whole of government activities to achieve
    outcomes aligned to national interests. One of the greatest
    opportunities to improve relationships with our allies and partners is
    whole of government coordinated strategic messaging that allows us to
    speak with one voice as a community of likeminded nations with shared
    interests and values. For example, the Quad, which is expressly not a
    Defense-centric grouping, provides us incredible opportunities to
    cooperate with Australia, India, and Japan to address some of the most
    complex issues of our day, including climate change, counterterrorism,
    infrastructure development, critical emerging technologies, maritime
    security, combating cyber threats, and humanitarian assistance/disaster
    relief.
                              strategic logistics
        30. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, the role of logistics in
    deterrence is often understated. I am proud of this committee's work
    implementing the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, but we cannot forget
    logistics and strategy are inextricably linked. Effective deterrence
    requires effective logistics. What role can U.S. Transportation Command
    play in the formulation of our strategic deterrent in the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Grady. USTRANSCOM (USTC) plays multiple roles in sustaining
    strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. USTC continually
    demonstrates the ability to project and sustain military power over
    trans-oceanic distances in support of the National Defense Strategy.
    The ability of USTC to control and rapidly shift assets anywhere in the
    world to address emerging and high priority needs is foundational to
    global responsiveness and strategic reach. USTC is responsible for
    leading the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to
    support planning and operations across all domains and supports
    USINDOPACOM by helping set global posture (infrastructure, equipment,
    and forces), as well as advocating for access, basing, and overflight
    (ABO) permissions from partner nations. USTC's mobility posture enables
    the critical ABO necessary in wartime and essential to any global
    response, as recently demonstrated during the Afghan Non-Combatant
    Evacuation Operation (NEO). Additionally, USTC continues to support
    USINDOPACOM to establish and grow strategic partnership with Indo-
    Pacific nations that will increases interoperability, expands training
    opportunities, increases airlift options for allies and partners, and
    leads to greater cooperation and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

        31. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, one of your
    roles will include overseeing joint military requirements. How would
    you approach coordinating logistics and sustainment requirements across
    the military services, to eliminate redundancy and inefficiency and
    improve effectiveness in how the different military services are
    attempting to overcome the ``tyranny of distance'' in the Indo-Pacific
    region?
        Admiral Grady. The JROC has in the last year, begun a capability
    portfolio management review process (CPMR) which is not only exploring
    Combatant Command identified capability gaps, but also exploring our
    Joint Warfighting Concept required capabilities. These CPMRs are
    looking at what our Joint Force has now, how well the Force is meeting
    our requirements, and at how we build the Joint Force for the future.
    Addressing inefficacies, redundancies and capability gaps in our
    logistics and sustainment portfolios will be a top priority if I am
    confirmed.
       australia, united kingdom, united states trilateral security pact
        32. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, this weekend, I spoke with
    Admiral John Aquilino about the Australia, United Kingdom, United
    States--or ``AUKUS''--trilateral security pact. I am impressed by
    Australia's bold commitment to building nuclear-powered submarines as
    we look to enhance our shared ability to tackle the threats of the 21st
    century together. We must begin the hard work to operationalize this
    historic security pact to match our ally's resolve and enhance our
    competitive edge in the Indo-Pacific. What steps can be taken to help
    accelerate the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS,
    and if confirmed, will you commit to taking any steps available to
    rapidly develop these platforms?
        Admiral Grady. The AUKUS trilateral security pact and the agreement
    to help Australia build nuclear-powered submarines is an excellent
    example of the impact we can have when working closely with our allies
    and partners. If confirmed, I am fully committed to working with the
    Navy, Naval Reactors and the Department of Energy to see the security
    pact and the submarine program successfully executed in the most
    expeditious manner possible.

        33. Senator Duckworth. Admiral Grady, will you also commit to
    working with Admiral Aquilino and the Joint Staff to expand the
    capabilities of the Australian submarine force to help shape, deter,
    and respond to potential threats in the Indo-Pacific region?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                 nuclear policy
        34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, five of my colleagues and I
    recently sent a letter to senior administration officials expressing
    concern that President Joseph Biden may pursue changes to long-standing
    U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, despite increasingly aggressive moves
    by China and Russia and clear objections from our allies. What is your
    best military advice on whether the United States should adopt a ``no
    first use'' or ``sole-purpose'' declaratory policy?
        Admiral Grady. From a military perspective, I do believe in giving
    the President as many options as possible, and that maintaining
    calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary's decision calculus. I
    would not advocate for any change that would simplify an adversary's
    decisionmaking, particularly if our adversaries are increasing their
    reliance on nuclear capabilities.

        35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, what is your understanding of
    allies' perspectives on potential U.S. adoption of a no-first-use or
    sole-purpose nuclear declaratory policy?
        Admiral Grady. I believe our alliances are our strategic center of
    gravity. The extended nuclear deterrence guarantees we provide to our
    allies have been called one of the most important and effective tools
    for stemming the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Any
    potential changes to our nuclear declaratory policy should be carefully
    crafted in consultation with allies.

        36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, in your view, should the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remain a nuclear alliance as long
    as nuclear weapons exist?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, do you believe that the forward
    deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component
    of NATO's nuclear posture?
        Admiral Grady. Yes. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to
    deterrence, provide NATO with credible capabilities to respond if
    deterrence fails, and serve as a tangible demonstration of Alliance
    unity.

        38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    highlighted the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a hedge against
    an uncertain future security environment. Considering China's massive
    ongoing nuclear breakout, and Russia's increasingly aggressive
    behaviors, do you believe it is prudent for the United States to
    continue to maintain this role for its nuclear weapons in order to
    reduce the risks to the United States and its allies from a worsening
    international security environment?
        Admiral Grady. The speed at which China is modernizing its nuclear
    forces is deeply concerning which contributes to uncertainty and
    potential miscalculation. There are benefits to having the deterrent
    serve as a hedge. If confirmed, I will advocate for a modern US nuclear
    deterrent that can flexibly and credibly deter both Russia and China in
    a rapidly changing and dynamic security environment.

        39. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
    outlined a separate hedging strategy that would rely on a responsive
    and reliable nuclear weapons production infrastructure capable of
    producing new and additional weapons. However, more than a decade
    later, DOD is still unable to rely on the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's (NNSA) infrastructure as a viable hedging strategy due
    to its declining condition. If confirmed, will you support accelerating
    the modernization of NNSA's aging nuclear weapons production
    infrastructure as a hedge against future risks?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will support the modernization of
    NNSA's infrastructure and will work with my Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC) colleagues to determine the most effective way to do so.
                                missile defense
        40. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the last review of roles and
    missions regarding missile defense occurred at Key West in March 1948.
    The realm of missile defense has evolved significantly since then and
    has expanded both in terms of threat and defensive capability. Do you
    believe a review of roles and missions regarding missile defense is
    necessary?
        Admiral Grady. Yes. Missile defense has become an increasingly
    complex warfighting function that spans the entirety of the joint
    force, touches numerous warfighting domains and often crosses combatant
    command areas of responsibility. As a joint force, we must be able to
    seamlessly integrate multi-mission sensors, battle management systems,
    active defensive systems as well as offensive capabilities to deter,
    and if necessary, defeat missile threats. I believe the Department must
    continue to re-evaluate not only our missile defense capabilities, but
    also whether we have the correct roles, responsibilities, and
    authorities to effectively develop, field and employ those systems.

        41. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, this committee has received
    significant testimony regarding the threat that China's rapid military
    growth and modernization poses to U.S. citizens and military forces in
    Guam, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) reinforced the
    criticality of this issue when it placed defense of Guam at the top of
    its unfunded requirement list last year. Do you feel that our missile
    defense forces in the Pacific are adequate to defend major military
    bases in Japan and Guam from advanced Chinese ballistic and cruise
    missiles?
        Admiral Grady. China is designing and fielding advanced missiles
    for land and maritime targets, with both conventional and nuclear
    warheads, and doing so at a record pace. We must have the capability to
    project forces forward in a conflict, and to counter missile
    capabilities from any country that would employ them against us,
    including China.
        A comprehensive defense mission against such missile threats
    requires leveraging networked partners and integrating capabilities
    across the spectrum of operations. Numerous capability and capacity
    gaps do exist, and I look forward to working with the Department
    leadership and your committee to quickly field solutions that are both
    effective and affordable.

        42. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, INDOPACOM has stated that its
    preferred defense solution for Guam is an Aegis Ashore based sensor-
    shooter architecture since there are no real alternatives that provide
    an equivalent level of capability and modularity in a reasonable
    timeframe given the threat. Do you believe there are available, cost-
    effective alternatives to an Aegis Ashore based system that could
    provide Guam with an equivalent sensor-shooter capability on an
    operationally relevant timeframe?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we continue to
    explore new and existing technology options that can reliably and
    affordably provide homeland defense capabilities and capacity as we
    prioritize resources and capabilities to the Indo-Pacific region.

        43. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, if confirmed, what would be your
    priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities against cruise and
    hypersonic missiles?
        Admiral Grady. China and Russia have fielded thousands of advanced
    cruise missiles and possess the industrial base to rapidly produce
    more. They routinely demonstrate the ability to launch cruise missiles
    from land, sea, air, and subsurface platforms in coordinated and
    structured attacks. Cruise missiles deliver lethal effects by flying at
    lower altitudes, along unpredictable trajectories, while remaining
    within earth's atmosphere.
        Iran and North Korea have considerable investments in their cruise
    missile programs as well. For example, North Korea is advancing its
    land attack cruise missile program, along with anti-ship cruise
    missiles that provide Pyongyang the ability to threaten the United
    States, our allies, and our partners.
        Hypersonic weapons, particularly those observed recently,
    incorporate the speed of ballistic missiles with the maneuvering
    capabilities of a cruise missile. While the speed of the hypersonic
    missiles offers its own challenge, their real advantage lies in the
    enhanced maneuverability and unpredictable flight paths they offer,
    which make them more difficult to track and target than traditional
    missiles.
        If confirmed, I look forward to working as the Chairman of the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to ensure requirements are
    prioritized among the Services and Agencies and that they are properly
    resourced to field affordable capability and capacity against these
    challenging threats.
                                     space
        44. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, the Space Force mission is to
    protect and defend U.S. space assets as well as use the high ground of
    space to ensure our warfighters in other domains cannot only compete,
    but win. We don't want a fair fight, and space is essential to making
    sure it's not fair. Do you agree that the Space Force, as part of its
    title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip should be a
    first among equals as the chief architect for space?
        Admiral Grady. I agree. The Space Force is responsible for defining
    the operational architecture needed to accomplish its assigned
    missions.

        45. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, how important
    is it for Services to transfer missions and people to the Space Force?
        Admiral Grady. It is vitally important to meeting the Space Force
    mission that we continue the process of successfully integrating units
    and capabilities into the Space Force.

        46. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, does this promote efficiency and
    effectiveness or should each Service have its own ``organic'' space
    capabilities?
        Admiral Grady. The preponderance of space forces within the DOD
    resides with the Space Force, which does promote efficiency and
    effectiveness. However, the other Services will continue to retain some
    organic space expertise to ensure that space is properly integrated
    into doctrine and operations. Some space capabilities directly tied to
    their domain-specific platforms and missions, such as ship-based
    systems, will remain with the other Services as well. As the department
    develops future space systems and missions they will be approved,
    assigned, and resourced in accordance with standard DOD processes

        47. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, please explain why being the
    ``first mover'' in the space domain means and why our current space
    architecture is considered strategically unstable--or in fact
    encourages rapid escalation?
        Admiral Grady. The current State of the U.S. space architecture is
    vulnerable to attack because it relies on a small number of critically
    important satellites. An adversary's well-placed and well-timed ``first
    move'' kinetic or non-kinetic attack on a small number of key
    satellites could cause great harm to our ability to execute a military
    response to aggression.

        48. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Grady, should there be a conflict in
    space or a related domain, what are your views on the importance of
    unity of command as compared to unity of effort between DOD and
    Intelligence Community assets, both in space and on the ground?
        Admiral Grady. As in any other domain, unity of command of space
    activities is essential for effective and efficient execution. The
    capabilities and effects that those activities provide to warfighters
    and decisionmakers are fundamentally enabled by unity of effort. The
    Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community have a long
    history of collaborating in fielding and operating space capabilities
    that support U.S. leadership and preeminence in space. As adversaries
    increasingly threaten U.S. freedom of action in space, the DOD and IC
    must continue their collaboration in order to maintain a competitive
    advantage, prevail against foreign aggression, counter emergent
    threats, and achieve unified action. This collaboration will transform
    and strengthen the critical DOD and IC partnership in response to
    growing space threats.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                     w76-2
        49. Senator Cotton. Admiral Grady, earlier this year Admiral
    Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before
    the House Armed Services Committee that ``The deployment of the W76-2
    makes nuclear weapon use less likely. Specifically, W76-2 deployment
    will raise the nuclear threshold by helping to ensure that potential
    adversaries perceive no possible advantages in limited nuclear use--
    making nuclear weapon employment less likely. The W76-2 provides
    deterrence and assurance through tailored response options in vast
    operating areas where forward basing may not be possible. Further, the
    W76-2 provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
    survivability, and serve as a valuable hedge against future nuclear
    ``break out'' scenarios. It also offers a timely response option able
    to penetrate adversary defenses and does not require host nation
    support to provide deterrent effect. Limited U.S. response options,
    provided by the W76-2, ensure a more credible deterrent to limited
    attack against the U.S., allies, and partners rather than relying
    primarily on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. Without this
    capability, adversaries may perceive an advantage at lower levels of
    conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.'' Do you agree with
    Admiral Richard's views on the W76-2? Please elaborate as to the extent
    you agree or disagree.
        Admiral Grady. I agree with Admiral Richard's explanation of the
    W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead. I would
    add that we do not need to match China or Russia capability-for-
    capability. What we need is a range of credible low-yield nuclear
    response options to convince potential adversaries that we will deny
    them the objectives they seek and impose costs that far outweigh those
    benefits they can achieve if they initiate limited nuclear use. The
    low-yield W76-2 provides a prompt, survivable strike option against
    targets that are heavily defended against air-delivered strikes. These
    unique capabilities enhance the U.S. ability to offer a credible
    nuclear response of limited nuclear strike, thereby strengthening
    deterrence and allied assurance.
                   nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile
        50. Senator Cotton. Admiral Grady, earlier this year Admiral
    Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before
    the House Armed Services Committee that ``The nuclear-armed sea-
    launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is intended to deny potential
    adversaries any mistaken confidence limited nuclear employment would
    provide an advantage over the U.S., its allies, and partners. SLCM-N
    will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an assured
    response capability. It does not require host nation support and
    provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability.
    The SLCM-N will provide assurance to our allies and partners through
    tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward basing
    may not be possible. Limited U.S. response options, such as the SLCM-N,
    is intended to provide a more credible deterrent to limited attack
    against the U.S., allies, and partners rather than relying primarily on
    the threat of large-scale nuclear responses. It will enhance our
    ability to tailor deterrence and assurance while expanding the range of
    credible U.S. options.'' Do you agree with Admiral Richard's views on
    SLCM-N? Please elaborate as to the extent you agree or disagree.
        Admiral Grady. Yes, I do agree with Admiral Richard, and I support
    the continued development of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
    missile. I believe SLCM-N would enhance deterrence, raising the
    threshold for the use of low yield nuclear weapons by our adversaries.
    Additionally, SLCM-N would enhance our ability to provide extended
    deterrence to our Allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, without the
    need to ask our allies and partners to host more nuclear weapons.
                                   __________

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                            congressional oversight
        51. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, senior leaders at the
    Department of Defense periodically appear before the Senate Armed
    Services Committee to provide information to senators and answer their
    questions. This critical oversight function depends on forthright
    answers to challenging questions. I found your answers to my questions,
    and those of some of my colleagues, to be evasive and indirect. When
    you are asked to give your personal opinion, I expect you to give your
    personal opinion directly. In future appearances before this committee,
    will you commit to providing your personal opinion in a direct manner?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.
                                   readiness
        52. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, over several years this
    committee has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness--across
    each of our services--to levels that would enable our success in a
    conflict. We've had some success, but there is still a lot of work to
    do. If you have not done so already, I recommend that every senior
    defense leader read T.R. Fehrenbach's ``This Kind of War'', which
    provides a cautionary tale of our Nation's failure to adequately fund
    and train our Armed Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were
    steep and American service members paid with their lives. If confirmed,
    you will invariably make decisions that directly or indirectly impact
    readiness. Accordingly, will you commit--if confirmed--to work with
    this committee and within the Department on further bolstering military
    readiness to ensure the failures we endured in the Korean War never
    happen again?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.
                                     budget
        53. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe a $25 billion
    increase in the Department of Defense's budget, above what President
    Biden deemed sufficient in his fiscal year 2022 budget, puts us in a
    stronger position to compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat
    China?
        Admiral Grady. Additional funding would enable the Department to
    further modernize and deliver relevant capabilities to counter China
    while further reducing risk.

        54. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe that a future
    Department of Defense budget that fails to even keep pace with
    inflation would be adequate to address the security challenges we will
    likely face?
        Admiral Grady. I believe that sustaining the buying power of our
    funded programs is a critical part of ensuring the successful execution
    of our long-term investments in our defense infrastructure in support
    of the National Security Strategy.

        55. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Secretaries of
    Defense, and the previous and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff have all stated the need for sustained 3-5 percent annual real
    growth to the Defense budget to implement the National Defense Strategy
    (NDS), increase readiness, and advance long-overdue modernization.
    Further emphasizing the need for consistent and increased funding, the
    NDS Commission report stated, ``America is very near the point of
    strategic insolvency, where its `means' are badly out of alignment with
    its `ends'.'' This critical situation is negatively compounded by the
    Biden administration's dismal defense topline that does not keep pace
    with inflation. With these facts in mind, and understanding your
    ability to influence the budget will be limited to future year
    submissions, will you commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget
    vice a budget-driven strategy?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the
    Department delivers strategy-driven budgets that are shaped by
    strategic guidance in order to deter and, if necessary, defeat
    aggressors. I look forward to working with OSD and Congress to achieve
    these ends.
                     great power competition in the arctic
        56. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, given the National Defense
    Strategy's focus on great power competition and increased Russia and
    Chinese activity in the Arctic, do you believe the Arctic is an
    emerging front-line for great power competition and rivalry? Please
    elaborate.
        Admiral Grady. DOD recognizes that increased Russian and Chinese
    activity in the Arctic is challenging the international rules-based
    order. Russia views itself as a great polar power and regulates
    maritime operations in the Northern Sea Route in a manner contrary to
    international law. Meanwhile, while China is not an Arctic nation, it
    is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine
    international rules and norms. The Arctic is a rapidly evolving
    security environment where the Joint Force must prepare to respond
    promptly and effectively to contingencies.

        57. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, can you explain why our
    adversaries would want to limit our presence and power projection
    capabilities in the Arctic region?
        Admiral Grady. Russia seeks to limit U.S. and allied presence and
    influence in the region because it views the Arctic as a strategic base
    of natural resources, seeks to develop its waterways as a major
    international shipping route, and sees the region as integral to its
    security. Militarily, Moscow is particularly concerned with protecting
    the ballistic missile submarines that are homeported in the Arctic and
    with ensuring its Northern Fleet's ability to navigate throughout the
    European Arctic and North Atlantic; it has taken steps to deploy
    coastal-and air-defense systems to secure those goals. Economically,
    the Kremlin seeks to turn the Northern Sea Route--which runs along the
    Russian northern coast--into a major maritime shipping route, and to
    develop fossil fuel extraction projects in the region.
        In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy that
    promoted a ``Polar Silk Road'' and declared China to be a ``near-Arctic
    State.'' This strategy calls on Beijing to preserve its access to
    abundant natural resources and sea lines of communication in the region
    and highlights the PRC's icebreaker vessels and research stations as
    integral to this strategy's implementation. Since 2015, Beijing has
    pushed its state-owned enterprises to secure agreements to trade rare
    earth metals with countries such as Greenland, which is believed to
    host a quarter of the world's rare earth reserves. Beijing's expanding
    Arctic interests have created new opportunities for China-Russia
    engagement and probably will motivate the PRC to attempt to limit our
    presence and power projection capabilities in the Arctic.

        58. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, what power
    projection capability gaps currently exist that inhibit our ability to
    effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic to compete with
    Russia and China in the northern latitudes?
        Admiral Grady. As DOD examines the attributes of Joint Force
    capabilities, posture, operations, and activities necessary for
    deterrence in the Arctic, it will do so in a strategy-driven and
    resource-informed way. Determinations will be made on the basis of U.S.
    interests, National Defense Strategy goals and priorities, DOD's Arctic
    objectives, and emerging threats in the Arctic and other key theaters
    of competition. We have important work to do along with Canada to
    modernize sensor coverage of North America to support Arctic awareness.
    We also need to look for ways to improve Command, Control,
    Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) capability above 65 degrees North latitude. The
    Coast Guard and Navy are also working together in an integrated program
    office to develop and field the Polar Security Cutter, and Coast Guard
    is working through a 4-year service life extension of the icebreaker
    Polar Star to ensure polar access through delivery of the Polar
    Security Cutter in 2025.

        59. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, will you commit to visiting
    Alaska with me in your first year to see first-hand the opportunities
    for the U.S. military offered by my great State?
        Admiral Grady. Yes

        60. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, the fiscal year 2022 NDAA will
    include the Arctic Security Initiative (ASI), a bipartisan provision
    that requires the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander to conduct
    an independent assessment of the resources, posture, and activities
    required to meet U.S. defense policy objectives in the Artic. ASI will
    also authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish the Arctic
    Security Initiative. Will you commit to supporting the NORTHCOM
    Commander's independent assessment and the establishment of ASI?
        Admiral Grady. Artic security is critically important and if
    confirmed I look forward to working with NORTHCOM on this matter.
                       department of defense bureaucracy
        61. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, General John Hyten, Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has repeatedly stated his
    growing concern over the Department of Defense's inability to ``move
    fast'' when compared to China and Russia due to agency bureaucracy and
    risk-aversion. Do you agree that our existing bureaucratic processes
    may disadvantage us compared to China and Russia?
        Admiral Grady. Yes. If confirmed, I will prioritize opportunities
    where the Department can streamline processes, reduce bureaucracy, and
    become more efficient in order to outpace the continuously evolving
    challenges posed by China and Russia.

        62. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, if our existing bureaucratic
    processes may disadvantage us compared to China and Russia, what is
    your personal opinion on how to address this?
        Admiral Grady. There are benefits and challenges with our existing
    processes and there is room for improvement. We must get better
    managing program and acquisition risk and inserting speed in our
    processes. This includes empowering and developing our workforce--the
    workforce of today and of the future--and it means developing a more
    resilient defense industrial base that can meet the needs of the
    Department. We also need to assess how we can better leverage
    technology, innovation, and industry partnerships, trade schools, and
    academia to field and develop capabilities that outpace our security
    challenges.

        63. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, are there
    certain entities within the Department of Defense that are preventing
    us from ``moving fast'' as General Hyten described?
        Admiral Grady. If confirmed, I will absolutely look for ways to
    carry on Gen. Hyten's hard work to ``move fast'' and will not be silent
    when I see bureaucratic processes or entities impeding our ability to
    move rapidly.

        64. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, in your opinion, how can
    Congress help the Department of Defense remove structural or procedural
    impediments to ``moving fast''?
        Admiral Grady. congressional oversight is incredibly important, and
    I think we have to get more comfortable with leveraging and applying
    learning and opportunities when failures occur in programs with
    promising technological breakthroughs. The ability to learn from these
    exploratory, hypothesis testing, or uncertain and complex process
    ``failures'' is crucial to the delivery of advanced warfighting
    capabilities especially as we look at hypersonic capabilities.
             transforming the joint requirements oversight council
        65. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, as the Vice Chairman, you
    would chair the JROC, which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs uses as an
    advisory council to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on
    requirements prioritization and the conformance of programs and budgets
    to priorities established both in strategic plans and those identified
    by the combatant commands. Former Vice Chairman General Hyten advocated
    that the JROC needed to be more fixated on near-term capability gaps
    and indicated that upcoming JROC guidance would focus on allowing
    lower-level officials flexibility in how they tackle acquisition
    issues. This past May he said, ``[t]hey have to be given the
    responsibility, the authority and the funding flexibility to make
    decisions, put money where it needs to be, and go fast because
    otherwise we will not be able to keep up with our adversaries.'' Do you
    share General Hyten's concerns?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        66. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, if you share General Hyten's
    concerns, what is your personal opinion on how to address them?
        Admiral Grady. I believe General Hyten and the Vice Chiefs have set
    the stage to address the JROC's concerns with respect to going faster
    while maintaining oversight and moving at a rate that paces or outpaces
    our adversaries. I will continue to address this concern as the JROC
    Chair. I will address this by continuing to apply the JROC's charter of
    providing Strategic Directives that enable Service funding flexibility
    to address capability gaps within their portfolios. This practice will
    continue in concert with OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) as critical advisors
    to the JROC process.
    joint pacific alaskan range complex and military training opportunities
                                   in alaska
        67. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, the JROC is creating a revised
    joint warfighting concept called ``expanded maneuver'' and its next
    strategic directive will provide the services with a unified integrated
    air and missile defense (IAMD) vision. The JROC has already approved a
    strategic directive for four areas--joint fires, contested logistics,
    joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and information
    advantage. General Hyten believes the JROC will be challenged to
    develop ``expanded maneuver'' since there is a lack of ``good campaign
    level modelling across all domains, including space and cyber that show
    how all these things fit together across the board.'' Can you explain
    the relationship between training, modeling, and concept development?
        Admiral Grady. The Joint Warfighting Concept and expanded maneuver
    are foundational concepts designed to address gaps with respect to
    future warfighting challenges. While aspirational, these concepts will
    continually evolve based on experimentation, training, modeling and
    simulation, additional concept development, and applying what we learn.
    Modeling and simulation create the operational environment for
    experimentation to occur. Both current and future force models should
    blend all five warfighting domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, all
    dimensions of warfare (conventional, irregular, and nuclear), across
    the spectrum of conflict to best represent how a campaign would unfold.

        68. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, how many ranges in the United
    States allow the Joint Force to exercise all domains concurrently?
        Admiral Grady. Currently, there is no single physical range that
    allows the Joint Force to exercise all domains concurrently. Exercising
    the Joint Force across all domains will need to be accomplished through
    the modernization of live ranges and the further development and
    fielding of systems that provide realistic virtual and constructive
    environments. More efforts, like INDOPACOM's Pacific Multi-Domain
    Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC), which includes the
    Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), will be required to train
    to and integrate all domain operations.

        69. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, how important is it to the
    Joint Staff to have training ranges capable of employing the full
    capabilities of equipment like 5th-generation fighters to test and
    refine new doctrine and operating concepts?
        Admiral Grady. The Joint Force requires improvements to live,
    virtual, and constructive training infrastructure in order to create
    realistic training environments and stress the full capabilities of the
    Joint Force. New systems like 5th generation fighters and new units
    like the Marine Littoral Regiment or Army Multi-Domain Task Force need
    training ranges that have the capacity and scale to integrate
    capabilities across all domains. Current training infrastructure
    permits the Joint Force to either integrate capabilities across the
    traditional domains of air, land and sea together or the newly
    recognized domains of space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic
    spectrum individually. Training infrastructure and ranges, like the
    Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), require modernization to
    enable the Joint Force to train and prepare for conflict with a peer
    adversary across all domains. This modernization will need to include
    the integration of virtual and constructive means that enable the Joint
    Force to further test and evaluate warfighting concepts, techniques,
    and procedures, while concealing the full capabilities of current and
    emerging systems.
                   future recruitment and retention concerns
        70. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, I would like to get your
    thoughts on an issue that I view with increasingly deep concern, an
    issue that serves as the foundation for our military now and into the
    future. The issue I am referencing is the recruitment and retention of
    a highly talented, All Volunteer Joint Force. Let me cite a few metrics
    that are driving this concern. First, the recently published Reagan
    National Defense Survey indicates that trust in the military has fallen
    from 70 percent in November 2018 to a dismal 45 percent in November
    2021. That is concerning. Second, a recently released Harvard Kennedy
    School Youth Poll reported results that indicate the majority of young
    Americans do not believe the United States is an exceptional country.
    This is equally concerning. And, third, the National Commission on
    Military, National, and Public Service detailed in their report to
    Congress that only 29 percent of the population is eligible to serve in
    the Armed Forces. I think you can see where I'm going with this.
    Overlap this decreasing propensity to service with the few that are
    even eligible to do so, and it appears we are headed toward a very
    uncertain future for recruiting and retaining a highly talented, All
    Volunteer Joint Force. How are we going to recruit and retain service
    members into an institution that a growing number of Americans do not
    trust, to serve a country that they do not believe is exceptional?
        Admiral Grady. National service--both military and civilian--is one
    of the core tenants of our country. Addressing challenges with respect
    to recruitment and retention is a multifaceted challenge that will
    require focused leadership and attention from the Services and across
    the broader Department and key stakeholders to ensure access to talent.
    Part of my personal philosophy is that a strong family means a stronger
    fleet and to achieve this I would prioritize how we can 1) work to
    restore trust by; remaining an apolitical institution, being the
    world's best, most lethal fighting force, and being open and
    accountable fiscal stewards of taxpayer dollars, 2) explore stronger
    partnerships with the broader population to include industry, academia
    and trade schools, and especially the communities which host our
    installations, 3) create a safe, secure, and productive working
    environment for the sons and daughters of America. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working with the Department and collaborating with all
    stakeholders to also raise awareness about the incredible career
    opportunities that exist in the military for professional, technical,
    skilled and craft labor.

        71. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, what ideas do you have for
    both the Department and Congress to work together to reverse these
    concerning trends?
        Admiral Grady. The U.S. military must continue to engage with the
    whole of American society to increase understanding of the Department
    of Defense roles and responsibilities and enhance the military's access
    to a wide array of talent. Defense leaders, as well as our many
    talented service members, must continue to engage with American society
    and effectively publicize to our fellow citizens the important and
    unique role the military has in protecting and defending the Nation.
        If confirmed, I look forward to assessing more specific
    opportunities to address these challenges and leverage opportunities.
                                systemic racism
        72. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe that systemic
    racism exists within the Department of Defense?
        Admiral Grady. I do not believe the Department of Defense is a
    fundamentally racist organization. I do recognize that racial and
    ethnic biases still exist, and service members continue to experience
    and report racial/ethnic discrimination. This harms the readiness and
    lethality of the Joint Force and we must do better to address this and
    foster greater unity among all service members.
                    purpose and mission of the u.s. military
        73. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, what is the purpose and
    mission of the U.S. military?
        Admiral Grady. The military's enduring mission is to defend the
    United States and its interests. We do this by providing combat-
    credible military forces needed to deter war, and if deterrence fails,
    win wars.
                     engagements with reporters and authors
        74. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, I believe it is important for
    senior leaders in the Department of Defense to engage with the media
    and the American people. I also believe that senior leaders must
    exercise discretion in deciding whether or not to talk to an individual
    reporter or author. Recent books featuring alleged statements and
    recollections of senior Department of Defense leaders have caused
    unnecessary controversy that distracts from our focus on China, Russia,
    and other threats around the world. Will you commit to not sit for
    interviews with authors or journalists writing books about events
    occurring while you are still in uniform?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.
                             size of the u.s. navy
        75. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe that in both
    the short-and long-term, the Navy must increase the number of ships in
    the fleet to effectively compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat
    China?
        Admiral Grady. First, I appreciate Congress' direction to achieve a
    355 ship Navy, as written into law. Further, I believe a balanced,
    hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned platforms is an effective and
    affordable way to meet the security demands of our Nation. Analysis
    confirms that ship numbers is just one of many factors required to
    achieve the correct balance of capability and capacity needed in order
    to achieve the combat effectiveness required of our Navy's fleet.
                         pacific deterrence initiative
        76. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, will you commit to support the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and aligning the Department of
    Defense's funding process for PDI with that used for the European
    Deterrence Initiative?
        Admiral Grady. I am committed to supporting the PDI and ensuring
    the Department's investments on a global scale are optimized to deter,
    and if necessary, defeat, any strategic competitor, with China as the
    pacing threat. If confirmed, I look forward to working with OSD and
    Congress to balance resources toward modernization, operations, and
    readiness to effectively address these threats.
                                     taiwan
        77. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe the United
    States should use its leverage as Taiwan's largest arms supplier to
    ensure it acquires equipment and weapons to execute an asymmetric
    defense doctrine?
        Admiral Grady. The Department continues to engage our Taiwan
    counterparts to ensure we share the same definition of asymmetric
    defense and share the same understanding of the PRC Most Likely Course
    of Action. If confirmed, I will continue to support an emphasis of
    asymmetric acquisitions.

        78. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Grady, do you believe the United
    States presently has the will, capability, and capacity to contest a
    Chinese amphibious invasion, blockade, quarantine, or air assault
    against Taiwan?
        Admiral Grady. The U.S. military is ready, willing, and able to
    carry out our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
                                   __________

                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
            national nuclear security administration infrastructure
        79. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, if major weapons life
    extension programs are funded, but infrastructure, recapitalization,
    and maintenance are starved, what sort of impacts can we expect to see
    unfold?
        Admiral Grady. Nuclear modernization cannot occur without resilient
    and modern infrastructure and supporting workforce. This includes key
    scientific and manufacturing infrastructure capabilities necessary to
    modernize the surveil the nuclear deterrent. The NNSA is one of the
    Department's most important relationships. I am firmly committed to
    working with NNSA's leadership, the national laboratories, and the
    production complex to ensure the delivery of military requirements. The
    nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of our national security. To that
    end, I support modernizing and recapitalizing NNSA's critically
    important infrastructure. This will require sustained funding and
    support over time. Without a modern and resilient infrastructure and
    workforce, we will be challenged to modernize the nuclear deterrent.

        80. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, what modernization impacts
    can we anticipate for the key secondaries group of capabilities--
    enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and lithium--if recapitalization
    program funding for infrastructure modernization is decreased?
        Admiral Grady. Infrastructure investments, including those that
    underpin key weapons materials and components, are necessary for
    modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Without sufficient
    investments in these areas, modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile
    will not be possible which will directly impact DOD's ability to field
    effective U.S. nuclear forces. If confirmed, I will continue to
    encourage a strong partnership between the DOD and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration through the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure
    these investments remain sufficient.
                                     china
        81. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, how can our policy toward
    maintaining Taiwan's freedom be less ``one dimensional'' in the sense
    that we incorporate more than just DOD operations plans and incorporate
    a more whole-of-government approach?
        Admiral Grady. Our competition with China and our policy toward
    Taiwan are multi-dimensional. Integrated deterrence is not just about
    taking a multi-domain approach using our military instruments of power,
    but also taking a multi-domain, whole-of-government approach that
    brings our diplomatic, economic, and other instruments of national
    power to bear in support of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
    the DOD continues to support the interagency effort toward an
    integrated, whole-of-government approach. The United States will not be
    able to fully deter the PRC if we continue to rely on military posture
    alone. We must leverage trade, commerce, treasury, diplomatic, and
    other intergovernmental tools in order to create the conditions for
    deterrence. We must also leverage our worldwide network of Alliances to
    further this effort.

        82. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, of all the qualitative and
    quantitative investments China has made in their nuclear arsenal, which
    concern you the most?
        Admiral Grady. I remain most concerned about China's aggressive
    pursuit of an increasingly capable and viable nuclear triad, which
    includes advanced delivery platforms. The People's Liberation Army Navy
    already has operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
    providing a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Chinese also
    continue to pursue long range aircraft capable of delivering air-
    launched ballistic missiles. Finally, open press has reported on the
    construction of hundreds of new missile silos, and on a new fractional-
    orbit hypersonic system which represents a highly advanced weapons
    delivery platform. Taken together, the elements of China's emerging
    triad are problematic and raise concerns about their intentions and
    nuclear doctrine.

        83. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, given the scope and scale of
    China's investment in their nuclear forces, what can we infer about
    their intentions and nuclear doctrine?
        Admiral Grady. Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to
    expand and diversify its nuclear forces. For example, last year the DOD
    estimated that the PRC had a nuclear warhead stockpile in the low 200's
    and projected it to at least double over the next decade. Since then,
    Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion, which may enable the PRC
    to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and perhaps as
    many as 1,000 warheads by 2030. These warheads and delivery platforms
    likely equal the effectiveness, reliability and survivability of
    similar platforms currently under development in the United States.
    These developing capabilities span the range from tactical to strategic
    and demonstrate an approach that seeks to undermine credible U.S.
    deterrence.
        Given these facts, combined with PLA documents describing a future
    combat style characterized by integrated joint operations under a
    unified command, I would infer that China is seeking to expand its
    options in terms of nuclear doctrine and strategy. These could include
    combining and integrating their conventional and nuclear capabilities
    into their warfighting doctrine. They could pursue this approach to
    nullify U.S. deterrence strategy, which as you are aware includes the
    extended deterrence strategy for our allies.

        84. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Grady, in light of China's ongoing
    nuclear force expansion, do you believe it is prudent to scale back any
    aspect of the current U.S. nuclear modernization plan?
        Admiral Grady. No. I believe that would be a dangerous course of
    action. China is not the only nation pursuing nuclear force expansion.
    Russia is also expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal. Given
    the aging State of every leg of our nuclear triad, as well as the
    systems we rely on to execute nuclear command and control, it is
    imperative that existing modernization efforts continue and that we
    remain open to innovative and prudent ways to ensure the capabilities
    of our nuclear enterprise can meet the challenges of an uncertain
    future. A credible modern nuclear force provides the foundation for
    strategic deterrence. With multiple competitors either expanding or
    developing their own capabilities, we must remain mindful that any
    reduction in our nuclear forces would undermine strategic deterrence
    and potentially invite adventurism by nations equipped with a modern
    nuclear arsenal.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
              defense strategy, force planning, and force posture
        85. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
    Austin has designated China as the Department of Defense's pacing
    threat. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Secretary's
    designation? Why or why not?
        Admiral Grady. I agree with the Secretary's designation. Beijing
    aims to achieve ``the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation'' by
    2049 to match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace U.S.
    alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and
    revise the international order to be more advantageous to Beijing's
    authoritarian system and national interests. PRC leaders have
    emphasized strengthening the PLA into a ``world-class'' military as an
    essential part of this strategy to expand Beijing's national power. To
    that end, the PRC continues to strengthen its ability to project power
    globally, coerce Taiwan and rival claimants in territorial disputes,
    and counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along its
    periphery.

        86. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
    Austin has designated the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense's
    priority theater. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the
    Secretary's designation? Why or why not?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, I do. A geostrategic struggle between the free
    international rules-based order and a repressive world order is
    occurring in the Indo-Pacific region. This region, which stretches from
    the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States,
    represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the
    world. There is a historical precedence for U.S. interests in a free
    and open Indo-Pacific, and some of our strongest defense alliances are
    in this region--Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.

        87. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner has testified, ``The PRC
    [People's Republic of China] is the Department's pacing challenge and a
    Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario.'' In your personal opinion,
    do you agree with the designation of a Taiwan contingency as the
    Department's pacing scenario? Why or why not?
        Admiral Grady. I agree with the Assistant Secretary. The Taiwan
    issue does present the pacing scenario in the West Pacific. Supporting
    our allies and partners in this region against an increasingly
    aggressive PRC is key to the maintenance of the current international
    rules-based order and ability to address the parameters of the Taiwan
    scenario postures us to be able to effectively respond to a wide array
    of potential scenarios in the western Pacific.

        88. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
    Austin, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
    Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command Admiral John Aquilino, and former Commander of U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command Phil Davidson, among others, have testified that the
    U.S. military must maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait
    accompli against Taiwan in order to strengthen our ability to deter
    such a contingency. In your personal opinion, do you agree that the
    U.S. military must maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait
    accompli against Taiwan?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        89. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Secretary Austin wrote earlier
    this year that a ``combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is
    instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter, and if necessary,
    deny a fait accompli scenario.'' Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen
    Hicks, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin,
    and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs
    Ely Ratner have since reaffirmed the Secretary's emphasis on denial, as
    have INDOPACOM Commander Admiral John Aquilino and former INDOPACOM
    Commander Admiral Philip Davidson. Indeed, Secretary Karlin went so far
    as to write, ``I believe strongly that deterrence by denial should be
    prioritized when it comes to China, and Taiwan in particular.
    Deterrence by cost-imposition or deterrence by punishment can
    complement but should not supplant deterrence by denial when it comes
    to deterring China.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree that
    deterrence by denial is the best approach to deterring a Chinese fait
    accompli against Taiwan?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        90. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
    agree that combat-credible forces forward are instrumental to the U.S.
    military's ability to deny a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        91. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command Admiral John Aquilino testified earlier this year that the
    threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is ``much closer to us than most
    think'' and that this threat could materialize well before 2035. Former
    Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson went
    even further, testifying that the threat of a Chinese invasion of
    Taiwan is ``manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next 6
    years.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree that the threat of a
    Chinese invasion of Taiwan is one we must be concerned about in this
    decade, not just in the 2030's or later?
        Admiral Grady. I respect Admiral Aquilino and Admiral Davidson's
    assessments. The People's Liberation Army's rate of growth in both
    capacity and capability has outpaced our projections for years. It is
    reasonable to assume that China could achieve a level of military means
    within the next decade that could embolden them to military action
    against Taiwan. The Joint Force needs to continue to act with allies
    and partners to ensure that cross-strait tension does not result in
    military conflict and remain committed to our obligations under the
    Taiwan Relations Act.

        92. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, given the increasingly urgent
    threat of a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, do you commit to
    prioritize efforts to maintain the U.S. military's ability to defeat a
    Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, if you are confirmed?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, I am committed to prioritizing efforts to
    maintain the U.S. military's ability to prevent a Chinese fait accompli
    against Taiwan and most importantly to ensure that cross-strait tension
    does not result in military conflict.

        93. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, many of the Department of
    Defense's most important modernization programs will not produce
    results at scale until the 2030's. In your personal opinion, what
    concrete steps should the Department of Defense take to strengthen
    deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prior to 2030?
        Admiral Grady. I believe it's important to recognize that while we
    are modernizing our force, we currently have significant deterrent
    capabilities postured in the region, and we are adjusting that posture
    to enhance those capabilities even further. Taiwan, along with our
    other allies and partners, are also making adjustments to their own
    force posture. We are, and will, continue to assist our allies and
    partners in bolstering their own deterrent capabilities. If confirmed,
    I look forward to seeking opportunities to accelerate the development
    and delivery of capabilities to this critically important region.

        94. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
    agree that the Department of Defense needs to do less in lower-priority
    theaters so that it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring
    China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the U.S.
    defense budget?
        Admiral Grady. We must always start with the threat. This should
    drive our global posture and allocation of resources to ensure we are
    positioned to deter adversaries and win conflicts if deterrence fails.
    If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice to ensure our
    resource priorities are aligned to address threats in a highly dynamic
    and rapidly changing security environment.

        95. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Mara Karlin sent me the following earlier this year: ``I believe that
    the force planning construct should prioritize and focus on China
    unless and until the security environment changes dramatically'' and
    that ``the threat China poses to Taiwan should be a priority'' for the
    force planning construct. In your personal opinion, do you agree with
    Secretary Karlin's statement?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.
                       allied and partner burden-sharing
        96. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
    agree that Taiwan needs to field cost-effective and resilient
    asymmetric defense capabilities as quickly as possible in order to
    strengthen deterrence against a Chinese invasion?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        97. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
    agree that Taiwan's acquisition and deployment of asymmetric defense
    capabilities is essential not just for strengthening deterrence against
    a Chinese invasion, but also for reducing operational risk to American
    Forces who may be sent to help Taiwan repel such an invasion?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        98. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, do you
    agree that it is critical for Taiwan to prioritize acquisition of cost-
    effective and resilient asymmetric defense capabilities?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        99. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith
    wrote the following to me prior to her confirmation: ``I have long
    argued that NATO's defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP [gross
    domestic product] ought to be a floor, not a ceiling. It is my view
    that allies should treat it as such and invest according. That is
    because the world is not unipolar anymore. The security environment has
    changed dramatically since the Wales Pledge was drafted.'' In your
    personal opinion, do you agree with Ambassador Smith that our NATO
    allies should be increasing defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP?
        Admiral Grady. Yes, 2 percent should be the floor and not the
    ceiling with respect to NATO defense spending.
                           military personnel policy
        100. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, do you commit to ensuring that
    DOD and the military services adhere to a forthright and clear process
    of evaluating requests for religious exemption requests for the COVID-
    19 vaccination, if you are confirmed?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        101. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, do you commit to ensuring that
    all exemption requests are evaluated on a case by case basis, as well
    as involving your key advisors on spiritual issues--your chaplains--at
    all stages of decisionmaking when a request for a religious exemption
    is involved--and particularly at the final stage, as is ordinarily the
    case with other accommodation requests, if you are confirmed?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        102. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, do you commit to providing my
    office and offices of other Members of Congress with requested
    information regarding the religious accommodation process and relevant
    records in a thorough and timely manner, if you are confirmed?
        Admiral Grady. Yes.

        103. Senator Hawley. Admiral Grady, in your personal opinion, are
    you concerned that a failure to fairly and even-handedly consider
    religious exemption requests could result in the loss of high-quality
    service members who have devoted their lives to serving our county,
    thereby creating a national security risk?
        Admiral Grady. The military has established and documented
    processes and procedures to consider exemptions. The COVID outbreak on
    USS Theodore Roosevelt highlighted the impact that an infectious
    disease outbreak can have on lethality and combat readiness. The tragic
    loss of a member of the crew who died of COVID is now almost completely
    preventable with the use of vaccines. Each of us who volunteers to
    serve in uniform commits to complying with applicable regulations, and
    I respect the right of Service members to choose to pursue alternative
    careers if they believe they cannot comply with a lawful order. While I
    regret that some service members will choose to leave the service
    instead of getting vaccinated against COVID-19, current data shows that
    the numbers of those leaving will not be significant enough to present
    a national security risk.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Admiral Christopher W. Grady,
    USN follows:]

       [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [TThe biographical sketch of Admiral Christopher W. Grady,
    USN, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Admiral
    Christopher W. Grady, USN in connection with his nomination
    follows:]

        [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Admiral Christopher W. Grady, USN was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on December 14, 2021,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 16, 2021.]

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