[Senate Hearing 117-993]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-993
NOMINATIONS OF: DR. DAVID A. HONEY TO
BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; MS. BREN-
DA S. FULTON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS; AND MS. COREY A. HINDERSTEIN
TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-381 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
�JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
�
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
�
�
� Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
� John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
october 7, 2021
Page
Nominations of: Dr. David A. Honey to be Deputy Under Secretary 1
of Defense for Research and Engineering; Ms. Brenda S. Fulton
to be Assistant Secretary OF Defense for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs; and Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein to be Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National
Nuclear Security Administration.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Nunn, Hon. Samuel, Former U.S. Senator from Georgia.............. 3
Sherrill, Hon. Mikie, A Representative in Congress from the State 5
of New Jersey.
Honey, Dr. David, Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 6
for Research and Engineering.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 49
Questions for the Record....................................... 68
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 78
Biographical Sketch............................................ 79
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 81
Signature Page................................................. 88
Fulton, Brenda, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 8
Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 88
Questions for the Record....................................... 101
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 122
Biographical Sketch............................................ 123
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 125
Signature Page................................................. 131
Hinderstein, Corey, Nominee to be Deputy Administrator for 10
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 131
Questions for the Record....................................... 145
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 149
Biographical Sketch............................................ 150
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 151
Signature Page................................................. 161
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information Requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
NOMINATIONS OF: DR. DAVID A. HONEY TO BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; MS. BRENDA S. FULTON TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; AND
MS. COREY A. HINDERSTEIN TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the
nominations of Dr. David Honey to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering; Ms. Brenda Sue Fulton, to
be Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and
Ms. Corey Hinderstein to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
I thank the nominees for their willingness to return to
public service.
I would also like to welcome the family members who are
with us today. Dr. Honey, I welcome your wife, Cynthia and son,
Jonathan; Ms. Fulton, I welcome your cousin Rachel; and I thank
Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill, who will introduce you, via
Webex; and Ms. Hinderstein, I welcome your family members,
Evan, Laura, and Rachel; and I thank Senator Sam Nunn for
joining us to introduce you via Webex.
Dr. Honey, you are nominated to be Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering. You have an extensive
technical and professional background from your career at
DARPA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Strategic
Capabilities Office, and in other positions working on research
and advanced technology programs and issues. If confirmed, you
will support Under Secretary Heidi Shyu in shepherding the
Department's modernization activities.
We are in a competition with China for technological
superiority in areas like quantum computing, artificial
intelligence, robotics, and biotechnology, and you and your
team will be responsible for ensuring that the Department has
the right budget and policies in place to win that competition.
You will have also a role helping to ensure that DOD's
acquisition programs are managed with solid, technical
foundations, mature technologies, and robust developmental
testing in systems engineering approaches.
Too many of our systems skip important early engineering
steps, leading to test failures, costs and schedule overruns,
and worst of all, delays in deploying new capabilities to our
forces. In your role, you will serve as a technical conscience
of the Department to ensure that acquisition programs proceed
prudently and expeditiously from research into deployment. I
look forward to hearing how you will address these challenges.
Ms. Fulton, you are nominated to be the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As the principal
advisor on all matters relating to civilian and military
personnel policies, you will be responsible for Reserve
integration and military community and family policy, as well
as day-to-day supervision of the Department of Defense
Education Activity and the Defense Commissary Agency.
Your extensive leadership experiences in the public,
private, and military sectors should serve your well. One of
Secretary Austin's priorities is to eradicate extremism within
the ranks. While we continue to believe that the number of
extremists in the ranks remains very small, even one is too
many. I hope you will share your views on how you will approach
this issue, especially as the lines between actions, thought,
and speech becomes more difficult to define each day.
As we know from the President's Independent Review
Commission that studied sexual assault and harassment in the
military, there has been a dangerous erosion of trust and faith
within the ranks in leaders' ability to effectively address
this issue. While reforming how we prosecute sexual assault,
harassment, and related crimes under the UCMJ, it is important,
prevention is paramount. I would ask that you share your views
on how we can reduce the incidents of sexual assault and
harassment across the force.
Ms. Hinderstein, you are nominated to be the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the
National Nuclear Security Administration. I would note your
expertise in this area from your previous work at NNSA and the
Nuclear Threat Initiative.
If confirmed, you will be responsible for leading NNSA's
nonproliferation efforts across a broad, important portfolio,
which ranges from supporting the verification of current and
future arms control treaties, securing the loose nuclear
material around the world, safeguarding the sale of U.S.
nuclear technology overseas, and technically supporting the
interagency in any future negotiations with Iran on their
nuclear capability. As part of these duties, you will be
responsible for overseeing the disposal of excess weapons
plutonium, including working with the State of New Mexico to
dispose of the 34 metric tons of excess plutonium at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant.
On the international stage, you will be charged with
leading technical efforts for any follow-on nuclear weapons
agreements with Russia after New START, as well as technical
efforts to verify and secure North Korea's nuclear capabilities
if a freeze agreement is reached. These are complex challenges
and I am going to ask that you discuss how you would address
them.
I want to, again, thank the nominees for their willingness
to serve. I look forward to your testimonies.
Now, let me recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
Thanks to our witnesses for being with us and their
willingness to serve the nation. The world is a dangerous place
and America is under a greater threat than at any point in our
lifetime; threats from China, Russia, and North Korea, Iran
have all worsened since 2018.
As we learned over the last 2 weeks of hearings, threat of
radical Islamic terrorism is growing, now that Afghanistan is
the safest place in the world for terrorist planners. Now,
while the world is focused on Afghanistan, we saw concerning
developments in other places, too. In the last 2 months,
revelation about the new Chinese nuclear silos has completely
changed the nuclear environment. Russia continues to test
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and its recent exercise was the
largest in 4 decades. Iran's stockpile of fissile material
continues to expand and the North Koreans continue to make
surprising technological leaps. It more important than ever
that we complete our nuclear modernization on time and continue
to encourage innovation at the Department of Defense.
It is clear to me that the old ways of doing business just
no longer work. Our government requires strong civilian
leaderships and leaders of competence and character, if we hope
to preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do
us harm.
That is why these areas are so important because they help
us understand our potential leaders and the values that they
would bring to the job. So, we look forward to the hearing, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. At this time, it gives me great pleasure to
introduce the former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Sam Nunn, so he can introduce Ms. Hinderstein.
Chairman Nunn?
STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL NUNN, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Am I unmuted? Can you hear me?
Chairman Reed. We can hear you, Mr. Chairman, and see you.
Senator Nunn. Good.
Thank you, Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, members of the
Armed Services Committee. I am honored to appear before this
important committee and, of course, it is familiar and I
understand the job and the awesome responsibilities that all of
you have.
I am joining you today from California at Stanford, where I
will be attending the memorial service for George Schultz. As
you know, our Nation lost George earlier this year at the age
of 100. He had a remarkable record of public service from
serving as a captain in the U.S. Marine Corps to the U.S.
Secretary of State and a lot of important jobs in between.
George believed that the Committee and the Senate should be
in on the takeoff, as well as, in on the landing on important
national security and foreign policy issues, and he made a
point of keeping us informed.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, in that spirit, I am
honored to introduce Corey Hinderstein to the committee. I am
confident that our nation's security will be greatly
strengthened by Corey's expertise, her leadership skills, and
her sound judgment in this crucial role, if she is confirmed.
Corey has worked for 25 years in the areas of nuclear
nonproliferation and security. She has strong leadership and
analytical skills and a commitment to pragmatic problem-
solving. Corey has a great understanding of the history of
these issues that she will be involved in and she develops
innovative and creative paths forward, as well as anyone I have
seen.
Corey is an extraordinarily qualified nominee. Her previous
work at the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, and
her experience working with us at the Nuclear Threat Initiative
have prepared her very well for this important position.
Mr. Chairman, if you compare Corey's list of experiences
with the areas of responsibility that you outline for the job
that she will hold, if confirmed, they line up almost
perfectly, from international safeguards to arms-control
verification, to nuclear security, to minimization of enriched
uranium; all enormously important.
Corey was the key staff member responsible for scoping and
standing up the World Institute for Nuclear Security. This is
an international, nongovernmental organization, focusing on
security for people who are handling nuclear materials all over
the world; almost 5,000 members now from more than 140
countries and Corey played the key role there.
She also played a critical role in the creation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's Low Enriched Uranium Bank,
which I think is enormously important going forward in the
future. In both of these projects and many others, Corey worked
with governments and international organizations and across
Republican and Democratic administrations.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, I am
confident she would bring this spirit of cooperation to her
work and NNSA and in her dealings with this committee and the
Congress. For 3 years, Corey took a leave of absence from our
organization, NTI, to serve in the same NNSA office she is now
nominated to lead.
During that time, she worked closely with the Secretary of
Energy, the NNSA administrator, and her international and
interagency colleagues to strengthen global nuclear security,
including work to deliver strong risk-reduction commitments at
the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, held by President Obama.
She was also part of the team implementing the Iran nuclear
agreement with a focus on monitoring, as well as the all-
important job of verification.
In conclusion, Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, and members
of the committee, I am confident that Corey is fully prepared
to serve in this critical role and I support her nomination by
President Biden. I urge the committee's support, and I urge
your confirmation by the full Senate.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, not only
for your introduction today, but for your extraordinary service
to the nation.
Now I would like to introduce, via Webex, Congresswoman
Mikie Sherrill, who will introduce Ms. Fulton.
Congresswoman?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKIE SHERRILL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
Representative Sherrill. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, for
holding this hearing today. It is also wonderful to be here
today with the legendary Chairman Nunn, so that is quite an
honor for me.
Senator Nunn. Thank you.
Representative Sherrill. I am so glad to be before you to
introduce my friend Sue Fulton and I am incredibly proud she
has been nominated for the position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
I have admired Sue for many years. As a graduate of the
first class at West Point that included women, she is certainly
a trailblazer. In the Army, she served our country with
distinction as a platoon leader and as a company commander, but
as with so many of our veterans, her service did not end when
she left active-duty. She has continued to be a tireless
advocate for our servicemembers, their families, and our
veterans.
After she left the Army, Sue had a successful private
sector career, but stayed connected to the military;
continually finding ways to support her community and her
country. That includes the work she did for 8 years on the West
Point Board of Visitors, including 5 as chair or vice chair,
working in a nonpartisan manner to center character development
as a way to deliver the best possible Army leaders. It includes
decades of improving the military's ability to fight and win
wars by increasing the pool of talented men and women who
served. She did this through expanding opportunities for women,
LGBTQ Americans, and black Americans. She ensured we continued
to provide our Nation with the world's very best fighting
force.
Most recently, Sue took on the challenge, and it truly was
a challenge, of heading the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission, the MVC, and led a charge to modernize and
transform a broken hidebound system where customers stood in
land to stand in line. Under her tenure, she moved to a
primarily analog system for in-person services to a system
where about 80 percent of transactions are available online.
Sue is knowledgeable, passionate, and she gets results.
I am going to just highlight, briefly, something I think is
abundantly clear across Sue's resume. By virtue of who she is,
Sue has achieved a remarkable number of firsts and I can tell
you firsthand, that in the best of us, people like Sue Fulton,
those experiences breed not only toughness and courage, but
also compassion and empathy.
Sue has spent her life fighting to help others achieve
their own firsts and to make sure they have supporters by their
side when they do so. That would be admirable in its own right,
but what makes Sue special is that she has led with the broader
mission in mind, whether it was readiness, preparing the next
generation of leaders, or innovating the MVC.
Sue exemplifies the type of leadership that we prize in the
military. She doesn't care what your political ideology is but
focuses on bringing people together and leading them to
achievements that benefit everyone. Let me assure you that Sue
understands the importance of working in a bipartisan and even
nonpartisan manner. She has an impressive track record for
doing so and would bring that with her into the Department of
Defense. She knows how to work with a broad array of people to
get the job done. If you need proof, look no further, here I
am; a hardcore Navy fan introducing an Army grad in glowing
terms.
So, I will end by expressing my sincere hope that you all
support Sue Fulton's nomination, because I cannot wait to see
what she will accomplish for our servicemembers, for their
families, and for our country. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.
Now, let me recognize the witnesses for their opening
statements.
Dr. Honey, please?
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID HONEY, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Dr. Honey. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be
here.
I would also like to thank President Biden, Vice President
Harris, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and Under
Secretary Shyu for the trust they have placed in me throughout
this nomination process. I would also like to thank my wife,
Cynthia, and the rest of my family for their support and
understanding of the many demands I have encountered during my
career.
Today, I am humbled to sit before you to be considered for
the role of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering. Bringing the best innovations and technologies to
our servicemembers and civilian workforce is paramount to
protecting our way of life.
I take this charge seriously and have devoted much of my
career to the defense of our Nation. I received my first
security clearance as a federal employee in 1974 and have seen
firsthand the evolution of many of the issues that concern us
today.
While the global competition and challenges we face seem
daunting, I know from my experiences that there is much that we
can do to overcome them. For example, while serving as a B-52
pilot, our combat capabilities benefited greatly from a series
of aircraft modernization efforts, and as a result, the B-52
remains a formidable weapon system.
Having served as a scientist in the Air Force Research
Laboratory, I have participated in the struggle to push
research and development across the ``Valley of Death'' and
deliver a competitive edge to our warfighters. While I have
often tapped into the significant capabilities of large
companies in the Defense Industrial Base, I am also a strong
proponent of our highly innovative small business sector and
have actively participated in the SBIR program.
My commitment to pursing innovation has deepened during my
two tours at DARPA, where I learned how a small agency can
pursue high-risk/high payoff research, and repeatedly change
our world for the better. During my time as the Director of
Science and Technology in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, I gained additional perspective on the
nature of today's threats to our national security and the role
of S&T leadership in meeting those challenges. Having served
previously in R&E, I am keenly aware of what it takes to ensure
that R&E will be a valued contributor, and I believe that my
experiences have well-acquainted me with the demands this
position requires.
As Under Secretary Shyu has stated before this Committee,
``the mission of furthering science, technology, and innovation
across the Department of Defense could not be more important
than it is today.''
We face wide-ranging threats from across the globe and
meeting these challenges takes teamwork and collaboration. It
is critical that we leverage the research being done by experts
in academia, industry, and DOD laboratories. Our future success
will require a new wave of diverse STEM talent, robust
investments in advanced technologies and manufacturing, and
enabling a culture that allows us to take risks in search of
reward. It is critical that we continue to modernize in areas
such as microelectronics, 5G, directed energy, and hypersonics.
We must also take real steps to partner with and support the
acquisition community to transition our most promising
technologies into programs of record.
I do not take these obligations lightly, and if confirmed,
it would be an immense honor to continue to serve our Nation,
the Department of Defense, and the United States of America
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering. Thank you.
[The statement of Dr. David Honey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. David Honey
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is a pleasure to be here. I would also like to thank
President Biden, Vice President Harris, Secretary Austin, Deputy
Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Shyu for the trust they have
placed in me throughout this nomination process. I would also like to
thank my wife, Cynthia, and the rest of my family for their support and
understanding of the many demands I have encountered during my career.
Today, I am humbled to sit before you to be considered for the role
of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
Bringing the best innovations and technologies to our servicemembers
and civilian workforce is paramount to protecting our way of life.
I take this charge seriously and have devoted much of my career to
the defense of our Nation. I received my first security clearance as a
federal employee in 1974, and have seen firsthand the evolution of many
of the issues that concern us today. While the global competition and
challenges we face seem daunting, I know from my experiences that there
is much that we can do to overcome them. For example, while serving as
a B-52 pilot, our combat capabilities benefited greatly from a series
of aircraft modernization efforts, and as a result, the B-52 remains a
formidable weapon system.
Having served as a scientist in the Air Force Research Laboratory,
I have participated in the struggle to push research and development
across the ``Valley of Death'' and deliver a competitive edge to our
warfighters. While I have often tapped into the significant
capabilities of large companies in the Defense Industrial Base, I am
also a strong proponent of our highly innovative small business sector,
and have actively participated in the SBIR program.
My commitment to pursing innovation has deepened during my two
tours at DARPA, where I learned how a small agency can pursue high-
risk/high payoff research, and repeatedly change our world for the
better. During my time as the Director of Science and Technology in the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I gained additional
perspective on the nature of today's threats to our national security
and the role of S&T leadership in meeting those challenges. Having
served previously in R&E, I am keenly aware of what it takes to ensure
that R&E will be a valued contributor, and I believe that my
experiences have well-acquainted me with the demands this position
requires.
As Under Secretary Shyu has stated before this Committee, ``the
mission of furthering science, technology, and innovation across the
Department of Defense could not be more important than it is today.''
We face wide ranging threats from across the globe and meeting
these challenges takes teamwork and collaboration. It is critical that
we leverage the research being done by experts in academia, industry,
and DoD laboratories. Our future success will require a new wave of
diverse STEM talent, robust investments in advanced technologies and
manufacturing, and enabling a culture that allows us to take risks in
search of reward. It is critical that we continue to modernize in areas
such as microelectronics, 5G, directed energy, and hypersonics. We must
also take real steps to partner with and support the acquisition
community to transition our most promising technologies into programs
of record.
I do not take these obligations lightly, and if confirmed, it would
be an immense honor to continue to serve our Nation, the Department of
Defense, and the United States of America within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, very much, Dr. Honey.
Ms. Fulton, please?
STATEMENT OF BRENDA FULTON, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
Ms. Fulton. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee.
I also want to extend my thanks to Congresswoman Mikie
Sherrill, a fellow veteran, and a New Jerseyan for that
generous introduction.
I am honored to come before you as President Biden's
nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs.
I am joined here today by my cousin, Rachel Fulton Gray,
who was a great support to my wife Penny and me during Penny's
illness. I know that Penny, along with my parents, is looking
down on me today. They are largely responsible for me being
here today, and I miss them terribly.
Across my career, I have accumulated a breadth of
leadership experience, having served in the military, worked in
the private sector, launched and led nonprofit organizations,
and, in my current job, served in state government.
The thread that unites my experience is a desire to serve.
I was 17 when I first raised my right hand and swore a solemn
oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United
States, as a new cadet at West Point.
My father served in the Navy in the Korean conflict, on the
USS Lewis which saw significant action. As a proud sonarman, he
would always tease me about being an officer and not having to
work for a living, a saying all of you who are military
veterans will recognize, but his love of this country and for
the military lives deep in me.
I have worked with military leaders on multiple initiatives
to increase diversity in the force. In every case, my guiding
light was an effort to improve our ability to fight and win
wars.
On the West Point Board of Visitors, I had the good fortune
to work with Lieutenant General Bob Caslen and my friend Rep.
Steve Womack, and other board members in fighting sexual
harassment and assault; expanding the diversity of our entering
classes; and most of all, centering character and character
development as a way to deliver the Army the best leaders
possible.
Our military faces an incredibly dynamic threat
environment, with disruptive technologies and powerful
adversaries. If confirmed to the role of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, I would focus on
ensuring the Department can attract and retain a lethal and
effective force to meet those challenges.
That means attracting the best talent. We know that smart,
innovative people will seek out and thrive in an environment
that is challenging, inclusive, diverse, and led by leaders of
character. Whether in the civilian workforce, the Guard, the
Reserves, or the active force, leadership rooted in our
essential core values: selfless service, personal courage,
honor, respect, and integrity, plays an important part in
growing our overall talent.
We also have to retain that talent. Where it makes sense,
we should look at broadening opportunities, reviewing standards
to ensure they align with the needs of the service and
increasing flexibility in our talent management systems, and
always, we must take care of our families.
If I am confirmed, our core values will guide my efforts in
support of Secretary Austin, all of our military services, and
in my work with this Committee to deliver a smarter, stronger,
more resilient, more capable total force for our country.
Senators, I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Fulton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Brenda Fulton
Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe.
I am honored to come before you as President Biden's nominee for
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs.
I am joined here today by my cousin, Rachel Fulton Gray, who was a
great support to my wife Penny and me during Penny's illness. I know
that Penny, along with my parents, is looking down on me. They are
largely responsible for me being here today, and I miss them terribly.
Across my career, I have accumulated a breadth of leadership
experience, having served in the military, worked in the private
sector, launched and led nonprofit organizations, and, in my current
job, served in state government.
The thread that unites my experience is a desire to serve. I was 17
when I first raised my right hand and swore a solemn oath to support
and defend the Constitution of the United States, as a new cadet at
West Point.
My father served in the Navy in the Korean conflict, on the USS
Lewis which saw significant action. As a proud sonarman, he would tease
me about being an officer and not having to work for a living . . . a
saying all of you who are military veterans will recognize. But his
love of this country and for the military lives deep in me.
I have worked with military leaders on multiple initiatives to
increase diversity in the force. In every case, my guiding light was an
effort to improve our ability to fight and win wars.
On the West Point Board of Visitors, I had the good fortune to work
with Lt. Gen. Bob Caslen, my friend Rep. Steve Womack, and other Board
members in fighting sexual harassment and assault; expanding the
diversity of our entering classes; and most of all, centering character
development as a way to deliver the Army the best leaders possible.
Our military faces an incredibly dynamic threat environment, with
disruptive technologies and powerful adversaries. If confirmed to the
role of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs,
I would focus on ensuring the Department can attract and retain a
lethal and effective force to meet those challenges.
That means attracting the best talent. We know that smart, creative
people will seek out and thrive in an environment that is challenging,
inclusive, diverse, and led by leaders of character. Whether in the
civilian workforce, the Guard, the Reserves, or the active force,
leadership rooted in our essential core values - selfless service,
personal courage, honor, respect, and integrity - plays an important
part in growing our overall talent.
We also have to retain that talent. Where it makes sense, we should
look at broadening opportunities, reviewing standards to ensure they
align with the needs of the service; and increasing flexibility in our
talent management systems.
Always, we must take care of our families.
If I'm confirmed, our core values will guide my efforts in support
of Secretary Austin, all of our military services, and in my work with
this Committee to deliver a smarter, stronger, more resilient, more
capable total force for our country.
Senators, I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Ms. Fulton.
Ms. Hinderstein, please?
STATEMENT OF COREY HINDERSTEIN, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Hinderstein. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished members of this committee.
I am honored to appear before the Senate Armed Services
Committee today. I want to begin by expressing my appreciation
to President Biden and Secretary Granholm and Administrator
Ruby for the confidence they have shown in nominating me for
this position.
I would like to take this opportunity, also, to recognize
my husband, Chase, who was not able to be with me here today,
but who has supported me for more than 27 years through long
days in the office and many weeks on the road.
I would also like to thank my father, Evan, his partner
Laura, and my sister Rachel for being with me today.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my mother, Sheila, who
passed away in 2005, but who I know would be very proud to see
me here today in your company.
I would also like to thank Senator Nunn for his kind words
of introduction. Senator Nunn is a model of public service,
dedicating his life to his fellow Georgians and to the security
of this country. He has been a mentor and a role model to me
and to so many. I have learned from his example of vision with
pragmatism, strength with flexibility, and leadership without
ego. His great respect for the Senate and this Committee makes
it even more of an honor for me to be here today.
There is no more important role for government than to
protect the security, health, well-being, and opportunity for
the United States and its residents. For this reason, the
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has an enormously
important mission. As a technical office, DNN works to protect
nuclear material wherever it exists in the world; reduce and
eliminate nuclear material wherever possible; preserve American
leadership by enabling us to meet our international
obligations, while holding others to their commitments; reduce
the opportunities for nuclear weapons to spread; develop
verification and monitoring technology and approaches for
current commitments; and to inform negotiations of future
agreements, to increase the chance that we will be able to
detect if nuclear activities pose a threat to the United States
and our allies and to focus now on the tools and technologies
to meet future threats.
While addressing these foundational obligations of the
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of
Energy, DNN must also work collaboratively across the
interagency and build partnerships in the international
community, the nuclear industry, in academia, and with
nongovernmental organizations.
If confirmed, I would seek to strengthen and expand these
connections in service of our collective goals. Good ideas and
good partners can be anywhere, and we need diverse viewpoints
to meet the challenges ahead.
I had the pleasure of working with the DNN team for nearly
3 years. From the career civil servants to the professional
support contractors, to the scientists and technicians at our
national laboratories, plants, and sites, you won't find a more
dedicated group of public servants. They work on nuclear
nonproliferation and security because it is important and
rewarding, and certainly not for the fame and fortune. This is
a job that is never done. In the world of nuclear terrorism,
for example, those protecting nuclear materials and facilities
must get it right every day, while our adversaries only need to
succeed once.
The technical and political landscape is constantly
shifting. Each new accomplishment is followed by a new
challenge. If I am confirmed, I would commit myself to sustain
today's investments, while also innovating tomorrow's
solutions.
I have worked for more than 25 years on nuclear
nonproliferation and security, and much of that time has been
in civil society. I have always wanted to dedicate myself more
to public service and I am humbled by this opportunity to do so
at a critical time for our nation's future.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee
today and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Hinderstein follows:]
Prepared Statement by Statement of Ms. Corey Hinderstein
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee,
I am honored to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee
today. I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to President Biden
and Secretary Granholm for the confidence they have shown in nominating
me for the position of Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation of the Department of Energy.
I would like to take this opportunity to recognize my husband,
Chase Hinderstein [who was not able to be with me here today] but has
supported me for more than 27 years and I know is watching now. I would
also like to thank my father, Evan, his partner Laura, and my sister
Rachel for being with me today. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my
mother, Sheila, who passed away in 2005, but who I know would be very
proud to see me here today.
I would also like to thank Senator Sam Nunn for his kind words of
introduction. Senator Nunn is a model of public service, dedicating his
life to his fellow Georgians and to the security of this country. He
has been a mentor and a role model to so many, and I am proud to count
myself among those that have learned from his example of vision with
pragmatism, strength with flexibility, and leadership without ego. His
great respect for the Senate and this Committee - in which he spent so
much time and energy as Chair - makes it even more of an honor for me
to be here today.
There is no more important role for government than to protect the
safety, security, and opportunity for people of the United States. For
this reason, the mission of the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN) of the National Nuclear Security Administration
has an enormously important mission. Put simply, DNN works to:
protect nuclear material wherever it exists in the world;
reduce and eliminate nuclear material wherever possible;
preserve American leadership by enabling us to meet our
international obligations while holding others to their commitments;
reduce the opportunities for nuclear weapons to spread;
increase the chance that we will be able to detect it if
nuclear activities pose a threat to the United States or our allies;
and,
focus now on developing the tools and technologies to
meet future threats.
While addressing these foundational obligations of the National
Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy, DNN must
also work collaboratively across U.S. government agencies and build
partnerships in the international community, in the nuclear industry,
in academia, and with nongovernmental organizations. If confirmed, I
would seek to strengthen and expand these connections in service of our
collective goals. Good ideas and good partners can be anywhere, and we
need diverse viewpoints to meet the challenges ahead.
I had the pleasure of working with the DNN team for nearly three
years, from 2015 through 2017. From the career civil servants, to the
professional support contractors, to the scientists of our national
laboratories, you cannot find a more dedicated and hard-working group
of public servants. They work on nuclear nonproliferation and security
because it is important and rewarding; it is certainly not for the fame
and fortune. This is a job that is never done. For example, those
protecting nuclear materials and facilities from theft or terrorism
must get it right every day, while our adversaries only need to succeed
once. The technical and political landscape is constantly shifting.
Each new accomplishment is followed by a new challenge. If confirmed, I
would be proud to stand by their side as they work to sustain progress
while innovating solutions.
I have committed almost 25 years of my career to addressing nuclear
nonproliferation and security issues and creating practical and
actionable approaches to difficult challenges. Most of that time has
been spent in civil society, but I have always wanted to dedicate more
of myself to public service. I am humbled by this opportunity to do so
at a critical time for our nation's future.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today and
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Before we proceed to questions, I have a series of
questions which all nominees must respond to. So, together, you
can respond as appropriately.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would
appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
subcommittees and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
this committee, when requested?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines by this committee for the production of reports,
records, and other information, including timely responding to
hearing questions for the record?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional request?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Now, Dr. Honey, what first struck me was your extraordinary
experience in so many fields that are directly applicable to
the position you have been nominated to, so I think that should
be noted up front.
As you know, we have been very concerned about the
production of microchips, the supply base. As you know, we
passed the CHIPS Act, working to provide funding for the
development of domestic microelectronics manufacturing. The key
effort is ensuring that the U.S. has capabilities that support
both, state-of-the-art commercial needs and DOD's needs.
It has been the history, though, that DOD has tried to go
it alone too many times by using Trusted Foundry, which doesn't
really work out because they are not commercially viable and
they don't have the technological edge that some of our
commercial entities can get.
So, I would like your assurance that you will support
efforts to develop commercially viable domestic
microelectronics and not retreat to the foundry approach.
Dr. Honey. Yes, Senator, I agree. The DOD needs, you know,
are very important to me and while Trusted Foundry has had
great utility for Department in the past, in my experience,
keeping that up to the commercial state-of-the- art standards
and making that available to the Defense Industrial Base and,
thus, to our warfighters, just hasn't worked out. So, new
models are needed and I am committed, if confirmed for this
position, to work those issues and ensure that we are on a path
to get commercial, state-of- the-art available to our
performers and, ultimately, into our weapons systems.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Honey.
Ms. Fulton, Secretary Austin implemented the Independent
Review Commission at the direction of the President. There was
a series of recommendations, in response, of course, to the
scourge of sexual assault and harassment we have already
witnessed.
First, I would assume, and I ask for your confirmation that
you will make this your top priority or one of your top
priorities.
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator. We have to address the blight of
sexual harassment and sexual assault if we expect to attract,
continue to attract, and retain talent. If we expect to build
effective teams, we have got to address this.
A big part of my job, if I am confirmed, will be building a
prevention workforce and addressing the leader challenges that
were highlighted by the Independent Review Commission.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Many of the Commission's recommendations do not require
legislation, so I assume and expect that you will immediately
begin to do what you can do administratively. I know there has
already been some changes. We have a civilian head now at the
CID, but we have to be much more aggressive, and prevention is
really the goal; it is not simply adjudication.
Are you committing to that effort?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator, I am completely committed. There
is an urgency around this issue, and if confirmed, I would
definitely put that as one of my top priorities.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Ms. Hinderstein, and I have probably pronounced your name
three different ways, so give me----
Ms. Hinderstein. Hinderstein is correct. Thank you,
Senator.
Chairman Reed. Hinderstein. So, it is----
Ms. Hinderstein. There are a few options.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. As Meatloaf would say, two out of three
ain't bad, so anyway, forgive me.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. In July of 2019, you told CNBC News that,
quote, I see no indication that Iran is rushing toward a
nuclear weapon and they are taking steps that can be reversed.
Can you clarify those remarks in regard to your assessment
at the time.
Ms. Hinderstein. Thank you, Senator, and I appreciate you
bringing up this really important issue of Iran's technical
capability.
The purpose of my comments at the time and others,
similarly, was not to minimize the threat posed by Iran, but to
differentiate the increasingly uranium enrichment activity from
the broad suite of activities that would be required for them
to actually produce a nuclear weapon.
My comments were consistent with what I was seeing from the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence's unclassified
annual threat assessment, which said that Iran was not
currently undertaking the activities that would be required to
produce a nuclear device. So, I think that is the context. It
was really a technical assessment on the weaponization issue,
but it is certainly not to undermine any concern about the
progression of the uranium enrichment activities.
Chairman Reed. Well, how have you seen Iran's nuclear
program advancing since you made those remarks?
Ms. Hinderstein. Iran's nuclear program has certainly
advanced as they have increased both, the scope and scale of
the uranium enrichment activities, and I think it is going to
be very important, if confirmed, that I understand what the
current assessment is of those activities and how that might
have changed our underlying understanding about their program.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe, please?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Fulton, in 2017, you were quoted by the New York Times,
and I have the article right here, saying, quote, what people
fail to understand is that chaplains give up some of their
rights as ministers when they become military chaplains.
Now, the DOD policy for chaplains doesn't say anything at
all about this. In fact, it says, I believe, quite the
opposite. It says, and I am quoting right now, and I am going
to ask that this be part of the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Inhofe. That if a chaplain is unable to support a
specific request because of his or her religious endorsing
organization's teachings, they all, the chaplains have these
procedures that they go through with organizations, then the
chaplain must offer referral to another chaplain or
professional.
Now, first of all, I would ask the question, do you still
stand by your statement?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I----
Senator Inhofe. The quote I am talking about is the quote
where you said what people fail to realize is that the
chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when they
become military chaplains.
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I was referring to--thank you for
allowing me to clarify--I was referring to that clause where a
chaplain is required to find support for that individual one
way or another; either support them, themselves, or find that
support, whereas, you know, a civilian could turn someone away
and say, not my job. Our chaplains are bound and do a
remarkable job addressing all of the needs, one way or another,
of our servicemembers.
Senator Inhofe. Well, Ms. Fulton, that is not as I would
understand the context that we are talking about this, but let
me ask you, do you think that there are some of their rights,
are any of the rights that they have given up in the context
that we would look at those rights?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I think anyone who wears the uniform
of this country has certain constraints on what they can say in
public and certain requirements to serve others and to serve
without regard to some of whatever personal feelings they may
have.
Senator Inhofe. Let me----
Ms. Fulton. So, in that context, I would say, you know, our
chaplains do a tremendous job serving everyone, but that may
take them----
Senator Inhofe. My time is disappearing, as you well know,
right now. Let me just ask you, do you intend to change any of
the longstanding DOD policy regarding the rights of chaplains
to minister in accordance with their tenets and their faith,
just yes or no?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. You have referred, and I have several
documents here I can use, to conservative people, primarily, as
radicals. Do you consider me to be a radical because I don't
support abortion?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Ms. Hinderstein and thank you
for giving me that----
Chairman Reed. Thank Meatloaf.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate it very much.
Last month the International Atomic Energy related a report
stating that Iran's refusal to allow inspectors' access
seriously compromised the agents' technical capability to
monitor Iran.
I think that I would join the chairman in just wanting some
clarification in terms of your feelings about Iran. You did
explain this thing on reversible, but I would like to have you
elaborate just a little bit there on that because it is my
understanding that you feel maybe you know some things I don't
know, and I am hoping you are right and I am wrong, but how do
you see that as reversible?
Ms. Hinderstein. Senator, thank you so much for the
question.
Let me state, unequivocally, that I am extremely concerned
about Iran's nuclear program and about the progress that they
have made, in particular, in the last few years. I have been
paying attention to Iran's nuclear program for more than 20
years and, if confirmed, I would expect that it would have a
high priority for me going forward, as well.
Regarding the question of reversibility, I think it is
important to separate the technical reversibility related to
the equipment and materials. We can downblend uranium. We can
remove, uninstall, put in storage, or even destroy uranium
enrichment equipment. I think that is important to note when we
ask ourselves, could Iran come back to the technical
constraints of the deal. Those activities are possible.
But I will also say that the knowledge that they have
gained in the last few years is not reversible. We can't
eliminate knowledge and experience, and so I do believe that,
if confirmed, I would need it understand how their basic
capacity has changed and whether there needs to be any change
to our approach to accommodate that.
I would note that Secretary Blinken even just said this
last weekend that the terms of the JCPOA, at some point, will
not be sufficient to recapture the benefits of the agreement
because of the progress that is made and I would agree with his
statement and seek to understand more, if confirmed.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I appreciate that.
My time has expired, but I would like to, if you are
confirmed, have an opportunity to visit with you at some length
and we could exchange some ideas. I would appreciate that.
Ms. Hinderstein. I would appreciate that, too, Senator.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't have any questions
for Dr. Honey. He is going to be in good shape. I can't think
of a better team than for him to be with than Heidi Shyu and I
look forward to working closely with him.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Good morning and congratulations to each
of you on your nominations and for your willingness to serve
the country at this critical time.
Ms. Fulton, in your opening statement, you talked about one
of the challenges of your job would be ensuring that military
families are taken care of. In 2019, as a result of hearing
from military spouses, Congress passed legislation that
authorized DOD to use federal funds to help states come up with
universal standards for professional licenses, so that military
spouses, as they are moving from place to place, can start work
at soon as they arrive at a new assignment and they don't have
to go through a whole extended licensure process.
If confirmed, will you commit to bolstering these grant
programs, that I am pleased that DOD has already started work
on this, but there is a lot more than needs to be done.
Ms. Fulton. Senator Shaheen, I want to thank you for those
efforts. We say all the time that we recruit the servicemember,
but we retain the family. This is a very important benefit for
spouses who take advantage of those professional licenses.
If I am confirmed, I would do anything I could to make sure
that that program is working for our military families.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. We are still hearing from some
folks that it is a challenge, so I know that they will
appreciate that.
Continuing with another issue that this committee has been
very concerned about, our anomalous health incidents, also
known as Havana Syndrome, which have been in the news a lot in
the last few years, I was pleased to see Secretary Austin
release a memo that details DOD's commitment to the issue and
urges employees to track and report any symptoms.
But, if confirmed, do I have your commitment that you will
review the Department's training and reporting process for
anomalous health incidents, so that we ensure that people who
may be affected, understand what to do in case of attack?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, we have to get on this issue. Anywhere
within my area of responsibility, where we can review and
support that effort, I commit to do so. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Dr. Honey, I am sure that you are aware that PFAS is a big
issue on our military bases across the country and the 2020
NDAA. This committee directed that by January 1 of 2023, the
military would come up with specifications to replace aqueous
firefighting foam, which is the current biggest contributor to
that on military bases, and then after October 1, the DOD will
be prohibited, October 1 of 2024, will be prohibited from using
aqueous firefighting foam.
Can you talk about what you think needs to be done in terms
of research, to ensure that we can meet those deadlines.
Dr. Honey. Senator, the problem of what is also called
``forever chemicals'' is a serious issue. In fact, my wife and
I were stationed at, while I was stationed at Pease Air Force
Base, we took our kids back for a visit on vacation and I got
to see the areas of the base that we used to occupy and go to
were closed off for environmental remediation. So, the
environmental impact has been huge and it does need to be taken
care of.
I am not presently engaged in that area of research, but if
confirmed, I do commit to you that will be get briefed on what
the activities are, are there any obstacles and communicate
back to you where we are with this program and what needs to be
done to meet those deadlines.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
If you were at Pease, you know that there has been a major
cleanup effort there dating back to 2014, and the Air Force has
been very responsive, but to replicate that at every base
across the country that has PFAS, we have got a lot more work
to do. So, thank you for that commitment.
Ms. Hinderstein, as you know, the U.S., Australia, and the
United Kingdom just signed an agreement to transfer, to provide
nuclear submarines to Australia, and in order to do that, we
are going to have to transfer some fissile material to
Australia, despite the fact that it signed a 123 Agreement on
the use of that material.
So, can you talk about some of the challenges that will be
involved in that, what we need to do to help work with the
Australians, whether there is any conflict with their 123
Agreement.
Ms. Hinderstein. Thank you, Senator.
I want to say up front that I support the President's
effort to shore up Australia's capabilities in the Pacific and
I understand the contribution that the submarine deal makes to
that arrangement.
But there are also some challenges that come with it,
including the nuclear safeguards challenges, as Australia is a
non-nuclear weapon state and has an obligation for
international safeguards. I would say that Australia has been a
leader on nuclear nonproliferation. While this doesn't mean
that we can transfer any technology or material capriciously,
it means that I believe we will have a good partner in
addressing any concerns that come and I believe that we can use
the 18 months that has been announced to actually define the
arrangements to our benefit to make sure that whatever the
arrangement is with Australia, that it doesn't set a bad
precedent for any other country that may seek nuclear
capability.
I would commit, if confirmed, to addressing this issue, as
well as coming back and consulting with the committee.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Dr. Honey, this committee has made a
number of changes, including creating the R&E Division, in
order to improve DOD's ability to deliver innovative solutions
to the warfighter. But one thing that Congress cannot legislate
is culture of the workforce, which witnesses have testified to
is generally risk-averse.
Can you talk about the importance of culture and risk
tolerance, in particular, when it comes to innovation?
Dr. Honey. Yes, Senator.
A culture of risk tolerance really begins with leadership
and it is very important as senior leaders that we communicate
continuously to the workforce, risks that are acceptable, risks
that may be going too far, and how we can work together to
ensure that we are taking risks appropriately.
During my two tours at DARPA, which have spanned a total of
14 years, it is an agency which is really a master at the art
of how do you take risks intelligently and lead the world in
delivering capabilities to the warfighter.
So, if confirmed, in R&E, that was one of the things that I
would undertake to work with the workforce to understand what
is the current risk-tolerance culture and what can be done to
ensure that we have an environment where the workforce there
feels comfortable in taking risks and is supported by
leadership.
Senator Fischer. What role do you think that R&E can play
to help encourage this? Do you have any specific examples in
mind how you would approach that?
Dr. Honey. So, one of the things that I think is very
important in the early process of creating a risk-tolerant
culture is helping people think about objectives that they
would like to achieve. What are the big things that if they had
the resources and the commitment of leadership to follow
through with, what could they undertake.
At that point, you know, when leadership buys in, they,
similarly, are also taking part and taking on the risk. One way
that has been done, for example, is through the use of grant
challenges. That has been very effective at trying to really
take the leading edge out there in a risk-tolerant culture.
Then there are tools, such as other transactions, which
have been very helpful in engaging non-traditional parts of the
community, which for many people, has been a big leap forward
in risk-taking.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Hinderstein, while some proliferation challenges such
as North Korea and Iran remain constant, the expanding arsenals
of both, Russia and China, as well as their development of new
and novel nuclear systems, they are dramatically changing the
threat landscape.
How do you see DNN's role adapting to the new environment
and what area of focus to you intend to prioritize if you are
confirmed?
Ms. Hinderstein. Thank you, Senator.
I agree that the reports, in particular, of China's nuclear
buildup are profoundly concerning. I would certainly need, if
confirmed, to get a full briefing on what the changes are with
regard to China's nuclear arsenal.
But in any case, we need to have a meaningful dialogue with
China. I support the President's interim National Security
Strategy, in which he calls for such a meaningful dialogue, and
to me, that dialogue means that it would have to benefit U.S.
national security interests, first and foremost.
Similarly, with Russia, their expansion into new and novel
deliver platforms does change the scope of activity,
potentially, for future arms-control agreements. So, from a DNN
perspective, if confirmed, I would want to focus on what the
needs would be for verification and monitoring and technical
support to any future arms-control agreement, making sure that
they take into account the changes that have happened since our
last negotiation with Russia and support the State Department's
process. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. When we look at Russia's arsenal,
especially, the nonstrategic nuclear weapons and you are
talking about an arms-control process, that is going to be
really complicated and you alluded to that in your answer, when
we look at those verification challenges for weapons that are
far more complicated than the strategic nuclear forces.
Do you anticipate that we have enough knowledge right now
in order to address that, and if we don't, how are we going to
be able to have the facts at our fingertips?
Ms. Hinderstein. Senator, I completely agree with you that
if we were to pursue an arms-control agreement with Russia that
started to touch on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, we would need
to take that into account into the verification system and we
wouldn't be able to simply apply all of the existing system to
that new reality.
This is why I think it is extremely important that we work
now and invest now, and that is my commitment, if confirmed, to
look at those longer-term needs when it comes to verification,
monitoring, and detection, to look at nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, novel delivery platforms, and even looking at warheads
as treaty limited items. These verification techniques do not
come off the shelf when you need them, unless you invest in
their development in advance, and I think that is what I would
commit to do if confirmed.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Fulton, I really appreciated reading your written
answers and you specifically said that sexual harassment and
assault are barriers to recruiting and retaining the best
workforce. I share your opinion that the Nation's brightest,
most innovative individuals want to work in an inclusive
environment and for leaders of character.
The DOD has to make some substantial improvements in
preventing sexual assault and harassment and prosecuting
perpetrators. We have previously heard from President Biden
that he beliefs that the decision-making of whether to
prosecute these crimes should be removed from the chain of
command for serious crimes, such as rape, murder, and child
abuse.
Do you share the President's commitment to removing these
serious crimes from the chain of command?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I fully support the Secretary and the
President in removing the sexual assault crimes from the chain
of command. I would like to know more and understand more
before I commit. You know, I would follow the lead of Secretary
Austin. I would follow the lead of Under Secretary Cisneros in
supporting whatever the decision is regarding what crimes
remain with the commander and what crimes go to a different
prosecutor.
Senator Gillibrand. One of the challenges with regard to
Secretary Austin's view is that it doesn't include murder, and
so in the case of Vanessa Guillen from Fort Hood, she would not
have had the benefit of a special review. There had been no
evidence reported that she was harassed or assaulted, even
though, in fact, she was, according to her family. But her
murder would not be included and her murder may not have been
investigated as carefully as a sexual harassment or a sexual
assault case.
So, my concern is that if you limit it to just two crimes,
you are going to miss other related crimes, such as murder,
such as arson, such as financial fraud, which are typically
used in domestic violence cases against the person in the
relationship who is being abused.
So, I would like your commitment that you will look into
the benefits that include bright-line felonies, not only for
simplicity so that servicemembers can follow it appropriately,
but also to make sure these, sometimes unseen, domestic
violence cases and sexual assault and harassment cases that end
in murder are included.
Ms. Fulton. Senator, it is a legitimate and extremely
important question and you have my commitment to explore as, in
every way, that if I was confirmed--if I am confirmed, I would
explore in every way that is appropriate in my area of
responsibility.
Senator Gillibrand. Good, and I don't expect you to follow
the leadership's views on this in this current position that
you are going to be given. I expect you to make
recommendations, to actually review the issues, perhaps in a
more in-depth way, in a more thoughtful, nuanced way and make
your recommendations up the chain of command, including to the
President, and to really stand by your views and opinions
because the position you are about to undertake is very
important from the perspective of servicemembers.
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I understand and, if confirmed, I will
take that responsibility very seriously.
Senator Gillibrand. Then related to that, Ms. Fulton, how
will you support the President's view that transgender
servicemembers should be able to serve openly?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I fully support that.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Well, I look forward to
working with you.
Dr. Honey, I would like to ask you a little bit about some
New York assets. During my most recent visit to Rome Labs, I
saw firsthand the incredible innovations New York's defense
equities had to offer. The Innovare Advancement Center is
particularly impress it to me in how it will bridge the private
and public sectors in one space.
How do you intend to improve this notion that the Valley of
Death or Death Valley that a lot of entrepreneurs and
innovators find, when they have technological breakthroughs and
they develop technological breakthroughs but getting it to the
warfighter and getting it into production is often very
difficult, so I would like your thoughts on how to eradicate or
rectify that, especially for the information directorate of the
AFRL.
Dr. Honey. Senator, I agree, the Valley of Death problem is
one that is pervasive and is a very difficult challenge. I
first encountered the notion of the Valley of Death and those
issues, actually, when I was stationed at Rome Lab at Griffiss
Air Force Base and saw a lot of great research going on, but it
was very challenging to get it through the various wickets that
it needed to go through to get it into a program of record.
Areas where I have had success in this regard and where I
would try and help R&E lead the Department is conducting the
planning for tech transition from the very beginning. It is
very important and R&E has the ability to do this, in my
opinion, to bring together all the stakeholders, the
developers, the acquisition community, the Defense Industrial
Base, the users and other parts of the community to understand
from the very beginning, what technology is being developed, to
make sure that the developers have the right information they
need, that they are going to go down the right path, but also
that the experimentation and prototyping that needs to be
conducted along the way happens, and then, ultimately, that the
programs and the performers who are going to adopt and acquire
the technology and integrate it, have the information they need
in order to do so in an effective manner. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all our witnesses.
I will submit additional questions for the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Now, let me recognize Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all of you for appearing before us today.
Ms. Hinderstein, I would like to begin by just asking a
question, but I am going to ask that you would answer it for
the record afterwards. I am really concerned about preventing
nuclear proliferation within the entire Middle East and I know
that most of the discussion will be on Iran, but I think we
have other players, as well, there.
The cascading effect of one nuclear power simply seems to
add to another, and so I will asking down the nuclear Iran
problem or the Iranian nuclear problem, what are your next,
biggest, and nuclear proliferation concerns in the Middle East,
but I would ask if you would follow up with me and I will get
that as a question for the record, okay?
Ms. Hinderstein. Of course, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Dr. Honey, it would appear to me that you are very well
qualified for the position that you are before us as a nominee
for. One area that I think you could be very helpful to us on
is with regard to your experience in DARPA and the
opportunities provided for some very, very advanced research in
a very classified way. A number of the areas in which we could
very well fall behind other nations with regard to AI and so
forth is if we are not able to find a way to bring into a
commercially viable program, new technologies.
I would ask for your cooperation in finding appropriate
ways to declassify some of our research in such a fashion that
it could be commercialized in a more expeditious manner.
Would you be willing to work with us to see if we can do
that?
Dr. Honey. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
There is tremendous benefits to getting the right
technologies out into the commercial world. When the commercial
world takes on some of these technologies, their ability to
produce them at scale gives us yield, uniformity, and
reliability that we just can't get any other way, so I do
commit to work with you on that.
Senator Rounds. What we do find here right now is in many
cases, because of the classification of so many of the projects
that we find success in, even other committees that help to
fund other areas, such as in healthcare and so forth, we can't
get connectivity between the Department of Defense and some of
the others because of the classification necessary. So, I do
appreciate that and I think it is an area in which we can work
together to really bring some new technologies to the forefront
and I thank you for that.
Ms. Fulton, thank you for your service to our country. I
have to admit, I start out these processes in which I believe
that a President has, should have the right to appoint
individuals they believe are appropriate to positions, but then
I also believe we have a strong responsibility here to both
advise and consent. Sometimes we give consent. Sometimes we are
able to give advice if we disagree.
I have serious questions about some of the inflammatory
social posts which you have provided, and in particular, any
concern is this, in the Department of Defense, we really do our
best to try to keep inflammatory or partisan activities to a
minimum. Your posts are pretty tough on Republicans and, in
fact, you go out of your way in many, many cases to really
attack Republicans on a very personal level. This is concerning
to me. You have got 27,000 members that you would oversee. They
are going to be Republican and Democrat, and independent.
Can you share with us, let me just give you an example and
perhaps you can respond to it. Let me pull out the right piece
of paper. This is your quote from 2008 and this is on social
media.
Let's be real, when one of our two national political
parties is unable to call out racism, our system is broken. It
is not a political statement to say the GOP is racist; it is a
moral statement, and one backed up by an increasing mountain of
evidence.
Ms. Fulton, can you explain this tweet to me.
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I want to take the opportunity to
apologize to you and to all the members of the committee for
that tweet. My intent was to say that racism Democratic or
Republican, that it is not a political issue; it is a moral
issue and the parties should make a statement, because a whole
group of people should never be tarnished with the actions of
one, but I went about it all wrong. The words are muddled and
confused and I deeply regret them.
The idea that my words, that people I love and respect
would be hurt by my words, especially Republicans, especially
those Republicans, the people that I have worked with
throughout my career to do work to benefit the Armed Forces, to
make our military stronger and more effective, the people I
have worked side-by-side with, the idea that I had hurt them
with these words is devastating to me and I regret it.
I know when we talk about race, we have to do it in a way
that opens and expands the conversation, instead of shutting it
down. By that standard, I failed miserably, and I deeply
apologize.
Senator Rounds. Well, Ms. Fulton, thank you for the
apology, but I do think further explanation is necessary,
because you wrote that in a very offensive and truly an
incorrect statement for the world to see on the internet and
you did that a few years ago and yet, as of Sunday, this tweet
was still up on your Twitter page. So, look, I mean, I think
you have got some explaining to do here and this is a very
serious issue, because this is a time in which we are trying to
take and bring people together, this type of an approach, an
inflammatory approach, doesn't work, particularly, not within
the Department of Defense. So, I think you have got some more
explaining to do, but I do thank you for your apology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have long held that racism is never far below the surface
in our country and it pops up way too often. I will leave it at
that.
Congratulations to all of our nominees. Thank you for your
commitment to service. I ask the following two questions of all
nominees that come before any of the committees on which I sit.
So, I will ask you, since you became a legal adult, have you
ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any
verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Senator Hirono. Dr. Honey, there has been a recognition
that at times, a current acquisition process in the Department
of Defense does not provide combatant commanders with the
required resources to fulfill critical, operational needs
arising from cross-service missions. This is especially evident
in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility, as they struggle to
bring on the new technologies they need to compete with and
deter China.
This committee has attempted to remedy this issue in the
pending NDAA, through a pilot program at the Strategic
Capabilities Office, SCO.
If confirmed, how would you support SCO in the
implementation of this program to ensure it is successful?
Dr. Honey. Senator, thank you for your support in this
area.
In my experience, I have also, you know, had to work the
issues of the services and the responsibility for train and
equip. The combatant commands have the responsibility for
combat operations and I have worked with INDOPACOM on these
very issues.
Senator Hirono. Uh-huh.
Dr. Honey. For 7 months, I was the acting director of the
Strategic Capabilities Office, so I deepened my understanding
at that time of what INDOPACOM needs and what the issues are
that they face.
So, I am very grateful for what you have done in the NDAA.
I believe that R&E, even though SCO is a direct report to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCO does have a strong
relationship with R&E, and I would do everything I could to
support the director of SCO and that organization in meeting
their commitments in that area.
Senator Hirono. Well, I think that you understand that the
importance of ensuring that the technologies and capabilities,
that the services align with the requirements identified by the
INDOPACOM AOR. It is good to know that you have some
familiarity with the INDOPACOM AOR because your position has
wide-ranging responsibilities, including a responsibility to
oversee the DOD labs and test ranges, and that includes Pacific
Missile Range Facility.
Have you ever visited PMRF on Kauai?
Dr. Honey. No, Senator, I have not visited.
Senator Hirono. I would welcome your visiting that facility
should you be confirmed because PMRF is the world's largest
instrumental, multidimensional, testing, and training missile
range in the world. So, I would welcome your visiting.
In addition, you also oversee the Missile Defense Agency
and one of the concerns that I have had is that the DOD and the
administration continues to not support funding for the
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii and this committee, through NDAA,
has been putting back the money for that. Considering that the
North Korea missile threat is not abating anytime soon, if
confirmed, how would you ensure Hawaii is protected from
missile threats from North Korea and elsewhere, going forward?
As I said before, if the administration can come up with
some other way to defend Hawaii, other than through the
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, I am all ears, but up to now, I
have not been given that kind of assurance. So, I just want to
point that out to you, that that is an area that I welcome your
input and support for Hawaii.
One more thing. I am really glad that you mentioned your
support for the SBIR and STTR programs. I am have a big
supporter of these programs and you have said that you are a
strong proponent of highly innovative small businesses through
these programs, and much of the innovation comes from small
businesses, but there is the issue of the Valley of Death that
you have mentioned.
As part of the Valley of Death issue, one of resources,
these innovative small businesses need money to get past the
Valley of Death. Is that something that we can address in a
more fruitful way?
Dr. Honey. So, Senator, to your first question about the
MDA and the issue of missile defense. I am not currently
briefed on some of the details of the MDA efforts, but I do
commit to you that I will get fully briefed, if confirmed. You
know, I am very concerned about the missile threats and would
appreciate the opportunity to get back to you after I have been
briefed and, you know, explain what I see the situation as and
what we need to do in that regard.
In the case of SBIR, one of the things I know that would be
helpful, you know, if the reauthorization goes through that is
always a concern. When I was at a small business, we worried
about that quite a bit.
I do think that there is a lot that can be done to try and
help promote within the programs of record and the larger
defense contractors where there are opportunities to leverage
the investments that we have made into the small businesses
that are then ready to transition into those programs. If
confirmed, and I am working in R&E again, that is an area that
I would focus on.
Senator Hirono. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, and I
look forward to working with all of you.
Ms. Fulton, thank you for your commitment to make sure that
we more effectively address the issue of sexual assault and
sexual harassment in the military, which is a continuing
scourge. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Blackburn, please?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Honey, Senator Hirono wants you to Hawaii. I want to
get you to Oak Ridge National Lab and the quantum computing
project there, I am sure you are aware, is something that is
national lab-wide collaboration, and Oak Ridge is doing some
really solid work to develop the next generation of computing
systems. So, I would like to have you on a trip to visit there,
so thank you.
Ms. Fulton, my fellow Tennesseeans and I are very concerned
about the current values of our nation's defense officials in
their commitment to securing our nation. It is my hope that if
you are confirmed, that you would act in a manner that would
represent all Americans, even those that disagree with you.
I won't sugarcoat this. The inflammatory rhetoric and the
claims that you have made on Twitter and in interviews are very
concerning. Your language is not representative of the way a
top policy official at the Pentagon to write about policy or
refer to her fellow Americans, including Republicans.
Senator Rounds approached the January 2018 tweet with you.
I have got a stack of your tweets here. We have got a poster
with your tweets on it. Let me go to your March 2014 tweet.
What about calling Republicans, right-winged, anti-everyone
nutjobs, falling in love with a dictatorship?
Or what about tweeting, this is from June 2017, that most
Repubs still shamefully quiet on lies, corruption,
incompetence, treason, they betrayed their oath to the
Constitution?
Would you consider that Republican Reservists and Guardsmen
whose interests you will be representing at the Pentagon, would
you consider them to be nutjobs? Would you consider them to be
racists?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. You would not, okay.
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator. I don't think any, in any case
that a whole group of people should be tarnished with the
actions of a few----
Senator Blackburn. Okay. What about the Republicans within
the 25,000 employees that you would oversee as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? If they
are Christians, do you think that they are racist and nutjobs?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I am a Christian, and no, I don't. I
will, as I have throughout my career, work side-by-side with
Republicans, with Democrats, with independents, with anyone,
regardless of their political beliefs for the mission, for what
is best for Armed Forces.
Senator Blackburn. Why should we believe that if you were
confirmed, that you would actually build a team that is diverse
in fact and thought, rather than just diverse in appearance?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, throughout my career, I have worked
side-by-side with Republicans, with everyone. My closest
partner on the Board of Visitors----
Senator Blackburn. Did you form an opinion that they were
nutjobs and racists----
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator. One----
Senator Blackburn.--and that the Christianity that the
religion that they practiced didn't team with what you thought
it ought to be?
Are you a leader of character, a theme you focus on in your
public speeches, and how do leaders of character behave on
Twitter?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I strive to be a leader of character
every day. I strive to uphold our values----
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Let me move on to Ms. Hinderstein.
Nuclear proliferation is something that I have focused on. When
we did the NDAA, I had an amendment on that. I was concerned
about your statement that you saw no indication, this is from
July 2019, you saw no indication that Iran is rushing toward a
nuclear weapon.
We know from the IAEA reports that they have stockpiled
approximately 10 times the amount of total uranium that they
were allowed under the JCPOA. So, have you changed your opinion
on Iran and do you acknowledge that Iran has made irreversible
gains toward a nuclear arsenal?
Ms. Hinderstein. Senator, I am extremely concerned about
Iran and I will clarify that my comments were about the
technical capability to produce the nuclear weapon but were not
intended to minimize the consequence of their dangerous and
increased uranium enrichment activities.
My statement about the rush to the bomb that you so
accurately quoted was really intending to be consistent with
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's public
national threat assessment that said that there wasn't an
indication that they were pursuing the activities related to
the weaponization.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. I will come to you with a written
question to delve further on this. If you are confirmed, then I
would want to work with you on this issue.
Ms. Fulton, my time has expired, but I have a couple of
other questions I will send to you. Your rhetoric and your
conduct is incredibly disturbing to me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Let me recognize Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you. I have got a lot of questions, so
I am going to try to cover a lot of material very quickly.
Ms. Fulton, I have recently seen data that the military is
being more and more geographically concentrated in the South
and the West. In 1985, it was about 50/50 between the South and
the West and the Northeast and the Midwest. Today is 70/30.
It concerns me our framers were very concerned about a
standing army. We have crossed that Rubicon and now we are
developing a regional basis to our army. I hope you will
address this in terms of recruiting and just being cognizant of
this growing regionalization, if you will, if our professional
military.
Will you commit to me that you will pursue that issue?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I will. All kinds of diversity are
important; geographic diversity, no less than others.
Senator King. Thank you.
Second, we are in a whole new set of conflict. The
beginning of whatever conflict we enter into, and hopefully
there won't be one, will be cyber. So, the question is, do we
use the same kind of recruiting tools, the same kind standards,
the same kind of physical standards for people that we need to
fight the cyber war, as opposed to the people that need to
fight the kinetic war?
I think we need to face the reality that we are in, at
least, a partially different kind of conflict. Do you agree?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I do agree. I think we have to do
everything we can to make sure that we are getting the best
cyber talent and that includes being creative.
I have to say the committee has done an incredible job
granting special authorities to be able to recruit and retain
that talent. I think we have to make sure, while we have very
high standards, we want to maintain those high standards, but
make sure that we----
Senator King. Well, the standards should match the
requirements of the job; that is what I am suggesting.
Ms. Fulton. The standards should align with the needs of
the service.
Senator King. Thank you.
Ms. Fulton. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Honey, a couple of just comments and a couple of
questions. One is, I know this is not strictly in your field
but it is close, and that is, I believe strongly that when we
are acquiring complex, technological weapon systems platforms,
we should be also acquiring the IP. We should not have to pay
extra for being able to 3-D print a part, for example. So, I
hope that is something that will inform your discussion.
Secondly, I am very worried about smaller, more agile and
innovative companies being de facto excluded from the
Department of Defense process simply because of the
overwhelming nature of the forms and what is necessary. We have
done a lot here to try to encourage working with smaller
companies, but we have testimony from Silicon Valley saying, we
don't even go to the Pentagon anymore, we don't answer the
RFPs, because the process is so cumbersome and burdensome. So,
I hope that is something else that you will follow-up on.
You mentioned hypersonics. I believe that is one of our
great strategic problems right now. Our posture, with regard to
China involves aircraft carriers and naval power and unless we
develop a counterforce to hypersonics, that force can be
diminished dramatically at the early stages of a conflict,
hypersonics.
Cyber, of course, and directed energy, you mentioned all of
those, directed energy, in particular, where we are talking
about missile defense using 75, hundred-million-dollar
missiles. Directed energy could be a lot more efficient if we
can deal with the technological problems.
Are you interested in and believe that we should be
pursuing greater research into directed energy?
Dr. Honey. Yes, Senator. The issues of missile defense and
other applications for directed energy is one that I have
worked in and around for a number of years. The technologies
have gotten much better. There has been, tremendous advances
have been made, still more to be made, but it is an area of
research of which I continue to support.
Senator King. Thank you.
Ms. Hinderstein, deterrence doesn't work with terrorists.
My nightmare is terrorists getting ahold of nuclear weapons. We
had a display here recently of nuclear warheads. They are about
the size of a beer keg. They are not room-size; they are not
very big.
How do we deal, and perhaps you should take this question
for the record, rather than try to answer it in 25 seconds, how
do we deal with the issue of proliferation and the danger of
terrorists getting ahold of nuclear material and, eventually,
either an entire nuclear weapon or the technology to make a
nuclear weapon?
I think that is one of the great sort of, undiscussed
challenges that is coming at us. If the terrorists on September
11 could have killed three million people, instead of 3,000,
they would have. Give me just a brief discussion of that and
then hopefully a longer discussion for the record.
Ms. Hinderstein. Yes, Senator, and thank you for the
question. I would be happy to take a longer answer on the
record, but I would just say that I agree that nuclear, the
potential for nuclear, radiological terrorism is a major
concern. I support an ``all of the above'' approach to nuclear
security, meaning, secure, remove, convert, prevent, detect,
and then if anything were to happen, be able to attribute and
prosecute. I do think we have to look at nuclear security as a
significant and, frankly, persistent threat to the United
States.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. Ms. Fulton, in your written answers to
advanced policy questions, you were asked if troops that are
part of religious group or advocate for socially conservative
changes to the law should be punished. You respond that as long
as they are, quote, acting within the confines of federal law
and DOD policy, they should be allowed to exercise their First
Amendment rights of free speech and to observe the tenets of
their religion.
However, on June 30, 2014, you stated, once again,
religious freedom, which you put in quotes, is twisted to mean
conservative Christians can dictate their views to the rest of
us. I suppose this was in response to the Supreme Court's Hobby
Lobby decision.
You also advocated for the repeal in that statement of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which I presume you know,
was passed almost unanimously by this Congress. It was signed
by President Clinton, and it was voted for by President Joe
Biden. That law requires the Government to demonstrate a
compelling government interest before it burdens any person's
individual right to freedom of exercise of religion.
So, if you were confirmed for this position, you will be in
charge of DOD religious policies. You would have responsibility
for overseeing chaplains and religious accommodations, yet you
believe the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is apparently
being twisted by conservative Christians to dictate their views
to the rest of us.
So, which is it, Ms. Fulton, are you actually going to
protect the religious freedom of troops and chaplains, or are
you going to ensure that they can't dictate their views to the
rest of us under the guise of religious freedom?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I support religious freedom and I
would support religious freedom for all of our troops, all of
our civilian employees, consistent with the law.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act should be repealed?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Why did you say so on June 30, 2014?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I support religious freedom and I
would support religious freedom for our troops.
Senator Cotton. Are you disappointed with Joe Biden that he
voted for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Let's turn to a statement that you had in
2017, where you said the vast majority of white evangelical
leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ.
The vast majority of white evangelical leaders.
What percentage do you mean by the vast majority,
obviously, something more than 51 percent of white evangelical
leaders are unmoored from gospel of Christ, could you put a
number on it?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Vast means of great extent or quantity,
immense.
Do you think 95 percent of white evangelical leaders are
unmoored from the gospel of Christ?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Eighty percent?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Seventy percent?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Fifty-one percent? It has to be 51, right?
It has to be at least 51; you said the majority.
Ms. Fulton. Understood, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Let me ask you this, why is it white
evangelical leaders? There are a lot of black evangelical
leaders. There are a lot of Hispanic evangelical leaders.
Are black evangelical leaders unmoored from the gospel of
Christ?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I am not sure the entire context of
that, but I would say that there are a wide variety of beliefs.
We don't all have the same beliefs. We don't all have the same
understanding of the gospel.
Senator Cotton. Of course we don't, that is why we have
things like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. That is why
we respect the freedom of exercise of all of our troops and all
of our fellow citizens, whether they are white, black,
Hispanic, Asian, or any other race or ethnicity, or whatever
their religion is, yet here you are saying in public that the
vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored
from the gospel of Jesus Christ.
Do you think it is appropriate to claim that anyone is
unmoored from the gospel of Christ, any believing Christian,
even if you disagree with this or that view they may have on a
political controversy?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, while it is consistent with free
speech, it is unwise.
Senator Cotton. So, Ms. Fulton, I think you will understand
why so many members of this committee and the Senate do not
think that you are fit to take over this position. You are
going to be in charge of military chaplains. You are nominated
to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs and you have a long history of offensive,
inflammatory accusations against Bible-believing Christians.
I will oppose this nomination, and I certainly hope the
entire Senate will oppose it, as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Let me recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to one
of my colleagues. I am still prepping here if that is okay?
Chairman Reed. That is fine.
Senator Scott, at the deferral of Senator Sullivan, you are
recognized.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
Ms. Fulton, I have read a number of your tweets and re-
tweets about Republicans, white persons, Christians, voters,
Americans, and sitting U.S. senators who will be voting on your
confirmation. I simply cannot ignore the callous, hateful,
divisive, and absolutely untrue things that you have said over
the years.
First off, do you want to apologize for any of the things
you have said as we brought them up? Is there anybody,
anything--what I have watched of your testimony, you are not
apologetic for anything that you have said in the past; is that
right?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I have deeply apologized to, and I do,
again, deeply apologize to all of the members of the committee
for the tweet that we discussed earlier, where, you know, my
feeling is that the parties should have made a statement about
racism, because I feel that no group of people should be
tarnished with the actions of one, but I went about it all
wrong and I am deeply sorry for that.
My entire career, I have worked in a nonpartisan and
bipartisan way, regardless of people's politics, worked to
support the Armed Forces and make our military stronger----
Senator Scott. Let me interrupt you for a second.
Let's go back to what Senator Cotton said. The vast
majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from
the gospel of Jesus Christ.
Then you told the Windy City Times, the United States has a
powerful, right-wing, antigay, anti-abortion lobby that
purports to represent Christians. These radicals, I can't bring
myself to call them Christians, since their language and
actions hold no resemblance to the Jesus I know from the Bible.
If confirmed, you are going to lead, as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 27,000
people and you will be doing policy for the entire military and
civilian DOD workforce. You know, there are going to be some
evangelical Christians in there and there are going to be
Catholics who would work for you, if you were confirmed.
Obviously, some of your potential subordinates are going to be
pro-life.
Some of us actually believe that we shouldn't be killing
children. Obviously, this person would know that you have
called their deeply held views, which they are free to hold, in
this country, you are free to hold these things, you have
called them radical. They are going to have to wonder about
their ability to do their jobs or get promoted when their boss
has such hateful, and it is hateful what you have said, and
divisive language. So, how would you think that anybody, a
conservative would ever move up after the things you have said?
You supposedly, you said, oh, you spent a career advocating
for diversity and demanding intolerance, but you struggle with
intolerance, right, of anybody who has a different view.
Now, let's go back to what Senator Cotton talked about,
chaplains. You said what people fail to understand is that
chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when they
become military chaplains.
That is not true. The DOD policy for chaplains doesn't say
anything like that; in fact, it says quite the opposite, quote,
if a chaplain is unable to support a specific request because
of his or her religious endorsing organization's teachings the
chaplain must offer referral to another chaplain or
professional.
That is totally different than what you said. So, why?
You obviously believe these things because you have said it
a lot of times. You clearly lack sufficient self-control to
show respect for other people and what they believe in,
completely. You don't show any respect for them.
There is good, productive public discourse. We have it
here. We disagree a lot up here. But what you have said is
hateful and you have done it a lot of times.
So, I think when we review a nominee, I think it is
important that we review their qualifications, but you are
going to manage 27,000 people. I can't imagine those
individuals that have a differently held belief are going to
believe anything other than the fact that you will never give
them a shot.
So, I don't know why you did what you did. I am
disappointed that you didn't--you should have started off by
saying, I have made a lot of mistakes and let me go through
them, and here is the reason why I said it, and I apologize,
and it will never happen again. You are not willing to do that.
So, I am in the same position Senator Cotton is. I hope
this committee rejects your nomination, because I don't think
you deserve to be able to be a manager over 27,000 people and
especially over the chaplains of the military.
Thank you, Chairman Reed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Hawley, please?
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the nominees for being here.
You know, we have heard from a lot of nominees who have
come before this committee from this administration a lot about
equity and about fairness being top priorities in today's DOD,
but I have to say, that just doesn't seem to bear out to be the
facts, and, Ms. Fulton, your nomination is the perfect example
of it.
What we have actually seen is targeting political
opponents, targeting people who the administration doesn't
agree with, trying to silence folks who they don't like.
Clearly, it is a priority for this administration, because they
have been focused on that, rather than doing things like, oh, I
don't know, managing the evacuation from Afghanistan, where we
have, let me remind this committee, yet again, 13
servicemembers dead, hundreds of civilians dead, potentially
thousands of Americans left behind enemy lines.
Why?
Because the DOD is focused on their radical left agenda,
rather than on actually saving Americans and doing their jobs.
Now, Ms. Fulton, I am astounded, frankly, that you have
been nominated. Listen, you are entitled to have whatever views
you want. Look, I am a constitutional lawyer. I am actually a
religious liberty lawyer by training.
Your faith is your faith. Your views are your views. You
can say whatever the heck you want. This is the United States
of America, but you are asking to be appointed to a very
important position in the DOD.
Let me come back to some of these statements that you have
made. Religious freedom is twisted to mean conservative
Christians can dictate their beliefs to the rest of us,
hashtag, Hobby Lobby, repeal RFRA.
When did you change your view on RFRA?
You told Senator Cotton you are not in favor of repealing
it. You were on June 30, 2014. When did you change your mind?
Ms. Fulton. I couldn't tell you exactly, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Why did you change your mind?
Ms. Fulton. I couldn't tell you exactly, Senator.
Senator Hawley. You are choosing not to tell me or you
don't want to engage or you don't like this line of questioning
or you don't think you need to be responsive?
Ms. Fulton. Oh, I am sorry, Senator.
Of course I do mean to be responsive. I don't recall the
details of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and I want to
be clear that I support religious freedom. I support the rights
of our troops and our civilian employees to their religious
freedom to the entire extent that the law allows within their
employment in the Department of Defense and I support that in
every way, yes, sir.
Senator Hawley. Why is it that you think that the vast
majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from
the gospel of Jesus Christ? Can you explain that to me.
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I am a Christian. I am a follower of
Jesus Christ. I have had differences of opinion from people who
don't believe in full equality for all, but I will say it is
wrong, it was wrong for me in that moment and I believe it is
always wrong to tarnish an entire group of people with the
beliefs or actions of one or a few, and for that, I apologize.
Senator Hawley. You said that if getting a Supreme Court
judge who would outlaw abortion makes all of this worth it to
you, referring to evangelicals, your religion has nothing to do
with Jesus. You also say 86 percent of those who consider
themselves white evangelicals support Trump.
So, which part of it is, disqualifies these people as
Christians, is it that they are opposed to abortion or they
supported Trump or both? Help me understand your thinking.
Ms. Fulton. I am so sorry, Senator. Could you read that
again.
Senator Hawley. On September 4, you said, 2017, 86 percent
of those who consider themselves white evangelicals support
Trump. You said in the same tweet thread, if getting a Supreme
Court judge who would outlaw abortion makes all this worth it
to you, your religion has nothing to do with Jesus.
So, is it because that they supported Trump that they are
not followers of Jesus or is it because they oppose abortion?
Is it both?
Ms. Fulton. I am trying to, Senator, I am trying to put
myself back in that moment. I know there were several points at
which I felt that the President had made statements or taken
actions that I felt were in direct contradiction with the way
that I understand Jesus' teaching, and I am expecting that I
was reacting to that.
Again, I don't believe we should ever tarnish a whole group
of people for the actions of one.
Senator Hawley. Do you think that it is your position to
tell people when they are and aren't followers of Christ or
truly----
Ms. Fulton. No, sir.
Senator Hawley.--Christians or not, just because they don't
disagree with you?
I understand you disagree with these folks but saying over
and over that they are not followers of Jesus, you cited
Matthew 23 on August 29, 2017, when you said the vast majority
of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the
gospel of Jesus Christ. Matthew 23 applies.
Do you remember what you meant by that?
Maybe a reference to the brood of vipers; that is Matthew
23?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator.
Senator, none of what I have ever expressed on social media
was intended to silence others. I believe there is a free
expression of beliefs there, but I do believe that I apologized
for statements at any time when I tarnished a whole group of
people for the actions or statements of one or a few and I----
Senator Hawley. Well, it was clearly meant to denigrate
others.
Listen, my time is expired. I just have to say, Ms. Fulton,
it is not just one statement; it is multiple statements over
multiple years, running from 2014 through 2008, years, I mean,
there is just pages and pages of these statements all directed
at a particular group of people for whom you appear to have
quite a significant amount of animus. You would be expected to
oversee many of these folks in the Department of Defense.
I mean, that is not fairness. That is not equity. That is
targeting, and for those reasons, among others, I can't support
your nomination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Honey, during our recent meetings, we discussed the
risks to national security created by America's reliance on
foreign-made microelectronics, including microchips. As you
know, this is a major concern of mine and countries like China
are investing heavily to try to outcompete us, which is why I
have been working with my Republican and Democratic colleagues
to ensure our Nation has the resources it needs to increase
American microelectronics manufacturing and development. I led
the effort to include $52 billion in the competitiveness bill
towards this goal with $2 billion allocated for efforts within
DOD.
I appreciated your opening comments about the need to
leverage research from experts across academia, industry, and
DOD. In your written responses to the committee, you indicated
strong support for the establishment of a national network for
microelectronics research that can bring those three parties
together.
In your view, what are the advantages of having academia
and industry working in direct partnership with the Department
of Defense as the national network model proposes?
Dr. Honey. Senator, I thank you for your support in
microelectronics and for these types of initiatives.
My support for this and my interest in it actually stems
from my previous experience at DARPA, having run a very similar
type of effort in optoelectronics, where we did bring together
industry, academia, and the Department to solve some very
profound challenges over a number of domains in
optoelectronics.
So, having seen that before and the tech transition and the
impact that that has had on the commercial world and to then
feed back new capabilities to the Department that we could get
out of the commercial world, I believe that this area of
microelectronics is ripe for this type of activity again.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you.
Can you explain a little bit why domestic, R&D testing,
production, and packaging is so critical for our nation's
ability to leverage to the next generation of technologies.
Dr. Honey. Senator, yes, these, as you have just
identified, these are a group of technology areas that are very
important to have here onshore and available to our university
students for learning how to design and make parts that will
feed into that part of the supply chain, and that is part of
the testing environment, but it is also important for industry
to have resources to go to when they face a production problem.
I had some experience in doing that previously when I was
at Rome Lab in our test facility there when some folks from
industry and, again, the optoelectronics world, faced
challenges like that. They could come to us and leverage our
expertise, and because we were working with so many different
parts of industry and academia at that time, we were able to
give them a much broader perspective on solving problems.
Again, I think that activity would be replicated in this
environment.
Senator Kelly. Could you give an example, maybe, how
currently when we need to test microelectronics and we have to
do that offshore, why that is a risk to our national security.
Dr. Honey. Senator, these types of activities, when they
are done offshore, are a risk because it exposes the
intellectual property, it exposes the circuit design,
capabilities, and our intent when we do that, or there is the
possibility of having that happening, for certain.
So, having the ability to do that here in the U.S. gives us
the ability to have those layers of protections that we need
for our microelectronics that we are using in various
applications or weapons systems and other places, as well.
Senator Kelly. I want to highlight, just for the record,
that some of that testing is done in China, which is not in the
interests of our national security.
Under Secretary Shyu has identified microelectronics as a
priority, modernization area for DOD. You know, what are some
of the challenges that the Department will face going forward,
if we do not create a robust, domestic manufacturing
capability?
Dr. Honey. The challenges that I see, based on, you know,
my experience at DARPA, my time in the Air Force, and working
these issues is that we have to have the ability to work at the
leading edge. We need to be able to have security for our
designs. We need to have the environments where our Defense
Industrial Base can collaborate with commercial partners on the
leading edge and know that the intellectual property is
properly being protected. We need to be able to ensure that,
you know, all parts of that ecosystem that we need to master,
we have the ability to do that here or, you know, we have
already seen the democratization and spread of technology and
how it impacts us. This is a way to help ensure that when we
want to let that information out, we can, but when we need to
protect it, we can keep it here in the U.S., as well.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Dr. Honey.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Fulton, I have got to tell you, I am very concerned
about your nomination. I am very concerned about the
politicization of our military. I think if you are confirmed,
you are going to add to that. It is very dangerous.
So, let me go into some questions. You served on the Board
of the U.S. Military Academy, didn't you?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Sullivan. You were chairman?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. You enjoyed it, you got a lot out of it?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. I serve on the Board of the Naval
Academy. I love it, actually.
You served until 2019, if I recall, correct, December 2019?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator, that is correct.
Senator Sullivan. So, when President Trump came onboard as
a new President, he didn't fire you or any of the other members
appointed by President Obama, correct?
Ms. Fulton. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So, you weren't fired.
So, Joe Biden gets elected, this is what I am talking about
politicization of the military, he purges everybody nominated
by President Trump off all the service academy boards.
Do you think that was a good idea?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, that was the President's prerogative.
Senator Sullivan. It is not his prerogative.
I am asking you, do you think it was a good idea?
You served on the Board. You weren't fired by Donald Trump.
Do you think it was a good idea that--do you think any other
President in the history of the country has done that?
Ms. Fulton. I don't know, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. I will answer for you: no. First time
ever.
Do you think it was a good idea?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I think there is benefit to having
people with longevity on the Board----
Senator Sullivan. So, Donald Trump should have--I am sorry,
go ahead.
Ms. Fulton. There is a benefit to having people with
longevity on the Board that, with experience in knowing how the
Board works. There is also a benefit in getting new eyes on
the----
Senator Sullivan. But let me read you the law. The law says
that board members designated by the President shall serve 3
years. So, Biden's firing of everybody was illegal. I have no
doubt about it. It is right here in the law.
So, if you are confirmed, will you work to reinstate those,
well, let me give you two examples from the U.S. Military
Academy. General H.R. McMaster, the day after he was fired by
Biden, he received the Distinguished Graduate Award.
Do you think he deserved to be fired?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I have respect for General McMaster,
as someone who I know.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think he deserved to be fired?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I don't know on what grounds that
decision was made.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think General Keane deserved to be
fired?
Ms. Fulton. I don't know what grounds that was made----
Senator Sullivan. Well, here is the point. Will you commit
to reinstating people like General McMaster?
President Biden illegally fired everybody. No one had ever
done that in the history of the country before, but he decided
to purge every service academy for what reason?
The only reason is to politicize the service academy. Do
you think it is a good idea, you are a West Point grad, to
politicize the service academies?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator, I don't believe it is good to
politicize----
Senator Sullivan. So, will you work, if confirmed, to
reinstate the people Joe Biden fired?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will look into
what authorities--my understanding is that is solely within the
President's----
Senator Sullivan. It is not. I just read you the statute.
It says ``shall.'' That is why you weren't fired by President
Trump.
Anyway, let me turn to another issue. But this is an
important issue, Mr. Chairman, that we haven't done enough to
look at. It is an important issue. Politicizing the officer
court of our military academies is something nobody should
accept and Joe Biden is doing it and you are going to be in
charge of this.
The Under Secretary of Defense, in his confirmation hearing
said one of his goals was to stamp out, quote, systemic racism
within the ranks of the military.
Do you believe that the military is systemically racist?
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator.
I have heard different definitions of that term, but I
don't believe that the military is fundamentally racist.
Senator Sullivan. So, one of your tweets said, it is not a
political statement to say the GOP, that is half the country,
is racist; it is a moral statement.
So, do you believe that every Republican in the GOP,
probably a lot of military members, too, are they all racist?
That is what you said in 2018.
Ms. Fulton. No, Senator. I want to repeat what I said when
I apologized for that tweet earlier. My intent was to say that
racism isn't Republican or Democratic, that it is not
political; it is moral.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
Ms. Fulton. The parties should make a statement, because no
group of people, no whole group of people should be tarnished
be the actions of one.
But my words were muddled, confused. I went about it the
wrong way and I deeply apologized for----
Senator Sullivan. Let me focus on another group, that for
whatever reason seems to get the ire of the far left, and it is
the Marine Corps. I love the Marine Corps. I think it is one of
the best institutions in America.
I remember an Obama administration official, I can't
remember, senior in the Pentagon, she called the marines a
bunch of extremists.
You were quoted, stated in 2016, quote, so tired of USMC
women fighting to keep combat ban because they want so badly
for the male marines to love them; hashtag, co-opted, hashtag,
Stockholm Syndrome.
That is a blatant insult to the women in the U.S. Marine
Corps. Hey, do you want to apologize to them right now, because
you are looking to possibly lead them?
Why the hell would you say something like that?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, the honor, courage, and commitment of
the Marine Corps is----
Senator Sullivan. How about women marines?
Ms. Fulton. Especially women marines.
Senator Sullivan. So, why are you insulting them?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, that was, I never want to tarnish a
whole group of people with the actions of one and in that case,
it was the action of one and----
Senator Sullivan. No, it wasn't. You said the USMC women.
Why are you insulting the women in the United States Marine
Corps and will you, right now, apologize for that tweet or
whatever the heck it was in 2016?
Ms. Fulton. I apologize, Senator. I have all respect for
the Marine Corps. I know a great deal of Marine men and women
who served honorably, continue to serve honorably, and I have
served alongside of and worked alongside of, and I have
tremendous respect for them. I will continue to work with them.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, this nominee is clearly
unqualified and I hope everybody on this committee votes to not
move forward her confirmation out of the Armed Services
Committee. It will be an insult, part of this continuing focus
on the Biden administration to put officials like you who are
disingenuous, condescending, dismissive, and insulting of the
very people you want to lead in the military, and I think it
has to stop on this nominee. Sorry.
Chairman Reed. Senator Peters, please?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to each and every one of you for your willingness
to serve in tough and challenging jobs, and I appreciate your
willingness to serve the country.
Dr. Honey, my first question is going to be for you. If
confirmed, you will oversee the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, DARPA, and certainly in an era of strategic
competition against our near-peer threats, there is a renewed
emphasis on DARPA, and I think rightly so, because of the
critical work that it does.
But my question for you is, how do you plan to increase the
coordination and bring DARPA closer to industry, academia, and
other government agencies to advance our capabilities in areas,
particularly, artificial intelligence, microelectronics,
quantum science. We know now that a lot of some of the cutting-
edge new technologies coming onboard are happening in the
commercial sector. They are happening in academia. DARPA
clearly plays an important role, but that role has to be
coordinated with all of these other entities.
If you would elaborate on your thoughts on that, I would
appreciate it.
Dr. Honey. So, Senator, I agree, these are all important
areas, and DARPA's role in, not only leveraging what's going on
in industry, but creating new areas of research for industry
and academia, has been very important, at least, I have seen
it, you know, day-to-day during my two tours at DARPA, over the
14 years that I spent there. DARPA, and I would say that all of
the service labs and even more broadly, all of DOD research
does need these connections, exactly as you described.
There are a number of ways that can serve to do that. COVID
has had an impact on, I know, on all of my colleagues in trying
to do that, and so we have been experimenting with a number of
ways of, you know, Webex, Zoom meetings, things like that, ways
to try and better collaborate and coordinate. I do hope,
though, that as COVID recedes, that we are able to, you know,
get to more in-person and technical conferences and whatnot. We
will be able to have greater participation in those venues, as
well.
But I think one of the things that is key is from the
Government's side from DOD, we need to be very forthcoming with
our partners outside of government on what it is we are
planning to do and why are we going to do it and what are our
thoughts on how to do that, and then have means of
communication back in.
When I left the Government, I went out to a small defense
contractor for 2 years. I had no idea how hard it was to
communicate back into Government until I went there and saw it
firsthand. So, I commit to you that if I am confirmed, I will
tackle these issues, because it is very important to have those
lines of communication if we are to succeed.
Senator Peters. Well, absolutely. I am glad you had that
experience so you know what it is on the other side and how
difficult that can be and that certainly can happen. We need a
very fluid ecosystem and innovation in our ecosystem.
Speaking of that, the defense innovation ecosystem,
generally, has been calling for an expansion of DARPA. What are
your thoughts of expanding DARPA? Is there a need to do that
and, if so, why?
Dr. Honey. DARPA's budget has grown over the years and I
believe that has been a very worthwhile investment that DARPA
does deliver tremendous value to the government. Going forward,
of course, you know, I support the President's budget and will
look to, if confirmed, when I am in R&E, get a better
understanding of the research that is going on, not just across
the Department, overseeing, you know, greater opportunities for
collaboration with the National Science Foundation, NIH, and
other departments, as well.
NIST has a great amount of work going on, the Department of
Energy with all of its labs. So, figuring out, not just, you
know, how much money needs to be spent, but where it needs to
be spent. We have to make sure that we are getting the right
bang for the buck, deconflicting, where necessary, are all
activities that, if confirmed, I commit to support.
Senator Peters. Very good.
Ms. Fulton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs has purview over review boards that deal
with bad-paper discharges. Earlier this year, I pressed
Secretary Austin to quickly and effectively implement the
Fairness for Veterans legislation that I, along with members of
this committee, enacted into law.
Veterans who have been erroneously given a less-than-
honorable discharge from the military, due to negative behavior
resulting from mental trauma, such as PTSD or traumatic brain
injury that wasn't properly diagnosed while they were in
service, certainly deserve to have their petitions for change
adjudicated in a timely manner. We find many of these folks,
the behaviors they had was a direct result of PTSD that wasn't
diagnosed.
While I understand that COVID-19 has added obstacles for
veterans getting their records corrected, my question for you
is, if confirmed, do you have a commitment, will you make a
commitment to me to work with my office to ensure that review
boards are making expeditious decisions and to transmit to my
office, data and information related to these review boards?
It was estimated that we may be talking about 30 or 40,000
veterans in this category and, yet, only, roughly, I believe
1,500 to 2,000 have actually had changes in those papers as a
result of those boards. Talk to me about that and please offer
me your commitment.
Ms. Fulton. Senator Peters, thank you for that important
legislation that really recognizes the impact of PTSD on
behavior, and it is important for our soldiers.
If I am confirmed, I commit to move out smartly on this and
do whatever I can to move it along.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Tillis, please?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations to the nominees for your nominations.
Very briefly, Dr. Honey, I would be kind of curious to see,
with respect to the United States compared to China and Russia,
how are we doing in the race for quantum information science
and with respect to China, maybe include in that artificial
intelligence. Are we ahead, behind, or just keeping up?
Dr. Honey. Senator, based on what I see, you know,
published and where the activities going on, our adversaries
are certainly very interested in these areas and they are
competing with us, as best as they can. I still believe,
though, that the U.S. does have the best R&E ecosystem and that
we are ahead in these areas. But it is a challenge to stay
ahead and one that we have to keep focused on to remain there.
Senator Tillis. If confirmed, briefly, what would be your
top priorities to make sure that we leapfrog ahead?
Dr. Honey. Senator, my priorities would be supporting the
DOD ecosystem to make sure that we are, you know, making the
right investments, that we are getting the value out of it,
collaborating with the other agencies, but even more
importantly these days, staying in contact with the commercial
industry. There is a lot of quantum that is being funded by the
venture capital community today that previously never would
have been done, so we need to leverage all of these investments
to stay ahead.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Ms. Fulton, I have been watching some of the hearing in my
office and I was in the Banking Committee hearing with a
nominee who had a long history of incendiary and profane tweets
about Republicans, about the former President. Yours were not
profane, but they are questioning.
I also want to associate myself with some of the comments
that Senator Sullivan made about his concerns, but rather than
getting into the specifics of the tweets, they are in the
record, in an organization that you are going to go into that
are going to have thousands, tens of thousands of people across
the political spectrum, why would those who would just object
to what you have put out there, feel comfortable with you
having to lead them?
Ms. Fulton. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Throughout my career, I have worked side-by-side with
people, regardless of their political affiliation. One of the
most critical issues that we faced at the Military Academy was
a combination of sexual assault and harassment problems and a
need to recenter character.
I worked, my closest partner in that was Congressman Steve
Womack. I worked probably throughout my time on the Board of
Visitors, my closest working partners on getting things done
were either appointed by Republicans or were Republican members
of Congress. I have always worked with people, regardless of
their political viewpoint. I would continue to strive to do so.
As I did in the military, what we do is we focus on the
mission, what is the mission, and we work together to achieve
that.
Senator Tillis. What is the thought process, and by the
way, you have a very impressive career and you should be
commended for blazing the trail for women in the Army, but you
know, what would motivate you to take it to that level if, on
the one hand you just told me that you have worked side-by-side
and collaborative, why didn't it give you pause before you
pressed tweet, when you are casting an entire political party
in the same light?
There was one tweet that you had out there that I took
personal offense to, because back in 1996 when I became a new
partner in Price Waterhouse, I volunteered to create a
diversity recruiting practice that went across the entire
spectrum that you are obviously, based on your tweet,
sympathetic to, and I am too, but just give me an idea of why
you felt comfortable with doing that if you also have just said
that you worked across a broad spectrum of people. How could
that, if they knew that this is what you felt, do you think it
would undermine your ability to actually work with them?
Ms. Fulton. Senator, I want to apologize for that tweet. My
intent was to say that racism isn't Democratic or Republican.
It is not political; it is a moral issue.
The parties should make a statement, because a whole group
of people should never be tarnished with the actions of one or
a few and----
Senator Tillis. I just don't recall----
Ms. Fulton.--but it came across completely wrong and I
apologize, Senator. It came out completely wrong.
Senator Tillis. If you could submit, for the record, an
example of where there is a pattern where you have said that
you are calling on everybody across the ideological spectrum,
but it seems to me that at least what I have observed, and
there could be more that were not submitted to me for
preparation before the committee, to demonstrate that balance.
Because, you know, honestly, I hired a lot of people as a
partner of Price Waterhouse and if this were, and we did a lot
of searches on social media, I do that in my office, it is a
deal-killer for anybody to have made a political statement
about the other party. As a matter of fact, in my office if
someone says something that is overheard that is the least bit
critical of someone else on the other side of the aisle, it is
grounds for termination, based on my business code of conduct.
So, the reason I would have a concern with supporting you
is it doesn't even live up to my hiring practices in my office,
which is highly diverse and, in fact, my nominations to the
committees, is one of the top four or five in the
U.S. Senate for diversity. So, I actually do it in a way,
and in my 20 years in public service, have never taken on the
party or said or had a single tweet or a public statement,
where we have a record of several.
So, it just worries me about your temperament and about the
confidence people would have and the side of the political
spectrum that you have, at least, some contempt for.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tillis.
Senator Rosen is trying to get to her computer, so I will
take the opportunity to begin my second round.
Ms. Fulton, you had an extraordinary career: the first
class of women at West Point, which was very challenging. Not
only did you survive an experience that most people, and I have
some experience in this regard, could not have done, and then
you went on and throughout your public service, and currently
in the state of New Jersey, working with people from all
different persuasions, political, theological, ethnic
differences, and there has been no complaints by any of your
subordinates or any of your superiors about your work.
Is that fair?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator, that is true.
Chairman Reed. So, that, in the performance of your duties,
you have done it in a way that is based on the principles, and
I will be somewhat trite, of duty, honor, country, that you
have a job to do and you must do that job. It is other factors
which you might, privately, as we all have private thoughts and
ideas, do not influence your professional activities.
Is that fair?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, Senator. I strive to live up to the ideals
of duty, honor, country. I do think about that. I am
passionate. I am strong-willed. I am a fighter.
If I am confirmed, I will strive to prove to you and every
member of this committee, every day, that I am the person of my
record.
Chairman Reed. Well, I, you know, obviously, I think the
record bears that out in the sense that everyone is entitled to
their opinions, but they have to recognize their opinions and
deal in the workplace with facts and with the principles, the
fairness, and responsibility and commitment, in this case, to
the Constitution and to the laws of the United States. So, I
think that point has to be emphasized, so I will emphasize
that.
I am going to follow-up Ms. Hinderstein, with a question
and give you a little more time to elaborate, which is securing
of nuclear materials, again, I have the same concerns as my
colleagues, with respect to the real danger of these materials
flowing into the hands of terrorist groups, which are very
difficult, if not impossible, to deter. What can you add to
your previous answer?
Ms. Hinderstein. Thank you, Senator.
I really am appreciative of this line of inquiry, because I
do think that nuclear security and anything that we can do to
reduce the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear or
radiological material is extremely important, and it is a risk
that threatens to kind of fall below the radar while we deal
with other extremely important national security issues.
If confirmed, I would seek to support a number of the
really important programs that the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation has not only innovated, but implemented, with
partners around the world, because it is not just about telling
folks what to do; it is more about giving them the tools, the
capability, and the sustainability to continue that mission
globally. Because the United States, we can't just protect
ourselves here, we have to protect ourselves in any area of
risk.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
I am informed that Senator Rosen is available. At this
point, I will recognize Senator Rosen for her questions.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I appreciate
it. Thank you, Ranking Member Inhofe.
I want to thank the nominees for being here today and your
willingness to serve.
I want to talk a little bit about Nevada's National
Security Site. So, Ms. Hinderstein, the Nevada test site, now
known as the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS, was ground
zero for our country's explosive testing between 1945 and 1992
with a hundred atmospheric and 828 underground tests conducted
at the test site. NNSS is the only facility in the Nation
equipped to accommodate subcritical nuclear experiments,
helping to advance our national security and maintain the
integrity of our nuclear stockpile.
Under the direction of the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, NNSS hosts a Nonproliferation Test
and Evaluation Complex, the largest facility for open-air
testing of hazardous materials and biological stimulants in the
world, which trains our first responders for nuclear
catastrophes.
If confirmed, another Nevada equity, which would fall under
your direction is the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air
Force Base and Joint Base Andrews, providing radiological
emergency response teams along the West Coast and the East
Coast, respectively. They stand ready to provide emergency
radiological response anywhere in the world with deployable
teams of experts.
RSL has been undergoing a number of upgrades to their
equipment, including helicopters, detectors, communications
gear. I had the pleasure of touring their headquarters right
there at Nellis in July.
So, Ms. Hinderstein, can you speak to importance of the
Nevada National Security Site and the Remote Sensing Lab and
the specialized people and equipment they field, and will you
ensure that, if confirmed, that they have the tools and the
resources that they need to maintain our nuclear stockpile, to
think about any potential radiological events, and prepare and
plan for the things that our country is going to need going
forward.
Ms. Hinderstein. Thank you for your question, Senator. I
agree with you that the capabilities that are resident in
Nevada and, in particular, at Nellis and at the National
Nuclear Security Site, are unique to our country.
Because of the history of the facility, there are
capabilities in Nevada that we don't have elsewhere and that
would be nearly impossible, if not actually impossible to
replicate if we were to try to do so. So, I think it is
extremely important that we support the mission at Nevada.
There are profound and important activities that go on there
that are related to DNN's R&E portfolio.
If confirmed, first of all, I hope I would get the
opportunity to see some of those facilities directly. I have
been to the site once, but I didn't have the opportunity to see
some of those. I would commit to you to an ongoing conversation
about the needs of the site to meet our national security
missions.
Senator Rosen. Well, that is important, because as you
mentioned, they have highly specialized nuclear-detection
equipment found nowhere else. It does need to be maintained and
upgraded, and it is critical.
Talking about their infrastructure needs, in general, when
I last visited the National Security Site, I saw the ongoing
construction project for the U1a facility for enhanced
capabilities for subcritical experiments. We call it the ECSE.
I am expedited that the NNSS will host the most capable weapons
and radiographic system in the world.
So, again, Ms. Hinderstein, if confirmed, what additional
investments in the Nevada National Security Site do you think
would be prudent to ensure that the site can continue to
fulfill its counterterrorism and nonproliferation missions in
the years to come?
Ms. Hinderstein. Senator, I think it is extremely important
to coordinate with my counterparts at the Office of
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation at NNSA if I were to
be confirmed, because there are such specific capabilities that
would benefit both our mission spaces.
I would not dare to speculate on exactly which investments
would be needed now, but I would think it would be extremely
important, if confirmed, that I get up to speed on where the
capabilities lie, where the gaps may be, and how we can
strategically invest in the site to meet all of our needs.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. My team and I look forward
to welcoming you to Nevada, taking you on those tours, and
having just these very discussions.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
That concludes the hearing. I want to thank the witnesses
for their testimony. I also want to thank you for your
willingness to serve the nation. It is deeply appreciated.
With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. David A. Honey by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (DUSD(R&E)) is the primary assistant to and senior-most
official under the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering. The Deputy Under Secretary will assist the Under Secretary
to perform all duties enumerated in Section 133a of title 10. As a
Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed official, the Deputy
Under Secretary is empowered to act on behalf of the Under Secretary on
delegated topics, and when the Under Secretary is unavailable or
recused.
The Deputy Under Secretary also leads efforts supporting the Under
Secretary's role as the Chief Technology Officer of the Department. The
Deputy Under Secretary works with the staff to engage industry,
academia, the Services and other stakeholders to ensure that the Under
Secretary is provided comprehensive and accurate information and
advice.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions would
you expect the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research & Engineering (USD(R&E)) to prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed as the Deputy Under Secretary, I expect to
have an exceedingly collaborative relationship with the Under Secretary
where both of us are working in our strengths, and where my role is to
enable the Under Secretary to be most effective and impactful in
driving the technology dominance of U.S. Forces. I expect that on
behalf of the Under Secretary, I will be deeply engaged with the staff
on the day-to-day details of accomplishing Research and Engineering's
mission, and will support the staff in overcoming challenges and
obstacles. I expect that I will assist the Under Secretary in building
collaborative relationships across the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and in supporting Research and Engineering's engagements with
its other partner organizations. I would also stand ready to support
the needs of the Department and the Deputy Secretary to represent
Research and Engineering equities on any Department-wide initiative, if
so tasked. I look forward to having this dialogue with the Under
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, if confirmed.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. Over the course of my career, I have served as an officer
in United States Air Force, a member of the Senior Executive Service in
the Department of Defense, a senior executive in a small business
defense contractor, and as a senior executive in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. I have managed research, technology
and engineering programs on a broad range of technologies. I have
served as a bench level scientist, a member of United States Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board, and supervisor of large national
security research and development efforts, through which I developed a
broad understanding of the science, technology, innovation ecosystems,
platform integration, and testing that will be essential to this role.
As a former B-52 and FB-111 pilot, I have a strong connection to and
understanding of the needs and benefits of advanced technologies for
our warfighers. During the 14 years over two tours that I have served
at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), I have
experienced creating and leading innovation as a program manager,
deputy office director, office director, and special assistant to the
Director. While I have often led projects involving large companies in
the Defense Industrial Base, I am a strong proponent of our highly
innovative small business sector and have actively participated in the
SBIR program, first as a government program manager and later as a
performer when I worked at a small defense contractor. In all of these
previous assignments, I have actively participated in the efforts to
push R&D across the Valley of Death and deliver a competitive edge to
our warfighters. Having previously served as the Deputy Assistant
Director of Research (DASD/R) in Research and Engineering while it was
a part of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), as the Acting Director of the Strategic
Capabilities Office, and recently as a senior advisor in Research and
Engineering, I gained a deep appreciation of what it takes to ensure
that Research and Engineering will be a valued contributor, and I
believe that my experiences have well-acquainted me with the demands of
this position.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to relying on experts within the
organization as I grow into the role of Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, and to be constantly learning. As
the scope of the threats to our national security evolves, it will be
an important responsibility for me to stay informed and to seek out a
diverse set of viewpoints. The research and development landscape is
also rapidly increasing its pace of change and to be successful, I must
tap into a wide range of information sources both within and from
outside of the Department. From a management perspective, my experience
in the military, the Intelligence Community, and industry have taught
me the importance of relationships, collaboration, and building
consensus. Building and continuing the enabling relationships to be
successful as the Deputy Under Secretary will begin on day one, and I
am committed to undertaking that important work.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with
the following:
The Military Service Science and Technology Executives.
Answer. The Military Service Science and Technology Executives
oversee a multi-billion-dollar investment across the Services. It is my
understanding that in order to ensure unity of effort and coordination
across the Department of Defense's strategy, budget, and execution
decisions, that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering has established a Science & Technology (S&T) Executive
Committee (EXCOM), under the auspices of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (Research and Technology) that helps the
Department maximize S&T resources, avoid unnecessary duplication and
identify strategic opportunities for S&T investment. It is also my
understanding that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering is assisted by the Deputy Under Secretary in evaluating the
plans and programs of this activity.
Question. The Directors of Department of Defense Laboratories and
Research Centers.
Answer. It is my understanding that the S&T EXCOM that has been
established by the USD(R&E), in addition to maximizing the Department's
S&T resources, oversees the Department's Laboratories and Research
Centers through four Laboratory Quality Enhancement Panels (LQEPs). The
Directors of the Defense Laboratories and Research Centers are active
participants in all of the LQEPs. It is also my understanding that the
Deputy Under Secretary would participate in regular briefings by the
S&T EXCOM and the LQEPS in order to advise the Under Secretary on
important issues.
Question. The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA).
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority,
direction, and control over The Director of The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As the principal assistant to the
USD(R&E), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility.
If confirmed I look forward to supporting the USD(R&E)'s commitment to
ensure that DAPRA continues to have the support it needs to conduct
breakthrough research and accelerate DARPA's innovation into the
Services.
Question. The Administrator of the Defense Technical Information
Center.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority,
direction, and control over The Director of The Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E),
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility, and in
helping other organizations within the Department better utilize this
important resource.
Question. The Director of the Defense Test Resource Management
Center.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority,
direction, and control over The Director of the Test Resource
Management Center (TRMC). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E),
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility. If
confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(R&E) as she works to
ensure that TRMC is able to accomplish its assigned roles and
responsibilities.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering in her efforts to work with the Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to enhance the
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of DOD systems. I will
seek to communicate frequently with DOT&E and staff on matters related
to strategic test and evaluation policy, and other matters of
overlapping concern where collaboration will help further the mission
of the Department.
Question. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.
Answer. As the Principal assistant to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering supports coordination
and collaboration with the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and staff on
information technology, information resource, and data management
matters, in accordance with applicable DOD Information Technology
policy and law. Other topics for USD(R&E) and CIO coordination and
collaboration include Fully Networked Command, Control, and
Communications; cyber security capabilities; artificial intelligence
and machine learning; as well as information technology infrastructure
and interoperability.
Question. The Director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) works in close collaboration with the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to ensure the Department of
Defense's science and technology efforts fit within the
Administration's policy. As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E),
the Deputy Under Secretary collaborates closely with OSTP to
synchronize efforts and advance national science and technology
priorities and to ensure that the Department's needs are addressed.
Question. The Director of the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO).
Answer. The Department of Defense Directive establishing the
Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) states that the Director of SCO
will coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal
Staff Assistants, whose responsibilities and authorities are affected
by proposed actions of the SCO. Due to the shared missions of
innovation, rapid prototyping, and capability delivery, I expect, if
confirmed, to collaborate closely with the Director of the SCO to
partner on shared projects, to further promote technology transfer, and
to coordinate to remove barriers and ensure no duplication of efforts.
Question. The Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU).
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority,
direction, and control over the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit
(DIU). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E), the Deputy Under
Secretary supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility.
If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(R&E) in fulfilling
her commitment to ensuring that DIU continues to play an important role
in the Department's innovation ecosystem and bring forth new dual-use
technologies and products to the Services.
Question. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
Answer. If confirmed as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, I
expect to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which
falls under the guidance and direction of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)). While assisting the
USD(R&E) in the management of the MDA, I expect to collaborate closely
with the Director of MDA to ensure we maintain a robust multi-layered
missile defense system capable of defending the Homeland, our forward
deployed forces, and our allies.
Question. The Director of the Defense Microelectronics Activity.
Answer. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) plays an
essential role to enable secure microelectronics for Department of
Defense (DOD) systems. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) was
previously a component within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)). In January 2021, DMEA
was transitioned to the authority, direction, and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)). If
confirmed, I will work with USD(A&S) and the Director of the DMEA to
ensure the maintenance sustainment of our legacy systems and to
facilitate integration of microelectronics quantifiable assurance
standards developed under the Trusted and Assured Microelectronics
program under the USD(R&E).
Question. The Director of the Space Development Agency.
Answer. The Space Development Agency currently falls under the
purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
and receives broad guidance and direction from that office. In
preparation for the agency's transfer to the Space Force in FY23, Air
Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu are working together to facilitate
the smooth transition of SDA and prepare the Space Force to support the
agency's ability to execute its mission. Until that transfer in FY23, I
will, if confirmed, work to ensure the Space Development Agency
continues to develop and deliver advanced space-based capabilities in
support of the joint warfighter.
Question. The Program Administrator for Department of Defense Small
Business Innovation Research.
Answer. It is my understanding the Program Administrator for the
Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) reports
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering through
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Research and
Technology. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that investments
made through the SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer programs
provide innovative, technology solutions for our Warfighters.
office of the under secretary of defense for research and engineering
Question. What is your vision for the Office of the USD(R&E)?
Answer. As the nominee for Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, I see my primary function as enabling and
operationalizing the vision of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)); which I understand includes
working collaboratively with universities, commercial and defense
industry, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC),
University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC), and other Department of
Defense (DOD) organizations, across the Services and in partnership
with our Allies to rapidly deliver innovative technical solutions to
solve the toughest problems for national security, while also fostering
diversity and inclusive practices. If confirmed, I foresee my role as
assisting the USD(R&E) in setting the overarching DOD technology
strategy, and addressing critical warfighting challenges and capability
gaps.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
make regarding changes to the organization, management, and resourcing
of the Office of the USD(R&E) so as better to execute its duties and
responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed I will, as a part of my ongoing duties,
observe and evaluate the performance of Research and Engineering, and
its abilities to fulfill its obligations and meet the needs of its
customers and partner organizations. I will share my observations with
the Under Secretary and make recommendations on how the organization
could be better organized in this regard.
Question. Are there certain additional assets, including staffing
and resources that you believe the Office of the USD(R&E) requires to
optimize mission accomplishment?
Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to better understand how well
Research and Engineering is currently performing with regards to
meeting its many commitments and obligations. I will share these
observations with the Under Secretary and recommend ways by which any
deficiencies can be addressed.
Question. What do you perceive to be the appropriate role of the
Principal Directors, designated in accordance with Section 217 of the
Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, for each
technology area deemed by the USD(R&E) to be critical for support of
the National Defense Strategy?
Answer. Section 217 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (USD(R&E)) to identify technologies it considers
critical to support the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and designate
Senior Officials to coordinate research & engineering (R&E) activities
for each of those areas. The Principal Directors (PDs) have been
identified as Senior Officials for the current 11 technology areas and,
as such, are responsible for the Senior Official duties outlined in
Section 217 to: 1) develop and update research & technology development
roadmaps, funding strategies, and technology transition strategies; 2)
conduct annual assessments of workforce, infrastructure, and industrial
base capabilities/capacity; 3) review the relevant R&E budgets across
the Department; and 4) coordinate R&E activities of the Department with
international partners, the interagency, and the private sector, and
task appropriate intelligence agencies of the Department to compare
U.S. capabilities to those of our adversaries. USD(R&E) looks to PDs to
coordinate activities across the department to ensure cohesion and
unity of effort towards enabling the NDS.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering? If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, the major challenges I anticipate are the
ones that Secretary Austin has articulated, to include developing the
capabilities needed to deter and maintain our competitive advantage
against China and other persistent threats, defeat COVID-19, address
the climate crisis, and grow the Department's talent so the Department
can meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Technology and
innovation will play a key role in addressing these challenges, and if
confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department leverages our
partnerships across the commercial and defense sectors, universities,
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) and
University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC), as well as our Allies
and partners, to rapidly deliver cutting-edge and trusted technical
capabilities to our warfighters to protect and defend the nation.
national defense strategy (nds) and interim national security strategic
guidance
Question. The 2018 NDS outlines the threats confronting the United
States: a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat
from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden
Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,
which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration.
Among these priorities is the requirement to ``promote a favorable
distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly
threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the
global commons, or dominating key regions''. The Administration has
initiated the process of preparing a new National Defense Strategy,
planned for issuance 2022.
Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment,
including the most critical and enduring threats to the national
security of the United States and its allies?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense has
initiated a National Defense Strategy review to ensure the Department
of Defense's strategic priorities are properly aligned to the
President's interim National Security Strategic Guidance and assess the
threats across the security environment. If confirmed, I will work with
the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary to ensure the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
is postured to support the Department's defense priorities.
Question. In your view, what role should the Office of the USD(R&E)
play in ensuring the Department of Defense can meet the requirements of
the NDS?
Answer. I believe the role of the Office of Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) is to prioritize and
advance the Department's technological and modernization investments
which underpin the capabilities of our warfighters and enables them to
meet National Defense requirements. If confirmed, I will work with
USD(R&E) and other senior leaders to ensure the Department is making
the right investments, spurring and leveraging innovation from the
commercial and defense sectors, and strategically maturing technologies
to more rapidly transition them into fielded capabilities to meet
National Defense Strategy requirements.
Question. In your view, how can research and engineering priorities
best be incorporated in the new NDS for 2022?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has initiated a
National Defense Strategy 2022 development process. If confirmed, I
will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering to understand how best to ensure research and engineering
priorities are incorporated in the National Defense Strategy in such a
way that executes our strategy and maintain the nation's technological
edge.
Question. In your view, what advantages in the domain of research
and engineering must the United States develop and enhance to enable it
to prevail in the strategic competition with Russia and with China? If
confirmed, what approaches would you implement to develop and sustain
such advantages?
Answer. I believe our ability to innovate provides the US an
advantage in any strategic competition with Russia or China. However,
our ability to transition those innovations into operational
capabilities faster than Russia or China remains a persistent
challenge. If confirmed, I will look at the systemic root cause of any
barriers to transition and will seek to work with our partners to
overcome them. One area of particular concern is the potential
displacement of the United States as a leader in the establishment of
global technical standards by China. Such actions puts our position as
innovation leader at risk and also greatly limits the technologies and
infrastructures that the Department needs to rely on in the future. If
confirmed, I will work with other Department stakeholders and our
systems engineering and defense standards office to work more closely
with our allies and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
to address this problem.
The 2018 NDS also provides that ``effectively expanding the
competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency
to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts
of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland
Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law
enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address
areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities.''
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
have to better employ all dimensions of national power, including in
the domain of research and engineering, to expand the competitive
space?
Answer. Few technologies or engineering practices are uniquely
military anymore. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USD(R&E)) should maintain early and continuous engagement
with all U.S. agencies, industry, academia, non-profits, and our
international partners to synergize our activities not only to
streamline our programs for efficiencies, but also to leverage the
talent and expertise that others have and bring those to bear on the
toughest challenges facing the Nation. While the Department has
historically had a close research and engineering relationship with
others in the national security community, I believe the USD(R&E)
should broaden its engagements with the non-traditional organizations.
support for the chief technology officer
Question. If confirmed, you would be the Deputy to the Chief
Technology Officer (CTO) of the Department of Defense.
What do you see as the role of the CTO of the Department of
Defense?
Answer. The Chief Technology Officer's (CTO) role is to advise the
Secretary of Defense on all matters related to research, engineering,
manufacturing, developmental test and evaluation, technology
development, innovation, and technology protection activities occurring
within the Department of Defense, as well as internationally. The CTO
also serves as a resource upon which other Department offices can rely
upon for support. Further, the CTO establishes priorities across those
matters to ensure conformance with Departmental policy and guidance.
Question. What experience do you have that will enhance your
ability to serve as the Deputy CTO of the Department?
Answer. I have had professional roles that include being a United
States Air Force pilot, bench level scientist, and headquarters staff
officer; working at a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC); managing science and technology organizations; serving as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research under the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; serving in the
intelligence community; and working at the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). I have also worked in small businesses and
understand the scope of how research progresses into a military
capability. I have experience working interagency research and
development strategic planning efforts, have co-led a private-public
partnership, and have participated in a number of planning and
coordination activities led by the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP). My previous assignment as the Director of Science and
Technology in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and
my current position as a special assistant to the Director of DARPA
have each contained many of the roles and responsibilities of a CTO. I
know from my previous positions that the government, defense industry,
and military-user interfaces all must collaborate to enable that
capability delivery. I believe that my experience will allow me to
advise the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) on these areas and to be a
particularly strong Deputy where the CTO is unavailable or recused.
Question. Given the growing role of information technology and
software in military capabilities, what do you understand to be the
differences in roles, responsibilities, and authorities between the
Office of the Chief Information Officer and the CTO?
Answer. The Chief Technology Officer is the principal advisor to
the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to science,
technology, research, and engineering. Whereas the Chief Information
Officer is the senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters
relating to the information enterprise, to include cybersecurity,
communications, information systems, and more.
Question. What technologies do you consider the highest priorities
for development in the DOD, based upon the ability of each to
contribute to DOD mission accomplishment in the short- and longer-
terms?
Answer. Of the 11 modernization priority areas identified by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Rsearch and Engineering, artificial
intelligence, autonomy, cyber, directed energy, Fully Networked C3,
hypersonics, microelectronics, space and 5G stand to transform our
capabilities in the short-term. The remaining priority areas of
biotechnology and quantum science hold great promise for the longer-
term. Beyond the 11 priority areas, significant contribution in the
short-term from software and high performance processing and virtual
augmented reality will be beneficial, while advancements in low cost
materials and cognitive warfare would significantly contribute to
Department of Defense mission accomplishment. Each of the 11
modernization areas encompasses a number of important enabling
technologies which must also be properly supported. If confirmed, I
will help the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
scan the horizon for new technology areas so that the department can be
prepared for the future.
investment in science and technology (s&t)
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the appropriateness
of the size and portfolio of DOD and Military Department S&T
investments?
Answer. If confirmed, in order to ensure there is an appropriate
level of long term Science and Technology (S&T) investment, I will
assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in
evaluating the strength of Service S&T investments in light of the
current Service focus on prototyping and modernization. It is also
important to understand the current gaps which exist in our operational
capabilities, and to collaborate with other stakeholders to establish
the best possible S&T investment strategy.
Question. What role should the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering play in the development and coordination
of Military Department and Defense Agency S&T investment strategies,
programs, and budgets?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering should review the status of the current investments and
their efficacy towards achieving technology-based capability overmatch
in the respective Joint Warfighting Domains. If there is not a clear
path to overmatch, there should be analysis performed to identify
science and technology investments to advance game changing
technologies and approaches, and adjustments to investments should be
made.
Question. In your judgment, will the level of funding appropriated
and allocated to S&T affect the Department's ability to meet the
threats of the future? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Analysis of science and technology investments should be an
ongoing activity, in order to determine if they are funded at an
appropriate level to meet the threats of the future. As the priorities
of the Department of Defense shift and new security challenges emerge,
it is critically important to ensure the right S&T investments are
being made. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing this matter with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's current S&T
investment strategy strikes the appropriate balance between funding
innovative, disruptive technologies and addressing near-term
operational needs and military requirements? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to review current science and
technology investment strategy to see if it strikes an appropriate
balance between funding innovative, disruptive technologies and
addressing near-term operational needs and military requirements.
basic research
Question. Given the continuing nature of basic research and the
broad implications and applications of discovery-focused and
innovation-focused sciences, what criteria would you use, if confirmed,
to measure the success of these programs and investments?
Answer. Having clear and established methods to measure and assess
these programs and investments is important. However, traditional
metrics involving schedules and planned milestones, while necessary to
gauge programmatic progress, do not adequately reflect the high-risk
and exploratory nature of basic research. Regular reviews of such
programs coupled with independent peer review by an independent group
can often provide the needed insights. If confirmed, I will assess
existing and new metrics and measures for basic research success, and
investigate where those metrics and measures could help the Department
of Defense better forecast success of the program.
Question. What concerns do you have, if any, about current levels
of funding for Department of Defense basic research? If confirmed, how
would you plan to address those concerns?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to review current basic research
activities and funding levels with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and other department leaders to ensure basic
research activities are positioned to enable the Department of Defense
to meet emerging security challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
increase efforts in unfettered exploration, which has historically been
a critical enabler of the most important breakthroughs in military
capabilities?
Answer. The Department of Defense plays an essential role in
supporting unfettered scientific exploration. The Department has a
number of fellowship, sponsorship, and scholarship programs to
facilitate far-reaching, exploratory research with transformative
potential. If confirmed, I will support and seek to strengthen these
programs to ensure the robustness of the Department's science and
technology ecosystem.
Question. In your view, how should the Department balance the
inherent openness and academic freedom that are integral to university-
based fundamental research with the need to protect our national
security interests and maintain technological advantages over our
potential adversaries?
Answer. The Department of Defense conducts research across a wide
range of readiness levels, from very basic research to highly
controlled classified work. The Department uses fundamental research,
principally conducted at colleges and universities, to provide early-
stage idea generation that will help spark breakthrough technologies
that will give the United States an advantage many years into the
future. This type of research requires an open and collaborative
mindset, so that groups of talented scientists can come up with
something no one has thought of before. Once that work has identified a
clear path forward on an application, then the Department can
transition the work to a more secure environment to protect it.
microelectronics
Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense should
support efforts to establish commercially viable microelectronics
production capabilities in the United States? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. Yes. If confirmed I will work with and support the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Executive Office of
the President, the interagency, and Congress in a whole of government
approach to establish and maintain a commercially viable
microelectronics production capability in the United States. It is
critical that the Department of Defense support and leverage the
efforts of the interagency to establish partnerships with commercial
industry to enable Department-assured access to state-of-the-art
microelectronics technologies.
Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense should seek
to establish a ``trusted foundry'' to support DOD microelectronics
requirements? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I am not fully briefed on the current status of all of the
Department of Defense's microelectronics developments efforts. While
the ``trusted foundry'' model might potentially support some of the
Department's unique and legacy technology needs, it is very clear that
new approaches are needed to address Defense demands for state-of-the-
art microelectronics. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the
Under Secretary's microelectronics strategy, and to working with the
Congress on these issues and delivering secure, reliable semiconductor
technologies for Defense systems.
Question. What is your opinion regarding whether the Department of
Defense should invest in the establishment of a robust national network
for microelectronics research to support the development of next
generation dual use microelectronics technologies and domestic
production capabilities? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I fully support the establishment of a robust national
network for microelectronics research and development, leveraging the
expertise of academia and industry in an intentional and strategic
partnership, in order to facilitate moving microelectronics
technologies from laboratories to fabrication. If confirmed, I will
support Department of Defense investment in and oversight of
establishing a national network for microelectronics research.
5g
Question. In your view, what role should the Department of Defense
play in the development and deployment of advanced 5G infrastructure
and capabilities?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) should be instrumental in
advancing U.S. and partner abilities to produce the most advanced and
highest quality 5G and NextG products in the world, to ensure that the
DOD can securely operate in a global 5G environment and take full
advantage of the improvements offered.
Question. In your view, what role should the Office of the USD(R&E)
play in these efforts?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering should facilitate the development of dual-use
capabilities, the experimentation and evaluation of performance gains,
the assessment of risks and identification of core security principles,
and the advocacy of international standards that support Department of
Defense and U.S. interests.
Question. The Department's 5G initiative, led by the Office of the
USD(R&E), promises to help ensure that the U.S. military and commercial
sectors take a lead in 5G wireless infrastructure and applications. If
confirmed, how would you intend to continue to prioritize the USD(R&E)-
led 5G initiative going forward?
Answer. The 5G initiative should continue to be a priority. The 5G
initiative should expand its tech horizon to include future
developments such as 6G and NextG to include Department of Defense use
cases. Also, the 5G initiative should lead the way in transitioning the
applications and enhancements being developed to the Services and
programs of record.
coordination of defense s&t internally and with other agencies
Question. If confirmed, how would you integrate the S&T programs of
the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to reduce redundancy,
leverage investments, and promote cooperation in order to achieve
greater efficiency and technological advancement?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has established an
overarching framework in Reliance 21 for the joint planning and
coordination of the Department's science and technology (S&T) programs.
The goal of Reliance 21 is to ensure and promote the DOD S&T community
to provide solutions and advice to the Department's senior-level
decision makers, warfighters, Congress, and other stakeholders in the
most effective and efficient manner possible. This is achieved through
an ecosystem and infrastructure that enables information sharing,
alignment of effort, coordination of priorities, reduced redundancies
and support for scientists and engineers across the Department. If
confirmed, I will endeavor to continue to advocate for collaboration
and coordination across the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
and maximize the effectiveness of the existing Reliance 21 framework.
Question. Do you believe the mechanisms of coordination between
other federal departments and agencies and the Department of Defense
are adequate to ensure that the military can best leverage the advances
of others in the following domains:
National Science Foundation on defense needs for basic
science, especially in social sciences
National Institute for Standards and Technology for
quantum computing and cybersecurity
National Aeronautics and Space Administration on
hypersonics and other space research and the viability and availability
of testing facilities
National Institutes of Health on areas in which military
medical research and vaccine development overlap with civilian medical
needs
Intelligence Community in setting defense research
priorities to prepare for future threat environments
Department of Homeland Security on homeland defense and
national security-related science
The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear
Security Administration
Answer. The Department has significant ability to coordinate and
collaborate with other government agencies through the White House's
Office and Science and Technology Policy's National Science and
Technology Council, National Coordination Offices, and other direct
arrangements (Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)) between specific
agencies. A few examples of these include the National Quantum
Coordination Office and the MOU with the Department of Energy and the
National Nuclear Security Administration. If confirmed, I will assess
where the Reliance 21 framework can better leverage other Departments
and Agencies and make recommendations to modify the framework as
necessary.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
engage with these other federal agencies and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy to improve coordination?
Answer. I would reaffirm the Department's commitment to
collaboration and coordination with other federal agencies and the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy through direct
engagement with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
and through a thorough review and update of our existing MOUs to ensure
that the Department is deriving the maximum benefit from existing
collaboration efforts.
technology strategy
Question. What do you believe to be the key attributes of a sound
technology strategic plan that could be used effectively to justify DOD
programming and budgeting?
Answer. Technology strategic plans should not only identify
technology goals and objectives, they also need to integrate the
policy, workforce, infrastructure, and prototyping and experimentation
required to enable their development and successfully socialize the
transition into service. Off ramps for tech transition and expected
levels of technology readiness and the relationship to manufacturing
readiness should also be included. All stakeholders and partners should
participate in the creation, evaluation and updates of these plans.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that such strategic plans are used during the DOD planning,
programming, and budgeting process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that technology strategic plans
fully inform the budget, planning, and programming process. I believe
that the strategic plans should be guiding the activities of the
Services and Agencies at every level. Ensuring these plans are adopted
at the grass-roots level by researchers, engineers, and program
managers and emphasizing these plans as a programming priority in
defense-wide planning guidance will help ensure the strategy's
objectives are moving forward and enable us to achieve the technology
modernization we need.
Question. How should a Department of Defense-wide technology
strategy inform the activities of the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies, in your view?
Answer. The Department-wide technology strategy should inform the
activities of the Services and Agencies at multiple levels, beginning
fundamentally with the researchers, engineers and program managers
responsible for developing the technology. This technology needs to be
incorporated into current and future program architectures, in
alignment with the full weight and direction of the defense-wide
planning guidance; which will help garner support from respective
Service and Agency programmers. Having these technology plans
incorporated at the grass-roots level by researchers, engineers and
program managers will smooth the transition from legacy systems to the
modernized systems we need in the future.
technology transition
Question. What is your evaluation of the effectiveness of current
technology transition processes and systems?
Answer. Technology transition is a very demanding activity and my
sense is that the Department of Defense is successfully transitioning
many important technologies into programs of record, and many programs
emphasize transition rate as a key metric. In my experience, the
highest likelihood of successful technology transition occurs when such
planning occurs early in the research and development lifecycle. All of
the stakeholders, such as the acquisition offices, the users and the
test community must be engaged throughout. The research and development
community must be proactive in communicating its plans, progress and
remaining risks to be mitigated. While transition is very important, I
believe the Department also requires programs that explore higher-risk
technologies as a hedge against future needs. If confirmed, I will
continue to place emphasis on appropriate transition rates that
emphasize getting technologies across the ``Valley of Death,'' without
creating a risk-averse culture that marginalizes disruptive innovation
Question. What do you perceive to be the most significant in
technology transition within the Department of Defense?
Answer. Close coordination between technology developers, Service
programs of record, the test community, and warfighters is critical
from the start. As one example, the Advanced Capabilities directorate
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, which oversees prototyping and experimentation activities,
transitions approximately 80% of its prototypes to the military
services or the warfighter. This success is based on working intimately
with the Services' acquisition Program Managers (PMs) before a
prototype is initiated, to ensure the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) understands whether the PM is truly invested in the
results of the prototyping activity. If confirmed, I will continue to
emphasize this approach with my acquisition counterparts at OSD and the
Services.
Question. What would you do, if confirmed, to address these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the current portfolio of
mutually supportive research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
programs, while looking for ways to make them even more impactful. This
would include efforts like an emphasis on continued outreach across the
U.S. innovation ecosystem, maintaining a decentralized but federated
mix of RDT&E programs that maximizes innovation by reducing
bureaucracy, and promoting a clear understanding of the Services'
interests in new technologies so we have a clear-eyed understanding of
transition risks. Facilitating meaningful communications between the
various stakeholders so that all are kept informed of new technical
developments, changes in the threat, or emerging requirements is a key
responsibility for the research community in meeting expectations and
obligations. I believe that thoughtfully balancing these sorts of
priorities will enable us to deliver the capabilities needed for us to
maintain our technological edge.
Question. Do you believe that we need to change the manner in which
we fund technology transition in the Department? If so, what changes
would you recommend?
Answer. I am aware of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's recently
announced initiatives to reform the innovation communities of the
Department of Defense, and to focus specifically on rapid
experimentation, in order to demonstrate technologies in operationally
relevant environments, enabling technologies to transition to the
acquisition process and get into the field more quickly. This is an
important initiative which I would fully support, if confirmed.
Successful transition is also highly dependent on the technology
recipient's readiness, funding profile, and adequate preparation within
the appropriate program of record. Ensuring program outreach and
adoption of transition plans early on are keys to success. If
confirmed, I will review these processes with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering and ensure the Department is
making full use of existing authorities to address the valley of death.
using commercial technology for national security missions
Question. If confirmed, what changes would you pursue to current
research and engineering, experimentation, and prototyping processes to
make better use of commercial technologies?
Answer. The Department of Defense must access all sources of
innovation, particularly from non-typical defense suppliers, small
businesses, and purely commercial entities in order to remain
competitive. I would work with Research and Engineering's Advanced
Capabilities Directorate, the Small Business Innovation Research
program, the Defense Innovation Unit, and other prototyping
stakeholders to ensure we are maximizing their outreach initiatives to
access commercial technology and transition it to the users. If
confirmed, I will review all these programs and authorities, and make
recommendations to the Under Secretary.
Question. If confirmed, how would you effectively transition the
outputs of such processes to major defense acquisition programs or
capabilities that are fielded at scale within the Military Departments?
Answer. Developing technologies that provide joint solutions and
applying a mission focus at the entry point helps ensure that the
Department's technology investments have the highest chance of
transitioning. Close coordination with the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, as well as with
the Service Acquisition Executives, and with the Joint Staff is
critical to ensure that the outputs of these efforts can get fielded at
scale. Additionally, when the Services or combatant commands have a
stake in agreed-upon transition plans, and have jointly co-funded
development, this helps guide the technology into fielding at scale.
Question. Many of the Military Departments have created their own
organizations to make use of commercially available technologies. If
confirmed, how would you ensure these organizations coordinate with the
Office of the USD(R&E), and with each other, such that unnecessary
overlaps in investment are avoided?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the coordination mechanisms
between the Department of Defense's commercial technology outreach
organizations to optimize efforts and prevent duplication.
Question. If confirmed, what processes would you encourage to allow
commercial companies to become prime contractors and systems
integrators for defense programs?
Answer. Having greater participation as a prime contractor by new
entrants from the commercial world could significantly increase
marketplace competition and benefit the Department. If confirmed, I
will review our prototyping strategy and practices to ensure that there
is no undue bias toward traditional prime contractors or system
integrators, and that qualified commercial companies (both large and
small) are considered for these functions. Improving participation by
commercial companies in prototyping will give them valuable insight
into the Department's needs, and will also allow the Department's
workforce to become more familiar with new concepts.
manufacturing
Question. How should the Department of Defense use investments in
advanced manufacturing capabilities to support achieving the goals of
the NDS?
Answer. Translating innovation into fielded capability is
critically dependent upon the ability of the Department of Defense and
the industrial base to make system designs producible and manufacture
those systems at scale and speed of warfighter relevance. Advanced
manufacturing enables the ability to apply new designs and materials to
warfighting challenges while reducing the cost and time to produce
current and emerging designs. If confirmed, I will ensure our advanced
manufacturing investments continue to address the most critical
industrial base and supply chain needs of the department.
systems engineering and prototyping
Question. In your view, does the Department of Defense have
sufficient systems engineering expertise in its current military and
civilian workforce? In its contractor base?
Answer. Ensuring that the Department of Defense and its contractor
base have sufficient engineering expertise is critically important
throughout all parts of a weapons system's lifecycle. Developing
engineers with sufficient systems engineering expertise takes
continuous learning and training as well as experience and mentorship.
If confirmed, I will work with Research and Engineering's partners to
understand the scope of any current or future gaps and will support the
development of the necessary systems engineering expertise to meet
future mission needs.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe should be made in
the Department's systems engineering organization and practices?
Answer. The Department of Defense's system engineering organization
and practices need to be continuously evaluated and then strengthened
where needed. New opportunities may exist in the areas of digital
engineering and model-based systems engineering. Ensuring the continual
modernization of system engineering processes will facilitate rapid and
iterative ``design-test-fix'' cycles and improve flexibility. If
confirmed, I will identify opportunities to strengthen and resource the
Department's systems engineering organization and practices.
Question. What are your views on the vesting of technical data
rights? What rights should the Department retain from the prototyping
phase into development?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to acquire
appropriate technical data rights to enable the conduct of business
that will ensure systems will remain functional, sustainable,
upgradable, and affordable. Program managers need to consider and
acquire the appropriate technical data rights necessary to support the
operation, maintenance, modernization, and sustainment of programs. The
Department needs to consider and use all available techniques and best
practices, including modular open systems approaches when cost
effective and feasible. Acquiring technical data rights early in the
acquisition process helps protect core DOD interests over the entire
life cycle.
venture capital strategies
Question. What role do you believe that venture capital firms
should play in the Department's investments in developing technologies,
including in the Small Business Innovation Research program?
Answer. Venture capital firms can be powerful allies for the
Department by sharing development costs, accelerating time to market,
and in identifying dual use opportunities. The Department can enhance
venture capital participation by signaling areas of interest that may
spur strategic and timely investment through its National Security
Innovation Capital program. Venture Capital can be an essential partner
in the Small Business Innovation Research program by helping small
companies find new sources of investment, accelerate product
development, and efficiently bring dual use capabilities to the
marketplace.
Question. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the use
of venture capital strategies?
Answer. Advantages are that venture capital strategies provide
start-ups with access to critical resources, industry and customer
connections through extensive business networks, and guidance as the
companies grow. Venture capital can help the Department of Defense
accelerate product development and efficiently deliver breakthrough,
war-winning capabilities while reducing technical, financial and
schedule risk.
Disadvantages include the potential for companies to lose autonomy,
since investors may want to participate in company decisions. Also,
without strong demand signals from the government, venture capital may
not accept investment risk and this could force shifting of development
priorities to more profitable projects or shorter-term pay-offs.
international research cooperation
Question. In your view, how should increased globalization of
defense technology affect the Department of Defense's research and
technology development and investment strategy?
Answer. The Department of Defense's (DOD) research and technology
development and investment strategy should consider the increasingly
global and interdependent research, development, and manufacturing of
defense technology, including the global competition for talent.
Identifying critical DOD programs and technologies will focus our
investment, protection, and exploitation activities on the technologies
critical to military capability. DOD must also work to apply the
appropriate protection based on the maturity of the technology and
establish procedures to reinforce the integrity of our research
enterprise. DOD can share improved threat awareness, inform necessary
controls, and collaboratively develop best practices with the broader
national science and technology community and with select allies and
partners, while supporting the free exchange of ideas critical for
technological advancement. If confirmed, I will support the Under
Secretary in addressing the increased globalization of defense
technology and ensure the Department's investment strategies strike the
proper balance between promoting and protecting critical technologies.
Question. In your view, what are the obstacles to more effective
international cooperation, and, if confirmed, how would you address
those obstacles?
Answer. I am unaware of any substantive issues facing the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering's (USD(R&E)) ability
to pursue international science and technology collaboration. I
understand that USD(R&E)'s ``DOD International S&T Engagement
Strategy'' establishes a framework for guiding its international
cooperation activities. If confirmed, I will review this Strategy,
examine any barriers that may impede its implementation, and work to
continue the USD(R&E)'s efforts to expand international science and
technology collaboration with Allies and partners.
Question. How would increased international technology cooperation
affect our domestic defense industrial base, in your view?
Answer. The Department of Defense's (DOD) international partners
invest their own research and development funds to achieve their
defense and security objectives and increase their military
capabilities. By increasing technology cooperation with these partners,
DOD can pool its investments and leverage expertise and ideas that both
benefit and enhance U.S. military capabilities and the U.S. domestic
defense industrial base. Participation in international armaments
cooperation programs also provides our partner with greater insight and
appreciation of U.S. industry. If confirmed, I will support the
continued close collaboration between the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment on these and other international efforts.
test & evaluation
Question. What role should the Office of the USD(R&E) have in
ensuring the acquisition programs undertake sufficient developmental
test & evaluation?
Answer. I believe the research and engineering enterprise needs to
continue to execute sufficient and appropriate developmental testing to
ensure warfighters are equipped with affordable, effective, suitable,
and survivable systems. Such testing must be commensurate with the
urgency of deploying a capability. I believe testing should be thought
of as a continuum--breaking down the stovepipes that have traditionally
constituted Contractor Testing, Developmental Testing, and Operational
Testing. Research and Engineering must communicate to the other
stakeholders the value of early mission-based developmental testing and
evaluation, which will be a critical enabler to reduce ``Operational
Testing discovery'' and provide more confidence for successful
Operational Testing completion. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the committee to assure acquisition programs undertake sufficient
and appropriate developmental test & evaluation activities.
Question. What is your assessment of the developmental test &
evaluation capabilities of the Department of Defense?
Answer. I am not fully briefed on the Department of Defense's test
and evaluation capabilities. However, as we face new and evolving
threats it is incumbent upon the Department to ensure our acquisition
programs are able to address them. I have been involved in test
activities relevant to the research & engineering enterprise throughout
my career, and I fully understand that early developmental testing of a
system in a mission-based environment is critical in informing
acquisition decision making, identifying opportunities for application
of additional engineering and risk mitigation resources, and ensuring
overall system readiness. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the Committee to assure our developmental test activities, such as
cyber resiliency testing and robust early modeling and simulation
testing, are aligned with the new Adaptive Acquisition Framework and
properly structured to test and evaluate new capabilities and emerging
areas such as artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems and
software intensive systems.
Question. What is the value of robust developmental test &
evaluation activities, in your view?
Answer. I have been involved in test activities relevant to the
research & engineering enterprise throughout my career, and I fully
understand that thorough and robust developmental testing and
evaluation is a critical enabler to the success of our acquisition
programs. Robust development test and evaluation activities are
critical to informing acquisition decision making, identifying
programmatic opportunities for application of additional engineering
and risk mitigation resources, establishing readiness for operational
testing, and ultimately ensuring delivery of relevant, timely
capability.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your plan to develop and
implement best practices for effective testing of new and emerging
technologies and systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current enterprise test and
evaluation processes and best practices and take necessary action to
further implement those that support effective testing of new and
emerging technologies and systems. This focus is especially critical as
more Department of Defense acquisition programs are executing system
development within a digital engineering environment, including
significant application of Model-Based Systems Engineering. I believe
the test community at both the Office of the Secretary of Defense level
and within the Military Departments must develop and use best practices
throughout program development to ensure testing produces actionable
information to inform programmatic decision making and provide
confidence in the intended capability being delivered to the
warfighter. If confirmed, I would support efforts to implement best
practices for effective testing of new and emerging technologies and
systems.
Question. What modifications would you recommend to current test
and evaluation processes in the Department of Defense to efficiently
develop and deliver operationally effective and suitable technologies
and systems to the warfighter?
Answer. I am not familiar with all of the Department's current test
evaluation processes, but if confirmed, I will support the Under
Secretary in reviewing and making recommendations to test planning and
execution processes for which Research and Engineering is a
stakeholder. In developing these recommendations, I will coordinate
closely with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the
Undersecretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, and other partner
organizations.
Question. What role do you believe the Office of the USD(R&E)
should play in developmental test and evaluation processes within the
Department of Defense and what type of organizational structure and
staffing would be required to effectuate this role?
Answer. I believe the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering has a critical role in developmental testing,
in that successful developmental test is integral in validating
incorporation of critical technologies and capabilities into Department
of Defense programs to ensure robust capability delivery against
increasing capabilities of the threat. If confirmed, I will assist the
Under Secretary in reviews of the organizational structure help her
ensure that the developmental test and evaluation function within the
research and engineering enterprise is properly staffed and resourced
and given the right authorities.
small business issues
Question. The $1 billion+ annual Department of Defense Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has shown great success in
investing in innovative technologies and small businesses and
transitioning products to acquisition programs and into operational
use.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the SBIR program serves a
useful purpose in meeting the Department's research goals?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program has shown great success in investing in
innovative technology in the Nation's small business community. If
confirmed, I would continue to leverage the over $1 billion annual
investment in America's innovative small businesses via the SBIR and
Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs to help achieve the
Department's priorities. Through the Department of Defense SBIR/STTR
program, small businesses are already contributing to important areas
of research and modernization. I would also ensure that SBIR/STTR
technologies are considered and incorporated, where appropriate, in the
DOD's technology roadmaps.
Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR
program to improve the transition of S&T capabilities into acquisition
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support efforts to improve and
incentivize Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small Business
Technology Transfer Program (STTR) technology transition into programs
of record. I would also support modifications to the SBIR/STTR program
that would allow the Department of Defense more flexibility in further
maturing technologies so that they can be inserted and integrated into
a program of record or fielded system.
The Department of Defense struggles to keep up with the pace at
which technology advances and evolves. Given the Department's lengthy
budget cycle, certain technologies can be out of date or less-efficient
by the time they are funded.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would make to the SBIR
program to ensure innovative technologies can be integrated into
existing Programs of Record to equip the warfighter with the most up-
to-date equipment and technology?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program assist R&E and the Service
Acquisition Executives with reviewing existing projects in the SBIR/
Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) pipeline to determine
which ones should receive non-SBIR/STTR funding in order to be
integrated/inserted into programs of record or fielded systems. SBIR/
STTR technologies are often looked at too late for incorporation into
existing programs of record. Reviewing projects on an ongoing basis
would better raise awareness of insertion opportunities and better
facilitate transition.
Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR
program to improve its ability to attract non-traditional defense
contractors, such as small startup companies, into the program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Small Business
Innovation Research program establish a mechanism for educating and
preparing firms to do business with the Department of Defense. For
example, assistance with understanding proposal submission
requirements, assistance with pre-contracting activities, assistance
with addressing cybersecurity requirements, and any other assistance
that may be provided prior to a contract award.
defense laboratories
Question. What is your overall assessment of the technical
capabilities and quality of Defense laboratories relative to their
Department of Energy, Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC), industry, academic, and foreign peers?
Answer. While I have limited insight into the technical
capabilities of the Defense and other federal laboratories, my overall
impression is that the defense laboratories are competitive with peers
in other federal agencies in specific technical areas. However, I do
believe that the Department of Defense needs to continually assess its
technical capabilities and quality of the defense laboratories as it
sees competitive pressure on the laboratory system due to factors such
as aging infrastructure and greater competition for talent.
Question. What do you perceive to be the most effective management
approaches for personnel at DOD laboratory facilities?
Answer. Establishing the most effective management approaches is
critically important if the Department of Defense's (DOD) laboratories
are to succeed in recruiting and retaining top notch talent. While I am
not familiar with current DOD laboratory personnel management
practices, there may be a need to provide greater management control at
the local level. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in
working with DOD laboratory leadership to better understand these
issues and make recommendations. Other approaches for consideration
could include direct hire, enhanced pay, and other personnel
authorities. I would assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering to review these and support expansion of these
authorities where appropriate.
Question. What are your views on the most effective ways to ensure
that the defense laboratories have appropriate research infrastructure
and equipment?
Answer. Ensuring that the Department's laboratories have the needed
infrastructure and equipment requires a long-term, sustained and
strategically-aligned effort on the part of the Military Departments
and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering. All of the stakeholders must collaborate to ensure that
the research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure needs
are adequately communicated to the appropriate decision-makers. If
confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in ensuring that defense
laboratory infrastructure modernization is appropriately prioritized.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
improve the quality, technical capabilities, and mission performance of
the Defense laboratories?
Answer. The defense laboratories are vital elements of the
interconnected academic and industrial base necessary to keep our
military the most technologically advanced, lethal, and protected force
in the world. If confirmed, in addition to ensuring a continual
assessment of the quality, technical capabilities, and mission
performance of the defense laboratories, I would continue to advocate
for the enhanced flexibilities available to the defense laboratories
that have allowed them to remain a competitive and high-performing
organizations for the Department of Defense.
Question. What is the appropriate balance for the Department of
Defense in leveraging commercial R&D and government-exclusive R&D?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to maintain a balance
between leveraging commercial research and development (R&D) and
government exclusive R&D for research areas where the DOD is not the
primary driver of the technology. If confirmed, I will assess whether
the current Reliance 21 framework includes assessments of areas where
the Department can better leverage commercial and other federal agency
investment, and how best to do so.
Question. Do you believe there are research areas of which the
Department should divest itself? If so, what are those areas and how
can the Department best leverage associated commercial efforts, in your
view?
Answer. I understand that the Department has an established
governance structure (Reliance 21) by which the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering interfaces with the
Science & Technology Executives (S&T EXCOM) from across the Services
and agencies. Reliance 21 provides a mechanism to continually evaluate
the Department's S&T portfolio and assess areas for adjustment in
emphasis. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in assessing
those areas where the Department has sufficient investment and those
areas that the Department should consider divestment and leverage
commercial efforts instead.
personnel management
Question. If confirmed, which particular research and engineering
workforce challenges would you focus on first?
Answer. While I have not been briefed on the extend of these
challenges, several of the Department's senior technical leaders have
stated that retaining experienced cyber and artificial intelligence
experts is a continual challenge. If confirmed, I would assist the
Under Secretary in assessing the current and projected research and
engineering workforce challenges and focus on identifying any skills
gaps, and ways by which they should be addressed.
Question. Should the Office of the USD(R&E) and organizations under
the purview of the USD(R&E) be permitted to apply the same hiring
flexibilities as those of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
or the Defense laboratories, in your view?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the personnel
policy and management communities within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Military Departments to ensure that personnel
flexibilities are delegated to the lowest appropriate level?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has benefitted from many
personnel flexibilities authorized by Congress. If confirmed, I will
explore the role that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering plays with respect to the Department's technical community
and continue to advocate and work with the other DOD offices to ensure
that additional personnel flexibilities are available and delegated to
the rest of the Department's technical community to attract top talent.
Question. In your view, does the Department of Defense have
adequate technical expertise within the government workforce to execute
its designated acquisition and technical development missions?
Answer. The Department of Defense needs to continually grow its
technical expertise to address near and long term needs. If confirmed,
I will continue to emphasize recruitment, retention, and training
efforts in order to keep up with the changes in threats and emerging
technologies.
defense advanced research projects agency, strategic capabilities
office, and defense innovation unit
Question. What do you believe is the proper mission for DARPA? For
SCO? DIU? For the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN)?
Answer. The proper mission for Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is to pursue high-risk/high-payoff technical and
scientific challenges of extreme difficulty, at the cusp of discovery
and invention, and thereby cultivate what may develop into
transformational capabilities several or even many years later. The
Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) mission is to pursue new
prototyping opportunities that will impose cost on our adversaries
through novel strategies, technologies, and concepts of operation,
often relying on repurposing or leveraging existing technologies in the
defense inventory. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) accelerates the
adoption and harnessing of commercial technology across the DOD, and
has several sub-offices, including National Security Innovation Capital
(NSIC) and the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN). NSIC
accelerates targeted dual-use hardware into the DOD, catalyzing private
investment by de-risking development and signaling potential DOD
demand. NSIN works to source new talent at universities, to
commercialize technology from DOD labs, and to develop novel solutions
for DOD challenges through programs like Hacking 4 Defense.
Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship
between each of these offices and the Military Departments' S&T
programs?
Answer. These offices should interact regularly with the Military
Departments' science and technology (S&T) organizations to both inform
them of current projects and plans and be informed about technologies
being performed by the Services. While it is important for leadership
in these organizations to coordinate regularly, it is more important
for interactions to occur at the program manager level where Service
laboratory subject matter experts can support specific programs, and be
a proponent for Office of the Secretary of Defense S&T organization-
developed technology to the respective Service acquisition community.
These offices also face similar technology transfer obstacles and
should collaborate on mutually beneficial solutions to this problem.
Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship
between each of these offices and the Military Departments'
laboratories?
Answer. The Department's laboratories offer many infrastructure
resources and subject matter experts which can help the offices in
program formulation, source selection, test and evaluation and
technology transfer. These offices should view the Department's
laboratories as an important source of peer review and continue to
involve them as contracting officer's technical representatives. Since
many of the technical personnel in the offices serve on a rotational
basis, the Department's laboratories should be viewed as an important
source of highly qualified future recruits.
Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship
between each of these and the Military Departments' acquisition
programs?
Answer. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the
Strategic Capabilities Office, and the Defense Innovation Unit should
coordinate frequently with senior Military Department leadership to
inform them of ongoing programs. Individual science and technology
program management should meet with appropriate acquisition program
managers early, often, and deeply to assure the technology being
developed meets their needs and to structure a path to transition to a
program of record. Memoranda of Agreement/Memoranda of Understanding
should be generated to establish each organization's interest and
responsibilities. These organizations should also coordinate with the
combatant commands to better understand the warfighter needs and
conduct demonstrations and experiments at scale with them in the
intended operational environment.
Question. If confirmed, how would you oversee and support the
transition of capabilities from these offices into acquisition programs
or operational use?
Answer. If confirmed, I would place a high emphasis on working with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and
other stakeholders to identify barriers to the transition process and
to foster an effective working relationship with these offices.
Collectively these offices all strive to decrease the time to
transition innovative technology to the warfighter, and if confirmed, I
would welcome the opportunity to work with these offices to improve the
transition process.
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (stem) education
Question. In your view, what role should the Department play in
supporting STEM education, including for military dependents?
Answer. The Department of Defense is the largest employer of
Federal scientists and engineers and, therefore, understands the
importance of providing meaningful science, technology, engineering,
and math (STEM) education opportunities for dependents of
servicemembers through formal and informal STEM activities. If
confirmed, I will seek to understand the future STEM needs of the
Department and our industrial base, and will advise the Under Secretary
on ways to meet these needs. STEM education for military dependents
should be strongly supported by the Department and there may be ways to
leverage the scientists, engineers, laboratories, and engineering
centers across the DOD research and engineering enterprise, to include
our academic and industry partners, to appropriately support STEM
opportunities for military children.
Question. In your view, what role should the Department play in
supporting STEM education opportunities for transitioning
servicemembers?
Answer. Departing servicemembers represent a valuable and unique
resource through which the Department's future technology needs could
be met. A key way to leverage this talent pool would be to provide
support for STEM education and provide these veterans with new
opportunities to contribute to the national security mission with which
they are already familiar. If confirmed, I will seek to better
understand the current status of these efforts and advise the Under
Secretary on opportunities for improvement.
health of r&d enterprise
Question. What is your assessment of the current health of the
Department of Defense's R&D enterprise as a whole?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a robust and largely
successful research and development enterprise consisting of the
defense laboratories, the academic community, the small and large
businesses, the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and
University Affiliated Research Centers, and other government agencies.
Success, now and in the future is not a given, and I believe that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering needs to
continue to foster and develop the relationships with all entities
across the DOD research and development enterprise. This should be
accomplished through greater communication, ease of access, shared
understanding of purpose, and breaking through barriers and silos that
will allow the research and engineering enterprise to continue to be
agile and responsive to the Department's needs, and ensure that DOD
retains technological superiority.
Question. Are the statutory authorities, rules, and regulations
currently in place to govern the Department's R&D conducive to a
healthy enterprise? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Coming from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), I have seen how the statutory authorities, rules, and
regulations of DARPA allow for a fast paced, healthy, and highly
innovative environment that permits the undertaking of high-risk, high-
reward endeavors for the future warfighter. If confirmed, I will seek
to work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering and other Component leaders to review applicable
authorities, rules, and regulations to assure that the enterprise
fosters a healthy research and development environment and identify
necessary changes.
Question. The Department has recently taken criticism for not
devoting enough funding to constructing and upgrading facilities,
especially those related to testing and R&D. If confirmed, how would
you address that issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary in
evaluating the health of the Department of Defense's research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities to determine
modernization requirements, and in collaboration with the Military
Departments, work to ensure these RDT&E modernization priorities are
appropriately represented in the annual budget deliberations.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment, gender discrimination, and other harassment in the Office
of the USD(R&E)?
Answer. Any occurrence of sexual harassment, gender discrimination,
and other harassment within the Department of Defense is deeply
disturbing and unacceptable. Such actions foster a climate that is
inconsistent with the dignity and respect that our workforce deserves.
The Department must continue its work to eliminate sexual harassment,
gender-based discrimination, and any other form of harassment or
discrimination. If confirmed, I would assist the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) in reviewing previous
workforce assessments including climate surveys, Office of Personnel
Management Federal employee viewpoint survey results, and any other
documentation that would give me insight into the USD(R&E) organization
and help the USD(R&E) make informed decisions on next steps to
mitigate, and hopefully eliminate, sexual harassment, gender-based
discrimination, and any other harassment within the Office of the
USD(R&E).
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment,
discrimination, or other harassment from an employee of the Office of
the USD(R&E) or an employee of an organization over which the USD(R&E)
exercises authority, direction, and control?
Answer. I would take the complaint seriously and immediately
contact the appropriate office to initiate an investigation to gather
all facts, conduct the necessary interviews, collect appropriate
information, and address the complaint within the specified guidelines
of Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I
would assist the Under Secretary in reiterating to the workforce of the
importance of equality and diversity, as well as our support for the
Department's zero tolerance for harassment. Additionally, I would
further reiterate my expectations of professional conduct to all
employees, and to contractor employees.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
microelectronics
1. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, the trusted foundry model has not met
our military's needs for advanced microelectronics. That model relied
on a single vendor providing leading-edge technologies rather than
leveraging competition in the commercial marketplace. What steps will
you take to ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) is using
commercial state-of-the-art manufacturing capabilities and not forcing
vendors to use processes and steps that force them to increase costs
and deviate from commercial state-of-the-art practices?
Dr. Honey. In order to meet the needs of our warfighters, DOD
contractors must have assured and secure access to commercial state-of-
the-art fabrication, packaging and test facilities. The DOD program
offices recognize the need for this type of access and the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) believes that this is required in order to
produce the highest-performing and most cost-effective weapons systems.
In my previous and current positions, I have been a participant in
interagency working groups seeking to address this issue as it is a
concern in other departments besides DOD. Solving this problem for all
U.S. critical infrastructure needs will require bringing together all
of the stakeholders from both inside and outside DOD to formulate a
comprehensive solution. If confirmed, I would look forward to the
opportunity to buildupon the important relationships that the DOD and
interagency groups have established with the commercial semiconductor
industry to make their state-of-the-art capabilities available in a
secure manner to the DIB.
2. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, Research and Engineering's (R&E)
current microelectronics strategy leverages advanced commercial
facilities. Do you believe that the commercial sector's existing
security and verification processes can protect appropriate national
security information and intellectual property?
Dr. Honey. Protecting national security information and
intellectual property are important concerns for DOD. In conversations
I have had with the commercial industry, they are now keenly aware of
the threats our adversaries pose to their economic well-being and are
increasingly interested in partnering with the DOD on these issues. In
my experience, DOD's information protection practices can protect its
equities when appropriately used in a commercial setting. Some of DOD's
information protection best practices are being leveraged by our
commercial partners to protect their intellectual property from theft
or destruction.
3. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, if not, what changes do you think are
needed to ensure that protection?
Dr. Honey. In similar situations I have previously encountered, DOD
often possesses unique and important threat information which when
shared appropriately, motivates our industrial partners to adopt
effective countermeasures. In addition, DOD has connections to subject
matter experts who can often provide cost-effective advice and program
protection strategies. If confirmed, I would look forward to building
these relationships and ensuring that the protection of national
security information and intellectual property remains a high priority
for R&E.
4. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, security is a top concern from DOD's
perspective and the trusted supplier program, which has not resulted in
U.S.-manufactured leading-edge technologies, has relied on commercial
facilities operated by people with security clearances. Must the path
to getting secure access to leading edge microelectronics rely on
facility and personnel security clearances at design and production
facilities?
Dr. Honey. The trusted supplier program has had many challenges
which must be overcome if DOD is to have access to leading-edge
technologies, and at the same time, meet its security requirements. In
my experience, not enough emphasis has been placed on understanding the
nature of the threat and performing a risk/benefit analysis of
different acquisition approaches, for example. This in turn has led to
the existing practices, which have made it difficult for DOD to meet
its needs. In my current position, I participate in an interagency
working group that is concerned with this problem, and there has been
interest from the leading-edge commercial sector in collaborating with
DOD on this issue. These discussions are still early in their
development, and if confirmed, I would look forward to working with the
interagency and the commercial sector to explore, evaluate, and
implement new approaches, simultaneously giving DOD access to leading
edge technologies while also meeting its security requirements.
5. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, what are the benefits and pitfalls of
such an approach?
Dr. Honey. Securing the DOD supply chain can best be achieved
through new approaches to overcoming the threat posed by our
adversaries. Sharing DOD's unique information where appropriate,
educating our commercial partners on proven best practices and
supporting them during implementation can deliver an effective,
affordable and scalable solution. However, to be successful, this new
approach will require an unprecedented level of collaborative
engagement and commitment by DOD, the interagency, and commercial
industry. R&E leadership in particular would play a key role and if
confirmed, I would look forward to tackling this issue.
6. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, would building a trusted enclave that
is responsible for sensitive military technology make this a bigger
target to attackers than a traditional commercial facility? Why or why
not?
Dr. Honey. Having encountered this issue during my time in DOD and
in the Intelligence Community, it is very clear that the threats to our
supply chain are increasing exponentially and often in unexpected ways.
The key to tackling this problem is understanding the nature of the
threat, how it will evolve in the future and exploring a range of
effective, affordable and scalable counter-measures. Given the very
diverse nature of DOD's acquisitions, it is unlikely that there is a
one--size-fits-all approach to this problem, which means that a case-
by-case analysis will often be required. If confirmed, I would look
forward to working with the stakeholder community to develop and deploy
the best available solutions.
7. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, DOD has many microelectronics
requirements to support capabilities that are currently in acquisition,
operations, and sustainment needs. The current focus of activity seems
to be on next generation capabilities and science and technology
programs. What is your plan and funding to support all parts of the DOD
microelectronics ecosystem and meet near and mid-term defense systems
requirements?
Dr. Honey. In my experience as a DOD program manager and
contractor, it is often the case that state-of-the-art microelectronics
do not meet all of the DOD's needs, especially in cases such as legacy
systems, power electronics, radio frequency, and other applications. If
confirmed, I do commit to advancing a balanced research program that
prioritizes those technologies that provide the best solutions so as to
address all parts of the DOD microelectronics ecosystem at all times
during each weapons systems' lifecycle.
8. Senator Reed. Dr. Honey, Congress has mandated that DOD
establish a national network for microelectronics research that will
serve to connect university researchers, small businesses, defense
contractors, and commercial manufacturers and users of advanced
microelectronics into an integrated enterprise to promote rapid
innovation and development of dual-use domestic microelectronics
production capabilities. What is your vision for this network and what
steps will you take to establish this network?
Dr. Honey. I strongly support the proposed national network, and
have seen in my earlier DOD assignments the many benefits that such
collaborations can deliver. The key to ensuring success of such an
endeavor lies in understanding the differing and unique characteristics
that each community requires in the development of dual-use
capabilities. While the final applications may differ, finding common
ground on the underlying technology developments will bring together
the best of commercial and DOD interests. It is paramount that the full
spectrum of commercial and DOD industrial developers participate and
conduct their own unique experimentation and prototyping, so as to
ensure all tech transfer and Valley of Death challenges are
appropriately addressed. As the leader of such an effort, it is
important that R&E build source selection teams with representatives
from the Service Laboratories, program offices, user community,
prototyping and experimentation organizations, and other DOD
acquisition offices. R&E should also, to the maximum extent
practicable, engage Service contracting offices and rely upon Service
Contracting Technical Representatives to oversee this effort, thus
building support for and understanding of the program's goals and
objectives. If confirmed, I would look forward to building the
stakeholder community and guiding the implementation and operation of
this network.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
advanced manufacturing
9. Senator King. Dr. Honey, over my time in public service, I have
been fortunate enough to work with researchers and scientists at the
University of Maine and have witnessed firsthand the innovative
research and development projects they are conducting at the
University's Advanced Structures and Composites Center. As you may
know, the Advanced Structures and Composites Center boasts the world's
largest 3D printer, and has developed a wide range of capabilities--
from offshore wind technology to the world's first 3D printed boat.
There are numerous opportunities that exist for the Department to
leverage these capabilities in future warfighting. Can you expand on
how you think the Department should prioritize and further develop
emerging technologies like advanced manufacturing, and how we can
continue to partner and cooperate with cutting-edge research
institutions like the University of Maine?
Dr. Honey. Emerging technologies are the foundation upon which
future DOD capabilities are developed. They provide new ways to more
efficiently tackle existing challenges, and create opportunities for
the development and deployment of unanticipated capabilities for our
warfighters. An excellent example can be found in additive
manufacturing, which offers DOD supply chain agility while also
enabling the defense industrial base to affordably sustain
technologically advanced weapons systems. Prioritizing and supporting
the development of emerging technologies is an area where R&E can make
a significant contribution. Because so many emerging technologies are
the direct result of breakthroughs in basic and applied sciences, our
university-based research community is often the best place to pursue
such developments. In addition to engaging universities directly
through R&D programs, linking these developments to commercial
companies through activities such as the DOD's Manufacturing Institutes
can further accelerate adoption of these important technical
advancements.
procurement technical assistance center
10. Senator King. Dr. Honey, the Procurement Technical Assistance
Center (PTAC) is a wonderful program having a huge impact assisting
Maine businesses with navigating Department of Defense (DOD)
contracting. PTAC organizationally is shifting from oversight under the
Defense Logistics Agency to the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for
Research and Engineering (R&E) as directed by Congress. Can you give an
update of the status of this move, and how can we continue to utilize
programs like this to ensure we are leveraging our assets properly in
emerging technologies?
Dr. Honey. The Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTACs),
which form a nationwide network acting on the behalf of DOD, are a key
resource for DOD in ensuring broader access to new industrial
suppliers. Many of the most impactful emerging technologies are
increasingly being developed outside of the normal channels to which
DOD has had access, so the PTACs are important means by which DOD can
meet its developmental needs. While I am not at this time aware of the
plans or the details of the shift in oversight responsibilities, I do
commit if confirmed to get briefed on this issue and to provide an
update on its status. It is important that this transition occur
smoothly and with minimal disruption to the program.
11. Senator King. Dr. Honey, while programs like PTAC are great for
helping to alleviate some of the current stop gaps and chokepoints in
the acquisition process, they would not be necessary if we were able to
get at the root of the problem. We have had plenty of testimony before
this Committee acknowledging the fact that we are not currently
operating in a way that most efficiently and effectively allows the
Department to acquire and develop technology. But we haven't yet been
able to identify and implement concrete solutions. This will be
especially important as we seek to keep pace with China in accordance
with our new strategy of ``integrated strategic deterrence''. If
confirmed, what specific changes to these processes would you seek to
implement?
Dr. Honey. In my experience, both in the DOD and in the private
sector, the DOD has missed opportunities to prevent these types of
problems when it fails to proactively engage its industrial partners on
a timely and continuing basis. Often our partners find out much too
late the challenges that DOD faces and the types of solutions it is
considering, which in turn precludes new and innovative solutions.
There are many opportunities for DOD to initiate quality dialog and
inform the R&D community what has been learned about the threat, US
capability gaps, and new opportunities for solutions. If confirmed, I
would support DOD conducting these types of activities, and would look
forward to hearing ideas from interested parties on investments the DOD
should pursue, as well as how best to organize and benefit from the
changing landscape of new potential partners.
12. Senator King. Dr. Honey, what do you see as the biggest causal
factor, and how can we go about rectifying this in the coming years?
Dr. Honey. In my experience, the DOD must do a better job of
expeditiously informing our partners the details of the threats we face
and our capability gaps. Too often the DOD focuses on its preferred
solutions, and in doing so, shuts down any offering of the innovative
solutions that would otherwise be submitted. The DOD must commit to
sharing its information with its industrial partners as much as
possible, and must remain open to receiving new ideas, objectively
evaluating these ideas, and providing feedback in order to meet its
most pressing challenges. Encouraging organizations at all levels to
engage in experimentation, prototyping, and risk-taking will help
create the enterprise-wide culture needed to succeed.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
small business
13. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, I was pleased to hear you mention
your previous engagement with the Small Business Innovation Research
program at the Department of Defense (DOD); I believe DOD hasn't been
as successful in the past as they could be with engaging with small
businesses. If confirmed, how do you plan to increase small business
participation under your jurisdiction, specifically in rural areas of
our country?
Dr. Honey. Having previously worked at a small business which
participated in the DOD Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program, I have seen firsthand the challenges such businesses face. It
is an even bigger challenge for those performers who are in more rural
areas and are not in close proximity to either DOD facility or larger
tech transfer partners. To address these issues, the DOD must get more
creative in using its existing tools, and in establishing and
supporting Private-Public-Partnerships (PPPs). For example, DOD and its
contracting officers must understand the constraints under which small
businesses operate. Most small businesses do not have the production
line of a large contractor to generate significant revenue, which means
that the various DOD organizations must be aggressively responsive in
fulfilling payments to small businesses. In some cases, the needs of
the small business community should be prioritized ahead of larger
contract actions in order to ensure that these smaller companies do not
experience financial hardship. It can also be a challenge for small
businesses to obtain and maintain a facility clearance in order to
perform classified R&D, and the DOD must commit to solving these types
of problems. It is also important that DOD continue to be very
proactive in its participation in and support of the Procurement
Technical Assistance Program (PTAP), the Procurement Technical
Assistance Centers (PTACs) and the local business organizations which
serve as a bridge between the DOD and its small business partners.
14. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, have you worked with the Office of
Small Business Programs at DOD in the past, and if so can you tell me
about that experience? I ask because I included language in this year's
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to streamline small business
engagement underneath that office to ensure DOD is coordinating
outreach.
Dr. Honey. I have in the past worked both with the Office of Small
Business Programs at DOD and with other small business offices at other
locations. I have always been impressed with enthusiasm and devotion of
the staffs in all of these organizations. The staff in these offices
are very effective advocates for small business and go above and beyond
in order to help these companies succeed. While I am not familiar the
specific NDAA language referenced, I am aware that the Committee also
believes there is room for improvement. If confirmed, I will get
briefed on this activity to better understand how it can help the small
business community.
research and development
15. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, you mention in your testimony the
``Valley of Death'' that exists between research and development (R&D)
programs and programs of record that make their way into the hands of
the warfighter. How do you plan to address this problem generally for
the R&D programs in each of our Services?
Dr. Honey. In my experience, programs that successfully navigate
the Valley of Death do so because tech transition was a key part of the
planning and funding from the earliest stage of the R&D effort. All of
the stakeholders must be participants at every stage, and it must truly
be a team effort if it is to succeed. The researchers must be able to
explain the technology, how it works, the development and testing
schedules, the plan for manufacturing, anticipated performance, and the
sustainability issues. The test community must ensure that the
researchers get adequate feedback, and that the acquisition and user
communities have confidence in the results. It is imperative that the
program offices plan for the tech adoption, that the industrial partner
has early samples for integration studies, and that the users consider
how the new technology can benefit their operational concepts. R&E in
particular should serve as the organizer of these teams, and facilitate
their formation and ongoing activities. The stakeholder community today
is keenly aware of the need to use new technologies to gain a
competitive edge for the warfighter, and if confirmed, I would look
forward to help lead these teams.
16. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, I am particularly worried that we
are losing our competitive advantage on Artificial Intelligence (AI).
The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has a
number of funding recommendations through the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Office of Naval Research's Adaptive
Future Force program are two programs I am following very closely. Are
you familiar with these programs specifically, and if not can you
commit to be briefed on them within 60 days of your confirmation?
Dr. Honey. The National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence (NSCAI) has performed a great service in conducting this
study. I look forward to, and do commit, to getting a detailed briefing
on these programs within 60 days if confirmed.
cybersecurity
17. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, in your advance policy questions,
you mention the transformative nature of cyber technology development,
the need for increased cyber resiliency, and the efforts we must take
to maintain cyber expertise in our manpower. Specifically, how do you
plan to use your position, if confirmed, to ensure our military
maintains and widens our cyber capability versus threats such as China,
Russia, North Korea, and cybercrime organizations?
Dr. Honey. The cyber domain is already a heavily contested
environment in which we must compete and dominate if we are to ensure
our national security. For our adversaries, these activities not only
give them an opportunity to undermine our efforts, it also provides
them with many of the tools they need to subdue their own populace. It
is imperative that DOD maintain a robust cybersecurity development
portfolio which includes research, product development, and an
aggressive plan of continual testing and red-teaming. These efforts
must be informed by intelligence reports and estimates from across the
Intelligence Community. The tools that are developed must leverage the
best that Artificial Intelligence has to offer, as the scope of our
adversaries' efforts exceed our ability to use solely human operators
as an effective countermeasure. If confirmed, I would use my position
in R&E to bring together the stakeholder community to better share
information, resources, and solutions to ensure that the DOD acts
jointly and effectively.
18. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, do you view this role as strictly
developing hardware for use in the cyber domain, or do you plan to
pursue software development as well?
Dr. Honey. The contested cyber domain that we face today and into
the future is one in which both hardware and software are intrinsically
linked. We cannot focus on just one or the other and expect to succeed.
This domain poses unique systems and mission integration challenges
which require a detailed knowledge of the interactions of hardware and
software together as a system.
19. Senator Manchin. Dr. Honey, as you pursue these goals in the
cyber domain, do you plan to reach out to the operational experts like
Lieutenant General Stephen Fogarty and his successor at Army Cyber
Command?
Dr. Honey. If confirmed, I plan to engage all of the stakeholders
across DOD, to include U.S. Army Cyber Command. I would also seek to
engage our partners in the Intelligence Community and other inter-
agency organizations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
microelectronics
20. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, as foreign sources of
microelectronics increase, the risks across the supply chain multiply,
diminishing visibility into the design, manufacturing, packaging,
testing, and distribution of these devices with consequences for
security, safety, and reliability. The Department of Defense needs
access to the best microelectronics ecosystem without fear of
disruption from nefarious actors, foreign adversaries, or natural
disasters, which is why Congress included section 224 in the Fiscal
Year 2020 NDAA. Under section 224, the Department of Defense must
establish trusted supply chain and operational security standards for
the purchase of microelectronics through a risk-based approach, a
requirement that has not yet been implemented. Wouldn't you agree that
excluding the majority of the devices that the Department of Defense
uses from trusted supply chain and operational security standards
undermines the effectiveness of the section 224 requirements contrary
to congressional intent?
Dr. Honey. I am in complete agreement that excluding these devices
undermines the effectiveness of Section 224. From my time in DOD and in
the Intelligence Community, I am keenly aware of the threats to our
supply chain, and I am grateful for Congress's attention to this
critical national security issue.
21. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, do you commit to ensuring section
224 implementation covers design, fabrication, package, and test for
custom chips, printed circuit boards, commercial off the shelf chips,
and guaranteed long term access strategies?
Dr. Honey. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring Section 224
implementation covers design, fabrication, package, and test for custom
chips, printed circuit boards, commercial off the shelf chips, and
guaranteed long term access strategies.
22. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, in recent years, research and
engineering (R&E) has narrowly focused on microelectronics using state-
of-the-art lithography, ignoring the overwhelming majority of
microelectronics end uses for defense systems to the detriment of our
national defense. R&E has failed to take a holistic approach that
considers the best technologies for applications irrespective of node
size, many of which like power and radio frequency (RF) do not and
cannot perform effectively at single digit nodes. Defense systems
require the best size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-C) solutions
regardless of lithography generation. If confirmed, will you commit to
advancing a balanced research program that prioritizes the technologies
that provide the best size, weight, power, and cost solutions
irrespective of lithography node?
Dr. Honey. I agree that state-of-the-art microelectronics does not
meet all of the DOD's needs, especially in cases such as legacy
systems, power electronics, RF, and other applications. If confirmed, I
do commit to advancing a balanced research program that prioritizes the
technologies that provide the best size, weight, power, and cost
solutions irrespective of lithography node.
23. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, do you commit to leveraging and
upgrading systems that use differentiated microelectronics built using
a range of lithography processes?
Dr. Honey. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to leveraging and upgrading
systems that use differentiated microelectronics built using a range of
lithography processes.
quantifiable assurance
24. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, the Research and Engineering office
has been promoting something called ``zero trust'' or ``quantifiable
assurance'' for microelectronics. Unlike in software and cybersecurity,
this concept is not yet proven for hardware and microelectronics. It is
not clear that people know how to do this yet. Even if further
developed, quantifiable assurance would be a tool that adds a layer of
security, not a standalone solution because of its inability to address
the location and workforce aspects of the supply chain. Unfortunately,
prematurely changing the way DOD buys microelectronics could drive
massive increases to acquisition programs without adding any value.
What is your view on the maturity of quantifiable assurance?
Dr. Honey. I am in complete agreement with these concerns and have
been quite vocal about these very issues in previous inter-agency
meetings, especially while serving in my most recent tour in the
Intelligence Community. While I am not presently engaged with the
development of quantifiable assurance and so cannot speak to its
current status, I have not yet seen any empirical data or other
evidence which suggests it is ready for deployment. I will, if
confirmed, make this one of my highest priorities because a self-
inflicted misstep in this area could have dire consequences.
25. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, will you commit to work closely with
the acquisition community to understand the cost of systems?
Dr. Honey. Yes, if confirmed I commit to working work closely with
the acquisition community to understand the cost of systems. In my
experience, one of the biggest cost drivers has been lack of technology
readiness and R&E can help the acquisition community to overcome these
types of problems.
26. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, since quantifiable assurance is
still in multi-year development and not yet proven or implemented, how
will the Department of Defense ensure warfighter access to
microelectronics immediately and without delay?
Dr. Honey. In my current and previous assignments, I have been
engaged with inter-agency organizations to address this problem, and if
confirmed, I will make this one of my highest priorities because a
self-inflicted misstep in this area could have dire consequences. The
inter-agency has uncovered strong interest in addressing this problem
from a variety of commercial vendors, and if confirmed, I commit to
organizing the stakeholders to facilitate these types of partnerships.
I would also welcome the opportunity to further discuss this critically
important issue with the Committee.
supply and access
27. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, this country is finally starting to
wake up to the need for robust domestic microelectronics manufacturing
capacity. The United States' defense systems cannot be reliant on chips
manufactured in countries like China. Is it acceptable for Defense
National Security systems to be assembled with parts from potential
adversaries?
Dr. Honey. No, it is not acceptable. If confirmed, rectifying this
issue will be one of my highest priorities.
28. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, if depending on potential
adversaries is not right, what actions will you take to reduce
dependence on foreign produced chips and promote a robust domestic
industrial base?
Dr. Honey. In my previous and current positions, I have been a
participant in inter-agency working groups that have been trying to
solve this problem. Strong DOD leadership is needed to address this
issue, and if confirmed, I will work to organize and support all of the
stakeholders to secure and promote a robust domestic industrial base.
29. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, are you committed to changing the
way R&E operates?
Dr. Honey. Yes, I am strongly committed to changing the way R&E
operates. Having served three times in R&E, to include when it was part
of OUSD(AT&L), I am keenly aware of what it takes to make R&E a valued
team member and contributor. If confirmed, I will consult with and
support Under Secretary Shyu in making any necessary changes.
30. Senator Tillis. Dr. Honey, instead of looking for the lowest
cost by having chips fabricated in foreign foundries subject to
significant geopolitical risks or natural disasters, are you committed
to R&E increasing fabrication in the United States and supporting the
strength, security, and resiliency of our domestic industrial base?
Dr. Honey. Yes. I am absolutely committed to R&E increasing
fabrication in the United States and supporting the strength, security,
and resiliency of our domestic industrial base, and if confirmed, this
will be one of my highest priorities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
armed forces readiness
31. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Honey, over several years this Committee
has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness--across each of our
Services--to levels that would enable our success in a conflict. We've
had some success, but there is still a lot of work to do. If you have
not done so already, I recommend that every senior defense leader read
T.R. Fehrenbach's ``This Kind of War'', which provides a cautionary
tale of our Nation's failure to adequately fund and train our Armed
Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were steep and American
servicemembers paid with their lives. If confirmed, all of you--based
on your positions--will invariably make decisions that directly or
indirectly impact readiness. Accordingly, will you commit--if
confirmed--to work with this Committee and within the Department on
further bolstering military readiness to ensure the failures we endured
in the Korean War never happen again?
Dr. Honey. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to doing so.
strategy driven budget
32. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Honey, Ms. Fulton, the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed
Secretaries of Defense (SECDEF), and the previous and current Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) have all stated the need for
sustained 3-5 percent annual real growth to the defense budget to
implement the NDS, increase readiness, and advance long-overdue
modernization. Further emphasizing the need for consistent and
increased funding, the NDS Commission report stated, ``America is very
near the point of strategic insolvency, where its `means' are badly out
of alignment with its `ends'.'' This critical situation is negatively
compounded by the Biden administration's dismal defense topline that
does not keep pace with inflation. With these facts in mind, and
understanding your ability to influence the budget will be limited to
future year submissions, will each of you commit to advocating for a
strategy-driven budget vice a budget-driven strategy?
Dr. Honey. Answer for Dr. Honey: Yes. I commit to advocating for a
strategy-driven budget, and will base my recommendations on the gaps we
face in our capabilities and on the solutions that best make use of the
resources at our disposal.
missile defense
33. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Honey, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
stated that, ``[d]efense of the Homeland is a key priority for DOD and
missile defense is a central component of this mission.'' Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks agreed by saying, ``[d]efense of
the Homeland is a top priority for DOD and the Homeland missile defense
system is an essential component to that mission.'' Do you agree with
the statements made by Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks?
Dr. Honey. Yes. I agree with and support the statements made by
Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks.
34. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Honey, do you support robust funding for
missile defense modernization?
Dr. Honey. Yes. I support robust funding for missile defense
modernization.
35. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Honey, how does missile defense
contribute to our national security?
Dr. Honey. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is a key pillar of our
national security enterprise. It provides unequaled value through its
mission to develop and deploy a layered Missile Defense System to
defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends from
missile attacks in all phases of flight. MDA and its capabilities serve
as a powerful deterrent to our adversaries.
36. Dr. Honey, in Admiral Philip Davidson's statement for the
record--presented to this committee during the U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (INDOPACOM) posture hearing--he highlighted that, ``. . . North
Korea will remain our most immediate threat.'' Admiral Davidson went on
to State, ``Pyongyang maintains a diverse and growing missile
inventory, and North Korea unveiled several new ballistic systems . . .
including two SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missile] and an ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile].'' He concluded that,
``Pyongyang's missile research and development efforts . . . are
consistent with the regime's stated objective of being able to strike
the U.S. Homeland.'' Provided this characterization, and the very real
and growing missile threat posed by North Korea, will you commit to
prioritizing and accelerating modernization and fielding of our
Homeland missile defense systems to include the next generation
interceptor?
Dr. Honey. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and accelerating
modernization and fielding of our Homeland missile defense systems, to
include the next generation interceptor.
cyber survivability
37. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Honey, earlier this year, Dr. Raymond
O'Toole testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
Readiness. In his statement for the record, he highlighted that
``virtually none of the programs assessed in fiscal year 2020 were
survivable against relevant cyber threats.'' This is deeply concerning
to me given the role of cyber in today's and tomorrow's strategic
environment. If confirmed, how will you assist the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering in addressing this critical
national security issue?
Dr. Honey. Assuring that all of our weapons systems can safely and
effectively operate through a sustained cyberattack is a key challenge
for the DOD, and building the capability to do so must be a part of
every R&D effort right from the start. If confirmed, I will assist
Under Secretary Shyu in assuring R&D stakeholders have the relevant
threat information, and that each effort endeavors to build in the
right protections at the beginning of the development program. I will
also assist in ensuring Department test and evaluation capabilities
meet the needs of this critical challenge.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
oak ridge national laboratory
38. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Honey, what are some near-, mid-, and
long-term capabilities that you want to see to emerge out of ongoing
quantum information science (QIS) research within our national labs?
Dr. Honey. QIS is an important area of research for the DOD and a
near-, mid-, and long-term portfolio approach is best suited to this
topic. From a long-term basic science perspective, it is important that
we invest in new advances in fundamental, material science and device
fabrication in order to overcome environmental and performance
limitations of the current state-of-the-art. Given the performance of
existing components and subsystems, our mid-term goals should focus on
implementation and understanding the performance, limitations, and
future directions of systems integration and engineering. In the near-
term, the results from prototyping and experimentation with existing
systems and algorithms focused on real-world problems will help inform
the next series of investment choices for DOD's basic science programs.
39. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Honey, how closely linked is DOD to the
overall QIS research ecosystem and where do you see its role within our
national security enterprise?
Dr. Honey. In my experience, DOD is deeply engaged with the broader
QIS research ecosystem and has previously been responsible for many of
the key investments in this field. DOD must stay engaged in promoting
research in this area, following the efforts of other US agencies and
also must maintain awareness of developments by non-US entities.
40. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Honey, where is the United States in
relation to China and Russia in the race to develop and deploy QIS?
Dr. Honey. QIS R&D is an active area of investment worldwide. While
the United States continues to operate at the forefront, our
adversaries are very active and will continue to press for leadership
in this important capability.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
taiwan
41. Senator Hawley. Dr. Honey, Admiral Philip Davidson, former
Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, and Admiral John Aquilino, current
Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, have warned that China might attempt
a fait accompli against Taiwan much sooner than previously anticipated,
potentially as soon as 2027. Yet many of the Department's modernization
efforts aren't expected to pay off until the 2030's. Do you agree with
Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and every other DOD leader
that I've asked that we must maintain our ability to deny a Chinese
fait accompli against Taiwan?
Dr. Honey. Yes. I agree asked that we must maintain our ability to
deny a PRC fait accompli against Taiwan.
42. Senator Hawley. Dr. Honey, do you agree that this is something
we have to be worried in this decade, not just in the 2030's and
beyond?
Dr. Honey. Yes. I agree that this is something we have to be
worried about in this decade, not just in the 2030's and beyond.
43. Senator Hawley. Dr. Honey, if confirmed, what specifically will
you do to accelerate the DOD research enterprise's work on solutions
for this decade, not just the 2030's and beyond?
Dr. Honey. If confirmed, I would assist Under Secretary Shyu in
analyzing the performance gaps in our war plans, identifying those gaps
for which solutions could be rapidly developed, and help construct
research, experimentation, and prototyping plans to accelerate
deployment of the highest priority capabilities. I would also assist
Under Secretary Shyu in forming the stakeholder teams so as to ensure
that the right solutions are accelerated, the acquisition community is
ready to accept them, and forces supporting U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
are able to train and deploy these new weapons systems.
______
[The nomination reference of Dr. David A. Honey, follows:]
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[The biographical sketch of Dr. David A. Honey, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
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[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. David A.
Honey in connection with his nomination follows:]
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[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
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[The nomination of Dr. David A. Honey was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Reed on October 21, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 16, 2022.]
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[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Brenda S. Fulton by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(ASD(M&RA))?
Answer. It is my understanding that, if confirmed as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, I will serve as
the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on all matters regarding
military and civilian personnel programs and policies, Reserve
Component affairs and integration, military community and family
policy, and Total Force manpower issues. The ASD(M&RA) also has direct
oversight and responsibility for the Defense Commissary Agency and the
Department of Defense Education Activity.
Question. What background and experience do you have that qualify
you for this position?
Answer. Across my career, I have accumulated a breadth of
leadership experience, having served in the military, worked in the
private sector, launched and led nonprofit organizations, and, in my
present capacity, served in State government.
In my current job, we transformed a hidebound, primarily analog
system where customers ``stand in line to stand in line'' for in-person
services to a mostly automated regime where about 80 percent of
transactions are available online, and in-person services are governed
by appointments, text reminders, and an automated queuing system.
I have worked with senior military leaders in every branch on
multiple initiatives to increase diversity in the force, expanding
opportunities for women, LGBT Americans, and Black Americans. In every
case, my guiding light was an effort to improve our ability to fight
and win wars.
In my 8 years on the West Point Board of Visitors, five of them
serving as Chair or Vice Chair, I had the good fortune to work with Lt.
Gen. Bob Caslen, my friend Rep. Steve Womack, and other Board members
in fighting sexual harassment and assault; expanding the diversity of
our entering classes; and most of all, centering character development
as a way to deliver the Army the best leaders possible.
As an Army veteran and West Point graduate, I deeply love our Armed
Forces and the values we represent, and will strive to continue to make
those forces stronger, smarter, and more effective--the envy of the
world.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the ASD(M&RA), and how would you address them, if confirmed?
Answer. Our military faces an incredibly dynamic threat
environment, with disruptive technologies and powerful adversaries. I
believe that the primary challenge in this role will be to deliver a
smarter force. That means attracting smart people--and retaining our
best talent.
We know from research that smart, talented, innovative people want
to work in places where they are (a) given challenging, meaningful
opportunities that align with their talents; (b) part of a diverse and
inclusive environment; and (c) led by leaders of character.
That means we must also make significant progress in ending sexual
harassment and assault in the military.
And if we are to retain those people, especially in the military
ranks, we must do a better job taking care of their families.
I believe these are our greatest challenges, and if confirmed, I
will do everything within my power to succeed against them.
civilian control of the military
Question. If confirmed, how would you use your position to adhere
to and further the fundamental principle of civilian control of the
armed forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as a principal advisor to the
Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness on matters regarding military and civilian personnel
programs and policies, Reserve Component affairs and integration,
military community and family policy, and Total Force manpower issues.
I will, if confirmed, strive to provide sound guidance and
recommendations regarding the impact of policies and decisions on the
Department's workforce, both civilian and military, the Reserve
Component and our military families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure your inclusion in the
discussion, debate, and resolution of U.S. defense and national
security issues?
Answer. Our military and civilian personnel are vital to achieving
the Department's mission. Since nearly all decisions made regarding
U.S. defense and national security impact them, it is necessary to
include the ASD(M&RA) when discussions or debates related to personnel
occur. If confirmed, I will actively engage on matters within my
portfolio and provide the best information and advice possible.
personnel policy implementation
Question. If confirmed, what personnel policies and processes would
you implement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of human
resources management--both military and civilian--across the
Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I would first seek to learn much more about
the pressing challenges that face our people before taking any action.
We must always strive for a smarter, stronger, more effective force; it
is my opinion that we attract and retain talent by taking care of our
people and their families, by offering challenging and meaningful
opportunities, fostering a diverse and inclusive environment, and
putting leaders of character in place at every level. However, I
believe in making decisions based on evidence and data, and if
confirmed, I would seek the best information before pushing for change.
Question. What is your understanding of your responsibility, if
confirmed, to inform and consult with this Committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress, on the implementation of personnel
policies directed by law?
Answer. My understanding is that, if confirmed, I will implement
all personnel policies in my area of responsibility as directed by law,
and be responsive to this and other congressional committees on
requests for information and reporting requirements, as appropriate.
non-deployable servicemembers
Question. In your view, should servicemembers who are non-
deployable for more than 12 consecutive months be subject either to
separation from the service or referral to the Disability Evaluation
System, as is current Department policy?
Answer. I understand that it is Department policy to maximize the
lethality and readiness of the joint force and all Servicemembers are
expected to be deployable. It is also my understanding that
Servicemembers who are considered non-deployable for more than 12
consecutive months require a retention determination from their
Military Department, not mandatory separation. In my view these
individuals should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if
continued service is appropriate.
Question. Under what circumstances would the retention of a
servicemember who has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be
``in the best interest of the service''?
Answer. I would expect the Secretaries of the Military Departments
to evaluate each individual on a case-by-case basis. Considerations
should include the individual's ability to perform appropriate military
duties commensurate with his/her office, grade, rank or skill as well
as the likelihood that the Servicemember will resolve the condition or
reason that is the underlying cause of the non-deployable status.
Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to
servicemembers with HIV?
Answer. In my view, Servicemembers should be evaluated individually
on a case-by-case basis; impartial treatment, regardless of the medical
condition at issue, is critical.
The new Department of Defense policy on service by transgender
persons, as set forth in DOD Instruction 1300.28, provides that ``any
determination that a transgender Servicemember is non-deployable at any
time will be consistent with established Military Department and
Service standards, as applied to other Servicemembers whose
deployability is similarly affected in comparable circumstances
unrelated to gender transition.''
Question. Please provide an example of a ``comparable
circumstance'' that would be used to determine deployability of a
transgender servicemember.
Answer. It would not be appropriate for me to speculate at this
time as this is a very individualized policy. If confirmed, I am
committed to ensuring Servicemembers are treated fairly, in an
environment affording everyone dignity and respect.
Question. On average, how long should a commander of a
servicemember undergoing a gender transition expect that servicemember
to be non-deployable?
Answer. I do not think it is appropriate to speculate on the
timeline as every case is highly individualized. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely on this matter with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs and medical professionals within the
Department.
Question. In your view, should a servicemember's readiness to
perform the required specific missions, functions, and tasks in the
context of a particular deployment also be considered in determining
whether that servicemember is deployable?
Answer. I do not have enough information to provide a thorough
assessment at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Military Departments to review policies and procedures as appropriate
to ensure the lethality and readiness of the joint force.
Question. What are your ideas for addressing the challenges of
medical non-deployability in the Reserve components?
Answer. I do not currently have access to DOD data regarding the
challenges of medical non-deployability in the Reserve components. If
confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Military Departments
to address any challenges that are identified.
diversity and inclusion
Question. In general, what is your assessment of the diversity of
the U.S. armed forces and of the DOD civilian workforce?
Answer. It is my understanding that, although there is room for
improvement, the Department and the Military Departments continue to
work toward improving diversity through a number of ongoing
initiatives. If confirmed, I will continue to support and, where
necessary, expand diversity initiatives to achieve greater
representation in the Armed Forces and the DOD civilian workforce.
Question. According to researchers at the RAND Corporation, African
American and Hispanic youth are less likely to be eligible for military
service than white and Asian Americans. Why do you think this is the
case?
Answer. I am not familiar with the referenced RAND study. I
believe, however, that although eligibility standards should be based
on operational requirements, these standards should be as broad and
inclusive as possible.
Question. In your judgment, should military accession and
commissioning standards be modified to achieve racial diversity goals?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the qualification standards should ensure our
military force remains unmatched in the world and that individuals who
join can meet the high standards and demands the mission requires.
These standards should ensure we are able to recruit the best and
brightest of America's youth while also ensuring our armed forces are
diverse and representative of the society they serve.
Question. If confirmed, how would you increase diversity and
inclusion in the armed forces, and work toward the goal of ensuring
that the Nation's military, at all levels, especially within the senior
officer ranks, reflects the broad diversity of the nation?
Answer. I understand that the diversity and inclusion initiatives
that the Department and the Military Departments are currently working
on underscore the Department's commitment to diversity, including in
senior ranks. I believe these initiatives will provide a framework to
remove barriers and facilitate greater diversity in all ranks. If
confirmed, I will continue to support and, where necessary, expand
these initiatives to help improve the diversity among senior leaders.
Question. If confirmed, how would you increase diversity and
inclusion within the Department's civilian workforce, especially at the
senior General Schedule and Senior Executive Service levels?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support and seek to expand, if
necessary, current diversity initiatives to achieve greater
representation at the senior General Schedule and Senior Executive
levels.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
increase geographical diversity in the armed forces, especially from
areas of the country and local communities that are currently
underrepresented?
Answer. Unfortunately, many of today's youth do not have family or
other mentor connections to the military that promote an understanding
of what military service offers. This is particularly true in more
remote and isolated communities. I believe broad, expansive
communication efforts and strategic messaging are a crucial part of
educating all youth about the opportunities that come with military
service. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure proactive engagement
with community leaders to ensure accurate perceptions of military
service and the significant opportunities it provides.
extremism
Question. What is your view of the prevalence and effect of
extremism within the armed forces?
Answer. It is my view that the majority of military personnel and
civilian employees take their Oath to the U.S. Constitution seriously
and serve our Nation honorably. Unfortunately, there may be a small
number of individuals who choose to align themselves with extremist
ideologies and have an outsized impact among the Force. This has no
place in our military and should not be tolerated.
Question. If confirmed, what would you direct the Military Services
to do to eliminate extremism within the ranks?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put into action the recommendations
and best practices from the Department's review of this issue this past
summer. As I understand, that work focused on improvements to policy,
training and education, and screening processes to prevent and respond
to any emergent threats.
The current DOD policy on ``Handling Dissident and Protest
Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces'' prohibits servicemembers
from ``active participation'' in organizations ``that advocate
supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes;
including those that attempt to create illegal discrimination based on
race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin . . .
.''
Question. Do you believe that servicemembers who are active
participants in religious or political groups that advocate for
socially conservative changes to laws related to marriage and gender
should be punished, counseled, or prohibited from military service?
Answer. I believe that Servicemembers, as long as they act within
the confines of Federal law and DOD policy, should be allowed to
exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech and to observe the
tenets of their religion.
military service academies
Question. What is your assessment of the diversity of cadets and
midshipmen in the Military Service Academies? What measures can be
taken to increase diversity in the Academies?
Answer. Diversity within the officer corps is essential to both the
Department's current mission and to developing our future leaders.
Accordingly, it is imperative to ensure diverse talent is found within
the applicant pool and student population of our accession programs,
such as the Military Service Academies. While I was on the Board of
Visitors for West Point, I was a strong advocate for increasing
diversity in the incoming classes. I understand the value of increasing
DOD's minority and female accession rates to maintaining a strong and
lethal force. If confirmed, I will strive to improve DOD's marketing,
recruitment, and community partnership efforts to help the Military
Service Academies establish a more diverse pool of applicants.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies
and processes in place across the Military Service Academies to prevent
sexual assault and sexual harassment, and to ensure that cadets and
midshipmen who do report assault or harassment are not subject to
retaliation--social ostracism and reputation damage--in particular?
Answer. Unfortunately, the Department has more work to do in the
prevention of sexual assault and harassment, as well as stopping all
forms of retaliation, including from peers and supervisors. If
confirmed, I will continue the work of the Department to ensure victims
feel comfortable coming forward to report sexual assault and harassment
without fear of retaliation. Furthermore, if confirmed I will work to
ensure the Military Service Academies appropriately address and prevent
all forms of unacceptable behaviors, including retaliatory behaviors.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of suicide
prevention programs at each Military Service Academy?
Answer. I know, from my time in the U.S. Army and my work with West
Point cadets, junior officers, and enlisted members, our youngest
troops are often at highest risk. We must carefully consider the cadet
and midshipmen population in the Department's efforts to address
suicide. I am committed to the welfare of our military community, which
includes the future leaders at our Military Service Academies. If
confirmed, I will work with my colleagues who oversee the suicide
prevention programs and assess their efficacy in my endeavor to care
for the military community at large, including cadets and midshipmen.
Question. Do you believe the current 5-year minimum Active Duty
service commitment for Military Service Academy graduates is sufficient
return on investment for the U.S. military and the American taxpayer?
Answer. As a graduate of West Point, I am familiar with the 5-year
minimum Active Duty service obligation for Military Service Academy
graduates that has been in effect for many years. If confirmed, I will
assess the existing service obligation policies to evaluate if the U.S.
military and American taxpayers are receiving an acceptable return on
their investment.
Question. In your view, do the Military Service Academies
contribute to the pool of military officer accessions commensurate with
their attendant costs? Why or why not?
Answer. I firmly believe the Military Service Academies produce
high-quality commissioned officers and leaders. If confirmed, I will
examine the resources provided to the Military Service Academies to
ensure they are efficiently used and maximized to the greatest benefit
for the Department and the Nation.
Question. Under what conditions would you deem it appropriate, if
confirmed, to permit a military officer to play professional sports
prior to completing at least two consecutive years of commissioned
service following graduation from the United States Military Academy?
Answer. I am aware that there has been a relatively small number of
talented cadets and midshipmen who have received approval to
participate in professional sports prior to serving at least two
consecutive years of commissioned service following their graduation
from a Military Service Academy. If confirmed, I will analyze the
current policy on professional sport participation for Military Service
Academy graduates, and will work with Department leadership to
determine if there is a need to propose changes to the Secretary
concerning the current policy.
senior reserve officers' training corps (srotc)
Question. In your view, does the Senior Reserve Officers' Training
Corps (SROTC) program remain a viable source of officer accessions?
Answer. It is my understanding that SROTC is the largest source of
commissioned officers. If confirmed, I will evaluate the Department's
policies and procedures to maximize efficiencies.
Question. What is your assessment of the diversity in our ROTC
programs? What measures can be taken to increase diversity in the ROTC?
Answer. SROTC units are hosted at a number of geographically and
culturally diverse institutions across the United States. It is my
understanding that these civilian institutions facilitate a diverse
cadet and midshipmen pool. If confirmed, I will evaluate those
institutions that draw from diverse and underrepresented populations
and strive to improve DOD's marketing, recruitment, and community
partnership efforts to encourage a more diverse applicant pool.
Question. In your view, should the Military Services continue to
operate SROTC units at colleges and universities that fail to meet
their minimum annual commissioning requirements? If not, please explain
the factors you believe should be used to determine which units should
be terminated.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review our policies concerning
SROTC units that may be having difficulty meeting annual commissioning
requirements, as well as examining the conditions and challenges faced
by such units. In consultation with Congress, I will explore ways to
get the best out of current SROTC programs and not lose representation
in certain geographical areas.
Question. How would you modify the SROTC scholarship program to
attract the top talent that our armed forces need to meet national
defense?
Answer. There are SROTC programs at some of the top-rated colleges
and universities in the United States. If confirmed, I will stress the
importance and value of recruiting efforts at every participating
college and university. In addition, I will encourage an increased
effort at some of the underused locations.
military compensation
Question. Do you agree that the primary purpose of a competitive
military pay and benefits package is to recruit and retain a military
of sufficient size and quality to meet national defense objectives?
Answer. Yes. Military pay and benefits have to be competitive with
salaries and benefits in the private sector so the Department can
recruit and retain the high-quality men and women the Nation needs to
the fill the ranks of its military.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current
military pay package in achieving this goal?
Answer. It is my understanding that today's military compensation
package is considered robust and compares very favorably with the
private-sector. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate the full
range of pay and benefits to ensure they are adequate to recruit and
retain the most talented people our country has to offer for service in
the Armed Forces.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current
military pay and benefits package, if confirmed?
Answer. I do not have any specific changes to military pay and
benefits that I'd recommend at this time. However, if confirmed, I will
be eager to work with Congress on issues surrounding military pay and
benefits and will be more than open to considering potential options
for change. Above all, however, my goal would be that we only seek
changes that maintain readiness, as well as our ability to recruit,
retain, and sustain the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. What specific recommendations do you have for controlling
rising military personnel costs, including entitlement spending?
Answer. I am aware that recent growth in military personnel costs
is an ongoing source of concern. I believe we have to look for
processes that improve efficiencies and support controlling costs. If
confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure any future military pay
or benefit change is justified and enhances our ability to recruit,
retain, and sustain the Force while remaining cost-efficient.
recruiting and retention
Question. In your view, what are the main reasons that less than 30
percent of 17 to 24-year-olds are eligible for military service, and
how would you propose increasing the size of that pool?
Answer. I am aware that some of the main reasons today's youth are
ineligible for military service are medical issues, such as obesity,
drug use, and past conduct issues, to include illegal activity and
associated proceedings. I believe that the low eligibility rates are a
national, not just a DOD, concern. If confirmed, I will work to improve
the recruiting pool. I believe the Department can improve the
propensity for military service among today's youth by working to
eliminate misperceptions, and reaffirming the value of military service
through positive messaging and strategic engagements.
Question. Similarly, why do you believe that the propensity of
youth to serve continues to drop and is at its lowest level (about 10
percent according to DOD data) in years?
Answer. My understanding is that the low propensity to serve is due
in large part to the increasing disconnect between civilians and the
military, misperceptions and lack of knowledge about military service,
and the shrinking Veteran population. If confirmed, I will focus on
shifting the views and perceived value of military service.
Question. Do you believe that non-native English speakers are
disadvantaged in qualifying for military service by the current testing
process?
Answer. The ability to communicate and understand the English
language is critical for success in the military. I understand that the
Military Services use recruiting programs directed at non-native
English speakers, providing them with the highest potential for
success. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Military
Services to ensure the Department utilizes the most modern assessment
tools that provide the broadest possible opportunity for today's youth.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address any such
disadvantages to increase the pool of eligible and interested youth?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department utilizes modern
marketing and advertising methods to reach a diverse and qualified pool
of eligible applicants and that eligibility standards result in optimum
fit between service demands and member capabilities.
Question. In your view, should existing medical and other
qualification standards be reconsidered to accommodate youth willing to
enlist for service in certain high--demand specialties, such as
remotely piloted aircraft pilots or the cyber workforce?
Answer. I am not familiar with the specific qualification standards
for military service but, if confirmed, I will work with the Military
Services to ensure that qualification standards are appropriate, while
still ensuring that Servicemembers can complete their required training
and deploy worldwide on a moment's notice to fight and win our Nation's
wars.
military accessions vital to national interest program
Question. In your view, did the benefits of the Military Accessions
Vital to National Interest Program (MAVNI)--recruiting and utilizing
those with critical skills vital to the national interest--outweigh the
costs to the Department associated with conducting security,
suitability, and reliability screenings of applicants?
Answer. It is my understanding that the MAVNI program mostly
provided the Military Services with critical language speakers and
those with various medical specialties. I am also aware that
legislation enacted in recent years greatly limits the use of such a
program, but the Department recruits large numbers of Lawful Permanent
Residents each year, greatly contributing to the diverse language
capabilities of the Department.
Question. In your view, was the program effective in helping the
Department to recruit for certain hard-to-fill specialties?
Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of the
program to answer this, but understand that lawful permanent residents
positively contribute to the Military Services and fill important
positions that are challenging for the Military Services to fill.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend reactivating the MAVNI
program and authorize the enlistment of new applicants? If so,
conditions would you impose on program operations, particularly as
regards applicant security, suitability, and reliability screening?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the history of the program and
look for ways in which we can effectively fill critical but
challenging-to-recruit vacancies within existing authorities. I am
aware that legislation enacted in recent years greatly limits the use
of such a program.
reserve components
Question. In your judgment, what has been the effect of increased
operational tempo on Reserve component recruiting and retention?
Answer. I understand the members of our Reserve Components have
responded admirably to the numerous missions they have supported around
the world and here at home; however, I am unaware of the impact of
those operational requirements on recruiting and retention. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Military Departments and
Services to ensure the Department can recruit and retain an effective
Reserve force.
Question. In your view, do the Reserve components serve as an
operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your
answer, should the Reserve components be supported by increased
training, improved equipment, and higher levels of overall resourcing
for readiness?
Answer. In my view, the Reserve Component is no longer solely a
strategic force and is increasingly relied on as part of the total
operational force. If confirmed, I will work with the Military
Departments and the Military Services to ensure the Reserve Component
is appropriately and equitably resourced with the equipment,
facilities, and training needed to meet total force requirements.
Question. In your view, what actions can be taken to improve
permeability between the active and Reserve components?
Answer. In my view, providing a continuity of service option
between the Active and Reserve Components improves recruiting and
retention of talent. If confirmed, I will review the current policies
to transition between the Active and Reserve Components to identify any
shortfalls and successes, and work with the Military Departments and
Services, as well as Congress, as appropriate, to improve permeability.
Question. In your view, are the current requirements for becoming a
Joint Qualified Officer appropriate for Reserve component officers? If
not, how should requirements be revised to better meet the needs of
Reserve component officers?
Answer. It is my understanding that officer careers are closely
managed to meet Military Department requirements. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure joint qualification requirements for both active and
Reserve component officers are reasonable and enhance an officer's
professional abilities.
Question. In your view, is the current professional military
educations system appropriate for the Reserve components? If not, what
changes would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the State of the professional
military education system for the Reserve Components to ensure that for
any areas not appropriate for Servicemembers in the Reserve force, we
work to make the necessary changes to the system. My review would also
seek to ensure that there are processes that allow for the continuous
improvement of professional military education system to meet the
unique considerations of Servicemembers in the Reserve Component.
military quality of life
Question. If confirmed, what qualify of life and morale, welfare,
and recreation (MWR) programs would you consider to be a priority?
Answer. If I am confirmed, programs that enhance the well-being and
resilience of Servicemembers and their families will be among my top
priorities. I support critical programs such as spouse education and
employment support; military family life counseling; MWR and resale
programs; fitness; and quality child care. In my view, these programs
enrich military family readiness, which is crucial to mission
readiness.
Question. What metric would you apply in determining which MWR and
quality of life programs should be sustained or enriched and which
should be eliminated or reduced in scope as ineffective or outmoded?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the metrics and measures for
essential MWR and quality of life programs. I will also review MWR
programs and funding policies to ensure they are adequately funded and
meet the needs of Servicemember and families. I believe these programs
are an essential part of maintaining Total Force fitness, because they
impact the readiness, recruitment, and retention of personnel and lead
to increased physical and mental well-being.
military family readiness and support
Question. What do you consider to be the most important family
readiness issues for servicemembers and their families?
Answer. My understanding is that spouse employment and child care
are two of the most important family readiness issues for
Servicemembers and their families. The lack of child care availability
and spouse unemployment, or underemployment, can have significant
negative impacts on the financial readiness of Servicemembers and their
families. In addition, these readiness issues may also lead to
retention problems, as they impact a family's satisfaction with
military life. If confirmed, I will work to address these crucial
issues.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that military families are provided with accessible, high-
quality childcare, at an appropriate cost?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure our military families
have access to affordable, quality child care. Child care is a critical
mission readiness issue and important to ensuring the economic
viability of military families. I will work with Department leadership,
as well as continuously seeking feedback from our military families, to
determine where challenges exist and find ways to improve this mission
critical service.
department of defense education activity, dod schools, and dependent
education (dodea)
Question. What is your assessment of the overall quality of DOD
schools?
Answer. In my view, DODEA schools provide an excellent education
that rivals the best public schools in the country. This should never
change because military dependents deserve the best education the
Department can provide.
Question. In your view, are DODEA's administrative overhead costs,
meaning its funding and employment above the school level, comparable
to those found in high quality public school districts in the United
States?
Answer. It is my understanding that DODEA has been subject to
Headquarters staffing reviews and reductions more than once. Although I
do not presently have access to the analysis, I am aware that DODEA's
overhead is now lower than that of comparable public school systems.
Question. Should the eligibility requirements for military
dependents to attend DOD schools be modified in any way, in your
opinion? If so, what modifications would you propose, if confirmed?
Answer. I do not currently know enough about DODEA eligibility
requirements to offer an informed opinion on potential modifications.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to ensure that DODEA
has the resources and authorities that may be needed in the future.
Question. What lasting impacts, if any, do you believe the COVID-19
pandemic will have on the way DOD schools are run and how DOD
dependents who attend those schools learn?
Answer. I am aware that DODEA was able to quickly adapt its
education program during the COVID-19 pandemic by incorporating remote
learning nearly immediately. If confirmed, I will build on this
momentum for using technology and adaptive curriculum to meet every
student's needs and support success no matter where they are located.
Question. Do you believe that DODEA should further expand its
capabilities to deliver online education in the future?
Answer. Yes. I am aware that the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021 directed DODEA to conduct a pilot program to
expand access to its virtual school. If confirmed, I look forward to
learning more about DODEA's implementation of this pilot.
Question. How can these programs be improved?
Answer. I have not reviewed the performance goals and metrics for
DODEA. I look forward to doing so if confirmed, after which I may have
additional thoughts.
Question. What is your assessment of the preparedness of DOD
schools to respond and react appropriately to active shooter
emergencies?
Answer. The Department must ensure that all students and staff are
ready for an active shooter incident. Training and procedural
compliance will be key in preparing for such an event. If confirmed, I
will ensure DODEA continues to monitor security threats and update
response plans as needed.
Question. How do you assess current class sizes (student to teacher
ratios) throughout DODEA schools, and do you recommend they be
adjusted? If so, why?
Answer. I do not have enough information to make such an assessment
at this time. I believe the Department must be a good custodian of
taxpayer resources and it also has an obligation to invest deliberately
and responsibly in the students it serves. I believe that means if a
school system is to maintain high levels of student achievement, it
must be well-resourced and have an appropriate number of teachers in
each school. If confirmed, I will review the resource requirements of
DODEA to ensure the Department meets these obligations.
Question. Are you confident that DODEA has in place the policies
and processes to ensure that:
Allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment by a student in
locations under the jurisdiction of DODEA are properly investigated?
Answer. I am aware that DODEA uses effective tracking and reporting
processes which assist the organization to prevent and, when necessary
to respond to unlawful discrimination throughout DODEA schools. If
confirmed, I plan to continue to work to ensure that all such
allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment are appropriately
addressed.
Question. Information documenting such misconduct, if
substantiated, is recorded in the permanent record of the offending
student and that any school to which that student subsequently
transfers is made aware of that information, as appropriate?
Answer. Although I do not know the details, I am aware that DODEA
requires the documentation of substantiated misconduct be included in a
student's record. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review DODEA's
process and make appropriate adjustments if necessary.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you direct to ensure
that DODEA takes all appropriate actions to hold its teachers, other
employees, and students accountable for acts of sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and unlawful discrimination?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the policies currently in
place, making any needed adjustments to ensure sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and unlawful discrimination, are not tolerated in DODEA.
When allegations are made, they will be investigated and, if
substantiated, the responsible individual(s) will be held appropriately
accountable.
Question. In your view, should the quality and availability of
local public education factor into Department and military service
basing decisions?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will thoroughly examine how the
quality and availability of local public education are considered in
basing decisions. I will work with stakeholders to implement any needed
actions required to ensure access to high quality education for
military dependents.
community support for military families with special needs
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that servicemembers
with special needs family members relocate to new duty stations where
services are available to address the special needs of members of that
family?
Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly examine this important
issue. Supporting all our Servicemembers and families is critical to
the recruitment, readiness, and retention of the force. I will review
policies and procedures to better understand the process in which
Servicemembers with special needs family members are assigned to new
duty stations and see where we can improve this process for special
needs families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those
military families with special needs dependents so they are able to
obtain the support they need?
Answer. I do not have enough information at this time to adequately
comment on the current outreach efforts of the Department. However, if
confirmed, I am committed to providing support to military families
that have family members with special needs. This includes making sure
all families know about the support services available to them. If
confirmed, I will work to better understand how the Department is
meeting the needs of these important members of our military community
and in which areas we can improve.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in
sustaining MWR programs in the constrained fiscal environment of the
Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to protecting the funding
support for both appropriated and nonappropriated funds that I believe
are integral to the successful sustainment of MWR programs. I will
review the impacts that the COVID-19 pandemic has had on MWR programs,
and I will study the long-term fiscal challenges impacting the ability
to deliver products and services efficiently and effectively to
Servicemembers, retirees, and their families.
commissary and military exchange systems
Question. What is your view of the need for modernization of
business policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems?
Answer. I fully support the modernization of commissary and
exchange policies and business practices to ensure they are timely;
relevant to the environment in which we operate; responsive to changes
in that environment; and effective in meeting the needs for which they
were developed. If confirmed, I will ensure the commissary and exchange
systems are utilizing cutting-edge policies and practices, as the
resale system is an important non-pay benefit contributing to the
readiness of our military members and their families.
Question. What are the most promising avenues for change to achieve
these modernization goals?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department recently
completed an update of its Business Case Analysis involving the
commissary and exchange systems. If confirmed, I look forward to
reviewing the results and promoting even greater levels of
collaboration and modernization in the commissary and exchange systems.
Question. What should the Department do to make the commissary
system more self-sustaining?
Answer. The commissary system is an invaluable benefit to our
Servicemembers and their families, which proved even more critical
during the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I will assess and support
efforts to better balance the delivery of the commissary benefit with
funding sources in accordance with Department guidance.
Question. What is your view of proposals to consolidate, eliminate,
or privatize commissaries and exchanges in certain areas where they are
duplicative of services readily available at reasonable cost in the
community?
Answer. It is my understanding that military members and their
families consider the commissary and exchange benefits to be two of the
most valuable benefits the Department provides. If confirmed, I look
forward to reviewing the information on such proposals, so I can
carefully consider any impacts or risks before commenting on any
proposals regarding consolidation, elimination, or privatization.
department of defense civilian workforce matters
Question. How would you describe the current State of the
Department's civilian workforce, including its morale and the
Department's ability to successfully recruit and retain top talent?
Answer. I have not been in a position to become aware of the
civilian workforce's morale, or the Department's ability to
successfully recruit top talent. If I am confirmed, this will be an
important focus of my portfolio and I will work closely with other DOD
leaders to address it, as appropriate.
Question. In your judgment, what are the biggest challenges facing
the DOD in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?
Answer. Although I am not aware of all the possible challenges
facing the DOD in managing its civilian workforce, I expect that, like
for many complex and technical organizations, the competition for
highly skilled talent is a major undertaking. If confirmed, I will work
closely with stakeholders across the Department to assess workforce
challenges, and develop the strategies to address them where necessary.
Question. What is your view of both the favorable and adverse
effects that borrowed military manpower can have on participating
military personnel and on the performance of civilian functions?
Answer. I believe it is important for the Military Departments to
have the flexibility they need to successfully execute their missions,
and borrowed military manpower can be a part of that equation. My
primary concern about this practice is the potential impact on
operational readiness if it were relied upon too often to fill gaps. If
confirmed, I will work with the Military Departments to ensure that
their end strength is adequate to accomplish all assigned missions.
Question. Would there be any value to the Department, in your view,
in eliminating the moratorium on the use of A-76 public/private
competitions that has been in effect since 2009?
Answer. I am not yet familiar with the A-76 process or the
reasoning behind the moratorium, but it is my understanding that the A-
76 process itself is widely considered flawed by both the public and
the private sectors. I believe it is important for the Department to
have flexibility to meet its mission requirements in a manner that
optimizes its resources. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts
in the Department to understand the impact of the moratorium and gauge
if there is a need to reconsider its usefulness.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act
required the Department of Defense to implement a probationary period
of at least 2 years for new civilian employees. How does this
requirement benefit the Department, in your view?
Answer. I do not currently have access to the details regarding the
Department's implementation of this provision, or how it has benefited
the Department. If confirmed, I will review current personnel policies
to assess their effectiveness and propose changes where necessary.
Question. In your view, what role should the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs play in
establishing the ``return to work'' policies for DOD civilians who have
been operating in a ``telework'' environment for lengthy periods of
time due to the COVID-19 pandemic?
Answer. With its responsibility for directing policies affecting
the DOD workforce, I believe the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs should play a critical role in
developing ``return to work'' and ``telework'' policies, while
considering the input of DOD leaders and employees in shaping the right
policies for the Department.
Question. In your view, what challenges will this ``return to
work'' effort engender and how would you address each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. While I am not currently aware of the challenges that might
arise from a ``return to work'' effort, I will, if confirmed, work
closely with DOD leaders and stakeholders to assess any challenges, and
develop strategies to address them, as appropriate.
cyber workforce
Question. What is your view of the appropriate mix between the
uniformed cyber workforce and civilian employees?
Answer. I believe that there is no specific optimal ``mix'' of
military and civilian personnel for the cyber workforce, and that any
such mix should be based on the requirements, nature of the work, and
cost factors that are unique to an organization and the mission it
performs. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts in the
Department to ensure that leaders in cyber and other functional
workforces have the authorities and flexibilities needed to optimize
the mix of military and civilian personnel to achieve success.
Question. In your view, how effective is the Cyber Excepted Service
Workforce authority under section 1599f of title 10, United States
Code, in meeting the requirements for a highly qualified and competent
cyber workforce?
Answer. I do not have enough information at this time to comment on
the effectiveness of the Cyber Excepted Service, but I understand that
the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) has a role in overseeing its
implementation and evaluation. If confirmed, I will work with my
colleagues in the DOD CIO's office to ensure the Department is meeting
requirements for a highly qualified and competent cyber workforce.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate
any gaps between cyber workforce capacity and capability?
Answer. To mitigate any cyber workforce capacity and capability
gaps, if confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the Office of
the DOD CIO to assess workforce data, identify staffing and competency
requirements to meet current and future mission needs, and develop
talent management strategies and policies to build workforce capacity
and capability where identified gaps exist.
technical workforce
Question. In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active
Duty military personnel (as compared to civilian employees) trained and
working as scientists, engineers, software coders, and in other
technical positions across the DOD research, development, and
acquisition enterprise?
Answer. I believe it is critical to have Active Duty military
personnel trained and working in STEM and other technical positions
across the Department. Active Duty military personnel bring knowledge,
skills, and perspectives to such efforts that their civilian
counterparts may not possess. If confirmed, I will work with my
counterparts across the Department to ensure that the talents of our
Active Duty and Reserve Component personnel are being harnessed
appropriately in concert with their civilian counterparts.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the directors of
national labs under the purview of DOD have the civilian workforce
management tools they need to shape their science, technology, and
engineering workforces?
Answer. I understand that DOD's science, technology, and
engineering workforce, including those in the DOD laboratories, are
critical to the advancement of the Department's research and
development mission. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research &
Engineering, as well as the Military Departments, to ensure all
civilian workforce management tools and flexibilities are available to
the Directors of DOD laboratories to the greatest extent possible for
their use in attracting, retaining, and shaping their science,
technology, and engineering workforces.
senior executive service
Question. Given that competent and caring leadership is one of the
most significant factors in shaping a high-performing DOD civilian
workforce, if confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be most
important to you in selecting candidates for appointment to the Senior
Executive Service?
Answer. I believe that those selected for appointment to the Senior
Executive Service must be innovative, capable of managing complex
systems and organizations, and possess the ability to lead and develop
a globally relevant workforce for the future. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department's leadership models are focused on these core
principles for shaping a high-performing civilian workforce.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that SES under your
authority are held accountable for both organizational performance and
the rigorous performance management of their subordinate employees?
Answer. If confirmed, I will communicate to the SES members under
my authority clear and measurable performance expectations that include
standards for both organizational outcomes and effective leadership for
achieving a high performing subordinate workforce.
acquisition workforce
Question. In your view, in what ways can DOD better train military
personnel to be acquisition professionals?
Answer. I believe that a highly trained acquisition workforce is a
key component of keeping the Department competitive and on the cutting
edge in the 21st century. It is my understanding that this issue
primarily falls under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, but if confirmed, I will
work with my counterpart in that office to ensure that they have the
personnel-related authorities and flexibilities they need to succeed in
building the acquisition workforce.
Question. What role should the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs play in developing, executing,
and overseeing such training, in your view?
Answer. It is my understanding that training military personnel,
including acquisition professionals, falls primarily under the purview
of the Military Services to organize, train, and equip. If confirmed, I
will work with my counterparts in the Services to ensure they have the
authorities and flexibilities they need to be successful in continuing
to build a world-class acquisition community.
Question. How can acquisition workforce management policies be
modified to make leaders accountable for cost overruns on procurement
contracts?
Answer. I understand that matters regarding cost overruns on
procurement contracts fall under the purview of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. If confirmed, I
will work with my colleagues in that office to assess the effectiveness
of acquisition workforce management policies in holding leaders
appropriately accountable.
Question. In your judgment, what factors should program offices
consider in determining which tasks are best accomplished by civilian
employees, military personnel, or support contractors?
Answer. I believe it is important for program offices to consider
the nature of specific functions when applying statutory and regulatory
criteria to determine the appropriate workforce mix. If confirmed, I
will work with my counterparts across the Department, and especially
with leaders in the fields of Acquisition and Sustainment, to ensure
that these considerations are fully integrated into the Department's
workforce decisionmaking processes.
laboratory, science and technology, and test range stem personnel
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the maximum use of
personnel flexibilities provided by Congress to improve the quality of
the Department of Defense's STEM workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, as well
as the Military Departments, to provide awareness and training for
supervisors and human resources staff on personnel flexibilities
provided by Congress that are available for the improvement of the DOD
STEM workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
such personnel flexibilities can be employed at the lowest appropriate
level?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues to encourage
and develop policies that would allow for the delegation of
flexibilities for use by managers and supervisors at the lowest
appropriate level.
stem educational opportunities for military dependents
Question. In your view, what role should the Military Departments
play in supporting STEM educational opportunities for military
children?
Answer. I understand that OSD and the other DOD Components,
including the Military Departments, are invested in developing current
and future STEM talent throughout DOD to meet its unique mission. If
confirmed, I will work with my colleagues across the Department to
ensure and expand STEM opportunities for military children.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Department of
Defense research and development organizations to increase STEM
educational opportunities for children of military personnel?
Answer. The exceptional scientists and engineers in the Department
of Defense are the reason the United States of America is a world
leader in science and technologies that are critical to our national
security. I understand that the Department is cultivating the future
STEM workforce by providing unique education opportunities to students
and educators of all ages and across all demographics throughout the
country. If confirmed, I will support these efforts which are vitally
important to maintaining our Nation's competitive advantage, ensuring
we are prepared for the ever-changing global landscape.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
personnel
1. Senator Manchin. Ms. Fulton, the pacing threat from China is a
constant reminder that we need a strong and All-Volunteer Force that is
both physically fit, mentally adapt, technical in skill, and capable of
critical reasoning. As a country, we spend a significant amount of
money training and equipping our Forces to meet these challenges.
However, that training and experience is worth significantly more money
in the civilian sector than it is in the current military pay scale. As
our Forces become more equipped with advanced technologies, how do we
balance physical standards without inadvertently pushing away those
with these critical skills?
Ms. Fulton. We know that smart, creative people will seek out and
thrive in an environment that is challenging, inclusive, diverse, and
led by leaders of character. We offer that; so we have to tell that
story--and we have to deliver on that promise.
We also have to retain that talent. Where it makes sense, we should
look at reviewing standards to ensure they align with the needs of the
service; broadening opportunities; and increasing flexibility in our
talent management systems. If confirmed, attracting and retaining
talent will be a top priority for me.
2. Senator Manchin. Ms. Fulton, General David Berger, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, spoke about promotion reform in his
planning guidance. What are your thoughts on his views or how would you
restructure promotion in order to better retain those who are lured
into the civilian sector?
Ms. Fulton. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Military
Departments to ensure that they have the authorities required to
improve the overall retention of their highly trained professionals. If
restructuring of any of the current promotion processes (within the
Marine Corps or the other Services) is required to better retain
personnel, I will work with the Services to examine ways to improve the
processes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
armed forces readiness
3. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, over several years this Committee
has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness--across each of our
Services--to levels that would enable our success in a conflict. We've
had some success, but there is still a lot of work to do. If you have
not done so already, I recommend that every senior defense leader read
T.R. Fehrenbach's ``This Kind of War'', which provides a cautionary
tale of our Nation's failure to adequately fund and train our Armed
Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were steep and American
servicemembers paid with their lives. If confirmed, all of you--based
on your positions--will invariably make decisions that directly or
indirectly impact readiness. Accordingly, will you commit--if
confirmed--to work with this Committee and within the Department on
further bolstering military readiness to ensure the failures we endured
in the Korean War never happen again?
Ms. Fulton. I read ``This Kind of War'' recently--a remarkable
story with many important lessons. I can make that commitment.
strategy driven budget
4. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, the National Defense Strategy
(NDS) Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Secretaries
of Defense (SECDEF), and the previous and current Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) have all stated the need for sustained 3-5
percent annual real growth to the defense budget to implement the NDS,
increase readiness, and advance long-overdue modernization. Further
emphasizing the need for consistent and increased funding, the NDS
Commission report stated, ``America is very near the point of strategic
insolvency, where its `means' are badly out of alignment with its
`ends'.'' This critical situation is negatively compounded by the Biden
administration's dismal defense topline that does not keep pace with
inflation. With these facts in mind, and understanding your ability to
influence the budget will be limited to future year submissions, will
each of you commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget vice a
budget-driven strategy?
Ms. Fulton. Yes. If confirmed I commit to advocating that we are
strategic in our funding decisions, in-line with SECDEF direction and
Defense Planning Guidance.
military academy board of visitors
5. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, President Biden recently purged
the military academy boards of all members appointed to their
respective positions by the previous administration. To me, as a
currently serving member on the United States Naval Academy (USNA)
Board of Visitors, this is a very troubling precedent. Many of the
forced resignations, or firings, imposed by President Biden targeted
imminently qualified individuals to include General Jack Keane, USA
(ret.) and LTG H.R. McMaster, USA (ret.). As I understand, President
Obama appointed you to the West Point Board of Visitors and you served
for a total of 8 years. I also understand that you completed your term
under the Trump administration. Do you believe that any service academy
board appointed by a prior administration should be removed when a new
administration comes in?
Ms. Fulton. I believe the Boards of Visitors provide great value to
the Service Academies and was honored to serve on the U.S. Military
Academy Board. Though I followed the events described through the news,
I am not familiar with them in detail, nor relevant policies. I
hesitate to agree or disagree with an absolute statement given my
limited knowledge of this issue, especially in light of the President's
broad discretion in making appointments. If confirmed, I would be happy
to look into the issue further.
6. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that diverse
perspectives and experiences are an asset for service academy board
members?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
suicide prevention
7. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, U.S. Army Alaska has experienced
numerous suicides from 2016 through 2021, mostly at Fort Wainwright,
Alaska. Army leadership has taken steps to improve the quality of life
for soldiers in Alaska and to provide more mental health resources, but
suicides continue. If confirmed, will you commit to making suicide
prevention a top priority for your office, especially in remote
locations like Fort Wainwright?
Ms. Fulton. Suicide is a tragedy, and the Department as a whole
must make every effort to prevent these losses. If confirmed, I will
support all activities across the Department and coordinate with my
colleagues at the Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) and Health
Affairs (HA) for their roles in this area. Further, I would also ensure
that offices within Manpower & Reserve Affairs that can support policy
or programmatic suicide prevention efforts led by DSPO or HA do so
whenever appropriate. I recognize the importance of this issue and
ensuring we get it right, particularly at locations that are more
remote such as Fort Wainwright.
8. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, what ideas do you have to decrease
the number of suicides in Alaska and across the all the services?
Ms. Fulton. I believe strengthening relationships with stakeholders
and continuing collaboration efforts in this area are essential to
implementing policies and programs that address problems that
contribute to suicide. Suicide is often the result of several factors.
If confirmed, I would support efforts that align with evidence-informed
best practices to prevent suicides across the military.
``gop is racist''
9. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, on January 12, 2018, you stated on
Twitter, ``Let's be real. When one of our two national political
parties is unable to call out racism, our system is broken. It's not a
political statement to say the GOP is racist; it's a moral statement,
and one backs up by an increasing mountain of evidence #FixThis.''
Please detail for me the context and reasoning behind this statement.
If it was specific to an individual, please name that individual and
explain why you chose not to specifically identify them.
Ms. Fulton. I apologize to the entire committee for that tweet. I
intended to say that racism is neither Democratic nor Republican, not
political but moral; and the party should make a statement because a
whole group of people should never be tarnished by the actions of one.
But I went about it all wrong--my words were muddled and confused. And
the idea that people I love and respect--especially those who are
Republicans, especially those I have worked with on important military
issues--were hurt by my words, is devastating to me. Throughout my
career I've worked in a bipartisan and nonpartisan way to make our
military stronger, smarter, and better. I know that when we talk about
race, we have to do it in a way that opens and expands the conversation
rather than shutting it down, and in this case, I failed miserably, and
I'm deeply sorry.
10. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement
outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for
this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service
Committee on October 7, 2021?
Ms. Fulton. I apologized for this tweet in several of my meetings
with Senate Armed Service Committee members and staff prior to the
meeting.
``steal our election''
11. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, on December 9, 2016, you stated
on Twitter, ``I've said this before. I can't believe we let a hostile
foreign power steal our election without national outrage.'' Please
detail for me the context and reasoning behind this statement.
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the specific context and reasoning
behind this tweet, but may been reacting to documented evidence of
Russian interference in the 2016 election.
12. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement
outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for
this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service
Committee on October 7, 2021?
Ms. Fulton. No.
``#usmc women''
13. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, on December 19, 2016, you stated
on Twitter, ``So tired of #USMC women fighting to keep combat ban b/c
they want so badly for the male marines to love them.
#CoOpted#StockholdSyndrome.'' Please detail for me the context and
reasoning behind this statement. If it was specific to an individual,
please name that individual.
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall specifically my reasoning behind this
tweet, but I applaud the progress the Marine Corps has made on
including women and would be happy to work with the Marine Corps to
continue that progress if confirmed.
14. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement
outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for
this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service
Committee on October 7, 2021?
Ms. Fulton. No.
``#hobbylobby''
15. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, on June 30, 2014, you stated on
Twitter, ``One again, `religious freedom' twisted to mean conservative
Christians can dictate their beliefs to the rest of us. #HobbyLobby
#repealRFRA.'' Please detail for me the context and reasoning behind
this statement.
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context or my reasoning behind this
tweet, though I apologize if I spoke in overly broad terms that
ascribed to a larger group the actions of a few of its members.
Americans are lucky to have freedom to openly practice their religious
beliefs, and as a Christian I treasure that freedom. If confirmed, I
would respect and protect servicemembers', including chaplains, and
civilians' religious freedom in accordance with applicable law and
policy.
16. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement
outlined above, do you still believe the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) should be repealed?
Ms. Fulton. No.
17. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement
outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for
this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service
Committee on October 7, 2021?
Ms. Fulton. No.
leader of character
18. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the statements/
tweets outlined above, do you believe these comments reflect a leader
of character who values inclusivity and diversity of thought?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that leaders of character who value diversity
can have many diverse personal opinions. I strive to be a leader of
character every day, and my record reflects that I treat all those with
whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
military fitness standards
19. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that gender-
neutral military physical fitness standards benefit our force and
quantifiably increase the lethality of our military?
Ms. Fulton. Yes. Gender-neutral baseline military physical fitness
standards benefit our force and increase the lethality of our military
as job-specific standards for Servicemembers irrespective of gender.
20. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Fulton, what impact do you assess non-
binary standards implemented across DOD would have on female
recruitment, retention, and promotion?
Ms. Fulton. It is currently unknown how non-binary standards will
impact female recruitment, retention, and promotion. As the role of
female Servicemembers in the military has expanded and restrictions on
female Servicemembers serving on active duty, including in combat, have
been eliminated, DOD efforts in recruiting and retaining women are
important in order to reflect the Nation's population and ensure strong
military leadership.
christians
21. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Fulton, per this quote you gave the
Windy City Times--``The U.S. has a powerful right-wing, anti-gay, anti-
abortion lobby that purports to represent Christians . . . These
``radicals''--I can't bring myself to call them Christians, since their
language and actions hold no resemblance to the Jesus I know from the
Bible.''--if confirmed, how would you treat these so-called
``radicals'' within your organization?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that leaders of character who value diversity
can have many diverse personal opinions. I strive to be a leader of
character every day, and my record reflects that I treat all those with
whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.
22. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Fulton, should Christians within the
Office of Manpower & Reserve Affairs be concerned about how your
predispositions will impact their ability to continue working in public
service?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that leaders of character who value diversity
can have many diverse personal opinions. I strive to be a leader of
character every day, and my record reflects that I treat all those with
whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.
23. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Fulton, in light of your ``repeal RFRA''
tweet in 2014, a reference to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
please articulate why you should be entrusted with the responsibility
to oversee the implementation of religious accommodation in the
military services.
Ms. Fulton. Americans are lucky to have freedom to openly practice
their religious beliefs, and as a Christian I treasure that freedom. If
confirmed, I would respect and protect servicemembers', including
chaplains, and civilians' religious freedom and accommodations in
accordance with applicable law and policy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
concerning statements and related matters
24. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on January 12, 2018, an account in
your name posted ``It's not a political statement to say the GOP is
racist; it's a moral statement, and one back up by an increasing
mountain of evidence.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
25. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I believe this happened around the time that the
President made a comment about ``s--hole nations.''
26. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I apologize to the entire committee for that tweet. I
intended to say that racism is neither Democratic nor Republican, not
political but moral; and the party should make a statement because a
whole group of people should never be tarnished by the actions of one.
But I went about it all wrong--my words were muddled and confused. And
the idea that people I love and respect--especially those who are
Republicans, especially those I have worked with on important military
issues--were hurt by my words, is devastating to me. Throughout my
career I've worked in a bipartisan and nonpartisan way to make our
military stronger, smarter, and better. I know that when we talk about
race, we have to do it in a way that opens and expands the conversation
rather than shutting it down, and in this case, I failed miserably, and
I'm deeply sorry.
27. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who may identify as
members of the GOP?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately.
28. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, is it your view today that ``the
GOP is racist''?
Ms. Fulton. No.
29. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you formally apologized to
anyone for this tweet or otherwise expressed remorse? Please provide
appropriate citations.
Ms. Fulton. Yes. I apologized several times in meetings with SASC
staff and members prior to my hearing; and several times during the
hearing.
30. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and,
though I apologize for the tweet, believe that removing it would have
only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than
adequately clarify my feelings about it.
31. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what ``evidence'' did you have in
mind when you posted your tweet?
Ms. Fulton. I intended to say that racism is neither Democratic nor
Republican, not political but moral; and the party should make a
statement because a whole group of people should never be tarnished by
the actions of one. But my words were muddled and confused, and for
that I apologize.
32. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on January 21, 2018, an account in
your name posted, ``Let's be clear: minority and women servicemembers
were ordered to stand behind Pence as a backdrop for his political
speech. Unethical and unacceptable.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I did not write this.
33. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this tweet.
34. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, at the time, did you have any
specific evidence to support this claim?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall any specific evidence.
35. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, at the time, was this post informed
by racial or sexual stereotypes about the political preference of
servicemembers?
Ms. Fulton. No.
36. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you decline to associate with
individuals that you know or have reason to believe may be conservative
or supportive of Vice President Pence?
Ms. Fulton. No.
37. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
38. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on January 2017, an account in your
name posted, ``Funniest overheard at #WomensMarch: `I see a lot of
women I'm looking forward to meeting in Pence's mandated conversion
camps.' '' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
39. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I was at the Washington Women's March, and I found many
of the signs funny. This one was a crude reference to the many lesbians
at the March and Vice President Pence's support for conversion therapy
while he was Governor of Indiana.
40. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I found the sign humorous.
41. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, why did you find this funny?
Ms. Fulton. It contained a crude reference to the many lesbians at
the March and Vice President Pence's support for conversion therapy
while he was Governor of Indiana.
42. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you have any friends or
colleagues who hold traditional views on marriage?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
43. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who may hold
traditional views on marriage?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, and in line with my own
Christian beliefs, I treat all those with whom I work positively,
fairly, and compassionately.
44. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
45. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on August 29, 2017, an account in
your name posted, ``The vast majority of white evangelical leaders are
utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ. Matthew 23 applies.''
Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. Yes, I believe that I did.
46. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this quote.
47. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall what I meant by this. At this point in
time, I would say I was very wrong to say ``vast majority.'' I do not
believe a whole group of people should ever be tarnished by the actions
of one or a few.
48. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what were you implying by citing
Matthew 23?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall, but I have always believed in this
verse that leaders should not demand many sacrifices from others, but
few from themselves.
49. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who are white and/or
evangelical?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, and in line with my own
Christian beliefs, I treat all those with whom I work positively,
fairly, and compassionately.
50. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
51. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on May 19, 2017, an account in your
name posted, ``Pence has repeatedly lied to cover up the Trump regime
misdeeds. He's not clean in this.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I did not write this.
52. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this post.
53. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this post.
54. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that this post makes
you appear to be partisan?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that it makes me appear to have personal
political opinions.
55. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who support Vice
President Pence?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, and in line with my own
Christian beliefs, I treat all those with whom I work positively,
fairly, and compassionately.
56. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
57. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on December 9, 2016, an account in
your name posted ``I've said this before. I can't believe we let a
hostile foreign power steal our election without national outrage.''
What was the context for this post? Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but
there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in
the 2016 election.
58. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall specifically the context behind this
tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian
interference in the 2016 election.
59. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this? Did you
write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but
there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in
the 2016 election.
60. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that President Trump
was legitimately elected President in 2016?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
61. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
62. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on March 20, 2017, an account in
your name posted ``GOP focus on leaks highlights their terror that
we'll get details of Trump campaign colluding with Russia to win an
election. Patriotism??'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
63. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall specifically the context behind this
tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian
interference in the 2016 election, and interaction between the campaign
and Russian leaders.
64. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall specifically the context behind this
tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian
interference in the 2016 election, and interaction between the campaign
and Russian leaders.
65. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who support
President Trump?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately.
66. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
67. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on December 19, 2016, an account in
your name posted ``So tired of #USMC women fighting to keep combat ban
b/c they want so badly for the male marines to love them. #CoOpted
#StockholmSyndrome.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I did not write this.
68. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I believe I wrote this post in reference to discussions
about whether the Marine Corps would lift the combat exclusion for
female servicemembers.
69. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall specifically my reasoning behind this
tweet, but I applaud the progress the Marine Corps has made on
including women and would be happy to work with the Marine Corps to
continue that progress if confirmed.
70. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, why did you think it was
appropriate to silence or minimize the voice of female armed
servicemembers?
Ms. Fulton. That was not my intent, and it is not appropriate to
silence the voices of servicemembers.
71. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you support the ability of women
to express their views on matters of public policy, even if they differ
from your own?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
72. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what steps would you
take to make sure that women felt free to express their opinions where
they conflict with your own, without fear of being silenced or
intimidated?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately.
73. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who advocated for
the policy targeted in your tweet?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately, even those I disagree
with, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.
74. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
75. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on December 14, 2017, an account in
your name posted ``Worth discussing whether the military's slow-to-
change culture, however frustrating, might be a virtue in highly
polarized political environment.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write this.
76. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall the context.
77. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that I meant, as I have always believed, that
the military's deliberate, careful culture helps it to avoid
politicization.
78. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that we are
currently living in a highly polarized political environment?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
79. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, why did you subsequently write, on
the same day, ``And I'm gonna regret saying that''?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall.
80. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on June 26, 2019, an account in
your name posted a photograph captioned with ``this look from some
white dude.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I did not write this.
81. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know.
82. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know.
83. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, why did you think it was
appropriate to identify the photographed individual by his race?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall my intention behind this tweet or words
chosen.
84. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe it is ever
appropriate to judge an individual on the color of his skin, rather
than the content of his character?
Ms. Fulton. No.
85. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you regret reducing the
photographed individual to his race and sex?
Ms. Fulton. I do not believe that by referencing the individual in
that way that I ``reduced'' him.
86. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
87. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on June 27, 2017, an account in
your name posted ``The only way to understand today's GOP is that their
core principle is hatred of Obama, Hillary, and Democrats. Nothing else
matters.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write that.
88. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this tweet.
89. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall what I meant by this, but it is
reductive and unfair, and I apologize.
90. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you stand by this
characterization?
Ms. Fulton. No. This statement is reductive and does not reflect
the complexity and nuance of the issue.
91. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe there is any merit
to the principle that America should be governed according to the
principle of limited government?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
92. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe there is any merit
to the principle that some may want to elect a president who will
appoint textualist and originalist judges to the Federal judiciary?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
93. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you knowingly decline to
associate with co-workers or neighbors that you believe or suspect to
be members of a different political party than yourself?
Ms. Fulton. No.
94. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members
of our armed services that you will be supervising who identify as
members of the GOP?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately, even those I disagree
with, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.
95. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not,
why?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
96. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on May 2, 2017, an account in your
name posted ``In any case, most Repubs still shamefully quiet-on lies,
corruption, incompetence, treason. They've betrayed their oath to the
Constitution.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write this.
97. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this tweet.
98. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall what I meant by this tweet.
99. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, you reference ``most Repubs''.
Please identify by name all the Republicans that you believed
``betrayed their oath the Constitution'' or committed ``treason''.
Ms. Fulton. Since I cannot recall the intent behind this tweet, I
am unable to name individuals who I was describing, but regret my
overly broad language.
100. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, please provide the evidence you
had at the time that these individuals committed treason.
Ms. Fulton. Since I cannot recall the intent behind this tweet, I
am unable to provide evidence, if any existed, to substantiate it.
101. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you stand by your
characterization that Members of Congress have committed treason?
Ms. Fulton. No. I do not believe, nor did I intend to State, that
Members of Congress committed treason.
102. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you intend on
accusing members of the armed services of committing ``treason''?
Ms. Fulton. If confirmed, I would not have a law enforcement or
legal role that would routinely involve assessments of criminal conduct
and related charging decisions. However, if I discover evidence of
treasonous acts committed by individuals in the Department of Defense,
I will handle them in accordance with relevant law and policy.
103. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what is the standard
you will use to determine whether someone in the Department has
committed treason?
Ms. Fulton. If confirmed, I would not have a law enforcement or
legal role that would routinely involve assessments of criminal conduct
and related charging decisions. However, if I discover evidence of
treasonous acts committed by individuals in the Department of Defense,
I will handle them in accordance with relevant law and policy.
104. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on February 9, 2016, an account in
your name posted ``Calling the President a traitor is extremist. Rubio
& other `mainstream' GOP candidates are no better than the rest.'' Did
you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
105. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall what I could have meant by this. The
tweet doesn't seem to make sense.
106. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe Senator Rubio is a
political extremist?
Ms. Fulton. No.
107. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that Senator
Rubio's Republican colleagues are political extremists?
Ms. Fulton. No.
108. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized to Senator
Rubio and his colleagues for this tweet or otherwise expressed remorse?
If so, please provide appropriate citations.
Ms. Fulton. No.
109. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If
not, why not?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
110. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on March 20, 2014, an account in
your name posted ``Bound to happen: right-wing anti-everyone nutjobs
falling in love with a dictatorship. #FoxLovesPutin #madefor each
other.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
111. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
post?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall the context of this post.
112. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that I might have meant that Fox News support
for Vladimir Putin meant that there were some extremists who watch Fox
News who also admired him.
113. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, did you believe conservative or
Republican Americans support dictatorship?
Ms. Fulton. No.
114. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if so, do you still believe
conservative or Republican Americans support dictatorship?
Ms. Fulton. No.
115. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, did you believe that Fox News
Channel is an agent of the Government of the Russian Federation?
Ms. Fulton. No.
116. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if so, do you still believe Fox
News Channel is an agent of the Government of the Russian Federation?
Ms. Fulton. No.
117. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized for this tweet
or otherwise expressed remorse? If so, please provide appropriate
citations.
Ms. Fulton. No.
118. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If
not, why not?
Ms. Fulton. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and
believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the
Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.
119. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, in a 2011 interview, you stated to
a reporter, ``The United States has a powerful right-wing anti-gay,
anti-abortion lobby that purports to represent Christians . . . These
radicals--I can't bring myself to call them Christians since their
language and actions hold no resemblance to the Jesus I know from the
Bible--have succeeded in gaining essential veto power over any
political action. They demonize their political opponents, then cry
`discrimination! bigotry!' when they incur the slightest criticism.''
What was the context for this statement?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context.
120. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I believe I was characterizing political engagement by
certain individuals, but apologize for doing so in a way that was
callous and overly broad.
121. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in
other statements?
Ms. Fulton. Not that I am aware of.
122. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe Christians are at
liberty to engage in political activity?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
123. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anyone can
arbitrate who and who does not identify as Christian?
Ms. Fulton. No.
124. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anti-Christian
discrimination violates constitutionally provided freedom of religion?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
125. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized for these
statements or otherwise expressed remorse? If so, please provide
appropriate citations.
Ms. Fulton. I believe I discussed these statements during my
confirmation hearing.
126. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, in a 2017 interview, you stated to
a reporter, ``What people fail to understand is that chaplains give up
some of their rights as ministers when become military chaplains . . .
if your responsibility is to God and not the Army, you need to get out
of the Army.'' What was the context for this statement?
Ms. Fulton. I believe the context of this statement was that some
chaplains at the time refused to abide by their responsibilities as
Army officers.
127. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do military chaplains surrender
any rights as ministers? If yes, please specify which and provide
appropriate citations.
Ms. Fulton. Yes, unlike civilian ministers who have no obligations
to those not of their faith, military chaplains must provide support to
all servicemembers who come to them, or find someone who can.
128. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, should soldiers whose first
responsibility is to God ``get out of the Army''?
Ms. Fulton. No. However, all soldiers must follow lawful orders and
comply with Army regulations as required, regardless of their religious
beliefs.
129. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on November 14, 2017, an account
in your name posted ``These are not Christian pastors. They are members
of an anti-abortion, anti-LGBT, anti-women's-equality cult that claims
speak for actual followers of Jesus.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I did not write this.
130. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know the context, or to whom I was referring.
This appears to be a reply or a ``quote-tweet'' and I do not know what
the original tweet was.
131. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know.
132. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in
other statements?
Ms. Fulton. Without knowing who this refers to, I cannot say.
133. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, who are ``actual followers of
Jesus''?
Ms. Fulton. My reference is to those who try to abide by the
teachings of Jesus.
134. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anyone can
arbitrate who and who does not identify as Christian?
Ms. Fulton. No.
135. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on March 2, 2016, an account in
your name posted ``This is a stunning essay. I wish every Christian who
`opposes abortion' would read this and understand the reality.'' What
was the context for this statement?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know the context. This appears to be a reply
or a ``quote-tweet'' and I do not know what the article was.
136. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know, but I probably felt that it reflected
compassion for women in crisis pregnancies.
137. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in
other statements?
Ms. Fulton. I have expressed my personal views that women in crisis
pregnancies should be treated with compassion, and the government
should not make their decisions for them.
138. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, why did you place the words
``opposes abortion'' in quotation marks?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall.
139. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do Christians who oppose abortion
fail to ``understand the reality''?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that there are differences of opinion on what
women with crisis pregnancies experience.
140. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on June 30, 2014, an account in
your name posted ``Once again, `religious freedom,' twisted to mean
conservative Christians can dictate their beliefs to the rest of the
us. #HobbyLobby #repealRFRA'' What was the context for this statement?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall exactly, but it likely relates to the
Hobby Lobby decision.
141. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was your view of the Hobby
Lobby case?
Ms. Fulton. My personal opinion is that birth control is essential
health care for women, and should be covered in health care insurance.
142. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was your view of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act?
Ms. Fulton. I recall that I objected to its application in ways
that restricted access to health care.
143. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what does religious freedom mean,
and should it protect conservative Christians?
Ms. Fulton. Religious freedom means the right to practice your
religion without interference from the government. It should protect
everyone, while being appropriately balanced with the rights of others.
144. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on June 26, 2015, an account in
your name posted ``Anti-gay `Christians' weeping because they lost . .
. nothing. But people they hate gained something precious. And that's
enough.#NotMyGod.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
145. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context of this tweet.
146. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall.
147. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on September 4, 2017, an account
in your name posted ``4/ If getting a Supreme Court judge who'd outlaw
abortion makes all this `worth it' to you, your religion has nothing to
do with Jesus.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write this.
148. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. It appears to be part of a lengthier series of tweets,
but I do not know what the other tweets are.
149. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I suspect that ``all this'' refers to other things that
I believed were not in keeping with Christian values, but I am not
sure.
150. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in
other statements?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know without knowing the context of the other
tweets.
151. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anyone can
arbitrate who and who does not identify as Christian?
Ms. Fulton. No.
152. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on August 5, 2015, an account in
your name posted ``Kasich: `God wants America to succeed , [sic] and He
wants America to lead.' This is so un-Biblical I don't know where to
start. #GOPDebate'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
153. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I believe this was during one of the Republican
Presidential debates.
154. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I don't specifically recall.
155. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on July 13, 2016, an account in
your name posted ``For our Armed Forces, `we choose the best. The
best--not the best of 1 gender, religion, race, or orientation--just
the best.' @stenyhoyer'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I did not write this.
156. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I do not recall the context.
157. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that it indicates that we should seek out the
best talent regardless of gender, religion, race, or orientation.
158. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever treated a colleague
differently on the basis of gender, religion, race, or sexual
orientation?
Ms. Fulton. No.
159. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the Armed Forces
should ``choose the best,'' independent of gender, religion, race, or
sexual orientation?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
160. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on December 15, 2017, an account
in your name posted ``Every time someone claims `the best person for
the job' to excuse their bias for white males and against diverse
candidates, remind them of the data.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write this.
161. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall specifically, but I have experienced
colleagues saying someone is ``the best person for the job'' when they
really weren't, but they were hesitant to hire a woman or person of
color.
162. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall specifically, but I have experienced
colleagues saying someone is ``the best person for the job'' when they
really weren't, but they were hesitant to hire a woman or person of
color.
163. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the armed services
should commission and promote the best people for the job?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
164. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the armed services
should commission and promote leaders on the basis of gender, religion,
race, or sexual orientation?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
165. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on September 17, 2017, an account
in your name posted ``I've said it before--we'd all be better off if
black queer women ran the world.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write this.
166. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I am confident this was said in jest.
167. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall, but I am confident it was said in jest.
168. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, would the Department of Defense be
better off if ``black queer women'' ran it?
Ms. Fulton. Not necessarily. This was not a serious statement.
169. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on April 18, 2013, an account in
your name posted ``@marcorubio @SenatorTimScott This Army vet says
shame on your for your gutless vote against background checks
#LACKOFLEADERSHIP'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe that I didn't write this.
170. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I believe this was about a vote for background checks
on guns.
171. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I personally strongly favor background checks for gun
purchases.
172. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, is it still your view that
Senators Rubio and Tim Scott are gutless?
Ms. Fulton. No, I intended to characterize their actions, not them
as people.
173. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that Second
Amendment advocates cannot be leaders?
Ms. Fulton. No.
174. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on August 6, 2015, an account in
your name posted ``I feel bad for Marco Rubio's stuttering problem. Can
someone get him some water? #noShame #GOPDebate'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
175. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I believe this was probably regarding Senator Rubio's
State of the Union response.
176. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I don't recall, but I am confident this was said in
jest.
177. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe disability-based
harassment is acceptable conduct?
Ms. Fulton. No.
178. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized to Senator
Rubio?
Ms. Fulton. No.
179. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on October 28, 2015, an account in
your name posted ``Jeb, when Kasich out-charisma's you , [sic] it's
time to quit the race. #RubiosBitch #CNBCGOPDebate'' Did you write
this?
Ms. Fulton. I have no reason to believe I didn't write this.
180. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. I believe this was in the context of a Republican
Presidential debate.
181. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I'm confident this comment was made in jest.
182. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe gender-based
harassment is acceptable conduct?
Ms. Fulton. No.
183. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe someone who has
committed gender-based harassment is qualified to manage military
personnel policy?
Ms. Fulton. No.
184. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever committed gender-
based harassment against a colleague or employee?
Ms. Fulton. No.
185. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on October 25, 2017, an account in
your name posted ``The Nation slowly and uncomfortably realizing that
John Kelly may be as dishonest, sexist, and racist as the rest of the
Trump admin.'' Did you write this?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
186. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this
statement?
Ms. Fulton. This was in the context of former General John Kelly
making negative statements about Congresswoman Frederica Wilson in
Florida that turned out to be false.
187. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. Fulton. I believe I meant that former General Kelly's attacks
on the Congresswoman were unfair.
188. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the members of the
Trump administration were dishonest, sexist, and racist?
Ms. Fulton. I do not believe that a whole group of people should
ever be tarnished by the actions of one or a few.
189. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe supporters of the
Trump administration supported dishonestly, sexism, and racism?
Ms. Fulton. I do not believe that a whole group of people should
ever be tarnished by the actions of one or a few.
190. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, are you familiar with critical
race theory?
Ms. Fulton. Not really. I have heard many definitions, but I have
never studied it.
191. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you consider yourself a
proponent of critical race theory?
Ms. Fulton. No.
192. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever expressed support or
advocated for critical race theory? Please provide a list with
appropriate citations.
Ms. Fulton. No.
193. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever published statements
expressing support or advocating for critical race theory? Please
provide all such records.
Ms. Fulton. No.
194. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to
ensuring that you will not support or advocate for inserting critical
race theory into any departmental policy?
Ms. Fulton. I have heard many definitions for critical race theory,
but I have never studied it. However, I feel strongly that our training
should support building strong teams and cohesive units, based on the
core values of integrity and respect. If confirmed, I will abide by all
relevant laws and regulations regarding critical race theory.
195. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to
ensuring that you will not support or advocate for requiring any
employee to attend training sessions that include critical race theory?
Ms. Fulton. I have heard many definitions for critical race theory,
but I have never studied it. However, I feel strongly that our training
should support building strong teams and cohesive units, based on the
core values of integrity and respect. If confirmed, I will abide by all
relevant laws and regulations regarding critical race theory.
196. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, when, in your view, is it ever
appropriate to consider a Federal employee's race?
Ms. Fulton. If this question asks about hiring the best individuals
for the job, as with previous questions, the answer is no. However,
there are cases where under law and policy, employees' race should or
must be considered, such as in evaluating a discrimination complaint,
collecting statistical data, or administering medical care.
197. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you agree or disagree with the
statement that ``the United States of America is the least racist
country in the history of the world''? If not, please explain.
Ms. Fulton. The United States of America is not fundamentally
racist. I do not have the scholarly background to assess the United
States against every country in the world.
198. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, in your view, has any country in
the history of the world done more to eradicate slavery and promote
liberty across the world than the United States? If so, please identify
such a country.
Ms. Fulton. The United States of America has been instrumental in
eradicating slavery and promoting liberty around the world. I do not
have the scholarly background to assess the United States against every
country in the world.
199. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, yes or no, do you believe that
America is systematically racist?
Ms. Fulton. No.
200. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, are you proud to be an American?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
201. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, are you familiar with the term
``birthing people''?
Ms. Fulton. No.
202. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever used the term
``birthing people''? If so, please list and identify the context for
each.
Ms. Fulton. No.
203. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you agree that women but not
men may become pregnant? If not, please explain.
Ms. Fulton. Transgender men may become pregnant.
204. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever expressed any views
on the inclusion of transgender individuals in U.S. military? If so,
please provide copies.
Ms. Fulton. I strongly supported the Obama administration and the
Biden administration in allowing transgender people to serve. I co-
authored a document on implementing legal transgender service, which I
will provide.
205. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what, in your view, is the
importance of the separation of powers?
Ms. Fulton. Though I am not a constitutional scholar, I believe it
is crucial that the three branches of our government check and balance
each other.
206. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what role does Congress have in
exercising control over diplomatic and military policy of the United
States?
Ms. Fulton. Though I am not a constitutional scholar, I believe
that Congress has significant powers to authorize policies and
programs, fund them, advise and consent on nominees, ratify treaties,
authorize the use of armed force, and perform oversight, among others.
207. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what historical examples inform
your responses to the previous question?
Ms. Fulton. I cannot cite specific examples that inform my
response, but have likely learned about Congress exercising most or all
of these powers through academic study or in the news.
208. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to
providing Congress timely access to information and testimony?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
209. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to
notifying the Senate Armed Services Committee immediately if you
witness or have reason to believe a servicemember's religious liberty
has been violated?
Ms. Fulton. I commit to following all relevant laws and policies
regarding violations of servicemembers' religious liberty.
210. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to
notifying the Senate Armed Services Committee immediately if you
witness or have reason to believe that critical race theory is being
espoused in the U.S. military?
Ms. Fulton. I commit to following all relevant laws and policies
regarding espousal of critical race theory.
211. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that an unborn
child is a human being?
Ms. Fulton. I support women's right to terminate their pregnancies
in a safe, timely manner based on their own individual beliefs and
needs.
212. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you respect the opinion of your
fellow citizens and servicemembers who believe that life begins at
conception?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
213. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what evidence can you point from
your past that you will respect your fellow citizens and fellow
servicemembers who hold the belief that life begins at conception?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately, regardless of their own
opinions or beliefs.
214. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe it is appropriate
for Federal taxpayer dollars to be used to fund or facilitate
abortions?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
215. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, please describe, in your own
words, the importance of religious tolerance in the military.
Ms. Fulton. All military servicemembers have a right to their own
religious beliefs, without being discriminated against or singled out
because of those beliefs. As long as those beliefs do not prevent the
servicemember from obeying lawful orders and following military
regulations as required, it is critical that all servicemembers feel
that their religious beliefs are acceptable and that they are
respected.
216. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what experience can you cite to
support your claim that you will be tolerant of servicemembers'
religious beliefs?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately, regardless of their own
opinions or beliefs.
217. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that radical
Islamic terrorists present the greatest counter-terrorism threat today?
If not, please identify what you believe is a greater threat and why.
Ms. Fulton. I am not a terrorism expert, but U.S. law enforcement
agencies have identified domestic violent extremists as the greatest
threat currently.
218. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that individuals
have implicit bias?
Ms. Fulton. I believe that some people have biases of which they
are not conscious.
219. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever taken a test that
measures an individual's implicit biases? If so, what were the results?
Ms. Fulton. No.
220. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, against what individuals or groups
do you have an implicit bias?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know.
221. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what steps do you take to ensure
that you do not act on an implicit bias?
Ms. Fulton. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I
work positively, fairly, and compassionately, regardless of their own
opinions or beliefs.
222. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what, in your view, is more
important, the military's preparedness or promoting diversity and
inclusion initiatives?
Ms. Fulton. Military preparedness is primary; however, if we fail
to develop a diverse and inclusive force, our readiness will suffer.
223. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that the
Department's focus on diversity and inclusion compromised the
military's ability to execute its missions in Afghanistan?
Ms. Fulton. No.
224. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what steps will you
take to ensure that the military's mission is always placed above the
promotion of woke initiatives?
Ms. Fulton. Military preparedness is primary; however, if we fail
to develop a diverse and inclusive force, our readiness will suffer. We
must develop strong teams and cohesive units that share the core
military values of integrity and respect in order to accomplish the
mission. My No. 1 priority if confirmed will always be a smarter,
stronger, more effective force.
225. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what role will
diversity and equity play in your job?
Ms. Fulton. A diverse, inclusive, fair environment makes the force
stronger, smarter, and more effective. Diverse teams are better
problem-solvers. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and
retains the best people.
226. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what initiatives on diversity and
equity do you plan to promote?
Ms. Fulton. A diverse, inclusive, fair environment makes the force
stronger, smarter, and more effective. Diverse teams are better
problem-solvers. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and
retains the best people. If confirmed, I would want to consult with
Department experts before proposing any specific initiatives, but I
would ensure they promote the above-discussed values.
227. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what initiatives, policies, or
guidance do you plan to revoke or reconsider?
Ms. Fulton. A diverse, inclusive, fair environment makes the force
stronger, smarter, and more effective. Diverse teams are better
problem-solvers. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and
retains the best people. If confirmed, I would want to consult with
Department experts before proposing any specific revocations or
reconsiderations, but I would ensure they advance the above-discussed
values.
228. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, in your view, what are the three
greatest global terrorist threats in the world and why you identified
these?
Ms. Fulton. I do not feel qualified to make this assessment based
on my experience and, if confirmed, would defer to experts in the
Department to make these assessments.
229. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you now or have you ever
downloaded TikTok onto your personal or work devices?
Ms. Fulton. I downloaded TikTok to my personal device a year or so
ago.
230. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you believe is the most
probable origin of the COVID-19 virus?
Ms. Fulton. I do not know.
231. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, on what evidence do you base your
belief?
Ms. Fulton. I have not paid a lot of attention to the origin of the
virus.
232. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever shamed or publicly
accosted an individual for not wearing a mask?
Ms. Fulton. I have never shamed or accosted anyone for not wearing
a mask, but as the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission,
I have asked employees to wear a mask inside State buildings as
required.
233. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, how often have you done so?
Ms. Fulton. I have never shamed or accosted anyone for not wearing
a mask.
234. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what were the circumstances of
each of these incidents?
Ms. Fulton. I have never shamed or accosted anyone for not wearing
a mask.
235. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that Americans
should be vaccinated against their will?
Ms. Fulton. No.
236. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that servicemembers
should be vaccinated against COVID-19 if they have sincerely held
religious objection to receiving the vaccine?
Ms. Fulton. Administering COVID vaccinations is a national security
imperative that will increase the readiness of our forces. If
confirmed, I would implement vaccination requirements in coordination
with the Military Departments and in accordance with relevant law and
policy, which include an exemption based on sincerely held religious
beliefs.
237. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to
ensuring that every servicemember may apply for an exemption for any
vaccine, including for COVID-19, that violates a sincerely held
religious belief?
Ms. Fulton. If confirmed, I would implement vaccination
requirements in coordination with the Military Departments and in
accordance with relevant law and policy, which include an exemption
based on sincerely held religious beliefs.
238. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what professional accomplishment
are you most proud of?
Ms. Fulton. I am proudest of the transformation of the New Jersey
Motor Vehicle Commission from a hidebound, primarily analog system
where customers ``stood in line to stand in line'' for in-person
services, to a system upgraded across the board, where about 80 percent
of transactions are available online, and in-person services are
managed with a state-of-the-art queuing system, text notification, and
readily available appointments--all accomplished during a historic
pandemic.
239. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that someone's sex
is a biological fact that can be determined by reference to objective
criteria or is a subjective determination up to each individual? Please
explain and include citations to any scientific evidence on which you
base your opinion.
Ms. Fulton. Sex, as opposed to gender, is biological.
240. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what role do you believe
``equity'' should play in the office to which you have been appointed?
Ms. Fulton. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and
retains the best people.
241. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, have you ever donated to the
political campaign of the current President of the United States?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
242. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if so, how much and on what
occasions?
Ms. Fulton. 3/4/20 $2,800
243. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, other than at your hearing before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, have you ever testified under
oath? If this testimony is available online or as a record, please
include the reference below or as an attachment.
Ms. Fulton. I have, the references are included in a separate
attachment.
244. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, in the course of considering your
candidacy for this position, has anyone at the White House or
Department of Defense asked for you to provide your views on the
following: systemic racism, critical race theory, critical race
studies, and/or transgender individuals in the military?
Ms. Fulton. No.
245. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, at any point during the pendency
of your nomination, have you held any cryptocurrencies? Please list the
amounts, coins, and dates of holdings.
Ms. Fulton. No.
246. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, at any point during the pendency
or your nomination, have you held any shares in the following
companies: Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, and/or Twitter?
Ms. Fulton. No.
247. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, please describe your understanding
of the duty of candor, if any, that nominees have to State their views
on their judicial philosophy and be forthcoming when testifying before
the Senate Armed Services Committee. See U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 2,
cl. 2.
Ms. Fulton. I have no views on this question as asked, but have
been and will remain forthright with the committee and will abide by
all relevant laws and regulations.
taiwan
248. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, do you strongly and unequivocally
support the right of the people of Taiwan to live free from military
coercion by the Chinese Communist Party?
Ms. Fulton. Yes.
249. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what evidence in your record can
you cite to substantiate your support for the people of Taiwan?
Ms. Fulton. I do not believe I am on the record on this issue
anywhere.
250. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, what do you believe is the
geopolitical importance of ensuring Taiwan is free from, or at least
able to resist, military coercion by the Chinese Communist Party?
Ms. Fulton. Though I support the right of Taiwan to live free of
and resist coercion by the Chinese Communist Party, I do not feel
qualified to make geopolitical assessments on the matter and would
defer to experts in the Department if confirmed.
251. Senator Hawley. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what steps would you
advocate to ensure that Taiwan remains free from, or at least able to
resist, military coercion by the Chinese Communist Party?
Ms. Fulton. I believe my responsibilities if confirmed would only
impact this issue indirectly, but, if confirmed, I would strive to
ensure we have a ready, lethal, effective force.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Brenda S. Fulton,
follows:]
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Brenda S. Fulton, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Brenda S.
Fulton in connection with her nomination follows:]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
[The nomination of Ms. Brenda S. Fulton was returned to the
President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6
of the Standing Rules of the Senate on January 3, 2022.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein
by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)?
Answer. I have more than 25 years of experience focusing on nuclear
nonproliferation, nuclear security and the nuclear fuel cycle. My
experience includes close working relationships with the DOE, NNSA and
other key elements of the U.S. national security enterprise, including
the national laboratories and the State Department. I have developed
and implemented international projects working with partners and allies
and had oversight and governance responsibilities for such projects. In
short, I have devoted my career to the issues that fall in DNN's
portfolio and, if confirmed, I would be prepared to step into this
important role, working closely with the DOE and NNSA leadership, the
career staff at DNN and stakeholders across the U.S. interagency, the
Congress and the international community.
Question. If confirmed, do you believe that there are any steps
that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties
of the Deputy Administrator?
Answer. The Deputy Administrator is responsible for substantive and
strategic leadership, management of a diverse team, and stewardship of
a large budget on behalf of the American taxpayers. If confirmed, I
would balance early action with learning. I have been out of government
since December 2017, and it would be presumptuous to think I could
start on day one with all the knowledge needed to execute this
important mission. In close collaboration with the NNSA and DOE
leadership, and the career staff, it will be important to come up to
speed quickly and begin to provide strategic guidance. The threats and
challenges that DNN works are not on hold, but it is also important to
act from a position of information and good judgement. If confirmed, I
also would have a responsibility to the federal and contractor
workforce of DNN and will want to understand their issues and
challenges so that I can help them be more effective meeting the
mission.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. We face a complex and dynamic strategic environment that
poses significant challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear
security, and arms control regimes. These challenges include strategic
competition from such adversaries as Russia and China, states seeking
to improve their nuclear capabilities, such as Iran and North Korea,
the potential for terrorist acquisition of nuclear or radioactive
materials, and staying ahead of emerging technologies and new uses of
existing technologies that could lower barriers to proliferation.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would begin by reviewing and understanding
DNN's current and planned activities and then identify opportunities to
accelerate work to match the threat environment or begin new
initiatives to address these challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, my main priorities would be maintaining and
build upon DNN's core technical competencies so that DNN is ready to
play our unique role in meeting not only the enduring challenges, but
also those we may face in the future. In order to do this, we may also
need to develop our current workforce and plan for future needs.
Orienting DNN towards our most pressing national security challenges
will require taking a ``one house'' approach with colleagues in other
parts of the Department, such as the offices of science and nuclear
energy, and with the rest of NNSA. If confirmed, I would also seek
close coordination with the interagency and with Congress.
Question. Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) includes a diverse
portfolio of nonproliferation programs, subprograms, and activities.
What criteria would you apply and what processes would you follow to
establish priorities and evaluate tradeoffs in investment between the
various DNN commitments?
Answer. The President has established the priority to renew U.S.
nonproliferation leadership and reduce the dangers posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of nuclear
terrorism. DNN programs are a critical component of achieving this
goal. If confirmed, I would base program prioritization decisions on
the contributions of activities to the President's goals, as described
inter alia in the Interim National Security Strategy. I would closely
evaluate DNN's strategic plans, and adhering program planning in this,
and future, fiscal years to a forward-looking nonproliferation strategy
as well as DOE/NNSA's established programming, planning, budgeting, and
execution processes. I also would maintain a focus on pragmatic and
deliverable program activities that make a specific impact on the
security environment.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship
between the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in particular, and with
Congress in general?
Answer. I understand that DNN has always had a strong relationship
with its Congressional stakeholders. If confirmed, I would commit to a
transparent and responsive relationship with the Committee and the
Congress, and expect to continue the excellent support DNN reports that
it has received over the years.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage regularly with DNN's
stakeholders and partners in Congress, be responsive to requests for
information, and provide regular updates on DNN's efforts and vision
for the future. Recognizing the difference in responsibilities between
the Congress and the executive branch, I would also seek input and
feedback from the Congress as DNN develops and implements critical
programs.
international norms and agreements
Question. In what ways do you see the United States exercising its
global leadership on nonproliferation issues, and, if confirmed as
Deputy Administrator, what would you do to advance and balance both
U.S. interests and the global nonproliferation regime?
Answer. The United States has been, and continues to be, a global
leader in nuclear nonproliferation. A strong global nonproliferation
regime is in the United States' interest and serves our overarching
goals of supporting the peaceful uses of the atom to benefit the
environment, support global health, and underpin the U.S. commercial
sector. The Department's role in support of these objectives has grown
over the years through its world class science, global partnerships,
and innovative policy approaches. If confirmed, I would seek to carry
that tradition forward by supporting the Biden-Harris Administration's
desire to re-engage with our global partners in the nonproliferation
regime. This would include strengthening our work with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), working toward a successful
Non-Proliferation (NPT) Review Conference in 2022, evolving our global
partnerships to meet the changing landscape, and investing into our
nonproliferation, safeguards, security, and verification assets -
especially at the DOE's complex of labs, plants, and sites.
Question. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) regime has been challenged since the Treaty entered into force in
1970, and the divisions between the nuclear weapons states and the non-
nuclear weapons states are becoming more apparent, as exemplified by
the conclusion of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty which now has entered
into force without the signature of nuclear weapons states.
What are your views with respect to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty?
Answer. I do not support the ``Ban Treaty.'' I share the position
of this and previous Administrations that it is incompatible with U.S.
extended deterrence relationships, which are still necessary for
international peace and security, and reinforces divisions that hinder
the international community's ability to work together to address
pressing proliferation and security challenges.
Question. What do you see as your role, if confirmed, in
strengthening support for the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation
regime, as compared to the tenets of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I would lead DNN to engage with the U.S.
interagency and allies to revisit the real-world impacts of the Ban
Treaty. I want to help supporters of the treaty understand that the Ban
Treaty poses significant threats to the nonproliferation regime, the
NATO alliance, and it may have a negative impact on the NPT Review
Conference. NNSA should continue to work in coordination with the
Departments of State and Defense, to engage with allies on this issue,
emphasizing that becoming a party to the TPNW could also potentially
impact security cooperation with the United States.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in mitigating the
international perception that the United States is not committed to its
NPT Article VI commitments in the context of modernizing its nuclear
deterrent?
Answer. The United States is in full compliance with its NPT
obligations, including Article VI. The United States has significantly
reduced its nuclear stockpile since its peak, consistent with its
national security needs. If confirmed, I would support a continued U.S.
Government participation in the P5 process, and other bi- and
multilateral fora affirming our commitment to the shared goal of
nuclear disarmament and emphasize the importance of the NPT as a
central element of the nonproliferation regime.
Question. What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)?
Answer. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the
security of the United States, and its entry-into-force would benefit
all countries. It is a key step to diminishing the world's reliance on
nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of another nuclear arms race,
goals consistent with President Biden's Interim National Security
Strategy.
Question. The CTBT Organization (CTBTO) has, among its
organizational goals, achieving universality of the treaty.
Do you agree with this goal? If yes, and if confirmed, how might
you support attainment of this goal as Deputy Administrator? If not,
what do you think the United States' role should be in continuing to
work with the CTBTO?
Answer. I agree with the U.S. Government's support for the CTBT and
the commitment to achieve its entry-into-force, recognizing the
significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal. If
confirmed as Deputy Administrator, I would work with my U.S.
interagency colleagues, the CTBTO PrepCom, non-governmental
organizations, and the international community to promote the CTBT and
encourage ratification by the Annex 2 countries necessary for the
Treaty to enter into force. NNSA and the U.S. Government provide strong
support to the CTBTO PrepCom, and recognize that the United States
derives significant benefit from the effective functioning of the
CTBTO's monitoring and verification system. If confirmed, I would look
forward to helping to continue and grow that support.
Question. What are your views on the zero yield standard to which
the United States adheres, as compared to the interpretation by other
CTBT signatories such as Russia and China?
Answer. The U.S. zero yield standard, consistent with the CTBT and
the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium, does not allow any supercritical
nuclear explosive testing that produces a self-sustaining chain
reaction. I understand from the latest Compliance Report to Congress in
April 2021 that the United States finds that Russia, since declaring
its testing moratorium in 1996, has conducted nuclear weapons
experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with
the U.S. zero yield standard. I also understand that the United States
has concerns regarding China's adherence to the United States zero
yield nuclear weapons testing moratorium. If I am confirmed as Deputy
Administrator, I look forward to learning more details about the
concerns regarding activities in both countries and working with my
departmental colleagues, including Defense Programs, and the U.S.
interagency to address them.
Question. For the past several years, the Intelligence Community
and the Department of State have highlighted U.S. concerns that Russia,
and especially China, are conducting nuclear tests that may be
inconsistent with this standard. In your view, should countries that
conduct tests producing nuclear yield face repercussions? If so, what
actions would you recommend the international community take in
response to these alleged activities on the part of China and Russia?
Answer. I am aware that the United States Government has raised
concerns about Russia and China's nuclear testing and potential
inconsistency with the zero yield standard. The United States has
publicly challenged Russia and China to explain their actions and
encouraged the international community to join in condemnation of any
inconsistency with their self-declared moratoria or their obligations
as signatories to the CTBT. If confirmed as Deputy Administrator, I
look forward to learning more details about the concerns with both
countries and helping to develop appropriate responses. One significant
contribution of DNN is to support the U.S.' ability to detect and
characterize nuclear explosions wherever they may occur globally. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working with the team to understand
our capabilities and remaining gaps.
Question. What do you view as the purpose of Iran's nuclear
program?
Answer. Iran has consistently cast its nuclear activities as being
for exclusively peaceful purposes, yet it has regularly sought to
expand and increase its nuclear material production capabilities beyond
those justified by Iran's civilian need. I am deeply concerned by this.
Even if current activities are for civilian purposes, the existence
of a nuclear weapons research and development effort prior to 2004, as
reported in the unclassified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and
validated by the IAEA's December 2015 report, means that we cannot
exclude the possibility that one purpose of the program is to retain
the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to develop nuclear
weapons if a decision is made to do so.
Question. In your assessment, do Iran's nuclear program and
ballistic missile program indicate a desire by the Iranian government
to have a nuclear weapons capability?
Answer. According to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence's unclassified Annual Threat Assessment, Iran is not
currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities
the intelligence community judges would be necessary to produce a
nuclear device. As I previously stated, we cannot exclude the
possibility that Iran seeks to retain a latent capability to develop
nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so.
Question. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), the limitations on Iran's uranium enrichment expire between
2026 and 2031.
If the United States rejoins the JCPOA, do you assess that Iran
will be legally able to increase its uranium enrichment after 2031?
Answer. Yes. According to the terms of the JCPOA, in 2031 Iran is
permitted to enrich uranium above 3.67%, increase its enriched uranium
stockpile above 300 kg, and conduct enrichment at facilities other than
Natanz. Iran has already exceeded these key limits in response to our
withdrawal from JCPOA. It is worth noting that Iran's obligations to
accept IAEA monitoring and verification of its nuclear activities never
expire under the JCPOA.
Question. If Iran acquires enough fissile material to produce a
nuclear weapon, what is the risk of other countries in the region
seeking a nuclear weapons capability, in your assessment?
Answer. Iran's acquisition of a sufficient stockpile of enriched
uranium for a nuclear weapon is a significant threat. I understand that
this is a key reason for the stated intent of the Biden administration
to pursue a diplomatic strategy to return to the JCPOA stockpile limits
and the intrusive verification and monitoring of their nuclear
activities.
Question. In 2018, Israel's Mossad released a series of Iranian
nuclear files, which included information about at least three uranium
enrichment facilities that Iran had hidden from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Do you agree that providing the IAEA access to those sites is
essential to ensuring oversight of Iran's nuclear program?
Answer. I have not reviewed these documents or collateral
information. That said, I support the IAEA using all of its authorities
to the fullest extent possible to be able to assure us and the
international community that Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively
peaceful. According to the most recent IAEA report in September, Iran
is not being responsive to requests to resolve these outstanding issues
and I believe they must do so under their existing legal obligations.
Question. Given the existence of these sites (and possibly others),
do you assess that returning to the 2015 JCPOA would effectively
constrain Iran's nuclear program?
Answer. I believe that returning to the JCPOA is a critical first
step to effectively constrain Iran's nuclear program and again provide
the IAEA with the tools it needs to monitor all of Iran's nuclear
activities.
fissile material disposition
Question. The fissile material disposition program, under which the
United States and Russia each committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of
surplus weapons-grade plutonium, has been plagued by numerous problems
and delays. Construction of the MOX fuel fabrication facility is now
canceled, and a dilute and dispose approach substituted, with final
disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
In your view, is the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement
still viable and relevant? If yes, what steps would you take to
preserve and implement it, if confirmed? If not, what would be your
plan for the excess plutonium once subject to the Agreement?
Answer. The United States remains committed to the disposition of
34 MT consistent with its international obligations and consistent with
the PMDA. As you are aware, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the PMDA
in 2016, and, therefore, dialogue has not continued with Russia on this
topic. I believe NNSA should continue to take the necessary steps to
transition to the Dilute and Dispose strategy for the permanent
disposition of the excess plutonium subject to the Agreement, as this
decision was deemed to be in the United States national interest
regardless of the unfortunate decision that Russia has made to
withdraw.
Question. The Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation is now working with Department of Energy
officials overseeing the WIPP in developing the dilute and dispose
strategy. If confirmed, what steps would you deem necessary in order
move forward with the final disposal of significant quantities of
plutonium at the WIPP?
Answer. The key next steps necessary to move forward with the
disposition of significant quantities of plutonium at the WIPP, all of
which I understand are already underway, are finalizing of the National
Environmental Policy Act analysis of the program and completing of
construction of the necessary facilities to dilute and dispose all 34
MT of excess plutonium.
international atomic energy agency (iaea) and safeguards
Question. Timely and consistent IAEA access and monitoring is
integral to verifying Iran's compliance with the provisions of the
JCPOA. The Department of Energy and the NNSA are considered the
Executive Branch's technical experts for verification and assessment of
adherence to the JPCOA.
What is your understanding of role of the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in supporting IAEA capability and will
to execute its mission regarding JCPOA, while at the same time
maintaining IAEA independence and without making it reliant on any one
member state?
Answer. I understand that DNN is responsible for developing and
maintaining verification and monitoring capabilities for a range of
nonproliferation missions, including IAEA safeguards and JCPOA
monitoring. Where the United States can offer unique capabilities to
the IAEA that serve the national security interest of our country and
our allies, I believe we should do so. That said, while DNN should
provide significant financial and in-kind support to the IAEA
Department of Safeguards, it cannot be a ``one stop shop'' for the
IAEA's needs. If confirmed, I would support DNN's efforts to encourage
the Secretariat to seek a diverse pool of donors beyond just the United
States and take advantage of the technical and financial resources of
the international community.
Question. What is your assessment of recent actions by Iran to
increase enrichment levels as well as actions Iran has taken with
respect to its heavy water reactor?
Answer. According to IAEA reports, since May 2019, Iran has
expanded its nuclear activities above and beyond JCPOA limits. Iran has
been clear and consistent in its public messaging that it would reverse
these steps if it receives sanctions relief. These activities are,
however, concerning. Specifically, Iran's operation of advanced
centrifuges and efforts to produce uranium metal could result in
knowledge gains that cannot be reversed even if the machines are
uninstalled and the metal reconverted. The return of the verification
and monitoring regime in Iran would be critical in any resumption of
JCPOA constraints to gain confidence that Iran does not resume these
activities or benefit from their knowledge to expand nuclear
activities. Regarding the heavy water reactor, I understand from the
IAEA reports that the conversion effort has slowed but that there has
not been an attempt to resume construction of the reactor under the
old, more dangerous design. If confirmed, and if there is a return to
the JCPOA, I would support DNN experts again contributing to the
reactor conversion effort so that the facility is permanently unable to
operate under the old design.
Question. Nuclear fuel reprocessing programs in East Asia,
particularly Japan, have created a glut of fissile material in the
region and have added to the IAEA's safeguard burden.
Do you believe the IAEA is adequately resourced to effectively
apply safeguards on reprocessing programs?
Answer. The IAEA verification budget has remained essentially flat
while its workload has increased as new facilities around the world
come online and the quantity of spent nuclear fuel and separated civil
plutonium grows. The Agency has augmented its regular budget with
extrabudgetary contributions (primarily from the United States) but
this approach is not sustainable as its workload continues to increase.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in regard to IAEA's
development of safeguard techniques and technologies applicable to
reprocessing programs?
Answer. I understand that DNN has programs that develop and test
safeguards techniques and technologies that are used as part of IAEA
safeguards verification and could be used for reprocessing facilities.
Question. What other concerns, if any, do you have with
reprocessing and plutonium accumulation in East Asia and elsewhere?
Answer. NNSA supports U.S. efforts to limit the spread of uranium
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies that pose risks of
nuclear weapons proliferation. These sensitive technologies should be
restricted to help minimize the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
activities around the world. Ever increasing plutonium stockpile can be
both proliferation risks and nuclear security risks. Both of these
concerns need to be addressed, and plutonium accumulation, even in
civil programs, should be discouraged.
Question. In your view, what are the other emerging challenges for
the international safeguards regime/IAEA safeguards and how might the
Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
contribute to addressing or be leveraged to meet those challenges?
Answer. The major challenges facing the IAEA safeguards regime
include ongoing noncompliance issues from states such as Iran, DPRK,
and Syria, stagnant verification budgets paired with increasing
workload, understanding the threats and opportunities presented by
emerging technologies, and the lack of universality of the highest
standard of IAEA safeguards verification (e.g., the Additional
Protocol) to enable the IAEA to provide assurances that all nuclear
material remains in peaceful use. The DNN office can contribute to all
of these challenges through technical investment and innovations, and
must collaborate with the IAEA and our partners to prioritize needs and
find efficiencies.
nuclear material security
Question. What is your view of the strategy, if any, that NNSA has
developed for prioritizing its nuclear security activities so that
material that poses the highest risk is identified and addressed first?
Answer. I support a risk-informed approach to secure material of
concern. If confirmed, I would want to understand how DNN applies their
risk prioritization models to take into account information relevant to
the threat environment, existing security vulnerabilities, and material
consequences. I would also advocate for DNN with the intelligence
community and other government agencies to get all the relevant
information needed to make good decisions, if DNN is not already
getting this information. This information allows DNN to effectively
prioritize its risk reduction work and then build the necessary
relationships in order to secure these materials and improve
interdiction capabilities.
Question. United States nuclear security cooperation programs with
Russia are currently inactive after years of joint investment between
our two countries to ensure our stockpiles of fissile materials have
adequate protection.
What are your views with respect to the state of safeguards
currently in place in Russia and the level of risk of diversion of
Russia's fissile material?
Answer. Russia has the technical expertise among its nuclear
security professionals to protect its most sensitive nuclear material
and weapons. I understand that many of the best practices and lessons
of the two decades of joint activity under the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Agreement have been codified into their regulations. However,
since 2014, the United States' influence and insight into the state of
nuclear security in Russia has diminished. Considering the large
quantity of nuclear materials and facilities in Russia and renewed
emphasis on the nuclear enterprise, one could imagine a need for
renewed focus on nuclear security in and around Russia. If confirmed, I
would seek early briefings on this subject.
Question. What visibility should the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation have on Russian efforts to sustain the
equipment and technology the United States has provided? If confirmed,
what more would you do to sustain those investments?
Answer. Given the complexities of the relationship, there is little
to no direct information about the state of the investments that the
United States made to nuclear security in Russia. Ultimately, it will
be necessary to re-engage with Russian counterparts where appropriate,
to discuss nuclear security issues. Even when the relationship is
fraught, this dialogue would serve U.S. national security interests.
If the broader political relationship were to evolve to be more
favorable, this might include a cooperative re-engagement, as peers, to
increase awareness and insight. Failing that, if confirmed, I would
seek multilateral opportunities to create information exchanges with
Russia on the sustainability of investments and try to learn from
ongoing track 1.5 and track 2 efforts.
Question. What, in your view, are the other areas of nuclear
security and nonproliferation cooperation that could be sustained or
initiated with Russia in the next five years?
Answer. The United States and Russia possess 90 percent of the
world's useable materials and control the largest nuclear stockpiles
and complexes. The reality is that it is difficult to address global
nuclear security without such a significant player at the table. It
would be in the United States' national interest to re-engage at a
basic level with Russia to discuss nuclear security issues. If given
the opportunity, there are a number of bilateral areas related to
nuclear and radiological security and nonproliferation associated with
fuel cycle activities that could be explored with Russia. It is not
conceivable nor necessarily desirable that there would be a return to
the same level of assistance on nuclear security of the past, but there
may be opportunity and reason to engage on a peer-to-peer basis on
common and global nuclear security challenges on a mutually-beneficial
basis. The United States and Russia have successfully collaborated,
even in recent years, to reduce nuclear security risks in third
countries. If confirmed, I would continue this cooperation.
Question. Significant progress has been made over the past two
decades to improve security over vast amounts of vulnerable nuclear
material and to consolidate fissile material to fewer, more secure
locations. Yet, some countries remain unwilling or reluctant to
cooperate with U.S. nuclear material security programs.
Do you agree with the assertion by some that efforts to secure
fissile material around the world have run their course? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. I believe that the challenge to secure fissile material is
enduring, and there is still much work to do. The threat environment is
constantly evolving and our nuclear security efforts must anticipate
and stay ahead of emerging threats. There are remaining inventories of
materials to convert or remove, new facilities being built, and regimes
falling into instability. These are all factor that alter our nuclear
security calculations.
Question. How do you believe the United States should address
countries that, to date, have been unwilling to cooperate with these
efforts? What would you do differently, and what new strategies would
you employ to this end, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support a continued, multi-pronged
strategy which seeks bilateral relationships but also leverages
multilateral relationships to support its efforts. In the cases in
which NNSA does not have a direct bilateral relationship with a
partner, its multilateral efforts with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and/or regional organizations are vital to supporting
best practices and international norms for nuclear security. For those
countries the United States cannot engage on nuclear security, NNSA
should place special emphasis on providing layered defenses to counter
smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials that might originate
from those countries. Building capacity in partners along high-risk
pathways provides for risk reduction when NNSA cannot work with
specific countries of concern.
Question. With the end of the Nuclear Security Summits, what are
your thoughts on how international consensus building and dialogue on
nuclear security can continue between the United States and senior
leadership of key foreign governments? What models or mechanisms would
you propose, if confirmed?
Answer. The Nuclear Security Summits were valuable engagements to
highlight the important nuclear security work that had been done, but
more importantly they highlighted the magnitude of work left to be
completed. I was honored to lead the Department of Energy's
participation in the 2016 Summit, so I saw the process and challenges
firsthand. I believe it is necessary to sustain awareness at the
highest levels while also working on practical, tangible projects and
collaborative approaches at the working level. If confirmed, I would
support advocacy for nuclear security in international fora, in
bilateral engagements with NNSA and DOE leadership and their
counterparts, and through senior representation at key opportunities,
such as the upcoming first Review Conference on the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment.
Question. This administration has emphasized working with other
countries on a bilateral basis. In your view, what are the top five
countries with which the United States needs to work most closely on
nuclear security technical and policy issues, and what are the most
pressing issues that need to be addressed with each of those countries?
Answer. I would include Belarus, India, Russia, South Africa, and
Ukraine in my top five list of countries to engage on nuclear security
because of either large volumes of proliferation-sensitive materials
present in-country and/or nuclear security conditions in-country.
In alphabetical order:
Belarus--In addition to the historical upgrades that DOE/
NNSA completed at the Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research
(JIPNR) in Belarus and the successful removal of all fresh and spent
HEU fuel from the Pamir research reactor, my understanding is that
since 2016 NNSA has been engaging with JIPNR on nuclear security
culture and gradually expanded the cooperation to include insider
threat mitigation, response training, and performance evaluation. DNN
must also continue efforts to remove the remaining highly enriched
uranium in the country.
India--India has a well-developed nuclear program
including a growing nuclear power program with a complete nuclear fuel
cycle and a weapons program. We have developed and delivered training
jointly through the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GCNEP). We will continue to prioritize cooperation on nuclear security
topics including: accounting for nuclear material, advanced modelling
to improve physical security, transportation security for radiological
sources, and emergency response.
Russia--Considering the large quantity of nuclear
materials and facilities in Russia we need a renewed focus on nuclear
security with Russia, despite the very real and appropriate constraints
on working with them.
South Africa--South Africa is involved in every part of
the nuclear fuel cycle. South Africa is the only country to have
declared and denuclearized a full nuclear weapons program, and there
are large amounts of HEU still located there. As South Africa seeks
additional nuclear power generation and advanced reactor technologies,
a strong partnership with South Africa on nuclear security will only
grow in importance.
Ukraine--Ukraine continues to be an important partner for
nuclear security. Two key power plants, Zaporizhzhia and South Ukraine,
are located near the Line of Conflict, the border between Ukraine and
the areas under Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists. Priority areas of
work with Ukraine should include: protective/response force training,
physical protection upgrades at South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants and
physical security upgrades at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
I would add honorable mentions, in alphabetical order, for both
China and Pakistan, but don't feel that I have all the relevant
information to make specific recommendations. Both were active
participants in the Nuclear Security Summit process, but I no longer
have good insight into their activities. If confirmed, I would seek
briefings on these two countries' nuclear security situations urgently.
Question. In your view, what are the guidelines and objectives that
should be part of developing nuclear security cooperation with China?
India? Pakistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the White House and
interagency on key principles for engaging with these countries in
service of U.S. national security. I would not seek engagement for the
sake of engagement. China represents a significant challenge that is
changing rapidly, and engagement with China on nuclear issues is
entangled in the broader strategic relationship. India is a key nuclear
security partner, and, if confirmed, I would like to continue to mature
and deepen this collaborative relationship, especially on nuclear
security. Pakistan is an important country for bilateral engagement on
nuclear security and I would seek early information on their current
situation. Given that India and Pakistan are high-priority countries,
it is important to continue to carry out and implement bilateral
nuclear security cooperation through existing mechanisms, but it is
also vital to develop creative strategies to further engage with India
and Pakistan through track 2 dialogues to provide a platform for open
and continued dialogues on nuclear security topics.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of NNSA-sponsored
Centers of Nuclear Security Excellence in engaging such countries, and
what tangible results have you observed from the programs sponsored by
those centers?
Answer. The NNSA-sponsored Centers of Nuclear Security Excellence
(COE) have been instrumental in improving nuclear security worldwide.
In particular, these centers provide venues for training and
professional development activities in support of sustaining nuclear
security at the national and regional levels where none were before.
Further, the COEs are a part of the IAEA's network that further expands
and sustains IAEA's influence at the international and regional level
for the important elements of a nuclear security regime. If confirmed,
I would request information about the specific and tangible results
from each of the COEs, and seek ways to improve their reach and
effectiveness, if possible.
Question. Historically, efforts to minimize, inventory/account for,
and secure nuclear materials have focused on civilian stockpiles, to
the exclusion of military stockpiles. Crossover between civilian/
military nuclear programs is problematic.
What to you envision as the role, if any, of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in addressing the
dangers posed by military fissile material stockpiles?
Answer. DNN's role is to engage with any partner who maintains
fissile material stockpiles - either by civilian entities or by the
military. If confirmed, I will look for increased opportunities to
engage in this area and to strengthen our engagement with weapons
states. Vulnerable nuclear material is vulnerable nuclear material, and
it does not matter what its intended purpose is.
Question. As with other nuclear materials security programs, DNN
has significant accomplishments in terms of converting research
reactors to run on low-enriched uranium. However, a number of highly
enriched uranium-fueled reactors continue to operate around the world,
and converting some of these reactors presents greater technological
and other challenges than NNSA has previously encountered in other
reactor conversions, including strong political resistance to such
conversions.
In your view, how should the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation approach these challenges?
Answer. There are technical and political challenges in converting
the remaining high performance HEU research reactors to LEU fuel. If
confirmed, I will approach these challenges by advocating for continued
funding for the qualification of high-density LEU fuels necessary to
convert these reactors, and by working closely with our international
partners to address any political challenges that arise in the process.
Part of that task is understanding the role and purpose of the
remaining HEU-fueled reactors and seeking ways to build confidence that
the missions can be met after conversion to LEU.
Question. The Office of the Deputy Administrator sponsors an
ongoing program to replace Cesium-137 blood irradiators in hospitals,
but this program is modest and faces limitations.
Do you believe the Office of the Deputy Administrator has the
requisite capacity for a more comprehensive program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to understand the capacity
limits of the program and the lab experts supporting it to know if
there is a need to expand the program. A more comprehensive program
could expand beyond just cesium-137-based blood irradiators. There are
irradiators used for other applications that have viable alternative
technologies available now and the program should expand their focus to
those other applications. The program is on track to replace all
cesium-based blood irradiators by 2027 as called for in the 2019 NDAA.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan on overcoming the
current program's limitations?
Answer. The program's main limitation is the number of irradiators
that it can safely recover in year. If confirmed, I will look for ways
to increase the rate of yearly recoveries including optimizing the use
of existing transportation containers.
Question. The fall of Mosul in Iraq revealed that ISIS was in close
proximity to many sources of Cesium-137 used for commercial and medical
purposes.
What are your views on the way forward in securing nuclear
materials in the Levant?
Answer. I think there should be a focus on permanent risk reduction
in all regions where the risk is high that a terrorist could access
nuclear or radioactive materials. DNN's approach, as I understand it,
is sound - working with bilateral partners to focus on transitioning to
alternative, non-radioisotope technologies and removing the radioactive
sources. In September 2021, DNN removed three cesium-based devices from
Lebanon and replaced them with x-ray devices. I understand that DNN is
in discussions for similar activities with partners in Iraq. In order
to address concerns about vulnerable material in the Levant,
cooperation with multiple partner agencies on counter nuclear smuggling
is of highest importance. NNSA must look to build layered defenses
throughout the region, working with border security partners, law
enforcement agencies, and security services to build capacity detect
materials outside regulatory control and to return those materials to
control and accounting systems. Current DNN efforts with Lebanon,
Israel,
Jordan, and Turkey reflect this approach. If confirmed, I would
seek additional information about these efforts and the overall risk
environment to inform prioritization.
Question. Former Soviet states that border Russia have historical
trade and smuggling routes that stretch from the Russian border to the
Levant.
What are your perceptions of the extent of nuclear smuggling in
these regions?
Answer. These are definitely areas of concern, but my current
information is anecdotal. If confirmed, one of my first tasks will be
to review the current intelligence on nuclear smuggling and seizures in
these regions.
Question. If confirmed, what do you believe NNSA should or should
not be doing to control nuclear smuggling in this region and along
these routes?
Answer. NNSA has a crucial role in this region to support partner
country systems already deployed and to build additional layers of
defense, particularly with law enforcement, internal security, and
regulatory agencies. I believe NNSA should continue its commitment to
sustaining baseline capacity, including building indigenous capacity
for training, operations, maintenance, policies, and assessments.
Further, NNSA should help enhance partner capabilities not just at
official points of entry but also along frontier regions and in the
interior of countries. This should be complemented with investigation
support to help partner countries translate detections into
prosecutions. By building layered defenses and long-term security
partnerships in this region, NNSA can provide an enduring benefit to
U.S. national security.
nuclear cooperation agreements and export controls
Question. The United States is working on a nonproliferation
agreement with Saudi Arabia under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Do you believe that Saudi Arabia should be required to adhere to
the IAEA additional protocols?
Answer. Yes, consistent with longstanding United States policy
supporting universal adherence to the Additional Protocol (AP), I
believe that Saudi Arabia should have an AP in force. U.S. policy is to
encourage all states, particularly those with civil nuclear programs,
to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their safeguards
agreements with the IAEA.
Question. Do you believe Saudi Arabia should be allowed to
reprocess spent nuclear fuel or have the ability to enrich uranium?
Answer. The introduction of reprocessing or enrichment technology
into Saudi Arabia could be destabilizing, which would not serve United
States national security interests. One of the pillars of United States
nonproliferation policy is to encourage foreign partners to make the
sovereign decision to rely upon the strong and reliable international
nuclear fuel industry for their fuel supplies, and not pursue domestic
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. I believe this is the right
approach for Saudi Arabia.
Question. What proliferation risks do you see as arising from any
nonproliferation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and if confirmed, what
would be your role in and approach to managing these risks?
Answer. A well-crafted nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi
Arabia can address key nonproliferation risks and concerns. Such an
agreement would address nuclear safeguards and the possibility of
enrichment and reprocessing. If such an agreement with Saudi Arabia
were possible, it would also serve United States interests by
supporting United States industry, providing a channel for sharing high
safety, security and nonproliferation standards, and reduce the chances
that Russia or China would provide nuclear technology with lower
requirements than those that come with United States technology.
Question. To what extent do you believe the likelihood of reaching
such an agreement could be affected by reports of Saudi Arabia's
conclusion of agreements for uranium exploration with two Chinese
entities, one of which is China's primary nuclear weapons
infrastructure construction provider?
Answer. I don't think that Saudi Arabia's mining of uranium
presents obstacles for a 123 Agreement with the United States. In fact,
because of the Chinese presence in these activities, it is even more
important that the United States emphasize in its bilateral engagements
the need for a strong export control regime, in-line with Nuclear
Suppliers Group principles, so that any mined uranium from Saudi Arabia
is used only for peaceful purposes.
Question. In spite of process improvements, the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has faced criticism
from the nuclear industry for its implementation of 10 C.F.R. Part 810
regulations controlling the export of civilian nuclear technology.
What ideas do you have for improving the implementation of Part
810, and how would you go about implementing them, if confirmed?
Answer. This is an area where I will need more information, if
confirmed. I know that DNN has an on-going Process Improvement Plan for
its implementation of Part-810, and that it remains dedicated to
constantly working to improve response times and authorization
determinations. If confirmed, I will work closely with interagency
partners on best practices and improving efficiency. I support
reviewing and enhancing DNN's 810 system so that it is useful and
effective for U.S. exporters, and is not a barrier to industry efforts.
Question. In the debates surrounding Part 810, which implements
section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, there is disagreement as to the
extent to which some of the controlled technologies--such as some types
of light-water reactor technology--pose a proliferation risk. To what
extent do you believe that export controls should cover such
technologies?
Answer. It remains U.S. nonproliferation policy to protect
information and know-how related to production of special nuclear
material, which could aid in the development of weapons usable
material. Based on my current understanding, I believe this technology
is appropriately controlled under 10 CFR Part 810 because all nuclear
reactors (including light water reactors) have the ability to produce
plutonium. If confirmed, I would seek to understand the concerns in
this area, as appropriate.
Question. In your view, how does one ensure enforcement through
export control licenses and conditions when it is increasingly common
for end users to change affiliations?
Answer. Review of export licenses by the USG is an effective tool
to mitigate the risk of transferring sensitive goods and technologies
to proliferant entities and networks, but it is not a silver bullet. I
believe DNN has a responsibility to make the process as robust as
possible. DNN applies a rigorous license review process including a
comprehensive technical review and an end user review. This process
builds confidence that the goods being exported are appropriate for the
stated end use and also identifies other potential end uses would be
consistent with proliferation-related activities. The end user review
portion consists of an open-source review and an all-source
intelligence review. The end user review identifies any present or past
proliferation activities as well as any known association of the entity
to other organizations of concern including military, government,
proliferation networks and changed affiliations. Periodic updates
support the assessment of whether the end user reviews remain relevant.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address the challenges posed
by increasingly sophisticated illicit procurement networks that can
circumvent export controls with apparent ease?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue DNN's support to U.S.
interdiction efforts, evaluate the end-user review process, and
continue participating in interagency activities to strengthen the
Export Administration Regulations.
I also would continue DNN's partnership with the intelligence
community so that issues related to attempts to circumvent Part 810
export controls are understood and addressed in a timely manner to
maintain our strong nonproliferation regime.
Question. If confirmed, how would you go about substantiating the
claim that the United States must maintain a leadership role in the
global nuclear industry in order to maintain leadership in global
nonproliferation efforts?
Answer. I would not seek to substantiate the claim that the United
States must maintain a leadership role in the global nuclear industry
in order to maintain leadership in global nonproliferation efforts.
Rather, if confirmed, I would seek to understand (and request
indicators of) how U.S. engagement in the nuclear industry can support
economic goals while also bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear
security priorities. It is true that providing access to peaceful
nuclear technology establishes a multi-decade relationship with partner
countries. Through this relationship, the United States may influence
critical thinking in partner countries about the importance of
nonproliferation. The global nuclear market has become very competitive
with Russia and China seeking to use access to cheap financing to turn
traditional partners and new partners away from the United States,
undermining our nonproliferation efforts. In spite of Russian and
Chinese efforts, most of the world still recognizes that the United
States can supply the safest and most advanced nuclear technology. If
confirmed, I will work with my departmental colleagues, including the
Office of Nuclear Energy, and the interagency to facilitate robust
civil nuclear cooperation to support the President's climate change
agenda while protecting nonproliferation leadership and innovation.
Question. How does this argument frame the role of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) in maintaining global standards?
Answer. As the global standard bearer for the supply of peaceful
nuclear technologies, the NSG is an important part of the
nonproliferation regime. The role of the NSG becomes more important as
the global marketplace becomes more competitive as it requires members
to include minimum of nonproliferation requirements in all
transactions, including the application of IAEA safeguards, physical
protection, and peaceful uses. This puts all suppliers on a basic, even
playing field. If confirmed, I will seek to work with our partners in
U.S. industry and academia as well as with other NSG Participating
Governments to increase understanding and effectiveness of current
controls and to identify new technologies of proliferation concern that
may warrant control through the NSG.
Question. If confirmed, what ideas and approaches would you apply
to strengthening the NSG export guidelines?
Answer. The NSG has been at the forefront of the export control
regimes in terms of innovation in its policies and practices. Much of
this innovation has come from the work that the Department and its
national labs have done over the years to understand how global
regulators and global industry can interact effectively and
efficiently. Broadening the engagement of the NSG directly with the
global industry may a vital next step for the regime. I believe
adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a formal condition of
supply should also be vigorously pursued.
Question. NNSA has previously advocated for India's membership in
the NSG, which has in turn led Pakistan to advocate for its membership.
Do you support India's and/or Pakistan's membership in the NSG?
Answer. I support the U.S. policy of considering all NSG membership
applications on their individual merits on a case-by-case basis. The
United States continues to support India's NSG membership.
Question. If you are confirmed, what would you perceive to be your
role in advocating for or against membership by India and Pakistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the United States' policy of
considering all NSG membership applications on their individual merits
on a case-by-case basis, and would help DNN bring to bear its expertise
to contribute to a technically-informed evaluation process for any
membership applications.
nonproliferation research and development
Question. North Korea enriches and reprocesses fissile material for
its nuclear weapons program.
In your view, what areas of research and development do you believe
are needed to further assess the advances North Korea has or is making
in its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. DNN has a strong R&D program in place with a focus on
detecting and characterizing foreign nuclear weapons programs like that
in North Korea. Results from this R&D program are transitioned to
partners across the interagency but, in particular, the intelligence
community and Department of Defense. In the case of North Korea, R&D to
improve our ability to not only detect, but to characterize underground
tests, such as the one conducted in 2017, is critical. DPRK is also a
difficult access problem and R&D is needed that can provide technical
remote monitoring solutions. For example, next generation AI tools may
help us extract more information from the data we do get from watching
North Korea remotely. Research and development in the areas of remote
detection and recognition of processing signatures could help the
United States better assess North Korea's fissile material processing
activities. In addition, R&D of onsite verification technologies can
prepare U.S. verification teams to implement negotiated measures in
support of any denuclearization agreement.
Question. If North Korea were to freeze its nuclear weapons
program, what additional safeguards do you believe would be needed to
verify such a freeze?
Answer. Deploying on-site verification teams (U.S., IAEA, or
another model) will be the best way to independently verify the
comprehensiveness and completeness of a freeze. Specific onsite
monitoring actions would have to be tailored to each technical process
that would be suspended. DNN has experience designing technical
approaches and deploying expert teams to cover a range of activities in
North Korea.
Question. Future arms control agreements may propose a cap on the
total number of nuclear warheads in each country. This would require
significant portal monitoring of locations where such warheads are
stored or employed.
What is your assessment of the capabilities of portal monitoring
technologies to accurately identify nuclear warheads and their types?
Answer. There are different options for monitoring and verifying
different types of potential warhead limits. In general, portal
monitors could potentially play a role in future monitoring and
verification, but their capability will depend on the exact use case
and the specific configuration of the portal monitoring system and
associated implementation procedures. While I am familiar with some
past studies of portal monitoring for arms control monitoring, if
confirmed I would need to increase my understanding of this issue to
judge the applicability to future regimes.
Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others
have reported on issues affecting the nonproliferation research and
development capacity in the NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including
deteriorating facilities, stagnant or diminishing production capacity,
a retirement-driven ``brain drain,'' and a constrained resource
environment with many competing priorities.
In your view, what complex-related priorities should NNSA focus on
to ensure continued capability and advancement in the nonproliferation
area?
Answer. The Nonproliferation Stewardship Program (NSP) within DNN
R&D is sharply focused on many of these issues. The design of the NSP
is to provide targeted infrastructure and S&T activities so that DNN
has a cadre of nonproliferation expertise capable of meeting future
nonproliferation threats and challenges. The U.S. can no longer rely
only on a robust nuclear weapons development enterprise or a civilian
nuclear power industry to provide future expertise. NNSA must be
intentional and targeted in identifying and developing needed
nonproliferation competencies. That said, it is important for DNN and
Defense Programs to align human capacity development and expertise to
benefit NNSA as a whole. If confirmed, I would seek to engage my
counterpart in DP to assess our collective human capital needs. NNSA
must focus on building and retaining a diverse, highly skilled,
flexible workforce capable of addressing complex, multifaceted
nonproliferation challenges. Recruiting the ``best and the brightest,''
and providing them with world class facilities in which to work, should
be a key priority for NNSA.
budget execution and program management
Question. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2022 for
NNSA nonproliferation programs is $2.26 billion.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to prioritize resources to
ensure the maximum programmatic benefit?
Answer. If confirmed, my initial focus would be on reviewing DNN's
mission activities to evaluate whether they reflect the appropriate
balance of efforts to address the President's goals, as described in
the Interim National Security Strategy, of renewing U.S.
nonproliferation leadership and reducing the dangers posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as by the threat of nuclear
terrorism. Further, I would work to align DNN's financial resources,
and future fiscal year budget requests, to support activities that
provide clear benefit to the U.S. national security. I would also
emphasize through DNN the responsibility to use its financial resources
efficiently.
If confirmed, I would assess DNN's programs to identify any
possible efficiencies or areas that could be bolstered by additional
resources. I would work with and welcome insights from members of this
committee on how to best align DNN's budget to those priorities.
Question. Other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland
Security, also have nuclear forensics programs that are carried out by
the NNSA nonproliferation program. Should these programs be
consolidated under the NNSA, in your view? Why or why not?
Answer. I recognize the increased level of effort and the
leadership role that the NNSA has assumed since technical nuclear
forensics since I was last in the Department. If legislative change
were enacted, I believe NNSA is well suited to accept the interagency
coordination and expertise development responsibilities currently
assigned to DHS. Technical nuclear forensics supports the broader
mission of attribution. Attribution is, by necessity, an interagency
effort relying on law enforcement, intelligence, technical, diplomatic,
and others from across the government to provide the best determination
and advice to the President in the event of an unclaimed nuclear
attack. While the NNSA laboratories are clearly the centers of
excellence for nuclear forensics, if confirmed, I would seek
information from other departments and agencies to determine if they
need additional support for their attribution responsibilities.
Question. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation has made progress in recent years in providing
transparency to the cost and schedule for some programs by issuing an
annual strategic plan to reduce global nuclear threats. However,
because of international agreements, the DNN has been identified as
maintaining carry over accounts for extremely long periods of time.
In your view, what is the appropriate degree of program management
that DNN should exercise to ensure its programs can demonstrate
performance against cost and schedule commitments, while also
acknowledging the uncertainty of its operating environment--for
example, its dependence on international partners to accomplish its
mission?
Answer. DNN faces unique challenges in budget planning and
execution that relates to both technical constraint, partner support
and the uncertainty that comes from implementing a substantially
international program. Despite these challenges, I believe DNN must
track budget and cost execution, relying on DOE/NNSA's project
management practices, as precisely possible to make efficient use of
taxpayer resources. Further, future fiscal year budget requests need to
take into account existing and updated funding projections. Finally, I
believe DNN programs need the latitude to pivot to take advantage of
unanticipated program execution opportunities when they arise. If
confirmed, I would take program stewardship seriously, and look forward
to engaging with this Committee and other stakeholders if questions
arise.
Question. If confirmed, to what extent would you support a
requirement for all DNN programs to establish life-cycle cost and
schedule baselines and measure performance against those baselines in
its annual report?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support appropriate reporting of
performance against program cost and schedule baselines. I would
welcome this committee's input on how DNN might better communicate its
performance to budget.
sexual harassment
Question. In April of 2021 the General Accountability Office
released a report ``Sexual Harassment: NNSA Could Improve Prevention
and Response Efforts in Its Nuclear Security Forces'', which in
addition to the examination of the NNSA Security Forces gave
recommendations for the NNSA and the DOE in how they surveys, assess
and trains to prevent sexual harassment.
What are your views on the GAO report's findings and
recommendations? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I have read the GAO report and understand that DOE/NNSA has
concurred with all five recommendations. If confirmed, I would request
an update on the status of addressing the recommendations. I am
committed to working with DOE/NNSA to prevent and respond to incidents
of sexual harassment.
Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. This is an important issue in any workplace, and one I take
seriously. The only way for a workplace to be both ethically robust and
mission effective is for everyone to be respected and protected. I
understand that DNN already has a robust Diversity, Equity, Inclusion,
and Accessibility (DEIA) effort underway that is coordinated with
broader NNSA efforts and includes addressing all forms of
discrimination and harassment. If confirmed, I look forward to learning
more about this effort and working to address and eliminate all forms
of discrimination and harassment in DNN.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the Office of the Deputy
Administrator?
Answer. First, if confirmed, I would identify the appropriate
reporting procedure and make sure that it is communicated to all DNN
employees and contractors. If there were a report, I would take all
possible steps to make sure it is addressed fairly to all parties and
in a timely manner, in accordance with NNSA policy.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee
relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the
Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the
formality of a letter from the Chairman?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
nuclear security and non-state actors
1. Senator King. Ms. Hinderstein, as we discussed at the hearing,
deterrence does not work with terrorists. I would appreciate you
expanding upon your comments at the hearing regarding your thoughts on
how we address the issue of nuclear security and the danger of non-
State actors acquiring nuclear material, an entire nuclear weapon, or
the technology to develop a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Hinderstein. While the overall probability of a terrorist group
acquiring a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences are unacceptably
high. For that reason, I believe that the United States and the Office
of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) should continue to prioritize
permanent threat reduction through material elimination and facility
conversion, strengthen nuclear security standards and practices
globally, and use a strategy of defense-in-depth. This strategy
emphasizes preventing access to nuclear or radiological materials at
their source and impeding access to the necessary expertise and
equipment or technology required to build a device, such as through
export controls and interdiction efforts. As a further barrier, it is
important to strengthen partner capabilities to detect, interdict, and
investigate smuggled nuclear or radiological materials. As a final
barrier, we should create real consequences for those who do illegally
obtain these materials, expertise, or equipment through penalties,
sanctions, and support for criminal prosecutions. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure that DNN maintains the R&D work, international
partnerships, and technical capabilities required for this defense-in-
depth strategy.
If confirmed, I would also welcome the opportunity to travel to
some of NNSA's sites with members of this committee to learn more about
NNSA's contribution to nonproliferation efforts against non-State
actors.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
iran deal
2. Senator Manchin. Ms. Hinderstein, your professional biography
states that you led the Department of Energy's Iran Task Force, and
that you were responsible for the implementation of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the ``Iran
Deal.'' I opposed this deal because I believed that Iran should earn
sanctions relief by demonstrating goodwill, rather than rewarding them
and hoping that they stay compliant. Realizing that you didn't have
authority to approve or deny the finer points of the Iran Deal, do you
generally believe that we should relax sanctions on Iran in the future
before they demonstrate that they can be a stable nation in the
international community?
Ms. Hinderstein. I would defer to my colleagues in the interagency
on policy questions related to sanctions on Iran, but would prioritize
the provision of technical tools and analysis so that they can make
informed decisions about the nuclear risk as they make those judgments.
Developing and implementing any approach for Iran requires the
expertise of NNSA, the Department of Treasury, and other agencies in
support of the State Department's efforts. If confirmed, my goal would
be to ensure that NNSA's sound, technical expertise is available to
inform policymakers regarding the technical status and implications of
Iran's nuclear program, technical opportunities to limit Iran's
capabilities, and verification and monitoring approaches
3. Senator Manchin. Ms. Hinderstein, if you were consulted on
future negotiations for an agreement with Iran, would you be of the
opinion that the U.S. Government should also hold them accountable for
their terrorism operations abroad, and conventional weapons development
in addition to preventing their development of nuclear weapons?
Ms. Hinderstein. Yes, Iran should be held accountable for all its
actions. I support U.S. efforts to impose unilateral sanctions (most of
which were never lifted or waived under the JCPOA), as well U.N.
Security Council actions, in response to international terrorism, human
rights, and ballistic missile activities, among other problematic and
provocative activities.
nonproliferation resources
4. Senator Manchin. Ms. Hinderstein, in your advance policy
questions you noted that strategic competition from Russia and China,
and nuclear capability increases by Iran and North Korea were some of
the most pressing concerns for you if confirmed. Do you believe the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is currently properly
funded and equipped to counter those threats?
Ms. Hinderstein. If confirmed, I will review DNN's mission
activities to evaluate whether they reflect the appropriate balance of
efforts to address the President's goals, as described in the Interim
National Security Strategy, of renewing U.S. nonproliferation
leadership and reducing the dangers posed by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons as well as the threat of nuclear terrorism. I would
focus on aligning DNN's financial resources, and future fiscal year
budget requests, to support activities that provide clear benefit to
the U.S. national security and take into account a changing security
environment. If shifts or increases in resources would be warranted, I
would look forward to discussing the threat environment and the
contribution DNN could make with this Committee and other relevant
congressional stakeholders. In all cases, I believe DNN must track
budget and cost execution, relying on DOE/NNSA's project management
practices, as precisely as possible to make efficient use of taxpayer
resources.
5. Senator Manchin. Ms. Hinderstein, while you were previously at
NNSA, how did your policy affairs position adequately prepare you to
deal specifically with nonproliferation?
Ms. Hinderstein. My experience at NNSA included working closely
with the DOE, NNSA and other key elements of the U.S. national security
enterprise, including the national laboratories and the State
Department. I developed and implemented international projects working
with partners and allies and had oversight and governance
responsibilities for such projects. If confirmed, this familiarity with
DNN, NNSA and DOE will be important to developing and delivering
technical approaches for nonproliferation challenges and providing the
best guidance to NNSA, DOE and USG policy development processes. In
addition, from a substantive perspective, my time at DNN (in addition
to my other background) helped me gain deep knowledge in international
safeguards and verification, nonproliferation and export control policy
and regimes, and bilateral and international nonproliferation
relationships. As effective nonproliferation policy requires building
and sustaining partnerships, not just developing national approaches,
if confirmed, this experience will also help me meet U.S. national
security objectives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
nuclear proliferation in the middle east
6. Senator Rounds. Ms. Hinderstein, I believe it is critical we
prevent a cascade of nuclear proliferators in the Middle East, though
of course I'm most concerned about the imminent threat posed by Iran.
Beyond the Iran nuclear problem, can you provide some detail about your
next biggest nuclear proliferation concerns in the Middle East?
Ms. Hinderstein. The Middle East represents a significant challenge
as well as a significant opportunity for our nonproliferation goals.
Many countries in the broader Middle East have indicated varying levels
of interest in pursuing civil nuclear programs which could bring with
them new dual-use capabilities and possibilities for increased tension
and unpredictability in an already volatile region. With the possible
introduction of new advanced reactor technologies, we may have a window
of opportunity to influence states' decisions to bring carbon free
energy to the region while mitigating proliferation concerns. If
confirmed, I will want to work with my colleagues in the Office of
Nuclear Energy to identify which advanced reactor technologies could be
deployed to the Middle East so as to mitigate the proliferation
concerns, which I share with you. We should not cede the region to
nuclear suppliers who may not require the same nonproliferation and
nuclear security commitments of their partners that the United States
does, but we should also be careful about whether and how U.S.
technology is introduced so we do not undermine our own
nonproliferation objectives. If confirmed, I also will work closely
with the IAEA and existing DNN programs to identify and bring more
resources to the region to ensure the security of nuclear sites and
nuclear materials and to enhance regulatory and safeguards regimes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
nuclear proliferation
7. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Hinderstein, was the Obama
administration's JCPOA designed to be verifiable over the long term,
and why did it fail in this regard?
Ms. Hinderstein. The nuclear constraints placed on Iran under the
JCPOA were designed to be verifiable by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) over the long term, and the IAEA has demonstrated that
they are verifiable. Until Iran restricted its cooperation with the
IAEA, the verification was the most intrusive anywhere in the world,
including daily access to all enrichment sites, and utilizing the most
advanced technical tools available. As a result, the IAEA was able to
immediately identify when Iran began to violate its uranium enrichment
limits after the U.S. left the deal. In addition, several of the
enhanced transparency and verification measures of the JCPOA would
never expire. Iran has failed to live up to its obligations under the
JCPOA, however, in my opinion, that is not a failure of the
verification system which is designed to detect, not prevent, such
activities.
8. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Hinderstein, if a nation is nefariously
stockpiling nuclear addition supplies and equipment and not disclosing
it properly, what should be the United States' response?
Ms. Hinderstein. If a country is engaged in any nefarious or
illicit procurement of nuclear commodities, I believe that the United
States has demonstrated the ability to work both directly with that
country to roll back nuclear capability, and to work through the
appropriate entities in the nonproliferation regime to address and
correct the situation. Options include engaging directly (like the
George W. Bush administration did in Libya), working with the IAEA and
U.N. Security Council to resolve safeguards violations, or
collaborating with other suppliers in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
identify and prevent illegal attempts at procurement. All three
approaches have been used in the past. DNN has an important role in
providing information to prevent, identify, and assess these activities
and to develop approaches for the recovery/disablement of these illicit
nuclear commodities if detected.
9. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Hinderstein, is Iran's failure to comply
with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards
agreement a violation of its obligations as a Nonproliferation Treaty
signatory?
Ms. Hinderstein. The legal determination of a treaty violation is
in the purview of lawyers at the State Department, but Iran's failure
to provide substantive or technically credible responses to the IAEA's
questions related to possible undeclared nuclear materials and
activities is cause for serious concern. If confirmed, I will strongly
support the IAEA in their efforts to resolve these outstanding issues,
and engage members of the Board of Governors to take action if Iran
fails to cooperate. The resolution of outstanding safeguards
inconsistencies is separate from the JCPOA, and must be addressed
regardless of whether all parties return to that agreement.
10. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Hinderstein, as you know, the Taliban
had established a Minister of Atomic Energy. If confirmed, what steps
would you take to prevent a nuclear Taliban?
Ms. Hinderstein. I have noted the news that the Taliban has
appointed a new leader of the Minister of Atomic Energy in Afghanistan.
This was a role that already existed in recently ousted Afghan
government, and at that time was a partner in efforts to improve
regional nuclear security. I am not aware of the intent of the new
leadership with regard to any civil or non-civilian nuclear programs.
That said, we must approach this situation with caution. We know that
areas of instability pose significant challenges for nuclear security.
The United States must build the international partnerships necessary
to help detect and interdict illicit movements of nuclear materials,
equipment and technologies in the region. If confirmed, I would
prioritize getting up to speed on our current assessment of the
situation in Afghanistan and any connections the Taliban-led government
might have with other countries that may pose proliferation risks. I
would also commit to come back to this Committee, perhaps in another
setting, to discuss the risks and what tools we might have to mitigate
them.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
nuclear arms control and proliferation
11. Senator Hawley. Ms. Hinderstein, under what conditions do you
think the United States should tolerate or even support nuclear
proliferation to friendly nations, for instance, to bolster regional
deterrence against China?
Ms. Hinderstein. The proliferation of any nuclear weapons
technology anywhere in the world represents a potential threat to the
United States, and may bring unintended consequences that could create
bigger national security problems beyond countering China. The most
important steps we can take in the Asia Pacific to deter China are to
shore up our alliances in the region and make sure that our nuclear
deterrent commitments are robust. Consistent with the Atomic Energy
Act, any expansion of defense relationships that include a nuclear
component would require a decision by the President and consultations
with Congress.
12. Senator Hawley. Ms. Hinderstein, would you agree that nuclear
modernization is essential not just for ensuring our nuclear deterrent
remains safe, secure, and reliable, but also for providing the United
States with additional options for incentivizing Russia and China to
accept restrictions on their nuclear forces as part of future arms
control negotiations?
Ms. Hinderstein. I agree that nuclear modernization includes
important updates to critical NNSA infrastructure and our nuclear
forces, and may influence future arms control negotiations. Continuing
to demonstrate a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is
essential for U.S. national security and may further incentivize
Russian and Chinese engagement on security matters, including arms
control.
13. Senator Hawley. Ms. Hinderstein, what role do you think arms
control should play in our response to China's rapid buildup of its
nuclear arsenal?
Ms. Hinderstein. China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and
nuclear material production is a concern to the United States. I
support efforts to seek clarity from the Chinese regarding the purpose
and intention of their buildup. A meaningful dialog with China is a
critical first step that may lead to formal arms control measures or
informal confidence building measures in the future that would
ultimately strengthen U.S. national security. Verifiable arms control
measures can provide stability and predictability, and serve as a
critical tool to help mitigate threats to the United States.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein,
follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
ms. corey a. hinderstein
Corey Hinderstein is vice president of International Fuel Cycle
Strategies at the Nuclear Threat Initiative based in Washington, DC.
where she focuses on international nuclear fuel cycle and
nonproliferation policy, global nuclear security, and arms control and
nonproliferation monitoring and verification. From February 2015
through November 2017, Ms. Hinderstein was senior coordinator for
nuclear security and nonproliferation policy affairs at the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation office of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). At NNSA, she
led the DOE's preparations for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and
worked on other projects related to nuclear security and illicit
trafficking, Iran's nuclear program and international monitoring and
verification. Prior to her service at DOE, Ms. Hinderstein had been
with NTI since 2006 and earlier was deputy director of the Institute
for Science and International Security.
Ms. Hinderstein is a past president and Fellow of the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and serves on the board of
directors for the World Institute for Nuclear Security. She also has
served in advisory capacities for multiple national laboratories and
has published widely on nuclear nonproliferation, verification and
monitoring and nuclear security. Ms. Hinderstein graduated from Clark
University in Worcester, MA where she was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Corey A.
Hinderstein in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 21, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on November 30, 2021.]
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