

**NOMINATIONS OF: DR. DAVID A. HONEY TO
BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; MS. BREN-
DA S. FULTON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS; AND MS. COREY A. HINDERSTEIN
TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 7, 2021

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This hearing is printed to include all available information
requested or required to be inserted for the record.

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CURITY ADMINISTRATION**

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2021

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. Let me call the hearing to order.

Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the nominations of Dr. David Honey to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Ms. Brenda Sue Fulton, to be Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and Ms. Corey Hinderstein to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the National Nuclear Security Administration.

I thank the nominees for their willingness to return to public service.

I would also like to welcome the family members who are with us today. Dr. Honey, I welcome your wife, Cynthia and son, Jonathan; Ms. Fulton, I welcome your cousin Rachel; and I thank Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill, who will introduce you, via Webex; and Ms. Hinderstein, I welcome your family members, Evan, Laura, and Rachel; and I thank Senator Sam Nunn for joining us to introduce you via Webex.

Dr. Honey, you are nominated to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. You have an extensive tech-

nical and professional background from your career at DARPA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Strategic Capabilities Office, and in other positions working on research and advanced technology programs and issues. If confirmed, you will support Under Secretary Heidi Shyu in shepherding the Department's modernization activities.

We are in a competition with China for technological superiority in areas like quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, and biotechnology, and you and your team will be responsible for ensuring that the Department has the right budget and policies in place to win that competition.

You will have also a role helping to ensure that DOD's acquisition programs are managed with solid, technical foundations, mature technologies, and robust developmental testing in systems engineering approaches.

Too many of our systems skip important early engineering steps, leading to test failures, costs and schedule overruns, and worst of all, delays in deploying new capabilities to our forces. In your role, you will serve as a technical conscience of the Department to ensure that acquisition programs proceed prudently and expeditiously from research into deployment. I look forward to hearing how you will address these challenges.

Ms. Fulton, you are nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As the principal advisor on all matters relating to civilian and military personnel policies, you will be responsible for Reserve integration and military community and family policy, as well as day-to-day supervision of the Department of Defense Education Activity and the Defense Commissary Agency.

Your extensive leadership experiences in the public, private, and military sectors should serve you well. One of Secretary Austin's priorities is to eradicate extremism within the ranks. While we continue to believe that the number of extremists in the ranks remains very small, even one is too many. I hope you will share your views on how you will approach this issue, especially as the lines between actions, thought, and speech becomes more difficult to define each day.

As we know from the President's Independent Review Commission that studied sexual assault and harassment in the military, there has been a dangerous erosion of trust and faith within the ranks in leaders' ability to effectively address this issue. While reforming how we prosecute sexual assault, harassment, and related crimes under the UCMJ, it is important, prevention is paramount. I would ask that you share your views on how we can reduce the incidents of sexual assault and harassment across the force.

Ms. Hinderstein, you are nominated to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security Administration. I would note your expertise in this area from your previous work at NNSA and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

If confirmed, you will be responsible for leading NNSA's nonproliferation efforts across a broad, important portfolio, which ranges from supporting the verification of current and future arms control treaties, securing the loose nuclear material around the

world, safeguarding the sale of U.S. nuclear technology overseas, and technically supporting the interagency in any future negotiations with Iran on their nuclear capability. As part of these duties, you will be responsible for overseeing the disposal of excess weapons plutonium, including working with the State of New Mexico to dispose of the 34 metric tons of excess plutonium at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

On the international stage, you will be charged with leading technical efforts for any follow-on nuclear weapons agreements with Russia after New START, as well as technical efforts to verify and secure North Korea's nuclear capabilities if a freeze agreement is reached. These are complex challenges and I am going to ask that you discuss how you would address them.

I want to, again, thank the nominees for their willingness to serve. I look forward to your testimonies.

Now, let me recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Chairman Reed.

Thanks to our witnesses for being with us and their willingness to serve the nation. The world is a dangerous place and America is under a greater threat than at any point in our lifetime; threats from China, Russia, and North Korea, Iran have all worsened since 2018.

As we learned over the last 2 weeks of hearings, threat of radical Islamic terrorism is growing, now that Afghanistan is the safest place in the world for terrorist planners. Now, while the world is focused on Afghanistan, we saw concerning developments in other places, too. In the last 2 months, revelation about the new Chinese nuclear silos has completely changed the nuclear environment. Russia continues to test nonstrategic nuclear weapons and its recent exercise was the largest in 4 decades. Iran's stockpile of fissile material continues to expand and the North Koreans continue to make surprising technological leaps. It more important than ever that we complete our nuclear modernization on time and continue to encourage innovation at the Department of Defense.

It is clear to me that the old ways of doing business just no longer work. Our government requires strong civilian leaderships and leaders of competence and character, if we hope to preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do us harm.

That is why these areas are so important because they help us understand our potential leaders and the values that they would bring to the job. So, we look forward to the hearing, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman REED. At this time, it gives me great pleasure to introduce the former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, so he can introduce Ms. Hinderstein.

Chairman Nunn?

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL NUNN, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Am I unmuted? Can you hear me?

Chairman REED. We can hear you, Mr. Chairman, and see you.

Senator NUNN. Good.

Thank you, Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, members of the Armed Services Committee. I am honored to appear before this important committee and, of course, it is familiar and I understand the job and the awesome responsibilities that all of you have.

I am joining you today from California at Stanford, where I will be attending the memorial service for George Schultz. As you know, our Nation lost George earlier this year at the age of 100. He had a remarkable record of public service from serving as a captain in the U.S. Marine Corps to the U.S. Secretary of State and a lot of important jobs in between.

George believed that the Committee and the Senate should be in on the takeoff, as well as, in on the landing on important national security and foreign policy issues, and he made a point of keeping us informed.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, in that spirit, I am honored to introduce Corey Hinderstein to the committee. I am confident that our nation's security will be greatly strengthened by Corey's expertise, her leadership skills, and her sound judgment in this crucial role, if she is confirmed.

Corey has worked for 25 years in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and security. She has strong leadership and analytical skills and a commitment to pragmatic problem-solving. Corey has a great understanding of the history of these issues that she will be involved in and she develops innovative and creative paths forward, as well as anyone I have seen.

Corey is an extraordinarily qualified nominee. Her previous work at the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, and her experience working with us at the Nuclear Threat Initiative have prepared her very well for this important position.

Mr. Chairman, if you compare Corey's list of experiences with the areas of responsibility that you outline for the job that she will hold, if confirmed, they line up almost perfectly, from international safeguards to arms-control verification, to nuclear security, to minimization of enriched uranium; all enormously important.

Corey was the key staff member responsible for scoping and standing up the World Institute for Nuclear Security. This is an international, nongovernmental organization, focusing on security for people who are handling nuclear materials all over the world; almost 5,000 members now from more than 140 countries and Corey played the key role there.

She also played a critical role in the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Low Enriched Uranium Bank, which I think is enormously important going forward in the future. In both of these projects and many others, Corey worked with governments and international organizations and across Republican and Democratic administrations.

If confirmed, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, I am confident she would bring this spirit of cooperation to her work and NNSA and in her dealings with this committee and the Congress. For 3 years, Corey took a leave of absence from our organization, NTI, to serve in the same NNSA office she is now nominated to lead.

During that time, she worked closely with the Secretary of Energy, the NNSA administrator, and her international and inter-

agency colleagues to strengthen global nuclear security, including work to deliver strong risk-reduction commitments at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, held by President Obama.

She was also part of the team implementing the Iran nuclear agreement with a focus on monitoring, as well as the all-important job of verification.

In conclusion, Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, and members of the committee, I am confident that Corey is fully prepared to serve in this critical role and I support her nomination by President Biden. I urge the committee's support, and I urge your confirmation by the full Senate.

Thank you very much.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, not only for your introduction today, but for your extraordinary service to the nation.

Now I would like to introduce, via Webex, Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill, who will introduce Ms. Fulton.

Congresswoman?

**STATEMENT OF HON. MIKIE SHERRILL, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.**

Representative SHERRILL. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, for holding this hearing today. It is also wonderful to be here today with the legendary Chairman Nunn, so that is quite an honor for me.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Representative SHERRILL. I am so glad to be before you to introduce my friend Sue Fulton and I am incredibly proud she has been nominated for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

I have admired Sue for many years. As a graduate of the first class at West Point that included women, she is certainly a trailblazer. In the Army, she served our country with distinction as a platoon leader and as a company commander, but as with so many of our veterans, her service did not end when she left active-duty. She has continued to be a tireless advocate for our servicemembers, their families, and our veterans.

After she left the Army, Sue had a successful private sector career, but stayed connected to the military; continually finding ways to support her community and her country. That includes the work she did for 8 years on the West Point Board of Visitors, including 5 as chair or vice chair, working in a nonpartisan manner to center character development as a way to deliver the best possible Army leaders. It includes decades of improving the military's ability to fight and win wars by increasing the pool of talented men and women who served. She did this through expanding opportunities for women, LGBTQ Americans, and black Americans. She ensured we continued to provide our Nation with the world's very best fighting force.

Most recently, Sue took on the challenge, and it truly was a challenge, of heading the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, the MVC, and led a charge to modernize and transform a broken hide-bound system where customers stood in land to stand in line. Under her tenure, she moved to a primarily analog system for in-

person services to a system where about 80 percent of transactions are available online. Sue is knowledgeable, passionate, and she gets results.

I am going to just highlight, briefly, something I think is abundantly clear across Sue's resume. By virtue of who she is, Sue has achieved a remarkable number of firsts and I can tell you firsthand, that in the best of us, people like Sue Fulton, those experiences breed not only toughness and courage, but also compassion and empathy.

Sue has spent her life fighting to help others achieve their own firsts and to make sure they have supporters by their side when they do so. That would be admirable in its own right, but what makes Sue special is that she has led with the broader mission in mind, whether it was readiness, preparing the next generation of leaders, or innovating the MVC.

Sue exemplifies the type of leadership that we prize in the military. She doesn't care what your political ideology is but focuses on bringing people together and leading them to achievements that benefit everyone. Let me assure you that Sue understands the importance of working in a bipartisan and even nonpartisan manner. She has an impressive track record for doing so and would bring that with her into the Department of Defense. She knows how to work with a broad array of people to get the job done. If you need proof, look no further, here I am; a hardcore Navy fan introducing an Army grad in glowing terms.

So, I will end by expressing my sincere hope that you all support Sue Fulton's nomination, because I cannot wait to see what she will accomplish for our servicemembers, for their families, and for our country. Thank you so much.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.

Now, let me recognize the witnesses for their opening statements.

Dr. Honey, please?

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID HONEY, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Dr. HONEY. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here.

I would also like to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Shyu for the trust they have placed in me throughout this nomination process. I would also like to thank my wife, Cynthia, and the rest of my family for their support and understanding of the many demands I have encountered during my career.

Today, I am humbled to sit before you to be considered for the role of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Bringing the best innovations and technologies to our servicemembers and civilian workforce is paramount to protecting our way of life.

I take this charge seriously and have devoted much of my career to the defense of our Nation. I received my first security clearance as a federal employee in 1974 and have seen firsthand the evolution of many of the issues that concern us today.

While the global competition and challenges we face seem daunting, I know from my experiences that there is much that we can do to overcome them. For example, while serving as a B-52 pilot, our combat capabilities benefited greatly from a series of aircraft modernization efforts, and as a result, the B-52 remains a formidable weapon system.

Having served as a scientist in the Air Force Research Laboratory, I have participated in the struggle to push research and development across the “Valley of Death” and deliver a competitive edge to our warfighters. While I have often tapped into the significant capabilities of large companies in the Defense Industrial Base, I am also a strong proponent of our highly innovative small business sector and have actively participated in the SBIR program.

My commitment to pursuing innovation has deepened during my two tours at DARPA, where I learned how a small agency can pursue high-risk/high payoff research, and repeatedly change our world for the better. During my time as the Director of Science and Technology in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I gained additional perspective on the nature of today’s threats to our national security and the role of S&T leadership in meeting those challenges. Having served previously in R&E, I am keenly aware of what it takes to ensure that R&E will be a valued contributor, and I believe that my experiences have well-acquainted me with the demands this position requires.

As Under Secretary Shyu has stated before this Committee, “the mission of furthering science, technology, and innovation across the Department of Defense could not be more important than it is today.”

We face wide-ranging threats from across the globe and meeting these challenges takes teamwork and collaboration. It is critical that we leverage the research being done by experts in academia, industry, and DOD laboratories. Our future success will require a new wave of diverse STEM talent, robust investments in advanced technologies and manufacturing, and enabling a culture that allows us to take risks in search of reward. It is critical that we continue to modernize in areas such as microelectronics, 5G, directed energy, and hypersonics. We must also take real steps to partner with and support the acquisition community to transition our most promising technologies into programs of record.

I do not take these obligations lightly, and if confirmed, it would be an immense honor to continue to serve our Nation, the Department of Defense, and the United States of America within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Thank you.

[The statement of Dr. David Honey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. DAVID HONEY

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be here. I would also like to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary Shyu for the trust they have placed in me throughout this nomination process. I would also like to thank my wife, Cynthia, and the rest of my family for their support and understanding of the many demands I have encountered during my career.

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I do not take these obligations lightly, and if confirmed, it would be an immense honor to continue to serve our Nation, the Department of Defense, and the United States of America within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, very much, Dr. Honey.
Ms. Fulton, please?

**STATEMENT OF BRENDA FULTON, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS**

Ms. FULTON. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee.

I also want to extend my thanks to Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill, a fellow veteran, and a New Jerseyan for that generous introduction.

I am honored to come before you as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

I am joined here today by my cousin, Rachel Fulton Gray, who was a great support to my wife Penny and me during Penny's illness. I know that Penny, along with my parents, is looking down on me today. They are largely responsible for me being here today, and I miss them terribly.

Across my career, I have accumulated a breadth of leadership experience, having served in the military, worked in the private sector, launched and led nonprofit organizations, and, in my current job, served in state government.

The thread that unites my experience is a desire to serve. I was 17 when I first raised my right hand and swore a solemn oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, as a new cadet at West Point.

My father served in the Navy in the Korean conflict, on the USS Lewis which saw significant action. As a proud sonarman, he would always tease me about being an officer and not having to work for a living, a saying all of you who are military veterans will recognize, but his love of this country and for the military lives deep in me.

I have worked with military leaders on multiple initiatives to increase diversity in the force. In every case, my guiding light was an effort to improve our ability to fight and win wars.

On the West Point Board of Visitors, I had the good fortune to work with Lieutenant General Bob Caslen and my friend Rep. Steve Womack, and other board members in fighting sexual harassment and assault; expanding the diversity of our entering classes; and most of all, centering character and character development as a way to deliver the Army the best leaders possible.

Our military faces an incredibly dynamic threat environment, with disruptive technologies and powerful adversaries. If confirmed to the role of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, I would focus on ensuring the Department can attract and retain a lethal and effective force to meet those challenges.

That means attracting the best talent. We know that smart, innovative people will seek out and thrive in an environment that is challenging, inclusive, diverse, and led by leaders of character. Whether in the civilian workforce, the Guard, the Reserves, or the active force, leadership rooted in our essential core values: selfless service, personal courage, honor, respect, and integrity, plays an important part in growing our overall talent.

We also have to retain that talent. Where it makes sense, we should look at broadening opportunities, reviewing standards to ensure they align with the needs of the service and increasing flexibility in our talent management systems, and always, we must take care of our families.

If I am confirmed, our core values will guide my efforts in support of Secretary Austin, all of our military services, and in my work with this Committee to deliver a smarter, stronger, more resilient, more capable total force for our country.

Senators, I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Ms. Fulton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MS. BRENDA FULTON

Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe.

I am honored to come before you as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs.

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Senators, I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Ms. Fulton.

Ms. Hinderstein, please?

STATEMENT OF COREY HINDERSTEIN, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of this committee.

I am honored to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today. I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to President Biden and Secretary Granholm and Administrator Ruby for the confidence they have shown in nominating me for this position.

I would like to take this opportunity, also, to recognize my husband, Chase, who was not able to be with me here today, but who has supported me for more than 27 years through long days in the office and many weeks on the road.

I would also like to thank my father, Evan, his partner Laura, and my sister Rachel for being with me today.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my mother, Sheila, who passed away in 2005, but who I know would be very proud to see me here today in your company.

I would also like to thank Senator Nunn for his kind words of introduction. Senator Nunn is a model of public service, dedicating his life to his fellow Georgians and to the security of this country. He has been a mentor and a role model to me and to so many. I have learned from his example of vision with pragmatism, strength with flexibility, and leadership without ego. His great respect for the Senate and this Committee makes it even more of an honor for me to be here today.

There is no more important role for government than to protect the security, health, well-being, and opportunity for the United States and its residents. For this reason, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has an enormously important mission. As a technical office, DNN works to protect nuclear material wherever it exists in the world; reduce and eliminate nuclear material wherever possible; preserve American leadership by enabling us to meet our international obligations, while holding others to their commitments; reduce the opportunities for nuclear weapons to spread; develop verification and monitoring technology and approaches for current commitments; and to inform negotiations of future agreements, to increase the chance that we will be able to detect if nuclear activities pose a threat to the United States and our allies and to focus now on the tools and technologies to meet future threats.

While addressing these foundational obligations of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy, DNN must also work collaboratively across the interagency and build partnerships in the international community, the nuclear industry, in academia, and with nongovernmental organizations.

If confirmed, I would seek to strengthen and expand these connections in service of our collective goals. Good ideas and good partners can be anywhere, and we need diverse viewpoints to meet the challenges ahead.

I had the pleasure of working with the DNN team for nearly 3 years. From the career civil servants to the professional support contractors, to the scientists and technicians at our national laboratories, plants, and sites, you won't find a more dedicated group of public servants. They work on nuclear nonproliferation and security because it is important and rewarding, and certainly not for the fame and fortune. This is a job that is never done. In the world of nuclear terrorism, for example, those protecting nuclear materials and facilities must get it right every day, while our adversaries only need to succeed once.

The technical and political landscape is constantly shifting. Each new accomplishment is followed by a new challenge. If I am confirmed, I would commit myself to sustain today's investments, while also innovating tomorrow's solutions.

I have worked for more than 25 years on nuclear nonproliferation and security, and much of that time has been in civil society. I have always wanted to dedicate myself more to public service and I am humbled by this opportunity to do so at a critical time for our nation's future.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today and I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Ms. Hinderstein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY STATEMENT OF MS. COREY HINDERSTEIN

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today. I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to President Biden and Secretary Granholm for the confidence they have shown in nominating me for the position of Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the Department of Energy.

I would like to take this opportunity to recognize my husband, Chase Hinderstein [who was not able to be with me here today] but has supported me for more than 27 years and I know is watching now. I would also like to thank my father, Evan, his partner Laura, and my sister Rachel for being with me today. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my mother, Sheila, who passed away in 2005, but who I know would be very proud to see me here today.

I would also like to thank Senator Sam Nunn for his kind words of introduction. Senator Nunn is a model of public service, dedicating his life to his fellow Georgians and to the security of this country. He has been a mentor and a role model to so many, and I am proud to count myself among those that have learned from his example of vision with pragmatism, strength with flexibility, and leadership without ego. His great respect for the Senate and this Committee – in which he spent so much time and energy as Chair – makes it even more of an honor for me to be here today.

There is no more important role for government than to protect the safety, security, and opportunity for people of the United States. For this reason, the mission of the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) of the National Nuclear Security Administration has an enormously important mission. Put simply, DNN works to:

- protect nuclear material wherever it exists in the world;
- reduce and eliminate nuclear material wherever possible;
- preserve American leadership by enabling us to meet our international obligations while holding others to their commitments;
- reduce the opportunities for nuclear weapons to spread;
- increase the chance that we will be able to detect it if nuclear activities pose a threat to the United States or our allies; and,
- focus now on developing the tools and technologies to meet future threats.

While addressing these foundational obligations of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy, DNN must also work collaboratively across U.S. government agencies and build partnerships in the international community, in the nuclear industry, in academia, and with nongovernmental organizations. If confirmed, I would seek to strengthen and expand these connections in service of our collective goals. Good ideas and good partners can be anywhere, and we need diverse viewpoints to meet the challenges ahead.

I had the pleasure of working with the DNN team for nearly three years, from 2015 through 2017. From the career civil servants, to the professional support contractors, to the scientists of our national laboratories, you cannot find a more dedicated and hard-working group of public servants. They work on nuclear nonproliferation and security because it is important and rewarding; it is certainly not for the fame and fortune. This is a job that is never done. For example, those protecting nuclear materials and facilities from theft or terrorism must get it right every day, while our adversaries only need to succeed once. The technical and political landscape is constantly shifting. Each new accomplishment is followed by a new challenge. If confirmed, I would be proud to stand by their side as they work to sustain progress while innovating solutions.

I have committed almost 25 years of my career to addressing nuclear nonproliferation and security issues and creating practical and actionable approaches to difficult challenges. Most of that time has been spent in civil society, but I have always wanted to dedicate more of myself to public service. I am humbled by this opportunity to do so at a critical time for our nation's future.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Before we proceed to questions, I have a series of questions which all nominees must respond to. So, together, you can respond as appropriately.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Thank you.

Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibility makes it important that this committee, its subcommittees and other appropriate committees of Congress receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this committee, when requested?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such records?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines by this committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional request?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

[All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

Now, Dr. Honey, what first struck me was your extraordinary experience in so many fields that are directly applicable to the position you have been nominated to, so I think that should be noted up front.

As you know, we have been very concerned about the production of microchips, the supply base. As you know, we passed the CHIPS Act, working to provide funding for the development of domestic microelectronics manufacturing. The key effort is ensuring that the U.S. has capabilities that support both, state-of-the-art commercial needs and DOD's needs.

It has been the history, though, that DOD has tried to go it alone too many times by using Trusted Foundry, which doesn't really work out because they are not commercially viable and they don't have the technological edge that some of our commercial entities can get.

So, I would like your assurance that you will support efforts to develop commercially viable domestic microelectronics and not retreat to the foundry approach.

Dr. HONEY. Yes, Senator, I agree. The DOD needs, you know, are very important to me and while Trusted Foundry has had great utility for Department in the past, in my experience, keeping that up to the commercial state-of-the-art standards and making that available to the Defense Industrial Base and, thus, to our warfighters, just hasn't worked out. So, new models are needed and

I am committed, if confirmed for this position, to work those issues and ensure that we are on a path to get commercial, state-of-the-art available to our performers and, ultimately, into our weapons systems.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Dr. Honey.

Ms. Fulton, Secretary Austin implemented the Independent Review Commission at the direction of the President. There was a series of recommendations, in response, of course, to the scourge of sexual assault and harassment we have already witnessed.

First, I would assume, and I ask for your confirmation that you will make this your top priority or one of your top priorities.

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator. We have to address the blight of sexual harassment and sexual assault if we expect to attract, continue to attract, and retain talent. If we expect to build effective teams, we have got to address this.

A big part of my job, if I am confirmed, will be building a prevention workforce and addressing the leader challenges that were highlighted by the Independent Review Commission.

Chairman REED. Thank you.

Many of the Commission's recommendations do not require legislation, so I assume and expect that you will immediately begin to do what you can do administratively. I know there has already been some changes. We have a civilian head now at the CID, but we have to be much more aggressive, and prevention is really the goal; it is not simply adjudication.

Are you committing to that effort?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator, I am completely committed. There is an urgency around this issue, and if confirmed, I would definitely put that as one of my top priorities.

Chairman REED. Thank you.

Ms. Hinderstein, and I have probably pronounced your name three different ways, so give me—

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Hinderstein is correct. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman REED. Hinderstein. So, it is—

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. There are a few options.

[Laughter.]

Chairman REED. As Meatloaf would say, two out of three ain't bad, so anyway, forgive me.

[Laughter.]

Chairman REED. In July of 2019, you told CNBC News that, quote, I see no indication that Iran is rushing toward a nuclear weapon and they are taking steps that can be reversed.

Can you clarify those remarks in regard to your assessment at the time.

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator, and I appreciate you bringing up this really important issue of Iran's technical capability.

The purpose of my comments at the time and others, similarly, was not to minimize the threat posed by Iran, but to differentiate the increasingly uranium enrichment activity from the broad suite of activities that would be required for them to actually produce a nuclear weapon.

My comments were consistent with what I was seeing from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's unclassified annual

threat assessment, which said that Iran was not currently undertaking the activities that would be required to produce a nuclear device. So, I think that is the context. It was really a technical assessment on the weaponization issue, but it is certainly not to undermine any concern about the progression of the uranium enrichment activities.

Chairman REED. Well, how have you seen Iran's nuclear program advancing since you made those remarks?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Iran's nuclear program has certainly advanced as they have increased both, the scope and scale of the uranium enrichment activities, and I think it is going to be very important, if confirmed, that I understand what the current assessment is of those activities and how that might have changed our underlying understanding about their program.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

Senator Inhofe, please?

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Fulton, in 2017, you were quoted by the New York Times, and I have the article right here, saying, quote, what people fail to understand is that chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when they become military chaplains.

Now, the DOD policy for chaplains doesn't say anything at all about this. In fact, it says, I believe, quite the opposite. It says, and I am quoting right now, and I am going to ask that this be part of the record.

Chairman REED. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

The New York Times Magazine

Talk

Sue Fulton Thinks Equal Rights Make the Military Stronger



Sue Fulton
Andrew T. Warman for The New York Times

Interview by Ana Marie Cox

Jan. 11, 2017

You were a member of the first co-ed class at West Point, then you served in the Army for five and a half years, but it's safe to say that you've spent more time on a different battle: fighting for civil rights within the military. Do you think there are any similarities between what drew you to the military as a young person and what drew you to this crusade? One hundred percent. The reason I fought the "don't ask, don't tell" battle and

the battle for women and transgender people in combat was the same reason I was at West Point: I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I fought to expand those opportunities because it was the right thing to do, but also because it would make my Army stronger. When you open the doors to include everyone who is qualified to do a job, you're making your organization stronger.

There's a common argument against this idea, especially the phrase — I'm bracing myself. Is it "social experiment"?

Yes, that the military should not be a place where we conduct "social experiments" — to try to diversify the military by opening the ranks to those who were previously excluded. It's not a social experiment to work alongside L.G.B.T. people; that experiment has been conducted for centuries, and we've kind of sorted out the results. Armed forces shouldn't be hidebound. If you want a stronger force, it should be the most flexible, the most advanced, the most forward-thinking. During the fight to repeal D.A.D.T., there were some people in the L.G.B.T. community who were trying to make a case on the grounds of equal rights, but the strongest case to repeal D.A.D.T. is, frankly, that it was bad for the military. It's bad for the military to kick good people out.

Can Donald Trump undo the advancements that occurred during the Obama administration in opening the ranks? These are all policies that a secretary of defense, not to mention a president, could undo. Practically, though, it would cause a great deal of disruption in the force. You know, he has other priorities.

Fetishizing troops and veterans is a phenomenon that extends beyond Trump, but he has been doing it very publicly — particularly in regard to appointing generals to his cabinet. Congress may issue a waiver in order to have a recently retired general serve as secretary of defense. There are centuries of history that argue that civilian control of the military is essential for a free democratic country. The military has tremendous power, and unless you want to turn over your government to the guys with guns, you have to maintain the status quo.

The vice president-elect has a position on what he calls religious liberty, which allows citizens to refuse to do business with people with whom they have a sincere religious objection — but this has also popped up in the military, right? Yes. One estimate indicates that nearly two-thirds of military chaplains identify as evangelistic Christians, and only about 15 percent of service members do. We've had a number of instances in which a gay or transgender troop will visit a chaplain and hear, "Well, I can't talk to you unless you confess your sin and turn straight or be who God made you to be."

That has happened? Yes! What people fail to understand is that chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when they become military chaplains, just as soldiers give up some of their free speech to defend free speech. Some chaplains argue: "My first responsibility is to God." Well, if your responsibility is to God and not the Army, you need to get out of the Army. That sounds cold — of course your first responsibility is to God — but you take on these obligations, and if your responsibility to God doesn't allow you to fulfill them, you're in the wrong place.

Sue Fulton is chairwoman of the U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors. She was a founding member of OutServe, an advocacy group for L.G.B.T. soldiers.

Age: 58

Occupation: Consumer-health marketing manager, Pfizer

Hometown: Asbury Park, N.J.

Her Top Five Sci-Fi Books With Military Themes:

1. "Old Man's War"
2. "Red Rising"
3. "Ancillary Sword"
4. "Zone One"
5. "A Fire Upon the Deep"

Interview has been condensed and edited.

Senator INHOFE. That if a chaplain is unable to support a specific request because of his or her religious endorsing organization's teachings, they all, the chaplains have these procedures that they go through with organizations, then the chaplain must offer referral to another chaplain or professional.

Now, first of all, I would ask the question, do you still stand by your statement?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I——

Senator INHOFE. The quote I am talking about is the quote where you said what people fail to realize is that the chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when they become military chaplains.

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I was referring to—thank you for allowing me to clarify—I was referring to that clause where a chaplain is required to find support for that individual one way or another; ei-

ther support them, themselves, or find that support, whereas, you know, a civilian could turn someone away and say, not my job. Our chaplains are bound and do a remarkable job addressing all of the needs, one way or another, of our servicemembers.

Senator INHOFE. Well, Ms. Fulton, that is not as I would understand the context that we are talking about this, but let me ask you, do you think that there are some of their rights, are any of the rights that they have given up in the context that we would look at those rights?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I think anyone who wears the uniform of this country has certain constraints on what they can say in public and certain requirements to serve others and to serve without regard to some of whatever personal feelings they may have.

Senator INHOFE. Let me—

Ms. FULTON. So, in that context, I would say, you know, our chaplains do a tremendous job serving everyone, but that may take them—

Senator INHOFE. My time is disappearing, as you well know, right now. Let me just ask you, do you intend to change any of the longstanding DOD policy regarding the rights of chaplains to minister in accordance with their tenets and their faith, just yes or no?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. You have referred, and I have several documents here I can use, to conservative people, primarily, as radicals. Do you consider me to be a radical because I don't support abortion?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Ms. Hinderstein and thank you for giving me that—

Chairman REED. Thank Meatloaf.

[Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate it very much.

Last month the International Atomic Energy related a report stating that Iran's refusal to allow inspectors' access seriously compromised the agents' technical capability to monitor Iran.

I think that I would join the chairman in just wanting some clarification in terms of your feelings about Iran. You did explain this thing on reversible, but I would like to have you elaborate just a little bit there on that because it is my understanding that you feel maybe you know some things I don't know, and I am hoping you are right and I am wrong, but how do you see that as reversible?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Senator, thank you so much for the question.

Let me state, unequivocally, that I am extremely concerned about Iran's nuclear program and about the progress that they have made, in particular, in the last few years. I have been paying attention to Iran's nuclear program for more than 20 years and, if confirmed, I would expect that it would have a high priority for me going forward, as well.

Regarding the question of reversibility, I think it is important to separate the technical reversibility related to the equipment and materials. We can downblend uranium. We can remove, uninstall, put in storage, or even destroy uranium enrichment equipment. I think that is important to note when we ask ourselves, could Iran

come back to the technical constraints of the deal. Those activities are possible.

But I will also say that the knowledge that they have gained in the last few years is not reversible. We can't eliminate knowledge and experience, and so I do believe that, if confirmed, I would need it understand how their basic capacity has changed and whether there needs to be any change to our approach to accommodate that.

I would note that Secretary Blinken even just said this last weekend that the terms of the JCPOA, at some point, will not be sufficient to recapture the benefits of the agreement because of the progress that is made and I would agree with his statement and seek to understand more, if confirmed.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Well, I appreciate that.

My time has expired, but I would like to, if you are confirmed, have an opportunity to visit with you at some length and we could exchange some ideas. I would appreciate that.

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. I would appreciate that, too, Senator. Thank you.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't have any questions for Dr. Honey. He is going to be in good shape. I can't think of a better team than for him to be with than Heidi Shyu and I look forward to working closely with him.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Shaheen, please?

Senator SHAHEEN. Good morning and congratulations to each of you on your nominations and for your willingness to serve the country at this critical time.

Ms. Fulton, in your opening statement, you talked about one of the challenges of your job would be ensuring that military families are taken care of. In 2019, as a result of hearing from military spouses, Congress passed legislation that authorized DOD to use federal funds to help states come up with universal standards for professional licenses, so that military spouses, as they are moving from place to place, can start work at soon as they arrive at a new assignment and they don't have to go through a whole extended licensure process.

If confirmed, will you commit to bolstering these grant programs, that I am pleased that DOD has already started work on this, but there is a lot more than needs to be done.

Ms. FULTON. Senator Shaheen, I want to thank you for those efforts. We say all the time that we recruit the servicemember, but we retain the family. This is a very important benefit for spouses who take advantage of those professional licenses.

If I am confirmed, I would do anything I could to make sure that that program is working for our military families.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. We are still hearing from some folks that it is a challenge, so I know that they will appreciate that.

Continuing with another issue that this committee has been very concerned about, our anomalous health incidents, also known as Havana Syndrome, which have been in the news a lot in the last few years, I was pleased to see Secretary Austin release a memo that details DOD's commitment to the issue and urges employees to track and report any symptoms.

But, if confirmed, do I have your commitment that you will review the Department's training and reporting process for anomalous health incidents, so that we ensure that people who may be affected, understand what to do in case of attack?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, we have to get on this issue. Anywhere within my area of responsibility, where we can review and support that effort, I commit to do so. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Honey, I am sure that you are aware that PFAS is a big issue on our military bases across the country and the 2020 NDAA. This committee directed that by January 1 of 2023, the military would come up with specifications to replace aqueous firefighting foam, which is the current biggest contributor to that on military bases, and then after October 1, the DOD will be prohibited, October 1 of 2024, will be prohibited from using aqueous firefighting foam.

Can you talk about what you think needs to be done in terms of research, to ensure that we can meet those deadlines.

Dr. HONEY. Senator, the problem of what is also called "forever chemicals" is a serious issue. In fact, my wife and I were stationed at, while I was stationed at Pease Air Force Base, we took our kids back for a visit on vacation and I got to see the areas of the base that we used to occupy and go to were closed off for environmental remediation. So, the environmental impact has been huge and it does need to be taken care of.

I am not presently engaged in that area of research, but if confirmed, I do commit to you that will be get briefed on what the activities are, are there any obstacles and communicate back to you where we are with this program and what needs to be done to meet those deadlines.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you.

If you were at Pease, you know that there has been a major cleanup effort there dating back to 2014, and the Air Force has been very responsive, but to replicate that at every base across the country that has PFAS, we have got a lot more work to do. So, thank you for that commitment.

Ms. Hinderstein, as you know, the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom just signed an agreement to transfer, to provide nuclear submarines to Australia, and in order to do that, we are going to have to transfer some fissile material to Australia, despite the fact that it signed a 123 Agreement on the use of that material.

So, can you talk about some of the challenges that will be involved in that, what we need to do to help work with the Australians, whether there is any conflict with their 123 Agreement.

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator.

I want to say up front that I support the President's effort to shore up Australia's capabilities in the Pacific and I understand the contribution that the submarine deal makes to that arrangement.

But there are also some challenges that come with it, including the nuclear safeguards challenges, as Australia is a non-nuclear weapon state and has an obligation for international safeguards. I would say that Australia has been a leader on nuclear non-proliferation. While this doesn't mean that we can transfer any

technology or material capriciously, it means that I believe we will have a good partner in addressing any concerns that come and I believe that we can use the 18 months that has been announced to actually define the arrangements to our benefit to make sure that whatever the arrangement is with Australia, that it doesn't set a bad precedent for any other country that may seek nuclear capability.

I would commit, if confirmed, to addressing this issue, as well as coming back and consulting with the committee.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Fischer.

Senator FISCHER. Dr. Honey, this committee has made a number of changes, including creating the R&E Division, in order to improve DOD's ability to deliver innovative solutions to the warfighter. But one thing that Congress cannot legislate is culture of the workforce, which witnesses have testified to is generally risk-averse.

Can you talk about the importance of culture and risk tolerance, in particular, when it comes to innovation?

Dr. HONEY. Yes, Senator.

A culture of risk tolerance really begins with leadership and it is very important as senior leaders that we communicate continuously to the workforce, risks that are acceptable, risks that may be going too far, and how we can work together to ensure that we are taking risks appropriately.

During my two tours at DARPA, which have spanned a total of 14 years, it is an agency which is really a master at the art of how do you take risks intelligently and lead the world in delivering capabilities to the warfighter.

So, if confirmed, in R&E, that was one of the things that I would undertake to work with the workforce to understand what is the current risk-tolerance culture and what can be done to ensure that we have an environment where the workforce there feels comfortable in taking risks and is supported by leadership.

Senator FISCHER. What role do you think that R&E can play to help encourage this? Do you have any specific examples in mind how you would approach that?

Dr. HONEY. So, one of the things that I think is very important in the early process of creating a risk-tolerant culture is helping people think about objectives that they would like to achieve. What are the big things that if they had the resources and the commitment of leadership to follow through with, what could they undertake.

At that point, you know, when leadership buys in, they, similarly, are also taking part and taking on the risk. One way that has been done, for example, is through the use of grant challenges. That has been very effective at trying to really take the leading edge out there in a risk-tolerant culture.

Then there are tools, such as other transactions, which have been very helpful in engaging non-traditional parts of the community, which for many people, has been a big leap forward in risk-taking.

Senator FISCHER. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Hinderstein, while some proliferation challenges such as North Korea and Iran remain constant, the expanding arsenals of both, Russia and China, as well as their development of new and novel nuclear systems, they are dramatically changing the threat landscape.

How do you see DNN's role adapting to the new environment and what area of focus to you intend to prioritize if you are confirmed?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator.

I agree that the reports, in particular, of China's nuclear buildup are profoundly concerning. I would certainly need, if confirmed, to get a full briefing on what the changes are with regard to China's nuclear arsenal.

But in any case, we need to have a meaningful dialogue with China. I support the President's interim National Security Strategy, in which he calls for such a meaningful dialogue, and to me, that dialogue means that it would have to benefit U.S. national security interests, first and foremost.

Similarly, with Russia, their expansion into new and novel deliver platforms does change the scope of activity, potentially, for future arms-control agreements. So, from a DNN perspective, if confirmed, I would want to focus on what the needs would be for verification and monitoring and technical support to any future arms-control agreement, making sure that they take into account the changes that have happened since our last negotiation with Russia and support the State Department's process. Thank you.

Senator FISCHER. When we look at Russia's arsenal, especially, the nonstrategic nuclear weapons and you are talking about an arms-control process, that is going to be really complicated and you alluded to that in your answer, when we look at those verification challenges for weapons that are far more complicated than the strategic nuclear forces.

Do you anticipate that we have enough knowledge right now in order to address that, and if we don't, how are we going to be able to have the facts at our fingertips?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Senator, I completely agree with you that if we were to pursue an arms-control agreement with Russia that started to touch on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, we would need to take that into account into the verification system and we wouldn't be able to simply apply all of the existing system to that new reality.

This is why I think it is extremely important that we work now and invest now, and that is my commitment, if confirmed, to look at those longer-term needs when it comes to verification, monitoring, and detection, to look at nonstrategic nuclear weapons, novel delivery platforms, and even looking at warheads as treaty limited items. These verification techniques do not come off the shelf when you need them, unless you invest in their development in advance, and I think that is what I would commit to do if confirmed.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer.

Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Fulton, I really appreciated reading your written answers and you specifically said that sexual harassment and assault are barriers to recruiting and retaining the best workforce. I share your opinion that the Nation's brightest, most innovative individuals want to work in an inclusive environment and for leaders of character.

The DOD has to make some substantial improvements in preventing sexual assault and harassment and prosecuting perpetrators. We have previously heard from President Biden that he believes that the decision-making of whether to prosecute these crimes should be removed from the chain of command for serious crimes, such as rape, murder, and child abuse.

Do you share the President's commitment to removing these serious crimes from the chain of command?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I fully support the Secretary and the President in removing the sexual assault crimes from the chain of command. I would like to know more and understand more before I commit. You know, I would follow the lead of Secretary Austin. I would follow the lead of Under Secretary Cisneros in supporting whatever the decision is regarding what crimes remain with the commander and what crimes go to a different prosecutor.

Senator GILLIBRAND. One of the challenges with regard to Secretary Austin's view is that it doesn't include murder, and so in the case of Vanessa Guillen from Fort Hood, she would not have had the benefit of a special review. There had been no evidence reported that she was harassed or assaulted, even though, in fact, she was, according to her family. But her murder would not be included and her murder may not have been investigated as carefully as a sexual harassment or a sexual assault case.

So, my concern is that if you limit it to just two crimes, you are going to miss other related crimes, such as murder, such as arson, such as financial fraud, which are typically used in domestic violence cases against the person in the relationship who is being abused.

So, I would like your commitment that you will look into the benefits that include bright-line felonies, not only for simplicity so that servicemembers can follow it appropriately, but also to make sure these, sometimes unseen, domestic violence cases and sexual assault and harassment cases that end in murder are included.

Ms. FULTON. Senator, it is a legitimate and extremely important question and you have my commitment to explore as, in every way, that if I was confirmed—if I am confirmed, I would explore in every way that is appropriate in my area of responsibility.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Good, and I don't expect you to follow the leadership's views on this in this current position that you are going to be given. I expect you to make recommendations, to actually review the issues, perhaps in a more in-depth way, in a more thoughtful, nuanced way and make your recommendations up the chain of command, including to the President, and to really stand by your views and opinions because the position you are about to undertake is very important from the perspective of servicemembers.

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I understand and, if confirmed, I will take that responsibility very seriously.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Then related to that, Ms. Fulton, how will you support the President's view that transgender servicemembers should be able to serve openly?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I fully support that.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. Well, I look forward to working with you.

Dr. Honey, I would like to ask you a little bit about some New York assets. During my most recent visit to Rome Labs, I saw firsthand the incredible innovations New York's defense equities had to offer. The Innovare Advancement Center is particularly impress it to me in how it will bridge the private and public sectors in one space.

How do you intend to improve this notion that the Valley of Death or Death Valley that a lot of entrepreneurs and innovators find, when they have technological breakthroughs and they develop technological breakthroughs but getting it to the warfighter and getting it into production is often very difficult, so I would like your thoughts on how to eradicate or rectify that, especially for the information directorate of the AFRL.

Dr. HONEY. Senator, I agree, the Valley of Death problem is one that is pervasive and is a very difficult challenge. I first encountered the notion of the Valley of Death and those issues, actually, when I was stationed at Rome Lab at Griffiss Air Force Base and saw a lot of great research going on, but it was very challenging to get it through the various wickets that it needed to go through to get it into a program of record.

Areas where I have had success in this regard and where I would try and help R&E lead the Department is conducting the planning for tech transition from the very beginning. It is very important and R&E has the ability to do this, in my opinion, to bring together all the stakeholders, the developers, the acquisition community, the Defense Industrial Base, the users and other parts of the community to understand from the very beginning, what technology is being developed, to make sure that the developers have the right information they need, that they are going to go down the right path, but also that the experimentation and prototyping that needs to be conducted along the way happens, and then, ultimately, that the programs and the performers who are going to adopt and acquire the technology and integrate it, have the information they need in order to do so in an effective manner. Thank you.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all our witnesses.

I will submit additional questions for the record.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Now, let me recognize Senator Rounds.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for appearing before us today.

Ms. Hinderstein, I would like to begin by just asking a question, but I am going to ask that you would answer it for the record afterwards. I am really concerned about preventing nuclear proliferation within the entire Middle East and I know that most of the discus-

sion will be on Iran, but I think we have other players, as well, there.

The cascading effect of one nuclear power simply seems to add to another, and so I will asking down the nuclear Iran problem or the Iranian nuclear problem, what are your next, biggest, and nuclear proliferation concerns in the Middle East, but I would ask if you would follow up with me and I will get that as a question for the record, okay?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Of course, Senator.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.

Dr. Honey, it would appear to me that you are very well qualified for the position that you are before us as a nominee for. One area that I think you could be very helpful to us on is with regard to your experience in DARPA and the opportunities provided for some very, very advanced research in a very classified way. A number of the areas in which we could very well fall behind other nations with regard to AI and so forth is if we are not able to find a way to bring into a commercially viable program, new technologies.

I would ask for your cooperation in finding appropriate ways to declassify some of our research in such a fashion that it could be commercialized in a more expeditious manner.

Would you be willing to work with us to see if we can do that?

Dr. HONEY. Yes, Senator, absolutely.

There is tremendous benefits to getting the right technologies out into the commercial world. When the commercial world takes on some of these technologies, their ability to produce them at scale gives us yield, uniformity, and reliability that we just can't get any other way, so I do commit to work with you on that.

Senator ROUNDS. What we do find here right now is in many cases, because of the classification of so many of the projects that we find success in, even other committees that help to fund other areas, such as in healthcare and so forth, we can't get connectivity between the Department of Defense and some of the others because of the classification necessary. So, I do appreciate that and I think it is an area in which we can work together to really bring some new technologies to the forefront and I thank you for that.

Ms. Fulton, thank you for your service to our country. I have to admit, I start out these processes in which I believe that a President has, should have the right to appoint individuals they believe are appropriate to positions, but then I also believe we have a strong responsibility here to both advise and consent. Sometimes we give consent. Sometimes we are able to give advice if we disagree.

I have serious questions about some of the inflammatory social posts which you have provided, and in particular, any concern is this, in the Department of Defense, we really do our best to try to keep inflammatory or partisan activities to a minimum. Your posts are pretty tough on Republicans and, in fact, you go out of your way in many, many cases to really attack Republicans on a very personal level. This is concerning to me. You have got 27,000 members that you would oversee. They are going to be Republican and Democrat, and independent.

Can you share with us, let me just give you an example and perhaps you can respond to it. Let me pull out the right piece of paper. This is your quote from 2008 and this is on social media.

Let's be real, when one of our two national political parties is unable to call out racism, our system is broken. It is not a political statement to say the GOP is racist; it is a moral statement, and one backed up by an increasing mountain of evidence.

Ms. FULTON, can you explain this tweet to me.

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I want to take the opportunity to apologize to you and to all the members of the committee for that tweet. My intent was to say that racism Democratic or Republican, that it is not a political issue; it is a moral issue and the parties should make a statement, because a whole group of people should never be tarnished with the actions of one, but I went about it all wrong. The words are muddled and confused and I deeply regret them.

The idea that my words, that people I love and respect would be hurt by my words, especially Republicans, especially those Republicans, the people that I have worked with throughout my career to do work to benefit the Armed Forces, to make our military stronger and more effective, the people I have worked side-by-side with, the idea that I had hurt them with these words is devastating to me and I regret it.

I know when we talk about race, we have to do it in a way that opens and expands the conversation, instead of shutting it down. By that standard, I failed miserably, and I deeply apologize.

Senator ROUNDS. Well, Ms. Fulton, thank you for the apology, but I do think further explanation is necessary, because you wrote that in a very offensive and truly an incorrect statement for the world to see on the internet and you did that a few years ago and yet, as of Sunday, this tweet was still up on your Twitter page. So, look, I mean, I think you have got some explaining to do here and this is a very serious issue, because this is a time in which we are trying to take and bring people together, this type of an approach, an inflammatory approach, doesn't work, particularly, not within the Department of Defense. So, I think you have got some more explaining to do, but I do thank you for your apology.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.

Senator HIRONO, please?

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have long held that racism is never far below the surface in our country and it pops up way too often. I will leave it at that.

Congratulations to all of our nominees. Thank you for your commitment to service. I ask the following two questions of all nominees that come before any of the committees on which I sit. So, I will ask you, since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Senator HIRONO. Have you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

[All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Senator HIRONO. Dr. Honey, there has been a recognition that at times, a current acquisition process in the Department of Defense

does not provide combatant commanders with the required resources to fulfill critical, operational needs arising from cross-service missions. This is especially evident in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility, as they struggle to bring on the new technologies they need to compete with and deter China.

This committee has attempted to remedy this issue in the pending NDAA, through a pilot program at the Strategic Capabilities Office, SCO.

If confirmed, how would you support SCO in the implementation of this program to ensure it is successful?

Dr. HONEY. Senator, thank you for your support in this area.

In my experience, I have also, you know, had to work the issues of the services and the responsibility for train and equip. The combatant commands have the responsibility for combat operations and I have worked with INDOPACOM on these very issues.

Senator HIRONO. Uh-huh.

Dr. HONEY. For 7 months, I was the acting director of the Strategic Capabilities Office, so I deepened my understanding at that time of what INDOPACOM needs and what the issues are that they face.

So, I am very grateful for what you have done in the NDAA. I believe that R&E, even though SCO is a direct report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCO does have a strong relationship with R&E, and I would do everything I could to support the director of SCO and that organization in meeting their commitments in that area.

Senator HIRONO. Well, I think that you understand that the importance of ensuring that the technologies and capabilities, that the services align with the requirements identified by the INDOPACOM AOR. It is good to know that you have some familiarity with the INDOPACOM AOR because your position has wide-ranging responsibilities, including a responsibility to oversee the DOD labs and test ranges, and that includes Pacific Missile Range Facility.

Have you ever visited PMRF on Kauai?

Dr. HONEY. No, Senator, I have not visited.

Senator HIRONO. I would welcome your visiting that facility should you be confirmed because PMRF is the world's largest instrumental, multidimensional, testing, and training missile range in the world. So, I would welcome your visiting.

In addition, you also oversee the Missile Defense Agency and one of the concerns that I have had is that the DOD and the administration continues to not support funding for the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii and this committee, through NDAA, has been putting back the money for that. Considering that the North Korea missile threat is not abating anytime soon, if confirmed, how would you ensure Hawaii is protected from missile threats from North Korea and elsewhere, going forward?

As I said before, if the administration can come up with some other way to defend Hawaii, other than through the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, I am all ears, but up to now, I have not been given that kind of assurance. So, I just want to point that out to you, that that is an area that I welcome your input and support for Hawaii.

One more thing. I am really glad that you mentioned your support for the SBIR and STTR programs. I am have a big supporter of these programs and you have said that you are a strong proponent of highly innovative small businesses through these programs, and much of the innovation comes from small businesses, but there is the issue of the Valley of Death that you have mentioned.

As part of the Valley of Death issue, one of resources, these innovative small businesses need money to get past the Valley of Death. Is that something that we can address in a more fruitful way?

Dr. HONEY. So, Senator, to your first question about the MDA and the issue of missile defense. I am not currently briefed on some of the details of the MDA efforts, but I do commit to you that I will get fully briefed, if confirmed. You know, I am very concerned about the missile threats and would appreciate the opportunity to get back to you after I have been briefed and, you know, explain what I see the situation as and what we need to do in that regard.

In the case of SBIR, one of the things I know that would be helpful, you know, if the reauthorization goes through that is always a concern. When I was at a small business, we worried about that quite a bit.

I do think that there is a lot that can be done to try and help promote within the programs of record and the larger defense contractors where there are opportunities to leverage the investments that we have made into the small businesses that are then ready to transition into those programs. If confirmed, and I am working in R&E again, that is an area that I would focus on.

Senator HIRONO. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to working with all of you.

Ms. Fulton, thank you for your commitment to make sure that we more effectively address the issue of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the military, which is a continuing scourge. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono.

Senator Blackburn, please?

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Honey, Senator Hirono wants you to Hawaii. I want to get you to Oak Ridge National Lab and the quantum computing project there, I am sure you are aware, is something that is national lab-wide collaboration, and Oak Ridge is doing some really solid work to develop the next generation of computing systems. So, I would like to have you on a trip to visit there, so thank you.

Ms. Fulton, my fellow Tennesseans and I are very concerned about the current values of our nation's defense officials in their commitment to securing our nation. It is my hope that if you are confirmed, that you would act in a manner that would represent all Americans, even those that disagree with you.

I won't sugarcoat this. The inflammatory rhetoric and the claims that you have made on Twitter and in interviews are very concerning. Your language is not representative of the way a top policy official at the Pentagon to write about policy or refer to her fellow Americans, including Republicans.

Senator Rounds approached the January 2018 tweet with you. I have got a stack of your tweets here. We have got a poster with your tweets on it. Let me go to your March 2014 tweet.

What about calling Republicans, right-winged, anti-everyone nutjobs, falling in love with a dictatorship?

Or what about tweeting, this is from June 2017, that most Repubs still shamefully quiet on lies, corruption, incompetence, treason, they betrayed their oath to the Constitution?

Would you consider that Republican Reservists and Guardsmen whose interests you will be representing at the Pentagon, would you consider them to be nutjobs? Would you consider them to be racists?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator BLACKBURN. You would not, okay.

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator. I don't think any, in any case that a whole group of people should be tarnished with the actions of a few—

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. What about the Republicans within the 25,000 employees that you would oversee as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs? If they are Christians, do you think that they are racist and nutjobs?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I am a Christian, and no, I don't. I will, as I have throughout my career, work side-by-side with Republicans, with Democrats, with independents, with anyone, regardless of their political beliefs for the mission, for what is best for Armed Forces.

Senator BLACKBURN. Why should we believe that if you were confirmed, that you would actually build a team that is diverse in fact and thought, rather than just diverse in appearance?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, throughout my career, I have worked side-by-side with Republicans, with everyone. My closest partner on the Board of Visitors—

Senator BLACKBURN. Did you form an opinion that they were nutjobs and racists—

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator. One—

Senator BLACKBURN.—and that the Christianity that the religion that they practiced didn't team with what you thought it ought to be?

Are you a leader of character, a theme you focus on in your public speeches, and how do leaders of character behave on Twitter?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I strive to be a leader of character every day. I strive to uphold our values—

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. Let me move on to Ms. Hinderstein. Nuclear proliferation is something that I have focused on. When we did the NDAA, I had an amendment on that. I was concerned about your statement that you saw no indication, this is from July 2019, you saw no indication that Iran is rushing toward a nuclear weapon.

We know from the IAEA reports that they have stockpiled approximately 10 times the amount of total uranium that they were allowed under the JCPOA. So, have you changed your opinion on Iran and do you acknowledge that Iran has made irreversible gains toward a nuclear arsenal?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Senator, I am extremely concerned about Iran and I will clarify that my comments were about the technical capability to produce the nuclear weapon but were not intended to minimize the consequence of their dangerous and increased uranium enrichment activities.

My statement about the rush to the bomb that you so accurately quoted was really intending to be consistent with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's public national threat assessment that said that there wasn't an indication that they were pursuing the activities related to the weaponization.

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. I will come to you with a written question to delve further on this. If you are confirmed, then I would want to work with you on this issue.

Ms. Fulton, my time has expired, but I have a couple of other questions I will send to you. Your rhetoric and your conduct is incredibly disturbing to me.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.

Let me recognize Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Thank you. I have got a lot of questions, so I am going to try to cover a lot of material very quickly.

Ms. Fulton, I have recently seen data that the military is being more and more geographically concentrated in the South and the West. In 1985, it was about 50/50 between the South and the West and the Northeast and the Midwest. Today is 70/30.

It concerns me our framers were very concerned about a standing army. We have crossed that Rubicon and now we are developing a regional basis to our army. I hope you will address this in terms of recruiting and just being cognizant of this growing regionalization, if you will, of our professional military.

Will you commit to me that you will pursue that issue?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I will. All kinds of diversity are important; geographic diversity, no less than others.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Second, we are in a whole new set of conflict. The beginning of whatever conflict we enter into, and hopefully there won't be one, will be cyber. So, the question is, do we use the same kind of recruiting tools, the same kind standards, the same kind of physical standards for people that we need to fight the cyber war, as opposed to the people that need to fight the kinetic war?

I think we need to face the reality that we are in, at least, a partially different kind of conflict. Do you agree?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I do agree. I think we have to do everything we can to make sure that we are getting the best cyber talent and that includes being creative.

I have to say the committee has done an incredible job granting special authorities to be able to recruit and retain that talent. I think we have to make sure, while we have very high standards, we want to maintain those high standards, but make sure that we—

Senator KING. Well, the standards should match the requirements of the job; that is what I am suggesting.

Ms. FULTON. The standards should align with the needs of the service.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Ms. FULTON. Yes, sir.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Mr. Honey, a couple of just comments and a couple of questions. One is, I know this is not strictly in your field but it is close, and that is, I believe strongly that when we are acquiring complex, technological weapon systems platforms, we should be also acquiring the IP. We should not have to pay extra for being able to 3-D print a part, for example. So, I hope that is something that will inform your discussion.

Secondly, I am very worried about smaller, more agile and innovative companies being de facto excluded from the Department of Defense process simply because of the overwhelming nature of the forms and what is necessary. We have done a lot here to try to encourage working with smaller companies, but we have testimony from Silicon Valley saying, we don't even go to the Pentagon anymore, we don't answer the RFPs, because the process is so cumbersome and burdensome. So, I hope that is something else that you will follow-up on.

You mentioned hypersonics. I believe that is one of our great strategic problems right now. Our posture, with regard to China involves aircraft carriers and naval power and unless we develop a counterforce to hypersonics, that force can be diminished dramatically at the early stages of a conflict, hypersonics.

Cyber, of course, and directed energy, you mentioned all of those, directed energy, in particular, where we are talking about missile defense using 75, hundred-million-dollar missiles. Directed energy could be a lot more efficient if we can deal with the technological problems.

Are you interested in and believe that we should be pursuing greater research into directed energy?

Dr. HONEY. Yes, Senator. The issues of missile defense and other applications for directed energy is one that I have worked in and around for a number of years. The technologies have gotten much better. There has been, tremendous advances have been made, still more to be made, but it is an area of research of which I continue to support.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Ms. Hinderstein, deterrence doesn't work with terrorists. My nightmare is terrorists getting ahold of nuclear weapons. We had a display here recently of nuclear warheads. They are about the size of a beer keg. They are not room-size; they are not very big.

How do we deal, and perhaps you should take this question for the record, rather than try to answer it in 25 seconds, how do we deal with the issue of proliferation and the danger of terrorists getting ahold of nuclear material and, eventually, either an entire nuclear weapon or the technology to make a nuclear weapon?

I think that is one of the great sort of, undiscussed challenges that is coming at us. If the terrorists on September 11 could have killed three million people, instead of 3,000, they would have. Give me just a brief discussion of that and then hopefully a longer discussion for the record.

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Yes, Senator, and thank you for the question. I would be happy to take a longer answer on the record, but I

would just say that I agree that nuclear, the potential for nuclear, radiological terrorism is a major concern. I support an “all of the above” approach to nuclear security, meaning, secure, remove, convert, prevent, detect, and then if anything were to happen, be able to attribute and prosecute. I do think we have to look at nuclear security as a significant and, frankly, persistent threat to the United States.

Senator KING. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King.

Senator COTTON, please?

Senator COTTON. Ms. Fulton, in your written answers to advanced policy questions, you were asked if troops that are part of religious group or advocate for socially conservative changes to the law should be punished. You respond that as long as they are, quote, acting within the confines of federal law and DOD policy, they should be allowed to exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech and to observe the tenets of their religion.

However, on June 30, 2014, you stated, once again, religious freedom, which you put in quotes, is twisted to mean conservative Christians can dictate their views to the rest of us. I suppose this was in response to the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision.

You also advocated for the repeal in that statement of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which I presume you know, was passed almost unanimously by this Congress. It was signed by President Clinton, and it was voted for by President Joe Biden. That law requires the Government to demonstrate a compelling government interest before it burdens any person’s individual right to freedom of exercise of religion.

So, if you were confirmed for this position, you will be in charge of DOD religious policies. You would have responsibility for overseeing chaplains and religious accommodations, yet you believe the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is apparently being twisted by conservative Christians to dictate their views to the rest of us.

So, which is it, Ms. Fulton, are you actually going to protect the religious freedom of troops and chaplains, or are you going to ensure that they can’t dictate their views to the rest of us under the guise of religious freedom?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I support religious freedom and I would support religious freedom for all of our troops, all of our civilian employees, consistent with the law.

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act should be repealed?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Why did you say so on June 30, 2014?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I support religious freedom and I would support religious freedom for our troops.

Senator COTTON. Are you disappointed with Joe Biden that he voted for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Let’s turn to a statement that you had in 2017, where you said the vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ. The vast majority of white evangelical leaders.

What percentage do you mean by the vast majority, obviously, something more than 51 percent of white evangelical leaders are unmoored from gospel of Christ, could you put a number on it?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Vast means of great extent or quantity, immense.

Do you think 95 percent of white evangelical leaders are unmoored from the gospel of Christ?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Eighty percent?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Seventy percent?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Fifty-one percent? It has to be 51, right? It has to be at least 51; you said the majority.

Ms. FULTON. Understood, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Let me ask you this, why is it white evangelical leaders? There are a lot of black evangelical leaders. There are a lot of Hispanic evangelical leaders.

Are black evangelical leaders unmoored from the gospel of Christ?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I am not sure the entire context of that, but I would say that there are a wide variety of beliefs. We don't all have the same beliefs. We don't all have the same understanding of the gospel.

Senator COTTON. Of course we don't, that is why we have things like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. That is why we respect the freedom of exercise of all of our troops and all of our fellow citizens, whether they are white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or any other race or ethnicity, or whatever their religion is, yet here you are saying in public that the vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Do you think it is appropriate to claim that anyone is unmoored from the gospel of Christ, any believing Christian, even if you disagree with this or that view they may have on a political controversy?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, while it is consistent with free speech, it is unwise.

Senator COTTON. So, Ms. Fulton, I think you will understand why so many members of this committee and the Senate do not think that you are fit to take over this position. You are going to be in charge of military chaplains. You are nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and you have a long history of offensive, inflammatory accusations against Bible-believing Christians.

I will oppose this nomination, and I certainly hope the entire Senate will oppose it, as well.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Cotton.

Let me recognize Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to one of my colleagues. I am still prepping here if that is okay?

Chairman REED. That is fine.

Senator Scott, at the deferral of Senator Sullivan, you are recognized.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Chairman Reed.

Ms. Fulton, I have read a number of your tweets and re-tweets about Republicans, white persons, Christians, voters, Americans, and sitting U.S. senators who will be voting on your confirmation. I simply cannot ignore the callous, hateful, divisive, and absolutely untrue things that you have said over the years.

First off, do you want to apologize for any of the things you have said as we brought them up? Is there anybody, anything—what I have watched of your testimony, you are not apologetic for anything that you have said in the past; is that right?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I have deeply apologized to, and I do, again, deeply apologize to all of the members of the committee for the tweet that we discussed earlier, where, you know, my feeling is that the parties should have made a statement about racism, because I feel that no group of people should be tarnished with the actions of one, but I went about it all wrong and I am deeply sorry for that.

My entire career, I have worked in a nonpartisan and bipartisan way, regardless of people's politics, worked to support the Armed Forces and make our military stronger—

Senator SCOTT. Let me interrupt you for a second.

Let's go back to what Senator Cotton said. The vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ.

Then you told the Windy City Times, the United States has a powerful, right-wing, antigay, anti-abortion lobby that purports to represent Christians. These radicals, I can't bring myself to call them Christians, since their language and actions hold no resemblance to the Jesus I know from the Bible.

If confirmed, you are going to lead, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 27,000 people and you will be doing policy for the entire military and civilian DOD workforce. You know, there are going to be some evangelical Christians in there and there are going to be Catholics who would work for you, if you were confirmed. Obviously, some of your potential subordinates are going to be pro-life.

Some of us actually believe that we shouldn't be killing children. Obviously, this person would know that you have called their deeply held views, which they are free to hold, in this country, you are free to hold these things, you have called them radical. They are going to have to wonder about their ability to do their jobs or get promoted when their boss has such hateful, and it is hateful what you have said, and divisive language. So, how would you think that anybody, a conservative would ever move up after the things you have said?

You supposedly, you said, oh, you spent a career advocating for diversity and demanding intolerance, but you struggle with intolerance, right, of anybody who has a different view.

Now, let's go back to what Senator Cotton talked about, chaplains. You said what people fail to understand is that chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when they become military chaplains.

That is not true. The DOD policy for chaplains doesn't say anything like that; in fact, it says quite the opposite, quote, if a chap-

lain is unable to support a specific request because of his or her religious endorsing organization's teachings the chaplain must offer referral to another chaplain or professional.

That is totally different than what you said. So, why?

You obviously believe these things because you have said it a lot of times. You clearly lack sufficient self-control to show respect for other people and what they believe in, completely. You don't show any respect for them.

There is good, productive public discourse. We have it here. We disagree a lot up here. But what you have said is hateful and you have done it a lot of times.

So, I think when we review a nominee, I think it is important that we review their qualifications, but you are going to manage 27,000 people. I can't imagine those individuals that have a differently held belief are going to believe anything other than the fact that you will never give them a shot.

So, I don't know why you did what you did. I am disappointed that you didn't—you should have started off by saying, I have made a lot of mistakes and let me go through them, and here is the reason why I said it, and I apologize, and it will never happen again. You are not willing to do that.

So, I am in the same position Senator Cotton is. I hope this committee rejects your nomination, because I don't think you deserve to be able to be a manager over 27,000 people and especially over the chaplains of the military.

Thank you, Chairman Reed.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Scott.

Senator Hawley, please?

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to the nominees for being here.

You know, we have heard from a lot of nominees who have come before this committee from this administration a lot about equity and about fairness being top priorities in today's DOD, but I have to say, that just doesn't seem to bear out to be the facts, and, Ms. Fulton, your nomination is the perfect example of it.

What we have actually seen is targeting political opponents, targeting people who the administration doesn't agree with, trying to silence folks who they don't like. Clearly, it is a priority for this administration, because they have been focused on that, rather than doing things like, oh, I don't know, managing the evacuation from Afghanistan, where we have, let me remind this committee, yet again, 13 servicemembers dead, hundreds of civilians dead, potentially thousands of Americans left behind enemy lines.

Why?

Because the DOD is focused on their radical left agenda, rather than on actually saving Americans and doing their jobs.

Now, Ms. Fulton, I am astounded, frankly, that you have been nominated. Listen, you are entitled to have whatever views you want. Look, I am a constitutional lawyer. I am actually a religious liberty lawyer by training.

Your faith is your faith. Your views are your views. You can say whatever the heck you want. This is the United States of America, but you are asking to be appointed to a very important position in the DOD.

Let me come back to some of these statements that you have made. Religious freedom is twisted to mean conservative Christians can dictate their beliefs to the rest of us, hashtag, Hobby Lobby, repeal RFRA.

When did you change your view on RFRA?

You told Senator Cotton you are not in favor of repealing it. You were on June 30, 2014. When did you change your mind?

Ms. FULTON. I couldn't tell you exactly, Senator.

Senator HAWLEY. Why did you change your mind?

Ms. FULTON. I couldn't tell you exactly, Senator.

Senator HAWLEY. You are choosing not to tell me or you don't want to engage or you don't like this line of questioning or you don't think you need to be responsive?

Ms. FULTON. Oh, I am sorry, Senator.

Of course I do mean to be responsive. I don't recall the details of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and I want to be clear that I support religious freedom. I support the rights of our troops and our civilian employees to their religious freedom to the entire extent that the law allows within their employment in the Department of Defense and I support that in every way, yes, sir.

Senator HAWLEY. Why is it that you think that the vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ? Can you explain that to me.

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I am a Christian. I am a follower of Jesus Christ. I have had differences of opinion from people who don't believe in full equality for all, but I will say it is wrong, it was wrong for me in that moment and I believe it is always wrong to tarnish an entire group of people with the beliefs or actions of one or a few, and for that, I apologize.

Senator HAWLEY. You said that if getting a Supreme Court judge who would outlaw abortion makes all of this worth it to you, referring to evangelicals, your religion has nothing to do with Jesus. You also say 86 percent of those who consider themselves white evangelicals support Trump.

So, which part of it is, disqualifies these people as Christians, is it that they are opposed to abortion or they supported Trump or both? Help me understand your thinking.

Ms. FULTON. I am so sorry, Senator. Could you read that again.

Senator HAWLEY. On September 4, you said, 2017, 86 percent of those who consider themselves white evangelicals support Trump. You said in the same tweet thread, if getting a Supreme Court judge who would outlaw abortion makes all this worth it to you, your religion has nothing to do with Jesus.

So, is it because that they supported Trump that they are not followers of Jesus or is it because they oppose abortion? Is it both?

Ms. FULTON. I am trying to, Senator, I am trying to put myself back in that moment. I know there were several points at which I felt that the President had made statements or taken actions that I felt were in direct contradiction with the way that I understand Jesus' teaching, and I am expecting that I was reacting to that.

Again, I don't believe we should ever tarnish a whole group of people for the actions of one.

Senator HAWLEY. Do you think that it is your position to tell people when they are and aren't followers of Christ or truly—

Ms. FULTON. No, sir.

Senator HAWLEY.—Christians or not, just because they don't disagree with you?

I understand you disagree with these folks but saying over and over that they are not followers of Jesus, you cited Matthew 23 on August 29, 2017, when you said the vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ. Matthew 23 applies.

Do you remember what you meant by that?

Maybe a reference to the brood of vipers; that is Matthew 23?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator.

Senator, none of what I have ever expressed on social media was intended to silence others. I believe there is a free expression of beliefs there, but I do believe that I apologized for statements at any time when I tarnished a whole group of people for the actions or statements of one or a few and I—

Senator HAWLEY. Well, it was clearly meant to denigrate others.

Listen, my time is expired. I just have to say, Ms. Fulton, it is not just one statement; it is multiple statements over multiple years, running from 2014 through 2008, years, I mean, there is just pages and pages of these statements all directed at a particular group of people for whom you appear to have quite a significant amount of animus. You would be expected to oversee many of these folks in the Department of Defense.

I mean, that is not fairness. That is not equity. That is targeting, and for those reasons, among others, I can't support your nomination.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hawley.

Senator Kelly, please?

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Honey, during our recent meetings, we discussed the risks to national security created by America's reliance on foreign-made microelectronics, including microchips. As you know, this is a major concern of mine and countries like China are investing heavily to try to outcompete us, which is why I have been working with my Republican and Democratic colleagues to ensure our Nation has the resources it needs to increase American microelectronics manufacturing and development. I led the effort to include \$52 billion in the competitiveness bill towards this goal with \$2 billion allocated for efforts within DOD.

I appreciated your opening comments about the need to leverage research from experts across academia, industry, and DOD. In your written responses to the committee, you indicated strong support for the establishment of a national network for microelectronics research that can bring those three parties together.

In your view, what are the advantages of having academia and industry working in direct partnership with the Department of Defense as the national network model proposes?

Dr. HONEY. Senator, I thank you for your support in microelectronics and for these types of initiatives.

My support for this and my interest in it actually stems from my previous experience at DARPA, having run a very similar type of effort in optoelectronics, where we did bring together industry, aca-

demia, and the Department to solve some very profound challenges over a number of domains in optoelectronics.

So, having seen that before and the tech transition and the impact that that has had on the commercial world and to then feed back new capabilities to the Department that we could get out of the commercial world, I believe that this area of microelectronics is ripe for this type of activity again.

Senator KELLY. Well, thank you.

Can you explain a little bit why domestic, R&D testing, production, and packaging is so critical for our nation's ability to leverage to the next generation of technologies.

Dr. HONEY. Senator, yes, these, as you have just identified, these are a group of technology areas that are very important to have here onshore and available to our university students for learning how to design and make parts that will feed into that part of the supply chain, and that is part of the testing environment, but it is also important for industry to have resources to go to when they face a production problem.

I had some experience in doing that previously when I was at Rome Lab in our test facility there when some folks from industry and, again, the optoelectronics world, faced challenges like that. They could come to us and leverage our expertise, and because we were working with so many different parts of industry and academia at that time, we were able to give them a much broader perspective on solving problems. Again, I think that activity would be replicated in this environment.

Senator KELLY. Could you give an example, maybe, how currently when we need to test microelectronics and we have to do that offshore, why that is a risk to our national security.

Dr. HONEY. Senator, these types of activities, when they are done offshore, are a risk because it exposes the intellectual property, it exposes the circuit design, capabilities, and our intent when we do that, or there is the possibility of having that happening, for certain.

So, having the ability to do that here in the U.S. gives us the ability to have those layers of protections that we need for our microelectronics that we are using in various applications or weapons systems and other places, as well.

Senator KELLY. I want to highlight, just for the record, that some of that testing is done in China, which is not in the interests of our national security.

Under Secretary Shyu has identified microelectronics as a priority, modernization area for DOD. You know, what are some of the challenges that the Department will face going forward, if we do not create a robust, domestic manufacturing capability?

Dr. HONEY. The challenges that I see, based on, you know, my experience at DARPA, my time in the Air Force, and working these issues is that we have to have the ability to work at the leading edge. We need to be able to have security for our designs. We need to have the environments where our Defense Industrial Base can collaborate with commercial partners on the leading edge and know that the intellectual property is properly being protected. We need to be able to ensure that, you know, all parts of that ecosystem that we need to master, we have the ability to do that here or, you

know, we have already seen the democratization and spread of technology and how it impacts us. This is a way to help ensure that when we want to let that information out, we can, but when we need to protect it, we can keep it here in the U.S., as well.

Senator KELLY. Well, thank you, Dr. Honey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Fulton, I have got to tell you, I am very concerned about your nomination. I am very concerned about the politicization of our military. I think if you are confirmed, you are going to add to that. It is very dangerous.

So, let me go into some questions. You served on the Board of the U.S. Military Academy, didn't you?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator SULLIVAN. You were chairman?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. You enjoyed it, you got a lot out of it?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. I serve on the Board of the Naval Academy. I love it, actually.

You served until 2019, if I recall, correct, December 2019?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator, that is correct.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, when President Trump came onboard as a new President, he didn't fire you or any of the other members appointed by President Obama, correct?

Ms. FULTON. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, you weren't fired.

So, Joe Biden gets elected, this is what I am talking about politicization of the military, he purges everybody nominated by President Trump off all the service academy boards.

Do you think that was a good idea?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, that was the President's prerogative.

Senator SULLIVAN. It is not his prerogative.

I am asking you, do you think it was a good idea?

You served on the Board. You weren't fired by Donald Trump. Do you think it was a good idea that—do you think any other President in the history of the country has done that?

Ms. FULTON. I don't know, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. I will answer for you: no. First time ever.

Do you think it was a good idea?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I think there is benefit to having people with longevity on the Board—

Senator SULLIVAN. So, Donald Trump should have—I am sorry, go ahead.

Ms. FULTON. There is a benefit to having people with longevity on the Board that, with experience in knowing how the Board works. There is also a benefit in getting new eyes on the—

Senator SULLIVAN. But let me read you the law. The law says that board members designated by the President shall serve 3 years. So, Biden's firing of everybody was illegal. I have no doubt about it. It is right here in the law.

So, if you are confirmed, will you work to reinstate those, well, let me give you two examples from the U.S. Military Academy.

General H.R. McMaster, the day after he was fired by Biden, he received the Distinguished Graduate Award.

Do you think he deserved to be fired?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I have respect for General McMaster, as someone who I know.

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think he deserved to be fired?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I don't know on what grounds that decision was made.

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think General Keane deserved to be fired?

Ms. FULTON. I don't know what grounds that was made—

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, here is the point. Will you commit to reinstating people like General McMaster?

President Biden illegally fired everybody. No one had ever done that in the history of the country before, but he decided to purge every service academy for what reason?

The only reason is to politicize the service academy. Do you think it is a good idea, you are a West Point grad, to politicize the service academies?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator, I don't believe it is good to politicize—

Senator SULLIVAN. So, will you work, if confirmed, to reinstate the people Joe Biden fired?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will look into what authorities—my understanding is that is solely within the President's—

Senator SULLIVAN. It is not. I just read you the statute. It says "shall." That is why you weren't fired by President Trump.

Anyway, let me turn to another issue. But this is an important issue, Mr. Chairman, that we haven't done enough to look at. It is an important issue. Politicizing the officer court of our military academies is something nobody should accept and Joe Biden is doing it and you are going to be in charge of this.

The Under Secretary of Defense, in his confirmation hearing said one of his goals was to stamp out, quote, systemic racism within the ranks of the military.

Do you believe that the military is systemically racist?

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator.

I have heard different definitions of that term, but I don't believe that the military is fundamentally racist.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, one of your tweets said, it is not a political statement to say the GOP, that is half the country, is racist; it is a moral statement.

So, do you believe that every Republican in the GOP, probably a lot of military members, too, are they all racist? That is what you said in 2018.

Ms. FULTON. No, Senator. I want to repeat what I said when I apologized for that tweet earlier. My intent was to say that racism isn't Republican or Democratic, that it is not political; it is moral.

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay.

Ms. FULTON. The parties should make a statement, because no group of people, no whole group of people should be tarnished by the actions of one.

But my words were muddled, confused. I went about it the wrong way and I deeply apologized for——

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me focus on another group, that for whatever reason seems to get the ire of the far left, and it is the Marine Corps. I love the Marine Corps. I think it is one of the best institutions in America.

I remember an Obama administration official, I can't remember, senior in the Pentagon, she called the marines a bunch of extremists.

You were quoted, stated in 2016, quote, so tired of USMC women fighting to keep combat ban because they want so badly for the male marines to love them; hashtag, co-opted, hashtag, Stockholm Syndrome.

That is a blatant insult to the women in the U.S. Marine Corps. Hey, do you want to apologize to them right now, because you are looking to possibly lead them?

Why the hell would you say something like that?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, the honor, courage, and commitment of the Marine Corps is——

Senator SULLIVAN. How about women marines?

Ms. FULTON. Especially women marines.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, why are you insulting them?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, that was, I never want to tarnish a whole group of people with the actions of one and in that case, it was the action of one and——

Senator SULLIVAN. No, it wasn't. You said the USMC women.

Why are you insulting the women in the United States Marine Corps and will you, right now, apologize for that tweet or whatever the heck it was in 2016?

Ms. FULTON. I apologize, Senator. I have all respect for the Marine Corps. I know a great deal of Marine men and women who served honorably, continue to serve honorably, and I have served alongside of and worked alongside of, and I have tremendous respect for them. I will continue to work with them.

Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, this nominee is clearly unqualified and I hope everybody on this committee votes to not move forward her confirmation out of the Armed Services Committee. It will be an insult, part of this continuing focus on the Biden administration to put officials like you who are disingenuous, condescending, dismissive, and insulting of the very people you want to lead in the military, and I think it has to stop on this nominee. Sorry.

Chairman REED. Senator Peters, please?

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to each and every one of you for your willingness to serve in tough and challenging jobs, and I appreciate your willingness to serve the country.

Dr. Honey, my first question is going to be for you. If confirmed, you will oversee the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, DARPA, and certainly in an era of strategic competition against our near-peer threats, there is a renewed emphasis on DARPA, and I think rightly so, because of the critical work that it does.

But my question for you is, how do you plan to increase the coordination and bring DARPA closer to industry, academia, and

other government agencies to advance our capabilities in areas, particularly, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, quantum science. We know now that a lot of some of the cutting-edge new technologies coming onboard are happening in the commercial sector. They are happening in academia. DARPA clearly plays an important role, but that role has to be coordinated with all of these other entities.

If you would elaborate on your thoughts on that, I would appreciate it.

Dr. HONEY. So, Senator, I agree, these are all important areas, and DARPA's role in, not only leveraging what's going on in industry, but creating new areas of research for industry and academia, has been very important, at least, I have seen it, you know, day-to-day during my two tours at DARPA, over the 14 years that I spent there. DARPA, and I would say that all of the service labs and even more broadly, all of DOD research does need these connections, exactly as you described.

There are a number of ways that can serve to do that. COVID has had an impact on, I know, on all of my colleagues in trying to do that, and so we have been experimenting with a number of ways of, you know, Webex, Zoom meetings, things like that, ways to try and better collaborate and coordinate. I do hope, though, that as COVID recedes, that we are able to, you know, get to more in-person and technical conferences and whatnot. We will be able to have greater participation in those venues, as well.

But I think one of the things that is key is from the Government's side from DOD, we need to be very forthcoming with our partners outside of government on what it is we are planning to do and why are we going to do it and what are our thoughts on how to do that, and then have means of communication back in.

When I left the Government, I went out to a small defense contractor for 2 years. I had no idea how hard it was to communicate back into Government until I went there and saw it firsthand. So, I commit to you that if I am confirmed, I will tackle these issues, because it is very important to have those lines of communication if we are to succeed.

Senator PETERS. Well, absolutely. I am glad you had that experience so you know what it is on the other side and how difficult that can be and that certainly can happen. We need a very fluid ecosystem and innovation in our ecosystem.

Speaking of that, the defense innovation ecosystem, generally, has been calling for an expansion of DARPA. What are your thoughts of expanding DARPA? Is there a need to do that and, if so, why?

Dr. HONEY. DARPA's budget has grown over the years and I believe that has been a very worthwhile investment that DARPA does deliver tremendous value to the government. Going forward, of course, you know, I support the President's budget and will look to, if confirmed, when I am in R&E, get a better understanding of the research that is going on, not just across the Department, overseeing, you know, greater opportunities for collaboration with the National Science Foundation, NIH, and other departments, as well.

NIST has a great amount of work going on, the Department of Energy with all of its labs. So, figuring out, not just, you know,

how much money needs to be spent, but where it needs to be spent. We have to make sure that we are getting the right bang for the buck, deconflicting, where necessary, are all activities that, if confirmed, I commit to support.

Senator PETERS. Very good.

Ms. Fulton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has purview over review boards that deal with bad-paper discharges. Earlier this year, I pressed Secretary Austin to quickly and effectively implement the Fairness for Veterans legislation that I, along with members of this committee, enacted into law.

Veterans who have been erroneously given a less-than- honorable discharge from the military, due to negative behavior resulting from mental trauma, such as PTSD or traumatic brain injury that wasn't properly diagnosed while they were in service, certainly deserve to have their petitions for change adjudicated in a timely manner. We find many of these folks, the behaviors they had was a direct result of PTSD that wasn't diagnosed.

While I understand that COVID-19 has added obstacles for veterans getting their records corrected, my question for you is, if confirmed, do you have a commitment, will you make a commitment to me to work with my office to ensure that review boards are making expeditious decisions and to transmit to my office, data and information related to these review boards?

It was estimated that we may be talking about 30 or 40,000 veterans in this category and, yet, only, roughly, I believe 1,500 to 2,000 have actually had changes in those papers as a result of those boards. Talk to me about that and please offer me your commitment.

Ms. FULTON. Senator Peters, thank you for that important legislation that really recognizes the impact of PTSD on behavior, and it is important for our soldiers.

If I am confirmed, I commit to move out smartly on this and do whatever I can to move it along.

Senator PETERS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Peters.

Senator Tillis, please?

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations to the nominees for your nominations.

Very briefly, Dr. Honey, I would be kind of curious to see, with respect to the United States compared to China and Russia, how are we doing in the race for quantum information science and with respect to China, maybe include in that artificial intelligence. Are we ahead, behind, or just keeping up?

Dr. HONEY. Senator, based on what I see, you know, published and where the activities going on, our adversaries are certainly very interested in these areas and they are competing with us, as best as they can. I still believe, though, that the U.S. does have the best R&E ecosystem and that we are ahead in these areas. But it is a challenge to stay ahead and one that we have to keep focused on to remain there.

Senator TILLIS. If confirmed, briefly, what would be your top priorities to make sure that we leapfrog ahead?

Dr. HONEY. Senator, my priorities would be supporting the DOD ecosystem to make sure that we are, you know, making the right investments, that we are getting the value out of it, collaborating with the other agencies, but even more importantly these days, staying in contact with the commercial industry. There is a lot of quantum that is being funded by the venture capital community today that previously never would have been done, so we need to leverage all of these investments to stay ahead.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you.

Ms. Fulton, I have been watching some of the hearing in my office and I was in the Banking Committee hearing with a nominee who had a long history of incendiary and profane tweets about Republicans, about the former President. Yours were not profane, but they are questioning.

I also want to associate myself with some of the comments that Senator Sullivan made about his concerns, but rather than getting into the specifics of the tweets, they are in the record, in an organization that you are going to go into that are going to have thousands, tens of thousands of people across the political spectrum, why would those who would just object to what you have put out there, feel comfortable with you having to lead them?

Ms. FULTON. Thank you for the question, Senator.

Throughout my career, I have worked side-by-side with people, regardless of their political affiliation. One of the most critical issues that we faced at the Military Academy was a combination of sexual assault and harassment problems and a need to recenter character.

I worked, my closest partner in that was Congressman Steve Womack. I worked probably throughout my time on the Board of Visitors, my closest working partners on getting things done were either appointed by Republicans or were Republican members of Congress. I have always worked with people, regardless of their political viewpoint. I would continue to strive to do so.

As I did in the military, what we do is we focus on the mission, what is the mission, and we work together to achieve that.

Senator TILLIS. What is the thought process, and by the way, you have a very impressive career and you should be commended for blazing the trail for women in the Army, but you know, what would motivate you to take it to that level if, on the one hand you just told me that you have worked side-by-side and collaborative, why didn't it give you pause before you pressed tweet, when you are casting an entire political party in the same light?

There was one tweet that you had out there that I took personal offense to, because back in 1996 when I became a new partner in Price Waterhouse, I volunteered to create a diversity recruiting practice that went across the entire spectrum that you are obviously, based on your tweet, sympathetic to, and I am too, but just give me an idea of why you felt comfortable with doing that if you also have just said that you worked across a broad spectrum of people. How could that, if they knew that this is what you felt, do you think it would undermine your ability to actually work with them?

Ms. FULTON. Senator, I want to apologize for that tweet. My intent was to say that racism isn't Democratic or Republican. It is not political; it is a moral issue.

The parties should make a statement, because a whole group of people should never be tarnished with the actions of one or a few and——

Senator TILLIS. I just don't recall——

Ms. FULTON.—but it came across completely wrong and I apologize, Senator. It came out completely wrong.

Senator TILLIS. If you could submit, for the record, an example of where there is a pattern where you have said that you are calling on everybody across the ideological spectrum, but it seems to me that at least what I have observed, and there could be more that were not submitted to me for preparation before the committee, to demonstrate that balance.

Because, you know, honestly, I hired a lot of people as a partner of Price Waterhouse and if this were, and we did a lot of searches on social media, I do that in my office, it is a deal-killer for anybody to have made a political statement about the other party. As a matter of fact, in my office if someone says something that is overheard that is the least bit critical of someone else on the other side of the aisle, it is grounds for termination, based on my business code of conduct.

So, the reason I would have a concern with supporting you is it doesn't even live up to my hiring practices in my office, which is highly diverse and, in fact, my nominations to the committees, is one of the top four or five in the

U.S. Senate for diversity. So, I actually do it in a way, and in my 20 years in public service, have never taken on the party or said or had a single tweet or a public statement, where we have a record of several.

So, it just worries me about your temperament and about the confidence people would have and the side of the political spectrum that you have, at least, some contempt for.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Tillis.

Senator Rosen is trying to get to her computer, so I will take the opportunity to begin my second round.

Ms. Fulton, you had an extraordinary career: the first class of women at West Point, which was very challenging. Not only did you survive an experience that most people, and I have some experience in this regard, could not have done, and then you went on and throughout your public service, and currently in the state of New Jersey, working with people from all different persuasions, political, theological, ethnic differences, and there has been no complaints by any of your subordinates or any of your superiors about your work.

Is that fair?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator, that is true.

Chairman REED. So, that, in the performance of your duties, you have done it in a way that is based on the principles, and I will be somewhat trite, of duty, honor, country, that you have a job to do and you must do that job. It is other factors which you might, privately, as we all have private thoughts and ideas, do not influence your professional activities.

Is that fair?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, Senator. I strive to live up to the ideals of duty, honor, country. I do think about that. I am passionate. I am strong-willed. I am a fighter.

If I am confirmed, I will strive to prove to you and every member of this committee, every day, that I am the person of my record.

Chairman REED. Well, I, you know, obviously, I think the record bears that out in the sense that everyone is entitled to their opinions, but they have to recognize their opinions and deal in the workplace with facts and with the principles, the fairness, and responsibility and commitment, in this case, to the Constitution and to the laws of the United States. So, I think that point has to be emphasized, so I will emphasize that.

I am going to follow-up Ms. Hinderstein, with a question and give you a little more time to elaborate, which is securing of nuclear materials, again, I have the same concerns as my colleagues, with respect to the real danger of these materials flowing into the hands of terrorist groups, which are very difficult, if not impossible, to deter. What can you add to your previous answer?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator.

I really am appreciative of this line of inquiry, because I do think that nuclear security and anything that we can do to reduce the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear or radiological material is extremely important, and it is a risk that threatens to kind of fall below the radar while we deal with other extremely important national security issues.

If confirmed, I would seek to support a number of the really important programs that the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has not only innovated, but implemented, with partners around the world, because it is not just about telling folks what to do; it is more about giving them the tools, the capability, and the sustainability to continue that mission globally. Because the United States, we can't just protect ourselves here, we have to protect ourselves in any area of risk.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much.

I am informed that Senator Rosen is available. At this point, I will recognize Senator Rosen for her questions.

Senator ROSEN. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed. I appreciate it. Thank you, Ranking Member Inhofe.

I want to thank the nominees for being here today and your willingness to serve.

I want to talk a little bit about Nevada's National Security Site. So, Ms. Hinderstein, the Nevada test site, now known as the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS, was ground zero for our country's explosive testing between 1945 and 1992 with a hundred atmospheric and 828 underground tests conducted at the test site. NNSS is the only facility in the Nation equipped to accommodate subcritical nuclear experiments, helping to advance our national security and maintain the integrity of our nuclear stockpile.

Under the direction of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, NNSS hosts a Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex, the largest facility for open-air testing of hazardous materials and biological stimulants in the world, which trains our first responders for nuclear catastrophes.

If confirmed, another Nevada equity, which would fall under your direction is the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base and Joint Base Andrews, providing radiological emergency response teams along the West Coast and the East Coast, respectively. They stand ready to provide emergency radiological response anywhere in the world with deployable teams of experts.

RSL has been undergoing a number of upgrades to their equipment, including helicopters, detectors, communications gear. I had the pleasure of touring their headquarters right there at Nellis in July.

So, Ms. Hinderstein, can you speak to importance of the Nevada National Security Site and the Remote Sensing Lab and the specialized people and equipment they field, and will you ensure that, if confirmed, that they have the tools and the resources that they need to maintain our nuclear stockpile, to think about any potential radiological events, and prepare and plan for the things that our country is going to need going forward.

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Thank you for your question, Senator. I agree with you that the capabilities that are resident in Nevada and, in particular, at Nellis and at the National Nuclear Security Site, are unique to our country.

Because of the history of the facility, there are capabilities in Nevada that we don't have elsewhere and that would be nearly impossible, if not actually impossible to replicate if we were to try to do so. So, I think it is extremely important that we support the mission at Nevada. There are profound and important activities that go on there that are related to DNN's R&E portfolio.

If confirmed, first of all, I hope I would get the opportunity to see some of those facilities directly. I have been to the site once, but I didn't have the opportunity to see some of those. I would commit to you to an ongoing conversation about the needs of the site to meet our national security missions.

Senator ROSEN. Well, that is important, because as you mentioned, they have highly specialized nuclear-detection equipment found nowhere else. It does need to be maintained and upgraded, and it is critical.

Talking about their infrastructure needs, in general, when I last visited the National Security Site, I saw the ongoing construction project for the U1a facility for enhanced capabilities for subcritical experiments. We call it the ECSE. I am expedited that the NNSS will host the most capable weapons and radiographic system in the world.

So, again, Ms. Hinderstein, if confirmed, what additional investments in the Nevada National Security Site do you think would be prudent to ensure that the site can continue to fulfill its counterterrorism and nonproliferation missions in the years to come?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Senator, I think it is extremely important to coordinate with my counterparts at the Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation at NNSA if I were to be confirmed, because there are such specific capabilities that would benefit both our mission spaces.

I would not dare to speculate on exactly which investments would be needed now, but I would think it would be extremely important, if confirmed, that I get up to speed on where the capabili-

ties lie, where the gaps may be, and how we can strategically invest in the site to meet all of our needs.

Senator ROSEN. Well, thank you. My team and I look forward to welcoming you to Nevada, taking you on those tours, and having just these very discussions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rosen.

That concludes the hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I also want to thank you for your willingness to serve the nation. It is deeply appreciated.

With that, I will adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. David A. Honey by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering?

Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (DUSD(R&E)) is the primary assistant to and senior-most official under the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. The Deputy Under Secretary will assist the Under Secretary to perform all duties enumerated in Section 133a of title 10. As a Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed official, the Deputy Under Secretary is empowered to act on behalf of the Under Secretary on delegated topics, and when the Under Secretary is unavailable or recused.

The Deputy Under Secretary also leads efforts supporting the Under Secretary's role as the Chief Technology Officer of the Department. The Deputy Under Secretary works with the staff to engage industry, academia, the Services and other stakeholders to ensure that the Under Secretary is provided comprehensive and accurate information and advice.

Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions would you expect the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering (USD(R&E)) to prescribe for you?

Answer. If confirmed as the Deputy Under Secretary, I expect to have an exceedingly collaborative relationship with the Under Secretary where both of us are working in our strengths, and where my role is to enable the Under Secretary to be most effective and impactful in driving the technology dominance of U.S. Forces. I expect that on behalf of the Under Secretary, I will be deeply engaged with the staff on the day-to-day details of accomplishing Research and Engineering's mission, and will support the staff in overcoming challenges and obstacles. I expect that I will assist the Under Secretary in building collaborative relationships across the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in supporting Research and Engineering's engagements with its other partner organizations. I would also stand ready to support the needs of the Department and the Deputy Secretary to represent Research and Engineering equities on any Department-wide initiative, if so tasked. I look forward to having this dialogue with the Under Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, if confirmed.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. Over the course of my career, I have served as an officer in United States Air Force, a member of the Senior Executive Service in the Department of Defense, a senior executive in a small business defense contractor, and as a senior executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. I have managed research, technology and engineering programs on a broad range of technologies. I have served as a bench level scientist, a member of United States Air Force

Scientific Advisory Board, and supervisor of large national security research and development efforts, through which I developed a broad understanding of the science, technology, innovation ecosystems, platform integration, and testing that will be essential to this role. As a former B-52 and FB-111 pilot, I have a strong connection to and understanding of the needs and benefits of advanced technologies

for our warfighters. During the 14 years over two tours that I have served at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), I have experienced creating and leading innovation as a program manager, deputy office director, office director, and special assistant to the Director. While I have often led projects involving large companies in the Defense Industrial Base, I am a strong proponent of our highly innovative small business sector and have actively participated in the SBIR program, first as a government program manager and later as a performer when I worked at a small defense contractor. In all of these previous assignments, I have actively participated in the efforts to push R&D across the Valley of Death and deliver a competitive edge to our warfighters. Having previously served as the Deputy Assistant Director of Research (DASD/R) in Research and Engineering while it was a part of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), as the Acting Director of the Strategic Capabilities Office, and recently as a senior advisor in Research and Engineering, I gained a deep appreciation of what it takes to ensure that Research and Engineering will be a valued contributor, and I believe that my experiences have well-acquainted me with the demands of this position.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to relying on experts within the organization as I grow into the role of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and to be constantly learning. As the scope of the threats to our national security evolves, it will be an important responsibility for me to stay informed and to seek out a diverse set of viewpoints. The research and development landscape is also rapidly increasing its pace of change and to be successful, I must tap into a wide range of information sources both within and from outside of the Department. From a management perspective, my experience in the military, the Intelligence Community, and industry have taught me the importance of relationships, collaboration, and building consensus. Building and continuing the enabling relationships to be successful as the Deputy Under Secretary will begin on day one, and I am committed to undertaking that important work.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering with the following:

The Military Service Science and Technology Executives.

Answer. The Military Service Science and Technology Executives oversee a multi-billion-dollar investment across the Services. It is my understanding that in order to ensure unity of effort and coordination across the Department of Defense's strategy, budget, and execution decisions, that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has established a Science & Technology (S&T) Executive Committee (EXCOM), under the auspices of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Research and Technology) that helps the Department maximize S&T resources, avoid unnecessary duplication and identify strategic opportunities for S&T investment. It is also my understanding that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is assisted by the Deputy Under Secretary in evaluating the plans and programs of this activity.

Question. The Directors of Department of Defense Laboratories and Research Centers.

Answer. It is my understanding that the S&T EXCOM that has been established by the USD(R&E), in addition to maximizing the Department's S&T resources, oversees the Department's Laboratories and Research Centers through four Laboratory Quality Enhancement Panels (LQEPs). The Directors of the Defense Laboratories and Research Centers are active participants in all of the LQEPs. It is also my understanding that the Deputy Under Secretary would participate in regular briefings by the S&T EXCOM and the LQEPs in order to advise the Under Secretary on important issues.

Question. The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority, direction, and control over The Director of The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility. If confirmed I look forward to supporting the USD(R&E)'s commitment

to ensure that DAPRA continues to have the support it needs to conduct breakthrough research and accelerate DARPA's innovation into the Services.

Question. The Administrator of the Defense Technical Information Center.

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority, direction, and control over The Director of The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility, and in helping other organizations within the Department better utilize this important resource.

Question. The Director of the Defense Test Resource Management Center.

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority, direction, and control over The Director of the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(R&E) as she works to ensure that TRMC is able to accomplish its assigned roles and responsibilities.

Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in her efforts to work with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to enhance the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of DOD systems. I will seek to communicate frequently with DOT&E and staff on matters related to strategic test and evaluation policy, and other matters of overlapping concern where collaboration will help further the mission of the Department.

Question. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.

Answer. As the Principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering supports coordination and collaboration with the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and staff on information technology, information resource, and data management matters, in accordance with applicable DOD Information Technology policy and law. Other topics for USD(R&E) and CIO coordination and collaboration include Fully Networked Command, Control, and Communications; cyber security capabilities; artificial intelligence and machine learning; as well as information technology infrastructure and interoperability.

Question. The Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) works in close collaboration with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to ensure the Department of Defense's science and technology efforts fit within the Administration's policy. As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E), the Deputy Under Secretary collaborates closely with OSTP to synchronize efforts and advance national science and technology priorities and to ensure that the Department's needs are addressed.

Question. The Director of the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO).

Answer. The Department of Defense Directive establishing the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) states that the Director of SCO will coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistants, whose responsibilities and authorities are affected by proposed actions of the SCO. Due to the shared missions of innovation, rapid prototyping, and capability delivery, I expect, if confirmed, to collaborate closely with the Director of the SCO to partner on shared projects, to further promote technology transfer, and to coordinate to remove barriers and ensure no duplication of efforts.

Question. The Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU).

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) is assigned the responsibility to exercise authority, direction, and control over the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). As the principal assistant to the USD(R&E), the Deputy Under Secretary supports the USD(R&E) in managing this core responsibility. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(R&E) in fulfilling her commitment to ensuring that DIU continues to play an important role in the Department's innovation ecosystem and bring forth new dual-use technologies and products to the Services.

Question. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.

Answer. If confirmed as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, I expect to work closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which falls under the guidance and direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)). While assisting the USD(R&E) in the management of the MDA, I expect to collaborate closely with the Director of MDA to ensure we maintain a robust

multi-layered missile defense system capable of defending the Homeland, our forward deployed forces, and our allies.

Question. The Director of the Defense Microelectronics Activity.

Answer. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) plays an essential role to enable secure microelectronics for Department of Defense (DOD) systems. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) was previously a component within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)). In January 2021, DMEA was transitioned to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)). If confirmed, I will work with USD(A&S) and the Director of the DMEA to ensure the maintenance sustainment of our legacy systems and to facilitate integration of microelectronics quantifiable assurance standards developed under the Trusted and Assured Microelectronics program under the USD(R&E).

Question. The Director of the Space Development Agency.

Answer. The Space Development Agency currently falls under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and receives broad guidance and direction from that office. In preparation for the agency's transfer to the Space Force in FY23, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu are working together to facilitate the smooth transition of SDA and prepare the Space Force to support the agency's ability to execute its mission. Until that transfer in FY23, I will, if confirmed, work to ensure the Space Development Agency continues to develop and deliver advanced space-based capabilities in support of the joint warfighter.

Question. The Program Administrator for Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research.

Answer. It is my understanding the Program Administrator for the Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering through the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Research and Technology. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that investments made through the SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer programs provide innovative, technology solutions for our Warfighters.

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Question. What is your vision for the Office of the USD(R&E)?

Answer. As the nominee for Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, I see my primary function as enabling and operationalizing the vision of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)); which I understand includes working collaboratively with universities, commercial and defense industry, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC), University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC), and other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations, across the Services and in partnership with our Allies to rapidly deliver innovative technical solutions to solve the toughest problems for national security, while also fostering diversity and inclusive practices. If confirmed, I foresee my role as assisting the USD(R&E) in setting the overarching DOD technology strategy, and addressing critical warfighting challenges and capability gaps.

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make regarding changes to the organization, management, and resourcing of the Office of the USD(R&E) so as better to execute its duties and responsibilities?

Answer. If confirmed I will, as a part of my ongoing duties, observe and evaluate the performance of Research and Engineering, and its abilities to fulfill its obligations and meet the needs of its customers and partner organizations. I will share my observations with the Under Secretary and make recommendations on how the organization could be better organized in this regard.

Question. Are there certain additional assets, including staffing and resources that you believe the Office of the USD(R&E) requires to optimize mission accomplishment?

Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to better understand how well Research and Engineering is currently performing with regards to meeting its many commitments and obligations. I will share these observations with the Under Secretary and recommend ways by which any deficiencies can be addressed.

Question. What do you perceive to be the appropriate role of the Principal Directors, designated in accordance with Section 217 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, for each technology area deemed by the USD(R&E) to be critical for support of the National Defense Strategy?

Answer. Section 217 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

(USD(R&E)) to identify technologies it considers critical to support the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and designate Senior Officials to coordinate research & engineering (R&E) activities for each of those areas. The Principal Directors (PDs) have been identified as Senior Officials for the current 11 technology areas and, as such, are responsible for the Senior Official duties outlined in Section 217 to: 1) develop and update research & technology development roadmaps, funding strategies, and technology transition strategies; 2) conduct annual assessments of workforce, infrastructure, and industrial base capabilities/capacity; 3) review the relevant R&E budgets across the Department; and 4) coordinate R&E activities of the Department with international partners, the interagency, and the private sector, and task appropriate intelligence agencies of the Department to compare U.S. capabilities to those of our adversaries. USD(R&E) looks to PDs to coordinate activities across the department to ensure cohesion and unity of effort towards enabling the NDS.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering? If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, the major challenges I anticipate are the ones that Secretary Austin has articulated, to include developing the capabilities needed to deter and maintain our competitive advantage against China and other persistent threats, defeat COVID-19, address the climate crisis, and grow the Department's talent so the Department can meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow. Technology and innovation will play a key role in addressing these challenges, and if confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department leverages our partnerships across the commercial and defense sectors, universities, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC), as well as our Allies and partners, to rapidly deliver cutting-edge and trusted technical capabilities to our warfighters to protect and defend the nation.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS) AND INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Question. The 2018 NDS outlines the threats confronting the United States: a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration. Among these priorities is the requirement to "promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions". The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new National Defense Strategy, planned for issuance 2022.

Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense has initiated a National Defense Strategy review to ensure the Department of Defense's strategic priorities are properly aligned to the President's interim National Security Strategic Guidance and assess the threats across the security environment. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary to ensure the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is postured to support the Department's defense priorities.

Question. In your view, what role should the Office of the USD(R&E) play in ensuring the Department of Defense can meet the requirements of the NDS?

Answer. I believe the role of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) is to prioritize and advance the Department's technological and modernization investments which underpin the capabilities of our warfighters and enables them to meet National Defense requirements. If confirmed, I will work with USD(R&E) and other senior leaders to ensure the Department is making the right investments, spurring and leveraging innovation from the commercial and defense sectors, and strategically maturing technologies to more rapidly transition them into fielded capabilities to meet National Defense Strategy requirements.

Question. In your view, how can research and engineering priorities best be incorporated in the new NDS for 2022?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has initiated a National Defense Strategy 2022 development process. If confirmed, I will work with the Under

Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to understand how best to ensure research and engineering priorities are incorporated in the National Defense Strategy in such a way that executes our strategy and maintain the nation's technological edge.

Question. In your view, what advantages in the domain of research and engineering must the United States develop and enhance to enable it to prevail in the strategic competition with Russia and with China? If confirmed, what approaches would you implement to develop and sustain such advantages?

Answer. I believe our ability to innovate provides the US an advantage in any strategic competition with Russia or China. However, our ability to transition those innovations into operational capabilities faster than Russia or China remains a persistent challenge. If confirmed, I will look at the systemic root cause of any barriers to transition and will seek to work with our partners to overcome them. One area of particular concern is the potential displacement of the United States as a leader in the establishment of global technical standards by China. Such actions puts our position as innovation leader at risk and also greatly limits the technologies and infrastructures that the Department needs to rely on in the future. If confirmed, I will work with other Department stakeholders and our systems engineering and defense standards office to work more closely with our allies and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to address this problem.

The 2018 NDS also provides that "effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with the U.S. interagency to employ all dimensions of national power. We will assist the efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, Commerce, USAID, as well as the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerabilities."

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have to better employ all dimensions of national power, including in the domain of research and engineering, to expand the competitive space?

Answer. Few technologies or engineering practices are uniquely military anymore. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) should maintain early and continuous engagement with all U.S. agencies, industry, academia, non-profits, and our international partners to synergize our activities not only to streamline our programs for efficiencies, but also to leverage the talent and expertise that others have and bring those to bear on the toughest challenges facing the Nation. While the Department has historically had a close research and engineering relationship with others in the national security community, I believe the USD(R&E) should broaden its engagements with the non-traditional organizations.

SUPPORT FOR THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER

Question. If confirmed, you would be the Deputy to the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of the Department of Defense.

What do you see as the role of the CTO of the Department of Defense?

Answer. The Chief Technology Officer's (CTO) role is to advise the Secretary of Defense on all matters related to research, engineering, manufacturing, developmental test and evaluation, technology development, innovation, and technology protection activities occurring within the Department of Defense, as well as internationally. The CTO also serves as a resource upon which other Department offices can rely upon for support. Further, the CTO establishes priorities across those matters to ensure conformance with Departmental policy and guidance.

Question. What experience do you have that will enhance your ability to serve as the Deputy CTO of the Department?

Answer. I have had professional roles that include being a United States Air Force pilot, bench level scientist, and headquarters staff officer; working at a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC); managing science and technology organizations; serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; serving in the intelligence community; and working at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). I have also worked in small businesses and understand the scope of how research progresses into a military capability. I have experience working interagency research and development strategic planning efforts, have co-lead a private-public partnership, and have participated in a number of planning and coordination activities led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). My previous assignment as the Director of Science and Technology in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and my current position as a special assistant to the Director of DARPA have each contained many of the roles and responsibilities of a CTO. I know from my previous positions that the government, de-

fense industry, and military-user interfaces all must collaborate to enable that capability delivery. I believe that my experience will allow me to advise the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) on these areas and to be a particularly strong Deputy where the CTO is unavailable or recused.

Question. Given the growing role of information technology and software in military capabilities, what do you understand to be the differences in roles, responsibilities, and authorities between the Office of the Chief Information Officer and the CTO?

Answer. The Chief Technology Officer is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to science, technology, research, and engineering. Whereas the Chief Information Officer is the senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the information enterprise, to include cybersecurity, communications, information systems, and more.

Question. What technologies do you consider the highest priorities for development in the DOD, based upon the ability of each to contribute to DOD mission accomplishment in the short- and longer-terms?

Answer. Of the 11 modernization priority areas identified by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, directed energy, Fully Networked C3, hypersonics, microelectronics, space and 5G stand to transform our capabilities in the short-term. The remaining priority areas of biotechnology and quantum science hold great promise for the longer-term. Beyond the 11 priority areas, significant contribution in the short-term from software and high performance processing and virtual augmented reality will be beneficial, while advancements in low cost materials and cognitive warfare would significantly contribute to Department of Defense mission accomplishment. Each of the 11 modernization areas encompasses a number of important enabling technologies which must also be properly supported. If confirmed, I will help the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering scan the horizon for new technology areas so that the department can be prepared for the future.

INVESTMENT IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T)

Question. What metrics will you use to assess the appropriateness of the size and portfolio of DOD and Military Department S&T investments?

Answer. If confirmed, in order to ensure there is an appropriate level of long term Science and Technology (S&T) investment, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in evaluating the strength of Service S&T investments in light of the current Service focus on prototyping and modernization. It is also important to understand the current gaps which exist in our operational capabilities, and to collaborate with other stakeholders to establish the best possible S&T investment strategy.

Question. What role should the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering play in the development and coordination of Military Department and Defense Agency S&T investment strategies, programs, and budgets?

Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should review the status of the current investments and their efficacy towards achieving technology-based capability overmatch in the respective Joint Warfighting Domains. If there is not a clear path to overmatch, there should be analysis performed to identify science and technology investments to advance game changing technologies and approaches, and adjustments to investments should be made.

Question. In your judgment, will the level of funding appropriated and allocated to S&T affect the Department's ability to meet the threats of the future? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Analysis of science and technology investments should be an ongoing activity, in order to determine if they are funded at an appropriate level to meet the threats of the future. As the priorities of the Department of Defense shift and new security challenges emerge, it is critically important to ensure the right S&T investments are being made. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing this matter with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Question. Do you believe that the Department's current S&T investment strategy strikes the appropriate balance between funding innovative, disruptive technologies and addressing near-term operational needs and military requirements? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to review current science and technology investment strategy to see if it strikes an appropriate balance between funding innovative, disruptive technologies and addressing near-term operational needs and military requirements.

BASIC RESEARCH

Question. Given the continuing nature of basic research and the broad implications and applications of discovery-focused and innovation-focused sciences, what criteria would you use, if confirmed, to measure the success of these programs and investments?

Answer. Having clear and established methods to measure and assess these programs and investments is important. However, traditional metrics involving schedules and planned milestones, while necessary to gauge programmatic progress, do not adequately reflect the high-risk and exploratory nature of basic research. Regular reviews of such programs coupled with independent peer review by an independent group can often provide the needed insights. If confirmed, I will assess existing and new metrics and measures for basic research success, and investigate where those metrics and measures could help the Department of Defense better forecast success of the program.

Question. What concerns do you have, if any, about current levels of funding for Department of Defense basic research? If confirmed, how would you plan to address those concerns?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to review current basic research activities and funding levels with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and other department leaders to ensure basic research activities are positioned to enable the Department of Defense to meet emerging security challenges.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to increase efforts in unfettered exploration, which has historically been a critical enabler of the most important breakthroughs in military capabilities?

Answer. The Department of Defense plays an essential role in supporting unfettered scientific exploration. The Department has a number of fellowship, sponsorship, and scholarship programs to facilitate far-reaching, exploratory research with transformative potential. If confirmed, I will support and seek to strengthen these programs to ensure the robustness of the Department's science and technology ecosystem.

Question. In your view, how should the Department balance the inherent openness and academic freedom that are integral to university-based fundamental research with the need to protect our national security interests and maintain technological advantages over our potential adversaries?

Answer. The Department of Defense conducts research across a wide range of readiness levels, from very basic research to highly controlled classified work. The Department uses fundamental research, principally conducted at colleges and universities, to provide early-stage idea generation that will help spark breakthrough technologies that will give the United States an advantage many years into the future. This type of research requires an open and collaborative mindset, so that groups of talented scientists can come up with something no one has thought of before. Once that work has identified a clear path forward on an application, then the Department can transition the work to a more secure environment to protect it.

MICROELECTRONICS

Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense should support efforts to establish commercially viable microelectronics production capabilities in the United States? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. If confirmed I will work with and support the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Executive Office of the President, the interagency, and Congress in a whole of government approach to establish and maintain a commercially viable microelectronics production capability in the United States. It is critical that the Department of Defense support and leverage the efforts of the interagency to establish partnerships with commercial industry to enable Department-assured access to state-of-the-art microelectronics technologies.

Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense should seek to establish a "trusted foundry" to support DOD microelectronics requirements? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I am not fully briefed on the current status of all of the Department of Defense's microelectronics developments efforts. While the "trusted foundry" model might potentially support some of the Department's unique and legacy technology needs, it is very clear that new approaches are needed to address Defense demands for state-of-the-art microelectronics. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Under Secretary's microelectronics strategy, and to working with the Congress on these issues and delivering secure, reliable semiconductor technologies for Defense systems.

Question. What is your opinion regarding whether the Department of Defense should invest in the establishment of a robust national network for microelectronics research to support the development of next generation dual use microelectronics technologies and domestic production capabilities? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I fully support the establishment of a robust national network for microelectronics research and development, leveraging the expertise of academia and industry in an intentional and strategic partnership, in order to facilitate moving microelectronics technologies from laboratories to fabrication. If confirmed, I will support Department of Defense investment in and oversight of establishing a national network for microelectronics research.

5G

Question. In your view, what role should the Department of Defense play in the development and deployment of advanced 5G infrastructure and capabilities?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) should be instrumental in advancing U.S. and partner abilities to produce the most advanced and highest quality 5G and NextG products in the world, to ensure that the DOD can securely operate in a global 5G environment and take full advantage of the improvements offered.

Question. In your view, what role should the Office of the USD(R&E) play in these efforts?

Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should facilitate the development of dual-use capabilities, the experimentation and evaluation of performance gains, the assessment of risks and identification of core security principles, and the advocacy of international standards that support Department of Defense and U.S. interests.

Question. The Department's 5G initiative, led by the Office of the USD(R&E), promises to help ensure that the U.S. military and commercial sectors take a lead in 5G wireless infrastructure and applications. If confirmed, how would you intend to continue to prioritize the USD(R&E)-led 5G initiative going forward?

Answer. The 5G initiative should continue to be a priority. The 5G initiative should expand its tech horizon to include future developments such as 6G and NextG to include Department of Defense use cases. Also, the 5G initiative should lead the way in transitioning the applications and enhancements being developed to the Services and programs of record.

COORDINATION OF DEFENSE S&T INTERNALLY AND WITH OTHER AGENCIES

Question. If confirmed, how would you integrate the S&T programs of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to reduce redundancy, leverage investments, and promote cooperation in order to achieve greater efficiency and technological advancement?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has established an overarching framework in Reliance 21 for the joint planning and coordination of the Department's science and technology (S&T) programs. The goal of Reliance 21 is to ensure and promote the DOD S&T community to provide solutions and advice to the Department's senior-level decision makers, warfighters, Congress, and other stakeholders in the most effective and efficient manner possible. This is achieved through an ecosystem and infrastructure that enables information sharing, alignment of effort, coordination of priorities, reduced redundancies and support for scientists and engineers across the Department. If confirmed, I will endeavor to continue to advocate for collaboration and coordination across the Military Departments and Defense Agencies and maximize the effectiveness of the existing Reliance 21 framework.

Question. Do you believe the mechanisms of coordination between other federal departments and agencies and the Department of Defense are adequate to ensure that the military can best leverage the advances of others in the following domains:

- National Science Foundation on defense needs for basic science, especially in social sciences
- National Institute for Standards and Technology for quantum computing and cybersecurity
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration on hypersonics and other space research and the viability and availability of testing facilities
- National Institutes of Health on areas in which military medical research and vaccine development overlap with civilian medical needs
- Intelligence Community in setting defense research priorities to prepare for future threat environments
- Department of Homeland Security on homeland defense and national security-related science
- The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration

Answer. The Department has significant ability to coordinate and collaborate with other government agencies through the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy's National Science and Technology Council, National Coordination Offices, and other direct arrangements (Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)) between specific agencies. A few examples of these include the National Quantum Coordination Office and the MOU with the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. If confirmed, I will assess where the Reliance 21 framework can better leverage other Departments and Agencies and make recommendations to modify the framework as necessary.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to engage with these other federal agencies and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to improve coordination?

Answer. I would reaffirm the Department's commitment to collaboration and coordination with other federal agencies and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy through direct engagement with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and through a thorough review and update of our existing MOUs to ensure that the Department is deriving the maximum benefit from existing collaboration efforts.

TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY

Question. What do you believe to be the key attributes of a sound technology strategic plan that could be used effectively to justify DOD programming and budgeting?

Answer. Technology strategic plans should not only identify technology goals and objectives, they also need to integrate the policy, workforce, infrastructure, and prototyping and experimentation required to enable their development and successfully socialize the transition into service. Off ramps for tech transition and expected levels of technology readiness and the relationship to manufacturing readiness should also be included. All stakeholders and partners should participate in the creation, evaluation and updates of these plans.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that such strategic plans are used during the DOD planning, programming, and budgeting process?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that technology strategic plans fully inform the budget, planning, and programming process. I believe that the strategic plans should be guiding the activities of the Services and Agencies at every level. Ensuring these plans are adopted at the grass-roots level by researchers, engineers, and program managers and emphasizing these plans as a programming priority in defense-wide planning guidance will help ensure the strategy's objectives are moving forward and enable us to achieve the technology modernization we need.

Question. How should a Department of Defense-wide technology strategy inform the activities of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, in your view?

Answer. The Department-wide technology strategy should inform the activities of the Services and Agencies at multiple levels, beginning fundamentally with the researchers, engineers and program managers responsible for developing the technology. This technology needs to be incorporated into current and future program architectures, in alignment with the full weight and direction of the defense-wide planning guidance; which will help garner support from respective Service and Agency programmers. Having these technology plans incorporated at the grass-roots level by researchers, engineers and program managers will smooth the transition from legacy systems to the modernized systems we need in the future.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. What is your evaluation of the effectiveness of current technology transition processes and systems?

Answer. Technology transition is a very demanding activity and my sense is that the Department of Defense is successfully transitioning many important technologies into programs of record, and many programs emphasize transition rate as a key metric. In my experience, the highest likelihood of successful technology transition occurs when such planning occurs early in the research and development lifecycle. All of the stakeholders, such as the acquisition offices, the users and the test community must be engaged throughout. The research and development community must be proactive in communicating its plans, progress and remaining risks to be mitigated. While transition is very important, I believe the Department also requires programs that explore higher-risk technologies as a hedge against future needs. If confirmed, I will continue to place emphasis on appropriate transition rates

that emphasize getting technologies across the “Valley of Death,” without creating a risk-averse culture that marginalizes disruptive innovation

Question. What do you perceive to be the most significant in technology transition within the Department of Defense?

Answer. Close coordination between technology developers, Service programs of record, the test community, and warfighters is critical from the start. As one example, the Advanced Capabilities directorate within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, which oversees prototyping and experimentation activities, transitions approximately 80% of its prototypes to the military services or the warfighter. This success is based on working intimately with the Services’ acquisition Program Managers (PMs) before a prototype is initiated, to ensure the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) understands whether the PM is truly invested in the results of the prototyping activity. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize this approach with my acquisition counterparts at OSD and the Services.

Question. What would you do, if confirmed, to address these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the current portfolio of mutually supportive research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs, while looking for ways to make them even more impactful. This would include efforts like an emphasis on continued outreach across the U.S. innovation ecosystem, maintaining a decentralized but federated mix of RDT&E programs that maximizes innovation by reducing bureaucracy, and promoting a clear understanding of the Services’ interests in new technologies so we have a clear-eyed understanding of transition risks. Facilitating meaningful communications between the various stakeholders so that all are kept informed of new technical developments, changes in the threat, or emerging requirements is a key responsibility for the research community in meeting expectations and obligations. I believe that thoughtfully balancing these sorts of priorities will enable us to deliver the capabilities needed for us to maintain our technological edge.

Question. Do you believe that we need to change the manner in which we fund technology transition in the Department? If so, what changes would you recommend?

Answer. I am aware of the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s recently announced initiatives to reform the innovation communities of the Department of Defense, and to focus specifically on rapid experimentation, in order to demonstrate technologies in operationally relevant environments, enabling technologies to transition to the acquisition process and get into the field more quickly. This is an important initiative which I would fully support, if confirmed. Successful transition is also highly dependent on the technology recipient’s readiness, funding profile, and adequate preparation within the appropriate program of record. Ensuring program outreach and adoption of transition plans early on are keys to success. If confirmed, I will review these processes with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and ensure the Department is making full use of existing authorities to address the valley of death.

USING COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS

Question. If confirmed, what changes would you pursue to current research and engineering, experimentation, and prototyping processes to make better use of commercial technologies?

Answer. The Department of Defense must access all sources of innovation, particularly from non-typical defense suppliers, small businesses, and purely commercial entities in order to remain competitive. I would work with Research and Engineering’s Advanced Capabilities Directorate, the Small Business Innovation Research program, the Defense Innovation Unit, and other prototyping stakeholders to ensure we are maximizing their outreach initiatives to access commercial technology and transition it to the users. If confirmed, I will review all these programs and authorities, and make recommendations to the Under Secretary.

Question. If confirmed, how would you effectively transition the outputs of such processes to major defense acquisition programs or capabilities that are fielded at scale within the Military Departments?

Answer. Developing technologies that provide joint solutions and applying a mission focus at the entry point helps ensure that the Department’s technology investments have the highest chance of transitioning. Close coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, as well as with the Service Acquisition Executives, and with the Joint Staff is critical to ensure that the outputs of these efforts can get fielded at scale. Additionally, when the Services

or combatant commands have a stake in agreed-upon transition plans, and have jointly co-funded development, this helps guide the technology into fielding at scale.

Question. Many of the Military Departments have created their own organizations to make use of commercially available technologies. If confirmed, how would you ensure these organizations coordinate with the Office of the USD(R&E), and with each other, such that unnecessary overlaps in investment are avoided?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the coordination mechanisms between the Department of Defense's commercial technology outreach organizations to optimize efforts and prevent duplication.

Question. If confirmed, what processes would you encourage to allow commercial companies to become prime contractors and systems integrators for defense programs?

Answer. Having greater participation as a prime contractor by new entrants from the commercial world could significantly increase marketplace competition and benefit the Department. If confirmed, I will review our prototyping strategy and practices to ensure that there is no undue bias toward traditional prime contractors or system integrators, and that qualified commercial companies (both large and small) are considered for these functions. Improving participation by commercial companies in prototyping will give them valuable insight into the Department's needs, and will also allow the Department's workforce to become more familiar with new concepts.

MANUFACTURING

Question. How should the Department of Defense use investments in advanced manufacturing capabilities to support achieving the goals of the NDS?

Answer. Translating innovation into fielded capability is critically dependent upon the ability of the Department of Defense and the industrial base to make system designs producible and manufacture those systems at scale and speed of warfighter relevance. Advanced manufacturing enables the ability to apply new designs and materials to warfighting challenges while reducing the cost and time to produce current and emerging designs. If confirmed, I will ensure our advanced manufacturing investments continue to address the most critical industrial base and supply chain needs of the department.

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND PROTOTYPING

Question. In your view, does the Department of Defense have sufficient systems engineering expertise in its current military and civilian workforce? In its contractor base?

Answer. Ensuring that the Department of Defense and its contractor base have sufficient engineering expertise is critically important throughout all parts of a weapons system's lifecycle. Developing engineers with sufficient systems engineering expertise takes continuous learning and training as well as experience and mentorship. If confirmed, I will work with Research and Engineering's partners to understand the scope of any current or future gaps and will support the development of the necessary systems engineering expertise to meet future mission needs.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe should be made in the Department's systems engineering organization and practices?

Answer. The Department of Defense's system engineering organization and practices need to be continuously evaluated and then strengthened where needed. New opportunities may exist in the areas of digital engineering and model-based systems engineering. Ensuring the continual modernization of system engineering processes will facilitate rapid and iterative "design-test-fix" cycles and improve flexibility. If confirmed, I will identify opportunities to strengthen and resource the Department's systems engineering organization and practices.

Question. What are your views on the vesting of technical data rights? What rights should the Department retain from the prototyping phase into development?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to acquire appropriate technical data rights to enable the conduct of business that will ensure systems will remain functional, sustainable, upgradable, and affordable. Program managers need to consider and acquire the appropriate technical data rights necessary to support the operation, maintenance, modernization, and sustainment of programs. The Department needs to consider and use all available techniques and best practices, including modular open systems approaches when cost effective and feasible. Acquiring technical data rights early in the acquisition process helps protect core DOD interests over the entire life cycle.

VENTURE CAPITAL STRATEGIES

Question. What role do you believe that venture capital firms should play in the Department's investments in developing technologies, including in the Small Business Innovation Research program?

Answer. Venture capital firms can be powerful allies for the Department by sharing development costs, accelerating time to market, and in identifying dual use opportunities. The Department can enhance venture capital participation by signaling areas of interest that may spur strategic and timely investment through its National Security Innovation Capital program. Venture Capital can be an essential partner in the Small Business Innovation Research program by helping small companies find new sources of investment, accelerate product development, and efficiently bring dual use capabilities to the marketplace.

Question. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the use of venture capital strategies?

Answer. Advantages are that venture capital strategies provide start-ups with access to critical resources, industry and customer connections through extensive business networks, and guidance as the companies grow. Venture capital can help the Department of Defense accelerate product development and efficiently deliver breakthrough, war-winning capabilities while reducing technical, financial and schedule risk.

Disadvantages include the potential for companies to lose autonomy, since investors may want to participate in company decisions. Also, without strong demand signals from the government, venture capital may not accept investment risk and this could force shifting of development priorities to more profitable projects or shorter-term pay-offs.

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COOPERATION

Question. In your view, how should increased globalization of defense technology affect the Department of Defense's research and technology development and investment strategy?

Answer. The Department of Defense's (DOD) research and technology development and investment strategy should consider the increasingly global and interdependent research, development, and manufacturing of defense technology, including the global competition for talent. Identifying critical DOD programs and technologies will focus our investment, protection, and exploitation activities on the technologies critical to military capability. DOD must also work to apply the appropriate protection based on the maturity of the technology and establish procedures to reinforce the integrity of our research enterprise. DOD can share improved threat awareness, inform necessary controls, and collaboratively develop best practices with the broader national science and technology community and with select allies and partners, while supporting the free exchange of ideas critical for technological advancement. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary in addressing the increased globalization of defense technology and ensure the Department's investment strategies strike the proper balance between promoting and protecting critical technologies.

Question. In your view, what are the obstacles to more effective international cooperation, and, if confirmed, how would you address those obstacles?

Answer. I am unaware of any substantive issues facing the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering's (USD(R&E)) ability to pursue international science and technology collaboration. I understand that USD(R&E)'s "DOD International S&T Engagement Strategy" establishes a framework for guiding its international cooperation activities. If confirmed, I will review this Strategy, examine any barriers that may impede its implementation, and work to continue the USD(R&E)'s efforts to expand international science and technology collaboration with Allies and partners.

Question. How would increased international technology cooperation affect our domestic defense industrial base, in your view?

Answer. The Department of Defense's (DOD) international partners invest their own research and development funds to achieve their defense and security objectives and increase their military capabilities. By increasing technology cooperation with these partners, DOD can pool its investments and leverage expertise and ideas that both benefit and enhance U.S. military capabilities and the U.S. domestic defense industrial base. Participation in international armaments cooperation programs also provides our partner with greater insight and appreciation of U.S. industry. If confirmed, I will support the continued close collaboration between the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment on these and other international efforts.

TEST & EVALUATION

Question. What role should the Office of the USD(R&E) have in ensuring the acquisition programs undertake sufficient developmental test & evaluation?

Answer. I believe the research and engineering enterprise needs to continue to execute sufficient and appropriate developmental testing to ensure warfighters are equipped with affordable, effective, suitable, and survivable systems. Such testing must be commensurate with the urgency of deploying a capability. I believe testing should be thought of as a continuum—breaking down the stovepipes that have traditionally constituted Contractor Testing, Developmental Testing, and Operational Testing. Research and Engineering must communicate to the other stakeholders the value of early mission-based developmental testing and evaluation, which will be a critical enabler to reduce “Operational Testing discovery” and provide more confidence for successful Operational Testing completion. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee to assure acquisition programs undertake sufficient and appropriate developmental test & evaluation activities.

Question. What is your assessment of the developmental test & evaluation capabilities of the Department of Defense?

Answer. I am not fully briefed on the Department of Defense’s test and evaluation capabilities. However, as we face new and evolving threats it is incumbent upon the Department to ensure our acquisition programs are able to address them. I have been involved in test activities relevant to the research & engineering enterprise throughout my career, and I fully understand that early developmental testing of a system in a mission-based environment is critical in informing acquisition decision making, identifying opportunities for application of additional engineering and risk mitigation resources, and ensuring overall system readiness. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to assure our developmental test activities, such as cyber resiliency testing and robust early modeling and simulation testing, are aligned with the new Adaptive Acquisition Framework and properly structured to test and evaluate new capabilities and emerging areas such as artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous systems and software intensive systems.

Question. What is the value of robust developmental test & evaluation activities, in your view?

Answer. I have been involved in test activities relevant to the research & engineering enterprise throughout my career, and I fully understand that thorough and robust developmental testing and evaluation is a critical enabler to the success of our acquisition programs. Robust development test and evaluation activities are critical to informing acquisition decision making, identifying programmatic opportunities for application of additional engineering and risk mitigation resources, establishing readiness for operational testing, and ultimately ensuring delivery of relevant, timely capability.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your plan to develop and implement best practices for effective testing of new and emerging technologies and systems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current enterprise test and evaluation processes and best practices and take necessary action to further implement those that support effective testing of new and emerging technologies and systems. This focus is especially critical as more Department of Defense acquisition programs are executing system development within a digital engineering environment, including significant application of Model-Based Systems Engineering. I believe the test community at both the Office of the Secretary of Defense level and within the Military Departments must develop and use best practices throughout program development to ensure testing produces actionable information to inform programmatic decision making and provide confidence in the intended capability being delivered to the warfighter. If confirmed, I would support efforts to implement best practices for effective testing of new and emerging technologies and systems.

Question. What modifications would you recommend to current test and evaluation processes in the Department of Defense to efficiently develop and deliver operationally effective and suitable technologies and systems to the warfighter?

Answer. I am not familiar with all of the Department’s current test evaluation processes, but if confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary in reviewing and making recommendations to test planning and execution processes for which Research and Engineering is a stakeholder. In developing these recommendations, I will coordinate closely with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the Undersecretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, and other partner organizations.

Question. What role do you believe the Office of the USD(R&E) should play in developmental test and evaluation processes within the Department of Defense and what type of organizational structure and staffing would be required to effectuate this role?

Answer. I believe the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has a critical role in developmental testing, in that successful developmental test is integral in validating incorporation of critical technologies and capabilities into Department of Defense programs to ensure robust capability delivery against increasing capabilities of the threat. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in reviews of the organizational structure help her ensure that the developmental test and evaluation function within the research and engineering enterprise is properly staffed and resourced and given the right authorities.

SMALL BUSINESS ISSUES

Question. The \$1 billion+ annual Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has shown great success in investing in innovative technologies and small businesses and transitioning products to acquisition programs and into operational use.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the SBIR program serves a useful purpose in meeting the Department's research goals?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has shown great success in investing in innovative technology in the Nation's small business community. If confirmed, I would continue to leverage the over \$1 billion annual investment in America's innovative small businesses via the SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs to help achieve the Department's priorities. Through the Department of Defense SBIR/STTR program, small businesses are already contributing to important areas of research and modernization. I would also ensure that SBIR/STTR technologies are considered and incorporated, where appropriate, in the DOD's technology roadmaps.

Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR program to improve the transition of S&T capabilities into acquisition programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support efforts to improve and incentivize Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) technology transition into programs of record. I would also support modifications to the SBIR/STTR program that would allow the Department of Defense more flexibility in further maturing technologies so that they can be inserted and integrated into a program of record or fielded system.

The Department of Defense struggles to keep up with the pace at which technology advances and evolves. Given the Department's lengthy budget cycle, certain technologies can be out of date or less-efficient by the time they are funded.

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would make to the SBIR program to ensure innovative technologies can be integrated into existing Programs of Record to equip the warfighter with the most up-to-date equipment and technology?

Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program assist R&E and the Service Acquisition Executives with reviewing existing projects in the SBIR/ Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) pipeline to determine which ones should receive non-SBIR/STTR funding in order to be integrated/inserted into programs of record or fielded systems. SBIR/STTR technologies are often looked at too late for incorporation into existing programs of record. Reviewing projects on an ongoing basis would better raise awareness of insertion opportunities and better facilitate transition.

Question. What recommendations would you suggest to the SBIR program to improve its ability to attract non-traditional defense contractors, such as small startup companies, into the program?

Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Small Business Innovation Research program establish a mechanism for educating and preparing firms to do business with the Department of Defense. For example, assistance with understanding proposal submission requirements, assistance with pre-contracting activities, assistance with addressing cybersecurity requirements, and any other assistance that may be provided prior to a contract award.

DEFENSE LABORATORIES

Question. What is your overall assessment of the technical capabilities and quality of Defense laboratories relative to their Department of Energy, Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), industry, academic, and foreign peers?

Answer. While I have limited insight into the technical capabilities of the Defense and other federal laboratories, my overall impression is that the defense laboratories are competitive with peers in other federal agencies in specific technical areas. However, I do believe that the Department of Defense needs to continually assess its technical capabilities and quality of the defense laboratories as it sees competitive

pressure on the laboratory system due to factors such as aging infrastructure and greater competition for talent.

Question. What do you perceive to be the most effective management approaches for personnel at DOD laboratory facilities?

Answer. Establishing the most effective management approaches is critically important if the Department of Defense's (DOD) laboratories are to succeed in recruiting and retaining top notch talent. While I am not familiar with current DOD laboratory personnel management practices, there may be a need to provide greater management control at the local level. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in working with DOD laboratory leadership to better understand these issues and make recommendations. Other approaches for consideration could include direct hire, enhanced pay, and other personnel authorities. I would assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to review these and support expansion of these authorities where appropriate.

Question. What are your views on the most effective ways to ensure that the defense laboratories have appropriate research infrastructure and equipment?

Answer. Ensuring that the Department's laboratories have the needed infrastructure and equipment requires a long-term, sustained and strategically-aligned effort on the part of the Military Departments and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. All of the stakeholders must collaborate to ensure that the research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure needs are adequately communicated to the appropriate decision-makers. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in ensuring that defense laboratory infrastructure modernization is appropriately prioritized.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to improve the quality, technical capabilities, and mission performance of the Defense laboratories?

Answer. The defense laboratories are vital elements of the interconnected academic and industrial base necessary to keep our military the most technologically advanced, lethal, and protected force in the world. If confirmed, in addition to ensuring a continual assessment of the quality, technical capabilities, and mission performance of the defense laboratories, I would continue to advocate for the enhanced flexibilities available to the defense laboratories that have allowed them to remain a competitive and high-performing organizations for the Department of Defense.

Question. What is the appropriate balance for the Department of Defense in leveraging commercial R&D and government-exclusive R&D?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to maintain a balance between leveraging commercial research and development (R&D) and government exclusive R&D for research areas where the DOD is not the primary driver of the technology. If confirmed, I will assess whether the current Reliance 21 framework includes assessments of areas where the Department can better leverage commercial and other federal agency investment, and how best to do so.

Question. Do you believe there are research areas of which the Department should divest itself? If so, what are those areas and how can the Department best leverage associated commercial efforts, in your view?

Answer. I understand that the Department has an established governance structure (Reliance 21) by which the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering interfaces with the Science & Technology Executives (S&T EXCOM) from across the Services and agencies. Reliance 21 provides a mechanism to continually evaluate the Department's S&T portfolio and assess areas for adjustment in emphasis. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary in assessing those areas where the Department has sufficient investment and those areas that the Department should consider divestment and leverage commercial efforts instead.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Question. If confirmed, which particular research and engineering workforce challenges would you focus on first?

Answer. While I have not been briefed on the extend of these challenges, several of the Department's senior technical leaders have stated that retaining experienced cyber and artificial intelligence experts is a continual challenge. If confirmed, I would assist the Under Secretary in assessing the current and projected research and engineering workforce challenges and focus on identifying any skills gaps, and ways by which they should be addressed.

Question. Should the Office of the USD(R&E) and organizations under the purview of the USD(R&E) be permitted to apply the same hiring flexibilities as those of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the Defense laboratories, in your view?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the personnel policy and management communities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments to ensure that personnel flexibilities are delegated to the lowest appropriate level?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has benefitted from many personnel flexibilities authorized by Congress. If confirmed, I will explore the role that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering plays with respect to the Department's technical community and continue to advocate and work with the other DOD offices to ensure that additional personnel flexibilities are available and delegated to the rest of the Department's technical community to attract top talent.

Question. In your view, does the Department of Defense have adequate technical expertise within the government workforce to execute its designated acquisition and technical development missions?

Answer. The Department of Defense needs to continually grow its technical expertise to address near and long term needs. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize recruitment, retention, and training efforts in order to keep up with the changes in threats and emerging technologies.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OFFICE,
AND DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT

Question. What do you believe is the proper mission for DARPA? For SCO? DIU? For the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN)?

Answer. The proper mission for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is to pursue high-risk/high-payoff technical and scientific challenges of extreme difficulty, at the cusp of discovery and invention, and thereby cultivate what may develop into transformational capabilities several or even many years later. The Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) mission is to pursue new prototyping opportunities that will impose cost on our adversaries through novel strategies, technologies, and concepts of operation, often relying on repurposing or leveraging existing technologies in the defense inventory. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) accelerates the adoption and harnessing of commercial technology across the DOD, and has several sub-offices, including National Security Innovation Capital (NSIC) and the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN). NSIC accelerates targeted dual-use hardware into the DOD, catalyzing private investment by de-risking development and signaling potential DOD demand. NSIN works to source new talent at universities, to commercialize technology from DOD labs, and to develop novel solutions for DOD challenges through programs like Hacking 4 Defense.

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship between each of these offices and the Military Departments' S&T programs?

Answer. These offices should interact regularly with the Military Departments' science and technology (S&T) organizations to both inform them of current projects and plans and be informed about technologies being performed by the Services. While it is important for leadership in these organizations to coordinate regularly, it is more important for interactions to occur at the program manager level where Service laboratory subject matter experts can support specific programs, and be a proponent for Office of the Secretary of Defense S&T organization-developed technology to the respective Service acquisition community. These offices also face similar technology transfer obstacles and should collaborate on mutually beneficial solutions to this problem.

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship between each of these offices and the Military Departments' laboratories?

Answer. The Department's laboratories offer many infrastructure resources and subject matter experts which can help the offices in program formulation, source selection, test and evaluation and technology transfer. These offices should view the Department's laboratories as an important source of peer review and continue to involve them as contracting officer's technical representatives. Since many of the technical personnel in the offices serve on a rotational basis, the Department's laboratories should be viewed as an important source of highly qualified future recruits.

Question. What, in your view, is the appropriate relationship between each of these and the Military Departments' acquisition programs?

Answer. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Strategic Capabilities Office, and the Defense Innovation Unit should coordinate frequently with senior Military Department leadership to inform them of ongoing programs. Individual science and technology program management should meet with appropriate acquisition program managers early, often, and deeply to assure the technology being developed meets their needs and to structure a path to transition to a program of record. Memoranda of Agreement/Memoranda of Understanding should be generated

to establish each organization's interest and responsibilities. These organizations should also coordinate with the combatant commands to better understand the warfighter needs and conduct demonstrations and experiments at scale with them in the intended operational environment.

Question. If confirmed, how would you oversee and support the transition of capabilities from these offices into acquisition programs or operational use?

Answer. If confirmed, I would place a high emphasis on working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and other stakeholders to identify barriers to the transition process and to foster an effective working relationship with these offices. Collectively these offices all strive to decrease the time to transition innovative technology to the warfighter, and if confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with these offices to improve the transition process.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS (STEM) EDUCATION

Question. In your view, what role should the Department play in supporting STEM education, including for military dependents?

Answer. The Department of Defense is the largest employer of Federal scientists and engineers and, therefore, understands the importance of providing meaningful science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education opportunities for dependents of servicemembers through formal and informal STEM activities. If confirmed, I will seek to understand the future STEM needs of the Department and our industrial base, and will advise the Under Secretary on ways to meet these needs. STEM education for military dependents should be strongly supported by the Department and there may be ways to leverage the scientists, engineers, laboratories, and engineering centers across the DOD research and engineering enterprise, to include our academic and industry partners, to appropriately support STEM opportunities for military children.

Question. In your view, what role should the Department play in supporting STEM education opportunities for transitioning servicemembers?

Answer. Departing servicemembers represent a valuable and unique resource through which the Department's future technology needs could be met. A key way to leverage this talent pool would be to provide support for STEM education and provide these veterans with new opportunities to contribute to the national security mission with which they are already familiar. If confirmed, I will seek to better understand the current status of these efforts and advise the Under Secretary on opportunities for improvement.

HEALTH OF R&D ENTERPRISE

Question. What is your assessment of the current health of the Department of Defense's R&D enterprise as a whole?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a robust and largely successful research and development enterprise consisting of the defense laboratories, the academic community, the small and large businesses, the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and University Affiliated Research Centers, and other government agencies. Success, now and in the future is not a given, and I believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering needs to continue to foster and develop the relationships with all entities across the DOD research and development enterprise. This should be accomplished through greater communication, ease of access, shared understanding of purpose, and breaking through barriers and silos that will allow the research and engineering enterprise to continue to be agile and responsive to the Department's needs, and ensure that DOD retains technological superiority.

Question. Are the statutory authorities, rules, and regulations currently in place to govern the Department's R&D conducive to a healthy enterprise? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Coming from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), I have seen how the statutory authorities, rules, and regulations of DARPA allow for a fast paced, healthy, and highly innovative environment that permits the undertaking of high-risk, high-reward endeavors for the future warfighter. If confirmed, I will seek to work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and other Component leaders to review applicable authorities, rules, and regulations to assure that the enterprise fosters a healthy research and development environment and identify necessary changes.

Question. The Department has recently taken criticism for not devoting enough funding to constructing and upgrading facilities, especially those related to testing and R&D. If confirmed, how would you address that issue?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary in evaluating the health of the Department of Defense's research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities to determine modernization requirements, and in collaboration with the Military Departments, work to ensure these RDT&E modernization priorities are appropriately represented in the annual budget deliberations.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by "someone at work" in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and other harassment in the Office of the USD(R&E)?

Answer. Any occurrence of sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and other harassment within the Department of Defense is deeply disturbing and unacceptable. Such actions foster a climate that is inconsistent with the dignity and respect that our workforce deserves. The Department must continue its work to eliminate sexual harassment, gender-based discrimination, and any other form of harassment or discrimination. If confirmed, I would assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) in reviewing previous workforce assessments including climate surveys, Office of Personnel Management Federal employee viewpoint survey results, and any other documentation that would give me insight into the USD(R&E) organization and help the USD(R&E) make informed decisions on next steps to mitigate, and hopefully eliminate, sexual harassment, gender-based discrimination, and any other harassment within the Office of the USD(R&E).

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment, discrimination, or other harassment from an employee of the Office of the USD(R&E) or an employee of an organization over which the USD(R&E) exercises authority, direction, and control?

Answer. I would take the complaint seriously and immediately contact the appropriate office to initiate an investigation to gather all facts, conduct the necessary interviews, collect appropriate information, and address the complaint within the specified guidelines of Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I would assist the Under Secretary in reiterating to the workforce of the importance of equality and diversity, as well as our support for the Department's zero tolerance for harassment. Additionally, I would further reiterate my expectations of professional conduct to all employees, and to contractor employees.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

MICROELECTRONICS

1. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, the trusted foundry model has not met our military's needs for advanced microelectronics. That model relied on a single vendor providing leading-edge technologies rather than leveraging competition in the commercial marketplace. What steps will you take to ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) is using commercial state-of-the-art manufacturing capabilities and not forcing vendors to use processes and steps that force them to increase costs and deviate from commercial state-of-the-art practices?

Dr. HONEY. In order to meet the needs of our warfighters, DOD contractors must have assured and secure access to commercial state-of-the-art fabrication, packaging and test facilities. The DOD program offices recognize the need for this type of access and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) believes that this is required in order to produce the highest-performing and most cost-effective weapons systems. In my previous and current positions, I have been a participant in interagency working groups seeking to address this issue as it is a concern in other departments besides DOD. Solving this problem for all U.S. critical infrastructure needs will require bringing together all of the stakeholders from both inside and outside DOD to formulate a comprehensive solution. If confirmed, I would look forward to the opportunity to build upon the important relationships that the DOD and interagency groups have established with the commercial semiconductor industry to make their state-of-the-art capabilities available in a secure manner to the DIB.

2. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, Research and Engineering's (R&E) current microelectronics strategy leverages advanced commercial facilities. Do you believe that the commercial sector's existing security and verification processes can protect appropriate national security information and intellectual property?

Dr. HONEY. Protecting national security information and intellectual property are important concerns for DOD. In conversations I have had with the commercial industry, they are now keenly aware of the threats our adversaries pose to their economic well-being and are increasingly interested in partnering with the DOD on these issues. In my experience, DOD's information protection practices can protect its equities when appropriately used in a commercial setting. Some of DOD's information protection best practices are being leveraged by our commercial partners to protect their intellectual property from theft or destruction.

3. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, if not, what changes do you think are needed to ensure that protection?

Dr. HONEY. In similar situations I have previously encountered, DOD often possesses unique and important threat information which when shared appropriately, motivates our industrial partners to adopt effective countermeasures. In addition, DOD has connections to subject matter experts who can often provide cost-effective advice and program protection strategies. If confirmed, I would look forward to building these relationships and ensuring that the protection of national security information and intellectual property remains a high priority for R&E.

4. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, security is a top concern from DOD's perspective and the trusted supplier program, which has not resulted in U.S.-manufactured leading-edge technologies, has relied on commercial facilities operated by people with security clearances. Must the path to getting secure access to leading edge microelectronics rely on facility and personnel security clearances at design and production facilities?

Dr. HONEY. The trusted supplier program has had many challenges which must be overcome if DOD is to have access to leading-edge technologies, and at the same time, meet its security requirements. In my experience, not enough emphasis has been placed on understanding the nature of the threat and performing a risk/benefit analysis of different acquisition approaches, for example. This in turn has led to the existing practices, which have made it difficult for DOD to meet its needs. In my current position, I participate in an interagency working group that is concerned with this problem, and there has been interest from the leading-edge commercial sector in collaborating with DOD on this issue. These discussions are still early in their development, and if confirmed, I would look forward to working with the interagency and the commercial sector to explore, evaluate, and implement new approaches, simultaneously giving DOD access to leading edge technologies while also meeting its security requirements.

5. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, what are the benefits and pitfalls of such an approach?

Dr. HONEY. Securing the DOD supply chain can best be achieved through new approaches to overcoming the threat posed by our adversaries. Sharing DOD's unique information where appropriate, educating our commercial partners on proven best practices and supporting them during implementation can deliver an effective, affordable and scalable solution. However, to be successful, this new approach will require an unprecedented level of collaborative engagement and commitment by DOD, the interagency, and commercial industry. R&E leadership in particular would play a key role and if confirmed, I would look forward to tackling this issue.

6. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, would building a trusted enclave that is responsible for sensitive military technology make this a bigger target to attackers than a traditional commercial facility? Why or why not?

Dr. HONEY. Having encountered this issue during my time in DOD and in the Intelligence Community, it is very clear that the threats to our supply chain are increasing exponentially and often in unexpected ways. The key to tackling this problem is understanding the nature of the threat, how it will evolve in the future and exploring a range of effective, affordable and scalable counter-measures. Given the very diverse nature of DOD's acquisitions, it is unlikely that there is a one-size-fits-all approach to this problem, which means that a case-by-case analysis will often be required. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the stakeholder community to develop and deploy the best available solutions.

7. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, DOD has many microelectronics requirements to support capabilities that are currently in acquisition, operations, and sustainment needs. The current focus of activity seems to be on next generation capabilities and science and technology programs. What is your plan and funding to support all parts of the DOD microelectronics ecosystem and meet near and mid-term defense systems requirements?

Dr. HONEY. In my experience as a DOD program manager and contractor, it is often the case that state-of-the-art microelectronics do not meet all of the DOD's needs, especially in cases such as legacy systems, power electronics, radio frequency, and other applications. If confirmed, I do commit to advancing a balanced research program that prioritizes those technologies that provide the best solutions so as to address all parts of the DOD microelectronics ecosystem at all times during each weapons systems' lifecycle.

8. Senator REED. Dr. Honey, Congress has mandated that DOD establish a national network for microelectronics research that will serve to connect university researchers, small businesses, defense contractors, and commercial manufacturers and users of advanced microelectronics into an integrated enterprise to promote rapid innovation and development of dual-use domestic microelectronics production capabilities. What is your vision for this network and what steps will you take to establish this network?

Dr. HONEY. I strongly support the proposed national network, and have seen in my earlier DOD assignments the many benefits that such collaborations can deliver. The key to ensuring success of such an endeavor lies in understanding the differing

and unique characteristics that each community requires in the development of dual-use capabilities. While the final applications may differ, finding common ground on the underlying technology developments will bring together the best of commercial and DOD interests. It is paramount that the full spectrum of commercial and DOD industrial developers participate and conduct their own unique experimentation and prototyping, so as to ensure all tech transfer and Valley of Death challenges are appropriately addressed. As the leader of such an effort, it is important that R&E build source selection teams with representatives from the Service Laboratories, program offices, user community, prototyping and experimentation organizations, and other DOD acquisition offices. R&E should also, to the maximum extent practicable, engage Service contracting offices and rely upon Service Contracting Technical Representatives to oversee this effort, thus building support for and understanding of the program's goals and objectives. If confirmed, I would look forward to building the stakeholder community and guiding the implementation and operation of this network.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

ADVANCED MANUFACTURING

9. Senator KING. Dr. Honey, over my time in public service, I have been fortunate enough to work with researchers and scientists at the University of Maine and have witnessed firsthand the innovative research and development projects they are conducting at the University's Advanced Structures and Composites Center. As you may know, the Advanced Structures and Composites Center boasts the world's largest 3D printer, and has developed a wide range of capabilities—from offshore wind technology to the world's first 3D printed boat. There are numerous opportunities that exist for the Department to leverage these capabilities in future warfighting. Can you expand on how you think the Department should prioritize and further develop emerging technologies like advanced manufacturing, and how we can continue to partner and cooperate with cutting-edge research institutions like the University of Maine?

Dr. HONEY. Emerging technologies are the foundation upon which future DOD capabilities are developed. They provide new ways to more efficiently tackle existing challenges, and create opportunities for the development and deployment of unanticipated capabilities for our warfighters. An excellent example can be found in additive manufacturing, which offers DOD supply chain agility while also enabling the defense industrial base to affordably sustain technologically advanced weapons systems. Prioritizing and supporting the development of emerging technologies is an area where R&E can make a significant contribution. Because so many emerging technologies are the direct result of breakthroughs in basic and applied sciences, our university-based research community is often the best place to pursue such developments. In addition to engaging universities directly through R&D programs, linking these developments to commercial companies through activities such as the DOD's Manufacturing Institutes can further accelerate adoption of these important technical advancements.

PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTER

10. Senator KING. Dr. Honey, the Procurement Technical Assistance Center (PTAC) is a wonderful program having a huge impact assisting Maine businesses with navigating Department of Defense (DOD) contracting. PTAC organizationally is shifting from oversight under the Defense Logistics Agency to the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Research and Engineering (R&E) as directed by Congress. Can you give an update of the status of this move, and how can we continue to utilize programs like this to ensure we are leveraging our assets properly in emerging technologies?

Dr. HONEY. The Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTACs), which form a nationwide network acting on the behalf of DOD, are a key resource for DOD in ensuring broader access to new industrial suppliers. Many of the most impactful emerging technologies are increasingly being developed outside of the normal channels to which DOD has had access, so the PTACs are important means by which DOD can meet its developmental needs. While I am not at this time aware of the plans or the details of the shift in oversight responsibilities, I do commit if confirmed to get briefed on this issue and to provide an update on its status. It is important that this transition occur smoothly and with minimal disruption to the program.

11. Senator KING. Dr. Honey, while programs like PTAC are great for helping to alleviate some of the current stop gaps and chokepoints in the acquisition process, they would not be necessary if we were able to get at the root of the problem. We have had plenty of testimony before this Committee acknowledging the fact that we are not currently operating in a way that most efficiently and effectively allows the Department to acquire and develop technology. But we haven't yet been able to identify and implement concrete solutions. This will be especially important as we seek to keep pace with China in accordance with our new strategy of "integrated strategic deterrence". If confirmed, what specific changes to these processes would you seek to implement?

Dr. HONEY. In my experience, both in the DOD and in the private sector, the DOD has missed opportunities to prevent these types of problems when it fails to proactively engage its industrial partners on a timely and continuing basis. Often our partners find out much too late the challenges that DOD faces and the types of solutions it is considering, which in turn precludes new and innovative solutions. There are many opportunities for DOD to initiate quality dialog and inform the R&D community what has been learned about the threat, US capability gaps, and new opportunities for solutions. If confirmed, I would support DOD conducting these types of activities, and would look forward to hearing ideas from interested parties on investments the DOD should pursue, as well as how best to organize and benefit from the changing landscape of new potential partners.

12. Senator KING. Dr. Honey, what do you see as the biggest causal factor, and how can we go about rectifying this in the coming years?

Dr. HONEY. In my experience, the DOD must do a better job of expeditiously informing our partners the details of the threats we face and our capability gaps. Too often the DOD focuses on its preferred solutions, and in doing so, shuts down any offering of the innovative solutions that would otherwise be submitted. The DOD must commit to sharing its information with its industrial partners as much as possible, and must remain open to receiving new ideas, objectively evaluating these ideas, and providing feedback in order to meet its most pressing challenges. Encouraging organizations at all levels to engage in experimentation, prototyping, and risk-taking will help create the enterprise-wide culture needed to succeed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN

SMALL BUSINESS

13. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, I was pleased to hear you mention your previous engagement with the Small Business Innovation Research program at the Department of Defense (DOD); I believe DOD hasn't been as successful in the past as they could be with engaging with small businesses. If confirmed, how do you plan to increase small business participation under your jurisdiction, specifically in rural areas of our country?

Dr. HONEY. Having previously worked at a small business which participated in the DOD Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, I have seen firsthand the challenges such businesses face. It is an even bigger challenge for those performers who are in more rural areas and are not in close proximity to either DOD facility or larger tech transfer partners. To address these issues, the DOD must get more creative in using its existing tools, and in establishing and supporting Private-Public-Partnerships (PPPs). For example, DOD and its contracting officers must understand the constraints under which small businesses operate. Most small businesses do not have the production line of a large contractor to generate significant revenue, which means that the various DOD organizations must be aggressively responsive in fulfilling payments to small businesses. In some cases, the needs of the small business community should be prioritized ahead of larger contract actions in order to ensure that these smaller companies do not experience financial hardship. It can also be a challenge for small businesses to obtain and maintain a facility clearance in order to perform classified R&D, and the DOD must commit to solving these types of problems. It is also important that DOD continue to be very proactive in its participation in and support of the Procurement Technical Assistance Program (PTAP), the Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTACs) and the local business organizations which serve as a bridge between the DOD and its small business partners.

14. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, have you worked with the Office of Small Business Programs at DOD in the past, and if so can you tell me about that experience?

I ask because I included language in this year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to streamline small business engagement underneath that office to ensure DOD is coordinating outreach.

Dr. HONEY. I have in the past worked both with the Office of Small Business Programs at DOD and with other small business offices at other locations. I have always been impressed with enthusiasm and devotion of the staffs in all of these organizations. The staff in these offices are very effective advocates for small business and go above and beyond in order to help these companies succeed. While I am not familiar the specific NDAA language referenced, I am aware that the Committee also believes there is room for improvement. If confirmed, I will get briefed on this activity to better understand how it can help the small business community.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

15. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, you mention in your testimony the "Valley of Death" that exists between research and development (R&D) programs and programs of record that make their way into the hands of the warfighter. How do you plan to address this problem generally for the R&D programs in each of our Services?

Dr. HONEY. In my experience, programs that successfully navigate the Valley of Death do so because tech transition was a key part of the planning and funding from the earliest stage of the R&D effort. All of the stakeholders must be participants at every stage, and it must truly be a team effort if it is to succeed. The researchers must be able to explain the technology, how it works, the development and testing schedules, the plan for manufacturing, anticipated performance, and the sustainability issues. The test community must ensure that the researchers get adequate feedback, and that the acquisition and user communities have confidence in the results. It is imperative that the program offices plan for the tech adoption, that the industrial partner has early samples for integration studies, and that the users consider how the new technology can benefit their operational concepts. R&E in particular should serve as the organizer of these teams, and facilitate their formation and ongoing activities. The stakeholder community today is keenly aware of the need to use new technologies to gain a competitive edge for the warfighter, and if confirmed, I would look forward to help lead these teams.

16. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, I am particularly worried that we are losing our competitive advantage on Artificial Intelligence (AI). The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has a number of funding recommendations through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Office of Naval Research's Adaptive Future Force program are two programs I am following very closely. Are you familiar with these programs specifically, and if not can you commit to be briefed on them within 60 days of your confirmation?

Dr. HONEY. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) has performed a great service in conducting this study. I look forward to, and do commit, to getting a detailed briefing on these programs within 60 days if confirmed.

CYBERSECURITY

17. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, in your advance policy questions, you mention the transformative nature of cyber technology development, the need for increased cyber resiliency, and the efforts we must take to maintain cyber expertise in our manpower. Specifically, how do you plan to use your position, if confirmed, to ensure our military maintains and widens our cyber capability versus threats such as China, Russia, North Korea, and cybercrime organizations?

Dr. HONEY. The cyber domain is already a heavily contested environment in which we must compete and dominate if we are to ensure our national security. For our adversaries, these activities not only give them an opportunity to undermine our efforts, it also provides them with many of the tools they need to subdue their own populace. It is imperative that DOD maintain a robust cybersecurity development portfolio which includes research, product development, and an aggressive plan of continual testing and red-teaming. These efforts must be informed by intelligence reports and estimates from across the Intelligence Community. The tools that are developed must leverage the best that Artificial Intelligence has to offer, as the scope of our adversaries' efforts exceed our ability to use solely human operators as an effective countermeasure. If confirmed, I would use my position in R&E to bring together the stakeholder community to better share information, resources, and solutions to ensure that the DOD acts jointly and effectively.

18. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, do you view this role as strictly developing hardware for use in the cyber domain, or do you plan to pursue software development as well?

Dr. HONEY. The contested cyber domain that we face today and into the future is one in which both hardware and software are intrinsically linked. We cannot focus on just one or the other and expect to succeed. This domain poses unique systems and mission integration challenges which require a detailed knowledge of the interactions of hardware and software together as a system.

19. Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Honey, as you pursue these goals in the cyber domain, do you plan to reach out to the operational experts like Lieutenant General Stephen Fogarty and his successor at Army Cyber Command?

Dr. HONEY. If confirmed, I plan to engage all of the stakeholders across DOD, to include U.S. Army Cyber Command. I would also seek to engage our partners in the Intelligence Community and other inter-agency organizations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS

MICROELECTRONICS

20. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, as foreign sources of microelectronics increase, the risks across the supply chain multiply, diminishing visibility into the design, manufacturing, packaging, testing, and distribution of these devices with consequences for security, safety, and reliability. The Department of Defense needs access to the best microelectronics ecosystem without fear of disruption from nefarious actors, foreign adversaries, or natural disasters, which is why Congress included section 224 in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. Under section 224, the Department of Defense must establish trusted supply chain and operational security standards for the purchase of microelectronics through a risk-based approach, a requirement that has not yet been implemented. Wouldn't you agree that excluding the majority of the devices that the Department of Defense uses from trusted supply chain and operational security standards undermines the effectiveness of the section 224 requirements contrary to congressional intent?

Dr. HONEY. I am in complete agreement that excluding these devices undermines the effectiveness of Section 224. From my time in DOD and in the Intelligence Community, I am keenly aware of the threats to our supply chain, and I am grateful for Congress's attention to this critical national security issue.

21. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, do you commit to ensuring section 224 implementation covers design, fabrication, package, and test for custom chips, printed circuit boards, commercial off the shelf chips, and guaranteed long term access strategies?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring Section 224 implementation covers design, fabrication, package, and test for custom chips, printed circuit boards, commercial off the shelf chips, and guaranteed long term access strategies.

22. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, in recent years, research and engineering (R&E) has narrowly focused on microelectronics using state-of-the-art lithography, ignoring the overwhelming majority of microelectronics end uses for defense systems to the detriment of our national defense. R&E has failed to take a holistic approach that considers the best technologies for applications irrespective of node size, many of which like power and radio frequency (RF) do not and cannot perform effectively at single digit nodes. Defense systems require the best size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-C) solutions regardless of lithography generation. If confirmed, will you commit to advancing a balanced research program that prioritizes the technologies that provide the best size, weight, power, and cost solutions irrespective of lithography node?

Dr. HONEY. I agree that state-of-the-art microelectronics does not meet all of the DOD's needs, especially in cases such as legacy systems, power electronics, RF, and other applications. If confirmed, I do commit to advancing a balanced research program that prioritizes the technologies that provide the best size, weight, power, and cost solutions irrespective of lithography node.

23. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, do you commit to leveraging and upgrading systems that use differentiated microelectronics built using a range of lithography processes?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to leveraging and upgrading systems that use differentiated microelectronics built using a range of lithography processes.

QUANTIFIABLE ASSURANCE

24. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, the Research and Engineering office has been promoting something called “zero trust” or “quantifiable assurance” for microelectronics. Unlike in software and cybersecurity, this concept is not yet proven for hardware and microelectronics. It is not clear that people know how to do this yet. Even if further developed, quantifiable assurance would be a tool that adds a layer of security, not a standalone solution because of its inability to address the location and workforce aspects of the supply chain. Unfortunately, prematurely changing the way DOD buys microelectronics could drive massive increases to acquisition programs without adding any value. What is your view on the maturity of quantifiable assurance?

Dr. HONEY. I am in complete agreement with these concerns and have been quite vocal about these very issues in previous inter-agency meetings, especially while serving in my most recent tour in the Intelligence Community. While I am not presently engaged with the development of quantifiable assurance and so cannot speak to its current status, I have not yet seen any empirical data or other evidence which suggests it is ready for deployment. I will, if confirmed, make this one of my highest priorities because a self-inflicted misstep in this area could have dire consequences.

25. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, will you commit to work closely with the acquisition community to understand the cost of systems?

Dr. HONEY. Yes, if confirmed I commit to working closely with the acquisition community to understand the cost of systems. In my experience, one of the biggest cost drivers has been lack of technology readiness and R&E can help the acquisition community to overcome these types of problems.

26. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, since quantifiable assurance is still in multi-year development and not yet proven or implemented, how will the Department of Defense ensure warfighter access to microelectronics immediately and without delay?

Dr. HONEY. In my current and previous assignments, I have been engaged with inter-agency organizations to address this problem, and if confirmed, I will make this one of my highest priorities because a self-inflicted misstep in this area could have dire consequences. The inter-agency has uncovered strong interest in addressing this problem from a variety of commercial vendors, and if confirmed, I commit to organizing the stakeholders to facilitate these types of partnerships. I would also welcome the opportunity to further discuss this critically important issue with the Committee.

SUPPLY AND ACCESS

27. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, this country is finally starting to wake up to the need for robust domestic microelectronics manufacturing capacity. The United States’ defense systems cannot be reliant on chips manufactured in countries like China. Is it acceptable for Defense National Security systems to be assembled with parts from potential adversaries?

Dr. HONEY. No, it is not acceptable. If confirmed, rectifying this issue will be one of my highest priorities.

28. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, if depending on potential adversaries is not right, what actions will you take to reduce dependence on foreign produced chips and promote a robust domestic industrial base?

Dr. HONEY. In my previous and current positions, I have been a participant in inter-agency working groups that have been trying to solve this problem. Strong DOD leadership is needed to address this issue, and if confirmed, I will work to organize and support all of the stakeholders to secure and promote a robust domestic industrial base.

29. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, are you committed to changing the way R&E operates?

Dr. HONEY. Yes, I am strongly committed to changing the way R&E operates. Having served three times in R&E, to include when it was part of OUSD(AT&L), I am keenly aware of what it takes to make R&E a valued team member and contributor. If confirmed, I will consult with and support Under Secretary Shyu in making any necessary changes.

30. Senator TILLIS. Dr. Honey, instead of looking for the lowest cost by having chips fabricated in foreign foundries subject to significant geopolitical risks or natural disasters, are you committed to R&E increasing fabrication in the United

States and supporting the strength, security, and resiliency of our domestic industrial base?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. I am absolutely committed to R&E increasing fabrication in the United States and supporting the strength, security, and resiliency of our domestic industrial base, and if confirmed, this will be one of my highest priorities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

ARMED FORCES READINESS

31. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Honey, over several years this Committee has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness—across each of our Services—to levels that would enable our success in a conflict. We’ve had some success, but there is still a lot of work to do. If you have not done so already, I recommend that every senior defense leader read T.R. Fehrenbach’s “This Kind of War”, which provides a cautionary tale of our Nation’s failure to adequately fund and train our Armed Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were steep and American servicemembers paid with their lives. If confirmed, all of you—based on your positions—will invariably make decisions that directly or indirectly impact readiness. Accordingly, will you commit—if confirmed—to work with this Committee and within the Department on further bolstering military readiness to ensure the failures we endured in the Korean War never happen again?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to doing so.

STRATEGY DRIVEN BUDGET

32. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Honey, Ms. Fulton, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Secretaries of Defense (SECDEF), and the previous and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) have all stated the need for sustained 3–5 percent annual real growth to the defense budget to implement the NDS, increase readiness, and advance long-overdue modernization. Further emphasizing the need for consistent and increased funding, the NDS Commission report stated, “America is very near the point of strategic insolvency, where its ‘means’ are badly out of alignment with its ‘ends.’” This critical situation is negatively compounded by the Biden administration’s dismal defense topline that does not keep pace with inflation. With these facts in mind, and understanding your ability to influence the budget will be limited to future year submissions, will each of you commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget vice a budget-driven strategy?

Dr. HONEY. Answer for Dr. Honey: Yes. I commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget, and will base my recommendations on the gaps we face in our capabilities and on the solutions that best make use of the resources at our disposal.

MISSILE DEFENSE

33. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Honey, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that, “[d]efense of the Homeland is a key priority for DOD and missile defense is a central component of this mission.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks agreed by saying, “[d]efense of the Homeland is a top priority for DOD and the Homeland missile defense system is an essential component to that mission.” Do you agree with the statements made by Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. I agree with and support the statements made by Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks.

34. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Honey, do you support robust funding for missile defense modernization?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. I support robust funding for missile defense modernization.

35. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Honey, how does missile defense contribute to our national security?

Dr. HONEY. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is a key pillar of our national security enterprise. It provides unequalled value through its mission to develop and deploy a layered Missile Defense System to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends from missile attacks in all phases of flight. MDA and its capabilities serve as a powerful deterrent to our adversaries.

36. Dr. Honey, in Admiral Philip Davidson’s statement for the record—presented to this committee during the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) posture hearing—he highlighted that, “... North Korea will remain our most immediate

threat.” Admiral Davidson went on to State, “Pyongyang maintains a diverse and growing missile inventory, and North Korea unveiled several new ballistic systems ... including two SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missile] and an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile].” He concluded that, “Pyongyang’s missile research and development efforts ... are consistent with the regime’s stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. Homeland.” Provided this characterization, and the very real and growing missile threat posed by North Korea, will you commit to prioritizing and accelerating modernization and fielding of our Homeland missile defense systems to include the next generation interceptor?

Dr. HONEY. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and accelerating modernization and fielding of our Homeland missile defense systems, to include the next generation interceptor.

CYBER SURVIVABILITY

37. Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Honey, earlier this year, Dr. Raymond O’Toole testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. In his statement for the record, he highlighted that “virtually none of the programs assessed in fiscal year 2020 were survivable against relevant cyber threats.” This is deeply concerning to me given the role of cyber in today’s and tomorrow’s strategic environment. If confirmed, how will you assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in addressing this critical national security issue?

Dr. HONEY. Assuring that all of our weapons systems can safely and effectively operate through a sustained cyberattack is a key challenge for the DOD, and building the capability to do so must be a part of every R&D effort right from the start. If confirmed, I will assist Under Secretary Shyu in assuring R&D stakeholders have the relevant threat information, and that each effort endeavors to build in the right protections at the beginning of the development program. I will also assist in ensuring Department test and evaluation capabilities meet the needs of this critical challenge.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

38. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Honey, what are some near-, mid-, and long-term capabilities that you want to see to emerge out of ongoing quantum information science (QIS) research within our national labs?

Dr. HONEY. QIS is an important area of research for the DOD and a near-, mid-, and long-term portfolio approach is best suited to this topic. From a long-term basic science perspective, it is important that we invest in new advances in fundamental, material science and device fabrication in order to overcome environmental and performance limitations of the current state-of-the-art. Given the performance of existing components and subsystems, our mid-term goals should focus on implementation and understanding the performance, limitations, and future directions of systems integration and engineering. In the near-term, the results from prototyping and experimentation with existing systems and algorithms focused on real-world problems will help inform the next series of investment choices for DOD’s basic science programs.

39. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Honey, how closely linked is DOD to the overall QIS research ecosystem and where do you see its role within our national security enterprise?

Dr. HONEY. In my experience, DOD is deeply engaged with the broader QIS research ecosystem and has previously been responsible for many of the key investments in this field. DOD must stay engaged in promoting research in this area, following the efforts of other US agencies and also must maintain awareness of developments by non-US entities.

40. Senator BLACKBURN. Dr. Honey, where is the United States in relation to China and Russia in the race to develop and deploy QIS?

Dr. HONEY. QIS R&D is an active area of investment worldwide. While the United States continues to operate at the forefront, our adversaries are very active and will continue to press for leadership in this important capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

TAIWAN

41. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Honey, Admiral Philip Davidson, former Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, and Admiral John Aquilino, current Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, have warned that China might attempt a fait accompli against Taiwan much sooner than previously anticipated, potentially as soon as 2027. Yet many of the Department's modernization efforts aren't expected to pay off until the 2030's. Do you agree with Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and every other DOD leader that I've asked that we must maintain our ability to deny a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. I agree asked that we must maintain our ability to deny a PRC fait accompli against Taiwan.

42. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Honey, do you agree that this is something we have to be worried in this decade, not just in the 2030's and beyond?

Dr. HONEY. Yes. I agree that this is something we have to be worried about in this decade, not just in the 2030's and beyond.

43. Senator HAWLEY. Dr. Honey, if confirmed, what specifically will you do to accelerate the DOD research enterprise's work on solutions for this decade, not just the 2030's and beyond?

Dr. HONEY. If confirmed, I would assist Under Secretary Shyu in analyzing the performance gaps in our war plans, identifying those gaps for which solutions could be rapidly developed, and help construct research, experimentation, and prototyping plans to accelerate deployment of the highest priority capabilities. I would also assist Under Secretary Shyu in forming the stakeholder teams so as to ensure that the right solutions are accelerated, the acquisition community is ready to accept them, and forces supporting U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are able to train and deploy these new weapons systems.

[The nomination reference of Dr. David A. Honey, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN1001

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
August 9, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

David A. Honey, of Virginia, to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, vice Lisa Porter, resigned.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Dr. David A. Honey, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

David A. Honey**Education:**

- Rochester Institute of Technology
 - 1972-1976
 - A.A.S, B.S. Photographic Science and Engineering
- University of Arizona
 - 1976-1978
 - M.S. Optical Science
- Air Force Institute of Technology
 - 1988-1989
 - M.S. Engineering Physics
- Syracuse University
 - 1990-1994
 - PhD Solid State Science

Employment Record:

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Arlington VA,
 - 10/2017 - present
 - Special Assistant to the DARPA Director, to include:
 - Liaison to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
 - Acting Director of the Strategic Capabilities Office
 - Acting Deputy Director of DARPA
 - Senior Advisor to the Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, McLean VA,
 - 11/2011 – 10/2017
 - Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Director of Science & Technology
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Arlington VA
 - 08/2009 – 09/2011
 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
- Department of the Air Force, Pentagon, Arlington VA
 - 10/2008 – 08/2009
 - Member of the US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (part-time Special Government Employee)
- Information Systems Laboratories, San Diego CA and Vienna VA
 - 10/2007 – 08/2009
 - Senior Vice President and General Manager of the Defense Sector
- DARPA, Arlington VA
 - 01/2001 – 09/2007

- Program Manager, Deputy Office Director and Office Director
- MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Boston MA and Arlington VA
 - 10/1999 – 01/2001
 - Member of the Technical Staff and on loan to DARPA as a Program Manager via the Intergovernmental Program Act (IPA)
- US Air Force
 - 09/1978 – 09/1999
 - Officer, pilot (B-52, FB-111) and scientist

Honors and Awards:

- Military Awards
 - Air Force Meritorious Service Medal
 - Air Force Commendation Medal
- Federal Civilian Awards
 - Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
 - Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service
 - Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service
 - Department of the Air Force Award for Exemplary Civilian Service
 - Office of the Director of National Intelligence Award for Exceptional Service
- Other Awards
 - SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing Lifetime Achievement Award

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. David A. Honey in connection with his nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. Name (Include any former names you have used): David Alan Honey
2. Position to which nominated: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
3. Date of nomination: 9 August 2021
4. Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

1972-1976 Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester NY
1974 A.A.S. Photographic Science and Instrumentation
1976 B.S. Photographic Science and Instrumentation
1976-1978 University of Arizona, Tucson AZ

1978 M.S. Optical Science
 1988-1989 Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB OH
 1989 M.S. Engineering Physics
 1990-1994 Syracuse University, Syracuse NY
 1994 PhD Solid State Science

5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):

Nov 2017 – Present: Special Assistant, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Arlington VA. In this assignment I have also served as:
 Acting Director, Strategic Capabilities Office
 Acting Deputy Director, DARPA
 Senior Advisor, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

Nov 2011 – Nov 2017: Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence (Science and Technology) and Director, Science and Technology, Office of the Assistant Director of National Intelligence (Acquisition, Technology and Facilities), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), McLean VA

Aug 2009 – Nov 2011: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD/AT&L), Pentagon Wash DC

6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):

2008 – 2009 Member, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board

7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):

None.

8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other

organizations):

Fairfax Rod & Gun Club, Inc., 7039 Signal Hill Rd, Manassas, VA 20111

<https://www.fxrgc.org/>

Position – Member and Shotgun Chairman: Oversee all shotgun activities such as leagues, competitions, facilities and safety issues.

National Skeet Shooting Association <http://mynssa.nssa-nsca.org/>
(2014 – Present) Member only, no other responsibilities.

American Trap Association <https://shootata.com/>
(2014 – Present) Member only, no other responsibilities

National Rifle Association <https://home.nra.org/>
(1982 – Present) Member only, no other responsibilities

Congregation Olam Tikvah <https://www.olamtikvah.org/>
(1997 – Present) Member only, no other responsibilities

Current professional memberships:

Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) <https://www.ieee.org/>
Optical Society of America (OSA) <https://www.osa.org/en-us/home/>

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA)
<https://www.afcea.org/site/>

Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) <https://www.moaa.org/>

American Armed Forces Mutual Aid Association (AAFMAA)
<https://www.aafmaa.com/>

Optical Society of America (OSA) <https://www.osa.org/en-us/home/>
(1977 – Present) Member only, no other responsibilities

Previous professional memberships:

National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) <https://www.ndia.org/>

Air Force Association (AFA) <https://www.afa.org/>

Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) <https://spie.org/>

9. Political affiliations and activities:

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):

None

- b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:

None

- c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:

None

10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):

2014 SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing Lifetime Achievement Award

11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):

SPIE Conference Proceeding | May 26, 2005

Networking for network centric operations: technologies and challenges

Dave Honey, Larry Stotts, et al.

Proc. SPIE. 5820, Defense Transformation and Network-Centric Systems

SPIE Conference Proceeding | July 19, 2004

Achieving joint battle command in network-centric operations

Larry Stotts, David Honey, et al.

Proc. SPIE. 5441, Battlespace Digitization and Network-Centric Systems IV

SPIE Conference Proceeding | April 13, 1999
 Optical interconnects for military systems
 David Honey
 Proc. SPIE. 3632, Optoelectronic Interconnects VI

Active Electronic Component Handbook, 2nd Edition 1996, Ch. 9 Photonic
 Components
 Raymond K. Boncek, George A. Brost, Mark F. Krol, Michael A. Parker and
 David A. Honey

SPIE Conference Proceeding | June 3, 1994
 Optical interconnects for multichip modules
 Franz Haas; David Honey
 Proc. SPIE. 2216, Photonics at the Air Force Photonics Center

IEEE Photonics Letters, February 1993
 A Simple Surface-Emitting LED Array Useful for Developing Free-Space Optical In-
 terconnects
 H.F. Bare, F. Haas, D.A. Honey, D. Mikolas, H.G. Craighead, G. Pugh and R. Soave

Journal of Vacuum Science Technology B, 1994
 Fabrication of aspheric high numerical aperture reflective diffractive optic ele-
 ments using electron beam lithography
 D. Mikolas, R. Bojko, H.G. Craighead, F. Haas, D.A. Honey, H.F. Bare

Journal of Vacuum Science & Technology B, 1994
 Multiple-level phase gratings fabricated using focused ion-beam milling and elec-
 tron-beam lithography
 S. M. Shank, F. T. Chen, M. Skvarla, H. G. Craighead, P. Cook, R. Bussjager, F. Haas,
 and D. A. Honey

Journal of Applied Physics, 1991
 Efficient pulsed CO2 laser calculations
 David H. Stone and David A. Honey

12. Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches
 you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in
 which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have
 been nominated).

None available.

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?

Yes.

14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?

Yes.

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes.

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes.

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes.

18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes.

19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 19th day of August, 2021

[The nomination of Dr. David A. Honey was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 21, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 16, 2022.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Brenda S. Fulton by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASD(M&RA))?

Answer. It is my understanding that, if confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, I will serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on all matters regarding military and civilian personnel programs and policies, Reserve Component affairs and integration, military community and family policy, and Total Force manpower issues. The ASD(M&RA) also has direct oversight and responsibility for the Defense Commissary Agency and the Department of Defense Education Activity.

Question. What background and experience do you have that qualify you for this position?

Answer. Across my career, I have accumulated a breadth of leadership experience, having served in the military, worked in the private sector, launched and led non-profit organizations, and, in my present capacity, served in State government.

In my current job, we transformed a hidebound, primarily analog system where customers "stand in line to stand in line" for in-person services to a mostly automated regime where about 80 percent of transactions are available online, and in-person services are governed by appointments, text reminders, and an automated queuing system.

I have worked with senior military leaders in every branch on multiple initiatives to increase diversity in the force, expanding opportunities for women, LGBT Americans, and Black Americans. In every case, my guiding light was an effort to improve our ability to fight and win wars.

In my 8 years on the West Point Board of Visitors, five of them serving as Chair or Vice Chair, I had the good fortune to work with Lt. Gen. Bob Caslen, my friend Rep. Steve Womack, and other Board members in fighting sexual harassment and assault; expanding the diversity of our entering classes; and most of all, centering character development as a way to deliver the Army the best leaders possible.

As an Army veteran and West Point graduate, I deeply love our Armed Forces and the values we represent, and will strive to continue to make those forces stronger, smarter, and more effective—the envy of the world.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the ASD(M&RA), and how would you address them, if confirmed?

Answer. Our military faces an incredibly dynamic threat environment, with disruptive technologies and powerful adversaries. I believe that the primary challenge in this role will be to deliver a smarter force. That means attracting smart people—and retaining our best talent.

We know from research that smart, talented, innovative people want to work in places where they are (a) given challenging, meaningful opportunities that align with their talents; (b) part of a diverse and inclusive environment; and (c) led by leaders of character.

That means we must also make significant progress in ending sexual harassment and assault in the military.

And if we are to retain those people, especially in the military ranks, we must do a better job taking care of their families.

I believe these are our greatest challenges, and if confirmed, I will do everything within my power to succeed against them.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Question. If confirmed, how would you use your position to adhere to and further the fundamental principle of civilian control of the armed forces?

Answer. If confirmed, I will serve as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on matters regarding military and civilian personnel programs and policies, Reserve Component affairs and integration, military community and family policy, and Total Force manpower issues. I will, if confirmed, strive to provide sound guidance and recommendations regarding the impact of policies and decisions on the Department's workforce, both civilian and military, the Reserve Component and our military families.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure your inclusion in the discussion, debate, and resolution of U.S. defense and national security issues?

Answer. Our military and civilian personnel are vital to achieving the Department's mission. Since nearly all decisions made regarding U.S. defense and national security impact them, it is necessary to include the ASD(M&RA) when discussions or debates related to personnel occur. If confirmed, I will actively engage on matters within my portfolio and provide the best information and advice possible.

PERSONNEL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Question. If confirmed, what personnel policies and processes would you implement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of human resources management—both military and civilian—across the Department?

Answer. If confirmed, I would first seek to learn much more about the pressing challenges that face our people before taking any action. We must always strive for a smarter, stronger, more effective force; it is my opinion that we attract and retain talent by taking care of our people and their families, by offering challenging and meaningful opportunities, fostering a diverse and inclusive environment, and putting leaders of character in place at every level. However, I believe in making decisions based on evidence and data, and if confirmed, I would seek the best information before pushing for change.

Question. What is your understanding of your responsibility, if confirmed, to inform and consult with this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress, on the implementation of personnel policies directed by law?

Answer. My understanding is that, if confirmed, I will implement all personnel policies in my area of responsibility as directed by law, and be responsive to this and other congressional committees on requests for information and reporting requirements, as appropriate.

NON-DEPLOYABLE SERVICEMEMBERS

Question. In your view, should servicemembers who are non-deployable for more than 12 consecutive months be subject either to separation from the service or referral to the Disability Evaluation System, as is current Department policy?

Answer. I understand that it is Department policy to maximize the lethality and readiness of the joint force and all Servicemembers are expected to be deployable.

It is also my understanding that Servicemembers who are considered non-deployable for more than 12 consecutive months require a retention determination from their Military Department, not mandatory separation. In my view these individuals should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if continued service is appropriate.

Question. Under what circumstances would the retention of a servicemember who has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be “in the best interest of the service”?

Answer. I would expect the Secretaries of the Military Departments to evaluate each individual on a case-by-case basis. Considerations should include the individual’s ability to perform appropriate military duties commensurate with his/her office, grade, rank or skill as well as the likelihood that the Servicemember will resolve the condition or reason that is the underlying cause of the non-deployable status.

Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to servicemembers with HIV?

Answer. In my view, Servicemembers should be evaluated individually on a case-by-case basis; impartial treatment, regardless of the medical condition at issue, is critical.

The new Department of Defense policy on service by transgender persons, as set forth in DOD Instruction 1300.28, provides that “any determination that a transgender Servicemember is non-deployable at any time will be consistent with established Military Department and Service standards, as applied to other Servicemembers whose deployability is similarly affected in comparable circumstances unrelated to gender transition.”

Question. Please provide an example of a “comparable circumstance” that would be used to determine deployability of a transgender servicemember.

Answer. It would not be appropriate for me to speculate at this time as this is a very individualized policy. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring Servicemembers are treated fairly, in an environment affording everyone dignity and respect.

Question. On average, how long should a commander of a servicemember undergoing a gender transition expect that servicemember to be non-deployable?

Answer. I do not think it is appropriate to speculate on the timeline as every case is highly individualized. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely on this matter with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and medical professionals within the Department.

Question. In your view, should a servicemember’s readiness to perform the required specific missions, functions, and tasks in the context of a particular deployment also be considered in determining whether that servicemember is deployable?

Answer. I do not have enough information to provide a thorough assessment at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Military Departments to review policies and procedures as appropriate to ensure the lethality and readiness of the joint force.

Question. What are your ideas for addressing the challenges of medical non-deployability in the Reserve components?

Answer. I do not currently have access to DOD data regarding the challenges of medical non-deployability in the Reserve components. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Military Departments to address any challenges that are identified.

DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION

Question. In general, what is your assessment of the diversity of the U.S. armed forces and of the DOD civilian workforce?

Answer. It is my understanding that, although there is room for improvement, the Department and the Military Departments continue to work toward improving diversity through a number of ongoing initiatives. If confirmed, I will continue to support and, where necessary, expand diversity initiatives to achieve greater representation in the Armed Forces and the DOD civilian workforce.

Question. According to researchers at the RAND Corporation, African American and Hispanic youth are less likely to be eligible for military service than white and Asian Americans. Why do you think this is the case?

Answer. I am not familiar with the referenced RAND study. I believe, however, that although eligibility standards should be based on operational requirements, these standards should be as broad and inclusive as possible.

Question. In your judgment, should military accession and commissioning standards be modified to achieve racial diversity goals? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe the qualification standards should ensure our military force remains unmatched in the world and that individuals who join can meet the high standards and demands the mission requires. These standards should ensure we are able to recruit the best and brightest of America's youth while also ensuring our armed forces are diverse and representative of the society they serve.

Question. If confirmed, how would you increase diversity and inclusion in the armed forces, and work toward the goal of ensuring that the Nation's military, at all levels, especially within the senior officer ranks, reflects the broad diversity of the nation?

Answer. I understand that the diversity and inclusion initiatives that the Department and the Military Departments are currently working on underscore the Department's commitment to diversity, including in senior ranks. I believe these initiatives will provide a framework to remove barriers and facilitate greater diversity in all ranks. If confirmed, I will continue to support and, where necessary, expand these initiatives to help improve the diversity among senior leaders.

Question. If confirmed, how would you increase diversity and inclusion within the Department's civilian workforce, especially at the senior General Schedule and Senior Executive Service levels?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support and seek to expand, if necessary, current diversity initiatives to achieve greater representation at the senior General Schedule and Senior Executive levels.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to increase geographical diversity in the armed forces, especially from areas of the country and local communities that are currently underrepresented?

Answer. Unfortunately, many of today's youth do not have family or other mentor connections to the military that promote an understanding of what military service offers. This is particularly true in more remote and isolated communities. I believe broad, expansive communication efforts and strategic messaging are a crucial part of educating all youth about the opportunities that come with military service. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure proactive engagement with community leaders to ensure accurate perceptions of military service and the significant opportunities it provides.

EXTREMISM

Question. What is your view of the prevalence and effect of extremism within the armed forces?

Answer. It is my view that the majority of military personnel and civilian employees take their Oath to the U.S. Constitution seriously and serve our Nation honorably. Unfortunately, there may be a small number of individuals who choose to align themselves with extremist ideologies and have an outsized impact among the Force. This has no place in our military and should not be tolerated.

Question. If confirmed, what would you direct the Military Services to do to eliminate extremism within the ranks?

Answer. If confirmed, I will put into action the recommendations and best practices from the Department's review of this issue this past summer. As I understand, that work focused on improvements to policy, training and education, and screening processes to prevent and respond to any emergent threats.

The current DOD policy on "Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces" prohibits servicemembers from "active participation" in organizations "that advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes; including those that attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin"

Question. Do you believe that servicemembers who are active participants in religious or political groups that advocate for socially conservative changes to laws related to marriage and gender should be punished, counseled, or prohibited from military service?

Answer. I believe that Servicemembers, as long as they act within the confines of Federal law and DOD policy, should be allowed to exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech and to observe the tenets of their religion.

MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES

Question. What is your assessment of the diversity of cadets and midshipmen in the Military Service Academies? What measures can be taken to increase diversity in the Academies?

Answer. Diversity within the officer corps is essential to both the Department's current mission and to developing our future leaders. Accordingly, it is imperative to ensure diverse talent is found within the applicant pool and student population

of our accession programs, such as the Military Service Academies. While I was on the Board of Visitors for West Point, I was a strong advocate for increasing diversity in the incoming classes. I understand the value of increasing DOD's minority and female accession rates to maintaining a strong and lethal force. If confirmed, I will strive to improve DOD's marketing, recruitment, and community partnership efforts to help the Military Service Academies establish a more diverse pool of applicants.

Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies and processes in place across the Military Service Academies to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment, and to ensure that cadets and midshipmen who do report assault or harassment are not subject to retaliation—social ostracism and reputation damage—in particular?

Answer. Unfortunately, the Department has more work to do in the prevention of sexual assault and harassment, as well as stopping all forms of retaliation, including from peers and supervisors. If confirmed, I will continue the work of the Department to ensure victims feel comfortable coming forward to report sexual assault and harassment without fear of retaliation. Furthermore, if confirmed I will work to ensure the Military Service Academies appropriately address and prevent all forms of unacceptable behaviors, including retaliatory behaviors.

Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of suicide prevention programs at each Military Service Academy?

Answer. I know, from my time in the U.S. Army and my work with West Point cadets, junior officers, and enlisted members, our youngest troops are often at highest risk. We must carefully consider the cadet and midshipmen population in the Department's efforts to address suicide. I am committed to the welfare of our military community, which includes the future leaders at our Military Service Academies. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues who oversee the suicide prevention programs and assess their efficacy in my endeavor to care for the military community at large, including cadets and midshipmen.

Question. Do you believe the current 5-year minimum Active Duty service commitment for Military Service Academy graduates is sufficient return on investment for the U.S. military and the American taxpayer?

Answer. As a graduate of West Point, I am familiar with the 5-year minimum Active Duty service obligation for Military Service Academy graduates that has been in effect for many years. If confirmed, I will assess the existing service obligation policies to evaluate if the U.S. military and American taxpayers are receiving an acceptable return on their investment.

Question. In your view, do the Military Service Academies contribute to the pool of military officer accessions commensurate with their attendant costs? Why or why not?

Answer. I firmly believe the Military Service Academies produce high-quality commissioned officers and leaders. If confirmed, I will examine the resources provided to the Military Service Academies to ensure they are efficiently used and maximized to the greatest benefit for the Department and the Nation.

Question. Under what conditions would you deem it appropriate, if confirmed, to permit a military officer to play professional sports prior to completing at least two consecutive years of commissioned service following graduation from the United States Military Academy?

Answer. I am aware that there has been a relatively small number of talented cadets and midshipmen who have received approval to participate in professional sports prior to serving at least two consecutive years of commissioned service following their graduation from a Military Service Academy. If confirmed, I will analyze the current policy on professional sport participation for Military Service Academy graduates, and will work with Department leadership to determine if there is a need to propose changes to the Secretary concerning the current policy.

SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (SROTC)

Question. In your view, does the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (SROTC) program remain a viable source of officer accessions?

Answer. It is my understanding that SROTC is the largest source of commissioned officers. If confirmed, I will evaluate the Department's policies and procedures to maximize efficiencies.

Question. What is your assessment of the diversity in our ROTC programs? What measures can be taken to increase diversity in the ROTC?

Answer. SROTC units are hosted at a number of geographically and culturally diverse institutions across the United States. It is my understanding that these civilian institutions facilitate a diverse cadet and midshipmen pool. If confirmed, I will evaluate those institutions that draw from diverse and underrepresented popu-

lations and strive to improve DOD's marketing, recruitment, and community partnership efforts to encourage a more diverse applicant pool.

Question. In your view, should the Military Services continue to operate SROTC units at colleges and universities that fail to meet their minimum annual commissioning requirements? If not, please explain the factors you believe should be used to determine which units should be terminated.

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review our policies concerning SROTC units that may be having difficulty meeting annual commissioning requirements, as well as examining the conditions and challenges faced by such units. In consultation with Congress, I will explore ways to get the best out of current SROTC programs and not lose representation in certain geographical areas.

Question. How would you modify the SROTC scholarship program to attract the top talent that our armed forces need to meet national defense?

Answer. There are SROTC programs at some of the top-rated colleges and universities in the United States. If confirmed, I will stress the importance and value of recruiting efforts at every participating college and university. In addition, I will encourage an increased effort at some of the underused locations.

MILITARY COMPENSATION

Question. Do you agree that the primary purpose of a competitive military pay and benefits package is to recruit and retain a military of sufficient size and quality to meet national defense objectives?

Answer. Yes. Military pay and benefits have to be competitive with salaries and benefits in the private sector so the Department can recruit and retain the high-quality men and women the Nation needs to fill the ranks of its military.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current military pay package in achieving this goal?

Answer. It is my understanding that today's military compensation package is considered robust and compares very favorably with the private-sector. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate the full range of pay and benefits to ensure they are adequate to recruit and retain the most talented people our country has to offer for service in the Armed Forces.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current military pay and benefits package, if confirmed?

Answer. I do not have any specific changes to military pay and benefits that I'd recommend at this time. However, if confirmed, I will be eager to work with Congress on issues surrounding military pay and benefits and will be more than open to considering potential options for change. Above all, however, my goal would be that we only seek changes that maintain readiness, as well as our ability to recruit, retain, and sustain the All-Volunteer Force.

Question. What specific recommendations do you have for controlling rising military personnel costs, including entitlement spending?

Answer. I am aware that recent growth in military personnel costs is an ongoing source of concern. I believe we have to look for processes that improve efficiencies and support controlling costs. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure any future military pay or benefit change is justified and enhances our ability to recruit, retain, and sustain the Force while remaining cost-efficient.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. In your view, what are the main reasons that less than 30 percent of 17 to 24-year-olds are eligible for military service, and how would you propose increasing the size of that pool?

Answer. I am aware that some of the main reasons today's youth are ineligible for military service are medical issues, such as obesity, drug use, and past conduct issues, to include illegal activity and associated proceedings. I believe that the low eligibility rates are a national, not just a DOD, concern. If confirmed, I will work to improve the recruiting pool. I believe the Department can improve the propensity for military service among today's youth by working to eliminate misperceptions, and reaffirming the value of military service through positive messaging and strategic engagements.

Question. Similarly, why do you believe that the propensity of youth to serve continues to drop and is at its lowest level (about 10 percent according to DOD data) in years?

Answer. My understanding is that the low propensity to serve is due in large part to the increasing disconnect between civilians and the military, misperceptions and lack of knowledge about military service, and the shrinking Veteran population. If confirmed, I will focus on shifting the views and perceived value of military service.

Question. Do you believe that non-native English speakers are disadvantaged in qualifying for military service by the current testing process?

Answer. The ability to communicate and understand the English language is critical for success in the military. I understand that the Military Services use recruiting programs directed at non-native English speakers, providing them with the highest potential for success. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Military Services to ensure the Department utilizes the most modern assessment tools that provide the broadest possible opportunity for today's youth.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address any such disadvantages to increase the pool of eligible and interested youth?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department utilizes modern marketing and advertising methods to reach a diverse and qualified pool of eligible applicants and that eligibility standards result in optimum fit between service demands and member capabilities.

Question. In your view, should existing medical and other qualification standards be reconsidered to accommodate youth willing to enlist for service in certain high-demand specialties, such as remotely piloted aircraft pilots or the cyber workforce?

Answer. I am not familiar with the specific qualification standards for military service but, if confirmed, I will work with the Military Services to ensure that qualification standards are appropriate, while still ensuring that Servicemembers can complete their required training and deploy worldwide on a moment's notice to fight and win our Nation's wars.

MILITARY ACCESSIONS VITAL TO NATIONAL INTEREST PROGRAM

Question. In your view, did the benefits of the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest Program (MAVNI)—recruiting and utilizing those with critical skills vital to the national interest—outweigh the costs to the Department associated with conducting security, suitability, and reliability screenings of applicants?

Answer. It is my understanding that the MAVNI program mostly provided the Military Services with critical language speakers and those with various medical specialties. I am also aware that legislation enacted in recent years greatly limits the use of such a program, but the Department recruits large numbers of Lawful Permanent Residents each year, greatly contributing to the diverse language capabilities of the Department.

Question. In your view, was the program effective in helping the Department to recruit for certain hard-to-fill specialties?

Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of the program to answer this, but understand that lawful permanent residents positively contribute to the Military Services and fill important positions that are challenging for the Military Services to fill.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend reactivating the MAVNI program and authorize the enlistment of new applicants? If so, conditions would you impose on program operations, particularly as regards applicant security, suitability, and reliability screening?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the history of the program and look for ways in which we can effectively fill critical but challenging-to-recruit vacancies within existing authorities. I am aware that legislation enacted in recent years greatly limits the use of such a program.

RESERVE COMPONENTS

Question. In your judgment, what has been the effect of increased operational tempo on Reserve component recruiting and retention?

Answer. I understand the members of our Reserve Components have responded admirably to the numerous missions they have supported around the world and here at home; however, I am unaware of the impact of those operational requirements on recruiting and retention. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Military Departments and Services to ensure the Department can recruit and retain an effective Reserve force.

Question. In your view, do the Reserve components serve as an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your answer, should the Reserve components be supported by increased training, improved equipment, and higher levels of overall resourcing for readiness?

Answer. In my view, the Reserve Component is no longer solely a strategic force and is increasingly relied on as part of the total operational force. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Departments and the Military Services to ensure the Reserve Component is appropriately and equitably resourced with the equipment, facilities, and training needed to meet total force requirements.

Question. In your view, what actions can be taken to improve permeability between the active and Reserve components?

Answer. In my view, providing a continuity of service option between the Active and Reserve Components improves recruiting and retention of talent. If confirmed, I will review the current policies to transition between the Active and Reserve Components to identify any shortfalls and successes, and work with the Military Departments and Services, as well as Congress, as appropriate, to improve permeability.

Question. In your view, are the current requirements for becoming a Joint Qualified Officer appropriate for Reserve component officers? If not, how should requirements be revised to better meet the needs of Reserve component officers?

Answer. It is my understanding that officer careers are closely managed to meet Military Department requirements. If confirmed, I will work to ensure joint qualification requirements for both active and Reserve component officers are reasonable and enhance an officer's professional abilities.

Question. In your view, is the current professional military education system appropriate for the Reserve components? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the State of the professional military education system for the Reserve Components to ensure that for any areas not appropriate for Servicemembers in the Reserve force, we work to make the necessary changes to the system. My review would also seek to ensure that there are processes that allow for the continuous improvement of professional military education system to meet the unique considerations of Servicemembers in the Reserve Component.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. If confirmed, what quality of life and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs would you consider to be a priority?

Answer. If I am confirmed, programs that enhance the well-being and resilience of Servicemembers and their families will be among my top priorities. I support critical programs such as spouse education and employment support; military family life counseling; MWR and resale programs; fitness; and quality child care. In my view, these programs enrich military family readiness, which is crucial to mission readiness.

Question. What metric would you apply in determining which MWR and quality of life programs should be sustained or enriched and which should be eliminated or reduced in scope as ineffective or outmoded?

Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the metrics and measures for essential MWR and quality of life programs. I will also review MWR programs and funding policies to ensure they are adequately funded and meet the needs of Servicemember and families. I believe these programs are an essential part of maintaining Total Force fitness, because they impact the readiness, recruitment, and retention of personnel and lead to increased physical and mental well-being.

MILITARY FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT

Question. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for servicemembers and their families?

Answer. My understanding is that spouse employment and child care are two of the most important family readiness issues for Servicemembers and their families. The lack of child care availability and spouse unemployment, or underemployment, can have significant negative impacts on the financial readiness of Servicemembers and their families. In addition, these readiness issues may also lead to retention problems, as they impact a family's satisfaction with military life. If confirmed, I will work to address these crucial issues.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that military families are provided with accessible, high-quality childcare, at an appropriate cost?

Answer. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure our military families have access to affordable, quality child care. Child care is a critical mission readiness issue and important to ensuring the economic viability of military families. I will work with Department leadership, as well as continuously seeking feedback from our military families, to determine where challenges exist and find ways to improve this mission critical service.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY, DOD SCHOOLS, AND DEPENDENT EDUCATION (DODEA)

Question. What is your assessment of the overall quality of DOD schools?

Answer. In my view, DODEA schools provide an excellent education that rivals the best public schools in the country. This should never change because military dependents deserve the best education the Department can provide.

Question. In your view, are DODEA's administrative overhead costs, meaning its funding and employment above the school level, comparable to those found in high quality public school districts in the United States?

Answer. It is my understanding that DODEA has been subject to Headquarters staffing reviews and reductions more than once. Although I do not presently have access to the analysis, I am aware that DODEA's overhead is now lower than that of comparable public school systems.

Question. Should the eligibility requirements for military dependents to attend DOD schools be modified in any way, in your opinion? If so, what modifications would you propose, if confirmed?

Answer. I do not currently know enough about DODEA eligibility requirements to offer an informed opinion on potential modifications. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to ensure that DODEA has the resources and authorities that may be needed in the future.

Question. What lasting impacts, if any, do you believe the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the way DOD schools are run and how DOD dependents who attend those schools learn?

Answer. I am aware that DODEA was able to quickly adapt its education program during the COVID-19 pandemic by incorporating remote learning nearly immediately. If confirmed, I will build on this momentum for using technology and adaptive curriculum to meet every student's needs and support success no matter where they are located.

Question. Do you believe that DODEA should further expand its capabilities to deliver online education in the future?

Answer. Yes. I am aware that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 directed DODEA to conduct a pilot program to expand access to its virtual school. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about DODEA's implementation of this pilot.

Question. How can these programs be improved?

Answer. I have not reviewed the performance goals and metrics for DODEA. I look forward to doing so if confirmed, after which I may have additional thoughts.

Question. What is your assessment of the preparedness of DOD schools to respond and react appropriately to active shooter emergencies?

Answer. The Department must ensure that all students and staff are ready for an active shooter incident. Training and procedural compliance will be key in preparing for such an event. If confirmed, I will ensure DODEA continues to monitor security threats and update response plans as needed.

Question. How do you assess current class sizes (student to teacher ratios) throughout DODEA schools, and do you recommend they be adjusted? If so, why?

Answer. I do not have enough information to make such an assessment at this time. I believe the Department must be a good custodian of taxpayer resources and it also has an obligation to invest deliberately and responsibly in the students it serves. I believe that means if a school system is to maintain high levels of student achievement, it must be well-resourced and have an appropriate number of teachers in each school. If confirmed, I will review the resource requirements of DODEA to ensure the Department meets these obligations.

Question. Are you confident that DODEA has in place the policies and processes to ensure that:

Allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment by a student in locations under the jurisdiction of DODEA are properly investigated?

Answer. I am aware that DODEA uses effective tracking and reporting processes which assist the organization to prevent and, when necessary to respond to unlawful discrimination throughout DODEA schools. If confirmed, I plan to continue to work to ensure that all such allegations of sexual assault or sexual harassment are appropriately addressed.

Question. Information documenting such misconduct, if substantiated, is recorded in the permanent record of the offending student and that any school to which that student subsequently transfers is made aware of that information, as appropriate?

Answer. Although I do not know the details, I am aware that DODEA requires the documentation of substantiated misconduct be included in a student's record. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review DODEA's process and make appropriate adjustments if necessary.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you direct to ensure that DODEA takes all appropriate actions to hold its teachers, other employees, and students ac-

countable for acts of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and unlawful discrimination?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the policies currently in place, making any needed adjustments to ensure sexual assault, sexual harassment, and unlawful discrimination, are not tolerated in DODEA. When allegations are made, they will be investigated and, if substantiated, the responsible individual(s) will be held appropriately accountable.

Question. In your view, should the quality and availability of local public education factor into Department and military service basing decisions?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will thoroughly examine how the quality and availability of local public education are considered in basing decisions. I will work with stakeholders to implement any needed actions required to ensure access to high quality education for military dependents.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that servicemembers with special needs family members relocate to new duty stations where services are available to address the special needs of members of that family?

Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly examine this important issue. Supporting all our Servicemembers and families is critical to the recruitment, readiness, and retention of the force. I will review policies and procedures to better understand the process in which Servicemembers with special needs family members are assigned to new duty stations and see where we can improve this process for special needs families.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those military families with special needs dependents so they are able to obtain the support they need?

Answer. I do not have enough information at this time to adequately comment on the current outreach efforts of the Department. However, if confirmed, I am committed to providing support to military families that have family members with special needs. This includes making sure all families know about the support services available to them. If confirmed, I will work to better understand how the Department is meeting the needs of these important members of our military community and in which areas we can improve.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

Question. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs in the constrained fiscal environment of the Department?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to protecting the funding support for both appropriated and nonappropriated funds that I believe are integral to the successful sustainment of MWR programs. I will review the impacts that the COVID-19 pandemic has had on MWR programs, and I will study the long-term fiscal challenges impacting the ability to deliver products and services efficiently and effectively to Servicemembers, retirees, and their families.

COMMISSARY AND MILITARY EXCHANGE SYSTEMS

Question. What is your view of the need for modernization of business policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems?

Answer. I fully support the modernization of commissary and exchange policies and business practices to ensure they are timely; relevant to the environment in which we operate; responsive to changes in that environment; and effective in meeting the needs for which they were developed. If confirmed, I will ensure the commissary and exchange systems are utilizing cutting-edge policies and practices, as the resale system is an important non-pay benefit contributing to the readiness of our military members and their families.

Question. What are the most promising avenues for change to achieve these modernization goals?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department recently completed an update of its Business Case Analysis involving the commissary and exchange systems. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the results and promoting even greater levels of collaboration and modernization in the commissary and exchange systems.

Question. What should the Department do to make the commissary system more self-sustaining?

Answer. The commissary system is an invaluable benefit to our Servicemembers and their families, which proved even more critical during the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I will assess and support efforts to better balance the delivery of the commissary benefit with funding sources in accordance with Department guidance.

Question. What is your view of proposals to consolidate, eliminate, or privatize commissaries and exchanges in certain areas where they are duplicative of services readily available at reasonable cost in the community?

Answer. It is my understanding that military members and their families consider the commissary and exchange benefits to be two of the most valuable benefits the Department provides. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the information on such proposals, so I can carefully consider any impacts or risks before commenting on any proposals regarding consolidation, elimination, or privatization.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE MATTERS

Question. How would you describe the current State of the Department's civilian workforce, including its morale and the Department's ability to successfully recruit and retain top talent?

Answer. I have not been in a position to become aware of the civilian workforce's morale, or the Department's ability to successfully recruit top talent. If I am confirmed, this will be an important focus of my portfolio and I will work closely with other DOD leaders to address it, as appropriate.

Question. In your judgment, what are the biggest challenges facing the DOD in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?

Answer. Although I am not aware of all the possible challenges facing the DOD in managing its civilian workforce, I expect that, like for many complex and technical organizations, the competition for highly skilled talent is a major undertaking. If confirmed, I will work closely with stakeholders across the Department to assess workforce challenges, and develop the strategies to address them where necessary.

Question. What is your view of both the favorable and adverse effects that borrowed military manpower can have on participating military personnel and on the performance of civilian functions?

Answer. I believe it is important for the Military Departments to have the flexibility they need to successfully execute their missions, and borrowed military manpower can be a part of that equation. My primary concern about this practice is the potential impact on operational readiness if it were relied upon too often to fill gaps. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Departments to ensure that their end strength is adequate to accomplish all assigned missions.

Question. Would there be any value to the Department, in your view, in eliminating the moratorium on the use of A-76 public/private competitions that has been in effect since 2009?

Answer. I am not yet familiar with the A-76 process or the reasoning behind the moratorium, but it is my understanding that the A-76 process itself is widely considered flawed by both the public and the private sectors. I believe it is important for the Department to have flexibility to meet its mission requirements in a manner that optimizes its resources. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts in the Department to understand the impact of the moratorium and gauge if there is a need to reconsider its usefulness.

Question. The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense to implement a probationary period of at least 2 years for new civilian employees. How does this requirement benefit the Department, in your view?

Answer. I do not currently have access to the details regarding the Department's implementation of this provision, or how it has benefited the Department. If confirmed, I will review current personnel policies to assess their effectiveness and propose changes where necessary.

Question. In your view, what role should the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs play in establishing the "return to work" policies for DOD civilians who have been operating in a "telework" environment for lengthy periods of time due to the COVID-19 pandemic?

Answer. With its responsibility for directing policies affecting the DOD workforce, I believe the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs should play a critical role in developing "return to work" and "telework" policies, while considering the input of DOD leaders and employees in shaping the right policies for the Department.

Question. In your view, what challenges will this "return to work" effort engender and how would you address each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Answer. While I am not currently aware of the challenges that might arise from a "return to work" effort, I will, if confirmed, work closely with DOD leaders and stakeholders to assess any challenges, and develop strategies to address them, as appropriate.

CYBER WORKFORCE

Question. What is your view of the appropriate mix between the uniformed cyber workforce and civilian employees?

Answer. I believe that there is no specific optimal “mix” of military and civilian personnel for the cyber workforce, and that any such mix should be based on the requirements, nature of the work, and cost factors that are unique to an organization and the mission it performs. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts in the Department to ensure that leaders in cyber and other functional workforces have the authorities and flexibilities needed to optimize the mix of military and civilian personnel to achieve success.

Question. In your view, how effective is the Cyber Excepted Service Workforce authority under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, in meeting the requirements for a highly qualified and competent cyber workforce?

Answer. I do not have enough information at this time to comment on the effectiveness of the Cyber Excepted Service, but I understand that the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) has a role in overseeing its implementation and evaluation. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the DOD CIO’s office to ensure the Department is meeting requirements for a highly qualified and competent cyber workforce.

Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate any gaps between cyber workforce capacity and capability?

Answer. To mitigate any cyber workforce capacity and capability gaps, if confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the Office of the DOD CIO to assess workforce data, identify staffing and competency requirements to meet current and future mission needs, and develop talent management strategies and policies to build workforce capacity and capability where identified gaps exist.

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active Duty military personnel (as compared to civilian employees) trained and working as scientists, engineers, software coders, and in other technical positions across the DOD research, development, and acquisition enterprise?

Answer. I believe it is critical to have Active Duty military personnel trained and working in STEM and other technical positions across the Department. Active Duty military personnel bring knowledge, skills, and perspectives to such efforts that their civilian counterparts may not possess. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts across the Department to ensure that the talents of our Active Duty and Reserve Component personnel are being harnessed appropriately in concert with their civilian counterparts.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the directors of national labs under the purview of DOD have the civilian workforce management tools they need to shape their science, technology, and engineering workforces?

Answer. I understand that DOD’s science, technology, and engineering workforce, including those in the DOD laboratories, are critical to the advancement of the Department’s research and development mission. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, as well as the Military Departments, to ensure all civilian workforce management tools and flexibilities are available to the Directors of DOD laboratories to the greatest extent possible for their use in attracting, retaining, and shaping their science, technology, and engineering workforces.

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. Given that competent and caring leadership is one of the most significant factors in shaping a high-performing DOD civilian workforce, if confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be most important to you in selecting candidates for appointment to the Senior Executive Service?

Answer. I believe that those selected for appointment to the Senior Executive Service must be innovative, capable of managing complex systems and organizations, and possess the ability to lead and develop a globally relevant workforce for the future. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department’s leadership models are focused on these core principles for shaping a high-performing civilian workforce.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that SES under your authority are held accountable for both organizational performance and the rigorous performance management of their subordinate employees?

Answer. If confirmed, I will communicate to the SES members under my authority clear and measurable performance expectations that include standards for both

organizational outcomes and effective leadership for achieving a high performing subordinate workforce.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. In your view, in what ways can DOD better train military personnel to be acquisition professionals?

Answer. I believe that a highly trained acquisition workforce is a key component of keeping the Department competitive and on the cutting edge in the 21st century. It is my understanding that this issue primarily falls under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, but if confirmed, I will work with my counterpart in that office to ensure that they have the personnel-related authorities and flexibilities they need to succeed in building the acquisition workforce.

Question. What role should the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs play in developing, executing, and overseeing such training, in your view?

Answer. It is my understanding that training military personnel, including acquisition professionals, falls primarily under the purview of the Military Services to organize, train, and equip. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts in the Services to ensure they have the authorities and flexibilities they need to be successful in continuing to build a world-class acquisition community.

Question. How can acquisition workforce management policies be modified to make leaders accountable for cost overruns on procurement contracts?

Answer. I understand that matters regarding cost overruns on procurement contracts fall under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in that office to assess the effectiveness of acquisition workforce management policies in holding leaders appropriately accountable.

Question. In your judgment, what factors should program offices consider in determining which tasks are best accomplished by civilian employees, military personnel, or support contractors?

Answer. I believe it is important for program offices to consider the nature of specific functions when applying statutory and regulatory criteria to determine the appropriate workforce mix. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts across the Department, and especially with leaders in the fields of Acquisition and Sustainment, to ensure that these considerations are fully integrated into the Department's workforce decisionmaking processes.

LABORATORY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND TEST RANGE STEM PERSONNEL

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the maximum use of personnel flexibilities provided by Congress to improve the quality of the Department of Defense's STEM workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, as well as the Military Departments, to provide awareness and training for supervisors and human resources staff on personnel flexibilities provided by Congress that are available for the improvement of the DOD STEM workforce.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that such personnel flexibilities can be employed at the lowest appropriate level?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues to encourage and develop policies that would allow for the delegation of flexibilities for use by managers and supervisors at the lowest appropriate level.

STEM EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY DEPENDENTS

Question. In your view, what role should the Military Departments play in supporting STEM educational opportunities for military children?

Answer. I understand that OSD and the other DOD Components, including the Military Departments, are invested in developing current and future STEM talent throughout DOD to meet its unique mission. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues across the Department to ensure and expand STEM opportunities for military children.

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Department of Defense research and development organizations to increase STEM educational opportunities for children of military personnel?

Answer. The exceptional scientists and engineers in the Department of Defense are the reason the United States of America is a world leader in science and technologies that are critical to our national security. I understand that the Department

is cultivating the future STEM workforce by providing unique education opportunities to students and educators of all ages and across all demographics throughout the country. If confirmed, I will support these efforts which are vitally important to maintaining our Nation's competitive advantage, ensuring we are prepared for the ever-changing global landscape.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN

PERSONNEL

1. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Fulton, the pacing threat from China is a constant reminder that we need a strong and All-Volunteer Force that is both physically fit, mentally adapt, technical in skill, and capable of critical reasoning. As a country, we spend a significant amount of money training and equipping our Forces to meet these challenges. However, that training and experience is worth significantly more money in the civilian sector than it is in the current military pay scale. As our Forces become more equipped with advanced technologies, how do we balance physical standards without inadvertently pushing away those with these critical skills?

Ms. FULTON. We know that smart, creative people will seek out and thrive in an environment that is challenging, inclusive, diverse, and led by leaders of character. We offer that; so we have to tell that story—and we have to deliver on that promise.

We also have to retain that talent. Where it makes sense, we should look at reviewing standards to ensure they align with the needs of the service; broadening opportunities; and increasing flexibility in our talent management systems. If confirmed, attracting and retaining talent will be a top priority for me.

2. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Fulton, General David Berger, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, spoke about promotion reform in his planning guidance. What are your thoughts on his views or how would you restructure promotion in order to better retain those who are lured into the civilian sector?

Ms. FULTON. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Military Departments to ensure that they have the authorities required to improve the overall retention of their highly trained professionals. If restructuring of any of the current promotion processes (within the Marine Corps or the other Services) is required to better retain personnel, I will work with the Services to examine ways to improve the processes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

ARMED FORCES READINESS

3. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, over several years this Committee has worked tirelessly to restore military readiness—across each of our Services—to levels that would enable our success in a conflict. We’ve had some success, but there is still a lot of work to do. If you have not done so already, I recommend that every senior defense leader read T.R. Fehrenbach’s “This Kind of War”, which provides a cautionary tale of our Nation’s failure to adequately fund and train our Armed Forces before the Korean War. The consequences were steep and American servicemembers paid with their lives. If confirmed, all of you—based on your positions—will invariably make decisions that directly or indirectly impact readiness. Accordingly, will you commit—if confirmed—to work with this Committee and within the Department on further bolstering military readiness to ensure the failures we endured in the Korean War never happen again?

Ms. FULTON. I read “This Kind of War” recently—a remarkable story with many important lessons. I can make that commitment.

STRATEGY DRIVEN BUDGET

4. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Secretaries of Defense (SECDEF), and the previous and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) have all stated the need for sustained 3–5 percent annual real growth to the defense budget to implement the NDS, increase readiness, and advance long-overdue modernization. Further emphasizing the need for consistent and increased funding, the NDS Commission report stated, “America is very near the point of strategic insolvency, where its ‘means’ are badly out of alignment with its ‘ends’.” This critical situation is negatively compounded by the Biden administration’s dismal defense topline that does not keep pace with inflation. With these facts in mind, and understanding your ability to influence the budget will be limited to future year submissions, will each of you commit to advocating for a strategy-driven budget vice a budget-driven strategy?

Ms. FULTON. Yes. If confirmed I commit to advocating that we are strategic in our funding decisions, in-line with SECDEF direction and Defense Planning Guidance.

MILITARY ACADEMY BOARD OF VISITORS

5. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, President Biden recently purged the military academy boards of all members appointed to their respective positions by the previous administration. To me, as a currently serving member on the United States Naval Academy (USNA) Board of Visitors, this is a very troubling precedent. Many of the forced resignations, or firings, imposed by President Biden targeted imminently qualified individuals to include General Jack Keane, USA (ret.) and LTG H.R. McMaster, USA (ret.). As I understand, President Obama appointed you to the West Point Board of Visitors and you served for a total of 8 years. I also understand that you completed your term under the Trump administration. Do you believe that

any service academy board appointed by a prior administration should be removed when a new administration comes in?

Ms. FULTON. I believe the Boards of Visitors provide great value to the Service Academies and was honored to serve on the U.S. Military Academy Board. Though I followed the events described through the news, I am not familiar with them in detail, nor relevant policies. I hesitate to agree or disagree with an absolute statement given my limited knowledge of this issue, especially in light of the President's broad discretion in making appointments. If confirmed, I would be happy to look into the issue further.

6. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that diverse perspectives and experiences are an asset for service academy board members?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

7. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, U.S. Army Alaska has experienced numerous suicides from 2016 through 2021, mostly at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. Army leadership has taken steps to improve the quality of life for soldiers in Alaska and to provide more mental health resources, but suicides continue. If confirmed, will you commit to making suicide prevention a top priority for your office, especially in remote locations like Fort Wainwright?

Ms. FULTON. Suicide is a tragedy, and the Department as a whole must make every effort to prevent these losses. If confirmed, I will support all activities across the Department and coordinate with my colleagues at the Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) and Health Affairs (HA) for their roles in this area. Further, I would also ensure that offices within Manpower & Reserve Affairs that can support policy or programmatic suicide prevention efforts led by DSPO or HA do so whenever appropriate. I recognize the importance of this issue and ensuring we get it right, particularly at locations that are more remote such as Fort Wainwright.

8. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, what ideas do you have to decrease the number of suicides in Alaska and across the all the services?

Ms. FULTON. I believe strengthening relationships with stakeholders and continuing collaboration efforts in this area are essential to implementing policies and programs that address problems that contribute to suicide. Suicide is often the result of several factors. If confirmed, I would support efforts that align with evidence-informed best practices to prevent suicides across the military.

"GOP IS RACIST"

9. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, on January 12, 2018, you stated on Twitter, "Let's be real. When one of our two national political parties is unable to call out racism, our system is broken. It's not a political statement to say the GOP is racist; it's a moral statement, and one backs up by an increasing mountain of evidence #FixThis." Please detail for me the context and reasoning behind this statement. If it was specific to an individual, please name that individual and explain why you chose not to specifically identify them.

Ms. FULTON. I apologize to the entire committee for that tweet. I intended to say that racism is neither Democratic nor Republican, not political but moral; and the party should make a statement because a whole group of people should never be tarnished by the actions of one. But I went about it all wrong—my words were muddled and confused. And the idea that people I love and respect—especially those who are Republicans, especially those I have worked with on important military issues—were hurt by my words, is devastating to me. Throughout my career I've worked in a bipartisan and nonpartisan way to make our military stronger, smarter, and better. I know that when we talk about race, we have to do it in a way that opens and expands the conversation rather than shutting it down, and in this case, I failed miserably, and I'm deeply sorry.

10. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service Committee on October 7, 2021?

Ms. FULTON. I apologized for this tweet in several of my meetings with Senate Armed Service Committee members and staff prior to the meeting.

"STEAL OUR ELECTION"

11. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, on December 9, 2016, you stated on Twitter, "I've said this before. I can't believe we let a hostile foreign power steal our election

without national outrage.” Please detail for me the context and reasoning behind this statement.

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the specific context and reasoning behind this tweet, but may be reacting to documented evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election.

12. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service Committee on October 7, 2021?

Ms. FULTON. No.

“#USMC WOMEN”

13. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, on December 19, 2016, you stated on Twitter, “So tired of #USMC women fighting to keep combat ban b/c they want so badly for the male marines to love them. #CoOpted#StockholdSyndrome.” Please detail for me the context and reasoning behind this statement. If it was specific to an individual, please name that individual.

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall specifically my reasoning behind this tweet, but I applaud the progress the Marine Corps has made on including women and would be happy to work with the Marine Corps to continue that progress if confirmed.

14. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service Committee on October 7, 2021?

Ms. FULTON. No.

“#HOBBYLOBBY”

15. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, on June 30, 2014, you stated on Twitter, “One again, ‘religious freedom’ twisted to mean conservative Christians can dictate their beliefs to the rest of us. #HobbyLobby #repealRFRA.” Please detail for me the context and reasoning behind this statement.

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context or my reasoning behind this tweet, though I apologize if I spoke in overly broad terms that ascribed to a larger group the actions of a few of its members. Americans are lucky to have freedom to openly practice their religious beliefs, and as a Christian I treasure that freedom. If confirmed, I would respect and protect servicemembers’, including chaplains, and civilians’ religious freedom in accordance with applicable law and policy.

16. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement outlined above, do you still believe the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) should be repealed?

Ms. FULTON. No.

17. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the same statement outlined above, did you at any point clarify, retract, or apologize for this comment prior to appearing before the Senate Armed Service Committee on October 7, 2021?

Ms. FULTON. No.

LEADER OF CHARACTER

18. Senator SULLIVAN. Ms. Fulton, with regard to the statements/tweets outlined above, do you believe these comments reflect a leader of character who values inclusivity and diversity of thought?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that leaders of character who value diversity can have many diverse personal opinions. I strive to be a leader of character every day, and my record reflects that I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

MILITARY FITNESS STANDARDS

19. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that gender-neutral military physical fitness standards benefit our force and quantifiably increase the lethality of our military?

Ms. FULTON. Yes. Gender-neutral baseline military physical fitness standards benefit our force and increase the lethality of our military as job-specific standards for Servicemembers irrespective of gender.

20. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Fulton, what impact do you assess non-binary standards implemented across DOD would have on female recruitment, retention, and promotion?

Ms. FULTON. It is currently unknown how non-binary standards will impact female recruitment, retention, and promotion. As the role of female Servicemembers in the military has expanded and restrictions on female Servicemembers serving on active duty, including in combat, have been eliminated, DOD efforts in recruiting and retaining women are important in order to reflect the Nation's population and ensure strong military leadership.

CHRISTIANS

21. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Fulton, per this quote you gave the Windy City Times—"The U.S. has a powerful right-wing, anti-gay, anti-abortion lobby that purports to represent Christians . . . These "radicals"—I can't bring myself to call them Christians, since their language and actions hold no resemblance to the Jesus I know from the Bible."—if confirmed, how would you treat these so-called "radicals" within your organization?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that leaders of character who value diversity can have many diverse personal opinions. I strive to be a leader of character every day, and my record reflects that I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

22. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Fulton, should Christians within the Office of Manpower & Reserve Affairs be concerned about how your predispositions will impact their ability to continue working in public service?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that leaders of character who value diversity can have many diverse personal opinions. I strive to be a leader of character every day, and my record reflects that I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

23. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Fulton, in light of your "repeal RFRA" tweet in 2014, a reference to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, please articulate why you should be entrusted with the responsibility to oversee the implementation of religious accommodation in the military services.

Ms. FULTON. Americans are lucky to have freedom to openly practice their religious beliefs, and as a Christian I treasure that freedom. If confirmed, I would respect and protect servicemembers', including chaplains, and civilians' religious freedom and accommodations in accordance with applicable law and policy.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

CONCERNING STATEMENTS AND RELATED MATTERS

24. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on January 12, 2018, an account in your name posted "It's not a political statement to say the GOP is racist; it's a moral statement, and one back up by an increasing mountain of evidence." Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

25. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I believe this happened around the time that the President made a comment about "s—hole nations."

26. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I apologize to the entire committee for that tweet. I intended to say that racism is neither Democratic nor Republican, not political but moral; and the party should make a statement because a whole group of people should never be tarnished by the actions of one. But I went about it all wrong—my words were muddled and confused. And the idea that people I love and respect—especially those who are Republicans, especially those I have worked with on important military issues—were hurt by my words, is devastating to me. Throughout my career I've worked in a bipartisan and nonpartisan way to make our military stronger, smarter, and better. I know that when we talk about race, we have to do it in a way that opens

and expands the conversation rather than shutting it down, and in this case, I failed miserably, and I'm deeply sorry.

27. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who may identify as members of the GOP?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

28. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, is it your view today that "the GOP is racist"?
Ms. FULTON. No.

29. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you formally apologized to anyone for this tweet or otherwise expressed remorse? Please provide appropriate citations.

Ms. FULTON. Yes. I apologized several times in meetings with SASC staff and members prior to my hearing; and several times during the hearing.

30. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and, though I apologize for the tweet, believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than adequately clarify my feelings about it.

31. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what "evidence" did you have in mind when you posted your tweet?

Ms. FULTON. I intended to say that racism is neither Democratic nor Republican, not political but moral; and the party should make a statement because a whole group of people should never be tarnished by the actions of one. But my words were muddled and confused, and for that I apologize.

32. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on January 21, 2018, an account in your name posted, "Let's be clear: minority and women servicemembers were ordered to stand behind Pence as a backdrop for his political speech. Unethical and unacceptable." Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I did not write this.

33. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this tweet.

34. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, at the time, did you have any specific evidence to support this claim?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall any specific evidence.

35. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, at the time, was this post informed by racial or sexual stereotypes about the political preference of servicemembers?

Ms. FULTON. No.

36. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you decline to associate with individuals that you know or have reason to believe may be conservative or supportive of Vice President Pence?

Ms. FULTON. No.

37. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

38. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on January 2017, an account in your name posted, "Funniest overheard at #WomensMarch: 'I see a lot of women I'm looking forward to meeting in Pence's mandated conversion camps.'" Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

39. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I was at the Washington Women's March, and I found many of the signs funny. This one was a crude reference to the many lesbians at the March and Vice President Pence's support for conversion therapy while he was Governor of Indiana.

40. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I found the sign humorous.

41. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, why did you find this funny?

Ms. FULTON. It contained a crude reference to the many lesbians at the March and Vice President Pence's support for conversion therapy while he was Governor of Indiana.

42. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you have any friends or colleagues who hold traditional views on marriage?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

43. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who may hold traditional views on marriage?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, and in line with my own Christian beliefs, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

44. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

45. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on August 29, 2017, an account in your name posted, "The vast majority of white evangelical leaders are utterly unmoored from the gospel of Jesus Christ. Matthew 23 applies." Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. Yes, I believe that I did.

46. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this quote.

47. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall what I meant by this. At this point in time, I would say I was very wrong to say "vast majority." I do not believe a whole group of people should ever be tarnished by the actions of one or a few.

48. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what were you implying by citing Matthew 23?

Ms. FULTON. I don't recall, but I have always believed in this verse that leaders should not demand many sacrifices from others, but few from themselves.

49. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who are white and/or evangelical?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, and in line with my own Christian beliefs, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

50. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

51. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on May 19, 2017, an account in your name posted, "Pence has repeatedly lied to cover up the Trump regime misdeeds. He's not clean in this." Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I did not write this.

52. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this post.

53. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this post.

54. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that this post makes you appear to be partisan?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that it makes me appear to have personal political opinions.

55. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who support Vice President Pence?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, and in line with my own Christian beliefs, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

56. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

57. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on December 9, 2016, an account in your name posted “I’ve said this before. I can’t believe we let a hostile foreign power steal our election without national outrage.” What was the context for this post? Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election.

58. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election.

59. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this? Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election.

60. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that President Trump was legitimately elected President in 2016?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

61. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

62. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on March 20, 2017, an account in your name posted “GOP focus on leaks highlights their terror that we’ll get details of Trump campaign colluding with Russia to win an election. Patriotism??” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

63. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election, and interaction between the campaign and Russian leaders.

64. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall specifically the context behind this tweet, but there was significant documented evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 election, and interaction between the campaign and Russian leaders.

65. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who support President Trump?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

66. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

67. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on December 19, 2016, an account in your name posted “So tired of #USMC women fighting to keep combat ban b/c they want so badly for the male marines to love them. #CoOpted #StockholmSyndrome.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I did not write this.

68. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I believe I wrote this post in reference to discussions about whether the Marine Corps would lift the combat exclusion for female servicemembers.

69. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall specifically my reasoning behind this tweet, but I applaud the progress the Marine Corps has made on including women and would be happy to work with the Marine Corps to continue that progress if confirmed.

70. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, why did you think it was appropriate to silence or minimize the voice of female armed servicemembers?

Ms. FULTON. That was not my intent, and it is not appropriate to silence the voices of servicemembers.

71. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you support the ability of women to express their views on matters of public policy, even if they differ from your own?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

72. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what steps would you take to make sure that women felt free to express their opinions where they conflict with your own, without fear of being silenced or intimidated?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately.

73. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who advocated for the policy targeted in your tweet?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately, even those I disagree with, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.

74. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

75. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on December 14, 2017, an account in your name posted “Worth discussing whether the military’s slow-to-change culture, however frustrating, might be a virtue in highly polarized political environment.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write this.

76. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I don’t recall the context.

77. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that I meant, as I have always believed, that the military’s deliberate, careful culture helps it to avoid politicization.

78. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that we are currently living in a highly polarized political environment?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

79. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, why did you subsequently write, on the same day, “And I’m gonna regret saying that”?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall.

80. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on June 26, 2019, an account in your name posted a photograph captioned with “this look from some white dude.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I did not write this.

81. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know.

82. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know.

83. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, why did you think it was appropriate to identify the photographed individual by his race?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall my intention behind this tweet or words chosen.

84. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe it is ever appropriate to judge an individual on the color of his skin, rather than the content of his character?

Ms. FULTON. No.

85. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you regret reducing the photographed individual to his race and sex?

Ms. FULTON. I do not believe that by referencing the individual in that way that I “reduced” him.

86. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

87. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on June 27, 2017, an account in your name posted “The only way to understand today’s GOP is that their core principle is hatred of Obama, Hillary, and Democrats. Nothing else matters.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write that.

88. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this tweet.

89. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall what I meant by this, but it is reductive and unfair, and I apologize.

90. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you stand by this characterization?

Ms. FULTON. No. This statement is reductive and does not reflect the complexity and nuance of the issue.

91. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe there is any merit to the principle that America should be governed according to the principle of limited government?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

92. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe there is any merit to the principle that some may want to elect a president who will appoint textualist and originalist judges to the Federal judiciary?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

93. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you knowingly decline to associate with co-workers or neighbors that you believe or suspect to be members of a different political party than yourself?

Ms. FULTON. No.

94. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you say to the many members of our armed services that you will be supervising who identify as members of the GOP?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately, even those I disagree with, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.

95. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

96. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on May 2, 2017, an account in your name posted “In any case, most Repubs still shamefully quiet-on lies, corruption, incompetence, treason. They’ve betrayed their oath to the Constitution.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write this.

97. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this tweet.

98. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall what I meant by this tweet.

99. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, you reference “most Repubs”. Please identify by name all the Republicans that you believed “betrayed their oath the Constitution” or committed “treason”.

Ms. FULTON. Since I cannot recall the intent behind this tweet, I am unable to name individuals who I was describing, but regret my overly broad language.

100. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, please provide the evidence you had at the time that these individuals committed treason.

Ms. FULTON. Since I cannot recall the intent behind this tweet, I am unable to provide evidence, if any existed, to substantiate it.

101. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you stand by your characterization that Members of Congress have committed treason?

Ms. FULTON. No. I do not believe, nor did I intend to State, that Members of Congress committed treason.

102. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you intend on accusing members of the armed services of committing “treason”?

Ms. FULTON. If confirmed, I would not have a law enforcement or legal role that would routinely involve assessments of criminal conduct and related charging decisions. However, if I discover evidence of treasonous acts committed by individuals in the Department of Defense, I will handle them in accordance with relevant law and policy.

103. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what is the standard you will use to determine whether someone in the Department has committed treason?

Ms. FULTON. If confirmed, I would not have a law enforcement or legal role that would routinely involve assessments of criminal conduct and related charging decisions. However, if I discover evidence of treasonous acts committed by individuals in the Department of Defense, I will handle them in accordance with relevant law and policy.

104. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on February 9, 2016, an account in your name posted “Calling the President a traitor is extremist. Rubio & other ‘mainstream’ GOP candidates are no better than the rest.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

105. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall what I could have meant by this. The tweet doesn’t seem to make sense.

106. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe Senator Rubio is a political extremist?

Ms. FULTON. No.

107. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that Senator Rubio’s Republican colleagues are political extremists?

Ms. FULTON. No.

108. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized to Senator Rubio and his colleagues for this tweet or otherwise expressed remorse? If so, please provide appropriate citations.

Ms. FULTON. No.

109. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why not?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

110. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on March 20, 2014, an account in your name posted “Bound to happen: right-wing anti-everyone nutjobs falling in love with a dictatorship. #FoxLovesPutin #madefor each other.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

111. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this post?

Ms. FULTON. I don’t recall the context of this post.

112. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that I might have meant that Fox News support for Vladimir Putin meant that there were some extremists who watch Fox News who also admired him.

113. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, did you believe conservative or Republican Americans support dictatorship?

Ms. FULTON. No.

114. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if so, do you still believe conservative or Republican Americans support dictatorship?

Ms. FULTON. No.

115. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, did you believe that Fox News Channel is an agent of the Government of the Russian Federation?

Ms. FULTON. No.

116. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if so, do you still believe Fox News Channel is an agent of the Government of the Russian Federation?

Ms. FULTON. No.

117. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized for this tweet or otherwise expressed remorse? If so, please provide appropriate citations.

Ms. FULTON. No.

118. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you removed this post? If not, why not?

Ms. FULTON. No. I believe the Committee deserves transparency and believe that removing it would have only made it harder for the Committee to find it, rather than remove it from existence.

119. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, in a 2011 interview, you stated to a reporter, “The United States has a powerful right-wing anti-gay, anti-abortion lobby that purports to represent Christians . . . These radicals—I can’t bring myself to call them Christians since their language and actions hold no resemblance to the Jesus I know from the Bible—have succeeded in gaining essential veto power over any political action. They demonize their political opponents, then cry ‘discrimination! bigotry!’ when they incur the slightest criticism.” What was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context.

120. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I believe I was characterizing political engagement by certain individuals, but apologize for doing so in a way that was callous and overly broad.

121. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in other statements?

Ms. FULTON. Not that I am aware of.

122. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe Christians are at liberty to engage in political activity?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

123. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anyone can arbitrate who and who does not identify as Christian?

Ms. FULTON. No.

124. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anti-Christian discrimination violates constitutionally provided freedom of religion?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

125. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized for these statements or otherwise expressed remorse? If so, please provide appropriate citations.

Ms. FULTON. I believe I discussed these statements during my confirmation hearing.

126. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, in a 2017 interview, you stated to a reporter, “What people fail to understand is that chaplains give up some of their rights as ministers when become military chaplains . . . if your responsibility is to God and

not the Army, you need to get out of the Army.” What was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I believe the context of this statement was that some chaplains at the time refused to abide by their responsibilities as Army officers.

127. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do military chaplains surrender any rights as ministers? If yes, please specify which and provide appropriate citations.

Ms. FULTON. Yes, unlike civilian ministers who have no obligations to those not of their faith, military chaplains must provide support to all servicemembers who come to them, or find someone who can.

128. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, should soldiers whose first responsibility is to God “get out of the Army”?

Ms. FULTON. No. However, all soldiers must follow lawful orders and comply with Army regulations as required, regardless of their religious beliefs.

129. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on November 14, 2017, an account in your name posted “These are not Christian pastors. They are members of an anti-abortion, anti-LGBT, anti-women’s-equality cult that claims speak for actual followers of Jesus.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I did not write this.

130. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know the context, or to whom I was referring. This appears to be a reply or a “quote-tweet” and I do not know what the original tweet was.

131. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know.

132. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in other statements?

Ms. FULTON. Without knowing who this refers to, I cannot say.

133. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, who are “actual followers of Jesus”?

Ms. FULTON. My reference is to those who try to abide by the teachings of Jesus.

134. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anyone can arbitrate who and who does not identify as Christian?

Ms. FULTON. No.

135. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on March 2, 2016, an account in your name posted “This is a stunning essay. I wish every Christian who ‘opposes abortion’ would read this and understand the reality.” What was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know the context. This appears to be a reply or a “quote-tweet” and I do not know what the article was.

136. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know, but I probably felt that it reflected compassion for women in crisis pregnancies.

137. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in other statements?

Ms. FULTON. I have expressed my personal views that women in crisis pregnancies should be treated with compassion, and the government should not make their decisions for them.

138. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, why did you place the words “opposes abortion” in quotation marks?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall.

139. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do Christians who oppose abortion fail to “understand the reality”?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that there are differences of opinion on what women with crisis pregnancies experience.

140. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on June 30, 2014, an account in your name posted “Once again, ‘religious freedom,’ twisted to mean conservative Christians can

dictate their beliefs to the rest of the us. #HobbyLobby #repealRFRA” What was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall exactly, but it likely relates to the Hobby Lobby decision.

141. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was your view of the Hobby Lobby case?

Ms. FULTON. My personal opinion is that birth control is essential health care for women, and should be covered in health care insurance.

142. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was your view of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?

Ms. FULTON. I recall that I objected to its application in ways that restricted access to health care.

143. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what does religious freedom mean, and should it protect conservative Christians?

Ms. FULTON. Religious freedom means the right to practice your religion without interference from the government. It should protect everyone, while being appropriately balanced with the rights of others.

144. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on June 26, 2015, an account in your name posted “Anti-gay ‘Christians’ weeping because they lost . . . nothing. But people they hate gained something precious. And that’s enough.#NotMyGod.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

145. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context of this tweet.

146. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I do not recall.

147. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on September 4, 2017, an account in your name posted “4/ If getting a Supreme Court judge who’d outlaw abortion makes all this ‘worth it’ to you, your religion has nothing to do with Jesus.” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write this.

148. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. It appears to be part of a lengthier series of tweets, but I do not know what the other tweets are.

149. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I suspect that “all this” refers to other things that I believed were not in keeping with Christian values, but I am not sure.

150. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you expressed these views in other statements?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know without knowing the context of the other tweets.

151. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe anyone can arbitrate who and who does not identify as Christian?

Ms. FULTON. No.

152. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on August 5, 2015, an account in your name posted “Kasich: ‘God wants America to succeed , [sic] and He wants America to lead.’ This is so un-Biblical I don’t know where to start. #GOPDebate” Did you write this?

Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.

153. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?

Ms. FULTON. I believe this was during one of the Republican Presidential debates.

154. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?

Ms. FULTON. I don’t specifically recall.

155. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on July 13, 2016, an account in your name posted “For our Armed Forces, ‘we choose the best. The best—not the best of 1 gender, religion, race, or orientation—just the best.’ @stenyhoyer” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I did not write this.

156. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. I do not recall the context.

157. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I believe that it indicates that we should seek out the best talent regardless of gender, religion, race, or orientation.

158. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever treated a colleague differently on the basis of gender, religion, race, or sexual orientation?
Ms. FULTON. No.

159. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the Armed Forces should “choose the best,” independent of gender, religion, race, or sexual orientation?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.

160. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on December 15, 2017, an account in your name posted “Every time someone claims ‘the best person for the job’ to excuse their bias for white males and against diverse candidates, remind them of the data.” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write this.

161. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. I don’t recall specifically, but I have experienced colleagues saying someone is “the best person for the job” when they really weren’t, but they were hesitant to hire a woman or person of color.

162. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I don’t recall specifically, but I have experienced colleagues saying someone is “the best person for the job” when they really weren’t, but they were hesitant to hire a woman or person of color.

163. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the armed services should commission and promote the best people for the job?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.

164. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the armed services should commission and promote leaders on the basis of gender, religion, race, or sexual orientation?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.

165. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on September 17, 2017, an account in your name posted “I’ve said it before—we’d all be better off if black queer women ran the world.” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write this.

166. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. I am confident this was said in jest.

167. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I don’t recall, but I am confident it was said in jest.

168. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, would the Department of Defense be better off if “black queer women” ran it?
Ms. FULTON. Not necessarily. This was not a serious statement.

169. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on April 18, 2013, an account in your name posted “@marcorubio @SenatorTimScott This Army vet says shame on your for your gutless vote against background checks #LACKOFLEADERSHIP” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe that I didn’t write this.

170. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. I believe this was about a vote for background checks on guns.

171. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I personally strongly favor background checks for gun purchases.
172. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, is it still your view that Senators Rubio and Tim Scott are gutless?
Ms. FULTON. No, I intended to characterize their actions, not them as people.
173. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that Second Amendment advocates cannot be leaders?
Ms. FULTON. No.
174. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on August 6, 2015, an account in your name posted “I feel bad for Marco Rubio’s stuttering problem. Can someone get him some water? #noShame #GOPDebate” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.
175. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. I believe this was probably regarding Senator Rubio’s State of the Union response.
176. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I don’t recall, but I am confident this was said in jest.
177. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe disability-based harassment is acceptable conduct?
Ms. FULTON. No.
178. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you apologized to Senator Rubio?
Ms. FULTON. No.
179. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on October 28, 2015, an account in your name posted “Jeb, when Kasich out-charisma’s you , [sic] it’s time to quit the race. #RubiosBitch #CNBCGOPDebate” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. I have no reason to believe I didn’t write this.
180. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. I believe this was in the context of a Republican Presidential debate.
181. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I’m confident this comment was made in jest.
182. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe gender-based harassment is acceptable conduct?
Ms. FULTON. No.
183. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe someone who has committed gender-based harassment is qualified to manage military personnel policy?
Ms. FULTON. No.
184. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever committed gender-based harassment against a colleague or employee?
Ms. FULTON. No.
185. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on October 25, 2017, an account in your name posted “The Nation slowly and uncomfortably realizing that John Kelly may be as dishonest, sexist, and racist as the rest of the Trump admin.” Did you write this?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.
186. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what was the context for this statement?
Ms. FULTON. This was in the context of former General John Kelly making negative statements about Congresswoman Frederica Wilson in Florida that turned out to be false.
187. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what did you mean by this?
Ms. FULTON. I believe I meant that former General Kelly’s attacks on the Congresswoman were unfair.

188. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe the members of the Trump administration were dishonest, sexist, and racist?

Ms. FULTON. I do not believe that a whole group of people should ever be tarnished by the actions of one or a few.

189. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe supporters of the Trump administration supported dishonestly, sexism, and racism?

Ms. FULTON. I do not believe that a whole group of people should ever be tarnished by the actions of one or a few.

190. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, are you familiar with critical race theory?

Ms. FULTON. Not really. I have heard many definitions, but I have never studied it.

191. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you consider yourself a proponent of critical race theory?

Ms. FULTON. No.

192. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever expressed support or advocated for critical race theory? Please provide a list with appropriate citations.

Ms. FULTON. No.

193. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever published statements expressing support or advocating for critical race theory? Please provide all such records.

Ms. FULTON. No.

194. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that you will not support or advocate for inserting critical race theory into any departmental policy?

Ms. FULTON. I have heard many definitions for critical race theory, but I have never studied it. However, I feel strongly that our training should support building strong teams and cohesive units, based on the core values of integrity and respect. If confirmed, I will abide by all relevant laws and regulations regarding critical race theory.

195. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that you will not support or advocate for requiring any employee to attend training sessions that include critical race theory?

Ms. FULTON. I have heard many definitions for critical race theory, but I have never studied it. However, I feel strongly that our training should support building strong teams and cohesive units, based on the core values of integrity and respect. If confirmed, I will abide by all relevant laws and regulations regarding critical race theory.

196. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, when, in your view, is it ever appropriate to consider a Federal employee's race?

Ms. FULTON. If this question asks about hiring the best individuals for the job, as with previous questions, the answer is no. However, there are cases where under law and policy, employees' race should or must be considered, such as in evaluating a discrimination complaint, collecting statistical data, or administering medical care.

197. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you agree or disagree with the statement that "the United States of America is the least racist country in the history of the world"? If not, please explain.

Ms. FULTON. The United States of America is not fundamentally racist. I do not have the scholarly background to assess the United States against every country in the world.

198. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, in your view, has any country in the history of the world done more to eradicate slavery and promote liberty across the world than the United States? If so, please identify such a country.

Ms. FULTON. The United States of America has been instrumental in eradicating slavery and promoting liberty around the world. I do not have the scholarly background to assess the United States against every country in the world.

199. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, yes or no, do you believe that America is systematically racist?

Ms. FULTON. No.

200. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, are you proud to be an American?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.

201. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, are you familiar with the term “birthing people”?
Ms. FULTON. No.

202. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever used the term “birthing people”? If so, please list and identify the context for each.
Ms. FULTON. No.

203. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you agree that women but not men may become pregnant? If not, please explain.
Ms. FULTON. Transgender men may become pregnant.

204. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever expressed any views on the inclusion of transgender individuals in U.S. military? If so, please provide copies.
Ms. FULTON. I strongly supported the Obama administration and the Biden administration in allowing transgender people to serve. I co-authored a document on implementing legal transgender service, which I will provide.

205. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what, in your view, is the importance of the separation of powers?
Ms. FULTON. Though I am not a constitutional scholar, I believe it is crucial that the three branches of our government check and balance each other.

206. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what role does Congress have in exercising control over diplomatic and military policy of the United States?
Ms. FULTON. Though I am not a constitutional scholar, I believe that Congress has significant powers to authorize policies and programs, fund them, advise and consent on nominees, ratify treaties, authorize the use of armed force, and perform oversight, among others.

207. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what historical examples inform your responses to the previous question?
Ms. FULTON. I cannot cite specific examples that inform my response, but have likely learned about Congress exercising most or all of these powers through academic study or in the news.

208. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to providing Congress timely access to information and testimony?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.

209. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to notifying the Senate Armed Services Committee immediately if you witness or have reason to believe a servicemember’s religious liberty has been violated?
Ms. FULTON. I commit to following all relevant laws and policies regarding violations of servicemembers’ religious liberty.

210. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to notifying the Senate Armed Services Committee immediately if you witness or have reason to believe that critical race theory is being espoused in the U.S. military?
Ms. FULTON. I commit to following all relevant laws and policies regarding espousal of critical race theory.

211. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that an unborn child is a human being?
Ms. FULTON. I support women’s right to terminate their pregnancies in a safe, timely manner based on their own individual beliefs and needs.

212. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you respect the opinion of your fellow citizens and servicemembers who believe that life begins at conception?
Ms. FULTON. Yes.

213. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what evidence can you point from your past that you will respect your fellow citizens and fellow servicemembers who hold the belief that life begins at conception?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.

214. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe it is appropriate for Federal taxpayer dollars to be used to fund or facilitate abortions?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

215. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, please describe, in your own words, the importance of religious tolerance in the military.

Ms. FULTON. All military servicemembers have a right to their own religious beliefs, without being discriminated against or singled out because of those beliefs. As long as those beliefs do not prevent the servicemember from obeying lawful orders and following military regulations as required, it is critical that all servicemembers feel that their religious beliefs are acceptable and that they are respected.

216. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what experience can you cite to support your claim that you will be tolerant of servicemembers' religious beliefs?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.

217. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that radical Islamic terrorists present the greatest counter-terrorism threat today? If not, please identify what you believe is a greater threat and why.

Ms. FULTON. I am not a terrorism expert, but U.S. law enforcement agencies have identified domestic violent extremists as the greatest threat currently.

218. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that individuals have implicit bias?

Ms. FULTON. I believe that some people have biases of which they are not conscious.

219. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever taken a test that measures an individual's implicit biases? If so, what were the results?

Ms. FULTON. No.

220. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, against what individuals or groups do you have an implicit bias?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know.

221. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what steps do you take to ensure that you do not act on an implicit bias?

Ms. FULTON. As my record reflects, I treat all those with whom I work positively, fairly, and compassionately, regardless of their own opinions or beliefs.

222. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what, in your view, is more important, the military's preparedness or promoting diversity and inclusion initiatives?

Ms. FULTON. Military preparedness is primary; however, if we fail to develop a diverse and inclusive force, our readiness will suffer.

223. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that the Department's focus on diversity and inclusion compromised the military's ability to execute its missions in Afghanistan?

Ms. FULTON. No.

224. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the military's mission is always placed above the promotion of woke initiatives?

Ms. FULTON. Military preparedness is primary; however, if we fail to develop a diverse and inclusive force, our readiness will suffer. We must develop strong teams and cohesive units that share the core military values of integrity and respect in order to accomplish the mission. My No. 1 priority if confirmed will always be a smarter, stronger, more effective force.

225. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what role will diversity and equity play in your job?

Ms. FULTON. A diverse, inclusive, fair environment makes the force stronger, smarter, and more effective. Diverse teams are better problem-solvers. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and retains the best people.

226. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what initiatives on diversity and equity do you plan to promote?

Ms. FULTON. A diverse, inclusive, fair environment makes the force stronger, smarter, and more effective. Diverse teams are better problem-solvers. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and retains the best people. If confirmed, I would want to consult with Department experts before proposing any specific initiatives, but I would ensure they promote the above-discussed values.

227. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what initiatives, policies, or guidance do you plan to revoke or reconsider?

Ms. FULTON. A diverse, inclusive, fair environment makes the force stronger, smarter, and more effective. Diverse teams are better problem-solvers. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and retains the best people. If confirmed, I would want to consult with Department experts before proposing any specific revocations or reconsiderations, but I would ensure they advance the above-discussed values.

228. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, in your view, what are the three greatest global terrorist threats in the world and why you identified these?

Ms. FULTON. I do not feel qualified to make this assessment based on my experience and, if confirmed, would defer to experts in the Department to make these assessments.

229. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you now or have you ever downloaded TikTok onto your personal or work devices?

Ms. FULTON. I downloaded TikTok to my personal device a year or so ago.

230. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you believe is the most probable origin of the COVID-19 virus?

Ms. FULTON. I do not know.

231. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, on what evidence do you base your belief?

Ms. FULTON. I have not paid a lot of attention to the origin of the virus.

232. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever shamed or publicly accosted an individual for not wearing a mask?

Ms. FULTON. I have never shamed or accosted anyone for not wearing a mask, but as the Chief Administrator of the Motor Vehicle Commission, I have asked employees to wear a mask inside State buildings as required.

233. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, how often have you done so?

Ms. FULTON. I have never shamed or accosted anyone for not wearing a mask.

234. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what were the circumstances of each of these incidents?

Ms. FULTON. I have never shamed or accosted anyone for not wearing a mask.

235. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that Americans should be vaccinated against their will?

Ms. FULTON. No.

236. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that servicemembers should be vaccinated against COVID-19 if they have sincerely held religious objection to receiving the vaccine?

Ms. FULTON. Administering COVID vaccinations is a national security imperative that will increase the readiness of our forces. If confirmed, I would implement vaccination requirements in coordination with the Military Departments and in accordance with relevant law and policy, which include an exemption based on sincerely held religious beliefs.

237. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that every servicemember may apply for an exemption for any vaccine, including for COVID-19, that violates a sincerely held religious belief?

Ms. FULTON. If confirmed, I would implement vaccination requirements in coordination with the Military Departments and in accordance with relevant law and policy, which include an exemption based on sincerely held religious beliefs.

238. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what professional accomplishment are you most proud of?

Ms. FULTON. I am proudest of the transformation of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission from a hidebound, primarily analog system where customers “stood in line to stand in line” for in-person services, to a system upgraded across the board, where about 80 percent of transactions are available online, and in-person services are managed with a state-of-the-art queuing system, text notification, and readily available appointments—all accomplished during a historic pandemic.

239. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you believe that someone’s sex is a biological fact that can be determined by reference to objective criteria or is a subjective determination up to each individual? Please explain and include citations to any scientific evidence on which you base your opinion.

Ms. FULTON. Sex, as opposed to gender, is biological.

240. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what role do you believe “equity” should play in the office to which you have been appointed?

Ms. FULTON. A fair and inclusive workplace attracts talent, and retains the best people.

241. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, have you ever donated to the political campaign of the current President of the United States?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

242. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if so, how much and on what occasions?

Ms. FULTON. 3/4/20 \$2,800

243. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, other than at your hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, have you ever testified under oath? If this testimony is available online or as a record, please include the reference below or as an attachment.

Ms. FULTON. I have, the references are included in a separate attachment.

244. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, in the course of considering your candidacy for this position, has anyone at the White House or Department of Defense asked for you to provide your views on the following: systemic racism, critical race theory, critical race studies, and/or transgender individuals in the military?

Ms. FULTON. No.

245. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, at any point during the pendency of your nomination, have you held any cryptocurrencies? Please list the amounts, coins, and dates of holdings.

Ms. FULTON. No.

246. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, at any point during the pendency or your nomination, have you held any shares in the following companies: Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, and/or Twitter?

Ms. FULTON. No.

247. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, please describe your understanding of the duty of candor, if any, that nominees have to State their views on their judicial philosophy and be forthcoming when testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

Ms. FULTON. I have no views on this question as asked, but have been and will remain forthright with the committee and will abide by all relevant laws and regulations.

TAIWAN

248. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, do you strongly and unequivocally support the right of the people of Taiwan to live free from military coercion by the Chinese Communist Party?

Ms. FULTON. Yes.

249. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what evidence in your record can you cite to substantiate your support for the people of Taiwan?

Ms. FULTON. I do not believe I am on the record on this issue anywhere.

250. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, what do you believe is the geopolitical importance of ensuring Taiwan is free from, or at least able to resist, military coercion by the Chinese Communist Party?

Ms. FULTON. Though I support the right of Taiwan to live free of and resist coercion by the Chinese Communist Party, I do not feel qualified to make geopolitical assessments on the matter and would defer to experts in the Department if confirmed.

251. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Fulton, if confirmed, what steps would you advocate to ensure that Taiwan remains free from, or at least able to resist, military coercion by the Chinese Communist Party?

Ms. FULTON. I believe my responsibilities if confirmed would only impact this issue indirectly, but, if confirmed, I would strive to ensure we have a ready, lethal, effective force.

[The nomination reference of Ms. Brenda S. Fulton, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN427

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 27, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Brenda Sue Fulton, of New Jersey, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice James N. Stewart.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Brenda S. Fulton, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Bio
Brenda S. "Sue" Fulton

Education:

United States Military Academy

- 7/7/76-5/28/80
- Bachelor of Science

Employment Record:

NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, Trenton, NJ
Chair and Chief Administrator
3/2018 – Present

PFIZER CONSUMER HEALTH, Madison, NJ
Global Project Leader, Disruptive Channels (3/2016-3/2018)
Franchise Lead and Director, Rx to OTC Switch (7/2012-3/2016)

SCHERING-PLOUGH/MERCK CONSUMER CARE, Summit, New Jersey
Senior Project Manager, Brand Director
3/1997 – 2/2011

MOVIEFONE, INC., New York, New York
Marketing Manager
10/95 - 12/96

CHURCH & DWIGHT COMPANY, Princeton, New Jersey
Assistant Product Manager, Product Manager, Product Director
9/91 - 10/95

PARISH MISSION TEAM, Archdiocese of New York, Suffern, NY
Team Member and Music Director
8/89 – 8/91

PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, Cincinnati, Ohio
Assistant Brand Manager
3/86 – 5/88

UNITED STATES ARMY, Stuttgart, Germany
Captain, Signal Corps
Company Commander, Staff Officer, Platoon Leader
5/80-1/86

Honors and Awards:

- Meritorious Service Medal, 12/85
- Army Commendation Medal, 4/85
- Major George A. Smith Memorial "HOOAH" Award, National Conference on Citizenship, 10/18
- Selected for NBC Out's first "Pride30," a list of "innovators, changemakers, and rising stars," 6/17
- Selected by "We Are the Mighty" as one of 25 "Veterans to Watch in 2017"
- Secretary of the Army Public Service Award, 1/17

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Brenda S. Fulton in connection with her nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):**

Brenda Sue Fulton

2. **Position to which nominated:**

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

3. **Date of nomination:**

27 April 2021

4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-**

line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

United States Military Academy, 7/76-5/80, B.S. 5/28/80

- 5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

Chair and Chief Administrator, New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, Trenton, NJ
3/2018-Present

Global Project Leader, Disruptive Channels (3/2016-3/2018), Franchise Lead and Director, Rx to OTC Switch (7/2012-3/2016), Pfizer Consumer Health, Madison, NJ

Unemployed (*other than pro bono nonprofit work*) 2/2011– 7/2012

- 6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**

Member, New Jersey State Ethics Commission, 7/18-present
Member, Board of Visitors, National Defense University 3/17-2/21
Member/Vice Chair/Chair, Board of Visitors, 7/11-12/19

- 7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**

None

- 8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):**

American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), 4/18 – present
AAMVA International Board of Directors, 8/18 – 8/20
Joy to the Kids, Inc., Board of Directors 7/20 – 4/21
SPART*A President/Board Member 8/13 – 1/16
OutServe/SLDN Board of Directors, 10/12 – 6/13

OutServe Board, Member, 7/10 – 10/12
 Knights Out President/Board Member, 3/09 – 5/13
 Olympia's Daughters choral group, President/Board Member, 3/95 – 12/08

9. Political affiliations and activities:

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):**

Monmouth County Freeholder (now County Commissioner), 2016, lost the election.

- b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:**

2012 Obama Delegate to DNC from New Jersey
 Member, DNC LGBT Advisory Board 2016
 Member, Vets for Warren 2020
 Member, National Security Leaders for Biden ("NSL4B") 2020

- c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:**

Attached.

10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):

Meritorious Service Medal, 12/85
 Army Commendation Medal, 4/85
 Major George A. Smith Memorial "HOOAH" Award, National Conference on Citizenship, 10/18
 Selected for NBC Out's first "Pride30," a list of "innovators, changemakers, and rising stars," 6/17
 Selected by "We Are the Mighty" as one of 25 "Veterans to Watch in 2017"
 Awarded Secretary of the Army Public Service Award, 1/17

11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):

- *Trump's Trans Ban is Bad for Military Readiness*
JustSecurity.org, Aug 3, 2017
<https://www.justsecurity.org/43838/trumps-trans-ban-bad-military-readiness/>
- *What Trump Doesn't Understand About the Military*
New York Times, Sep 9, 2016
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/opinion/what-trump-doesnt-understand-about-the-military.html>
- *Just Because She's a Woman*
Huffington Post, Feb 4, 2016
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brenda-s-/just-because-shes-a-woman_b_9144276.html
- *Academy Graduates: Open Combat Roles to Women*
Huffington Post, Sep 23, 2015
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/academy-graduates-open-co_b_8182454
- *A Letter to My Niece About Race*
Huffington Post, Jun 23, 2015
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-letter-to-my-niece-about-race_b_7624568
- *Transgender Military Service: A Guide to Implementation*
Co-authored with Allyson Robinson, USMA '94, and Brynn Tannehill, USNA '97
Published by SPART*A, Feb 2015
https://d3n8a8pro7vnm.cloudfront.net/sparta/pages/288/attachments/original/1466950956/SPARTA_Transgender_Policy_Implementation_Guide_3.22.15.pdf?1466950956
- *OutServe: An Underground Network Stands Up*
Journal of Homosexuality, Volume 60, 2013 - Issue 2-3: Evolution of Government Policy toward Homosexuality in the U.S. Military.
- *Something about this West Point Summit Will Surprise You*
Huffington Post, Apr 15, 2013
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-summit-at-west-point_b_3083714
- *Women are Fit for Combat*
Huffington Post, Jan 25, 2013
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/women-in-combat_b_2551276

12. Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches

you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).

USMA BOV Farewell.docx – 12/2019
Hooah speech final.docx – 10/2018
USMA Diversity Conference final.pdf – 03/2017

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?

Yes.

14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?

Yes.

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes.

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization

previously provided?

Yes.

- 17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?**

Yes.

- 18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?**

Yes.

- 19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?**

Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 3rd day of August, 2021

[The nomination of Ms. Brenda S. Fulton was returned to the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate on January 3, 2022.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS**

Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)?

Answer. I have more than 25 years of experience focusing on nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security and the nuclear fuel cycle. My experience includes close working relationships with the DOE, NNSA and other key elements of the U.S. national security enterprise, including the national laboratories and the State Department. I have developed and implemented international projects working with partners and allies and had oversight and governance responsibilities for such projects. In short, I have devoted my career to the issues that fall in DNN's portfolio and, if confirmed, I would be prepared to step into this important role, working closely with the DOE and NNSA leadership, the career staff at DNN and stakeholders across the U.S. interagency, the Congress and the international community.

Question. If confirmed, do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator?

Answer. The Deputy Administrator is responsible for substantive and strategic leadership, management of a diverse team, and stewardship of a large budget on behalf of the American taxpayers. If confirmed, I would balance early action with learning. I have been out of government since December 2017, and it would be presumptuous to think I could start on day one with all the knowledge needed to execute this important mission. In close collaboration with the NNSA and DOE leadership, and the career staff, it will be important to come up to speed quickly and begin to provide strategic guidance. The threats and challenges that DNN works are not on hold, but it is also important to act from a position of information and good judgement. If confirmed, I also would have a responsibility to the federal and contractor workforce of DNN and will want to understand their issues and challenges so that I can help them be more effective meeting the mission.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Answer. We face a complex and dynamic strategic environment that poses significant challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and arms control

regimes. These challenges include strategic competition from such adversaries as Russia and China, states seeking to improve their nuclear capabilities, such as Iran and North Korea, the potential for terrorist acquisition of nuclear or radioactive materials, and staying ahead of emerging technologies and new uses of existing technologies that could lower barriers to proliferation.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I would begin by reviewing and understanding DNN's current and planned activities and then identify opportunities to accelerate work to match the threat environment or begin new initiatives to address these challenges.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities?

Answer. If confirmed, my main priorities would be maintaining and build upon DNN's core technical competencies so that DNN is ready to play our unique role in meeting not only the enduring challenges, but also those we may face in the future. In order to do this, we may also need to develop our current workforce and plan for future needs. Orienting DNN towards our most pressing national security challenges will require taking a "one house" approach with colleagues in other parts of the Department, such as the offices of science and nuclear energy, and with the rest of NNSA. If confirmed, I would also seek close coordination with the inter-agency and with Congress.

Question. Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) includes a diverse portfolio of nonproliferation programs, subprograms, and activities. What criteria would you apply and what processes would you follow to establish priorities and evaluate tradeoffs in investment between the various DNN commitments?

Answer. The President has established the priority to renew U.S. nonproliferation leadership and reduce the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of nuclear terrorism. DNN programs are a critical component of achieving this goal. If confirmed, I would base program prioritization decisions on the contributions of activities to the President's goals, as described inter alia in the Interim National Security Strategy. I would closely evaluate DNN's strategic plans, and adhering program planning in this, and future, fiscal years to a forward-looking nonproliferation strategy as well as DOE/NNSA's established programming, planning, budgeting, and execution processes. I also would maintain a focus on pragmatic and deliverable program activities that make a specific impact on the security environment.

RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in particular, and with Congress in general?

Answer. I understand that DNN has always had a strong relationship with its Congressional stakeholders. If confirmed, I would commit to a transparent and responsive relationship with the Committee and the Congress, and expect to continue the excellent support DNN reports that it has received over the years.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Answer. If confirmed, I would engage regularly with DNN's stakeholders and partners in Congress, be responsive to requests for information, and provide regular updates on DNN's efforts and vision for the future. Recognizing the difference in responsibilities between the Congress and the executive branch, I would also seek input and feedback from the Congress as DNN develops and implements critical programs.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND AGREEMENTS

Question. In what ways do you see the United States exercising its global leadership on nonproliferation issues, and, if confirmed as Deputy Administrator, what would you do to advance and balance both U.S. interests and the global nonproliferation regime?

Answer. The United States has been, and continues to be, a global leader in nuclear nonproliferation. A strong global nonproliferation regime is in the United States' interest and serves our overarching goals of supporting the peaceful uses of the atom to benefit the environment, support global health, and underpin the U.S. commercial sector. The Department's role in support of these objectives has grown over the years through its world class science, global partnerships, and innovative policy approaches. If confirmed, I would seek to carry that tradition forward by supporting the Biden-Harris Administration's desire to re-engage with our global partners in the nonproliferation regime. This would include strengthening our work with

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), working toward a successful Non-Proliferation (NPT) Review Conference in 2022, evolving our global partnerships to meet the changing landscape, and investing into our nonproliferation, safeguards, security, and verification assets – especially at the DOE’s complex of labs, plants, and sites.

Question. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime has been challenged since the Treaty entered into force in 1970, and the divisions between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states are becoming more apparent, as exemplified by the conclusion of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty which now has entered into force without the signature of nuclear weapons states.

What are your views with respect to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty?

Answer. I do not support the “Ban Treaty.” I share the position of this and previous Administrations that it is incompatible with U.S. extended deterrence relationships, which are still necessary for international peace and security, and reinforces divisions that hinder the international community’s ability to work together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges.

Question. What do you see as your role, if confirmed, in strengthening support for the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, as compared to the tenets of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty?

Answer. If confirmed, I would lead DNN to engage with the U.S. interagency and allies to revisit the real-world impacts of the Ban Treaty. I want to help supporters of the treaty understand that the Ban Treaty poses significant threats to the non-proliferation regime, the NATO alliance, and it may have a negative impact on the NPT Review Conference. NNSA should continue to work in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, to engage with allies on this issue, emphasizing that becoming a party to the TPNW could also potentially impact security cooperation with the United States.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in mitigating the international perception that the United States is not committed to its NPT Article VI commitments in the context of modernizing its nuclear deterrent?

Answer. The United States is in full compliance with its NPT obligations, including Article VI. The United States has significantly reduced its nuclear stockpile since its peak, consistent with its national security needs. If confirmed, I would support a continued U.S. Government participation in the P5 process, and other bi- and multilateral fora affirming our commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and emphasize the importance of the NPT as a central element of the non-proliferation regime.

Question. What are your views on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

Answer. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the security of the United States, and its entry-into-force would benefit all countries. It is a key step to diminishing the world’s reliance on nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of another nuclear arms race, goals consistent with President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategy.

Question. The CTBT Organization (CTBTO) has, among its organizational goals, achieving universality of the treaty.

Do you agree with this goal? If yes, and if confirmed, how might you support attainment of this goal as Deputy Administrator? If not, what do you think the United States’ role should be in continuing to work with the CTBTO?

Answer. I agree with the U.S. Government’s support for the CTBT and the commitment to achieve its entry-into-force, recognizing the significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal. If confirmed as Deputy Administrator, I would work with my U.S. interagency colleagues, the CTBTO PrepCom, non-governmental organizations, and the international community to promote the CTBT and encourage ratification by the Annex 2 countries necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. NNSA and the U.S. Government provide strong support to the CTBTO PrepCom, and recognize that the United States derives significant benefit from the effective functioning of the CTBTO’s monitoring and verification system. If confirmed, I would look forward to helping to continue and grow that support.

Question. What are your views on the zero yield standard to which the United States adheres, as compared to the interpretation by other CTBT signatories such as Russia and China?

Answer. The U.S. zero yield standard, consistent with the CTBT and the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium, does not allow any supercritical nuclear explosive testing that produces a self-sustaining chain reaction. I understand from the latest Compliance Report to Congress in April 2021 that the United States finds that Russia, since declaring its testing moratorium in 1996, has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with the U.S. zero

yield standard. I also understand that the United States has concerns regarding China's adherence to the United States zero yield nuclear weapons testing moratorium. If I am confirmed as Deputy Administrator, I look forward to learning more details about the concerns regarding activities in both countries and working with my departmental colleagues, including Defense Programs, and the U.S. interagency to address them.

Question. For the past several years, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State have highlighted U.S. concerns that Russia, and especially China, are conducting nuclear tests that may be inconsistent with this standard. In your view, should countries that conduct tests producing nuclear yield face repercussions? If so, what actions would you recommend the international community take in response to these alleged activities on the part of China and Russia?

Answer. I am aware that the United States Government has raised concerns about Russia and China's nuclear testing and potential inconsistency with the zero yield standard. The United States has publicly challenged Russia and China to explain their actions and encouraged the international community to join in condemnation of any inconsistency with their self-declared moratoria or their obligations as signatories to the CTBT. If confirmed as Deputy Administrator, I look forward to learning more details about the concerns with both countries and helping to develop appropriate responses. One significant contribution of DNN is to support the U.S.' ability to detect and characterize nuclear explosions wherever they may occur globally. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the team to understand our capabilities and remaining gaps.

Question. What do you view as the purpose of Iran's nuclear program?

Answer. Iran has consistently cast its nuclear activities as being for exclusively peaceful purposes, yet it has regularly sought to expand and increase its nuclear material production capabilities beyond those justified by Iran's civilian need. I am deeply concerned by this.

Even if current activities are for civilian purposes, the existence of a nuclear weapons research and development effort prior to 2004, as reported in the unclassified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and validated by the IAEA's December 2015 report, means that we cannot exclude the possibility that one purpose of the program is to retain the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to develop nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so.

Question. In your assessment, do Iran's nuclear program and ballistic missile program indicate a desire by the Iranian government to have a nuclear weapons capability?

Answer. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's unclassified Annual Threat Assessment, Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities the intelligence community judges would be necessary to produce a nuclear device. As I previously stated, we cannot exclude the possibility that Iran seeks to retain a latent capability to develop nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so.

Question. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the limitations on Iran's uranium enrichment expire between 2026 and 2031.

If the United States rejoins the JCPOA, do you assess that Iran will be legally able to increase its uranium enrichment after 2031?

Answer. Yes. According to the terms of the JCPOA, in 2031 Iran is permitted to enrich uranium above 3.67%, increase its enriched uranium stockpile above 300 kg, and conduct enrichment at facilities other than Natanz. Iran has already exceeded these key limits in response to our withdrawal from JCPOA. It is worth noting that Iran's obligations to accept IAEA monitoring and verification of its nuclear activities never expire under the JCPOA.

Question. If Iran acquires enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon, what is the risk of other countries in the region seeking a nuclear weapons capability, in your assessment?

Answer. Iran's acquisition of a sufficient stockpile of enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon is a significant threat. I understand that this is a key reason for the stated intent of the Biden administration to pursue a diplomatic strategy to return to the JCPOA stockpile limits and the intrusive verification and monitoring of their nuclear activities.

Question. In 2018, Israel's Mossad released a series of Iranian nuclear files, which included information about at least three uranium enrichment facilities that Iran had hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Do you agree that providing the IAEA access to those sites is essential to ensuring oversight of Iran's nuclear program?

Answer. I have not reviewed these documents or collateral information. That said, I support the IAEA using all of its authorities to the fullest extent possible to be

able to assure us and the international community that Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful. According to the most recent IAEA report in September, Iran is not being responsive to requests to resolve these outstanding issues and I believe they must do so under their existing legal obligations.

Question. Given the existence of these sites (and possibly others), do you assess that returning to the 2015 JCPOA would effectively constrain Iran's nuclear program?

Answer. I believe that returning to the JCPOA is a critical first step to effectively constrain Iran's nuclear program and again provide the IAEA with the tools it needs to monitor all of Iran's nuclear activities.

FISSILE MATERIAL DISPOSITION

Question. The fissile material disposition program, under which the United States and Russia each committed to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, has been plagued by numerous problems and delays. Construction of the MOX fuel fabrication facility is now canceled, and a dilute and dispose approach substituted, with final disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

In your view, is the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement still viable and relevant? If yes, what steps would you take to preserve and implement it, if confirmed? If not, what would be your plan for the excess plutonium once subject to the Agreement?

Answer. The United States remains committed to the disposition of 34 MT consistent with its international obligations and consistent with the PMDA. As you are aware, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the PMDA in 2016, and, therefore, dialogue has not continued with Russia on this topic. I believe NNSA should continue to take the necessary steps to transition to the Dilute and Dispose strategy for the permanent disposition of the excess plutonium subject to the Agreement, as this decision was deemed to be in the United States national interest regardless of the unfortunate decision that Russia has made to withdraw.

Question. The Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is now working with Department of Energy officials overseeing the WIPP in developing the dilute and dispose strategy. If confirmed, what steps would you deem necessary in order move forward with the final disposal of significant quantities of plutonium at the WIPP?

Answer. The key next steps necessary to move forward with the disposition of significant quantities of plutonium at the WIPP, all of which I understand are already underway, are finalizing of the National Environmental Policy Act analysis of the program and completing of construction of the necessary facilities to dilute and dispose all 34 MT of excess plutonium.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) AND SAFEGUARDS

Question. Timely and consistent IAEA access and monitoring is integral to verifying Iran's compliance with the provisions of the JCPOA. The Department of Energy and the NNSA are considered the Executive Branch's technical experts for verification and assessment of adherence to the JCPOA.

What is your understanding of role of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in supporting IAEA capability and will to execute its mission regarding JCPOA, while at the same time maintaining IAEA independence and without making it reliant on any one member state?

Answer. I understand that DNN is responsible for developing and maintaining verification and monitoring capabilities for a range of nonproliferation missions, including IAEA safeguards and JCPOA monitoring. Where the United States can offer unique capabilities to the IAEA that serve the national security interest of our country and our allies, I believe we should do so. That said, while DNN should provide significant financial and in-kind support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards, it cannot be a "one stop shop" for the IAEA's needs. If confirmed, I would support DNN's efforts to encourage the Secretariat to seek a diverse pool of donors beyond just the United States and take advantage of the technical and financial resources of the international community.

Question. What is your assessment of recent actions by Iran to increase enrichment levels as well as actions Iran has taken with respect to its heavy water reactor?

Answer. According to IAEA reports, since May 2019, Iran has expanded its nuclear activities above and beyond JCPOA limits. Iran has been clear and consistent in its public messaging that it would reverse these steps if it receives sanctions relief. These activities are, however, concerning. Specifically, Iran's operation of advanced centrifuges and efforts to produce uranium metal could result in knowledge

gains that cannot be reversed even if the machines are uninstalled and the metal reconverted. The return of the verification and monitoring regime in Iran would be critical in any resumption of JCPOA constraints to gain confidence that Iran does not resume these activities or benefit from their knowledge to expand nuclear activities. Regarding the heavy water reactor, I understand from the IAEA reports that the conversion effort has slowed but that there has not been an attempt to resume construction of the reactor under the old, more dangerous design. If confirmed, and if there is a return to the JCPOA, I would support DNN experts again contributing to the reactor conversion effort so that the facility is permanently unable to operate under the old design.

Question. Nuclear fuel reprocessing programs in East Asia, particularly Japan, have created a glut of fissile material in the region and have added to the IAEA's safeguard burden.

Do you believe the IAEA is adequately resourced to effectively apply safeguards on reprocessing programs?

Answer. The IAEA verification budget has remained essentially flat while its workload has increased as new facilities around the world come online and the quantity of spent nuclear fuel and separated civil plutonium grows. The Agency has augmented its regular budget with extrabudgetary contributions (primarily from the United States) but this approach is not sustainable as its workload continues to increase.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in regard to IAEA's development of safeguard techniques and technologies applicable to reprocessing programs?

Answer. I understand that DNN has programs that develop and test safeguards techniques and technologies that are used as part of IAEA safeguards verification and could be used for reprocessing facilities.

Question. What other concerns, if any, do you have with reprocessing and plutonium accumulation in East Asia and elsewhere?

Answer. NNSA supports U.S. efforts to limit the spread of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies that pose risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. These sensitive technologies should be restricted to help minimize the spread of enrichment and reprocessing activities around the world. Ever increasing plutonium stockpile can be both proliferation risks and nuclear security risks. Both of these concerns need to be addressed, and plutonium accumulation, even in civil programs, should be discouraged.

Question. In your view, what are the other emerging challenges for the international safeguards regime/IAEA safeguards and how might the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation contribute to addressing or be leveraged to meet those challenges?

Answer. The major challenges facing the IAEA safeguards regime include ongoing noncompliance issues from states such as Iran, DPRK, and Syria, stagnant verification budgets paired with increasing workload, understanding the threats and opportunities presented by emerging technologies, and the lack of universality of the highest standard of IAEA safeguards verification (e.g., the Additional Protocol) to enable the IAEA to provide assurances that all nuclear material remains in peaceful use. The DNN office can contribute to all of these challenges through technical investment and innovations, and must collaborate with the IAEA and our partners to prioritize needs and find efficiencies.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY

Question. What is your view of the strategy, if any, that NNSA has developed for prioritizing its nuclear security activities so that material that poses the highest risk is identified and addressed first?

Answer. I support a risk-informed approach to secure material of concern. If confirmed, I would want to understand how DNN applies their risk prioritization models to take into account information relevant to the threat environment, existing security vulnerabilities, and material consequences. I would also advocate for DNN with the intelligence community and other government agencies to get all the relevant information needed to make good decisions, if DNN is not already getting this information. This information allows DNN to effectively prioritize its risk reduction work and then build the necessary relationships in order to secure these materials and improve interdiction capabilities.

Question. United States nuclear security cooperation programs with Russia are currently inactive after years of joint investment between our two countries to ensure our stockpiles of fissile materials have adequate protection.

What are your views with respect to the state of safeguards currently in place in Russia and the level of risk of diversion of Russia's fissile material?

Answer. Russia has the technical expertise among its nuclear security professionals to protect its most sensitive nuclear material and weapons. I understand that many of the best practices and lessons of the two decades of joint activity under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement have been codified into their regulations. However, since 2014, the United States' influence and insight into the state of nuclear security in Russia has diminished. Considering the large quantity of nuclear materials and facilities in Russia and renewed emphasis on the nuclear enterprise, one could imagine a need for renewed focus on nuclear security in and around Russia. If confirmed, I would seek early briefings on this subject.

Question. What visibility should the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation have on Russian efforts to sustain the equipment and technology the United States has provided? If confirmed, what more would you do to sustain those investments?

Answer. Given the complexities of the relationship, there is little to no direct information about the state of the investments that the United States made to nuclear security in Russia. Ultimately, it will be necessary to re-engage with Russian counterparts where appropriate, to discuss nuclear security issues. Even when the relationship is fraught, this dialogue would serve U.S. national security interests.

If the broader political relationship were to evolve to be more favorable, this might include a cooperative re-engagement, as peers, to increase awareness and insight. Failing that, if confirmed, I would seek multilateral opportunities to create information exchanges with Russia on the sustainability of investments and try to learn from ongoing track 1.5 and track 2 efforts.

Question. What, in your view, are the other areas of nuclear security and non-proliferation cooperation that could be sustained or initiated with Russia in the next five years?

Answer. The United States and Russia possess 90 percent of the world's useable materials and control the largest nuclear stockpiles and complexes. The reality is that it is difficult to address global nuclear security without such a significant player at the table. It would be in the United States' national interest to re-engage at a basic level with Russia to discuss nuclear security issues. If given the opportunity, there are a number of bilateral areas related to nuclear and radiological security and nonproliferation associated with fuel cycle activities that could be explored with Russia. It is not conceivable nor necessarily desirable that there would be a return to the same level of assistance on nuclear security of the past, but there may be opportunity and reason to engage on a peer-to-peer basis on common and global nuclear security challenges on a mutually-beneficial basis. The United States and Russia have successfully collaborated, even in recent years, to reduce nuclear security risks in third countries. If confirmed, I would continue this cooperation.

Question. Significant progress has been made over the past two decades to improve security over vast amounts of vulnerable nuclear material and to consolidate fissile material to fewer, more secure locations. Yet, some countries remain unwilling or reluctant to cooperate with U.S. nuclear material security programs.

Do you agree with the assertion by some that efforts to secure fissile material around the world have run their course? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe that the challenge to secure fissile material is enduring, and there is still much work to do. The threat environment is constantly evolving and our nuclear security efforts must anticipate and stay ahead of emerging threats. There are remaining inventories of materials to convert or remove, new facilities being built, and regimes falling into instability. These are all factors that alter our nuclear security calculations.

Question. How do you believe the United States should address countries that, to date, have been unwilling to cooperate with these efforts? What would you do differently, and what new strategies would you employ to this end, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support a continued, multi-pronged strategy which seeks bilateral relationships but also leverages multilateral relationships to support its efforts. In the cases in which NNSA does not have a direct bilateral relationship with a partner, its multilateral efforts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and/or regional organizations are vital to supporting best practices and international norms for nuclear security. For those countries the United States cannot engage on nuclear security, NNSA should place special emphasis on providing layered defenses to counter smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials that might originate from those countries. Building capacity in partners along high-risk pathways provides for risk reduction when NNSA cannot work with specific countries of concern.

Question. With the end of the Nuclear Security Summits, what are your thoughts on how international consensus building and dialogue on nuclear security can continue between the United States and senior leadership of key foreign governments? What models or mechanisms would you propose, if confirmed?

Answer. The Nuclear Security Summits were valuable engagements to highlight the important nuclear security work that had been done, but more importantly they highlighted the magnitude of work left to be completed. I was honored to lead the Department of Energy's participation in the 2016 Summit, so I saw the process and challenges firsthand. I believe it is necessary to sustain awareness at the highest levels while also working on practical, tangible projects and collaborative approaches at the working level. If confirmed, I would support advocacy for nuclear security in international fora, in bilateral engagements with NNSA and DOE leadership and their counterparts, and through senior representation at key opportunities, such as the upcoming first Review Conference on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment.

Question. This administration has emphasized working with other countries on a bilateral basis. In your view, what are the top five countries with which the United States needs to work most closely on nuclear security technical and policy issues, and what are the most pressing issues that need to be addressed with each of those countries?

Answer. I would include Belarus, India, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine in my top five list of countries to engage on nuclear security because of either large volumes of proliferation-sensitive materials present in-country and/or nuclear security conditions in-country.

In alphabetical order:

- Belarus—In addition to the historical upgrades that DOE/NNSA completed at the Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research (JIPNR) in Belarus and the successful removal of all fresh and spent HEU fuel from the Pamir research reactor, my understanding is that since 2016 NNSA has been engaging with JIPNR on nuclear security culture and gradually expanded the cooperation to include insider threat mitigation, response training, and performance evaluation. DNN must also continue efforts to remove the remaining highly enriched uranium in the country.
- India—India has a well-developed nuclear program including a growing nuclear power program with a complete nuclear fuel cycle and a weapons program. We have developed and delivered training jointly through the Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP). We will continue to prioritize cooperation on nuclear security topics including: accounting for nuclear material, advanced modelling to improve physical security, transportation security for radiological sources, and emergency response.
- Russia—Considering the large quantity of nuclear materials and facilities in Russia we need a renewed focus on nuclear security with Russia, despite the very real and appropriate constraints on working with them.
- South Africa—South Africa is involved in every part of the nuclear fuel cycle. South Africa is the only country to have declared and denuclearized a full nuclear weapons program, and there are large amounts of HEU still located there. As South Africa seeks additional nuclear power generation and advanced reactor technologies, a strong partnership with South Africa on nuclear security will only grow in importance.
- Ukraine—Ukraine continues to be an important partner for nuclear security. Two key power plants, Zaporizhzhia and South Ukraine, are located near the Line of Conflict, the border between Ukraine and the areas under Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists. Priority areas of work with Ukraine should include: protective/response force training, physical protection upgrades at South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants and physical security upgrades at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

I would add honorable mentions, in alphabetical order, for both China and Pakistan, but don't feel that I have all the relevant information to make specific recommendations. Both were active participants in the Nuclear Security Summit process, but I no longer have good insight into their activities. If confirmed, I would seek briefings on these two countries' nuclear security situations urgently.

Question. In your view, what are the guidelines and objectives that should be part of developing nuclear security cooperation with China? India? Pakistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the White House and interagency on key principles for engaging with these countries in service of U.S. national security. I would not seek engagement for the sake of engagement. China represents a significant challenge that is changing rapidly, and engagement with China on nuclear issues is entangled in the broader strategic relationship. India is a key nuclear secu-

rity partner, and, if confirmed, I would like to continue to mature and deepen this collaborative relationship, especially on nuclear security. Pakistan is an important country for bilateral engagement on nuclear security and I would seek early information on their current situation. Given that India and Pakistan are high-priority countries, it is important to continue to carry out and implement bilateral nuclear security cooperation through existing mechanisms, but it is also vital to develop creative strategies to further engage with India and Pakistan through track 2 dialogues to provide a platform for open and continued dialogues on nuclear security topics.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of NNSA-sponsored Centers of Nuclear Security Excellence in engaging such countries, and what tangible results have you observed from the programs sponsored by those centers?

Answer. The NNSA-sponsored Centers of Nuclear Security Excellence (COE) have been instrumental in improving nuclear security worldwide. In particular, these centers provide venues for training and professional development activities in support of sustaining nuclear security at the national and regional levels where none were before. Further, the COEs are a part of the IAEA's network that further expands and sustains IAEA's influence at the international and regional level for the important elements of a nuclear security regime. If confirmed, I would request information about the specific and tangible results from each of the COEs, and seek ways to improve their reach and effectiveness, if possible.

Question. Historically, efforts to minimize, inventory/account for, and secure nuclear materials have focused on civilian stockpiles, to the exclusion of military stockpiles. Crossover between civilian/military nuclear programs is problematic.

What to you envision as the role, if any, of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in addressing the dangers posed by military fissile material stockpiles?

Answer. DNN's role is to engage with any partner who maintains fissile material stockpiles – either by civilian entities or by the military. If confirmed, I will look for increased opportunities to engage in this area and to strengthen our engagement with weapons states. Vulnerable nuclear material is vulnerable nuclear material, and it does not matter what its intended purpose is.

Question. As with other nuclear materials security programs, DNN has significant accomplishments in terms of converting research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium. However, a number of highly enriched uranium-fueled reactors continue to operate around the world, and converting some of these reactors presents greater technological and other challenges than NNSA has previously encountered in other reactor conversions, including strong political resistance to such conversions.

In your view, how should the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation approach these challenges?

Answer. There are technical and political challenges in converting the remaining high performance HEU research reactors to LEU fuel. If confirmed, I will approach these challenges by advocating for continued funding for the qualification of high-density LEU fuels necessary to convert these reactors, and by working closely with our international partners to address any political challenges that arise in the process. Part of that task is understanding the role and purpose of the remaining HEU-fueled reactors and seeking ways to build confidence that the missions can be met after conversion to LEU.

Question. The Office of the Deputy Administrator sponsors an ongoing program to replace Cesium-137 blood irradiators in hospitals, but this program is modest and faces limitations.

Do you believe the Office of the Deputy Administrator has the requisite capacity for a more comprehensive program?

Answer. If confirmed, I would need to understand the capacity limits of the program and the lab experts supporting it to know if there is a need to expand the program. A more comprehensive program could expand beyond just cesium-137-based blood irradiators. There are irradiators used for other applications that have viable alternative technologies available now and the program should expand their focus to those other applications. The program is on track to replace all cesium-based blood irradiators by 2027 as called for in the 2019 NDAA.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan on overcoming the current program's limitations?

Answer. The program's main limitation is the number of irradiators that it can safely recover in year. If confirmed, I will look for ways to increase the rate of yearly recoveries including optimizing the use of existing transportation containers.

Question. The fall of Mosul in Iraq revealed that ISIS was in close proximity to many sources of Cesium-137 used for commercial and medical purposes.

What are your views on the way forward in securing nuclear materials in the Levant?

Answer. I think there should be a focus on permanent risk reduction in all regions where the risk is high that a terrorist could access nuclear or radioactive materials. DNN's approach, as I understand it, is sound – working with bilateral partners to focus on transitioning to alternative, non-radioisotope technologies and removing the radioactive sources. In September 2021, DNN removed three cesium-based devices from Lebanon and replaced them with x-ray devices. I understand that DNN is in discussions for similar activities with partners in Iraq. In order to address concerns about vulnerable material in the Levant, cooperation with multiple partner agencies on counter nuclear smuggling is of highest importance. NNSA must look to build layered defenses throughout the region, working with border security partners, law enforcement agencies, and security services to build capacity detect materials outside regulatory control and to return those materials to control and accounting systems. Current DNN efforts with Lebanon, Israel,

Jordan, and Turkey reflect this approach. If confirmed, I would seek additional information about these efforts and the overall risk environment to inform prioritization.

Question. Former Soviet states that border Russia have historical trade and smuggling routes that stretch from the Russian border to the Levant.

What are your perceptions of the extent of nuclear smuggling in these regions?

Answer. These are definitely areas of concern, but my current information is anecdotal. If confirmed, one of my first tasks will be to review the current intelligence on nuclear smuggling and seizures in these regions.

Question. If confirmed, what do you believe NNSA should or should not be doing to control nuclear smuggling in this region and along these routes?

Answer. NNSA has a crucial role in this region to support partner country systems already deployed and to build additional layers of defense, particularly with law enforcement, internal security, and regulatory agencies. I believe NNSA should continue its commitment to sustaining baseline capacity, including building indigenous capacity for training, operations, maintenance, policies, and assessments. Further, NNSA should help enhance partner capabilities not just at official points of entry but also along frontier regions and in the interior of countries. This should be complemented with investigation support to help partner countries translate detections into prosecutions. By building layered defenses and long-term security partnerships in this region, NNSA can provide an enduring benefit to U.S. national security.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS AND EXPORT CONTROLS

Question. The United States is working on a nonproliferation agreement with Saudi Arabia under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Do you believe that Saudi Arabia should be required to adhere to the IAEA additional protocols?

Answer. Yes, consistent with longstanding United States policy supporting universal adherence to the Additional Protocol (AP), I believe that Saudi Arabia should have an AP in force. U.S. policy is to encourage all states, particularly those with civil nuclear programs, to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Question. Do you believe Saudi Arabia should be allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel or have the ability to enrich uranium?

Answer. The introduction of reprocessing or enrichment technology into Saudi Arabia could be destabilizing, which would not serve United States national security interests. One of the pillars of United States nonproliferation policy is to encourage foreign partners to make the sovereign decision to rely upon the strong and reliable international nuclear fuel industry for their fuel supplies, and not pursue domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. I believe this is the right approach for Saudi Arabia.

Question. What proliferation risks do you see as arising from any nonproliferation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and if confirmed, what would be your role in and approach to managing these risks?

Answer. A well-crafted nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia can address key nonproliferation risks and concerns. Such an agreement would address nuclear safeguards and the possibility of enrichment and reprocessing. If such an agreement with Saudi Arabia were possible, it would also serve United States interests by supporting United States industry, providing a channel for sharing high safety, security and nonproliferation standards, and reduce the chances that Russia

or China would provide nuclear technology with lower requirements than those that come with United States technology.

Question. To what extent do you believe the likelihood of reaching such an agreement could be affected by reports of Saudi Arabia's conclusion of agreements for uranium exploration with two Chinese entities, one of which is China's primary nuclear weapons infrastructure construction provider?

Answer. I don't think that Saudi Arabia's mining of uranium presents obstacles for a 123 Agreement with the United States. In fact, because of the Chinese presence in these activities, it is even more important that the United States emphasize in its bilateral engagements the need for a strong export control regime, in-line with Nuclear Suppliers Group principles, so that any mined uranium from Saudi Arabia is used only for peaceful purposes.

Question. In spite of process improvements, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has faced criticism from the nuclear industry for its implementation of 10 C.F.R. Part 810 regulations controlling the export of civilian nuclear technology.

What ideas do you have for improving the implementation of Part 810, and how would you go about implementing them, if confirmed?

Answer. This is an area where I will need more information, if confirmed. I know that DNN has an on-going Process Improvement Plan for its implementation of Part-810, and that it remains dedicated to constantly working to improve response times and authorization determinations. If confirmed, I will work closely with inter-agency partners on best practices and improving efficiency. I support reviewing and enhancing DNN's 810 system so that it is useful and effective for U.S. exporters, and is not a barrier to industry efforts.

Question. In the debates surrounding Part 810, which implements section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, there is disagreement as to the extent to which some of the controlled technologies—such as some types of light-water reactor technology—pose a proliferation risk. To what extent do you believe that export controls should cover such technologies?

Answer. It remains U.S. nonproliferation policy to protect information and know-how related to production of special nuclear material, which could aid in the development of weapons usable material. Based on my current understanding, I believe this technology is appropriately controlled under 10 CFR Part 810 because all nuclear reactors (including light water reactors) have the ability to produce plutonium. If confirmed, I would seek to understand the concerns in this area, as appropriate.

Question. In your view, how does one ensure enforcement through export control licenses and conditions when it is increasingly common for end users to change affiliations?

Answer. Review of export licenses by the USG is an effective tool to mitigate the risk of transferring sensitive goods and technologies to proliferant entities and networks, but it is not a silver bullet. I believe DNN has a responsibility to make the process as robust as possible. DNN applies a rigorous license review process including a comprehensive technical review and an end user review. This process builds confidence that the goods being exported are appropriate for the stated end use and also identifies other potential end uses would be consistent with proliferation-related activities. The end user review portion consists of an open-source review and an all-source intelligence review. The end user review identifies any present or past proliferation activities as well as any known association of the entity to other organizations of concern including military, government, proliferation networks and changed affiliations. Periodic updates support the assessment of whether the end user reviews remain relevant.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address the challenges posed by increasingly sophisticated illicit procurement networks that can circumvent export controls with apparent ease?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue DNN's support to U.S. interdiction efforts, evaluate the end-user review process, and continue participating in interagency activities to strengthen the Export Administration Regulations.

I also would continue DNN's partnership with the intelligence community so that issues related to attempts to circumvent Part 810 export controls are understood and addressed in a timely manner to maintain our strong nonproliferation regime.

Question. If confirmed, how would you go about substantiating the claim that the United States must maintain a leadership role in the global nuclear industry in order to maintain leadership in global nonproliferation efforts?

Answer. I would not seek to substantiate the claim that the United States must maintain a leadership role in the global nuclear industry in order to maintain leadership in global nonproliferation efforts. Rather, if confirmed, I would seek to understand (and request indicators of) how U.S. engagement in the nuclear industry can

support economic goals while also bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security priorities. It is true that providing access to peaceful nuclear technology establishes a multi-decade relationship with partner countries. Through this relationship, the United States may influence critical thinking in partner countries about the importance of nonproliferation. The global nuclear market has become very competitive with Russia and China seeking to use access to cheap financing to turn traditional partners and new partners away from the United States, undermining our nonproliferation efforts. In spite of Russian and Chinese efforts, most of the world still recognizes that the United States can supply the safest and most advanced nuclear technology. If confirmed, I will work with my departmental colleagues, including the Office of Nuclear Energy, and the interagency to facilitate robust civil nuclear cooperation to support the President's climate change agenda while protecting nonproliferation leadership and innovation.

Question. How does this argument frame the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in maintaining global standards?

Answer. As the global standard bearer for the supply of peaceful nuclear technologies, the NSG is an important part of the nonproliferation regime. The role of the NSG becomes more important as the global marketplace becomes more competitive as it requires members to include minimum of nonproliferation requirements in all transactions, including the application of IAEA safeguards, physical protection, and peaceful uses. This puts all suppliers on a basic, even playing field. If confirmed, I will seek to work with our partners in U.S. industry and academia as well as with other NSG Participating Governments to increase understanding and effectiveness of current controls and to identify new technologies of proliferation concern that may warrant control through the NSG.

Question. If confirmed, what ideas and approaches would you apply to strengthening the NSG export guidelines?

Answer. The NSG has been at the forefront of the export control regimes in terms of innovation in its policies and practices. Much of this innovation has come from the work that the Department and its national labs have done over the years to understand how global regulators and global industry can interact effectively and efficiently. Broadening the engagement of the NSG directly with the global industry may be a vital next step for the regime. I believe adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a formal condition of supply should also be vigorously pursued.

Question. NNSA has previously advocated for India's membership in the NSG, which has in turn led Pakistan to advocate for its membership.

Do you support India's and/or Pakistan's membership in the NSG?

Answer. I support the U.S. policy of considering all NSG membership applications on their individual merits on a case-by-case basis. The United States continues to support India's NSG membership.

Question. If you are confirmed, what would you perceive to be your role in advocating for or against membership by India and Pakistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the United States' policy of considering all NSG membership applications on their individual merits on a case-by-case basis, and would help DNN bring to bear its expertise to contribute to a technically-informed evaluation process for any membership applications.

NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. North Korea enriches and reprocesses fissile material for its nuclear weapons program.

In your view, what areas of research and development do you believe are needed to further assess the advances North Korea has or is making in its nuclear weapons program?

Answer. DNN has a strong R&D program in place with a focus on detecting and characterizing foreign nuclear weapons programs like that in North Korea. Results from this R&D program are transitioned to partners across the interagency but, in particular, the intelligence community and Department of Defense. In the case of North Korea, R&D to improve our ability to not only detect, but to characterize underground tests, such as the one conducted in 2017, is critical. DPRK is also a difficult access problem and R&D is needed that can provide technical remote monitoring solutions. For example, next generation AI tools may help us extract more information from the data we do get from watching North Korea remotely. Research and development in the areas of remote detection and recognition of processing signatures could help the United States better assess North Korea's fissile material processing activities. In addition, R&D of onsite verification technologies can prepare U.S. verification teams to implement negotiated measures in support of any denuclearization agreement.

Question. If North Korea were to freeze its nuclear weapons program, what additional safeguards do you believe would be needed to verify such a freeze?

Answer. Deploying on-site verification teams (U.S., IAEA, or another model) will be the best way to independently verify the comprehensiveness and completeness of a freeze. Specific onsite monitoring actions would have to be tailored to each technical process that would be suspended. DNN has experience designing technical approaches and deploying expert teams to cover a range of activities in North Korea.

Question. Future arms control agreements may propose a cap on the total number of nuclear warheads in each country. This would require significant portal monitoring of locations where such warheads are stored or employed.

What is your assessment of the capabilities of portal monitoring technologies to accurately identify nuclear warheads and their types?

Answer. There are different options for monitoring and verifying different types of potential warhead limits. In general, portal monitors could potentially play a role in future monitoring and verification, but their capability will depend on the exact use case and the specific configuration of the portal monitoring system and associated implementation procedures. While I am familiar with some past studies of portal monitoring for arms control monitoring, if confirmed I would need to increase my understanding of this issue to judge the applicability to future regimes.

Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others have reported on issues affecting the nonproliferation research and development capacity in the NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including deteriorating facilities, stagnant or diminishing production capacity, a retirement-driven “brain drain,” and a constrained resource environment with many competing priorities.

In your view, what complex-related priorities should NNSA focus on to ensure continued capability and advancement in the nonproliferation area?

Answer. The Nonproliferation Stewardship Program (NSP) within DNN R&D is sharply focused on many of these issues. The design of the NSP is to provide targeted infrastructure and S&T activities so that DNN has a cadre of nonproliferation expertise capable of meeting future nonproliferation threats and challenges. The U.S. can no longer rely only on a robust nuclear weapons development enterprise or a civilian nuclear power industry to provide future expertise. NNSA must be intentional and targeted in identifying and developing needed nonproliferation competencies. That said, it is important for DNN and Defense Programs to align human capacity development and expertise to benefit NNSA as a whole. If confirmed, I would seek to engage my counterpart in DP to assess our collective human capital needs. NNSA must focus on building and retaining a diverse, highly skilled, flexible workforce capable of addressing complex, multifaceted nonproliferation challenges. Recruiting the “best and the brightest,” and providing them with world class facilities in which to work, should be a key priority for NNSA.

BUDGET EXECUTION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2022 for NNSA nonproliferation programs is \$2.26 billion.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to prioritize resources to ensure the maximum programmatic benefit?

Answer. If confirmed, my initial focus would be on reviewing DNN’s mission activities to evaluate whether they reflect the appropriate balance of efforts to address the President’s goals, as described in the Interim National Security Strategy, of renewing U.S. nonproliferation leadership and reducing the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as by the threat of nuclear terrorism. Further, I would work to align DNN’s financial resources, and future fiscal year budget requests, to support activities that provide clear benefit to the U.S. national security. I would also emphasize through DNN the responsibility to use its financial resources efficiently.

If confirmed, I would assess DNN’s programs to identify any possible efficiencies or areas that could be bolstered by additional resources. I would work with and welcome insights from members of this committee on how to best align DNN’s budget to those priorities.

Question. Other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, also have nuclear forensics programs that are carried out by the NNSA nonproliferation program. Should these programs be consolidated under the NNSA, in your view? Why or why not?

Answer. I recognize the increased level of effort and the leadership role that the NNSA has assumed since technical nuclear forensics since I was last in the Department. If legislative change were enacted, I believe NNSA is well suited to accept the interagency coordination and expertise development responsibilities currently

assigned to DHS. Technical nuclear forensics supports the broader mission of attribution. Attribution is, by necessity, an interagency effort relying on law enforcement, intelligence, technical, diplomatic, and others from across the government to provide the best determination and advice to the President in the event of an unclaimed nuclear attack. While the NNSA laboratories are clearly the centers of excellence for nuclear forensics, if confirmed, I would seek information from other departments and agencies to determine if they need additional support for their attribution responsibilities.

Question. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has made progress in recent years in providing transparency to the cost and schedule for some programs by issuing an annual strategic plan to reduce global nuclear threats. However, because of international agreements, the DNN has been identified as maintaining carry over accounts for extremely long periods of time.

In your view, what is the appropriate degree of program management that DNN should exercise to ensure its programs can demonstrate performance against cost and schedule commitments, while also acknowledging the uncertainty of its operating environment—for example, its dependence on international partners to accomplish its mission?

Answer. DNN faces unique challenges in budget planning and execution that relates to both technical constraint, partner support and the uncertainty that comes from implementing a substantially international program. Despite these challenges, I believe DNN must track budget and cost execution, relying on DOE/NNSA's project management practices, as precisely possible to make efficient use of taxpayer resources. Further, future fiscal year budget requests need to take into account existing and updated funding projections. Finally, I believe DNN programs need the latitude to pivot to take advantage of unanticipated program execution opportunities when they arise. If confirmed, I would take program stewardship seriously, and look forward to engaging with this Committee and other stakeholders if questions arise.

Question. If confirmed, to what extent would you support a requirement for all DNN programs to establish life-cycle cost and schedule baselines and measure performance against those baselines in its annual report?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support appropriate reporting of performance against program cost and schedule baselines. I would welcome this committee's input on how DNN might better communicate its performance to budget.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Question. In April of 2021 the General Accountability Office released a report "Sexual Harassment: NNSA Could Improve Prevention and Response Efforts in Its Nuclear Security Forces", which in addition to the examination of the NNSA Security Forces gave recommendations for the NNSA and the DOE in how they surveys, assess and trains to prevent sexual harassment.

What are your views on the GAO report's findings and recommendations? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I have read the GAO report and understand that DOE/NNSA has concurred with all five recommendations. If confirmed, I would request an update on the status of addressing the recommendations. I am committed to working with DOE/NNSA to prevent and respond to incidents of sexual harassment.

Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation?

Answer. This is an important issue in any workplace, and one I take seriously. The only way for a workplace to be both ethically robust and mission effective is for everyone to be respected and protected. I understand that DNN already has a robust Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) effort underway that is coordinated with broader NNSA efforts and includes addressing all forms of discrimination and harassment. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this effort and working to address and eliminate all forms of discrimination and harassment in DNN.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the Deputy Administrator?

Answer. First, if confirmed, I would identify the appropriate reporting procedure and make sure that it is communicated to all DNN employees and contractors. If there were a report, I would take all possible steps to make sure it is addressed fairly to all parties and in a timely manner, in accordance with NNSA policy.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-STATE ACTORS

1. Senator KING. Ms. Hinderstein, as we discussed at the hearing, deterrence does not work with terrorists. I would appreciate you expanding upon your comments at the hearing regarding your thoughts on how we address the issue of nuclear security and the danger of non-State actors acquiring nuclear material, an entire nuclear weapon, or the technology to develop a nuclear weapon.

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. While the overall probability of a terrorist group acquiring a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences are unacceptably high. For that reason, I believe that the United States and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) should continue to prioritize permanent threat reduction through material

elimination and facility conversion, strengthen nuclear security standards and practices globally, and use a strategy of defense-in-depth. This strategy emphasizes preventing access to nuclear or radiological materials at their source and impeding access to the necessary expertise and equipment or technology required to build a device, such as through export controls and interdiction efforts. As a further barrier, it is important to strengthen partner capabilities to detect, interdict, and investigate smuggled nuclear or radiological materials. As a final barrier, we should create real consequences for those who do illegally obtain these materials, expertise, or equipment through penalties, sanctions, and support for criminal prosecutions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that DNN maintains the R&D work, international partnerships, and technical capabilities required for this defense-in-depth strategy.

If confirmed, I would also welcome the opportunity to travel to some of NNSA's sites with members of this committee to learn more about NNSA's contribution to nonproliferation efforts against non-State actors.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN

IRAN DEAL

2. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Hinderstein, your professional biography states that you led the Department of Energy's Iran Task Force, and that you were responsible for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the "Iran Deal." I opposed this deal because I believed that Iran should earn sanctions relief by demonstrating goodwill, rather than rewarding them and hoping that they stay compliant. Realizing that you didn't have authority to approve or deny the finer points of the Iran Deal, do you generally believe that we should relax sanctions on Iran in the future before they demonstrate that they can be a stable nation in the international community?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. I would defer to my colleagues in the interagency on policy questions related to sanctions on Iran, but would prioritize the provision of technical tools and analysis so that they can make informed decisions about the nuclear risk as they make those judgments. Developing and implementing any approach for Iran requires the expertise of NNSA, the Department of Treasury, and other agencies in support of the State Department's efforts. If confirmed, my goal would be to ensure that NNSA's sound, technical expertise is available to inform policymakers regarding the technical status and implications of Iran's nuclear program, technical opportunities to limit Iran's capabilities, and verification and monitoring approaches.

3. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Hinderstein, if you were consulted on future negotiations for an agreement with Iran, would you be of the opinion that the U.S. Government should also hold them accountable for their terrorism operations abroad, and conventional weapons development in addition to preventing their development of nuclear weapons?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. Yes, Iran should be held accountable for all its actions. I support U.S. efforts to impose unilateral sanctions (most of which were never lifted or waived under the JCPOA), as well U.N. Security Council actions, in response to international terrorism, human rights, and ballistic missile activities, among other problematic and provocative activities.

NONPROLIFERATION RESOURCES

4. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Hinderstein, in your advance policy questions you noted that strategic competition from Russia and China, and nuclear capability increases by Iran and North Korea were some of the most pressing concerns for you if confirmed. Do you believe the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is currently properly funded and equipped to counter those threats?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. If confirmed, I will review DNN's mission activities to evaluate whether they reflect the appropriate balance of efforts to address the President's goals, as described in the Interim National Security Strategy, of renewing U.S. non-proliferation leadership and reducing the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the threat of nuclear terrorism. I would focus on aligning DNN's financial resources, and future fiscal year budget requests, to support activities that provide clear benefit to the U.S. national security and take into account a changing security environment. If shifts or increases in resources would be warranted, I would look forward to discussing the threat environment and the contribution DNN could make with this Committee and other relevant congressional stakeholders. In all cases, I believe DNN must track budget and cost execution, relying

on DOE/NNSA's project management practices, as precisely as possible to make efficient use of taxpayer resources.

5. Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Hinderstein, while you were previously at NNSA, how did your policy affairs position adequately prepare you to deal specifically with nonproliferation?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. My experience at NNSA included working closely with the DOE, NNSA and other key elements of the U.S. national security enterprise, including the national laboratories and the State Department. I developed and implemented international projects working with partners and allies and had oversight and governance responsibilities for such projects. If confirmed, this familiarity with DNN, NNSA and DOE will be important to developing and delivering technical approaches for nonproliferation challenges and providing the best guidance to NNSA, DOE and USG policy development processes. In addition, from a substantive perspective, my time at DNN (in addition to my other background) helped me gain deep knowledge in international safeguards and verification, nonproliferation and export control policy and regimes, and bilateral and international nonproliferation relationships. As effective nonproliferation policy requires building and sustaining partnerships, not just developing national approaches, if confirmed, this experience will also help me meet U.S. national security objectives.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR M. MICHAEL ROUNDS

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

6. Senator ROUNDS. Ms. Hinderstein, I believe it is critical we prevent a cascade of nuclear proliferators in the Middle East, though of course I'm most concerned about the imminent threat posed by Iran. Beyond the Iran nuclear problem, can you provide some detail about your next biggest nuclear proliferation concerns in the Middle East?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. The Middle East represents a significant challenge as well as a significant opportunity for our nonproliferation goals. Many countries in the broader Middle East have indicated varying levels of interest in pursuing civil nuclear programs which could bring with them new dual-use capabilities and possibilities for increased tension and unpredictability in an already volatile region. With the possible introduction of new advanced reactor technologies, we may have a window of opportunity to influence states' decisions to bring carbon free energy to the region while mitigating proliferation concerns. If confirmed, I will want to work with my colleagues in the Office of Nuclear Energy to identify which advanced reactor technologies could be deployed to the Middle East so as to mitigate the proliferation concerns, which I share with you. We should not cede the region to nuclear suppliers who may not require the same nonproliferation and nuclear security commitments of their partners that the United States does, but we should also be careful about whether and how U.S. technology is introduced so we do not undermine our own nonproliferation objectives. If confirmed, I also will work closely with the IAEA and existing DNN programs to identify and bring more resources to the region to ensure the security of nuclear sites and nuclear materials and to enhance regulatory and safeguards regimes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

7. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Hinderstein, was the Obama administration's JCPOA designed to be verifiable over the long term, and why did it fail in this regard?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. The nuclear constraints placed on Iran under the JCPOA were designed to be verifiable by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the long term, and the IAEA has demonstrated that they are verifiable. Until Iran restricted its cooperation with the IAEA, the verification was the most intrusive anywhere in the world, including daily access to all enrichment sites, and utilizing the most advanced technical tools available. As a result, the IAEA was able to immediately identify when Iran began to violate its uranium enrichment limits after the U.S. left the deal. In addition, several of the enhanced transparency and verification measures of the JCPOA would never expire. Iran has failed to live up to its obligations under the JCPOA, however, in my opinion, that is not a failure of the verification system which is designed to detect, not prevent, such activities.

8. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Hinderstein, if a nation is nefariously stockpiling nuclear addition supplies and equipment and not disclosing it properly, what should be the United States' response?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. If a country is engaged in any nefarious or illicit procurement of nuclear commodities, I believe that the United States has demonstrated the ability to work both directly with that country to roll back nuclear capability, and to work through the appropriate entities in the nonproliferation regime to address and correct the situation. Options include engaging directly (like the George W. Bush administration did in Libya), working with the IAEA and U.N. Security Council to resolve safeguards violations, or collaborating with other suppliers in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to identify and prevent illegal attempts at procurement. All three approaches have been used in the past. DNN has an important role in providing information to prevent, identify, and assess these activities and to develop approaches for the recovery/disablement of these illicit nuclear commodities if detected.

9. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Hinderstein, is Iran's failure to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards agreement a violation of its obligations as a Nonproliferation Treaty signatory?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. The legal determination of a treaty violation is in the purview of lawyers at the State Department, but Iran's failure to provide substantive or technically credible responses to the IAEA's questions related to possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities is cause for serious concern. If confirmed, I will strongly support the IAEA in their efforts to resolve these outstanding issues, and engage members of the Board of Governors to take action if Iran fails to cooperate. The resolution of outstanding safeguards inconsistencies is separate from the JCPOA, and must be addressed regardless of whether all parties return to that agreement.

10. Senator BLACKBURN. Ms. Hinderstein, as you know, the Taliban had established a Minister of Atomic Energy. If confirmed, what steps would you take to prevent a nuclear Taliban?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. I have noted the news that the Taliban has appointed a new leader of the Minister of Atomic Energy in Afghanistan. This was a role that already existed in recently ousted Afghan government, and at that time was a partner in efforts to improve regional nuclear security. I am not aware of the intent of the new leadership with regard to any civil or non-civilian nuclear programs. That said, we must approach this situation with caution. We know that areas of instability pose significant challenges for nuclear security. The United States must build the international partnerships necessary to help detect and interdict illicit movements of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies in the region. If confirmed, I would prioritize getting up to speed on our current assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and any connections the Taliban-led government might have with other countries that may pose proliferation risks. I would also commit to come back to this Committee, perhaps in another setting, to discuss the risks and what tools we might have to mitigate them.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND PROLIFERATION

11. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Hinderstein, under what conditions do you think the United States should tolerate or even support nuclear proliferation to friendly nations, for instance, to bolster regional deterrence against China?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. The proliferation of any nuclear weapons technology anywhere in the world represents a potential threat to the United States, and may bring unintended consequences that could create bigger national security problems beyond countering China. The most important steps we can take in the Asia Pacific to deter China are to shore up our alliances in the region and make sure that our nuclear deterrent commitments are robust. Consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, any expansion of defense relationships that include a nuclear component would require a decision by the President and consultations with Congress.

12. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Hinderstein, would you agree that nuclear modernization is essential not just for ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable, but also for providing the United States with additional options for

incentivizing Russia and China to accept restrictions on their nuclear forces as part of future arms control negotiations?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. I agree that nuclear modernization includes important updates to critical NNSA infrastructure and our nuclear forces, and may influence future arms control negotiations. Continuing to demonstrate a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is essential for U.S. national security and may further incentivize Russian and Chinese engagement on security matters, including arms control.

13. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Hinderstein, what role do you think arms control should play in our response to China's rapid buildup of its nuclear arsenal?

Ms. HINDERSTEIN. China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear material production is a concern to the United States. I support efforts to seek clarity from the Chinese regarding the purpose and intention of their buildup. A meaningful dialog with China is a critical first step that may lead to formal arms control measures or informal confidence building measures in the future that would ultimately strengthen U.S. national security. Verifiable arms control measures can provide stability and predictability, and serve as a critical tool to help mitigate threats to the United States.

[The nomination reference of Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN1000

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
August 9, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Corey Hinderstein, of Virginia, to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Brent K. Park.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

MS. COREY A. HINDERSTEIN

Corey Hinderstein is vice president of International Fuel Cycle Strategies at the Nuclear Threat Initiative based in Washington, DC. where she focuses on international nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation policy, global nuclear security, and arms control and nonproliferation monitoring and verification. From February 2015 through November 2017, Ms. Hinderstein was senior coordinator for nuclear security and nonproliferation policy affairs at the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). At NNSA, she led the DOE's preparations for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and worked on other projects related to nuclear security and illicit trafficking, Iran's nuclear program and international monitoring and verification. Prior to her service at DOE, Ms. Hinderstein had been with NTI since 2006 and earlier was deputy director of the Institute for Science and International Security.

Ms. Hinderstein is a past president and Fellow of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and serves on the board of directors for the World Institute for Nuclear Security. She also has served in advisory capacities for multiple national laboratories and has published widely on nuclear nonproliferation, verification and monitoring and nuclear security. Ms. Hinderstein graduated from Clark University in Worcester, MA where she was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein in connection with her nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 205106050
(202) 2243871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):**

Corey Alison Hinderstein
Maiden Name: Corey Alison Gay

2. **Position to which nominated:**

Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
National Nuclear Security Administration
Department of Energy

3. **Date of nomination:** August 4, 2021

4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college,**

university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

Clark University, August 1992-December 1995, BA awarded May 1996

- 5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

Vice President, International Fuel Cycle Strategies, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, December 2017-current

Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Policy Affairs, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Washington, DC, January 2015-November 2017 (note: this was a fully-reimbursed IPA, employed by but on leave from the Nuclear Threat Initiative)

Director/Vice President, International Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC, April 2006-January 2015

- 6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**

None

- 7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**

Nuclear Threat Initiative, Vice President, Washington, District of Columbia, 4/2006-Present

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (UT-Battelle) (uncompensated), Consultant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 11/2017-Present

World Institute for Nuclear Security (uncompensated), Director, Vienna, Outside U.S., 2/2018-Present

Idaho National Laboratory (Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) (uncompensated), Member of the Strategic Advisory Committee for the Idaho National Laboratory's Nuclear Science and Technology Directorate, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 1/2019-Present

Sandia National Laboratories (National Technology Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS)) (uncompensated), Global Security Advisory Board Member, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 9/2019-Present

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (uncompensated), Volunteer Oversight Chair, Mount Laurel, New Jersey, 9/2020-Present

8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management – Current: Oversight Chair for Management, Fellow; Past: President, Vice President, Northeast Chapter President and Vice President, Member-at-Large on the Executive Committee; member since 2003 (est)
American Nuclear Society – Member since 2018 (est)

National Security Girl Squad – Member since 2020

Council on Foreign Relations – Term member, 2010-15 (est.)

Women in International Security – member off and on since 2008 (est)

Women in Nuclear – member off and on since 2013 (est)

Clark University – DC Regional Alumni Council

National Academies of Science – co-chair of committee stood up to meet the 2020 NDAA requirement to conduct an independent review of U.S. capabilities for monitoring, detection, verification of nuclear weapons and fissile material

Clifton (VA) Betterment Association (neighborhood association)

Country Club of Fairfax

Tower Club – members 2016-2019 (est)

9. Political affiliations and activities:

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):

NONE

- b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:

NONE

c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:

Donte Tanner	\$500.00
Wendy Gooditis	\$300.00
Daniel Helmer	\$500.00
Jennifer Wexton	\$250.00
Jennifer Wexton	\$500.00
Leslie Cockburn	\$300.00
Ray Morrogh	\$500.00
Laura Jane Cohen	\$250.00
Dan Helmer	\$500.00
Ray Morrogh	\$250.00
Dan Helmer	\$500.00
Laura Jane Cohen	\$250.00
Hala Ayala	\$250.00
Dan Helmer	\$500.00
Hala Ayala	\$500.00
Jennifer Wexton	\$500.00
Dan Helmer	\$500.00
Democratic Party of Virginia	\$50.00
	\$1000.00
Biden for President	0
	\$1000.00
Biden Victory Fund	0
Hillary Victory Fund	\$500.00
Hillary for America	\$500.00

10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):

Professional:
 NNSA Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award
 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management: Elected Fellow
 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management: Early Career Award

Clark University:
 Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society
 Gryphon & Pleiades Honor Society (limited to twelve seniors)
 Fiat Lux Honor Society – Recognizes volunteerism and scholastic achievement

11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):

"Connecting the Pillars of the NPT: Multilateral Disarmament Verification and Non-Proliferation," Corey Hinderstein and Lars van Dassen, NTI Publication, May 2021.

"Nuclear Cooperation and Political Influence," an essay in *The Next 50 Years of Nuclear Proliferation*, George Washington University, February 2021.

"The Future of IAEA Safeguards: Rebuilding the Vienna Spirit through Russian-U.S. Expert Dialogue," editor and coauthor, NTI Publication, November 2020.

"Connecting the Pillars of the NPT: Enabling Multilateral Disarmament Verification While Respecting Nonproliferation Obligations," co-authored with Grace Strellich and Lars van Dassen, Presented at the 61st Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, July 2020.

"How Quickly Could Iran Get a Nuclear Bomb? A former National Nuclear Security Administration coordinator explains breakout time — and why it's getting shorter." *Defense One*, January 8, 2020.

"International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Laying a foundation for future arms reductions," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 2018.

"A New Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Best Practices for Security, Nonproliferation, and Sustainable Nuclear Energy," Kelsey Hartigan, Corey Hinderstein, Andrew Newman, Sharon Squassoni, NTI Publication, February 2015.

"Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks," four-report series, NTI Publication, July 2014.

"The Opportunities and Limits of Societal Verification," Kelsey L. Hartigan and Corey Hinderstein, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, July 2013.

"From HEU minimization to elimination: Time to change the vocabulary," co-authored with Andrew Newman, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2012.

"Moving from Civil HEU Minimization to Elimination: Defining a New International Agenda," Corey Hinderstein and Andrew Newman, INMM Annual Meeting, July 2012.

"Societal Verification: Leveraging the Information Revolution for Arms Control Verification," co-authored with Kelsey Hartigan, Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, July 18, 2012

"Cultivating Confidence: Verification, Monitoring, and Enforcement for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons," editor, NTI with Hoover Institution Press, 2010. [Book/Hard Copy Available on Request]

"Verification and Monitoring for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Key Opportunities and Challenges," Corey Hinderstein and James W. Tape, INMM Annual Meeting, June 10, 2010.

"Dismantling the DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action," co-authored with David Albright, *USIP Peaceworks* Report, Winter 2005.

"The AQ Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," co-authored with David Albright, *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2005 (28:2), pp. 111–128.3

"Iran: Countdown to Showdown," co-authored with David Albright, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 2004.

"Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working toward closing gaps in the international nonproliferation Regime," David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, INMM Annual Meeting, 2004.

"Verifiable, Irreversible, Cooperative Dismantlement of the DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Program," David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, INMM Annual Meeting, 2004.

"The Centrifuge Connection," co-authored with David Albright, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 2004.

"Iran, Player or Rogue?" co-authored with David Albright, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 2003.

"Cooperative Verified Dismantlement of Nuclear Programs: An Eye Toward North Korea," David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, INMM Annual Meeting, 2003.

"Iran: Furor over fuel," co-authored with David Albright, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 2003.

"Algeria: Big deal in the desert?" co-authored with David Albright, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 2001.

"The Role of Commercial Satellite Imagery in Locating South Asian Nuclear Test Sites," co-authored with David Albright, *Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency*, Edited by John C. Baker, Kevin M. O'Connell, Ray A. Williamson, RAND Press, 2000.

"Nongovernmental Use of Commercial Satellite Imagery for Achieving Nuclear Nonproliferation Goals: Perspectives and Case Studies," co-authored with David Albright, *Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency*, Edited by John C. Baker, Kevin M. O'Connell, Ray A. Williamson, RAND Press, 2000.

"An Overhead Tour: The Yongbyon Nuclear Site," co-authored with David Albright, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle*, Edited by David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, ISIS Press, 2000.

"New Details Emerge on Pakistan's First Nuclear Test Site," co-authored with David Albright and Frank Pabian, *Earth Observation Magazine*, December 1998/January 1999, 18-21.

"So, whatever happened to checking with another source?" [as Corey Gay], *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 1998.

"Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted," co-authored with David Albright [as Corey Gay], *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 1998, 54-60.

"A Flash from the Past," co-authored with David Albright, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 1997, 15-17.

12. **Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).**

Many presentations, panel discussions, guest lectures. No formal speeches with scripts.

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports,

records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?
Yes
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?
Yes
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?
Yes
16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?
Yes
17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?
Yes
18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
Yes

19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.

C. Hinderstein

This 7 day of Sept, 2021

[The nomination of Ms. Corey A. Hinderstein was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 21, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on November 30, 2021.]

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