[Senate Hearing 117-991]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-991
NOMINATIONS OF: MR. NICKOLAS H. GUERTIN
TO BE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST
AND EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
MS. ALEXANDRA N. BAKER TO BE DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
MR. JOHN P. COFFEY TO BE GENERAL COUN-
SEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY;
AND MR. DOUGLAS R. BUSH TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION,
LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 19, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORAMT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-352 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
�
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
�
�
� Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
� John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
october 19, 2021
Page
Nominations of: Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin to be Director of 1
Operational Test and Evaluation Department of Defense; Ms.
Alexandra N. Baker to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy; Mr. John P. Coffey to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy; and Mr. Douglas R. Bush to be Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Guertin, Nickolas, Nominee to be Director of Operational Test and 4
Evaluation, Department of Defense.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 40
Questions for the Record....................................... 59
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 62
Biographical Sketch............................................ 63
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 65
Signature Page................................................. 74
Baker, Alexandra, Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 6
for Policy.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 74
Questions for the Record....................................... 112
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 116
Biographical Sketch............................................ 117
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 119
Signature Page................................................. 126
Coffey, John, Nominee to be General Counsel of the Department of 9
the Navy.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 126
Questions for the Record....................................... 152
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 153
Biographical Sketch............................................ 154
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 157
Signature Page................................................. 167
Bush, Douglas, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for 11
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 167
Questions for the Record....................................... 194
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 202
Biographical Sketch............................................ 203
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 205
Signature Page................................................. 211
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information requested or required to be inserted for
the record.
(iv)
HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF: MR. NICKOLAS H. GUERTIN TO BE
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MS.
ALEXANDRA N. BAKER TO BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
MR. JOHN P. COFFEY TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY;
AND MR. DOUGLAS R. BUSH TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR
ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Ernst, Tillis, Scott,
Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
Before I begin my formal remarks, I would like to recognize
the passing of two extraordinary soldiers, General Colin Powell
and General Raymond Odierno. Their selfless service to the
nation, remarkable courage and remarkable commitment to the men
and women of our armed services has sustained and inspired us
all. They have left a legacy of honor and commitment that will
be a beacon for future generations of Americans. To their
families, I express our profound sympathy. Thank you very much.
The committee meets this morning to consider the
nominations of Mr. Nickolas Guertin to be Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation; Ms. Alexandra Baker to be
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Mr. John Coffey
to be General Counsel of the Department of the Navy; and Mr.
Douglas Bush to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. I thank the nominees
for their long careers of service to the United States and
their willingness to assume these important roles.
I would also like to welcome the family members who are
with us today. Mr. Guertin, I welcome your wife, Maria, son,
Enrico, and daughter, Isabella; Ms. Baker, I welcome your
husband, Sam; Mr. Coffey, I welcome your wife, Anne, and son,
Connor; and Mr. Bush, I welcome your wife, Patricia.
Mr. Guertin, you are nominated to be the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, or DOT&E. This position is
responsible for all operational and live fire review, testing,
and evaluation activities. Your long career of technology and
weapons development in military, industry, and academic roles
should serve you well.
There are a number of challenges that will require your
attention within the Department. Of note, it is important for
DOT&E to be independent and resist pressure from the services
and industry to deploy systems that are not yet operationally
effective. You will be responsible for oversight of a number of
programs, including the F-35, the Army Integrated Visual
Augmentation System, the Navy Ford- class carrier, space
satellite systems, and missile defense programs. While there is
always a demand to move more rapidly in acquisition, it is
critical that you ensure we do so prudently. Indeed, we must
move both rapidly and prudently in acquisition.
Another challenge will be developing ways to test new
information technology programs, including commercial cloud
computing services, as well as ensuring robust cybersecurity
testing on all systems. In addition, concerns have been raised
about potential reductions in the workforce that supports live
fire testing. I would ask that you share your plan on
addressing these challenges.
Ms. Baker, you are nominated to serve as Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. Your current role as Senior
Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security
Council and previous experiences in Congress, the DOD, and OMB
will be valuable in this new position.
If confirmed, you will have a broad scope of responsibility
in advising and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Secretary of Defense on a range of issues,
including strategic competition with a rising China, the COVID-
19 pandemic, cyber threats, and climate change.
In the immediate term, the Policy office is revising the
2022 National Defense Strategy. The NDS will play a critical
role in defining the United States' national security
priorities, but coordinating it across the Department and the
Federal Government will be a challenge. I hope you will share
how you plan to integrate the NDS with the Administration's
whole-of-government approach.
In the coming months, the Department will also publish its
Nuclear Posture Review. I am interested in your testimony on a
number of issues relating to the Nuclear Posture Review,
including modernization of all three legs of the triad,
updating our nuclear facilities, the role of arms control, and
ongoing strategic stability talks.
Mr. Coffey, you are nominated to be General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy. This position is responsible for
providing legal services throughout the Department in a vast
array of fields, including acquisition-related law, arms
control, business and commercial law, and national security-
related law, among many others. The General Counsel also
assists in ethics, intelligence, criminal investigation, and
law enforcement activities. I would note your extensive legal
career in the Navy, and you should be well prepared for this
very responsible job.
One of Secretary Austin's priorities is to eradicate
extremism within the ranks. While we continue to believe that
the number of extremists in the ranks remains very small, even
one is too many, and I hope you will share your views on how
you will approach this issue, especially as the line between
action, thought, and speech becomes much more difficult to
define.
Mr. Bush, you are nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. If
confirmed, you will oversee Army research, development,
acquisition, program sustainment, and logistics activities as
the Army is undertaking it most expansive modernization effort
in decades. You will be well served by your experience which
includes nearly two decades of congressional legislative work,
including with the House Armed Services Committee. You will be
responsible for balancing the need for rigorous cost management
with the need to move quickly and use tailored acquisition
approaches. To achieve this, it will be necessary to strengthen
the Army's workforce and capacity while improving data
available to the Army and DOD to more effectively acquire and
sustain Army weapon systems.
Importantly, you will also be responsible for overcoming
the so-called ``Valley of Death,'' ensuring that the Army is
able to turn research innovations into real operational
capabilities. This will require strengthening connections
between research and engineering activities and the Army's
acquisition programs and defense contractors. It will also
include investing in and protecting the people and
infrastructure at organizations like the Army's labs and test
ranges. I look forward to hearing how you will address these
challenges.
Thank you, again, to our nominees.
Senator Inhofe is unable to join us this morning, but I
will request unanimous consent to include his opening statement
in the record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The opening statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ranking Member James M. Inhofe
Thank you, Chairman Reed, and thanks to our witnesses for being
with us and for their willingness to serve the nation.
The world is more dangerous than at any point in my lifetime.
American interests are under immense pressure from our adversaries.
We learned from hearings over the last month that after a
disastrous departure from Afghanistan, the threat of global terrorism
is growing. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan is now the safest place in
the world for terrorist planners.
While we have been focused on Afghanistan, threats from China,
Russia, North Korea, and Iran have all increased:
China has expanded construction of nuclear siloes and
aggression against Taiwan;
Russia has held its largest military exercise in four
decades and continues to test dangerous nuclear weapons;
Iran has continued to move closer to a nuclear bomb; and
North Korea has sustained its track record of violating
UN resolutions.
It's more important than ever that we accelerate our work to deter
each of these threats, which were identified and prioritized in the
2018 National Defense Strategy. We've got to take each of these threats
seriously--we've got interests around the globe.
That starts with adhering to the core of the existing strategy. We
can't get distracted, and we can't simply study the problems we have
forever.
Next, we've got to adequately resource that strategy, even as we
innovate in technology and in the way that we fight.
I'm particularly concerned that the Army will bear the brunt of any
proposed budget cuts at DOD, which will significantly impact the Army's
hard-fought modernization plan.
Implementing our strategy also includes honest assessments of where
the U.S. military has gaps, and moving rapidly to fix those gaps and
create problems for our adversaries.
One of our big gaps with the Chinese and the Russians is in our
outdated and inadequate test capabilities, and I think we'll hear a bit
about that today.
We need strong, capable civilian leadership in the department, so
thank you all again for your willingness to serve.
Chairman Reed.
Chairman Reed. Now, Mr. Guertin, could you please give your
statement.
STATEMENT OF NICKOLAS GUERTIN, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Guertin. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to be
with you here today. I am humbled to be considered to serve as
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. I would like
to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Deputy
Secretary Hicks for entrusting me with this nomination. I would
also like to thank my family, who you see behind me, for their
support: Maria, my wife of almost 20 years and our twin
children, Enrico and Isabella, of whom we are both immensely
proud.
The greatest asset of the Department of Defense is
undoubtedly its people. Our men and women in uniform and our
civilian and contractor workforce make the American military
the best in the world. However, our ability to defend the
Nation also depends on the capabilities of our technologies,
which must be tested as they would be used in combat. Injecting
operationally realistic testing early into a program's
development allows the Department to implement affordable,
comprehensive changes, making the best and most efficient use
of taxpayer resources, and ultimately, achieving the greatest
possible performance. Transparency on the results of those
tests are critical to ensuring the most effective, suitable,
survivable, and where necessary, lethal performance. If
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the office of the
Director for Operational Test and Evaluation will deliver an
independent, objective, and authoritative evaluation of system
performance to you and to Secretary Austin.
Testing the way we fight in the future will require
evolutionary and revolutionary changes, ones that cannot be
successfully planned or implemented without teamwork. It will
require increased reliance on state-of-the-art test
infrastructure and tools, and a well-trained test and
evaluation workforce in order to support faster and more
efficient evaluation of complex, interconnected systems in a
joint, multi-domain operational environment. It will require
reliance on innovative methods like credible virtual
environments and modeling and simulation tools to complement
on-range and laboratory testing. If confirmed, I am committed
to working closely with our research and engineering community,
acquisition programs, and the Services so that together we can
most effectively deliver capability to the Joint Force.
I take this commitment to national security seriously,
having spent the past four decades working on, developing,
testing, fielding, and researching the acquisition of military
systems. I started my career as an enlisted nuclear power plant
operator on submarines. I later transitioned to the Reserves
and after graduating college, landed a job as a Navy civilian
engineer. Shortly afterwards I was also commissioned as a Navy
Reserve engineering duty officer. This citizen-sailor pairing
would serve me well for the following decade by keeping me
grounded in what it took to do maintenance, operations, and
testing in the fleet, while also developing new systems.
Testing had long been a central tenet to this experience, from
developing automated test equipment for weapon components, to
testing and deploying new sensors and combat management systems
that were built to change and improve over time.
Improving acquisition practices for national security
systems has long been a passion of mine. It started when I was
fortunate enough to be on the team that pioneered the use of
open architectures for sonar systems in the mid- 1990s. I have
been on the forefront of developing and applying a wide array
of improved acquisition practices, and helping others do the
same ever since. More recently, while at Carnegie Mellon
University's Software Engineering Institute, I learned a great
deal more about the evolving practices of software-reliant
system architectures, test automation, artificial intelligence
and machine learning, to name a few. While at the SEI, I have
also extended the research I performed while in government on
advanced systems development methods for improving DOD
acquisition.
As Secretary Austin has testified, ``We have the greatest
equipment in the world.'' If confirmed, it is my objective to
ensure that assessment continues to hold true, providing for
the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable fighting
force in the world. It would be an honor to contribute to that
mission, and to serve as the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guertin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Nickolas Guertin
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is a privilege to be with you here today. I am
humbled to be considered to serve as the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation. I would like to thank President Biden, Secretary
Austin, and Deputy Secretary Hicks for entrusting me with this
nomination. I would also like to thank my family whom you see behind me
for their support; Maria, my wife of almost 20 years and our twin
children Enrico and Isabella of whom we are both immensely proud.
The greatest asset of the Department of Defense is undoubtedly its
people. Our men and women in uniform and our civilian and contractor
workforce make the American military the best in the world. However,
our ability to defend the Nation also depends on the capabilities of
our technologies, which must be tested as they would be used in combat.
Injecting operationally realistic testing early into a program's
development allows the Department to implement affordable,
comprehensive changes, making the best and most efficient use of
taxpayer resources, and ultimately, achieving the greatest possible
performance. Transparency on the results of those tests are critical to
ensuring the most effective, suitable, survivable, and where necessary,
lethal performance. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation will deliver
an independent, objective, and authoritative evaluation of system
performance to you and to Secretary Austin.
Testing the way we fight in the future will require evolutionary
and revolutionary changes - ones that cannot be successfully planned or
implemented without teamwork. It will require increased reliance on
state-of-the art test infrastructure and tools, and a well-trained test
and evaluation workforce in order to support faster and more effective
evaluation of complex, interconnected systems in a joint, multi-domain
operational environment. It will require reliance on innovative methods
like credible virtual environments and modeling and simulation tools to
complement on-range and laboratory testing. If confirmed, I am
committed to working closely with our research and engineering
community, acquisition programs, and the Services so that together, we
can most effectively deliver capability to the Joint Force.
I take this commitment to national security seriously, having spent
the past four decades working on, developing, testing, fielding, and
researching the acquisition of military systems. I started my career as
an enlisted nuclear power plant operator on submarines. I later
transitioned to the Reserves and after graduating college, landed a job
as a Navy civilian engineer. Shortly afterwards I was also commissioned
as a Reserve engineering duty officer. This citizen-sailor pairing
would serve me well for the following decade by keeping me grounded in
what it took to do maintenance, operations, and testing in the fleet,
while also developing new systems. Testing had long been a central
tenet to this experience, from developing automated test equipment for
weapon components, to testing and deploying new sensor and combat
management systems that were built to change and improve over time.
Improving acquisition practices for national security systems has
long been a passion of mine. It started when I was fortunate enough to
be on the team that pioneered the use of open architectures for sonar
systems in the mid-1990s. I have been on the forefront of developing
and applying a wide array of improved acquisition practices, and
helping others do the same ever since. More recently, while at Carnegie
Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, I learned a great
deal about the evolving practices of software-reliant system
architectures, DevOps practices, the application of machine learning
and artificial intelligence, and test automation to name a few. While
at the SEI, I have also extended the research I performed while in
Government on advanced systems development methods for improving DOD
acquisition outcomes.
As Secretary Austin has testified: ``We have the greatest equipment
in the world.'' If confirmed, it is my objective to ensure that
assessment continues to hold true, providing for the best trained, best
equipped, and most capable warfighting force in the world. It would be
an honor to contribute to that mission, and to serve as the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Guertin. Ms. Baker,
please.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDRA BAKER, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Ms. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also to the
Ranking Member and members of this committee. It is an honor to
be before you today as President Biden's nominee for the
position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I am
grateful to the President, Secretary Austin, and Undersecretary
Kahl for their trust and confidence in me.
I want to thank my husband, Sam, who is here with me today
and who shares my deep commitment to the values this nation was
founded upon. I also want to acknowledge my mother, who is
watching at home, and who came to this country as a refugee and
taught me the importance of giving back, and my father, who
enlisted in the Army in 1969, and who always considered his
military service to be the formative experience of his life. He
passed away earlier this year, but it is my honor to continue
the family tradition of service.
The job of the Department of Defense is to deter
adversaries and to fight and win the nation's wars should
deterrence fail--in short, to keep Americans safe. There is no
more sacred mission. Today we have entered a new era of
strategic competition, and we must update our policies, our
operations, our capabilities, and our workforce to meet the
moment. I believe that there is no time to waste.
China is the pacing challenge for the Department. As the
President's Interim National Security Guidance states, it is
the only competitor that is capable of combining its economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a
sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.
To meet this challenge, we will need to invest in capabilities
that are relevant not to the last fight but to future ones. We
will need creative and agile operational concepts and plans
that rapidly assimilate and take advantage of technological
advances. We will need a high-end, combat-capable, and ready
force that is forward positioned, distributed, and resilient.
We will need to operate seamlessly across all domains, and we
will need increased interoperability with strong and capable
partners and allies who are proficient in their warfighting
roles. If I am confirmed, I will work tirelessly to support
those priorities.
As the NSC's Senior Director for Strategic Planning, I have
been tasked with drafting the President's national security
strategy and coordinating it with our departments and agencies,
and as well with our closest allies and partners. At the same
time, the Department has been updating the National Defense
Strategy, building on the strong foundation provided in the
2018 NDS to reflect new developments in the strategic
environment and new insights about the intentions and the
capabilities of our adversaries. If confirmed, my first
priority will be to help implement the NDS, with a focus on
better integrating Policy's work with other DOD components,
with our interagency partners, and with our allies.
Beyond implementing the NDS, if confirmed, I will also seek
to support the Under Secretary in executing his priorities.
These include rising to the challenge China poses. It includes
defeating the COVID-19 pandemic, which remains the most
immediate threat to U.S. national security and to the health,
safety, and readiness of our men and women in uniform.
We also continue to face a growing cyber threat from both
state and non-state actors, including to our critical
infrastructure. The Department will need to continue to defend
forward to protect its networks, while building the resilience
necessary to deny our adversaries' ability to threaten our
nation in this domain.
Climate change represents another Department-wide focus,
given its potential to drastically change the operational
environment, and its current impact on our bases and facilities
around the world. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that
Policy is best positioned to advance these priorities.
We have the greatest military in the world, but at the end
of the day it is about people, both our servicemembers and
civilian workforce. I believe that Policy is the beating heart
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is the place
where deep expertise and longstanding regional relationships
meet next-generation approaches that integrate new concepts,
new ideas, and new warfighting capabilities.
The Policy organization has been challenged in recent
years, and if confirmed in this role I will seek to assist the
Under Secretary in leading and renewing the organization,
breaking down silos, facilitating communication and cooperative
approaches, and improving effectiveness. My commitment to the
workforce will be to focus relentlessly on organizational
health and morale, so that Policy is postured to provide a
strong and constructive civilian voice in the Department for
years to come.
As a former Senate staffer, I have a deep appreciation for
the critical role that this committee and this body plays. I
want to express my gratitude to the committee for its many
decades of bipartisan, cooperative focus on the defense of our
nation and for your thoughtful oversight of our military. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with you in a spirit of
partnership to continue that tradition.
Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement by Sasha Baker
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of this
Committee.
It is an honor to be before you today as President Biden's nominee
for the position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I'm
grateful to the President, Secretary Austin, and Undersecretary Kahl
for their trust and confidence in me.
I want to thank my husband Sam, who is here with me today and who
shares my deep commitment to the values this nation was founded upon. I
also want to acknowledge my mother, who came to this country as a
refugee and who taught me the importance of giving back; and my father,
who enlisted in the Army in 1969 and who always considered his military
service to be the formative experience of his life. He passed away
earlier this year, but it is my honor to continue our family tradition
of service.
The job of the Department of Defense is to deter adversaries and to
fight and win the nation's wars should deterrence fail - in short, to
keep Americans safe. There is no more sacred mission.
Today, we have entered a new era of strategic competition, and we
must update our policies, our operations, our capabilities, and our
workforce to meet the moment. There is no time to waste.
China is the pacing challenge for the Department. As the
President's Interim National Security Guidance states, it is the only
competitor capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and
technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open
international system.
To meet this challenge, we will need to invest in capabilities
relevant not to the last fight but to future ones. We will need
creative and agile operational concepts and plans that rapidly
assimilate and take advantage of technological advances. We will need a
high-end, combat-capable, and ready force that is forward positioned,
distributed, and resilient. We will need to operate seamlessly across
all domains. And we will need increased interoperability with strong
and capable partners and allies proficient in their warfighting roles.
If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to support these requirements.
As the NSC's Senior Director for Strategic Planning, I have been
tasked with drafting the President's national security strategy and
coordinating it with our departments and agencies, as well as with our
closest partners and allies. At the same time, the Department has been
updating the National Defense Strategy, building on the strong
foundation of the 2018 NDS to reflect new developments in the strategic
environment and new insights about the intentions and capabilities of
our adversaries. If confirmed, my first priority will be to help
implement this NDS, with a focus on better integrating Policy's work
with other DOD components, with our interagency partners, and with our
allies.
Beyond implementing the NDS, if confirmed, I will also seek to
support the Undersecretary in executing his priorities. These include
rising to the challenge China poses. It means defeating the COVID-19
pandemic, which remains the most immediate threat to U.S. national
security and to the health, safety and readiness of our men and women
in uniform. We also continue to face a growing cyber threat from both
state and non-state actors, including to our critical infrastructure,
and the Department will need to continue to defend forward to protect
its networks, while building the resilience necessary to deny our
adversaries' ability to threaten our nation in this domain. Climate
change represents another Department-wide focus, given its potential to
drastically change the operational environment, and its current impact
on our bases and facilities around the world. If confirmed, I am
committed to ensuring that Policy is best positioned to advance these
priorities.
We have the greatest military in the world, but at the end of the
day it's about people - both servicemembers and civilian employees.
Policy is the beating heart of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the place where deep expertise and longstanding regional relationships
meet next-generation approaches that integrate new concepts, ideas, and
warfighting capabilities. The Policy organization has been challenged
in recent years, and if confirmed in this role, I will seek to assist
the Undersecretary in leading and renewing the organization - breaking
down silos, facilitating communication and cooperative approaches, and
improving effectiveness. My commitment to the workforce will be to
focus relentlessly on organizational health and morale, so that Policy
is postured to provide a strong, constructive civilian voice in the
Department for years to come.
As a former Senate staffer, I have a deep appreciation for the
critical role this body plays. I want to express my gratitude to the
committee for its many decades of bipartisan, cooperative focus on the
defense of our nation and for your thoughtful oversight of our
military. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you in a spirit
of partnership to continue that tradition.
Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Ms. Baker. Mr. Coffey, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN COFFEY, NOMINEE TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Mr. Coffey. Thank you, Chairman Reed and other
distinguished members of this committee. I want to begin by
thanking my wife of over 32 years, Anne, and our children Kate,
Cameron, and Conor. I cannot say enough about what their
support, and patience, has meant as I pursued parallel careers
in the law and in the Navy. I am so pleased that Anne and Conor
could be here today.
I am very grateful to President Biden for his trust and
confidence in nominating me to serve as General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy. I thank the committee and its staff for
making time over the past few weeks to discuss my nomination. I
am eager to return to public service, and hope to earn your
support.
I would like to address briefly, why I believe that, if
confirmed, I would bring a number of pertinent strengths to the
role of Navy General Counsel. First, I have for over 30 years
led a varied career in the law, including several years as a
Federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York and as
a civil litigator handling some of the Nation's most
challenging and impactful cases. I have experience solving
difficult problems, building effective teams, providing candid,
timely counsel, and advocating for my clients' interests.
Second, I served in the United States Navy for over 30
years, as a midshipman at the Naval Academy, on active duty for
8 years, and, after graduating from Georgetown Law's night
program while I was stationed here in Washington, as a
reservist for 18 years. I served in several operational roles,
including as a P-3 Orion mission commander tracking Soviet
submarines, and I was privileged to be selected twice for
command. In Washington, I had the opportunity to serve as
personal aide to Vice President George H. W. Bush and to serve
in various Pentagon policy and planning roles.
Third, I bring the perspective of a child of immigrants. I
am humbled by the opportunity that, if confirmed, I could once
again serve the country that drew my parents here from Ireland
seven decades ago. I grew up in a home where my six younger
siblings and I were told, on a near-daily basis, that if we did
our homework, applied ourselves, and went to Mass, there was no
limit to what we could accomplish in America.
Our family went through some tough times--my Dad was a
construction worker who was out of work when the economy went
sour--but our parents always reminded us that we were lucky
because we were American, and that because we had been given
this great gift, much was expected of us.
These principles have animated much of my life, leading me
to take the oath of office to protect and defend our
Constitution as a 17-year-old midshipman at Annapolis and,
after completing my obligated service, to continue to serve in
the Reserve for almost two decades while juggling a family and
career in New York. And, Senators, it is why I sit here today,
ready, if confirmed, to bring all of my experience, energy, and
love of country to the role of Navy General Counsel.
If confirmed, my top priority would be to ensure that the
Office of the General Counsel robustly supports the mission of
the Navy and Marine Corps by providing the timely, candid, and
accurate legal advice they need to carry out their missions
successfully. If confirmed, I would also focus on taking care
of our sailors, marines, Department civilians, and their
families, which I know firsthand as my tour as commanding
officer enables mission success. And, if confirmed, I would
seek to promote a culture where ethical decision-making is
paramount throughout the Department of the Navy.
Relatedly, I would work hard to leverage the office to
ensure that every taxpayer dollar that the Navy is given is
spent wisely, fully accounted for, and subject to effective
oversight and full transparency to this committee and to the
American public.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with Navy Secretary
Del Toro, the senior leadership of the Pentagon, and this
committee, doing so in the bipartisan tradition that is a
prized hallmark of this committee.
Thank you for your consideration of my nomination. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. John Coffey
Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other
distinguished members of this Committee.
I want to begin by thanking my wife of over thirty-two years, Anne,
and our children Kate, Cameron, and Conor. I cannot say enough about
what their support, and patience, has meant as I pursued parallel
careers in the law and in the Navy. I am so pleased that Anne and Conor
could be here today.
I am very grateful to President Biden for his trust and confidence
in nominating me to serve as General Counsel of the Department of the
Navy. I thank the Committee and its staff for making time over the past
few weeks to discuss my nomination. I am eager to return to public
service, and hope I can earn your support.
I would like to address briefly why I believe that, if confirmed, I
would bring a number of pertinent strengths to the role of Navy General
Counsel.
First, I have for over thirty years led a varied career in the law,
including several years as a federal prosecutor in the Southern
District of New York and as a civil litigator handling some of the
country's most challenging and impactful cases. I have experience
solving difficult problems; building effective teams; providing candid,
timely counsel; and advocating for my clients' interests.
Second, I served in the United States Navy for over thirty years,
as a midshipman at the Naval Academy, on active duty for eight years,
and, after graduating from Georgetown Law's night program while
stationed here in Washington, as a reservist for eighteen years. I took
on several operational roles--including as a P-3 Orion mission
commander tracking Soviet submarines--and I was privileged to be
selected twice for command. In Washington, I had the opportunity to
serve as personal aide to Vice President George H.W. Bush and in
Pentagon policy and planning roles.
Third, I bring the perspective of a child of immigrants. I am
humbled by the possibility that, if confirmed, I could once again serve
the country that drew my parents here from Ireland seven decades ago. I
grew up in a home where my six younger siblings and I were told on a
near-daily basis that, if we did our homework, applied ourselves, and
went to Mass, there was no limit to what we could accomplish in
America. Our family went through some tough times--my Dad was a
construction worker who was often out of work when the economy soured--
but our parents always reminded us that how lucky we were to be
American. And that because we had been given this great gift, much was
expected of us.
These principles have animated much of my life, leading me to take
the oath to protect and defend our Constitution as a 17-year old
midshipman at Annapolis and, after completing my obligated active duty
service, to continue to serve in the Navy Reserve for almost two
decades while juggling a career and a family. And it's why I sit here
today, ready--if confirmed--to bring all of my experience, energy, and
love of country to the role of Navy General Counsel.
If confirmed, my top priority would be to ensure that the Office of
the General Counsel robustly supports the mission of the Navy and
Marine Corps by providing the timely, candid, and accurate legal advice
they need to carry out their missions successfully.
I would if confirmed also focus on taking care of our sailors,
marines, Department civilians, and their families, which I know
firsthand enables mission success.
And if confirmed, I would seek to promote a culture where ethical
decision-making is paramount throughout the Department. Relatedly, I
would work hard to leverage the Office of the General Counsel to ensure
that every taxpayer dollar given to the Department of the Navy is spent
wisely, fully accounted for, and subject to effective oversight and
full transparency to this Committee and to the American public.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with Navy Secretary Del
Toro, the senior leadership of the Pentagon, and this Committee, doing
so in the bipartisan tradition that is a prized hallmark of this
Committee.
Thank you for your consideration. I am happy to answer your
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Coffey. Mr. Bush, please.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS BUSH, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bush. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members
of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. I am humbled by the
faith President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Secretary Wormuth
have placed in me by nominating me to fill this critical role
in the United States Army. I am also humbled to sit before you,
leaders of an institution,
the United States Congress, where it was my honor and
privilege to serve as a staff member for almost 19 years.
I would like to start by thanking the many people who have
supported me during my 28 years of public service, starting
with my wife, Trisha, who has been at my side for 24 of those
years, my father and mother, Donald and Sandra Bush, who
sacrificed greatly to give me every opportunity in life to
succeed, and the many superb Army officers and noncommissioned
officers who taught me what it means to serve my country and to
lead soldiers, both at West Point and during my time as a young
officer.
Here in Congress, I was fortunate to work for many members
on both sides, but I owe my chance to serve in Congress
especially to Senator Bill Nelson, Congressman Jim Cooper,
Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Congressman Ike Skelton, and
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith.
Finally, I want to thank the outstanding Army officers and
civilians I was honored to work with during my 6 months as an
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army earlier this year. If
confirmed, I am eager to take on the challenge of leading the
Army's acquisition enterprise during a period of dramatic
change. The Army is in the early years of what promises to be
its most significant equipment modernization in nearly 40
years.
If confirmed, I would be responsible for bringing to
fruition many efforts that a talented and dedicated group of
Army military and civilian leaders who came before me set in
motion. Having supported congressional oversight of Army
programs for many years, and serving in the role I have been
nominated for in an Acting capacity for 6 months, I am
confident I know how to achieve this goal.
If confirmed, I would work diligently to meet the
objectives of Secretary Wormuth, other Department senior
leaders, and Congress. My priorities would include the
following. First, I would place a laser-like focus on program
execution and performance to ensure rapid delivery of improved
equipment to our soldiers. For many years, Congress has
directed acquisition reforms on accelerating the pace of
delivery. I will orient my decisions toward taking action to
advance programs and deliver effective equipment, while
ensuring appropriate oversight of program cost and performance.
Second, I believe the Army must get better at acquiring
software, using all the available tools that Congress has
provided. Many efforts are underway to shift software
acquisition from an industrial age to an information age
approach. If confirmed, I intend to further accelerate those
efforts.
Third, the Army must return to a focus on security in its
acquisition efforts, including cybersecurity and supply chain
security. Both are necessary to deliver capabilities
uncompromised by the aggressive efforts of China, Russia, and
other countries.
Fourth, I believe that realistic operational testing is an
aid, rather than a hindrance, to delivering effective equipment
for the Army. Taking a little extra time and effort to fully
test systems up front ensures that contractors are held
accountable and problems are identified on test ranges rather
than in combat.
Finally, and most critically, I will work to ensure Army
modernization is closely coordinated with Congress. The Army
cannot achieve any of its modernization goals without the
support of, and partnership with, Congress.
In closing, I want to assure members that while the
position I have been nominated for deals principally with the
acquisition of equipment, I am also aware of the larger context
our Army faces. The potential threats to our military are many.
We are tested by our adversaries on a seemingly daily basis.
While Army acquisition is only a small part of confronting
these challenges, I believe it is also a vital one. Our
soldiers are the best in the world. They represent the very
best of America. They deserve the very best equipment the
country can provide. Our soldiers stand on the front line of
freedom around the world. Providing them with what they need to
deter our enemies and, if necessary, fight and defeat them, is
an enormous responsibility. It is one that, if confirmed, I
will take very seriously every moment of every day.
I look forward to your questions today and, if confirmed,
to working with this committee to support the United States
Army.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bush follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Douglas Ross Bush
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee,
I am honored to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to
be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology. I am humbled by the faith President Biden, Secretary
Austin, and Secretary Wormuth have placed in me by nominating me to
fill this critical role in the United States Army. I am also humbled to
sit before you - leaders of an institution, the United States Congress,
where it was my honor and privilege to serve as a staff member for
almost 19 years.
I would like to start by thanking the many people who have
supported me during my 28 years of public service. Starting with my
wife Trisha, who has been at my side for 24 of those years, my father
and mother, Donald and Sandra Bush, who sacrificed to give me every
opportunity in life to succeed, and the many superb Army officers who
taught me what it means to serve my country and lead soldiers, both at
West Point and during my time as a young officer. Here in Congress, I
was fortunate to work for many members on both sides, but I owe my
chance to serve in Congress to Senator Bill Nelson, Congressman Jim
Cooper, Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Congressman Ike Skelton, and
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith. Finally, I want to
thank the outstanding Army officers and civilians I was honored to work
with during my six months as an Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
earlier this year.
If confirmed, I am eager to take on the challenge of leading the
Army's acquisition enterprise during a period of dramatic change. The
Army is in the early years of what promises to be its most significant
equipment modernization effort in nearly 40 years. If confirmed, I
would be responsible for bringing to fruition many efforts that a
talented and dedicated group of Army military and civilian leaders who
came before me set in motion.
Having supported Congressional oversight of Army programs for
fourteen years, and serving in the role I have been nominated for in an
Acting capacity for six months, I am confident I know how to achieve
this goal. If confirmed, I would work diligently to meet the objectives
of Secretary Wormuth, other Department senior leaders, and Congress. My
priorities would include the following:
First, I would place a laser-like focus on program execution and
performance to ensure rapid delivery of improved equipment to our
soldiers. For many years, Congress has directed acquisition reforms on
accelerating the pace of delivery. I will orient my decisions toward
taking action to advance programs and deliver effective equipment,
while ensuring appropriate oversight of program cost and performance.
Second, the Army must get better at acquiring software, using all
available tools granted by Congress to get there. Many efforts are
underway to shift software acquisition from an industrial age to an
information age approach. If confirmed, I intend to further accelerate
those efforts.
Third, the Army must return to a focus on security in its
acquisition efforts - including cyber security and supply chain
security. Both are necessary to deliver capabilities uncompromised by
the aggressive efforts of China, Russia, and other countries.
Fourth, I believe that realistic operational testing is an aid,
rather than a hindrance, to the acquisition of effective equipment for
the Army. Taking a little extra time and effort to fully test systems
up front ensures that contractors are held accountable and problems are
identified on test ranges rather than in combat.
Finally - and most critically - I will work to ensure Army
modernization is closely coordinated with Congress. The Army cannot
achieve any of its modernization goals without the support of, and
partnership with, Congress.
In closing, I want to assure members that while the position I have
been nominated for deals principally with acquisition of equipment, I
am also aware of the larger context our Army faces. The potential
threats to our military are many. We are tested by our adversaries on a
seemingly daily basis.
While Army acquisition is only a small part of confronting these
challenges, I believe it is also a vital one. Our soldiers are the best
in the world. They represent the very best of America. They deserve the
very best equipment the country can provide.
Our soldiers stand on the front line of freedom around the world.
Providing them with what they need to deter our enemies and, if
necessary, fight and defeat them, is an enormous responsibility. It is
one that, if confirmed, I will take very seriously every moment of
every day.
I look forward to your questions today and, if confirmed, to
working with this committee to support the United States Army.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Bush. Now I have a series of
questions which are directed to all civilian nominees. You may
answer together.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Guertin. Yes.
Ms. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Coffey. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Guertin. No.
Ms. Baker. No.
Mr. Coffey. No.
Mr. Bush. No.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
committee when requested?
Mr. Guertin. Yes.
Ms. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Coffey. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Mr. Guertin. Yes.
Ms. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Coffey. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Mr. Guertin. Yes.
Ms. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Coffey. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Guertin. Yes.
Ms. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Coffey. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony before this
committee or any briefings they may give?
Mr. Guertin. Yes.
Ms. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Coffey. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. And now let me begin my round of
questions.
Mr. Guertin, as I alluded to in my opening statement, one
of the tensions we have is we have been trying to accelerate
the acquisition process, trying to keep it within cost
outlines, and frankly, there have been some real examples of
delay and cost overruns that are difficult to accept. And your
job is to be sort of, in a way, the cop on the street, to not
let anything through that is not of great quality and capable
of doing its job. So how do you intend to balance that need of
people yelling for speed and you saying, ``Stop. This is not
ready for prime time"?
Mr. Guertin. One of the hallmarks of my career has been to
be involved early in the development of products and thinking
about how they are architected before it is too late. Setting
the conditions for success early in the development program is
especially important in making sure that you get to the place
you want to in the end.
So, one of the things I would like to bring to the
operational test community is a shift-left mindset, getting
more involved in some of the early decision-makings and set up
those architectures and understanding how those systems are
going to interact with the other things around it before the
program gets so far down the road that they are going to be in
trouble later. I have been involved in enough acquisitions and
seen enough of these examples to fully appreciate where you are
coming from, and if confirmed, I will do my utmost to make sure
we minimize those kinds of outcomes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Ms. Baker, you indicated in your testimony that part of
your tasks will be to integrate a whole-of-government strategy,
including elements at the Department of Defense as well as
State as well as other nations. Can you just give a brief sort
or snapshot of how you intend to do this?
Ms. Baker. Sure, Senator. As I said in my opening
statement, I believe that China is the only adversary that is
capable of combining economic, diplomatic, militarily, and
technological might to pose a challenge to the United States. I
believe that they are proceeding in a whole-of- government
approach, and our response needs to be whole-of- government as
well. So, if I am confirmed, I would seek to work closely and
support the Under Secretary in working closely with our
interagency partners at the State Department and elsewhere to
ensure that our approach is integrated, not only across
military domains but across the interagency.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Mr. Coffey, the NDS Commission, in their 2018 report, which
has been very valuable to all of us, indicated that there is a
concern about the balance between civilian officials and the
military within the DOD, that civilian control, which is the
essence of our government, is not as robust as it should be.
Are there any actions you believe that need to be taken at the
Department of Navy to ensure that civilian control is foremost?
Mr. Coffey. Well, Senator, I agree. Mr. Chairman, I agree
that the principle of civilian control in the military is
paramount. I believe that with Secretary Austin at the helm of
the Pentagon and with Secretary Del Toro at the helm of the
Navy Department that they are asserting the primacy of civilian
control.
I am unaware of any specific action that needs to be taken
to emphasize that. If confirmed, I will certainly work with
Secretary Del Toro to see if he views that, and if need be,
take whatever actions he directs to try and reinforce the
principle that you just spoke to.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Coffey.
And finally, Mr. Bush, cybersecurity is a ubiquitous
problem, so my question is, do you think the Army, at this
juncture, with your experience, is correctly postured to
address the full spectrum of cyber?
Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman, I think the tools are in place, and
we have all the talent we need. I think now it is a question of
coordination and activity.
Within the acquisition world we have many efforts underway,
the Army does, to design cyber up front, to do more cyber
testing earlier, to work more closely with Army cyber and Army
intelligence to maintain awareness of the threat as it evolves.
I believe over time, though, it will need to become
something that is just part of everything we do, rather than
being viewed as an additional duty. There is much work to be
made, to be done over time, to ensure that full integration
takes place.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, and I want to thank the
witnesses for their statements and for their response. And let
me now recognize Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
too want to thank the witnesses for their statements. It seems
that I have been gone.
Chairman Reed. Well --
Senator Wicker. Ms. Baker, can you hear me?
Chairman Reed. Continue, sir.
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I can hear you.
Senator Wicker. Okay. I want those 15 seconds back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Now the lights came on.
Senator Wicker. Here we go.
Chairman Reed. You have got them.
Senator Wicker. Ms. Baker, thank you for your willingness
to serve. You said, in your opening statement, that China is
the pacing challenge, that the job of the Department of Defense
is to deter adversaries, that there is no time to waste. I
agree with you on all of that. And then in answer to a question
by the Chair, you referred to China as an adversary, and I
agree with that.
Let me ask about shipbuilding. I know it is going to come
as a shock to my colleagues on the committee but in 2010, China
commissioned 4 warships and the United States commissioned 3.
That was 2010. Five years later, China commissioned 12
warships; the United States commissioned 2. And in 2020, China
commissioned 26 new warships, and the United States only 3.
China now has the largest Navy in the world.
Are you concerned about the priority China has placed on
naval shipbuilding, and will you commit to supporting the
statutory congressional mandate for a 355-ship Navy?
Ms. Baker. Senator, yes, I am concerned about the emphasis
that China has put on building its fleet. I think that China
has pursued a strategy of seeking to thwart United States
advantages across the board, and certainly naval sea power is
one area.
If I am confirmed, I will support the plan of record. I
would just say, in addition to everything else, that we need to
be focused not only on the number of ships, which I agree is
critically important, but also the capabilities that those
ships bring to bear.
Senator Wicker. True, but there is a congressional mandate,
signed into law, passed by the Congress, House, and Senate, and
signed by the President, for 355 ships. Is that the plan of
record that you support?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, it is.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me switch to Taiwan. The Republic
of China owned the island of Formosa, the Taiwanese government.
It consists of 23 million citizens. They are the 21st largest
economy in the world. They operate under a constitution that
next year will be three-quarters of a century old. Do you
believe that the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan have
the right to self-determination?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Wicker. And do you believe that preventing an
invasion of Taiwan is in the national security interest of the
United States of America?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Wicker. And do you believe it is in the national
security interest of our friends and allies in the Pacific Rim?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Do you believe that they are currently
capable of preventing an invasion by the People's Republic of
China?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I would just say that our commitment to
supporting Taiwan's self-defense is longstanding, it is
bipartisan, and it is something that I am prepared to support,
moving forward.
Senator Wicker. And in my judgment, the best way to prevent
military conflict between the People's Republic and the
Republic of China is for us to have an adequate Navy in the
Pacific Rim and for the United States to assist Taiwan in
building up its defense. Do you agree with that?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, thank you very much. I am
concerned that, as a matter of policy, that the money that this
current Administration is requesting for military strength,
particularly naval strength in the Pacific, is inadequate, and
I do believe we are going to find support for that position on
both sides of the dais here on this committee. So, I look
forward to working with you. But I will tell you, we need to
change the trend and reverse the curve that we are currently
facing.
Thank you, ma'am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Let me recognize
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to all of our nominees this morning, and we
very much appreciate your willingness to continue to serve this
country.
Ms. Baker, I want to start with you, following up on some
of Senator Wicker's questions about China and the importance of
responding to the great power competition that we are now in.
We heard, over the weekend, the reports that China had fired a
hypersonic weapon. They walked that back, but it's very clear
that they're working on that. And then we've also heard in the
last day that North Korea has just fired two ballistic
missiles.
How high up on our priority list for both our national
defense strategy and for the Department should a response to
both the hypersonic weapons and to what North Korea is
currently doing be, and how should we be approaching that?
Ms. Baker. Thank you, Senator. As the Secretary has said,
China is the pacing threat for the Department of Defense, and
that means that we, I believe, if confirmed, will need to have
a sense of urgency about developing not only the capabilities
but the concepts of operation that will allow us to counter
some of the developments that we're seeing, the PRC put
forward. I think that they have pursued a strategy of seeking
to blunt U.S. advantages over a number of years, so not only in
terms of hypersonics but space and counter-space, cyber. All of
these are areas that, if confirmed, I would seek to prioritize.
As it relates to North Korea, certainly their continued
unwillingness to abide by their international obligations, the
rapid pace of missile testing that we have seen in recent
weeks, all of those things are concerning. I believe that the
Department has a responsibility to maintain a robust deterrent
to ensure that we have forces positioned, ready to fight
tonight on the peninsula, in order to provide that credible
deterrent to Kim Jung-un.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. You mentioned, in your opening
statement, the importance of personnel and that needs to be our
first priority. I was pleased to see Secretary Austin issue
some guidance around our personnel who might be affected by
Havana syndrome or the anomalous health incidents. But
obviously there is a lot more that we need to be doing to
respond to that. We need to get to the bottom of who is
responsible and how they are orchestrating these attacks.
So if confirmed, do I have your commitment to work closely
with this committee and provide timely updates on matters
pertaining to these attacks?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, absolutely. I have friends and
colleagues who have been affected by anomalous health
incidents. I take that very personally and I will commit to
work with you on this.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Guertin, I had the opportunity to go up on a KC-46 air
refueling mission with a crew from the 157th Refueling Wing at
Pease in New Hampshire. We were the first Guard base to get
those KC-46 tankers. But as you know, they are still not
operating the way they are supposed to operate. So if
confirmed, do I have your commitment to ensure that testing and
evaluation for the Remote Vision System 2.0 remains on
schedule?
Mr. Guertin. Yes, Senator. It is especially important that
the systems are tested the way they will be operated,
operationally, and to have those things come out as a part of
fielding them is not the time we want to discover those
problems.
Senator Shaheen. And will you ensure that the committee,
this committee, is notified of any further delays or problems
with that Remote Vision System?
Mr. Guertin. Yes, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Coffey, one of the big challenges that we have seen
across our military, and the Navy, unfortunately, has not been
exempt over the last decade, that has gotten a lot of attention
has been sexual assault, and obviously there have been concerns
about how to respond to that and the culture of the military
and how it seems to, if not promote at least condone sexual
assault and sexual harassment. So can you talk about what role
you can have, as legal counsel, to addressing this issue?
Mr. Coffey. Thank you, Senator. There is no place in the
Department of the Navy or anywhere in the military for sexual
harassment, sexual assault, or any of those destructive
behaviors, no room whatsoever. I was very distressed when I
read the IRC report to see that something that I saw in my own
active-duty days and reserve duty days, when we were first
integrating women into combat units was not only not solved, it
was worse. And it is very distressing to me.
I am very pleased to see that the IRC gave specific
recommendations and that Secretary Austin has directed that the
Department will carry out every one of those recommendations,
albeit some with some modifications. If I am confirmed, I would
vigorously support implementing those changes on the roadmap
that the Secretary of Defense has laid out. This is personal to
me. I was in a squadron that suffered a lot of tension and
disruption due to allegations of sexual assault. It was a
priority for me when I was a commander, and it is distressing
for me that many years later it is still a problem in the
Department.
But if I am confirmed, I am absolutely committed to helping
eradicate that scourge within the Department of the Navy.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I hope you will
make it a priority. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffey. I will, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator
Tuberville, which I think this sets the record for earliest
recognition. So Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for you
all being here today.
Mr. Bush, you being a former tanker, you know Anniston Army
Depot in Alabama is the only depot in the U.S. that performance
maintenance on our tanks. Give me your thoughts about the
future of our tank use in the United States military.
Mr. Bush. Senator, Anniston is part of the broader organic
industrial base that supports the whole Army, and a vital part.
We have to have it, and it has to be effective and efficient
with a good workforce. I believe as long as the Army has heavy
armored vehicles there will be a major role for Anniston in
supporting those efforts.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Coffey, we recently had
a young man arrested, court-martialed, because of saying
something on social media about the war in Afghanistan. What
are your thoughts on that?
Mr. Coffey. Well, Senator, I am vaguely aware of the
circumstances of which you speak and I understand it was
handled within the Uniform Code of Military Justice system,
which, of course, falls within the purview of the uniformed
lawyers within the Department. I understand that that process
may be ongoing, in at least one shape or form, so I would be
reluctant to offer any opinion on the specific facts of that
case.
But I will say this. I firmly believe in the First
Amendment. I believe in the right of every servicemember to
have the beliefs that they believe. But also if you pull on a
uniform, as I did for 30 years, you understand that there is a
time and a place to voice those and that you are, first and
foremost, a member of the military with a chain of command and
respect for your superiors. And again, not tying it to this
specific instance, but if you disobey direct orders, if your
conduct threatens good order and discipline, then under the
UCMJ you can, in my view, should be held accountable, again
without opining on the specific facts of that matter, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Sure. Thank you. Ms. Baker, your
thoughts?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I am not a lawyer. I am not an expert
on UCMJ. But as Mr. Coffey said, I am --
Senator Tuberville. But you are into team-building, right?
Ms. Baker. I do believe in prioritizing team-building. I
think, as Mr. Coffey said, everyone is entitled to their First
Amendment rights, but at the end of the day there is a chain of
command and that is something that we will expect our
servicemembers to adhere to.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah. We are in a business here of
team-building, as you said, and we need a strong and vibrant
military. I want to know what your opinion is and your
definition is of ``extremism.'' Could you tell me that?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I do not know that I can give you a
textbook definition of the term.
Senator Tuberville. Well, your thoughts.
Ms. Baker. What I can tell you is that I believe that the
vast majority of our servicemembers serve with honor and
distinction. As the Chairman said earlier, thought, to the
extent that there are individuals in the Services who are
seeking to disrupt that unity and that team-building that you
spoke of, that is something, I think, the Secretary has
indicated he intends to prioritize.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Guertin, Alabama is a fast-growing hub for commercial
engineering and software companies. What do you believe the DOD
should be doing to monitor the development of these
operational, new commercial systems that we have?
Mr. Guertin. So, Senator, the challenges we face in using
new systems that are based on commercial technologies, one
aspect to it is the supply chain--where are those things coming
from and are they secure and suitable for military use. Our use
case is not exactly the same as, you know, a university or your
home. So, we want to make sure that those products are suitable
to the task. But also, we want to take advantage of commercial
technologies that allow us to move faster and effectively into
the future.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your generosity.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. And now let
me recognize Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask the following two initial questions of all the
nominees who come before any of the committees on which I sit,
so I will ask the entire panel, in unison.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Mr. Guertin. No.
Ms. Baker. No.
Mr. Coffey. No.
Mr. Bush. No.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Guertin. No, Senator.
Ms. Baker. No.
Mr. Coffey. No.
Ms. Baker. No.
Senator Hirono. Ms. Baker, you were asked by Senator
Shaheen about China's hypersonic missiles and you said that
there would be a robust deterrent. And so I just wanted to also
mention and take note of what China is doing, and, of course,
as it impacts Hawaii, not to mention what North Korea's missile
testing is doing in the Indo-Pacific arena.
So, I just would like to ask you, since you acknowledged
that we need to have a robust deterrent, that the DOD budgets
will reflect this kind of robust deterrence in either this
budget or in the following budgets.
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I believe that the first
responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the
homeland. Of course, Hawaii is part of that. And so I would
expect that we would have robust and credible defense of Hawaii
and that we would put forward in the Indo-Pacific a credible
deterrent.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Mr. Coffey, earlier this month, The Washington Post
reported that Federal agents are investigating a new corruption
scandal involving alleged bribery and fraud related to service
contracts when our ships and submarines pull into ports in
Europe and the Middle East. I am concerned that these facts are
eerily reminiscent of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia, GDMA,
contracting scandal in the Indo-Pacific.
In a congressional hearing over 3 years ago, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations at that time assured my counterparts in the
House that the Navy had installed new layers of oversight in
its contracting process for overseas ports to thwart a report
of the GDMA type of scandal, but that does not seem to have
worked. If confirmed, what steps do you plan to take to ensure
adequate controls are in place to prevent fraud in these
overseas shipping service contracts?
Mr. Coffey. Senator, there is no room in the Navy for any
type of corruption along the lines of what you have described,
and I too was distressed to read about the MLS case a few weeks
ago. I thought there were encouraging signs in the wake of the
Glenn Defense Marine scandal, specifically the comprehensive
review relating to the uniformed lawyers in the Department and
some of the recommendations they had made, which are being
carried out and which I look forward to reviewing more closely,
if confirmed.
But it is clear that there are still problems, and if I am
confirmed, I would look to see how we can address those. From
my time as a Federal prosecutor and as a plaintiff's lawyer, I
believe in personal accountability, so I think this is a
problem that is going to need continuing focus of leadership,
focus on personal accountability, and reviewing what continues
to go wrong. I hope it is isolated, but If I am confirmed I am
going to try and get to the bottom of it.
Senator Hirono. Really, I think we need your commitment
that you will review whatever oversight procedures are already
in place, because the Navy hardly needs these kinds of
scandals.
Mr. Guertin, the Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility,
Banking Sands, PMRF, on Kauai, is the world's largest
instrumented, multidimensional testing and training range.
Continuing to integrate and upgrade PMRF, along with other
ranges in the Pacific, is critical to our national security,
and why that task is included as a line of effort within the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Have you ever visited PMRF?
Mr. Guertin. Not yet, Senator.
Senator Hirono. I hope you will. You know, I would like to
ask you, what is the importance of this kind of facility and
the importance of this type of initiative that I just
mentioned?
Mr. Guertin. Test ranges of the kinds that we have,
especially the one in Hawaii, is critical to our ability to
test weapons systems as they would be used in combat. All of
our facilities need to be examined for how they might be
modernized in the future. There is a great report turned out
recently by the National Academies that highlighted some of the
changes we need to make. If confirmed, I am looking forward to
getting into the details of that and working with the rest of
the DOT&E team to figure out to not just modernize but also
position these ranges so that they can keep pace with the
evolving needs for the long haul.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just want to
note for Ms. Baker that I do appreciate your mentioning that
climate change considerations are an important part of what you
will be focusing on. And so climate change considerations in
the operations, planning, and resource allocation decisions are
very important, so I wanted to note that.
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, and I would look forward, if
confirmed, to working with you on that.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Guertin, I
want to ask you some questions. You are nominated for a very
important position. One of your predecessors earlier this year,
Dr. Ray O'Toole, I think was the Acting in your position, came
before our Readiness Subcommittee and gave the following
testimony, which troubled Senator Sullivan and I, the Chair and
Ranking of the Readiness Subcommittee, and I quote, ``DOD's
acquisition and T&E communities need to address cybersecurity
more comprehensively. Unfortunately, some programs do not
properly plan for cybersecurity assessments. More critically,
due to poor system hardening against dynamic cyber threats
driven by lack of workforce, cyber capacity, talent, and tools
within the program offices, virtually none of the programs
assessed in fiscal year 2020 were survivable against relevant
cyber threats.''
That testimony was offered in an open hearing. Senator
Sullivan and I both looked at each other and said, ``Is this an
open hearing?'' and the witness, Dr. O'Toole, said, ``I got
this cleared for delivery of testimony in an open hearing.''
But it troubled us greatly that in the programs that were
tested by your office, should you be confirmed, in fiscal year
2020, virtually none of the programs were survivable against
relevant cyber threats.
Do you think the survivability failures are due to poor
acquisition policy or is there a larger cultural problem within
the DOD that we need to address to solve this, you know,
shocking weakness?
Mr. Guertin. Well, Senator, getting our cybersecurity right
on our weapons systems is critically important to them actually
being useful in the field. It is very affordable to attack our
systems before they actually make it to the field, to get to
the kinetic stage of the fight, so we have got to get this
right. And again, as I mentioned earlier, shifting left the
view of the operational test community to get into those early-
stage decisions before people start on the path to developing
their products, that they get those cybersecurity principles
right up front so that when they get out toward the end, when
we are doing the actual operational test side of it, that they
have positioned themselves well to be able to respond to the
continuous evolving threat. It would not be a big deal if we
were not being attacked all the time, and we are, and we need
to position ourselves well for that.
Senator Kaine. You have experience both in software
development and Navy weapons development, so I think you are in
a unique posture to make sure when we are doing acquisition and
early-stage work on these programs that we build in cyber
protections.
A second issue that has come up recently, a family in
Annapolis was caught by the FBI offering to sell classified
information on submarine reactor and propulsion design to
another country, and that demonstrates just how damaging
insider threats can be. The news report indicated that this
particular individual was storing classified information on an
SD card, hopefully to then transfer that information to another
country. From your time with Naval Surface Warfare Center, do
you think we do enough monitoring, or have enough monitoring
systems in place, to flag potentially harmful activity like
folks storing classified information on private SD cards?
Mr. Guertin. Senator, I am not familiar currently with the
protection of systems that is going on in, say specifically,
Naval Surface or Undersea Warfare Center. Having been an
employee at those kinds of facilities in the past, that they
actually do have very good protections. We did find this
problem before it got out of hand, so chalked it up as a little
bit of a win, but it is also dangerously close to getting it
too far out of hand before it would be a real problem. So, if
confirmed, I will make sure that the operational test community
and the systems that we use are well positioned to be able to
capture those things before they get out of hand.
Senator Kaine. And just, you know, to a non-expert--I am
not an expert--are there software systems or AI programs that
you think are sufficient to identify potentially harmful
activity of the kind that, you are right, we did catch it and
stopped the family from transferring the information. But do
you think that there is software, AI programs, that can help us
ensure that this kind of data and activity is protected?
Mr. Guertin. Senator, I could not make a definitive
statement about the specific use of machine learning or
artificial intelligence to capture that sort of activity. I do
know that there is some research going on in that area, form my
time at the Software Engineering Institute. So if confirmed, it
would be a pleasure to look into that and find out how we can
be more effective in that area.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. I appreciate it, Mr.
Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Hawley, if
you are ready you may begin.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses for being here.
Mr. Bush, if I could just start with you. I want to talk
first about something that is very important to my state, and
that is the Lake City Ammunition Plant, also important for the
Next Generation Squad Weapon. As you know, the Lake City Army
Ammunition Plant does vital work ensuring that our warfighters
are prepared and armed for any future conflict, and in
particular, that plant provides ammunition, produces
ammunition, for the Next Generation Squad Weapon.
Here is my question. Do I have your commitment to ensure
that Lake City will receive the facility upgrades that it needs
in order to continue to produce ammunition at the rate that we
need it to?
Mr. Bush. Senator, first let me say I was recently able to
visit the facility, so I saw firsthand the great work done
there and the great people that work there. Assuming the Army
stays on its current plan for that program it will need to
build that ammunition at Lake City. Preliminary work is
underway, and should the program stay on schedule I would
expect the Army to fund production efforts as well.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
Ms. Baker, let me come to you, and let us talk a little bit
about China, if we could. Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary
Hicks, and Under Secretary Kahl have all testified that the
U.S. has to maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait
accompli, vis-a-vis Taiwan. I have made it my habit in this
committee to ask every witness, practically, from DOD,
certainly those in a policymaking role, about this scenario,
which I think China not only being the pacing threat but the
Taiwan challenge the pacing scenario.
So if I could just ask for a yes or no from you, do you
agree with their testimony that it is vital that the U.S.
maintain the ability to defeat a potential fait accompli
against Taiwan?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Hawley. Very good. And do you agree that the
Department should be prioritizing this scenario as it develops
plans, concepts, and capabilities for the future?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do. I think a Taiwan contingency
is certainly among the most stressing scenarios that we can be
planning for, and for that reason it is critical that we
prioritize it.
Senator Hawley. Great. I am glad to hear that. Let me ask
you about another aspect of this. Admiral Davidson and Admiral
Aquilino have both testified to this committee that China may
attempt a fait accompli in Taiwan before the end of this
decade. Now it is widely thought that this is possible in the
2030s, but what caught my attention from both of them was their
testimony that this is something we should be planning for and
looking at in the 2020s. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and
the Chief of Naval Operations have both said that they agree
with that assessment, and the TRANSCOM Commander and other
officials have said the same.
Do you agree that the threat of a Chinese fait accompli
against Taiwan is something we need to be concerned about and
planning for in this decade and not just in the 2030s?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you something
adjacent to this. Secretary Austin wrote earlier this year, in
response to a question from me, and I am going to quote him
now, that ``a combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is
instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter and, if
necessary, to deny a fait accompli scenario.'' The Deputy
Secretary, the Under Secretary, and multiple commanders of
INDOPACOM have reaffirmed the Secretary's emphasis on denial.
Do you agree that a strategy of denial is essential for
deterring Chinese aggression?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me shift gears just a little
bit and ask you about some of the recent disturbing testimony
that this committee has heard with regard to the situation in
Afghanistan. Do you think it was appropriate for the United
States to draw down nearly all of its forces in Afghanistan
before we finished the evacuation of American citizens? And I
am thinking particularly given General Miller's warning that
the Afghan Security Forces and government could collapse
quickly.
Ms. Baker. Senator, not being at the Department right now,
I am familiar with the testimony that you are referencing. I
understand that the Department planned for a range of
contingencies, including different levels of troops on the
ground. I am not in a position, I think, to assess the details
of that planning.
Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin testified both to this
committee, and then more pointedly, actually, to the House
Armed Services Committee, that the non-combatant evacuation he
believes should have begun earlier. It is reported that General
Milley, reported in the press that General Milley said the same
thing, again even more pointedly, that DOD warned the White
House and State that the non-combatant evacuation had to begin
earlier. It did not, of course, and as a consequence hundreds
of civilians were killed, hundreds of Americans left behind, 13
servicemembers killed.
Do you agree with them, that the non-combatant evacuation
should have begun earlier in Afghanistan?
Ms. Baker. Senator, my understanding is that there was a
robust interagency discussion about the timing of the NEO
operations. I am simply not currently in a position where I
have the details that I would need to be able to really assess
that.
Senator Hawley. I have got another question, too, for you
about the forced planning construct in the 2018 NDS and a
couple of other things related also to Russia. I will submit
those for the record because my time has expired.
Thanks so much to all the witnesses, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me
recognize Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
follow Senator Hawley's questions about the impact of our
withdrawal from Afghanistan on both Americans who were left
there and our Afghan partners and allies, many of whom are
still there.
You mentioned that there was a robust interagency
discussion, and a number of actually visited the White House in
the spring, in April and May, to urge that there be
evacuations, and much more massive efforts at evacuations
beginning then and not waiting. Now you have been working on
the National Security Council. Are you saying that the National
Security Council was uninvolved in those discussions?
Ms. Baker. No, Senator. My role in the National Security
Council is primarily related to drafting the National Security
strategy. I was not involved in the operational planning for
the evacuation of Afghanistan.
Senator Blumenthal. So there was no preparation in terms of
strategy for that evacuation?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I believe that there was. It simply was
not in my job jar.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, looking forward in
terms of what we should do now, there have been nine planes
that have continued the evacuation effort. They are private
planes, not United States military planes. We have no presence
there, either diplomatically or militarily. Those nine planes
have evacuated approximately 300 people each, most of them
interpreters, translators, guards, security, personnel who
sided with us and literally put their lives on the line, risked
their families. But they are just a fraction of the total
number of Afghan allies and partners who remain there in very
severe danger. And the reason I am asking about it is because
they were of direct service to our men and women in uniform,
often going into harm's way with them, and the President has
committed to get them out.
Do you agree with me that we ought to make, as a
precondition of any serious talks or conversations or
discussions with the Taliban that they permit all of those
Afghan allies, who sided with us, to leave if they want to do
so?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I think we have a commitment that
we make as a military to our partners on the ground and that we
need to abide by that. I think that the safe passage of not
only American citizens and legal permanent residents but also
the Afghan partners that you describe should be a priority for
moving forward.
Senator Blumenthal. My office has been directly involved in
enabling a number of those planes to leave. It has been a
torturous day-and-night process, and my feeling often has been
that our own government is not as robustly supportive as it
could be. Do you commit that you will be actively engaged,
personally, with the Department of State in urging that we
fulfill our commitment to those Afghan partners and allies, as
well as the Americans who may still be there?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, and let me thank you for the work
that I know you have done on this issue and the leadership that
you have displayed. As you mentioned, the Department of State
does have the lead on this for the interagency, but if am
confirmed I will see to ensure that the Department of Defense
is providing all of the necessary support to the State
Department.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you be willing to support the use
of our United States military aircraft in that effort, if the
Taliban permitted it?
Ms. Baker. Senator that is not an issue I have looked at
directly, so I do not know that I can give you a direct answer.
But if confirmed, I certainly would seek to get the details of
what something like that could look like and have a follow-on
discussion.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Guertin, I want
to follow up on Senator Kaine's questions. There is no question
in my mind that if there is some level of conflict it will
begin with cyber. And we can have all the ships in the world in
the Pacific but if they are silenced, if they lose their
communications capability, their navigation capability, then
they are not going to be very effective in protecting the
interests of this country.
Will you pursue, actively and aggressively, testing for
cybersecurity of every system that comes under your purview in
this new position?
Mr. Guertin. Senator, the operational testing of software-
intensive, or software-reliant systems has to include
cybersecurity testing as a part of its suitability for
operational use. I believe that policy is already in place, but
I commit to you that we will make sure that it --
Senator King. To your knowledge, does this Department, this
division office have the capability to provide that kind of
cybersecurity testing? This is a specialized field. Do you have
hackers for hire in that office?
Mr. Guertin. So we have Red Team people that can go in and
have a high degree of expertise for doing penetration testing
and finding out where the vulnerabilities lie, and inform the
programs what they need to do to go in and fix it.
Senator King. I hope --
Mr. Guertin. I am not certain, though, that we have like
all of the people in place for testing every system. I would
have to look into that and get back to you, if confirmed.
Senator King. Well, I view this as an absolutely essential
and urgent part of your responsibility, in terms of supply
chain, in terms of acquisition of equipment. Nothing is going
to work if it is subject to a cyberattack.
Ms. Baker, one of your responsibilities will be to lead and
develop the Nuclear Posture Review. Without going into a great
deal of discussion, do you believe that no-first-use policy
should be part of the new nuclear policy?
Ms. Baker. Senator, as the Deputy Secretary testified when
she was last here, that is unlikely to be part of the Nuclear
Posture Review. That is ultimately a decision that is made by
the President of the United States. If I was confirmed, though,
I would seek to ensure--and I know that NPR is already well
underway--but to ensure that the product is analytically
rigorous, that it takes into account changes in the strategic
environment, which includes the fact that we are facing now two
nuclear-capable peer, near- peer adversaries, and that it
reflects the input and advice of all components of the
Department of Defense, to include our combatant commanders,
EUCOM, INDOPACOM, and STRATCOM, in particular. Ultimately, I
think our obligation is to provide the best analytic product to
the President in order to inform his choices.
Senator King. Thank you. We just heard about the launch of
a Chinese hypersonic missile into orbit and then out of orbit.
We are still talking about missile defense, hitting a bullet
with a bullet. I am concerned that for years we have been
talking about directed energy as a possible solution, and yet
it just does not seem to be getting the attention, the research
money that I believe it deserves in terms of its future
capability. We are not going to be able to do missile defense
against a hypersonic missile. I think it is very unlikely.
Will you commit to, in terms of policy, looking hard at
directed energy as a potential asset in the new world of
missile defense?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I think there are a number of
emerging and advanced technologies that we need to do a better
job of incorporating into our concepts and our war planning,
and certainly I would put directed energy in that category.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Coffey, I have to begin by asking you, you were a P-3
commander. Were you ever at Brunswick?
Mr. Coffey. Only three different squadrons, Senator.
Senator King. Only three different squadrons.
Mr. Coffey. I was there for about 10 years of my 30 years,
including command of Patrol Squadron 92.
Senator King. At Brunswick Naval Air Station?
Mr. Coffey. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Congratulations.
Mr. Coffey. Thank you.
Senator King. In your advanced testimony, you mentioned
accession to the Convention of the Law of the Sea would
strengthen our global security posture. As a lawyer, do you see
any legal objections to the accession of this country to the
Law of the Sea Convention?
Mr. Coffey. Senator, the Navy has been abiding by the
tenets of that --
Senator King. We are abiding by it, but the problem is we
are not at the table.
Mr. Coffey. We are not. We are not. And I do not see any
legal obstacle to us signing on formally to that.
Senator King. Do you think it is a strategic disadvantage
to us to not be at the table under the Law of the Sea
Convention?
Mr. Coffey. I think our voice would carry more weight if we
were at the table. I mean, we carry a lot of weight regardless,
and I know our allies are abiding by it as well. But that is
actually something in the purview of the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, and I certainly, if confirmed, would
confer with her to see what we could do to advance the ball on
that.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. I thank each of
you for being here. Congratulations on your nominations and
your willingness to serve.
Just two weeks ago, the Chinese military sent nearly 150
war planes over Taiwanese airspace, and we have heard the
Communist Party General Secretary Xi express his intentions for
taking over Taiwan. We have a long military relationship with
the Taiwanese people, and it is one of our most strategic
partners in the region, and I think we would all agree they
deserve our complete support.
Ms. Baker, if confirmed, would you support providing Taiwan
with robust military training and expertise to ensure its armed
forces present a combat-credible deterrent?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I think that our commitments under the
Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan's self-defense are
longstanding, they are partisan, and I intend to support them,
if confirmed.
Senator Scott. So you would support robust military
training and expertise to ensure that they are a credible
threat.
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I would support meeting our
commitments under the TRA.
Senator Scott. Would you consider such military support to
include individual and unit-level training as well as training
for operations that would make cooperation with U.S. and our
other militaries more effective if Taiwan required it to defend
itself?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I have not looked at that question
specifically so I think I need to dig into some of the details
and maybe get back to you with a more definitive answer. But
certainly I think that it is incredibly important that we
improve the interoperability of our military to work with our
partners and allies in the region, particularly as it might
relate to a Taiwan scenario.
Senator Scott. I realize the primary goal for the United
States is to enhance Taiwan's ability to engage in asymmetric
warfare with a much stronger China, and I think we all would
agree with that. But shouldn't we also consider ways to help
Taiwan defend itself and hopefully be a great deterrent for
whatever Communist China might throw at it, such as an enhanced
Iron Dome system or greater anti-missile defense system, to
make it clear to General Secretary Xi that he will not be
permitted to take Taiwan by force?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I again have not looked specifically at
the concept of an Iron Dome-like system. I understand that
Taiwan is pursuing a strategy of building robust, lethal,
mobile asymmetric capabilities that I think makes a great deal
of sense. But certainly these are all things that I think we
can look at, and should look at carefully.
Senator Scott. It has clearly worked for Israel, and this
would be totally different. I mean, the capabilities of
Communist China are totally different. But this concept of
making the Taiwanese people comfortable, and telling Xi that he
will not be able to take them by force I think would be
helpful. Don't you agree?
Ms. Baker. Senator, certainly everything I know about the
operation of the Iron Dome system in Israel indicates that it
has been remarkably successful. I simply have not considered
how that might translate into the Indo-Pacific.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Bush, we are hearing of reports that Communist China
has successfully tested a hypersonic weapon that is capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead. We are also hearing that these
reports surprised our intelligence community and Pentagon
leadership. Do you believe that is true, and do you believe
that the United States is comfortably ahead of China on nuclear
warheads, or is this launch evidence that we have a lot of work
to do to modernize our nuclear capability?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I have not received the specific
classified briefing on that event yet. I am sure there are
classified details I would need to know before giving you a
good answer, sir. More broadly speaking, the entire DOD,
including the Army, does need to continue to work rapidly to
improve our deterrence capability, including in the area of
hypersonic missiles.
Senator Scott. All right. Ms. Baker and Mr. Guertin, what
do you think about these reports about the hypersonic, and were
we surprised, and do you believe that we need to modernize our
nuclear arsenal to be able to defend ourselves against an
aggressive communist leadership in China?
Ms. Baker. Senator, as Mr. Bush said, I think it is
difficult to discuss the details in this open session, but
certainly I agree a modern and credible nuclear deterrent is
essential to homeland defense, moving forward.
Mr. Guertin. I concur with Ms. Baker on that point.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to
each of our nominees. Welcome. And I want to say a special
thank you to Ms. Baker for her commitment to serve. Her
intellect and her integrity is matched only by her deep and
abiding commitment to public service, and I was fortunate to
benefit from her advice and counsel. She is precisely the kind
of person that we should all hope agrees to serve in our
government.
Mr. Guertin, I would like to start with you today. There is
something I would like to be able to ask about, and that is the
annual report published by the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation. This is one of the most important report cards for
determining whether or not our weapons are working. The Section
809 panel, created by Congress, to streamline and improve
defense acquisition found that the annual report, and I am
going to quote here, ``assists with both the office's internal
success and the ability of Congress to exercise proper
oversight.''
Now, this is where it is important to me to get some
commitments from you. There is always pressure to keep elements
of this report away from the public. So, Mr. Guertin, do you
agree that this report must remain available to the public, to
the maximum extent possible?
Mr. Guertin. So Senator, transparency on how our weapons
systems are doing is especially important so that the public
knows that we are doing a good job with the money we have or
where we are not quite living up to our expectations. I commit
to you that we will have an unclassified report. I will also
assert that some of the stuff might be a little sensitive that
perhaps might be better suited for like a classified appendix,
that sort of thing. I would be happy to work with you on what
are the balance points of those.
Senator Warren. Good. So, I take that as a yes, to the
maximum extent possible.
Mr. Guertin. To the maximum extent possible.
Senator Warren. Good. And do you commit to this committee
that you will make this report and other reports from your
office publicly available, to the maximum extent possible?
Mr. Guertin. To the maximum extent possible, yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you. That is very important to me.
Now one way to keep information from the public is to use
pseudo-classification, like ``For Official Use Only,'' which
means that the information is not deemed to be classified but
it is still restricted from public view. So let me ask you
another question on this. Do you commit to avoiding the use of
designations such as ``For Official Use Only'' for the
unclassified portions of the Operational Test and Evaluation
reports?
Mr. Guertin. Senator, to the maximum extent possible, yes,
but I think there might be some policy issues we might have to
work out with Congress to make sure that the information is
provided as unclassified and public released but also not
sensitive in some way.
Senator Warren. All right. Well, we might have to talk
through what ``sensitive'' means, because if it is not
classified then I think the public generally, the presumption
should be that the public has a right to know, and that is the
commitment I want from you, to the maximum extent possible.
Mr. Guertin. Yes, Senator.
Senator Warren. Okay. And then my final question on this,
do you commit to notifying this committee if you believe that
your work is being wrongfully restricted or pseudo-classified
or overclassified?
Mr. Guertin. Senator, if there are any restrictions that do
not make sense or are not in the interest of the country I will
make sure that we communicate that with this committee.
Senator Warren. Good. I every much appreciate that. I plan
to hold you to these commitments, and I look forward to working
with you to ensure maximum transparency from your office. I
think that is how both of us will better serve the American
people. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator
Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to each of you for being here today.
Mr. Coffey, I want to come to you. We saw the release of
NAVADMIN last week and the guidance on how sailors who are not
fully vaccinated and do not have a pending or approved
exemption will be punished administratively. So, I have got
some questions for you. Is it correct to say that sailors who
are separated only for refusing the vaccine will, in the least
favorable outcome, receive a discharge no lower than ``general
under honorable conditions"?
Mr. Coffey. Well, Senator, I support the vaccination
program. I think it is critically important that the force be
vaccinated. I was vaccinated quite frequently when I was on
active duty and as a reservist. I have not reviewed the
NAVADMIN you are talking about specifically, so I --
Senator Blackburn. Will you review it and then answer me
specifically?
Mr. Coffey. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Enlisted servicemembers
separated under this subparagraph will apparently not be
eligible for involuntary separation pay and will be subject to
recoupment of any unearned special or incentive pays. Can you
articulate what the recoupment of any unearned special or
incentive pays means, providing me a tangible example of this?
Mr. Coffey. Well, I can speak to my own background,
Senator. As a naval aviator, a naval flight officer, if I --
Senator Blackburn. No. I am talking about the specific
guidance. So why don't you do that one in writing, since you
have not seen that. I cannot believe you did not look at that
guidance before coming in here for this hearing. So look at it
and then give me a written response with a tangible example.
A general discharge allows the servicemember to use the
majority of veterans programs and benefits such as hiring
preferences for Federal jobs, VA medical coverage, and home
loan benefits. Please confirm the following for the record.
Will sailors who are separated only for refusing the vaccine be
deemed ineligible from future military service? Yes or no.
Mr. Coffey. Senator, I would have to submit that in writing
after the hearing.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. You will submit that also. Is the
GI Bill education benefit the only absolute benefit not awarded
to servicemembers with a general discharge? Yes or no.
Mr. Coffey. Same answer, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
Mr. Coffey. I will put that in my written response.
Senator Blackburn. Is it fair to say that any sailor
discharged for a vaccination refusal will not be entitled to
their post-9/11 GI Bill benefit?
Mr. Coffey. Same answer, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. What happens to personnel from the
other military services who are assigned to naval commands and
refuse the vaccine? We would want to know that, so again, a
written answer.
Mr. Coffey. Same answer.
Senator Blackburn. And then also, what happens to foreign
military personnel, such as those studying U.S. professional
military education courses, if they refuse the vaccine for
religious reasons?
Mr. Coffey. I will submit that as well.
Senator Blackburn. I want you to know, my office has been
inundated with calls trying to get clarity on these issues. So
I think it is so important that you all get these to us.
One more. Is it also correct that separation determinations
made by the Navy will be centralized under the CCDA to ensure a
fair and consistent process is applied across the board?
Mr. Coffey. I will be sure to provide the clarity you seek
in my written response.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. And then also a statement as to
whether or not you think a centralized process is the best
practice.
Mr. Coffey. I will do that as well, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Baker, if I may come to you. As Senator Warren alluded,
you have advised her on shaping her national security agenda
which, and I am quoting, ``took aim at rising defense budgets
and the revolving door between the Pentagon and the defense
industry.'' If confirmed, would these be your priorities in the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy role? Would it be
these rising DOD budgets in the defense industry?
Ms. Baker. Senator, The Secretary has been clear that China
is the pacing threat for the Department and should be our
priority, so if I am confirmed, I would seek to prioritize
those issues.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Well, we know that flat defense
budgets are actually shrinking defense budgets. How do you
reconcile this reality with your inherent bias toward, and I am
quoting you, ``taking aim at risking defense budgets'' because
China is a priority? And we want to make certain that we are
addressing that great power competition. So how do you
reconcile that?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I agree that we need to be prioritizing
issues surrounding great power competition, particularly with
China. Where I start on questions of defense budget is to start
with the strategy first, and as you know, I think the
Department is well underway in drafting an update to the
National Defense Strategy that will build, I believe, on the
2018 strategy. I think from there we can look at the
capabilities and investments that the strategy requires and
from there build back into a budget number.
Senator Blackburn. And you think you can do that with less
resources?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I would be guided by the strategy. So,
I do not have an arbitrary number in mind. I think we should
resource to the strategy.
Senator Blackburn. So you are saying you are going to leave
your opinions at the door.
Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to each of the
nominees congratulations on your nomination and thank you for
your willingness to serve our country.
Mr. Coffey, my first question is for you. In August of
2019, Corporal Anne Vassas of Michigan unfortunately took her
own life at a Marine Corps air station in Japan. The Vassas
family was told that command investigation was concluded but
the release of the final report requires additional approvals,
and they have been now waiting for 2 years.
As General Counsel, will you maintain a close relationship
with the staff judge advocate and have a role in oversight of
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, if confirmed?
Mr. Coffey. Senator, let me begin by expressing my
condolences to the family, and it is something I will look
into, if confirmed. Yes, Senator, I commit to working closely
with the uniformed lawyers of the Department. I understand
there is a very good relationship now, a one- team, one-mission
approach that I heartily endorse. And I will likewise work
closely with the Under Secretary or the Secretary, whoever is
at the present time overseeing NCIS. I do think that my
background as a Federal prosecutor working with law enforcement
will be beneficial, if I am confirmed.
Senator Peters. Well, I cdertainly hope that the Vassas
family has achieved some degree of closure by the time that you
have been confirmed. But I am still going to ask for your help
in resolving this matter for them. And more broadly, I just
want to get a clearer confirmation from you that you are going
to strive to ensure that the legal and investigative mechanisms
in the Department are working to ensure timely, open, and
regular contact with the next of kin in the event of a tragedy
such as this.
Mr. Coffey. Senator, you have my commitment that if I am
confirmed I will act accordingly. I will do that.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that.
Mr. Bush, as vehicles get smarter, automotive cybersecurity
is clearly becoming an increasing concern. The economic loss
and military risk that is posed by cyberattacks on the U.S.
vehicle ecosystem is certainly significant, as no single firm
has the expertise, the resources, or, quite frankly, the
technical depth to independently address all of these
cybersecurity threats.
So my question for you, Mr. Bush, is what is your vision
for how the Army can secure our increasingly networked vehicle
fleet from cyberattacks?
Mr. Bush. Senator, I think for new programs we can start up
front, by building in the right architecture and the right
cybersecurity early so that we have systems in place that we
can test and be reliant upon, that ensure that our vehicles are
cybersecure.
I believe there is a greater challenge working on older
vehicles, where they were designed in times when cyber did not
even exist, and they have had systems added to them over the
years in a less systematic way. I believe that in those cases
we will need to come up with a better way of testing those
federated type systems in older vehicles to make sure they are
cybersecure as well.
And lastly, I would add that Army vehicles historically
have been designed to be able to continue to fight with
degraded conditions. So, I believe it would be incumbent for
the Army to ensure that new systems, even if under
cyberattacks, still retain some combat capability so our
soldiers can continue fighting.
Chairman Reed. We are having technical difficulties. Let us
wait a moment to see if we can move forward.
Let me, at this point, recognize, if we can--Senator
Peters, are you back with us?
Senator Peters. Am I back here now?
Chairman Reed. You are back. You have reappeared.
Senator Peters. Well, good.
Chairman Reed. Thirty-five seconds.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will
leave that as my last question. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Now let me
recognize, once again, via Webex, if it is functioning
properly, Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this will be
to Ms. Baker. The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the
JCPOA, was a great goal that fell extremely short. I voted
against the agreement in 2015, because it rewarded Iran before
they demonstrated any desire to return to good order in the
global community, and it failed to address their terrorism
financing or conventional weapons development.
So, my question would be, with an on-and-off-again
negotiation taking place, what concessions would you hope to
see in a new version of the Iran deal? And my follow-up to
that, Ms. Baker, would be, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom launched a barter system known as INSTC, to facilitate
transactions between them and Iran. Can you comment on that?
Ms. Baker. Senator, thank you for the question. To your
first point about what concessions would we seek, certainly my
understanding is that the intent of returning to negotiations
around the JCPOA was to use that as a foundation to build
toward a longer and stronger deal. Certainly there are any
number of Iranian destabilizing activities in the region that
are not covered by the JCPOA, to include their support for
terrorist groups, militias, the proliferation of ballistic
missile technology, UAV technology, threats to freedom of
navigation, all of which I think we should seek to address. I
will say that --
Senator Manchin. [Inaudible.]
Ms. Baker. I am sorry, Senator. I could not hear you.
Senator Manchin. Do you have any information? Do you have
any thoughts on INSTC, which is what United Kingdom, Germany,
and France have launched?
Ms. Baker. Senator, I do not have any details on that.
Certainly it is something I would be prepared, if confirmed, to
look into with my interagency colleagues and get back to you
for a longer discussion.
Senator Manchin. Okay. No problem. I understand. And here,
this is for you again, ma'am, and I do not mean this to be
personal at all. I am stating the facts here. You have a total
of 10 years and 7 months of experience working as a Federal
employee, with 1 year and 7 months inside the Department of
Defense. What is concerning to me is the entirety of your
career is based on partisanship. You have never worked for a
Republican administration or a moderate member, that we can
see, and this toxic atmosphere we are in right now it takes
working across the aisle, understanding both sides.
So my question would be, tell me about any tangible
experience that you believe demonstrates how you could approach
this position from a nonpartisan stance.
Ms. Baker. Senator, respectfully, I believe that I have
demonstrated, in my career, an ability to work across the aisle
in a bipartisan fashion, something I was very proud of as a
Senate staffer here, working with this committee. I was also a
nonpartisan career civil servant for a number of years. In
addition to serving here in the Senate I have worked for
national security principals that held a variety of views, to
include former HASC Chairman Ike Skelton, former Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter.
So, I do understand, Senator. I understand the concern, and
I think it is a valid one. I believe that I have a track record
that will enable me, if confirmed, to approach this role in a
nonpartisan fashion, and that is certainly how I would intend
to conduct myself.
Senator Manchin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Guertin, if you could--I share your vision for a
renewed approach to evaluation and system performance within
the program and development process. One of the areas I believe
that we need to focus on is direct input and effects to the
warfighter, especially as it relates to effectiveness on the
battlefield.
The past week, my office spent a considerable amount of
time with the staff from the WVU, West Virginia University,
Rockefeller Neuroscience Institute, who lead the world in
advanced neurological care.
So can you commit to scheduling a tour to the state-of-
the-art facility with my staff and West Virginia University
personnel who already are working with Marine Corps to
potentially standardize the capability of the future test and
development efforts? We just need you there.
Mr. Guertin. Senator, it sounds like a great opportunity. I
am looking forward to meeting you there and learning about
those things.
Senator Manchin. We would love to. It is unbelievable.
Final question to Mr. Bush. We share a significant amount
of similarities when it comes to our future need to transition
from an industrial age to an information age, approach to
acquisitions, cybersecurity, and supply chain security. My
fear, though, is that we will leave our small businesses
further behind, than where they are currently, if we do not
make a prioritized effort to bring them along.
So my question is, how will you shape future efforts to
support small business against growing cybersecurity
requirements? How are they going to be able to compete and
maintain any type of viability?
Ms. Baker. Senator, first of all, I would like to say I am
proud of the Army's past track record, leading the Department
in overall small business contracting. The specific issue you
mentioned is a challenging one. The Department and the Army
want more small businesses and more diverse businesses
involved. However, we also have cybersecurity concerns.
Senator, I believe, like in other aspects of the small
program, it is going to require partnership and the Department
and the Services working with companies in developing ways to
collaborate so that they can achieve the level of cybersecurity
necessary to participate in bigger and bigger programs.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, and I thank all three of you. I
appreciate your answer.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now, via Webex,
let me recognize Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, and, of
course, Ranking Member Inhofe, and I want to thank all the
nominees for being here today for your service and willingness
to serve going forward.
And like Senator Manchin said, cybersecurity is so
important. I have a number of bills to that effect, and we are
going to talk about one of them today, because as our
adversaries actively try to undermine our interests via
cyberattacks, we have to continue to invest in cyber talent.
That is going to increase our capabilities, allow us to defend
forward.
So, this year's Senate NDAA, as reported out of this
committee, includes my Civilian Cybersecurity Reserve Act, and
it is bipartisan legislation I introduced with Senator
Blackburn to create a civilian cyber reserve that ensures
additional cyber capacity at greatest times of need.
So Ms. Banker, if confirmed, what are the steps that you
would take to improve the cybersecurity posture of our most
critical systems through workforce investments, because we have
a lot out there? This need to be in line with both our National
Defense Strategy and the President's budget request proposing
significant growth of the cyber mission force. And more
specifically, how would you use existing authorities, and
potentially my act, to protect our critical assets?
Ms. Baker. Senator, first let me say thank you for your
leadership on this critical issue. As we have discussed here
today, the cybersecurity of the Department systems is what will
allow us to fight and prevail in a high-end contingency.
As I am sure you know, the Department has a cyber strategy
that has three components. It requires the Department to be
able to fight and win the nation's war sin the cyber domain, to
protect the Department of Defense information network, the
DODIN, and then, of course, to protect the nation, and we do
that, as you said, by defending forward.
If I am confirmed, I can commit to you that I will make a
priority of developing new and agile concepts of operations and
the cyber domain. I would work closely with my colleagues in
the Services and elsewhere in the Department to ensure that we
are appropriately resourced and that we have a workforce that
is capable of operating in the cyber domain.
I have not, unfortunately, yet had an opportunity, Senator,
to look at your legislation specifically, but certainly I think
new and innovative ways of approaching the cyber challenge is
exactly what is needed. And so, if confirmed, I will commit to
looking into that and would welcome a chance for further
conversation.
Senator Rosen. Great. I will have you up to the office and
we can talk about the Civilian Cyber Reserve Act. But I am glad
you are talking about all the different postures you have,
because I want to talk about the zero trust security model,
because, you know, cyber threats exist both inside and outside
traditional network boundaries. So earlier this year, the
National Security Agency issued a cybersecurity bulletin
entitled ``Embracing A Zero Trust Security Model'' and strongly
recommends zero trust security be considered for critical
networks, including national security systems, Department of
Defense networks, and our defense-based, industrial-based
systems.
And so the timeline for implementation and completion not
yet known, but if confirmed, how would you use your position to
encourage the DOD-wide adoption of the zero trust security
model?
Ms. Baker. Senator, if confirmed in this position I would
certainly seek to ensure that our policies were in alignment.
Certainly I take your point that there are cyber
vulnerabilities that arise, both from without and from within,
and we need to be prepared to manage both of those cases. I
seek to work closely with the DOD-CIO, with the principal cyber
advisor and others to ensure that we have the appropriate plans
in place.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. And speaking
of issues from without, we want to combat Iranian aggression,
because Iran continues to be the world's leading state sponsor
of terrorism and a threat to the United States and allied
interests via its ballistic missile program and support for
terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, including through
conventional weapons sales. The combination of Iran acquiring
advanced Russian and Chinese platforms and its transfer of arms
to terrorist groups like Hezbollah poses significant
conventional threats to United States personnel in the region
and undermines Israel's voluntary military edge, or QME.
So Ms. Baker, again, I guess you could put this off the
record--I am just about out of time--if confirmed, how would
you work to combat Iranian aggression to our United States
interests against rogue state actors like Iran and maintain our
ally, Israel's, QME? And since I am out of time I am not sure
there is someone after me, you can submit that in writing,
please.
Ms. Baker. Senator. Yes, absolutely, I agree with
everything you said and I am happy to submit a longer answer
for the record.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me recognize
Senator Kelly and thank him for his patience. Thank you.
Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations
to each of the nominees and thanks for your willingness to
continue to serve our nation.
My first question is for Mr. Guertin. I want to talk a
little bit about the F-35. I have had a chance myself to fly
the simulator, and as a former test pilot it is an impressive
platform and I think it will serve the Navy, the Air Force, and
the Marine Corps very well. And I am very honored that Arizona
is going to continue to host F-35 squadrons at Luke and at Yuma
Marine Corps Air Station.
But I am concerned that delays related to testing in the
joint simulated environment have gotten off track in completing
tests and evaluation and starting to get us towards closer to
full rate production. Leveraging digital assets like these in
testing and design is the way of the future. I am convinced of
that. So, it is important that we get it right and apply the
lessons we are learning now to future upgrades for the F-35 and
the next generation fighter aircraft, NGAD and anything beyond
that.
So could you give me an assessment of what you think the
lessons are so far in what we have experienced with the testing
in the joint simulated environment?
Mr. Guertin. So Senator, one of the things we need to be
thinking about as we move forward into the future is a tighter
alignment between modeling complex systems like the F-35. It
has got a lot going on under the hood. Some things you are not
going to be able to test operationally, all at the same time,
in a threat-representative environment, so we need to be
thinking about how we combine modeling and simulation of those
environments with live physical testing.
The F-35 has been a great object lesson, use case, that we
need to be taking full advantage of the lessons, both good and
bad, and how we position ourselves in the future for taking
advantage of those kinds of technologies as we build out these
more and more complex systems as we move further forward into
the future.
Senator Kelly. Part of the value of simulated testing is
that we can examine, you know, both aircraft and weapons system
performance in these complex scenarios that better approximate
what we will face in combat. With that in mind, how important
is it to incorporate cyber and space domains in these simulated
tests?
Mr. Guertin. So Senator, it is critically important that
the operational tests encompass all of the things that the
weapons system will see when it is being used, which includes
cyber. It is a big part of the problem, because you cannot use
it if you are turned off before you get a chance to take
advantage of it.
The other thing you did mention, though, that I wanted to
park on is the opportunity to iterate on designs and take
advantage of those digital twins and modeling environments so
that you can explore how that system might be built better into
the future.
Senator Kelly. And do you think this needs to also account
for emergent capabilities like AI as well?
Mr. Guertin. Indeed it does, yes.
Senator Kelly. I just want to switch, in the remaining time
I have here, Mr. Guertin, with you as well. You know, in modern
warfare, as we all know, software can be important to our
success, and as important as the hardware, the equipment. And
software often advances much more quickly. You touched on this
theme, I think, in your opening remarks. We are going to need
to improve our ability to more effectively integrate rapidly
changing software, and it is also one of the most challenging
things we deal with, whether it is military hardware or space,
you know, software, you know, reliability and testing and
verification.
What have we learned from our efforts to incorporate more
agile development practices with Block 4 upgrades to the F-35?
Mr. Guertin. Senator, I would not be able to talk about
Block 4 specifically, because I have not been briefed on the
details of it. But I do want to say that some of the systems I
have worked on in the past, even going back to mid 1990s, to
build these things so that they can evolve gracefully over
time. In those early stages when we are using open
architectures and submarine sonar systems, we thought we were
totally knocking it out of the park by having annual updates.
Today that might not be fast enough, depending on the product,
and it certainly is not fast enough for a lot of the things we
hold and use in an everyday life.
So, we need to be thinking about how do we, you know, shift
left in terms of our understanding of how things are built, but
also be responsive and fast on our feet when it comes to being
responsive to the users' needs as they would use them in an
operational context in the joint force.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, and I look forward to
working with you and your office as we get these new weapons
systems fully evaluated and tested, through OT&E and out to the
fleet. Thank you.
Mr. Guertin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly, and I want to
thank the witnesses for their thoughtful testimony and their
statements and their commitment to public service. And with
that I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 139 of title 10, U.S. Code establishes the
position of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the
Department of Defense. The law provides that [t]he Director shall be
appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office of Director.
What is your understanding of the duties, functions, and
authorities of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)?
Answer. The duties for the DOT&E functions stem from Title 10,
Section 139 and 236, and are refined through DOD Directives and
Instructions. I understand that if confirmed, I would serve as the
principal staff advisor to the Secretary of Defense for operational
test and evaluation within the Department. I would also be required to
provide Congress with an annual report summarizing the activities
associated with operational test and evaluation. This report would
include recommendations on associated resources to include facilities
and funding. Matters concerning budget recommendations related to
operational and live fire test and evaluation will be provided to the
Secretary of Defense as well. Reporting would also include Beyond Low-
Rate Initial Production reports, Early Fielding reports for systems
that fall into the category of urgent need and would be deployed before
completion of initial operational testing, Live Fire reports and also
to respond to any request from Congress. If confirmed, I also would be
responsible for crafting and implementing policy for operational test
and evaluation and to provide oversight of operational testing of
defense programs that meet specific thresholds (e.g. Major Defense
Acquisition, Major Automated Information Systems) and programs that I
would designate. Policy and procedures that I would be responsible for
would include the conduct of live fire test and evaluation for
monitoring, reviewing, and reporting on all operational and live-fire
test and evaluation within the Department. I would also be responsible
for coordinating joint operational testing.
Question. What experience and expertise do you have that qualify
you for appointment to this position?
Answer. I have a combination of technical and organizational change
experiences that I feel give me the range of expertise to, if
confirmed, bring the Departments OT&E efforts further forward into the
future. I have four decades of operation, development, testing and
organizational transformation experiences across a wide array of
technologies and warfighting domains to leverage into this position. On
the technical side, I have performed systems engineering for sensors,
weapons, combat management and information technologies. I have also
led prototyping initiatives for air, ground, and sea-based systems.
Across all of these experiences, testing and coordination across
technical disciplines and stakeholders had long been a central tenet.
My experience in program management and change transformation related
to the improvement of Defense acquisition may prove to be my most
valuable asset especially in the areas fielding software-intensive
systems that were built to change and improve over time. More recently,
while at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, I
learned a great deal about how to architect and develop systems,
including the automation of testing and integration of artificial
intelligence and machine learning to create robust, reliable, testable,
and sustainable products that will evolve over the life of a program.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties, functions, and authorities of the DOT&E?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the DOT&E team to examine
how we are addressing the evolving aspects of system development, both
in the tools used to build the products and the capabilities being
delivered to the warfighter. The nature of engineering, modeling,
simulating, validating, and testing these systems is changing rapidly,
and the operational test and evaluation community must both change to
where we are today and ensure we have an organizational framework to
continuously evolve. Testing the way we fight in the future will
require evolutionary and revolutionary changes from where we are now.
This will require teamwork throughout DOD, and with the Services and
Agencies. It will require increased reliance on state-of-the art test
infrastructure and tools, and a well-trained test and evaluation
workforce that embraces constant change as a core equity in order to
support faster and more effective evaluation of complex, interconnected
systems in a joint, multi-domain operational environment. It will
require reliance on innovative methods like credible virtual
environments and modeling and simulation tools to complement on-range
and laboratory testing. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely
with Congress, the Secretary of Defense, our research and engineering
community, acquisition programs, and the Services so that together, we
can most effectively deliver capability to the Joint Force.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would confront, if confirmed, as the DOT&E?
Answer. The next DOT&E will be challenged to help the Department
ensure that the way we test our systems accurately reflects the way we
will use them to fight. The adversary often tests, learns, and iterates
faster than we do. To win in conflict and to deter adversaries from
initiating conflict, we must outpace them in every aspect of our
developmental and operational investments and processes in every
warfighting domain. We will be challenged to test, especially against
cyber threats, and use next-generation technologies, such as autonomy
and artificial intelligence-enabled equipment, in our warfighting
systems. The Department must build a workforce that is ready to
leverage the incredible amount of innovation that exists across this
Nation, and to work collaboratively with the commercial and defense
industries, universities, FFRDCs and UARCs, and allied partners.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing each
of these challenges, and on what specific timeline?
Answer. I believe it is important to determine what efforts are
already under way in the Department and to assess existing manpower,
including the staff of DOT&E and the test and evaluation (T&E) partners
within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USD(R&E)) (including the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency), the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the Services. If confirmed,
I will renew the strong working relationships among these organizations
so that we can break down more barriers, identify and reduce
redundancy, increase integration, and forge a workforce for the future.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
and how would you measure progress in achieving these priorities?
Answer. In addition to building a T&E coalition in the Department
and with our allies, I would seek to address the continuous competing
priorities between program resources and test adequacy. As stakeholders
place more value on test, the more they will incorporate mission-based,
operationally relevant T&E activities earlier in the acquisition
process. I would seek to bolster the adequacy of test programs by
ensuring software and cyber T&E occur iteratively and incrementally
throughout the life cycle, and not just during OT&E events. I believe
that digital technology, including strategic use of modeling and
simulation, should be used much more frequently to transform the
testing of software-intensive and cyber-physical systems from linear,
serial processes to iterative, incremental processes that build a body
of evidence over time usable for operational assessments and
evaluations.
relations with congress
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the DOT&E?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working collaboratively with
Congress and Department of Defense oversight Committees and responding
to congressional requests in a timely manner. This includes informing
Members and their staffs of critical updates and results of operational
test and evaluation (OT&E) efforts in a timely and transparent manner.
I commit to providing my independent and objective assessments, and
will strive to maintain a strong relationship with Congress as DOT&E.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you leverage your
unique and independent access to Congress better to provide technical
and program information in support of this Committee's legislative and
oversight processes?
Answer. Serving as the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
rightfully demands close coordination and consultation with Congress.
Independence and impartiality are paramount to executing that mission,
and if confirmed, I assure the Committee that I will serve as a partner
with Congress, providing clear assessments of technical demands and
programmatic efforts both in response to oversight requirements, and in
support of legislative processes.
independence and objectivity
Question. Congress established the position of DOT&E as an
independent and objective lead for test and evaluation across DOD,
including test and evaluation relating to major defense acquisition
programs. Section 139 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that ``[t]he
Director [of Operational Test and Evaluation] shall consult closely
with, but the Director and the Director's staff are independent of, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and all other
officers and entities of the Department of Defense responsible for
acquisition.''
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that
your evaluations are wholly independent and objective?
Answer. Independence and impartiality are paramount to executing
the mission of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. I assure the
Committee that, if confirmed, I will rely on my technical and
operational background to determine the adequacy of proposed test
plans, relying on the scientifically validated and appropriate tools
and methods to ensure their efficiency and operational credibility. I
will look for evidence that modeling and simulation tools used to
support an evaluation were adequately validated and accredited for
their intended use.
I will follow the data and employ proven data analysis tools to
draw conclusions, but will consider alternate findings and
interpretations to ensure the quality of my own assessments. Every
conclusion I make will be defensible and will accurately reflect
observed performance. I will seek out the most technically savvy
workforce, and will continue to coordinate with USD(R&E), USD(A&S) and
other DOD entities responsible for acquisition to ensure that we
collectively deliver the best weapon systems to the warfighter.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that the assessments of major defense acquisition programs you
provide to Congress are candid and complete?
Answer. If confirmed, my assessments will be based solely on the
data collected during operational and other appropriate testing. I will
ensure that the information collected has been adequately analyzed, and
that all assumptions and test limitations were considered and are
reflected in the final assessment. I intend to let the facts speak for
themselves. I will not let demonstrated good performance overwhelm
revealed limitations, and vice versa. I will be balanced, neutral, and
non-judgmental in my assessments; and without exception, my assessments
will cover all of the facts revealed by adequate operational testing.
So that my assessments are complete and defensible and accurately
portray system performance, I will ensure that test plans will provide
the data necessary for authoritative and operationally meaningful
evaluations.
Question. Section 2399 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes certain
requirements regarding the impartiality of contractor testing personnel
and contracted-for advisory and assistance services used with regard to
the test and evaluation of a system.
If confirmed, how would you ensure the independence and
impartiality of contractor testing personnel and contracted advisory
and assistance services, including when employing personnel from
federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)?
Answer. DOT&E relies on heavily on FFRDC partners, in particular
the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). I have confidence in IDA's
impartiality and integrity but, if confirmed, would be sure to
emphasize to its director and division leads my expectations for
completely unbiased, professional comportment and products. I would
take the same approach with any FFRDC. In addition, I would continue
the practice of having a DOT&E civilian review and approve all FFRDC
activities and material.
Title 10 already sets the standard for use of contractor personnel
in OT&E. If I were to avail DOT&E of the waiver authority granted in
Section 2399 paragraph (e)(2), I would ask the DODIG and OGC to
recommend what steps to take to ensure the impartiality and ethical
participation of those personnel.
operational testing issues
Question. If confirmed, how would you manage disagreements with
other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and/or the
Military Departments and Services, that seek to progress or approve
programs, notwithstanding the results of operational testing that
suggests further development, testing, or technical and engineering
work is required?
Answer. I believe in open and honest communication, transparency,
and data-driven conclusions. If confirmed, I will forthrightly provide
assessments of all systems under oversight that have undergone some
level of operational testing. These assessments will be independent and
reflect my evaluation of the data revealed by testing. I will ensure
that other elements of OSD and/or the Military Departments and Services
fully understand the underlying data and analyses that led me to my
conclusions. If disagreements arise, I will listen to all counterpoints
to ensure the quality and strength of my conclusions. As the
warfighter's unbiased, objective representative, I will always share my
findings and data analysis with the Congress, and the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Question. In your view, to what extent should the DOT&E evaluate
system capabilities and testing results against formal requirements
established in the program? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Formal program requirements are necessary as they focus
system development, influence program decisions, and provide
contractual specifications. It is important to understand how delivered
capabilities measure against these requirements, but operational
effectiveness ultimately depends upon how well a unit equipped with the
system accomplishes its mission. Ideally, these two would coincide, but
that is not always the case. Such divergence occurs most frequently
when formal requirements do not reflect real-world operational metrics.
As an example, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle met its key
performance parameter (KPP) for payload. However, that KPP focused on
weight, and did not take into account physical space inside the
vehicle, or the quantity of mission-essential equipment and supplies
necessary for long-duration tactical missions. Operators were thus
forced to store items in locations that were unsuitable for mission
accomplishment. As a result, DOT&E concluded that, while JLTV satisfied
the payload KPP as written, the vehicle could not accommodate
operational reality; overall vehicle performance and reliability would
be degraded.
If confirmed, I would objectively evaluate systems against both
their formal requirements, and seek to ascertain whether a unit
equipped with the system under test can accomplish the intended
mission. Both factors must be considered to determine operational
effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality.
Question. In your view, when evaluating system capabilities and
testing results for new system, to what extent should the DOT&E
consider the capabilities of deployed, legacy systems that the system
undergoing testing is designed to replace? Please explain your answer.
Answer. DOD Directive 5000.01 provides clear guidance on this
matter: ``The acquisition system will be designed to acquire products
and services that satisfy user needs with measureable and timely
improvements to mission capability, materiel readiness, and operational
support, at a fair and reasonable price.''
Inherent in delivering measureable improvements in comparison to
legacy systems. Such comparisons are essential to determining whether:
1) the new system provides greater mission capability; 2) the new
system's performance equals that of the legacy system, but it improves
other elements of the effective-suitable-survivable-lethal metric by,
for example, reducing operator workload or easing the sustainment
burden (reliability, availability, maintainability); or 3) the new
system performs equally well, but its design enables capability
expansion and augmentation.
If confirmed, I intend to continue the practice of comparing new
capabilities to the legacy capabilities they are supposed to replace.
Question. In your view, to what extent should the DOT&E evaluate
system capabilities and testing results against known or expected
threats the system will face across its lifetime while in operational
use?
Answer. Combat credibility is the benchmark for DOT&E's assessment
of new and evolving systems and platforms. Our capabilities must allow
our warfighters to bring game-changing technologies to the fight, and
to succeed and survive against the actual kinetic and non-kinetic
threats that they will face, including cyber. The only way to determine
whether our capabilities can do that is to test them against the
threats that the systems are designed to address. This applies to how
systems are modified to credibly address evolving threats.
This means that the Department must address how operational T&E and
live-fire T&E will provide adequate oversight for evolving capability
delivery. This includes addressing revolutionary and evolutionary
changes to methods and processes associated with an evolving T&E
infrastructure, including threat emulation and simulation, tools, and
processes. DOT&E should ensure that operational testing represents the
real-world conditions and scenarios warfighters will face. It will be
difficult to determine the effectiveness, suitability, survivability,
and lethality of our weapon systems--and create the opportunity to
remedy deficiencies prior to actual combat--without a realistic and
evolving T&E enterprise.
Question. In your view, how should the DOD design testing
environments to mirror perceived denied and degraded environments? What
benefit would such testing design yield the testing and evaluation
(T&E) process?
Answer. Our military cannot successfully deter or win wars without
the ability to operate in all domains and environments, including
denied and degraded. Our testing must realistically represent those
environments and include accurate threats so that we can understand the
capabilities and limitations of our weapons systems. For testing that
accurately replicates denied and degraded environments, DOD needs
facilities that permit live, ``open-air'' events, as well as robust,
validated, and accredited modeling and simulation venues in which real
operators are the testers. Both data sets are critical for our
operational forces to develop the right tactics, techniques, and
procedures, and for our acquisition system to correctly prioritize
fixes and improvements to our weapons systems.
Question. In your view, to what information must DOT&E have access
to support testing, and who is (and should be) responsible for
obtaining and maintaining access to that information?
Answer. DOT&E should have full access to all data and information
needed to support adequate test and evaluation of programs under
oversight, or to determine if a program should be placed under
oversight. This information includes system design data, requirements
data and their rationale, concepts of operations and concepts of
employment data, acquisition strategy data, and decision timelines (in
order to adequately plan the tests needed to support those decisions).
DOT&E also needs access to data that may affect the test and
evaluation program, such as test and evaluation resource shortfalls,
test asset or test range limitations, and known system design
deficiencies. To ensure T&E program efficiency, DOT&E should have
access to all test data and information that would help scope the next
testing phase. DOT&E also must have access to the assessed accuracy,
limitations, and assumptions associated with any modeling and
simulation tools that are used to evaluate weapon system performance,
particularly during OT&E phases (initial and follow-on). DOT&E should
receive all raw artifacts and processed data as soon as they are
collected in order to start independent data analysis, and to inform
all decisions in a timely fashion.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
promote encourage information sharing among testing communities,
program offices, and contractors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be very transparent about my
expectations and the data I need to execute my Title 10
responsibilities. I will review my expectations and their rationale
with the test community, program offices, and contractors, and will
offer to work with them to develop the most robust T&E program for the
warfighter. I will offer analytical support and advocacy to resolve
test and evaluation challenges presented to the test community, program
offices, and contractors. I also will encourage and enhance the concept
of agile, integrated testing and evaluation, as well as the use of
digital technology tools, to make T&E part of the overall digital
ecosystem, which will inherently promote information sharing. I will
work on building trust with all T&E stakeholders to further promote
collaboration and teamwork, and facilitate progress at faster rates.
Question. Communications interoperability has been a challenge for
the DOD for several decades.
If confirmed, how would you plan to construct test environments to
ensure interoperability of command and control systems for the Joint
force?
Answer. It is my understanding that the available test
infrastructure is not currently robust enough to meet the demands of
realistic testing in a joint command and control (C2) environment.
Security and safety restrictions that limit electronic warfare against
communications and data links, along with commercial spectrum
limitations, also constrain testing. The Department needs to invest
more heavily in range infrastructure that enables linking open-air
results with operationally representative virtual and constructive test
venues designed to assess the interoperability of joint C2 systems,
including the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept and
supporting Service efforts.
Question. In your view, does DOT&E need to modernize or reform its
approach to planning for, executing, and assessing weapons system
operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability? If so, in
what areas are reforms most needed?
Answer. I believe that DOT&E needs to modernize, and in some cases
reform, its approach to T&E planning, execution, and data analysis.
This is will be necessary given the development of increasingly complex
weapon systems that are highly interconnected and adaptive, and the
rising complexities of the multi-domain operational environment that
changes rapidly in both space and time. For example, software and
cybersecurity T&E need innovative tools to improve efficiency and
operational realism, and to meet the exponentially growing demand for
such testing. DOD must pursue the development of credible digital
environments, digital models, and data architectures to store, share,
and best utilize test and evaluation data across all stakeholders. The
use of the latest advances in science and technology should be
leveraged to improve the way OT&E captures and analyzes the volumes of
data. The Department needs new tools and methods that promote
integrated testing and evaluation, and optimize the benefits of all
data captured across the acquisition cycle. These points all lead to a
need to examine the way we train and prepare our T&E workforce for the
future, to infuse new techniques and training for using the related
tools and technologies that will be required going forward.
Question. In your view, what additional T&E initiatives would best
position DOT&E to support digital transformation and modernization of
warfighting capabilities and concepts in multi-domain environments?
What resources would be required to effectuate these initiatives?
Answer. Digital transformation and modernization of warfighting
capabilities and concepts in multi-domain environments require
enterprise-level solutions and coordination across USD(R&E), USD(A&S),
the Intelligence Community, the Services, the Joint Staff, and
Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I will seek to coordinate an effort
to identify the requirements and resources needed to develop an
adequate representation of the multi-domain operational environment,
which will depend on the adequacy of the virtual environment and
digital twins of our systems, their interoperability, and expected
threats. I will evaluate the development and credibility of digital
twins and the feasibility of requiring digital twins early in an
acquisition program to inform T&E plans and reduce overall risk. I will
work with USD(R&E) to buildupon their digital engineering initiatives,
to include the development of a digital ecosystem and the data
architectures needed to adequately store, access, and then analyze T&E
data, the management of which is critical to the transformation of T&E
efforts.
test and evaluation funding
Question. Concern over long-term support for and viability of the
Department of Defense's test ranges and facilities led to the creation
of the Defense Test Resource Management Center in 2002, as well as a
requirement for direct funding of T&E facilities. Yet, almost 20 years
later, concerns about test ranges and facilities remain.
Do you believe that the Department's T&E capabilities, including
infrastructure and workforce, are adequately funded? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. Though I am not currently fully privy to the condition of
DOD's T&E enterprise, it appears that the department's T&E capacity,
agility, and expertise are insufficient given the scale, frequency, and
depth of testing necessary for the types of systems and threats
expected (e.g., software-intensive, autonomous/artificial intelligence-
enabled, offensive and defensive cyber, space, and electromagnetic
spectrum) in the current and predicted multi-domain operational
environment. Adaptive acquisition framework initiatives, which focus on
quick delivery to the field of incremental capability, further
exacerbate T&E shortfalls.
Moreover, our potential adversaries are improving and adding
capabilities faster than DOD's test infrastructure and workforce can
adapt and realistically replicate them. Those adversaries appear not to
have the same level of concern or can take short-cuts about the safety
of those systems and the appropriate operational use in a kinetic
environment. Together, we hold our programs to higher standards. The
complexity of integrated air defenses, space and cyber threats,
cognitive threats, hypersonic threats, directed energy weapons, and
various combinations thereof requires modernization of T&E
infrastructure. If confirmed, I will continue DOT&E's working
relationship with the Test Resource Management Center, and support them
as necessary, as they carry out their responsibility of assessing the
adequacy of the Department's T&E capabilities, including infrastructure
and workforce.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's current T&E
capabilities in the aggregate including infrastructure and workforce,
are adequate to perform the full range of test and evaluation
responsibilities of Department weapons systems and equipment?
Answer. I am not currently briefed on or have full knowledge of the
conditions of the T&E enterprise, but it would appear that the
Department's T&E capabilities may be out of date and if so, should be
modernized to represent and capture the complexities of the operational
environments of today and the future. Of particular importance is the
sufficiency of T&E capabilities for emerging areas to support the
testing of hypersonic systems, as well as the testing of all systems in
contested electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, and space domains. The
ability to adequately replicate adversarial threats and targets in both
fidelity and realistic quantities is also a challenge.
To keep pace with emerging technologies and adequately test and
train U.S. and coalition partner forces in projected multi-domain
operational environments, the Department must make significant, and
steady, investments in T&E infrastructure and the workforce. If
confirmed, I will work with the Test Resource Management Center and the
Service T&E executives concerning the prioritization and funding of
modernization efforts..
Question. In your view, how effective has DOD been in accurately
projecting future test facility resource requirements and budgeting for
these needs? How would you improve these processes, if confirmed?
Answer. In my opinion, accurately projecting future test facility
resource requirements and budgeting for these needs is essential to
conducting adequate operational and live fire testing, and determining
operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. If
confirmed, I will collaborate with USD(R&E), the office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and the Service T&E
executives to review the State of our facilities and adequately
prioritize investments. This process will include identifying
opportunities to leverage existing capabilities, and developing an
investment strategy that keeps pace with our adversaries who have
steadily invested in their T&E infrastructure over the last two
decades.
Question. If confirmed, how would the sufficiency of investments in
test resources and workforces factor into your review and approval of
proposed test plans and schedules for acquisition programs?
Answer. Human and financial resources are key factors in
determining the adequacy of Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs)
and test plans. These resources must be clearly defined and maintained
throughout the development and acquisition cycle to ensure that
operational and live fire OT&E are adequate. If confirmed, I will
closely review individual programs' planned test budgets and personnel
for sufficiency. Additionally, in coordination with CAPE, I will
annually assess the adequacy of available T&E resources to execute test
plans as agreed. I will leverage
the Department's data management strategy to ensure adequate data
are collected to support such analyses. I will inform senior DOD
leadership and Congress of test resource and workforce shortfalls so
that they can be addressed in an operationally relevant and timely
fashion.
Question. In your view, should adjustments be made in the
regulations and policies that govern the allocation of testing costs to
test customers?
Answer. Existing regulations and policies have been in place for
many years. I believe a review is needed to accurately establish how
test costs are allocated to customers, and whether the policies and
funding processes the Services are required to use are still the most
effective and efficient ways to support T&E.
I also understand that DOT&E recently commissioned the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to
independently review the adequacy of DOD test ranges and capabilities.
If confirmed, I would seek to understand the recommendations made by
NASEM in this report, as well as the recommendations of any similar
reports, and make all appropriate recommendations to the Secretary and
this Congress on any potential revisions to existing regulations and
policies that would promote more efficient and thorough OT&E.
data
Question. If confirmed, what initiatives would you undertake to
ensure that the Department of Defense collects, maintains, and provides
appropriate access to appropriate personnel for all relevant data
derived from the development, testing, and operational use of systems
and platforms to support acquisition, testing, and operations?
Answer. As the Department transforms digitally, we must make data
visible (so we can easily locate it), accessible (so we can retrieve it
when needed), traceable (so we can link conclusions to data sources),
secure (so we can rely on it) and integrated (so we can track our
performance and collaborate).
While DOT&E does not produce test data directly, the OT&E community
does own a vast amount of information related to historical weapons
systems performance. If these data were accessible and in a consumable
format, they could be more effectively utilized to inform new programs
of record; to improve our ability to identify, quantify, prioritize,
and estimate DOD system vulnerabilities; and to help set future
requirements. Advanced analytics capabilities for large data sets, in
particular, have the potential to reduce T&E cost, time, and
operational risk by identifying the highest risks in lethality and
survivability during the test design phase, and by accelerating the
evaluation phase.
If confirmed, I will work in partnership with A&S, CDO, and CFO, to
ensure that DOT&E is both able to consume and provide data associated
with T&E to support my role in informing other senior decisionmaking
activities.
office of the director of operational test and evaluation
Question. In April 2021, the then-Acting DOT&E testified that the
office faces numerous workforce challenges, including a limited number
of civilian staff responsible for program oversight, and limited
expertise in important emerging technology areas and in the use of
advanced digital tools.
If confirmed, how would you improve the operational testing
workforce, particularly in light of the growing numbers of new
technologies embedded in weapon systems and the desire to speed the
acquisition and deployment of systems to the battlefield?
Answer. People are our greatest asset, and the Department must
continue promoting a culture of innovation and learning. It would be
worthwhile to conduct a T&E workforce analysis to identify current and
future military and civilian skillsets and gaps, and unique expertise
requirements. If confirmed, I will seek to develop hiring and training
objectives to fill any identified needs. As part of that process, I
will work with USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) to refine, adapt, and develop new
education and training curricula in specific technical areas, including
cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, machine learning, data
analytics, modeling and simulation development, and advanced scientific
test design and analysis methods; and to create and execute a plan to
deliver continuous and structured training to the workforce. I will
advocate for detailee and rotational assignment opportunities within
the T&E community, and identify avenues for recruitment of the future
workforce, such as internships and memoranda of agreement or
understanding with government laboratories, other agencies, academia,
and industry.
Question. If confirmed, how would you determining the correct mix
of government, military, and contractor personnel necessary to meet the
missions of the Office of the DOT&E?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the DOT&E portfolio, scope,
and workload to ensure that we are adequately positioned to meet the
Secretary's priorities and fulfill the Department's strategic
initiatives. I would identify the competencies and skills needed to
meet current responsibilities and future requirements given the rise of
emerging technologies, the complexity of the operational environment,
and the demands of adaptive acquisition framework initiatives. I
believe DOT&E will need a balanced mix of government, civilian, and
contractor personnel to achieve these objectives. The number of
personnel and types of skills should be based on the complexity and
scope of DOT&E's oversight portfolio, ensuring we can keep pace with
the acquisition community, our adversaries, and the operational
environment.
Question. In your view, could the Office of DOT&E benefit from any
unique personnel authorities, such as those available to DARPA, medical
personnel, service academies, or defense laboratories, to attract,
recruit, and retain the workforce needed to perform designated
missions? Please explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that DOT&E regularly utilizes direct
hire authority (DHA) to minimize mission disruption, and to ensure that
civilian billets are filled quickly by personnel with the right
expertise. These DHA provisions include Sections 1101, 1125(b),
1599(h), 1643, and 1109 in 63 percent of all GS hiring actions. DOT&E
was leveraging the authorities in Sections 1125(b) and 1109; however,
the temporary Section 1125(b) authority expired on September 30, 2021,
leaving only Section 1109 authorities. If Section 1109 were terminated
or allowed to expire on September 30, 2025, it is my understanding that
DOT&E would no longer have access to any DHAs. If confirmed, I would
welcome unique personnel authorities to attract, recruit, and retain
the very technical workforce who must also have a detailed
understanding of the DOD mission, a combination that is hard to find.
Question. In your view, could the Office of DOT&E benefit from any
special acquisition or management authorities to more effectively and
efficiently perform its designated missions?
Answer. Based on my current knowledge of DOT&E, I do not yet see a
need for special acquisition or management authorities at this time. If
confirmed, I will reassess with my staff and the USD(A&S) and USD(R&E).
If we determine changes are needed, I will provide my best
recommendations to the Secretary and the Congress.
operational test agencies
Question. Operational Test Agencies of the Military Services are
tasked with conducting independent operational testing and evaluation
of acquisition programs. Recent demands on these organizations have
increased to meet rapid acquisition initiatives, to demonstrate joint
and advanced concept technology programs and commercial technologies,
and to evaluate information assurance, information operations, and
joint T&E requirements.
How would you propose to arbitrate shortfalls between program
managers' limited funding and operational test agencies' independent
test requirements?
Answer. Test and evaluation must be funded adequately from a
program's inception. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
documents the T&E funding profile and timeline, and all relevant
parties--DOT&E, the program manager, and the operational test agency--
agree to that TEMP early in the program's life cycle. When the time to
test arrives, Operational Test Agency requirements should never be a
surprise, and all Service and agency resource and program managers
should have allocated an appropriate amount of funding.
Question. Do you have any concerns about the ``actual''
independence of the operational test agencies? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. I have no concerns regarding OTA independence. The
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation approves all test plans, and
DOT&E and the OTAs independently evaluate the data collected during
OT&E events. I am confident that the OTAs understand their role as the
warfighter's representative and are committed, with DOT&E, to providing
unvarnished assessments of system performance.
Question. Should policies and procedures governing the activities
of the operational test agencies be standardized across the Department
of Defense, in your view?
Answer. Where commonality exists, I believe that OTAs and DOD would
benefit from standardized policies and procedures. Data formatting,
collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination is one category of T&E
activity that should be standardized. Doing so would allow DOD
organizations access to others' data, and glean relevant information
and lessons--which, today, often are inaccessible--to strengthen T&E
efficacy and potentially reduce the time needed to conduct an adequate
test. However, each Service has unique systems to test. A fair amount
of flexibility and Service-or program-specific customization is
therefore necessary. I will strive to seek a balance between maximizing
standardization at the enterprise level, without introducing
inefficiency into our programs.
operational and developmental testing in the adaptive acquisition
framework
Question. The Department of Defense recently implemented its
Adaptive Acquisition Framework, which uses a series of six pathways,
each designed for the unique characteristics of the capability being
acquired. With the new framework, DOD encourages the use of Integrated
T&E.
In your view, what value is provided to the department by the
operational T&E community providing input into developmental testing?
Answer. When conducted in a program's early stages, and when
adequately resourced across the acquisition cycle, operationally
realistic T&E offers a unique opportunity to identify and correct
deficiencies before the system matures. Typically, the later issues and
solutions are identified, the more complex, expensive, and time-
consuming the fixes are to implement. Early problem discovery may allow
the program to better manage cost and schedule. Most importantly,
addressing problems early in the T&E process mitigates the risk of
discovery during operational test, after the system is in the field,
or, worse, in combat.
By sharing OT&E feedback, the Program has an opportunity to
development the system in a manner that allows OT&E to effectively and
efficiently conduct its testing. This creates an OT&E event that
ensures the system's capabilities with minimal resources in the most
condensed timeline practical.
Question. How, in your view, should the Department determine the
appropriate point in concept development of a new acquisition program
for incorporation of T&E planning and the integration of testing
requirements?
Answer. In November 2020, DOT&E and USD(R&E) co-wrote DOD
Instruction 5000.89, Test and Evaluation. It codified what I believe to
be true: if done correctly, integrated testing provides greater
opportunity for early identification of concerns, allowing system
design to be improved sooner, and potentially, allowing the engineering
and manufacturing development phase to proceed more efficiently.
At the inception of a program, this policy instructs the program
manager to charter an integrated test planning group early, allowing
empowered representatives of test data producers and consumers
(including all applicable stakeholders) to ensure collaborative
development of a robust, efficient testing strategy that supports
systems engineering, evaluations, and certifications throughout the
acquisition life cycle. Conducting critical test activities earlier
will enable the program manager to discover and remediate problems
while the system is still in development, and likely avoid costly
redesigns late in the acquisition life cycle.
This DODI is a step in the right direction but may require
additional improvements to optimize the benefits of this concept. For
example, I believe that planning the aggregate test and evaluation
program from the beginning (with developmental and operational
objectives in mind) in a digital ecosystem would enable use of all
available data and test events, avoiding redundancies while promoting
early discovery.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should
take to ensure that testing takes place early enough in the program
cycle to identify and fix problems before it becomes prohibitively
time-consuming and expensive to do so?
Answer. I firmly believe in the value of developmental testing and
wide application of automation in testing. It is essential, however,
that the rigor of developmental testing match the rigor of operational
testing in order to ensure that operational testing is as efficient and
effective as possible. Augmenting the authorities for developmental
test oversight and placing more programs under developmental testing
oversight would improve developmental T&E execution and, ultimately,
acquisition program outcomes.
Question. In your view, are there periods throughout the operations
and sustainment portions of a program's life cycle where operational
testing needs to be used to ascertain system effectiveness and
suitability, given changing technologies and threats? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. Yes. Today, the threat landscape changes very rapidly. When
it comes to cyberattacks against both networks and individual,
software-dependent platforms, our adversaries' skills and tools improve
as frequently as every few weeks. At the same time, DOD more often adds
capability not by fielding an entirely new system, but by upgrading an
existing platform's software or a few of its individual components.
These two factors mean that we must periodically update our assessments
of effectiveness and suitability so that decisionmakers and warfighters
understand the performance and limitations of the systems in actual use
against the threats we expect them to face today and tomorrow, not last
year or last decade. Just as the product is updated incrementally, the
OT&E assessments should be performed in an incremental fashion where
possible, so as to keep pace with the speed of relevance in getting
capabilities in the hands of the warfighters. We must move to enable
continuous monitoring of capabilities wherever we can to be on par with
commercial systems and facilitate a a rapid flow of knowledge and an
associated dynamic assessments of systems.
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the tradeoffs between
rapid deployment of new capabilities and the need to ensure that
deployed capabilities are operationally effective and suitable?
Answer. If confirmed, I will defer to the Services and the
Combatant Commanders to ascertain the operational need of a specific
capability. By implementing the strategies contained within the DOT&E
Science and Technology Strategic Plan, the Department will be postured
to ensure that these fielding decisions are made with an understanding
of the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability that
the capability brings to the operational force. It would be my
responsibility to ensure that DOT&E regularly engages with the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, Service Secretaries, and acquisition
executives to better understand the desired capabilities and fielding
timelines, and to conduct independent assessments.
Question. If confirmed, what changes in DOT&E policies, processes,
and practice to help DOD achieve its goal of timely delivery of weapon
systems, while still ensuring that weapons are safe, effective, and
lethal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review existing polices, processes,
and practices and identify opportunities to help meet operational
demand without compromising our understanding of the capability headed
to the field. I will advocate for modernization of T&E methods that
will allow us to mitigate risks in test and the field, and adequately
evaluate the performance in operationally relevant and realistic
conditions.
adaptation of t&e to evolving acquisition strategies
Question. The current Acting DOT&E has praised some Middle Tier
Acquisition programs for incorporating integrated testing approaches,
while acknowledging the stress that these rapid test-fix-test cycles
have put on operational test agencies and developmental test
organizations--in major part because of the resource constraints these
agencies and organizations regularly experience.
If confirmed, how would you propose to achieve an appropriate
balance among the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times, T&E
resource demands and constraints, and the need to perform adequate
testing and evaluation?
Answer. I believe a shorter overall acquisition process is
necessary to deliver capability to the warfighter at the speed of
relevance, but it cannot come at a cost of unexpected and unaccounted
for weapons systems performance in combat. Neither DOT&E nor Congress
should relinquish its oversight role, regardless of acquisition model.
If confirmed, I would not shy from placing Middle Tier Acquisition
(MTA) programs under DOT&E oversight, if necessary.
To ensure that capabilities obtained under MTA authorities are
assessed appropriately, DOD should direct the Services and Agencies to
execute integrated T&E programs that fully leverage mission-and model-
based approaches, transformative digital technologies, and other
innovative T&E tools and processes. The Department also must fund the
formation of a more robust T&E workforce, with both more full-time in-
house personnel and access, on demand, to experts in cutting-edge
fields from academia, FFRDCs and the commercial sector.
If confirmed, I will engage with Service leadership, system
developers, and developmental and operational testers to develop a test
and evaluation strategy appropriate to the program, system, or
capability that will: 1) effect the discovery of problems early in
system development; 2) verify desired system functionality; and 3)
facilitate planning and execution of adequate operational
demonstrations of required capabilities, which must validate
achievement of the intended capability and inform the decision whether
to transition from a Rapid Prototyping effort to a follow-on program
or, in a Rapid Fielding program, to start initial production.
Question. What requirements and criteria would you propose to
ensure an effective test and evaluation program is established for
rapid and/or agile acquisition programs?
Answer. Adequate resourcing of the DOT&E workforce and supporting
FFRDC funding and manpower is critical to ensuring these programs have
early DOT&E involvement, independent oversight, and access to expertise
and experience. The development and implementation of innovative test
and evaluation methods to support more advanced T&E early and often
would also be beneficial for such programs.
Question. What are your views on the important and timing of the
testing and evaluation of systems under spiral, iterative, or agile
development? When, in your view, should follow-on testing and
evaluation be required?
Answer. Regardless of the systems development approaches now
available through the Adaptive Acquisition Framework--to include
spiral, iterative, and agile development--adequate test and evaluation
of systems is critical to fielding weapons that work. As is the case
with all systems, T&E must be completed in a timely manner in order to
provide the right information to those who need it to support funding
and schedule decisions, system development and fielding decisions, and
development of operator concepts of operations and employment and
tactics, techniques and procedures.
Typically, follow-on T&E is conducted using fielded production
systems with appropriate modifications, upgrades, or increments. I
believe this should remain the case in programs that adopting a spiral,
iterative, or agile development paradigm. The differences in follow-on
T&E, due to the iterative nature of these methods, are twofold: 1) DODI
5000.87 requires software to be instrumented such that it supports data
collection during operations; and 2) the iterative process enables
testers to collect data from tests over time, building a cumulative
body of evidence over time.
In this model and with these enablers, follow-on T&E no longer
needs to be considered a ``big bang'' testing event. Instead, it could
be a data-collection activity that happens over time, and seen as an
evaluation process that occurs when deemed necessary.
cybersecurity
Question. The current Acting DOT&E testified that of the programs
DOT&E assessed in fiscal year 2020, virtually none were survivable
against relevant cyber threats. All can agree that a lack of program
resilience in this regard is unacceptable.
If confirmed, how would you propose to improve cybersecurity
testing of systems and technologies, including the security of
commercial cloud services?
Answer. The only way to test whether a system can withstand an
actual cyberattack is to actually conduct such an attack on the system
in a test environment. It is my understanding that the Department uses
NSA-certified red teams to do that during operational testing.
Unfortunately, those teams are stretched very thin by high demand, and
have limited resources. Additional resources for those teams, as well
as automation capabilities to ease their workload, would improve
cybersecurity testing. We also need to take advantage of the evolving
body of research that is coming out of our FFRDC's that can inform the
methods and tools for how we would do this work in the future.
Regarding commercial cloud services, upon which DOD relies more and
more to store highly sensitive, classified data, the biggest limitation
is that DOD's current contracts with cloud vendors generally don't
allow DOD to independently assess the security of cloud infrastructure
owned by the commercial vendor. Unless this burden is lessened, it is
difficult to assess the security of those clouds.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to ensure the Office
of DOT&E, program offices, and the Military Departments' and Services'
Test Agencies have the appropriate infrastructure for cybersecurity
testing?
Answer. If confirmed, I would first seek to better understand any
additional obstacles facing the Military Departments' and Services'
Test Agencies when it comes to infrastructure for cybersecurity
testing. I also believe that each entity should make use of the NSA-
certified red teams during operational testing.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to improve use of
National Security Agency-certified red teams and other mechanisms for
stress testing?
Answer. I believe that these red teams should be used early and
often to conduct attacks on blue systems, and they need to be
incorporated in all levels of testing from developmental through
operational. Unfortunately, those teams are stretched very thin by high
demand, and they don't have the resources or personnel needed to
routinely mimic sophisticated nation-State attacks, such as those China
or Russia have executed and will continue to do. Additional improvement
in cybersecurity testing should include integration of research,
automation capabilities, evolving tools and resources for those teams
to either ease or reshape their workload.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate time in the program
lifecycle to conduct cybersecurity operational testing, particularly
given almost constant updates in software?
Answer. Operationally realistic cyber testing should occur
throughout the program's lifetime. Persistent Cyber Operations provide
such testing periodically in a very operationally realistic way, for
critical operational networks and systems. It is my understanding that
DOT&E sponsors Persistent Cyber Operations in a number of Combatant
Commands through its congressionally mandated Cyber Assessment Program.
Additionally, the Department may consider expanding such operations to
support critical missions, such as nuclear command and control and
missile defense.
information systems and software test issues
Question. The Department of Defense's weapon systems, enterprise IT
systems, and business systems are increasingly software intensive and
software defined, requiring a fundamental shift away from a traditional
``waterfall'' acquisition process toward smaller increments fielded
more frequently. This poses challenges for developmental and
operational testing.
In your view, what are the most significant challenges unique to
the testing of incrementally developed information systems and
software?
Answer. The challenges of testing software-intensive systems or
cyber-physical systems are robust, and will not be mitigated by the
Software Acquisition Pathway (SWP) alone. The Department may require
additional technologies, both for development and test, to meet these
challenges. For example, I believe the Department must move to a more
robust digital modeling capability, such as digital twinning, which
will allow DOD to test the software in a simulated or emulated hardware
environment.
I am also aware that DOT&E has partnered with USD(R&E) in the
execution of NDAA 2020 Section 231, the use of Digital Engineering to
Automate T&E. This effort is focused on demonstrating the utility of
the digital engineering approach to deliver operationally effective,
suitable and survivable software-reliant and/or cyber-physical systems.
If confirmed, I would wholeheartedly support continuing this
partnership to advance these capabilities.
historically, dot&e evaluates programs against requirements established
at the beginning of system development.
Question. What role do you believe the DOT&E should play in testing
of software intensive weapons systems, business systems, and enterprise
information systems?
Answer. DOT&E's role in any program on oversight, by statute, is to
independently assess the effectiveness, suitability, survivability and,
where appropriate, lethality of U.S. warfighting and business
capabilities in operationally representative scenarios. Traditionally,
the operational test and evaluation community is able to test systems
only after the software has been delivered in a formal baseline that
will meet program requirements, embedded in the hardware, and in a form
where it could be executed in the context of the system and mission it
supports. This is a validation-type activity, which is appropriate for
the operational T&E community. While verifying software is inherently a
developmental T&E function, modern software methodologies potentially
provide operational T&E an opportunity to ``shift left'' and examine
smaller pieces of completed software code as it becomes available, in
the context of a mission. This could lead to earlier discovery of
defects, and provide OT&E a more active voice in the ``find, fix,
verify'' cycle early on, when software changes are less difficult to
implement. State-of-the-practices software development embraces the
involvement of the intended users early and often throughout
development, testing, certification and operations. In this way, their
feedback is implemented more efficiently and effectively, but also is
likely to have an impact on some requirements initially set by the
program.. Modern tools and methods provide a controlled mechanism by
which detailed requirements evolve over time. The OT&E community will
need to understand how those requirements are evolving so that we can
to adjusted testing of high-level requirements that evolve in concert
with user priorities.
Question. Does the test and evaluation community of the Department
possess adequate tools, test environments, expertise, staffing, and
funding to carry out its testing responsibilities as they relate to
software intensive systems?
Answer. Based on my current understanding of DOD's T&E ecosystem, I
believe the Department must substantially improve its tools and test
environments in order to handle the volume of software-reliant systems
in the acquisition pipeline. Potential capabilities include automation-
based testing that can keep pace with rapid incremental software
releases, and embedded diagnostics that warn when software isn't
behaving as it should. From a personnel standpoint, I believe DOD needs
a much larger, robust pool of software and cyber expertise. Given the
extremely competitive nature of the software and cyber fields, I
believe a two-pronged approach will be required: human resources that
reside in house, and an on-demand consortium of other government
organizations, academics, and commercial sector practitioners.
Question. What access to commercial information services, software,
and systems does the operational test and developmental test community
need to identify potential performance and security issues, and confirm
operational effectiveness and suitability prior to a system's use by
the Department of Defense?
Answer. It is imperative that DOD have the opportunity to evaluate
the performance and security of all warfighting capabilities, including
commercial information services, software, and systems. It is my
understanding that currently, DOD cannot adequately test and evaluate
the cybersecurity of any DOD capability hosted in the commercial cloud,
to include software factories. I believe that going forward, every
contract for cloud services should permit such testing. Moreover, the
DOD should be informed immediately of any breaches of commercial
networks where commercial products utilized by the department were
developed.
Question. What role, if any, should commercial sector testing play
in the Department's testing and evaluation of commercial information
systems that are being modified to support defense needs?
Answer. Out-of-the-box commercial components are not tested at the
same level as military standard components, which could potentially
create failures when operating at extreme conditions. I believe there
is a T&E role for the commercial sector in this scenario, but
successful execution requires more rigorous standards, sufficient
contract specifications, and modular open system architectures.
Commercial sector testing resources should be focused on verification
efforts, with DOD's operational T&E community leading the assessment of
operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality in
order to maintain acquisition independence.
modular open systems approaches and interfaces
Question. Congress has enacted legislation mandating the use of
Modular Open Systems Approaches (MOSA) in systems acquisition and the
delivery to the government of interface characterizations to enable
interoperability.
What are the unique challenges and imperatives, if any, in testing
MOSA-based systems and verifying compliance with interface
requirements?
Answer. Many net-centric programs across the Department, including
MOSA-based programs, have to develop dozens or even hundreds of
interfaces internally, or to other products and legacy systems, in
order to be operationally effective. To ensure that these interfaces
work correctly, it is imperative that the program fund an adequate
developmental test environment so that modules of the system can change
and improve over time. This would include with operationally realistic
interfaces and data flows so that the program can mitigate performance
and interface problems early. Programs that do so are much more likely
to succeed during operational testing and are deployed soon after.
Programs without an adequate developmental test environment usually
experience severe delays and cost overruns.
business and cloud computing systems
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve DOT&E capabilities to
test and evaluate the operational suitability of business systems and
the business processes they are intended to support?
Answer. I understand that recent DOT&E reporting shows that
business programs that fund operationally realistic test environments
early on, and use such environments to support both developmental and
operational testing, typically have fewer cost and schedule problems
than programs that choose not to fund such environments. I believe the
best thing the Department can do to improve the testing and
programmatic outcomes of business systems is to robustly fund
operationally realistic test environments as soon as possible during
program development.
Question. How would you improve the capabilities to test and
evaluate the operational suitability of cloud computing systems and
services?
Answer. Determining the operational suitability of cloud computing
systems and services has generally not been a problem to date. However,
it is my understanding that DOT&E, and DOD in general, is currently
unable to determine the cybersecurity of commercial cloud systems and
services because DOD's contracts fail to permit independent DOD
cybersecurity assessments of the cloud's commercially owned
infrastructure. This is a severe limitation, which should be addressed
in order to ensure that sensitive and classified data stored in such
clouds are secure.
Question. In your view, what are the challenges currently affecting
DOD's ability to determine the operational effectiveness and
suitability of commercial information services prior to their
deployment and use?
Answer. It is my understanding that determining the operational
effectiveness and suitability of commercial information services has
not been a problem for the Department to date. The major challenge is
DOD's inability to independently assess the cybersecurity of commercial
clouds because DOD's contracts do not permit such assessments on
commercially owned cloud infrastructure.
testing of commercial hardware based systems and technologies
Question. The Department of Defense is making significant efforts
to use more commercial hardware platforms, technologies, and systems.
What policies and practices should the Department establish to
govern the developmental and operational testing of these kinds of
commercial systems?
Answer. To enable adequate cybersecurity testing of commercial
hardware systems, such as commercial clouds, the Department should
establish policies that require DOD contracts with commercial vendors
to permit independent, DOD cybersecurity assessments of commercially
owned platforms, technologies and systems.
combination of testing with training exercises
Question. Some hold the view that the most representative
operational testing would be to allow operational forces to conduct
training exercises with the system under evaluation.
In your view, should testing be combined with scheduled training
exercises for efficiency and effectiveness?
Answer. Training exercises offer a unique opportunity to test in
more realistic operational scenarios that better replicate the density
and complexity of modern warfare. They can and should be leveraged to
provide critical operational test data on joint force interoperability
and tactical employment. However, data-driven operational test
objectives are not always compatible with training objectives because
training exercises are not often intended to address, and do not
include, the instrumentation necessary to generate the high-quality
data needed to characterize system performance, and to determine
mission outcomes and root causes of system deficiencies. It understand
that DOT&E frequently observes training exercises in which
developmental systems participate to gain early insights, but the
aforementioned factors currently limit the extent to which these
activities should be combined.
Question. What are the barriers, if any, to doing so?
Answer. Combined test and training events require trained
personnel, a relatively mature system under test, and agreed-to and
compatible test and training objectives. These resources and conditions
are typically available only near the end of system development, which
may limit available opportunities. Differences in test and training
objectives also make integration of these events difficult.
Another significant barrier is the lack of affordable, high-quality
instrumentation that is common to both test and training systems.
Installing modular, open-air battle shaping instrumentation systems on
both test and training systems would enable both communities to
leverage these events while applying emergent Big Data analytics and
knowledge management capabilities to improve post-mission analyses.
Standing up Big Data analytic teams that are capable of engineering and
analysis to develop requisite tools and analysis methodologies is also
required to be able to accurately assess the results of large-force
exercise and/or test events.
Question. How can training and testing ranges be used more jointly
and efficiently, in your view?
Answer. Development of common, but tailorable, instrumentation
systems, such as the Quick Reaction Instrumentation Package (QRIP) and
Open Air Battle Shaping (OABS) systems currently in use for testing of
several types of aircraft, is necessary to enable the application of
Big Data and Knowledge Management capabilities in both communities. I
support efforts to enable high-quality data collection in training
venues, which would significantly improve both testing and training and
lead to more opportunities for combined test and training activities.
``system of systems'' testing
Question. What inherent challenges exist for the operational T&E of
DOD programs that are part of an overall ``system of systems''?
Answer. A good example of such a system of systems is the Missile
Defense System, which comprises more than a dozen different missile,
sensor, and network systems, all of which must work together during
wartime. Operational test challenges for such a system of systems
include getting all system owners to agree on the testing plans,
schedule, and scope; obtaining an appropriate venue for such a large-
scale test; and obtaining adequate funding to support operationally
realistic testing. For the Missile Defense System, Congress has helped
the DOD achieve more realistic testing by mandating that the Army and
the Missile Defense Agency conduct joint testing of their individual
missile defense systems.
Question. How should a ``system of systems'' be tested to assess
the effectiveness of the whole system? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The only way to truly understand how a system of systems
will perform in combat is to test it as a system of systems, with all
of its component systems deployed against operationally realistic
threats. However, such tests are difficult to conduct routinely due to
a variety of operational test challenges. Hence, the best way to assess
the effectiveness of such systems is to use a combination of modeling
and simulation and real-world testing, where the real-world testing is
designed to validate and accredit the modeling and simulation.
live fire testing
Question. The live fire testing program is a statutory requirement
enacted to ensure DOD assessment of the vulnerability and survivability
of platforms, while also assessing the lethality of weapons against
required target sets.
What are the major challenges facing the live fire testing program,
in your view?
Answer. The live fire testing program must be resourced and staffed
to be responsive to evolving designs while also staying ahead of
current and expected threats. The survivability of new defense systems,
including those in space and the electromagnetic spectrum environment,
should be assessed against the operationally relevant spectrum of
threats, including evolving kinetic threats and more sophisticated non-
kinetic threats.
Question. Is live fire testing to determine whether weapons
systems, vehicles, or personal protective equipment meet military and
contract specifications for procurement an inherently governmental
function, a function that can be outsourced, or a function that can use
a mix of government and commercial facilities? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. Live fire testing that supports a fielding decision or
full-rate production decision is inherently governmental. Warfighters
should be provided systems that have undergone government testing at a
government facility or, under limited circumstances, testing at non-
governmental facilities with government supervision. The government
could use private certified labs, as necessary, to meet surge
requirements or to conduct research and development testing. When
testing is conducted at commercial facilities, it must have government
oversight and meet a common standard appropriate for the intended use
of the data.
modeling and simulation
Question. Advances in modeling and simulation have provided an
opportunity to streamline the testing process, saving time and expense.
What do you believe to be the proper balance between modeling and
simulation and actual testing of a developed product?
Answer. Testers must use models that are credible or risk providing
warfighters incorrect information about their systems. Failure to
identify system vulnerabilities during testing prevents correction or
mitigation, and can create disastrous results in combat. Modeling and
simulation (M&S) credibility is achieved through a process of
verification, validation and accreditation. At its base, validation
requires live data to confirm that the modeled performance is
representative of the real world.
Modeling and simulation is an investment. There can be significant
cost to developing and validating M&S. However, returns may include: 1)
system evaluation in scenarios that cannot be achieved with live
testing due to safety constraints, availability of threat surrogates
and test range limitations; 2) less demand on Service assets; 3)
shorter timelines due to its availability and speed of execution; and
4) significant repetitions at lower cost yet greater fidelity in
performance assessment. The early costs of M&S may be high but it
produces significant dividends in testing of the follow-on iterations
of a system or a similar system. I strongly support a healthy
investment in M&S for all systems.
The proper balance between modeling and simulation and actual
testing changes with system and model maturity. For a new system
employing emerging technology or significantly modified technology,
there may be little to no representative live data. For initial
evaluations, it is possible that the live data required to develop and
validate models will exceed the amount of live data necessary to assess
initial system performance. For follow-on iterations of the system,
much of the previously attained data remains pertinent, which means
less new live data is needed. As the system develops with each
iteration, tester confidence in the M&S increases and enables greater
reliance on M&S to assess the system's performance.
Sufficiently robust and validated models are not yet available that
would preclude testing things like combat systems without some form of
live events. Actual demonstration is essential to operator confidence.
Further, all M&S has limitations. Continued system improvement depends
upon some live testing, particularly testing that evaluates the system
under its most stressing conditions. However, significantly less live
testing is appropriate when supplemented with credible M&S.
Question. Are there areas in modeling and simulation that need to
be advanced in order to improve its utility as a tool for operational
and developmental testing?
Answer. Advances in M&S are essential to support the evaluation of
emergent technologies, such as artificial intelligence, autonomous
systems, directed energy, and hypersonics. Confidence in an autonomous
system, for example, requires an assessment of system response to a set
of circumstances and combinations of those circumstances that would be
cost-and time-prohibitive in live events alone. A virtual range is
necessary to provide the data-rich environment needed to have
confidence in the decisionmaking of an autonomous machine. Further,
decisionmaking needs to balance between safe operations and mission
accomplishment. For example, a system that over-maneuvers can never get
to its objective. Developers need to be able to determine the threshold
for response that supports the expected environment, which can be
significantly different for each intended mission.
Another area for investment is a comprehensive M&S environment to
assess ship self-defense capability against anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs). Threat ASCMs vary significantly in capability and employment.
The same is true for the radar systems, intercept missiles, and combat
systems on naval ships. Adequately evaluating the capability of the
growing number of unique ships will be cost-, time-, and resource-
prohibitive without an effective M&S environment that can credibly
assess any combination of defense systems against any presentation of
threat ASCM.
Question. Given recent advancements in modeling and simulation, and
increasing interest in the Department's use of so-called ``digital
twin'' technology to improve mission readiness and sustainment, where
would you draw the line between the suitability of virtual testing and
live testing?
Answer. Modeling and simulation must be credible, with its
credibility anchored by comparison to live test data to confirm
representation of the real world. As confidence develops in the M&S
through validation, it is appropriate to lean more heavily on virtual
testing. However, it is not appropriate to exclude all live testing.
Smaller live test events, called demonstration events, should remain a
part of testing to ensure operator confidence in their combat systems,
to enable continued improvement and validation of M&S, and to mitigate
the inherent limitations of M&S.
science and technology
Question. What are your views on the appropriate level of
investment in science and technology (S&T) programs to develop next
generation testing capabilities?
Answer. The complexity of DOD weapon systems and the multi-domain
operational environment that is changing in both space and time warrant
heavy reliance on science and technology investment to advance T&E
tools and methods. Future T&E demands will require us to improve the
way we collect, store and analyze data. If confirmed, I will seek to
review the existing DOT&E S&T strategy, ensure that it is implemented
in a timely and operationally relevant fashion, and provide my best
recommendations to the Secretary and the Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what mechanisms would you employ to ensure
the S&T portfolio is responsive to the Department of Defense's future
test instrumentation needs?
Answer. In annual reports to Congress, DOT&E has pointed out
specific test areas where more S&T is required in order to ensure
future OT&E adequacy. DOT&E has also historically prepared issue
papers, which highlight particular test resource issues, including
those related to S&T, for the Department's annual program and budget
reviews. If confirmed, I will evaluate the Test Resource Management
Center T&E and S&T portfolio, discuss any shortfalls with the
Secretary, and keep the Congress informed of my findings and intended
actions.
Question. In your view, in which areas should the Department's S&T
program be investing with a view to improving the quality of current
and future testing capabilities?
Answer. S&T areas for potential investment include 1) a continuum
of T&E for changing software capabilities, evolving interoperability,
and cybersecurity threat response; 2) next-generation T&E capabilities,
to include hypersonic weapons and defense, directed energy, contested
space, cybersecurity, data analytics, electronic warfare, nuclear
survivability, spectrum allocation, artificial intelligence-based
system T&E, real-time casualty assessments, and telepresence (remote)
T&E; 3) integrated T&E; 4) digital transformation in taking advantage
of new model-based engineering tools to redesign how we perform T&E;
and 5) workforce expertise and partnership. If confirmed, I will
evaluate the progress in these areas, discuss any shortfalls with the
Secretary, and keep the Congress informed of my findings and intended
actions.
encroachment and environmental issues
Question. As is the case with military training, the Department of
Defense's test and evaluation efforts must take into account
encroachment requirements and environmental regulations, both on land
and at sea.
In your view, what is DOT&E's responsibility to the communities and
environment near its test ranges?
Answer. I believe it is vitally important to maintain open and
proactive communications with our community partners to achieve
mutually beneficial solutions. While I understand this authority is
assigned to the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), I will ensure
that my views concerning the compatibility of the test ranges with
neighboring communities, along with any impacts on the environment, are
known to TRMC and leadership within the Department.
If confirmed, will also ensure that Department officials sustain
longstanding relationships with Federal, State, and local governments,
tribes, and non-governmental organizations, such as the Western
Regional Partnership, the Southeast Regional Partnership for Planning
and Sustainability, and the Land Trust Alliance. This will enable full
awareness of current and projected environmental requirements, and
prospective encroachment issues that may affect the Department's test
ranges, and in particular, the effective conduct of operational and
live-fire T&E.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address encroachment and
environmental requirements, while ensuring the quality and quantity of
the Department's test and evaluation programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain alert for environmental
requirements and range encroachment that could adversely affect the
ability to conduct adequate operational and live-fire T&E. I will not
hesitate to bring any concerns that I have about the effects of
environmental requirements and/or range encroachment on the ability to
conduct adequate operational testing to senior leadership of the
Department. Further, I will document such concerns in both my Annual
Report and program evaluations, as appropriate. Where I am aware of any
issues pertaining to encroachment and environment, I will bring such
matters to the attention of TRMC as well as the leadership of other
Department stakeholders.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the DOT&E?
Answer. Any sexual harassment or gender discrimination within
DOT&E, or the Department as a whole, is deeply disturbing and entirely
unacceptable; these actions foster a climate that is inconsistent with
the dignity and respect that our workforce deserves. The Department
should continue its efforts to eliminate sexual harassment and gender
discrimination, ensure consistent incident tracking and responsiveness,
and provide training to improve outcomes and workforce stability. If
confirmed, I would review previous workforce assessments, including
climate surveys, OPM Federal employee viewpoint survey results, and any
other documentation that would give me insight into the DOT&E
organization, and help me make informed decisions on next steps to
eliminate sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and any other
harassment within the Office of DOT&E.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the Office of the DOT&E?
Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately reiterate to the
workforce the importance of equality and diversity, the Department's
zero tolerance for any form of harassment, and the expectations of
professional conduct. I would take any complaint brought to my
attention very seriously, and would immediately contact the appropriate
office to initiate an investigation to gather all facts, conduct the
necessary interviews, collect appropriate information, and address the
complaint within the specified guidelines of DOD regulations and
policies.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
emerging technologies
1. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, currently there are no validated
requirements or concepts of operation for Joint All Domain Command and
Control (JADC2). How should the Department of Defense (DOD) test
emerging JADC2 technologies?
Mr. Guertin. It is my understanding that DOT&E is working with the
Joint Staff and the Services as they develop JADC2 requirements and
operational concepts to help ensure the results of the process can be
linked to operationally testable outcomes. As requirements become more
refined, DOT&E should continue to ensure the Services develop the
appropriate scenarios and vignettes, with the inclusion of the
necessary test infrastructure and tools, to provide the warfighter a
meaningful assessment of JADC2 capabilities. It is my view that the
Department may be able to accelerate this process, and to lower overall
execution risk, by incrementally accomplishing JADC2 experimentation
and limited operational user evaluations to inform continued JADC2
requirements and operational concept development.
2. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, how and when should the office of the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's (DOT&E) be involved in
testing emerging JADC2 technologies?
Mr. Guertin. In my view, DOT&E should be involved earlier than has
been done in the past in order to shape how capabilities can be tested.
This will ensure the OT&E community and the Services develop the
appropriate scenarios and vignettes, and have access to the right data
at the right time. This should include the development strategy for
test infrastructure and tools that will facilitate giving the
warfighter a meaningful assessment of JADC2 capabilities. It is my view
that the Department may be able to accelerate this process by
incrementally accomplishing JADC2 experimentation and limited
operational user evaluations to inform continued development of JADC2
requirements, test approaches, data accessibility, and the overall
operational concept.
software testing
3. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, I understand that you supported the
Defense Innovation Board's 2019 Software Acquisition and Practices
Study while at Carnegie Melon's Software Engineering Institute. As an
outgrowth of that study, Congress directed in the Fiscal Year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), section 231, ``Digital
engineering capability to automate testing and evaluation'', and the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation subsequently led a number
of demonstrations of digital engineering in support of automated
testing. In your view, what should be the next steps that DOT&E takes
to continue to advance these efforts?
Mr. Guertin. It is my understanding that the Section 231
demonstrations have been useful to illustrate some pockets of
excellence in the Department related to that application of, and
benefits from, using digital engineering methods and tools. Based on
those demonstrations, it appears that DOD needs to transition more of
its enterprise capabilities and associated infrastructure to support
digital engineering solutions. These demonstrations of driving down
program execution time and risk are widely beneficial to programs
adopting evidence-based practices when using digital engineering
methods and tools. DOD should also use the case studies developed from
the Section 231 demonstrations to discover defects earlier in the
acquisition lifecycle, promote a ``Shift Left'' T&E paradigm, and
reduce risk in order to speed delivery and deployment of improved
warfighter functionality.
live fire testing
4. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, if confirmed as the new DOT&E, how
would you ensure that your office is adequately staffed and resourced
in the critical area of live fire testing given its importance to
missions and statutory requirements?
Mr. Guertin. If confirmed, I will review the DOT&E portfolio and
the allocated resources for both operational and live fire test and
evaluation. I will assess the DOT&E workforce to include any supporting
workforce (e.g. FFRDCs) to ensure DOT&E has the appropriate capacity
and skill sets needed to provide rigorous oversight of live fire
testing and evaluation (LFT&E) programs. I will use these assessments
to evaluate the health of the organization and the ability of DOT&E to
meet all Title 10 responsibilities, including the LFT&E
responsibilities outlined in 10 USC 2366. In addition, I will review
the findings of the recent National Academies study on test ranges with
the DOT&E team to identify initiative and efficiencies that will inform
changes to LFT&E practices. If my assessment identifies any shortfalls
that precludes my ability to conduct adequate oversight of LFT&E
programs, I will work with Congress and the stakeholders within the
Department to mitigate those shortfalls as quickly as possible. If
confirmed, I intend to apply both existing and new methods to advance
the effectiveness and efficiency of LFT&E programs to enhance their
value.
5. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, what specific organizational
construct do you believe will support the importance of live fire
testing?
Mr. Guertin. Live fire testing and evaluation is indispensable for
ensuring that the taxpayer is getting the capability they are paying
for, and that the warfighter has confidence in the weapons and systems
they will use in combat. A viable next step would be to ensure
survivability and lethality assessments are effectively carried out at
the Services level. This would be done by designating an organization
responsible within each Service for LFT&E which would work with DOT&E
to establish common policies and practices. This would increase the
credibility and efficiency of all test and evaluation programs
performed by all of DOD, and further highlight the indispensable nature
of live fire testing. It is my understanding that the Army has already
made great strides in this area through their Army Test and Evaluation
Command (ATEC). If confirmed, I would evaluate the effectiveness of
this construct and make my best recommendations to the Secretary for
application of this practice to other Services operational test
organizations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
cybersecurity
6. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Guertin, if confirmed, what are your
recommended priorities for cybersecurity improvements for operational
testing and evaluation to mitigate cybersecurity testing limitations
and enhance system survivability?
Mr. Guertin. My current understanding is that the most significant
limitation to cybersecurity operational testing and evaluation is the
lack of proper tools, and access to highly skilled cyber operators who
are capable of emulating cyberattacks by near-peer competitors. If
confirmed, one of my first priorities in this area would be to find
ways to gain greater access to, and more robustly resource, these
highly skilled cyber operators and the associated tools of their craft.
In concert with this shift, the military Services would also need to
synchronize their efforts and similarly provide additional resources to
their ``cyber red teams'' to enable them to acquire those same
automated tools and advanced cyber capabilities commensurate with known
and evolving cyber threats. It is my opinion that in order to improve
both access and retention of these highly skilled cyber operators, the
Services should ensure that they have the resources they need to excel
in their craft, and consider treating them like other highly skilled
military personnel, such as pilots and doctors, by providing cyber
career paths and advancement opportunities for which they may not
currently have access.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
software
7. Senator Peters. Mr. Guertin, Nicolas Chaillan, the Air Force's
first-ever chief software officer left his post last month and
expressed his frustration with DOD's use of resources and priorities in
a letter announcing his decision. He also pointed out the lack of an
enterprise approach when it comes to software development and shared
repositories. Software testing currently falls under developmental
testing, but the software is constantly being updated in operations.
How do you think the DOT&E office can ensure more efficient and
thorough reviews of software and continuous monitoring of every
software bill of materials as a part of the operational evaluation?
Mr. Guertin. DOT&E can and will need to understand the software
pipeline (e.g. development, security, and operations, or DevSecOps,
methods) and how a product's software bill of materials (SBOM) and
related cyber risks are tracked and managed in order to adequately
perform operational testing for programs under DOT&E oversight. Related
to this is research I have performed on the value of broader
application of open architectures. Based on that research, I believe
that the Department should increase its focus on standardization, which
would include mechanisms for continuous monitoring. This would support
the OT&E equity in understanding the supply chain risks and cyber
security considerations in the developmental and operational phases of
the software life cycle. However, these are not practices that could be
put in place by DOT&E alone. Many of these activities are established
in the early stages of implementation, which is primarily reviewed as a
Developmental Test activity. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the other stakeholders in USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and the Services to
establish these patterns and the insights they would provide.
In the meantime and in support of the above potential future State,
during Operational Test planning, DOT&E could enforce a requirement to
monitor the SBOM and associated supply chain (to include the
development tooling), both during and after product release. This would
ensure the SBOM remains accurate and up-to-date, and is reflective of
the cyber vulnerabilities and risks of the product. As part of the
Operational Test, DOT&E could also require verification that the
process to monitor the SBOM and related supply chain is accurate, and
that there are procedures to mitigate any issues discovered after
release.
8. Senator Peters. Mr. Guertin, how can DOT&E more effectively
apply its resources?
Mr. Guertin. In my view, DOT&E should work with the other OSD
stakeholders and the Services to transform the test and evaluation
concept of operations to keep pace with the methods of product
development and demands of the future capability needs of the
warfighter. If confirmed, I will assemble this team of practitioners to
examine the tools and methods associated with advance software and
cyber test and evaluation needed to take advantage of transformational
digital engineering technologies, evolving workforce expertise, and new
partnerships to more effectively apply available resources.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
operational testing and evaluation
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Guertin, I believe the Department of Defense
needs to speed up acquisition where possible. The Department should
tailor its approach to acquisition based on what is being procured.
Along these lines, I support the intent of the Department of Defense's
relatively new Adaptive Acquisition Framework. At the same time, we
must also ensure that any new Department of Defense system is
rigorously assessed to ensure it meets our requirements before it's
fielded.
In your view, to what extent does the growing threat posed by
China, as well as the increasingly high-tech nature of many new weapons
systems, change how operational test and evaluation should be
performed?
Mr. Guertin. In my view, the change in operational testing needs a
more holistic and continuous approach, propelled by transformative
digital technologies, to enable DOT&E to test the way the Department
must fight. This will be especially important to deal with the pacing
threat posed by China. From an operational test perspective, we will
need to address more comprehensively how we instantiate representative
environments that are as dynamic and complex as the projected threat,
and be able to test our systems as they would be used as a part of a
comprehensive joint force. This would include testing protections
against the persistent and advanced cyber threat that all systems must
be able to address, individually and jointly.
With all this in mind, it is my intention, if confined, to examine
the published DOT&E Science and Technology Strategic Plan and the
recently released study on test ranges performed by the National
Academies, to develop this more holistic and continuous approach to
testing and evaluation that will enable DOT&E to test the way the
Department must fight in today's joint and all-domain operational
environment well into the future.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin,
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Nickolas
H. Guertin in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2021.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Alexandra N. Baker by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. Pursuant to section 137a of title 10, U.S. Code, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) serve as the
first assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))
and assists the Under Secretary in the performance of the duties set
forth in section 134 of the code.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
DUSD(P)?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P))
is the primary assistant to and senior-most official under the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The DUSD(P) will assist the
USD(P) to perform all duties in Section 134 and 137a of Title 10,
U.S.C. As a Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed official, the
DUSD(P) is empowered to act on behalf of USD(P) on delegated topics,
and when the USD(P) is unavailable or recused.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the DUSD(P) as
``first assistant'' to the USD(P)?
Answer. Per the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended (5
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 3345-3349d), the ``first assistant'' is the first
successor to USD(P) in case the USD(P) dies, resigns, or is unavailable
to perform his/her duties. In such a case, DUSD(P) shall act for the
USD(P) until a successor is either appointed or the absence or
unavailability ends, subject to the time limitations and other
provisions of the Act.
Question. If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you
expect the USD(P) to prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I will foremost help USD(P) carry out the
responsibilities, fulfill functions, manage relationships, and exercise
authorities provided for in law and pursuant to the DOD directive that
assigns responsibilities to USD(P). I understand that the specific
duties assigned to DUSD(P) by the USD(P) has differed for every USD(P)/
DUSD(P) relationship. If I am confirmed, I will support USD(P) and the
Policy organization as directed by USD(P).
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you for this position?
Answer. My many years of service in the national security
community, to include as Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff,
national security advisor for Senator Warren, Deputy Chief of Staff to
former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, as a career civilian budget
analyst at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and my time on
the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Committee have
provided me with expertise, background, and experiences that qualify me
for this position. This background and experience will give me a
variety of perspectives on how best to support the Secretary of Defense
and the USD(P).
Question. Specifically what leadership and management experience do
you possess that you would apply to your service as DUSD(P), if
confirmed?
Answer. I have led diverse teams at multiple levels to meet or
exceed their organizational objectives, both within the Department and
over the course of my career. In my role as Deputy Chief of Staff to
the Secretary of Defense, I helped to stand-up several new offices and
initiatives within the Department, including the Defense Innovation
Unit (DIU), coordinating their activities across multiple stakeholders
and with Congress. Having worked directly for a Secretary of Defense
gave me a Department-wide view of how the Department functions, and the
role played by Policy in the broader defense organization. In my
current role as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the
National Security Council, I lead key interagency strategy efforts,
coordinating input and actions at the Assistant Secretary-level across
the government. My time at OMB additionally gave me tools to understand
how resources are apportioned among the departments and agencies. I
believe this background will help me assist the Secretary and USD(P)
with the Policy organization's responsibilities.
Question. Are there any actions you would take to enhance your
ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the DUSD(P)?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will familiarize myself with the
Policy organization, its assigned responsibilities, and the
expectations of the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for me. I will
seek to build and expand on relationships within DOD, other departments
and agencies, and with the legislative branch to further Policy's
goals.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you would face if confirmed as the DUSD(P)?
Answer. The most significant challenge for me would be the same as
for the Policy organization--providing the best strategic advice to the
Secretary, implementing the policies deriving from those strategies,
and accomplishing these missions in a COVID constrained environment. If
confirmed, I would also seek to prioritize the organizational health of
the Policy enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to
address each of these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Policy team on enhancing
resources and examining the tools the team has to work on classified
issues under the COVID challenges facing the Policy team.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas, if any, would you
consider providing the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense regarding
the organization and operations of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))?
Answer. As I have not yet served in Policy, I believe it would be
premature for me to speculate before gaining a better understanding of
the organization. If confirmed, I will spend time learning the
organization and its operations so that I can provide the Secretary and
USD(P) the best possible innovative recommendations.
guantanamo bay naval station
Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
facility at Guantanamo?
Answer. I support the Biden Administration's stated view that it is
time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly. Until
that time, however, the Department must ensure the continued safe,
humane, and legal care and treatment of the 39 remaining detainees
through Joint Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, does the end of combat
operations in Afghanistan have on the Defense Department's detention
policy and strategy?
Answer. While I am aware that there is litigation ongoing on this
matter, I understand that the end of combat operations in Afghanistan
does not affect the legal basis for the Defense Department's detention
operations, which remains the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force. With regard to the Department's detention policy and strategy,
in line with the Biden Administration's policy, I believe it is time to
close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly.
Question. What factors should be considered in setting policy for
determining the release or transfer of GTMO detainees?
Answer. I believe the factors used by the Periodic Review Board in
determining whether a detainee should be considered transfer eligible,
as laid out in the governing policy memo posted at prs.mil are
appropriate. The Periodic Review Board review process uses available
information to determine whether a detainee remains a continuing
significant threat to the security of the United States and, if not,
whether there are conditions which could ensure any remaining threat is
mitigated such that transfer to a suitable country is appropriate.
Question. In your view, what should be the Department's long-term
detention strategy?
Answer. In line with the Biden Administration's policy, I believe
it is time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly.
It is my understanding that the Biden administration does not intend to
bring new detainees to the facility and will seek to close it.
The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section
1023 of the fiscal year 2012 NDAA, is conducted ``to determine whether
certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing
significant threat to the security of the United States such that their
continued detention is warranted''.
Question. Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the PRB
process and the transfer of detainees to other countries based on the
PRB's determinations, subject to the restrictions currently in law?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the continued Period Review
Board process. I understand that the PRB conducts hearings on a regular
basis to make administrative determinations as to whether continued
detention remains necessary, although no transfers occur unless the
Secretary of Defense provides a certification in accordance with the
relevant legal requirements.
Question. Under what circumstances would you envision the
Administration directing the activation and operations of such a
migrant detention facility?
Answer. I believe the referenced facility is the Migrant Operations
Center, which is located on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and operated
by the Department of Homeland Security. To my knowledge this facility
has a steady-State mission of housing migrants interdicted at sea while
they are processed for third-country resettlement.
Question. What role would the Department of Defense play in the
Administration and operation of this migrant detention facility?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Homeland
Security manages the administration and operations of the Migrant
Operations Center. I understand that Naval Station Guantanamo Bay
provides some support services, such as medical care for staff and
those housed at this center, on a reimbursable basis.
Question. What is the appropriate role for a contractor to play in
the administration of this facility?
Answer. I cannot speak to the appropriate role of contractors at
this facility as it is operated by the Department of Homeland Security.
department of defense reforms
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 included an increase in the number of personnel authorized to be
assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Do you believe that an increase in the number of personnel assigned
to the OUSD(P) is necessary and appropriate?
Answer. I am aware that the number of personnel in the Policy
organization has been reduced over the last several years. My
understanding is that this has been challenging to the Policy
organization, especially as our national security challenges have grown
in complexity. If confirmed, I would seek to work with USD(P) to review
missions and current staffing levels to determine whether the
professional civilian staff is sized appropriately, and how we can best
recruit and retain a skilled and talented workforce. I would also seek
to work with Congress to ensure that the Policy organization is
resourced appropriately to support the Secretary and the Nation.
Question. To what missions and functions would you apply such an
increase, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look to the upcoming National Defense
Strategy to guide my recommendations to USD(P) about how best to use
any additional resources.
Question. In your opinion, how does the number of personnel
assigned to OUSD(P) (as compared to the number of personnel assigned to
the Joint Staff) impact civilian control of the military?
Answer. OUSD(P) personnel play an important role in advising the
Secretary of Defense and ensuring civilian control of the military. As
I am not yet aware of the personnel assigned to OUSD(P) and Joint
Staff, and if their responsibilities are comparable, I cannot assess
this question yet. If confirmed, I will commit to examining this issue
closely.
Question. In your view, would an increase in the number of
personnel assigned to the OUSD(P) enhance civilian control of the
military? Please explain your answer.
Answer. This is a complex question, which I am committed to examine
if I am confirmed. An increase in personnel would allow OUSD(P) to
increase its ability to provide the best strategic advice to the
Secretary of Defense, the senior departmental official, and would be
consistent with the commitment to ensure civilian control of the
military.
national defense strategy and interim national security strategic
guidance
Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) shifted United
States strategic priorities to focus on a rising China, an aggressive
Russia, and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global
terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, which sets out the national
security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has
initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, to be completed in 2022.
Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment,
including the most critical and enduring threats to the national
security of the United States and its allies?
Answer. The 2018 National Defense Strategy was notable, in my view,
particularly for how it accelerated bipartisan consensus on the
concerning growth of China's military capabilities and its implications
for the United States, and our allies and partners. As Secretary Austin
has highlighted, and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
more recently articulated, the growing scope and scale of China's
military modernization make China the Department's pacing challenge.
The Interim Guidance also highlights a range of other key challenges in
the security environment--to include climate change, the global COVID-
19 pandemic, and other biological threats. If confirmed, I would work
to ensure that the Department's ongoing NDS review accounts for key
features of the security environment, to include any changes since the
2018 NDS and the 2021 Interim National Security
strategic guidance were published.
Question. Do you support the national security priorities set out
in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance?
Answer. Yes. In my current role, I am leading efforts to update the
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which will ultimately
result in publication of the Administration's new National Security
Strategy. If confirmed, I would expect to focus on ensuring NDS
alignment and implementation consistent with administration guidance.
Question. What areas of current NDS implementation cause you the
most concern and what recommendations would you have for addressing
each of these concerns, if confirmed?
Answer. Any defense strategy, in my view, stands or falls on
implementation. Assessments of past National Defense Strategies (and
QDRs before them) have consistently identified the need for more
deliberate planning, organization, and prioritization to execute the
priorities in these documents. I understand the NDS process is well
underway. If confirmed, I will work to finalize the forthcoming NDS
with a deliberate eye toward ensuring that it builds implementation
into its approach. In so doing, I would work with the Department's
senior leadership to ensure that implementation efforts are integrated
across the Department, in support of other U.S. elements of national
power, and alongside our allies and partners.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the
quantity and quality of analytic capability required to support
informed assessment and decisionmaking in the OUSD(P)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in working with the
Deputy Secretary's recently chartered Analytic Working Group--comprised
of Policy, Joint Staff, CAPE, and the Chief Data Officer (CDO)--in
consultation with the Services and other components, to ensure the
analytic support processes, tools, and methodologies provide civilian
leadership with the variety of decision support that they need to
address the scope and scale of challenges the NDS will address.
Question. What is your assessment of the ability of DOD modeling
and simulation capabilities to support policy missions, for example in
modeling the impacts of financial market uncertainties on military
operations?
While I am not in a position to know firsthand, I understand that
the Department's analytic capabilities may have been strained by
budgetary reductions over the past decade. At the same time, potential
tools and methodologies have been evolving based on new analytic
approaches and technologies and better harnessing of data. If
confirmed, I will make it a priority to review these developments and
ensure that Policy has the requisite personnel, tools, and
methodologies to support senior leader decisions.
Question. What is your view of the role that social science
research, such as that funded under the DOD Minerva program, has played
in support of defense policy objectives?
Answer. I believe it is important for DOD policymakers to listen
to, and draw upon, a wide range of research, including from the
academic community. The Minerva program, and the social science it
supports, is an exemplar of such research and I understand that it has,
and continues to be, an important resource for policymakers, and the
wider DOD community.
In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the National
Defense Strategy Commission observed, ``[t]he United States needs more
than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational
concepts that expand United States options and constrain those of
China, Russia, and other actors. Operational concepts constitute an
essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and
budgetary priorities needed to advance them.''
Question. What do you view as the role of the OUSD(P) in the
development of operational concepts?
Answer. Operational concepts are an essential link between
strategic objectives, policies, and the capability and budgetary
priorities needed to advance them. As such, OUSD(P)'s role is to
provide appropriate civilian guidance and oversight to ensure
operational concepts are well-integrated and strategically aligned.
Question. What key elements or components must operational concepts
include, in your opinion, to effectively guide capability and budgetary
priorities?
Answer. Joint concept development is an iterative process that
requires tight linkages between civilian and military leadership. At
any resource level, the Department's concept development must balance
sustaining systems capable of countering threats at lower costs,
divesting systems that are not fit for purpose, and modernizing forces
able to contend with threats posed by increasingly advanced competitors
over time, with a prioritized focus on China. To do so, operational
concepts must clearly articulate the operational problems that a threat
poses over time and how the concept is intended to provide options to
address the threat in relation to the above.
Question. In your opinion, does the planning, programming,
budgeting and execution process in the Department of Defense need to be
modified to better support the emerging joint requirements of the Joint
Warfighting Concept? If so, in what ways? If not, why not?
Answer. I believe the Department's planning, programming,
budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process, including the supporting force
planning and development efforts, provides a transparent and neutral
process for considering and prioritizing key investments that stem from
the emerging defense strategy and Joint Warfighting Concept work.
However, as with all processes, DOD should frequently evaluate PPBE to
ensure that it is effectively providing needed alignment between
strategic priorities, analysis, concepts, and specific solutions.
cyber policy and authorities
Question. National Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13),
United States Cyber Operations Policy, provides the process for
approving cyberspace operations. Together with congressional
clarification that clandestine military activities or operations in
cyberspace can be considered ``traditional military operations'' under
the National Security Act of 1947, NSPM-13 is credited with enabling
the Federal Government to undertake significant cyberspace actions on a
timely basis within an effective oversight framework.
In your view, has NSPM-13 significantly improved the planning and
approval of military operations in cyberspace?
Answer. In my view, the existing policy framework for approving
offensive cyber operations has made a positive contribution by enabling
the Department to effectively perform its mission to disrupt threats
overseas at the source, before they reach our networks. I also welcomed
Congress's clarification in the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA of what
constitutes traditional military activities. Together, these measures
ensure that the Department is better able to operate in cyberspace and
understand the evolving cyber environment.
Question. In your view, can NSPM-13 be improved, and if so, how?
Answer. It is my understanding that the current policy has resulted
in well-coordinated and timely DOD cyber operations. If confirmed, I
will support the USD(P) in reviewing the policy and any associated
risks, and work to ensure that the Department remains focused on
improving its effective use of the authority granted by the President
and the existing interagency coordination process. I will also seek to
ensure that the Department remains fully transparent with Congress as
we ensure that DOD is able to perform its mission effectively in
cyberspace.
The United States has been subjected to an increasing number of
serious ransomware attacks facilitated by criminal organizations
located in countries whose governments appear to tolerate, if not
encourage, these activities.
Question. In your view, specifically how should the U.S. Government
hold other governments accountable for failing to act against criminal
ransomware organizations operating within their borders?
Answer. Addressing the threat of ransomware is a challenge, in part
due to the increasingly blurry lines between nation-State and criminal
actors. Some governments have let government-employed hackers
``moonlight'' as cybercriminals for personal benefit, and some
governments have created permissive environments for criminal
ransomware gangs, allowing them to operate from within their borders
and shielding them from prosecution. President Biden has been clear
that this is not acceptable, and that responsible countries must take
action against cybercriminals who conduct ransomware activities from
within their territory.
Thwarting ransomware actors requires a whole-of-government response
that is coordinated with the private sector and our international
partners. If confirmed, I will work to support these efforts, which
include working with the defense industrial base to increase its
security and resiliency; defending the Department's networks from
malware, including ransomware; and strengthening partnerships with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security in
their efforts to improve the cyber defenses of Federal, State, and
local governments, as well as those of the private sector.
Question. Does the ability of these large cyber-criminal
enterprises to target critical infrastructure pose a potential threat
to national security, in your view?
Answer. Ransomware attacks can threaten our national, homeland, and
economic security. Recent high-profile attacks on critical
infrastructure, including attacks on the Colonial Pipeline and JBS
Foods, have demonstrated ransomware's potential to disrupt the everyday
lives of Americans. The cyber degradation or disruption of critical
infrastructure can have cascading physical consequences that could have
serious effects on our national security.
Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in
assessing whether a cyber action by an adversary would constitute an
act of war?
Answer. The implications of any cyberattack must be considered on a
case-by-case basis. This includes consideration of the total effects of
an incident, such as injury, death, or significant property
destruction. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department is
postured to support whole-of-government responses to cyber incidents,
particularly if they are destructive or target our critical
infrastructure.
Question. While diplomacy, law enforcement actions, and improved
defenses are critical to countering the ransomware threat, do you
envision a role for DOD Cyber Mission Forces in conducting disruptive
actions directly against these organizations in cyberspace? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that the Department is prepared to use its
unique authorities to defend forward and disrupt significant ransomware
threats at the source, before they reach our networks. However,
ransomware actors generally target victims for financial gain, making
ransomware threats criminal in nature and often the focus of law
enforcement action. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the
Department continues to support whole-of-government efforts to counter
ransomware threats, including through robust sharing of information
that can enable our law enforcement partners as well as the Department
of Homeland Security, which is responsible for coordinating the
security of U.S. critical infrastructure.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal
year 2014, required the appointment of a Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA)
to the Secretary of Defense to coordinate across all the DOD components
with cyberspace responsibilities, assist in the development of cyber
strategies and posture reviews, and oversee implementation of
strategies and policies. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is reviewing a
recommendation to transfer the PCA role from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security to the DOD Chief
Information Officer (CIO).
What do you perceive to be both the pros and cons associated with
the transfer of PCA roles and duties to the DOD CIO?
Answer. I understand the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary
of Defense (PCA) and Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
(DOD CIO) play critical roles in the Department's governance and
oversight of cyber policy and programs. Within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense the PCA's responsibilities include oversight of
U.S. Cyber Command and implementation of the Department's cyber
strategy playing a key role in overseeing cyber operations and policy,
programs, and processes that support these operations, and integrating
policy, programs, and processes germane to cyber operations across the
Department. I understand the DOD CIO, as the principal staff assistant
for information technology, manages the Department's cybersecurity
program and develops and oversees implementation of cybersecurity
policy across the Department. I am not aware of and have not been a
part of internal DOD discussions about a potential transfer of the PCA
role to the DOD CIO. If confirmed, and designated by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy to contribute to those internal
discussions, I would develop a recommendation based on careful review
of the PCA and CIO roles and responsibilities, respectively, and DOD
leaders' vision and strategy for organizing the Department for all of
its cyber-related missions.
Question. If confirmed, will you pledge to consult with the
Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate prior to any
decision by the Secretary to transfer the PCA role from the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. I understand the Deputy Secretary of Defense intends, and
has promised, to consult with the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and House of Representatives prior to any redesignation of the
Principal Cyber Advisor. If confirmed, I will ensure that consultation
with these committees occurs prior to any final decision.
spectrum
Question. In what ways does DOD rely on spectrum to support
warfighter requirements?
Answer. My understanding is that the electromagnetic spectrum is
essential to a wide range of the Joint Force's operations, including
command, control, communications, and warfighting.
Question. What future spectrum warfighter requirements are
essential to competing with Russia and China?
Answer. I understand that the spectrum is increasingly contested.
If confirmed, I will look to better understand what the force needs to
achieve spectrum access and superiority in order to prevail in a high-
end warfight.
Question. Under the July 15, 2021, Electromagnetic Spectrum
Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan and Roadmap, and per section
1053 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, the DOD CIO has now assumed
responsibilities as the DOD senior official for overall implementation
of the Spectrum Superiority Strategy. Yet, the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, USD(P) is expected to name a
Deputy Assistant Secretary to advocate and represent the USD(P) on
matters related to Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).
Do you believe EMSO policy processes are adequately represented in
this planning structure?
Answer. I am not in a position at this time to assess whether EMSO
policy processes are adequately represented in this planning structure.
If confirmed, I will work with key stakeholders across the Department
to advance the Joint Force's priorities for EMSO, in accordance with
Policy's roles and per the implementation plan.
Question. Are Combatant Commander requirements properly
represented? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that the EMSO cross functional team included
participation by the CCMDs, but I am not in a position at this time to
evaluate CCMD representation in practice.
Question. If confirmed, what improvements would you propose to
strengthen the role of EMSO in the policy processes under the USD(P)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) to ensure that
Policy fully supports the consideration of EMSO in the appropriate
strategic guidance documents, to include the National Defense Strategy
and associated guidance on force management guidance and force
planning. I would also direct that Policy's participation in the
Department's budget and force management processes fully account for
EMSO.
Question. Do you believe it prudent for DOD to vacate or share the
3100-3450 Mhz band for commercial 5G wireless networks?
Answer. I am not in a position at this time to evaluate technical
specifics, but I believe the Department must balance achieving U.S.
economic development objectives while not limiting constraints on
military capabilities. If confirmed, I would work so support the USD(P)
in working alongside DOD's Chief Information Officer to ensure DOD's
access to critical spectrum.
Question. What most concerns you about the proposal that DOD vacate
this particular band?
Answer. I am generally concerned that adversary actions, commercial
development, and regulatory constraints could impede U.S. forces'
freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. If confirmed, I will
work with the USD(P) to ensure that the Department reforms its
processes and modernize the Joint Force in order to maintain an edge in
key domains, to include EMSO and 5G, in cooperation with the
Department's technical experts and other stakeholders.
Question. How would you articulate the impacts to the capabilities
of DOD under such circumstances, and how will those impacts be
mitigated, in your view?
Answer. I cannot speak to the technical specifics of how the
Department is grappling with this issue from my current position, but I
understand that, under the Secretary's guidance to make China the
Department's overall pacing threat for modernization, the Department is
prioritizing a wide range of modernization efforts. If confirmed, I
would expect to play a key role in linking strategic guidance to
implementation efforts and investments, informed by robust analysis and
new operating concepts.
space
Question. What are your views with respect to the necessity of
civilian oversight of DOD space operations with respect to U.S. Space
Command and Space Force?
Answer. Space is a critical warfighting domain, and civilian
oversight of force development and operations regarding the space
domain is as important as civilian oversight of force development and
military operations in any other domain. Given that conflict could
extend to or originate in space, and in light of the new and rapidly
evolving nature of the challenge, civilian oversight regarding space is
particularly important.
Question. Is current civilian oversight of these organizations
adequate?
Answer. I understand that when passing the legislation that
established the U.S. Space Force, Congress also took important steps to
strengthen civilian oversight of space by placing the Space Force under
the oversight of the Secretary of the Air Force, establishing a new
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration, and designating that one of the Assistant Secretaries of
Defense would be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
If confirmed, I would work closely with these organizations to ensure
strong civilian oversight and regularly assess if further changes are
needed.
Question. Should the OUSD(P) play a different or greater role in
oversight of these organizations? Please explain your answer.
Answer. My understanding is that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy--who reports directly to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and whose principal duty is the overall supervision
of DOD policy for space warfighting--is well positioned to support the
USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in ensuring appropriate civilian
oversight of both the operational and planning activities of the U.S.
Space Command and the organize, train, and equip activities of the U.S.
Space Force. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD for Space
Policy, regularly evaluating the effectiveness of this oversight role
and whether any changes might be advisable.
There is growing concern about the vulnerability of our Nation's
space-based systems and supporting architectures.
Question. If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to
address these vulnerabilities?
Answer. It is essential to have strong mission assurance of the
critical space-based capabilities that support our national security.
If confirmed, I would prioritize understanding the extent of progress
to date in transitioning to new space architectures that are resilient
against the types of counterspace capabilities our strategic
competitors, specifically China and Russia, are developing. I would
also want to ensure DOD is taking necessary steps to protect the joint
force in all domains against potential adversaries' hostile uses of
space.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to national security space
policy, organization, and programs would you propose?
Answer. If confirmed, before making specific proposals, I would
want to receive detailed briefings on the current and projected
security environment in space, and the extent of coordination and
integration across the national security space enterprise to ensure the
national security advantages of our space capabilities. It is critical
that policy, organizational, and programmatic decisions reflect broad
consensus across our government regarding the importance of space, and
I would continually assess whether our efforts are producing the
intended results or if further changes are required.
Question. In your view, what are the roles of our allies and
industry with respect to DOD space and national security operations?
Answer. Close relationships with our allies and partners, and a
strong, vibrant U.S. industry, are fundamental to a successful space
security strategy. If confirmed, I would look to strengthen space
policy, programmatic, and operational cooperation with our allies and
partners. I would also work closely with the U.S. Space Force and U.S.
Space Command to maximize our ability to leverage the dynamic and
innovative capacities of U.S. industry.
Pursuant to section 955 of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA, President
Biden has nominated an individual to be the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy. The NDAA specifies that ``The principal duty
of the Assistant Secretary shall be the overall supervision of policy
of the Department of Defense for space warfighting.''
Question. Congress has repeatedly opposed diluting the missions and
functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with
matters related to nuclear or missile defense. How will you, if
confirmed, ensure a continued, laser-like focus on Space Policy within
the OUSD(P)?
Answer. DOD space capabilities support all aspects of national
defense strategy from peacetime competition and strategic deterrence,
to operations and decisionmaking in conventional and nuclear conflict.
These capabilities support the total force across all domains as well
as national leadership at the highest levels. If confirmed, I would
ensure that the OUSD(P), and in particular the ASD for Space Policy, is
addressing the challenges of space warfighting policy holistically,
within the context of an integrated national defense strategy and total
force posture, rather than from a perspective limited to just the space
domain. This approach would maximize the strategic benefits of a
dedicated focus on the challenges of space security.
Question. What principal duties do you believe should be assigned
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with respect to
space? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the principal duties of the ASD for Space Policy
should center on the space policy and related matters that correspond
most closely to the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy in advising the Secretary of Defense. Thus, in addition to
the duties assigned in statute, the ASD for Space Policy should
represent the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy in interagency policy and strategy deliberations and in
international negotiations regarding space and related matters. The ASD
for Space Policy also should advise on the strategic and policy aspects
of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution activities related
to space, and on integration of space and related capabilities into
operations and contingency plans.
Question. What other duties and responsibilities should be assigned
to this ASD?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) to assess the
appropriate scope of responsibilities for the ASD for Space Policy,
taking into account the overall structure of the Policy organization.
middle east
Question. What do you view as the Department's top priorities in
the Middle East?
Answer. The Department of Defense's priorities derive from the
President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I see at
least three major priorities for the Department in the Middle East:
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and addressing threats
from Iran's regional aggression and support for terrorism, including
protecting our own forces; disrupting Al-Qaeda and related terrorist
networks and preventing an ISIS resurgence; and protecting other vital
U.S. interests such as freedom of navigation. Our presence in the
region also provides opportunities for security cooperation with our
allies and partners in the region, including Israel, as we seek to
cultivate their military capabilities and build interoperability to
pursue shared objectives. DOD must be mindful that China remains the
Department's pacing threat and that strategic competition must be a
priority in the Middle East as well.
Question. To what extent does achieving U.S. national security
interests in the Middle East require a continuous U.S. military
presence there, in your view?
Answer. The United States cannot achieve our national security
interests in the Middle East without a military presence in the region,
but the Department's military posture in the Middle East must also be
sustainable and balanced with global military priorities. Our military
presence enables the protection of the homeland, positions us to
respond to contingencies, and allows us to better cooperate with our
allies and partners as DOD works to improve their military
capabilities, build interoperability, and collaborate on shared
security objectives. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P) to
continually assess our presence in the region in light of the dynamic
security environment.
Question. In your opinion, is the current U.S. force presence in
the Middle East appropriately sized? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The President's Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance states that in the Middle East, DOD will right-size our
military presence to the level required to disrupt international
terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital
interests. If confirmed, I will work with other leaders in the
Department to ensure our military presence in the Middle East is
appropriately aligned with our strategic objectives.
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with U.S. regional and European partners to counter threats emanating
from and affecting the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of
Responsibility (AOR)?
Answer. Sharing the responsibility of regional security with our
allies and partners is critically important to achieving our national
security objectives. This is one of the reasons the President's Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance calls for prioritizing our
alliances and partnerships. The Department already does this well,
including through such coalitions as the International Maritime
Security Construct, the Defeat ISIS Coalition, and an expanded NATO
mission in Iraq. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the
Department, U.S. interagency, and internationally to find additional
opportunities to further enhance security cooperation.
Question. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power
competition?
Answer. The Middle East remains an important region for United
States interests, particularly in terms of strategic waterways and
access for global commerce, and is increasingly a key theater for
competition. China and Russia both seek to displace the United States
as the partner of choice in the Middle East. Their presence often
undermines United States force protection in the region, and their
weapons sales and increased technical cooperation with our Middle East
partners put United States technology at risk.
Question. How should DOD consider countering Russia and China in
the Middle East, in your view?
Answer. China continues to expand its military and intelligence
footprint and increase its involvement in the region, as does Russia.
But the United States retains many advantages, including our long-
standing partnerships in the region. I understand that the Department
is investing in support for regional partners and affirming common
interests to counter common threats. If confirmed, I work to ensure
that the United States remains the strategic partner of choice in the
Middle East.
Question. In your judgment, should the Department accept greater
risk in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. I believe that DOD should right-size our military posture
in the CENTCOM AOR to the level required to secure U.S. national
interests while keeping a focus on our global strategy.
Question. How could such risks be mitigated, in your view?
Answer. The Department's prioritization of China as its pacing
challenge for developing new military technology and operational
concepts ensures that the United States will maintain its overwhelming
overmatch vis-a-vis Iran. This overmatch, combined with the
Department's demonstrated ability to rapidly deploy forces to the
region, should allow the Department to adopt a sustainable posture that
is less dependent on static, long-term deployments, without losing
significant deterrent benefits.
iraq
Question. What, in your view, are the primary goals of our current
military posture in Iraq?
Answer. The United States military is in Iraq at the invitation of
the Government of Iraq under Operation INHERENT RESOLVE to support the
Iraqi security forces as they lead in the fight against ISIS alongside
our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
Question. What is your view of the Administration's decision to
transition combat forces from Iraq?
Answer. The announcement that the United States and Iraq security
relationship will fully transition to a training, advising, assisting,
and intelligence-sharing role is only possible because of the increased
capabilities of the Iraqi security forces as they continue to lead in
the fight against ISIS. It is a signal of remarkable progress and the
success of the United States-Iraq strategic partnership.
Question. Going forward, what do you envision to be the missions
and size of the United States military presence in Iraq?
Answer. The United States military is in Iraq at the invitation of
the Iraqi government. As Iraqi needs continue to evolve, so will the
United States mission. If confirmed, I will work to support the USD(P)
in ongoing conversations the Department and the interagency have with
our Iraqi and Coalition partners.
Question. Do you believe the United States should continue to
provide security assistance to Iraq following the defeat of the so-
called physical caliphate of ISIS? If so, for what purposes?
Answer. Although ISIS no longer holds territory, it remains a
threat and ISIS continues to conduct attacks, jeopardizing the hard-
fought gains of Iraqi security forces over the past several years. The
United States should remain committed to the defeat-ISIS mission and
continue to build the capacity of Iraqi security forces to enable them
to conduct counter-ISIS operations independently.
Question. How should the United States regularize security
assistance to Iraq in future years?
Answer. It is my understanding that during the fight against ISIS,
United States security cooperation with Iraq has largely focused on
tactical and operational needs. If confirmed, I would advocate for the
United States and Iraq to look beyond immediate-term priorities toward
longer-term institutional development and a future cooperation between
our militaries that extends beyond counterterrorism.
Question. How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq?
Answer. It is my understanding that Iran provides financial
support, training, and equipment to Iraqi militia groups to grow its
political and military influence, seeking both an end to the United
States presence through both political and military means and to use
Iraq as a platform for its destabilizing activities in the region.
Attacks from these Iranian-backed militias not only threaten the safety
of United States and Coalition personnel, but also undermine Iraq's
stability and threaten Iraqi civilians.
Question. If confirmed, what strategy would you recommend to limit
Iranian malign influence in Iraq?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in working with
our interagency partners to craft a whole-of-government approach to
limit Iranian malign influence and ensure that Iraq is strong, stable,
and sovereign. Following the recent Iraqi elections, the United States
should encourage a swift government formation process that results in a
government dedicated to creating a brighter future for all Iraqis and
advancing the United States-Iraq strategic partnership. The United
States should also continue to support Iraq's sovereignty and improved
relations with other neighboring states as a counterweight to Iran.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Iranian military and its
proxies and partners pose a conventional and unconventional threat to
United States forces and our regional partners. Iran leverages regional
militia groups to threaten United States forces and partners and
undermine regional sovereignty. It has attacked United States forces
with ballistic missiles, while proliferating this capability to its
partners and proxies. Iran is similarly proliferating one-way attack
unmanned aerial systems to its proxies for attacks on United States
forces and regional partners. Finally, it is my understanding that Iran
also threatens freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz region
through direct attacks on civilian shipping, and stockpiling naval
mines designed to close the Strait.
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
United States security strategy with respect to Iran?
Answer. It is my understanding that the U.S. strategy is to pursue
diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and to
counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. The Department
supports this effort by deterring and, if necessary, defending against
Iranian aggression, and by working to build partner capacity and
promote increased cooperation to address shared threats.
Question. What is the role of the U.S. military in this strategy?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
deters aggressive actions by Iran by maintaining a calibrated force
presence and working with its partners to enhance regional defenses
against Iran's destabilizing actions.
Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense is
currently undertaking a global posture review to, in part, answer this
question. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services,
and the Combatant Commands to carefully review the size, shape, and
readiness of the force, and to ensure we are creating a flexible global
posture that effectively deters threats and provides the President the
options he needs by leveraging our unmatched ability to rapidly deploy
forces anywhere in the world.
Question. What is your assessment of United States national
security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in
the Middle East?
Answer. Countries that experience an increase in Iranian influence
typically see a weakening of State authority as Iran creates and arms
militias that undermine national sovereignty. These militias then use
their Iranian-provided weapons to threaten or attack neighboring
countries spreading conflict and instability across the region.
Question. How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran's
malign influence--more specifically, Iran's proxy networks--and other
activities throughout the Middle East?
Answer. I understand the United States strategy aims to counter
Iranian malign influence in the Middle East by enhancing the
capabilities and capacity of United States regional partners,
leveraging the international community to condemn and push back against
Iran and its proxies' destabilizing activities, and deterring and
responding to any attacks from Iranian proxies.
Question. If the United States were to return to compliance with
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what concerns, if any,
would you have for regional security? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that the Administration's intent is to use a
return to the JCPOA as the first step toward negotiating a longer,
stronger deal which addresses Iran's other destabilizing regional
activities. I agree with this approach because a nuclear-armed Iran
would pose a tremendous threat to our regional partners and further
embolden Iran in its activities to undermine regional security. At the
same time, the United States should continue to push back against
Iran's destabilizing activities, working together with our partners and
allies.
Question. In your view, what effect, if any, has the election of
President Ebrahim Raisi had on regional security?
Answer. I have not seen any indication that President Raisi has
changed Iran's destabilizing approach to the region.
afghanistan
Question. Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do
you see as some of the major strategic missteps?
Answer. The mission in Afghanistan succeeded in decimating al
Qaeda, but United States nation building efforts were less successful.
My understanding is that there are a number of proposed and ongoing
inquiries and lessons learned reviews on matters related to the events
of the past 20 years in Afghanistan, including the events of the last
few months. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, the
Department, and the interagency on all such reviews.
Question. How would you apply those lessons learned in future
military operations?
Answer. I believe there are strategic, operational, tactical, and
administrative lessons to be learned from the Afghanistan war, and that
the understanding the Department develops from Afghanistan should
inform our efforts going forward. If confirmed, I would seek to work
with leaders in the Department and in Congress to undertake a
systematic review of lessons learned. I will want to identify efforts
that were effective that we should replicate in the future, as well as
efforts that failed.
Question. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban's
ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department
and Congress to more fully understand the factors leading to the
Taliban's ultimate success. In part, we will need to understand the
role of corruption and poor leadership in Afghanistan's senior ranks of
the government and the military, and the effects of the Doha Agreement
on the morale of Afghan forces. We should also seek to understand how
and why our own efforts to build the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces were ultimately not successful.
Question. In your opinion, what are the implications of the
collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for
future advise, train and assist missions?
Answer. I believe that many of the lessons we have learned and will
continue to learn from the Afghanistan mission will be applicable to
future train, advise, and assist missions. Every context is unique, but
for future large-scale train, advise, and assist missions, one key
challenge will be preventing our partner security forces from
developing an overreliance on international presence.
Question. In light of the end of the military mission, what do you
view as United States strategic interests in Afghanistan?
Answer. It is my understanding that our vital national interest in
Afghanistan has not changed: it is to make sure Afghanistan can never
be used again to launch an attack on the United States Homeland.
Question. In your view, can the United States conduct effective
``over the horizon'' counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without
a partner force on the ground? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, while difficult, in my view the United States can
conduct an effective counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The
Department has experience conducting counterterrorism operations from
outside of target countries--or ``over the horizon.'' Developing
effective intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities in the region
is the cornerstone of any effective counterterrorism operation,
regardless of whether it is from in country or from over-the-horizon.
If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring that we maintain an effective
over-the-horizon capability to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe
haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the United States.
Question. What is your understanding of the definition or
characterization of an ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism operation
or strategy?
Answer. I understand that ``over the horizon'' is used to describe
an operation that is primarily conducted from outside the country of
interest. The United States has experience in conducting military
operations from over the horizon--whether it is conducting command and
control from another location in the region or from a naval asset in
theater, flying collection or strike operations from CONUS or a third
country, performing civil affairs or conducting advise and assist
operations from a neighboring country, or training indigenous partner
forces in different region. All of these are examples of the Department
conducting operations from over the horizon and each present their own
challenges.
Question. In your view, what conditions or factors would be
indicative of a resurgence or reconstitution of al Qaeda, ISIS-K, or
other terrorist organization in Afghanistan such that they pose a
threat of international terrorism?
Answer. In the past several years, both al Qaeda and ISIS have
become adept at leveraging social media to further their ideology and
protect internal communications. They have leveraged aspects of the
international banking system to financially enable their operations.
Each of these avenues provide vectors to gain insight into the groups'
intent and influence. If confirmed, I will prioritize keeping a close
eye on any intelligence that would indicate a resurgence in terrorist
capabilities in Afghanistan or the broader global terrorist network. I
will also seek to continue DOD's work with our network of
counterterrorism partners in order to detect and disrupt external
operations against the Homeland or our allies and partners.
Question. What are the core components of a successful ``over-the-
horizon'' strategy, in your view?
Answer. I understand that successful over-the-horizon operations
rely on intelligence that can come from a variety of sources, along
with air assets, ISR, and other capabilities typically located outside
the country. Any successful strategy--whether conducted within the
country of focus or from ``over-the-horizon''--must reflect the reality
of the operating environment and the level of threat posed by the
adversary.
pakistan
Question. What is your view of the current State of the United
States-Pakistan security relationship?
Answer. Pakistan is an important partner. The United States has
enduring interests in South Asia, and must continue to engage with
Pakistan. If confirmed, I would seek to work with Pakistan on key
issues of mutual concern, including regional stability and the defeat
of al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State--Khorasan (ISIS-K).
Question. What policy changes, if any, would you recommend for
United States relations with Pakistan in terms of military-to-military
relations and in light of the collapse of the ANDSF and the Taliban's
return to power in Afghanistan?
Answer. I understand that United States security assistance and
other support to Pakistan is designed to foster greater cooperation in
areas of mutual security interest. We have enduring interests in South
Asia and we must continue to engage with Pakistan in order to counter
violent extremism. Although we cannot fundamentally change Pakistan's
strategic calculus, we can work together in areas of mutual interest,
including counterterrorism and border security. If confirmed, I will
seek to work with colleagues at the State Department to continue the
International Military Education and Training program with Pakistan,
along with other opportunities to develop relationships with Pakistan's
future military leaders. I would also continue to urge Pakistan to take
action against militants and violent extremist organizations operating
in its territory.
Question. Do you believe this to be the appropriate construct for
future assistance to Pakistan?
Answer. Yes. Although we need to be realistic about what we can
achieve with Pakistan, the Department must also continue to press for
important United States interests in South Asia. If confirmed, I would
continue to work with Pakistan in areas of mutual interest, including
counterterrorism and border security.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in security
cooperation with Pakistan?
Answer. The United States has enduring interests in South Asia, and
I believe that we must continue to engage with Pakistan in order to
counter violent extremism. Although we cannot fundamentally change
Pakistan's strategic calculus, we can work together in areas of mutual
interest, including counterterrorism and border security. If confirmed,
I would recommend we focus security cooperation on opportunities to
develop relationships with Pakistan's future military leaders. I would
also work to ensure any U.S. security assistance includes the necessary
conditions to advance U.S. values and interests.
Question. What do you consider to be areas of shared security
interest between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. I understand that in recent years, Pakistan has worked with
the United States in some key areas of mutual interest, including
counterterrorism and border security.
yemen
Question. What are United States national security interests in
Yemen?
Answer. The most important United States national security interest
in Yemen remains ensuring that groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen do not have a safe haven for conducting
attacks against the United States Homeland. Additional U.S. national
security interests include securing an end to the ongoing war and
addressing the humanitarian crisis. Continued cross-border attacks by
the Houthis, with support from Iran, exacerbate instability in the
region by violating the territorial integrity of our Gulf partners
(including Saudi Arabia) and threatening freedom of navigation. A
cessation of hostilities and political solution to the conflict is the
only long-term solution to this crisis.
Question. In your view, has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately to
the threat they face from the Houthis?
Answer. I understand that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a
persistent cross-border threat from Houthi militia forces. I also
remain concerned about the incidence of civilian casualties as a result
of Saudi Arabia's conduct of its military campaign in Yemen. If
confirmed, I will work with others in the United States interagency to
continue to support Saudi Arabia in defending its borders and while at
the same time working to bring the war in Yemen to a close.
Question. What do you see as the implications of the Biden
Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the
Saudi-led coalition?
Answer. A political resolution is the only long-term means of
bringing the war in Yemen to an end. There is no military solution to
the conflict. The Biden administration's decision to cease support for
Saudi-led Coalition offensive operations is intended to send a signal
to our Saudi partners that we need to see more precipitous steps to end
the war soon even as we work to fulfill the President's commitment of
supporting Saudi Arabia's defense of its borders. Ending the war in
Yemen is in the national security interest of the United States.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States
play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
Answer. I support the Biden administration commitment to ending the
war in the Yemen through diplomacy, and to enhancing relief efforts..
As the President has said, Saudi Arabia faces a persistent cross-border
threat from Houthi militia forces, which also puts at risk United
States citizens residing in the Kingdom. If confirmed, I will work with
others in the United States interagency to continue to support Saudi
Arabia in defending its borders and while at the same time working to
bring the war in Yemen to a close.
syria
Question. What are the United States national security objectives
in Syria?
Answer. It is my understanding that United States national security
objectives include preventing the resurgence of ISIS, supporting the
Syrian people through the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid,
and preserving existing cease-fire lines to prevent the outbreak of
broader regional conflict and establish a foundation for a broader
political solution under U.N. auspices.
Question. To what extent does continued United States force
presence in Syria support those objectives?
Answer. It is my understanding that the United States and Coalition
military presence is necessary to prevent an ISIS resurgence. Although
ISIS no longer holds territory, it remains a capable and dangerous
threat. DOD support and assistance builds capacity of vetted Syrian
partner forces to enable them to maintain pressure on ISIS.
Question. To what extent should the United States continue to
provide support to the Syrian Democratic Forces?
Answer. While the Defeat-ISIS Coalition has made significant
progress, ISIS remains a threat. I understand that working by, with,
and through our Syrian partner forces, including the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF), remains critical to keeping pressure on ISIS.
Question. In your view, what are the key strategic interests and
objectives of the Russians in Syria and how successful have they been
in accomplishing them?
Answer. Russia's continued support for the Assad regime makes clear
that Russia's primary interest is maintaining a regime friendly to its
interests, no matter the consequences. It is my understanding that
Russia's support to the Assad regime's military campaign enables
continued violence and human rights abuses against the Syrian people.
Russia does not appear to view ISIS as a significant threat nor does it
seem dedicated to enabling its enduring defeat.
russia
Question. The 2018 NDS assessed a need for ``urgent change at
significant scale'' to prepare the U.S. military for the realities of
great power competition.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. In light of the mounting and accelerating challenges to the
United States from global competitors, I agree that the Department of
Defense should be undertaking ``urgent change at significant scale.''
Question. Where do you see the greatest need for change in the
Joint Force to address the realities of strategic competition with
Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use the NDS Review--and its
implementation--to consider any changes needed in the Joint Force to
address the realities of the Russia challenge. While it would be
premature for me to suggest any specific changes needed in the Joint
Force, I do believe that whatever changes the Department makes should
be focused on ensuring that we achieve strong links between strategy,
concept development, innovation, and program investments.
The Department of Defense is currently engaged in the development
of a new Joint Warfighting Concept.
Question. In your view, why is a new Joint Warfighting Concept
necessary to overcome the strategic and operational challenges posed by
Russia?
Answer. I understand the Department has developed a Joint
Warfighting Concept to align with strategy and theories of victory. If
confirmed, I will review this effort, and provide my assessment and
recommendations to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense.
The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has the stated objectives
of: enhancing the United States deterrence posture, increasing the
readiness and responsiveness of United States forces in Europe,
supporting the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and
bolstering the security and capacity of United States allies and
partners.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress made in each of
these EDI objectives?
Answer. EDI has been highly effective in increasing USEUCOM's
combat capability and enhancing deterrence of Russian aggression. EDI
funding has enabled DOD to increase its force presence in Europe,
improve critical capabilities, establish prepositioned equipment sets,
and improve United States and Allied readiness. Taken together, these
efforts have demonstrated commitment to NATO, reassured Allies, and
sent a strong message of resolve to Russia.
Question. What changes, if any, would you make to EDI objectives or
activities going forward?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders from across the
Department to determine how best to evolve EDI objectives and
activities going forward, and will ensure Congress maintains visibility
into EDI initiatives.
Question. As many military construction programs funded under EDI
reach maturity and settle into the sustainment phase, and in light of
the clear signal from our military leadership that exercises such as
DEFENDER 2021 sent deterrent signals to Russia, while yielding lessons
learned for the United States, our European Allies, and partners, what
is your vision for the future of EDI?
Answer. Many EDI resource requirements are evolving as the result
of the acquisition of prepositioned equipment and completion of MILCON
projects, as well as changes to USEUCOM's exercise program. If
confirmed, I will work with stakeholders from across the Department to
ensure we adapt EDI based on the evolving threat environment, changes
in planning or operational concepts, and the ability of Allies to share
more of the responsibility to present a credible defense.
Question. Do you support continued United States security
assistance to Ukraine?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would recommend that United States
security assistance efforts, including the provision of defensive
lethal assistance, to build the capacity of Ukraine's forces should
remain a top priority.
Question. If so, how does the provision of such assistance
contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?
Answer. It is my understanding that United States security
assistance efforts enable Ukraine to progress toward NATO
interoperability and more effectively defend itself against Russian
aggression. It is also my understanding that these efforts, combined
with investments through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to
improve the readiness, responsiveness, lethality, and resiliency of
United States forces in Europe, contribute to maintaining an effective
deterrent against further Russian aggression.
Question. In your view, what additional capabilities should Ukraine
and other Black Sea regional Allies and partners develop and enhance to
support regional security and deter aggression?
Answer. It is my understanding that the stability of the Black Sea
region, which is vulnerable to Russian aggression, is critical to the
security of NATO's eastern flank. Although I understand that the
specific requirements of regional Allies and partners varies, if
confirmed, I would seek to work with our partners to continue to
prioritize capabilities to counter conventional and hybrid threats on
land and improve their capacity to secure their territorial waters in
the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
Question. How can the United States best support the achievement of
those capabilities?
Answer. I understand that robust United States security assistance
support through authorities such as the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative, Foreign Military Financing, and Section 333 remains a
critical component to supporting the development of those capabilities.
If confirmed, I will strongly support efforts to provide training,
equipment, and advisory support to build the capacity of these critical
United States Allies and partners on the frontline of Russian
aggression.
Question. What role do you envision for Turkey in support of United
States strategic priorities in the Black Sea region?
Answer. It is my understanding that United States access, basing,
and overflight provided by Turkey, including at Incirlik Air Base,
remain important for supporting emergent United States, NATO, and
Coalition requirements and missions in the region. I understand that
the United States continues to encourage Turkey, and fellow Black Sea
Allies and partners, to deepen cooperation in the Black Sea region.
President Biden has said that he and outgoing German Chancellor
Angela Merkel ``are absolutely united in our conviction that Russia
must not be allowed to use energy as a weapon to coerce or threaten its
neighbors.''
Question. How should DOD support the achievement of this goal?
Answer. I agree with President Biden that Russia must not be
allowed to use energy as a weapon to coerce or threaten its neighbors.
If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department of Defense support
this goal through a whole-of-government approach to deterring and
defending against Russia's strategy for advancing its interests--at the
expense of United States, Allied, and partner interests--via Russia's
wide range of subversive, coercive, and aggressive tactics, including
the use of energy to coerce or threaten its neighbors.
Question. How might Russia use energy as a weapon to undermine
United States military efforts with Allies and partners in Europe,
including those related to enhancing military mobility?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review any classified assessments of
the threat Russia poses in this regard and work diligently to address
those threats with colleagues across the Department of Defense, United
States interagency, and with our Allies and partners.
Question. In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to
counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power?
Answer. Russia takes a whole-of-government approach to advancing
its interests, across the spectrum of conflict and at the expense of
United States, Allied, and partner interests. I believe the key to
countering such tactics is for the United States to take a whole-of-
government approach to protecting our interests in response, in close
coordination with our Allies and partners. This should include DOD's
efforts to implement innovative approaches to irregular warfare and
hybrid tactics below the threshold of conflict. Such an approach
necessarily entails the careful orchestration of our diplomatic,
economic, and informational strengths, as well as our military power.
Question. What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence
threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role
of the United States Government, and DOD, in particular, in countering
that threat?
Answer. It is my understanding that Russia uses malign influence to
advance its interests, typically at the expense of United States,
Allied, and partner interests, through a wide range of subversive,
coercive, and aggressive tactics, while seeking to avoid direct
military confrontation with United States and NATO forces. I am
concerned that Russia may underestimate the extent to which these
tactics increase the risk of unintended escalation, and if confirmed, I
would therefore recommend that the U.S. Government, and the Department
of Defense in particular, communicate clearly and consistently its
perceptions of this risk. In addition, I would recommend that the
Department of Defense must maintain its strong measures of conventional
and nuclear deterrence while assisting Allies and partners in
developing resilience against malign threats.
north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
Question. In your opinion, what should the major strategic
objectives of the NATO Alliance be in the coming years?
Answer. It is my understanding that NATO's major strategic
objectives are deterring nuclear and non-nuclear aggression, defending
Allied populations and territory if deterrence fails, and projecting
stability beyond NATO's borders, which should remain the appropriate
focus for our Alliance in the coming years.
Question. Despite the conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission in
Afghanistan, NATO still has declared responsibilities for counter
terrorism. In what ways do you believe Allies can best contribute to
the fight against terrorism emanating from Afghanistan going forward?
Answer. I believe NATO can continue to play a role in countering
terrorism through enhanced threat awareness and intelligence sharing,
improved interoperability and development of capabilities to prepare
and respond to threats, and outreach to partner nations and
international organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with NATO allies and partners to continue our counter terrorism
mission together.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your top defense priorities
for engagement with NATO Allies and partners on issues relating to
China?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority for engagement with NATO Allies
and partners on China would be to continue to advance the work the
Alliance has been doing in recent years to understand and consider
options to mitigate the challenges that an increasingly assertive PRC
poses to the Alliance. This would include strengthening NATO's
resilience and encouraging reflection of that perspective in the
forthcoming strategic concept. I would also encourage NATO to continue
strengthening relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific to address
cross-cutting security issues and global challenges.
Question. What are your views on the importance of the NATO
Alliance?
Answer. As President Biden has said, the transatlantic alliance is
the strong foundation on which our collective security and our shared
prosperity are built. U.S. commitment to NATO Allies under Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to U.S. strategic interests, and our
shared commitment to the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty has
made NATO the most successful Alliance in history.
Question. Do you believe there are areas where the United States
could benefit from greater coordination and consultation with Allies?
Answer. Absolutely. There are many areas of shared interest where
the United States can benefit from greater coordination and
consultation with Allies. This includes engagement on major reviews
that are underway in the Department of Defense right now. If confirmed,
I would seek to continue those efforts to engage our Allies and ensure
their perspectives are a critical part of the discussions for these
reviews. If confirmed, I would also seek other ways to coordinate with
our Allies in support of our shared security interests.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for
NATO?
Answer. The NATO Alliance faces many challenges, the greatest of
which may include continuing efforts to ensure ready forces and
capabilities in the wake of this global pandemic and maintaining unity
in the face of continuing efforts by Russia to fracture the Alliance.
Question. What are the most important capability improvements that
the Alliance must make to deal with the threats it faces?
Answer. It is my understanding that readiness remains a critical
improvement the Alliance must focus on to deal with the threats we
face. The Alliance must continue to rebuild a culture of readiness in
order to procure, prepare, and provide interoperable and ready forces
and capabilities, which enables our credible deterrence and defense.
Contributing to that is the continuing ability of the Alliance to adapt
to the changing security environment.
Question. What, in your opinion, are the most useful measurements
of allied commitments to carrying the burden of common security and
collective defense?
Answer. Cash, capabilities, and contributions, as Secretary General
Stoltenberg has often said, are all important markers of sharing
responsibility for our common defense. Without the investment in
defense today, we will not have the necessary capabilities and
contributions tomorrow. In 2014, Allies signed onto the Wales Defense
Investment Pledge, committing to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. I
appreciate that several Allies have taken important steps in this
direction in the past few years, and if confirmed will seek to continue
this progress.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
Answer. Yes. The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries
for over 60 years has successfully deterred aggression against the
Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is to
preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. They also
continue to provide an essential political and military link between
Europe and North America. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance, and as long as nuclear weapons remain a
threat, I believe U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries.
NATO has made a series of declarations, at successive summits, to
improve our credible deterrence and defense posture. Among these are
the NATO Readiness Initiative announced at the 2018 Brussels Summit and
the 2021 Summit pledge to ``ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient
multi-domain force architecture with the right forces in the right
place at the right time.''
Question. If confirmed, how would you support DOD efforts to work
with our Allies to make progress on these initiatives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to
increase the number of ready and interoperable forces and capabilities
as we continue to rebuild NATO's culture of readiness. With our Allies,
U.S. European Command, and our Mission to NATO, I would, if confirmed,
take the next steps to implement the recently adopted NATO Military
Strategy and NATO Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-
Atlantic Area, which outline Alliance capability and force structure
requirements needed to address current and emerging threats in NATO's
area of responsibility.
Question. In your view, how do these initiatives align with United
States priorities in Europe?
Answer. It is my understanding that these initiatives are closely
aligned with United States priorities in Europe. This Administration is
seeking to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships,
and the NATO Alliance is absolutely critical to that effort.
Reaffirming, investing in, and modernizing NATO serves to recognize
this fact, and ensuring a credible deterrent and defense in Europe is
even more important in an increasingly complex security environment.
allies and partners in the indo-pacific region
Question. In your view, how can DOD more effectively cultivate
multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. I understand that Indo-Pacific security depends on the
ability of the United States and like-minded partners to work together
to prevent and respond to crises. To enable this goal, it is critical
to build stronger linkages between U.S. allies and partners across the
region--including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). If confirmed, I would
work to ensure DOD strengthens ties across its bilateral and
multilateral security networks to build interoperability; pursue more
advanced multilateral training activities; and build common norms in
new defense domains, such as space and cyber.
Question. What is your assessment of the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India?
Answer. I understand that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(Quad) plays an increasingly central role in promoting security,
prosperity, and shared values in the Indo-Pacific region. The
commitment of all Quad countries to elevate their consultations,
including convening historic Head of State Summits in March and
September 2021, reflects growing strategic convergence between
Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. I understand that
through a wide range of shared activities, such as space cooperation,
technology cooperation, and vaccine production, the Quad partners are
working to sustain a free and open Indo-Pacific, including in support
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) centrality in
the region.
Question. What military lines of effort can be strengthened through
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to benefit deterrence in the Indo-
Pacific region and what do you view as the challenges to doing so?
Answer. I understand that the strength of the Quad partnership lies
in the willingness of like-minded democracies to leverage their
combined resources to address emerging crises and maintain regional
stability, as they did in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami. There are opportunities for the Quad countries to expand their
cooperative activities in areas that will prevent future instability,
such as maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, and to enhance their crisis response capabilities through joint
exercises. These cooperative activities, however, do not reflect a
formal alliance structure. Rather, they reflect the partners' abiding
commitment to ensuring the durability of shared principles such as the
rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Question. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. I understand that the United States has a fundamental
interest in building a strong network of capable and like-minded
partners who are committed to preserving a rules-based order in the
Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would recommend that DOD leverage
our capacity-building resources to support partners in protecting their
own sovereignty and territorial integrity and building resilience, and
enable them to collectively address shared transnational threats, such
as proliferation, violent extremism, and humanitarian disasters.
Question. How would you prioritize the types of programs or
activities that should receive support under these security assistance
authorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that DOD prioritize
programs that enable partners to preserve their own sovereign rights,
such as maritime security and border security initiatives, and
activities that strengthen their capacity to address transnational
threats, such as proliferation and violent extremism. I would also
ensure that DOD continues to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the
Department of State as we leverage our full suite of diplomatic,
economic, and security tools to strengthen the capacity and
capabilities of our partners.
Question. In your view, how should DOD seek to engage with partner
nations to better support their ability to protect their sovereignty
and natural resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that DOD should support
partners in building the necessary capabilities, personnel resources,
and operational capacity to protect their own sovereignty. This should
include providing sustained capacity-building training and exercises,
as well as an increased emphasis on defense professionalization and
military education. It is also my understanding that DOD can support
partners in preserving their own sovereign rights through U.S. presence
operations and military activities, and by strengthening the capacity
of multilateral organizations such as ASEAN.
Question. Respect for human rights has long been a core principle
of U.S. foreign and security policy. In your view, what role does U.S.
military engagement, including efforts to help professionalize foreign
partner militaries, play in encouraging respect for human rights?
Answer. U.S. military training and education can play a valuable
role in professionalizing partner militaries, by reinforcing the
importance of respecting human rights, supporting the rule of law, and
adhering to the principle of civilian oversight of the military. It is
my understanding that DOD consistently emphasizes that these values are
critical to the continued advancement of our defense relationships.
Question. In your opinion, what are the key capabilities the United
States should encourage, enable, and support for partners and allies in
the Indo-Pacific to enhance deterrence of China?
Answer. It is my understanding that our allies and partners require
capacity-building support to strengthen their ability to preserve their
sovereign rights, especially in the air and maritime domain. Increased
maritime domain awareness is a foundational capability that would help
regional partners develop a common operating picture. It is also my
understanding that additional investments in asymmetric defense
capabilities and concepts could also enable allies and partners to
raise the cost of potential Chinese aggression. If confirmed, I would
recommend that DOD should continue to prioritize expanded exercises,
training programs, combined planning, and security cooperation that
strengthens the self-defense capabilities of our allies and partners.
china
Question. Is the current posture of United States forces in the
Indo-Pacific region sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. To deter our adversaries and defend our interests, allies,
and partners, the United States requires a combat-credible, resilient,
and forward force posture in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I
will work with INDOPACOM and the military services to support DOD's
development, assessment, and implementation of posture concepts that
effectively address key operational challenges and maintain the
military advantage that is foundational to deterrence. But our success
in the Indo-Pacific should not be measured only as a function of our
forward-established posture--it is just as critical that we make the
right investments in modernization, operational concepts, and readiness
to ensure we improve our future deterrence capabilities.
Question. The INDOPACOM commander indicated China could achieve
military overmatch in the Indo-Pacific as soon as 2026, at which time
China might be tempted to use military force to forcibly change the
status quo in the region. Do you agree?
Answer. I agree that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
urgently seeking to obtain the military capability to achieve its
stated strategic objectives. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the
Department of Defense is focused on maintaining combat-credible
deterrence and warfighting capabilities.
Question. If not, what approximate year do you see this happening?
Answer. I would not want to speculate on a specific date that the
People's Republic of China (PRC) may decide to use force, but as
indicators of increasing risks in the near-term and beyond, I would
point to the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) 2027 modernization goal
announced last year, President Xi Jinping's consistent refusal to
renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and the PRC's increasingly
provocative military activities near Taiwan and ongoing coercion.
Question. What types of behavior or signaling on the part of China
might provide early alert to the United States of Chinese intentions in
this regard?
Answer. It is my understanding that the PRC would likely signal its
intent through a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military measures
and actions.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make that would implement the NDS and enable a more favorable
balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. To deter and prevail in a future conflict with China, I
believe the Department must prioritize investment in preserving and
enhancing a military edge in areas such as long-range strike,
associated kill chains, undersea warfare, base resilience, critical
munitions, EMSO, space, and cyber. Over the longer-term, DOD must
invest in areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, and directed
energy to ensure we do not fall behind China or other potential
adversaries' advancements in these areas.
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2021 established the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative. What is your assessment of the value of this
initiative?
Answer. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) promises to serve
as both a key tool for congressional oversight of investments related
to strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a means to
enhance the Department's ongoing focus on this goal as part of China
pacing. If confirmed, I will seek to closely align PDI with
congressional intent.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's implementation of this
initiative?
Answer. I understand that PDI is not a separate appropriation, but
that DOD has used its fiscal year 2022 PDI submission as a means to
highlight select investments and activities that support deterrence of
China, as well as reassurance of allies and partners in the region. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department further refines its
future PDI submissions, consulting closely with Congress in order to
meet intent and enhance the PDI's impact.
Question. What non-military activities and resources do you believe
are necessary to effectively address the challenge posed by China?
Answer. It is my understanding that the PRC is increasingly
synchronizing its military and non-military efforts to achieve its
strategic objectives, so I believe that it is essential that non-DOD
departments and agencies are sufficiently aligned and resourced to
address the challenge posed by the PRC. President Biden's Interim
National Security Strategy has set forth the whole-of-government agenda
that would strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to prevail
in strategic competition with the PRC. If confirmed, I would work
closely with interagency partners to ensure a whole-of-government
approach.
Question. Do you believe the activities in which DOD is currently
engaged are sufficient? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on ensuring the Department of
Defense has the right strategy, concepts, capabilities, and posture to
deliver combat-credible deterrence and warfighting. I would recommend
that DOD, as well as whole-of-government efforts, prioritize
cooperation with and support to our Indo-Pacific region allies and
partners, including expanded bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
engagement, increased economic and technological partnerships, and
joint military exercises and operations. It is my understanding that
improving partner resilience to the PRC's military and economic
coercion is essential for deterring PRC aggression throughout the Indo-
Pacific region. Enhanced coordination on military and non-military
efforts will serve as a force multiplier for strategic competition with
the PRC.
Question. What are the United States' responsibilities under the
Taiwan Relations Act?
Answer. The Taiwan Relations Act states that any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, is a
threat to the region and of grave concern to U.S. interests. It is my
understanding that for more than 40 years, it has been United States
policy to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense
capability and to maintain the capacity to prevent any use of force or
other form of coercion that would jeopardize the security or way of
life for the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I would seek to support
the USD(P) in implementing United States policy in accordance with the
TRA.
Question. What policy recommendations do you have for improving
United States support to Taiwan?
Answer. China's military modernization, its refusal to disavow the
use of force, and its coercive and aggressive military actions near
Taiwan present an increasingly urgent challenge. I support the
continued and bipartisan United States commitment to Taiwan to maintain
United States policy commitments to Taiwan and to ensure that Taiwan
can defend against PRC coercion or aggression.
Question. In your view, what security capabilities should Taiwan
acquire to enhance deterrence of Chinese aggression?
Answer. I believe that Taiwan should continue to acquire asymmetric
capabilities that are capable of denying the PRC any forced or coerced
control of the island against the wishes of its people. These
capabilities should be mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In
addition to specific asymmetric capabilities, it is critical that
Taiwan's Armed Forces and civil defense institutions work together to
provide a layered defense against coercion and aggression--one that
ensures the resiliency of Taiwan's economy, political institutions, and
democracy. If confirmed, I would work within the Department and the
interagency to understand and address these requirements.
Question. What areas of security capability would you consider
appropriate for potential coproduction by the United States and Taiwan?
Answer. It is my understanding that Taiwan's talented workforce and
technology sector already provide a number of key capabilities and
systems that are critical to the global supply chain. Taiwan is also a
leading manufacturer of other defense-related components, and if
confirmed, I would support Administration efforts to explore
opportunities in aeronautics, shipbuilding, and missile technology.
Question. Considering the NDS and China's crackdown on Hong Kong,
how do you view the United States relationship with Taiwan in the
context of broader United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. I believe that Taiwan's economy, its flourishing democracy,
and its position within the first island chain are all critical to
United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. Insofar as
Taiwan's population interpreted efforts of the PRC in Hong Kong as a
manifestation of the PRC's ``one-country, two-systems'' policy, so too
do other allies and partners view PRC coercive efforts as an affront to
not only Taiwan but the entire region.
Question. To what extent do you believe multilateral engagement is
important for addressing the challenges posed by China?
Answer. Continued multilateral engagement is critical to preventing
the PRC from subverting the international rules-based order and
coercing its neighbors. Our network of allies and partners is a key
advantage in addressing the challenges posed by the PRC, and
multilateral formats provide opportunities to share concerns, speak
with one voice, pool resources, and promote a more stable and secure
strategic environment.
Question. In your view, what are the most important multilateral
relationships in the region and where do you perceive opportunities to
improve multilateral coordination?
Answer. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a
central role in bringing the region together and building habits of
cooperation, and I understand that the Department of Defense works
through the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus to build cooperation
on security issues with these partners. Quadrilateral discussions with
Australia, India, and Japan provide growing opportunities for
cooperation across a wide range of shared priorities. It is my
understanding that DOD also engages in several trilateral forums,
including with Australia and Japan, the Republic of Korea and Japan,
and now with Australia and the United Kingdom through the new AUKUS
mechanism. If confirmed, I would work to strengthen the Department's
efforts to collaborate on security and build linkages between like-
minded partners, including through new and expanded multilateral
partnerships where opportunities arise.
japan
Question. How would you characterize the United States-Japan
security relationship?
Answer. I understand that the United States-Japan security
relationship forms the cornerstone of the United States Indo-Pacific
security strategy. The United States-Japan Alliance is resolute and
resilient, facing the regional security challenges of today, and
adapting to new challenges in the future. It is a comprehensive
Alliance, training and operating together across the spectrum of
potential conflict, and its capabilities are strong and getting
stronger.
Question. If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to
continue to improve this relationship and improve United States-
Japanese military force interoperability?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that continued examination
of roles and missions, especially relating to the maintenance of
regional security, is an important subject for the Alliance to
carefully consider. Working together to build the capabilities of
regional partners is also a recent area of cooperation that we should
expand.
Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
neighbors, predominantly China, North Korea and South Korea, influence
the United States-Japan relationship, in your view?
Answer. It is critical that there are strong and close
relationships between and among our allies. I understand that we have a
common view of the immediate dangers posed by North Korea, and the
strategic challenge from China, and we are working together to face
those. If confirmed, I would support efforts to build a strong
trilateral security relationship with the Republic of Korea and Japan,
while recognizing that there are historical sensitivities between the
two that complicate that trilateral relationship.
Question. What steps should Japan take to become a more active
partner in security activities with the United States and in the
international security arena?
Answer. It is my understanding that Japan has made significant
strides to play a security role more commensurate with its economic and
political strength in the region. If confirmed, I would encourage the
continued development of that role, while acknowledging the legacy
regional and domestic constraints Japan must consider.
Question. What specific security capabilities do you believe Japan
should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to
contribute to the deterrence of China?
Answer. Japan possesses a modern, capable and well-equipped Self-
Defense Force. I understand we are working closely with Japan to
improve interoperability in operations critical to regional stability,
such as integrated air and missile defense, and maritime interdiction
operations. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan to chart an ambitious
path to acquire improved capabilities in view of increased
requirements, consistent with transformed Alliance roles.
Question. How would you describe Japan's burden sharing
contributions, including host nation support, for United States forces
stationed in Japan?
Answer. Japan provides approximately $1.8B per year to offset some
of the cost of stationing more than 50,000 United States forces there,
equipped with some of our most advanced capabilities. I understand we
are in negotiations on a new 5-year host nation support agreement and
expect to reach a fair and equitable conclusion in the near future.
Question. Do you believe that Japan should acquire integrated air
and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with United
States capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and
other missile threats?
Answer. Yes. I am aware that Japan is a longstanding BMD partner
and has invested heavily in IAMD. The Self Defense Forces possess
significant maritime and ground-based missile defense capability, and
Japan has decided to procure two additional Aegis system-equipped
vessels. As an Alliance, I understand the United States and Japan are
working to increase interoperability. If confirmed, I would support
continued progress to meet current and future challenges, as threat
capabilities continue to evolve and the U.S. means of response adapts
to those challenges
north korea
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK)
development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
represents a threat to United States security and interests and that of
our allies and partners. It is my understanding that the security and
stability of the Korean Peninsula is inextricably tied to regional
security and stability. Our network of allies and partners in the
region gives us a significant advantage as compared to our adversaries.
In particular, our relationships with the Republic of Korea and Japan
provide a powerful deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I
would work to ensure United States and allied forces have what they
need to maintain our robust deterrent and readiness posture in
Northeast Asia.
Question. In your view, what should be the overall United States
strategy to mitigate the threat posed by North Korea to our allies in
the region and to the United States?
Answer. The United States, in close coordination with allies and
partners, has a vital interest in deterring the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), defending against its provocations or use of
force, limiting the reach of its dangerous weapons programs, and, above
all, keeping the American people and our allies and partners safe. I
believe that the role of the Department of Defense is to maintain a
robust defense and deterrence posture that ensures that the United
States engages the DPRK from a position of strength. Having a strong
and credible deterrent is essential to any potential path that the
United States and our allies pursue to meet the North Korean threat,
including diplomatic engagement. We must also continue to pursue robust
sanctions enforcement to mitigate the nuclear proliferation threat
posed by North Korea. The Administration completed a whole-of-
government strategy review to articulate its way ahead on the DPRK, and
if confirmed, I would work with stakeholders across the government, as
well as our regional allies and partners, to forge a comprehensive
approach to North Korean threats, including those emanating from
nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and cyber programs.
Question. What policy recommendations would you make to ensure
United States and allied forces can secure weapons of mass
destructionsites in North Korea in the event of a contingency?
Answer. United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces must
maintain a ``fight-tonight'' readiness on the Korean Peninsula to deter
North Korean aggression and to be able to respond quickly and
effectively should deterrence fail. It is my understanding that a
critical element of this readiness is the ability to secure nuclear and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites in order to prevent the further
proliferation of these capabilities in a contingency. I understand DOD
is improving capabilities that could reduce the threat posed by WMD and
missile sites in North Korea in the event of a contingency, and is
working closely with the ROK in this regard. If confirmed, I would
consult closely with our operational commanders, intelligence
specialists, and resource providers in this effort.
republic of korea
Question. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-South Korean
security relationship?
Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is a
linchpin of peace and security in the region. Since its establishment
in 1953, the United States-ROK Alliance has proven strong and durable
in the face of new global conditions and is among the most
interoperable, capable, and dynamic bilateral Alliances in the world.
It is my understanding that the ROK-United States Alliance remains at a
high level of readiness and continues to maintain a robust combined
defense posture to protect the Republic of Korea against any threat or
adversary. If confirmed, I would prioritize working with our ROK allies
on identifying and addressing future security challenges, including
those beyond the Korean Peninsula, to maintain a free and open Indo-
Pacific region.
Question. What is the value to United States national security of
the United States-South Korea alliance, in your view?
Answer. I understand that the United States-ROK Alliance is
critical not only to the security of the ROK, but also to the stability
of the Indo-Pacific region. Beyond the region, over the course of its
70-year existence, our Alliance has evolved into one of global
importance, with the ROK having deployed alongside United States
servicemembers in nearly every conflict since the Korean War. I
understand that the ROK is a critical partner for our broader
priorities in the region, and principal among these priorities is
upholding the rules-based international order that has underpinned
global prosperity since World War II. If confirmed, I would work with
our ROK allies to ensure that we continue to strengthen the
relationship and also invest in the right combination of capabilities
to provide for our common defense.
Question. What is your understanding of the United States
obligations in the event of an attack by North Korea?
Answer. It is my understanding that the United States obligation to
the ROK in the event of an attack, consistent with the Mutual Defense
Treaty, is to consult on the best appropriate response and act together
in the defense of the ROK. If confirmed, I would remain committed to
enhancing the combined deterrence and defense posture of the United
States-ROK Alliance.
Question. In your view what factors should trigger the commitment
of United States forces to engage North Korean forces in response to an
attack on South Korea?
Answer. It is my understanding that in accordance with United
States obligations in the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will
maintain the ability to deter, defend, and, if necessary, defeat any
adversary that threatens our treaty ally.
Question. Under what conditions should wartime operational control
be transferred from the United States to the Republic of Korea, in your
opinion?
Answer. The transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from
the United States to the ROK is and should remain conditions-based,
consistent with the bilateral Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan,
or COTP. Any transfer of wartime OPCON must fundamentally strengthen
United States-ROK combined defense posture. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with the ROK to ensure all conditions for
OPCON transition are met.
Question. In your view, should United States forces on the Korean
Peninsula remain focused on defense of South Korea or should United
States forces in Korea also be available for regional or global
operations? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that the United States must maintain operational
flexibility to ensure that our forces are ready to meet emerging
threats to the United States, as well as to our allies and partners in
the region and around the world. It is my understanding that the
Defense Department must continue to consider adjustments to every
command in every theater to ensure the optimization of our global force
posture to meeting emerging challenges. If confirmed, I would
prioritize a continued ``fight tonight'' readiness within our Alliance
with the ROK, as well as force assignment and allocation that advances
our national interests.
Question. What specific security capabilities do you believe South
Korea should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to
contribute to the deterrence of China?
Answer. The ROK is among the most capable military forces in the
region. If confirmed, I would review the entire range of current and
proposed activities to enhance United States and allied capabilities to
deter the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as to counter North
Korea. I would also work with our allies and partners to prioritize
capabilities, readiness, and interoperability, that could be leveraged
in a variety of contingencies.
Question. Do you believe that South Korea should acquire integrated
air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with United
States capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and
other missile threats?
Answer. Yes. I understand that the United States is cooperating
with South Korea via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases to upgrade its
existing PAC-2 PATRIOT batteries to the more advanced PAC-3 system. It
is my understanding that one of our key priorities with South Korea is
to ensure the ROK builds capabilities to contribute to the Alliance's
counter-missile capability required for the conditions-based OPCON
transition. In order to strengthen deterrence and work together more
effectively in the event of a missile attack from North Korea, the
United States and ROK also need to work toward a more integrated air
and missile defense (IAMD)-based approach to enhance missile defense of
the Peninsula.
australia
Question. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-Australia
security relationship?
Answer. This year we proudly celebrate the 70th anniversary of the
ANZUS Treaty as the United States--Australia security alliance remains
an anchor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region. It provides
operational reliability, political viability, and mutual confidence,
facilitating a combined Alliance approach to the current and future
global operational environment. Our shared commitment to freedom,
democracy, and the rules-based international order remains steadfast
and resolute. The recently announced Australia-United Kingdom-United
States partnership further demonstrates the depth of our security
relationship with Australia.
Question. What is the value to U.S. national security of the United
States-Australia alliance, in your view?
Answer. Our allies and partners are our greatest strategic asset
and central to achieving our collective goals in an increasing complex
and challenging security environment. Australia is a critical ally in
the Indo-Pacific region, providing strategic capabilities, operational
access, and support in building other alliances and partnerships to
facilitate our operational freedom of maneuver, deterrence of PRC
aggression, and preservation of the security and prosperity of the
Indo-Pacific region.
Question. What specific security capabilities do you believe
Australia should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability
to contribute to the deterrence of China?
Answer. At the recent AUKUS announcement, the United States and UK
committed to support Australia to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-
powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. In addition,
Australia committed to establish a sovereign Guided Weapons and
Explosive Ordnance Enterprise. Strategic capabilities such as
hypersonic weapons and electromagnetic warfare are key areas of
bilateral defense cooperation. It is also important for Australia to
have a strong and resilient defense supply chain and provides
maintenance repair and overhaul capabilities in the Indo-Pacific
region.
Question. Australia was included as part of the National Technology
and Industrial Base (NTIB) in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA. What is your
view on the utility of Australia's inclusion in NTIB and of the recent
AUKUS initiative to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered
submarines for the Royal Australian Navy?
Answer. The operational effectiveness of our Alliance is
underpinned by the strength of cooperation on science, technology,
strategic capabilities, and defense industrial base integration. It is
my understanding that Australia's inclusion in the NTIB allows our
countries to enhance industrial collaboration, build supply chain
resiliency, and facilitate technology transfer and protection. The
AUKUS initiative further deepens our integration of defense and
security-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply
chains, and deepens our cooperation on a range of defense capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that Australia should acquire integrated
air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with United
States capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and
other missile threats?
Answer. Yes. The United States has a very close and expanding
alliance relationship with Australia, which encompasses the full scope
of defense cooperation, including integrated air and missile Defense
(IAMD). Australia currently deploys Aegis-equipped ships and by the end
of the decade has plans to field a new class of Aegis-equipped
frigates. If confirmed, I would work with Australia to advance IAMD
cooperation, such as through Australia's planned AIR 6500 project to
field a Joint Battle Management System, which will represent the core
of the Australian Defence Force command and control system and hold
great potential for future IAMD interoperability in coalition
operations.
africa
Question. How do you define United States national security
interests in Africa?
Answer. Africa is a continent with great opportunities to advance
common values and security interests. It is my understanding that our
national security interests in Africa are diverse and include the
growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in both
East and West Africa; competition with strategic competitors for
access, influence, and values; the threat to secure lines of
communication in the maritime domain; and the threat that climate
change has on regional stability. It is my understanding that U.S.
national security interests across the continent are pursued through
whole-of-government efforts to ensure continued U.S. access and
influence to protect our people, partners, resources, and interests.
Question. What should be the Department's top priorities in Africa?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD plays an important role in
supporting whole-of-government efforts focused on defense, development,
and diplomacy priorities in Africa. If confirmed, I would recommend
that our top priorities should focus on VEO threats to the United
States Homeland, maritime challenges that impact our trade and
communications, and the influence and access our strategic competitors
continue to gain in Africa. I understand that our defense engagement in
Africa protects the United States Homeland and fosters opportunities
for mutually beneficial partnerships in other sectors by promoting
stability and security. Finally, I understand that African countries
often desire United States engagement and support shared values, such
as fostering global trade, addressing conflict, and promoting human
rights.
Question. What is your assessment of the current United States
force posture and the associated resourcing in the United States Africa
Command (AFRICOM) AOR?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD supports strategic
priorities in Africa through our forward presence, periodic
engagements, and supporting force laydown in neighboring United States
European Command. This posture is complemented by a range of security
cooperation and assistance activities, which serve as our most powerful
tool to strengthen partnerships and counter competitors in Africa. If
confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in considering all Commander,
AFRICOM requests and requirements, and advocate for continued security
cooperation efforts, participation in United States-led exercises, and
professional military education.
Question. In your view, are the current forces available to AFRICOM
sufficient to support United States strategic objectives in the AOR?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD's ``by, with, and through''
approach to achieving security and stability in Africa has proven
effective with a limited forward presence. Often our security
cooperation efforts enhance larger ally and partner force operations,
which achieve shared strategic objectives and build enduring
relationships. Central to this approach is the limited forward presence
on the continent and a focus on building African partner nation
capabilities while supporting efforts of other international partners.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al-Qaeda,
ISIS, and other violent extremist organizations in Africa?
Answer. Worldwide, al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates continue to
pose threats to United States interests around the globe, including
Africa. It is my understanding that persistent pressure from the United
States and our allies and partners remains necessary. These groups
continue to present regional and localized threats in Africa to United
States interests. If confirmed, I will review our regional
counterterrorism approach to ensure our resources are being employed
appropriately and effectively toward priority threats in the region.
Question. Which groups are of greatest concern to you, and why?
Answer. East Africa, Somalia specifically, remains of strategic
concern, as Al-Shabaab has become the largest and wealthiest associated
force of al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has expressed intent to target the
Homeland and has demonstrated capability to target United States
interests in the region.
Question. What should be the priorities and associated policy
objectives of the United States counterterrorism strategy in Africa?
Answer. Terrorism will remain a persistent threat to our national
security. The Department must remain focused on maintaining the
proficiency of special operations forces in order to deny violent
extremist organizations their safe havens in Africa and to help degrade
and disrupt terrorist groups from further destabilizing these areas.
The ability to work alongside regional and international partners in
these regions is key to maintaining our objectives while conducting
such operations in a resource sustainable manner.
Question. What are the associated policy objectives and, in your
view, is the current United States approach meeting those policy
objectives in Africa?
Answer. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance sets a
priority to prevent terrorists from directing or supporting external
operations against the United States Homeland and our citizens, allies,
and partners overseas. Special Operations Forces remain a key
contributor to the Nation's counterterrorism missions in Africa by
supporting and enabling local partners and allies in pursuing shared
objectives, including degrading terrorist threats.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current
U.S. approach?
Answer. I believe a resource sustainable approach is necessary to
address all of our global challenges, including counterterrorism, as we
confront an increasingly complicated global environment of threats to
our national security. I understand that the U.S. counterterrorism
strategy is a whole-of-government approach to integrating military and
non-military efforts, calibrated to varied threats and the regional
context in which they exist. DOD employs kinetic and non-kinetic
capabilities, enabling other U.S. Government departments and agencies
and regional partners. United States SOF complements a broad set of
national instruments of power in countering terrorism in Africa and
worldwide. If confirmed, I will review our counterterrorism approach in
the region to ensure our resources are being employed appropriately and
effectively toward priority threats in the region.
Question. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic
objectives in Africa?
Answer. It is my understanding that both Russia and the PRC have
expanded their strategic focus on Africa and use engagement in Africa
to bolster their international standing, obtain access to raw
materials, undermine Western influence, and pursue access agreements to
support force projection in the region. The methods vary widely between
the two.
China is engaging diplomatically, economically, and militarily
across the Continent. Specific to our military interests, it is my
understanding that the PLA continues improvements to its military base
in Djibouti and has expressed interest in opening more bases in Africa.
Russia markets its security services and experience to African
countries to expand its influence and challenge United States
interests. Russia's outreach is not as wide reaching as China's;
however, Russia continues to contribute to instability through the use
and presence of Russian private military companies (PMC) in several
African countries, like Libya and the Central African Republic, but is
also trying to expand its presence in other areas, like the Sahel
region. Russia remains a key arms supplier for many African militaries
and continues to look for opportunities to project power.
Question. In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with
those of the U.S.?
Answer. Actions by Russia and the PRC could create future access
challenges and currently undermine our efforts in African countries to
promote regional stability, civilian control of the armed forces,
transparency, and accountability.
Question. In your view, what should be the DOD role in supporting
United States strategic objectives in Africa?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD engagement in Africa
protects the U.S. Homeland and fosters opportunities for mutually
beneficial partnerships in other sectors by promoting stability and
security. By building partnerships and bolstering security exporters,
DOD assists African partners in overcoming security challenges. The
U.S. is especially sought after as a security partner thanks to the
high quality of U.S. military equipment, expertise, and training.
Question. What should be the role of DOD with regard to China and
Russia in Africa?
Answer. As part of our whole-of-government approach, I would
prioritize DOD's efforts to build partner capacity to address security
challenges and to reinforce United States influence in strategically
critical countries, both in Africa and throughout the Global South.
latin america and the caribbean
Question. Do you define United States national security interests
in Latin America and the Caribbean?
Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. national security
interests in the Western Hemisphere include protecting the American
people, promoting economic prosperity and opportunity, supporting and
strengthening democratic institutions, and upholding human rights and
dignity. Our security depends greatly on the security and well-being of
our Western Hemisphere neighbors. We face many challenges in the
Western Hemisphere, including the migration crisis, natural disasters,
drug trafficking and other transnational criminal networks, COVID-19,
climate change, and the efforts of foreign competitors and adversaries
to undermine democratic governments and U.S. interests. If confirmed, I
would help ensure that the Department of Defense plays an appropriate
supporting role to help address these challenges.
Question. What should be the Department's top priorities in Latin
America and the Caribbean?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department should
build and strengthen its cooperation with Western Hemisphere partners
to address shared security challenges. From this basis, the Department
could help support partner nation efforts in traditional areas such as
countering narcotics trafficking and other transnational crime,
disaster response, and strengthening defense institutions. In addition,
there are opportunities for cooperation in newer fields such as cyber
defense and addressing climate change. If confirmed, I would expect to
help ensure the Department focuses on cooperation to help enable our
partners' self-sufficiency in defense and their contributions to
regional and hemispheric security.
Question. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic
objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean?
Answer. It is my understanding that Russia and the PRC actively
seek opportunities to deepen their influence in the hemisphere through
diplomatic, economic, and security inroads. If confirmed, I would
recommend that the United States leverage all elements of national
power to counter PRC and Russian activities intended to interfere with
our security relationships and undermine the rules-based international
order. Working within a whole-of-government response, DOD has an
important role in building and maintaining strong defense and security
partnerships, enabled by engagements and presence, intelligence and
information exchanges, and educational programs and exercises. If
confirmed, I would help lead the Department's employment of these tools
to minimize the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere.
Question. In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with
those of the U.S.?
Answer. It is my understanding that Russian and PRC activities pose
challenges to security and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. For
example, their support to authoritarian governments in Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba undermines democracy and freedom of expression in
those nations. PRC-flagged vessels conducting illegal fishing
activities engage in economic theft and environmental destruction of
Western Hemisphere nations' resources. PRC-based transnational criminal
organizations and money laundering firms contribute to the illicit drug
trade responsible for killing tens of thousands of people each year in
the United States. Russian attempts to influence populations through
social media activities and other misinformation operations aim to
undermine United States goals for the hemisphere. If confirmed, I would
recommend to the Secretary that we help counter these activities
through a whole-of-government approach and robust engagements with our
partners in the region, promoting the values of democracy, respect for
human rights, and cooperation in a rules-based international order.
Question. In your view, what would be the appropriate role for DOD
in addressing the sources of instability in the region, including
criminal violence, corruption, environmental devastation, and the
health crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic?
Answer. The President's Interim National Security Strategy
recognizes the challenges posed by transnational criminal
organizations, corruption, environmental crime, and COVID-19 to
security in the Western Hemisphere. I understand that Congress provides
dedicated authorities and funding to enable DOD to help U.S. and
foreign law enforcement partners disrupt drug trafficking and other
forms of transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking and
smuggling, weapons trafficking, trafficking in wildlife and natural
resources, and illicit financial flows. If confirmed, I would ensure
that the Department continues to provide appropriate support to U.S.
and foreign partners with the resources that Congress dedicates for
this purpose. I'm also aware that DOD has helped neighbors in the
Western Hemisphere in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, through the
provision of field hospitals, freezers to store vaccines safely, oxygen
generators to make medical-grade oxygen, therapeutic drugs, and other
medical equipment and supplies.
ballistic missile defense
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against United States forces, allies, and the
United States Homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense
Review (MDR) articulated existing U.S. policy on missile defense and
endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.
In your view, should United States missile defense policy should be
limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?
Answer. I support the longstanding United States policy that
Homeland missile defenses should remain focused on defending against
comparatively limited rogue State ballistic missile attacks from North
Korea and Iran, not against attacks by near-peers China and Russia
which possess much larger strategic missile arsenals that could
overwhelm United States Homeland missile defenses. To address the
threat of a comprehensive and technologically sophisticated strategic
missile attack by China or Russia, the United States should continue to
rely on the same strategy it has employed for more than half a
century--nuclear deterrence.
Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
threats, such as Russia and China?
Answer. Defending the United States Homeland against non-strategic
missile attacks by near-peers such as China or Russia remains a
difficult problem. I agree that missile defense cannot defend against
every threat and that it must be only one capability within a broader
range of options to increase our overall protection against the growing
number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department is
examining ways to enhance its architecture against conventional missile
threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our
Homeland missile defense architecture.
Question. The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking
threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne,
and space-based ``system of systems,'' with the constituent pieces
managed and sustained by a number of different DOD components.
Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated
and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture
capable of supporting real-time operational decisions? If so, please
explain your answer. If not, please explain what steps you would take,
if confirmed, to improve global sensor integration.
Answer. Having a persistent and integrated network of sensors is
integral to the success of any effective missile defense architecture.
Sensors provide real-time detection, tracking, and targeting
information that is critical to policymakers during a crisis. The
existing Department of Defense global network of sensors on land, at
sea, and in the air and space domains is highly complex and must be
improved to increase operational awareness and decisionmaking. If
confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure that this
element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is prioritized
appropriately.
Question. The cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program
with the replacement of the Next Generation Interceptor program has
resulted in a likely delay of at least 10 years before the deployment
of modernized ground-based interceptors for homeland ballistic missile
defense.
Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program and the
fielding of additional interceptors from this program, presuming the
program achieves its acquisition objectives?
Answer. Yes. Defense of the Homeland is a DOD priority, and missile
defense is a central component of this mission. I support the
Department's decision to move forward with development of the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI), as well as other ongoing efforts to
enhance the effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse
Defense System (GMD) which currently protects the United States
Homeland against limited Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support continuing
improvements to our missile defense architecture.
Question. Recently, a Navy Aegis Destroyer was able to successfully
intercept an ICBM-class target, raising the possibility of using a
system of Homeland Defense layered between the Ground Based Interceptor
at mid-flight and the Aegis system for intercepts in the final phases
of the ICBM's trajectory.
In your view, would this layered approach require a change in
policy with respect to the types of interceptors used, the defended
area, and the specific threats each is deployed against?
Answer. Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or
existing capabilities would require weighing a variety of factors:
cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability against
the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure that the Department uses the layered homeland defense analysis
called for in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 to help determine the proper mix of capabilities to defend the
Homeland against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea.
Question. What are your views regarding United States Indo-Pacific
Command's (INDOPACOM's) unfunded priorities with respect to missile
defense and Guam?
Answer. Guam is a critical forward operating position. Although I
do not have access to the specific unfunded priority lists, I agree
with INDOPACOM that ensuring Guam has sufficient defenses against
growing adversary anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) conventional
missile capabilities is critical. Active missile defenses that enable
the United States to sustain military operations during a conflict are
one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If
confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right
combination of capabilities on Guam to enhance the United States
regional deterrence and defense posture, assure allies and partners,
and increase readiness to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific
region.
Question. In recent months, missile and rocket attacks by Iran and
Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East have highlighted the shortage
of Theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TIAMD) assets available
to protect deployed United States forces. This same shortage is most
acute in United States European Command and INDOPACOM, where the
missile threats are much more sophisticated. Air defense units remain
the highest-demand, lowest-density forces in the Army.
In your view, should DOD expand its theater missile defense
capabilities (including improvements to existing systems or the
development of new systems), capacity (increased procurement of
existing systems), or both? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Each Area of Responsibility (AOR) has unique sets of
challenges and requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with
Department stakeholders, including the Joint Staff and the relevant
Combatant Commands, to help determine the most appropriate mixture and
allocation of missile defense capabilities and other posture
requirements to maintain theater readiness and a strong deterrent.
Question. Do you believe the United States should encourage
regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense
capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the
burden on U.S. forces and requirements?
Answer. Yes. The world has arrived in a new era of offensive
missiles. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries are pursuing
A2/AD strategies centered on their missile forces with the intention of
inhibiting and disrupting U.S. and allied military freedom of maneuver.
Allies and partners have the lead role in their sovereign defense,
backed by mutual security treaties and other relationships with the
United States. If confirmed, I would work closely with our allies and
key partners as they strengthen their own Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) capabilities. Such allied investments offer common
protection, enhanced deterrence, and improved interoperability. They
also complicate adversary planning and attack calculus, and provide
leverage for leaders to negotiate against threats from a position of
strength in peacetime, as well as during a crisis and/or conflict.
Question. If confirmed, on which specific allies and partners would
you focus in this regard, and specifically what would you encourage
each to do?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support strong United
States missile defense cooperation, which occurs with many different
allies and key partners throughout the world, and is strongest with
NATO, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and Israel. Our
cooperation with these countries strengthens collective deterrence
efforts and offers assurance essential to the unity of our alliances
which are threatened by missile coercion and attacks particularly from
China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. I would also prioritize continued
dialog and progress toward greater interoperability, including regular
military-to-military exercises and training.
nuclear weapons
Question. Do you agree with former Secretary of Defense Ash
Carter's statement that our nuclear deterrent is the ``bedrock'' of
every national security mission we undertake?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree with the assessment of the past four
Secretaries of Defense--including Secretary Austin, and as well, Deputy
Secretary Hicks--that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority
mission and that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the
Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical
national security priority?
Answer. Yes. I agree with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
Hicks that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and
that modernization of the triad is a critical national security
priority.
Question. In your view, is the sustainment and timely modernization
of the three legs of the nuclear triad essential? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. Yes. As Secretary Austin has explained, the service life of
many elements of the nuclear triad has been extended long past the time
it should have been modernized. We must continue to modernize the triad
and sustain legacy nuclear delivery systems.
Question. Is the current program of record sufficient to support
full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems,
warheads, and the supporting National Nuclear Security Administration
infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
surrounding the program of record for the nuclear triad and, in
conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration, for
nuclear infrastructure. In gaining this understanding, I recognize that
the Administration is committed to modernizing the triad in a cost-
effective and judicious manner that provides us the necessary
capabilities when they are needed.
Question. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that
the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear
forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on
alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any
given time.
Do you agree with this conclusion? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. Although I am not familiar with the specific details
of the United States' nuclear forces readiness posture, I understand
this posture has remained consistent over multiple Presidential
Administrations and has contributed to global stability for many
decades. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding these details
with a focus on enhancing deterrence, maximizing decision time, and
preserving the range of U.S. response options.
Question. In response to conditions set forth in the Senate
Resolution of Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama
certified on February 2, 2011, that he intended to ``(a) modernize or
replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber
and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the
United States rocket motor industrial base.''
Do you agree with and support these objectives for modernizing the
triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. The triad has provided a strong nuclear deterrent for
decades, and I believe we must continue to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent in the years to come. If confirmed, I
commit to better understanding the details surrounding the program of
record for strategic nuclear delivery systems, recognizing that the
Administration is committed to a triad of nuclear forces and to
modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious manner that
provides us the necessary capabilities when they are needed.
Question. Admiral Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
recently reaffirmed the longstanding assessment of the Department of
Defense that extending the service life of the Minuteman III (MM III)
system is no longer a cost-effective option for preserving the Nation's
intercontinental ballistic missile force.
Do you agree with the Commander's assessment?
Answer. I agree that we cannot extend the life expectancy of legacy
systems indefinitely without increased cost and risk. If confirmed, I
commit to consult closely with the STRATCOM Commander to better
understanding the specific details surrounding the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile system and its replacement system,
the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). I would also consult with
Minuteman III and GBSD program managers and other experts to understand
the budgetary, programmatic, and operational implications of further
life extensions.
Question. The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to
replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)--a system that
is 20 years past its retirement, under increasing threat from adversary
air defenses, and considered essential to maintaining the air leg of
the triad.
Do you support the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a replacement for
the aging ALCM?
Answer. Yes. As Secretary Austin testified, maintaining a credible
nuclear deterrent is critical to our Nation's defense. If confirmed, I
will seek to ensure that the Department thoroughly studies all proposed
plans and alternatives to ensure we are on the most cost-effective path
to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.
Question. If confirmed as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, what steps will you take to advocate for, and ensure the
continued development of, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and Long
Range Stand-Off programs? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that both the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
and the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) program are being addressed in the
NPR. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the NPR is conducted in
an analytically rigorous manner and takes into account changes in the
strategic environment, recognizing that we face two nuclear-armed near-
peer competitors. I will also commit to better understanding the
details surrounding both programs, recognizing that the Administration
is committed to modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious
manner.
Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
surrounding the W93 program and parallel efforts to collaborate with
the United Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear
deterrent. I do recognize the critical importance of the long-standing
nuclear deterrence cooperation between the United States and the United
Kingdom, and the continued value of the United Kingdom's continuous at-
sea deterrence mission to NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
Question. Per Secretary of Defense Austin's direction, the
Department is undergoing an integrated deterrence review, which
includes are review of nuclear deterrence.
Please explain your views on how nuclear weapons can be part of an
integrated deterrence with conventional weapons.
Answer. Although I understand that DOD is developing a National
Defense Strategy that is intended to focus on an integrated deterrence
approach, I am not yet familiar with the specific details of that
review. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
surrounding this issue and the role of nuclear weapons in such an
approach along with other military capabilities, including those in the
conventional, space, cyber, missile defense and information domains.
Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command has
referred to reports of China's nuclear force expansion as
``breathtaking'' and contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear
peer to the United States and Russia is a ``strategic breakout,'' which
represents an unprecedented threat to global stability.
Do you agree with this assessment? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Although I am not familiar with the specific details
surrounding Admiral Richard's assessment, I agree that China's nuclear
forces are rapidly improving both quantitatively and qualitatively. I
understand issues such as those identified by Admiral Richard are being
addressed in DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will
consult with Admiral Richard and other experts to better understand how
the United States should posture itself in response.
Question. What are your views on Russia's nuclear modernization
effort?
Answer. Of most concern in Russia's nuclear modernization and
expansion are its development and fielding of systems that are not
accountable under--and thus not constrained by--the New START Treaty,
including so-called ``novel'' systems of strategic range; as well as
continued development and fielding of a large variety of ground-, air-,
and sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapon systems, many of which are
dual-capable. The development of such systems undermines global and
regional stability and the goal of reducing the salience of nuclear
weapons.
Question. Russia is now fielding their Avangard hypersonic strike
system, which is accountable under the New START Treaty. What are your
views on the effects of this system with respect to strategic stability
and missile defense?
Answer. The Avangard hypersonic system has the potential to
undermine strategic stability and is being addressed in DOD's ongoing
Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. If confirmed, I
commit to better understanding the details surrounding this capability
and how the United States should respond from both a military posture
and arms control perspective.
Question. What are your views on the recent expansion and
modernization of China's ICBM force?
Answer. I am concerned by reports of China's nuclear modernization
and expansion, including its ICBM force. This concern is exacerbated by
China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear forces, as well as
its strategy and doctrine. I understand issues such as these are being
addressed in DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will
have seek to ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic
environment such as these into account.
Question. What is your understanding of China's rationale for this
expansion?
Answer. I understand that the recent expansion and modernization of
China's nuclear forces, including its ICBM force, are the result of its
strategic ambitions and evolving view of the security landscape.
Moreover, the PRC's nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance
of a survivable nuclear force that can retaliate against an adversary's
first strike.
Question. How should the United States respond to China's efforts,
in your opinion?
Answer. I understand issues such as China's expansion and
modernization of nuclear forces are being addressed in DOD's ongoing
Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR
takes developments in the strategic environment such as these into
account.
Question. What are your views on China's fielding of an SSBN-class
submarine fleet and what are your concerns with respect to its
continued development over the next 5-10 years?
Answer. Fielding of an SSBN-class submarine fleet will contribute
to a survivable and functional nuclear triad. While an SSBN force by
itself is just one facet of China's nuclear forces expansion and
modernization, it affirms the 2021 Threat Assessment Report from the
United States Intelligence Community noting that ``China is building a
larger and increasingly capable nuclear missile force that is more
survivable, more diverse, and on higher alert than in the past,
including nuclear missile systems designed to manage regional
escalation and ensure an intercontinental second-strike capability.''
Question. Do you believe China is developing a triad of delivery
systems?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. If so, on what do you base this belief and to what
motivations do you ascribe China's actions?
Answer. China's development of a triad of nuclear delivery systems
is a fact established by voluminous evidence about China's ground-,
sea-, and air-based nuclear forces, reinforced in testimony by numerous
DOD and United States intelligence officials and DOD reports to
Congress on China's military. I understand that the recent expansion
and modernization of China's nuclear forces are the result of its
strategic ambitions, evolving view of the security landscape, and
concerns over survivability of its nuclear forces. I further understand
that its nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a
survivable nuclear force that can retaliate against an adversary's
first strike.
Question. How can the United States best counter China in this
regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
surrounding China's nuclear modernization and expansion, as well as its
other nuclear developments, and how the United States might need to
adjust its posture, policy or doctrine in response.
Question. In your understanding, has this expansion been
accompanied by a change in China's nuclear weapons use doctrine?
Answer. China continues to maintain a stated no first use policy. I
understand, however, that there is a degree of ambiguity surrounding
the conditions under which China's no first use policy would no longer
apply.
Question. If so, how has China's doctrine changed?
Answer. My understanding is that China's publicly stated nuclear
weapons use doctrine has not changed--and that Beijing continues to
affirm that it abides by a no first use policy. However, the lack of
transparency in the scope, scale, and speed of its nuclear expansion
raises fundamental questions about its future doctrine.
Question. Should U.S. doctrine change also?
Answer. I am familiar with, and concerned by, reports of China's
nuclear modernization and expansion, as well as its other nuclear
developments. I understand issues such as this are being addressed in
DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will seek to
ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic environment such as
these into account and examines how the United States might need to
adjust its posture, policy, doctrine or arms control approaches in
response.
Question. What are your views with respect to deterring both Russia
and China, in light of China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal (as
compared to its arsenal of 10 years ago)?
Answer. I am generally familiar with concerns regarding the
prospect of having to deter two peer or near-peer nuclear adversaries
simultaneously in the coming years. If confirmed, I commit to better
understanding the details surrounding these issues to include how the
United States should posture itself in response, and whether arms
control efforts can contribute to reducing this threat.
Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced
his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should
only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions.
Do you agree with this statement? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Administration is committed to reestablishing U.S.
credibility as a leader in arms control as demonstrated, in part, by
the extension of the New START Treaty earlier this year. With that
said, I agree that the United States should not unilaterally reduce
nuclear forces without some corresponding action on the part of our
adversaries.
Question. In your opinion, should the United States pursue arms
control and strategic stability talks with China while it is are
undertaking this expansion of its nuclear arsenal?
Answer. The Administration is committed to reestablishing U.S.
credibility as a leader in arms control. We have long been concerned
with China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear forces, as well
as its strategy and doctrine. Dialogue aimed at such transparency,
improving strategic stability and risk reduction through mutual
understandings, and possibly leading to arms control agreements that
improve the security of the United States and its allies and partners
is in the interest of the United States, China and the global
community.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or canceling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
Answer. I believe maintaining credible nuclear forces and pursuing
verifiable reductions are both aspects of strategic stability. How
current nuclear modernization plans intersect with our arms control
approach is an important matter that I understand is being addressed in
DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review as well as in an ongoing
interagency process. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR fully
considers the potential impact of modernization choices on our arms
control negotiation leverage.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
China on nuclear weapons' reductions? Please explain your answers.
Answer. I believe we should be careful not to limit our ability to
defend ourselves against limited missile threats or other types of
attack from rogue states. I understand the intersection of arms control
and integrated deterrence is an issue being considered as part of the
Administration's strategic reviews, including but not limited to DOD's
National Defense Strategy review and Nuclear Posture Review, as well as
an ongoing interagency arms control process. If confirmed, I would seek
to ensure DOD views are fully represented in any future nuclear arms
control negotiations with either Russia or China.
Question. What if your view of the value of the supplemental
capabilities recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, including
the deployed low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile and
possible return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. As set out in the President's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance, the Administration is committed to taking steps to
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,
while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and
effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies
remain strong and credible. I understand that the need for the so-
called supplemental capabilities is being addressed in DOD's ongoing
Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will have a role in overseeing
the NPR, and I commit to better understanding the arguments for and
against such capabilities in light of the foregoing guidance.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any significant change
in U.S. nuclear posture or declaratory policy, including reducing alert
status of ICBMs or adopting a ``No First Use'' policy? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. As the Deputy Secretary testified, declaratory policy is a
decision made by the President of the United States. If confirmed, I
would seek to ensure that the NPR process that informs any such
decision includes rigorous, fact-based analysis that takes into account
recent changes in the strategic environment, and to make certain that
the views of the STRATCOM commander and other senior military leaders
are fully represented, and that we conduct meaningful consultations
with treaty allies who rely on our extended deterrent.
defense support of civil authorities for covid-19 response
Question. Through contracting support, the program previously known
as Operation Warp Speed, and National Guard and active duty deployments
for vaccine support teams and other support efforts, DOD has provided
significant assistance to the U.S. Government's response to the COVID-
19 crisis.
What in your view is the appropriate role for the DOD in providing
support to Civil Authorities as part of the COVID-19 response?
Answer. I believe that it is appropriate that DOD has played an
important supporting role in our Nation's fight against the COVID-19
pandemic. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead
Federal agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is
the lead Federal coordinating agency bringing together the full
capabilities of the U.S. Government to support response efforts to a
national emergency. If confirmed, I will seek to support continued and
effective DOD support to whole-of-government efforts.
Question. Are there additional types of support that DOD should be
providing, or types of support that the DOD should not provide, in your
view?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, DOD has been responsive and
effective in providing assistance to the broader U.S. COVID-19 response
efforts. I believe DOD should continue to play a supporting role to the
lead Federal agency or the lead Federal coordinating agency. DOD
assistance supplements, not supplants, responsibilities that by law
belong to States and other Federal departments and agencies.
Question. What should be done to minimize the risk to Department
personnel who are tasked with providing defense support to civil
authorities during the coronavirus crisis?
Answer. DOD's highest priority should remain the protection of our
Nation and its people. While DOD cannot execute its missions risk-free,
DOD can mitigate and manage risks to ensure that DOD does not
compromise the safety and security of our force or the Nation. I
understand that DOD implemented force health protection measures early
in the pandemic designed to mitigate risks and has continued to adapt
these measures as our Nation's understanding of COVID-19 has improved.
Question. What in your view are the major lessons learned from the
Department's support to civil authorities in response to the COVID-19
crisis, and how should DOD position itself to be better prepared to
support civil authorities in response to a future pandemic?
Answer. I understand that DOD routinely conducts after-action
reviews to identify opportunities to improve. If confirmed, I will have
the opportunity to examine DOD's reviews and the lessons the Department
intends to incorporate into its plans and procedures as well as into
whole-of-government policies and processes.
Question. What risks do you envision to the vaccine program as DOD
draws down from the Countermeasures Acceleration Group, and how would
you mitigate those risks, if confirmed?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD had an important, albeit
supporting role in the vaccine program. If confirmed, I will review
DOD's posture for providing support and will work with partners to
mitigate any risks, should DOD be asked to provide support again.
foreign disinformation on covid-19
Question. China, Russia and other nations are disseminating
disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19, to advance
their strategic interests.
What role, if any, should the Department play in countering
disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19?
Answer. In support of whole-of-government efforts, I would expect
the Department to be an important voice in reinforcing fact-based
information and leverage trusted relationships with our own personnel,
our defense communities, allies, and partners to counter
disinformation. If confirmed, I would look to support the Department's
efforts to counter COVID-19 disinformation and false narratives in
support of the Administration's efforts and to provide timely and
accurate health information to the workforce.
dod security cooperation
Question. What is the appropriate role of the DOD in the conduct of
security cooperation in the strategic cooperation with China and
Russia?
Answer. Aligned with whole-of-government security sector assistance
efforts, Department of Defense security cooperation tools bolster ally
and partner capabilities for defense, advance shared national security
interests through addressing regional security challenges, and
strengthen relationships with key allies and partners. DOD security
cooperation, developed and executed in coordination the State
Department, serves to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and
partnerships, reinforcing a critical American asymmetric advantage in
strategic competition.
Question. What is your view of the value of a strategic and
integrated approach to DOD security cooperation as a tool for strategic
competition?
Answer. DOD building partner capacity efforts should focus on
enhancing ally and partner capabilities to effectively operate
alongside and in lieu of U.S. forces to address shared national
security challenges. Security cooperation investments should be
targeted to advance broader goals in strategic competition. I
understand the forthcoming National Defense Strategy will address the
strategic objectives and integrated approach of DOD security
cooperation.
Question. What specific steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to
ensure that the Department's security cooperation strategy is
integrated across the combatant commands, Military Services, and other
DOD components?
Answer. I understand the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
exercising responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 382, has made significant progress in
advancing the strategic oversight of security cooperation activities
since the reforms codified by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017. If confirmed, I will review existing processes
and assess whether additional guidance may be necessary to ensure DOD
security cooperation activities are developed, executed, and integrated
across echelons and in alignment with the forthcoming National Defense
Strategy.
Question. What should be the Department's relationship with the
Department of State in the conduct of these security cooperation
activities?
Answer. Effective DOD security cooperation aligns with and advances
broader U.S. foreign policy objectives driven by the Department of
State. Ensuring this alignment requires thorough collaboration with the
Department of State through interagency processes and regular
engagement between the two departments at all levels. If confirmed, I
would seek to support consistent coordination and engagement with the
Department of State and other interagency partners.
Question. In your view, are the current security sector assistance
authorities available to DOD sufficient to accomplish our strategic
objectives?
Answer. DOD security cooperation authorities and investments are
essential to the national security strategic goal of reinvigorating and
modernizing U.S. alliances and partnerships. If confirmed, I will
support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's responsibility for
oversight of strategic policy, guidance, and resource allocation for
security cooperation programs and assess whether authorities or
resource adjustments may be necessary in support of DOD strategic
priorities.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether any additional
organizational, legislative, or resource adjustments are necessary for
the effective implementation and strategic oversight of Department of
Defense security cooperation activities.
civilian oversight of special operations forces
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2017 included provisions
designed to enhance civilian oversight of, and advocacy for special
operations forces. Among other things, these reforms established an
administrative chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to the
Secretary of Defense, mirroring the relationship between the
Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Service Chiefs.
What is your understanding of the ``service secretary-like''
responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) with regard to special operations
forces?
Answer. In accordance with reforms enacted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the ASD(SO/LIC) reports
directly to the Secretary of Defense in exercising authority,
direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar
administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and
equipping of special operations forces. I understand that the ASD(SO/
LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict,
and special operations-peculiar administrative matters and, after the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the principal official
for these matters.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
reinforce the independent role of the ASD(SOLIC) as the ``service
secretary-like'' civilian for special operations forces?
Answer. DOD implements the organizational role of the ASD(SO/LIC)
with a dual reporting chain. In supporting the dual role, I will
reinforce the independent role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in regard to his
principal staff assistance responsibilities that are similar to those
of a Military Department secretary by, for example, supporting and
reinforcing the ASD(SOLIC)'S role as the Department's lead for the
manning, organizing, training, and equipping of SOF. One way I will do
this is by ensuring the ASD(SOLIC)'s participation in the appropriate
department-wide fora, and by ensuring the proper separation of tasks
between the ASD(SOLIC)'s service-like responsibilities and functions,
and the responsibilities and functions for which he is under the
authority, direction, and control of the USD(P).
Question. In your view, how should these responsibilities be
balanced with other ASD(SOLIC) responsibilities related to policy and
operational issues?
Answer. The ASD (SOLIC)'s dual responsibilities are complementary.
Every leader across the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be
working to integrate information and to ensure thorough coordination of
policies and issues for the Secretary. The ASD(SOLIC)'s dual role
ensures special operation forces are properly prepared for current and
future missions and that the DOD strategy and policy realistically
reflect the capabilities and operational options these forces provide
the Nation.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the OUSD(P)?
Answer. There is no place for sexual harassment, gender
discrimination, and other harassment within OUSD(P); any such behavior
is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will assist the USD(P) in reviewing
previous workforce assessments including surveys, both internal and
from the Office of Personnel Management, and any other documentation
that would give me insight into the Policy organization to help
determine next steps. I am aware of the GAO's report, issued earlier
this year, recommending steps the Department take to address sexual
harassment and assault among the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I
will support the Department's ongoing efforts to promote a culture of
dignity and respect, including a commitment to tackling the corrosive
issue of sexual harassment.
Question. In your view, is the civilian workforce harassment
prevention and response training for civilian employees in OUSD(P)
adequate and effective?
Answer. As I have not worked in OUSD(P), I cannot judge the current
harassment prevention and response training. If confirmed, I will make
it a priority to work the Policy team to determine if it is adequate
and effective.
Question. In your view, does the OUSD(P) program for response to
complaints of harassment or discrimination provide appropriate care and
services to OUSD(P) civilian employee victims?
Answer. As I have not worked in OUSD(P), I cannot judge the current
program for response to complaints of harassment or discrimination. If
confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure appropriate care and
services are provided to victims, in alignment with the
Administration's commitment to improving prevention and response to
sexual harassment and sexual assault for both civilians and military
personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment
or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(P)?
Answer. If confirmed, and I received or became aware of such
complaints, I would take them seriously and immediately contact the
appropriate office to initiate an inquiry to gather all facts, conduct
the necessary interviews, collect appropriate information, and address
the complaint within the specified guidelines of Federal statutes and
Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I would
assist the USD(P) in reiterating to the workforce that they deserve a
respectful workplace, of the importance of equality and diversity to
the entire team, as well as our support for the Department's zero
tolerance for harassment.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the State of the relationship
between the OUSD(P) and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in
particular, and with the Congress in general?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the relationship between the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Congress. As a
former Senate staffer, I recognize that the Senate Armed Services
Committee provides important oversight of the Department and issues
within the purview of OUSD(P). If confirmed, I am committed to
continuing regular engagement with Congress and maintaining these
important relationships to ensure the Committee can fulfill its
legislative and oversight role.
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
19, 2014. Individuals in the custody and control of the U.S. Government
may not be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not
authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.
Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing
triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016?
Answer. Since FM 2-22.3 is the responsibility of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, I understand that
my role in the review and revision will be to coordinate on the
suggested manual revisions.
Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM
2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I am not aware of any policies or processes that are in
need of revision at this time. congressional Oversight
In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it
is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other
appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information from the executive branch.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to appear and testify before this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
afghan refugees and special immigrant visa program
1. Senator Shaheen. Ms. Baker, from the Department of Defense
perspective, what type of inter-agency coordination, oversight, and
policy implementation do you believe is needed to improve United States
efforts in the processing, documentation, and effective resettlement of
Afghan refugees?
Ms. Baker. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
supports the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human
Services, and State by providing temporary housing, sustainment, and
other support for the Afghan evacuees. The Departments of Homeland
Security, Health and Human Services, and State are responsible for the
resettlement process. If confirmed, I will review how the Department of
Defense is working with its Federal partners and other organizations to
ensure our Afghan guests are being properly cared for and to identify
opportunities to improve how the Department of Defense contributes to
the resettlement process.
2. Senator Shaheen. Ms. Baker, from the Department of Defense
perspective, what policy reforms do you believe are needed to reduce or
remove the barriers and delays in processing refugee documentation,
medical care, and housing in support of timely and efficient
resettlement of Afghan evacuees seeking refuge in the United States?
Ms. Baker. I understand the Department of Defense is working
closely with the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human
Services, and State to host our Afghan guests, treat-our guests with
dignity and respect, and meet our guests' needs, including medical and
housing needs. If confirmed, I will review the Department of Defense's
support to ensure our Afghan guests are being properly cared for and to
identify any barriers or delays to this care. The Departments of
Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and State are responsible
for the resettlement process, so, if confirmed, I would work with those
Departments to identify and address any barriers or delays to the
resettlement process.
3. Senator Shaheen. Ms. Baker, if confirmed, how will you ensure
the lessons learned from the current Afghan non-combatant evacuation
are being applied and documented to inform and establish processes for
similar contingencies in the future?
Ms. Baker. I understand that there are several after action reviews
either proposed or ongoing, and if confirmed I will seek to support
those efforts and will be transparent with Congress about their
outcomes. I believe there are strategic, operational, tactical, and
administrative lessons to be learned from the noncombatant evacuation
in Afghanistan that should inform any similar operation going forward.
It will be important to identify aspects that were effective that we
should replicate in the future, as well as those aspects that need
improvement. If confirmed, I look forward to working with leaders in
the Department of Defense and in Congress to take a systematic review
of the operation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
information operations
4. Senator Peters. Ms. Baker, DOD has not released an Information
Operations (IO) strategy since your time serving under Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter--right around when Russia expanded an offensive
strategy to promote discord and call into question the legitimacy of
democratic institutions in the United States and Western Europe. When
Congress created the Principal Information Operations Adviser, the
previous Administration assigned it to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy--meaning that, if confirmed--you will likely play a role in
its development and in the ongoing IO posture review.
I know this is a whole-of-government problem, but what do you see
as an appropriate whole-of-Department approach to connecting each
disparate capability into an effective countereffort?
Ms. Baker. Connecting disparate activities in the Information
Environment has been a perennial challenge for the Department and the
broader U.S. Government. In my view, the core solution to integration
lies in how the Department thinks about and conducts strategic and
operational planning. Effective counter-efforts require the Department
to think in terms of strategic and operational influence to achieve
objectives supported by the utilization of all capabilities available
to the Department, rather than focusing solely on physical and lethal
operations. If confirmed, I will work with the Principal Information
Operations Advisor to ensure we are undertaking a whole of Department
approach.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
worsening threats
5. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Baker, we've consistently heard testimony
from our commanders and civilian experts that each of the five main
threats (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, global terrorism) we face
has worsened since the 2018 National Defense Strategy was published. Do
you agree that each of these threats is getting worse?
Ms. Baker. Many of the security trends and threats related to
China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations
(VEOs) that were present in 2018 remain in place today--and a number of
them have accelerated or intensified. Most notably and for instance, as
the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance notes, ``[China] is
the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained
challenge to a stable and open international system.'' For that reason,
the Secretary of Defense has made clear that China is the Department's
pacing threat. Additionally, other transnational threats--such as
climate change and pandemics--pose newly acute risks for the United
States and our allies and partners alike. If confirmed, I look forward
to working in concert with other departments and agencies, and with
allies and partners, to address the wide range of threats we face.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
taiwan
6. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, if confirmed, would you support
providing Taiwan with robust military training and expertise to ensure
its armed forces present a combat-credible deterrent?
Ms. Baker. I understand that Taiwan is seeking to modernize both
its forces and capabilities in response to the threat posed by the PRC.
If confirmed, I am committed to proactively supporting Taiwan's self-
defense as provided for under the Taiwan Relations Act.
7. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, would you consider such military
support to include individual-and unit-level training, as well as
training for operations that would make cooperation with United States
and other militaries more effective if Taiwan required help to defend
itself?
Ms. Baker. I am committed to fulfilling all United States
commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. Any response to a Taiwan
contingency is also likely to rely on interoperability with capable
allies and partners proficient in their warfighting roles.
8. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, I realize that a primary goal for the
United States is to enhance Taiwan's ability to engage in asymmetric
warfare with a much stronger China, and I support that effort, but
shouldn't we also be considering ways to help Taiwan defend itself from
whatever Communist China might try to throw at it, such as an enhanced
Iron Dome system or greater anti-missile defense systems to make it
clear to General Secretary Xi Jinping that he will not be permitted to
take Taiwan by force?
Ms. Baker. As the Secretary has said, no one should doubt that we
will continue to meet our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to
support Taiwan's ability to defend itself. If confirmed, I would
continue to support critical self-defense capabilities, such as short
and medium-range air defense for Taiwan. I also agree that we need to
consider ways to support Taiwan to resist all forms of coercion,
including from a whole of government perspective.
afghanistan
9. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, the failure of the Biden
administration to get our citizens and partners out of Afghanistan
before withdrawing our troops was a strategic failure, and a stain on
our reputation. If confirmed, can you envision yourself ever supporting
or advocating a mission or policy decision that would knowingly leave
American citizens behind enemy lines?
Ms. Baker. If confirmed, my primary responsibility will be
protecting the security of the American people, including by meeting
challenges abroad from State and non-State adversaries who threaten the
United States and our allies.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
national defense strategy and budget
10. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, in light of nuclear capable
hypersonic glide missiles launched by the Chinese, do you believe that
a declining United States defense budget will improve or erode our
competitive advantages over China?
Ms. Baker. It is my understanding that the Department follows an
approach that is strategy driven and resource informed. As a general
matter, therefore, the Department articulates its strategy and relies
on stable and consistent resourcing over time to achieve the tenets of
that strategy--to include maintaining and strengthening our military's
competitive advantages. The challenges of pacing to China not only
require a healthy DOD budget, but also must be complemented by other
high-priority efforts, to include developing and employing new
operational concepts and integrating emerging technologies into our
approaches. For that reason, if confirmed, I will focus not only on the
DOD topline but what capabilities we purchase with that funding, and
how those capabilities are employed.
11. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, do you intend to advocate for the
programs needed to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains credible
and effective--including modernizing our aging nuclear weapons
production infrastructure?
Ms. Baker. Yes. The nuclear deterrence mission is critical to the
security of the United States, and the triad is the bedrock of that
deterrence. As Secretary Austin has explained, the service life of many
elements of the nuclear triad has been extended long past the time it
should have been modernized. We must continue to modernize the triad
and sustain legacy nuclear delivery systems. If confirmed, I would also
seek to prioritize the nuclear command, control, and communications
(NC3) systems that are equally critical to our nuclear deterrent.
12. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, do you agree that insufficient
and unsafe working conditions, as exist throughout our Nation's nuclear
weapons enterprise, are a readiness concern?
Ms. Baker. It is essential that working conditions in the nuclear
enterprise are safe--this is a no fail mission for DOD and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). If confirmed, I commit to
better understanding the details surrounding the program of record for
nuclear infrastructure in conjunction with NNSA and other OSD
components.
13. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, given the efforts of China and
Russia in Africa, please elaborate on whether you see consistent U.S.
troops levels and presence in the United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR) as either mission critical or
mission enhancing to our National Defense Strategy (NDS) implementation
efforts?
Ms. Baker. Both Russia and China have expanded their focus on
Africa and use engagement in Africa to bolster their international
standing, obtain access to raw materials, and undermine Western
influence. It is mission essential to continue our ``by, with, and
through'' approach to bolstering partner capabilities to achieve
security and stability in Africa and support National Defense Strategy
implementation. U.S. presence in the AOR to build capacity, operate
transparently, and promote institutions and good governance for
sustainable security helps to achieve objectives shared by us and our
partners. I understand that these efforts have largely proven effective
with a limited forward presence, and often our security cooperation
enhances partner force operations, which achieve shared strategic
objectives and build enduring relationships.
14. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, is reducing troop presence in
Africa a priority for this Administration?
Ms. Baker. DOD posture is a critical tool for advancing U.S.
interests and enabling our regional partners. I understand that DOD
conducts significant security cooperation initiatives, military
exercises, and train and equip programs throughout Africa, and that we
use our forward presence to build African partner capacity and support
the efforts of other international partners. I believe our posture
should always be driven by our strategy and the threat picture on the
ground. I understand that the Department is aligning mission
requirements with the President's strategic priorities, and evaluating
the military posture and other tools required to meet those
requirements. If confirmed, I will seek to carefully balance
operational requirements, risk, readiness, and other global commitments
in the United States Africa Command area of responsibility (AOR), and
every AOR.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
european burden sharing
15. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, in 2014, NATO members agreed to
spend at least 2 percent of their respective Gross Domestic Products
(GDP) on defense by 2024. Would you agree that the security environment
facing us today is very different from the one we faced in 2014?
Ms. Baker. A number of key trends and threats that we saw in our
assessments of the 2014 security environment remain serious challenges
today, to include Russian aggression. Some challenges, such as the
geopolitical and military threat posed by China, have also increased
and intensified in their scope and scale. Moreover, a range of other
cross-cutting challenges and trends are emerging and becoming more
significant, to include pandemics and climate change.
16. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, given dramatic changes to the
security environment in the years since 2014, particularly as it
relates to the rise of China, would you agree that it is time to
reevaluate whether a 2 percent commitment by 2024 is still the right
spending target for NATO?
Ms. Baker. As NATO Allies, we all share the responsibility to
procure, prepare, and provide ready forces and capabilities. I
understand that non-U.S. defense spending has risen for seven
consecutive years since the Wales Summit Defense Investment Pledge.
While this progress is significant, we expect Allies to live up to
their full commitment across the board--including cash, capabilities,
and contributions--to ensure the Alliance is able to meet our shared
responsibilities. If confirmed, I would seek to support the Under
Secretary in working with our Allies on this broader definition of
NATO's deterrence and defense posture and the question of burden
sharing.
force planning construct
17. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, the force planning construct in the
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) shifted focus from maintaining our
ability to fight and win two regional conflicts at once to fighting and
winning a single war against a great power, while deterring
opportunistic aggression elsewhere. Do you agree with the force
planning construct used in the 2018 NDS?
Ms. Baker. Yes. While I agree with the general contours of the 2018
Force Planning Construct, I believe it is appropriate for the
Department to periodically review the Force Planning Construct to take
into account changes in the security environment, as I understand DOD
will do in the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
18. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, Dr. Mara Karlin, performing the
duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the
Department's lead official for the upcoming NDS, wrote the following in
August: ``I believe that the force planning construct should prioritize
and focus on China unless . . . In particular, the threat China poses
to Taiwan should be a priority in this vein. While the U.S. military
will invariably need to juggle other challenges simultaneously, it
would need to reprioritize those should a conflict with China arise.''
Do you agree with Dr. Karlin's assessment?
Ms. Baker. Yes, I agree with Dr. Karlin's assessment--China is the
priority challenge for DOD and United States national security.
nuclear force structure
19. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, do you think it would be wise for
the United States to reduce the size or flexibility of United States
nuclear forces at the same time as Russia is modernizing its forces,
including limited nuclear options, and China is rapidly building out
its own nuclear arsenal?
Ms. Baker. The President has been clear that the United States must
continue to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent and
strong and credible extended deterrence to our allies, while also
taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national
security strategy. Any change to the size, posture or composition of
U.S. nuclear forces must balance these considerations while accounting
for the current and anticipated security environment and the overall
costs of nuclear modernization. I understand that these are key
considerations of the Department's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If
confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the NPR process includes
rigorous, fact-based analysis that takes into account the changing
strategic environment.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Alexandra N. Baker,
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Alexandra N. Baker, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Alexandra
N. Baker in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Ms. Alexandra N. Baker was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 9, 2022.]
______
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. John P. Coffey by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and responsibilities
Question. Section 8019 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
position of the Department of the Navy General Counsel and provides
that the General Counsel shall perform such functions as the Secretary
of the Navy may prescribe.
What is your understanding of the current duties and functions of
the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy?
Answer. It is my understanding that the General Counsel (GC) of the
Department of the Navy performs the duties and functions that are
prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. The GC is the principal legal
advisor to the Secretary and is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Navy. The GC provides or oversees the provision of
legal advice and counsel to the Secretary of the Navy, the Under
Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the
civilian executive assistants, the staff assistants, and their staffs
on matters affecting the Department of the Navy. The GC's legal
opinions are controlling within the Department. The GC is also the head
of the Office of the General Counsel. In this role, he is responsible
for providing legal services throughout the Department on a variety of
issues, including acquisition law and international transactions;
business and commercial law; fiscal law; acquisition-related security
cooperation matters; acquisition integrity; arms control and
international arms regulation; intelligence and national security law;
real and personal property law; civilian and military personnel; labor
law; environmental law; occupational safety and health law; medical and
health affairs law, including credentialing; education law;
intellectual property law; law pertaining to cyberspace; ethics and
standards of conduct; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act
law; legislation; and such other legal services as may be assigned to
support the mission of the Navy and the Marine Corps or the discharge
of other duties assigned by the Secretary. The GC is responsible for
litigation in these areas, oversees litigation affecting the Department
of the Navy, and coordinates with the Department of Justice, as
necessary. The GC is the Designated Agency Ethics Official for the
Department; oversees the Department's Acquisition Integrity Program and
the Suspension and Debarment Official; manages the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Program; advises and assists with the oversight of the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service, and the Department's law enforcement
and related activities; and assists the Under Secretary with overseeing
all Department of the Navy intelligence and intelligence-related
activities. The GC also coordinates with the Department of Defense and
Military Department GCs in matters of mutual concern. Finally, it is my
understanding that the GC maintains a close working relationship with
the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps on issues of common interest.
Question. What additional duties and functions do you expect the
Secretary of the Navy to prescribe for you, if you are confirmed?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I anticipate providing candid and
accurate legal advice and counsel to the Secretary, the Under
Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian
executive assistants, the staff assistants, and their staffs. I also
expect to lead the Office of the General Counsel to the best of my
abilities while complying with the letter and the spirit of the law. I
anticipate that the Secretary will want me to continue the
collaborative working relationship previous General Counsels have
established with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant. Finally, I expect that the Secretary
may prescribe additional duties, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Sec.
8019.
Question. In your opinion, who is the ``client'' of the Navy
General Counsel?
Answer. The Department of the Navy is the client.
Question. What is your view of the responsibilities and authorities
associated with the Navy General Counsel's designation as the Chief
Legal Officer of the Department of the Navy?
Answer. The General Counsel, as the Chief Legal Officer of the
Department of the Navy, provides or oversees the provision of legal
advice and counsel to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian executive assistants, the staff
assistants, and their staffs on all issues affecting the Department
subject to all legal requirements.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense in his/her role as the Chief Legal Officer
of the Department of Defense?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively
with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense on issues of
mutual interest or concerns, and on issues affecting the Department of
the Navy and the Department of Defense. The Navy General Counsel, as
the Chief Legal Officer of the Department, determines the controlling
legal position of the Department.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to effectuate
your duties as the Designated Agency Ethics Official for the Department
of the Navy?
Answer. If I am confirmed, it will be my responsibility as the
Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) to ensure that all Department
of the Navy civilian and military personnel understand and follow all
ethics laws and regulations. As a member of the Navy Secretariat, I
will be responsible for ensuring that all Department of the Navy
personnel, including my colleagues and myself, are held to the highest
of ethical standards.
Question. Is there value in a General Counsel's practice of
``preventive law'', in your view? How, if at all, would you encourage
and engage in the practice of preventive law, if confirmed to be the
Navy General Counsel?
Answer. I strongly believe in the practice of ``preventive law.''
To be successful, the practice of ``preventive law'' requires
collaboration and communication between client and attorney to maintain
the trust and candor that is critical to maintaining the relationship.
If confirmed, I expect to provide candid, accurate legal advice and
counsel to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian executive assistants, the staff
assistants, and their staffs, and collaborate with them to spot issues
and manage risk.
Question. Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs encourage the
use of alternative means of dispute resolution and conflict management
practices as an integral part of normal business practices.
What is your view of the role of the Navy General Counsel in
facilitating the provision of ADR services to the Department of the
Navy?
Answer. ADR can efficiently resolve issues in controversy and
effectively enable resources and personnel to remain focused on the
Department of the Navy's mission. If confirmed, I would be responsible
for managing the Department's ADR program. In my view, the role of the
General Counsel is to resolve disputes and controversies at the
earliest stage possible, on the best terms possible, and by the fastest
and most efficient means possible, which will enable the Department to
remain focused on mission. The General Counsel must ensure that the use
of ADR is consistent with law, regulations, policy, and professional
ethics.
Question. Are there particular types of disputes in the context of
Navy and Marine Corps operations, as to which you perceive ADR may be
of particular utility?
Answer. My belief is that ADR can be considered for any conflict or
dispute, regardless of subject matter.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the Navy General
Counsel and attorneys assigned to the Office of the Navy General
Counsel play in developing and reviewing Navy and Marine Corps military
personnel policies and advising on policy application in individual
cases, including cases before the Board for Correction of Naval
Records?
Answer. It is my understanding that military personnel policy and
practice is a matter under the cognizance of the Secretariat,
specifically the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs (ASN (M&RA)) pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 8013,
8014. ASN (M&RA) receives legal advice from a dedicated component of
the Office of the General Counsel, whose members are experienced
civilian attorneys, many of whom have worked in other Federal agencies
and the private sector, and who are led by a member of the Senior
Executive Service. It is my belief that these capable civilian
attorneys possess the experience needed to work in this complex legal
area and are aware that they should be proactive and engaged with the
client. Specifically with regard to the BCNR, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552
calls for the Secretary to act through civilian boards; as such it is
entirely appropriate for attorneys of the Office of General Counsel to
advise the Board.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to serve as the General Counsel of the Department of the
Navy?
Answer. As chief legal and chief ethics officer for the Department
of the Navy, the Navy General Counsel must be a lawyer with sound legal
skills and experience, a strong ethical compass, demonstrated
leadership abilities, and a commitment to working collaboratively
within and outside the Department. I believe my background and
experience show that I meet these criteria.
I received my law degree through the evening program at Georgetown
University Law Center while stationed on active duty in Washington. I
returned home to New York, where I have practiced law for over three
decades and currently serve as Chair of Complex Litigation at Kramer
Levin Naftalis & Frankel. Over the course of my legal career, I have
handled significant litigation in courts all over the country, and been
involved in several landmark cases. Among the more notable was the
WorldCom securities litigation where, in addition to leading a team
that secured one of the largest settlements in history, we fortified
the principle of personal accountability by insisting that each senior
individual involved in the scandal pay personally (that is, not rely
simply on insurance). For a role with as broad a portfolio as the Navy
General Counsel, I would if confirmed bring the perspective of a lawyer
who has litigated both as a plaintiff's lawyer and defense lawyer, and
who has both represented major institutions and taken on powerful
institutions. My varied docket has included matters involving breach of
contract; intellectual property; accounting; environmental issues;
housing; veterans' benefits; securities; bankruptcy; and international
law. In addition, I served for several years as a Federal prosecutor in
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, an
experience that I believe will enhance my ability, if confirmed, to
interact with the Justice Department on matters where it represents the
Department of the Navy. With regard to issues of ethics and integrity,
I served on the board of Common Cause New York for over a decade and
was active in seeking to advance ethics in government and hold public
officials accountable for misconduct. In what I believe was an
endorsement of my reputation for probity and ethics, I was selected by
an organization comprised of notable attorneys and sitting Federal
judges to serve as President of the Federal Bar Foundation (a position
I still hold). I believe that, if confirmed, my broad experience on
handling some of the country's most challenging and impactful cases,
building effective teams, and providing candid and timely counsel on
thorny legal issues have prepared me well to serve as Navy General
Counsel.
If confirmed, I would also bring to the role over thirty years of
experience in the Navy in both operational and plans and policy
billets. After graduating from the Naval Academy, I served as a Naval
Flight Officer in P-3C Orion squadrons for 16 of the next twenty-six
years (four on active duty and the balance as a Reservist). Based
largely in Maine, I commanded aircrews that deployed to the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Indian Oceans, as well as the Mediterranean, Caribbean,
South China, and Northern Arabian Seas. In addition to tracking Soviet
submarines during the cold war, I flew surface reconnaissance missions,
armed missions to enforce the United Nations embargo of the former
Yugoslavia, and counter-narcotic missions over the Caribbean and South
America. I was selected to command a reserve P-3C squadron (Patrol
Squadron 92) and, after promotion to Captain, served as commanding
officer of the Reserve component of the Enterprise carrier battle group
staff (CCDG-12). My extensive operational experience was complemented
by three tours in Washington. As a junior officer on active duty, I
served in the Strategy Division in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-
5) of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the personal
aide to Vice President George Bush. In my final tour of duty, I served
for 4 years in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, focused primarily on the use of reservists in the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I believe that my effectiveness
as Navy General Counsel will be enhanced by my experiences in the
Fleet, the Pentagon and the White House.
In sum, I believe that my background and these varied experiences
qualify me to serve as Navy General Counsel.
Question. Do you believe that there are any actions you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Navy General
Counsel?
Answer. I believe I have the legal skills, leadership qualities,
and ethical compass necessary to perform the duties of Navy General
Counsel. If confirmed, I would of course seek to learn as much about my
new client as expeditiously as possible, a process that I believe would
be enhanced by my own military experiences in Washington and in the
Fleet. I would look to be briefed on the major legal challenges facing
the Department and to develop an understanding of how best to provide
sound, candid, and timely legal advice regarding those and other issues
to Secretary Del Toro and the other clients of the Office of the
General Counsel. In doing so I anticipate that I would benefit from the
experience and knowledge of the career civilian lawyers in the Office,
and, if confirmed, I would work to develop strong and productive
relationships with those lawyers. I would also work to forge a
cooperative and respectful relationship with the uniformed leaders of
the Navy Judge Advocate General and the Marine Corps Staff Judge
Advocate. I believe that developing strong working relationships with
the General Counsel of the Defense Department as well as the general
counsels of the other services will also be important, and I would look
for opportunities to benefit from their knowledge and experiences.
Consistent with how I have led legal teams and military units
throughout my legal and military careers, I would if confirmed work
collaboratively with others to ensure that the Office of the General
Counsel provides the finest legal services to the Department and does
its part to care for our sailors, marines, civilians and their
families.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What do you see as the most significant legal and policy
issues the Department of the Navy will be required to address in the
coming year?
Answer. I believe that readiness, lethality, and modernization are
essential requirements for both the Department of the Navy and the
Department of Defense. Addressing these issues requires timely,
accurate, candid, and well-reasoned legal advice. If I am confirmed, I
will ensure that the Navy legal community is proactively engaged with
our clients to implement these priorities. I will encourage our clients
seek advice and counsel from the Office of the General Counsel on every
major decision impacting the Navy, not just on legal questions or
issues. I will identify and seek the resources necessary to recruit and
retain the high-caliber and diverse legal talent needed to assist the
Department in meeting its ever-changing requirements.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as the Navy General Counsel?
Answer. I believe that a significant challenge that the Department
of the Navy faces is maximizing the Navy and Marine Corps maritime
dominance in an era of strategic competition. This challenge is
complicated by emerging threats that cause disruptions in the
international order by other State and non-State actors. If confirmed,
I anticipate opportunities to drive a culture within the Department
that ensures every military member and civilian employee is treated
with respect; to eliminate harmful behaviors, including sexual
harassment, sexual assault and suicide; to address climate change and
the climate resilience of our infrastructure and systems; to strengthen
our strategic partnerships and alliances; and to come through the
Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic with a healthy, ready and capable
force.
The Department of the Navy must address these challenges with the
assistance of candid, accurate, and timely legal advice from a
proactive group of military and civilian attorneys working
collaboratively together. If I am confirmed, my major challenge will be
to ensure that there are sufficient resources to recruit, hire, and
retain talented, diverse, and dedicated attorneys and professional
staff to meet the ever-changing requirements of the Department.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy legal
community is proactively engaged with our clients to find innovative
and legally sufficient solutions to address and overcome these
challenges. I will personally review the resources, organization, and
operation of the Office of the General Counsel to identify
developmental opportunities and to find the appropriate resources to
complete these efforts. I will also work collaboratively with the
Secretary of the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to ensure that there are
adequate legal resources across the Department to address these
challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what broad parameters would you establish
in terms of the types of legal and policy issues on which you and the
other attorneys comprising the Office of the Navy General Counsel
should be consulted?
Answer. As discussed above, I would ensure that the Office of the
General Counsel is proactively engaged with our clients to support the
Department's mission and priorities, using the legal skills and
expertise in the areas under the cognizance of the Office of the
General Counsel, providing candid, innovative and timely legal options
to decisionmakers and collaborating with the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, as needed.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus the
Office of the Navy General Counsel on your broad priorities and
significant legal issues?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my first action will be to review the
work already being done by Office of General Counsel attorneys and
determine what, if any, actions are needed to ensure they are able to
meet my foremost priority, which will be to ensure that the Department
of the Navy continues to receive the highest quality legal advice and
counsel to meet the Department's mission and support our sailors,
marines, civilians and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the Department of the Navy?
Answer. Congress is a vital partner in implementing the National
Defense Strategy and Secretary Austin's priorities of defending the
Nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork, as
well Secretary Del Toro's focus on maintaining maritime dominance,
empowering our people, and strengthening strategic partnerships. If I
am confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that
the Department works closely with Congress and that the Department is
transparent, proactive, and responsive to congressional requests.
civilian control of the military
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as Navy General Counsel epitomizes the fundamental
requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the
U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will support the Secretary in fully
exercising his Title 10 responsibilities to the Department of the Navy.
As General Counsel, I will advise the Secretary on his statutory and
regulatory duties when conducting the business of the Department of the
Navy, both at his request and when I determine that a matter requires
his attention.
Question. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the
National Defense Strategy Commission observed, ``there is an imbalance
in civil-military relations on critical issues . . . Civilian voices
appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and
national security policy.''
Do you agree with this assessment? If confirmed, how would you
ensure inclusion of the Navy General Counsel in the discussion, debate,
and resolution of Department of the Navy, defense, and national
security issues?
Answer. Currently, I am not in a position to agree or disagree with
this assessment. If I am confirmed, I will work to build strong client
relationships with the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian executive assistants, the staff
assistants, and their staffs to ensure I am able to provide candid,
accurate, and timely legal advice so we can resolve Department of the
Navy, defense, and national security issues as a team.
relationship with the judge advocate general of the navy and the staff
judge advocate to the commandant of the marine corps
Question. How are the responsibilities and authorities for
providing legal services, including the responsibility for the
provision of ethics advice to senior officials, to the Department of
the Navy and the Marine Corps allocated between the General Counsel of
the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. The General Counsel performs such duties and function as
prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. The General Counsel of the
Navy is the principal legal advisor to the Secretary and the chief
legal officer of the Department of the Navy. The General Counsel
provides, or oversees the provision of, legal advice and counsel to the
Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy,
the civilian executive assistants, the staff assistants, and their
staffs on all issues affecting the Department. The General Counsel's
legal opinions are controlling within the Department. Further, the
General Counsel leads the Office of the General Counsel. In this role,
the General Counsel provides, or oversees the provision of, legal
services in the Department in a multitude of areas, including
acquisition law and related international transactions; acquisition-
related matters; acquisition integrity; arms control and international
arms regulation; business and commercial law; real and personal
property law; civilian and military personnel and labor law; fiscal
law; environmental law; occupational safety and health law;
intellectual property law; intelligence and national security law; law
related to cyberspace; ethics and standards of conduct; Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act law; legislation; education law;
medical and health affairs law, including credentialing; and such other
legal services as may be assigned to support the mission of the Navy
and the Marine Corps or the discharge other duties assigned by the. The
General Counsel is also responsible for litigation in each of these
areas and oversees litigation affecting the Department. The GC
coordinates with the Department of Justice, as needed. Furthermore, the
General Counsel is the Navy's Designated Agency Ethics Official, is
responsible for overseeing the Acquisition Integrity program, managing
the Alternative Dispute Resolution program, and advising and assisting
with the oversight of Department of the Navy intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS), and Department of the Navy law enforcement and related
investigative activities. Finally, the General Counsel must maintain a
close and collaborative relationship with the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps on issues of common interest.
It is my understanding that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
reports directly to the Secretary and provides independent legal and
policy advice on military justice, administrative law, claims,
investigations, operational and international law, legal assistance,
and civil law. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy also provides
legal and policy advice to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps is the senior
uniformed attorney in the Marine Corps, and is responsible for
providing independent legal advice to the Secretary on matters as
assigned by the Secretary, and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
and other officers and officials of the Marine Corps. The Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant supervises and manages legal issues arising
in the Marine Corps that relate to military justice, operational and
international law, civil and administrative law, and legal assistance.
It is also my understanding that the responsibilities of the General
Counsel, the Judge Advocate General, and the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant overlap in the areas of environmental law; intelligence
and national security law; law related to cyberspace; FOIA and
Privacy Act law; legislation; litigation; and ethics and standards
of conduct.
Section 8088 of Title 10 prohibits interference with the ability of
the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to give independent legal advice
to the Secretary. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy also directs
the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of their duties
and is primarily responsible for providing legal advice regarding the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military
discipline. Section 8046 of Title 10 prohibits interference with the
ability of the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to give independent legal advice to the Commandant. The Staff
Judge Advocate's principal role is to be the senior uniformed legal
advisor on military justice, administrative law, international and
operational law, and legal assistant matters to the Commandant. If I am
confirmed, I will continue to enhance the strong cooperative and
collaborative relationship between the General Counsel and the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the General Counsel of the Navy and the Counsel to the Commandant of
the Marine Corps? Do you believe this relationship is appropriate, or
does it require review?
Answer. My understanding is that the Counsel to the Commandant is a
civilian attorney within the Office of the General Counsel assigned by
the General Counsel to support the Commandant and the Marine Corps and
who provides legal advice in the areas under the oversight of the
General Counsel. This alignment is consistent with the relationship of
other senior civilian attorneys assigned to organizations across the
Department. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that there is a strong
relationship between the General Counsel and the Counsel to the
Commandant so the Marine Corps continues to receive candid, accurate,
and timely legal advice.
Question. What is your understanding of the allocation of
responsibilities and authorities for providing legal services to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps between the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Counsel to the Commandant? Do
you believe this relationship is appropriate, or does it require
review?
Answer. As previously stated, the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps is the senior uniformed attorney to the
Commandant. The Staff Judge Advocate is responsible for providing
independent legal advice to the Secretary on matters as assigned by the
Secretary and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and other officers
and officials of the Marine Corps. The Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant supervises and manages legal issues arising in the Marine
Corps that relate to military justice, operational and international
law, civil and administrative law, and legal assistance. As a member of
the Office of General Counsel, the Counsel to the Commandant is
responsible for providing legal advice under the oversight of the
General Counsel. If I am confirmed, I will review this relationship to
ensure there is a strong cooperative and collaborative relationship
between the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the Office of
General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant, so the Marine
Corps continues to receive candid, accurate, and timely legal advice.
Question. In your view, is the allocation of responsibilities and
authorities for the provision of legal services to the Commandant of
the Marine Corps by the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the
Counsel to the Commandant the same as the allocation of
responsibilities and authorities for legal services provided to the
Chief of Naval Operations by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
the General Counsel of the Navy? If not, how do these allocations of
responsibility and authority differ and why are they different?
Answer. The Office of the General Counsel, including the Counsel to
the Commandant, and the Navy and Marine Corps uniformed judge advocates
are partners in the Navy's legal team. If I am confirmed, I anticipate
that the Office of General Counsel will continue to work closely and
collaboratively with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to provide the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant with coordinated legal advice across the
spectrum of their duties and responsibilities.
Question. In your view, what is the purpose underpinning the
assignment of a senior civilian attorney as Counsel to the Commandant
of the Marine Corps?
Answer. A senior civilian attorney is assigned as Counsel to the
Commandant in order to provide business and business-related legal
advice, which is the Office of General Counsel's primary function. The
Office of General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant, has
developed in-depth expertise in these areas, which are vital to the
Department of the Navy's mission and which provide clients with
continuity of support.
Question. What is your understanding of the role and authority of
the Judge Advocate General of the Navy vis-a-vis the Special Counsel
for the Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Judge Advocate General
serves as Special Assistant for Legal Services to the Chief of Naval
Operations to advise him in formulating and executing policies related
to providing legal services within the Navy. The Special Counsel to the
Chief of Naval Operations is a Navy Judge Advocate captain assigned to
the Chief of Naval Operations' staff.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of
the Marine Corps in carrying out your duties?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I expect to continue and further
strengthen the General Counsel's strong working relationship with the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps by ensuring close coordination,
collaboration, consultation, and communication on issues affecting the
Department of the Navy.
Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense
to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates
General to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the
General Counsels of the Military Departments, Congress enacted
legislation prohibiting DOD officers or employees from interfering with
the ability of the Judge Advocates General, the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Legal Advisor to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide independent legal
advice to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Service
Chiefs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
What is your view of the authority of the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, particularly with regard to the provision of independent legal
advice to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. Section 8088 of Title 10 prohibits interference with the
ability of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to give independent
legal advice to the Secretary. Similarly, section 8046 of Title 10
prohibits interference with the ability of the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps to give independent legal advice to
the Commandant. My opinion is that these statutory authorities should
be respected and are sufficient to ensure that the Judge Advocate
General and the Staff Judge Advocate can provide independent legal
advice to the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will continue to
strengthen this productive and collaborative partnership for the
benefit of the Department.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Navy and
Marine Corps judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to
military commanders and other Military Service officials and employees?
Answer. I believe that it is essential that Navy and Marine Corps
judge advocates provide legal advice to military commanders and other
Military Service officials free of improper external influence.
Uniformed judge advocates bring a different experience and perspective
to the practice of law that is shaped by their service. This
perspective should not be marginalized or silenced. My opinion is that
this perspective enhances the decisionmaking process. While there
should be coordination across the Navy legal communities, the judge
advocates must be able to provide candid, frank, independent, and
objective legal advice to their clients.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes in the
current relationships between the Navy General Counsel and the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy and between the Navy General Counsel,
including through the Counsel to the Commandant, and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any changes that need to be
made to the relationship between the uniformed judge advocates and the
General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant. I understand
that the General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant, the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant, and their teams enjoy a collaborative and close working
relationship. If confirmed, I will review these relationships and make
every effort to strengthen the relationships between the uniformed
judge advocates and the Office of the General Counsel.
Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the
current relationships and/or allocation of responsibilities between
uniformed Military Service judge advocates and attorneys of the Office
of the Navy General Counsel?
Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any changes that need to be
made. If confirmed, I intend to continue to strengthen the relationship
between the uniformed judge advocates and the civilian attorneys and
will partner with the military legal community. Should any changes to
the responsibilities assigned to the civilian or military legal
communities be identified in the future, I would expect that the
uniformed lawyers and civilian attorneys will partner with one another
to propose any necessary changes.
Question. In your view, are legal opinions of the Navy's Office of
the General Counsel binding on all Navy and Marine Corps attorneys?
Answer. It is my understanding that the legal opinions of the
General Counsel, as the Department's Chief Legal Officer, are the
controlling legal opinions within the Department. I also understand
that the General Counsel frequently collaborates with the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant on legal opinions. If I am confirmed, I will make every
effort to ensure that my legal opinions take into account the expertise
of both the civilian and uniformed members of the Navy legal community,
as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that controlling legal
opinions of your office are available to all Navy and Marine Corps
attorneys, including judge advocates?
Answer. It is my understanding that the legal opinions of the
Office of the General Counsel are disseminated throughout the
Department via normal Departmental distribution processes. If I am
confirmed, I would continue this process and determine if other methods
of distribution are available to ensure widest dissemination of the
legal opinions.
Question. If confirmed, are there specific matters on which your
predecessor Navy General Counsels have issued legal opinions that you
would expect to reconsider and possibly revise? If so, which opinions,
in which practice areas, do you believe might merit reconsideration?
Answer. I am not aware of any legal opinions that need to be
reconsidered or revised. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the
Office of the General Counsel works collaboratively with civilian and
uniformed members of the Navy legal community to update any legal
opinions that warrant reconsideration or revisions based on changes to
controlling statutes or regulations, policy, or precedent.
Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice assigns
to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and
the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
responsibility for the supervision of the administration of military
justice.
How do you view the role and responsibilities of the Navy General
Counsel in the supervision and oversight of military justice matters
vis-a-vis the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. My view is that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant have the statutory
responsibility to ensure proper administration of the military justice
system and have primary jurisdiction over military justice issues in
the Department of the Navy. If I am confirmed, I will work to continue
the strong and effective relationship with the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, in which
our offices share information and work collaboratively as appropriate
to resolve policy issues and issues related to specific cases,
recognizing that they have express statutory responsibility for, and
expertise in, this area of law.
In his letter forwarding to Congress the recommendations of the
Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military,
Secretary of Defense Austin stated that he intended to create dedicated
offices in the Secretariat of each Military Department to handle the
prosecution of special victim crimes.
Question. Were Secretary Austin's proposal to be implemented, what
role would you expect the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to have in
the operation and oversight of this Secretariat office and the special
victim prosecutors assigned thereto, particularly given the intent that
any such office and special victim prosecutors are intended to be
``outside the chain of command''?
Answer. I support Secretary Austin's efforts to eliminate sexual
harassment and sexual assault in the military by implementing
meaningful reforms, some proposed by the Independent Review Commission,
including by removing prosecution decisions related to these crimes
from the chain of command. I understand that the legislative amendments
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice necessary to effectuate that
particular reform are presently under consideration. If confirmed, I
will be wholly committed to working with Department of the Navy
leaders, including the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to implement any
directed reform in accordance with law and Department policy.
Question. What role would you expect the General Counsel of the
Navy to play in the operations and oversight of this Secretariat office
and the special victim prosecutors assigned thereto?
Answer. If confirmed, as the principal legal advisor to the
Secretary, I will work with the Secretary, the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps to implement the policies established by the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that all investigations and prosecutions, including
those related to sexual assault and sexual harassment, are conducted
professionally, in accordance with due process of law, and protect the
statutory rights of all, including those of victims.
Question. Would you foresee a role for the DOD General Counsel in
the operations and oversight of this Department of the Navy Secretariat
Office? If so, what would be the appropriate role for DOD General
Counsel, in your view?
Answer. I understand that Secretary Austin proposed that the
Component Department Offices of the Special Victim Prosecutor would
receive appropriate legal oversight and guidance from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, consistent with existing practice. I have not had
the opportunity to learn the specific practices employed within the
Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will learn the DOD's oversight
practices and I will work closely and collaboratively with the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense on issues of mutual interest or
concern.
Question. In your view, how do unlawful command influence and the
appearance of unlawful command influence jeopardize the credibility of,
and public confidence in the military justice system?
Answer. Unlawful command influence and even the appearance of
unlawful command influence has a detrimental impact on the military
justice system. The public, and especially sailors and marines, must be
able to rely on a properly functioning military justice system. In
order to maintain confidence, the Department of the Navy must maintain
a military justice system that ensures that commanders and military
prosecutors are free to act with independent discretion; the accused
has the full and equal ability to obtain evidence and witnesses; and
members of the court-martial are free to decide the case based on the
evidence presented and the law as instructed by the military judge.
When the actions or statements of civilian or military leaders impede
the exercise of this discretion, it can have a widespread detrimental
effect. If confirmed, I will work with the Judge Advocate of the Navy
and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to
ensure that there are appropriate policies and training to promote
public confidence in the military justice system, and to ensure that
the military justice system operates in a fair and efficient manner.
Question. In your view, would the placement of the special victim
prosecutions office in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy raise
any particular concerns with regard to the unlawful command influence
or the appearance of same with regard to the conduct of special victim
prosecutions? If so, what steps would you take to eliminate or mitigate
such concerns?
Answer. As previously stated, unlawful command influence and the
appearance of unlawful command influence can have a detrimental impact
on the military justice system. The public should be able to rely on a
properly functioning military justice system. If confirmed, I will work
with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish training
and policies to ensure placement of the special victim prosecutions
office in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy does not erode public
confidence in the military justice system.
Question. What role should the Navy General Counsel play, in your
perspective, in ensuring that all sailors and marines accused of a
criminal offense receive a fair trial and due process?
Answer. While the General Counsel of the Navy is the principal
legal advisor to the Secretary and the Chief Legal Officer of the
Department of the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant are primarily responsible for
providing independent legal advice on military justice matters. If I am
confirmed, I will work with the Judge Advocate General and the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant to ensure appropriate policies and
training to guarantee that all sailors and marines accused of a
criminal offense receive a fair trial and due process.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
of proposals to remove from military commanders case disposition
authority over most felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has committed to doing more to
counter sexual assault and sexual harassment, and I am fully supportive
of these efforts. Commanders must be held accountable for both the good
and the bad in their commands. Commanders must have the tools needed to
promote mission readiness, good order and discipline, and unit morale,
and must be held accountable. The ability to refer cases for trial by
court-martial is one of those tools. The commander's case disposition
authority is a vital tool to establish good order and discipline, and
to demonstrate acceptable behaviors. If confirmed, I will work with
Department leadership to assess the impact of any proposals to remove
case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice from military commanders.
Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found
that the timing, amount, and mix of legal training provided to
commanders may not be meeting their needs.
If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in
ensuring that military commanders receive the legal training they need
properly to effectuate their role in the military justice system?
Answer. I am not familiar with the legal training that is currently
provided to commanders to effectuate their role in the military justice
system. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively with the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to determine the most effective means of
meeting the training needs for the Department's military commanders.
Question. In your view, does the Department of the Navy have a
sufficient number of military and civilian attorneys to meet mission
requirements?
Answer. At this time, I do not have the information needed to
assess whether the Department has a sufficient number of attorneys to
perform its ongoing missions. If confirmed, I will review the civilian
staffing of the Office of General Counsel and work with the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant to ensure that the Department has a sufficient number of
highly talented and efficient military and civilian attorneys to meet
the Department's requirements while reducing any redundancies.
Question. Judge Advocates in the Navy and Marine Corps benefit from
an established career progression, substantial mentoring and training
opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal practice areas
and leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the
Military Departments normally do not have established career programs
and may do the same work for many years, with promotions based solely
upon longevity and vacancies.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to recruit,
hire, and retain high quality civilian attorneys and provide sufficient
opportunities for their development and advancement through positions
of increasing responsibility and leadership in the career civilian
component of the Navy and Marine Corps legal community?
Answer. I understand that the Department has a robust recruiting
program and hires outstanding civilian attorneys. If I am confirmed, I
will work closely with the senior leadership of the Office of the
General Counsel to ensure that the Office continues its efforts to
recruit, hire, retain, and develop highly skilled and effective
attorneys to satisfy the Department's needs.
Question. Do you foresee that in the coming years, the Department
of the Navy's demand for civilian attorneys in particular low-density
legal specialties or areas of technical legal expertise (e.g., cyber
law, the space domain, intellectual property) will increase,
commensurate with the Department's evolving missions? If so, in what
legal specialties would you expect the Navy and Marine Corps'
requirements for legal services to increase, and why?
Answer. At this time, I do not have specific information about the
number of types of attorneys assigned to each of the Office of General
Counsel's practice areas. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that
the Department recruits, retains, and develops the right number of
attorneys in the appropriate technical practice areas required to
support the Department's changing legal needs.
Question. Do you believe the Office of the Navy General Counsel
needs additional recruitment incentives and talent management tools to
recruit, develop, sustain, and retain highly competent career civilian
attorney workforce capable of meeting current and future mission
requirements? If so, what sort of incentives and tools would be
helpful?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Office of the General
Counsel has successful recruiting and retention programs. I am not
aware that any new recruitment incentives or talent management tools
are needed.
detainee matters
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing legal issues regarding detention under the law of armed
conflict?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense Office
of General Counsel is primarily responsible for addressing this issue.
If confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively with the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to address legal
issues regarding detention under the law of armed conflict that arise
within the Department of the Navy.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. Yes. I support the standards for detainee treatment set
forth in these documents and compliance with applicable legal
obligations regarding detention and treatment of detainees.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the Navy General
Counsel should play in the interpretation of international and domestic
law and DOD policy governing the treatment and interrogation of
detainees? What role, if any, should the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
play in the interpretation of laws and policies pertaining to
detainees?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense Office
of General Counsel is primarily responsible for addressing this issue.
If confirmed and called upon to give legal advice on this issue, I will
work closely with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps on the interpretation of law and policy
applicable to detainees, to ensure that the Department of the Navy
adheres to all of its legal obligations under the Constitution,
treaties, and laws of the United States.
Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
facility at Guantanamo?
Answer. The United States should ensure the continued safe, humane,
and legal care and treatment of detainees. If the Guantanamo detention
facility is identified for closure, I will work the Secretary of the
Navy and Department of Defense leadership to carry out this intent.
Question. In your view, does the United States have the legal
authority to continue detaining alleged members and supporters of Al
Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy combatants, without charges or
prosecution?
Answer. Yes. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF), along with the 2002 AUMF and the President's constitutional
authorities, provide the United States with the legal authority to
detain members and associated forces of al-Qaeda and the Taliban as
enemy combatants. Congress and the Federal courts have confirmed that
the executive branch has the authority to detain individuals who were
part of, or substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. This authority includes the power to
detain any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy forces.
Question. How does the withdrawal of United States forces from
Afghanistan affect the Department's authority to detain unlawful enemy
combatants at Guantanamo? Please explain your answer.
Answer. It does not. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF) and the President's constitutional authority is not
impacted by the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan.
The Department still maintains authority to detain unlawful enemy
combatants at Guantanamo under the 2001 AUMF regardless of the status
of forces in Afghanistan.
Question. In your view, does the United States have the legal
authority to detain ISIS fighters as enemy combatants?
Answer. It is my understanding that ISIS fighters are considered
``associated forces'' pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, and, as described
above, could therefore be detained as enemy combatants.
Question. As the Guantanamo detainee population ages, detainees are
increasingly subject to chronic, age-related illnesses and injuries. In
addition, it is asserted that many detainees show signs of mental
health conditions.
In your view, what standard should the United States apply to the
medical care, including mental and behavioral health care, provided to
detainees?
Answer. Adequate and humane care for the detainees at Guantanamo
that complies with the standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 is an important part of the mission. As the
detainee population ages and detainees experience chronic medical
conditions, we will continue to apply Department policy and relevant
laws to protect the health and well-being of Guantanamo detainees.
Question. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law
by Section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA), is conducted ``to determine whether certain individuals
detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to
the security of the United States such that their continued detention
is warranted''.
Do you support continuing the process of PRB determinations, and
the transfer of detainees based on those determinations, subject to
restrictions currently in law?
Answer. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by
section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), is conducted ``to determine whether certain individuals
detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to
the security of the United States such that their continued detention
is warranted.'' I support this process.
authorization for the use of military force (aumf)
Question. In your view, under what circumstances should the
President seek authorization from Congress before using military force?
Answer. The War Powers Resolution states that ``the President in
every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult
regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no
longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such
situations.'' If I am confirmed and called upon to provide legal advice
on the issue, I would support following the procedures and standards
laid out in the War Powers Resolution.
Question. In your view, should the American public be provided a
clear, unclassified explanation of the legal and policy frameworks
under which military force can be used abroad generally, and in each
specific case in which the President authorizes such a use of force?
Answer. I believe the American public should have access to
explanations of frameworks under which military force can be used
abroad, as well as specific cases in which the President authorizes
such use, when in the national security interests of the United States,
and when following Department of Defense policies, as well as any other
applicable policies and statutes.
Congress enacted the 2001 AUMF shortly after 9/11 to provide the
President authority to take action against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
their associated forces, and to detain enemy personnel captured during
the course of the armed conflict.
Question. What is your understanding of the current interpretation
and application of the 2001 AUMF?
Answer. My understanding is that current interpretation of the 2001
AUMF provides the President with the legal authority to use force
against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, including the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
Question. How is the application of that authorization affected by
the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. The authorization remains in effect regardless of the
status of United States forces in Afghanistan. The use of force in
Afghanistan relied on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF).
Question. Congress enacted the 2002 AUMF in the run-up to the 2003
United States invasion of Iraq. It authorized the United States to
defend against the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime and weapons
of mass destruction program. The Administration has stated that it does
not rely solely on the 2002 AUMF as the legal basis for any ongoing
military operations.
Do you share the view that the 2002 AUMF does not provide the sole
legal basis for any ongoing military operation?
Answer. My understanding is that the United States does not
currently rely on the 2002 AUMF as the sole domestic legal basis for
any ongoing operations, and that administrations have cited the statute
as additional authority to support counterterrorism operations for at
least the last 10 years. If confirmed and called upon to do so, I will
evaluate this issue.
Question. In your view, can the 2002 AUMF be rescinded without
significantly affecting ongoing DOD operations? Should it be rescinded?
Please explain your answers.
Answer. The 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military
Force and the President's constitutional authority provide the domestic
authority to conduct counter-terrorism operations. I am not familiar
with all aspects of ongoing DOD operations or the impact of rescinding
the 2002 AUMF. If confirmed and called upon to do so, I will review the
issue.
military commissions act
Question. In your view, have the military commissions constituted
pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2009 provided an effective
forum for trying violations of the law of armed conflict in the context
of the global war on terrorism?
Answer. In my view, the Military Commissions Act provides
appropriate standards and processes for trials of alien unprivileged
enemy belligerents for offenses against the law of armed conflict and
others traditionally triable by military commission.
Question. In your view, what are the advantages, if any, of
prosecuting alleged terrorists by military commission?
Answer. Military commission procedures comply with U.S. and
international law. They provide a just forum for trying alleged
terrorists for terrorism-related offenses. However, there are legal and
procedural challenges due to the number of unsettled legal and
procedural issues.
Question. What changes, if any, to the Military Commissions Act of
2009 would you propose, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate any proposed
amendments to the Military Commissions Act of 2009. Presently, I do not
have any specific proposals.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Military and civilian leaders in the Department of
Defense have advocated for accession to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, stressing the benefits to U.S. national
security.
Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea?
Answer. It is my understanding that the U.S. Navy already acts in a
manner consistent with the principles of navigation and overflight
outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. If
confirmed, I will take a closer look at the Convention and work with my
colleagues within the Department and interagency to consider the issue.
Question. From a national security standpoint, what are the
advantages and disadvantages to being a party to the Convention?
Answer. While I have not worked on the issue closely in the past,
it is my understanding that acceding to the Convention would strengthen
our global security posture and put us on a more equal footing with
States that are party to it, such as China and Russia. Accession would
enable the United States to reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and
uses of the sea and airspace recognized in the Convention, including
the navigational and overflight rights that are critical to the global
mobility of U.S. forces.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would United States
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging
maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
Answer. It is my understanding that acceding to the Convention
would improve our ability to maintain freedom of navigation and
challenge excessive maritime claims made by our adversaries in regions
like the South China Sea and the Arctic, and allow us to avail
ourselves of all the tools and mechanisms available to parties to the
Convention.
Question. What do you view as the role of the General Counsel of
the Department of the Navy in providing advice regarding the law of the
sea and accession to the Convention?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
Office of General Counsel is primarily responsible for addressing
issues related to accession, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
is the Department of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy, the
Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, and the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy to address this issue.
criminal jurisdiction over contractors on the battlefield
Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was
enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts to
persons employed by or accompanying United States Armed Forces outside
the United States.
In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction over the
alleged criminal actions of private contractor employees in nations in
which U.S. armed forces are engaged in combat operations?
Answer. Yes, it is important to have a mechanism whereby everyone
associated with the United States military overseas, including
servicemembers' family members and civilian personnel, may be held
appropriately accountable for any criminal misconduct. I am generally
familiar with MEJA, but I have not studied its application in
particular circumstances in depth. If confirmed, I would evaluate this
issue.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?
Answer. I do not currently have an opinion as to whether it should
be amended. If confirmed, I would examine this issue, if called upon to
do so, and recommend any appropriate modifications.
Question. Section 552 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2007 extended to
military courts jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) over persons serving with, or accompanying an armed force in the
field during time of declared war or a contingency operation.
In your view, does a military court, applying the UCMJ, provide an
appropriate forum for the disposition of the alleged criminal acts of
private contractor employees serving in areas in which United States
Armed Forces are engaged in contingency operations?
Answer. The United States must ensure that all of those
accompanying the U.S. military in the field can be held appropriately
accountable for any criminal misconduct. I am aware of the fiscal year
2007 extension of court-martial jurisdiction to include civilians
accompanying the U.S. military in the field during contingency
operations. If confirmed, I would study whether any further
modifications should be made concerning alleged criminal misconduct by
contractor employees engaged in contingency operations.
Question. What is your view of the procedures to which the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice have agreed to
reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?
Answer. I am generally familiar with the memorandum of
understanding between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Justice concerning investigation and prosecution of certain crimes, but
I would need to examine the operation of that Memorandum of
Understanding to determine whether I should recommend any adjustments.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to
perfect its jurisdiction over the alleged criminal conduct of private
contractor employees, in appropriate cases?
Answer. I do not now have any recommendations to amend the UCMJ
concerning its application to contractor employees. If confirmed, I
would consider whether any such amendments are appropriate.
religious accommodation
Question. In your view, do Navy and Marine Corps policies and
processes appropriately accommodate the religious practices of
individual servicemembers as mandated by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the NDAAs for fiscal years 2013 and 2014?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department respects the
rights of individuals to express their religious beliefs or no
religious beliefs at all. I also understand that current Navy and
Marine Corps policies and processes appropriately accommodate the
religious practices of servicemembers pursuant to the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, the National Defense Authorization Acts for
fiscal years 2013 and 2014, and Department of Defense Instruction
1300.17, ``Religious Liberty in the Military Services.''
Question. Under current law and policy, do you believe individual
sailors' and marines' expressions of religious belief are accommodated,
provided they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and
discipline?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding is that the Department of the
Navy complies with all laws requiring the Department to accommodate
sailors' and marines' expressions of religious belief unless,
consistent with the law, such accommodation could have an adverse
impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, and good order and
discipline.
Question. Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit
to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to
enlisting or accepting a commission in the Navy or in the Marine Corps?
Answer. Yes, both the Navy and Marine Corps have processes for
review and action on pre-accession requests for the accommodation of
religious practices. Applicants have the opportunity to submit a
request for religious accommodation and receive a final decision on
that request prior to enlistment, participation in a commissioning
program or warrant officer program, or enrollment at a Service Academy.
Question. Do you support a policy that allows a sailor's or
Marine's religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the member
throughout his/her military career--no matter where he/she is stationed
or the nature of his/her specific duties--unless it can be demonstrated
that the accommodation adversely affects military mission
accomplishment?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, how should the Navy and Marine Corps'
religious accommodation policies and processes be applied to sailors
and marines who decline to receive the COVID-19 vaccination on the
basis of their religious beliefs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy and Marine Corps
policies and procedures for mandatory vaccination of all sailors,
marines, and civilians include processes by which individuals may seek
and receive accommodation based upon religious beliefs to forego
vaccination for COVID-19. I believe that process is appropriate.
role in the officer promotion and confirmation process
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
Counsel of the Department of the Navy in ensuring the integrity and
propriety of the statutory officer promotion selection board process?
Answer. The Secretary of the Navy convenes promotion selection
boards as authorized by 10 U.S.C. Sec. 611 and issues precepts to
ensure those boards comply with statutes and regulations. The
uniformed, service Judge Advocates assume primary responsibility for
military personnel matters, and 10 U.S.C Sec. 8088 requires the Navy
Judge Advocate General conduct a compliance review of promotion boards.
Ultimately, the Secretary exercises 10 U.S.C. Sec. 618 approval
authority for promotion boards. As the General Counsel, I will support
the Secretary by working with both the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy and Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on
officer promotion matters.
Question. Do you perceive any need for change in this role? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I am not aware of any changes that are needed in this role.
Question. In your view, are the current policies and procedures
governing review of the records of military officers whose selection
for promotion or assignment requires Presidential or Secretary of
Defense approval or Senate confirmation, sufficient to enable informed
decisions by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, the
President, and the Senate? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Congress mandated changes to the officer promotion process
in both the 2020 and 2021 NDAAs to ensure promotion boards review
adverse material in an officer's record. It is my understanding that
those recent requirements, coupled with pre-existing policies and
procedures provide the Military Departments the means to gather records
that are as complete and accurate as possible, and provide military
officers the opportunity to address matters in their records, including
adverse or allegedly adverse information, prior to review. Accordingly,
it is my belief that the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the
Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Senate can engage in
informed decisionmaking.
Question. In your view, are these policies and procedures fair to
the individual Navy and Marine Corps officers proceeding through the
promotion or assignment processes?
Answer. Yes. It is my belief that the promotion and assignment
policies and procedures adequately balance the need for legal
compliance and procedural efficiency, while ensuring consideration of
the equities of the individual officers.
Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy in advising senior Navy, Marine Corps, and DOD
officials on the implications of adverse or reportable information
pertaining to a military officer nominated for promotion to General/
Flag grade or for appointment to a position of ``importance and
responsibility''? Do you believe this role should be changed in any
way?
Answer. In accordance with Title 10, applicable regulations, and
the direction of the Secretary, the General Counsel must support the
integrity of all Department activities. With respect to Department of
the Navy nominees, the General Counsel provides advice on cases with
adverse or potentially adverse information to ensure that the
information is properly evaluated and timely reported to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
non-deployable servicemembers
Question. DODI 1332.45, Retention Determinations for Non-Deployable
Servicemembers, provides that the Secretaries of the Military
Departments may ``retain . . . those servicemembers whose period of
non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit . . . if
determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.''
Do you agree that sailors and marines who are non-deployable for
more than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation
from the Service or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?
Answer. Generally, Servicemembers identified as non-deployable for
12 consecutive months should be evaluated for continued service.
However, each case must be evaluated individually based on the facts
presented. I believe that the Department of Defense policy
appropriately balances mission and individual equities.
Question. In your view, under what circumstances might the
retention of a sailor or Marine who has been non-deployable for more
than 12 months be ``in the best interest of the Service''?
Answer. Each case must be evaluated individually based on the facts
presented. What is in the best interest of the Service depends on
whether the Servicemember can perform their military duties and the
needs of the Service at the time of the review. An example may be a
Servicemember whose skill set is in high demand and who can perform
their duties from a non-deployed environment. Moreover, pregnant and
combat wounded Servicemembers are exempt from the 12-month non-
deployability determination requirements.
Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to
sailors and marines with HIV? To those who identify as transgender?
Answer. Readiness is vital to an effective military, and all
Servicemembers must be treated with dignity and respect. It is my
understanding that DODI 6485.01, ``Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
in Military Service Members'' sets forth the procedures for managing
servicemembers with HIV. These procedures include referring
servicemembers with HIV for appropriate medical treatment and
evaluation of fitness for continued service in the same manner as a
servicemember with other chronic or progressive illnesses. Further, I
understand that DODI 1300.28, ``In-Service Transition for Transgender
Service Members'' sets forth the procedures by which Servicemembers may
transition gender and requires determinations regarding deployability
to be effected the same way as would be for any servicemember
undergoing comparable medical procedures or treatment unrelated to
transition.
Question. Has the Navy or Marine Corps established any class or
group of personnel deemed ``deployable with limitations,'' such that
the class or group is exempt from the 12-month non-deployable retention
determination requirement?
Answer. It is my understanding that, in accordance with current
policy, the Navy and Marine Corps characterize servicemembers with a
medical condition that required medical screening or Combatant
Commander approval prior to deployment outside the continental United
States as Deployable with Limitations. This characterization includes
conditions referenced in DODI 6490.07, Deployment-Limiting Medical
Conditions for Service Members and DOD Civilian Employees. The list of
conditions includes pregnant and combat wounded Servicemembers.
Question. DODI 1332.45 also establishes categories and criteria to
be applied in determining and tracking whether or not a servicemember
is deployable.
In your view, should a sailor or Marine's readiness to perform the
specific missions, functions, and tasks required of him/her in the
context of a particular deployment also be considered in determining
whether a servicemember is deployable?
Answer. Yes, but each case must be evaluated individually based on
the facts presented. If confirmed, I will review current policies and
work with Department leadership to ensure commanders have the legal
authorities needed to accomplish mission while maintaining readiness.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in improving the
timeliness of the Navy's Disability Evaluation System process as it
applies to both Active and Reserve component sailors and marines?
Answer. Sailors, marines, and their families need to rely on
accurate and efficient processes, including the Disability Evaluation
System process. If confirmed, I will review the Navy's Disability
Evaluation System processes and work with Department leadership to look
for ways to improve those processes.
emerging contaminants
Question. Environmental and health effects associated with exposure
to Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA)
have long been a major concern for DOD, Congress, military families,
and communities in the vicinity of military installations. According to
GAO, the Navy has identified 127 installations with known or suspected
releases of PFOS and PFOA.
If confirmed, what would be your role in efforts to address PFOS/
PFOA contamination at Navy or Marine Corps installations?
Answer. The health and safety of sailors, marines, their families,
and the communities surrounding military installations is a top
priority. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders to ensure the
Department of the Navy complies with applicable laws, regulations, and
guidance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to address PFOS/
PFOA resulting from Navy or Marine Corps activities. I will also ensure
the Department of the Navy remains committed to supporting Department
of Defense efforts concerning this important issue.
Question. If confirmed, how would you advise the Secretary of the
Navy on his approach to addressing the health concerns of
servicemembers and their families who may have been exposed to
potentially harmful contaminants on Navy or Marine Corps bases and in
the context of performing military duties?
Answer. The health and safety of servicemembers and their families
is of paramount concern. If confirmed, I will advise the Secretary of
the Navy on the legal options available to promote the continued well-
being of sailors, marines, and their families.
suicide prevention
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to assist
the Secretary of the Navy in maintaining a strong focus on preventing
suicides in the Active Navy and Marine Corps, the Navy and Marine Corps
Reserve, and in the families of sailors and marines?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to
ensure the health and safety of sailors, marines, civilians, and their
family members remain a high priority. I will advise the Secretary on
legal options to enhance the health and safety of the force and their
families. The Department must ensure that resources are available to
address this issue and that support is available to help
Servicemembers, their families, and our civilian workforce.
Question. Mindful of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment II, and
related statutes, what are your ideas for preventing suicides by
curtailing the misuse of lethal means by servicemembers and their
families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to
support efforts to prevent suicides. It is my understanding that the
Department has worked with the Defense Suicide Prevention office (DSPO)
to offer free gun locks at medical facilities, Fleet & Family Support
Centers (FFSCs), and other locations throughout the Fleet. Training,
policies, and outreach materials encourage sailors, marines, and their
families to use gun locks and to practice other forms of safety,
including voluntary storage of personally owned firearms during periods
of increased stress and proactively disposing of unused prescription
medications.
mental and behavioral health care
Question. Although the Department has made some progress in
reducing the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors, many
servicemembers remain concerned that their military careers will be
adversely affected should their chain of command become aware that they
are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same time, the
military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical
and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness of
servicemembers under their command.
In your view, how can the Navy and Marine Corps bridge the gap
between a sailor or Marine's desire for confidentiality and the chain
of command's legitimate need to know about matters that may affect the
readiness of the servicemember and the unit?
Answer. The Department is dedicated to ensuring the health and
well-being of sailors, marines, civilians, and family members. If
confirmed, I will advise Department leadership on navigating the legal
and regulatory impacts that may arise from the Department's efforts to
bridge the gap between a sailor or marine's desire for confidentiality
and the chain of command's need to know about matters that may affect
the readiness of the Servicemember and the unit.
military sexual assault and harassment prevention and response
Question. Have you reviewed the report of the Independent Review
Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military? If so, what were your
impressions of the Commission's recommendations in regard to the
prevention of sexual assault in the military?
Answer. There is no place in any workplace especially in the
Department of the Navy for sexual assault and harassment. I have
reviewed the Independent Review Commission and its recommendations. I
am also aware that Secretary of Defense Austin has accepted the IRC's
recommendations with some adjustments made to ensure effective
implementation. My initial impressions of the IRC recommendations are
positive in that it sets forth a comprehensive approach across multiple
lines of effort. If confirmed, I will provide my best legal advice in
support of Secretary Austin's efforts to effectuate the recommendations
across the Department of the Navy.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to increase
the Navy and Marine Corps' focus on the prevention of sexual assaults?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department always strives
to find better ways to prevent and, where prevention fails, respond to
sexual assault, and that the Department of the Navy has made
comprehensive efforts to support survivors, promote reporting, and
encourage participation in the military justice process. If confirmed,
I will work with the Department's leadership to ensure that sexual
assault prevention and response is a high priority, including by
effectuating the prevention and cultural reforms proposed by the
Independent Review Commission and accepted by Secretary Austin. Sexual
harassment and assault do not have a place in the Services. I will
provide the legal support needed to ensure that the Department's SAPR
programs are implemented.
Question. What is your assessment of the Navy and Marine Corps'
implementation of protections against retaliation--most notably social
ostracism--against sailors and marines who report sexual assault?
Answer. Retaliation and reprisal do not belong in the Services. I
understand that the Department of the Navy is focused on ensuring
sexual assault reporting does not result in reprisal, and is training
servicemembers on recognizing and preventing retaliation and social
ostracism. The Naval Inspector General and Deputy Naval Inspector
General for Marine Corps Matters have responsibility for assisting the
Secretary in implementing section 1034 of title 10, United States Code.
If confirmed, as the principal legal advisor to the Secretary, I will
work with Department leadership to ensure that reprisal investigations
are thorough and conducted in accordance with statute, regulation, and
policy. I will provide comprehensive legal advice to ensure that
appropriate administrative or disciplinary action is taken against
Servicemembers or civilian personnel who engage in illegal reprisal or
retaliation.
Question. Do the Navy and Marine Corps' methods for recording the
outcomes of informal complaints of harassment or discrimination provide
Navy and Corps' leaders, supervisors, and managers with a means of
identifying repeat perpetrators in the military force?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of the Navy does
not tolerate harassment of any kind or unlawful discrimination. Such
acts are contrary to the Department's core values of honor, courage,
and commitment. The Department maintains an equal opportunity program
in accordance with all statutory and regulatory requirements but seeks
to exceed the minimum requirements. An important part of this program
is to regularly inform senior leaders to ensure consistent and
effective program execution. While I have some familiarity with the
equal opportunity processes, I have not had the opportunity to review
the specific processes used in the Department. If confirmed, I will
review the Department's program to ensure that it utilizes all legal
means to track repeat offenders, prevent sexual harassment, and protect
victims from such acts.
sexual harassment in the civilian workforce
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the General
Counsel of the Navy?
Answer. I have not had any opportunity to review any data or
discuss this matter with any current or former members of the Office of
General Counsel. If confirmed, I can assure you that I will promote a
climate that treats all the members of the Office of General Counsel
with dignity and respect and does not tolerate any form of harassment
or illegal discrimination.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from a civilian employee of the Office of the Navy
General Counsel?
Answer. If confirmed, I would take any complaint of sexual
harassment or discrimination seriously, and I would ensure that the
Office of the General Counsel followed all existing policies and
procedures to include the conduct of an inquiry by appropriate
authority and, if necessary, taking action to resolve the matter in an
efficient and expeditious manner.
Question. In your view, do Navy and Marine Corps' methods for
tracking the submission and monitoring the resolution of complaints of
harassment or discrimination provide appropriate leaders, supervisors,
and managers with an accurate picture of the systemic prevalence of
these adverse behaviors in the civilian workforces of the Navy and in
the Corps?
Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) policy is clear that
harassment of any kind or unlawful discrimination will not be
tolerated. Such acts are contrary to the DON's core values of honor,
courage, and commitment. The Department maintains an equal employment
opportunity program in accordance with all statutory and regulatory
requirements, but seeks to exceed the minimum requirements. I have not
had the opportunity to review all the methods used in the DON to track
and monitor complains and resolutions to express an opinion on their
adequacy in providing an accurate assessment upon which leaders can
rely. If confirmed, I would review these systems with the appropriate
officials to identify areas in which they may be improved.
Question. What actions has the Department of the Navy taken to
establish a modern, comprehensive harassment prevention and response
policy and program for the Navy and Marine Corps' civilian workforces?
Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is committed to
maintaining a positive and healthy culture where sexual harassment,
sexual assault and other harmful behaviors are not tolerated, offenders
are held accountable, and all personnel receive the support they need.
I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has issued a Department-
wide anti-harassment statement informing all employees, supervisors,
managers, and leaders that harassment is illegal and will not be
tolerated, and that the DON has established education and training
programs and a complaint resolution process to prevent and respond to
harassment and discrimination claims. These programs address the
identification, prevention, and resolution of sexual harassment and
prevention of reprisals, and are directed at personnel of all levels
and occupations.
Question. In your view, is civilian workforce harassment prevention
and response training across the Navy and Marine Corps adequate and
useful to employees?
Answer. I have some familiarity with the processes applicable to
the civilian workforce; however, I have not had the opportunity to
review the specific processes used in the Department of the Navy. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Department uses all appropriate
options to proactively prevent and respond to complaints of harassment
and discrimination.
Question. How does the Department of the Navy confirm that civilian
employees across the Navy and the Corps have completed such training at
the appropriate periodicity, and what metric does the Navy apply to
measure the efficacy of such training?
Answer. While I am somewhat familiar with the Government-wide equal
employment opportunity processes applicable to the civilian workforce,
I have not had the opportunity to review the specific processes used
within the Department of the Navy or the metrics tracked by the
Department. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Department
leaders to ensure that appropriate and effective training is provided
to all employees so that they understand the responsibility to prevent,
report, and respond to complaints of harassment and discrimination.
Question. Do the Navy and Marine Corps' methods for responding to
complaints of harassment or discrimination in their civilian workforces
provide appropriate care and services for victims?
Answer. I have some familiarity with the Government-wide equal
employment opportunity processes available to the civilian workforce as
well as the existence of civilian employee assistance programs. I also
understand that the Department of the Navy has a comprehensive and
multi-faceted response system for victims, which continues to evolve.
If confirmed, I will emphasize the high priority for support of all
victims, including those within our civilian workforce.
us naval academy
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies
and processes in place at the U.S. Naval Academy to prevent and respond
to sexual harassment and sexual assault, and to ensure that those who
report harassment or assault are not subject to retaliation (including
reprisal and social ostracism)?
Answer. I strongly believe that sexual assault and harassment at
the Naval Academy, my alma mater, are unacceptable. I believe the
Department is committed to ensuring that all Servicemembers, including
Midshipmen at the Academy, are treated with respect and dignity. If
confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to continue improving
the Department's efforts to prevent and respond to these issues,
including at the Academy.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies
and processes in place at the U.S. Naval Academy to ensure the free
exercise of religion and the accommodation of religious practices?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the most current
policies and processes at the Naval Academy, and do not have an opinion
on the efficacy of them. If confirmed, I will provide the Department
and Academy leadership the legal support they need on this issue. As a
Naval Academy graduate, I know that the Academy's policies reflect the
value the Department places on the rights of Servicemembers to observe
their religion or no religion. I also know that the Naval Academy has a
command religious program (CRP) that supports the diverse religious
beliefs of the Brigade of Midshipman and that can adapt to new
requirements.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of suicide
prevention programs at the U.S. Naval Academy?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the most current
policies and processes at the Naval Academy. In my view, suicide can be
prevented and any loss to suicide is avoidable. As a Naval Academy
graduate, I am committed to working with Department leadership to
ensure the health and safety of our Midshipmen. If confirmed, I will
work with Department and Academy leadership to examine the Academy's
current policies and to assess whether improvements can be made.
Question. Given the provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, under what
conditions would you deem it appropriate, if confirmed, to permit a
military officer to play professional sports prior to completing two
consecutive years of commissioned service following graduation from the
U.S. Naval Academy?
Answer. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 8459, a midshipman may not seek
release from their commissioned service obligation to play professional
sports until they complete at least two consecutive years of
commissioned service. If confirmed, I will work with Department
leadership to ascertain whether and how a policy can be formulated that
is consistent with title 10.
officer personnel management system reforms
Question. The John S. McCain NDAA for fiscal year 2019 contained
several provisions to modernize the officer personnel management
system. These reforms were designed to align officer career management
with the priorities outlined in the 2018 NDS.
How are the Navy and Marine Corps implementing these authorities
today and to what effect?
Answer. I understand the authorities granted by the fiscal year
2019 NDAA have given the Department of the Navy more flexibility to
better manage its officer corps. I also understand that the Services
have used the authority to merit-reorder promotion selection lists;
that Navy has allowed officers to ``opt out'' of promotion screening to
accommodate opportunities for career broadening assignments, instituted
``up and stay'' policies, and expanded its spot promotions in
accordance with the fiscal year 2019 NDAA authorities. If confirmed, I
intend to work with the Secretariat staff, Chief of Naval Operations,
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to understand the impact of
these changes and to offer any necessary legal support to pursue
additional authorities that would offer more flexibility for the
Department of the Navy to manage its officers.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in advising and
assisting the Navy and Marine Corps in further leveraging these new
authorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advise the Department's leadership
regarding any issues related to these authorities and ensure that
application of the authorities is consistent with Title 10, United
States Code, and relevant Department of Defense and Department of Navy
regulations.
Question. Are there other authorities that the Navy and Marine
Corps need in order to modernize the management of its officer
personnel?
Answer. I am unaware of whether the Navy and Marine Corps need
other authorities to modernize officer management. If confirmed, I will
work with the Secretariat staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop a full understanding of
authorities available to the Department in managing its officer
personnel. If needed, I would ensure the Office of the General Counsel
supported the pursuit of any additional authorities that would provide
more flexibility for the Department of the Navy to manage its officers.
Question. In your view, how can the scrolling and appointments
processes be improved so as to improve permeability between the Active
and Reserve components of the Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the scrolling and
appointments process and, therefore, I do not have enough information
to provide an informed recommendation as to whether the process
requires modification to improve permeability between the Active and
Reserve Components of the Navy and Marine Corps. I do believe that the
policies should allow greater permeability for officers to move between
the active (regular) and Reserve components without excessive delays
for administrative processing and, if confirmed, I will work with
Department leadership to evaluate the needs of the Navy and Marine
Corps and to propose legal solutions to satisfy those requirements.
whistleblower protection
Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or
threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of
the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication.
Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to
Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications
include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside
of the chain of command, including the Congress.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that sailors,
marines, and civilian employees of the Department of the Navy who
report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement to appropriate
authorities within or outside the chain of command, are protected from
reprisal and retaliation, including from the very highest levels of the
Navy, DOD, and the executive branch?
Answer. In my view, whistleblower protections are critical to
maintaining the confidence of the workforce when sailors, marines or
civilian employees make protected disclosures of wrongdoing within the
Government. If confirmed, I will advise Department leadership and those
individuals who are responsible for ensuring reprisal investigations
are conducted thoroughly, on issues including taking appropriate
administrative or disciplinary action against personnel who have
engaged in illegal reprisal or retaliation.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring
consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower
protections across the Department of the Navy and in the Department of
Defense?
Answer. If confirmed as General Counsel, it would be my duty to
maintain uniformity in applying legal principles with regard to matters
for which I am responsible, including ensuring consistency in applying
and interpreting whistleblower protections across the Department of the
Navy. As General Counsel, I would work with the Office of Special
Counsel, the DOD General Counsel, the DOD Inspector General, the DOD
General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Staff
Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Naval
Inspector General, and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine
Corps matters to ensure consistency in the application and
interpretation of whistleblower protection laws and regulations.
support to the navy and marine corps inspectors general
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the Navy General
Counsel have in reviewing and rendering opinions on the legal
sufficiency of the investigations and recommendations of the Navy and
Marine Corps Inspectors General?
Answer. The General Counsel plays an important role in reviewing
and rendering opinions on the legal sufficiency of investigations and
recommendations of the Naval Inspector General. If confirmed, I will
advise and assist the Secretary in the oversight of the Department of
the Navy law enforcement and investigative activities, including those
conducted by the Naval Inspector General and the Deputy Naval Inspector
General for Marine Corps Matters. If confirmed, I intend to provide my
independent and objective legal advice concerning the duties and
responsibilities of the Naval Inspector General and the Deputy Naval
Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters, but will respect the
independence of these officers and not infringe upon their statutory
authority. To accomplish this goal, I intend, if confirmed, to
establish a collaborative and productive working relationship with the
Naval Inspector General and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for
Marine Corps Matters.
department of defense acquisition reforms
Question. In successive NDAAs beginning in fiscal year 2013,
Congress enacted sweeping reforms of the defense acquisition system and
organizational structure. These reforms included expansion in
acquisition-related functions of the Service Chiefs and measures
designed to reduce the cost and development timelines of major systems.
Further, in February 2019, the congressionally established Advisory
Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations (the ``809
Panel'') submitted its final report, detailing 98 recommendations to
enhance DOD's ability to acquire and deliver warfighting capability in
a cost-effective and timely manner, better to address the concerns
raised by the current international security environment.
What is your understanding of the role of the Navy General Counsel
in ensuring that Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs are
executed in accordance with the law and DOD and Navy acquisition
policy?
Answer. The General Counsel plays a leading role in ensuring that
the Department's acquisition programs and procurement activities comply
both with statute and regulation, and with Department of Defense and
Department of the Navy acquisition policy. Complying with statute and
regulation and preserving acquisition integrity are vital to the
Department's ability to meet the needs of the warfighter, including the
need to maintain a robust and secure industrial base. The General
Counsel must actively ensure compliance and integrity at all levels of
the acquisition enterprise.
Question. What are your overall views of the effects of defense
acquisition reform to date?
Answer. It is my understanding that the effects of acquisition
reform have been positive overall. Specifically, enacting additional
acquisition pathways, such as the middle-tier acquisition and software
acquisition pathways, and increasing the Department's acquisition
decisionmaking authority have been helpful and are enabling a more
agile and adaptive acquisition system. The Department must continue to
focus on effective implementation and execution of the reforms that
have been enacted.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Navy and Marine
Corps acquisition officials understand and leverage the flexibilities
provided by Congress in the context of acquisition reform?
Answer. The General Counsel must proactively identify legal
authorities and flexibilities that will help acquisition officials
successfully and efficiently execute program requirements and
objectives. The General Counsel must inform acquisition officials of
new authorities and flexibilities, and assist the officials to identify
specific authorities and flexibilities that will benefit specific
programs or projects. The General Counsel also must support development
of effective guidance, policy, and training to implement new
authorities and flexibilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the performance of
certain acquisition-related functions, while ensuring their actions
remain compatible with the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (as
established in title 10, U.S. Code, sections 8014 and 8016)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure they fully
understand their role in the acquisition process outlined in 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 2547, as well as the enhanced acquisition roles for the Service
Chiefs enacted in previous National Defense Authorization Acts. I will
work with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps to ensure they understand the relationship between these
roles and functions and the statutory duties and responsibilities of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition, including such duties with respect to sustainment of DON
systems.
Question. Are there any additional acquisition reforms you would
endorse, in light of the recommendations of the 809 Panel?
Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations for further
acquisition reform at this time.
identifying and addressing conflicts of interest
Question. In the fallout of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA)
scandal, a significant number of Navy admirals and numerous other
Service personnel were investigated for bribery, corruption, and
violations of criminal conflict of interest laws and executive branch
ethics regulations. Some were prosecuted and convicted in Federal or
military courts, and many more were subject to public censure and
forced into early retirement from the Service.
In your view, has the Navy taken sufficient actions in response to
the GDMA scandal to ensure that its officers and other personnel are
trained--throughout their careers--on objective ethics and the Navy's
core values?
Answer. My understanding is that, following the GDMA scandal, the
Department of the Navy conducted a thorough review of its ethics and
professionalism programs to ensure it maximizes all available resources
to place an emphasis on ethics training of all personnel throughout
their careers. In addition to training requirements identified in 5
C.F.R. Sec. 2638 Subpart C, the Department also provides in-depth
ethics and professionalism training at the Senior Leaders Legal Course,
which is required for all prospective commanding officers, executive
officers, and command master chiefs, as well as the Senior Enlisted
Academy and the Navy Supply Corps School. In 2018, the Naval War
College established the College of Leadership and Ethics and the Chief
of Naval Operation's released an updated ``Navy Leader Development
Framework.'' Flag officers, general officers, and senior executives
receive ethics training at various executive symposiums that are held
annually. Moreover, all flag and general officers and their staffs are
required to receive in-person ethics training annually from a certified
ethics counselor. If confirmed, I intend to work closely and
collaboratively with the Judge Advocate General and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to provide the highest
quality of legal services, including ethics and standards of conduct
training and advice across the Department.
Furthermore, each employee or servicemember who is new to the
Department receives initial ethics training that meets the Office of
Government Ethics regulatory requirements. Additionally, any employee
or servicemember who is required to file an Office of Government Ethics
financial disclosure report, OGE form 278e or OGE form 450, must
complete interactive annual ethics training. Annually, the Office of
the Assistant General Counsel for Ethics develops interactive on-line
training that is available to all Department employees and meets the
Office of Government Ethics annual training regulatory requirements.
Also many commands require annual in-person ethics training for all
employees regardless of whether the employee is a financial disclosure
filer. In addition to initial and annual ethics training, the Navy
offers specialized ethics training for specific groups, when requested.
Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy issues an annual ethics
message emphasizing values-based decisionmaking rather than merely
complying with minimum rules, and reinforcing the expectation that
Department of the Navy personnel act with integrity and correctly apply
the ethics and standards of conduct rules. Emphasis is placed on
ethical leadership from the top down and requires senior leaders take
ownership of the ethics program within their respective command or
organization.
A number of officers investigated were able to rely on the ``safe
harbor'' of having consulted a Navy ethics official or a Navy lawyer
prior to accepting a gift from a prohibited source.
Question. What training do Navy and Marine Corps lawyers receive to
ensure they are competent to provide effective, accurate, and timely
guidance to personnel in need of such counsel? In your view, what is
the appropriate role of the Navy General Counsel in providing such
training to Navy and Marine Corps lawyers?
Answer. As the Designated Agency Ethics Official and senior legal
official in the Department of the Navy, the Navy General Counsel has an
important role in providing training and legal practice resources to
Department of the Navy legal professionals. My understanding is that
the Office of the General Counsel provides in-person and web-based
training and legal practice products to the legal community.
Additionally, in order to be certified as an ethics counselor, a
Department of the Navy uniformed or civilian attorney must complete a
comprehensive course on ethics and standards of conduct training for
ethics counselors and satisfy the requirement to take annual refresher
training in order to retain the ethics counselor designation.
Furthermore, Department of the Navy uniformed and civilian attorneys
regularly participate in a host of multi-day ethics courses offered by
the Navy, other Services, and the Department of Defense Office of
General Counsel. If confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively
with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to address training
needs for all uniformed and civilian attorneys and legal support
personnel within the Department and continue to strengthen the Navy's
ethical climate and culture.
Question. What resources has the Department of the Navy made
available to provide General/Flag Officers and other Military Service
personnel the training, advice, and assistance they need to adhere to
ethical and legal standards of conduct? Please explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has several
avenues by which flag officers and servicemembers receive ethics and
professionalism training throughout their careers. Specifically, new
Navy flag officers are required to attend the New Flag Training and, as
follow-on training, flag officers and members of the Senior Executive
Service attend an annual Flag Officers and Senior Executives Symposium
during which they receive additional training on ethics and standards
of conduct. Furthermore, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations issues an
annual ethics and standards of conduct memo for flag officers. In 2012,
the VCNO established a requirement that all flag officers and their
staff must receive in-person ethics and standards of conduct training
and this requirement remains in effect. The Marine Corps offers similar
training for its general officers and senior executives. Specifically,
the Marine Corps hosts a General Officer Offsite and an Executive
Offsite at least once per fiscal year, where attendees receive annual
ethics training presented by the Counsel for the Commandant of the
Marine Corps and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. The Navy and Marine Corps provide in-depth ethics and
professionalism training at various stages of career development,
including to prospective commanding officers, executive officers, and
senior enlisted leaders. In 2018 the Naval War College established the
College of Leadership and Ethics as a venue for officers and senior
civilians to continually learn and develop as leaders of character.
Finally, as part of career transition, all flag and general officers
attend a pre-separation ethics brief that includes a review of post-
Government employment conflict of interest restrictions on their future
employment.
Question. What role should the Navy General Counsel play in
ensuring that Department of the Navy personnel identify personal and
organizational conflicts of interest and take all appropriate steps to
avoid or mitigate them?
Answer. The General Counsel, as the Designated Agency Ethics
Official, is responsible for the Department of the Navy's ethics
program to prevent conflicts of interest in order to maintain the
public trust. Therefore, ensuring that the Department's business
practices are designed to prevent personal and organizational conflicts
of interest should be one of the Navy's highest priorities. If
confirmed, I will work closely with senior Departmental officials to
promote an organizational climate that is vigilant about preventing
conflicts of interest and reacts appropriately when specific issues
arise. I believe that Department attorneys play a significant role in
this area by providing training and advice on acquisition and the
Standards of Conduct for Employees of the executive branch (5 CFR
2635). Furthermore, my expectation is that the Department attorneys
will engage in all phases of the acquisition and contracting process to
assist the decisionmakers and to help identify and resolve conflicts of
interest.
Question. What is your understanding of the actions required of a
Department of the Navy attorney or judge advocate who becomes aware of
improper activities by a Department of the Navy official who has
sought, but failed to follow that attorney's legal advice in the domain
of ethics?
Answer. Department of the Navy attorneys are obligated to comply
with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations. If an attorney
believes that a Department official will act contrary to his/her advice
and the action will violate or has violated a law or regulation, the
attorney must take appropriate action, including immediately notifying
his/her supervisory attorney. If the allegation is against a senior
official, per DOD Directive 5505.06, ``Investigations of Allegations
Against Senior Officials of the Department of Defense,'' the alleged
violation must be reported to the DOD Inspector General within five
working days.
litigation involving the department of the navy
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Department of the Navy and the Department of Justice with respect
to litigation involving the Department of Defense?
Answer. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has the statutory
responsibility to represent the United States, its agencies, including
the Department of Defense, and its officers in litigation before
Federal courts. The Department of the Navy (DON) attorneys assist DOJ
attorneys in Federal court cases where the DON is a party or has an
interest. If confirmed, I will continue the DON's well established
collaborative relationship with the DOJ and advocate the Department's
interests.
Question. In your view, should the Department of the Navy have the
independence and resources to conduct its own litigation?
Answer. The Navy Office of the General Counsel has a well-
established, productive relationship with the Department of Justice. I
am unaware of a need for more independence or resources to conduct
litigation. If confirmed, I will evaluate this issue to determine if
more independence or resources are needed.
Question. In your view, should the Feres Doctrine be repealed in
whole--or in particular types of cases--to permit sailors and marines
to sue the U.S. Government and collect damages for personal injuries
sustained in the performance of their duties?
Answer. The Feres Doctrine should not be repealed. It is my
understanding that DOD has a benefits framework that has been designed
to maximize the benefits to be provided injured Servicemembers or
surviving family members without regard to the circumstances
surrounding the death or injury. The existing scheme of benefits and
no-fault compensation established by Congress for Servicemembers and
their families ensures they are fairly compensated for injuries
suffered incident to service in a consistent manner.
Question. How many administrative claims has the Department of the
Navy processed under the authority of title 10, U.S. Code, section
2733a, as added by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DON Tort Claims Unit (TCU)
began receiving claims in January 2020. All tort claims involving Navy
and Marine Corps personnel are adjudicated by the TCU. I am not aware
of the number of claims processed by the DON; however, if confirmed, I
will familiarize myself with the number and amounts claimed.
Question. What is the total value of the claims paid to date
pursuant to section 2733a?
Answer. I am not aware of the number of claims processed by the
DON; however, if confirmed, I will familiarize myself with the number
and amounts claimed.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
in mitigating the risks leading to claims under section 2733a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will become familiar with the types and
value of claims brought against the Department of the Navy (DON). As
General Counsel, I will work with Department leadership to ensure that
the DON takes all appropriate action to avoid personal injury or deaths
caused by medical malpractice of a Department of Defense health care
provider and to mitigate any impact to our Servicemembers.
the dod and navy civilian workforce
Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD and Navy civilian
personnel policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of
the U.S. Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the
Office of Personnel Management. Over the years, Congress has provided
numerous extraordinary hiring and management authorities applicable to
specific segments of the DOD and Navy civilian workforces.
In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the Navy in
effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?
Answer. I believe that the Department's biggest challenge is
competing for talent, especially in cutting-edge technical fields. If
confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to examine ways and
provide advice to enable the Department to eliminate obstacles and
promote opportunities to attract individuals with the necessary
critical skills to allow the Department to compete and meet its
missions.
Question. In your view, do Navy and Marine Corps supervisors have
adequate authorities and access to the expert human resources and legal
support required to address and remediate employee misconduct and poor
duty performance?
Answer. I believe that the Department generally has the authorities
needed to hold the civilian workforce accountable for misconduct and
poor performance. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership
to ensure that all civilian and military supervisors have adequate
training to supervise and lead the workforce. If confirmed, I will
ensure that Office of General Counsel attorneys proactively assist with
providing this training and advice to clients if or when these issues
arise.
Question. Are Navy and Marine Corps attorneys adequately trained to
advise and assist civilian and military supervisors in the appropriate
exercise of such authorities? If not, what additional authorities or
training do Navy and Marine Corps attorneys require?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the resources, organization,
and operation of the Office of General Counsel attorneys to ensure that
they are adequately trained to proactively advise and assist clients if
or when these issues arise.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify
before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate
committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee,
its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their
respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely
manner?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this
committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress,
and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or
denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records--including
documents and electronic communications, and other information
requested of you?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its
subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their
respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts
the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records--including
documents and electronic communications, and other information you or
your organization previously provided?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide
this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information
within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee
request?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters
to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization
from individual Senators who are members of this committee?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other
members of your organization protect from retaliation any military
member, Federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before,
or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other
appropriate committee of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
political donations
1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Coffey, in 2010, the ``New York Daily News''
published an article that questioned whether you and your former law
firm had used political donations to the State comptroller as a way to
secure legal business representing the New York State pension fund.
Could you please address these allegations?
Mr. Coffey. I regret that this article has become an issue, as I
understand the importance of my being perceived as having conducted
myself ethically given the position for which I am nominated. Let me
reassure you and the Committee that the allegations in this article are
false and that throughout my career I have abided by the highest
ethical standards. These claims surfaced while I was running for office
in New York State and faded from view as the facts came to light. My
firm was retained in the case in question solely due to our reputation
and ability to achieve results. I understand the committee is in
receipt of a letter from the good government activist quoted in the
article, who looked into the facts, determined the accusation did not
hold merit, and subsequently asked me to join the board of her watchdog
organization.
drug interdictions
2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Coffey, in an article you authored in 1987
in ``The Georgetown Law Journal'', you questioned the legality of the
use of Navy ships to transport Coast Guard teams interdicting suspected
drug smugglers and seizing their drug caches. Yet the use of the Navy
for this purpose has been sanctioned by the Department of Defense and
Navy lawyers. I understand you've served in the Navy and participated
in these operations. Have your views changed?
Mr. Coffey. Thank you for the opportunity to address this article.
The article called into question the legality of using Navy ships to
participate in drug interdictions under the then-prevailing statute, 10
USC 375, which expressly prohibited Navy involvement in the
interdiction of ships or aircraft. Congress amended Sec. 375 in 1988,
the year after my article was published, to remove that prohibition,
mooting my concerns. As you note, I participated in counter-narcotics
operations while in the Navy and believe that they serve an important
purpose.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
department of the navy covid policy (navadmin 225/21)
3. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, based on the guidance provided in
NAVADMIN 225/21, is it correct to say that sailors who are separated
only for refusing the vaccine will, in the least favorable outcome,
receive a discharge no lower than ``general under honorable
conditions''?
Mr. Coffey. Having read NAVADMIN 225/221 that is my understanding
of the Navy's proposed policy.
4. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, according to NAVADMIN 225/21,
enlisted servicemembers separated for vaccine refusal will be ``subject
to recoupment of any unearned special or incentive pays''. Will you
please articulate what the ``recoupment of any unearned special or
incentive pays'' means--providing a tangible example?
Mr. Coffey. Sailors may receive special and incentive pay in return
for performing a specific duty over a period of time. For example, the
Navy pays sailors who serve in the nuclear propulsion community bonuses
to remain in that community for a fixed period of time. Similar bonuses
incentivize medical personnel, aviation personnel, or other sailors
with specialized skills and training to remain in the Navy. It is my
understanding that, by longstanding practice within the Navy, sailors
who do not complete an enlistment must repay unearned special or
incentive pays such as the nuclear propulsion community bonus.
5. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, will sailors who are separated
only for refusing the vaccine be deemed ineligible from future military
service?
Mr. Coffey. I am aware that a sailor's eligibility for future
service is dependent on the facts and circumstances of their individual
service and the nature of the discharge received. It would be
speculative for me to offer a view on the outcome of what are
individual determinations.
6. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, will sailors discharged for only
for refusing the vaccine be entitled to their Post-9/11 GI Bill
Benefit?
Mr. Coffey. Any separation and characterization of service decision
will be made on the individual circumstances of a sailor's military
record and I cannot speculate about the outcome of any individual
decision. A sailor receiving a ``general under honorable conditions''
characterization is not eligible for the Post-9/11 GI Bill. A sailor
receiving an ``honorable'' characterization is eligible for this
benefit.
7. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, what is the protocol for
personnel, originating from the other military branches, who are
assigned to Navy commands and refuse the vaccine?
Mr. Coffey. I understand that cases involving soldiers, airmen,
guardians, marines, or coast guardsmen assigned to Navy commands are
reported to the Chief of Naval Personnel who will refer those cases to
the applicable service for disposition.
8. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, how will the Navy address foreign
military personnel--such as those studying U.S. professional military
education courses--if they refuse the vaccine for religious reasons?
Mr. Coffey. I am not familiar with the terms of the Department of
Defense's foreign military assistance programs and must defer to the
Department of Defense for an answer. As a general matter, I understand
that foreign military personnel are not subject to Department of the
Navy adverse administrative proceedings.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. John P. Coffey, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. John P. Coffey, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. John P.
Coffey in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Mr. John P. Coffey was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 9, 2022.]
______
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Douglas R. Bush by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. Section 7016(b)(5)(A) of title 10, United States Code,
provides that the principal duty of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) shall be the
overall supervision of acquisition, technology, and logistics matters
of the Department of the Army.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
ASA(ALT)?
Answer. The ASA(ALT) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of
the Army on all matters related to acquisition, logistics, and
technology. The ASA(ALT) serves, when delegated, as the Army
Acquisition Executive (AAE), the Senior Procurement Executive, the
Science Advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Army's senior
research and development official. The ASA(ALT) sets the strategic
direction for Army programs and policies related to acquisition,
logistics, and technology, including: acquisition management,
procurement, the industrial base, security cooperation and assistance,
sustainment, and science and technology (S&T). Importantly, the
ASA(ALT) also appoints, manages, and evaluates Program Executive
Officers (PEOs) and direct-reporting Program Managers (PMs), and is
responsible for managing the Army Acquisition Corps and the Army
Acquisition Workforce.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the ASA(ALT), as set forth in statute or in
Department of Defense regulations?
Answer. I have no specific recommendations to change the duties or
functions of the ASA(ALT) at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to
the opportunity to serve in the position before recommending any
potential changes that may be appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions would you expect
the Secretary of the Army to prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Secretary of the Army to
prescribe the duties currently specified in HQDA General Orders No.
2020-01 for the ASA(ALT) position, which includes:
(1) Developing and overseeing policies and programs for:
(a) Logistics, including acquisition fielding, sustainment, and
disposal logistics management, and administering lifecycle logistics
support planning and execution.
(b) Security cooperation, foreign military and foreign
government sales, and other related activities and general export
matters.
(c) The Defense Industrial Base, including the Army's Organic
Industrial Base.
(d) Aspects of the PPBE process within the ASA (ALT)'s assigned
functions and responsibilities and, when appropriate, coordinating and
integrating that direction with the ASA (FM&C) and Chief Information
Officer (CIO)/G-6.
(e) The acquisition function and the acquisition management
system and chairing the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council and
Configuration Steering Board.
(f) Execution of the authorities of the agency head for
procurement matters pursuant to laws and regulations, and execution of
the authorities of the SEC.ARMY for matters concerning grants,
cooperative agreements, and other non-procurement transactions under
the Defense Grant and Agreement Regulatory System (DOD Directive
3210.06), as well as other transactions under sections 2371 and 2371b
of Title 10, United States Code.
(g) Intellectual property, technical data, and computer
software management.
(2) Providing materiel solutions to equipment modernization as
part of the future force modernization enterprise.
(3) Managing the Army Acquisition Corps and Army Acquisition
Workforce; appointing those personnel below the executive level; and
evaluating acquisition program executive officers and direct reporting
program, project, and product managers.
(4) Representing the Army in ALT matters to DOD and non-DOD
partners
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges you would
confront if confirmed and appointed to be the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. The central challenge I expect to confront, if confirmed,
is the successful execution of the Army's top modernization priority
programs. Many of these programs are reaching a point where they will
soon transition from prototyping and development to production,
testing, and fielding. This process is likely to be challenging in many
cases due to the aggressive timelines currently assumed for these
programs. It is also likely to be challenging because of the normal
friction points that occur when a complex system moves to this more
detailed stage of development and production. Testing will reveal
things that need to be fixed. Early production efforts will likely
reveal currently unforeseen difficulties in ramping up production at
scale. The Army's needs may shift, which could disrupt fielding
schedules. And finally, delays or difficulties with some programs may
lead to cost growth. While these issues are expected when developing
and deploying new systems, they will require careful management,
balancing various risk factors, and constant communications across the
Army and with Congress to be overcome.
major challenges and problems
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing each
of these challenges?
If confirmed, what management actions would you direct and what
timelines would you establish for addressing each of these challenges?
Answer. I am confident that the Army has an acquisition workforce
with the talent and skills to successfully overcome the challenges
listed in question #3. If confirmed, I will allow the PEOs and PMs
maximum flexibility to navigate any difficulties, and provide them an
environment in which they can succeed. At the same time, I will
maintain close overwatch of their efforts and ensure that all the
appropriate Army elements, such as requirements, testing, contracting,
and financial are arranged to support them. I will also seek to protect
the funding for these efforts to maintain program schedules and help
ensure success. Finally, I will work closely with Congress to ensure
members have full visibility of the Army's efforts, especially on
programs that run into difficulties.
major challenges and problems
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
and how would you measure progress in achieving these priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize five aspects within the
Army's acquisition enterprise:
My first priority would be to intensely focus on acquisition
program execution that ensures rapid delivery of equipment to the
Army's soldiers. For many years, Congress has directed acquisition
reforms on accelerating the pace of the system. I will bias my
decisions toward taking actions that prioritize speed in a responsible
manner.
My second priority would be to improve the Army's policies and
practices regarding the acquisition of software. With strong
congressional support, the Army now has more tools and authorities than
ever to pursue software in a fundamentally different way and many
promising efforts are proceeding. If confirmed, I intend to accelerate
and expand those efforts.
My third priority would be to return the Army to a focus on
security in acquisition, with a special focus on cyber and supply chain
security. The Army faces a fundamentally different threat in this
regard as compared to the post-cold war era and must adapt its policies
and practices to enable delivery of systems and capabilities
uncompromised by aggressive efforts by China, Russia, and others to
disrupt them before they are fielded.
A fourth priority would be to ensure realistic operational testing
is integrated into Army programs, including rigorous cyber testing.
While testing can be expensive at times, more time spent doing
effective testing up front can pay huge dividends later and more
importantly allow us to find problems on test ranges rather than in
combat.
A fifth priority will be working to ensure that the Army's
modernization efforts are closely coordinated with Congress. The Army
cannot achieve any of its modernization goals without the support of,
and partnership with, Congress.
relations with congress
Question. What actions would you take to develop and sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the Office of the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. Based on my long experience as a staff member working on
behalf of Members of Congress, and my 6 months as Acting Army
Acquisition executive, I believe that trust, transparency, and constant
communication are the most important aspects of ensuring productive
relations with Congress. If confirmed as ASA(ALT), I would personally
communicate extensively with members and staff to set the example. I
would also direct my entire organization to provide all available
information to members and staff so Congress can pursue its oversight
and policymaking roles with full information. When there are
differences of opinion, I will seek to engage directly to understand
the different positions, and offer any additional information that
members may need to make their independent decisions regarding Army
acquisition programs.
budget
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of the Army's funding for the programs under your purview?
Answer. If confirmed, I will measure the adequacy of the Army's
funding based upon the Service's ability to meet the Biden
Administration's March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance and, when it is completed, by the Army's ability to meet the
requirements laid out in the new National Defense Strategy required by
Congress. Ultimately, the Army needs sufficient resources to fulfill
its role as part of the Joint Force responsible for deterring, and if
necessary, defeating military aggression that threatens vital U.S.
interests with acceptable risk to force and mission. I plan to work
within the Army's allocated funding to ensure the most modern, ready,
and lethal soldiers possible. I will also work with the Secretary of
the Army to ensure that the Army's priorities of People, Readiness, and
Modernization align with the Secretary of Defense's priorities of
defending our Nation, innovating and modernizing the Force, maintaining
and enhancing readiness, taking care of our people, and succeeding
through teamwork.
relations with the office of the secretary of defense
Question. In your view, what is the optimum relationship between
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E))
and the Military Department offices responsible for research and
engineering activities?
Answer. In my view, the AAE, who is responsible for research and
engineering in the Army, should have a very close relationship with the
USD(R&E) in order to coordinate research efforts across the Department
of Defense while still focusing Army efforts that provide capabilities
for soldiers. A close working relationship between the AAE and USD(R&E)
would afford the Army the ability to leverage work from the Army's
sister services and Defense agencies, avoid duplication, and accelerate
high risk technologies to advance warfighting capability. USD (R&E)
also oversees numerous organizations that do innovative research and
engineering work, such as DARPA, DIU, MDA, and SCO. A close and
collaborative relationship between those entities and the Army could
lead to significant efficiencies and the acceleration of new
technologies into Army Science and Technology and acquisition programs.
relations with the office of the secretary of defense
Question. In your view, what is the optimum relationship between
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the
Military Department Service and Defense Agency offices responsible for
acquisition and sustainment activities?
Answer. In my view, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) plays a significant role by establishing the
policy that synchronizes the services and enables the department to
operate effectively as an enterprise. The USD (A&S) also serves a
critical role as the Defense Acquisition Executive, with the authority
to retain, or delegate, milestone or decision authority for major
defense acquisition programs or their equivalent middle-tier
acquisition programs. A potential way to optimize the relationships
would be establishing and resourcing data repositories to prevent
inconsistent solutions and free the Services to focus on executing
Weapon System and Ammunition programs. Another area for optimization is
better coordination on cross-cutting issues such as supply chain risk
management, sensitive technology policies, COVID-19 response
activities, and cyber policies that relate to acquisition and
sustainment issues.
relationships within the army
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Army Chief of
Staff to improve Army acquisition outcomes and the overall health of
the Army research and engineering enterprise?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army Chief of Staff
(CSA), and other Army leaders, to ensure the timely delivery of
capabilities to soldiers. This includes advising the CSA regarding the
proper balance of resources against priorities as it relates to
acquisition programs, working with the CSA and Army Futures Command
(AFC) to ensure requirements are validated and technically feasible,
and to ensure that appropriate tradeoffs are made among cost, schedule,
and performance before milestone or production decisions in order to
avoid unnecessary costs or program risks. I would also work closely
with the Army Chief of Staff to develop and manage appropriate career
paths for military officers in the acquisition workforce.
relationships within the army
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to develop and
sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the
Army Senior Acquisition Executive and the Commander of the U.S. Army
Futures Command?
Answer. Success in Army modernization requires a collective effort
from multiple stakeholders and organizations that contribute to the
success of acquisition programs. A strong relationship between the Army
Acquisition Executive and the Commanding General of AFC is essential to
successful development of new warfighting capabilities. AFC plays a
critical role in executing the Army's Science and Technology enterprise
and in defining requirements for the Army's next generation
capabilities. If confirmed, I would work closely and collaboratively
with the AFC Commander to ensure the Army can effectively develop new
capabilities, to include iterating on requirements to ensure they are
well-informed and technically feasible, employing robust processes to
obtain soldier feedback, developing sound acquisition strategies, and
promoting the transition of S&T technology to formal programs of
record. In addition, if confirmed, I would work collaboratively with
the AFC Commander to prioritize resources within the Army's equipping
program to promote successful fielding of critical warfighting
capabilities.
relationships within the army
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the joint and Army
requirements community to ensure that requirements are technically
feasible and stable and will not result in programs that are likely to
fail due to technical failures or cost or schedule growth?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to make use of the forums
that bring the acquisition and requirements communities together to
discuss those issues before acquisition programs are started, such as
Materiel Development Decisions and Acquisition Shaping Panels; or when
programs are underway, such as the Configuration Steering Board. It
takes collaboration to balance what the user needs with what is
technically feasible within cost and schedule goals.
acquisition
Question. Over the past year alone, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), the Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E),
and others have documented that multiple Army procurement programs have
experienced cost growth, schedule delays, incomplete systems at
delivery, and post-delivery problems.
If confirmed, what would be your plan for improving Army
acquisition activities?
Answer. Successful acquisition programs start with sound
requirements. If confirmed, I would use multiple formal and informal
decision forums to involve the Army acquisition enterprise as early as
possible as requirements are formed. A process that occurs in parallel
to requirements development is acquisition strategy development. If
confirmed, I would work to ensure the Army develops sound acquisition
strategies that identify and mitigate technical and program risks.
Congress has provided many new authorities to tailor acquisition
strategies to programs. I would seek to use these new authorities to
accelerate the pace of programs while also mitigating cost and
performance risks. Once a program begins, I would make effective use of
program oversight processes, including various reviews and assessments,
such as technical reviews, independent assessments and tests, program
reviews, and milestone reviews and decisions. I would ensure the Army
employs risk reduction strategies in programs, to include modeling and
simulation, alternative design approaches, and contractor incentives,
as needed to achieve program cost, schedule and performance objectives.
A final critical aspect of achieving success in acquisition is close
coordination with Congress, and in particular, the four defense
committees. Without support from Congress, the Army cannot achieve
success in any of its acquisition efforts. As such, improving
coordination with Congress would be one of my top priorities.
acquisition
Question. What do you perceive to be the recent successes and
shortfalls in Army acquisition activities?
Answer. Based on my work for Congress conducting oversight and my 6
months as the Acting Army Acquisition Executive, I believe the Army is
more likely to succeed when acquisition has Army Senior Leader
involvement, stable and achievable requirements, accurate cost
estimates, consistent funding, support from Congress, effective test
plans, and a willingness to adapt as conditions change. The Army has
failed in the past when any of these factors are not in place for a
particular program.
The Army has over 700 programs, from very small ones to those of
national-level importance. On a given day, most are doing well in terms
of cost, schedule, and performance. However, many do have challenges. A
notable recent success includes the Army's role in the Federal
Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Army acquisition and
contracting professionals found ways to use a wide range of authorities
to develop therapeutics, procure protective equipment, and provide
vaccines at a highly accelerated pace compared to normal acquisition
program timelines. Among other recent successes are efforts to develop
early versions of hypersonic and long-range strike systems via a rapid-
prototyping approach that builds on proven technologies to limit
technical risk.
At the same time, the Army has struggled on some programs for a
variety of reasons. For example, while the programs are now performing
well, moving the Armored Multi-Purpose Fighting Vehicle (AMPV) and
M109A7 self-propelled howitzer programs into large-scale production
were plagued with manufacturing and supply challenges. What those
programs went through is illustrative of the challenge of going from
small-scale prototyping to large-scale manufacturing. In the area of
software, the Army has struggled at times to keep programs on budget
and on schedule, often due to unclear requirements work up front or
requirements creep during software development. In all these cases, I
have found that the Army can find a path to success when the problems
are clearly understood and all the appropriate stakeholders, including
Congress, are involved in finding solutions.
acquisition
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve
oversight in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or
acquisition management processes?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Army Futures
Command leadership to facilitate collaborative dialog with the Program
Executive Offices (PEOs) and ASA(ALT) staff throughout the requirements
determination process. This upfront collaboration allows for the Army's
trained Acquisition professionals to provide cost, schedule, and
performance perspective for achievability of a requested capability. In
the role of Co-Chair for the Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review and
the development of the Program Objective Memorandum, I would provide
oversight with an understanding that the Army works in a fiscally
constrained environment. Managing risk, while considering the best
capability for the warfighter, will always be first and foremost in my
considerations for resource allocation during the budgetary process. As
the Army's Acquisition Executive, I would reserve the right to withhold
milestone decisionmaking authority for any program, and request the
PEOs to provide regular program reviews to address risk areas, and
bring potential issues to light as early in the development lifecycle
as possible.
acquisition
Question. What roles do you see for developmental planning,
prototyping, and experimentation in the fielding of future Army
capabilities?
Answer. Developmental planning, prototyping, and experimentation
will always be key ingredients for the success of defense acquisitions.
When used appropriately, they can reduce the length and expense of
programs by gaining valuable insights early in a program.
Experimentation in realistic conditions can reveal entirely new uses
for systems and allow the Army to find innovative ways to solve
military problems. Prototyping is also very useful, but not all
prototypes are equal. Some are almost ``handmade'' demonstrators, while
others are very mature after having gone through earlier development
efforts, often in the private sector. Understanding where a program's
prototyping effort lies on that spectrum is the most vital factor in
putting a plan in place to get from prototype to production.
Question. How would you propose the Army better plan and prepare
for weapon system sustainment as part of its acquisition activities?
Answer. I understand the importance of identifying sustainment
costs and challenges early in the development cycle of a weapon system
in order to control lifecycle sustainment costs. It is my understanding
that the Army has several new efforts in this area underway. For
example, gaining an understanding of a program's sustainment approach
is directly related to the associated intellectual property (IP)
approach. If the Army does not plan for IP well in advance, it is very
difficult to do so later in a program, especially after production has
begun. Another example is the need to identify early on in a program
whether advanced manufacturing techniques, including additive
manufacturing, should be integrated into a weapon system's design to
enable more flexible sustainment options in the future. A final example
would be understanding a system's supply chain to ensure that it is
secure and dependable. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity
to evaluate the sustainment plans that Army program managers and
acquisition professionals develop before recommending any additional
potential changes that may be appropriate.
Question. Given that Army acquisition failures have often resulted
from technologically unachievable or conceptually flawed requirements,
how could you help the Army avoid these pitfalls, if confirmed?
Answer. Army acquisition receives program requirements from many
elements of the Army. If confirmed I would work closely with Army
leaders, such as the CSA, VCSA, AFC Commander, AMC Commander, and the
Army G-2, to facilitate collaborative dialog throughout the
requirements determination process. Having trained acquisition
professionals provide an early assessment of technological
achievability would help ensure requirements are not written with
apparent conceptual flaws. As a voting member of the Army Requirement
Oversight Committee, I would ensure that all new requirements are
vetted for cost, schedule and performance risks, from a materiel
perspective. If a requirement is deemed improbable for long-term
success, I would provide recommendations for change, or non-concur with
the approval until the concept is modified for achievability.
Question. How can the Department of Defense and the Army better
access and integrate commercial and military technology to remain ahead
of potential adversaries?
If confirmed, how would you balance the need to undertake
prototyping, experimentation, and rapid acquisition with the demands of
managing the execution of the Army's programs using other acquisition
pathways, such as major capability acquisition?
Answer. The Army's ability to modernize and maintain a decisive
advantage over its adversaries requires the ability to effectively
integrate innovative technologies, including those developed by the
defense industrial base and those found in the commercial sector. If
confirmed, I would look to leverage commercial innovation whenever
appropriate, including in those instances where technologies already
exist in the private sector and can be adopted quickly by the Army
either ``off the shelf'' or with minimal development. I would also work
to focus the Army's development efforts on military-unique capabilities
that address gaps needed to enable soldiers to have a decisive
advantage in combat.
Additionally, if confirmed, I would work to ensure that Army
develops acquisition strategies that employ the full range of statutory
authorities, as needed and as appropriate, to ensure the rapid
development and delivery of capabilities. These strategies may also
include employing a combination of multiple acquisition pathways to
obtain value not otherwise available through use of a single pathway,
or to address specific risks to program objectives. If confirmed, I
would also work with program managers and PEOs to ensure that
acquisition strategies successfully balance the need for rapid
development of new capabilities with the need to ensure that such
capabilities are effective and safe for soldiers.
cost and schedule estimates
Question. GAO has reported that the Army's use of unrealistically
optimistic cost and schedule estimates is a major contributor to cost
growth and program failure.
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that
cost and schedule estimates for Army programs are fair and independent,
and that such estimates provide a sound basis for decisionmaking?
Answer. Gaining insight from a wide a range of cost estimating
experts both in and outside the Army is essential to properly bounding
cost risk for a program. In my experience, the ASA(ALT) staff and
program offices have in recent years developed a positive and
collaborative working relationship with both the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics office and the OSD Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation office to ensure that the fair and
independent cost estimates they develop are based on the best available
program data. I would continue to support those relationships and the
resulting open dialog, if confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
improve the estimation of life cycle sustainment costs for Army
systems?
Answer. In my view, the Army has made great strides establishing
Operational Sustainment Reviews (OSRs). While the Army has increased
the capture of sustainment data in the Global Combat Support System-
Army, if confirmed, I would look to improve the data quality by
automating data capture and distributing soldier input using tablet
computers at the soldier/mechanic-level to provide needed visibility in
parts and equipment usage data (miles and hours), labor and failure
data to improve reliability. If confirmed, I would work to improve
tracking the visibility of both allocation and execution of depot
maintenance and Sustainment Systems Technical Support linked directly
to a weapon system.
software activities and acquisition of information technology (it)
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASA(ALT)
with respect to the IT acquisition and software activities of the Army?
Answer. Section 7016 of Title 10 U.S. Code states that the
principal duty of the ASA(ALT) is the overall supervision of
acquisition, technology, and logistics matters of the Department of the
Army. ASA(ALT) oversight includes acquisition and support of
Information Technology (IT), software and business transformation
systems; and decision authority for software acquisition pathway
programs. The ASA(ALT) works closely with the Chief Information Officer
(CIO) and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, in all matters related to IT and
ensures that all IT and software systems are designed, built, and
tested to meet regulatory and statutory requirements including but not
limited to those related to re-use, interoperability, and
cybersecurity. ASA(ALT)'s role in IT and software is distinguished from
the CIO's role of budget review, IT standards compliance,
interoperability, and requirements generation.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to address systemic and
persistent cultural, process, and technical barriers to improving the
Army's treatment of software activities and IT acquisition?
Answer. If confirmed, I would strengthen ASA(ALT) relationships
with AFC, the CIO and G6 in order to synchronize and streamline the
acquisition of software and IT capabilities. I would set policy,
guidance, standards, and best practices in order to maximize the
flexibility and speed of the PEOs and PMs to acquire and deploy
software and IT capabilities. I would also collaborate within the Army,
the Department of Defense (DOD), and with industry partners to capture
lessons learned, pain points, and opportunities for increased IT and
software agility to create a win/win environment for all stakeholders.
In addition, if confirmed, I would seek to exploit new authorities and
flexibilities provided by Congress to fundamentally shift software and
IT development activities out of traditional acquisition pathways and
into the new software acquisition pathway. It is my understanding that
the Army already has six software development efforts using this new
pathway but, in my view, much more can be done in this area.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the research and
testing community, the Army's Chief Information Officer, and with the
other Military Services--including their Chief Information Officers--in
the development and deployment of Army business IT systems?
Answer. The Army possesses a mature business IT system environment
and infrastructure across program management, requirements development,
and testing. If confirmed, I would continue to engage stakeholders
through the Army Business Council, programming and budgeting forums,
and Army acquisition decision boards. The Army is assessing how to
modernize and sustain its business systems and it will leverage
emerging commercial and government technologies where requirements are
aligned to save funding and to provide better capability. Also, if
confirmed, I would continue to engage with partner Military Services
where similar systems are in development or in fielding to leverage the
lessons learned and investments made, and to avoid duplication.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your highest priority IT and
software-related initiatives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize the use of best commercial
practices for reuse, modularity, development of IT and software
efforts. For example, I would fully support the use of cloud
capabilities and open source software that enable data driven decisions
and standards while ensuring open competition. In my view, the highest
priority for software and IT should be capitalizing on cloud and data
technologies, which work hand in hand, and institutionalizing their use
throughout every aspect of Army operations. The cloud enables the Army
to separate software and IT development from the management of hosting
infrastructure, offering the opportunity to do both more efficiently,
while also allowing the Army to leverage data to improve
decisionmaking, automate processes, and gain insights that would have
otherwise gone unknown. A second priority would be moving more Army
software development efforts into the new software acquisition pathway
to ensure that the significant flexibilities provided by this new
pathway are used to the move to a more modern approach to software
development.
Question. If confirmed, what major improvements would you make in
the Army's development and deployment of major IT systems and services
and software programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would leverage best practices and
partnerships that enable data centric and Modular Open System Approach
(MOSA) that reduces risk for modernization of IT systems and software
programs. Simultaneously, I would work to ensure the decoupling of
software from hardware and support cloud capabilities, the use of plug
and play modules, and the re-use of interfaces across the enterprise. I
would also promote the use of agile processes and Development, Security
and Operations (DEVSECOPS) environments in order to achieve the same
rapid-release cycles that private industry is able to achieve.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate relationship
between the Army's efforts to implement enterprise IT programs and
supporting computing services and infrastructure to support Army
missions, and the efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA)?
Answer. In my view, Army enterprise IT programs, computing services
and infrastructure provide a broad set of capabilities in support of
the Army's mission. Partnering with DISA and utilizing the services as
appropriate to obtain efficiencies and cost savings will remain a
consideration and potential course of action. This is critical as the
Army moves toward joint operations in support of Multi-Domain
Operations and Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
Question. If confirmed, how would you coordinate the development or
procurement of cloud computing services within the Army with other
Department of Defense and Federal Government cloud computing
initiatives?
Answer. The 2020 Army Cloud Plan communicates the Army's strategy
for utilizing cloud computing technologies in order to ensure our
soldiers and civilians are more skillful than any potential adversary
and the U.S. maintains overmatch in the information realm. In March
2021, the Army awarded an enterprise contract for commercial cloud
computing services, thus providing a single procurement vehicle to
optimize Army's enterprise cloud spend. The Army contract provides
critical capabilities required; particularly after the cancellation of
DOD's Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI). If confirmed, I
would support Army and DOD enterprise contract initiatives that provide
the Government with best-in-class performance and cost advantages that
the Army's significant buying power affords. Today, the Army
collaborates with the DOD's Cloud Computing Program Office on
requirements for the new Joint Warfighter Cloud Capability (JWCC)
contract. If confirmed, I will work diligently with the Army CIO, DOD
CIO and Service Acquisition Executives to ensure Army's equities are
included within the JWCC and it provides the capabilities required to
enable Joint Multi-Domain Operations.
Question. Where do you believe the best opportunities for
collaboration and joint execution between the Army and Defense Digital
Service (DDS) might exist?
Answer. I understand that the Army has a successful working
relationship with the Defense Digital Service (DDS) and they report
directly to the Secretary of the Army. To date, DDS contributes to the
Cyber Institute at Augusta University and played a significant role in
Hack-the-Army and Hack-the-Pentagon events. If confirmed, I look
forward to additional opportunities for collaboration and joint
execution between the Army and DDS. The DDS office significantly
contributed in assisting with the Department's COVID response, and is
capable of adding value to the most challenging cyber security issues.
The Army will also benefit from continued partnership with DDS
concerning their work in Counter-UAS.
middle tier acquisition
Question. Section 804 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA authorized DOD
to employ an acquisition approach (``Middle Tier Acquisition'') that
was intended to support the rapid delivery of new capability to meet
emerging operational needs.
In your view, what benefit has the Department of the Army derived
from its use of Section 804 authorities?
Answer. In my view, the use of Middle Tier Section 804 authorities
has yielded significant benefits to the Army, most notably by
streamlining the documentation and approval process for the pursuit of
mature integrated technologies. The rapid prototyping and fielding
acquisition pathways also facilitate an iterative process for
developing weapon system requirements that incorporates soldier
feedback through experimentation with prototypes or proofs of concept.
These approaches have allowed the Army to develop informed requirements
and better leverage mature technologies in the development of
modernized systems. Use of these acquisition pathways also provides
significantly more flexibility to adjust a program's requirements or
production quantities to meet new and emerging Army needs as compared
to the traditional 5000.02 series model. If used carefully, these
pathways should allow the Army to develop and acquire new capabilities
much more quickly than in the past.
Question. What risks have accrued and been accepted by the Army as
a consequence of the use of these authorities?
Answer. As with any acquisition program, those programs employing
the Middle Tier of Acquisition authority do contain some level of risk.
I believe, the most significant risk is related to the transitioning of
a prototype effort into production. It is critical that systems have
reached an appropriate level of maturity before they are transitioned
into fielding or production in order to ensure producible, safe, and
effective capabilities are delivered to soldiers. Another risk is cost
growth. The flexibilities inherent in this new authority, such as not
having traditional program baselines in many cases, could create
conditions that allow cost growth if a disciplined management process
is not in place to control it. If confirmed, I will ensure appropriate
oversight of the use of this authority, as well as the identification
and mitigation of any risks.
Question. If confirmed, what processes would you put in place to
ensure appropriate oversight of the Department's use of 804
authorities? Please explain your answer.
Answer. In creating the 804 authorities, Congress granted the Army
significant flexibilities compared to traditional acquisition
processes. With these increased flexibilities comes a responsibility to
aggressively manage program cost, schedule, and performance risk, as
well as establishing effective two-way communications with Congress. If
confirmed, I would comprehensively assess current Army processes to
ensure that systems developed under the Middle-Tier Acquisition
authorities are mature and prepared for transition to production. I
would work with PEOs and program managers to ensure that acquisition
strategies address specific risks associated with the transition, to
include compliance with formal program of record requirements where
appropriate, employment of required developmental and operation testing
as required, materiel release and safety reviews, and sustainment
planning, among others. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that these
and other relevant concerns are addressed in the program's strategy and
oversight and review processes, and I would implement any changes
needed.
Question. What best practices can the Army employ to generate
realistic and technically achievable specifications, particularly in
sophisticated, rapidly evolving technical areas such as cybersecurity,
long range precision fires, and artificial intelligence?
Answer. I believe the Army employs a number of best practices to
ensure realistic and technically sound requirements and specifications.
These include use of early prototyping and experimentation, increased
use of modeling and simulation and digital engineering tools, use of
independent technology readiness assessments to ensure technical
maturity. This also includes close and early collaboration between the
requirements developers and S&T community in AFC and PMs who oversee
acquisition efforts. In addition, the use of broad market research and
constant communication with industry regarding Army capability gaps are
critical to success in developing new warfighting capabilities. In the
areas of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence this is especially
salient as the vast majority of innovation in these areas resides in
the private sector. If confirmed, I would reinforce the use of these,
and other, best practices to ensure development of realistic and
achievable specifications.
Question. In your view, does the Army have the flexibility to shift
between acquisition pathways if a program warrants such a change in
strategy?
Answer. Yes, in my view the Army has the flexibility it needs to
shift between acquisition pathways, as appropriate. The Adaptive
Acquisition Framework provides the Army the ability to use multiple
pathways to obtain value not otherwise available through use of a
single pathway. As part of ongoing program oversight through various
venues, the ASA(ALT) must continuously assess the acquisition strategy,
program risks, and appropriate mitigation approaches called for in a
particular program or development effort. For larger programs, any
shift in pathway would also have to be coordinated with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. If confirmed, I
would utilize these reviews to determine whether any changes, to
include a shift in the acquisition pathway, are warranted.
contracting
Question. What are the major challenges facing the Army with
respect to contracting activities?
Answer. There are many challenges with respect to contracting, but
two in particular stand out. First, I think a major challenge,
affecting not only the Army, but all of Government, are the barriers to
entry for companies that would not normally do business with the Army.
The use of flexible contracting mechanisms, such as Other Transaction
Authority or the pilot Commercial Solutions Offering, are minimizing
bureaucratic processes and opening up lines of communication with non-
traditional defense contractors. In my view, the Army needs to do a
better job of understanding and applying innovation from the private
sector.
A second major challenge is creating and maintaining more
``contracting capacity'' to both speed the contracting process and
provide surge capacity for emergency situations. While having a larger
contracting workforce is an option, a more likely path of success given
funding limitations is developing tools and training to increase the
efficiency of the contracting workforce already in place. In Fiscal
Year 2020, the Army completed more than 200,000 separate contracting
actions. Even small gains in efficiency may have outsized results.
Question. What additional flexible contracting authorities might
you recommend the Congress enact?
Answer. I know the Army appreciates the flexible contracting
authorities already provided by Congress. If confirmed, I look forward
to the opportunity to serve in the position before recommending any
potential additional authorities that may be needed.
Question. Do you perceive that the Army is making appropriate use
of non-FAR-based contracting approaches, such as Other Transaction
Authority (OTA)? If confirmed, how might you modify the Army's efforts
to and processes for the use of these approaches?
Answer. Yes, I think the Army is making appropriate use of non-FAR
based contracting approaches. I recently reviewed the findings from the
DOD Inspector General and General Accountability Office related to the
award of Other Transactions and noted that the findings highlighted the
need for more transparency and consistency, especially when awarding
Other Transactions through consortium based agreements, but did not
identify any breach of law or procedure by the Army. I am also in
agreement with recent congressional language related to improving
accessibility and reporting of information related to the exercise of
other transaction authority. If confirmed, I intend to improve the
Army's ability to quickly provide details related to individual
projects through enhanced reporting.
Additionally, if confirmed, I intend to work to strike an
appropriate balance between flexibility and oversight in the execution
of non-FAR based approaches and evaluate the effectiveness of FAR based
and non-FAR based approaches to help ensure the appropriate authorities
are being used to achieve the intended objectives.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Army personnel
are properly trained in the use of non-FAR-based contracting
methodologies?
Answer. In my judgment, proper use of non-FAR based approaches is
essential to the effective use of these authorities. If confirmed, I
will support the USD(A&S) ``Back to Basics'' initiatives, and DOD's
work with the Defense Acquisition University to establish training for
the use of Other
Transactions. Within the Army, if confirmed, I will enhance
training on the use of non-FAR instruments, including the dissemination
of best practices and lessons learned by the seasoned practitioners,
and review the minimum requirements for personnel authorized to execute
these non-FAR based authorities. The requirements strengthen the
ability to include appropriate safeguards while executing innovative
approaches.
Question. In your view, what are the general advantages and
disadvantages of FAR and non-FAR based contracting approaches,
respectively?
Answer. In my view, the FAR-based approach includes numerous
controls designed to reduce risks to operational, reporting, and
compliance objectives. These controls help the system operate with
openness, integrity, and fairness while fulfilling important public
policy objectives. However, many controls are perceived as inconsistent
with commercial marketplace practices, and the sheer number of
accumulated controls has been criticized for endangering the cost,
schedule, and performance outcomes the system purports to uphold.
Non-FAR based approaches offer many advantages, including
flexibility, teaming, increased communication with industry, speed, and
access to the broadest possible pool of prospective vendors, especially
with respect to non-traditional contractors. I believe the Army has
been able to overcome the barriers to entry that non-traditional
defense contractors often face with traditional FAR-based contract
arrangements through the use of non-FAR based approaches. The lack of
controls as compared to the FAR-based approach must be balanced by
proper judgment to ensure the Government's interests are adequately
protected.
multiyear procurement contracts
Question. Section 2306b of title 10, United States Code,
establishes the criteria that are prerequisite to a Military
Department's exercise of multiyear contract authority.
What types of programs are appropriate for the use of multiyear
contracts, in your view?
Answer. In my view, a multiyear (MY) contract must have stable
requirements and be expected to remain substantially unchanged during
contract execution. Contract cost and anticipated cost avoidance
through the use of a MY contract needs to be realistic and provide
significant savings when compared to the use of single year contracts.
In my judgment, the Army should only enter into MY contracts when the
Army is confident that adequate funds for the program will be
programmed in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army fully
complies with the requirements of section 2306b?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the relevant Army
stakeholders to ensure that analysis has been conducted to satisfy the
10 USC 2306(a) findings to enter into multiyear contracts. I will
thoroughly consider these findings to ensure that they are supported by
facts. Further, for those multiyear contracts that require Secretary of
Defense certification, I will work with the relevant DOD organizations
and provide the necessary preliminary findings (10 USC 2306(a)) to
ensure that they are supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed
by the Director of Cost assessment and Program Evaluation.
Question. What is your understanding of the requirement that a
multiyear contract result in ``significant savings,'' as compared to
the cost of carrying out a program through annual contracts?
Answer. I understand that a multiyear (MY) contract needs to result
in significant savings when compared to a series of single year
contracts spanning the life of the proposed MY contract. There is no
official definition for the word ``significant'' when it is referring
to a specific percentage or a dollar value of savings for a multiyear
contract. Currently, a goal of a minimum savings of 10 percent is
expected. Due to a high value of some MY contracts, I believe that a
percentage less than 10 percent may be acceptable. Each contract needs
to be evaluated separately and determined to be a significant cost
savings for the U.S. Government.
Question. What is your understanding of the requirements regarding
the timing of a Department of Defense request for legislative
authorization of a multiyear procurement contract for a particular
program?
Answer. I understand that the Army may not enter into a multiyear
(MY) contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000 unless
the contract is specifically authorized by a law other than an
Appropriations Act. In the case of the Apache and Blackhawk programs, I
understand that the discussions leading to the requested required
Authorization Act language started years before it was included as part
of the Fiscal Year 2022 Presidential Budget Request. This has given all
the concerned entities within the Army and OSD enough time to
contemplate the benefits of a MY, as well as enough time to program
funding for such a contract.
Question. The Navy budget request for fiscal year 2022 included
insufficient funding to avoid breaking a multiyear contract for the
DDG-51 destroyer program. The committee views this action as breaking a
moral commitment from the Department to fully fund multiyear
procurement programs for the duration of the contract. Such an action
should only be taken in the direst of circumstances. The Army also
manages multiyear contracts.
Can you assure the committee that you intend to fully fund any
multiyear contracts within the purview of the Army in future budget
requests and that you would only recommend a budget request that fails
to do so in a dire emergency?
Answer. I understand that the Army does lay out future funding in
the FYDP that covers the cost associated with each multiyear contract.
Barring any unforeseen national emergency/disaster, I can assure the
committee that, if confirmed, I will work with the Army financial
stakeholders to prioritize each multiyear contract for full funding for
every year that it is active.
test and evaluation
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it
appropriate to procure weapons systems and equipment that have not been
demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
and operationally suitable?
Answer. I do not believe it is ever appropriate to procure weapons
systems the Army intends to field to its soldiers before it is
adequately tested and proven safe and effective--this is paramount.
Through testing we are able to determine whether a system is suitable,
survivable and effective. If confirmed, I will always ensure we
adequately test all Army systems in order to provide the best equipment
available to our soldiers to improve their ability to accomplish the
mission.
Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other streamlined acquisition
processes?
Answer. I view the developmental and operational test and
evaluation processes for rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition and
other streamlined acquisition processes much the same as the normal
test and evaluation processes. The challenge is to accomplish the test
mission quicker to meet the urgent needs of the Warfighter. The Army
must conduct enough testing to determine the capabilities and
limitations of any system before fielding. The Army must also ensure
all systems are safe to use before putting them into the hands of our
soldiers. One way the Army is helping to speed up the testing process
is by including soldier touch points earlier during developmental
testing, thereby gaining critical operational insights much sooner than
what the Army was able to accomplish in the past.
Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have
adequate test and evaluation organizations, resources, and capabilities
necessary to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
acquisition, and budget decisions?
Answer. In my view, the Army's Test and Evaluation Enterprise has
adequate test and evaluation organizations, resources, and capabilities
necessary to test and evaluate the Army's priority modernization
programs and also to provide test services for critical acquisition
programs across the joint force.
Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Army should be
developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. The Army is already investing significant resources to
ensure it can test all Army modernization priority programs. I
understand it is also leveraging the DOD managed Central Test and
Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP) funds to procure test
capabilities when the Army currently has a gap--autonomy is an example
of a current investment area that is focused on a future test
requirement. Artificial intelligence, machine learning, electronic
warfare and cyber are other areas that require attention now. I feel
that the Army must also ensure that it tests systems in all the
operational environments the Army intends to use the equipment.
INDOPACOM, EUCOM and the Arctic present vastly different environments
from those the Army operated in over the last 20 years. If I am
confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army Test and Evaluation
Enterprise is adequately resourced to test all systems to include the
relevant operational environments of the systems intended use.
Question. In your view, would there be benefit to the Department's
establishment of a comparative testing program for domestic commercial
technologies--perhaps a program modeled on the successful Foreign
Comparative Testing program?
Answer. Yes, there would potentially be a benefit. There is always
benefit if we can find ways to provide advanced technologies for
warfighters without expensive development costs. Doing this for
domestic commercial technologies would also keep the Army within the
bounds of statutory requirements, such as the Buy American Act (which
requires Federal Agencies to procure domestic materials and products)
and the Berry Amendment (which requires the Department of Defense to
use American textile materials and products). The challenge, in my
view, is working with the requirements community when these
technologies are close to, but below, the threshold requirements to
either accept the lower performance or establish an incremental
improvement path that is timely and affordable. If confirmed, I would
explore the feasibility of some form of a comparative testing program
for commercial technologies.
technology transition
Question. The Department of Defense continues to struggle with the
transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and
major weapons systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has
struggled with moving technologies from the Department's programs
rapidly into the hands of operational users.
What impediments to technology transition do you perceive to exist
within the Army?
Answer. The Army has a mixed record in the area of technology
transitions, with many successes, but also many situations where a
promising technology was not able to move rapidly into production and
fielding. There are many reasons for this situation, but two stand out
in my view.
The first is a lack of funding flexibility. Modern congressional
appropriation and authorization acts prescribe the use of funding in a
highly detailed manner, including hundreds of specific research and
development and procurement lines. As a result, there are few large
scale, flexible pools of funding that the Army can draw on to pursue a
new opportunity that comes along unless it uses reprogramming
authority. While reprograming does provide the Army with great
flexibility, it is a limited resource that the Army must carefully
manage to ensure that responses to true emergencies, such as a natural
disasters or unforeseen deployments, can be funded. This necessarily
limits its use for technology transitions. In cases where Congress has
provided more flexibility, such as the counter-IED efforts that took
place during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has been able
to transition technologies much more rapidly.
A second impediment is a lack of dialog between the innovators and
the ``receiving'' elements of the Army regarding what is required to
transition a prototype or commercial technology to a militarily useful
system that is fully tested, safe, effective, and sustainable. For
example, the Army can conduct an experiment to demonstrate a
technology's combat effectiveness, but often does not--absent some kind
of emergency need--enter into formal program until the technology is
sufficiently mature to be tested and qualified against all the safety
and certification requirements necessary to field a combat capability.
This can take time, and can lead to understandable frustration on the
part of the innovators that are trying to bring new technology to the
Army. In my view, more detailed dialog earlier in technology
development efforts can help bridge this divide and lead to more
successful technology transitions.
Question. To what extent could and should the Army Research
Laboratory and other Army combat capability development centers play a
greater role in enabling the transition of promising technologies from
a successful initial demonstration to a program-of-record, which may
include working with industry and the desired program executive officer
(PEO) to develop and assist with a systems engineering plan necessary
to achieve transition to the PEO?
Answer. In my assessment, the Army can no longer have technology
developers work in ``silos-of-excellence.'' I understand the value of
early collaboration and frequent communication between the
Requirements, Science and Technology, Acquisition, Test, and
Sustainment communities; along with the Army's academic and industry
partners; and, most importantly, soldiers. However, I do not believe
the Army needs more processes mandated in legislation in this area at
this time. Instead, I believe the Army needs to better coordinate the
efforts of those developing innovative solutions with the authorities
and funding to proceed to production and fielding at scale. The Army
also needs better metrics to measure success and failure of these
efforts so our progress can be tracked by Army leaders and Congress. It
is my understanding that many efforts in this area are underway between
Army Futures Command and PEOs, but there is always more that can be
done to facilitate success in this area. If confirmed, I will encourage
these communities to collaborate and have Army scientists, engineers
and PEOs work together to mature technologies and provide cutting edge
capabilities to soldiers.
Question. In your view, what can be done from a budget, policy, and
organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies
from science and technology programs and other sources, including small
businesses, venture capital-funded companies, and other non-traditional
defense contractors, into acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army is leveraging all
statutory authorities and acquisition flexibilities to facilitate
technology transition from science and technology (S&T) efforts,
including those originating from industry partners, small businesses,
non-traditional contractors, and venture-capital funded companies.
Mapping S&T and other technology programs, such as the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) and Technology Maturation Initiative (TMI)
programs, to acquisition transition milestones is an effective approach
to accelerate transformative technology solutions for Army problems.
Another area to explore is working with OSD level centers of
innovation, such as DARPA, SCO, DIU, and others, to bring together
innovators and elements of the Army that need help. I understand that
the Army has had several successful collaborations with these groups,
but more can be done. If confirmed, I would also endeavor to work with
Congress to explore new ways to provide more flexible funding that
would allow the rapid realignment of available funds to meet unexpected
opportunities, especially in areas where technology is rapidly
advancing. If confirmed, I will send a clear message to the American
innovation community that commercial success and technology partnership
with the Army are not mutually exclusive.
procurement sourcing issues
Question. How should the Army balance the ``pros'' and ``cons'' of
supporting the domestic industrial base through Army procurement
activities, as compared to procuring items from friendly partner
nations, as further compared to procuring items from commercial
providers globally, including potentially from China?
Answer. In my view, the Army should always look first to the
domestic industrial base for its procurement needs. American companies,
run by American entrepreneurs and employing hard-working Americans,
have been and will remain one of our strongest advantages over our
competitors. At the same time, in a world of integrated and global
supply chains, we should also always look to see what is available from
our allies and partner nations. In many cases, American companies work
closely with international partners in these countries, providing a
chance for many win-win scenarios. Given the many well-documented cases
of intellectual property theft, lack of supply chain reliability, and
security risks of procurements from China, I believe the Army must
carefully review its procurements from that country. If confirmed, I
expect to work with appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense that are conducting reviews of domestic sourcing policies.
Question. What are your views on U.S. and friendly nation content
requirements, also known colloquially as ``Buy America'' requirements,
for U.S. Army weapon systems?
Answer. In general, while ideally all Army needs--in terms of
quality, quantity, and price would be met by American industry, I
believe the Army needs flexibility to make informed case-by-case
decisions on the amount of foreign content allowed in weapon systems.
In most cases, current laws and policies provide that flexibility.
However, I support data-driven approaches that lead to increased
American content in Army equipment while also keeping programs
affordable.
There is tremendous variation of domestic versus foreign content
within the broad range of Army weapon systems. As a result, a metric
that proposes a rigid percent of content for the entire bill of
material may make some products with low risk impossible to procure.
Many unique military items are bought in extremely low density, making
it uneconomical for a business to sustain production. Once the Army has
determined which components are at greatest risk, there may be a better
subset of materials to apply a content-based requirement for
procurement from U.S. and friendly nations. If confirmed, I would work
to examine the Army's policies in this area, which are evolving rapidly
based on new policies being developed across the Federal Government.
Question. In your view, for which types of U.S. Army weapon
systems, or which types of components, are such requirements
appropriate or inappropriate?
Answer. Generally, in my view, the Army's larger ACAT I programs
tend to be the most appropriate, along with Information and
Communication Technologies. If confirmed, I would stress the importance
of maintaining munition production capability that is tied to a
resilient supply chain of chemicals and raw materials. I would also
offer that smaller, more commercial programs are less appropriate for
the requirement.
army-related defense industrial base
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the systems
and processes for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk among the
entities that form the Army industrial base, including its organic
industrial base, and supply chain?
Answer. I understand that the Army industrial base risk assessment
process addresses the risks to the industrial base in its resiliency,
its ability to support and sustain acquisition programs, and the need
to meet future requirements. It is also important to identify foreign
dependency and risk mitigations where appropriate. In my view, integral
to this assessment is ensuring the Organic Industrial Base is factored
in to address the Army's ability to surge and sustain its systems
during any emergency.
Question. What is your view of the current health of the defense
industrial base, including the organic industrial base that supports
the Army?
Answer. In my view, the current industrial base is overall well-
positioned to support the development and sustainment of weapon
systems. However, constant attention must be paid to address challenges
the industrial base faces. Consistent investment in both the commercial
and organic bases are required to ensure a ready and capable source of
innovation and sustainment to support the Army's requirements. As in
the past, I believe the Defense Industrial Base will need to
consolidate or expand based on available resources and demand.
Question. How should Army acquisition leaders consider impacts on
the industrial base when addressing requirements for recapitalization
or modernization of major end items such as tanks, tactical wheeled
vehicles, or key repair parts?
Answer. In my view, the Army should look at recapitalization and
modernization as opportunities to help strengthen the industrial base,
both commercial and organic. Ideally, having an existing industrial
base in production not only provides a surge capability, it also helps
smooth a transition to a recapitalization or modernization effort. Once
production ends, the time and cost required to restart a facility or
train a workforce to recap or modernize increases. Managing a major end
item already in production requires stable, predictable funding to
maintain a sustainable rate.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue in
systems and processes to improve identification, monitoring, and
assessment of actions to ensure that risk in Army-relevant sectors of
the defense industrial base is adequately managed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work closely with
USD(A&S) to address service-level defense industrial base assessments
and contributions to DOD-wide and whole-of-government assessments.
Improving the visibility of the risks within the industrial base
requires a holistic approach to ensure investments are impactful.
Beyond visibility, policies must be put in place to rapidly address
industrial base risk where it arises. Many such authorities, such as
those under the Defense Production Act, already exist, but more may be
needed given new circumstances. I have no specific recommendations to
change existing systems and processes at this time. If confirmed, I
look forward to the opportunity to serve in the position before
recommending any potential changes that may be appropriate.
Question. In your view, what actions should the Army take to
maintain access to critical elements of the defense industrial base?
Answer. In my view, there are many areas where the Army must do
more to protect crucial elements of the defense industrial base. In
particular, I believe the Army needs to continue to invest in
modernizing munition facilities not only for Army needs but to support
the other services and coalition partners. The Army should focus
limited resources on those programs within the Defense Industrial Base
that provide the capabilities to contest the Army's near peer
competitors, or where the DOD is the only customer for highly
specialized items, such as large gun barrels used for artillery
systems. In addition, I believe the Army must work with DOD to
synchronize an all-of-government strategy in areas such as Micro-
Electronics and Battery manufacturing. The Army should also continue to
support the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) process that ensures accessibility to suppliers and prohibits
the transfer of intellectual property to prohibited nations.
Question. If confirmed, what would you see as your office's role in
working with or supporting efforts of the Army Office of Small Business
Programs?
Answer. Small businesses play a critical role in all aspects of
Army acquisition, logistics, and technology. If confirmed, I will work
with the Army Office of Small Business Programs to ensure the Army
employs a small-business centric philosophy; reduces barriers to entry;
and leverages technology development programs such as the Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR), xTech prize competitions, and
Mentor-Protege Program; acquisition programs in support of PEOs and
PMs; and sustainment or logistic programs in support of Army depots and
arsenals.
Question. If confirmed, what would you see as the relationship
between your office and the Defense Innovation Unit?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's technology-sector
outpost, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), provides a mechanism for
the services to connect with small, non-traditional businesses in the
technology sector. I believe that small businesses across the non-
traditional technology ecosystem are critical for modernization and
innovation for the future Army. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
Army is maximizing collaboration with DIU and other similar technology
outreach initiatives.
science and technology
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role
that science and technology (S&T) programs have played and will play in
developing capabilities for current and future Army systems?
Answer. I understand that the Army's current modernization strategy
includes nine priority research areas: disruptive energetics, radio
frequency electronic materials, quantum technology, hypersonic flight,
artificial intelligence, autonomy, synthetic biology, material by
design, and additive manufacturing. I agree with those priorities.
Further, it is my view that Army S&T programs have played and will
continue to play a crucial role in developing the six Army
Modernization priorities: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation
Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, Network, Air & Missile Defense
and Soldier Lethality, as well as enable even more advanced
capabilities for the future.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that successful Army
science and technology programs will transition to operational
warfighting capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army S&T community and
program offices to ensure S&T efforts are aligned to the Army
Modernization Priorities and Programs of Record. One method for
fostering effective transition pathways is through formalized
transition agreements from S&T to programs of record and, ultimately,
to the operational warfighter. These agreements, if overseen and
managed at the appropriate level, are a proven way to increase the
Army's rate of success in technology transition. If confirmed, another
way I would consider increasing success in this area is to make S&T
transition success the primary duty of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Research & Technology, who would report directly to me.
Question. What is the role of university research in supporting
Army modernization efforts and in developing the Army technical
workforce for the future?
Answer. I understand the Army invests in a broad-based portfolio of
university research in enduring and emerging Army-relevant technical
areas, including those associated with the Army Modernization
Priorities. These university-based investments form the basis for
future applied research and advanced development efforts aligned to the
modernization priorities, help prevent technological surprise by the
Army's adversaries, and help to train the next generation of science
and engineering professionals in areas of interest to the Army and to
the overall Defense Innovation Base.
laboratories and test centers
Question. What experience do you have in working with the Army's
labs and test centers?
Answer. While I have limited experience working directly with the
Army labs and test centers, I am aware of their accomplishments from my
previous roles in Congress and in the Army. If confirmed, I look
forward to increasing my direct knowledge of the various labs, centers
and most importantly, the expertise that those scientists and engineers
bring to bear in solving the hard problems facing the soldiers of today
and tomorrow.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assess and
enhance the interaction between Army labs and test centers and with the
acquisition community?
Answer. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to encourage these
communities to collaborate and have Army scientists, engineers and PEOs
work together to mature technologies and develop capabilities for
warfighters. The Army labs rely on test centers to develop and
demonstrate their capabilities and I would seek to understand what
opportunities exist to make it easier to plan and support these
efforts. I am confident that increasing senior leader oversight of
efforts to bring these communities together will produce results. In
addition, if confirmed, I would explore development of new management
metrics to ensure that results are quantifiable and trackable.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the Army's labs and test centers can attract and retain a technical
workforce with the necessary skills and capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to
expand outreach efforts to attract a diverse, highly skilled technical
workforce in order to address the Army's unique scientific challenges.
It is my understanding that Army laboratories and centers have
benefited from the hiring authorities, provided by Congress, to ensure
the Army has the necessary technical experts. If confirmed, I will be
committed to ensuring the Army continues to use these authorities to
the greatest extent possible to recruit and retain science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent. I will ensure the Army
continues to leverage the Army Educational Outreach Program to build a
pipeline of STEM talent and scholarship for service initiatives like
the DOD Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation, or
SMART, program to bring that expertise into the Army workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the Army's labs and test centers have the resources they need to
acquire and maintain research and testing infrastructure and equipment?
Answer. I believe that modern infrastructure and equipment is vital
to ensuring the Army stays at the cutting edge of technology and
continues to recruit and retain the most talented personnel. If
confirmed, I will engage with the appropriate stakeholders to better
understand the infrastructure challenges, align investment and
recapitalization priorities of Army laboratories and test facilities,
and look for possible solutions and unique strategies to ensure the
Army is making the necessary investments to sustain, restore, and
modernize laboratories and test ranges.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the Army's labs and test centers are not inappropriately overburdened
by bureaucratic Army or DOD regulations and practices that slow their
processes and inhibit their ability to act as the Army's innovation
engine?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army laboratories, test
centers, and the science and engineering workforce to better understand
the Army and DOD policies and regulations that slow their processes for
modernizing laboratory and test infrastructure, affect their ability to
hire the best technical talent, or inhibit their ability to deliver
innovative technologies for current and future Army priorities. I will
be committed to identifying and resolving the specific practices that
delay these processes to ensure the Army's laboratories and test
centers have the necessary infrastructure and technical personnel to
act as the Army's innovation engine and be effective in performing
their missions.
senior military and civilian accountability
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve
individual and organizational accountability in acquisition management?
Answer. In my view, accountability is fundamentally a function of
proper management and oversight. In the case of Army acquisition, the
``front line'' of accountable officials resides in the Program
Executive Offices (PEOs) where programs move through their entire life
cycle. I believe the Army has the policies in place to hold officials
professionally accountable for their performance. Based on my time as
Acting Army Acquisition Executive, I can say that the acquisition
professionals in the PEOs seek and accept responsibility for doing
their jobs well. As leaders, they also understand that the needs of the
Army come first, and that they are all subject to relief or replacement
based on performance.
Another aspect of accountability is continuous and open
professional dialog so that when there is a program that runs into
challenges, the issues driving the problems are well understood and
communicated appropriately. If confirmed, I would reinforce the
previous guidance I provided while Acting Army Acquisition Executive:
that constant communication--especially regarding programs with
challenges--is the standard of behavior I would expect all Army
acquisition professionals to follow.
In addition, I would hold myself personally accountable for the
performance of Army acquisition programs, and be responsible for
communications to senior Army leaders, and to Congress, about any
challenges they are facing.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to hold acquisition
officials accountable for failing to follow acquisition laws and
regulations?
Answer. Generally speaking, acquisition personnel at every level,
to include the ASA(ALT), PEOs, and PMs, are required to comply with all
acquisition laws and regulations. If confirmed as the ASA(ALT), I would
ensure that accountability within individual programs is reinforced
through routine program reviews, milestone decisions, technical
reviews, and other program assessments. I would also ensure a close and
collaborative relationship with the Army Office of General Counsel to
review the Army's broader compliance with applicable statutes,
regulations, and policies. Moreover, I would ensure that proper
training and certification requirements are in place to educate and
reinforce compliance within the Army acquisition workforce and to
promote a culture of accountability and stewardship of taxpayer
resources. Last, if confirmed, I would hold the individuals responsible
and take appropriate action in response to violations of applicable
laws and regulations.
Question. What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of
accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Army
with regard to acquisition program failures?
Answer. In my view, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Staff of the Army are ultimately accountable for acquisition program
outcomes. They are assisted in this effort by the ASA(ALT), PEOs, and
PMs, who share accountability for the execution of acquisition
programs. At every level, these civilian and military leaders are
responsible for providing oversight and ensuring accountability for
program objectives in terms of cost, schedule, and system performance.
If confirmed, I would rigorously adhere to this standard and ensure
that the acquisition workforce understands its shared accountability
for these outcomes.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
senior leaders of the Army under your supervision and oversight are
properly held accountable for their actions and performance?
Answer. If confirmed as the ASA(ALT), I would ensure senior
acquisition leaders are held accountable through various mechanisms.
First, I would conduct milestone and other program and technical
reviews to ensure PEOs and PMs are held accountable to established
acquisition program baselines and objectives. The ASA(ALT), as the Army
Acquisition Executive, is also responsible for appointing, managing,
and evaluating PEOs and direct-reporting program managers, and I would
ensure that those evaluations accurately reflect the performance of the
individual. As the Senior Procurement Executive, I would conduct
routine reviews with the contracting enterprise and leadership to
ensure proper use of resources when executing Army contracting actions.
Last, across the acquisition enterprise, I would ensure proper training
and certification requirements and would establish metrics to ensure
compliance. In all of these efforts, I would work to promote a culture
of responsibility and ownership of acquisition outcomes.
management and development of the army acquisition workforce
Question. The transformation of the armed forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and
forward-thinking management of the acquisition workforce.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
acquisition workforce, including the scientific and technical fields?
Answer. In my judgment, to effectively modernize the Army over the
next decade and beyond, the Army must continue to develop the necessary
technical acumen and leadership competency within the acquisition
workforce. If confirmed, talent management will be one of my top
priorities and I will ensure we have the processes and tools in place
for managing talent particularly in the areas of recruitment,
development and retention. When it comes to competing for talent, the
Army must continue to be innovative in finding ways to make the
acquisition workforce a competitive employer including incentives for
critical acquisition functional areas such as program management,
contracting, and science and technology management.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has an appropriately sized
acquisition workforce, with the proper skills, to manage into the
future? If not, please describe the gaps you perceive to exist and how
you would address them.
Answer. I believe the Army has a need to grow knowledge, skills,
abilities in assessing and mitigating Supply Chain Risk. Army logicians
will require additional analytical and critical thinking skills and
training as part of Army's mission to secure its supply chains. We also
have significant gaps in the software area. The Army needs to recognize
that software is growing exponentially and develop strategies, skills
and expertise to properly manage software intensive programs throughout
the acquisition system lifecycle with a keen eye on reducing
operational and sustainment costs.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the
statutes, regulations, or policies regarding the Army's acquisition
workforce? If so, what changes would you recommend?
Answer. The Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration
Project (AcqDemo) is currently slated to sunset in December 2023.
Hiring restrictions and complex processes increase hiring timelines,
exhaust valuable resources, and unnecessarily detract attention from
the acquisition mission. The streamlined hiring and appointment
authorities the Army has under AcqDemo are essential to the ability to
attract and maintain a highly capable, agile, adaptive and professional
workforce. If confirmed, I would consider pursuing a legislative
proposal to make AcqDemo permanent.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Defense
Acquisition University and other educational institutions to improve
the education and training of all members of the Army acquisition
workforce?
Answer. In support of the OUSD A&S memo, dated September 2, 2020,
``Back-to-Basics for the Defense Acquisition Workforce'' it is my
understanding that the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is already
leading the largest overall change to DOD Acquisition training in 30
years. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the DAU to minimize
``scrap learning,'' focus on job-relevant training, and foster a
culture of life-long learning.
Question. In your judgment, how should decisionmakers determine
which acquisition tasks are best accomplished by government employees,
military personnel, and support contractors?
Answer. In my judgment, acquisition tasks require all three
categories in its workforce. Each brings different training, skills,
and experience that should be considered when assigning work. Unless
the task is inherently governmental in nature, which should be done by
civilian or military personnel, all should be considered.
Question. How can the Army best make use of the foreign national
technical talent that is being educated in the United States, so that
these individuals continue to support U.S. national security efforts
and are not attracted to work for competitor nations, while at the same
time ensuring such talent is properly cleared from a security and
suitability perspective?
Answer. In my view, it is critical that the Army, in close
coordination with the Department of Defense, leverages all existing
authorities to evaluate potential conflicts of interest and security
concerns when partnering with academia. I believe a whole of government
approach is required to truly address the problem by sharing grant and
cooperative agreement award information across agencies and creating
mechanisms for sharing adverse information across agencies.
army defense capabilities
Question. What is your opinion of the necessity of modernizing Army
weapons systems in light of current and emerging threats?
Answer. In my opinion, modernizing Army capabilities must be a top
priority. There is no responsible alternative. Army forces have lost
overmatch in some critical areas as our potential adversaries have
invested to exploit our known capability shortfalls, and new challenges
often require new capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to balance Army
readiness for today's conflicts and modernization for future conflicts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
Army, the Chief of Staff, and other Army senior leaders to strike the
best balance between our investments in People, Readiness, and
Modernization for both today and the future, within allocated
resources.
Question. What are the most critical capabilities the Army needs to
prioritize over the next 10 years, in your view?
Answer. In my assessment, the most critical capabilities that need
to be modernized over the next 10 years are clearly represented in the
Army's six modernization priorities: long-range precision fires, next
generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, the network, air and
missile defense, and soldier lethality. If confirmed, I will work
closely with Army Futures Command and other Army commands to ensure our
modernization priorities are continuously assessed, and refined when
needed, to reflect the dynamic operational environment and the defense
strategy.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to meet both Army
capability and capacity requirements consistent with the Defense
Planning Guidance?
Answer. I believe the Army must maintain sufficient capability and
capacity in accordance with defense strategic guidance and within
available resources. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of
the Army to assess its modernization priorities and adjust them, if
necessary. Ultimately the Army needs sufficient resources to fulfill
its role as part of the Joint Force responsible for deterring, and if
necessary, defeating military aggression that threatens vital U.S.
interests with acceptable risk to force and mission. If confirmed, I
plan to work within the Army's allocated funding to ensure the most
modern, ready, and lethal soldiers possible.
long-range precision fires
Question. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are all are
pursuing long-range strike capabilities. In your view, what is the
Army's role in developing and producing these capabilities and what is
necessary to best position the Services to work together to avoid
unnecessary duplication?
Answer. I agree that avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort
among Service investments and capabilities is important. In my view,
doing so starts with a Joint Warfighting Concept that clearly defines
what Service forces are expected to accomplish as part of the Joint
Force. However, what is perhaps sometimes seen as unnecessary
duplication of effort within the Joint Force is also seen by potential
adversaries as multiple, disparate ways to be defeated by US military
forces. To me, complicating an enemy's calculus is an element of a good
defense strategy. With regards to the Army as the Nation's land force,
I take the view that the Army is charged in Federal statute ``for the
preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of
war except as otherwise assigned.'' If confirmed, I will work closely
within the Army and across the Defense enterprise to avoid unnecessary
duplication, while complicating our enemy's calculus.
Question. The Army is rapidly fielding the Long-Range Hypersonic
Weapon system at a substantial cost per glide-body based round.
What can be done to reduce the cost of subsequent rounds once the
initial capability is fielded?
Answer. I believe the Army plans to continue to team with industry
to improve upon the initial prototype design of the hypersonic missile
in order to enhance the manufacturability and reduce costs. As
production quantities increase there is a learning curve and a natural
decrease in cost per round. As part of the Army's responsibilities in a
Joint-Service Memorandum of Agreement for Hypersonics development, the
Army is already actively working with its industry partners to transfer
hypersonic technology from the government labs and into the commercial
industrial base, which will further drive efficiencies as the
technology moves into production. I feel that Congress has also been
supportive of helping the Army achieve this goal of cost-saving for
Hypersonics by granting additional congressional funds that have gone
to the industrial base to directly support development, from which both
the Army and Navy will benefit.
8Question. Do you believe the Army should assess possible
alternative, cheaper capabilities, such as the air-breathing scramjet
missile being developed by the Air Force?
Answer. Yes, I believe the Army, in coordination with the other
services, should continue to assess future hypersonic technologies, to
include air-breathing scram jet technologies, as they mature for
integration into the long range fires portfolio. The priority of
hypersonic development for the Army is the Long Range Hypersonic
Weapon, which I understand will field in fiscal year 2023, as the
technology is mature and it will provide a near-term rapid national
hypersonic capability.
integrated visual augmentation system (ivas)
Question. The Army has made significant progress in a relatively
short time with its IVAS program, which features Army soldiers are
working side-by-side with Microsoft engineers to field-test the
technology and make frequent changes as indicated by such testing.
Additional improvements are expected.
In your view, are programs such as IVAS appropriately structured to
provide the Army with flexibility to continue evolving the system and
leverage improvements to better meet soldiers' needs?
Answer. Yes. In my view, all of the Army Middle Tier Acquisition
(MTA) programs are structured to achieve the desired results within the
5-year window for either rapid prototyping or rapid fielding. The Army
MTA rapid prototyping efforts are tailored to leverage as much
iteration as necessary between soldier feedback and industry
evolutionary improvements, based on the complexity and technology
maturity. soldier's needs and reliability are a paramount factor for
success. IVAS is an excellent example of an MTA rapid prototyping
effort that is adapting its schedule and funding to continue evolving
the system to better meet the Army needs, as evidenced by shifting
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in order to improve
functionality and reliability.
Question. In your view, what factors should the Army consider when
determining the quantities of quickly evolving systems to acquire?
Answer. In my view, each case is unique, but in general factors to
consider are: (1) the rate of change in that area of technology, (2)
the cost to procure the system, (3) the cost to sustain the system, and
(4) the possible need for surge capacity for the capability in
question.
With regard to the rate of change for a technology, the Army should
consider how long it would take to field the systems into the hands of
warfighters and how long the critical technology remains relevant.
An example of this type of technology is counter-UAS systems which
are rapidly evolving as threat systems evolve. The Army must be careful
not to over-invest in something that works today but will no longer be
relevant a year from now.
The cost to acquire and sustain a system in a rapidly evolving
technology area is frequently difficult to estimate. For example, the
cost to acquire it may be low, but it may require highly specialized
contractor support, which can prove very costly.
Surge capacity is a final factor to consider. What can start as a
``niche'' capability can, very quickly, become something that is needed
across a large number of Army units. In this case, understanding
industry's ability to potentially ramp up production is a critical
factor.
Question. Do you think there are ways the Army can position itself
to build in flexibility for off-ramps or staggered buys when acquiring
evolving technology?
Answer. I believe the Army has been successful with this
acquisition approach when there is flexible funding and authorities are
provided by Congress that allow a rapid shift of priorities in a
rapidly evolving technology area. The Army's counter-IED effort--from
MRAPs to jammers--during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is an
example. A more recent, though smaller scale, example is the nascent
counter-UAS efforts providing capability to deployed forces right now.
Another path to success is designing capability using a Modular Open
Systems Approach that will facilitate the ability to upgrade capability
as more advanced technology becomes available. In addition, taking an
incremental approach to providing system capability over time or
fielding earlier with Urgent Materiel Releases when appropriate would
allow for flexibility to keep pace with evolving technology.
optionally manned fighting vehicle
Question. The Army has made several attempts to develop a next-
generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle to replace the aging Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, including Future Combat System (FCS), Manned Ground
Vehicle (MGV), Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), and the initial Optionally
Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) effort that was halted and restructured.
What is your assessment of the restructured OMFV effort?
Answer. My assessment is that the current multiphase OMFV program
strategy is a balanced way to procure a robust platform with sufficient
size, weight, and power to integrate additional capabilities over time,
while remaining responsive to emerging near peer threats in a Multi-
Domain Operation environment. My understanding is that the shift from
highly prescriptive requirements to a Characteristics of Need document
is intended to provide industry trade space to develop optimized,
achievable alternatives leading to digital design concepts and open
architecture before committing to prototype builds. If confirmed, I
will monitor this program closely to ensure that its new approach is
executed successfully.
Question. Why do you think the restructured OMFV program will
succeed where the other efforts failed?
Answer. In my view, the current OMFV effort is fundamentally
different than previous similar programs. First, acquisition processes
have evolved in recent years, and the OMFV program is intended to take
advantage of innovative approaches that will hopefully create a path to
success for this vital capability. Most significant is the Adaptive
Acquisition Framework which established a set of acquisition pathways
to enable program managers and industry to tailor strategies to deliver
better solutions faster. The restructured OMFV effort has an improved
opportunity to succeed because the Army has an updated toolbox to take
advantage of innovative ideas and the latest technologies surrounding
design, program management, and manufacturing. Second, the OMFV program
is pursuing a Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) approach from
the ground up to ensure that it is upgradable, sustainable, and
affordable over time.
Question. Several of the prior efforts failed due to requirements
that were technologically unachievable and/or conceptually flawed. Do
you believe the Army's requirements for OMFV are appropriately
underpinned by robust analysis to avoid these pitfalls?
Answer. Yes. I am confident the path forward for the Army's
requirements for the OMFV program, and the underlying analysis, is
appropriately robust and will continue to evolve as technology and
threats change. Lessons learned from Future Combat System (FCS) and
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) have been foundational to the establishment
of Cross Functional Teams and codifying requirements commensurate with
what exists and what the end State is when the Army begins to build a
new fleet of next generation combat vehicles.
Question. As part of the Army's Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
(OMFV) program, the Army is developing what it refers to as Common
Modular Open Architecture (CMOA). The Army asserts that CMOA is
designed to make it easier to plug a subsystem into a vehicle, even if
the subsystem comes from a different manufacturer, through use of
common software and hardware connectors. The Army notes that adopting
CMOA would make it easier to upgrade combat systems; others have
highlighted the possibility that the shift to modular and open
architectures will result in increased initial procurement costs, while
potentially lowering procurement costs later in a weapon system's
lifespan.
What are your thoughts on CMOA--both as regards the Army and for
its potential for interoperability with other Services' platforms?
Answer. I believe that the CMOA has the potential to fundamentally
change the way we acquire capabilities as it will move the Army away
from purchasing an entire platform and toward purchasing severable
modules that can be used by multiple platforms. This enables better
buying power, provides clear communication with industry about what
components are needed and how they will integrate, and will reduce the
logistics footprint. It will also increase the opportunities for
horizontal integration and re-use across the Army and the other
services. However, this design approach, in my view, will likely
require more time up front, which could add to the program's early cost
while hopefully paying off through savings later in the program's life.
I also believe this is the right program to attempt this approach
at large scale. In my brief time as Acting Army Acquisition Executive,
I authorized numerous sole-source contract awards as a result of the
Army having limited intellectual property rights for major weapon
system components. Hopefully, in the case of the OMFV, the Army can
maintain competition for major system components that will lead to
increased innovation and reduced costs.
Question. In your view, what factors could be considered when
assessing whether the upfront costs of the CMOA are worth the potential
savings over the lifetime of the system?
Answer. I think the Army needs to consider the pace of
technological change, component obsolescence, and whether the function
provided by a given module is one that could be effectively used by
multiple platforms. When technology for a given commodity area changes
rapidly, the Army needs to keep that module severable so it can adopt
the latest version. Similarly, I think we can use CMOA to guard against
obsolete parts and avoid lifetime buys, instead integrating a form/fit/
functional replacement that may be able to support multiple platforms.
In addition, the length of time the Army intends to operate a weapon
system is a critical factor. In my view, in areas where technology is
changing so quickly that the Army is procuring systems it will only
operate for a short time, a focus on CMOA is less appropriate.
positioning, navigation, and timing (pnt)
Question. Given the expectation that the Nation's ground forces may
soon have to operate in GPS limited or denied environments, what
priority do you think should be placed on developing alternative
sources of PNT that are not dependent on GPS to function?
Answer. I believe that alternative sources of PNT are critically
important to our Nation's ground forces, as well as the entire Joint
Force. Army Futures Command has a PNT cross functional team, which
attests to the importance the Army assigns to this capability.
Question. In your view, will GPS vulnerabilities remain, even after
GPS is modernized with a new command and control system, M-Code
satellites, and M-Code enabled receivers for platforms and weapons
systems? Is there an enduring need for GPS alternatives in general, and
for weapons guidance in particular?
Answer. I believe that PNT, like many battlefield capabilities, is
a continuous competition between counter-measures and counter-counter-
measures. Modernizing the Army's current capabilities is required, but
doing so will not guarantee dominance forever. In my view, the Army
must remain ever vigilant for adversary advancements, as well as new
opportunities offered by technological advancements within the U.S.
industrial base and those of our closest allies.
integrated personnel and pay system--army (ipps-a)
Question. The Army has recently announced a major delay in
deploying capabilities as part of the IPPS-A program. This comes after
many years of cost overruns, schedule delays, and changes in
acquisition strategy.
What is your assessment of the causes of the problems that have
faced the IPPS-A program?
Answer. I believe the Army is transforming its Human Resource
processes from aging, disparate software systems to a fully integrated
solution. This is a vast and complex undertaking that is necessary for
Army talent management to succeed. Earlier efforts attempted to develop
multiple major software releases in parallel, which proved too
technically complex. Decisive steps were taken to re-baseline the
program and reduce the technical complexity by eliminating the parallel
software development efforts along with establishing a minimum viable
solution. I am confident that the Army can resolve these technical
issues to implement and deliver a fully integrated and working H.R.
solution that can execute end-to-end Army business processes.
Question. What role should the Army's technical community,
including at Army Developmental Command, have to address the technical
challenges in the program?
Answer. I understand that the IPPS-A program leverages technical
expertise from the Army's technical community, including those within
the PEO EIS organization as well as the Army's Human Resource data
subject matter experts. In my view, the Army should seek the expertise
from scientists and engineers who provide the Army with organic
research and development capability, as well as the office of the Chief
Information Officer, as appropriate. This must be a collective effort
where all resources are brought to bear on the challenges and the
effort must include the right metrics as the program goes through
development and testing. I am confident that the Army has access to the
right resources to address the technical challenges in the program.
integrated personnel and pay system--army (ipps-a)
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that this program
takes the appropriate steps to ensure the most effective and efficient
deployment of this capability to soldiers?
Answer. I believe the Army understands the importance of this
project and is greatly committed to delivering a modernized integrated
Human Resource solution. If confirmed, I will continue to take the
necessary steps to ensure the successful delivery of Release 3 in
September 2022, as well as subsequent releases. I will continue to use
the established metrics to measure and manage progress over time and
share that data on a regular basis to Army senior leaders. I will also
ensure the ASA(ALT) staff assists the PEO and PM in working directly
with the prime contractor to ensure the Army delivers this
transformational capability.
technical data
Question. In your view, what are ways the Army can improve the
process of obtaining the technical data needed to support requirements
development, maintaining competition in the industrial base,
developmental and operational testing, and sustaining systems and
software?
Answer. In my view, intellectual property (IP), including technical
data, plays a critical role in the Army's ability to modernize and
sustain weapons. In order to ensure the Army obtains the appropriate IP
necessary to achieve these objectives, programs must identify early in
the process the IP needed in all phases of a system's life cycle, to
include in sustainment. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that
programs develop appropriate IP strategies early in the process and
employ customized approaches to acquiring IP, to include working
collaboratively with industry to develop mutually beneficial
arrangements. I believe the Army must ensure adequate expertise is
resident in the Army to allow programs to effectively identify, pursue,
and negotiate IP rights and requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure
that the policies and practices governing intellectual property provide
the Army with the necessary access to effectively support weapons
systems.
systems engineering
Question. Do you believe that the Army has the systems engineering
organizations, resources, and capabilities needed to ensure that there
is a sound basis for key requirements, acquisition, contract oversight,
and budget decisions on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. In my assessment, the Army has the system engineering (SE)
organizations that it needs to operate now and in the future; however,
I think the Army may require additional resources to transition to the
future operating environment. The digital transformation of Army
systems engineering comes with a cost to change not only infrastructure
but culture. I believe the challenge is to maintain and grow the
engineering workforce through training, education, and SE governance,
and to recognize the knowledge, skills and behaviors needed to
continually meet the requirements of the ever-modernizing Army.
Question. In your view, to what extent could the Army's
introduction of systems engineering earlier in the acquisition process,
including component and subsystem prototyping, enable improved
acquisition outcomes? Please explain your answer.
Answer. In my view, introducing systems engineering early in the
acquisition process has the potential to change the Army's approach to
acquisition writ large. The development and use of government owned
reference architectures enables modularity and agility through the rest
of the acquisition process. Establishing a modular government
architecture communicates to industry what kinds of components are
needed now and in the future. This enables vendors to align product
lines to those modules enabling early prototyping and competition and
long-term technology insertion. Key practices include the use of
standards-driven architectures, technical management, and risk
assessments. These key practices support early evaluation of the
component and subsystem prototyping viable in the current and future
environments, inform requirements, and expose early opportunities for
integration.
Question. In your view, what would be the benefits of using
advanced engineering methods and technologies, such as digital
engineering practices?
Answer. In my judgment, utilization of advanced engineering best
practices throughout the lifecycle of a capability promotes
modernization of the Army portfolio and helps the Army recruit and
retain needed engineering talent that are digital natives. Modern
advances in engineering technology are only incremental within a given
discipline, but also transformational in their integration across
disciplines. Digital engineering practices are about integrating data
from across engineering disciplines to continuously evaluate whether
the design of a system/subsystem/component is consistent and meets the
required design requirements. The result of effectively applying
digital engineering is more rapid design cycles without sacrificing
engineering rigor. That is, delivering systems faster and knowing that
they will work as promised when they are delivered. I believe the
implementation of digital thread processes and common modular component
standards should ensure the Army's ability to maximize the benefits of
digital prototyping, design, simulation, and testing throughout the
lifecycle of the capability.
cyber and electronic warfare
Question. Do you support establishing the Principal Cyber Advisor
function in the Army? If confirmed, how would you envision working with
the Army PCA?
Answer. I fully support the position of the Principal Cyber
Advisor. If confirmed, I will support the efforts already in progress
to identify risk and mitigation priorities for the Army, to develop
more secure acquisition processes, and to increase the efficacy of the
cyber workforce.
Question. Do you believe the Army is organized and postured
appropriately to address the full spectrum of cyber threats to the
Army's role in joint, multi-domain operations?
Answer. I believe the Army has the right plans in place to ensure
soldiers have the integrated force structure, modernized equipment, and
interoperable command & control to address the full spectrum of cyber
threats in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) by 2028. Since 2012, I
understand the Army has been committed to operationalizing
capabilities, organizations and forces to meet the challenges posed in
cyberspace. As an example, one of the Army's top modernization
priorities includes fielding Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) aligned
against National Defense Strategy (NDS) key threats, with one MDTF at
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) recently supporting the INDO-PACOM
theater during the DEFENDER PACIFIC exercise, and a second MDTF planned
for the EUCOM theater achieving IOC by the end of fiscal year 2022. The
MDTF design provides the ability to deliver offensive cyber effects
while also defending the Department of Defense Information Networks
(DODIN) and critical infrastructure necessary for ensuring force
projection. The Army's advanced warfighting platform investment, such
as the Terrestrial Layer System (TLS) Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) with
the Long-Range Signals Sensing, Electronic Attack, and Cyber
Operations, provides capabilities essential to all phases of JADO.
Finally, the Army established a Cyber Warfare Battalion that will
eventually include 12 Expeditionary CEMA Teams capable of providing
downward reinforcing effects at echelon for hard targets requiring
reach back support from CONUS. Additionally, the Army dedicated
institutional programs for technology protection, program protection,
addressing readiness, testing forces in contested environments and in
the acquisition community. The Army also established the Army Priority
Vulnerability Management program to make sure systems are delivered and
remain uncompromised through the entire life cycle. If confirmed, I
will be committed to this critical challenge and I will work with the
Hill, Joint Staff, and the other Services to continuously evaluate and
improve our posture, programs, and capabilities.
Question. What are your recommendations for improving Army
acquisition of offensive and defense cyber capabilities?
Answer. It is my belief that offensive and defensive cyber
capability acquisition lifecycles are incredibly compressed. The time
from identification of a requirement through delivery of a capability
can be measured in months. If confirmed, I will work within existing
statutory authorities to treat the Army's offensive and defensive cyber
Program Managers in a manner that allows them to execute at the speed
demanded by this unique warfighting domain, and provide them with the
authority to decide how to meet rapidly emerging and evolving validated
requirements while still maintaining necessary oversight and reporting.
I will also recommend the continuation of flexible acquisition
practices such as the Software Acquisition Pathway, Mid-Tier
Acquisition, and will leverage the use of RDT&E Budget Activity 8
funding to enable faster and more relevant capability delivery.
Additionally, the Army must find innovative ways to leverage what is
being done in the commercial marketplace.
Whether it is incentivizing the hiring of technical experts or
being a ``fast follower'' in implementing or modifying commercial
products for military use, the Army must find ways to continue to keep
pace. In addition, if confirmed I will work closely with the Army
Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) to improve the Army's overall approach to
the acquisition of cyber capabilities, including potential new
structures to better align the Army with approaches used by other
services and elements of DOD, as well as the private sector.
Question. How could the Army better fund the acquisition and
sustainment of cyber capabilities, particularly given that the rules
and boundaries of existing funding mechanisms and accounts (research
and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance) create
numerous obstacles to timely acquisition outcomes?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Army
Principal Cyber Advisor on his efforts to assess all Army's cyberspace-
related investments in order to reduce operational risk and establish a
new Cyberspace Resourcing Framework IAW recent statutory requirements.
I will also work in tandem with appropriate stakeholders such as
ASA(FM&C), DCG G-8 PA&E, DCS G-3/5/7, Army Cyber Command and Army CIO
to ensure only the most appropriate capabilities are purchased and
linked to validated requirements thru the PPBE process.
Question. In your view, what should be the appropriate Army
contribution to joint EW capabilities, particularly as regards Multi-
Domain Task Forces?
Answer. In my view, a capability for Electronic Warfare includes
the capability itself, any associated analytical and dissemination
tools to enable the capability, and trained soldiers at all echelons.
Due to the Multi-Domain Task Force's responsibility across an enormous
area of terrain the Army must contribute EW capabilities associated
with the targets delegated to the Army by the theater. This comprises
both offensive and defensive EW capabilities across air and ground to
counter threat EW systems--this includes close in penetration phase EW
capabilities and standoff / deep capabilities during campaigning phase
and evaluation of competition phase capabilities. This also ensures
access to national data served by the intelligence community and the
associated authorities necessary to access, combine, and use the
exquisite data for EW targeting. The foundational military intelligence
and signature characterization for threat systems performs a critical
element of these EW capabilities.
Through Project Convergence and theater aligned exercises in the
Pacific and Europe the Army drove the inclusion of MDO experimentation
including non-kinetic options with the expansion of EW to echelons
above brigade and multi-Service efforts to develop Joint Electronic
Battle Management requirements and capabilities.
Question. Section 1637 of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit to
Congress, as a part of the documentation that supports the President's
annual budget for the Department of Defense, a consolidated Cyber
Vulnerability Evaluation and Mitigation budget justification display
for each major weapons system of the Department of Defense, starting in
Fiscal Year 2021. This consolidated budget display was not provided, as
required, for the Fiscal Year 2022 budget.
If confirmed, will you commit to providing this budget display
along with the Fiscal Year 2023 budget request?
Answer. Yes. In continued transparency as outlined in the NDAA, if
confirmed, I will work with the Army Principal Cyber Advisor to
determine the adequacy of the budget for all cyber matters and together
we will provide the information this Committee needs.
Question. More broadly, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure that the appropriate planning and budgeting is done to support a
robust cybersecurity weapon systems program, as part of the traditional
acquisition process?
Answer. If confirmed, my office would collaborate with Army Futures
Command to refine Concepts of Operations and Concepts of Employment for
cyber capabilities in support of Army formations and missions. As U.S.
Cyber Command takes a more assertive role in the programming and
budgeting process, I will work with the Army's corresponding staff
elements in Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, the Army Budget Office, and the
Army's Principal Cyber Advisor to ensure coordination and synergy
between Joint cybersecurity and cyber weapons programs and the Army's
critical and necessary Service-retained capabilities. Additionally, I
would encourage requirements developers to ensure appropriate cyber-
security requirements are included, and would task PEOs to implement
cyber-security from the start of each program. In my view, the Army
must include these requirements and costs up front, so they are known
and resourced parts of the program, as opposed to un-funded
requirements late in the life cycle.
munitions
Question. Army munitions inventories, particularly those of
precision guided munitions, have declined significantly due to high
operational usage, insufficient procurement, and a requirements system
that does not adequately account for the ongoing need to transfer
munitions to our allies and for operations short of major combat.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the Army has
sufficient inventories of munitions to meet combatant commanders'
needs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to coordinate with Combatant
Commanders to support their requirements. I will focus on aligning
funding to modernize our munitions stock and improve overall inventory
levels to ensure the Army meets combatant commanders' requirements. I
will also collaborate with our industry partners to increase production
and procurement of critical munitions.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to bolster
the munitions industrial base's depth and surge capacity?
Answer. I understand the Army is the DOD's Single Manager for
Conventional Ammunition (SMCA). If confirmed, I would ensure that Army,
Air Force, and Navy Acquisition Executives, are synchronized on
ammunition requirements to ensure optimization of the SMCA's ammunition
procurements and investments in the industrial base. I would ensure
clear and frequent communications to industry partners to enable them
to effectively plan and respond to the Army's ammunition needs. If
confirmed, in order to bolster the munitions organic industrial base, I
would support the completion of the 15-year Army Ammunition Plant (AAP)
modernization plan to increase manufacturing readiness and safety,
increase environmental stewardship, and increase operating
efficiencies. By resourcing and executing this plan, I believe that
critical AAPs will be well-postured to safely and effectively produce
ammunition for warfighters well into the future.
energy and acquisition
Question. How can our acquisition systems better address
requirements related to the use of energy in military platforms to
decrease risks to warfighters?
Answer. In my view, platform-level energy efficiency should be a
critical element of all new Army systems. By reducing overall energy
demand, more flexible operations are enabled and fewer logistics
personnel are put at risk on a highly lethal battlefield. As the Army
refines its concepts for logistics and sustainment going forward, such
considerations should become a standard feature of all Army programs.
However, energy efficiency is secondary to combat effectiveness. As a
result, energy savings must be pursued in a manner that does not
compromise a system's combat effectiveness or the safety of the
soldiers using it.
Question. What steps would you take to invest upfront in energy
savings technologies and practices to reduce the life cycle costs of
Army systems, even if those savings are not realized immediately?
Answer. In my view, reducing energy demand is key. Current
technology does not support moving to all electric platforms given the
capabilities required on a battlefield. However, I understand the Army
is exploring hybrid technologies that couple today's combustion engines
with battery storage. When mature, I understand the Army plans to
invest in these hybrid technologies to reduce demand and improve
reliability. These same hybrid technologies would also apply to Army
power generation systems.
Question. In your view, how can energy supportability that reduces
contested logistics vulnerabilities best be incorporated as a key
factors in the requirements process?
Answer. In my view, an integrated approach that starts with a
thorough analysis of a contested logistics environment is required to
fully understand significant changes in approach to system energy
requirements. If confirmed, I would look to Army logistics experts,
such as those in Army Materiel Command, to take leadership in
developing new logistics concepts that would then result in new
platform level requirements. Once that occurs, in my judgment, it will
still be critical to look at each system on a case-by-case basis. For
weapon systems soldiers will use in combat, it is my view that energy
efficiency must not compromise combat capability or survivability.
Question. Specifically, how can the Army broadly include
operational energy improvements in its weapons platforms?
Answer. Two potential areas for operational energy improvements in
weapons platforms are the addition of hybrid-electric technologies at
scale across the Army's fleet of combat vehicles, and the assessment of
the benefit of changing the policy for a single fuel on the battlefield
to allow for the potential use of ultra-low sulphur diesel for some
systems. Additionally, the use of electric vehicles across the Army for
non-tactical tasks (such as running ranges or on base maintenance) is
another potential avenue for improvement.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
male DOD respondents indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
12 months prior to completing the survey.
Question. Having served since January 2021 as the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology),
what is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. I started at ASA(ALT) as the Principal Deputy ASA (ALT) on
March 8, 2021. During my time in the organization, I have not been made
aware of any incidents of sexual harassment or gender discrimination.
Harassment and discrimination jeopardize readiness and mission
accomplishment, weaken trust among colleagues, and erode organizational
cohesion. If confirmed, I will focus on maintaining a workplace that
meets these standards. I am committed and responsible to provide a
workplace that is free from all unlawful forms of harassment and
discrimination.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. Upon receiving, or learning of, a complaint of sexual
harassment, discrimination, or other harassment from an employee, I
would ensure the employee receives information regarding their rights,
due process and avenues of redress; and immediately put them into
contact with appropriate servicing officials for intake and processing
(IAW Federal laws, EEOC, DOD, and Army policy).
If confirmed, I will ensure coordination with my servicing EEO
Official, legal advisor, and Civilian Personnel Official; support any
inquiry or response necessary to promptly address and resolve the
matter(s) at issue; and take appropriate corrective or disciplinary
action as warranted. Further, I will ensure all necessary and
appropriate policies and resources for prevention and response are in
place. I will ensure an unfettered procedure for civilian employees to
report all forms of harassment or discrimination. Finally, I will
ensure that all training and education requirements and standards are
met.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
army contract writing system
1. Senator Reed. Mr. Bush, over the summer, the Navy allowed their
award for a contract writing system to expire before receiving a final
product. The Army is using the same vendor. If confirmed, do you pledge
to look into the Army's contract writing system program and report back
to the committee on the health of that program and the extent to which
the Army is applying lessons learned from other services' efforts
developing and procuring contract writing systems?
Mr. Bush. I believe that the Army Contract Writing System (ACWS)
capability is critical to the Army's modernization effort, and the
continued coordination between the Army and the other services to
identify and apply lessons learned is critical to ACWS success as a
mission enabler. In my view, the Army continues to closely monitor the
progress toward finalizing ACWS at every level. If confirmed, I would
continue to actively assess the program and maintain close
communications with the Office of Secretary of Defense and other
service counterparts regarding their efforts to deliver modern and
adaptable contract writing capabilities. If confirmed, I would report
back to the committee on the health of this critical program.
2. Senator Reed. Mr. Bush, the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) applies to all of DOD and guides
requirements for contract writing systems. In your view, what
requirements are truly Army-specific?
Mr. Bush. The majority of Army-specific requirements are a result
of the Army continuing to employ three legacy systems that will be
replaced by ACWS. The Army also uses three Army-specific Enterprise
Resource Programs that define the business processes between our
acquisition workforce and the Army's financial and logistics
communities. Although the services all share a need to procure weapon
systems, our methods differ widely, thus requiring different systems
for contract writing. If confirmed, I would continue to actively assess
the ACWS program and its requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
night vision strategy
3. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Bush, how important is the fielding of
operationally proven next-generation equipment, such as the enhanced
night vision goggle-binocular (ENVG-B), to our soldiers for the
continued advancement of the Army's modernization effort?
Mr. Bush. The ENVG-B provides important capability to soldiers, and
it is critically important to field operationally proven next-
generation equipment to our soldiers. For the ENVG-B specifically, I
believe the Army is balancing the requirement for the ENVG-B with the
need for the Integrated Visual Augmentation System which provides
additional capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the current plan
to field the two systems to the Army.
4. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Bush, what is your view on whether the Army
should continue or increase the procurement of ENVG-B systems to ensure
our soldiers have the most capable night vision systems for deployment?
Mr. Bush. In my view, the Army must make hard choices that balance
the procurement rate of existing programs like the ENVG-B with the
development and procurement of Army modernization priority efforts.
However, if additional funds for ENVG-B are provided by Congress I
would support using them to field additional ENVG-B systems to soldiers
to meet Army requirements for improved night-vision capability.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
armored multi-purpose vehicle
5. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, during her confirmation hearing, I
asked Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth about the Army's
commitment to providing soldiers with the most modern combat vehicles
through the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) cross functional
team. The Army's current personnel carrier, the M113 vehicle, is a
Vietnam era vintage vehicle that was designed in the 1950's. The Army
still fields the vehicle today. In 2018, the Army made the Armored
Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) part of NGCV to replace the M113. All five
variants of that vehicle are in production and should be fielded to
soldiers as soon as possible. Unfortunately, funding for the vehicle
was reduced this year. AMPV is the only NGCV program currently in
production and begins fielding to soldiers later this year.
In her response, Secretary Wormuth stated that AMPV and NGCV are
``absolutely a capability set that we have to have and that we have to
modernize.'' More recently, General James McConville, Chief of Staff of
the Army, affirmed his commitment to fielding the most modernized NGCV
equipment to soldiers at AUSA. Do you share the Secretary and General
McConville's commitment to the AMPV program?
Mr. Bush. I share Secretary Wormuth's and General McConville's view
that the Army must be absolutely committed to the AMPV program.
6. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, given the M113's obsolescence, would
you agreed that the AMPV should replace the M113 as soon as possible?
Mr. Bush. I agree that the AMPV should replace the M113 in ABCTs as
quickly as possible, but would caution that AMPV development and
procurement must synchronize with other Army modernization priorities
to prudently modernize the ABCT.
7. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, given the recent funding reductions to
align with production, can we expect sustained funding increases next
year and in the Future Years Defense Plan?
Mr. Bush. Unfortunately, I cannot definitively answer this question
because any additional funding for the AMPV program is pre-decisional
at this time. If confirmed, I intend to keep Congress apprised of the
funding outlook moving forward.
8. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, will you commit to providing the
committee the FYDP for AMPV and all other Army programs to enable the
committee to conduct their oversight responsibility?
Mr. Bush. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army provides
timely support to the Secretary of Defense in connection with
preparation and presentation of the President's Budget Request for
fiscal year 2023.
abrams procurement
9. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, the Army's budget for fiscal year 2022
requested funding for less than one full brigade of Abrams tanks,
coming up short 20 tanks for a brigade which is planned to be fielded
to the Army National Guard. This decision departed from the Army's
established funding baseline of at least one full brigade of Abrams per
annual funding cycle and apparently came as a result of budget
pressures and not a change in strategy or direction. Ultimately, the
Army sought funding for a full brigade of Abrams tanks by including the
required funds on the Army's fiscal year 2022 Unfunded Priorities List.
In prior testimony before Congress, the Chief of Staff of the Army has
reiterated his support for funding a full brigade of Abrams and fully
supported the Army's Unfunded Priorities List to do so.
Do you support the goal of maintaining funding for one full brigade
of Abrams tanks per annual funding cycle to fulfill the Army's
commitments to provide the Army National Guard with the most modern
tank and to maintain the rate of Abrams modernization that has been
achieved to support the industrial base and the skilled workforce that
provides this crucial enduring program that is the strongest element of
Armored Brigade Combat Team modernization?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would remain committed to the goal of
maintaining funding for one full brigade of Abrams tanks per annual
funding cycle. However, I also acknowledge that the Army's ability to
accomplish that goal is contingent on the availability of funds and
that the Army must address an ever-evolving array of competing
priorities.
armored vehicle survivability concerns
10. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, I continue to have concerns about the
survivability of the Army's armored platforms in near-peer conflict,
especially those forward-deployed platforms like the Stryker Infantry
Carrier Vehicle. Outfitting our Stryker brigades with Active Protection
Systems (APS) would ensure that our forward-deployed units in Europe
and elsewhere are resilient against advanced threats. Yet, despite
millions of taxpayer dollars spent on research and development, the
Army has failed to adequately evaluate and field APS solutions for the
platform. Can you commit that you will examine the Army's schedule for
Stryker APS characterization testing and ensure that a system is
fielded on the platform as quickly as possible?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I am committed to fielding Active
Protection Systems (APS) as quickly as possible. However, I believe the
Army must be deliberate to ensure the APS will effectively protect our
warfighters when fielded. The Army conducted a Stryker-based APS system
characterization in 2017-2018 and a system demonstration in 2019 and
determined the APS solutions tested were not suitable for the Stryker
platform. I am aware that another APS limited characterization is
scheduled in 2d Quarter Fiscal Year 2022 to assess maturity,
performance, and integration risk of non-developmental item (NDI) APS
on Strykers and other platforms. I would anticipate that the results
from the limited characterization will inform APS suitability for the
Stryker platform and subsequently lead to a funding and fielding
determination based on Army modernization priorities.
optionally manned fighting vehicle competition
11. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, I am also concerned that in the event
of a constrained defense budget the Army will continue to be a ``bill
payer'' to reduce cuts to other services. I am specifically concerned
that programs in the Army's ``31+4'' modernization priorities, like the
Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), will be forced to endure
funding cuts despite their critical nature to maintaining strategic
competitiveness with adversaries like Russia and China. As you know,
the Army is scheduled to award up to three contracts for the second
phase of the OMFV program, which would ensure that the Army maintains
competition and technological innovation. Can you commit to ensuring
that the Army awards three contracts in the second phase of OMFV
development, even in the event of a constrained budget environment?
Mr. Bush. I am aware that the Army is currently executing Phase 2
for the OMFV program with five contractors. Phase 3 is scheduled and on
track to award up to three contracts in 2d Quarter, Fiscal Year 2023. I
believe that awarding three contracts in the third phase as planned
would promote competition. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring the
Committee is apprised of the Department's progress on this important
effort.
cyber and connected vehicle integrated center
12. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, the Cyber and Connected Vehicle
Integration Center at Selfridge Air National Guard Base would be a
vehicle cyber security proving ground which would help integrate
industry, academia, and U.S. Government capabilities under one roof.
This facility is precisely the type of investment the Army needs to be
making to combat this threat. Can I have your commitment that if
confirmed, you will work with my office to further the development of
army vehicles cybersecurity systems and protocols?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I will commit to the further development of
cybersecurity systems and protocols for Army vehicles; and I will work
with your office to that end. To best address future threats, I believe
the Army must leverage the expertise of the science and technology
community, academia, and industry, to include facilities such as the
Cyber and Connected Vehicle Integration Center at Selfridge.
ground vehicles systems center
13. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, semi-autonomous robotic tactical
wheeled vehicles are a key element to modernizing the sustainment
warfighting function and another reminder that the Ground Vehicle
Systems Center and Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)
are instrumental to our national defense.
Last month, a Leader-Follower truck squad supported a rotational
unit at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) for the first time,
setting the conditions for outfitting more vehicles and units with this
hardware over the next 2 years. How do you foresee incorporating
software into units' standard maintenance functions to ensure the
platform's cybersecurity?
Mr. Bush. Based on my experience, I foresee the Army will improve
the survivability of all its platforms by leveraging the standard
maintenance system to make cybersecurity a routine component of overall
supportability. If confirmed, I would ensure software packages are
developed with both cybersecurity and supportability best practices,
which includes identification and mitigation of threat informed risk.
To improve overall force readiness, if confirmed, I would also work
with the operational and logistics communities to notify field
Commanders when new secure versions of software are available and
identify any accepted risk.
14. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, with respect to JRTC, are cyber
threats in an anti-access/area denial setting something we can expect
to see incorporated into training?
Mr. Bush. For several years, the Army has incorporated the World
Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) into its Combat Training Centers (CTC).
There are several on-going Army initiatives meant to inform the
appropriate threat exposure and Operational Environment replication of
adversarial Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities.
U.S. Army Cyber currently replicates an adversary's information
warfare capabilities with the OPFOR at the CTCs to provide rotational
training units with the congested and contested cyber-electromagnetic
operating environments representative of nation-State threats. In the
future, the Army plans to expand these capabilities to include a wider
spectrum of cyber electromagnetic activities threats, such as jamming,
interference, and degradation across the radiated frequency spectrum to
include single and upper-side band degradation, interference, and
manipulation of radiated frequency for space-based assets.
ground vehicle autonomy
15. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, advances in ground robotics and
autonomy will provide Army formations new capabilities that will help
achieve its goals for Multi-Domain Operations. U.S. Army Combat
Capabilities Development Command's (DEVCOM) Ground Vehicle System
Center has led the Army's ground vehicle autonomy strategy and
development of the Robotic Technology Kernel
(RTK) which is built on a foundation of a Modular Open Systems
Architecture--with common software products lines and interfaces--to
enable common unmanned maneuver capabilities across the ground vehicle
fleet. How do you intend to buildupon the modular open system
architecture approach for the acquisition and fielding of robotic and
autonomous systems like Robotic Combat Vehicle and Optionally Manned
Leader Follower and across the ground vehicle fleet in general?
Mr. Bush. I would expect advancements in robotic and autonomous
vehicles, whether the Robotic Combat Vehicle or others, to require
rapid innovation in software and autonomous behaviors. I believe this
is a fundamental shift from the Army's traditional methods of ground
vehicle development and modernization, as rapidly modernizing software
is now critical for maintaining the latest operational capabilities. If
confirmed, I would support the Robotic Technology Kernel (RTK), which
represents the Army's method for instituting a robotic operating system
that can be quickly adapted, modified with competitively sourced new
autonomous behaviors, and applied across all the Army's ground vehicle
platforms with varying degrees of autonomy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
federal procurement policy and regulations
16. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, when it comes to Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) memos regarding category management (CM),
many small businesses (SB) are concerned that the Best In Class (BIC)
contracts do not allow room for the SB to engage in the procurement
process. How will you empower Department of Defense agencies to create
more strategic sourcing contracts with a small business focus to meet
CM and small business goals?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the Army
Office of Small Business Programs on Category Management (CM) and
increasing those opportunities to current and new small businesses. I
believe that Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) and Other Transaction
Authority (OTA) have broadened opportunities for small businesses, and
I would want to build on that. I consider Small Business participation
a key factor and, if confirmed, will coordinate with my counterparts
across the Department of Defense to explore methods to achieve all CM
and small business goals.
17. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, with the creation of new
Government-wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs), many with a large
business focus, from your perspective, to expand the business pool for
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQs) and Blanket Purchase
Agreement (BPAs) for small businesses, how often should onboarding
opportunities be allowed?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the Army
Office of Small Business Programs to ensure small business concerns are
considered for all Army acquisitions. I would also work to ensure
contracting officers and program managers conduct market research to
identify onboarding opportunities on a regular basis for businesses
that meet the requirements.
18. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, from my understanding, there is no
repository of all Government-wide accessible GWACs, IDIQs, BPAs, etc.
What would you recommend be created/used to offer a more streamlined
repository to ensure our Contracting Officers know of contracts that
fit the Government's needs while saving tax dollars?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would work with the DOD and the General
Services Administration (GSA), the agency with the most governmentwide
contracts, to share information on Army contracts suitable for expanded
use. It is my understanding that GSA currently hosts a repository of
governmentwide contracts via its publicly accessible website and this
repository is available to Army and government contracting personnel.
If confirmed, I would ensure it is easily accessible to the Army
acquisition workforce and stress its value for market research to
ensure the DOD is a good steward of tax-payer dollars.
19. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, as a leader in the Federal
acquisition workspace, DOD is a Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council
member with the General Service Administration (GSA) and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). What policies will you
review or obtain workforce feedback to improve the process for the
acquisition workforce (i.e., market research, acquisition strategy
determination, acquisition regulations) that make it difficult for
acquisition personnel to do their job?
Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I am committed to using existing flexible
acquisition authorities to the maximum extent practical and to gain
feedback from the Army's acquisition workforce and our partners across
DOD and the Federal Government to identify areas for further
acquisition reform. I would work to ensure the Army's acquisition
workforce has the knowledge, skills, and tools needed to quickly
acquire cutting-edge technology and that it offers the services needed
to meet the Army's modernization and readiness priorities.
working with small business
20. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, will you work with agencies such
as the Small Business Administration, who are very influential in
driving small business policy, specifically in the NDAA, and socio-
economical goals to ensure policy changes will not hinder the
acquisition process but offer equitable opportunities to small
businesses? (Examples: applying liquidated damages, applying
subcontracting tier reporting)
Mr. Bush. Yes. In my view, small businesses provide essential
supplies and services that enable the Army to maintain readiness while
building future capability for multi-domain operations. I fully support
providing maximum practicable opportunities for small businesses to
participate on Army contracts at the prime and subcontractor level. If
confirmed, I would work with the Small Business Administration and the
Army's Office of Small Business Programs to reduce barriers that
inhibit the ability of small businesses to compete for Army contract
opportunities, and ensure availability of opportunities for small,
disadvantaged businesses, women-owned businesses, veteran-owned
businesses, and businesses in historically underutilized business
zones.
21. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, given the outstanding track record
of GSA small business information technology (IT) GWACs, National
Institutes of Health's (NIH) Chief Information Officer--Solutions and
Partners 3 (CIO-SP3) small business GWAC and One Acquisition Solution
for Integrated Services (OASIS) SB, the abandonment of the acquisition
approach of these vehicles in their follow-on procurements appears to
be inconsistent with increasing opportunities for small businesses. Do
you feel this approach aligns with the Biden administration's increased
commitment to small business opportunities in Federal procurement?
Mr. Bush. I believe that the Army is committed to allowing
opportunities for small business and is the leading agency in the DOD
for small business achievement. In my view, the Army is in a good
position to meet the President's commitment to increase small business
opportunities for small, disadvantaged businesses by 50 percent no
later than 2025. If confirmed, I would ensure maximum practicable
opportunity for small business to compete for prime contracts,
consistent with efficient acquisition execution.
22. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, GSA is working to obtain more SB-
related GWACs and created strategic SB initiatives to ensure the
Federal Government is meeting goals in more challenging socioeconomic
categories (HUBZone, Women-owned small businesses (WOSB), Service-
disabled Veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB)). There could be
additional advantages to using NIH's IT, as some find it much easier to
order off of, based on the organization of the system. Should all
agencies consider following that model?
Mr. Bush. It is my understanding that the Army determines the
acquisition strategy that best fits the requirement based on extensive
market research. This includes industry engagement and consideration of
the number of small businesses who possess the technical capabilities
to perform at the prime and subcontract level. When the nature of the
requirement lends itself to establishing an agency-level contract, the
Army will pursue that acquisition strategy. If confirmed, I would
ensure acquisition strategies support maximum practicable opportunity
for small businesses across all socio-economic categories.
23. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, CIO-SP3, CIO-SP3 Small Business
and CIO-CS can be used by any Federal civilian or DOD agency to acquire
information technology services, solutions, and commodities from pre-
qualified vendors at lower than open-market prices in less time than
going the traditional full and open route. Do you think this process
limits the market research process that could impact a small business's
ability to compete?
Mr. Bush. The Army works to support small businesses while
following the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements for
conducting market research, which includes a review of existing pre-
negotiated contract vehicles when appropriate. It is my experience that
contracting officers consider a variety of factors when making the
sourcing decision, including when the item/service is required, and the
capability and capacity of small businesses. Generally, small
businesses who have master contracts are in a good position to compete
for and win task or delivery order contracts. If confirmed, I would
work with the Army's Office of Small Business Programs to ensure small
businesses receive fair opportunity to compete for prime contracts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
army modernization priorities
24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Bush, 4 years ago, the Army identified six
priority efforts as essential to modernizing the Army for great power
competition and, if deterrence fails, conflict. The Army has made
substantial progress on these priorities, but now it's time that these
efforts transition from development to procurement. What do you see as
the greatest challenges to procuring and fielding the Army's
modernization priorities?
Mr. Bush. I believe that the Army faces several challenges when
transitioning weapon systems from development to procurement and
fielding. The Army must demonstrate the systems meet their warfighting
requirements through operational test and evaluation in order to prove
the systems are ``effective, suitable, and survivable.'' The Army also
requires that weapon systems remain affordable to both procure,
operate, and sustain. Finally, the Army must successfully transition
the system from successful prototyping to efficient and cost-effective
large-scale production. However, despite these challenges I am
confident that the Army can succeed.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
other transaction authority for the army corp of engineers
25. Senator Wicker. Mr. Bush, the Department of Defense has
successfully used Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to access cutting-
edge technologies and innovation for the defense space by making
Federal contracting more accessible to non-traditional contractors. The
Corps of Engineers' lawyers have interpreted the law to mean that Other
Transaction Authority can be used only to support the Corps' defense
missions and not the Corps' non-military missions. Given the
significant volume of the Corps' work for Civil Works and other
programs, do you think it would be useful for the Corps to have the
ability to use OTA to support non-military missions?
Mr. Bush. I agree that OTAs have proven to be a very effective tool
for making Federal contracting more accessible to nontraditional
defense contractors, and I see potential application for use of this
authority in the Civil Works arena. If confirmed, I would further
review this matter with the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
ammunition production facilities
26. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, the Department of the Army has
testified that they have a multi-billion-dollar requirement for
recapitalization of the Department of Defenses' conventional ammunition
production facilities. Many of the facilities were constructed more
than 75 year ago and do not include modern manufacturing processes. Of
even more concern, in many of the plants the workers are handling
ammunition and explosives. Tragically, over the last decade two
civilian employees were killed in accidents on the production line.
Most of these projects are funded from ammunition procurement
funds. If confirmed, what will be your role in modernizing the
conventional ammunition infrastructure so that the projects are safe,
environmentally compliant and efficient?
Mr. Bush. I agree that this is a serious issue. During my time as
Acting Assistant Secretary earlier this year I visited three ammunition
production facilities and saw how important the modernization plan is
to the entire DOD. The Army is executing an Army Ammunition Plant (AAP)
modernization program to ensure production continuity, safety and
environmental compliance, and improve the Quality of the Work
Environment (QWE) at five of its critical Government Owned, Contractor
Operated (GOCO) AAPs. To directly bolster the munitions organic
industrial base further, the Army developed a 15-year transformational
modernization plan that will apply advanced technology, robotics, and
automation to enable increased manufacturing readiness and safety,
increased environmental stewardship, and increased operating
efficiencies. If confirmed, I would make every effort to push these
modernization efforts forward.
27. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, will you look to modern manufacturing
planning tools to include digital twinning to develop efficient,
flexible, and safe projects?
Mr. Bush. Yes. The use of modern manufacturing tools for ammunition
production is being assessed by all the Services. As part of the
development of the Army's holistic 15-year Organic Industrial Base
Modernization Strategy, the Army has partnered with Sandia National
Lab's High Consequence Robotics and Automation Directorate to identify
potentially different and better methods to produce quality ammunition
safely. In my judgment, improving manufacturing process
characterization and mapping, systems modeling, and data collection to
a digital platform (to include ``digitally twinning'') are key
recommendations that I would commit to exploring, if confirmed.
army corps of engineers
28. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, the Army Corps of Engineers depends
on contractors to design, build, and maintain projects. Industry has a
growing concern that the Corps is adding process that add cost and time
to both industry and the Government without reducing cost, increasing
quality, nor expediting project delivery. I am told that none of these
changes were driven by a change in law. If confirmed will you agree to
look into each of these issues and get back to the Committee with your
assessment if the added steps are necessary and improve the performance
of Government?
Mr. Bush. Yes. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to review the Corps' project
management procedures and identify ways to eliminate redundancies and
streamline processes without sacrificing quality, timeliness, or
affordability.
29. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, if you determine that the steps are
not required by statute and do not improve the delivery of projects,
will you issue an Acquisition Directive to streamline procurement?
Mr. Bush. Yes. If there are any unnecessary or burdensome processes
that could be remedied through an Army-level Acquisition Directive, I
would, if confirmed, issue any such necessary directives.
30. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, if a change to the law is required,
will you provide the Committee a draft legislative proposal to remove
the unnecessary processes?
Mr. Bush. Yes. If a change to the law is required, if confirmed, I
will support an Army legislative effort to propose removing any
unnecessary processes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
china
50. Senator Scott. Mr. Bush, if the reports on China testing
hypersonics is true, do you think the United States is comfortably
ahead of the Chinese on nuclear warheads or is this launch evidence
that we must modernize our nuclear arsenal and double down on our
efforts to develop and test the next generation of weapons, including
hypersonic weapons?
Mr. Bush. I believe readiness of our Nation's nuclear arsenal is
outside the purview of the ASA(ALT). That said, I do support a
modernized and effective nuclear deterrent. In addition, in my view,
the entire Department of Defense, including the Army, needs to continue
to work rapidly to improve our hypersonic capabilities. The development
of the Army's hypersonic weapons to deter and, if necessary, defeat our
Nation's adversaries does, in my opinion, fall under the oversight of
the ASA(ALT). If confirmed, I am committed to helping the Army develop
hypersonic capability as expeditiously as possible, with the goal of
fielding the first Long Range Hypersonic Weapon battery in fiscal year
2023.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Douglas R. Bush, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Douglas R. Bush, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Douglas R.
Bush in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Mr. Douglas R. Bush was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 9, 2022.]
[all]