    [Senate Hearing 117-991]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                       S. Hrg. 117-991

                NOMINATIONS OF: MR. NICKOLAS H. GUERTIN
                  TO BE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST
                  AND EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
                  MS. ALEXANDRA N. BAKER TO BE DEPUTY
                  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
                  MR. JOHN P. COFFEY TO BE GENERAL COUN-
                  SEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY;
                  AND MR. DOUGLAS R. BUSH TO BE ASSISTANT
                  SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION,
                  LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 19, 2021

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORAMT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-352 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    �
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    �
    �
    �		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
    � 		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                october 19, 2021

                                                                       Page
    Nominations of: Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin to be Director of             1
      Operational Test and Evaluation Department of Defense; Ms.
      Alexandra N. Baker to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
      Policy; Mr. John P. Coffey to be General Counsel of the
      Department of the Navy; and Mr. Douglas R. Bush to be Assistant
      Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
      Technology.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Guertin, Nickolas, Nominee to be Director of Operational Test and     4
      Evaluation, Department of Defense.
      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    40
      Questions for the Record.......................................    59
      Nomination Reference and Report................................    62
      Biographical Sketch............................................    63
      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    65
      Signature Page.................................................    74

    Baker, Alexandra, Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense     6
      for Policy.
      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    74
      Questions for the Record.......................................   112
      Nomination Reference and Report................................   116
      Biographical Sketch............................................   117
      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   119
      Signature Page.................................................   126

    Coffey, John, Nominee to be General Counsel of the Department of      9
      the Navy.
      Advance Policy Questions.......................................   126
      Questions for the Record.......................................   152
      Nomination Reference and Report................................   153
      Biographical Sketch............................................   154
      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   157
      Signature Page.................................................   167

    Bush, Douglas, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for     11
      Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
      Advance Policy Questions.......................................   167
      Questions for the Record.......................................   194
      Nomination Reference and Report................................   202
      Biographical Sketch............................................   203
      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   205
      Signature Page.................................................   211

                                     (iii)

                This hearing is printed to include all available
                information requested or required to be inserted for
                the record.

                                      (iv)

     HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF: MR. NICKOLAS H. GUERTIN TO BE
    DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MS.
    ALEXANDRA N. BAKER TO BE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
    MR. JOHN P. COFFEY TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY;
       AND MR. DOUGLAS R. BUSH TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR
                     ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Ernst, Tillis, Scott,
    Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
        Before I begin my formal remarks, I would like to recognize
    the passing of two extraordinary soldiers, General Colin Powell
    and General Raymond Odierno. Their selfless service to the
    nation, remarkable courage and remarkable commitment to the men
    and women of our armed services has sustained and inspired us
    all. They have left a legacy of honor and commitment that will
    be a beacon for future generations of Americans. To their
    families, I express our profound sympathy. Thank you very much.
        The committee meets this morning to consider the
    nominations of Mr. Nickolas Guertin to be Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation; Ms. Alexandra Baker to be
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Mr. John Coffey
    to be General Counsel of the Department of the Navy; and Mr.
    Douglas Bush to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for
    Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. I thank the nominees
    for their long careers of service to the United States and
    their willingness to assume these important roles.
        I would also like to welcome the family members who are
    with us today. Mr. Guertin, I welcome your wife, Maria, son,
    Enrico, and daughter, Isabella; Ms. Baker, I welcome your
    husband, Sam; Mr. Coffey, I welcome your wife, Anne, and son,
    Connor; and Mr. Bush, I welcome your wife, Patricia.
        Mr. Guertin, you are nominated to be the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation, or DOT&E. This position is
    responsible for all operational and live fire review, testing,
    and evaluation activities. Your long career of technology and
    weapons development in military, industry, and academic roles
    should serve you well.
        There are a number of challenges that will require your
    attention within the Department. Of note, it is important for
    DOT&E to be independent and resist pressure from the services
    and industry to deploy systems that are not yet operationally
    effective. You will be responsible for oversight of a number of
    programs, including the F-35, the Army Integrated Visual
    Augmentation System, the Navy Ford- class carrier, space
    satellite systems, and missile defense programs. While there is
    always a demand to move more rapidly in acquisition, it is
    critical that you ensure we do so prudently. Indeed, we must
    move both rapidly and prudently in acquisition.
        Another challenge will be developing ways to test new
    information technology programs, including commercial cloud
    computing services, as well as ensuring robust cybersecurity
    testing on all systems. In addition, concerns have been raised
    about potential reductions in the workforce that supports live
    fire testing. I would ask that you share your plan on
    addressing these challenges.
        Ms. Baker, you are nominated to serve as Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy. Your current role as Senior
    Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security
    Council and previous experiences in Congress, the DOD, and OMB
    will be valuable in this new position.
        If confirmed, you will have a broad scope of responsibility
    in advising and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy and the Secretary of Defense on a range of issues,
    including strategic competition with a rising China, the COVID-
    19 pandemic, cyber threats, and climate change.
        In the immediate term, the Policy office is revising the
    2022 National Defense Strategy. The NDS will play a critical
    role in defining the United States' national security
    priorities, but coordinating it across the Department and the
    Federal Government will be a challenge. I hope you will share
    how you plan to integrate the NDS with the Administration's
    whole-of-government approach.
        In the coming months, the Department will also publish its
    Nuclear Posture Review. I am interested in your testimony on a
    number of issues relating to the Nuclear Posture Review,
    including modernization of all three legs of the triad,
    updating our nuclear facilities, the role of arms control, and
    ongoing strategic stability talks.
        Mr. Coffey, you are nominated to be General Counsel of the
    Department of the Navy. This position is responsible for
    providing legal services throughout the Department in a vast
    array of fields, including acquisition-related law, arms
    control, business and commercial law, and national security-
    related law, among many others. The General Counsel also
    assists in ethics, intelligence, criminal investigation, and
    law enforcement activities. I would note your extensive legal
    career in the Navy, and you should be well prepared for this
    very responsible job.
        One of Secretary Austin's priorities is to eradicate
    extremism within the ranks. While we continue to believe that
    the number of extremists in the ranks remains very small, even
    one is too many, and I hope you will share your views on how
    you will approach this issue, especially as the line between
    action, thought, and speech becomes much more difficult to
    define.
        Mr. Bush, you are nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
    the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. If
    confirmed, you will oversee Army research, development,
    acquisition, program sustainment, and logistics activities as
    the Army is undertaking it most expansive modernization effort
    in decades. You will be well served by your experience which
    includes nearly two decades of congressional legislative work,
    including with the House Armed Services Committee. You will be
    responsible for balancing the need for rigorous cost management
    with the need to move quickly and use tailored acquisition
    approaches. To achieve this, it will be necessary to strengthen
    the Army's workforce and capacity while improving data
    available to the Army and DOD to more effectively acquire and
    sustain Army weapon systems.
        Importantly, you will also be responsible for overcoming
    the so-called ``Valley of Death,'' ensuring that the Army is
    able to turn research innovations into real operational
    capabilities. This will require strengthening connections
    between research and engineering activities and the Army's
    acquisition programs and defense contractors. It will also
    include investing in and protecting the people and
    infrastructure at organizations like the Army's labs and test
    ranges. I look forward to hearing how you will address these
    challenges.
        Thank you, again, to our nominees.
        Senator Inhofe is unable to join us this morning, but I
    will request unanimous consent to include his opening statement
    in the record. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The opening statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Ranking Member James M. Inhofe
        Thank you, Chairman Reed, and thanks to our witnesses for being
    with us and for their willingness to serve the nation.
        The world is more dangerous than at any point in my lifetime.
    American interests are under immense pressure from our adversaries.
        We learned from hearings over the last month that after a
    disastrous departure from Afghanistan, the threat of global terrorism
    is growing. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan is now the safest place in
    the world for terrorist planners.
        While we have been focused on Afghanistan, threats from China,
    Russia, North Korea, and Iran have all increased:
          China has expanded construction of nuclear siloes and
    aggression against Taiwan;
          Russia has held its largest military exercise in four
    decades and continues to test dangerous nuclear weapons;
          Iran has continued to move closer to a nuclear bomb; and
          North Korea has sustained its track record of violating
    UN resolutions.
        It's more important than ever that we accelerate our work to deter
    each of these threats, which were identified and prioritized in the
    2018 National Defense Strategy. We've got to take each of these threats
    seriously--we've got interests around the globe.
        That starts with adhering to the core of the existing strategy. We
    can't get distracted, and we can't simply study the problems we have
    forever.
        Next, we've got to adequately resource that strategy, even as we
    innovate in technology and in the way that we fight.
        I'm particularly concerned that the Army will bear the brunt of any
    proposed budget cuts at DOD, which will significantly impact the Army's
    hard-fought modernization plan.
        Implementing our strategy also includes honest assessments of where
    the U.S. military has gaps, and moving rapidly to fix those gaps and
    create problems for our adversaries.
        One of our big gaps with the Chinese and the Russians is in our
    outdated and inadequate test capabilities, and I think we'll hear a bit
    about that today.
        We need strong, capable civilian leadership in the department, so
    thank you all again for your willingness to serve.
        Chairman Reed.

        Chairman Reed. Now, Mr. Guertin, could you please give your
    statement.

       STATEMENT OF NICKOLAS GUERTIN, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR OF
         OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Guertin. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to be
    with you here today. I am humbled to be considered to serve as
    the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. I would like
    to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Deputy
    Secretary Hicks for entrusting me with this nomination. I would
    also like to thank my family, who you see behind me, for their
    support: Maria, my wife of almost 20 years and our twin
    children, Enrico and Isabella, of whom we are both immensely
    proud.
        The greatest asset of the Department of Defense is
    undoubtedly its people. Our men and women in uniform and our
    civilian and contractor workforce make the American military
    the best in the world. However, our ability to defend the
    Nation also depends on the capabilities of our technologies,
    which must be tested as they would be used in combat. Injecting
    operationally realistic testing early into a program's
    development allows the Department to implement affordable,
    comprehensive changes, making the best and most efficient use
    of taxpayer resources, and ultimately, achieving the greatest
    possible performance. Transparency on the results of those
    tests are critical to ensuring the most effective, suitable,
    survivable, and where necessary, lethal performance. If
    confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the office of the
    Director for Operational Test and Evaluation will deliver an
    independent, objective, and authoritative evaluation of system
    performance to you and to Secretary Austin.
        Testing the way we fight in the future will require
    evolutionary and revolutionary changes, ones that cannot be
    successfully planned or implemented without teamwork. It will
    require increased reliance on state-of-the-art test
    infrastructure and tools, and a well-trained test and
    evaluation workforce in order to support faster and more
    efficient evaluation of complex, interconnected systems in a
    joint, multi-domain operational environment. It will require
    reliance on innovative methods like credible virtual
    environments and modeling and simulation tools to complement
    on-range and laboratory testing. If confirmed, I am committed
    to working closely with our research and engineering community,
    acquisition programs, and the Services so that together we can
    most effectively deliver capability to the Joint Force.
        I take this commitment to national security seriously,
    having spent the past four decades working on, developing,
    testing, fielding, and researching the acquisition of military
    systems. I started my career as an enlisted nuclear power plant
    operator on submarines. I later transitioned to the Reserves
    and after graduating college, landed a job as a Navy civilian
    engineer. Shortly afterwards I was also commissioned as a Navy
    Reserve engineering duty officer. This citizen-sailor pairing
    would serve me well for the following decade by keeping me
    grounded in what it took to do maintenance, operations, and
    testing in the fleet, while also developing new systems.
    Testing had long been a central tenet to this experience, from
    developing automated test equipment for weapon components, to
    testing and deploying new sensors and combat management systems
    that were built to change and improve over time.
        Improving acquisition practices for national security
    systems has long been a passion of mine. It started when I was
    fortunate enough to be on the team that pioneered the use of
    open architectures for sonar systems in the mid- 1990s. I have
    been on the forefront of developing and applying a wide array
    of improved acquisition practices, and helping others do the
    same ever since. More recently, while at Carnegie Mellon
    University's Software Engineering Institute, I learned a great
    deal more about the evolving practices of software-reliant
    system architectures, test automation, artificial intelligence
    and machine learning, to name a few. While at the SEI, I have
    also extended the research I performed while in government on
    advanced systems development methods for improving DOD
    acquisition.
        As Secretary Austin has testified, ``We have the greatest
    equipment in the world.'' If confirmed, it is my objective to
    ensure that assessment continues to hold true, providing for
    the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable fighting
    force in the world. It would be an honor to contribute to that
    mission, and to serve as the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Guertin follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Mr. Nickolas Guertin
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Distinguished Members of
    the Committee, it is a privilege to be with you here today. I am
    humbled to be considered to serve as the Director of Operational Test
    and Evaluation. I would like to thank President Biden, Secretary
    Austin, and Deputy Secretary Hicks for entrusting me with this
    nomination. I would also like to thank my family whom you see behind me
    for their support; Maria, my wife of almost 20 years and our twin
    children Enrico and Isabella of whom we are both immensely proud.
        The greatest asset of the Department of Defense is undoubtedly its
    people. Our men and women in uniform and our civilian and contractor
    workforce make the American military the best in the world. However,
    our ability to defend the Nation also depends on the capabilities of
    our technologies, which must be tested as they would be used in combat.
    Injecting operationally realistic testing early into a program's
    development allows the Department to implement affordable,
    comprehensive changes, making the best and most efficient use of
    taxpayer resources, and ultimately, achieving the greatest possible
    performance. Transparency on the results of those tests are critical to
    ensuring the most effective, suitable, survivable, and where necessary,
    lethal performance. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
    office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation will deliver
    an independent, objective, and authoritative evaluation of system
    performance to you and to Secretary Austin.
        Testing the way we fight in the future will require evolutionary
    and revolutionary changes - ones that cannot be successfully planned or
    implemented without teamwork. It will require increased reliance on
    state-of-the art test infrastructure and tools, and a well-trained test
    and evaluation workforce in order to support faster and more effective
    evaluation of complex, interconnected systems in a joint, multi-domain
    operational environment. It will require reliance on innovative methods
    like credible virtual environments and modeling and simulation tools to
    complement on-range and laboratory testing. If confirmed, I am
    committed to working closely with our research and engineering
    community, acquisition programs, and the Services so that together, we
    can most effectively deliver capability to the Joint Force.
        I take this commitment to national security seriously, having spent
    the past four decades working on, developing, testing, fielding, and
    researching the acquisition of military systems. I started my career as
    an enlisted nuclear power plant operator on submarines. I later
    transitioned to the Reserves and after graduating college, landed a job
    as a Navy civilian engineer. Shortly afterwards I was also commissioned
    as a Reserve engineering duty officer. This citizen-sailor pairing
    would serve me well for the following decade by keeping me grounded in
    what it took to do maintenance, operations, and testing in the fleet,
    while also developing new systems. Testing had long been a central
    tenet to this experience, from developing automated test equipment for
    weapon components, to testing and deploying new sensor and combat
    management systems that were built to change and improve over time.
        Improving acquisition practices for national security systems has
    long been a passion of mine. It started when I was fortunate enough to
    be on the team that pioneered the use of open architectures for sonar
    systems in the mid-1990s. I have been on the forefront of developing
    and applying a wide array of improved acquisition practices, and
    helping others do the same ever since. More recently, while at Carnegie
    Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, I learned a great
    deal about the evolving practices of software-reliant system
    architectures, DevOps practices, the application of machine learning
    and artificial intelligence, and test automation to name a few. While
    at the SEI, I have also extended the research I performed while in
    Government on advanced systems development methods for improving DOD
    acquisition outcomes.
        As Secretary Austin has testified: ``We have the greatest equipment
    in the world.'' If confirmed, it is my objective to ensure that
    assessment continues to hold true, providing for the best trained, best
    equipped, and most capable warfighting force in the world. It would be
    an honor to contribute to that mission, and to serve as the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation. Thank you.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Guertin. Ms. Baker,
    please.

       STATEMENT OF ALEXANDRA BAKER, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY UNDER
                    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

        Ms. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also to the
    Ranking Member and members of this committee. It is an honor to
    be before you today as President Biden's nominee for the
    position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I am
    grateful to the President, Secretary Austin, and Undersecretary
    Kahl for their trust and confidence in me.
        I want to thank my husband, Sam, who is here with me today
    and who shares my deep commitment to the values this nation was
    founded upon. I also want to acknowledge my mother, who is
    watching at home, and who came to this country as a refugee and
    taught me the importance of giving back, and my father, who
    enlisted in the Army in 1969, and who always considered his
    military service to be the formative experience of his life. He
    passed away earlier this year, but it is my honor to continue
    the family tradition of service.
        The job of the Department of Defense is to deter
    adversaries and to fight and win the nation's wars should
    deterrence fail--in short, to keep Americans safe. There is no
    more sacred mission. Today we have entered a new era of
    strategic competition, and we must update our policies, our
    operations, our capabilities, and our workforce to meet the
    moment. I believe that there is no time to waste.
        China is the pacing challenge for the Department. As the
    President's Interim National Security Guidance states, it is
    the only competitor that is capable of combining its economic,
    diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a
    sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.
    To meet this challenge, we will need to invest in capabilities
    that are relevant not to the last fight but to future ones. We
    will need creative and agile operational concepts and plans
    that rapidly assimilate and take advantage of technological
    advances. We will need a high-end, combat-capable, and ready
    force that is forward positioned, distributed, and resilient.
    We will need to operate seamlessly across all domains, and we
    will need increased interoperability with strong and capable
    partners and allies who are proficient in their warfighting
    roles. If I am confirmed, I will work tirelessly to support
    those priorities.
        As the NSC's Senior Director for Strategic Planning, I have
    been tasked with drafting the President's national security
    strategy and coordinating it with our departments and agencies,
    and as well with our closest allies and partners. At the same
    time, the Department has been updating the National Defense
    Strategy, building on the strong foundation provided in the
    2018 NDS to reflect new developments in the strategic
    environment and new insights about the intentions and the
    capabilities of our adversaries. If confirmed, my first
    priority will be to help implement the NDS, with a focus on
    better integrating Policy's work with other DOD components,
    with our interagency partners, and with our allies.
        Beyond implementing the NDS, if confirmed, I will also seek
    to support the Under Secretary in executing his priorities.
    These include rising to the challenge China poses. It includes
    defeating the COVID-19 pandemic, which remains the most
    immediate threat to U.S. national security and to the health,
    safety, and readiness of our men and women in uniform.
        We also continue to face a growing cyber threat from both
    state and non-state actors, including to our critical
    infrastructure. The Department will need to continue to defend
    forward to protect its networks, while building the resilience
    necessary to deny our adversaries' ability to threaten our
    nation in this domain.
        Climate change represents another Department-wide focus,
    given its potential to drastically change the operational
    environment, and its current impact on our bases and facilities
    around the world. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that
    Policy is best positioned to advance these priorities.
        We have the greatest military in the world, but at the end
    of the day it is about people, both our servicemembers and
    civilian workforce. I believe that Policy is the beating heart
    of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is the place
    where deep expertise and longstanding regional relationships
    meet next-generation approaches that integrate new concepts,
    new ideas, and new warfighting capabilities.
        The Policy organization has been challenged in recent
    years, and if confirmed in this role I will seek to assist the
    Under Secretary in leading and renewing the organization,
    breaking down silos, facilitating communication and cooperative
    approaches, and improving effectiveness. My commitment to the
    workforce will be to focus relentlessly on organizational
    health and morale, so that Policy is postured to provide a
    strong and constructive civilian voice in the Department for
    years to come.
        As a former Senate staffer, I have a deep appreciation for
    the critical role that this committee and this body plays. I
    want to express my gratitude to the committee for its many
    decades of bipartisan, cooperative focus on the defense of our
    nation and for your thoughtful oversight of our military. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with you in a spirit of
    partnership to continue that tradition.
        Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Baker follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Sasha Baker
        Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, Members of this
    Committee.
        It is an honor to be before you today as President Biden's nominee
    for the position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I'm
    grateful to the President, Secretary Austin, and Undersecretary Kahl
    for their trust and confidence in me.
        I want to thank my husband Sam, who is here with me today and who
    shares my deep commitment to the values this nation was founded upon. I
    also want to acknowledge my mother, who came to this country as a
    refugee and who taught me the importance of giving back; and my father,
    who enlisted in the Army in 1969 and who always considered his military
    service to be the formative experience of his life. He passed away
    earlier this year, but it is my honor to continue our family tradition
    of service.
        The job of the Department of Defense is to deter adversaries and to
    fight and win the nation's wars should deterrence fail - in short, to
    keep Americans safe. There is no more sacred mission.
        Today, we have entered a new era of strategic competition, and we
    must update our policies, our operations, our capabilities, and our
    workforce to meet the moment. There is no time to waste.
        China is the pacing challenge for the Department. As the
    President's Interim National Security Guidance states, it is the only
    competitor capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and
    technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open
    international system.
        To meet this challenge, we will need to invest in capabilities
    relevant not to the last fight but to future ones. We will need
    creative and agile operational concepts and plans that rapidly
    assimilate and take advantage of technological advances. We will need a
    high-end, combat-capable, and ready force that is forward positioned,
    distributed, and resilient. We will need to operate seamlessly across
    all domains. And we will need increased interoperability with strong
    and capable partners and allies proficient in their warfighting roles.
    If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to support these requirements.
        As the NSC's Senior Director for Strategic Planning, I have been
    tasked with drafting the President's national security strategy and
    coordinating it with our departments and agencies, as well as with our
    closest partners and allies. At the same time, the Department has been
    updating the National Defense Strategy, building on the strong
    foundation of the 2018 NDS to reflect new developments in the strategic
    environment and new insights about the intentions and capabilities of
    our adversaries. If confirmed, my first priority will be to help
    implement this NDS, with a focus on better integrating Policy's work
    with other DOD components, with our interagency partners, and with our
    allies.
        Beyond implementing the NDS, if confirmed, I will also seek to
    support the Undersecretary in executing his priorities. These include
    rising to the challenge China poses. It means defeating the COVID-19
    pandemic, which remains the most immediate threat to U.S. national
    security and to the health, safety and readiness of our men and women
    in uniform. We also continue to face a growing cyber threat from both
    state and non-state actors, including to our critical infrastructure,
    and the Department will need to continue to defend forward to protect
    its networks, while building the resilience necessary to deny our
    adversaries' ability to threaten our nation in this domain. Climate
    change represents another Department-wide focus, given its potential to
    drastically change the operational environment, and its current impact
    on our bases and facilities around the world. If confirmed, I am
    committed to ensuring that Policy is best positioned to advance these
    priorities.
        We have the greatest military in the world, but at the end of the
    day it's about people - both servicemembers and civilian employees.
    Policy is the beating heart of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the place where deep expertise and longstanding regional relationships
    meet next-generation approaches that integrate new concepts, ideas, and
    warfighting capabilities. The Policy organization has been challenged
    in recent years, and if confirmed in this role, I will seek to assist
    the Undersecretary in leading and renewing the organization - breaking
    down silos, facilitating communication and cooperative approaches, and
    improving effectiveness. My commitment to the workforce will be to
    focus relentlessly on organizational health and morale, so that Policy
    is postured to provide a strong, constructive civilian voice in the
    Department for years to come.
        As a former Senate staffer, I have a deep appreciation for the
    critical role this body plays. I want to express my gratitude to the
    committee for its many decades of bipartisan, cooperative focus on the
    defense of our nation and for your thoughtful oversight of our
    military. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you in a spirit
    of partnership to continue that tradition.
        Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to your
    questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Ms. Baker. Mr. Coffey, please.

    STATEMENT OF JOHN COFFEY, NOMINEE TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
                         DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        Mr. Coffey. Thank you, Chairman Reed and other
    distinguished members of this committee. I want to begin by
    thanking my wife of over 32 years, Anne, and our children Kate,
    Cameron, and Conor. I cannot say enough about what their
    support, and patience, has meant as I pursued parallel careers
    in the law and in the Navy. I am so pleased that Anne and Conor
    could be here today.
        I am very grateful to President Biden for his trust and
    confidence in nominating me to serve as General Counsel of the
    Department of the Navy. I thank the committee and its staff for
    making time over the past few weeks to discuss my nomination. I
    am eager to return to public service, and hope to earn your
    support.
        I would like to address briefly, why I believe that, if
    confirmed, I would bring a number of pertinent strengths to the
    role of Navy General Counsel. First, I have for over 30 years
    led a varied career in the law, including several years as a
    Federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York and as
    a civil litigator handling some of the Nation's most
    challenging and impactful cases. I have experience solving
    difficult problems, building effective teams, providing candid,
    timely counsel, and advocating for my clients' interests.
        Second, I served in the United States Navy for over 30
    years, as a midshipman at the Naval Academy, on active duty for
    8 years, and, after graduating from Georgetown Law's night
    program while I was stationed here in Washington, as a
    reservist for 18 years. I served in several operational roles,
    including as a P-3 Orion mission commander tracking Soviet
    submarines, and I was privileged to be selected twice for
    command. In Washington, I had the opportunity to serve as
    personal aide to Vice President George H. W. Bush and to serve
    in various Pentagon policy and planning roles.
        Third, I bring the perspective of a child of immigrants. I
    am humbled by the opportunity that, if confirmed, I could once
    again serve the country that drew my parents here from Ireland
    seven decades ago. I grew up in a home where my six younger
    siblings and I were told, on a near-daily basis, that if we did
    our homework, applied ourselves, and went to Mass, there was no
    limit to what we could accomplish in America.
        Our family went through some tough times--my Dad was a
    construction worker who was out of work when the economy went
    sour--but our parents always reminded us that we were lucky
    because we were American, and that because we had been given
    this great gift, much was expected of us.
        These principles have animated much of my life, leading me
    to take the oath of office to protect and defend our
    Constitution as a 17-year-old midshipman at Annapolis and,
    after completing my obligated service, to continue to serve in
    the Reserve for almost two decades while juggling a family and
    career in New York. And, Senators, it is why I sit here today,
    ready, if confirmed, to bring all of my experience, energy, and
    love of country to the role of Navy General Counsel.
        If confirmed, my top priority would be to ensure that the
    Office of the General Counsel robustly supports the mission of
    the Navy and Marine Corps by providing the timely, candid, and
    accurate legal advice they need to carry out their missions
    successfully. If confirmed, I would also focus on taking care
    of our sailors, marines, Department civilians, and their
    families, which I know firsthand as my tour as commanding
    officer enables mission success. And, if confirmed, I would
    seek to promote a culture where ethical decision-making is
    paramount throughout the Department of the Navy.
        Relatedly, I would work hard to leverage the office to
    ensure that every taxpayer dollar that the Navy is given is
    spent wisely, fully accounted for, and subject to effective
    oversight and full transparency to this committee and to the
    American public.
        If confirmed, I look forward to working with Navy Secretary
    Del Toro, the senior leadership of the Pentagon, and this
    committee, doing so in the bipartisan tradition that is a
    prized hallmark of this committee.
        Thank you for your consideration of my nomination. I look
    forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Mr. John Coffey
        Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other
    distinguished members of this Committee.
        I want to begin by thanking my wife of over thirty-two years, Anne,
    and our children Kate, Cameron, and Conor. I cannot say enough about
    what their support, and patience, has meant as I pursued parallel
    careers in the law and in the Navy. I am so pleased that Anne and Conor
    could be here today.
        I am very grateful to President Biden for his trust and confidence
    in nominating me to serve as General Counsel of the Department of the
    Navy. I thank the Committee and its staff for making time over the past
    few weeks to discuss my nomination. I am eager to return to public
    service, and hope I can earn your support.
        I would like to address briefly why I believe that, if confirmed, I
    would bring a number of pertinent strengths to the role of Navy General
    Counsel.
        First, I have for over thirty years led a varied career in the law,
    including several years as a federal prosecutor in the Southern
    District of New York and as a civil litigator handling some of the
    country's most challenging and impactful cases. I have experience
    solving difficult problems; building effective teams; providing candid,
    timely counsel; and advocating for my clients' interests.
        Second, I served in the United States Navy for over thirty years,
    as a midshipman at the Naval Academy, on active duty for eight years,
    and, after graduating from Georgetown Law's night program while
    stationed here in Washington, as a reservist for eighteen years. I took
    on several operational roles--including as a P-3 Orion mission
    commander tracking Soviet submarines--and I was privileged to be
    selected twice for command. In Washington, I had the opportunity to
    serve as personal aide to Vice President George H.W. Bush and in
    Pentagon policy and planning roles.
        Third, I bring the perspective of a child of immigrants. I am
    humbled by the possibility that, if confirmed, I could once again serve
    the country that drew my parents here from Ireland seven decades ago. I
    grew up in a home where my six younger siblings and I were told on a
    near-daily basis that, if we did our homework, applied ourselves, and
    went to Mass, there was no limit to what we could accomplish in
    America. Our family went through some tough times--my Dad was a
    construction worker who was often out of work when the economy soured--
    but our parents always reminded us that how lucky we were to be
    American. And that because we had been given this great gift, much was
    expected of us.
        These principles have animated much of my life, leading me to take
    the oath to protect and defend our Constitution as a 17-year old
    midshipman at Annapolis and, after completing my obligated active duty
    service, to continue to serve in the Navy Reserve for almost two
    decades while juggling a career and a family. And it's why I sit here
    today, ready--if confirmed--to bring all of my experience, energy, and
    love of country to the role of Navy General Counsel.
        If confirmed, my top priority would be to ensure that the Office of
    the General Counsel robustly supports the mission of the Navy and
    Marine Corps by providing the timely, candid, and accurate legal advice
    they need to carry out their missions successfully.
        I would if confirmed also focus on taking care of our sailors,
    marines, Department civilians, and their families, which I know
    firsthand enables mission success.
        And if confirmed, I would seek to promote a culture where ethical
    decision-making is paramount throughout the Department. Relatedly, I
    would work hard to leverage the Office of the General Counsel to ensure
    that every taxpayer dollar given to the Department of the Navy is spent
    wisely, fully accounted for, and subject to effective oversight and
    full transparency to this Committee and to the American public.
        If confirmed, I look forward to working with Navy Secretary Del
    Toro, the senior leadership of the Pentagon, and this Committee, doing
    so in the bipartisan tradition that is a prized hallmark of this
    Committee.
        Thank you for your consideration. I am happy to answer your
    questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Coffey. Mr. Bush, please.

    STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS BUSH, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
          THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

        Mr. Bush. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members
    of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as
    President Biden's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army
    for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. I am humbled by the
    faith President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Secretary Wormuth
    have placed in me by nominating me to fill this critical role
    in the United States Army. I am also humbled to sit before you,
    leaders of an institution,
        the United States Congress, where it was my honor and
    privilege to serve as a staff member for almost 19 years.
        I would like to start by thanking the many people who have
    supported me during my 28 years of public service, starting
    with my wife, Trisha, who has been at my side for 24 of those
    years, my father and mother, Donald and Sandra Bush, who
    sacrificed greatly to give me every opportunity in life to
    succeed, and the many superb Army officers and noncommissioned
    officers who taught me what it means to serve my country and to
    lead soldiers, both at West Point and during my time as a young
    officer.
        Here in Congress, I was fortunate to work for many members
    on both sides, but I owe my chance to serve in Congress
    especially to Senator Bill Nelson, Congressman Jim Cooper,
    Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Congressman Ike Skelton, and
    House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith.
        Finally, I want to thank the outstanding Army officers and
    civilians I was honored to work with during my 6 months as an
    Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army earlier this year. If
    confirmed, I am eager to take on the challenge of leading the
    Army's acquisition enterprise during a period of dramatic
    change. The Army is in the early years of what promises to be
    its most significant equipment modernization in nearly 40
    years.
        If confirmed, I would be responsible for bringing to
    fruition many efforts that a talented and dedicated group of
    Army military and civilian leaders who came before me set in
    motion. Having supported congressional oversight of Army
    programs for many years, and serving in the role I have been
    nominated for in an Acting capacity for 6 months, I am
    confident I know how to achieve this goal.
        If confirmed, I would work diligently to meet the
    objectives of Secretary Wormuth, other Department senior
    leaders, and Congress. My priorities would include the
    following. First, I would place a laser-like focus on program
    execution and performance to ensure rapid delivery of improved
    equipment to our soldiers. For many years, Congress has
    directed acquisition reforms on accelerating the pace of
    delivery. I will orient my decisions toward taking action to
    advance programs and deliver effective equipment, while
    ensuring appropriate oversight of program cost and performance.
        Second, I believe the Army must get better at acquiring
    software, using all the available tools that Congress has
    provided. Many efforts are underway to shift software
    acquisition from an industrial age to an information age
    approach. If confirmed, I intend to further accelerate those
    efforts.
        Third, the Army must return to a focus on security in its
    acquisition efforts, including cybersecurity and supply chain
    security. Both are necessary to deliver capabilities
    uncompromised by the aggressive efforts of China, Russia, and
    other countries.
        Fourth, I believe that realistic operational testing is an
    aid, rather than a hindrance, to delivering effective equipment
    for the Army. Taking a little extra time and effort to fully
    test systems up front ensures that contractors are held
    accountable and problems are identified on test ranges rather
    than in combat.
        Finally, and most critically, I will work to ensure Army
    modernization is closely coordinated with Congress. The Army
    cannot achieve any of its modernization goals without the
    support of, and partnership with, Congress.
        In closing, I want to assure members that while the
    position I have been nominated for deals principally with the
    acquisition of equipment, I am also aware of the larger context
    our Army faces. The potential threats to our military are many.
    We are tested by our adversaries on a seemingly daily basis.
        While Army acquisition is only a small part of confronting
    these challenges, I believe it is also a vital one. Our
    soldiers are the best in the world. They represent the very
    best of America. They deserve the very best equipment the
    country can provide. Our soldiers stand on the front line of
    freedom around the world. Providing them with what they need to
    deter our enemies and, if necessary, fight and defeat them, is
    an enormous responsibility. It is one that, if confirmed, I
    will take very seriously every moment of every day.
        I look forward to your questions today and, if confirmed,
    to working with this committee to support the United States
    Army.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bush follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Mr. Douglas Ross Bush
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee,
    I am honored to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to
    be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
    Technology. I am humbled by the faith President Biden, Secretary
    Austin, and Secretary Wormuth have placed in me by nominating me to
    fill this critical role in the United States Army. I am also humbled to
    sit before you - leaders of an institution, the United States Congress,
    where it was my honor and privilege to serve as a staff member for
    almost 19 years.
        I would like to start by thanking the many people who have
    supported me during my 28 years of public service. Starting with my
    wife Trisha, who has been at my side for 24 of those years, my father
    and mother, Donald and Sandra Bush, who sacrificed to give me every
    opportunity in life to succeed, and the many superb Army officers who
    taught me what it means to serve my country and lead soldiers, both at
    West Point and during my time as a young officer. Here in Congress, I
    was fortunate to work for many members on both sides, but I owe my
    chance to serve in Congress to Senator Bill Nelson, Congressman Jim
    Cooper, Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Congressman Ike Skelton, and
    House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith. Finally, I want to
    thank the outstanding Army officers and civilians I was honored to work
    with during my six months as an Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
    earlier this year.
        If confirmed, I am eager to take on the challenge of leading the
    Army's acquisition enterprise during a period of dramatic change. The
    Army is in the early years of what promises to be its most significant
    equipment modernization effort in nearly 40 years. If confirmed, I
    would be responsible for bringing to fruition many efforts that a
    talented and dedicated group of Army military and civilian leaders who
    came before me set in motion.
        Having supported Congressional oversight of Army programs for
    fourteen years, and serving in the role I have been nominated for in an
    Acting capacity for six months, I am confident I know how to achieve
    this goal. If confirmed, I would work diligently to meet the objectives
    of Secretary Wormuth, other Department senior leaders, and Congress. My
    priorities would include the following:
        First, I would place a laser-like focus on program execution and
    performance to ensure rapid delivery of improved equipment to our
    soldiers. For many years, Congress has directed acquisition reforms on
    accelerating the pace of delivery. I will orient my decisions toward
    taking action to advance programs and deliver effective equipment,
    while ensuring appropriate oversight of program cost and performance.
        Second, the Army must get better at acquiring software, using all
    available tools granted by Congress to get there. Many efforts are
    underway to shift software acquisition from an industrial age to an
    information age approach. If confirmed, I intend to further accelerate
    those efforts.
        Third, the Army must return to a focus on security in its
    acquisition efforts - including cyber security and supply chain
    security. Both are necessary to deliver capabilities uncompromised by
    the aggressive efforts of China, Russia, and other countries.
        Fourth, I believe that realistic operational testing is an aid,
    rather than a hindrance, to the acquisition of effective equipment for
    the Army. Taking a little extra time and effort to fully test systems
    up front ensures that contractors are held accountable and problems are
    identified on test ranges rather than in combat.
        Finally - and most critically - I will work to ensure Army
    modernization is closely coordinated with Congress. The Army cannot
    achieve any of its modernization goals without the support of, and
    partnership with, Congress.
        In closing, I want to assure members that while the position I have
    been nominated for deals principally with acquisition of equipment, I
    am also aware of the larger context our Army faces. The potential
    threats to our military are many. We are tested by our adversaries on a
    seemingly daily basis.
        While Army acquisition is only a small part of confronting these
    challenges, I believe it is also a vital one. Our soldiers are the best
    in the world. They represent the very best of America. They deserve the
    very best equipment the country can provide.
        Our soldiers stand on the front line of freedom around the world.
    Providing them with what they need to deter our enemies and, if
    necessary, fight and defeat them, is an enormous responsibility. It is
    one that, if confirmed, I will take very seriously every moment of
    every day.
        I look forward to your questions today and, if confirmed, to
    working with this committee to support the United States Army.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Bush. Now I have a series of
    questions which are directed to all civilian nominees. You may
    answer together.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes.
        Ms. Baker. Yes.
        Mr. Coffey. Yes.
        Mr. Bush. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Mr. Guertin. No.
        Ms. Baker. No.
        Mr. Coffey. No.
        Mr. Bush. No.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    committee when requested?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes.
        Ms. Baker. Yes.
        Mr. Coffey. Yes.
        Mr. Bush. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
    regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in
    providing such records?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes.
        Ms. Baker. Yes.
        Mr. Coffey. Yes.
        Mr. Bush. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes.
        Ms. Baker. Yes.
        Mr. Coffey. Yes.
        Mr. Bush. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes.
        Ms. Baker. Yes.
        Mr. Coffey. Yes.
        Mr. Bush. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony before this
    committee or any briefings they may give?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes.
        Ms. Baker. Yes.
        Mr. Coffey. Yes.
        Mr. Bush. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. And now let me begin my round of
    questions.
        Mr. Guertin, as I alluded to in my opening statement, one
    of the tensions we have is we have been trying to accelerate
    the acquisition process, trying to keep it within cost
    outlines, and frankly, there have been some real examples of
    delay and cost overruns that are difficult to accept. And your
    job is to be sort of, in a way, the cop on the street, to not
    let anything through that is not of great quality and capable
    of doing its job. So how do you intend to balance that need of
    people yelling for speed and you saying, ``Stop. This is not
    ready for prime time"?
        Mr. Guertin. One of the hallmarks of my career has been to
    be involved early in the development of products and thinking
    about how they are architected before it is too late. Setting
    the conditions for success early in the development program is
    especially important in making sure that you get to the place
    you want to in the end.
        So, one of the things I would like to bring to the
    operational test community is a shift-left mindset, getting
    more involved in some of the early decision-makings and set up
    those architectures and understanding how those systems are
    going to interact with the other things around it before the
    program gets so far down the road that they are going to be in
    trouble later. I have been involved in enough acquisitions and
    seen enough of these examples to fully appreciate where you are
    coming from, and if confirmed, I will do my utmost to make sure
    we minimize those kinds of outcomes.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        Ms. Baker, you indicated in your testimony that part of
    your tasks will be to integrate a whole-of-government strategy,
    including elements at the Department of Defense as well as
    State as well as other nations. Can you just give a brief sort
    or snapshot of how you intend to do this?
        Ms. Baker. Sure, Senator. As I said in my opening
    statement, I believe that China is the only adversary that is
    capable of combining economic, diplomatic, militarily, and
    technological might to pose a challenge to the United States. I
    believe that they are proceeding in a whole-of- government
    approach, and our response needs to be whole-of- government as
    well. So, if I am confirmed, I would seek to work closely and
    support the Under Secretary in working closely with our
    interagency partners at the State Department and elsewhere to
    ensure that our approach is integrated, not only across
    military domains but across the interagency.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Coffey, the NDS Commission, in their 2018 report, which
    has been very valuable to all of us, indicated that there is a
    concern about the balance between civilian officials and the
    military within the DOD, that civilian control, which is the
    essence of our government, is not as robust as it should be.
    Are there any actions you believe that need to be taken at the
    Department of Navy to ensure that civilian control is foremost?
        Mr. Coffey. Well, Senator, I agree. Mr. Chairman, I agree
    that the principle of civilian control in the military is
    paramount. I believe that with Secretary Austin at the helm of
    the Pentagon and with Secretary Del Toro at the helm of the
    Navy Department that they are asserting the primacy of civilian
    control.
        I am unaware of any specific action that needs to be taken
    to emphasize that. If confirmed, I will certainly work with
    Secretary Del Toro to see if he views that, and if need be,
    take whatever actions he directs to try and reinforce the
    principle that you just spoke to.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Coffey.
        And finally, Mr. Bush, cybersecurity is a ubiquitous
    problem, so my question is, do you think the Army, at this
    juncture, with your experience, is correctly postured to
    address the full spectrum of cyber?
        Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman, I think the tools are in place, and
    we have all the talent we need. I think now it is a question of
    coordination and activity.
        Within the acquisition world we have many efforts underway,
    the Army does, to design cyber up front, to do more cyber
    testing earlier, to work more closely with Army cyber and Army
    intelligence to maintain awareness of the threat as it evolves.
        I believe over time, though, it will need to become
    something that is just part of everything we do, rather than
    being viewed as an additional duty. There is much work to be
    made, to be done over time, to ensure that full integration
    takes place.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, and I want to thank the
    witnesses for their statements and for their response. And let
    me now recognize Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    too want to thank the witnesses for their statements. It seems
    that I have been gone.
        Chairman Reed. Well --
        Senator Wicker. Ms. Baker, can you hear me?
        Chairman Reed. Continue, sir.
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I can hear you.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. I want those 15 seconds back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Now the lights came on.
        Senator Wicker. Here we go.
        Chairman Reed. You have got them.
        Senator Wicker. Ms. Baker, thank you for your willingness
    to serve. You said, in your opening statement, that China is
    the pacing challenge, that the job of the Department of Defense
    is to deter adversaries, that there is no time to waste. I
    agree with you on all of that. And then in answer to a question
    by the Chair, you referred to China as an adversary, and I
    agree with that.
        Let me ask about shipbuilding. I know it is going to come
    as a shock to my colleagues on the committee but in 2010, China
    commissioned 4 warships and the United States commissioned 3.
    That was 2010. Five years later, China commissioned 12
    warships; the United States commissioned 2. And in 2020, China
    commissioned 26 new warships, and the United States only 3.
    China now has the largest Navy in the world.
        Are you concerned about the priority China has placed on
    naval shipbuilding, and will you commit to supporting the
    statutory congressional mandate for a 355-ship Navy?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, yes, I am concerned about the emphasis
    that China has put on building its fleet. I think that China
    has pursued a strategy of seeking to thwart United States
    advantages across the board, and certainly naval sea power is
    one area.
        If I am confirmed, I will support the plan of record. I
    would just say, in addition to everything else, that we need to
    be focused not only on the number of ships, which I agree is
    critically important, but also the capabilities that those
    ships bring to bear.
        Senator Wicker. True, but there is a congressional mandate,
    signed into law, passed by the Congress, House, and Senate, and
    signed by the President, for 355 ships. Is that the plan of
    record that you support?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, it is.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me switch to Taiwan. The Republic
    of China owned the island of Formosa, the Taiwanese government.
    It consists of 23 million citizens. They are the 21st largest
    economy in the world. They operate under a constitution that
    next year will be three-quarters of a century old. Do you
    believe that the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan have
    the right to self-determination?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Wicker. And do you believe that preventing an
    invasion of Taiwan is in the national security interest of the
    United States of America?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Wicker. And do you believe it is in the national
    security interest of our friends and allies in the Pacific Rim?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Wicker. Do you believe that they are currently
    capable of preventing an invasion by the People's Republic of
    China?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I would just say that our commitment to
    supporting Taiwan's self-defense is longstanding, it is
    bipartisan, and it is something that I am prepared to support,
    moving forward.
        Senator Wicker. And in my judgment, the best way to prevent
    military conflict between the People's Republic and the
    Republic of China is for us to have an adequate Navy in the
    Pacific Rim and for the United States to assist Taiwan in
    building up its defense. Do you agree with that?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, thank you very much. I am
    concerned that, as a matter of policy, that the money that this
    current Administration is requesting for military strength,
    particularly naval strength in the Pacific, is inadequate, and
    I do believe we are going to find support for that position on
    both sides of the dais here on this committee. So, I look
    forward to working with you. But I will tell you, we need to
    change the trend and reverse the curve that we are currently
    facing.
        Thank you, ma'am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Let me recognize
    Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    congratulations to all of our nominees this morning, and we
    very much appreciate your willingness to continue to serve this
    country.
        Ms. Baker, I want to start with you, following up on some
    of Senator Wicker's questions about China and the importance of
    responding to the great power competition that we are now in.
    We heard, over the weekend, the reports that China had fired a
    hypersonic weapon. They walked that back, but it's very clear
    that they're working on that. And then we've also heard in the
    last day that North Korea has just fired two ballistic
    missiles.
        How high up on our priority list for both our national
    defense strategy and for the Department should a response to
    both the hypersonic weapons and to what North Korea is
    currently doing be, and how should we be approaching that?
        Ms. Baker. Thank you, Senator. As the Secretary has said,
    China is the pacing threat for the Department of Defense, and
    that means that we, I believe, if confirmed, will need to have
    a sense of urgency about developing not only the capabilities
    but the concepts of operation that will allow us to counter
    some of the developments that we're seeing, the PRC put
    forward. I think that they have pursued a strategy of seeking
    to blunt U.S. advantages over a number of years, so not only in
    terms of hypersonics but space and counter-space, cyber. All of
    these are areas that, if confirmed, I would seek to prioritize.
        As it relates to North Korea, certainly their continued
    unwillingness to abide by their international obligations, the
    rapid pace of missile testing that we have seen in recent
    weeks, all of those things are concerning. I believe that the
    Department has a responsibility to maintain a robust deterrent
    to ensure that we have forces positioned, ready to fight
    tonight on the peninsula, in order to provide that credible
    deterrent to Kim Jung-un.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. You mentioned, in your opening
    statement, the importance of personnel and that needs to be our
    first priority. I was pleased to see Secretary Austin issue
    some guidance around our personnel who might be affected by
    Havana syndrome or the anomalous health incidents. But
    obviously there is a lot more that we need to be doing to
    respond to that. We need to get to the bottom of who is
    responsible and how they are orchestrating these attacks.
        So if confirmed, do I have your commitment to work closely
    with this committee and provide timely updates on matters
    pertaining to these attacks?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, absolutely. I have friends and
    colleagues who have been affected by anomalous health
    incidents. I take that very personally and I will commit to
    work with you on this.
        Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you.
        Mr. Guertin, I had the opportunity to go up on a KC-46 air
    refueling mission with a crew from the 157th Refueling Wing at
    Pease in New Hampshire. We were the first Guard base to get
    those KC-46 tankers. But as you know, they are still not
    operating the way they are supposed to operate. So if
    confirmed, do I have your commitment to ensure that testing and
    evaluation for the Remote Vision System 2.0 remains on
    schedule?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes, Senator. It is especially important that
    the systems are tested the way they will be operated,
    operationally, and to have those things come out as a part of
    fielding them is not the time we want to discover those
    problems.
        Senator Shaheen. And will you ensure that the committee,
    this committee, is notified of any further delays or problems
    with that Remote Vision System?
        Mr. Guertin. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffey, one of the big challenges that we have seen
    across our military, and the Navy, unfortunately, has not been
    exempt over the last decade, that has gotten a lot of attention
    has been sexual assault, and obviously there have been concerns
    about how to respond to that and the culture of the military
    and how it seems to, if not promote at least condone sexual
    assault and sexual harassment. So can you talk about what role
    you can have, as legal counsel, to addressing this issue?
        Mr. Coffey. Thank you, Senator. There is no place in the
    Department of the Navy or anywhere in the military for sexual
    harassment, sexual assault, or any of those destructive
    behaviors, no room whatsoever. I was very distressed when I
    read the IRC report to see that something that I saw in my own
    active-duty days and reserve duty days, when we were first
    integrating women into combat units was not only not solved, it
    was worse. And it is very distressing to me.
        I am very pleased to see that the IRC gave specific
    recommendations and that Secretary Austin has directed that the
    Department will carry out every one of those recommendations,
    albeit some with some modifications. If I am confirmed, I would
    vigorously support implementing those changes on the roadmap
    that the Secretary of Defense has laid out. This is personal to
    me. I was in a squadron that suffered a lot of tension and
    disruption due to allegations of sexual assault. It was a
    priority for me when I was a commander, and it is distressing
    for me that many years later it is still a problem in the
    Department.
        But if I am confirmed, I am absolutely committed to helping
    eradicate that scourge within the Department of the Navy.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I hope you will
    make it a priority. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coffey. I will, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator
    Tuberville, which I think this sets the record for earliest
    recognition. So Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for you
    all being here today.
        Mr. Bush, you being a former tanker, you know Anniston Army
    Depot in Alabama is the only depot in the U.S. that performance
    maintenance on our tanks. Give me your thoughts about the
    future of our tank use in the United States military.
        Mr. Bush. Senator, Anniston is part of the broader organic
    industrial base that supports the whole Army, and a vital part.
    We have to have it, and it has to be effective and efficient
    with a good workforce. I believe as long as the Army has heavy
    armored vehicles there will be a major role for Anniston in
    supporting those efforts.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Coffey, we recently had
    a young man arrested, court-martialed, because of saying
    something on social media about the war in Afghanistan. What
    are your thoughts on that?
        Mr. Coffey. Well, Senator, I am vaguely aware of the
    circumstances of which you speak and I understand it was
    handled within the Uniform Code of Military Justice system,
    which, of course, falls within the purview of the uniformed
    lawyers within the Department. I understand that that process
    may be ongoing, in at least one shape or form, so I would be
    reluctant to offer any opinion on the specific facts of that
    case.
        But I will say this. I firmly believe in the First
    Amendment. I believe in the right of every servicemember to
    have the beliefs that they believe. But also if you pull on a
    uniform, as I did for 30 years, you understand that there is a
    time and a place to voice those and that you are, first and
    foremost, a member of the military with a chain of command and
    respect for your superiors. And again, not tying it to this
    specific instance, but if you disobey direct orders, if your
    conduct threatens good order and discipline, then under the
    UCMJ you can, in my view, should be held accountable, again
    without opining on the specific facts of that matter, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Sure. Thank you. Ms. Baker, your
    thoughts?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I am not a lawyer. I am not an expert
    on UCMJ. But as Mr. Coffey said, I am --
        Senator Tuberville. But you are into team-building, right?
        Ms. Baker. I do believe in prioritizing team-building. I
    think, as Mr. Coffey said, everyone is entitled to their First
    Amendment rights, but at the end of the day there is a chain of
    command and that is something that we will expect our
    servicemembers to adhere to.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. We are in a business here of
    team-building, as you said, and we need a strong and vibrant
    military. I want to know what your opinion is and your
    definition is of ``extremism.'' Could you tell me that?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I do not know that I can give you a
    textbook definition of the term.
        Senator Tuberville. Well, your thoughts.
        Ms. Baker. What I can tell you is that I believe that the
    vast majority of our servicemembers serve with honor and
    distinction. As the Chairman said earlier, thought, to the
    extent that there are individuals in the Services who are
    seeking to disrupt that unity and that team-building that you
    spoke of, that is something, I think, the Secretary has
    indicated he intends to prioritize.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you.
        Mr. Guertin, Alabama is a fast-growing hub for commercial
    engineering and software companies. What do you believe the DOD
    should be doing to monitor the development of these
    operational, new commercial systems that we have?
        Mr. Guertin. So, Senator, the challenges we face in using
    new systems that are based on commercial technologies, one
    aspect to it is the supply chain--where are those things coming
    from and are they secure and suitable for military use. Our use
    case is not exactly the same as, you know, a university or your
    home. So, we want to make sure that those products are suitable
    to the task. But also, we want to take advantage of commercial
    technologies that allow us to move faster and effectively into
    the future.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
    your generosity.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. And now let
    me recognize Senator Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I ask the following two initial questions of all the
    nominees who come before any of the committees on which I sit,
    so I will ask the entire panel, in unison.
        Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
    requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
    harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        Mr. Guertin. No.
        Ms. Baker. No.
        Mr. Coffey. No.
        Mr. Bush. No.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Mr. Guertin. No, Senator.
        Ms. Baker. No.
        Mr. Coffey. No.
        Ms. Baker. No.
        Senator Hirono. Ms. Baker, you were asked by Senator
    Shaheen about China's hypersonic missiles and you said that
    there would be a robust deterrent. And so I just wanted to also
    mention and take note of what China is doing, and, of course,
    as it impacts Hawaii, not to mention what North Korea's missile
    testing is doing in the Indo-Pacific arena.
        So, I just would like to ask you, since you acknowledged
    that we need to have a robust deterrent, that the DOD budgets
    will reflect this kind of robust deterrence in either this
    budget or in the following budgets.
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I believe that the first
    responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the
    homeland. Of course, Hawaii is part of that. And so I would
    expect that we would have robust and credible defense of Hawaii
    and that we would put forward in the Indo-Pacific a credible
    deterrent.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffey, earlier this month, The Washington Post
    reported that Federal agents are investigating a new corruption
    scandal involving alleged bribery and fraud related to service
    contracts when our ships and submarines pull into ports in
    Europe and the Middle East. I am concerned that these facts are
    eerily reminiscent of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia, GDMA,
    contracting scandal in the Indo-Pacific.
        In a congressional hearing over 3 years ago, the Vice Chief
    of Naval Operations at that time assured my counterparts in the
    House that the Navy had installed new layers of oversight in
    its contracting process for overseas ports to thwart a report
    of the GDMA type of scandal, but that does not seem to have
    worked. If confirmed, what steps do you plan to take to ensure
    adequate controls are in place to prevent fraud in these
    overseas shipping service contracts?
        Mr. Coffey. Senator, there is no room in the Navy for any
    type of corruption along the lines of what you have described,
    and I too was distressed to read about the MLS case a few weeks
    ago. I thought there were encouraging signs in the wake of the
    Glenn Defense Marine scandal, specifically the comprehensive
    review relating to the uniformed lawyers in the Department and
    some of the recommendations they had made, which are being
    carried out and which I look forward to reviewing more closely,
    if confirmed.
        But it is clear that there are still problems, and if I am
    confirmed, I would look to see how we can address those. From
    my time as a Federal prosecutor and as a plaintiff's lawyer, I
    believe in personal accountability, so I think this is a
    problem that is going to need continuing focus of leadership,
    focus on personal accountability, and reviewing what continues
    to go wrong. I hope it is isolated, but If I am confirmed I am
    going to try and get to the bottom of it.
        Senator Hirono. Really, I think we need your commitment
    that you will review whatever oversight procedures are already
    in place, because the Navy hardly needs these kinds of
    scandals.
        Mr. Guertin, the Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility,
    Banking Sands, PMRF, on Kauai, is the world's largest
    instrumented, multidimensional testing and training range.
    Continuing to integrate and upgrade PMRF, along with other
    ranges in the Pacific, is critical to our national security,
    and why that task is included as a line of effort within the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Have you ever visited PMRF?
        Mr. Guertin. Not yet, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. I hope you will. You know, I would like to
    ask you, what is the importance of this kind of facility and
    the importance of this type of initiative that I just
    mentioned?
        Mr. Guertin. Test ranges of the kinds that we have,
    especially the one in Hawaii, is critical to our ability to
    test weapons systems as they would be used in combat. All of
    our facilities need to be examined for how they might be
    modernized in the future. There is a great report turned out
    recently by the National Academies that highlighted some of the
    changes we need to make. If confirmed, I am looking forward to
    getting into the details of that and working with the rest of
    the DOT&E team to figure out to not just modernize but also
    position these ranges so that they can keep pace with the
    evolving needs for the long haul.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just want to
    note for Ms. Baker that I do appreciate your mentioning that
    climate change considerations are an important part of what you
    will be focusing on. And so climate change considerations in
    the operations, planning, and resource allocation decisions are
    very important, so I wanted to note that.
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, and I would look forward, if
    confirmed, to working with you on that.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Guertin, I
    want to ask you some questions. You are nominated for a very
    important position. One of your predecessors earlier this year,
    Dr. Ray O'Toole, I think was the Acting in your position, came
    before our Readiness Subcommittee and gave the following
    testimony, which troubled Senator Sullivan and I, the Chair and
    Ranking of the Readiness Subcommittee, and I quote, ``DOD's
    acquisition and T&E communities need to address cybersecurity
    more comprehensively. Unfortunately, some programs do not
    properly plan for cybersecurity assessments. More critically,
    due to poor system hardening against dynamic cyber threats
    driven by lack of workforce, cyber capacity, talent, and tools
    within the program offices, virtually none of the programs
    assessed in fiscal year 2020 were survivable against relevant
    cyber threats.''
        That testimony was offered in an open hearing. Senator
    Sullivan and I both looked at each other and said, ``Is this an
    open hearing?'' and the witness, Dr. O'Toole, said, ``I got
    this cleared for delivery of testimony in an open hearing.''
    But it troubled us greatly that in the programs that were
    tested by your office, should you be confirmed, in fiscal year
    2020, virtually none of the programs were survivable against
    relevant cyber threats.
        Do you think the survivability failures are due to poor
    acquisition policy or is there a larger cultural problem within
    the DOD that we need to address to solve this, you know,
    shocking weakness?
        Mr. Guertin. Well, Senator, getting our cybersecurity right
    on our weapons systems is critically important to them actually
    being useful in the field. It is very affordable to attack our
    systems before they actually make it to the field, to get to
    the kinetic stage of the fight, so we have got to get this
    right. And again, as I mentioned earlier, shifting left the
    view of the operational test community to get into those early-
    stage decisions before people start on the path to developing
    their products, that they get those cybersecurity principles
    right up front so that when they get out toward the end, when
    we are doing the actual operational test side of it, that they
    have positioned themselves well to be able to respond to the
    continuous evolving threat. It would not be a big deal if we
    were not being attacked all the time, and we are, and we need
    to position ourselves well for that.
        Senator Kaine. You have experience both in software
    development and Navy weapons development, so I think you are in
    a unique posture to make sure when we are doing acquisition and
    early-stage work on these programs that we build in cyber
    protections.
        A second issue that has come up recently, a family in
    Annapolis was caught by the FBI offering to sell classified
    information on submarine reactor and propulsion design to
    another country, and that demonstrates just how damaging
    insider threats can be. The news report indicated that this
    particular individual was storing classified information on an
    SD card, hopefully to then transfer that information to another
    country. From your time with Naval Surface Warfare Center, do
    you think we do enough monitoring, or have enough monitoring
    systems in place, to flag potentially harmful activity like
    folks storing classified information on private SD cards?
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, I am not familiar currently with the
    protection of systems that is going on in, say specifically,
    Naval Surface or Undersea Warfare Center. Having been an
    employee at those kinds of facilities in the past, that they
    actually do have very good protections. We did find this
    problem before it got out of hand, so chalked it up as a little
    bit of a win, but it is also dangerously close to getting it
    too far out of hand before it would be a real problem. So, if
    confirmed, I will make sure that the operational test community
    and the systems that we use are well positioned to be able to
    capture those things before they get out of hand.
        Senator Kaine. And just, you know, to a non-expert--I am
    not an expert--are there software systems or AI programs that
    you think are sufficient to identify potentially harmful
    activity of the kind that, you are right, we did catch it and
    stopped the family from transferring the information. But do
    you think that there is software, AI programs, that can help us
    ensure that this kind of data and activity is protected?
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, I could not make a definitive
    statement about the specific use of machine learning or
    artificial intelligence to capture that sort of activity. I do
    know that there is some research going on in that area, form my
    time at the Software Engineering Institute. So if confirmed, it
    would be a pleasure to look into that and find out how we can
    be more effective in that area.
        Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. I appreciate it, Mr.
    Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Hawley, if
    you are ready you may begin.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
    witnesses for being here.
        Mr. Bush, if I could just start with you. I want to talk
    first about something that is very important to my state, and
    that is the Lake City Ammunition Plant, also important for the
    Next Generation Squad Weapon. As you know, the Lake City Army
    Ammunition Plant does vital work ensuring that our warfighters
    are prepared and armed for any future conflict, and in
    particular, that plant provides ammunition, produces
    ammunition, for the Next Generation Squad Weapon.
        Here is my question. Do I have your commitment to ensure
    that Lake City will receive the facility upgrades that it needs
    in order to continue to produce ammunition at the rate that we
    need it to?
        Mr. Bush. Senator, first let me say I was recently able to
    visit the facility, so I saw firsthand the great work done
    there and the great people that work there. Assuming the Army
    stays on its current plan for that program it will need to
    build that ammunition at Lake City. Preliminary work is
    underway, and should the program stay on schedule I would
    expect the Army to fund production efforts as well.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
        Ms. Baker, let me come to you, and let us talk a little bit
    about China, if we could. Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary
    Hicks, and Under Secretary Kahl have all testified that the
    U.S. has to maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait
    accompli, vis-a-vis Taiwan. I have made it my habit in this
    committee to ask every witness, practically, from DOD,
    certainly those in a policymaking role, about this scenario,
    which I think China not only being the pacing threat but the
    Taiwan challenge the pacing scenario.
        So if I could just ask for a yes or no from you, do you
    agree with their testimony that it is vital that the U.S.
    maintain the ability to defeat a potential fait accompli
    against Taiwan?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. And do you agree that the
    Department should be prioritizing this scenario as it develops
    plans, concepts, and capabilities for the future?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do. I think a Taiwan contingency
    is certainly among the most stressing scenarios that we can be
    planning for, and for that reason it is critical that we
    prioritize it.
        Senator Hawley. Great. I am glad to hear that. Let me ask
    you about another aspect of this. Admiral Davidson and Admiral
    Aquilino have both testified to this committee that China may
    attempt a fait accompli in Taiwan before the end of this
    decade. Now it is widely thought that this is possible in the
    2030s, but what caught my attention from both of them was their
    testimony that this is something we should be planning for and
    looking at in the 2020s. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and
    the Chief of Naval Operations have both said that they agree
    with that assessment, and the TRANSCOM Commander and other
    officials have said the same.
        Do you agree that the threat of a Chinese fait accompli
    against Taiwan is something we need to be concerned about and
    planning for in this decade and not just in the 2030s?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you something
    adjacent to this. Secretary Austin wrote earlier this year, in
    response to a question from me, and I am going to quote him
    now, that ``a combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is
    instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter and, if
    necessary, to deny a fait accompli scenario.'' The Deputy
    Secretary, the Under Secretary, and multiple commanders of
    INDOPACOM have reaffirmed the Secretary's emphasis on denial.
        Do you agree that a strategy of denial is essential for
    deterring Chinese aggression?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me shift gears just a little
    bit and ask you about some of the recent disturbing testimony
    that this committee has heard with regard to the situation in
    Afghanistan. Do you think it was appropriate for the United
    States to draw down nearly all of its forces in Afghanistan
    before we finished the evacuation of American citizens? And I
    am thinking particularly given General Miller's warning that
    the Afghan Security Forces and government could collapse
    quickly.
        Ms. Baker. Senator, not being at the Department right now,
    I am familiar with the testimony that you are referencing. I
    understand that the Department planned for a range of
    contingencies, including different levels of troops on the
    ground. I am not in a position, I think, to assess the details
    of that planning.
        Senator Hawley. Secretary Austin testified both to this
    committee, and then more pointedly, actually, to the House
    Armed Services Committee, that the non-combatant evacuation he
    believes should have begun earlier. It is reported that General
    Milley, reported in the press that General Milley said the same
    thing, again even more pointedly, that DOD warned the White
    House and State that the non-combatant evacuation had to begin
    earlier. It did not, of course, and as a consequence hundreds
    of civilians were killed, hundreds of Americans left behind, 13
    servicemembers killed.
        Do you agree with them, that the non-combatant evacuation
    should have begun earlier in Afghanistan?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, my understanding is that there was a
    robust interagency discussion about the timing of the NEO
    operations. I am simply not currently in a position where I
    have the details that I would need to be able to really assess
    that.
        Senator Hawley. I have got another question, too, for you
    about the forced planning construct in the 2018 NDS and a
    couple of other things related also to Russia. I will submit
    those for the record because my time has expired.
        Thanks so much to all the witnesses, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me
    recognize Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    follow Senator Hawley's questions about the impact of our
    withdrawal from Afghanistan on both Americans who were left
    there and our Afghan partners and allies, many of whom are
    still there.
        You mentioned that there was a robust interagency
    discussion, and a number of actually visited the White House in
    the spring, in April and May, to urge that there be
    evacuations, and much more massive efforts at evacuations
    beginning then and not waiting. Now you have been working on
    the National Security Council. Are you saying that the National
    Security Council was uninvolved in those discussions?
        Ms. Baker. No, Senator. My role in the National Security
    Council is primarily related to drafting the National Security
    strategy. I was not involved in the operational planning for
    the evacuation of Afghanistan.
        Senator Blumenthal. So there was no preparation in terms of
    strategy for that evacuation?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I believe that there was. It simply was
    not in my job jar.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, looking forward in
    terms of what we should do now, there have been nine planes
    that have continued the evacuation effort. They are private
    planes, not United States military planes. We have no presence
    there, either diplomatically or militarily. Those nine planes
    have evacuated approximately 300 people each, most of them
    interpreters, translators, guards, security, personnel who
    sided with us and literally put their lives on the line, risked
    their families. But they are just a fraction of the total
    number of Afghan allies and partners who remain there in very
    severe danger. And the reason I am asking about it is because
    they were of direct service to our men and women in uniform,
    often going into harm's way with them, and the President has
    committed to get them out.
        Do you agree with me that we ought to make, as a
    precondition of any serious talks or conversations or
    discussions with the Taliban that they permit all of those
    Afghan allies, who sided with us, to leave if they want to do
    so?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I think we have a commitment that
    we make as a military to our partners on the ground and that we
    need to abide by that. I think that the safe passage of not
    only American citizens and legal permanent residents but also
    the Afghan partners that you describe should be a priority for
    moving forward.
        Senator Blumenthal. My office has been directly involved in
    enabling a number of those planes to leave. It has been a
    torturous day-and-night process, and my feeling often has been
    that our own government is not as robustly supportive as it
    could be. Do you commit that you will be actively engaged,
    personally, with the Department of State in urging that we
    fulfill our commitment to those Afghan partners and allies, as
    well as the Americans who may still be there?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator, and let me thank you for the work
    that I know you have done on this issue and the leadership that
    you have displayed. As you mentioned, the Department of State
    does have the lead on this for the interagency, but if am
    confirmed I will see to ensure that the Department of Defense
    is providing all of the necessary support to the State
    Department.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you be willing to support the use
    of our United States military aircraft in that effort, if the
    Taliban permitted it?
        Ms. Baker. Senator that is not an issue I have looked at
    directly, so I do not know that I can give you a direct answer.
    But if confirmed, I certainly would seek to get the details of
    what something like that could look like and have a follow-on
    discussion.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Guertin, I want
    to follow up on Senator Kaine's questions. There is no question
    in my mind that if there is some level of conflict it will
    begin with cyber. And we can have all the ships in the world in
    the Pacific but if they are silenced, if they lose their
    communications capability, their navigation capability, then
    they are not going to be very effective in protecting the
    interests of this country.
        Will you pursue, actively and aggressively, testing for
    cybersecurity of every system that comes under your purview in
    this new position?
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, the operational testing of software-
    intensive, or software-reliant systems has to include
    cybersecurity testing as a part of its suitability for
    operational use. I believe that policy is already in place, but
    I commit to you that we will make sure that it --
        Senator King. To your knowledge, does this Department, this
    division office have the capability to provide that kind of
    cybersecurity testing? This is a specialized field. Do you have
    hackers for hire in that office?
        Mr. Guertin. So we have Red Team people that can go in and
    have a high degree of expertise for doing penetration testing
    and finding out where the vulnerabilities lie, and inform the
    programs what they need to do to go in and fix it.
        Senator King. I hope --
        Mr. Guertin. I am not certain, though, that we have like
    all of the people in place for testing every system. I would
    have to look into that and get back to you, if confirmed.
        Senator King. Well, I view this as an absolutely essential
    and urgent part of your responsibility, in terms of supply
    chain, in terms of acquisition of equipment. Nothing is going
    to work if it is subject to a cyberattack.
        Ms. Baker, one of your responsibilities will be to lead and
    develop the Nuclear Posture Review. Without going into a great
    deal of discussion, do you believe that no-first-use policy
    should be part of the new nuclear policy?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, as the Deputy Secretary testified when
    she was last here, that is unlikely to be part of the Nuclear
    Posture Review. That is ultimately a decision that is made by
    the President of the United States. If I was confirmed, though,
    I would seek to ensure--and I know that NPR is already well
    underway--but to ensure that the product is analytically
    rigorous, that it takes into account changes in the strategic
    environment, which includes the fact that we are facing now two
    nuclear-capable peer, near- peer adversaries, and that it
    reflects the input and advice of all components of the
    Department of Defense, to include our combatant commanders,
    EUCOM, INDOPACOM, and STRATCOM, in particular. Ultimately, I
    think our obligation is to provide the best analytic product to
    the President in order to inform his choices.
        Senator King. Thank you. We just heard about the launch of
    a Chinese hypersonic missile into orbit and then out of orbit.
    We are still talking about missile defense, hitting a bullet
    with a bullet. I am concerned that for years we have been
    talking about directed energy as a possible solution, and yet
    it just does not seem to be getting the attention, the research
    money that I believe it deserves in terms of its future
    capability. We are not going to be able to do missile defense
    against a hypersonic missile. I think it is very unlikely.
        Will you commit to, in terms of policy, looking hard at
    directed energy as a potential asset in the new world of
    missile defense?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I think there are a number of
    emerging and advanced technologies that we need to do a better
    job of incorporating into our concepts and our war planning,
    and certainly I would put directed energy in that category.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Mr. Coffey, I have to begin by asking you, you were a P-3
    commander. Were you ever at Brunswick?
        Mr. Coffey. Only three different squadrons, Senator.
        Senator King. Only three different squadrons.
        Mr. Coffey. I was there for about 10 years of my 30 years,
    including command of Patrol Squadron 92.
        Senator King. At Brunswick Naval Air Station?
        Mr. Coffey. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Congratulations.
        Mr. Coffey. Thank you.
        Senator King. In your advanced testimony, you mentioned
    accession to the Convention of the Law of the Sea would
    strengthen our global security posture. As a lawyer, do you see
    any legal objections to the accession of this country to the
    Law of the Sea Convention?
        Mr. Coffey. Senator, the Navy has been abiding by the
    tenets of that --
        Senator King. We are abiding by it, but the problem is we
    are not at the table.
        Mr. Coffey. We are not. We are not. And I do not see any
    legal obstacle to us signing on formally to that.
        Senator King. Do you think it is a strategic disadvantage
    to us to not be at the table under the Law of the Sea
    Convention?
        Mr. Coffey. I think our voice would carry more weight if we
    were at the table. I mean, we carry a lot of weight regardless,
    and I know our allies are abiding by it as well. But that is
    actually something in the purview of the General Counsel of the
    Department of Defense, and I certainly, if confirmed, would
    confer with her to see what we could do to advance the ball on
    that.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. I thank each of
    you for being here. Congratulations on your nominations and
    your willingness to serve.
        Just two weeks ago, the Chinese military sent nearly 150
    war planes over Taiwanese airspace, and we have heard the
    Communist Party General Secretary Xi express his intentions for
    taking over Taiwan. We have a long military relationship with
    the Taiwanese people, and it is one of our most strategic
    partners in the region, and I think we would all agree they
    deserve our complete support.
        Ms. Baker, if confirmed, would you support providing Taiwan
    with robust military training and expertise to ensure its armed
    forces present a combat-credible deterrent?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I think that our commitments under the
    Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan's self-defense are
    longstanding, they are partisan, and I intend to support them,
    if confirmed.
        Senator Scott. So you would support robust military
    training and expertise to ensure that they are a credible
    threat.
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator. I would support meeting our
    commitments under the TRA.
        Senator Scott. Would you consider such military support to
    include individual and unit-level training as well as training
    for operations that would make cooperation with U.S. and our
    other militaries more effective if Taiwan required it to defend
    itself?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I have not looked at that question
    specifically so I think I need to dig into some of the details
    and maybe get back to you with a more definitive answer. But
    certainly I think that it is incredibly important that we
    improve the interoperability of our military to work with our
    partners and allies in the region, particularly as it might
    relate to a Taiwan scenario.
        Senator Scott. I realize the primary goal for the United
    States is to enhance Taiwan's ability to engage in asymmetric
    warfare with a much stronger China, and I think we all would
    agree with that. But shouldn't we also consider ways to help
    Taiwan defend itself and hopefully be a great deterrent for
    whatever Communist China might throw at it, such as an enhanced
    Iron Dome system or greater anti-missile defense system, to
    make it clear to General Secretary Xi that he will not be
    permitted to take Taiwan by force?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I again have not looked specifically at
    the concept of an Iron Dome-like system. I understand that
    Taiwan is pursuing a strategy of building robust, lethal,
    mobile asymmetric capabilities that I think makes a great deal
    of sense. But certainly these are all things that I think we
    can look at, and should look at carefully.
        Senator Scott. It has clearly worked for Israel, and this
    would be totally different. I mean, the capabilities of
    Communist China are totally different. But this concept of
    making the Taiwanese people comfortable, and telling Xi that he
    will not be able to take them by force I think would be
    helpful. Don't you agree?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, certainly everything I know about the
    operation of the Iron Dome system in Israel indicates that it
    has been remarkably successful. I simply have not considered
    how that might translate into the Indo-Pacific.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Mr. Bush, we are hearing of reports that Communist China
    has successfully tested a hypersonic weapon that is capable of
    carrying a nuclear warhead. We are also hearing that these
    reports surprised our intelligence community and Pentagon
    leadership. Do you believe that is true, and do you believe
    that the United States is comfortably ahead of China on nuclear
    warheads, or is this launch evidence that we have a lot of work
    to do to modernize our nuclear capability?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I have not received the specific
    classified briefing on that event yet. I am sure there are
    classified details I would need to know before giving you a
    good answer, sir. More broadly speaking, the entire DOD,
    including the Army, does need to continue to work rapidly to
    improve our deterrence capability, including in the area of
    hypersonic missiles.
        Senator Scott. All right. Ms. Baker and Mr. Guertin, what
    do you think about these reports about the hypersonic, and were
    we surprised, and do you believe that we need to modernize our
    nuclear arsenal to be able to defend ourselves against an
    aggressive communist leadership in China?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, as Mr. Bush said, I think it is
    difficult to discuss the details in this open session, but
    certainly I agree a modern and credible nuclear deterrent is
    essential to homeland defense, moving forward.
        Mr. Guertin. I concur with Ms. Baker on that point.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Warren,
    please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to
    each of our nominees. Welcome. And I want to say a special
    thank you to Ms. Baker for her commitment to serve. Her
    intellect and her integrity is matched only by her deep and
    abiding commitment to public service, and I was fortunate to
    benefit from her advice and counsel. She is precisely the kind
    of person that we should all hope agrees to serve in our
    government.
        Mr. Guertin, I would like to start with you today. There is
    something I would like to be able to ask about, and that is the
    annual report published by the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation. This is one of the most important report cards for
    determining whether or not our weapons are working. The Section
    809 panel, created by Congress, to streamline and improve
    defense acquisition found that the annual report, and I am
    going to quote here, ``assists with both the office's internal
    success and the ability of Congress to exercise proper
    oversight.''
        Now, this is where it is important to me to get some
    commitments from you. There is always pressure to keep elements
    of this report away from the public. So, Mr. Guertin, do you
    agree that this report must remain available to the public, to
    the maximum extent possible?
        Mr. Guertin. So Senator, transparency on how our weapons
    systems are doing is especially important so that the public
    knows that we are doing a good job with the money we have or
    where we are not quite living up to our expectations. I commit
    to you that we will have an unclassified report. I will also
    assert that some of the stuff might be a little sensitive that
    perhaps might be better suited for like a classified appendix,
    that sort of thing. I would be happy to work with you on what
    are the balance points of those.
        Senator Warren. Good. So, I take that as a yes, to the
    maximum extent possible.
        Mr. Guertin. To the maximum extent possible.
        Senator Warren. Good. And do you commit to this committee
    that you will make this report and other reports from your
    office publicly available, to the maximum extent possible?
        Mr. Guertin. To the maximum extent possible, yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. That is very important to me.
    Now one way to keep information from the public is to use
    pseudo-classification, like ``For Official Use Only,'' which
    means that the information is not deemed to be classified but
    it is still restricted from public view. So let me ask you
    another question on this. Do you commit to avoiding the use of
    designations such as ``For Official Use Only'' for the
    unclassified portions of the Operational Test and Evaluation
    reports?
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, to the maximum extent possible, yes,
    but I think there might be some policy issues we might have to
    work out with Congress to make sure that the information is
    provided as unclassified and public released but also not
    sensitive in some way.
        Senator Warren. All right. Well, we might have to talk
    through what ``sensitive'' means, because if it is not
    classified then I think the public generally, the presumption
    should be that the public has a right to know, and that is the
    commitment I want from you, to the maximum extent possible.
        Mr. Guertin. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Okay. And then my final question on this,
    do you commit to notifying this committee if you believe that
    your work is being wrongfully restricted or pseudo-classified
    or overclassified?
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, if there are any restrictions that do
    not make sense or are not in the interest of the country I will
    make sure that we communicate that with this committee.
        Senator Warren. Good. I every much appreciate that. I plan
    to hold you to these commitments, and I look forward to working
    with you to ensure maximum transparency from your office. I
    think that is how both of us will better serve the American
    people. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator
    Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to each of you for being here today.
        Mr. Coffey, I want to come to you. We saw the release of
    NAVADMIN last week and the guidance on how sailors who are not
    fully vaccinated and do not have a pending or approved
    exemption will be punished administratively. So, I have got
    some questions for you. Is it correct to say that sailors who
    are separated only for refusing the vaccine will, in the least
    favorable outcome, receive a discharge no lower than ``general
    under honorable conditions"?
        Mr. Coffey. Well, Senator, I support the vaccination
    program. I think it is critically important that the force be
    vaccinated. I was vaccinated quite frequently when I was on
    active duty and as a reservist. I have not reviewed the
    NAVADMIN you are talking about specifically, so I --
        Senator Blackburn. Will you review it and then answer me
    specifically?
        Mr. Coffey. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Enlisted servicemembers
    separated under this subparagraph will apparently not be
    eligible for involuntary separation pay and will be subject to
    recoupment of any unearned special or incentive pays. Can you
    articulate what the recoupment of any unearned special or
    incentive pays means, providing me a tangible example of this?
        Mr. Coffey. Well, I can speak to my own background,
    Senator. As a naval aviator, a naval flight officer, if I --
        Senator Blackburn. No. I am talking about the specific
    guidance. So why don't you do that one in writing, since you
    have not seen that. I cannot believe you did not look at that
    guidance before coming in here for this hearing. So look at it
    and then give me a written response with a tangible example.
        A general discharge allows the servicemember to use the
    majority of veterans programs and benefits such as hiring
    preferences for Federal jobs, VA medical coverage, and home
    loan benefits. Please confirm the following for the record.
    Will sailors who are separated only for refusing the vaccine be
    deemed ineligible from future military service? Yes or no.
        Mr. Coffey. Senator, I would have to submit that in writing
    after the hearing.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. You will submit that also. Is the
    GI Bill education benefit the only absolute benefit not awarded
    to servicemembers with a general discharge? Yes or no.
        Mr. Coffey. Same answer, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Mr. Coffey. I will put that in my written response.
        Senator Blackburn. Is it fair to say that any sailor
    discharged for a vaccination refusal will not be entitled to
    their post-9/11 GI Bill benefit?
        Mr. Coffey. Same answer, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. What happens to personnel from the
    other military services who are assigned to naval commands and
    refuse the vaccine? We would want to know that, so again, a
    written answer.
        Mr. Coffey. Same answer.
        Senator Blackburn. And then also, what happens to foreign
    military personnel, such as those studying U.S. professional
    military education courses, if they refuse the vaccine for
    religious reasons?
        Mr. Coffey. I will submit that as well.
        Senator Blackburn. I want you to know, my office has been
    inundated with calls trying to get clarity on these issues. So
    I think it is so important that you all get these to us.
        One more. Is it also correct that separation determinations
    made by the Navy will be centralized under the CCDA to ensure a
    fair and consistent process is applied across the board?
        Mr. Coffey. I will be sure to provide the clarity you seek
    in my written response.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. And then also a statement as to
    whether or not you think a centralized process is the best
    practice.
        Mr. Coffey. I will do that as well, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you.
        Ms. Baker, if I may come to you. As Senator Warren alluded,
    you have advised her on shaping her national security agenda
    which, and I am quoting, ``took aim at rising defense budgets
    and the revolving door between the Pentagon and the defense
    industry.'' If confirmed, would these be your priorities in the
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy role? Would it be
    these rising DOD budgets in the defense industry?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, The Secretary has been clear that China
    is the pacing threat for the Department and should be our
    priority, so if I am confirmed, I would seek to prioritize
    those issues.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Well, we know that flat defense
    budgets are actually shrinking defense budgets. How do you
    reconcile this reality with your inherent bias toward, and I am
    quoting you, ``taking aim at risking defense budgets'' because
    China is a priority? And we want to make certain that we are
    addressing that great power competition. So how do you
    reconcile that?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I agree that we need to be prioritizing
    issues surrounding great power competition, particularly with
    China. Where I start on questions of defense budget is to start
    with the strategy first, and as you know, I think the
    Department is well underway in drafting an update to the
    National Defense Strategy that will build, I believe, on the
    2018 strategy. I think from there we can look at the
    capabilities and investments that the strategy requires and
    from there build back into a budget number.
        Senator Blackburn. And you think you can do that with less
    resources?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I would be guided by the strategy. So,
    I do not have an arbitrary number in mind. I think we should
    resource to the strategy.
        Senator Blackburn. So you are saying you are going to leave
    your opinions at the door.
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to each of the
    nominees congratulations on your nomination and thank you for
    your willingness to serve our country.
        Mr. Coffey, my first question is for you. In August of
    2019, Corporal Anne Vassas of Michigan unfortunately took her
    own life at a Marine Corps air station in Japan. The Vassas
    family was told that command investigation was concluded but
    the release of the final report requires additional approvals,
    and they have been now waiting for 2 years.
        As General Counsel, will you maintain a close relationship
    with the staff judge advocate and have a role in oversight of
    the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, if confirmed?
        Mr. Coffey. Senator, let me begin by expressing my
    condolences to the family, and it is something I will look
    into, if confirmed. Yes, Senator, I commit to working closely
    with the uniformed lawyers of the Department. I understand
    there is a very good relationship now, a one- team, one-mission
    approach that I heartily endorse. And I will likewise work
    closely with the Under Secretary or the Secretary, whoever is
    at the present time overseeing NCIS. I do think that my
    background as a Federal prosecutor working with law enforcement
    will be beneficial, if I am confirmed.
        Senator Peters. Well, I cdertainly hope that the Vassas
    family has achieved some degree of closure by the time that you
    have been confirmed. But I am still going to ask for your help
    in resolving this matter for them. And more broadly, I just
    want to get a clearer confirmation from you that you are going
    to strive to ensure that the legal and investigative mechanisms
    in the Department are working to ensure timely, open, and
    regular contact with the next of kin in the event of a tragedy
    such as this.
        Mr. Coffey. Senator, you have my commitment that if I am
    confirmed I will act accordingly. I will do that.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that.
        Mr. Bush, as vehicles get smarter, automotive cybersecurity
    is clearly becoming an increasing concern. The economic loss
    and military risk that is posed by cyberattacks on the U.S.
    vehicle ecosystem is certainly significant, as no single firm
    has the expertise, the resources, or, quite frankly, the
    technical depth to independently address all of these
    cybersecurity threats.
        So my question for you, Mr. Bush, is what is your vision
    for how the Army can secure our increasingly networked vehicle
    fleet from cyberattacks?
        Mr. Bush. Senator, I think for new programs we can start up
    front, by building in the right architecture and the right
    cybersecurity early so that we have systems in place that we
    can test and be reliant upon, that ensure that our vehicles are
    cybersecure.
        I believe there is a greater challenge working on older
    vehicles, where they were designed in times when cyber did not
    even exist, and they have had systems added to them over the
    years in a less systematic way. I believe that in those cases
    we will need to come up with a better way of testing those
    federated type systems in older vehicles to make sure they are
    cybersecure as well.
        And lastly, I would add that Army vehicles historically
    have been designed to be able to continue to fight with
    degraded conditions. So, I believe it would be incumbent for
    the Army to ensure that new systems, even if under
    cyberattacks, still retain some combat capability so our
    soldiers can continue fighting.
        Chairman Reed. We are having technical difficulties. Let us
    wait a moment to see if we can move forward.
        Let me, at this point, recognize, if we can--Senator
    Peters, are you back with us?
        Senator Peters. Am I back here now?
        Chairman Reed. You are back. You have reappeared.
        Senator Peters. Well, good.
        Chairman Reed. Thirty-five seconds.
        Senator Peters. Well, thank you. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will
    leave that as my last question. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Now let me
    recognize, once again, via Webex, if it is functioning
    properly, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this will be
    to Ms. Baker. The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the
    JCPOA, was a great goal that fell extremely short. I voted
    against the agreement in 2015, because it rewarded Iran before
    they demonstrated any desire to return to good order in the
    global community, and it failed to address their terrorism
    financing or conventional weapons development.
        So, my question would be, with an on-and-off-again
    negotiation taking place, what concessions would you hope to
    see in a new version of the Iran deal? And my follow-up to
    that, Ms. Baker, would be, France, Germany, and the United
    Kingdom launched a barter system known as INSTC, to facilitate
    transactions between them and Iran. Can you comment on that?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, thank you for the question. To your
    first point about what concessions would we seek, certainly my
    understanding is that the intent of returning to negotiations
    around the JCPOA was to use that as a foundation to build
    toward a longer and stronger deal. Certainly there are any
    number of Iranian destabilizing activities in the region that
    are not covered by the JCPOA, to include their support for
    terrorist groups, militias, the proliferation of ballistic
    missile technology, UAV technology, threats to freedom of
    navigation, all of which I think we should seek to address. I
    will say that --
        Senator Manchin. [Inaudible.]
        Ms. Baker. I am sorry, Senator. I could not hear you.
        Senator Manchin. Do you have any information? Do you have
    any thoughts on INSTC, which is what United Kingdom, Germany,
    and France have launched?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, I do not have any details on that.
    Certainly it is something I would be prepared, if confirmed, to
    look into with my interagency colleagues and get back to you
    for a longer discussion.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. No problem. I understand. And here,
    this is for you again, ma'am, and I do not mean this to be
    personal at all. I am stating the facts here. You have a total
    of 10 years and 7 months of experience working as a Federal
    employee, with 1 year and 7 months inside the Department of
    Defense. What is concerning to me is the entirety of your
    career is based on partisanship. You have never worked for a
    Republican administration or a moderate member, that we can
    see, and this toxic atmosphere we are in right now it takes
    working across the aisle, understanding both sides.
        So my question would be, tell me about any tangible
    experience that you believe demonstrates how you could approach
    this position from a nonpartisan stance.
        Ms. Baker. Senator, respectfully, I believe that I have
    demonstrated, in my career, an ability to work across the aisle
    in a bipartisan fashion, something I was very proud of as a
    Senate staffer here, working with this committee. I was also a
    nonpartisan career civil servant for a number of years. In
    addition to serving here in the Senate I have worked for
    national security principals that held a variety of views, to
    include former HASC Chairman Ike Skelton, former Secretary of
    Defense Ash Carter.
        So, I do understand, Senator. I understand the concern, and
    I think it is a valid one. I believe that I have a track record
    that will enable me, if confirmed, to approach this role in a
    nonpartisan fashion, and that is certainly how I would intend
    to conduct myself.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Guertin, if you could--I share your vision for a
    renewed approach to evaluation and system performance within
    the program and development process. One of the areas I believe
    that we need to focus on is direct input and effects to the
    warfighter, especially as it relates to effectiveness on the
    battlefield.
        The past week, my office spent a considerable amount of
    time with the staff from the WVU, West Virginia University,
    Rockefeller Neuroscience Institute, who lead the world in
    advanced neurological care.
        So can you commit to scheduling a tour to the state-of-
    the-art facility with my staff and West Virginia University
    personnel who already are working with Marine Corps to
    potentially standardize the capability of the future test and
    development efforts? We just need you there.
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, it sounds like a great opportunity. I
    am looking forward to meeting you there and learning about
    those things.
        Senator Manchin. We would love to. It is unbelievable.
        Final question to Mr. Bush. We share a significant amount
    of similarities when it comes to our future need to transition
    from an industrial age to an information age, approach to
    acquisitions, cybersecurity, and supply chain security. My
    fear, though, is that we will leave our small businesses
    further behind, than where they are currently, if we do not
    make a prioritized effort to bring them along.
        So my question is, how will you shape future efforts to
    support small business against growing cybersecurity
    requirements? How are they going to be able to compete and
    maintain any type of viability?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, first of all, I would like to say I am
    proud of the Army's past track record, leading the Department
    in overall small business contracting. The specific issue you
    mentioned is a challenging one. The Department and the Army
    want more small businesses and more diverse businesses
    involved. However, we also have cybersecurity concerns.
        Senator, I believe, like in other aspects of the small
    program, it is going to require partnership and the Department
    and the Services working with companies in developing ways to
    collaborate so that they can achieve the level of cybersecurity
    necessary to participate in bigger and bigger programs.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, and I thank all three of you. I
    appreciate your answer.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now, via Webex,
    let me recognize Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, and, of
    course, Ranking Member Inhofe, and I want to thank all the
    nominees for being here today for your service and willingness
    to serve going forward.
        And like Senator Manchin said, cybersecurity is so
    important. I have a number of bills to that effect, and we are
    going to talk about one of them today, because as our
    adversaries actively try to undermine our interests via
    cyberattacks, we have to continue to invest in cyber talent.
    That is going to increase our capabilities, allow us to defend
    forward.
        So, this year's Senate NDAA, as reported out of this
    committee, includes my Civilian Cybersecurity Reserve Act, and
    it is bipartisan legislation I introduced with Senator
    Blackburn to create a civilian cyber reserve that ensures
    additional cyber capacity at greatest times of need.
        So Ms. Banker, if confirmed, what are the steps that you
    would take to improve the cybersecurity posture of our most
    critical systems through workforce investments, because we have
    a lot out there? This need to be in line with both our National
    Defense Strategy and the President's budget request proposing
    significant growth of the cyber mission force. And more
    specifically, how would you use existing authorities, and
    potentially my act, to protect our critical assets?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, first let me say thank you for your
    leadership on this critical issue. As we have discussed here
    today, the cybersecurity of the Department systems is what will
    allow us to fight and prevail in a high-end contingency.
        As I am sure you know, the Department has a cyber strategy
    that has three components. It requires the Department to be
    able to fight and win the nation's war sin the cyber domain, to
    protect the Department of Defense information network, the
    DODIN, and then, of course, to protect the nation, and we do
    that, as you said, by defending forward.
        If I am confirmed, I can commit to you that I will make a
    priority of developing new and agile concepts of operations and
    the cyber domain. I would work closely with my colleagues in
    the Services and elsewhere in the Department to ensure that we
    are appropriately resourced and that we have a workforce that
    is capable of operating in the cyber domain.
        I have not, unfortunately, yet had an opportunity, Senator,
    to look at your legislation specifically, but certainly I think
    new and innovative ways of approaching the cyber challenge is
    exactly what is needed. And so, if confirmed, I will commit to
    looking into that and would welcome a chance for further
    conversation.
        Senator Rosen. Great. I will have you up to the office and
    we can talk about the Civilian Cyber Reserve Act. But I am glad
    you are talking about all the different postures you have,
    because I want to talk about the zero trust security model,
    because, you know, cyber threats exist both inside and outside
    traditional network boundaries. So earlier this year, the
    National Security Agency issued a cybersecurity bulletin
    entitled ``Embracing A Zero Trust Security Model'' and strongly
    recommends zero trust security be considered for critical
    networks, including national security systems, Department of
    Defense networks, and our defense-based, industrial-based
    systems.
        And so the timeline for implementation and completion not
    yet known, but if confirmed, how would you use your position to
    encourage the DOD-wide adoption of the zero trust security
    model?
        Ms. Baker. Senator, if confirmed in this position I would
    certainly seek to ensure that our policies were in alignment.
    Certainly I take your point that there are cyber
    vulnerabilities that arise, both from without and from within,
    and we need to be prepared to manage both of those cases. I
    seek to work closely with the DOD-CIO, with the principal cyber
    advisor and others to ensure that we have the appropriate plans
    in place.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. And speaking
    of issues from without, we want to combat Iranian aggression,
    because Iran continues to be the world's leading state sponsor
    of terrorism and a threat to the United States and allied
    interests via its ballistic missile program and support for
    terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, including through
    conventional weapons sales. The combination of Iran acquiring
    advanced Russian and Chinese platforms and its transfer of arms
    to terrorist groups like Hezbollah poses significant
    conventional threats to United States personnel in the region
    and undermines Israel's voluntary military edge, or QME.
        So Ms. Baker, again, I guess you could put this off the
    record--I am just about out of time--if confirmed, how would
    you work to combat Iranian aggression to our United States
    interests against rogue state actors like Iran and maintain our
    ally, Israel's, QME? And since I am out of time I am not sure
    there is someone after me, you can submit that in writing,
    please.
        Ms. Baker. Senator. Yes, absolutely, I agree with
    everything you said and I am happy to submit a longer answer
    for the record.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me recognize
    Senator Kelly and thank him for his patience. Thank you.
    Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations
    to each of the nominees and thanks for your willingness to
    continue to serve our nation.
        My first question is for Mr. Guertin. I want to talk a
    little bit about the F-35. I have had a chance myself to fly
    the simulator, and as a former test pilot it is an impressive
    platform and I think it will serve the Navy, the Air Force, and
    the Marine Corps very well. And I am very honored that Arizona
    is going to continue to host F-35 squadrons at Luke and at Yuma
    Marine Corps Air Station.
        But I am concerned that delays related to testing in the
    joint simulated environment have gotten off track in completing
    tests and evaluation and starting to get us towards closer to
    full rate production. Leveraging digital assets like these in
    testing and design is the way of the future. I am convinced of
    that. So, it is important that we get it right and apply the
    lessons we are learning now to future upgrades for the F-35 and
    the next generation fighter aircraft, NGAD and anything beyond
    that.
        So could you give me an assessment of what you think the
    lessons are so far in what we have experienced with the testing
    in the joint simulated environment?
        Mr. Guertin. So Senator, one of the things we need to be
    thinking about as we move forward into the future is a tighter
    alignment between modeling complex systems like the F-35. It
    has got a lot going on under the hood. Some things you are not
    going to be able to test operationally, all at the same time,
    in a threat-representative environment, so we need to be
    thinking about how we combine modeling and simulation of those
    environments with live physical testing.
        The F-35 has been a great object lesson, use case, that we
    need to be taking full advantage of the lessons, both good and
    bad, and how we position ourselves in the future for taking
    advantage of those kinds of technologies as we build out these
    more and more complex systems as we move further forward into
    the future.
        Senator Kelly. Part of the value of simulated testing is
    that we can examine, you know, both aircraft and weapons system
    performance in these complex scenarios that better approximate
    what we will face in combat. With that in mind, how important
    is it to incorporate cyber and space domains in these simulated
    tests?
        Mr. Guertin. So Senator, it is critically important that
    the operational tests encompass all of the things that the
    weapons system will see when it is being used, which includes
    cyber. It is a big part of the problem, because you cannot use
    it if you are turned off before you get a chance to take
    advantage of it.
        The other thing you did mention, though, that I wanted to
    park on is the opportunity to iterate on designs and take
    advantage of those digital twins and modeling environments so
    that you can explore how that system might be built better into
    the future.
        Senator Kelly. And do you think this needs to also account
    for emergent capabilities like AI as well?
        Mr. Guertin. Indeed it does, yes.
        Senator Kelly. I just want to switch, in the remaining time
    I have here, Mr. Guertin, with you as well. You know, in modern
    warfare, as we all know, software can be important to our
    success, and as important as the hardware, the equipment. And
    software often advances much more quickly. You touched on this
    theme, I think, in your opening remarks. We are going to need
    to improve our ability to more effectively integrate rapidly
    changing software, and it is also one of the most challenging
    things we deal with, whether it is military hardware or space,
    you know, software, you know, reliability and testing and
    verification.
        What have we learned from our efforts to incorporate more
    agile development practices with Block 4 upgrades to the F-35?
        Mr. Guertin. Senator, I would not be able to talk about
    Block 4 specifically, because I have not been briefed on the
    details of it. But I do want to say that some of the systems I
    have worked on in the past, even going back to mid 1990s, to
    build these things so that they can evolve gracefully over
    time. In those early stages when we are using open
    architectures and submarine sonar systems, we thought we were
    totally knocking it out of the park by having annual updates.
    Today that might not be fast enough, depending on the product,
    and it certainly is not fast enough for a lot of the things we
    hold and use in an everyday life.
        So, we need to be thinking about how do we, you know, shift
    left in terms of our understanding of how things are built, but
    also be responsive and fast on our feet when it comes to being
    responsive to the users' needs as they would use them in an
    operational context in the joint force.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, and I look forward to
    working with you and your office as we get these new weapons
    systems fully evaluated and tested, through OT&E and out to the
    fleet. Thank you.
        Mr. Guertin. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly, and I want to
    thank the witnesses for their thoughtful testimony and their
    statements and their commitment to public service. And with
    that I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. Section 139 of title 10, U.S. Code establishes the
    position of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the
    Department of Defense. The law provides that [t]he Director shall be
    appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
    basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office of Director.
        What is your understanding of the duties, functions, and
    authorities of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)?
        Answer. The duties for the DOT&E functions stem from Title 10,
    Section 139 and 236, and are refined through DOD Directives and
    Instructions. I understand that if confirmed, I would serve as the
    principal staff advisor to the Secretary of Defense for operational
    test and evaluation within the Department. I would also be required to
    provide Congress with an annual report summarizing the activities
    associated with operational test and evaluation. This report would
    include recommendations on associated resources to include facilities
    and funding. Matters concerning budget recommendations related to
    operational and live fire test and evaluation will be provided to the
    Secretary of Defense as well. Reporting would also include Beyond Low-
    Rate Initial Production reports, Early Fielding reports for systems
    that fall into the category of urgent need and would be deployed before
    completion of initial operational testing, Live Fire reports and also
    to respond to any request from Congress. If confirmed, I also would be
    responsible for crafting and implementing policy for operational test
    and evaluation and to provide oversight of operational testing of
    defense programs that meet specific thresholds (e.g. Major Defense
    Acquisition, Major Automated Information Systems) and programs that I
    would designate. Policy and procedures that I would be responsible for
    would include the conduct of live fire test and evaluation for
    monitoring, reviewing, and reporting on all operational and live-fire
    test and evaluation within the Department. I would also be responsible
    for coordinating joint operational testing.
        Question. What experience and expertise do you have that qualify
    you for appointment to this position?
        Answer. I have a combination of technical and organizational change
    experiences that I feel give me the range of expertise to, if
    confirmed, bring the Departments OT&E efforts further forward into the
    future. I have four decades of operation, development, testing and
    organizational transformation experiences across a wide array of
    technologies and warfighting domains to leverage into this position. On
    the technical side, I have performed systems engineering for sensors,
    weapons, combat management and information technologies. I have also
    led prototyping initiatives for air, ground, and sea-based systems.
    Across all of these experiences, testing and coordination across
    technical disciplines and stakeholders had long been a central tenet.
    My experience in program management and change transformation related
    to the improvement of Defense acquisition may prove to be my most
    valuable asset especially in the areas fielding software-intensive
    systems that were built to change and improve over time. More recently,
    while at Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, I
    learned a great deal about how to architect and develop systems,
    including the automation of testing and integration of artificial
    intelligence and machine learning to create robust, reliable, testable,
    and sustainable products that will evolve over the life of a program.
        Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
    the duties, functions, and authorities of the DOT&E?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the DOT&E team to examine
    how we are addressing the evolving aspects of system development, both
    in the tools used to build the products and the capabilities being
    delivered to the warfighter. The nature of engineering, modeling,
    simulating, validating, and testing these systems is changing rapidly,
    and the operational test and evaluation community must both change to
    where we are today and ensure we have an organizational framework to
    continuously evolve. Testing the way we fight in the future will
    require evolutionary and revolutionary changes from where we are now.
    This will require teamwork throughout DOD, and with the Services and
    Agencies. It will require increased reliance on state-of-the art test
    infrastructure and tools, and a well-trained test and evaluation
    workforce that embraces constant change as a core equity in order to
    support faster and more effective evaluation of complex, interconnected
    systems in a joint, multi-domain operational environment. It will
    require reliance on innovative methods like credible virtual
    environments and modeling and simulation tools to complement on-range
    and laboratory testing. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely
    with Congress, the Secretary of Defense, our research and engineering
    community, acquisition programs, and the Services so that together, we
    can most effectively deliver capability to the Joint Force.
                                major challenges
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
    would confront, if confirmed, as the DOT&E?
        Answer. The next DOT&E will be challenged to help the Department
    ensure that the way we test our systems accurately reflects the way we
    will use them to fight. The adversary often tests, learns, and iterates
    faster than we do. To win in conflict and to deter adversaries from
    initiating conflict, we must outpace them in every aspect of our
    developmental and operational investments and processes in every
    warfighting domain. We will be challenged to test, especially against
    cyber threats, and use next-generation technologies, such as autonomy
    and artificial intelligence-enabled equipment, in our warfighting
    systems. The Department must build a workforce that is ready to
    leverage the incredible amount of innovation that exists across this
    Nation, and to work collaboratively with the commercial and defense
    industries, universities, FFRDCs and UARCs, and allied partners.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing each
    of these challenges, and on what specific timeline?
        Answer. I believe it is important to determine what efforts are
    already under way in the Department and to assess existing manpower,
    including the staff of DOT&E and the test and evaluation (T&E) partners
    within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering (USD(R&E)) (including the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency), the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the Services. If confirmed,
    I will renew the strong working relationships among these organizations
    so that we can break down more barriers, identify and reduce
    redundancy, increase integration, and forge a workforce for the future.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    and how would you measure progress in achieving these priorities?
        Answer. In addition to building a T&E coalition in the Department
    and with our allies, I would seek to address the continuous competing
    priorities between program resources and test adequacy. As stakeholders
    place more value on test, the more they will incorporate mission-based,
    operationally relevant T&E activities earlier in the acquisition
    process. I would seek to bolster the adequacy of test programs by
    ensuring software and cyber T&E occur iteratively and incrementally
    throughout the life cycle, and not just during OT&E events. I believe
    that digital technology, including strategic use of modeling and
    simulation, should be used much more frequently to transform the
    testing of software-intensive and cyber-physical systems from linear,
    serial processes to iterative, incremental processes that build a body
    of evidence over time usable for operational assessments and
    evaluations.
                            relations with congress
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
    productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
    the DOT&E?
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working collaboratively with
    Congress and Department of Defense oversight Committees and responding
    to congressional requests in a timely manner. This includes informing
    Members and their staffs of critical updates and results of operational
    test and evaluation (OT&E) efforts in a timely and transparent manner.
    I commit to providing my independent and objective assessments, and
    will strive to maintain a strong relationship with Congress as DOT&E.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you leverage your
    unique and independent access to Congress better to provide technical
    and program information in support of this Committee's legislative and
    oversight processes?
        Answer. Serving as the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
    rightfully demands close coordination and consultation with Congress.
    Independence and impartiality are paramount to executing that mission,
    and if confirmed, I assure the Committee that I will serve as a partner
    with Congress, providing clear assessments of technical demands and
    programmatic efforts both in response to oversight requirements, and in
    support of legislative processes.
                          independence and objectivity
        Question. Congress established the position of DOT&E as an
    independent and objective lead for test and evaluation across DOD,
    including test and evaluation relating to major defense acquisition
    programs. Section 139 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that ``[t]he
    Director [of Operational Test and Evaluation] shall consult closely
    with, but the Director and the Director's staff are independent of, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and all other
    officers and entities of the Department of Defense responsible for
    acquisition.''
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that
    your evaluations are wholly independent and objective?
        Answer. Independence and impartiality are paramount to executing
    the mission of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. I assure the
    Committee that, if confirmed, I will rely on my technical and
    operational background to determine the adequacy of proposed test
    plans, relying on the scientifically validated and appropriate tools
    and methods to ensure their efficiency and operational credibility. I
    will look for evidence that modeling and simulation tools used to
    support an evaluation were adequately validated and accredited for
    their intended use.
        I will follow the data and employ proven data analysis tools to
    draw conclusions, but will consider alternate findings and
    interpretations to ensure the quality of my own assessments. Every
    conclusion I make will be defensible and will accurately reflect
    observed performance. I will seek out the most technically savvy
    workforce, and will continue to coordinate with USD(R&E), USD(A&S) and
    other DOD entities responsible for acquisition to ensure that we
    collectively deliver the best weapon systems to the warfighter.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    ensure that the assessments of major defense acquisition programs you
    provide to Congress are candid and complete?
        Answer. If confirmed, my assessments will be based solely on the
    data collected during operational and other appropriate testing. I will
    ensure that the information collected has been adequately analyzed, and
    that all assumptions and test limitations were considered and are
    reflected in the final assessment. I intend to let the facts speak for
    themselves. I will not let demonstrated good performance overwhelm
    revealed limitations, and vice versa. I will be balanced, neutral, and
    non-judgmental in my assessments; and without exception, my assessments
    will cover all of the facts revealed by adequate operational testing.
    So that my assessments are complete and defensible and accurately
    portray system performance, I will ensure that test plans will provide
    the data necessary for authoritative and operationally meaningful
    evaluations.
        Question. Section 2399 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes certain
    requirements regarding the impartiality of contractor testing personnel
    and contracted-for advisory and assistance services used with regard to
    the test and evaluation of a system.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure the independence and
    impartiality of contractor testing personnel and contracted advisory
    and assistance services, including when employing personnel from
    federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)?
        Answer. DOT&E relies on heavily on FFRDC partners, in particular
    the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). I have confidence in IDA's
    impartiality and integrity but, if confirmed, would be sure to
    emphasize to its director and division leads my expectations for
    completely unbiased, professional comportment and products. I would
    take the same approach with any FFRDC. In addition, I would continue
    the practice of having a DOT&E civilian review and approve all FFRDC
    activities and material.
        Title 10 already sets the standard for use of contractor personnel
    in OT&E. If I were to avail DOT&E of the waiver authority granted in
    Section 2399 paragraph (e)(2), I would ask the DODIG and OGC to
    recommend what steps to take to ensure the impartiality and ethical
    participation of those personnel.
                           operational testing issues
        Question. If confirmed, how would you manage disagreements with
    other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and/or the
    Military Departments and Services, that seek to progress or approve
    programs, notwithstanding the results of operational testing that
    suggests further development, testing, or technical and engineering
    work is required?
        Answer. I believe in open and honest communication, transparency,
    and data-driven conclusions. If confirmed, I will forthrightly provide
    assessments of all systems under oversight that have undergone some
    level of operational testing. These assessments will be independent and
    reflect my evaluation of the data revealed by testing. I will ensure
    that other elements of OSD and/or the Military Departments and Services
    fully understand the underlying data and analyses that led me to my
    conclusions. If disagreements arise, I will listen to all counterpoints
    to ensure the quality and strength of my conclusions. As the
    warfighter's unbiased, objective representative, I will always share my
    findings and data analysis with the Congress, and the Secretary and
    Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Question. In your view, to what extent should the DOT&E evaluate
    system capabilities and testing results against formal requirements
    established in the program? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Formal program requirements are necessary as they focus
    system development, influence program decisions, and provide
    contractual specifications. It is important to understand how delivered
    capabilities measure against these requirements, but operational
    effectiveness ultimately depends upon how well a unit equipped with the
    system accomplishes its mission. Ideally, these two would coincide, but
    that is not always the case. Such divergence occurs most frequently
    when formal requirements do not reflect real-world operational metrics.
        As an example, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle met its key
    performance parameter (KPP) for payload. However, that KPP focused on
    weight, and did not take into account physical space inside the
    vehicle, or the quantity of mission-essential equipment and supplies
    necessary for long-duration tactical missions. Operators were thus
    forced to store items in locations that were unsuitable for mission
    accomplishment. As a result, DOT&E concluded that, while JLTV satisfied
    the payload KPP as written, the vehicle could not accommodate
    operational reality; overall vehicle performance and reliability would
    be degraded.
        If confirmed, I would objectively evaluate systems against both
    their formal requirements, and seek to ascertain whether a unit
    equipped with the system under test can accomplish the intended
    mission. Both factors must be considered to determine operational
    effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality.
        Question. In your view, when evaluating system capabilities and
    testing results for new system, to what extent should the DOT&E
    consider the capabilities of deployed, legacy systems that the system
    undergoing testing is designed to replace? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. DOD Directive 5000.01 provides clear guidance on this
    matter: ``The acquisition system will be designed to acquire products
    and services that satisfy user needs with measureable and timely
    improvements to mission capability, materiel readiness, and operational
    support, at a fair and reasonable price.''
        Inherent in delivering measureable improvements in comparison to
    legacy systems. Such comparisons are essential to determining whether:
    1) the new system provides greater mission capability; 2) the new
    system's performance equals that of the legacy system, but it improves
    other elements of the effective-suitable-survivable-lethal metric by,
    for example, reducing operator workload or easing the sustainment
    burden (reliability, availability, maintainability); or 3) the new
    system performs equally well, but its design enables capability
    expansion and augmentation.
        If confirmed, I intend to continue the practice of comparing new
    capabilities to the legacy capabilities they are supposed to replace.
        Question. In your view, to what extent should the DOT&E evaluate
    system capabilities and testing results against known or expected
    threats the system will face across its lifetime while in operational
    use?
        Answer. Combat credibility is the benchmark for DOT&E's assessment
    of new and evolving systems and platforms. Our capabilities must allow
    our warfighters to bring game-changing technologies to the fight, and
    to succeed and survive against the actual kinetic and non-kinetic
    threats that they will face, including cyber. The only way to determine
    whether our capabilities can do that is to test them against the
    threats that the systems are designed to address. This applies to how
    systems are modified to credibly address evolving threats.
        This means that the Department must address how operational T&E and
    live-fire T&E will provide adequate oversight for evolving capability
    delivery. This includes addressing revolutionary and evolutionary
    changes to methods and processes associated with an evolving T&E
    infrastructure, including threat emulation and simulation, tools, and
    processes. DOT&E should ensure that operational testing represents the
    real-world conditions and scenarios warfighters will face. It will be
    difficult to determine the effectiveness, suitability, survivability,
    and lethality of our weapon systems--and create the opportunity to
    remedy deficiencies prior to actual combat--without a realistic and
    evolving T&E enterprise.
        Question. In your view, how should the DOD design testing
    environments to mirror perceived denied and degraded environments? What
    benefit would such testing design yield the testing and evaluation
    (T&E) process?
        Answer. Our military cannot successfully deter or win wars without
    the ability to operate in all domains and environments, including
    denied and degraded. Our testing must realistically represent those
    environments and include accurate threats so that we can understand the
    capabilities and limitations of our weapons systems. For testing that
    accurately replicates denied and degraded environments, DOD needs
    facilities that permit live, ``open-air'' events, as well as robust,
    validated, and accredited modeling and simulation venues in which real
    operators are the testers. Both data sets are critical for our
    operational forces to develop the right tactics, techniques, and
    procedures, and for our acquisition system to correctly prioritize
    fixes and improvements to our weapons systems.
        Question. In your view, to what information must DOT&E have access
    to support testing, and who is (and should be) responsible for
    obtaining and maintaining access to that information?
        Answer. DOT&E should have full access to all data and information
    needed to support adequate test and evaluation of programs under
    oversight, or to determine if a program should be placed under
    oversight. This information includes system design data, requirements
    data and their rationale, concepts of operations and concepts of
    employment data, acquisition strategy data, and decision timelines (in
    order to adequately plan the tests needed to support those decisions).
        DOT&E also needs access to data that may affect the test and
    evaluation program, such as test and evaluation resource shortfalls,
    test asset or test range limitations, and known system design
    deficiencies. To ensure T&E program efficiency, DOT&E should have
    access to all test data and information that would help scope the next
    testing phase. DOT&E also must have access to the assessed accuracy,
    limitations, and assumptions associated with any modeling and
    simulation tools that are used to evaluate weapon system performance,
    particularly during OT&E phases (initial and follow-on). DOT&E should
    receive all raw artifacts and processed data as soon as they are
    collected in order to start independent data analysis, and to inform
    all decisions in a timely fashion.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    promote encourage information sharing among testing communities,
    program offices, and contractors?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be very transparent about my
    expectations and the data I need to execute my Title 10
    responsibilities. I will review my expectations and their rationale
    with the test community, program offices, and contractors, and will
    offer to work with them to develop the most robust T&E program for the
    warfighter. I will offer analytical support and advocacy to resolve
    test and evaluation challenges presented to the test community, program
    offices, and contractors. I also will encourage and enhance the concept
    of agile, integrated testing and evaluation, as well as the use of
    digital technology tools, to make T&E part of the overall digital
    ecosystem, which will inherently promote information sharing. I will
    work on building trust with all T&E stakeholders to further promote
    collaboration and teamwork, and facilitate progress at faster rates.
        Question. Communications interoperability has been a challenge for
    the DOD for several decades.
        If confirmed, how would you plan to construct test environments to
    ensure interoperability of command and control systems for the Joint
    force?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the available test
    infrastructure is not currently robust enough to meet the demands of
    realistic testing in a joint command and control (C2) environment.
    Security and safety restrictions that limit electronic warfare against
    communications and data links, along with commercial spectrum
    limitations, also constrain testing. The Department needs to invest
    more heavily in range infrastructure that enables linking open-air
    results with operationally representative virtual and constructive test
    venues designed to assess the interoperability of joint C2 systems,
    including the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept and
    supporting Service efforts.
        Question. In your view, does DOT&E need to modernize or reform its
    approach to planning for, executing, and assessing weapons system
    operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability? If so, in
    what areas are reforms most needed?
        Answer. I believe that DOT&E needs to modernize, and in some cases
    reform, its approach to T&E planning, execution, and data analysis.
    This is will be necessary given the development of increasingly complex
    weapon systems that are highly interconnected and adaptive, and the
    rising complexities of the multi-domain operational environment that
    changes rapidly in both space and time. For example, software and
    cybersecurity T&E need innovative tools to improve efficiency and
    operational realism, and to meet the exponentially growing demand for
    such testing. DOD must pursue the development of credible digital
    environments, digital models, and data architectures to store, share,
    and best utilize test and evaluation data across all stakeholders. The
    use of the latest advances in science and technology should be
    leveraged to improve the way OT&E captures and analyzes the volumes of
    data. The Department needs new tools and methods that promote
    integrated testing and evaluation, and optimize the benefits of all
    data captured across the acquisition cycle. These points all lead to a
    need to examine the way we train and prepare our T&E workforce for the
    future, to infuse new techniques and training for using the related
    tools and technologies that will be required going forward.
        Question. In your view, what additional T&E initiatives would best
    position DOT&E to support digital transformation and modernization of
    warfighting capabilities and concepts in multi-domain environments?
    What resources would be required to effectuate these initiatives?
        Answer. Digital transformation and modernization of warfighting
    capabilities and concepts in multi-domain environments require
    enterprise-level solutions and coordination across USD(R&E), USD(A&S),
    the Intelligence Community, the Services, the Joint Staff, and
    Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I will seek to coordinate an effort
    to identify the requirements and resources needed to develop an
    adequate representation of the multi-domain operational environment,
    which will depend on the adequacy of the virtual environment and
    digital twins of our systems, their interoperability, and expected
    threats. I will evaluate the development and credibility of digital
    twins and the feasibility of requiring digital twins early in an
    acquisition program to inform T&E plans and reduce overall risk. I will
    work with USD(R&E) to buildupon their digital engineering initiatives,
    to include the development of a digital ecosystem and the data
    architectures needed to adequately store, access, and then analyze T&E
    data, the management of which is critical to the transformation of T&E
    efforts.
                          test and evaluation funding
        Question. Concern over long-term support for and viability of the
    Department of Defense's test ranges and facilities led to the creation
    of the Defense Test Resource Management Center in 2002, as well as a
    requirement for direct funding of T&E facilities. Yet, almost 20 years
    later, concerns about test ranges and facilities remain.
        Do you believe that the Department's T&E capabilities, including
    infrastructure and workforce, are adequately funded? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. Though I am not currently fully privy to the condition of
    DOD's T&E enterprise, it appears that the department's T&E capacity,
    agility, and expertise are insufficient given the scale, frequency, and
    depth of testing necessary for the types of systems and threats
    expected (e.g., software-intensive, autonomous/artificial intelligence-
    enabled, offensive and defensive cyber, space, and electromagnetic
    spectrum) in the current and predicted multi-domain operational
    environment. Adaptive acquisition framework initiatives, which focus on
    quick delivery to the field of incremental capability, further
    exacerbate T&E shortfalls.
        Moreover, our potential adversaries are improving and adding
    capabilities faster than DOD's test infrastructure and workforce can
    adapt and realistically replicate them. Those adversaries appear not to
    have the same level of concern or can take short-cuts about the safety
    of those systems and the appropriate operational use in a kinetic
    environment. Together, we hold our programs to higher standards. The
    complexity of integrated air defenses, space and cyber threats,
    cognitive threats, hypersonic threats, directed energy weapons, and
    various combinations thereof requires modernization of T&E
    infrastructure. If confirmed, I will continue DOT&E's working
    relationship with the Test Resource Management Center, and support them
    as necessary, as they carry out their responsibility of assessing the
    adequacy of the Department's T&E capabilities, including infrastructure
    and workforce.
        Question. Do you believe that the Department's current T&E
    capabilities in the aggregate including infrastructure and workforce,
    are adequate to perform the full range of test and evaluation
    responsibilities of Department weapons systems and equipment?
        Answer. I am not currently briefed on or have full knowledge of the
    conditions of the T&E enterprise, but it would appear that the
    Department's T&E capabilities may be out of date and if so, should be
    modernized to represent and capture the complexities of the operational
    environments of today and the future. Of particular importance is the
    sufficiency of T&E capabilities for emerging areas to support the
    testing of hypersonic systems, as well as the testing of all systems in
    contested electromagnetic spectrum, cyber, and space domains. The
    ability to adequately replicate adversarial threats and targets in both
    fidelity and realistic quantities is also a challenge.
        To keep pace with emerging technologies and adequately test and
    train U.S. and coalition partner forces in projected multi-domain
    operational environments, the Department must make significant, and
    steady, investments in T&E infrastructure and the workforce. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Test Resource Management Center and the
    Service T&E executives concerning the prioritization and funding of
    modernization efforts..
        Question. In your view, how effective has DOD been in accurately
    projecting future test facility resource requirements and budgeting for
    these needs? How would you improve these processes, if confirmed?
        Answer. In my opinion, accurately projecting future test facility
    resource requirements and budgeting for these needs is essential to
    conducting adequate operational and live fire testing, and determining
    operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. If
    confirmed, I will collaborate with USD(R&E), the office of Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and the Service T&E
    executives to review the State of our facilities and adequately
    prioritize investments. This process will include identifying
    opportunities to leverage existing capabilities, and developing an
    investment strategy that keeps pace with our adversaries who have
    steadily invested in their T&E infrastructure over the last two
    decades.
        Question. If confirmed, how would the sufficiency of investments in
    test resources and workforces factor into your review and approval of
    proposed test plans and schedules for acquisition programs?
        Answer. Human and financial resources are key factors in
    determining the adequacy of Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs)
    and test plans. These resources must be clearly defined and maintained
    throughout the development and acquisition cycle to ensure that
    operational and live fire OT&E are adequate. If confirmed, I will
    closely review individual programs' planned test budgets and personnel
    for sufficiency. Additionally, in coordination with CAPE, I will
    annually assess the adequacy of available T&E resources to execute test
    plans as agreed. I will leverage
        the Department's data management strategy to ensure adequate data
    are collected to support such analyses. I will inform senior DOD
    leadership and Congress of test resource and workforce shortfalls so
    that they can be addressed in an operationally relevant and timely
    fashion.
        Question. In your view, should adjustments be made in the
    regulations and policies that govern the allocation of testing costs to
    test customers?
        Answer. Existing regulations and policies have been in place for
    many years. I believe a review is needed to accurately establish how
    test costs are allocated to customers, and whether the policies and
    funding processes the Services are required to use are still the most
    effective and efficient ways to support T&E.
        I also understand that DOT&E recently commissioned the National
    Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to
    independently review the adequacy of DOD test ranges and capabilities.
    If confirmed, I would seek to understand the recommendations made by
    NASEM in this report, as well as the recommendations of any similar
    reports, and make all appropriate recommendations to the Secretary and
    this Congress on any potential revisions to existing regulations and
    policies that would promote more efficient and thorough OT&E.
                                      data
        Question. If confirmed, what initiatives would you undertake to
    ensure that the Department of Defense collects, maintains, and provides
    appropriate access to appropriate personnel for all relevant data
    derived from the development, testing, and operational use of systems
    and platforms to support acquisition, testing, and operations?
        Answer. As the Department transforms digitally, we must make data
    visible (so we can easily locate it), accessible (so we can retrieve it
    when needed), traceable (so we can link conclusions to data sources),
    secure (so we can rely on it) and integrated (so we can track our
    performance and collaborate).
        While DOT&E does not produce test data directly, the OT&E community
    does own a vast amount of information related to historical weapons
    systems performance. If these data were accessible and in a consumable
    format, they could be more effectively utilized to inform new programs
    of record; to improve our ability to identify, quantify, prioritize,
    and estimate DOD system vulnerabilities; and to help set future
    requirements. Advanced analytics capabilities for large data sets, in
    particular, have the potential to reduce T&E cost, time, and
    operational risk by identifying the highest risks in lethality and
    survivability during the test design phase, and by accelerating the
    evaluation phase.
        If confirmed, I will work in partnership with A&S, CDO, and CFO, to
    ensure that DOT&E is both able to consume and provide data associated
    with T&E to support my role in informing other senior decisionmaking
    activities.
           office of the director of operational test and evaluation
        Question. In April 2021, the then-Acting DOT&E testified that the
    office faces numerous workforce challenges, including a limited number
    of civilian staff responsible for program oversight, and limited
    expertise in important emerging technology areas and in the use of
    advanced digital tools.
        If confirmed, how would you improve the operational testing
    workforce, particularly in light of the growing numbers of new
    technologies embedded in weapon systems and the desire to speed the
    acquisition and deployment of systems to the battlefield?
        Answer. People are our greatest asset, and the Department must
    continue promoting a culture of innovation and learning. It would be
    worthwhile to conduct a T&E workforce analysis to identify current and
    future military and civilian skillsets and gaps, and unique expertise
    requirements. If confirmed, I will seek to develop hiring and training
    objectives to fill any identified needs. As part of that process, I
    will work with USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) to refine, adapt, and develop new
    education and training curricula in specific technical areas, including
    cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, machine learning, data
    analytics, modeling and simulation development, and advanced scientific
    test design and analysis methods; and to create and execute a plan to
    deliver continuous and structured training to the workforce. I will
    advocate for detailee and rotational assignment opportunities within
    the T&E community, and identify avenues for recruitment of the future
    workforce, such as internships and memoranda of agreement or
    understanding with government laboratories, other agencies, academia,
    and industry.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you determining the correct mix
    of government, military, and contractor personnel necessary to meet the
    missions of the Office of the DOT&E?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would review the DOT&E portfolio, scope,
    and workload to ensure that we are adequately positioned to meet the
    Secretary's priorities and fulfill the Department's strategic
    initiatives. I would identify the competencies and skills needed to
    meet current responsibilities and future requirements given the rise of
    emerging technologies, the complexity of the operational environment,
    and the demands of adaptive acquisition framework initiatives. I
    believe DOT&E will need a balanced mix of government, civilian, and
    contractor personnel to achieve these objectives. The number of
    personnel and types of skills should be based on the complexity and
    scope of DOT&E's oversight portfolio, ensuring we can keep pace with
    the acquisition community, our adversaries, and the operational
    environment.
        Question. In your view, could the Office of DOT&E benefit from any
    unique personnel authorities, such as those available to DARPA, medical
    personnel, service academies, or defense laboratories, to attract,
    recruit, and retain the workforce needed to perform designated
    missions? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOT&E regularly utilizes direct
    hire authority (DHA) to minimize mission disruption, and to ensure that
    civilian billets are filled quickly by personnel with the right
    expertise. These DHA provisions include Sections 1101, 1125(b),
    1599(h), 1643, and 1109 in 63 percent of all GS hiring actions. DOT&E
    was leveraging the authorities in Sections 1125(b) and 1109; however,
    the temporary Section 1125(b) authority expired on September 30, 2021,
    leaving only Section 1109 authorities. If Section 1109 were terminated
    or allowed to expire on September 30, 2025, it is my understanding that
    DOT&E would no longer have access to any DHAs. If confirmed, I would
    welcome unique personnel authorities to attract, recruit, and retain
    the very technical workforce who must also have a detailed
    understanding of the DOD mission, a combination that is hard to find.
        Question. In your view, could the Office of DOT&E benefit from any
    special acquisition or management authorities to more effectively and
    efficiently perform its designated missions?
        Answer. Based on my current knowledge of DOT&E, I do not yet see a
    need for special acquisition or management authorities at this time. If
    confirmed, I will reassess with my staff and the USD(A&S) and USD(R&E).
    If we determine changes are needed, I will provide my best
    recommendations to the Secretary and the Congress.
                           operational test agencies
        Question. Operational Test Agencies of the Military Services are
    tasked with conducting independent operational testing and evaluation
    of acquisition programs. Recent demands on these organizations have
    increased to meet rapid acquisition initiatives, to demonstrate joint
    and advanced concept technology programs and commercial technologies,
    and to evaluate information assurance, information operations, and
    joint T&E requirements.
        How would you propose to arbitrate shortfalls between program
    managers' limited funding and operational test agencies' independent
    test requirements?
        Answer. Test and evaluation must be funded adequately from a
    program's inception. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
    documents the T&E funding profile and timeline, and all relevant
    parties--DOT&E, the program manager, and the operational test agency--
    agree to that TEMP early in the program's life cycle. When the time to
    test arrives, Operational Test Agency requirements should never be a
    surprise, and all Service and agency resource and program managers
    should have allocated an appropriate amount of funding.
        Question. Do you have any concerns about the ``actual''
    independence of the operational test agencies? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. I have no concerns regarding OTA independence. The
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation approves all test plans, and
    DOT&E and the OTAs independently evaluate the data collected during
    OT&E events. I am confident that the OTAs understand their role as the
    warfighter's representative and are committed, with DOT&E, to providing
    unvarnished assessments of system performance.
        Question. Should policies and procedures governing the activities
    of the operational test agencies be standardized across the Department
    of Defense, in your view?
        Answer. Where commonality exists, I believe that OTAs and DOD would
    benefit from standardized policies and procedures. Data formatting,
    collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination is one category of T&E
    activity that should be standardized. Doing so would allow DOD
    organizations access to others' data, and glean relevant information
    and lessons--which, today, often are inaccessible--to strengthen T&E
    efficacy and potentially reduce the time needed to conduct an adequate
    test. However, each Service has unique systems to test. A fair amount
    of flexibility and Service-or program-specific customization is
    therefore necessary. I will strive to seek a balance between maximizing
    standardization at the enterprise level, without introducing
    inefficiency into our programs.
       operational and developmental testing in the adaptive acquisition
                                   framework
        Question. The Department of Defense recently implemented its
    Adaptive Acquisition Framework, which uses a series of six pathways,
    each designed for the unique characteristics of the capability being
    acquired. With the new framework, DOD encourages the use of Integrated
    T&E.
        In your view, what value is provided to the department by the
    operational T&E community providing input into developmental testing?
        Answer. When conducted in a program's early stages, and when
    adequately resourced across the acquisition cycle, operationally
    realistic T&E offers a unique opportunity to identify and correct
    deficiencies before the system matures. Typically, the later issues and
    solutions are identified, the more complex, expensive, and time-
    consuming the fixes are to implement. Early problem discovery may allow
    the program to better manage cost and schedule. Most importantly,
    addressing problems early in the T&E process mitigates the risk of
    discovery during operational test, after the system is in the field,
    or, worse, in combat.
        By sharing OT&E feedback, the Program has an opportunity to
    development the system in a manner that allows OT&E to effectively and
    efficiently conduct its testing. This creates an OT&E event that
    ensures the system's capabilities with minimal resources in the most
    condensed timeline practical.
        Question. How, in your view, should the Department determine the
    appropriate point in concept development of a new acquisition program
    for incorporation of T&E planning and the integration of testing
    requirements?
        Answer. In November 2020, DOT&E and USD(R&E) co-wrote DOD
    Instruction 5000.89, Test and Evaluation. It codified what I believe to
    be true: if done correctly, integrated testing provides greater
    opportunity for early identification of concerns, allowing system
    design to be improved sooner, and potentially, allowing the engineering
    and manufacturing development phase to proceed more efficiently.
        At the inception of a program, this policy instructs the program
    manager to charter an integrated test planning group early, allowing
    empowered representatives of test data producers and consumers
    (including all applicable stakeholders) to ensure collaborative
    development of a robust, efficient testing strategy that supports
    systems engineering, evaluations, and certifications throughout the
    acquisition life cycle. Conducting critical test activities earlier
    will enable the program manager to discover and remediate problems
    while the system is still in development, and likely avoid costly
    redesigns late in the acquisition life cycle.
        This DODI is a step in the right direction but may require
    additional improvements to optimize the benefits of this concept. For
    example, I believe that planning the aggregate test and evaluation
    program from the beginning (with developmental and operational
    objectives in mind) in a digital ecosystem would enable use of all
    available data and test events, avoiding redundancies while promoting
    early discovery.
        Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should
    take to ensure that testing takes place early enough in the program
    cycle to identify and fix problems before it becomes prohibitively
    time-consuming and expensive to do so?
        Answer. I firmly believe in the value of developmental testing and
    wide application of automation in testing. It is essential, however,
    that the rigor of developmental testing match the rigor of operational
    testing in order to ensure that operational testing is as efficient and
    effective as possible. Augmenting the authorities for developmental
    test oversight and placing more programs under developmental testing
    oversight would improve developmental T&E execution and, ultimately,
    acquisition program outcomes.
        Question. In your view, are there periods throughout the operations
    and sustainment portions of a program's life cycle where operational
    testing needs to be used to ascertain system effectiveness and
    suitability, given changing technologies and threats? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. Yes. Today, the threat landscape changes very rapidly. When
    it comes to cyberattacks against both networks and individual,
    software-dependent platforms, our adversaries' skills and tools improve
    as frequently as every few weeks. At the same time, DOD more often adds
    capability not by fielding an entirely new system, but by upgrading an
    existing platform's software or a few of its individual components.
    These two factors mean that we must periodically update our assessments
    of effectiveness and suitability so that decisionmakers and warfighters
    understand the performance and limitations of the systems in actual use
    against the threats we expect them to face today and tomorrow, not last
    year or last decade. Just as the product is updated incrementally, the
    OT&E assessments should be performed in an incremental fashion where
    possible, so as to keep pace with the speed of relevance in getting
    capabilities in the hands of the warfighters. We must move to enable
    continuous monitoring of capabilities wherever we can to be on par with
    commercial systems and facilitate a a rapid flow of knowledge and an
    associated dynamic assessments of systems.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the tradeoffs between
    rapid deployment of new capabilities and the need to ensure that
    deployed capabilities are operationally effective and suitable?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will defer to the Services and the
    Combatant Commanders to ascertain the operational need of a specific
    capability. By implementing the strategies contained within the DOT&E
    Science and Technology Strategic Plan, the Department will be postured
    to ensure that these fielding decisions are made with an understanding
    of the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability that
    the capability brings to the operational force. It would be my
    responsibility to ensure that DOT&E regularly engages with the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council, Service Secretaries, and acquisition
    executives to better understand the desired capabilities and fielding
    timelines, and to conduct independent assessments.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes in DOT&E policies, processes,
    and practice to help DOD achieve its goal of timely delivery of weapon
    systems, while still ensuring that weapons are safe, effective, and
    lethal?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review existing polices, processes,
    and practices and identify opportunities to help meet operational
    demand without compromising our understanding of the capability headed
    to the field. I will advocate for modernization of T&E methods that
    will allow us to mitigate risks in test and the field, and adequately
    evaluate the performance in operationally relevant and realistic
    conditions.
              adaptation of t&e to evolving acquisition strategies
        Question. The current Acting DOT&E has praised some Middle Tier
    Acquisition programs for incorporating integrated testing approaches,
    while acknowledging the stress that these rapid test-fix-test cycles
    have put on operational test agencies and developmental test
    organizations--in major part because of the resource constraints these
    agencies and organizations regularly experience.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to achieve an appropriate
    balance among the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times, T&E
    resource demands and constraints, and the need to perform adequate
    testing and evaluation?
        Answer. I believe a shorter overall acquisition process is
    necessary to deliver capability to the warfighter at the speed of
    relevance, but it cannot come at a cost of unexpected and unaccounted
    for weapons systems performance in combat. Neither DOT&E nor Congress
    should relinquish its oversight role, regardless of acquisition model.
    If confirmed, I would not shy from placing Middle Tier Acquisition
    (MTA) programs under DOT&E oversight, if necessary.
        To ensure that capabilities obtained under MTA authorities are
    assessed appropriately, DOD should direct the Services and Agencies to
    execute integrated T&E programs that fully leverage mission-and model-
    based approaches, transformative digital technologies, and other
    innovative T&E tools and processes. The Department also must fund the
    formation of a more robust T&E workforce, with both more full-time in-
    house personnel and access, on demand, to experts in cutting-edge
    fields from academia, FFRDCs and the commercial sector.
        If confirmed, I will engage with Service leadership, system
    developers, and developmental and operational testers to develop a test
    and evaluation strategy appropriate to the program, system, or
    capability that will: 1) effect the discovery of problems early in
    system development; 2) verify desired system functionality; and 3)
    facilitate planning and execution of adequate operational
    demonstrations of required capabilities, which must validate
    achievement of the intended capability and inform the decision whether
    to transition from a Rapid Prototyping effort to a follow-on program
    or, in a Rapid Fielding program, to start initial production.
        Question. What requirements and criteria would you propose to
    ensure an effective test and evaluation program is established for
    rapid and/or agile acquisition programs?
        Answer. Adequate resourcing of the DOT&E workforce and supporting
    FFRDC funding and manpower is critical to ensuring these programs have
    early DOT&E involvement, independent oversight, and access to expertise
    and experience. The development and implementation of innovative test
    and evaluation methods to support more advanced T&E early and often
    would also be beneficial for such programs.
        Question. What are your views on the important and timing of the
    testing and evaluation of systems under spiral, iterative, or agile
    development? When, in your view, should follow-on testing and
    evaluation be required?
        Answer. Regardless of the systems development approaches now
    available through the Adaptive Acquisition Framework--to include
    spiral, iterative, and agile development--adequate test and evaluation
    of systems is critical to fielding weapons that work. As is the case
    with all systems, T&E must be completed in a timely manner in order to
    provide the right information to those who need it to support funding
    and schedule decisions, system development and fielding decisions, and
    development of operator concepts of operations and employment and
    tactics, techniques and procedures.
        Typically, follow-on T&E is conducted using fielded production
    systems with appropriate modifications, upgrades, or increments. I
    believe this should remain the case in programs that adopting a spiral,
    iterative, or agile development paradigm. The differences in follow-on
    T&E, due to the iterative nature of these methods, are twofold: 1) DODI
    5000.87 requires software to be instrumented such that it supports data
    collection during operations; and 2) the iterative process enables
    testers to collect data from tests over time, building a cumulative
    body of evidence over time.
        In this model and with these enablers, follow-on T&E no longer
    needs to be considered a ``big bang'' testing event. Instead, it could
    be a data-collection activity that happens over time, and seen as an
    evaluation process that occurs when deemed necessary.
                                 cybersecurity
        Question. The current Acting DOT&E testified that of the programs
    DOT&E assessed in fiscal year 2020, virtually none were survivable
    against relevant cyber threats. All can agree that a lack of program
    resilience in this regard is unacceptable.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to improve cybersecurity
    testing of systems and technologies, including the security of
    commercial cloud services?
        Answer. The only way to test whether a system can withstand an
    actual cyberattack is to actually conduct such an attack on the system
    in a test environment. It is my understanding that the Department uses
    NSA-certified red teams to do that during operational testing.
    Unfortunately, those teams are stretched very thin by high demand, and
    have limited resources. Additional resources for those teams, as well
    as automation capabilities to ease their workload, would improve
    cybersecurity testing. We also need to take advantage of the evolving
    body of research that is coming out of our FFRDC's that can inform the
    methods and tools for how we would do this work in the future.
        Regarding commercial cloud services, upon which DOD relies more and
    more to store highly sensitive, classified data, the biggest limitation
    is that DOD's current contracts with cloud vendors generally don't
    allow DOD to independently assess the security of cloud infrastructure
    owned by the commercial vendor. Unless this burden is lessened, it is
    difficult to assess the security of those clouds.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to ensure the Office
    of DOT&E, program offices, and the Military Departments' and Services'
    Test Agencies have the appropriate infrastructure for cybersecurity
    testing?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would first seek to better understand any
    additional obstacles facing the Military Departments' and Services'
    Test Agencies when it comes to infrastructure for cybersecurity
    testing. I also believe that each entity should make use of the NSA-
    certified red teams during operational testing.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to improve use of
    National Security Agency-certified red teams and other mechanisms for
    stress testing?
        Answer. I believe that these red teams should be used early and
    often to conduct attacks on blue systems, and they need to be
    incorporated in all levels of testing from developmental through
    operational. Unfortunately, those teams are stretched very thin by high
    demand, and they don't have the resources or personnel needed to
    routinely mimic sophisticated nation-State attacks, such as those China
    or Russia have executed and will continue to do. Additional improvement
    in cybersecurity testing should include integration of research,
    automation capabilities, evolving tools and resources for those teams
    to either ease or reshape their workload.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate time in the program
    lifecycle to conduct cybersecurity operational testing, particularly
    given almost constant updates in software?
        Answer. Operationally realistic cyber testing should occur
    throughout the program's lifetime. Persistent Cyber Operations provide
    such testing periodically in a very operationally realistic way, for
    critical operational networks and systems. It is my understanding that
    DOT&E sponsors Persistent Cyber Operations in a number of Combatant
    Commands through its congressionally mandated Cyber Assessment Program.
    Additionally, the Department may consider expanding such operations to
    support critical missions, such as nuclear command and control and
    missile defense.
                  information systems and software test issues
        Question. The Department of Defense's weapon systems, enterprise IT
    systems, and business systems are increasingly software intensive and
    software defined, requiring a fundamental shift away from a traditional
    ``waterfall'' acquisition process toward smaller increments fielded
    more frequently. This poses challenges for developmental and
    operational testing.
        In your view, what are the most significant challenges unique to
    the testing of incrementally developed information systems and
    software?
        Answer. The challenges of testing software-intensive systems or
    cyber-physical systems are robust, and will not be mitigated by the
    Software Acquisition Pathway (SWP) alone. The Department may require
    additional technologies, both for development and test, to meet these
    challenges. For example, I believe the Department must move to a more
    robust digital modeling capability, such as digital twinning, which
    will allow DOD to test the software in a simulated or emulated hardware
    environment.
        I am also aware that DOT&E has partnered with USD(R&E) in the
    execution of NDAA 2020 Section 231, the use of Digital Engineering to
    Automate T&E. This effort is focused on demonstrating the utility of
    the digital engineering approach to deliver operationally effective,
    suitable and survivable software-reliant and/or cyber-physical systems.
    If confirmed, I would wholeheartedly support continuing this
    partnership to advance these capabilities.
    historically, dot&e evaluates programs against requirements established
                    at the beginning of system development.
        Question. What role do you believe the DOT&E should play in testing
    of software intensive weapons systems, business systems, and enterprise
    information systems?
        Answer. DOT&E's role in any program on oversight, by statute, is to
    independently assess the effectiveness, suitability, survivability and,
    where appropriate, lethality of U.S. warfighting and business
    capabilities in operationally representative scenarios. Traditionally,
    the operational test and evaluation community is able to test systems
    only after the software has been delivered in a formal baseline that
    will meet program requirements, embedded in the hardware, and in a form
    where it could be executed in the context of the system and mission it
    supports. This is a validation-type activity, which is appropriate for
    the operational T&E community. While verifying software is inherently a
    developmental T&E function, modern software methodologies potentially
    provide operational T&E an opportunity to ``shift left'' and examine
    smaller pieces of completed software code as it becomes available, in
    the context of a mission. This could lead to earlier discovery of
    defects, and provide OT&E a more active voice in the ``find, fix,
    verify'' cycle early on, when software changes are less difficult to
    implement. State-of-the-practices software development embraces the
    involvement of the intended users early and often throughout
    development, testing, certification and operations. In this way, their
    feedback is implemented more efficiently and effectively, but also is
    likely to have an impact on some requirements initially set by the
    program.. Modern tools and methods provide a controlled mechanism by
    which detailed requirements evolve over time. The OT&E community will
    need to understand how those requirements are evolving so that we can
    to adjusted testing of high-level requirements that evolve in concert
    with user priorities.
        Question. Does the test and evaluation community of the Department
    possess adequate tools, test environments, expertise, staffing, and
    funding to carry out its testing responsibilities as they relate to
    software intensive systems?
        Answer. Based on my current understanding of DOD's T&E ecosystem, I
    believe the Department must substantially improve its tools and test
    environments in order to handle the volume of software-reliant systems
    in the acquisition pipeline. Potential capabilities include automation-
    based testing that can keep pace with rapid incremental software
    releases, and embedded diagnostics that warn when software isn't
    behaving as it should. From a personnel standpoint, I believe DOD needs
    a much larger, robust pool of software and cyber expertise. Given the
    extremely competitive nature of the software and cyber fields, I
    believe a two-pronged approach will be required: human resources that
    reside in house, and an on-demand consortium of other government
    organizations, academics, and commercial sector practitioners.
        Question. What access to commercial information services, software,
    and systems does the operational test and developmental test community
    need to identify potential performance and security issues, and confirm
    operational effectiveness and suitability prior to a system's use by
    the Department of Defense?
        Answer. It is imperative that DOD have the opportunity to evaluate
    the performance and security of all warfighting capabilities, including
    commercial information services, software, and systems. It is my
    understanding that currently, DOD cannot adequately test and evaluate
    the cybersecurity of any DOD capability hosted in the commercial cloud,
    to include software factories. I believe that going forward, every
    contract for cloud services should permit such testing. Moreover, the
    DOD should be informed immediately of any breaches of commercial
    networks where commercial products utilized by the department were
    developed.
        Question. What role, if any, should commercial sector testing play
    in the Department's testing and evaluation of commercial information
    systems that are being modified to support defense needs?
        Answer. Out-of-the-box commercial components are not tested at the
    same level as military standard components, which could potentially
    create failures when operating at extreme conditions. I believe there
    is a T&E role for the commercial sector in this scenario, but
    successful execution requires more rigorous standards, sufficient
    contract specifications, and modular open system architectures.
    Commercial sector testing resources should be focused on verification
    efforts, with DOD's operational T&E community leading the assessment of
    operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality in
    order to maintain acquisition independence.
                 modular open systems approaches and interfaces
        Question. Congress has enacted legislation mandating the use of
    Modular Open Systems Approaches (MOSA) in systems acquisition and the
    delivery to the government of interface characterizations to enable
    interoperability.
        What are the unique challenges and imperatives, if any, in testing
    MOSA-based systems and verifying compliance with interface
    requirements?
        Answer. Many net-centric programs across the Department, including
    MOSA-based programs, have to develop dozens or even hundreds of
    interfaces internally, or to other products and legacy systems, in
    order to be operationally effective. To ensure that these interfaces
    work correctly, it is imperative that the program fund an adequate
    developmental test environment so that modules of the system can change
    and improve over time. This would include with operationally realistic
    interfaces and data flows so that the program can mitigate performance
    and interface problems early. Programs that do so are much more likely
    to succeed during operational testing and are deployed soon after.
    Programs without an adequate developmental test environment usually
    experience severe delays and cost overruns.
                      business and cloud computing systems
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve DOT&E capabilities to
    test and evaluate the operational suitability of business systems and
    the business processes they are intended to support?
        Answer. I understand that recent DOT&E reporting shows that
    business programs that fund operationally realistic test environments
    early on, and use such environments to support both developmental and
    operational testing, typically have fewer cost and schedule problems
    than programs that choose not to fund such environments. I believe the
    best thing the Department can do to improve the testing and
    programmatic outcomes of business systems is to robustly fund
    operationally realistic test environments as soon as possible during
    program development.
        Question. How would you improve the capabilities to test and
    evaluate the operational suitability of cloud computing systems and
    services?
        Answer. Determining the operational suitability of cloud computing
    systems and services has generally not been a problem to date. However,
    it is my understanding that DOT&E, and DOD in general, is currently
    unable to determine the cybersecurity of commercial cloud systems and
    services because DOD's contracts fail to permit independent DOD
    cybersecurity assessments of the cloud's commercially owned
    infrastructure. This is a severe limitation, which should be addressed
    in order to ensure that sensitive and classified data stored in such
    clouds are secure.
        Question. In your view, what are the challenges currently affecting
    DOD's ability to determine the operational effectiveness and
    suitability of commercial information services prior to their
    deployment and use?
        Answer. It is my understanding that determining the operational
    effectiveness and suitability of commercial information services has
    not been a problem for the Department to date. The major challenge is
    DOD's inability to independently assess the cybersecurity of commercial
    clouds because DOD's contracts do not permit such assessments on
    commercially owned cloud infrastructure.
         testing of commercial hardware based systems and technologies
        Question. The Department of Defense is making significant efforts
    to use more commercial hardware platforms, technologies, and systems.
        What policies and practices should the Department establish to
    govern the developmental and operational testing of these kinds of
    commercial systems?
        Answer. To enable adequate cybersecurity testing of commercial
    hardware systems, such as commercial clouds, the Department should
    establish policies that require DOD contracts with commercial vendors
    to permit independent, DOD cybersecurity assessments of commercially
    owned platforms, technologies and systems.
                 combination of testing with training exercises
        Question. Some hold the view that the most representative
    operational testing would be to allow operational forces to conduct
    training exercises with the system under evaluation.
        In your view, should testing be combined with scheduled training
    exercises for efficiency and effectiveness?
        Answer. Training exercises offer a unique opportunity to test in
    more realistic operational scenarios that better replicate the density
    and complexity of modern warfare. They can and should be leveraged to
    provide critical operational test data on joint force interoperability
    and tactical employment. However, data-driven operational test
    objectives are not always compatible with training objectives because
    training exercises are not often intended to address, and do not
    include, the instrumentation necessary to generate the high-quality
    data needed to characterize system performance, and to determine
    mission outcomes and root causes of system deficiencies. It understand
    that DOT&E frequently observes training exercises in which
    developmental systems participate to gain early insights, but the
    aforementioned factors currently limit the extent to which these
    activities should be combined.
        Question. What are the barriers, if any, to doing so?
        Answer. Combined test and training events require trained
    personnel, a relatively mature system under test, and agreed-to and
    compatible test and training objectives. These resources and conditions
    are typically available only near the end of system development, which
    may limit available opportunities. Differences in test and training
    objectives also make integration of these events difficult.
        Another significant barrier is the lack of affordable, high-quality
    instrumentation that is common to both test and training systems.
    Installing modular, open-air battle shaping instrumentation systems on
    both test and training systems would enable both communities to
    leverage these events while applying emergent Big Data analytics and
    knowledge management capabilities to improve post-mission analyses.
    Standing up Big Data analytic teams that are capable of engineering and
    analysis to develop requisite tools and analysis methodologies is also
    required to be able to accurately assess the results of large-force
    exercise and/or test events.
        Question. How can training and testing ranges be used more jointly
    and efficiently, in your view?
        Answer. Development of common, but tailorable, instrumentation
    systems, such as the Quick Reaction Instrumentation Package (QRIP) and
    Open Air Battle Shaping (OABS) systems currently in use for testing of
    several types of aircraft, is necessary to enable the application of
    Big Data and Knowledge Management capabilities in both communities. I
    support efforts to enable high-quality data collection in training
    venues, which would significantly improve both testing and training and
    lead to more opportunities for combined test and training activities.
                         ``system of systems'' testing
        Question. What inherent challenges exist for the operational T&E of
    DOD programs that are part of an overall ``system of systems''?
        Answer. A good example of such a system of systems is the Missile
    Defense System, which comprises more than a dozen different missile,
    sensor, and network systems, all of which must work together during
    wartime. Operational test challenges for such a system of systems
    include getting all system owners to agree on the testing plans,
    schedule, and scope; obtaining an appropriate venue for such a large-
    scale test; and obtaining adequate funding to support operationally
    realistic testing. For the Missile Defense System, Congress has helped
    the DOD achieve more realistic testing by mandating that the Army and
    the Missile Defense Agency conduct joint testing of their individual
    missile defense systems.
        Question. How should a ``system of systems'' be tested to assess
    the effectiveness of the whole system? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The only way to truly understand how a system of systems
    will perform in combat is to test it as a system of systems, with all
    of its component systems deployed against operationally realistic
    threats. However, such tests are difficult to conduct routinely due to
    a variety of operational test challenges. Hence, the best way to assess
    the effectiveness of such systems is to use a combination of modeling
    and simulation and real-world testing, where the real-world testing is
    designed to validate and accredit the modeling and simulation.
                               live fire testing
        Question. The live fire testing program is a statutory requirement
    enacted to ensure DOD assessment of the vulnerability and survivability
    of platforms, while also assessing the lethality of weapons against
    required target sets.
        What are the major challenges facing the live fire testing program,
    in your view?
        Answer. The live fire testing program must be resourced and staffed
    to be responsive to evolving designs while also staying ahead of
    current and expected threats. The survivability of new defense systems,
    including those in space and the electromagnetic spectrum environment,
    should be assessed against the operationally relevant spectrum of
    threats, including evolving kinetic threats and more sophisticated non-
    kinetic threats.
        Question. Is live fire testing to determine whether weapons
    systems, vehicles, or personal protective equipment meet military and
    contract specifications for procurement an inherently governmental
    function, a function that can be outsourced, or a function that can use
    a mix of government and commercial facilities? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. Live fire testing that supports a fielding decision or
    full-rate production decision is inherently governmental. Warfighters
    should be provided systems that have undergone government testing at a
    government facility or, under limited circumstances, testing at non-
    governmental facilities with government supervision. The government
    could use private certified labs, as necessary, to meet surge
    requirements or to conduct research and development testing. When
    testing is conducted at commercial facilities, it must have government
    oversight and meet a common standard appropriate for the intended use
    of the data.
                            modeling and simulation
        Question. Advances in modeling and simulation have provided an
    opportunity to streamline the testing process, saving time and expense.
        What do you believe to be the proper balance between modeling and
    simulation and actual testing of a developed product?
        Answer. Testers must use models that are credible or risk providing
    warfighters incorrect information about their systems. Failure to
    identify system vulnerabilities during testing prevents correction or
    mitigation, and can create disastrous results in combat. Modeling and
    simulation (M&S) credibility is achieved through a process of
    verification, validation and accreditation. At its base, validation
    requires live data to confirm that the modeled performance is
    representative of the real world.
        Modeling and simulation is an investment. There can be significant
    cost to developing and validating M&S. However, returns may include: 1)
    system evaluation in scenarios that cannot be achieved with live
    testing due to safety constraints, availability of threat surrogates
    and test range limitations; 2) less demand on Service assets; 3)
    shorter timelines due to its availability and speed of execution; and
    4) significant repetitions at lower cost yet greater fidelity in
    performance assessment. The early costs of M&S may be high but it
    produces significant dividends in testing of the follow-on iterations
    of a system or a similar system. I strongly support a healthy
    investment in M&S for all systems.
        The proper balance between modeling and simulation and actual
    testing changes with system and model maturity. For a new system
    employing emerging technology or significantly modified technology,
    there may be little to no representative live data. For initial
    evaluations, it is possible that the live data required to develop and
    validate models will exceed the amount of live data necessary to assess
    initial system performance. For follow-on iterations of the system,
    much of the previously attained data remains pertinent, which means
    less new live data is needed. As the system develops with each
    iteration, tester confidence in the M&S increases and enables greater
    reliance on M&S to assess the system's performance.
        Sufficiently robust and validated models are not yet available that
    would preclude testing things like combat systems without some form of
    live events. Actual demonstration is essential to operator confidence.
    Further, all M&S has limitations. Continued system improvement depends
    upon some live testing, particularly testing that evaluates the system
    under its most stressing conditions. However, significantly less live
    testing is appropriate when supplemented with credible M&S.
        Question. Are there areas in modeling and simulation that need to
    be advanced in order to improve its utility as a tool for operational
    and developmental testing?
        Answer. Advances in M&S are essential to support the evaluation of
    emergent technologies, such as artificial intelligence, autonomous
    systems, directed energy, and hypersonics. Confidence in an autonomous
    system, for example, requires an assessment of system response to a set
    of circumstances and combinations of those circumstances that would be
    cost-and time-prohibitive in live events alone. A virtual range is
    necessary to provide the data-rich environment needed to have
    confidence in the decisionmaking of an autonomous machine. Further,
    decisionmaking needs to balance between safe operations and mission
    accomplishment. For example, a system that over-maneuvers can never get
    to its objective. Developers need to be able to determine the threshold
    for response that supports the expected environment, which can be
    significantly different for each intended mission.
        Another area for investment is a comprehensive M&S environment to
    assess ship self-defense capability against anti-ship cruise missiles
    (ASCMs). Threat ASCMs vary significantly in capability and employment.
    The same is true for the radar systems, intercept missiles, and combat
    systems on naval ships. Adequately evaluating the capability of the
    growing number of unique ships will be cost-, time-, and resource-
    prohibitive without an effective M&S environment that can credibly
    assess any combination of defense systems against any presentation of
    threat ASCM.
        Question. Given recent advancements in modeling and simulation, and
    increasing interest in the Department's use of so-called ``digital
    twin'' technology to improve mission readiness and sustainment, where
    would you draw the line between the suitability of virtual testing and
    live testing?
        Answer. Modeling and simulation must be credible, with its
    credibility anchored by comparison to live test data to confirm
    representation of the real world. As confidence develops in the M&S
    through validation, it is appropriate to lean more heavily on virtual
    testing. However, it is not appropriate to exclude all live testing.
    Smaller live test events, called demonstration events, should remain a
    part of testing to ensure operator confidence in their combat systems,
    to enable continued improvement and validation of M&S, and to mitigate
    the inherent limitations of M&S.
                             science and technology
        Question. What are your views on the appropriate level of
    investment in science and technology (S&T) programs to develop next
    generation testing capabilities?
        Answer. The complexity of DOD weapon systems and the multi-domain
    operational environment that is changing in both space and time warrant
    heavy reliance on science and technology investment to advance T&E
    tools and methods. Future T&E demands will require us to improve the
    way we collect, store and analyze data. If confirmed, I will seek to
    review the existing DOT&E S&T strategy, ensure that it is implemented
    in a timely and operationally relevant fashion, and provide my best
    recommendations to the Secretary and the Congress.
        Question. If confirmed, what mechanisms would you employ to ensure
    the S&T portfolio is responsive to the Department of Defense's future
    test instrumentation needs?
        Answer. In annual reports to Congress, DOT&E has pointed out
    specific test areas where more S&T is required in order to ensure
    future OT&E adequacy. DOT&E has also historically prepared issue
    papers, which highlight particular test resource issues, including
    those related to S&T, for the Department's annual program and budget
    reviews. If confirmed, I will evaluate the Test Resource Management
    Center T&E and S&T portfolio, discuss any shortfalls with the
    Secretary, and keep the Congress informed of my findings and intended
    actions.
        Question. In your view, in which areas should the Department's S&T
    program be investing with a view to improving the quality of current
    and future testing capabilities?
        Answer. S&T areas for potential investment include 1) a continuum
    of T&E for changing software capabilities, evolving interoperability,
    and cybersecurity threat response; 2) next-generation T&E capabilities,
    to include hypersonic weapons and defense, directed energy, contested
    space, cybersecurity, data analytics, electronic warfare, nuclear
    survivability, spectrum allocation, artificial intelligence-based
    system T&E, real-time casualty assessments, and telepresence (remote)
    T&E; 3) integrated T&E; 4) digital transformation in taking advantage
    of new model-based engineering tools to redesign how we perform T&E;
    and 5) workforce expertise and partnership. If confirmed, I will
    evaluate the progress in these areas, discuss any shortfalls with the
    Secretary, and keep the Congress informed of my findings and intended
    actions.
                     encroachment and environmental issues
        Question. As is the case with military training, the Department of
    Defense's test and evaluation efforts must take into account
    encroachment requirements and environmental regulations, both on land
    and at sea.
        In your view, what is DOT&E's responsibility to the communities and
    environment near its test ranges?
        Answer. I believe it is vitally important to maintain open and
    proactive communications with our community partners to achieve
    mutually beneficial solutions. While I understand this authority is
    assigned to the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), I will ensure
    that my views concerning the compatibility of the test ranges with
    neighboring communities, along with any impacts on the environment, are
    known to TRMC and leadership within the Department.
        If confirmed, will also ensure that Department officials sustain
    longstanding relationships with Federal, State, and local governments,
    tribes, and non-governmental organizations, such as the Western
    Regional Partnership, the Southeast Regional Partnership for Planning
    and Sustainability, and the Land Trust Alliance. This will enable full
    awareness of current and projected environmental requirements, and
    prospective encroachment issues that may affect the Department's test
    ranges, and in particular, the effective conduct of operational and
    live-fire T&E.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you address encroachment and
    environmental requirements, while ensuring the quality and quantity of
    the Department's test and evaluation programs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will remain alert for environmental
    requirements and range encroachment that could adversely affect the
    ability to conduct adequate operational and live-fire T&E. I will not
    hesitate to bring any concerns that I have about the effects of
    environmental requirements and/or range encroachment on the ability to
    conduct adequate operational testing to senior leadership of the
    Department. Further, I will document such concerns in both my Annual
    Report and program evaluations, as appropriate. Where I am aware of any
    issues pertaining to encroachment and environment, I will bring such
    matters to the attention of TRMC as well as the leadership of other
    Department stakeholders.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
    male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
    harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
    12 months prior to completing the survey.
        What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
    harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the DOT&E?
        Answer. Any sexual harassment or gender discrimination within
    DOT&E, or the Department as a whole, is deeply disturbing and entirely
    unacceptable; these actions foster a climate that is inconsistent with
    the dignity and respect that our workforce deserves. The Department
    should continue its efforts to eliminate sexual harassment and gender
    discrimination, ensure consistent incident tracking and responsiveness,
    and provide training to improve outcomes and workforce stability. If
    confirmed, I would review previous workforce assessments, including
    climate surveys, OPM Federal employee viewpoint survey results, and any
    other documentation that would give me insight into the DOT&E
    organization, and help me make informed decisions on next steps to
    eliminate sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and any other
    harassment within the Office of DOT&E.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the Office of the DOT&E?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately reiterate to the
    workforce the importance of equality and diversity, the Department's
    zero tolerance for any form of harassment, and the expectations of
    professional conduct. I would take any complaint brought to my
    attention very seriously, and would immediately contact the appropriate
    office to initiate an investigation to gather all facts, conduct the
    necessary interviews, collect appropriate information, and address the
    complaint within the specified guidelines of DOD regulations and
    policies.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                             emerging technologies
        1. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, currently there are no validated
    requirements or concepts of operation for Joint All Domain Command and
    Control (JADC2). How should the Department of Defense (DOD) test
    emerging JADC2 technologies?
        Mr. Guertin. It is my understanding that DOT&E is working with the
    Joint Staff and the Services as they develop JADC2 requirements and
    operational concepts to help ensure the results of the process can be
    linked to operationally testable outcomes. As requirements become more
    refined, DOT&E should continue to ensure the Services develop the
    appropriate scenarios and vignettes, with the inclusion of the
    necessary test infrastructure and tools, to provide the warfighter a
    meaningful assessment of JADC2 capabilities. It is my view that the
    Department may be able to accelerate this process, and to lower overall
    execution risk, by incrementally accomplishing JADC2 experimentation
    and limited operational user evaluations to inform continued JADC2
    requirements and operational concept development.

        2. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, how and when should the office of the
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's (DOT&E) be involved in
    testing emerging JADC2 technologies?
        Mr. Guertin. In my view, DOT&E should be involved earlier than has
    been done in the past in order to shape how capabilities can be tested.
    This will ensure the OT&E community and the Services develop the
    appropriate scenarios and vignettes, and have access to the right data
    at the right time. This should include the development strategy for
    test infrastructure and tools that will facilitate giving the
    warfighter a meaningful assessment of JADC2 capabilities. It is my view
    that the Department may be able to accelerate this process by
    incrementally accomplishing JADC2 experimentation and limited
    operational user evaluations to inform continued development of JADC2
    requirements, test approaches, data accessibility, and the overall
    operational concept.
                                software testing
        3. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, I understand that you supported the
    Defense Innovation Board's 2019 Software Acquisition and Practices
    Study while at Carnegie Melon's Software Engineering Institute. As an
    outgrowth of that study, Congress directed in the Fiscal Year 2020
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), section 231, ``Digital
    engineering capability to automate testing and evaluation'', and the
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation subsequently led a number
    of demonstrations of digital engineering in support of automated
    testing. In your view, what should be the next steps that DOT&E takes
    to continue to advance these efforts?
        Mr. Guertin. It is my understanding that the Section 231
    demonstrations have been useful to illustrate some pockets of
    excellence in the Department related to that application of, and
    benefits from, using digital engineering methods and tools. Based on
    those demonstrations, it appears that DOD needs to transition more of
    its enterprise capabilities and associated infrastructure to support
    digital engineering solutions. These demonstrations of driving down
    program execution time and risk are widely beneficial to programs
    adopting evidence-based practices when using digital engineering
    methods and tools. DOD should also use the case studies developed from
    the Section 231 demonstrations to discover defects earlier in the
    acquisition lifecycle, promote a ``Shift Left'' T&E paradigm, and
    reduce risk in order to speed delivery and deployment of improved
    warfighter functionality.
                               live fire testing
        4. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, if confirmed as the new DOT&E, how
    would you ensure that your office is adequately staffed and resourced
    in the critical area of live fire testing given its importance to
    missions and statutory requirements?
        Mr. Guertin. If confirmed, I will review the DOT&E portfolio and
    the allocated resources for both operational and live fire test and
    evaluation. I will assess the DOT&E workforce to include any supporting
    workforce (e.g. FFRDCs) to ensure DOT&E has the appropriate capacity
    and skill sets needed to provide rigorous oversight of live fire
    testing and evaluation (LFT&E) programs. I will use these assessments
    to evaluate the health of the organization and the ability of DOT&E to
    meet all Title 10 responsibilities, including the LFT&E
    responsibilities outlined in 10 USC 2366. In addition, I will review
    the findings of the recent National Academies study on test ranges with
    the DOT&E team to identify initiative and efficiencies that will inform
    changes to LFT&E practices. If my assessment identifies any shortfalls
    that precludes my ability to conduct adequate oversight of LFT&E
    programs, I will work with Congress and the stakeholders within the
    Department to mitigate those shortfalls as quickly as possible. If
    confirmed, I intend to apply both existing and new methods to advance
    the effectiveness and efficiency of LFT&E programs to enhance their
    value.

        5. Senator Reed. Mr. Guertin, what specific organizational
    construct do you believe will support the importance of live fire
    testing?
        Mr. Guertin. Live fire testing and evaluation is indispensable for
    ensuring that the taxpayer is getting the capability they are paying
    for, and that the warfighter has confidence in the weapons and systems
    they will use in combat. A viable next step would be to ensure
    survivability and lethality assessments are effectively carried out at
    the Services level. This would be done by designating an organization
    responsible within each Service for LFT&E which would work with DOT&E
    to establish common policies and practices. This would increase the
    credibility and efficiency of all test and evaluation programs
    performed by all of DOD, and further highlight the indispensable nature
    of live fire testing. It is my understanding that the Army has already
    made great strides in this area through their Army Test and Evaluation
    Command (ATEC). If confirmed, I would evaluate the effectiveness of
    this construct and make my best recommendations to the Secretary for
    application of this practice to other Services operational test
    organizations.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                                 cybersecurity
        6. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Guertin, if confirmed, what are your
    recommended priorities for cybersecurity improvements for operational
    testing and evaluation to mitigate cybersecurity testing limitations
    and enhance system survivability?
        Mr. Guertin. My current understanding is that the most significant
    limitation to cybersecurity operational testing and evaluation is the
    lack of proper tools, and access to highly skilled cyber operators who
    are capable of emulating cyberattacks by near-peer competitors. If
    confirmed, one of my first priorities in this area would be to find
    ways to gain greater access to, and more robustly resource, these
    highly skilled cyber operators and the associated tools of their craft.
    In concert with this shift, the military Services would also need to
    synchronize their efforts and similarly provide additional resources to
    their ``cyber red teams'' to enable them to acquire those same
    automated tools and advanced cyber capabilities commensurate with known
    and evolving cyber threats. It is my opinion that in order to improve
    both access and retention of these highly skilled cyber operators, the
    Services should ensure that they have the resources they need to excel
    in their craft, and consider treating them like other highly skilled
    military personnel, such as pilots and doctors, by providing cyber
    career paths and advancement opportunities for which they may not
    currently have access.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                                    software
        7. Senator Peters. Mr. Guertin, Nicolas Chaillan, the Air Force's
    first-ever chief software officer left his post last month and
    expressed his frustration with DOD's use of resources and priorities in
    a letter announcing his decision. He also pointed out the lack of an
    enterprise approach when it comes to software development and shared
    repositories. Software testing currently falls under developmental
    testing, but the software is constantly being updated in operations.
        How do you think the DOT&E office can ensure more efficient and
    thorough reviews of software and continuous monitoring of every
    software bill of materials as a part of the operational evaluation?
        Mr. Guertin. DOT&E can and will need to understand the software
    pipeline (e.g. development, security, and operations, or DevSecOps,
    methods) and how a product's software bill of materials (SBOM) and
    related cyber risks are tracked and managed in order to adequately
    perform operational testing for programs under DOT&E oversight. Related
    to this is research I have performed on the value of broader
    application of open architectures. Based on that research, I believe
    that the Department should increase its focus on standardization, which
    would include mechanisms for continuous monitoring. This would support
    the OT&E equity in understanding the supply chain risks and cyber
    security considerations in the developmental and operational phases of
    the software life cycle. However, these are not practices that could be
    put in place by DOT&E alone. Many of these activities are established
    in the early stages of implementation, which is primarily reviewed as a
    Developmental Test activity. If confirmed, I look forward to working
    with the other stakeholders in USD(A&S), USD(R&E), and the Services to
    establish these patterns and the insights they would provide.
        In the meantime and in support of the above potential future State,
    during Operational Test planning, DOT&E could enforce a requirement to
    monitor the SBOM and associated supply chain (to include the
    development tooling), both during and after product release. This would
    ensure the SBOM remains accurate and up-to-date, and is reflective of
    the cyber vulnerabilities and risks of the product. As part of the
    Operational Test, DOT&E could also require verification that the
    process to monitor the SBOM and related supply chain is accurate, and
    that there are procedures to mitigate any issues discovered after
    release.

        8. Senator Peters. Mr. Guertin, how can DOT&E more effectively
    apply its resources?
        Mr. Guertin. In my view, DOT&E should work with the other OSD
    stakeholders and the Services to transform the test and evaluation
    concept of operations to keep pace with the methods of product
    development and demands of the future capability needs of the
    warfighter. If confirmed, I will assemble this team of practitioners to
    examine the tools and methods associated with advance software and
    cyber test and evaluation needed to take advantage of transformational
    digital engineering technologies, evolving workforce expertise, and new
    partnerships to more effectively apply available resources.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                       operational testing and evaluation
        9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Guertin, I believe the Department of Defense
    needs to speed up acquisition where possible. The Department should
    tailor its approach to acquisition based on what is being procured.
    Along these lines, I support the intent of the Department of Defense's
    relatively new Adaptive Acquisition Framework. At the same time, we
    must also ensure that any new Department of Defense system is
    rigorously assessed to ensure it meets our requirements before it's
    fielded.
        In your view, to what extent does the growing threat posed by
    China, as well as the increasingly high-tech nature of many new weapons
    systems, change how operational test and evaluation should be
    performed?
        Mr. Guertin. In my view, the change in operational testing needs a
    more holistic and continuous approach, propelled by transformative
    digital technologies, to enable DOT&E to test the way the Department
    must fight. This will be especially important to deal with the pacing
    threat posed by China. From an operational test perspective, we will
    need to address more comprehensively how we instantiate representative
    environments that are as dynamic and complex as the projected threat,
    and be able to test our systems as they would be used as a part of a
    comprehensive joint force. This would include testing protections
    against the persistent and advanced cyber threat that all systems must
    be able to address, individually and jointly.
        With all this in mind, it is my intention, if confined, to examine
    the published DOT&E Science and Technology Strategic Plan and the
    recently released study on test ranges performed by the National
    Academies, to develop this more holistic and continuous approach to
    testing and evaluation that will enable DOT&E to test the way the
    Department must fight in today's joint and all-domain operational
    environment well into the future.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin,
    follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin, which
    was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Nickolas
    H. Guertin in connection with his nomination follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Mr. Nickolas H. Guertin was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on December 14, 2021.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Alexandra N. Baker by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                                     duties
        Question. Pursuant to section 137a of title 10, U.S. Code, the
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) serve as the
    first assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))
    and assists the Under Secretary in the performance of the duties set
    forth in section 134 of the code.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
    DUSD(P)?
        Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P))
    is the primary assistant to and senior-most official under the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The DUSD(P) will assist the
    USD(P) to perform all duties in Section 134 and 137a of Title 10,
    U.S.C. As a Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed official, the
    DUSD(P) is empowered to act on behalf of USD(P) on delegated topics,
    and when the USD(P) is unavailable or recused.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the DUSD(P) as
    ``first assistant'' to the USD(P)?
        Answer. Per the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended (5
    U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  3345-3349d), the ``first assistant'' is the first
    successor to USD(P) in case the USD(P) dies, resigns, or is unavailable
    to perform his/her duties. In such a case, DUSD(P) shall act for the
    USD(P) until a successor is either appointed or the absence or
    unavailability ends, subject to the time limitations and other
    provisions of the Act.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you
    expect the USD(P) to prescribe for you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will foremost help USD(P) carry out the
    responsibilities, fulfill functions, manage relationships, and exercise
    authorities provided for in law and pursuant to the DOD directive that
    assigns responsibilities to USD(P). I understand that the specific
    duties assigned to DUSD(P) by the USD(P) has differed for every USD(P)/
    DUSD(P) relationship. If I am confirmed, I will support USD(P) and the
    Policy organization as directed by USD(P).
                                 qualifications
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that
    qualify you for this position?
        Answer. My many years of service in the national security
    community, to include as Special Assistant to the President and Senior
    Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff,
    national security advisor for Senator Warren, Deputy Chief of Staff to
    former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, as a career civilian budget
    analyst at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and my time on
    the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Committee have
    provided me with expertise, background, and experiences that qualify me
    for this position. This background and experience will give me a
    variety of perspectives on how best to support the Secretary of Defense
    and the USD(P).
        Question. Specifically what leadership and management experience do
    you possess that you would apply to your service as DUSD(P), if
    confirmed?
        Answer. I have led diverse teams at multiple levels to meet or
    exceed their organizational objectives, both within the Department and
    over the course of my career. In my role as Deputy Chief of Staff to
    the Secretary of Defense, I helped to stand-up several new offices and
    initiatives within the Department, including the Defense Innovation
    Unit (DIU), coordinating their activities across multiple stakeholders
    and with Congress. Having worked directly for a Secretary of Defense
    gave me a Department-wide view of how the Department functions, and the
    role played by Policy in the broader defense organization. In my
    current role as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the
    National Security Council, I lead key interagency strategy efforts,
    coordinating input and actions at the Assistant Secretary-level across
    the government. My time at OMB additionally gave me tools to understand
    how resources are apportioned among the departments and agencies. I
    believe this background will help me assist the Secretary and USD(P)
    with the Policy organization's responsibilities.
        Question. Are there any actions you would take to enhance your
    ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the DUSD(P)?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, I will familiarize myself with the
    Policy organization, its assigned responsibilities, and the
    expectations of the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for me. I will
    seek to build and expand on relationships within DOD, other departments
    and agencies, and with the legislative branch to further Policy's
    goals.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you would face if confirmed as the DUSD(P)?
        Answer. The most significant challenge for me would be the same as
    for the Policy organization--providing the best strategic advice to the
    Secretary, implementing the policies deriving from those strategies,
    and accomplishing these missions in a COVID constrained environment. If
    confirmed, I would also seek to prioritize the organizational health of
    the Policy enterprise.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to
    address each of these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Policy team on enhancing
    resources and examining the tools the team has to work on classified
    issues under the COVID challenges facing the Policy team.
        Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas, if any, would you
    consider providing the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense regarding
    the organization and operations of the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))?
        Answer. As I have not yet served in Policy, I believe it would be
    premature for me to speculate before gaining a better understanding of
    the organization. If confirmed, I will spend time learning the
    organization and its operations so that I can provide the Secretary and
    USD(P) the best possible innovative recommendations.
                          guantanamo bay naval station
        Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
    facility at Guantanamo?
        Answer. I support the Biden Administration's stated view that it is
    time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly. Until
    that time, however, the Department must ensure the continued safe,
    humane, and legal care and treatment of the 39 remaining detainees
    through Joint Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
        Question. In your view, what impact, if any, does the end of combat
    operations in Afghanistan have on the Defense Department's detention
    policy and strategy?
        Answer. While I am aware that there is litigation ongoing on this
    matter, I understand that the end of combat operations in Afghanistan
    does not affect the legal basis for the Defense Department's detention
    operations, which remains the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
    Force. With regard to the Department's detention policy and strategy,
    in line with the Biden Administration's policy, I believe it is time to
    close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly.
        Question. What factors should be considered in setting policy for
    determining the release or transfer of GTMO detainees?
        Answer. I believe the factors used by the Periodic Review Board in
    determining whether a detainee should be considered transfer eligible,
    as laid out in the governing policy memo posted at prs.mil are
    appropriate. The Periodic Review Board review process uses available
    information to determine whether a detainee remains a continuing
    significant threat to the security of the United States and, if not,
    whether there are conditions which could ensure any remaining threat is
    mitigated such that transfer to a suitable country is appropriate.
        Question. In your view, what should be the Department's long-term
    detention strategy?
        Answer. In line with the Biden Administration's policy, I believe
    it is time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly.
    It is my understanding that the Biden administration does not intend to
    bring new detainees to the facility and will seek to close it.
        The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section
    1023 of the fiscal year 2012 NDAA, is conducted ``to determine whether
    certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing
    significant threat to the security of the United States such that their
    continued detention is warranted''.
        Question. Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the PRB
    process and the transfer of detainees to other countries based on the
    PRB's determinations, subject to the restrictions currently in law?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the continued Period Review
    Board process. I understand that the PRB conducts hearings on a regular
    basis to make administrative determinations as to whether continued
    detention remains necessary, although no transfers occur unless the
    Secretary of Defense provides a certification in accordance with the
    relevant legal requirements.
        Question. Under what circumstances would you envision the
    Administration directing the activation and operations of such a
    migrant detention facility?
        Answer. I believe the referenced facility is the Migrant Operations
    Center, which is located on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and operated
    by the Department of Homeland Security. To my knowledge this facility
    has a steady-State mission of housing migrants interdicted at sea while
    they are processed for third-country resettlement.
        Question. What role would the Department of Defense play in the
    Administration and operation of this migrant detention facility?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Homeland
    Security manages the administration and operations of the Migrant
    Operations Center. I understand that Naval Station Guantanamo Bay
    provides some support services, such as medical care for staff and
    those housed at this center, on a reimbursable basis.
        Question. What is the appropriate role for a contractor to play in
    the administration of this facility?
        Answer. I cannot speak to the appropriate role of contractors at
    this facility as it is operated by the Department of Homeland Security.
                         department of defense reforms
        Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2020 included an increase in the number of personnel authorized to be
    assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
        Do you believe that an increase in the number of personnel assigned
    to the OUSD(P) is necessary and appropriate?
        Answer. I am aware that the number of personnel in the Policy
    organization has been reduced over the last several years. My
    understanding is that this has been challenging to the Policy
    organization, especially as our national security challenges have grown
    in complexity. If confirmed, I would seek to work with USD(P) to review
    missions and current staffing levels to determine whether the
    professional civilian staff is sized appropriately, and how we can best
    recruit and retain a skilled and talented workforce. I would also seek
    to work with Congress to ensure that the Policy organization is
    resourced appropriately to support the Secretary and the Nation.
        Question. To what missions and functions would you apply such an
    increase, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will look to the upcoming National Defense
    Strategy to guide my recommendations to USD(P) about how best to use
    any additional resources.
        Question. In your opinion, how does the number of personnel
    assigned to OUSD(P) (as compared to the number of personnel assigned to
    the Joint Staff) impact civilian control of the military?
        Answer. OUSD(P) personnel play an important role in advising the
    Secretary of Defense and ensuring civilian control of the military. As
    I am not yet aware of the personnel assigned to OUSD(P) and Joint
    Staff, and if their responsibilities are comparable, I cannot assess
    this question yet. If confirmed, I will commit to examining this issue
    closely.
        Question. In your view, would an increase in the number of
    personnel assigned to the OUSD(P) enhance civilian control of the
    military? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. This is a complex question, which I am committed to examine
    if I am confirmed. An increase in personnel would allow OUSD(P) to
    increase its ability to provide the best strategic advice to the
    Secretary of Defense, the senior departmental official, and would be
    consistent with the commitment to ensure civilian control of the
    military.
       national defense strategy and interim national security strategic
                                    guidance
        Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) shifted United
    States strategic priorities to focus on a rising China, an aggressive
    Russia, and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global
    terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance, which sets out the national
    security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has
    initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, to be completed in 2022.
        Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment,
    including the most critical and enduring threats to the national
    security of the United States and its allies?
        Answer. The 2018 National Defense Strategy was notable, in my view,
    particularly for how it accelerated bipartisan consensus on the
    concerning growth of China's military capabilities and its implications
    for the United States, and our allies and partners. As Secretary Austin
    has highlighted, and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
    more recently articulated, the growing scope and scale of China's
    military modernization make China the Department's pacing challenge.
    The Interim Guidance also highlights a range of other key challenges in
    the security environment--to include climate change, the global COVID-
    19 pandemic, and other biological threats. If confirmed, I would work
    to ensure that the Department's ongoing NDS review accounts for key
    features of the security environment, to include any changes since the
    2018 NDS and the 2021 Interim National Security
                       strategic guidance were published.
        Question. Do you support the national security priorities set out
    in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance?
        Answer. Yes. In my current role, I am leading efforts to update the
    Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which will ultimately
    result in publication of the Administration's new National Security
    Strategy. If confirmed, I would expect to focus on ensuring NDS
    alignment and implementation consistent with administration guidance.
        Question. What areas of current NDS implementation cause you the
    most concern and what recommendations would you have for addressing
    each of these concerns, if confirmed?
        Answer. Any defense strategy, in my view, stands or falls on
    implementation. Assessments of past National Defense Strategies (and
    QDRs before them) have consistently identified the need for more
    deliberate planning, organization, and prioritization to execute the
    priorities in these documents. I understand the NDS process is well
    underway. If confirmed, I will work to finalize the forthcoming NDS
    with a deliberate eye toward ensuring that it builds implementation
    into its approach. In so doing, I would work with the Department's
    senior leadership to ensure that implementation efforts are integrated
    across the Department, in support of other U.S. elements of national
    power, and alongside our allies and partners.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the
    quantity and quality of analytic capability required to support
    informed assessment and decisionmaking in the OUSD(P)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in working with the
    Deputy Secretary's recently chartered Analytic Working Group--comprised
    of Policy, Joint Staff, CAPE, and the Chief Data Officer (CDO)--in
    consultation with the Services and other components, to ensure the
    analytic support processes, tools, and methodologies provide civilian
    leadership with the variety of decision support that they need to
    address the scope and scale of challenges the NDS will address.
        Question. What is your assessment of the ability of DOD modeling
    and simulation capabilities to support policy missions, for example in
    modeling the impacts of financial market uncertainties on military
    operations?
        While I am not in a position to know firsthand, I understand that
    the Department's analytic capabilities may have been strained by
    budgetary reductions over the past decade. At the same time, potential
    tools and methodologies have been evolving based on new analytic
    approaches and technologies and better harnessing of data. If
    confirmed, I will make it a priority to review these developments and
    ensure that Policy has the requisite personnel, tools, and
    methodologies to support senior leader decisions.
        Question. What is your view of the role that social science
    research, such as that funded under the DOD Minerva program, has played
    in support of defense policy objectives?
        Answer. I believe it is important for DOD policymakers to listen
    to, and draw upon, a wide range of research, including from the
    academic community. The Minerva program, and the social science it
    supports, is an exemplar of such research and I understand that it has,
    and continues to be, an important resource for policymakers, and the
    wider DOD community.
        In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the National
    Defense Strategy Commission observed, ``[t]he United States needs more
    than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational
    concepts that expand United States options and constrain those of
    China, Russia, and other actors. Operational concepts constitute an
    essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and
    budgetary priorities needed to advance them.''
        Question. What do you view as the role of the OUSD(P) in the
    development of operational concepts?
        Answer. Operational concepts are an essential link between
    strategic objectives, policies, and the capability and budgetary
    priorities needed to advance them. As such, OUSD(P)'s role is to
    provide appropriate civilian guidance and oversight to ensure
    operational concepts are well-integrated and strategically aligned.
        Question. What key elements or components must operational concepts
    include, in your opinion, to effectively guide capability and budgetary
    priorities?
        Answer. Joint concept development is an iterative process that
    requires tight linkages between civilian and military leadership. At
    any resource level, the Department's concept development must balance
    sustaining systems capable of countering threats at lower costs,
    divesting systems that are not fit for purpose, and modernizing forces
    able to contend with threats posed by increasingly advanced competitors
    over time, with a prioritized focus on China. To do so, operational
    concepts must clearly articulate the operational problems that a threat
    poses over time and how the concept is intended to provide options to
    address the threat in relation to the above.
        Question. In your opinion, does the planning, programming,
    budgeting and execution process in the Department of Defense need to be
    modified to better support the emerging joint requirements of the Joint
    Warfighting Concept? If so, in what ways? If not, why not?
        Answer. I believe the Department's planning, programming,
    budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process, including the supporting force
    planning and development efforts, provides a transparent and neutral
    process for considering and prioritizing key investments that stem from
    the emerging defense strategy and Joint Warfighting Concept work.
    However, as with all processes, DOD should frequently evaluate PPBE to
    ensure that it is effectively providing needed alignment between
    strategic priorities, analysis, concepts, and specific solutions.
                          cyber policy and authorities
        Question. National Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13),
    United States Cyber Operations Policy, provides the process for
    approving cyberspace operations. Together with congressional
    clarification that clandestine military activities or operations in
    cyberspace can be considered ``traditional military operations'' under
    the National Security Act of 1947, NSPM-13 is credited with enabling
    the Federal Government to undertake significant cyberspace actions on a
    timely basis within an effective oversight framework.
        In your view, has NSPM-13 significantly improved the planning and
    approval of military operations in cyberspace?
        Answer. In my view, the existing policy framework for approving
    offensive cyber operations has made a positive contribution by enabling
    the Department to effectively perform its mission to disrupt threats
    overseas at the source, before they reach our networks. I also welcomed
    Congress's clarification in the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA of what
    constitutes traditional military activities. Together, these measures
    ensure that the Department is better able to operate in cyberspace and
    understand the evolving cyber environment.
        Question. In your view, can NSPM-13 be improved, and if so, how?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the current policy has resulted
    in well-coordinated and timely DOD cyber operations. If confirmed, I
    will support the USD(P) in reviewing the policy and any associated
    risks, and work to ensure that the Department remains focused on
    improving its effective use of the authority granted by the President
    and the existing interagency coordination process. I will also seek to
    ensure that the Department remains fully transparent with Congress as
    we ensure that DOD is able to perform its mission effectively in
    cyberspace.
        The United States has been subjected to an increasing number of
    serious ransomware attacks facilitated by criminal organizations
    located in countries whose governments appear to tolerate, if not
    encourage, these activities.
        Question. In your view, specifically how should the U.S. Government
    hold other governments accountable for failing to act against criminal
    ransomware organizations operating within their borders?
        Answer. Addressing the threat of ransomware is a challenge, in part
    due to the increasingly blurry lines between nation-State and criminal
    actors. Some governments have let government-employed hackers
    ``moonlight'' as cybercriminals for personal benefit, and some
    governments have created permissive environments for criminal
    ransomware gangs, allowing them to operate from within their borders
    and shielding them from prosecution. President Biden has been clear
    that this is not acceptable, and that responsible countries must take
    action against cybercriminals who conduct ransomware activities from
    within their territory.
        Thwarting ransomware actors requires a whole-of-government response
    that is coordinated with the private sector and our international
    partners. If confirmed, I will work to support these efforts, which
    include working with the defense industrial base to increase its
    security and resiliency; defending the Department's networks from
    malware, including ransomware; and strengthening partnerships with the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security in
    their efforts to improve the cyber defenses of Federal, State, and
    local governments, as well as those of the private sector.
        Question. Does the ability of these large cyber-criminal
    enterprises to target critical infrastructure pose a potential threat
    to national security, in your view?
        Answer. Ransomware attacks can threaten our national, homeland, and
    economic security. Recent high-profile attacks on critical
    infrastructure, including attacks on the Colonial Pipeline and JBS
    Foods, have demonstrated ransomware's potential to disrupt the everyday
    lives of Americans. The cyber degradation or disruption of critical
    infrastructure can have cascading physical consequences that could have
    serious effects on our national security.
        Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in
    assessing whether a cyber action by an adversary would constitute an
    act of war?
        Answer. The implications of any cyberattack must be considered on a
    case-by-case basis. This includes consideration of the total effects of
    an incident, such as injury, death, or significant property
    destruction. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department is
    postured to support whole-of-government responses to cyber incidents,
    particularly if they are destructive or target our critical
    infrastructure.
        Question. While diplomacy, law enforcement actions, and improved
    defenses are critical to countering the ransomware threat, do you
    envision a role for DOD Cyber Mission Forces in conducting disruptive
    actions directly against these organizations in cyberspace? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that the Department is prepared to use its
    unique authorities to defend forward and disrupt significant ransomware
    threats at the source, before they reach our networks. However,
    ransomware actors generally target victims for financial gain, making
    ransomware threats criminal in nature and often the focus of law
    enforcement action. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the
    Department continues to support whole-of-government efforts to counter
    ransomware threats, including through robust sharing of information
    that can enable our law enforcement partners as well as the Department
    of Homeland Security, which is responsible for coordinating the
    security of U.S. critical infrastructure.
        Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal
    year 2014, required the appointment of a Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA)
    to the Secretary of Defense to coordinate across all the DOD components
    with cyberspace responsibilities, assist in the development of cyber
    strategies and posture reviews, and oversee implementation of
    strategies and policies. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is reviewing a
    recommendation to transfer the PCA role from the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security to the DOD Chief
    Information Officer (CIO).
        What do you perceive to be both the pros and cons associated with
    the transfer of PCA roles and duties to the DOD CIO?
        Answer. I understand the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary
    of Defense (PCA) and Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
    (DOD CIO) play critical roles in the Department's governance and
    oversight of cyber policy and programs. Within the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense the PCA's responsibilities include oversight of
    U.S. Cyber Command and implementation of the Department's cyber
    strategy playing a key role in overseeing cyber operations and policy,
    programs, and processes that support these operations, and integrating
    policy, programs, and processes germane to cyber operations across the
    Department. I understand the DOD CIO, as the principal staff assistant
    for information technology, manages the Department's cybersecurity
    program and develops and oversees implementation of cybersecurity
    policy across the Department. I am not aware of and have not been a
    part of internal DOD discussions about a potential transfer of the PCA
    role to the DOD CIO. If confirmed, and designated by the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy to contribute to those internal
    discussions, I would develop a recommendation based on careful review
    of the PCA and CIO roles and responsibilities, respectively, and DOD
    leaders' vision and strategy for organizing the Department for all of
    its cyber-related missions.
        Question. If confirmed, will you pledge to consult with the
    Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate prior to any
    decision by the Secretary to transfer the PCA role from the Office of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
        Answer. I understand the Deputy Secretary of Defense intends, and
    has promised, to consult with the Committees on Armed Services of the
    Senate and House of Representatives prior to any redesignation of the
    Principal Cyber Advisor. If confirmed, I will ensure that consultation
    with these committees occurs prior to any final decision.
                                    spectrum
        Question. In what ways does DOD rely on spectrum to support
    warfighter requirements?
        Answer. My understanding is that the electromagnetic spectrum is
    essential to a wide range of the Joint Force's operations, including
    command, control, communications, and warfighting.
        Question. What future spectrum warfighter requirements are
    essential to competing with Russia and China?
        Answer. I understand that the spectrum is increasingly contested.
    If confirmed, I will look to better understand what the force needs to
    achieve spectrum access and superiority in order to prevail in a high-
    end warfight.
        Question. Under the July 15, 2021, Electromagnetic Spectrum
    Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan and Roadmap, and per section
    1053 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, the DOD CIO has now assumed
    responsibilities as the DOD senior official for overall implementation
    of the Spectrum Superiority Strategy. Yet, the Office of the
    Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, USD(P) is expected to name a
    Deputy Assistant Secretary to advocate and represent the USD(P) on
    matters related to Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).
        Do you believe EMSO policy processes are adequately represented in
    this planning structure?
        Answer. I am not in a position at this time to assess whether EMSO
    policy processes are adequately represented in this planning structure.
    If confirmed, I will work with key stakeholders across the Department
    to advance the Joint Force's priorities for EMSO, in accordance with
    Policy's roles and per the implementation plan.
        Question. Are Combatant Commander requirements properly
    represented? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that the EMSO cross functional team included
    participation by the CCMDs, but I am not in a position at this time to
    evaluate CCMD representation in practice.
        Question. If confirmed, what improvements would you propose to
    strengthen the role of EMSO in the policy processes under the USD(P)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) to ensure that
    Policy fully supports the consideration of EMSO in the appropriate
    strategic guidance documents, to include the National Defense Strategy
    and associated guidance on force management guidance and force
    planning. I would also direct that Policy's participation in the
    Department's budget and force management processes fully account for
    EMSO.
        Question. Do you believe it prudent for DOD to vacate or share the
    3100-3450 Mhz band for commercial 5G wireless networks?
        Answer. I am not in a position at this time to evaluate technical
    specifics, but I believe the Department must balance achieving U.S.
    economic development objectives while not limiting constraints on
    military capabilities. If confirmed, I would work so support the USD(P)
    in working alongside DOD's Chief Information Officer to ensure DOD's
    access to critical spectrum.
        Question. What most concerns you about the proposal that DOD vacate
    this particular band?
        Answer. I am generally concerned that adversary actions, commercial
    development, and regulatory constraints could impede U.S. forces'
    freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. If confirmed, I will
    work with the USD(P) to ensure that the Department reforms its
    processes and modernize the Joint Force in order to maintain an edge in
    key domains, to include EMSO and 5G, in cooperation with the
    Department's technical experts and other stakeholders.
        Question. How would you articulate the impacts to the capabilities
    of DOD under such circumstances, and how will those impacts be
    mitigated, in your view?
        Answer. I cannot speak to the technical specifics of how the
    Department is grappling with this issue from my current position, but I
    understand that, under the Secretary's guidance to make China the
    Department's overall pacing threat for modernization, the Department is
    prioritizing a wide range of modernization efforts. If confirmed, I
    would expect to play a key role in linking strategic guidance to
    implementation efforts and investments, informed by robust analysis and
    new operating concepts.
                                     space
        Question. What are your views with respect to the necessity of
    civilian oversight of DOD space operations with respect to U.S. Space
    Command and Space Force?
        Answer. Space is a critical warfighting domain, and civilian
    oversight of force development and operations regarding the space
    domain is as important as civilian oversight of force development and
    military operations in any other domain. Given that conflict could
    extend to or originate in space, and in light of the new and rapidly
    evolving nature of the challenge, civilian oversight regarding space is
    particularly important.
        Question. Is current civilian oversight of these organizations
    adequate?
        Answer. I understand that when passing the legislation that
    established the U.S. Space Force, Congress also took important steps to
    strengthen civilian oversight of space by placing the Space Force under
    the oversight of the Secretary of the Air Force, establishing a new
    Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
    Integration, and designating that one of the Assistant Secretaries of
    Defense would be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
    If confirmed, I would work closely with these organizations to ensure
    strong civilian oversight and regularly assess if further changes are
    needed.
        Question. Should the OUSD(P) play a different or greater role in
    oversight of these organizations? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. My understanding is that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Space Policy--who reports directly to the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy and whose principal duty is the overall supervision
    of DOD policy for space warfighting--is well positioned to support the
    USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in ensuring appropriate civilian
    oversight of both the operational and planning activities of the U.S.
    Space Command and the organize, train, and equip activities of the U.S.
    Space Force. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD for Space
    Policy, regularly evaluating the effectiveness of this oversight role
    and whether any changes might be advisable.
        There is growing concern about the vulnerability of our Nation's
    space-based systems and supporting architectures.
        Question. If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to
    address these vulnerabilities?
        Answer. It is essential to have strong mission assurance of the
    critical space-based capabilities that support our national security.
    If confirmed, I would prioritize understanding the extent of progress
    to date in transitioning to new space architectures that are resilient
    against the types of counterspace capabilities our strategic
    competitors, specifically China and Russia, are developing. I would
    also want to ensure DOD is taking necessary steps to protect the joint
    force in all domains against potential adversaries' hostile uses of
    space.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes to national security space
    policy, organization, and programs would you propose?
        Answer. If confirmed, before making specific proposals, I would
    want to receive detailed briefings on the current and projected
    security environment in space, and the extent of coordination and
    integration across the national security space enterprise to ensure the
    national security advantages of our space capabilities. It is critical
    that policy, organizational, and programmatic decisions reflect broad
    consensus across our government regarding the importance of space, and
    I would continually assess whether our efforts are producing the
    intended results or if further changes are required.
        Question. In your view, what are the roles of our allies and
    industry with respect to DOD space and national security operations?
        Answer. Close relationships with our allies and partners, and a
    strong, vibrant U.S. industry, are fundamental to a successful space
    security strategy. If confirmed, I would look to strengthen space
    policy, programmatic, and operational cooperation with our allies and
    partners. I would also work closely with the U.S. Space Force and U.S.
    Space Command to maximize our ability to leverage the dynamic and
    innovative capacities of U.S. industry.
        Pursuant to section 955 of the fiscal year 2020 NDAA, President
    Biden has nominated an individual to be the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Space Policy. The NDAA specifies that ``The principal duty
    of the Assistant Secretary shall be the overall supervision of policy
    of the Department of Defense for space warfighting.''
        Question. Congress has repeatedly opposed diluting the missions and
    functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with
    matters related to nuclear or missile defense. How will you, if
    confirmed, ensure a continued, laser-like focus on Space Policy within
    the OUSD(P)?
        Answer. DOD space capabilities support all aspects of national
    defense strategy from peacetime competition and strategic deterrence,
    to operations and decisionmaking in conventional and nuclear conflict.
    These capabilities support the total force across all domains as well
    as national leadership at the highest levels. If confirmed, I would
    ensure that the OUSD(P), and in particular the ASD for Space Policy, is
    addressing the challenges of space warfighting policy holistically,
    within the context of an integrated national defense strategy and total
    force posture, rather than from a perspective limited to just the space
    domain. This approach would maximize the strategic benefits of a
    dedicated focus on the challenges of space security.
        Question. What principal duties do you believe should be assigned
    to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with respect to
    space? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe the principal duties of the ASD for Space Policy
    should center on the space policy and related matters that correspond
    most closely to the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy in advising the Secretary of Defense. Thus, in addition to
    the duties assigned in statute, the ASD for Space Policy should
    represent the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy in interagency policy and strategy deliberations and in
    international negotiations regarding space and related matters. The ASD
    for Space Policy also should advise on the strategic and policy aspects
    of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution activities related
    to space, and on integration of space and related capabilities into
    operations and contingency plans.
        Question. What other duties and responsibilities should be assigned
    to this ASD?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) to assess the
    appropriate scope of responsibilities for the ASD for Space Policy,
    taking into account the overall structure of the Policy organization.
                                  middle east
        Question. What do you view as the Department's top priorities in
    the Middle East?
        Answer. The Department of Defense's priorities derive from the
    President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I see at
    least three major priorities for the Department in the Middle East:
    preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and addressing threats
    from Iran's regional aggression and support for terrorism, including
    protecting our own forces; disrupting Al-Qaeda and related terrorist
    networks and preventing an ISIS resurgence; and protecting other vital
    U.S. interests such as freedom of navigation. Our presence in the
    region also provides opportunities for security cooperation with our
    allies and partners in the region, including Israel, as we seek to
    cultivate their military capabilities and build interoperability to
    pursue shared objectives. DOD must be mindful that China remains the
    Department's pacing threat and that strategic competition must be a
    priority in the Middle East as well.
        Question. To what extent does achieving U.S. national security
    interests in the Middle East require a continuous U.S. military
    presence there, in your view?
        Answer. The United States cannot achieve our national security
    interests in the Middle East without a military presence in the region,
    but the Department's military posture in the Middle East must also be
    sustainable and balanced with global military priorities. Our military
    presence enables the protection of the homeland, positions us to
    respond to contingencies, and allows us to better cooperate with our
    allies and partners as DOD works to improve their military
    capabilities, build interoperability, and collaborate on shared
    security objectives. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P) to
    continually assess our presence in the region in light of the dynamic
    security environment.
        Question. In your opinion, is the current U.S. force presence in
    the Middle East appropriately sized? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The President's Interim National Security Strategic
    Guidance states that in the Middle East, DOD will right-size our
    military presence to the level required to disrupt international
    terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital
    interests. If confirmed, I will work with other leaders in the
    Department to ensure our military presence in the Middle East is
    appropriately aligned with our strategic objectives.
        Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
    with U.S. regional and European partners to counter threats emanating
    from and affecting the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of
    Responsibility (AOR)?
        Answer. Sharing the responsibility of regional security with our
    allies and partners is critically important to achieving our national
    security objectives. This is one of the reasons the President's Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance calls for prioritizing our
    alliances and partnerships. The Department already does this well,
    including through such coalitions as the International Maritime
    Security Construct, the Defeat ISIS Coalition, and an expanded NATO
    mission in Iraq. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the
    Department, U.S. interagency, and internationally to find additional
    opportunities to further enhance security cooperation.
        Question. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power
    competition?
        Answer. The Middle East remains an important region for United
    States interests, particularly in terms of strategic waterways and
    access for global commerce, and is increasingly a key theater for
    competition. China and Russia both seek to displace the United States
    as the partner of choice in the Middle East. Their presence often
    undermines United States force protection in the region, and their
    weapons sales and increased technical cooperation with our Middle East
    partners put United States technology at risk.
        Question. How should DOD consider countering Russia and China in
    the Middle East, in your view?
        Answer. China continues to expand its military and intelligence
    footprint and increase its involvement in the region, as does Russia.
    But the United States retains many advantages, including our long-
    standing partnerships in the region. I understand that the Department
    is investing in support for regional partners and affirming common
    interests to counter common threats. If confirmed, I work to ensure
    that the United States remains the strategic partner of choice in the
    Middle East.
        Question. In your judgment, should the Department accept greater
    risk in the CENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. I believe that DOD should right-size our military posture
    in the CENTCOM AOR to the level required to secure U.S. national
    interests while keeping a focus on our global strategy.
        Question. How could such risks be mitigated, in your view?
        Answer. The Department's prioritization of China as its pacing
    challenge for developing new military technology and operational
    concepts ensures that the United States will maintain its overwhelming
    overmatch vis-a-vis Iran. This overmatch, combined with the
    Department's demonstrated ability to rapidly deploy forces to the
    region, should allow the Department to adopt a sustainable posture that
    is less dependent on static, long-term deployments, without losing
    significant deterrent benefits.
                                      iraq
        Question. What, in your view, are the primary goals of our current
    military posture in Iraq?
        Answer. The United States military is in Iraq at the invitation of
    the Government of Iraq under Operation INHERENT RESOLVE to support the
    Iraqi security forces as they lead in the fight against ISIS alongside
    our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
        Question. What is your view of the Administration's decision to
    transition combat forces from Iraq?
        Answer. The announcement that the United States and Iraq security
    relationship will fully transition to a training, advising, assisting,
    and intelligence-sharing role is only possible because of the increased
    capabilities of the Iraqi security forces as they continue to lead in
    the fight against ISIS. It is a signal of remarkable progress and the
    success of the United States-Iraq strategic partnership.
        Question. Going forward, what do you envision to be the missions
    and size of the United States military presence in Iraq?
        Answer. The United States military is in Iraq at the invitation of
    the Iraqi government. As Iraqi needs continue to evolve, so will the
    United States mission. If confirmed, I will work to support the USD(P)
    in ongoing conversations the Department and the interagency have with
    our Iraqi and Coalition partners.
        Question. Do you believe the United States should continue to
    provide security assistance to Iraq following the defeat of the so-
    called physical caliphate of ISIS? If so, for what purposes?
        Answer. Although ISIS no longer holds territory, it remains a
    threat and ISIS continues to conduct attacks, jeopardizing the hard-
    fought gains of Iraqi security forces over the past several years. The
    United States should remain committed to the defeat-ISIS mission and
    continue to build the capacity of Iraqi security forces to enable them
    to conduct counter-ISIS operations independently.
        Question. How should the United States regularize security
    assistance to Iraq in future years?
        Answer. It is my understanding that during the fight against ISIS,
    United States security cooperation with Iraq has largely focused on
    tactical and operational needs. If confirmed, I would advocate for the
    United States and Iraq to look beyond immediate-term priorities toward
    longer-term institutional development and a future cooperation between
    our militaries that extends beyond counterterrorism.
        Question. How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Iran provides financial
    support, training, and equipment to Iraqi militia groups to grow its
    political and military influence, seeking both an end to the United
    States presence through both political and military means and to use
    Iraq as a platform for its destabilizing activities in the region.
    Attacks from these Iranian-backed militias not only threaten the safety
    of United States and Coalition personnel, but also undermine Iraq's
    stability and threaten Iraqi civilians.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategy would you recommend to limit
    Iranian malign influence in Iraq?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in working with
    our interagency partners to craft a whole-of-government approach to
    limit Iranian malign influence and ensure that Iraq is strong, stable,
    and sovereign. Following the recent Iraqi elections, the United States
    should encourage a swift government formation process that results in a
    government dedicated to creating a brighter future for all Iraqis and
    advancing the United States-Iraq strategic partnership. The United
    States should also continue to support Iraq's sovereignty and improved
    relations with other neighboring states as a counterweight to Iran.
                                      iran
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
    posed by Iran?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Iranian military and its
    proxies and partners pose a conventional and unconventional threat to
    United States forces and our regional partners. Iran leverages regional
    militia groups to threaten United States forces and partners and
    undermine regional sovereignty. It has attacked United States forces
    with ballistic missiles, while proliferating this capability to its
    partners and proxies. Iran is similarly proliferating one-way attack
    unmanned aerial systems to its proxies for attacks on United States
    forces and regional partners. Finally, it is my understanding that Iran
    also threatens freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz region
    through direct attacks on civilian shipping, and stockpiling naval
    mines designed to close the Strait.
        Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
    United States security strategy with respect to Iran?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the U.S. strategy is to pursue
    diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and to
    counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. The Department
    supports this effort by deterring and, if necessary, defending against
    Iranian aggression, and by working to build partner capacity and
    promote increased cooperation to address shared threats.
        Question. What is the role of the U.S. military in this strategy?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
    deters aggressive actions by Iran by maintaining a calibrated force
    presence and working with its partners to enhance regional defenses
    against Iran's destabilizing actions.
        Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
    currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
    necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense is
    currently undertaking a global posture review to, in part, answer this
    question. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, the Services,
    and the Combatant Commands to carefully review the size, shape, and
    readiness of the force, and to ensure we are creating a flexible global
    posture that effectively deters threats and provides the President the
    options he needs by leveraging our unmatched ability to rapidly deploy
    forces anywhere in the world.
        Question. What is your assessment of United States national
    security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in
    the Middle East?
        Answer. Countries that experience an increase in Iranian influence
    typically see a weakening of State authority as Iran creates and arms
    militias that undermine national sovereignty. These militias then use
    their Iranian-provided weapons to threaten or attack neighboring
    countries spreading conflict and instability across the region.
        Question. How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran's
    malign influence--more specifically, Iran's proxy networks--and other
    activities throughout the Middle East?
        Answer. I understand the United States strategy aims to counter
    Iranian malign influence in the Middle East by enhancing the
    capabilities and capacity of United States regional partners,
    leveraging the international community to condemn and push back against
    Iran and its proxies' destabilizing activities, and deterring and
    responding to any attacks from Iranian proxies.
        Question. If the United States were to return to compliance with
    the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what concerns, if any,
    would you have for regional security? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that the Administration's intent is to use a
    return to the JCPOA as the first step toward negotiating a longer,
    stronger deal which addresses Iran's other destabilizing regional
    activities. I agree with this approach because a nuclear-armed Iran
    would pose a tremendous threat to our regional partners and further
    embolden Iran in its activities to undermine regional security. At the
    same time, the United States should continue to push back against
    Iran's destabilizing activities, working together with our partners and
    allies.
        Question. In your view, what effect, if any, has the election of
    President Ebrahim Raisi had on regional security?
        Answer. I have not seen any indication that President Raisi has
    changed Iran's destabilizing approach to the region.
                                  afghanistan
        Question. Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do
    you see as some of the major strategic missteps?
        Answer. The mission in Afghanistan succeeded in decimating al
    Qaeda, but United States nation building efforts were less successful.
    My understanding is that there are a number of proposed and ongoing
    inquiries and lessons learned reviews on matters related to the events
    of the past 20 years in Afghanistan, including the events of the last
    few months. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, the
    Department, and the interagency on all such reviews.
        Question. How would you apply those lessons learned in future
    military operations?
        Answer. I believe there are strategic, operational, tactical, and
    administrative lessons to be learned from the Afghanistan war, and that
    the understanding the Department develops from Afghanistan should
    inform our efforts going forward. If confirmed, I would seek to work
    with leaders in the Department and in Congress to undertake a
    systematic review of lessons learned. I will want to identify efforts
    that were effective that we should replicate in the future, as well as
    efforts that failed.
        Question. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban's
    ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department
    and Congress to more fully understand the factors leading to the
    Taliban's ultimate success. In part, we will need to understand the
    role of corruption and poor leadership in Afghanistan's senior ranks of
    the government and the military, and the effects of the Doha Agreement
    on the morale of Afghan forces. We should also seek to understand how
    and why our own efforts to build the Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces were ultimately not successful.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the implications of the
    collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for
    future advise, train and assist missions?
        Answer. I believe that many of the lessons we have learned and will
    continue to learn from the Afghanistan mission will be applicable to
    future train, advise, and assist missions. Every context is unique, but
    for future large-scale train, advise, and assist missions, one key
    challenge will be preventing our partner security forces from
    developing an overreliance on international presence.
        Question. In light of the end of the military mission, what do you
    view as United States strategic interests in Afghanistan?
        Answer. It is my understanding that our vital national interest in
    Afghanistan has not changed: it is to make sure Afghanistan can never
    be used again to launch an attack on the United States Homeland.
        Question. In your view, can the United States conduct effective
    ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without
    a partner force on the ground? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, while difficult, in my view the United States can
    conduct an effective counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The
    Department has experience conducting counterterrorism operations from
    outside of target countries--or ``over the horizon.'' Developing
    effective intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities in the region
    is the cornerstone of any effective counterterrorism operation,
    regardless of whether it is from in country or from over-the-horizon.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring that we maintain an effective
    over-the-horizon capability to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe
    haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the United States.
        Question. What is your understanding of the definition or
    characterization of an ``over the horizon'' counterterrorism operation
    or strategy?
        Answer. I understand that ``over the horizon'' is used to describe
    an operation that is primarily conducted from outside the country of
    interest. The United States has experience in conducting military
    operations from over the horizon--whether it is conducting command and
    control from another location in the region or from a naval asset in
    theater, flying collection or strike operations from CONUS or a third
    country, performing civil affairs or conducting advise and assist
    operations from a neighboring country, or training indigenous partner
    forces in different region. All of these are examples of the Department
    conducting operations from over the horizon and each present their own
    challenges.
        Question. In your view, what conditions or factors would be
    indicative of a resurgence or reconstitution of al Qaeda, ISIS-K, or
    other terrorist organization in Afghanistan such that they pose a
    threat of international terrorism?
        Answer. In the past several years, both al Qaeda and ISIS have
    become adept at leveraging social media to further their ideology and
    protect internal communications. They have leveraged aspects of the
    international banking system to financially enable their operations.
    Each of these avenues provide vectors to gain insight into the groups'
    intent and influence. If confirmed, I will prioritize keeping a close
    eye on any intelligence that would indicate a resurgence in terrorist
    capabilities in Afghanistan or the broader global terrorist network. I
    will also seek to continue DOD's work with our network of
    counterterrorism partners in order to detect and disrupt external
    operations against the Homeland or our allies and partners.
        Question. What are the core components of a successful ``over-the-
    horizon'' strategy, in your view?
        Answer. I understand that successful over-the-horizon operations
    rely on intelligence that can come from a variety of sources, along
    with air assets, ISR, and other capabilities typically located outside
    the country. Any successful strategy--whether conducted within the
    country of focus or from ``over-the-horizon''--must reflect the reality
    of the operating environment and the level of threat posed by the
    adversary.
                                    pakistan
        Question. What is your view of the current State of the United
    States-Pakistan security relationship?
        Answer. Pakistan is an important partner. The United States has
    enduring interests in South Asia, and must continue to engage with
    Pakistan. If confirmed, I would seek to work with Pakistan on key
    issues of mutual concern, including regional stability and the defeat
    of al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State--Khorasan (ISIS-K).
        Question. What policy changes, if any, would you recommend for
    United States relations with Pakistan in terms of military-to-military
    relations and in light of the collapse of the ANDSF and the Taliban's
    return to power in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I understand that United States security assistance and
    other support to Pakistan is designed to foster greater cooperation in
    areas of mutual security interest. We have enduring interests in South
    Asia and we must continue to engage with Pakistan in order to counter
    violent extremism. Although we cannot fundamentally change Pakistan's
    strategic calculus, we can work together in areas of mutual interest,
    including counterterrorism and border security. If confirmed, I will
    seek to work with colleagues at the State Department to continue the
    International Military Education and Training program with Pakistan,
    along with other opportunities to develop relationships with Pakistan's
    future military leaders. I would also continue to urge Pakistan to take
    action against militants and violent extremist organizations operating
    in its territory.
        Question. Do you believe this to be the appropriate construct for
    future assistance to Pakistan?
        Answer. Yes. Although we need to be realistic about what we can
    achieve with Pakistan, the Department must also continue to press for
    important United States interests in South Asia. If confirmed, I would
    continue to work with Pakistan in areas of mutual interest, including
    counterterrorism and border security.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in security
    cooperation with Pakistan?
        Answer. The United States has enduring interests in South Asia, and
    I believe that we must continue to engage with Pakistan in order to
    counter violent extremism. Although we cannot fundamentally change
    Pakistan's strategic calculus, we can work together in areas of mutual
    interest, including counterterrorism and border security. If confirmed,
    I would recommend we focus security cooperation on opportunities to
    develop relationships with Pakistan's future military leaders. I would
    also work to ensure any U.S. security assistance includes the necessary
    conditions to advance U.S. values and interests.
        Question. What do you consider to be areas of shared security
    interest between the United States and Pakistan?
        Answer. I understand that in recent years, Pakistan has worked with
    the United States in some key areas of mutual interest, including
    counterterrorism and border security.
                                     yemen
        Question. What are United States national security interests in
    Yemen?
        Answer. The most important United States national security interest
    in Yemen remains ensuring that groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen do not have a safe haven for conducting
    attacks against the United States Homeland. Additional U.S. national
    security interests include securing an end to the ongoing war and
    addressing the humanitarian crisis. Continued cross-border attacks by
    the Houthis, with support from Iran, exacerbate instability in the
    region by violating the territorial integrity of our Gulf partners
    (including Saudi Arabia) and threatening freedom of navigation. A
    cessation of hostilities and political solution to the conflict is the
    only long-term solution to this crisis.
        Question. In your view, has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately to
    the threat they face from the Houthis?
        Answer. I understand that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a
    persistent cross-border threat from Houthi militia forces. I also
    remain concerned about the incidence of civilian casualties as a result
    of Saudi Arabia's conduct of its military campaign in Yemen. If
    confirmed, I will work with others in the United States interagency to
    continue to support Saudi Arabia in defending its borders and while at
    the same time working to bring the war in Yemen to a close.
        Question. What do you see as the implications of the Biden
    Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the
    Saudi-led coalition?
        Answer. A political resolution is the only long-term means of
    bringing the war in Yemen to an end. There is no military solution to
    the conflict. The Biden administration's decision to cease support for
    Saudi-led Coalition offensive operations is intended to send a signal
    to our Saudi partners that we need to see more precipitous steps to end
    the war soon even as we work to fulfill the President's commitment of
    supporting Saudi Arabia's defense of its borders. Ending the war in
    Yemen is in the national security interest of the United States.
        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States
    play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
        Answer. I support the Biden administration commitment to ending the
    war in the Yemen through diplomacy, and to enhancing relief efforts..
    As the President has said, Saudi Arabia faces a persistent cross-border
    threat from Houthi militia forces, which also puts at risk United
    States citizens residing in the Kingdom. If confirmed, I will work with
    others in the United States interagency to continue to support Saudi
    Arabia in defending its borders and while at the same time working to
    bring the war in Yemen to a close.
                                     syria
        Question. What are the United States national security objectives
    in Syria?
        Answer. It is my understanding that United States national security
    objectives include preventing the resurgence of ISIS, supporting the
    Syrian people through the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid,
    and preserving existing cease-fire lines to prevent the outbreak of
    broader regional conflict and establish a foundation for a broader
    political solution under U.N. auspices.
        Question. To what extent does continued United States force
    presence in Syria support those objectives?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the United States and Coalition
    military presence is necessary to prevent an ISIS resurgence. Although
    ISIS no longer holds territory, it remains a capable and dangerous
    threat. DOD support and assistance builds capacity of vetted Syrian
    partner forces to enable them to maintain pressure on ISIS.
        Question. To what extent should the United States continue to
    provide support to the Syrian Democratic Forces?
        Answer. While the Defeat-ISIS Coalition has made significant
    progress, ISIS remains a threat. I understand that working by, with,
    and through our Syrian partner forces, including the Syrian Democratic
    Forces (SDF), remains critical to keeping pressure on ISIS.
        Question. In your view, what are the key strategic interests and
    objectives of the Russians in Syria and how successful have they been
    in accomplishing them?
        Answer. Russia's continued support for the Assad regime makes clear
    that Russia's primary interest is maintaining a regime friendly to its
    interests, no matter the consequences. It is my understanding that
    Russia's support to the Assad regime's military campaign enables
    continued violence and human rights abuses against the Syrian people.
    Russia does not appear to view ISIS as a significant threat nor does it
    seem dedicated to enabling its enduring defeat.
                                     russia
        Question. The 2018 NDS assessed a need for ``urgent change at
    significant scale'' to prepare the U.S. military for the realities of
    great power competition.
        Do you agree with this assessment?
        Answer. In light of the mounting and accelerating challenges to the
    United States from global competitors, I agree that the Department of
    Defense should be undertaking ``urgent change at significant scale.''
        Question. Where do you see the greatest need for change in the
    Joint Force to address the realities of strategic competition with
    Russia?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will use the NDS Review--and its
    implementation--to consider any changes needed in the Joint Force to
    address the realities of the Russia challenge. While it would be
    premature for me to suggest any specific changes needed in the Joint
    Force, I do believe that whatever changes the Department makes should
    be focused on ensuring that we achieve strong links between strategy,
    concept development, innovation, and program investments.
        The Department of Defense is currently engaged in the development
    of a new Joint Warfighting Concept.
        Question. In your view, why is a new Joint Warfighting Concept
    necessary to overcome the strategic and operational challenges posed by
    Russia?
        Answer. I understand the Department has developed a Joint
    Warfighting Concept to align with strategy and theories of victory. If
    confirmed, I will review this effort, and provide my assessment and
    recommendations to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the
    Secretary of Defense.
        The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has the stated objectives
    of: enhancing the United States deterrence posture, increasing the
    readiness and responsiveness of United States forces in Europe,
    supporting the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and
    bolstering the security and capacity of United States allies and
    partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress made in each of
    these EDI objectives?
        Answer. EDI has been highly effective in increasing USEUCOM's
    combat capability and enhancing deterrence of Russian aggression. EDI
    funding has enabled DOD to increase its force presence in Europe,
    improve critical capabilities, establish prepositioned equipment sets,
    and improve United States and Allied readiness. Taken together, these
    efforts have demonstrated commitment to NATO, reassured Allies, and
    sent a strong message of resolve to Russia.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you make to EDI objectives or
    activities going forward?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders from across the
    Department to determine how best to evolve EDI objectives and
    activities going forward, and will ensure Congress maintains visibility
    into EDI initiatives.
        Question. As many military construction programs funded under EDI
    reach maturity and settle into the sustainment phase, and in light of
    the clear signal from our military leadership that exercises such as
    DEFENDER 2021 sent deterrent signals to Russia, while yielding lessons
    learned for the United States, our European Allies, and partners, what
    is your vision for the future of EDI?
        Answer. Many EDI resource requirements are evolving as the result
    of the acquisition of prepositioned equipment and completion of MILCON
    projects, as well as changes to USEUCOM's exercise program. If
    confirmed, I will work with stakeholders from across the Department to
    ensure we adapt EDI based on the evolving threat environment, changes
    in planning or operational concepts, and the ability of Allies to share
    more of the responsibility to present a credible defense.
        Question. Do you support continued United States security
    assistance to Ukraine?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would recommend that United States
    security assistance efforts, including the provision of defensive
    lethal assistance, to build the capacity of Ukraine's forces should
    remain a top priority.
        Question. If so, how does the provision of such assistance
    contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?
        Answer. It is my understanding that United States security
    assistance efforts enable Ukraine to progress toward NATO
    interoperability and more effectively defend itself against Russian
    aggression. It is also my understanding that these efforts, combined
    with investments through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to
    improve the readiness, responsiveness, lethality, and resiliency of
    United States forces in Europe, contribute to maintaining an effective
    deterrent against further Russian aggression.
        Question. In your view, what additional capabilities should Ukraine
    and other Black Sea regional Allies and partners develop and enhance to
    support regional security and deter aggression?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the stability of the Black Sea
    region, which is vulnerable to Russian aggression, is critical to the
    security of NATO's eastern flank. Although I understand that the
    specific requirements of regional Allies and partners varies, if
    confirmed, I would seek to work with our partners to continue to
    prioritize capabilities to counter conventional and hybrid threats on
    land and improve their capacity to secure their territorial waters in
    the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
        Question. How can the United States best support the achievement of
    those capabilities?
        Answer. I understand that robust United States security assistance
    support through authorities such as the Ukraine Security Assistance
    Initiative, Foreign Military Financing, and Section 333 remains a
    critical component to supporting the development of those capabilities.
    If confirmed, I will strongly support efforts to provide training,
    equipment, and advisory support to build the capacity of these critical
    United States Allies and partners on the frontline of Russian
    aggression.
        Question. What role do you envision for Turkey in support of United
    States strategic priorities in the Black Sea region?
        Answer. It is my understanding that United States access, basing,
    and overflight provided by Turkey, including at Incirlik Air Base,
    remain important for supporting emergent United States, NATO, and
    Coalition requirements and missions in the region. I understand that
    the United States continues to encourage Turkey, and fellow Black Sea
    Allies and partners, to deepen cooperation in the Black Sea region.
        President Biden has said that he and outgoing German Chancellor
    Angela Merkel ``are absolutely united in our conviction that Russia
    must not be allowed to use energy as a weapon to coerce or threaten its
    neighbors.''
        Question. How should DOD support the achievement of this goal?
        Answer. I agree with President Biden that Russia must not be
    allowed to use energy as a weapon to coerce or threaten its neighbors.
    If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department of Defense support
    this goal through a whole-of-government approach to deterring and
    defending against Russia's strategy for advancing its interests--at the
    expense of United States, Allied, and partner interests--via Russia's
    wide range of subversive, coercive, and aggressive tactics, including
    the use of energy to coerce or threaten its neighbors.
        Question. How might Russia use energy as a weapon to undermine
    United States military efforts with Allies and partners in Europe,
    including those related to enhancing military mobility?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review any classified assessments of
    the threat Russia poses in this regard and work diligently to address
    those threats with colleagues across the Department of Defense, United
    States interagency, and with our Allies and partners.
        Question. In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to
    counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power?
        Answer. Russia takes a whole-of-government approach to advancing
    its interests, across the spectrum of conflict and at the expense of
    United States, Allied, and partner interests. I believe the key to
    countering such tactics is for the United States to take a whole-of-
    government approach to protecting our interests in response, in close
    coordination with our Allies and partners. This should include DOD's
    efforts to implement innovative approaches to irregular warfare and
    hybrid tactics below the threshold of conflict. Such an approach
    necessarily entails the careful orchestration of our diplomatic,
    economic, and informational strengths, as well as our military power.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence
    threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role
    of the United States Government, and DOD, in particular, in countering
    that threat?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Russia uses malign influence to
    advance its interests, typically at the expense of United States,
    Allied, and partner interests, through a wide range of subversive,
    coercive, and aggressive tactics, while seeking to avoid direct
    military confrontation with United States and NATO forces. I am
    concerned that Russia may underestimate the extent to which these
    tactics increase the risk of unintended escalation, and if confirmed, I
    would therefore recommend that the U.S. Government, and the Department
    of Defense in particular, communicate clearly and consistently its
    perceptions of this risk. In addition, I would recommend that the
    Department of Defense must maintain its strong measures of conventional
    and nuclear deterrence while assisting Allies and partners in
    developing resilience against malign threats.
                   north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
        Question. In your opinion, what should the major strategic
    objectives of the NATO Alliance be in the coming years?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NATO's major strategic
    objectives are deterring nuclear and non-nuclear aggression, defending
    Allied populations and territory if deterrence fails, and projecting
    stability beyond NATO's borders, which should remain the appropriate
    focus for our Alliance in the coming years.
        Question. Despite the conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission in
    Afghanistan, NATO still has declared responsibilities for counter
    terrorism. In what ways do you believe Allies can best contribute to
    the fight against terrorism emanating from Afghanistan going forward?
        Answer. I believe NATO can continue to play a role in countering
    terrorism through enhanced threat awareness and intelligence sharing,
    improved interoperability and development of capabilities to prepare
    and respond to threats, and outreach to partner nations and
    international organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to working
    closely with NATO allies and partners to continue our counter terrorism
    mission together.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your top defense priorities
    for engagement with NATO Allies and partners on issues relating to
    China?
        Answer. If confirmed, my priority for engagement with NATO Allies
    and partners on China would be to continue to advance the work the
    Alliance has been doing in recent years to understand and consider
    options to mitigate the challenges that an increasingly assertive PRC
    poses to the Alliance. This would include strengthening NATO's
    resilience and encouraging reflection of that perspective in the
    forthcoming strategic concept. I would also encourage NATO to continue
    strengthening relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific to address
    cross-cutting security issues and global challenges.
        Question. What are your views on the importance of the NATO
    Alliance?
        Answer. As President Biden has said, the transatlantic alliance is
    the strong foundation on which our collective security and our shared
    prosperity are built. U.S. commitment to NATO Allies under Article 5 of
    the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to U.S. strategic interests, and our
    shared commitment to the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty has
    made NATO the most successful Alliance in history.
        Question. Do you believe there are areas where the United States
    could benefit from greater coordination and consultation with Allies?
        Answer. Absolutely. There are many areas of shared interest where
    the United States can benefit from greater coordination and
    consultation with Allies. This includes engagement on major reviews
    that are underway in the Department of Defense right now. If confirmed,
    I would seek to continue those efforts to engage our Allies and ensure
    their perspectives are a critical part of the discussions for these
    reviews. If confirmed, I would also seek other ways to coordinate with
    our Allies in support of our shared security interests.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for
    NATO?
        Answer. The NATO Alliance faces many challenges, the greatest of
    which may include continuing efforts to ensure ready forces and
    capabilities in the wake of this global pandemic and maintaining unity
    in the face of continuing efforts by Russia to fracture the Alliance.
        Question. What are the most important capability improvements that
    the Alliance must make to deal with the threats it faces?
        Answer. It is my understanding that readiness remains a critical
    improvement the Alliance must focus on to deal with the threats we
    face. The Alliance must continue to rebuild a culture of readiness in
    order to procure, prepare, and provide interoperable and ready forces
    and capabilities, which enables our credible deterrence and defense.
    Contributing to that is the continuing ability of the Alliance to adapt
    to the changing security environment.
        Question. What, in your opinion, are the most useful measurements
    of allied commitments to carrying the burden of common security and
    collective defense?
        Answer. Cash, capabilities, and contributions, as Secretary General
    Stoltenberg has often said, are all important markers of sharing
    responsibility for our common defense. Without the investment in
    defense today, we will not have the necessary capabilities and
    contributions tomorrow. In 2014, Allies signed onto the Wales Defense
    Investment Pledge, committing to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. I
    appreciate that several Allies have taken important steps in this
    direction in the past few years, and if confirmed will seek to continue
    this progress.
        Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
    nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
        Answer. Yes. The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries
    for over 60 years has successfully deterred aggression against the
    Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is to
    preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. They also
    continue to provide an essential political and military link between
    Europe and North America. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
    remain a nuclear alliance, and as long as nuclear weapons remain a
    threat, I believe U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries.
        NATO has made a series of declarations, at successive summits, to
    improve our credible deterrence and defense posture. Among these are
    the NATO Readiness Initiative announced at the 2018 Brussels Summit and
    the 2021 Summit pledge to ``ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient
    multi-domain force architecture with the right forces in the right
    place at the right time.''
        Question. If confirmed, how would you support DOD efforts to work
    with our Allies to make progress on these initiatives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to
    increase the number of ready and interoperable forces and capabilities
    as we continue to rebuild NATO's culture of readiness. With our Allies,
    U.S. European Command, and our Mission to NATO, I would, if confirmed,
    take the next steps to implement the recently adopted NATO Military
    Strategy and NATO Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-
    Atlantic Area, which outline Alliance capability and force structure
    requirements needed to address current and emerging threats in NATO's
    area of responsibility.
        Question. In your view, how do these initiatives align with United
    States priorities in Europe?
        Answer. It is my understanding that these initiatives are closely
    aligned with United States priorities in Europe. This Administration is
    seeking to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships,
    and the NATO Alliance is absolutely critical to that effort.
    Reaffirming, investing in, and modernizing NATO serves to recognize
    this fact, and ensuring a credible deterrent and defense in Europe is
    even more important in an increasingly complex security environment.
                 allies and partners in the indo-pacific region
        Question. In your view, how can DOD more effectively cultivate
    multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. I understand that Indo-Pacific security depends on the
    ability of the United States and like-minded partners to work together
    to prevent and respond to crises. To enable this goal, it is critical
    to build stronger linkages between U.S. allies and partners across the
    region--including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
    and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). If confirmed, I would
    work to ensure DOD strengthens ties across its bilateral and
    multilateral security networks to build interoperability; pursue more
    advanced multilateral training activities; and build common norms in
    new defense domains, such as space and cyber.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Quadrilateral Security
    Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India?
        Answer. I understand that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
    (Quad) plays an increasingly central role in promoting security,
    prosperity, and shared values in the Indo-Pacific region. The
    commitment of all Quad countries to elevate their consultations,
    including convening historic Head of State Summits in March and
    September 2021, reflects growing strategic convergence between
    Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. I understand that
    through a wide range of shared activities, such as space cooperation,
    technology cooperation, and vaccine production, the Quad partners are
    working to sustain a free and open Indo-Pacific, including in support
    of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) centrality in
    the region.
        Question. What military lines of effort can be strengthened through
    the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to benefit deterrence in the Indo-
    Pacific region and what do you view as the challenges to doing so?
        Answer. I understand that the strength of the Quad partnership lies
    in the willingness of like-minded democracies to leverage their
    combined resources to address emerging crises and maintain regional
    stability, as they did in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean
    tsunami. There are opportunities for the Quad countries to expand their
    cooperative activities in areas that will prevent future instability,
    such as maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief, and to enhance their crisis response capabilities through joint
    exercises. These cooperative activities, however, do not reflect a
    formal alliance structure. Rather, they reflect the partners' abiding
    commitment to ensuring the durability of shared principles such as the
    rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
        Question. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in
    building the capacities of partner nations in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. I understand that the United States has a fundamental
    interest in building a strong network of capable and like-minded
    partners who are committed to preserving a rules-based order in the
    Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would recommend that DOD leverage
    our capacity-building resources to support partners in protecting their
    own sovereignty and territorial integrity and building resilience, and
    enable them to collectively address shared transnational threats, such
    as proliferation, violent extremism, and humanitarian disasters.
        Question. How would you prioritize the types of programs or
    activities that should receive support under these security assistance
    authorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that DOD prioritize
    programs that enable partners to preserve their own sovereign rights,
    such as maritime security and border security initiatives, and
    activities that strengthen their capacity to address transnational
    threats, such as proliferation and violent extremism. I would also
    ensure that DOD continues to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the
    Department of State as we leverage our full suite of diplomatic,
    economic, and security tools to strengthen the capacity and
    capabilities of our partners.
        Question. In your view, how should DOD seek to engage with partner
    nations to better support their ability to protect their sovereignty
    and natural resources?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that DOD should support
    partners in building the necessary capabilities, personnel resources,
    and operational capacity to protect their own sovereignty. This should
    include providing sustained capacity-building training and exercises,
    as well as an increased emphasis on defense professionalization and
    military education. It is also my understanding that DOD can support
    partners in preserving their own sovereign rights through U.S. presence
    operations and military activities, and by strengthening the capacity
    of multilateral organizations such as ASEAN.
        Question. Respect for human rights has long been a core principle
    of U.S. foreign and security policy. In your view, what role does U.S.
    military engagement, including efforts to help professionalize foreign
    partner militaries, play in encouraging respect for human rights?
        Answer. U.S. military training and education can play a valuable
    role in professionalizing partner militaries, by reinforcing the
    importance of respecting human rights, supporting the rule of law, and
    adhering to the principle of civilian oversight of the military. It is
    my understanding that DOD consistently emphasizes that these values are
    critical to the continued advancement of our defense relationships.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the key capabilities the United
    States should encourage, enable, and support for partners and allies in
    the Indo-Pacific to enhance deterrence of China?
        Answer. It is my understanding that our allies and partners require
    capacity-building support to strengthen their ability to preserve their
    sovereign rights, especially in the air and maritime domain. Increased
    maritime domain awareness is a foundational capability that would help
    regional partners develop a common operating picture. It is also my
    understanding that additional investments in asymmetric defense
    capabilities and concepts could also enable allies and partners to
    raise the cost of potential Chinese aggression. If confirmed, I would
    recommend that DOD should continue to prioritize expanded exercises,
    training programs, combined planning, and security cooperation that
    strengthens the self-defense capabilities of our allies and partners.
                                     china
        Question. Is the current posture of United States forces in the
    Indo-Pacific region sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. To deter our adversaries and defend our interests, allies,
    and partners, the United States requires a combat-credible, resilient,
    and forward force posture in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I
    will work with INDOPACOM and the military services to support DOD's
    development, assessment, and implementation of posture concepts that
    effectively address key operational challenges and maintain the
    military advantage that is foundational to deterrence. But our success
    in the Indo-Pacific should not be measured only as a function of our
    forward-established posture--it is just as critical that we make the
    right investments in modernization, operational concepts, and readiness
    to ensure we improve our future deterrence capabilities.
        Question. The INDOPACOM commander indicated China could achieve
    military overmatch in the Indo-Pacific as soon as 2026, at which time
    China might be tempted to use military force to forcibly change the
    status quo in the region. Do you agree?
        Answer. I agree that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
    urgently seeking to obtain the military capability to achieve its
    stated strategic objectives. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the
    Department of Defense is focused on maintaining combat-credible
    deterrence and warfighting capabilities.
        Question. If not, what approximate year do you see this happening?
        Answer. I would not want to speculate on a specific date that the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) may decide to use force, but as
    indicators of increasing risks in the near-term and beyond, I would
    point to the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) 2027 modernization goal
    announced last year, President Xi Jinping's consistent refusal to
    renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and the PRC's increasingly
    provocative military activities near Taiwan and ongoing coercion.
        Question. What types of behavior or signaling on the part of China
    might provide early alert to the United States of Chinese intentions in
    this regard?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the PRC would likely signal its
    intent through a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military measures
    and actions.
        Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
    could make that would implement the NDS and enable a more favorable
    balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. To deter and prevail in a future conflict with China, I
    believe the Department must prioritize investment in preserving and
    enhancing a military edge in areas such as long-range strike,
    associated kill chains, undersea warfare, base resilience, critical
    munitions, EMSO, space, and cyber. Over the longer-term, DOD must
    invest in areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, and directed
    energy to ensure we do not fall behind China or other potential
    adversaries' advancements in these areas.
        Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2021 established the Pacific
    Deterrence Initiative. What is your assessment of the value of this
    initiative?
        Answer. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) promises to serve
    as both a key tool for congressional oversight of investments related
    to strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a means to
    enhance the Department's ongoing focus on this goal as part of China
    pacing. If confirmed, I will seek to closely align PDI with
    congressional intent.
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's implementation of this
    initiative?
        Answer. I understand that PDI is not a separate appropriation, but
    that DOD has used its fiscal year 2022 PDI submission as a means to
    highlight select investments and activities that support deterrence of
    China, as well as reassurance of allies and partners in the region. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department further refines its
    future PDI submissions, consulting closely with Congress in order to
    meet intent and enhance the PDI's impact.
        Question. What non-military activities and resources do you believe
    are necessary to effectively address the challenge posed by China?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the PRC is increasingly
    synchronizing its military and non-military efforts to achieve its
    strategic objectives, so I believe that it is essential that non-DOD
    departments and agencies are sufficiently aligned and resourced to
    address the challenge posed by the PRC. President Biden's Interim
    National Security Strategy has set forth the whole-of-government agenda
    that would strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to prevail
    in strategic competition with the PRC. If confirmed, I would work
    closely with interagency partners to ensure a whole-of-government
    approach.
        Question. Do you believe the activities in which DOD is currently
    engaged are sufficient? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on ensuring the Department of
    Defense has the right strategy, concepts, capabilities, and posture to
    deliver combat-credible deterrence and warfighting. I would recommend
    that DOD, as well as whole-of-government efforts, prioritize
    cooperation with and support to our Indo-Pacific region allies and
    partners, including expanded bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
    engagement, increased economic and technological partnerships, and
    joint military exercises and operations. It is my understanding that
    improving partner resilience to the PRC's military and economic
    coercion is essential for deterring PRC aggression throughout the Indo-
    Pacific region. Enhanced coordination on military and non-military
    efforts will serve as a force multiplier for strategic competition with
    the PRC.
        Question. What are the United States' responsibilities under the
    Taiwan Relations Act?
        Answer. The Taiwan Relations Act states that any effort to
    determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, is a
    threat to the region and of grave concern to U.S. interests. It is my
    understanding that for more than 40 years, it has been United States
    policy to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense
    capability and to maintain the capacity to prevent any use of force or
    other form of coercion that would jeopardize the security or way of
    life for the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I would seek to support
    the USD(P) in implementing United States policy in accordance with the
    TRA.
        Question. What policy recommendations do you have for improving
    United States support to Taiwan?
        Answer. China's military modernization, its refusal to disavow the
    use of force, and its coercive and aggressive military actions near
    Taiwan present an increasingly urgent challenge. I support the
    continued and bipartisan United States commitment to Taiwan to maintain
    United States policy commitments to Taiwan and to ensure that Taiwan
    can defend against PRC coercion or aggression.
        Question. In your view, what security capabilities should Taiwan
    acquire to enhance deterrence of Chinese aggression?
        Answer. I believe that Taiwan should continue to acquire asymmetric
    capabilities that are capable of denying the PRC any forced or coerced
    control of the island against the wishes of its people. These
    capabilities should be mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In
    addition to specific asymmetric capabilities, it is critical that
    Taiwan's Armed Forces and civil defense institutions work together to
    provide a layered defense against coercion and aggression--one that
    ensures the resiliency of Taiwan's economy, political institutions, and
    democracy. If confirmed, I would work within the Department and the
    interagency to understand and address these requirements.
        Question. What areas of security capability would you consider
    appropriate for potential coproduction by the United States and Taiwan?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Taiwan's talented workforce and
    technology sector already provide a number of key capabilities and
    systems that are critical to the global supply chain. Taiwan is also a
    leading manufacturer of other defense-related components, and if
    confirmed, I would support Administration efforts to explore
    opportunities in aeronautics, shipbuilding, and missile technology.
        Question. Considering the NDS and China's crackdown on Hong Kong,
    how do you view the United States relationship with Taiwan in the
    context of broader United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. I believe that Taiwan's economy, its flourishing democracy,
    and its position within the first island chain are all critical to
    United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. Insofar as
    Taiwan's population interpreted efforts of the PRC in Hong Kong as a
    manifestation of the PRC's ``one-country, two-systems'' policy, so too
    do other allies and partners view PRC coercive efforts as an affront to
    not only Taiwan but the entire region.
        Question. To what extent do you believe multilateral engagement is
    important for addressing the challenges posed by China?
        Answer. Continued multilateral engagement is critical to preventing
    the PRC from subverting the international rules-based order and
    coercing its neighbors. Our network of allies and partners is a key
    advantage in addressing the challenges posed by the PRC, and
    multilateral formats provide opportunities to share concerns, speak
    with one voice, pool resources, and promote a more stable and secure
    strategic environment.
        Question. In your view, what are the most important multilateral
    relationships in the region and where do you perceive opportunities to
    improve multilateral coordination?
        Answer. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a
    central role in bringing the region together and building habits of
    cooperation, and I understand that the Department of Defense works
    through the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus to build cooperation
    on security issues with these partners. Quadrilateral discussions with
    Australia, India, and Japan provide growing opportunities for
    cooperation across a wide range of shared priorities. It is my
    understanding that DOD also engages in several trilateral forums,
    including with Australia and Japan, the Republic of Korea and Japan,
    and now with Australia and the United Kingdom through the new AUKUS
    mechanism. If confirmed, I would work to strengthen the Department's
    efforts to collaborate on security and build linkages between like-
    minded partners, including through new and expanded multilateral
    partnerships where opportunities arise.
                                     japan
        Question. How would you characterize the United States-Japan
    security relationship?
        Answer. I understand that the United States-Japan security
    relationship forms the cornerstone of the United States Indo-Pacific
    security strategy. The United States-Japan Alliance is resolute and
    resilient, facing the regional security challenges of today, and
    adapting to new challenges in the future. It is a comprehensive
    Alliance, training and operating together across the spectrum of
    potential conflict, and its capabilities are strong and getting
    stronger.
        Question. If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to
    continue to improve this relationship and improve United States-
    Japanese military force interoperability?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that continued examination
    of roles and missions, especially relating to the maintenance of
    regional security, is an important subject for the Alliance to
    carefully consider. Working together to build the capabilities of
    regional partners is also a recent area of cooperation that we should
    expand.
        Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
    neighbors, predominantly China, North Korea and South Korea, influence
    the United States-Japan relationship, in your view?
        Answer. It is critical that there are strong and close
    relationships between and among our allies. I understand that we have a
    common view of the immediate dangers posed by North Korea, and the
    strategic challenge from China, and we are working together to face
    those. If confirmed, I would support efforts to build a strong
    trilateral security relationship with the Republic of Korea and Japan,
    while recognizing that there are historical sensitivities between the
    two that complicate that trilateral relationship.
        Question. What steps should Japan take to become a more active
    partner in security activities with the United States and in the
    international security arena?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Japan has made significant
    strides to play a security role more commensurate with its economic and
    political strength in the region. If confirmed, I would encourage the
    continued development of that role, while acknowledging the legacy
    regional and domestic constraints Japan must consider.
        Question. What specific security capabilities do you believe Japan
    should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to
    contribute to the deterrence of China?
        Answer. Japan possesses a modern, capable and well-equipped Self-
    Defense Force. I understand we are working closely with Japan to
    improve interoperability in operations critical to regional stability,
    such as integrated air and missile defense, and maritime interdiction
    operations. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan to chart an ambitious
    path to acquire improved capabilities in view of increased
    requirements, consistent with transformed Alliance roles.
        Question. How would you describe Japan's burden sharing
    contributions, including host nation support, for United States forces
    stationed in Japan?
        Answer. Japan provides approximately $1.8B per year to offset some
    of the cost of stationing more than 50,000 United States forces there,
    equipped with some of our most advanced capabilities. I understand we
    are in negotiations on a new 5-year host nation support agreement and
    expect to reach a fair and equitable conclusion in the near future.
        Question. Do you believe that Japan should acquire integrated air
    and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with United
    States capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and
    other missile threats?
        Answer. Yes. I am aware that Japan is a longstanding BMD partner
    and has invested heavily in IAMD. The Self Defense Forces possess
    significant maritime and ground-based missile defense capability, and
    Japan has decided to procure two additional Aegis system-equipped
    vessels. As an Alliance, I understand the United States and Japan are
    working to increase interoperability. If confirmed, I would support
    continued progress to meet current and future challenges, as threat
    capabilities continue to evolve and the U.S. means of response adapts
    to those challenges
                                  north korea
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK)
    development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
    represents a threat to United States security and interests and that of
    our allies and partners. It is my understanding that the security and
    stability of the Korean Peninsula is inextricably tied to regional
    security and stability. Our network of allies and partners in the
    region gives us a significant advantage as compared to our adversaries.
    In particular, our relationships with the Republic of Korea and Japan
    provide a powerful deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I
    would work to ensure United States and allied forces have what they
    need to maintain our robust deterrent and readiness posture in
    Northeast Asia.
        Question. In your view, what should be the overall United States
    strategy to mitigate the threat posed by North Korea to our allies in
    the region and to the United States?
        Answer. The United States, in close coordination with allies and
    partners, has a vital interest in deterring the Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea (DPRK), defending against its provocations or use of
    force, limiting the reach of its dangerous weapons programs, and, above
    all, keeping the American people and our allies and partners safe. I
    believe that the role of the Department of Defense is to maintain a
    robust defense and deterrence posture that ensures that the United
    States engages the DPRK from a position of strength. Having a strong
    and credible deterrent is essential to any potential path that the
    United States and our allies pursue to meet the North Korean threat,
    including diplomatic engagement. We must also continue to pursue robust
    sanctions enforcement to mitigate the nuclear proliferation threat
    posed by North Korea. The Administration completed a whole-of-
    government strategy review to articulate its way ahead on the DPRK, and
    if confirmed, I would work with stakeholders across the government, as
    well as our regional allies and partners, to forge a comprehensive
    approach to North Korean threats, including those emanating from
    nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and cyber programs.
        Question. What policy recommendations would you make to ensure
    United States and allied forces can secure weapons of mass
    destructionsites in North Korea in the event of a contingency?
        Answer. United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces must
    maintain a ``fight-tonight'' readiness on the Korean Peninsula to deter
    North Korean aggression and to be able to respond quickly and
    effectively should deterrence fail. It is my understanding that a
    critical element of this readiness is the ability to secure nuclear and
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites in order to prevent the further
    proliferation of these capabilities in a contingency. I understand DOD
    is improving capabilities that could reduce the threat posed by WMD and
    missile sites in North Korea in the event of a contingency, and is
    working closely with the ROK in this regard. If confirmed, I would
    consult closely with our operational commanders, intelligence
    specialists, and resource providers in this effort.
                               republic of korea
        Question. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-South Korean
    security relationship?
        Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is a
    linchpin of peace and security in the region. Since its establishment
    in 1953, the United States-ROK Alliance has proven strong and durable
    in the face of new global conditions and is among the most
    interoperable, capable, and dynamic bilateral Alliances in the world.
    It is my understanding that the ROK-United States Alliance remains at a
    high level of readiness and continues to maintain a robust combined
    defense posture to protect the Republic of Korea against any threat or
    adversary. If confirmed, I would prioritize working with our ROK allies
    on identifying and addressing future security challenges, including
    those beyond the Korean Peninsula, to maintain a free and open Indo-
    Pacific region.
        Question. What is the value to United States national security of
    the United States-South Korea alliance, in your view?
        Answer. I understand that the United States-ROK Alliance is
    critical not only to the security of the ROK, but also to the stability
    of the Indo-Pacific region. Beyond the region, over the course of its
    70-year existence, our Alliance has evolved into one of global
    importance, with the ROK having deployed alongside United States
    servicemembers in nearly every conflict since the Korean War. I
    understand that the ROK is a critical partner for our broader
    priorities in the region, and principal among these priorities is
    upholding the rules-based international order that has underpinned
    global prosperity since World War II. If confirmed, I would work with
    our ROK allies to ensure that we continue to strengthen the
    relationship and also invest in the right combination of capabilities
    to provide for our common defense.
        Question. What is your understanding of the United States
    obligations in the event of an attack by North Korea?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the United States obligation to
    the ROK in the event of an attack, consistent with the Mutual Defense
    Treaty, is to consult on the best appropriate response and act together
    in the defense of the ROK. If confirmed, I would remain committed to
    enhancing the combined deterrence and defense posture of the United
    States-ROK Alliance.
        Question. In your view what factors should trigger the commitment
    of United States forces to engage North Korean forces in response to an
    attack on South Korea?
        Answer. It is my understanding that in accordance with United
    States obligations in the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will
    maintain the ability to deter, defend, and, if necessary, defeat any
    adversary that threatens our treaty ally.
        Question. Under what conditions should wartime operational control
    be transferred from the United States to the Republic of Korea, in your
    opinion?
        Answer. The transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from
    the United States to the ROK is and should remain conditions-based,
    consistent with the bilateral Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan,
    or COTP. Any transfer of wartime OPCON must fundamentally strengthen
    United States-ROK combined defense posture. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working closely with the ROK to ensure all conditions for
    OPCON transition are met.
        Question. In your view, should United States forces on the Korean
    Peninsula remain focused on defense of South Korea or should United
    States forces in Korea also be available for regional or global
    operations? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe that the United States must maintain operational
    flexibility to ensure that our forces are ready to meet emerging
    threats to the United States, as well as to our allies and partners in
    the region and around the world. It is my understanding that the
    Defense Department must continue to consider adjustments to every
    command in every theater to ensure the optimization of our global force
    posture to meeting emerging challenges. If confirmed, I would
    prioritize a continued ``fight tonight'' readiness within our Alliance
    with the ROK, as well as force assignment and allocation that advances
    our national interests.
        Question. What specific security capabilities do you believe South
    Korea should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to
    contribute to the deterrence of China?
        Answer. The ROK is among the most capable military forces in the
    region. If confirmed, I would review the entire range of current and
    proposed activities to enhance United States and allied capabilities to
    deter the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as to counter North
    Korea. I would also work with our allies and partners to prioritize
    capabilities, readiness, and interoperability, that could be leveraged
    in a variety of contingencies.
        Question. Do you believe that South Korea should acquire integrated
    air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with United
    States capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and
    other missile threats?
        Answer. Yes. I understand that the United States is cooperating
    with South Korea via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases to upgrade its
    existing PAC-2 PATRIOT batteries to the more advanced PAC-3 system. It
    is my understanding that one of our key priorities with South Korea is
    to ensure the ROK builds capabilities to contribute to the Alliance's
    counter-missile capability required for the conditions-based OPCON
    transition. In order to strengthen deterrence and work together more
    effectively in the event of a missile attack from North Korea, the
    United States and ROK also need to work toward a more integrated air
    and missile defense (IAMD)-based approach to enhance missile defense of
    the Peninsula.
                                   australia
        Question. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-Australia
    security relationship?
        Answer. This year we proudly celebrate the 70th anniversary of the
    ANZUS Treaty as the United States--Australia security alliance remains
    an anchor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region. It provides
    operational reliability, political viability, and mutual confidence,
    facilitating a combined Alliance approach to the current and future
    global operational environment. Our shared commitment to freedom,
    democracy, and the rules-based international order remains steadfast
    and resolute. The recently announced Australia-United Kingdom-United
    States partnership further demonstrates the depth of our security
    relationship with Australia.
        Question. What is the value to U.S. national security of the United
    States-Australia alliance, in your view?
        Answer. Our allies and partners are our greatest strategic asset
    and central to achieving our collective goals in an increasing complex
    and challenging security environment. Australia is a critical ally in
    the Indo-Pacific region, providing strategic capabilities, operational
    access, and support in building other alliances and partnerships to
    facilitate our operational freedom of maneuver, deterrence of PRC
    aggression, and preservation of the security and prosperity of the
    Indo-Pacific region.
        Question. What specific security capabilities do you believe
    Australia should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability
    to contribute to the deterrence of China?
        Answer. At the recent AUKUS announcement, the United States and UK
    committed to support Australia to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-
    powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. In addition,
    Australia committed to establish a sovereign Guided Weapons and
    Explosive Ordnance Enterprise. Strategic capabilities such as
    hypersonic weapons and electromagnetic warfare are key areas of
    bilateral defense cooperation. It is also important for Australia to
    have a strong and resilient defense supply chain and provides
    maintenance repair and overhaul capabilities in the Indo-Pacific
    region.
        Question. Australia was included as part of the National Technology
    and Industrial Base (NTIB) in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA. What is your
    view on the utility of Australia's inclusion in NTIB and of the recent
    AUKUS initiative to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered
    submarines for the Royal Australian Navy?
        Answer. The operational effectiveness of our Alliance is
    underpinned by the strength of cooperation on science, technology,
    strategic capabilities, and defense industrial base integration. It is
    my understanding that Australia's inclusion in the NTIB allows our
    countries to enhance industrial collaboration, build supply chain
    resiliency, and facilitate technology transfer and protection. The
    AUKUS initiative further deepens our integration of defense and
    security-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply
    chains, and deepens our cooperation on a range of defense capabilities.
        Question. Do you believe that Australia should acquire integrated
    air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with United
    States capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and
    other missile threats?
        Answer. Yes. The United States has a very close and expanding
    alliance relationship with Australia, which encompasses the full scope
    of defense cooperation, including integrated air and missile Defense
    (IAMD). Australia currently deploys Aegis-equipped ships and by the end
    of the decade has plans to field a new class of Aegis-equipped
    frigates. If confirmed, I would work with Australia to advance IAMD
    cooperation, such as through Australia's planned AIR 6500 project to
    field a Joint Battle Management System, which will represent the core
    of the Australian Defence Force command and control system and hold
    great potential for future IAMD interoperability in coalition
    operations.
                                     africa
        Question. How do you define United States national security
    interests in Africa?
        Answer. Africa is a continent with great opportunities to advance
    common values and security interests. It is my understanding that our
    national security interests in Africa are diverse and include the
    growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in both
    East and West Africa; competition with strategic competitors for
    access, influence, and values; the threat to secure lines of
    communication in the maritime domain; and the threat that climate
    change has on regional stability. It is my understanding that U.S.
    national security interests across the continent are pursued through
    whole-of-government efforts to ensure continued U.S. access and
    influence to protect our people, partners, resources, and interests.
        Question. What should be the Department's top priorities in Africa?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD plays an important role in
    supporting whole-of-government efforts focused on defense, development,
    and diplomacy priorities in Africa. If confirmed, I would recommend
    that our top priorities should focus on VEO threats to the United
    States Homeland, maritime challenges that impact our trade and
    communications, and the influence and access our strategic competitors
    continue to gain in Africa. I understand that our defense engagement in
    Africa protects the United States Homeland and fosters opportunities
    for mutually beneficial partnerships in other sectors by promoting
    stability and security. Finally, I understand that African countries
    often desire United States engagement and support shared values, such
    as fostering global trade, addressing conflict, and promoting human
    rights.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current United States
    force posture and the associated resourcing in the United States Africa
    Command (AFRICOM) AOR?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD supports strategic
    priorities in Africa through our forward presence, periodic
    engagements, and supporting force laydown in neighboring United States
    European Command. This posture is complemented by a range of security
    cooperation and assistance activities, which serve as our most powerful
    tool to strengthen partnerships and counter competitors in Africa. If
    confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in considering all Commander,
    AFRICOM requests and requirements, and advocate for continued security
    cooperation efforts, participation in United States-led exercises, and
    professional military education.
        Question. In your view, are the current forces available to AFRICOM
    sufficient to support United States strategic objectives in the AOR?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD's ``by, with, and through''
    approach to achieving security and stability in Africa has proven
    effective with a limited forward presence. Often our security
    cooperation efforts enhance larger ally and partner force operations,
    which achieve shared strategic objectives and build enduring
    relationships. Central to this approach is the limited forward presence
    on the continent and a focus on building African partner nation
    capabilities while supporting efforts of other international partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al-Qaeda,
    ISIS, and other violent extremist organizations in Africa?
        Answer. Worldwide, al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates continue to
    pose threats to United States interests around the globe, including
    Africa. It is my understanding that persistent pressure from the United
    States and our allies and partners remains necessary. These groups
    continue to present regional and localized threats in Africa to United
    States interests. If confirmed, I will review our regional
    counterterrorism approach to ensure our resources are being employed
    appropriately and effectively toward priority threats in the region.
        Question. Which groups are of greatest concern to you, and why?
        Answer. East Africa, Somalia specifically, remains of strategic
    concern, as Al-Shabaab has become the largest and wealthiest associated
    force of al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has expressed intent to target the
    Homeland and has demonstrated capability to target United States
    interests in the region.
        Question. What should be the priorities and associated policy
    objectives of the United States counterterrorism strategy in Africa?
        Answer. Terrorism will remain a persistent threat to our national
    security. The Department must remain focused on maintaining the
    proficiency of special operations forces in order to deny violent
    extremist organizations their safe havens in Africa and to help degrade
    and disrupt terrorist groups from further destabilizing these areas.
    The ability to work alongside regional and international partners in
    these regions is key to maintaining our objectives while conducting
    such operations in a resource sustainable manner.
        Question. What are the associated policy objectives and, in your
    view, is the current United States approach meeting those policy
    objectives in Africa?
        Answer. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance sets a
    priority to prevent terrorists from directing or supporting external
    operations against the United States Homeland and our citizens, allies,
    and partners overseas. Special Operations Forces remain a key
    contributor to the Nation's counterterrorism missions in Africa by
    supporting and enabling local partners and allies in pursuing shared
    objectives, including degrading terrorist threats.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current
    U.S. approach?
        Answer. I believe a resource sustainable approach is necessary to
    address all of our global challenges, including counterterrorism, as we
    confront an increasingly complicated global environment of threats to
    our national security. I understand that the U.S. counterterrorism
    strategy is a whole-of-government approach to integrating military and
    non-military efforts, calibrated to varied threats and the regional
    context in which they exist. DOD employs kinetic and non-kinetic
    capabilities, enabling other U.S. Government departments and agencies
    and regional partners. United States SOF complements a broad set of
    national instruments of power in countering terrorism in Africa and
    worldwide. If confirmed, I will review our counterterrorism approach in
    the region to ensure our resources are being employed appropriately and
    effectively toward priority threats in the region.
        Question. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic
    objectives in Africa?
        Answer. It is my understanding that both Russia and the PRC have
    expanded their strategic focus on Africa and use engagement in Africa
    to bolster their international standing, obtain access to raw
    materials, undermine Western influence, and pursue access agreements to
    support force projection in the region. The methods vary widely between
    the two.
        China is engaging diplomatically, economically, and militarily
    across the Continent. Specific to our military interests, it is my
    understanding that the PLA continues improvements to its military base
    in Djibouti and has expressed interest in opening more bases in Africa.
        Russia markets its security services and experience to African
    countries to expand its influence and challenge United States
    interests. Russia's outreach is not as wide reaching as China's;
    however, Russia continues to contribute to instability through the use
    and presence of Russian private military companies (PMC) in several
    African countries, like Libya and the Central African Republic, but is
    also trying to expand its presence in other areas, like the Sahel
    region. Russia remains a key arms supplier for many African militaries
    and continues to look for opportunities to project power.
        Question. In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with
    those of the U.S.?
        Answer. Actions by Russia and the PRC could create future access
    challenges and currently undermine our efforts in African countries to
    promote regional stability, civilian control of the armed forces,
    transparency, and accountability.
        Question. In your view, what should be the DOD role in supporting
    United States strategic objectives in Africa?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD engagement in Africa
    protects the U.S. Homeland and fosters opportunities for mutually
    beneficial partnerships in other sectors by promoting stability and
    security. By building partnerships and bolstering security exporters,
    DOD assists African partners in overcoming security challenges. The
    U.S. is especially sought after as a security partner thanks to the
    high quality of U.S. military equipment, expertise, and training.
        Question. What should be the role of DOD with regard to China and
    Russia in Africa?
        Answer. As part of our whole-of-government approach, I would
    prioritize DOD's efforts to build partner capacity to address security
    challenges and to reinforce United States influence in strategically
    critical countries, both in Africa and throughout the Global South.
                        latin america and the caribbean
        Question. Do you define United States national security interests
    in Latin America and the Caribbean?
        Answer. It is my understanding that U.S. national security
    interests in the Western Hemisphere include protecting the American
    people, promoting economic prosperity and opportunity, supporting and
    strengthening democratic institutions, and upholding human rights and
    dignity. Our security depends greatly on the security and well-being of
    our Western Hemisphere neighbors. We face many challenges in the
    Western Hemisphere, including the migration crisis, natural disasters,
    drug trafficking and other transnational criminal networks, COVID-19,
    climate change, and the efforts of foreign competitors and adversaries
    to undermine democratic governments and U.S. interests. If confirmed, I
    would help ensure that the Department of Defense plays an appropriate
    supporting role to help address these challenges.
        Question. What should be the Department's top priorities in Latin
    America and the Caribbean?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department should
    build and strengthen its cooperation with Western Hemisphere partners
    to address shared security challenges. From this basis, the Department
    could help support partner nation efforts in traditional areas such as
    countering narcotics trafficking and other transnational crime,
    disaster response, and strengthening defense institutions. In addition,
    there are opportunities for cooperation in newer fields such as cyber
    defense and addressing climate change. If confirmed, I would expect to
    help ensure the Department focuses on cooperation to help enable our
    partners' self-sufficiency in defense and their contributions to
    regional and hemispheric security.
        Question. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic
    objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Russia and the PRC actively
    seek opportunities to deepen their influence in the hemisphere through
    diplomatic, economic, and security inroads. If confirmed, I would
    recommend that the United States leverage all elements of national
    power to counter PRC and Russian activities intended to interfere with
    our security relationships and undermine the rules-based international
    order. Working within a whole-of-government response, DOD has an
    important role in building and maintaining strong defense and security
    partnerships, enabled by engagements and presence, intelligence and
    information exchanges, and educational programs and exercises. If
    confirmed, I would help lead the Department's employment of these tools
    to minimize the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere.
        Question. In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with
    those of the U.S.?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Russian and PRC activities pose
    challenges to security and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. For
    example, their support to authoritarian governments in Venezuela,
    Nicaragua, and Cuba undermines democracy and freedom of expression in
    those nations. PRC-flagged vessels conducting illegal fishing
    activities engage in economic theft and environmental destruction of
    Western Hemisphere nations' resources. PRC-based transnational criminal
    organizations and money laundering firms contribute to the illicit drug
    trade responsible for killing tens of thousands of people each year in
    the United States. Russian attempts to influence populations through
    social media activities and other misinformation operations aim to
    undermine United States goals for the hemisphere. If confirmed, I would
    recommend to the Secretary that we help counter these activities
    through a whole-of-government approach and robust engagements with our
    partners in the region, promoting the values of democracy, respect for
    human rights, and cooperation in a rules-based international order.
        Question. In your view, what would be the appropriate role for DOD
    in addressing the sources of instability in the region, including
    criminal violence, corruption, environmental devastation, and the
    health crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic?
        Answer. The President's Interim National Security Strategy
    recognizes the challenges posed by transnational criminal
    organizations, corruption, environmental crime, and COVID-19 to
    security in the Western Hemisphere. I understand that Congress provides
    dedicated authorities and funding to enable DOD to help U.S. and
    foreign law enforcement partners disrupt drug trafficking and other
    forms of transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking and
    smuggling, weapons trafficking, trafficking in wildlife and natural
    resources, and illicit financial flows. If confirmed, I would ensure
    that the Department continues to provide appropriate support to U.S.
    and foreign partners with the resources that Congress dedicates for
    this purpose. I'm also aware that DOD has helped neighbors in the
    Western Hemisphere in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, through the
    provision of field hospitals, freezers to store vaccines safely, oxygen
    generators to make medical-grade oxygen, therapeutic drugs, and other
    medical equipment and supplies.
                           ballistic missile defense
        Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
    ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
    but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic missiles against United States forces, allies, and the
    United States Homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense
    Review (MDR) articulated existing U.S. policy on missile defense and
    endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.
        In your view, should United States missile defense policy should be
    limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?
        Answer. I support the longstanding United States policy that
    Homeland missile defenses should remain focused on defending against
    comparatively limited rogue State ballistic missile attacks from North
    Korea and Iran, not against attacks by near-peers China and Russia
    which possess much larger strategic missile arsenals that could
    overwhelm United States Homeland missile defenses. To address the
    threat of a comprehensive and technologically sophisticated strategic
    missile attack by China or Russia, the United States should continue to
    rely on the same strategy it has employed for more than half a
    century--nuclear deterrence.
        Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
    missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
    smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
    threats, such as Russia and China?
        Answer. Defending the United States Homeland against non-strategic
    missile attacks by near-peers such as China or Russia remains a
    difficult problem. I agree that missile defense cannot defend against
    every threat and that it must be only one capability within a broader
    range of options to increase our overall protection against the growing
    number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department is
    examining ways to enhance its architecture against conventional missile
    threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our
    Homeland missile defense architecture.
        Question. The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking
    threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne,
    and space-based ``system of systems,'' with the constituent pieces
    managed and sustained by a number of different DOD components.
        Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated
    and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture
    capable of supporting real-time operational decisions? If so, please
    explain your answer. If not, please explain what steps you would take,
    if confirmed, to improve global sensor integration.
        Answer. Having a persistent and integrated network of sensors is
    integral to the success of any effective missile defense architecture.
    Sensors provide real-time detection, tracking, and targeting
    information that is critical to policymakers during a crisis. The
    existing Department of Defense global network of sensors on land, at
    sea, and in the air and space domains is highly complex and must be
    improved to increase operational awareness and decisionmaking. If
    confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure that this
    element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is prioritized
    appropriately.
        Question. The cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program
    with the replacement of the Next Generation Interceptor program has
    resulted in a likely delay of at least 10 years before the deployment
    of modernized ground-based interceptors for homeland ballistic missile
    defense.
        Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program and the
    fielding of additional interceptors from this program, presuming the
    program achieves its acquisition objectives?
        Answer. Yes. Defense of the Homeland is a DOD priority, and missile
    defense is a central component of this mission. I support the
    Department's decision to move forward with development of the Next
    Generation Interceptor (NGI), as well as other ongoing efforts to
    enhance the effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense System (GMD) which currently protects the United States
    Homeland against limited Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
    threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support continuing
    improvements to our missile defense architecture.
        Question. Recently, a Navy Aegis Destroyer was able to successfully
    intercept an ICBM-class target, raising the possibility of using a
    system of Homeland Defense layered between the Ground Based Interceptor
    at mid-flight and the Aegis system for intercepts in the final phases
    of the ICBM's trajectory.
        In your view, would this layered approach require a change in
    policy with respect to the types of interceptors used, the defended
    area, and the specific threats each is deployed against?
        Answer. Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or
    existing capabilities would require weighing a variety of factors:
    cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability against
    the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will work to
    ensure that the Department uses the layered homeland defense analysis
    called for in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2021 to help determine the proper mix of capabilities to defend the
    Homeland against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea.
        Question. What are your views regarding United States Indo-Pacific
    Command's (INDOPACOM's) unfunded priorities with respect to missile
    defense and Guam?
        Answer. Guam is a critical forward operating position. Although I
    do not have access to the specific unfunded priority lists, I agree
    with INDOPACOM that ensuring Guam has sufficient defenses against
    growing adversary anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) conventional
    missile capabilities is critical. Active missile defenses that enable
    the United States to sustain military operations during a conflict are
    one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If
    confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right
    combination of capabilities on Guam to enhance the United States
    regional deterrence and defense posture, assure allies and partners,
    and increase readiness to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific
    region.
        Question. In recent months, missile and rocket attacks by Iran and
    Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East have highlighted the shortage
    of Theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TIAMD) assets available
    to protect deployed United States forces. This same shortage is most
    acute in United States European Command and INDOPACOM, where the
    missile threats are much more sophisticated. Air defense units remain
    the highest-demand, lowest-density forces in the Army.
        In your view, should DOD expand its theater missile defense
    capabilities (including improvements to existing systems or the
    development of new systems), capacity (increased procurement of
    existing systems), or both? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Each Area of Responsibility (AOR) has unique sets of
    challenges and requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    Department stakeholders, including the Joint Staff and the relevant
    Combatant Commands, to help determine the most appropriate mixture and
    allocation of missile defense capabilities and other posture
    requirements to maintain theater readiness and a strong deterrent.
        Question. Do you believe the United States should encourage
    regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense
    capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the
    burden on U.S. forces and requirements?
        Answer. Yes. The world has arrived in a new era of offensive
    missiles. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries are pursuing
    A2/AD strategies centered on their missile forces with the intention of
    inhibiting and disrupting U.S. and allied military freedom of maneuver.
    Allies and partners have the lead role in their sovereign defense,
    backed by mutual security treaties and other relationships with the
    United States. If confirmed, I would work closely with our allies and
    key partners as they strengthen their own Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) capabilities. Such allied investments offer common
    protection, enhanced deterrence, and improved interoperability. They
    also complicate adversary planning and attack calculus, and provide
    leverage for leaders to negotiate against threats from a position of
    strength in peacetime, as well as during a crisis and/or conflict.
        Question. If confirmed, on which specific allies and partners would
    you focus in this regard, and specifically what would you encourage
    each to do?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support strong United
    States missile defense cooperation, which occurs with many different
    allies and key partners throughout the world, and is strongest with
    NATO, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and Israel. Our
    cooperation with these countries strengthens collective deterrence
    efforts and offers assurance essential to the unity of our alliances
    which are threatened by missile coercion and attacks particularly from
    China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. I would also prioritize continued
    dialog and progress toward greater interoperability, including regular
    military-to-military exercises and training.
                                nuclear weapons
        Question. Do you agree with former Secretary of Defense Ash
    Carter's statement that our nuclear deterrent is the ``bedrock'' of
    every national security mission we undertake?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree with the assessment of the past four
    Secretaries of Defense--including Secretary Austin, and as well, Deputy
    Secretary Hicks--that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority
    mission and that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the
    Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical
    national security priority?
        Answer. Yes. I agree with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
    Hicks that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and
    that modernization of the triad is a critical national security
    priority.
        Question. In your view, is the sustainment and timely modernization
    of the three legs of the nuclear triad essential? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. Yes. As Secretary Austin has explained, the service life of
    many elements of the nuclear triad has been extended long past the time
    it should have been modernized. We must continue to modernize the triad
    and sustain legacy nuclear delivery systems.
        Question. Is the current program of record sufficient to support
    full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems,
    warheads, and the supporting National Nuclear Security Administration
    infrastructure?
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
    surrounding the program of record for the nuclear triad and, in
    conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration, for
    nuclear infrastructure. In gaining this understanding, I recognize that
    the Administration is committed to modernizing the triad in a cost-
    effective and judicious manner that provides us the necessary
    capabilities when they are needed.
        Question. The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that
    the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear
    forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on
    alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any
    given time.
        Do you agree with this conclusion? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. Although I am not familiar with the specific details
    of the United States' nuclear forces readiness posture, I understand
    this posture has remained consistent over multiple Presidential
    Administrations and has contributed to global stability for many
    decades. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding these details
    with a focus on enhancing deterrence, maximizing decision time, and
    preserving the range of U.S. response options.
        Question. In response to conditions set forth in the Senate
    Resolution of Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama
    certified on February 2, 2011, that he intended to ``(a) modernize or
    replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber
    and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered
    ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the
    United States rocket motor industrial base.''
        Do you agree with and support these objectives for modernizing the
    triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. The triad has provided a strong nuclear deterrent for
    decades, and I believe we must continue to sustain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent in the years to come. If confirmed, I
    commit to better understanding the details surrounding the program of
    record for strategic nuclear delivery systems, recognizing that the
    Administration is committed to a triad of nuclear forces and to
    modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious manner that
    provides us the necessary capabilities when they are needed.
        Question. Admiral Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
    recently reaffirmed the longstanding assessment of the Department of
    Defense that extending the service life of the Minuteman III (MM III)
    system is no longer a cost-effective option for preserving the Nation's
    intercontinental ballistic missile force.
        Do you agree with the Commander's assessment?
        Answer. I agree that we cannot extend the life expectancy of legacy
    systems indefinitely without increased cost and risk. If confirmed, I
    commit to consult closely with the STRATCOM Commander to better
    understanding the specific details surrounding the Minuteman III
    intercontinental ballistic missile system and its replacement system,
    the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). I would also consult with
    Minuteman III and GBSD program managers and other experts to understand
    the budgetary, programmatic, and operational implications of further
    life extensions.
        Question. The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to
    replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)--a system that
    is 20 years past its retirement, under increasing threat from adversary
    air defenses, and considered essential to maintaining the air leg of
    the triad.
        Do you support the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a replacement for
    the aging ALCM?
        Answer. Yes. As Secretary Austin testified, maintaining a credible
    nuclear deterrent is critical to our Nation's defense. If confirmed, I
    will seek to ensure that the Department thoroughly studies all proposed
    plans and alternatives to ensure we are on the most cost-effective path
    to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.
        Question. If confirmed as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, what steps will you take to advocate for, and ensure the
    continued development of, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and Long
    Range Stand-Off programs? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that both the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
    and the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) program are being addressed in the
    NPR. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the NPR is conducted in
    an analytically rigorous manner and takes into account changes in the
    strategic environment, recognizing that we face two nuclear-armed near-
    peer competitors. I will also commit to better understanding the
    details surrounding both programs, recognizing that the Administration
    is committed to modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious
    manner.
        Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
    parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
    maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
    surrounding the W93 program and parallel efforts to collaborate with
    the United Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear
    deterrent. I do recognize the critical importance of the long-standing
    nuclear deterrence cooperation between the United States and the United
    Kingdom, and the continued value of the United Kingdom's continuous at-
    sea deterrence mission to NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
        Question. Per Secretary of Defense Austin's direction, the
    Department is undergoing an integrated deterrence review, which
    includes are review of nuclear deterrence.
        Please explain your views on how nuclear weapons can be part of an
    integrated deterrence with conventional weapons.
        Answer. Although I understand that DOD is developing a National
    Defense Strategy that is intended to focus on an integrated deterrence
    approach, I am not yet familiar with the specific details of that
    review. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
    surrounding this issue and the role of nuclear weapons in such an
    approach along with other military capabilities, including those in the
    conventional, space, cyber, missile defense and information domains.
        Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command has
    referred to reports of China's nuclear force expansion as
    ``breathtaking'' and contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear
    peer to the United States and Russia is a ``strategic breakout,'' which
    represents an unprecedented threat to global stability.
        Do you agree with this assessment? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Although I am not familiar with the specific details
    surrounding Admiral Richard's assessment, I agree that China's nuclear
    forces are rapidly improving both quantitatively and qualitatively. I
    understand issues such as those identified by Admiral Richard are being
    addressed in DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will
    consult with Admiral Richard and other experts to better understand how
    the United States should posture itself in response.
        Question. What are your views on Russia's nuclear modernization
    effort?
        Answer. Of most concern in Russia's nuclear modernization and
    expansion are its development and fielding of systems that are not
    accountable under--and thus not constrained by--the New START Treaty,
    including so-called ``novel'' systems of strategic range; as well as
    continued development and fielding of a large variety of ground-, air-,
    and sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapon systems, many of which are
    dual-capable. The development of such systems undermines global and
    regional stability and the goal of reducing the salience of nuclear
    weapons.
        Question. Russia is now fielding their Avangard hypersonic strike
    system, which is accountable under the New START Treaty. What are your
    views on the effects of this system with respect to strategic stability
    and missile defense?
        Answer. The Avangard hypersonic system has the potential to
    undermine strategic stability and is being addressed in DOD's ongoing
    Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. If confirmed, I
    commit to better understanding the details surrounding this capability
    and how the United States should respond from both a military posture
    and arms control perspective.
        Question. What are your views on the recent expansion and
    modernization of China's ICBM force?
        Answer. I am concerned by reports of China's nuclear modernization
    and expansion, including its ICBM force. This concern is exacerbated by
    China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear forces, as well as
    its strategy and doctrine. I understand issues such as these are being
    addressed in DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will
    have seek to ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic
    environment such as these into account.
        Question. What is your understanding of China's rationale for this
    expansion?
        Answer. I understand that the recent expansion and modernization of
    China's nuclear forces, including its ICBM force, are the result of its
    strategic ambitions and evolving view of the security landscape.
    Moreover, the PRC's nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance
    of a survivable nuclear force that can retaliate against an adversary's
    first strike.
        Question. How should the United States respond to China's efforts,
    in your opinion?
        Answer. I understand issues such as China's expansion and
    modernization of nuclear forces are being addressed in DOD's ongoing
    Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR
    takes developments in the strategic environment such as these into
    account.
        Question. What are your views on China's fielding of an SSBN-class
    submarine fleet and what are your concerns with respect to its
    continued development over the next 5-10 years?
        Answer. Fielding of an SSBN-class submarine fleet will contribute
    to a survivable and functional nuclear triad. While an SSBN force by
    itself is just one facet of China's nuclear forces expansion and
    modernization, it affirms the 2021 Threat Assessment Report from the
    United States Intelligence Community noting that ``China is building a
    larger and increasingly capable nuclear missile force that is more
    survivable, more diverse, and on higher alert than in the past,
    including nuclear missile systems designed to manage regional
    escalation and ensure an intercontinental second-strike capability.''
        Question. Do you believe China is developing a triad of delivery
    systems?
        Answer. Yes, I do.
        Question. If so, on what do you base this belief and to what
    motivations do you ascribe China's actions?
        Answer. China's development of a triad of nuclear delivery systems
    is a fact established by voluminous evidence about China's ground-,
    sea-, and air-based nuclear forces, reinforced in testimony by numerous
    DOD and United States intelligence officials and DOD reports to
    Congress on China's military. I understand that the recent expansion
    and modernization of China's nuclear forces are the result of its
    strategic ambitions, evolving view of the security landscape, and
    concerns over survivability of its nuclear forces. I further understand
    that its nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a
    survivable nuclear force that can retaliate against an adversary's
    first strike.
        Question. How can the United States best counter China in this
    regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details
    surrounding China's nuclear modernization and expansion, as well as its
    other nuclear developments, and how the United States might need to
    adjust its posture, policy or doctrine in response.
        Question. In your understanding, has this expansion been
    accompanied by a change in China's nuclear weapons use doctrine?
        Answer. China continues to maintain a stated no first use policy. I
    understand, however, that there is a degree of ambiguity surrounding
    the conditions under which China's no first use policy would no longer
    apply.
        Question. If so, how has China's doctrine changed?
        Answer. My understanding is that China's publicly stated nuclear
    weapons use doctrine has not changed--and that Beijing continues to
    affirm that it abides by a no first use policy. However, the lack of
    transparency in the scope, scale, and speed of its nuclear expansion
    raises fundamental questions about its future doctrine.
        Question. Should U.S. doctrine change also?
        Answer. I am familiar with, and concerned by, reports of China's
    nuclear modernization and expansion, as well as its other nuclear
    developments. I understand issues such as this are being addressed in
    DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will seek to
    ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic environment such as
    these into account and examines how the United States might need to
    adjust its posture, policy, doctrine or arms control approaches in
    response.
        Question. What are your views with respect to deterring both Russia
    and China, in light of China's expansion of its nuclear arsenal (as
    compared to its arsenal of 10 years ago)?
        Answer. I am generally familiar with concerns regarding the
    prospect of having to deter two peer or near-peer nuclear adversaries
    simultaneously in the coming years. If confirmed, I commit to better
    understanding the details surrounding these issues to include how the
    United States should posture itself in response, and whether arms
    control efforts can contribute to reducing this threat.
        Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced
    his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should
    only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
    agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions.
        Do you agree with this statement? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The Administration is committed to reestablishing U.S.
    credibility as a leader in arms control as demonstrated, in part, by
    the extension of the New START Treaty earlier this year. With that
    said, I agree that the United States should not unilaterally reduce
    nuclear forces without some corresponding action on the part of our
    adversaries.
        Question. In your opinion, should the United States pursue arms
    control and strategic stability talks with China while it is are
    undertaking this expansion of its nuclear arsenal?
        Answer. The Administration is committed to reestablishing U.S.
    credibility as a leader in arms control. We have long been concerned
    with China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear forces, as well
    as its strategy and doctrine. Dialogue aimed at such transparency,
    improving strategic stability and risk reduction through mutual
    understandings, and possibly leading to arms control agreements that
    improve the security of the United States and its allies and partners
    is in the interest of the United States, China and the global
    community.
        Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or canceling
    current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
    control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
        Answer. I believe maintaining credible nuclear forces and pursuing
    verifiable reductions are both aspects of strategic stability. How
    current nuclear modernization plans intersect with our arms control
    approach is an important matter that I understand is being addressed in
    DOD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review as well as in an ongoing
    interagency process. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR fully
    considers the potential impact of modernization choices on our arms
    control negotiation leverage.
        Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
    accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
    power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
    China on nuclear weapons' reductions? Please explain your answers.
        Answer. I believe we should be careful not to limit our ability to
    defend ourselves against limited missile threats or other types of
    attack from rogue states. I understand the intersection of arms control
    and integrated deterrence is an issue being considered as part of the
    Administration's strategic reviews, including but not limited to DOD's
    National Defense Strategy review and Nuclear Posture Review, as well as
    an ongoing interagency arms control process. If confirmed, I would seek
    to ensure DOD views are fully represented in any future nuclear arms
    control negotiations with either Russia or China.
        Question. What if your view of the value of the supplemental
    capabilities recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, including
    the deployed low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile and
    possible return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. As set out in the President's Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance, the Administration is committed to taking steps to
    reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,
    while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and
    effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies
    remain strong and credible. I understand that the need for the so-
    called supplemental capabilities is being addressed in DOD's ongoing
    Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will have a role in overseeing
    the NPR, and I commit to better understanding the arguments for and
    against such capabilities in light of the foregoing guidance.
        Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any significant change
    in U.S. nuclear posture or declaratory policy, including reducing alert
    status of ICBMs or adopting a ``No First Use'' policy? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. As the Deputy Secretary testified, declaratory policy is a
    decision made by the President of the United States. If confirmed, I
    would seek to ensure that the NPR process that informs any such
    decision includes rigorous, fact-based analysis that takes into account
    recent changes in the strategic environment, and to make certain that
    the views of the STRATCOM commander and other senior military leaders
    are fully represented, and that we conduct meaningful consultations
    with treaty allies who rely on our extended deterrent.
           defense support of civil authorities for covid-19 response
        Question. Through contracting support, the program previously known
    as Operation Warp Speed, and National Guard and active duty deployments
    for vaccine support teams and other support efforts, DOD has provided
    significant assistance to the U.S. Government's response to the COVID-
    19 crisis.
        What in your view is the appropriate role for the DOD in providing
    support to Civil Authorities as part of the COVID-19 response?
        Answer. I believe that it is appropriate that DOD has played an
    important supporting role in our Nation's fight against the COVID-19
    pandemic. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead
    Federal agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is
    the lead Federal coordinating agency bringing together the full
    capabilities of the U.S. Government to support response efforts to a
    national emergency. If confirmed, I will seek to support continued and
    effective DOD support to whole-of-government efforts.
        Question. Are there additional types of support that DOD should be
    providing, or types of support that the DOD should not provide, in your
    view?
        Answer. To the best of my knowledge, DOD has been responsive and
    effective in providing assistance to the broader U.S. COVID-19 response
    efforts. I believe DOD should continue to play a supporting role to the
    lead Federal agency or the lead Federal coordinating agency. DOD
    assistance supplements, not supplants, responsibilities that by law
    belong to States and other Federal departments and agencies.
        Question. What should be done to minimize the risk to Department
    personnel who are tasked with providing defense support to civil
    authorities during the coronavirus crisis?
        Answer. DOD's highest priority should remain the protection of our
    Nation and its people. While DOD cannot execute its missions risk-free,
    DOD can mitigate and manage risks to ensure that DOD does not
    compromise the safety and security of our force or the Nation. I
    understand that DOD implemented force health protection measures early
    in the pandemic designed to mitigate risks and has continued to adapt
    these measures as our Nation's understanding of COVID-19 has improved.
        Question. What in your view are the major lessons learned from the
    Department's support to civil authorities in response to the COVID-19
    crisis, and how should DOD position itself to be better prepared to
    support civil authorities in response to a future pandemic?
        Answer. I understand that DOD routinely conducts after-action
    reviews to identify opportunities to improve. If confirmed, I will have
    the opportunity to examine DOD's reviews and the lessons the Department
    intends to incorporate into its plans and procedures as well as into
    whole-of-government policies and processes.
        Question. What risks do you envision to the vaccine program as DOD
    draws down from the Countermeasures Acceleration Group, and how would
    you mitigate those risks, if confirmed?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD had an important, albeit
    supporting role in the vaccine program. If confirmed, I will review
    DOD's posture for providing support and will work with partners to
    mitigate any risks, should DOD be asked to provide support again.
                       foreign disinformation on covid-19
        Question. China, Russia and other nations are disseminating
    disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19, to advance
    their strategic interests.
        What role, if any, should the Department play in countering
    disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19?
        Answer. In support of whole-of-government efforts, I would expect
    the Department to be an important voice in reinforcing fact-based
    information and leverage trusted relationships with our own personnel,
    our defense communities, allies, and partners to counter
    disinformation. If confirmed, I would look to support the Department's
    efforts to counter COVID-19 disinformation and false narratives in
    support of the Administration's efforts and to provide timely and
    accurate health information to the workforce.
                            dod security cooperation
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the DOD in the conduct of
    security cooperation in the strategic cooperation with China and
    Russia?
        Answer. Aligned with whole-of-government security sector assistance
    efforts, Department of Defense security cooperation tools bolster ally
    and partner capabilities for defense, advance shared national security
    interests through addressing regional security challenges, and
    strengthen relationships with key allies and partners. DOD security
    cooperation, developed and executed in coordination the State
    Department, serves to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and
    partnerships, reinforcing a critical American asymmetric advantage in
    strategic competition.
        Question. What is your view of the value of a strategic and
    integrated approach to DOD security cooperation as a tool for strategic
    competition?
        Answer. DOD building partner capacity efforts should focus on
    enhancing ally and partner capabilities to effectively operate
    alongside and in lieu of U.S. forces to address shared national
    security challenges. Security cooperation investments should be
    targeted to advance broader goals in strategic competition. I
    understand the forthcoming National Defense Strategy will address the
    strategic objectives and integrated approach of DOD security
    cooperation.
        Question. What specific steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to
    ensure that the Department's security cooperation strategy is
    integrated across the combatant commands, Military Services, and other
    DOD components?
        Answer. I understand the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
    exercising responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense
    pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 382, has made significant progress in
    advancing the strategic oversight of security cooperation activities
    since the reforms codified by the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2017. If confirmed, I will review existing processes
    and assess whether additional guidance may be necessary to ensure DOD
    security cooperation activities are developed, executed, and integrated
    across echelons and in alignment with the forthcoming National Defense
    Strategy.
        Question. What should be the Department's relationship with the
    Department of State in the conduct of these security cooperation
    activities?
        Answer. Effective DOD security cooperation aligns with and advances
    broader U.S. foreign policy objectives driven by the Department of
    State. Ensuring this alignment requires thorough collaboration with the
    Department of State through interagency processes and regular
    engagement between the two departments at all levels. If confirmed, I
    would seek to support consistent coordination and engagement with the
    Department of State and other interagency partners.
        Question. In your view, are the current security sector assistance
    authorities available to DOD sufficient to accomplish our strategic
    objectives?
        Answer. DOD security cooperation authorities and investments are
    essential to the national security strategic goal of reinvigorating and
    modernizing U.S. alliances and partnerships. If confirmed, I will
    support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's responsibility for
    oversight of strategic policy, guidance, and resource allocation for
    security cooperation programs and assess whether authorities or
    resource adjustments may be necessary in support of DOD strategic
    priorities.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether any additional
    organizational, legislative, or resource adjustments are necessary for
    the effective implementation and strategic oversight of Department of
    Defense security cooperation activities.
                civilian oversight of special operations forces
        Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2017 included provisions
    designed to enhance civilian oversight of, and advocacy for special
    operations forces. Among other things, these reforms established an
    administrative chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special
    Operations Command through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to the
    Secretary of Defense, mirroring the relationship between the
    Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Service Chiefs.
        What is your understanding of the ``service secretary-like''
    responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) with regard to special operations
    forces?
        Answer. In accordance with reforms enacted in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the ASD(SO/LIC) reports
    directly to the Secretary of Defense in exercising authority,
    direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar
    administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and
    equipping of special operations forces. I understand that the ASD(SO/
    LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the
    Secretary of Defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict,
    and special operations-peculiar administrative matters and, after the
    Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the principal official
    for these matters.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    reinforce the independent role of the ASD(SOLIC) as the ``service
    secretary-like'' civilian for special operations forces?
        Answer. DOD implements the organizational role of the ASD(SO/LIC)
    with a dual reporting chain. In supporting the dual role, I will
    reinforce the independent role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in regard to his
    principal staff assistance responsibilities that are similar to those
    of a Military Department secretary by, for example, supporting and
    reinforcing the ASD(SOLIC)'S role as the Department's lead for the
    manning, organizing, training, and equipping of SOF. One way I will do
    this is by ensuring the ASD(SOLIC)'s participation in the appropriate
    department-wide fora, and by ensuring the proper separation of tasks
    between the ASD(SOLIC)'s service-like responsibilities and functions,
    and the responsibilities and functions for which he is under the
    authority, direction, and control of the USD(P).
        Question. In your view, how should these responsibilities be
    balanced with other ASD(SOLIC) responsibilities related to policy and
    operational issues?
        Answer. The ASD (SOLIC)'s dual responsibilities are complementary.
    Every leader across the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be
    working to integrate information and to ensure thorough coordination of
    policies and issues for the Secretary. The ASD(SOLIC)'s dual role
    ensures special operation forces are properly prepared for current and
    future missions and that the DOD strategy and policy realistically
    reflect the capabilities and operational options these forces provide
    the Nation.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
    male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
    harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
    12 months prior to completing the survey.
        What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
    harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the OUSD(P)?
        Answer. There is no place for sexual harassment, gender
    discrimination, and other harassment within OUSD(P); any such behavior
    is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will assist the USD(P) in reviewing
    previous workforce assessments including surveys, both internal and
    from the Office of Personnel Management, and any other documentation
    that would give me insight into the Policy organization to help
    determine next steps. I am aware of the GAO's report, issued earlier
    this year, recommending steps the Department take to address sexual
    harassment and assault among the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I
    will support the Department's ongoing efforts to promote a culture of
    dignity and respect, including a commitment to tackling the corrosive
    issue of sexual harassment.
        Question. In your view, is the civilian workforce harassment
    prevention and response training for civilian employees in OUSD(P)
    adequate and effective?
        Answer. As I have not worked in OUSD(P), I cannot judge the current
    harassment prevention and response training. If confirmed, I will make
    it a priority to work the Policy team to determine if it is adequate
    and effective.
        Question. In your view, does the OUSD(P) program for response to
    complaints of harassment or discrimination provide appropriate care and
    services to OUSD(P) civilian employee victims?
        Answer. As I have not worked in OUSD(P), I cannot judge the current
    program for response to complaints of harassment or discrimination. If
    confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure appropriate care and
    services are provided to victims, in alignment with the
    Administration's commitment to improving prevention and response to
    sexual harassment and sexual assault for both civilians and military
    personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment
    or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(P)?
        Answer. If confirmed, and I received or became aware of such
    complaints, I would take them seriously and immediately contact the
    appropriate office to initiate an inquiry to gather all facts, conduct
    the necessary interviews, collect appropriate information, and address
    the complaint within the specified guidelines of Federal statutes and
    Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I would
    assist the USD(P) in reiterating to the workforce that they deserve a
    respectful workplace, of the importance of equality and diversity to
    the entire team, as well as our support for the Department's zero
    tolerance for harassment.
                            relations with congress
        Question. What are your views on the State of the relationship
    between the OUSD(P) and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in
    particular, and with the Congress in general?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the relationship between the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Congress. As a
    former Senate staffer, I recognize that the Senate Armed Services
    Committee provides important oversight of the Department and issues
    within the purview of OUSD(P). If confirmed, I am committed to
    continuing regular engagement with Congress and maintaining these
    important relationships to ensure the Committee can fulfill its
    legislative and oversight role.
                 torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
        Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
    Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
    2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
    19, 2014. Individuals in the custody and control of the U.S. Government
    may not be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not
    authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.
        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing
    triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016?
        Answer. Since FM 2-22.3 is the responsibility of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, I understand that
    my role in the review and revision will be to coordinate on the
    suggested manual revisions.
        Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM
    2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I am not aware of any policies or processes that are in
    need of revision at this time. congressional Oversight
        In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it
    is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other
    appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information from the executive branch.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to appear and testify before this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please
    answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
               afghan refugees and special immigrant visa program
        1. Senator Shaheen. Ms. Baker, from the Department of Defense
    perspective, what type of inter-agency coordination, oversight, and
    policy implementation do you believe is needed to improve United States
    efforts in the processing, documentation, and effective resettlement of
    Afghan refugees?
        Ms. Baker. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
    supports the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human
    Services, and State by providing temporary housing, sustainment, and
    other support for the Afghan evacuees. The Departments of Homeland
    Security, Health and Human Services, and State are responsible for the
    resettlement process. If confirmed, I will review how the Department of
    Defense is working with its Federal partners and other organizations to
    ensure our Afghan guests are being properly cared for and to identify
    opportunities to improve how the Department of Defense contributes to
    the resettlement process.

        2. Senator Shaheen. Ms. Baker, from the Department of Defense
    perspective, what policy reforms do you believe are needed to reduce or
    remove the barriers and delays in processing refugee documentation,
    medical care, and housing in support of timely and efficient
    resettlement of Afghan evacuees seeking refuge in the United States?
        Ms. Baker. I understand the Department of Defense is working
    closely with the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human
    Services, and State to host our Afghan guests, treat-our guests with
    dignity and respect, and meet our guests' needs, including medical and
    housing needs. If confirmed, I will review the Department of Defense's
    support to ensure our Afghan guests are being properly cared for and to
    identify any barriers or delays to this care. The Departments of
    Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and State are responsible
    for the resettlement process, so, if confirmed, I would work with those
    Departments to identify and address any barriers or delays to the
    resettlement process.

        3. Senator Shaheen. Ms. Baker, if confirmed, how will you ensure
    the lessons learned from the current Afghan non-combatant evacuation
    are being applied and documented to inform and establish processes for
    similar contingencies in the future?
        Ms. Baker. I understand that there are several after action reviews
    either proposed or ongoing, and if confirmed I will seek to support
    those efforts and will be transparent with Congress about their
    outcomes. I believe there are strategic, operational, tactical, and
    administrative lessons to be learned from the noncombatant evacuation
    in Afghanistan that should inform any similar operation going forward.
    It will be important to identify aspects that were effective that we
    should replicate in the future, as well as those aspects that need
    improvement. If confirmed, I look forward to working with leaders in
    the Department of Defense and in Congress to take a systematic review
    of the operation.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                             information operations
        4. Senator Peters. Ms. Baker, DOD has not released an Information
    Operations (IO) strategy since your time serving under Secretary of
    Defense Ashton Carter--right around when Russia expanded an offensive
    strategy to promote discord and call into question the legitimacy of
    democratic institutions in the United States and Western Europe. When
    Congress created the Principal Information Operations Adviser, the
    previous Administration assigned it to the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy--meaning that, if confirmed--you will likely play a role in
    its development and in the ongoing IO posture review.
        I know this is a whole-of-government problem, but what do you see
    as an appropriate whole-of-Department approach to connecting each
    disparate capability into an effective countereffort?
        Ms. Baker. Connecting disparate activities in the Information
    Environment has been a perennial challenge for the Department and the
    broader U.S. Government. In my view, the core solution to integration
    lies in how the Department thinks about and conducts strategic and
    operational planning. Effective counter-efforts require the Department
    to think in terms of strategic and operational influence to achieve
    objectives supported by the utilization of all capabilities available
    to the Department, rather than focusing solely on physical and lethal
    operations. If confirmed, I will work with the Principal Information
    Operations Advisor to ensure we are undertaking a whole of Department
    approach.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                               worsening threats
        5. Senator Inhofe. Ms. Baker, we've consistently heard testimony
    from our commanders and civilian experts that each of the five main
    threats (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, global terrorism) we face
    has worsened since the 2018 National Defense Strategy was published. Do
    you agree that each of these threats is getting worse?
        Ms. Baker. Many of the security trends and threats related to
    China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations
    (VEOs) that were present in 2018 remain in place today--and a number of
    them have accelerated or intensified. Most notably and for instance, as
    the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance notes, ``[China] is
    the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic,
    diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained
    challenge to a stable and open international system.'' For that reason,
    the Secretary of Defense has made clear that China is the Department's
    pacing threat. Additionally, other transnational threats--such as
    climate change and pandemics--pose newly acute risks for the United
    States and our allies and partners alike. If confirmed, I look forward
    to working in concert with other departments and agencies, and with
    allies and partners, to address the wide range of threats we face.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                                     taiwan
        6. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, if confirmed, would you support
    providing Taiwan with robust military training and expertise to ensure
    its armed forces present a combat-credible deterrent?
        Ms. Baker. I understand that Taiwan is seeking to modernize both
    its forces and capabilities in response to the threat posed by the PRC.
    If confirmed, I am committed to proactively supporting Taiwan's self-
    defense as provided for under the Taiwan Relations Act.

        7. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, would you consider such military
    support to include individual-and unit-level training, as well as
    training for operations that would make cooperation with United States
    and other militaries more effective if Taiwan required help to defend
    itself?
        Ms. Baker. I am committed to fulfilling all United States
    commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. Any response to a Taiwan
    contingency is also likely to rely on interoperability with capable
    allies and partners proficient in their warfighting roles.

        8. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, I realize that a primary goal for the
    United States is to enhance Taiwan's ability to engage in asymmetric
    warfare with a much stronger China, and I support that effort, but
    shouldn't we also be considering ways to help Taiwan defend itself from
    whatever Communist China might try to throw at it, such as an enhanced
    Iron Dome system or greater anti-missile defense systems to make it
    clear to General Secretary Xi Jinping that he will not be permitted to
    take Taiwan by force?
        Ms. Baker. As the Secretary has said, no one should doubt that we
    will continue to meet our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to
    support Taiwan's ability to defend itself. If confirmed, I would
    continue to support critical self-defense capabilities, such as short
    and medium-range air defense for Taiwan. I also agree that we need to
    consider ways to support Taiwan to resist all forms of coercion,
    including from a whole of government perspective.
                                  afghanistan
        9. Senator Scott. Ms. Baker, the failure of the Biden
    administration to get our citizens and partners out of Afghanistan
    before withdrawing our troops was a strategic failure, and a stain on
    our reputation. If confirmed, can you envision yourself ever supporting
    or advocating a mission or policy decision that would knowingly leave
    American citizens behind enemy lines?
        Ms. Baker. If confirmed, my primary responsibility will be
    protecting the security of the American people, including by meeting
    challenges abroad from State and non-State adversaries who threaten the
    United States and our allies.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                      national defense strategy and budget
        10. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, in light of nuclear capable
    hypersonic glide missiles launched by the Chinese, do you believe that
    a declining United States defense budget will improve or erode our
    competitive advantages over China?
        Ms. Baker. It is my understanding that the Department follows an
    approach that is strategy driven and resource informed. As a general
    matter, therefore, the Department articulates its strategy and relies
    on stable and consistent resourcing over time to achieve the tenets of
    that strategy--to include maintaining and strengthening our military's
    competitive advantages. The challenges of pacing to China not only
    require a healthy DOD budget, but also must be complemented by other
    high-priority efforts, to include developing and employing new
    operational concepts and integrating emerging technologies into our
    approaches. For that reason, if confirmed, I will focus not only on the
    DOD topline but what capabilities we purchase with that funding, and
    how those capabilities are employed.

        11. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, do you intend to advocate for the
    programs needed to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains credible
    and effective--including modernizing our aging nuclear weapons
    production infrastructure?
        Ms. Baker. Yes. The nuclear deterrence mission is critical to the
    security of the United States, and the triad is the bedrock of that
    deterrence. As Secretary Austin has explained, the service life of many
    elements of the nuclear triad has been extended long past the time it
    should have been modernized. We must continue to modernize the triad
    and sustain legacy nuclear delivery systems. If confirmed, I would also
    seek to prioritize the nuclear command, control, and communications
    (NC3) systems that are equally critical to our nuclear deterrent.

        12. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, do you agree that insufficient
    and unsafe working conditions, as exist throughout our Nation's nuclear
    weapons enterprise, are a readiness concern?
        Ms. Baker. It is essential that working conditions in the nuclear
    enterprise are safe--this is a no fail mission for DOD and the National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). If confirmed, I commit to
    better understanding the details surrounding the program of record for
    nuclear infrastructure in conjunction with NNSA and other OSD
    components.

        13. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, given the efforts of China and
    Russia in Africa, please elaborate on whether you see consistent U.S.
    troops levels and presence in the United States Africa Command
    (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR) as either mission critical or
    mission enhancing to our National Defense Strategy (NDS) implementation
    efforts?
        Ms. Baker. Both Russia and China have expanded their focus on
    Africa and use engagement in Africa to bolster their international
    standing, obtain access to raw materials, and undermine Western
    influence. It is mission essential to continue our ``by, with, and
    through'' approach to bolstering partner capabilities to achieve
    security and stability in Africa and support National Defense Strategy
    implementation. U.S. presence in the AOR to build capacity, operate
    transparently, and promote institutions and good governance for
    sustainable security helps to achieve objectives shared by us and our
    partners. I understand that these efforts have largely proven effective
    with a limited forward presence, and often our security cooperation
    enhances partner force operations, which achieve shared strategic
    objectives and build enduring relationships.

        14. Senator Blackburn. Ms. Baker, is reducing troop presence in
    Africa a priority for this Administration?
        Ms. Baker. DOD posture is a critical tool for advancing U.S.
    interests and enabling our regional partners. I understand that DOD
    conducts significant security cooperation initiatives, military
    exercises, and train and equip programs throughout Africa, and that we
    use our forward presence to build African partner capacity and support
    the efforts of other international partners. I believe our posture
    should always be driven by our strategy and the threat picture on the
    ground. I understand that the Department is aligning mission
    requirements with the President's strategic priorities, and evaluating
    the military posture and other tools required to meet those
    requirements. If confirmed, I will seek to carefully balance
    operational requirements, risk, readiness, and other global commitments
    in the United States Africa Command area of responsibility (AOR), and
    every AOR.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                            european burden sharing
        15. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, in 2014, NATO members agreed to
    spend at least 2 percent of their respective Gross Domestic Products
    (GDP) on defense by 2024. Would you agree that the security environment
    facing us today is very different from the one we faced in 2014?
        Ms. Baker. A number of key trends and threats that we saw in our
    assessments of the 2014 security environment remain serious challenges
    today, to include Russian aggression. Some challenges, such as the
    geopolitical and military threat posed by China, have also increased
    and intensified in their scope and scale. Moreover, a range of other
    cross-cutting challenges and trends are emerging and becoming more
    significant, to include pandemics and climate change.

        16. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, given dramatic changes to the
    security environment in the years since 2014, particularly as it
    relates to the rise of China, would you agree that it is time to
    reevaluate whether a 2 percent commitment by 2024 is still the right
    spending target for NATO?
        Ms. Baker. As NATO Allies, we all share the responsibility to
    procure, prepare, and provide ready forces and capabilities. I
    understand that non-U.S. defense spending has risen for seven
    consecutive years since the Wales Summit Defense Investment Pledge.
    While this progress is significant, we expect Allies to live up to
    their full commitment across the board--including cash, capabilities,
    and contributions--to ensure the Alliance is able to meet our shared
    responsibilities. If confirmed, I would seek to support the Under
    Secretary in working with our Allies on this broader definition of
    NATO's deterrence and defense posture and the question of burden
    sharing.
                            force planning construct
        17. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, the force planning construct in the
    2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) shifted focus from maintaining our
    ability to fight and win two regional conflicts at once to fighting and
    winning a single war against a great power, while deterring
    opportunistic aggression elsewhere. Do you agree with the force
    planning construct used in the 2018 NDS?
        Ms. Baker. Yes. While I agree with the general contours of the 2018
    Force Planning Construct, I believe it is appropriate for the
    Department to periodically review the Force Planning Construct to take
    into account changes in the security environment, as I understand DOD
    will do in the 2022 National Defense Strategy.

        18. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, Dr. Mara Karlin, performing the
    duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the
    Department's lead official for the upcoming NDS, wrote the following in
    August: ``I believe that the force planning construct should prioritize
    and focus on China unless . . . In particular, the threat China poses
    to Taiwan should be a priority in this vein. While the U.S. military
    will invariably need to juggle other challenges simultaneously, it
    would need to reprioritize those should a conflict with China arise.''
    Do you agree with Dr. Karlin's assessment?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, I agree with Dr. Karlin's assessment--China is the
    priority challenge for DOD and United States national security.
                            nuclear force structure
        19. Senator Hawley. Ms. Baker, do you think it would be wise for
    the United States to reduce the size or flexibility of United States
    nuclear forces at the same time as Russia is modernizing its forces,
    including limited nuclear options, and China is rapidly building out
    its own nuclear arsenal?
        Ms. Baker. The President has been clear that the United States must
    continue to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent and
    strong and credible extended deterrence to our allies, while also
    taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national
    security strategy. Any change to the size, posture or composition of
    U.S. nuclear forces must balance these considerations while accounting
    for the current and anticipated security environment and the overall
    costs of nuclear modernization. I understand that these are key
    considerations of the Department's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If
    confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the NPR process includes
    rigorous, fact-based analysis that takes into account the changing
    strategic environment.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Ms. Alexandra N. Baker,
    follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Ms. Alexandra N. Baker, which
    was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Alexandra
    N. Baker in connection with her nomination follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Ms. Alexandra N. Baker was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on February 9, 2022.]
                                     ______

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. John P. Coffey by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                          duties and responsibilities
        Question. Section 8019 of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
    position of the Department of the Navy General Counsel and provides
    that the General Counsel shall perform such functions as the Secretary
    of the Navy may prescribe.
        What is your understanding of the current duties and functions of
    the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the General Counsel (GC) of the
    Department of the Navy performs the duties and functions that are
    prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. The GC is the principal legal
    advisor to the Secretary and is the chief legal officer of the
    Department of the Navy. The GC provides or oversees the provision of
    legal advice and counsel to the Secretary of the Navy, the Under
    Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the
    civilian executive assistants, the staff assistants, and their staffs
    on matters affecting the Department of the Navy. The GC's legal
    opinions are controlling within the Department. The GC is also the head
    of the Office of the General Counsel. In this role, he is responsible
    for providing legal services throughout the Department on a variety of
    issues, including acquisition law and international transactions;
    business and commercial law; fiscal law; acquisition-related security
    cooperation matters; acquisition integrity; arms control and
    international arms regulation; intelligence and national security law;
    real and personal property law; civilian and military personnel; labor
    law; environmental law; occupational safety and health law; medical and
    health affairs law, including credentialing; education law;
    intellectual property law; law pertaining to cyberspace; ethics and
    standards of conduct; Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act
    law; legislation; and such other legal services as may be assigned to
    support the mission of the Navy and the Marine Corps or the discharge
    of other duties assigned by the Secretary. The GC is responsible for
    litigation in these areas, oversees litigation affecting the Department
    of the Navy, and coordinates with the Department of Justice, as
    necessary. The GC is the Designated Agency Ethics Official for the
    Department; oversees the Department's Acquisition Integrity Program and
    the Suspension and Debarment Official; manages the Alternative Dispute
    Resolution Program; advises and assists with the oversight of the Naval
    Criminal Investigative Service, and the Department's law enforcement
    and related activities; and assists the Under Secretary with overseeing
    all Department of the Navy intelligence and intelligence-related
    activities. The GC also coordinates with the Department of Defense and
    Military Department GCs in matters of mutual concern. Finally, it is my
    understanding that the GC maintains a close working relationship with
    the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps on issues of common interest.
        Question. What additional duties and functions do you expect the
    Secretary of the Navy to prescribe for you, if you are confirmed?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, I anticipate providing candid and
    accurate legal advice and counsel to the Secretary, the Under
    Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian
    executive assistants, the staff assistants, and their staffs. I also
    expect to lead the Office of the General Counsel to the best of my
    abilities while complying with the letter and the spirit of the law. I
    anticipate that the Secretary will want me to continue the
    collaborative working relationship previous General Counsels have
    established with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff
    Judge Advocate to the Commandant. Finally, I expect that the Secretary
    may prescribe additional duties, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Sec.
    8019.
        Question. In your opinion, who is the ``client'' of the Navy
    General Counsel?
        Answer. The Department of the Navy is the client.
        Question. What is your view of the responsibilities and authorities
    associated with the Navy General Counsel's designation as the Chief
    Legal Officer of the Department of the Navy?
        Answer. The General Counsel, as the Chief Legal Officer of the
    Department of the Navy, provides or oversees the provision of legal
    advice and counsel to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
    Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian executive assistants, the staff
    assistants, and their staffs on all issues affecting the Department
    subject to all legal requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the General Counsel
    of the Department of Defense in his/her role as the Chief Legal Officer
    of the Department of Defense?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively
    with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense on issues of
    mutual interest or concerns, and on issues affecting the Department of
    the Navy and the Department of Defense. The Navy General Counsel, as
    the Chief Legal Officer of the Department, determines the controlling
    legal position of the Department.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to effectuate
    your duties as the Designated Agency Ethics Official for the Department
    of the Navy?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, it will be my responsibility as the
    Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) to ensure that all Department
    of the Navy civilian and military personnel understand and follow all
    ethics laws and regulations. As a member of the Navy Secretariat, I
    will be responsible for ensuring that all Department of the Navy
    personnel, including my colleagues and myself, are held to the highest
    of ethical standards.
        Question. Is there value in a General Counsel's practice of
    ``preventive law'', in your view? How, if at all, would you encourage
    and engage in the practice of preventive law, if confirmed to be the
    Navy General Counsel?
        Answer. I strongly believe in the practice of ``preventive law.''
    To be successful, the practice of ``preventive law'' requires
    collaboration and communication between client and attorney to maintain
    the trust and candor that is critical to maintaining the relationship.
    If confirmed, I expect to provide candid, accurate legal advice and
    counsel to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
    Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian executive assistants, the staff
    assistants, and their staffs, and collaborate with them to spot issues
    and manage risk.
        Question. Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs encourage the
    use of alternative means of dispute resolution and conflict management
    practices as an integral part of normal business practices.
        What is your view of the role of the Navy General Counsel in
    facilitating the provision of ADR services to the Department of the
    Navy?
        Answer. ADR can efficiently resolve issues in controversy and
    effectively enable resources and personnel to remain focused on the
    Department of the Navy's mission. If confirmed, I would be responsible
    for managing the Department's ADR program. In my view, the role of the
    General Counsel is to resolve disputes and controversies at the
    earliest stage possible, on the best terms possible, and by the fastest
    and most efficient means possible, which will enable the Department to
    remain focused on mission. The General Counsel must ensure that the use
    of ADR is consistent with law, regulations, policy, and professional
    ethics.
        Question. Are there particular types of disputes in the context of
    Navy and Marine Corps operations, as to which you perceive ADR may be
    of particular utility?
        Answer. My belief is that ADR can be considered for any conflict or
    dispute, regardless of subject matter.
        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the Navy General
    Counsel and attorneys assigned to the Office of the Navy General
    Counsel play in developing and reviewing Navy and Marine Corps military
    personnel policies and advising on policy application in individual
    cases, including cases before the Board for Correction of Naval
    Records?
        Answer. It is my understanding that military personnel policy and
    practice is a matter under the cognizance of the Secretariat,
    specifically the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and
    Reserve Affairs (ASN (M&RA)) pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  8013,
    8014. ASN (M&RA) receives legal advice from a dedicated component of
    the Office of the General Counsel, whose members are experienced
    civilian attorneys, many of whom have worked in other Federal agencies
    and the private sector, and who are led by a member of the Senior
    Executive Service. It is my belief that these capable civilian
    attorneys possess the experience needed to work in this complex legal
    area and are aware that they should be proactive and engaged with the
    client. Specifically with regard to the BCNR, 10 U.S.C. Sec.  1552
    calls for the Secretary to act through civilian boards; as such it is
    entirely appropriate for attorneys of the Office of General Counsel to
    advise the Board.
                                 qualifications
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that
    qualify you to serve as the General Counsel of the Department of the
    Navy?
        Answer. As chief legal and chief ethics officer for the Department
    of the Navy, the Navy General Counsel must be a lawyer with sound legal
    skills and experience, a strong ethical compass, demonstrated
    leadership abilities, and a commitment to working collaboratively
    within and outside the Department. I believe my background and
    experience show that I meet these criteria.
        I received my law degree through the evening program at Georgetown
    University Law Center while stationed on active duty in Washington. I
    returned home to New York, where I have practiced law for over three
    decades and currently serve as Chair of Complex Litigation at Kramer
    Levin Naftalis & Frankel. Over the course of my legal career, I have
    handled significant litigation in courts all over the country, and been
    involved in several landmark cases. Among the more notable was the
    WorldCom securities litigation where, in addition to leading a team
    that secured one of the largest settlements in history, we fortified
    the principle of personal accountability by insisting that each senior
    individual involved in the scandal pay personally (that is, not rely
    simply on insurance). For a role with as broad a portfolio as the Navy
    General Counsel, I would if confirmed bring the perspective of a lawyer
    who has litigated both as a plaintiff's lawyer and defense lawyer, and
    who has both represented major institutions and taken on powerful
    institutions. My varied docket has included matters involving breach of
    contract; intellectual property; accounting; environmental issues;
    housing; veterans' benefits; securities; bankruptcy; and international
    law. In addition, I served for several years as a Federal prosecutor in
    the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, an
    experience that I believe will enhance my ability, if confirmed, to
    interact with the Justice Department on matters where it represents the
    Department of the Navy. With regard to issues of ethics and integrity,
    I served on the board of Common Cause New York for over a decade and
    was active in seeking to advance ethics in government and hold public
    officials accountable for misconduct. In what I believe was an
    endorsement of my reputation for probity and ethics, I was selected by
    an organization comprised of notable attorneys and sitting Federal
    judges to serve as President of the Federal Bar Foundation (a position
    I still hold). I believe that, if confirmed, my broad experience on
    handling some of the country's most challenging and impactful cases,
    building effective teams, and providing candid and timely counsel on
    thorny legal issues have prepared me well to serve as Navy General
    Counsel.
        If confirmed, I would also bring to the role over thirty years of
    experience in the Navy in both operational and plans and policy
    billets. After graduating from the Naval Academy, I served as a Naval
    Flight Officer in P-3C Orion squadrons for 16 of the next twenty-six
    years (four on active duty and the balance as a Reservist). Based
    largely in Maine, I commanded aircrews that deployed to the Atlantic,
    Pacific, and Indian Oceans, as well as the Mediterranean, Caribbean,
    South China, and Northern Arabian Seas. In addition to tracking Soviet
    submarines during the cold war, I flew surface reconnaissance missions,
    armed missions to enforce the United Nations embargo of the former
    Yugoslavia, and counter-narcotic missions over the Caribbean and South
    America. I was selected to command a reserve P-3C squadron (Patrol
    Squadron 92) and, after promotion to Captain, served as commanding
    officer of the Reserve component of the Enterprise carrier battle group
    staff (CCDG-12). My extensive operational experience was complemented
    by three tours in Washington. As a junior officer on active duty, I
    served in the Strategy Division in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-
    5) of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as the personal
    aide to Vice President George Bush. In my final tour of duty, I served
    for 4 years in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Reserve Affairs, focused primarily on the use of reservists in the wars
    in Iraq and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I believe that my effectiveness
    as Navy General Counsel will be enhanced by my experiences in the
    Fleet, the Pentagon and the White House.
        In sum, I believe that my background and these varied experiences
    qualify me to serve as Navy General Counsel.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any actions you need to
    take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Navy General
    Counsel?
        Answer. I believe I have the legal skills, leadership qualities,
    and ethical compass necessary to perform the duties of Navy General
    Counsel. If confirmed, I would of course seek to learn as much about my
    new client as expeditiously as possible, a process that I believe would
    be enhanced by my own military experiences in Washington and in the
    Fleet. I would look to be briefed on the major legal challenges facing
    the Department and to develop an understanding of how best to provide
    sound, candid, and timely legal advice regarding those and other issues
    to Secretary Del Toro and the other clients of the Office of the
    General Counsel. In doing so I anticipate that I would benefit from the
    experience and knowledge of the career civilian lawyers in the Office,
    and, if confirmed, I would work to develop strong and productive
    relationships with those lawyers. I would also work to forge a
    cooperative and respectful relationship with the uniformed leaders of
    the Navy Judge Advocate General and the Marine Corps Staff Judge
    Advocate. I believe that developing strong working relationships with
    the General Counsel of the Defense Department as well as the general
    counsels of the other services will also be important, and I would look
    for opportunities to benefit from their knowledge and experiences.
    Consistent with how I have led legal teams and military units
    throughout my legal and military careers, I would if confirmed work
    collaboratively with others to ensure that the Office of the General
    Counsel provides the finest legal services to the Department and does
    its part to care for our sailors, marines, civilians and their
    families.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What do you see as the most significant legal and policy
    issues the Department of the Navy will be required to address in the
    coming year?
        Answer. I believe that readiness, lethality, and modernization are
    essential requirements for both the Department of the Navy and the
    Department of Defense. Addressing these issues requires timely,
    accurate, candid, and well-reasoned legal advice. If I am confirmed, I
    will ensure that the Navy legal community is proactively engaged with
    our clients to implement these priorities. I will encourage our clients
    seek advice and counsel from the Office of the General Counsel on every
    major decision impacting the Navy, not just on legal questions or
    issues. I will identify and seek the resources necessary to recruit and
    retain the high-caliber and diverse legal talent needed to assist the
    Department in meeting its ever-changing requirements.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you will face if confirmed as the Navy General Counsel?
        Answer. I believe that a significant challenge that the Department
    of the Navy faces is maximizing the Navy and Marine Corps maritime
    dominance in an era of strategic competition. This challenge is
    complicated by emerging threats that cause disruptions in the
    international order by other State and non-State actors. If confirmed,
    I anticipate opportunities to drive a culture within the Department
    that ensures every military member and civilian employee is treated
    with respect; to eliminate harmful behaviors, including sexual
    harassment, sexual assault and suicide; to address climate change and
    the climate resilience of our infrastructure and systems; to strengthen
    our strategic partnerships and alliances; and to come through the
    Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic with a healthy, ready and capable
    force.
        The Department of the Navy must address these challenges with the
    assistance of candid, accurate, and timely legal advice from a
    proactive group of military and civilian attorneys working
    collaboratively together. If I am confirmed, my major challenge will be
    to ensure that there are sufficient resources to recruit, hire, and
    retain talented, diverse, and dedicated attorneys and professional
    staff to meet the ever-changing requirements of the Department.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Navy legal
    community is proactively engaged with our clients to find innovative
    and legally sufficient solutions to address and overcome these
    challenges. I will personally review the resources, organization, and
    operation of the Office of the General Counsel to identify
    developmental opportunities and to find the appropriate resources to
    complete these efforts. I will also work collaboratively with the
    Secretary of the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the
    Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to ensure that there are
    adequate legal resources across the Department to address these
    challenges.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad parameters would you establish
    in terms of the types of legal and policy issues on which you and the
    other attorneys comprising the Office of the Navy General Counsel
    should be consulted?
        Answer. As discussed above, I would ensure that the Office of the
    General Counsel is proactively engaged with our clients to support the
    Department's mission and priorities, using the legal skills and
    expertise in the areas under the cognizance of the Office of the
    General Counsel, providing candid, innovative and timely legal options
    to decisionmakers and collaborating with the Judge Advocate General of
    the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, as needed.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus the
    Office of the Navy General Counsel on your broad priorities and
    significant legal issues?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, my first action will be to review the
    work already being done by Office of General Counsel attorneys and
    determine what, if any, actions are needed to ensure they are able to
    meet my foremost priority, which will be to ensure that the Department
    of the Navy continues to receive the highest quality legal advice and
    counsel to meet the Department's mission and support our sailors,
    marines, civilians and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
    productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
    the Department of the Navy?
        Answer. Congress is a vital partner in implementing the National
    Defense Strategy and Secretary Austin's priorities of defending the
    Nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork, as
    well Secretary Del Toro's focus on maintaining maritime dominance,
    empowering our people, and strengthening strategic partnerships. If I
    am confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that
    the Department works closely with Congress and that the Department is
    transparent, proactive, and responsive to congressional requests.
                        civilian control of the military
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that your tenure as Navy General Counsel epitomizes the fundamental
    requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the
    U.S. Constitution and other laws?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, I will support the Secretary in fully
    exercising his Title 10 responsibilities to the Department of the Navy.
    As General Counsel, I will advise the Secretary on his statutory and
    regulatory duties when conducting the business of the Department of the
    Navy, both at his request and when I determine that a matter requires
    his attention.
        Question. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the
    National Defense Strategy Commission observed, ``there is an imbalance
    in civil-military relations on critical issues . . . Civilian voices
    appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and
    national security policy.''
        Do you agree with this assessment? If confirmed, how would you
    ensure inclusion of the Navy General Counsel in the discussion, debate,
    and resolution of Department of the Navy, defense, and national
    security issues?
        Answer. Currently, I am not in a position to agree or disagree with
    this assessment. If I am confirmed, I will work to build strong client
    relationships with the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
    Secretaries of the Navy, the civilian executive assistants, the staff
    assistants, and their staffs to ensure I am able to provide candid,
    accurate, and timely legal advice so we can resolve Department of the
    Navy, defense, and national security issues as a team.
    relationship with the judge advocate general of the navy and the staff
              judge advocate to the commandant of the marine corps
        Question. How are the responsibilities and authorities for
    providing legal services, including the responsibility for the
    provision of ethics advice to senior officials, to the Department of
    the Navy and the Marine Corps allocated between the General Counsel of
    the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The General Counsel performs such duties and function as
    prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. The General Counsel of the
    Navy is the principal legal advisor to the Secretary and the chief
    legal officer of the Department of the Navy. The General Counsel
    provides, or oversees the provision of, legal advice and counsel to the
    Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy,
    the civilian executive assistants, the staff assistants, and their
    staffs on all issues affecting the Department. The General Counsel's
    legal opinions are controlling within the Department. Further, the
    General Counsel leads the Office of the General Counsel. In this role,
    the General Counsel provides, or oversees the provision of, legal
    services in the Department in a multitude of areas, including
    acquisition law and related international transactions; acquisition-
    related matters; acquisition integrity; arms control and international
    arms regulation; business and commercial law; real and personal
    property law; civilian and military personnel and labor law; fiscal
    law; environmental law; occupational safety and health law;
    intellectual property law; intelligence and national security law; law
    related to cyberspace; ethics and standards of conduct; Freedom of
    Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act law; legislation; education law;
    medical and health affairs law, including credentialing; and such other
    legal services as may be assigned to support the mission of the Navy
    and the Marine Corps or the discharge other duties assigned by the. The
    General Counsel is also responsible for litigation in each of these
    areas and oversees litigation affecting the Department. The GC
    coordinates with the Department of Justice, as needed. Furthermore, the
    General Counsel is the Navy's Designated Agency Ethics Official, is
    responsible for overseeing the Acquisition Integrity program, managing
    the Alternative Dispute Resolution program, and advising and assisting
    with the oversight of Department of the Navy intelligence and
    intelligence-related activities, the Naval Criminal Investigative
    Service (NCIS), and Department of the Navy law enforcement and related
    investigative activities. Finally, the General Counsel must maintain a
    close and collaborative relationship with the Judge Advocate General of
    the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps on issues of common interest.
        It is my understanding that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
    reports directly to the Secretary and provides independent legal and
    policy advice on military justice, administrative law, claims,
    investigations, operational and international law, legal assistance,
    and civil law. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy also provides
    legal and policy advice to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Staff
    Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps is the senior
    uniformed attorney in the Marine Corps, and is responsible for
    providing independent legal advice to the Secretary on matters as
    assigned by the Secretary, and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    and other officers and officials of the Marine Corps. The Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant supervises and manages legal issues arising
    in the Marine Corps that relate to military justice, operational and
    international law, civil and administrative law, and legal assistance.
    It is also my understanding that the responsibilities of the General
    Counsel, the Judge Advocate General, and the Staff Judge Advocate to
    the Commandant overlap in the areas of environmental law; intelligence
    and national security law; law related to cyberspace; FOIA and
        Privacy Act law; legislation; litigation; and ethics and standards
    of conduct.
        Section 8088 of Title 10 prohibits interference with the ability of
    the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to give independent legal advice
    to the Secretary. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy also directs
    the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of their duties
    and is primarily responsible for providing legal advice regarding the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military
    discipline. Section 8046 of Title 10 prohibits interference with the
    ability of the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps to give independent legal advice to the Commandant. The Staff
    Judge Advocate's principal role is to be the senior uniformed legal
    advisor on military justice, administrative law, international and
    operational law, and legal assistant matters to the Commandant. If I am
    confirmed, I will continue to enhance the strong cooperative and
    collaborative relationship between the General Counsel and the Judge
    Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant.
        Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
    the General Counsel of the Navy and the Counsel to the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps? Do you believe this relationship is appropriate, or
    does it require review?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Counsel to the Commandant is a
    civilian attorney within the Office of the General Counsel assigned by
    the General Counsel to support the Commandant and the Marine Corps and
    who provides legal advice in the areas under the oversight of the
    General Counsel. This alignment is consistent with the relationship of
    other senior civilian attorneys assigned to organizations across the
    Department. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that there is a strong
    relationship between the General Counsel and the Counsel to the
    Commandant so the Marine Corps continues to receive candid, accurate,
    and timely legal advice.
        Question. What is your understanding of the allocation of
    responsibilities and authorities for providing legal services to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps between the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Counsel to the Commandant? Do
    you believe this relationship is appropriate, or does it require
    review?
        Answer. As previously stated, the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps is the senior uniformed attorney to the
    Commandant. The Staff Judge Advocate is responsible for providing
    independent legal advice to the Secretary on matters as assigned by the
    Secretary and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and other officers
    and officials of the Marine Corps. The Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant supervises and manages legal issues arising in the Marine
    Corps that relate to military justice, operational and international
    law, civil and administrative law, and legal assistance. As a member of
    the Office of General Counsel, the Counsel to the Commandant is
    responsible for providing legal advice under the oversight of the
    General Counsel. If I am confirmed, I will review this relationship to
    ensure there is a strong cooperative and collaborative relationship
    between the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the Office of
    General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant, so the Marine
    Corps continues to receive candid, accurate, and timely legal advice.
        Question. In your view, is the allocation of responsibilities and
    authorities for the provision of legal services to the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps by the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the
    Counsel to the Commandant the same as the allocation of
    responsibilities and authorities for legal services provided to the
    Chief of Naval Operations by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
    the General Counsel of the Navy? If not, how do these allocations of
    responsibility and authority differ and why are they different?
        Answer. The Office of the General Counsel, including the Counsel to
    the Commandant, and the Navy and Marine Corps uniformed judge advocates
    are partners in the Navy's legal team. If I am confirmed, I anticipate
    that the Office of General Counsel will continue to work closely and
    collaboratively with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the
    Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to provide the Chief of Naval
    Operations and the Commandant with coordinated legal advice across the
    spectrum of their duties and responsibilities.
        Question. In your view, what is the purpose underpinning the
    assignment of a senior civilian attorney as Counsel to the Commandant
    of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. A senior civilian attorney is assigned as Counsel to the
    Commandant in order to provide business and business-related legal
    advice, which is the Office of General Counsel's primary function. The
    Office of General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant, has
    developed in-depth expertise in these areas, which are vital to the
    Department of the Navy's mission and which provide clients with
    continuity of support.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role and authority of
    the Judge Advocate General of the Navy vis-a-vis the Special Counsel
    for the Chief of Naval Operations?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Judge Advocate General
    serves as Special Assistant for Legal Services to the Chief of Naval
    Operations to advise him in formulating and executing policies related
    to providing legal services within the Navy. The Special Counsel to the
    Chief of Naval Operations is a Navy Judge Advocate captain assigned to
    the Chief of Naval Operations' staff.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Judge Advocate
    General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps in carrying out your duties?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, I expect to continue and further
    strengthen the General Counsel's strong working relationship with the
    Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps by ensuring close coordination,
    collaboration, consultation, and communication on issues affecting the
    Department of the Navy.
        Question. In response to attempts within the Department of Defense
    to subordinate legal functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates
    General to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the
    General Counsels of the Military Departments, Congress enacted
    legislation prohibiting DOD officers or employees from interfering with
    the ability of the Judge Advocates General, the Staff Judge Advocate to
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Legal Advisor to the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide independent legal
    advice to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Service
    Chiefs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        What is your view of the authority of the Judge Advocate General of
    the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps, particularly with regard to the provision of independent legal
    advice to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. Section 8088 of Title 10 prohibits interference with the
    ability of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to give independent
    legal advice to the Secretary. Similarly, section 8046 of Title 10
    prohibits interference with the ability of the Staff Judge Advocate to
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps to give independent legal advice to
    the Commandant. My opinion is that these statutory authorities should
    be respected and are sufficient to ensure that the Judge Advocate
    General and the Staff Judge Advocate can provide independent legal
    advice to the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will continue to
    strengthen this productive and collaborative partnership for the
    benefit of the Department.
        Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Navy and
    Marine Corps judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to
    military commanders and other Military Service officials and employees?
        Answer. I believe that it is essential that Navy and Marine Corps
    judge advocates provide legal advice to military commanders and other
    Military Service officials free of improper external influence.
    Uniformed judge advocates bring a different experience and perspective
    to the practice of law that is shaped by their service. This
    perspective should not be marginalized or silenced. My opinion is that
    this perspective enhances the decisionmaking process. While there
    should be coordination across the Navy legal communities, the judge
    advocates must be able to provide candid, frank, independent, and
    objective legal advice to their clients.
        Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes in the
    current relationships between the Navy General Counsel and the Judge
    Advocate General of the Navy and between the Navy General Counsel,
    including through the Counsel to the Commandant, and the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any changes that need to be
    made to the relationship between the uniformed judge advocates and the
    General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant. I understand
    that the General Counsel, including the Counsel to the Commandant, the
    Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant, and their teams enjoy a collaborative and close working
    relationship. If confirmed, I will review these relationships and make
    every effort to strengthen the relationships between the uniformed
    judge advocates and the Office of the General Counsel.
        Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the
    current relationships and/or allocation of responsibilities between
    uniformed Military Service judge advocates and attorneys of the Office
    of the Navy General Counsel?
        Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any changes that need to be
    made. If confirmed, I intend to continue to strengthen the relationship
    between the uniformed judge advocates and the civilian attorneys and
    will partner with the military legal community. Should any changes to
    the responsibilities assigned to the civilian or military legal
    communities be identified in the future, I would expect that the
    uniformed lawyers and civilian attorneys will partner with one another
    to propose any necessary changes.
        Question. In your view, are legal opinions of the Navy's Office of
    the General Counsel binding on all Navy and Marine Corps attorneys?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the legal opinions of the
    General Counsel, as the Department's Chief Legal Officer, are the
    controlling legal opinions within the Department. I also understand
    that the General Counsel frequently collaborates with the Judge
    Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant on legal opinions. If I am confirmed, I will make every
    effort to ensure that my legal opinions take into account the expertise
    of both the civilian and uniformed members of the Navy legal community,
    as appropriate.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that controlling legal
    opinions of your office are available to all Navy and Marine Corps
    attorneys, including judge advocates?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the legal opinions of the
    Office of the General Counsel are disseminated throughout the
    Department via normal Departmental distribution processes. If I am
    confirmed, I would continue this process and determine if other methods
    of distribution are available to ensure widest dissemination of the
    legal opinions.
        Question. If confirmed, are there specific matters on which your
    predecessor Navy General Counsels have issued legal opinions that you
    would expect to reconsider and possibly revise? If so, which opinions,
    in which practice areas, do you believe might merit reconsideration?
        Answer. I am not aware of any legal opinions that need to be
    reconsidered or revised. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the
    Office of the General Counsel works collaboratively with civilian and
    uniformed members of the Navy legal community to update any legal
    opinions that warrant reconsideration or revisions based on changes to
    controlling statutes or regulations, policy, or precedent.
        Question. Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice assigns
    to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and
    the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
    responsibility for the supervision of the administration of military
    justice.
        How do you view the role and responsibilities of the Navy General
    Counsel in the supervision and oversight of military justice matters
    vis-a-vis the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. My view is that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
    the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant have the statutory
    responsibility to ensure proper administration of the military justice
    system and have primary jurisdiction over military justice issues in
    the Department of the Navy. If I am confirmed, I will work to continue
    the strong and effective relationship with the Judge Advocate General
    of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, in which
    our offices share information and work collaboratively as appropriate
    to resolve policy issues and issues related to specific cases,
    recognizing that they have express statutory responsibility for, and
    expertise in, this area of law.
        In his letter forwarding to Congress the recommendations of the
    Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military,
    Secretary of Defense Austin stated that he intended to create dedicated
    offices in the Secretariat of each Military Department to handle the
    prosecution of special victim crimes.
        Question. Were Secretary Austin's proposal to be implemented, what
    role would you expect the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the
    Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to have in
    the operation and oversight of this Secretariat office and the special
    victim prosecutors assigned thereto, particularly given the intent that
    any such office and special victim prosecutors are intended to be
    ``outside the chain of command''?
        Answer. I support Secretary Austin's efforts to eliminate sexual
    harassment and sexual assault in the military by implementing
    meaningful reforms, some proposed by the Independent Review Commission,
    including by removing prosecution decisions related to these crimes
    from the chain of command. I understand that the legislative amendments
    to the Uniform Code of Military Justice necessary to effectuate that
    particular reform are presently under consideration. If confirmed, I
    will be wholly committed to working with Department of the Navy
    leaders, including the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff
    Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to implement any
    directed reform in accordance with law and Department policy.
        Question. What role would you expect the General Counsel of the
    Navy to play in the operations and oversight of this Secretariat office
    and the special victim prosecutors assigned thereto?
        Answer. If confirmed, as the principal legal advisor to the
    Secretary, I will work with the Secretary, the Judge Advocate General
    of the Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps to implement the policies established by the Secretary of
    Defense to ensure that all investigations and prosecutions, including
    those related to sexual assault and sexual harassment, are conducted
    professionally, in accordance with due process of law, and protect the
    statutory rights of all, including those of victims.
        Question. Would you foresee a role for the DOD General Counsel in
    the operations and oversight of this Department of the Navy Secretariat
    Office? If so, what would be the appropriate role for DOD General
    Counsel, in your view?
        Answer. I understand that Secretary Austin proposed that the
    Component Department Offices of the Special Victim Prosecutor would
    receive appropriate legal oversight and guidance from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, consistent with existing practice. I have not had
    the opportunity to learn the specific practices employed within the
    Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will learn the DOD's oversight
    practices and I will work closely and collaboratively with the General
    Counsel of the Department of Defense on issues of mutual interest or
    concern.
        Question. In your view, how do unlawful command influence and the
    appearance of unlawful command influence jeopardize the credibility of,
    and public confidence in the military justice system?
        Answer. Unlawful command influence and even the appearance of
    unlawful command influence has a detrimental impact on the military
    justice system. The public, and especially sailors and marines, must be
    able to rely on a properly functioning military justice system. In
    order to maintain confidence, the Department of the Navy must maintain
    a military justice system that ensures that commanders and military
    prosecutors are free to act with independent discretion; the accused
    has the full and equal ability to obtain evidence and witnesses; and
    members of the court-martial are free to decide the case based on the
    evidence presented and the law as instructed by the military judge.
    When the actions or statements of civilian or military leaders impede
    the exercise of this discretion, it can have a widespread detrimental
    effect. If confirmed, I will work with the Judge Advocate of the Navy
    and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to
    ensure that there are appropriate policies and training to promote
    public confidence in the military justice system, and to ensure that
    the military justice system operates in a fair and efficient manner.
        Question. In your view, would the placement of the special victim
    prosecutions office in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy raise
    any particular concerns with regard to the unlawful command influence
    or the appearance of same with regard to the conduct of special victim
    prosecutions? If so, what steps would you take to eliminate or mitigate
    such concerns?
        Answer. As previously stated, unlawful command influence and the
    appearance of unlawful command influence can have a detrimental impact
    on the military justice system. The public should be able to rely on a
    properly functioning military justice system. If confirmed, I will work
    with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish training
    and policies to ensure placement of the special victim prosecutions
    office in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy does not erode public
    confidence in the military justice system.
        Question. What role should the Navy General Counsel play, in your
    perspective, in ensuring that all sailors and marines accused of a
    criminal offense receive a fair trial and due process?
        Answer. While the General Counsel of the Navy is the principal
    legal advisor to the Secretary and the Chief Legal Officer of the
    Department of the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the
    Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant are primarily responsible for
    providing independent legal advice on military justice matters. If I am
    confirmed, I will work with the Judge Advocate General and the Staff
    Judge Advocate to the Commandant to ensure appropriate policies and
    training to guarantee that all sailors and marines accused of a
    criminal offense receive a fair trial and due process.
        Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
    of proposals to remove from military commanders case disposition
    authority over most felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice?
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense has committed to doing more to
    counter sexual assault and sexual harassment, and I am fully supportive
    of these efforts. Commanders must be held accountable for both the good
    and the bad in their commands. Commanders must have the tools needed to
    promote mission readiness, good order and discipline, and unit morale,
    and must be held accountable. The ability to refer cases for trial by
    court-martial is one of those tools. The commander's case disposition
    authority is a vital tool to establish good order and discipline, and
    to demonstrate acceptable behaviors. If confirmed, I will work with
    Department leadership to assess the impact of any proposals to remove
    case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code
    of Military Justice from military commanders.
        Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found
    that the timing, amount, and mix of legal training provided to
    commanders may not be meeting their needs.
        If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in
    ensuring that military commanders receive the legal training they need
    properly to effectuate their role in the military justice system?
        Answer. I am not familiar with the legal training that is currently
    provided to commanders to effectuate their role in the military justice
    system. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively with the Judge
    Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps to determine the most effective means of
    meeting the training needs for the Department's military commanders.
        Question. In your view, does the Department of the Navy have a
    sufficient number of military and civilian attorneys to meet mission
    requirements?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have the information needed to
    assess whether the Department has a sufficient number of attorneys to
    perform its ongoing missions. If confirmed, I will review the civilian
    staffing of the Office of General Counsel and work with the Judge
    Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant to ensure that the Department has a sufficient number of
    highly talented and efficient military and civilian attorneys to meet
    the Department's requirements while reducing any redundancies.
        Question. Judge Advocates in the Navy and Marine Corps benefit from
    an established career progression, substantial mentoring and training
    opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal practice areas
    and leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the
    Military Departments normally do not have established career programs
    and may do the same work for many years, with promotions based solely
    upon longevity and vacancies.
        If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to recruit,
    hire, and retain high quality civilian attorneys and provide sufficient
    opportunities for their development and advancement through positions
    of increasing responsibility and leadership in the career civilian
    component of the Navy and Marine Corps legal community?
        Answer. I understand that the Department has a robust recruiting
    program and hires outstanding civilian attorneys. If I am confirmed, I
    will work closely with the senior leadership of the Office of the
    General Counsel to ensure that the Office continues its efforts to
    recruit, hire, retain, and develop highly skilled and effective
    attorneys to satisfy the Department's needs.
        Question. Do you foresee that in the coming years, the Department
    of the Navy's demand for civilian attorneys in particular low-density
    legal specialties or areas of technical legal expertise (e.g., cyber
    law, the space domain, intellectual property) will increase,
    commensurate with the Department's evolving missions? If so, in what
    legal specialties would you expect the Navy and Marine Corps'
    requirements for legal services to increase, and why?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have specific information about the
    number of types of attorneys assigned to each of the Office of General
    Counsel's practice areas. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that
    the Department recruits, retains, and develops the right number of
    attorneys in the appropriate technical practice areas required to
    support the Department's changing legal needs.
        Question. Do you believe the Office of the Navy General Counsel
    needs additional recruitment incentives and talent management tools to
    recruit, develop, sustain, and retain highly competent career civilian
    attorney workforce capable of meeting current and future mission
    requirements? If so, what sort of incentives and tools would be
    helpful?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Office of the General
    Counsel has successful recruiting and retention programs. I am not
    aware that any new recruitment incentives or talent management tools
    are needed.
                                detainee matters
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
    addressing legal issues regarding detention under the law of armed
    conflict?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense Office
    of General Counsel is primarily responsible for addressing this issue.
    If confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively with the General
    Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Judge Advocate General of the
    Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to address legal
    issues regarding detention under the law of armed conflict that arise
    within the Department of the Navy.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
        Answer. Yes. I support the standards for detainee treatment set
    forth in these documents and compliance with applicable legal
    obligations regarding detention and treatment of detainees.
        Question. What role, if any, do you believe the Navy General
    Counsel should play in the interpretation of international and domestic
    law and DOD policy governing the treatment and interrogation of
    detainees? What role, if any, should the Judge Advocate General of the
    Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    play in the interpretation of laws and policies pertaining to
    detainees?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense Office
    of General Counsel is primarily responsible for addressing this issue.
    If confirmed and called upon to give legal advice on this issue, I will
    work closely with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the
    Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps on the interpretation of law and policy
    applicable to detainees, to ensure that the Department of the Navy
    adheres to all of its legal obligations under the Constitution,
    treaties, and laws of the United States.
        Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
    facility at Guantanamo?
        Answer. The United States should ensure the continued safe, humane,
    and legal care and treatment of detainees. If the Guantanamo detention
    facility is identified for closure, I will work the Secretary of the
    Navy and Department of Defense leadership to carry out this intent.
        Question. In your view, does the United States have the legal
    authority to continue detaining alleged members and supporters of Al
    Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy combatants, without charges or
    prosecution?
        Answer. Yes. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
    (AUMF), along with the 2002 AUMF and the President's constitutional
    authorities, provide the United States with the legal authority to
    detain members and associated forces of al-Qaeda and the Taliban as
    enemy combatants. Congress and the Federal courts have confirmed that
    the executive branch has the authority to detain individuals who were
    part of, or substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
    associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
    States or its coalition partners. This authority includes the power to
    detain any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
    supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy forces.
        Question. How does the withdrawal of United States forces from
    Afghanistan affect the Department's authority to detain unlawful enemy
    combatants at Guantanamo? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. It does not. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
    Force (AUMF) and the President's constitutional authority is not
    impacted by the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan.
    The Department still maintains authority to detain unlawful enemy
    combatants at Guantanamo under the 2001 AUMF regardless of the status
    of forces in Afghanistan.
        Question. In your view, does the United States have the legal
    authority to detain ISIS fighters as enemy combatants?
        Answer. It is my understanding that ISIS fighters are considered
    ``associated forces'' pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, and, as described
    above, could therefore be detained as enemy combatants.
        Question. As the Guantanamo detainee population ages, detainees are
    increasingly subject to chronic, age-related illnesses and injuries. In
    addition, it is asserted that many detainees show signs of mental
    health conditions.
        In your view, what standard should the United States apply to the
    medical care, including mental and behavioral health care, provided to
    detainees?
        Answer. Adequate and humane care for the detainees at Guantanamo
    that complies with the standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions of 1949 is an important part of the mission. As the
    detainee population ages and detainees experience chronic medical
    conditions, we will continue to apply Department policy and relevant
    laws to protect the health and well-being of Guantanamo detainees.
        Question. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law
    by Section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA), is conducted ``to determine whether certain individuals
    detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to
    the security of the United States such that their continued detention
    is warranted''.
        Do you support continuing the process of PRB determinations, and
    the transfer of detainees based on those determinations, subject to
    restrictions currently in law?
        Answer. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by
    section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA), is conducted ``to determine whether certain individuals
    detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to
    the security of the United States such that their continued detention
    is warranted.'' I support this process.
               authorization for the use of military force (aumf)
        Question. In your view, under what circumstances should the
    President seek authorization from Congress before using military force?
        Answer. The War Powers Resolution states that ``the President in
    every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
    United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where
    imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
    circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult
    regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no
    longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such
    situations.'' If I am confirmed and called upon to provide legal advice
    on the issue, I would support following the procedures and standards
    laid out in the War Powers Resolution.
        Question. In your view, should the American public be provided a
    clear, unclassified explanation of the legal and policy frameworks
    under which military force can be used abroad generally, and in each
    specific case in which the President authorizes such a use of force?
        Answer. I believe the American public should have access to
    explanations of frameworks under which military force can be used
    abroad, as well as specific cases in which the President authorizes
    such use, when in the national security interests of the United States,
    and when following Department of Defense policies, as well as any other
    applicable policies and statutes.
        Congress enacted the 2001 AUMF shortly after 9/11 to provide the
    President authority to take action against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
    their associated forces, and to detain enemy personnel captured during
    the course of the armed conflict.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current interpretation
    and application of the 2001 AUMF?
        Answer. My understanding is that current interpretation of the 2001
    AUMF provides the President with the legal authority to use force
    against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, including the
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
        Question. How is the application of that authorization affected by
    the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. The authorization remains in effect regardless of the
    status of United States forces in Afghanistan. The use of force in
    Afghanistan relied on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
    Force (AUMF).
        Question. Congress enacted the 2002 AUMF in the run-up to the 2003
    United States invasion of Iraq. It authorized the United States to
    defend against the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime and weapons
    of mass destruction program. The Administration has stated that it does
    not rely solely on the 2002 AUMF as the legal basis for any ongoing
    military operations.
        Do you share the view that the 2002 AUMF does not provide the sole
    legal basis for any ongoing military operation?
        Answer. My understanding is that the United States does not
    currently rely on the 2002 AUMF as the sole domestic legal basis for
    any ongoing operations, and that administrations have cited the statute
    as additional authority to support counterterrorism operations for at
    least the last 10 years. If confirmed and called upon to do so, I will
    evaluate this issue.
        Question. In your view, can the 2002 AUMF be rescinded without
    significantly affecting ongoing DOD operations? Should it be rescinded?
    Please explain your answers.
        Answer. The 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military
    Force and the President's constitutional authority provide the domestic
    authority to conduct counter-terrorism operations. I am not familiar
    with all aspects of ongoing DOD operations or the impact of rescinding
    the 2002 AUMF. If confirmed and called upon to do so, I will review the
    issue.
                            military commissions act
        Question. In your view, have the military commissions constituted
    pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2009 provided an effective
    forum for trying violations of the law of armed conflict in the context
    of the global war on terrorism?
        Answer. In my view, the Military Commissions Act provides
    appropriate standards and processes for trials of alien unprivileged
    enemy belligerents for offenses against the law of armed conflict and
    others traditionally triable by military commission.
        Question. In your view, what are the advantages, if any, of
    prosecuting alleged terrorists by military commission?
        Answer. Military commission procedures comply with U.S. and
    international law. They provide a just forum for trying alleged
    terrorists for terrorism-related offenses. However, there are legal and
    procedural challenges due to the number of unsettled legal and
    procedural issues.
        Question. What changes, if any, to the Military Commissions Act of
    2009 would you propose, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate any proposed
    amendments to the Military Commissions Act of 2009. Presently, I do not
    have any specific proposals.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        Question. Military and civilian leaders in the Department of
    Defense have advocated for accession to the United Nations Convention
    on the Law of the Sea, stressing the benefits to U.S. national
    security.
        Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on
    the Law of the Sea?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the U.S. Navy already acts in a
    manner consistent with the principles of navigation and overflight
    outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. If
    confirmed, I will take a closer look at the Convention and work with my
    colleagues within the Department and interagency to consider the issue.
        Question. From a national security standpoint, what are the
    advantages and disadvantages to being a party to the Convention?
        Answer. While I have not worked on the issue closely in the past,
    it is my understanding that acceding to the Convention would strengthen
    our global security posture and put us on a more equal footing with
    States that are party to it, such as China and Russia. Accession would
    enable the United States to reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and
    uses of the sea and airspace recognized in the Convention, including
    the navigational and overflight rights that are critical to the global
    mobility of U.S. forces.
        Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would United States
    accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging
    maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
        Answer. It is my understanding that acceding to the Convention
    would improve our ability to maintain freedom of navigation and
    challenge excessive maritime claims made by our adversaries in regions
    like the South China Sea and the Arctic, and allow us to avail
    ourselves of all the tools and mechanisms available to parties to the
    Convention.
        Question. What do you view as the role of the General Counsel of
    the Department of the Navy in providing advice regarding the law of the
    sea and accession to the Convention?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
    Office of General Counsel is primarily responsible for addressing
    issues related to accession, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
    is the Department of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs.
    If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy, the
    Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, and the Judge Advocate
    General of the Navy to address this issue.
           criminal jurisdiction over contractors on the battlefield
        Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was
    enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts to
    persons employed by or accompanying United States Armed Forces outside
    the United States.
        In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction over the
    alleged criminal actions of private contractor employees in nations in
    which U.S. armed forces are engaged in combat operations?
        Answer. Yes, it is important to have a mechanism whereby everyone
    associated with the United States military overseas, including
    servicemembers' family members and civilian personnel, may be held
    appropriately accountable for any criminal misconduct. I am generally
    familiar with MEJA, but I have not studied its application in
    particular circumstances in depth. If confirmed, I would evaluate this
    issue.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?
        Answer. I do not currently have an opinion as to whether it should
    be amended. If confirmed, I would examine this issue, if called upon to
    do so, and recommend any appropriate modifications.
        Question. Section 552 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2007 extended to
    military courts jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
    (UCMJ) over persons serving with, or accompanying an armed force in the
    field during time of declared war or a contingency operation.
        In your view, does a military court, applying the UCMJ, provide an
    appropriate forum for the disposition of the alleged criminal acts of
    private contractor employees serving in areas in which United States
    Armed Forces are engaged in contingency operations?
        Answer. The United States must ensure that all of those
    accompanying the U.S. military in the field can be held appropriately
    accountable for any criminal misconduct. I am aware of the fiscal year
    2007 extension of court-martial jurisdiction to include civilians
    accompanying the U.S. military in the field during contingency
    operations. If confirmed, I would study whether any further
    modifications should be made concerning alleged criminal misconduct by
    contractor employees engaged in contingency operations.
        Question. What is your view of the procedures to which the
    Department of Defense and the Department of Justice have agreed to
    reconcile jurisdictional responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?
        Answer. I am generally familiar with the memorandum of
    understanding between the Department of Defense and the Department of
    Justice concerning investigation and prosecution of certain crimes, but
    I would need to examine the operation of that Memorandum of
    Understanding to determine whether I should recommend any adjustments.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to
    perfect its jurisdiction over the alleged criminal conduct of private
    contractor employees, in appropriate cases?
        Answer. I do not now have any recommendations to amend the UCMJ
    concerning its application to contractor employees. If confirmed, I
    would consider whether any such amendments are appropriate.
                            religious accommodation
        Question. In your view, do Navy and Marine Corps policies and
    processes appropriately accommodate the religious practices of
    individual servicemembers as mandated by the Religious Freedom
    Restoration Act and the NDAAs for fiscal years 2013 and 2014?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department respects the
    rights of individuals to express their religious beliefs or no
    religious beliefs at all. I also understand that current Navy and
    Marine Corps policies and processes appropriately accommodate the
    religious practices of servicemembers pursuant to the Free Exercise
    Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Religious
    Freedom Restoration Act, the National Defense Authorization Acts for
    fiscal years 2013 and 2014, and Department of Defense Instruction
    1300.17, ``Religious Liberty in the Military Services.''
        Question. Under current law and policy, do you believe individual
    sailors' and marines' expressions of religious belief are accommodated,
    provided they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and
    discipline?
        Answer. Yes. It is my understanding is that the Department of the
    Navy complies with all laws requiring the Department to accommodate
    sailors' and marines' expressions of religious belief unless,
    consistent with the law, such accommodation could have an adverse
    impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, and good order and
    discipline.
        Question. Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit
    to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to
    enlisting or accepting a commission in the Navy or in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. Yes, both the Navy and Marine Corps have processes for
    review and action on pre-accession requests for the accommodation of
    religious practices. Applicants have the opportunity to submit a
    request for religious accommodation and receive a final decision on
    that request prior to enlistment, participation in a commissioning
    program or warrant officer program, or enrollment at a Service Academy.
        Question. Do you support a policy that allows a sailor's or
    Marine's religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the member
    throughout his/her military career--no matter where he/she is stationed
    or the nature of his/her specific duties--unless it can be demonstrated
    that the accommodation adversely affects military mission
    accomplishment?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. In your view, how should the Navy and Marine Corps'
    religious accommodation policies and processes be applied to sailors
    and marines who decline to receive the COVID-19 vaccination on the
    basis of their religious beliefs?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy and Marine Corps
    policies and procedures for mandatory vaccination of all sailors,
    marines, and civilians include processes by which individuals may seek
    and receive accommodation based upon religious beliefs to forego
    vaccination for COVID-19. I believe that process is appropriate.
             role in the officer promotion and confirmation process
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
    Counsel of the Department of the Navy in ensuring the integrity and
    propriety of the statutory officer promotion selection board process?
        Answer. The Secretary of the Navy convenes promotion selection
    boards as authorized by 10 U.S.C. Sec.  611 and issues precepts to
    ensure those boards comply with statutes and regulations. The
    uniformed, service Judge Advocates assume primary responsibility for
    military personnel matters, and 10 U.S.C Sec.  8088 requires the Navy
    Judge Advocate General conduct a compliance review of promotion boards.
    Ultimately, the Secretary exercises 10 U.S.C. Sec.  618 approval
    authority for promotion boards. As the General Counsel, I will support
    the Secretary by working with both the Judge Advocate General of the
    Navy and Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on
    officer promotion matters.
        Question. Do you perceive any need for change in this role? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I am not aware of any changes that are needed in this role.
        Question. In your view, are the current policies and procedures
    governing review of the records of military officers whose selection
    for promotion or assignment requires Presidential or Secretary of
    Defense approval or Senate confirmation, sufficient to enable informed
    decisions by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, the
    President, and the Senate? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Congress mandated changes to the officer promotion process
    in both the 2020 and 2021 NDAAs to ensure promotion boards review
    adverse material in an officer's record. It is my understanding that
    those recent requirements, coupled with pre-existing policies and
    procedures provide the Military Departments the means to gather records
    that are as complete and accurate as possible, and provide military
    officers the opportunity to address matters in their records, including
    adverse or allegedly adverse information, prior to review. Accordingly,
    it is my belief that the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the
    Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Senate can engage in
    informed decisionmaking.
        Question. In your view, are these policies and procedures fair to
    the individual Navy and Marine Corps officers proceeding through the
    promotion or assignment processes?
        Answer. Yes. It is my belief that the promotion and assignment
    policies and procedures adequately balance the need for legal
    compliance and procedural efficiency, while ensuring consideration of
    the equities of the individual officers.
        Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the
    Department of the Navy in advising senior Navy, Marine Corps, and DOD
    officials on the implications of adverse or reportable information
    pertaining to a military officer nominated for promotion to General/
    Flag grade or for appointment to a position of ``importance and
    responsibility''? Do you believe this role should be changed in any
    way?
        Answer. In accordance with Title 10, applicable regulations, and
    the direction of the Secretary, the General Counsel must support the
    integrity of all Department activities. With respect to Department of
    the Navy nominees, the General Counsel provides advice on cases with
    adverse or potentially adverse information to ensure that the
    information is properly evaluated and timely reported to the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
                         non-deployable servicemembers
        Question. DODI 1332.45, Retention Determinations for Non-Deployable
    Servicemembers, provides that the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments may ``retain . . . those servicemembers whose period of
    non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit . . . if
    determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.''
        Do you agree that sailors and marines who are non-deployable for
    more than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation
    from the Service or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?
        Answer. Generally, Servicemembers identified as non-deployable for
    12 consecutive months should be evaluated for continued service.
    However, each case must be evaluated individually based on the facts
    presented. I believe that the Department of Defense policy
    appropriately balances mission and individual equities.
        Question. In your view, under what circumstances might the
    retention of a sailor or Marine who has been non-deployable for more
    than 12 months be ``in the best interest of the Service''?
        Answer. Each case must be evaluated individually based on the facts
    presented. What is in the best interest of the Service depends on
    whether the Servicemember can perform their military duties and the
    needs of the Service at the time of the review. An example may be a
    Servicemember whose skill set is in high demand and who can perform
    their duties from a non-deployed environment. Moreover, pregnant and
    combat wounded Servicemembers are exempt from the 12-month non-
    deployability determination requirements.
        Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to
    sailors and marines with HIV? To those who identify as transgender?
        Answer. Readiness is vital to an effective military, and all
    Servicemembers must be treated with dignity and respect. It is my
    understanding that DODI 6485.01, ``Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
    in Military Service Members'' sets forth the procedures for managing
    servicemembers with HIV. These procedures include referring
    servicemembers with HIV for appropriate medical treatment and
    evaluation of fitness for continued service in the same manner as a
    servicemember with other chronic or progressive illnesses. Further, I
    understand that DODI 1300.28, ``In-Service Transition for Transgender
    Service Members'' sets forth the procedures by which Servicemembers may
    transition gender and requires determinations regarding deployability
    to be effected the same way as would be for any servicemember
    undergoing comparable medical procedures or treatment unrelated to
    transition.
        Question. Has the Navy or Marine Corps established any class or
    group of personnel deemed ``deployable with limitations,'' such that
    the class or group is exempt from the 12-month non-deployable retention
    determination requirement?
        Answer. It is my understanding that, in accordance with current
    policy, the Navy and Marine Corps characterize servicemembers with a
    medical condition that required medical screening or Combatant
    Commander approval prior to deployment outside the continental United
    States as Deployable with Limitations. This characterization includes
    conditions referenced in DODI 6490.07, Deployment-Limiting Medical
    Conditions for Service Members and DOD Civilian Employees. The list of
    conditions includes pregnant and combat wounded Servicemembers.
        Question. DODI 1332.45 also establishes categories and criteria to
    be applied in determining and tracking whether or not a servicemember
    is deployable.
        In your view, should a sailor or Marine's readiness to perform the
    specific missions, functions, and tasks required of him/her in the
    context of a particular deployment also be considered in determining
    whether a servicemember is deployable?
        Answer. Yes, but each case must be evaluated individually based on
    the facts presented. If confirmed, I will review current policies and
    work with Department leadership to ensure commanders have the legal
    authorities needed to accomplish mission while maintaining readiness.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in improving the
    timeliness of the Navy's Disability Evaluation System process as it
    applies to both Active and Reserve component sailors and marines?
        Answer. Sailors, marines, and their families need to rely on
    accurate and efficient processes, including the Disability Evaluation
    System process. If confirmed, I will review the Navy's Disability
    Evaluation System processes and work with Department leadership to look
    for ways to improve those processes.
                             emerging contaminants
        Question. Environmental and health effects associated with exposure
    to Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA)
    have long been a major concern for DOD, Congress, military families,
    and communities in the vicinity of military installations. According to
    GAO, the Navy has identified 127 installations with known or suspected
    releases of PFOS and PFOA.
        If confirmed, what would be your role in efforts to address PFOS/
    PFOA contamination at Navy or Marine Corps installations?
        Answer. The health and safety of sailors, marines, their families,
    and the communities surrounding military installations is a top
    priority. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders to ensure the
    Department of the Navy complies with applicable laws, regulations, and
    guidance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to address PFOS/
    PFOA resulting from Navy or Marine Corps activities. I will also ensure
    the Department of the Navy remains committed to supporting Department
    of Defense efforts concerning this important issue.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you advise the Secretary of the
    Navy on his approach to addressing the health concerns of
    servicemembers and their families who may have been exposed to
    potentially harmful contaminants on Navy or Marine Corps bases and in
    the context of performing military duties?
        Answer. The health and safety of servicemembers and their families
    is of paramount concern. If confirmed, I will advise the Secretary of
    the Navy on the legal options available to promote the continued well-
    being of sailors, marines, and their families.
                               suicide prevention
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to assist
    the Secretary of the Navy in maintaining a strong focus on preventing
    suicides in the Active Navy and Marine Corps, the Navy and Marine Corps
    Reserve, and in the families of sailors and marines?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to
    ensure the health and safety of sailors, marines, civilians, and their
    family members remain a high priority. I will advise the Secretary on
    legal options to enhance the health and safety of the force and their
    families. The Department must ensure that resources are available to
    address this issue and that support is available to help
    Servicemembers, their families, and our civilian workforce.
        Question. Mindful of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment II, and
    related statutes, what are your ideas for preventing suicides by
    curtailing the misuse of lethal means by servicemembers and their
    families?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to
    support efforts to prevent suicides. It is my understanding that the
    Department has worked with the Defense Suicide Prevention office (DSPO)
    to offer free gun locks at medical facilities, Fleet & Family Support
    Centers (FFSCs), and other locations throughout the Fleet. Training,
    policies, and outreach materials encourage sailors, marines, and their
    families to use gun locks and to practice other forms of safety,
    including voluntary storage of personally owned firearms during periods
    of increased stress and proactively disposing of unused prescription
    medications.
                       mental and behavioral health care
        Question. Although the Department has made some progress in
    reducing the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors, many
    servicemembers remain concerned that their military careers will be
    adversely affected should their chain of command become aware that they
    are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same time, the
    military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical
    and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness of
    servicemembers under their command.
        In your view, how can the Navy and Marine Corps bridge the gap
    between a sailor or Marine's desire for confidentiality and the chain
    of command's legitimate need to know about matters that may affect the
    readiness of the servicemember and the unit?
        Answer. The Department is dedicated to ensuring the health and
    well-being of sailors, marines, civilians, and family members. If
    confirmed, I will advise Department leadership on navigating the legal
    and regulatory impacts that may arise from the Department's efforts to
    bridge the gap between a sailor or marine's desire for confidentiality
    and the chain of command's need to know about matters that may affect
    the readiness of the Servicemember and the unit.
         military sexual assault and harassment prevention and response
        Question. Have you reviewed the report of the Independent Review
    Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military? If so, what were your
    impressions of the Commission's recommendations in regard to the
    prevention of sexual assault in the military?
        Answer. There is no place in any workplace especially in the
    Department of the Navy for sexual assault and harassment. I have
    reviewed the Independent Review Commission and its recommendations. I
    am also aware that Secretary of Defense Austin has accepted the IRC's
    recommendations with some adjustments made to ensure effective
    implementation. My initial impressions of the IRC recommendations are
    positive in that it sets forth a comprehensive approach across multiple
    lines of effort. If confirmed, I will provide my best legal advice in
    support of Secretary Austin's efforts to effectuate the recommendations
    across the Department of the Navy.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to increase
    the Navy and Marine Corps' focus on the prevention of sexual assaults?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department always strives
    to find better ways to prevent and, where prevention fails, respond to
    sexual assault, and that the Department of the Navy has made
    comprehensive efforts to support survivors, promote reporting, and
    encourage participation in the military justice process. If confirmed,
    I will work with the Department's leadership to ensure that sexual
    assault prevention and response is a high priority, including by
    effectuating the prevention and cultural reforms proposed by the
    Independent Review Commission and accepted by Secretary Austin. Sexual
    harassment and assault do not have a place in the Services. I will
    provide the legal support needed to ensure that the Department's SAPR
    programs are implemented.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Navy and Marine Corps'
    implementation of protections against retaliation--most notably social
    ostracism--against sailors and marines who report sexual assault?
        Answer. Retaliation and reprisal do not belong in the Services. I
    understand that the Department of the Navy is focused on ensuring
    sexual assault reporting does not result in reprisal, and is training
    servicemembers on recognizing and preventing retaliation and social
    ostracism. The Naval Inspector General and Deputy Naval Inspector
    General for Marine Corps Matters have responsibility for assisting the
    Secretary in implementing section 1034 of title 10, United States Code.
    If confirmed, as the principal legal advisor to the Secretary, I will
    work with Department leadership to ensure that reprisal investigations
    are thorough and conducted in accordance with statute, regulation, and
    policy. I will provide comprehensive legal advice to ensure that
    appropriate administrative or disciplinary action is taken against
    Servicemembers or civilian personnel who engage in illegal reprisal or
    retaliation.
        Question. Do the Navy and Marine Corps' methods for recording the
    outcomes of informal complaints of harassment or discrimination provide
    Navy and Corps' leaders, supervisors, and managers with a means of
    identifying repeat perpetrators in the military force?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of the Navy does
    not tolerate harassment of any kind or unlawful discrimination. Such
    acts are contrary to the Department's core values of honor, courage,
    and commitment. The Department maintains an equal opportunity program
    in accordance with all statutory and regulatory requirements but seeks
    to exceed the minimum requirements. An important part of this program
    is to regularly inform senior leaders to ensure consistent and
    effective program execution. While I have some familiarity with the
    equal opportunity processes, I have not had the opportunity to review
    the specific processes used in the Department. If confirmed, I will
    review the Department's program to ensure that it utilizes all legal
    means to track repeat offenders, prevent sexual harassment, and protect
    victims from such acts.
                  sexual harassment in the civilian workforce
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
    male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual
    harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
    12 months prior to completing the survey.
        What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
    harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the General
    Counsel of the Navy?
        Answer. I have not had any opportunity to review any data or
    discuss this matter with any current or former members of the Office of
    General Counsel. If confirmed, I can assure you that I will promote a
    climate that treats all the members of the Office of General Counsel
    with dignity and respect and does not tolerate any form of harassment
    or illegal discrimination.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from a civilian employee of the Office of the Navy
    General Counsel?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would take any complaint of sexual
    harassment or discrimination seriously, and I would ensure that the
    Office of the General Counsel followed all existing policies and
    procedures to include the conduct of an inquiry by appropriate
    authority and, if necessary, taking action to resolve the matter in an
    efficient and expeditious manner.
        Question. In your view, do Navy and Marine Corps' methods for
    tracking the submission and monitoring the resolution of complaints of
    harassment or discrimination provide appropriate leaders, supervisors,
    and managers with an accurate picture of the systemic prevalence of
    these adverse behaviors in the civilian workforces of the Navy and in
    the Corps?
        Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) policy is clear that
    harassment of any kind or unlawful discrimination will not be
    tolerated. Such acts are contrary to the DON's core values of honor,
    courage, and commitment. The Department maintains an equal employment
    opportunity program in accordance with all statutory and regulatory
    requirements, but seeks to exceed the minimum requirements. I have not
    had the opportunity to review all the methods used in the DON to track
    and monitor complains and resolutions to express an opinion on their
    adequacy in providing an accurate assessment upon which leaders can
    rely. If confirmed, I would review these systems with the appropriate
    officials to identify areas in which they may be improved.
        Question. What actions has the Department of the Navy taken to
    establish a modern, comprehensive harassment prevention and response
    policy and program for the Navy and Marine Corps' civilian workforces?
        Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is committed to
    maintaining a positive and healthy culture where sexual harassment,
    sexual assault and other harmful behaviors are not tolerated, offenders
    are held accountable, and all personnel receive the support they need.
    I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has issued a Department-
    wide anti-harassment statement informing all employees, supervisors,
    managers, and leaders that harassment is illegal and will not be
    tolerated, and that the DON has established education and training
    programs and a complaint resolution process to prevent and respond to
    harassment and discrimination claims. These programs address the
    identification, prevention, and resolution of sexual harassment and
    prevention of reprisals, and are directed at personnel of all levels
    and occupations.
        Question. In your view, is civilian workforce harassment prevention
    and response training across the Navy and Marine Corps adequate and
    useful to employees?
        Answer. I have some familiarity with the processes applicable to
    the civilian workforce; however, I have not had the opportunity to
    review the specific processes used in the Department of the Navy. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that the Department uses all appropriate
    options to proactively prevent and respond to complaints of harassment
    and discrimination.
        Question. How does the Department of the Navy confirm that civilian
    employees across the Navy and the Corps have completed such training at
    the appropriate periodicity, and what metric does the Navy apply to
    measure the efficacy of such training?
        Answer. While I am somewhat familiar with the Government-wide equal
    employment opportunity processes applicable to the civilian workforce,
    I have not had the opportunity to review the specific processes used
    within the Department of the Navy or the metrics tracked by the
    Department. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Department
    leaders to ensure that appropriate and effective training is provided
    to all employees so that they understand the responsibility to prevent,
    report, and respond to complaints of harassment and discrimination.
        Question. Do the Navy and Marine Corps' methods for responding to
    complaints of harassment or discrimination in their civilian workforces
    provide appropriate care and services for victims?
        Answer. I have some familiarity with the Government-wide equal
    employment opportunity processes available to the civilian workforce as
    well as the existence of civilian employee assistance programs. I also
    understand that the Department of the Navy has a comprehensive and
    multi-faceted response system for victims, which continues to evolve.
    If confirmed, I will emphasize the high priority for support of all
    victims, including those within our civilian workforce.
                                us naval academy
        Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies
    and processes in place at the U.S. Naval Academy to prevent and respond
    to sexual harassment and sexual assault, and to ensure that those who
    report harassment or assault are not subject to retaliation (including
    reprisal and social ostracism)?
        Answer. I strongly believe that sexual assault and harassment at
    the Naval Academy, my alma mater, are unacceptable. I believe the
    Department is committed to ensuring that all Servicemembers, including
    Midshipmen at the Academy, are treated with respect and dignity. If
    confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to continue improving
    the Department's efforts to prevent and respond to these issues,
    including at the Academy.
        Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the policies
    and processes in place at the U.S. Naval Academy to ensure the free
    exercise of religion and the accommodation of religious practices?
        Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the most current
    policies and processes at the Naval Academy, and do not have an opinion
    on the efficacy of them. If confirmed, I will provide the Department
    and Academy leadership the legal support they need on this issue. As a
    Naval Academy graduate, I know that the Academy's policies reflect the
    value the Department places on the rights of Servicemembers to observe
    their religion or no religion. I also know that the Naval Academy has a
    command religious program (CRP) that supports the diverse religious
    beliefs of the Brigade of Midshipman and that can adapt to new
    requirements.
        Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of suicide
    prevention programs at the U.S. Naval Academy?
        Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the most current
    policies and processes at the Naval Academy. In my view, suicide can be
    prevented and any loss to suicide is avoidable. As a Naval Academy
    graduate, I am committed to working with Department leadership to
    ensure the health and safety of our Midshipmen. If confirmed, I will
    work with Department and Academy leadership to examine the Academy's
    current policies and to assess whether improvements can be made.
        Question. Given the provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, under what
    conditions would you deem it appropriate, if confirmed, to permit a
    military officer to play professional sports prior to completing two
    consecutive years of commissioned service following graduation from the
    U.S. Naval Academy?
        Answer. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec.  8459, a midshipman may not seek
    release from their commissioned service obligation to play professional
    sports until they complete at least two consecutive years of
    commissioned service. If confirmed, I will work with Department
    leadership to ascertain whether and how a policy can be formulated that
    is consistent with title 10.
                  officer personnel management system reforms
        Question. The John S. McCain NDAA for fiscal year 2019 contained
    several provisions to modernize the officer personnel management
    system. These reforms were designed to align officer career management
    with the priorities outlined in the 2018 NDS.
        How are the Navy and Marine Corps implementing these authorities
    today and to what effect?
        Answer. I understand the authorities granted by the fiscal year
    2019 NDAA have given the Department of the Navy more flexibility to
    better manage its officer corps. I also understand that the Services
    have used the authority to merit-reorder promotion selection lists;
    that Navy has allowed officers to ``opt out'' of promotion screening to
    accommodate opportunities for career broadening assignments, instituted
    ``up and stay'' policies, and expanded its spot promotions in
    accordance with the fiscal year 2019 NDAA authorities. If confirmed, I
    intend to work with the Secretariat staff, Chief of Naval Operations,
    and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to understand the impact of
    these changes and to offer any necessary legal support to pursue
    additional authorities that would offer more flexibility for the
    Department of the Navy to manage its officers.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in advising and
    assisting the Navy and Marine Corps in further leveraging these new
    authorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will advise the Department's leadership
    regarding any issues related to these authorities and ensure that
    application of the authorities is consistent with Title 10, United
    States Code, and relevant Department of Defense and Department of Navy
    regulations.
        Question. Are there other authorities that the Navy and Marine
    Corps need in order to modernize the management of its officer
    personnel?
        Answer. I am unaware of whether the Navy and Marine Corps need
    other authorities to modernize officer management. If confirmed, I will
    work with the Secretariat staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop a full understanding of
    authorities available to the Department in managing its officer
    personnel. If needed, I would ensure the Office of the General Counsel
    supported the pursuit of any additional authorities that would provide
    more flexibility for the Department of the Navy to manage its officers.
        Question. In your view, how can the scrolling and appointments
    processes be improved so as to improve permeability between the Active
    and Reserve components of the Navy and Marine Corps?
        Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the scrolling and
    appointments process and, therefore, I do not have enough information
    to provide an informed recommendation as to whether the process
    requires modification to improve permeability between the Active and
    Reserve Components of the Navy and Marine Corps. I do believe that the
    policies should allow greater permeability for officers to move between
    the active (regular) and Reserve components without excessive delays
    for administrative processing and, if confirmed, I will work with
    Department leadership to evaluate the needs of the Navy and Marine
    Corps and to propose legal solutions to satisfy those requirements.
                            whistleblower protection
        Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or
    threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of
    the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication.
    Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to
    Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications
    include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside
    of the chain of command, including the Congress.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that sailors,
    marines, and civilian employees of the Department of the Navy who
    report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement to appropriate
    authorities within or outside the chain of command, are protected from
    reprisal and retaliation, including from the very highest levels of the
    Navy, DOD, and the executive branch?
        Answer. In my view, whistleblower protections are critical to
    maintaining the confidence of the workforce when sailors, marines or
    civilian employees make protected disclosures of wrongdoing within the
    Government. If confirmed, I will advise Department leadership and those
    individuals who are responsible for ensuring reprisal investigations
    are conducted thoroughly, on issues including taking appropriate
    administrative or disciplinary action against personnel who have
    engaged in illegal reprisal or retaliation.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring
    consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower
    protections across the Department of the Navy and in the Department of
    Defense?
        Answer. If confirmed as General Counsel, it would be my duty to
    maintain uniformity in applying legal principles with regard to matters
    for which I am responsible, including ensuring consistency in applying
    and interpreting whistleblower protections across the Department of the
    Navy. As General Counsel, I would work with the Office of Special
    Counsel, the DOD General Counsel, the DOD Inspector General, the DOD
    General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Staff
    Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Naval
    Inspector General, and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine
    Corps matters to ensure consistency in the application and
    interpretation of whistleblower protection laws and regulations.
            support to the navy and marine corps inspectors general
        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the Navy General
    Counsel have in reviewing and rendering opinions on the legal
    sufficiency of the investigations and recommendations of the Navy and
    Marine Corps Inspectors General?
        Answer. The General Counsel plays an important role in reviewing
    and rendering opinions on the legal sufficiency of investigations and
    recommendations of the Naval Inspector General. If confirmed, I will
    advise and assist the Secretary in the oversight of the Department of
    the Navy law enforcement and investigative activities, including those
    conducted by the Naval Inspector General and the Deputy Naval Inspector
    General for Marine Corps Matters. If confirmed, I intend to provide my
    independent and objective legal advice concerning the duties and
    responsibilities of the Naval Inspector General and the Deputy Naval
    Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters, but will respect the
    independence of these officers and not infringe upon their statutory
    authority. To accomplish this goal, I intend, if confirmed, to
    establish a collaborative and productive working relationship with the
    Naval Inspector General and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for
    Marine Corps Matters.
                   department of defense acquisition reforms
        Question. In successive NDAAs beginning in fiscal year 2013,
    Congress enacted sweeping reforms of the defense acquisition system and
    organizational structure. These reforms included expansion in
    acquisition-related functions of the Service Chiefs and measures
    designed to reduce the cost and development timelines of major systems.
    Further, in February 2019, the congressionally established Advisory
    Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations (the ``809
    Panel'') submitted its final report, detailing 98 recommendations to
    enhance DOD's ability to acquire and deliver warfighting capability in
    a cost-effective and timely manner, better to address the concerns
    raised by the current international security environment.
        What is your understanding of the role of the Navy General Counsel
    in ensuring that Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs are
    executed in accordance with the law and DOD and Navy acquisition
    policy?
        Answer. The General Counsel plays a leading role in ensuring that
    the Department's acquisition programs and procurement activities comply
    both with statute and regulation, and with Department of Defense and
    Department of the Navy acquisition policy. Complying with statute and
    regulation and preserving acquisition integrity are vital to the
    Department's ability to meet the needs of the warfighter, including the
    need to maintain a robust and secure industrial base. The General
    Counsel must actively ensure compliance and integrity at all levels of
    the acquisition enterprise.
        Question. What are your overall views of the effects of defense
    acquisition reform to date?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the effects of acquisition
    reform have been positive overall. Specifically, enacting additional
    acquisition pathways, such as the middle-tier acquisition and software
    acquisition pathways, and increasing the Department's acquisition
    decisionmaking authority have been helpful and are enabling a more
    agile and adaptive acquisition system. The Department must continue to
    focus on effective implementation and execution of the reforms that
    have been enacted.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Navy and Marine
    Corps acquisition officials understand and leverage the flexibilities
    provided by Congress in the context of acquisition reform?
        Answer. The General Counsel must proactively identify legal
    authorities and flexibilities that will help acquisition officials
    successfully and efficiently execute program requirements and
    objectives. The General Counsel must inform acquisition officials of
    new authorities and flexibilities, and assist the officials to identify
    specific authorities and flexibilities that will benefit specific
    programs or projects. The General Counsel also must support development
    of effective guidance, policy, and training to implement new
    authorities and flexibilities.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Chief of Naval
    Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the performance of
    certain acquisition-related functions, while ensuring their actions
    remain compatible with the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (as
    established in title 10, U.S. Code, sections 8014 and 8016)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Naval
    Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure they fully
    understand their role in the acquisition process outlined in 10 U.S.C.
    Sec.  2547, as well as the enhanced acquisition roles for the Service
    Chiefs enacted in previous National Defense Authorization Acts. I will
    work with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps to ensure they understand the relationship between these
    roles and functions and the statutory duties and responsibilities of
    the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
    Acquisition, including such duties with respect to sustainment of DON
    systems.
        Question. Are there any additional acquisition reforms you would
    endorse, in light of the recommendations of the 809 Panel?
        Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations for further
    acquisition reform at this time.
                identifying and addressing conflicts of interest
        Question. In the fallout of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA)
    scandal, a significant number of Navy admirals and numerous other
    Service personnel were investigated for bribery, corruption, and
    violations of criminal conflict of interest laws and executive branch
    ethics regulations. Some were prosecuted and convicted in Federal or
    military courts, and many more were subject to public censure and
    forced into early retirement from the Service.
        In your view, has the Navy taken sufficient actions in response to
    the GDMA scandal to ensure that its officers and other personnel are
    trained--throughout their careers--on objective ethics and the Navy's
    core values?
        Answer. My understanding is that, following the GDMA scandal, the
    Department of the Navy conducted a thorough review of its ethics and
    professionalism programs to ensure it maximizes all available resources
    to place an emphasis on ethics training of all personnel throughout
    their careers. In addition to training requirements identified in 5
    C.F.R. Sec.  2638 Subpart C, the Department also provides in-depth
    ethics and professionalism training at the Senior Leaders Legal Course,
    which is required for all prospective commanding officers, executive
    officers, and command master chiefs, as well as the Senior Enlisted
    Academy and the Navy Supply Corps School. In 2018, the Naval War
    College established the College of Leadership and Ethics and the Chief
    of Naval Operation's released an updated ``Navy Leader Development
    Framework.'' Flag officers, general officers, and senior executives
    receive ethics training at various executive symposiums that are held
    annually. Moreover, all flag and general officers and their staffs are
    required to receive in-person ethics training annually from a certified
    ethics counselor. If confirmed, I intend to work closely and
    collaboratively with the Judge Advocate General and the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to provide the highest
    quality of legal services, including ethics and standards of conduct
    training and advice across the Department.
        Furthermore, each employee or servicemember who is new to the
    Department receives initial ethics training that meets the Office of
    Government Ethics regulatory requirements. Additionally, any employee
    or servicemember who is required to file an Office of Government Ethics
    financial disclosure report, OGE form 278e or OGE form 450, must
    complete interactive annual ethics training. Annually, the Office of
    the Assistant General Counsel for Ethics develops interactive on-line
    training that is available to all Department employees and meets the
    Office of Government Ethics annual training regulatory requirements.
    Also many commands require annual in-person ethics training for all
    employees regardless of whether the employee is a financial disclosure
    filer. In addition to initial and annual ethics training, the Navy
    offers specialized ethics training for specific groups, when requested.
        Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy issues an annual ethics
    message emphasizing values-based decisionmaking rather than merely
    complying with minimum rules, and reinforcing the expectation that
    Department of the Navy personnel act with integrity and correctly apply
    the ethics and standards of conduct rules. Emphasis is placed on
    ethical leadership from the top down and requires senior leaders take
    ownership of the ethics program within their respective command or
    organization.
        A number of officers investigated were able to rely on the ``safe
    harbor'' of having consulted a Navy ethics official or a Navy lawyer
    prior to accepting a gift from a prohibited source.
        Question. What training do Navy and Marine Corps lawyers receive to
    ensure they are competent to provide effective, accurate, and timely
    guidance to personnel in need of such counsel? In your view, what is
    the appropriate role of the Navy General Counsel in providing such
    training to Navy and Marine Corps lawyers?
        Answer. As the Designated Agency Ethics Official and senior legal
    official in the Department of the Navy, the Navy General Counsel has an
    important role in providing training and legal practice resources to
    Department of the Navy legal professionals. My understanding is that
    the Office of the General Counsel provides in-person and web-based
    training and legal practice products to the legal community.
    Additionally, in order to be certified as an ethics counselor, a
    Department of the Navy uniformed or civilian attorney must complete a
    comprehensive course on ethics and standards of conduct training for
    ethics counselors and satisfy the requirement to take annual refresher
    training in order to retain the ethics counselor designation.
    Furthermore, Department of the Navy uniformed and civilian attorneys
    regularly participate in a host of multi-day ethics courses offered by
    the Navy, other Services, and the Department of Defense Office of
    General Counsel. If confirmed, I will work closely and collaboratively
    with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to address training
    needs for all uniformed and civilian attorneys and legal support
    personnel within the Department and continue to strengthen the Navy's
    ethical climate and culture.
        Question. What resources has the Department of the Navy made
    available to provide General/Flag Officers and other Military Service
    personnel the training, advice, and assistance they need to adhere to
    ethical and legal standards of conduct? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has several
    avenues by which flag officers and servicemembers receive ethics and
    professionalism training throughout their careers. Specifically, new
    Navy flag officers are required to attend the New Flag Training and, as
    follow-on training, flag officers and members of the Senior Executive
    Service attend an annual Flag Officers and Senior Executives Symposium
    during which they receive additional training on ethics and standards
    of conduct. Furthermore, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations issues an
    annual ethics and standards of conduct memo for flag officers. In 2012,
    the VCNO established a requirement that all flag officers and their
    staff must receive in-person ethics and standards of conduct training
    and this requirement remains in effect. The Marine Corps offers similar
    training for its general officers and senior executives. Specifically,
    the Marine Corps hosts a General Officer Offsite and an Executive
    Offsite at least once per fiscal year, where attendees receive annual
    ethics training presented by the Counsel for the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps. The Navy and Marine Corps provide in-depth ethics and
    professionalism training at various stages of career development,
    including to prospective commanding officers, executive officers, and
    senior enlisted leaders. In 2018 the Naval War College established the
    College of Leadership and Ethics as a venue for officers and senior
    civilians to continually learn and develop as leaders of character.
    Finally, as part of career transition, all flag and general officers
    attend a pre-separation ethics brief that includes a review of post-
    Government employment conflict of interest restrictions on their future
    employment.
        Question. What role should the Navy General Counsel play in
    ensuring that Department of the Navy personnel identify personal and
    organizational conflicts of interest and take all appropriate steps to
    avoid or mitigate them?
        Answer. The General Counsel, as the Designated Agency Ethics
    Official, is responsible for the Department of the Navy's ethics
    program to prevent conflicts of interest in order to maintain the
    public trust. Therefore, ensuring that the Department's business
    practices are designed to prevent personal and organizational conflicts
    of interest should be one of the Navy's highest priorities. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with senior Departmental officials to
    promote an organizational climate that is vigilant about preventing
    conflicts of interest and reacts appropriately when specific issues
    arise. I believe that Department attorneys play a significant role in
    this area by providing training and advice on acquisition and the
    Standards of Conduct for Employees of the executive branch (5 CFR
    2635). Furthermore, my expectation is that the Department attorneys
    will engage in all phases of the acquisition and contracting process to
    assist the decisionmakers and to help identify and resolve conflicts of
    interest.
        Question. What is your understanding of the actions required of a
    Department of the Navy attorney or judge advocate who becomes aware of
    improper activities by a Department of the Navy official who has
    sought, but failed to follow that attorney's legal advice in the domain
    of ethics?
        Answer. Department of the Navy attorneys are obligated to comply
    with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations. If an attorney
    believes that a Department official will act contrary to his/her advice
    and the action will violate or has violated a law or regulation, the
    attorney must take appropriate action, including immediately notifying
    his/her supervisory attorney. If the allegation is against a senior
    official, per DOD Directive 5505.06, ``Investigations of Allegations
    Against Senior Officials of the Department of Defense,'' the alleged
    violation must be reported to the DOD Inspector General within five
    working days.
                litigation involving the department of the navy
        Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
    the Department of the Navy and the Department of Justice with respect
    to litigation involving the Department of Defense?
        Answer. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has the statutory
    responsibility to represent the United States, its agencies, including
    the Department of Defense, and its officers in litigation before
    Federal courts. The Department of the Navy (DON) attorneys assist DOJ
    attorneys in Federal court cases where the DON is a party or has an
    interest. If confirmed, I will continue the DON's well established
    collaborative relationship with the DOJ and advocate the Department's
    interests.
        Question. In your view, should the Department of the Navy have the
    independence and resources to conduct its own litigation?
        Answer. The Navy Office of the General Counsel has a well-
    established, productive relationship with the Department of Justice. I
    am unaware of a need for more independence or resources to conduct
    litigation. If confirmed, I will evaluate this issue to determine if
    more independence or resources are needed.
        Question. In your view, should the Feres Doctrine be repealed in
    whole--or in particular types of cases--to permit sailors and marines
    to sue the U.S. Government and collect damages for personal injuries
    sustained in the performance of their duties?
        Answer. The Feres Doctrine should not be repealed. It is my
    understanding that DOD has a benefits framework that has been designed
    to maximize the benefits to be provided injured Servicemembers or
    surviving family members without regard to the circumstances
    surrounding the death or injury. The existing scheme of benefits and
    no-fault compensation established by Congress for Servicemembers and
    their families ensures they are fairly compensated for injuries
    suffered incident to service in a consistent manner.
        Question. How many administrative claims has the Department of the
    Navy processed under the authority of title 10, U.S. Code, section
    2733a, as added by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2020?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the DON Tort Claims Unit (TCU)
    began receiving claims in January 2020. All tort claims involving Navy
    and Marine Corps personnel are adjudicated by the TCU. I am not aware
    of the number of claims processed by the DON; however, if confirmed, I
    will familiarize myself with the number and amounts claimed.
        Question. What is the total value of the claims paid to date
    pursuant to section 2733a?
        Answer. I am not aware of the number of claims processed by the
    DON; however, if confirmed, I will familiarize myself with the number
    and amounts claimed.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
    in mitigating the risks leading to claims under section 2733a?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will become familiar with the types and
    value of claims brought against the Department of the Navy (DON). As
    General Counsel, I will work with Department leadership to ensure that
    the DON takes all appropriate action to avoid personal injury or deaths
    caused by medical malpractice of a Department of Defense health care
    provider and to mitigate any impact to our Servicemembers.
                      the dod and navy civilian workforce
        Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
    civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD and Navy civilian
    personnel policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of
    the U.S. Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the
    Office of Personnel Management. Over the years, Congress has provided
    numerous extraordinary hiring and management authorities applicable to
    specific segments of the DOD and Navy civilian workforces.
        In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the Navy in
    effectively and efficiently managing its civilian workforce?
        Answer. I believe that the Department's biggest challenge is
    competing for talent, especially in cutting-edge technical fields. If
    confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to examine ways and
    provide advice to enable the Department to eliminate obstacles and
    promote opportunities to attract individuals with the necessary
    critical skills to allow the Department to compete and meet its
    missions.
        Question. In your view, do Navy and Marine Corps supervisors have
    adequate authorities and access to the expert human resources and legal
    support required to address and remediate employee misconduct and poor
    duty performance?
        Answer. I believe that the Department generally has the authorities
    needed to hold the civilian workforce accountable for misconduct and
    poor performance. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership
    to ensure that all civilian and military supervisors have adequate
    training to supervise and lead the workforce. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that Office of General Counsel attorneys proactively assist with
    providing this training and advice to clients if or when these issues
    arise.
        Question. Are Navy and Marine Corps attorneys adequately trained to
    advise and assist civilian and military supervisors in the appropriate
    exercise of such authorities? If not, what additional authorities or
    training do Navy and Marine Corps attorneys require?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the resources, organization,
    and operation of the Office of General Counsel attorneys to ensure that
    they are adequately trained to proactively advise and assist clients if
    or when these issues arise.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify
    before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate
    committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee,
    its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their
    respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely
    manner?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this
    committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress,
    and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or
    denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records--including
    documents and electronic communications, and other information
    requested of you?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its
    subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their
    respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts
    the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records--including
    documents and electronic communications, and other information you or
    your organization previously provided?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide
    this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information
    within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee
    request?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters
    to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization
    from individual Senators who are members of this committee?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other
    members of your organization protect from retaliation any military
    member, Federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before,
    or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other
    appropriate committee of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                              political donations
        1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Coffey, in 2010, the ``New York Daily News''
    published an article that questioned whether you and your former law
    firm had used political donations to the State comptroller as a way to
    secure legal business representing the New York State pension fund.
    Could you please address these allegations?
        Mr. Coffey. I regret that this article has become an issue, as I
    understand the importance of my being perceived as having conducted
    myself ethically given the position for which I am nominated. Let me
    reassure you and the Committee that the allegations in this article are
    false and that throughout my career I have abided by the highest
    ethical standards. These claims surfaced while I was running for office
    in New York State and faded from view as the facts came to light. My
    firm was retained in the case in question solely due to our reputation
    and ability to achieve results. I understand the committee is in
    receipt of a letter from the good government activist quoted in the
    article, who looked into the facts, determined the accusation did not
    hold merit, and subsequently asked me to join the board of her watchdog
    organization.
                               drug interdictions
        2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Coffey, in an article you authored in 1987
    in ``The Georgetown Law Journal'', you questioned the legality of the
    use of Navy ships to transport Coast Guard teams interdicting suspected
    drug smugglers and seizing their drug caches. Yet the use of the Navy
    for this purpose has been sanctioned by the Department of Defense and
    Navy lawyers. I understand you've served in the Navy and participated
    in these operations. Have your views changed?
        Mr. Coffey. Thank you for the opportunity to address this article.
    The article called into question the legality of using Navy ships to
    participate in drug interdictions under the then-prevailing statute, 10
    USC 375, which expressly prohibited Navy involvement in the
    interdiction of ships or aircraft. Congress amended Sec. 375 in 1988,
    the year after my article was published, to remove that prohibition,
    mooting my concerns. As you note, I participated in counter-narcotics
    operations while in the Navy and believe that they serve an important
    purpose.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
             department of the navy covid policy (navadmin 225/21)
        3. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, based on the guidance provided in
    NAVADMIN 225/21, is it correct to say that sailors who are separated
    only for refusing the vaccine will, in the least favorable outcome,
    receive a discharge no lower than ``general under honorable
    conditions''?
        Mr. Coffey. Having read NAVADMIN 225/221 that is my understanding
    of the Navy's proposed policy.

        4. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, according to NAVADMIN 225/21,
    enlisted servicemembers separated for vaccine refusal will be ``subject
    to recoupment of any unearned special or incentive pays''. Will you
    please articulate what the ``recoupment of any unearned special or
    incentive pays'' means--providing a tangible example?
        Mr. Coffey. Sailors may receive special and incentive pay in return
    for performing a specific duty over a period of time. For example, the
    Navy pays sailors who serve in the nuclear propulsion community bonuses
    to remain in that community for a fixed period of time. Similar bonuses
    incentivize medical personnel, aviation personnel, or other sailors
    with specialized skills and training to remain in the Navy. It is my
    understanding that, by longstanding practice within the Navy, sailors
    who do not complete an enlistment must repay unearned special or
    incentive pays such as the nuclear propulsion community bonus.

        5. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, will sailors who are separated
    only for refusing the vaccine be deemed ineligible from future military
    service?
        Mr. Coffey. I am aware that a sailor's eligibility for future
    service is dependent on the facts and circumstances of their individual
    service and the nature of the discharge received. It would be
    speculative for me to offer a view on the outcome of what are
    individual determinations.

        6. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, will sailors discharged for only
    for refusing the vaccine be entitled to their Post-9/11 GI Bill
    Benefit?
        Mr. Coffey. Any separation and characterization of service decision
    will be made on the individual circumstances of a sailor's military
    record and I cannot speculate about the outcome of any individual
    decision. A sailor receiving a ``general under honorable conditions''
    characterization is not eligible for the Post-9/11 GI Bill. A sailor
    receiving an ``honorable'' characterization is eligible for this
    benefit.

        7. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, what is the protocol for
    personnel, originating from the other military branches, who are
    assigned to Navy commands and refuse the vaccine?
        Mr. Coffey. I understand that cases involving soldiers, airmen,
    guardians, marines, or coast guardsmen assigned to Navy commands are
    reported to the Chief of Naval Personnel who will refer those cases to
    the applicable service for disposition.

        8. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Coffey, how will the Navy address foreign
    military personnel--such as those studying U.S. professional military
    education courses--if they refuse the vaccine for religious reasons?
        Mr. Coffey. I am not familiar with the terms of the Department of
    Defense's foreign military assistance programs and must defer to the
    Department of Defense for an answer. As a general matter, I understand
    that foreign military personnel are not subject to Department of the
    Navy adverse administrative proceedings.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. John P. Coffey, follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Mr. John P. Coffey, which was
    transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. John P.
    Coffey in connection with his nomination follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Mr. John P. Coffey was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on February 9, 2022.]
                                     ______

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Douglas R. Bush by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                                     duties
        Question. Section 7016(b)(5)(A) of title 10, United States Code,
    provides that the principal duty of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
    for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) shall be the
    overall supervision of acquisition, technology, and logistics matters
    of the Department of the Army.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
    ASA(ALT)?
        Answer. The ASA(ALT) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of
    the Army on all matters related to acquisition, logistics, and
    technology. The ASA(ALT) serves, when delegated, as the Army
    Acquisition Executive (AAE), the Senior Procurement Executive, the
    Science Advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Army's senior
    research and development official. The ASA(ALT) sets the strategic
    direction for Army programs and policies related to acquisition,
    logistics, and technology, including: acquisition management,
    procurement, the industrial base, security cooperation and assistance,
    sustainment, and science and technology (S&T). Importantly, the
    ASA(ALT) also appoints, manages, and evaluates Program Executive
    Officers (PEOs) and direct-reporting Program Managers (PMs), and is
    responsible for managing the Army Acquisition Corps and the Army
    Acquisition Workforce.
        Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
    the duties and functions of the ASA(ALT), as set forth in statute or in
    Department of Defense regulations?
        Answer. I have no specific recommendations to change the duties or
    functions of the ASA(ALT) at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to
    the opportunity to serve in the position before recommending any
    potential changes that may be appropriate.
        Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions would you expect
    the Secretary of the Army to prescribe for you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would expect the Secretary of the Army to
    prescribe the duties currently specified in HQDA General Orders No.
    2020-01 for the ASA(ALT) position, which includes:
        (1)  Developing and overseeing policies and programs for:
           (a)  Logistics, including acquisition fielding, sustainment, and
    disposal logistics management, and administering lifecycle logistics
    support planning and execution.
           (b)  Security cooperation, foreign military and foreign
    government sales, and other related activities and general export
    matters.
           (c)  The Defense Industrial Base, including the Army's Organic
    Industrial Base.
           (d)  Aspects of the PPBE process within the ASA (ALT)'s assigned
    functions and responsibilities and, when appropriate, coordinating and
    integrating that direction with the ASA (FM&C) and Chief Information
    Officer (CIO)/G-6.
           (e)  The acquisition function and the acquisition management
    system and chairing the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council and
    Configuration Steering Board.
           (f)  Execution of the authorities of the agency head for
    procurement matters pursuant to laws and regulations, and execution of
    the authorities of the SEC.ARMY for matters concerning grants,
    cooperative agreements, and other non-procurement transactions under
    the Defense Grant and Agreement Regulatory System (DOD Directive
    3210.06), as well as other transactions under sections 2371 and 2371b
    of Title 10, United States Code.
           (g)  Intellectual property, technical data, and computer
    software management.
        (2)  Providing materiel solutions to equipment modernization as
    part of the future force modernization enterprise.
        (3)  Managing the Army Acquisition Corps and Army Acquisition
    Workforce; appointing those personnel below the executive level; and
    evaluating acquisition program executive officers and direct reporting
    program, project, and product managers.
        (4)  Representing the Army in ALT matters to DOD and non-DOD
    partners
                         major challenges and problems
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges you would
    confront if confirmed and appointed to be the ASA(ALT)?
        Answer. The central challenge I expect to confront, if confirmed,
    is the successful execution of the Army's top modernization priority
    programs. Many of these programs are reaching a point where they will
    soon transition from prototyping and development to production,
    testing, and fielding. This process is likely to be challenging in many
    cases due to the aggressive timelines currently assumed for these
    programs. It is also likely to be challenging because of the normal
    friction points that occur when a complex system moves to this more
    detailed stage of development and production. Testing will reveal
    things that need to be fixed. Early production efforts will likely
    reveal currently unforeseen difficulties in ramping up production at
    scale. The Army's needs may shift, which could disrupt fielding
    schedules. And finally, delays or difficulties with some programs may
    lead to cost growth. While these issues are expected when developing
    and deploying new systems, they will require careful management,
    balancing various risk factors, and constant communications across the
    Army and with Congress to be overcome.
                         major challenges and problems
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing each
    of these challenges?
        If confirmed, what management actions would you direct and what
    timelines would you establish for addressing each of these challenges?
        Answer. I am confident that the Army has an acquisition workforce
    with the talent and skills to successfully overcome the challenges
    listed in question #3. If confirmed, I will allow the PEOs and PMs
    maximum flexibility to navigate any difficulties, and provide them an
    environment in which they can succeed. At the same time, I will
    maintain close overwatch of their efforts and ensure that all the
    appropriate Army elements, such as requirements, testing, contracting,
    and financial are arranged to support them. I will also seek to protect
    the funding for these efforts to maintain program schedules and help
    ensure success. Finally, I will work closely with Congress to ensure
    members have full visibility of the Army's efforts, especially on
    programs that run into difficulties.
                         major challenges and problems
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    and how would you measure progress in achieving these priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize five aspects within the
    Army's acquisition enterprise:
        My first priority would be to intensely focus on acquisition
    program execution that ensures rapid delivery of equipment to the
    Army's soldiers. For many years, Congress has directed acquisition
    reforms on accelerating the pace of the system. I will bias my
    decisions toward taking actions that prioritize speed in a responsible
    manner.
        My second priority would be to improve the Army's policies and
    practices regarding the acquisition of software. With strong
    congressional support, the Army now has more tools and authorities than
    ever to pursue software in a fundamentally different way and many
    promising efforts are proceeding. If confirmed, I intend to accelerate
    and expand those efforts.
        My third priority would be to return the Army to a focus on
    security in acquisition, with a special focus on cyber and supply chain
    security. The Army faces a fundamentally different threat in this
    regard as compared to the post-cold war era and must adapt its policies
    and practices to enable delivery of systems and capabilities
    uncompromised by aggressive efforts by China, Russia, and others to
    disrupt them before they are fielded.
        A fourth priority would be to ensure realistic operational testing
    is integrated into Army programs, including rigorous cyber testing.
    While testing can be expensive at times, more time spent doing
    effective testing up front can pay huge dividends later and more
    importantly allow us to find problems on test ranges rather than in
    combat.
        A fifth priority will be working to ensure that the Army's
    modernization efforts are closely coordinated with Congress. The Army
    cannot achieve any of its modernization goals without the support of,
    and partnership with, Congress.
                            relations with congress
        Question. What actions would you take to develop and sustain a
    productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
    the Office of the ASA(ALT)?
        Answer. Based on my long experience as a staff member working on
    behalf of Members of Congress, and my 6 months as Acting Army
    Acquisition executive, I believe that trust, transparency, and constant
    communication are the most important aspects of ensuring productive
    relations with Congress. If confirmed as ASA(ALT), I would personally
    communicate extensively with members and staff to set the example. I
    would also direct my entire organization to provide all available
    information to members and staff so Congress can pursue its oversight
    and policymaking roles with full information. When there are
    differences of opinion, I will seek to engage directly to understand
    the different positions, and offer any additional information that
    members may need to make their independent decisions regarding Army
    acquisition programs.
                                     budget
        Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
    adequacy of the Army's funding for the programs under your purview?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will measure the adequacy of the Army's
    funding based upon the Service's ability to meet the Biden
    Administration's March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic
    Guidance and, when it is completed, by the Army's ability to meet the
    requirements laid out in the new National Defense Strategy required by
    Congress. Ultimately, the Army needs sufficient resources to fulfill
    its role as part of the Joint Force responsible for deterring, and if
    necessary, defeating military aggression that threatens vital U.S.
    interests with acceptable risk to force and mission. I plan to work
    within the Army's allocated funding to ensure the most modern, ready,
    and lethal soldiers possible. I will also work with the Secretary of
    the Army to ensure that the Army's priorities of People, Readiness, and
    Modernization align with the Secretary of Defense's priorities of
    defending our Nation, innovating and modernizing the Force, maintaining
    and enhancing readiness, taking care of our people, and succeeding
    through teamwork.
             relations with the office of the secretary of defense
        Question. In your view, what is the optimum relationship between
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E))
    and the Military Department offices responsible for research and
    engineering activities?
        Answer. In my view, the AAE, who is responsible for research and
    engineering in the Army, should have a very close relationship with the
    USD(R&E) in order to coordinate research efforts across the Department
    of Defense while still focusing Army efforts that provide capabilities
    for soldiers. A close working relationship between the AAE and USD(R&E)
    would afford the Army the ability to leverage work from the Army's
    sister services and Defense agencies, avoid duplication, and accelerate
    high risk technologies to advance warfighting capability. USD (R&E)
    also oversees numerous organizations that do innovative research and
    engineering work, such as DARPA, DIU, MDA, and SCO. A close and
    collaborative relationship between those entities and the Army could
    lead to significant efficiencies and the acceleration of new
    technologies into Army Science and Technology and acquisition programs.
             relations with the office of the secretary of defense
        Question. In your view, what is the optimum relationship between
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the
    Military Department Service and Defense Agency offices responsible for
    acquisition and sustainment activities?
        Answer. In my view, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
    and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) plays a significant role by establishing the
    policy that synchronizes the services and enables the department to
    operate effectively as an enterprise. The USD (A&S) also serves a
    critical role as the Defense Acquisition Executive, with the authority
    to retain, or delegate, milestone or decision authority for major
    defense acquisition programs or their equivalent middle-tier
    acquisition programs. A potential way to optimize the relationships
    would be establishing and resourcing data repositories to prevent
    inconsistent solutions and free the Services to focus on executing
    Weapon System and Ammunition programs. Another area for optimization is
    better coordination on cross-cutting issues such as supply chain risk
    management, sensitive technology policies, COVID-19 response
    activities, and cyber policies that relate to acquisition and
    sustainment issues.
                         relationships within the army
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Army Chief of
    Staff to improve Army acquisition outcomes and the overall health of
    the Army research and engineering enterprise?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army Chief of Staff
    (CSA), and other Army leaders, to ensure the timely delivery of
    capabilities to soldiers. This includes advising the CSA regarding the
    proper balance of resources against priorities as it relates to
    acquisition programs, working with the CSA and Army Futures Command
    (AFC) to ensure requirements are validated and technically feasible,
    and to ensure that appropriate tradeoffs are made among cost, schedule,
    and performance before milestone or production decisions in order to
    avoid unnecessary costs or program risks. I would also work closely
    with the Army Chief of Staff to develop and manage appropriate career
    paths for military officers in the acquisition workforce.
                         relationships within the army
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to develop and
    sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the
    Army Senior Acquisition Executive and the Commander of the U.S. Army
    Futures Command?
        Answer. Success in Army modernization requires a collective effort
    from multiple stakeholders and organizations that contribute to the
    success of acquisition programs. A strong relationship between the Army
    Acquisition Executive and the Commanding General of AFC is essential to
    successful development of new warfighting capabilities. AFC plays a
    critical role in executing the Army's Science and Technology enterprise
    and in defining requirements for the Army's next generation
    capabilities. If confirmed, I would work closely and collaboratively
    with the AFC Commander to ensure the Army can effectively develop new
    capabilities, to include iterating on requirements to ensure they are
    well-informed and technically feasible, employing robust processes to
    obtain soldier feedback, developing sound acquisition strategies, and
    promoting the transition of S&T technology to formal programs of
    record. In addition, if confirmed, I would work collaboratively with
    the AFC Commander to prioritize resources within the Army's equipping
    program to promote successful fielding of critical warfighting
    capabilities.
                         relationships within the army
        Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the joint and Army
    requirements community to ensure that requirements are technically
    feasible and stable and will not result in programs that are likely to
    fail due to technical failures or cost or schedule growth?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to make use of the forums
    that bring the acquisition and requirements communities together to
    discuss those issues before acquisition programs are started, such as
    Materiel Development Decisions and Acquisition Shaping Panels; or when
    programs are underway, such as the Configuration Steering Board. It
    takes collaboration to balance what the user needs with what is
    technically feasible within cost and schedule goals.
                                  acquisition
        Question. Over the past year alone, the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO), the Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E),
    and others have documented that multiple Army procurement programs have
    experienced cost growth, schedule delays, incomplete systems at
    delivery, and post-delivery problems.
        If confirmed, what would be your plan for improving Army
    acquisition activities?
        Answer. Successful acquisition programs start with sound
    requirements. If confirmed, I would use multiple formal and informal
    decision forums to involve the Army acquisition enterprise as early as
    possible as requirements are formed. A process that occurs in parallel
    to requirements development is acquisition strategy development. If
    confirmed, I would work to ensure the Army develops sound acquisition
    strategies that identify and mitigate technical and program risks.
    Congress has provided many new authorities to tailor acquisition
    strategies to programs. I would seek to use these new authorities to
    accelerate the pace of programs while also mitigating cost and
    performance risks. Once a program begins, I would make effective use of
    program oversight processes, including various reviews and assessments,
    such as technical reviews, independent assessments and tests, program
    reviews, and milestone reviews and decisions. I would ensure the Army
    employs risk reduction strategies in programs, to include modeling and
    simulation, alternative design approaches, and contractor incentives,
    as needed to achieve program cost, schedule and performance objectives.
    A final critical aspect of achieving success in acquisition is close
    coordination with Congress, and in particular, the four defense
    committees. Without support from Congress, the Army cannot achieve
    success in any of its acquisition efforts. As such, improving
    coordination with Congress would be one of my top priorities.
                                  acquisition
        Question. What do you perceive to be the recent successes and
    shortfalls in Army acquisition activities?
        Answer. Based on my work for Congress conducting oversight and my 6
    months as the Acting Army Acquisition Executive, I believe the Army is
    more likely to succeed when acquisition has Army Senior Leader
    involvement, stable and achievable requirements, accurate cost
    estimates, consistent funding, support from Congress, effective test
    plans, and a willingness to adapt as conditions change. The Army has
    failed in the past when any of these factors are not in place for a
    particular program.
        The Army has over 700 programs, from very small ones to those of
    national-level importance. On a given day, most are doing well in terms
    of cost, schedule, and performance. However, many do have challenges. A
    notable recent success includes the Army's role in the Federal
    Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Army acquisition and
    contracting professionals found ways to use a wide range of authorities
    to develop therapeutics, procure protective equipment, and provide
    vaccines at a highly accelerated pace compared to normal acquisition
    program timelines. Among other recent successes are efforts to develop
    early versions of hypersonic and long-range strike systems via a rapid-
    prototyping approach that builds on proven technologies to limit
    technical risk.
        At the same time, the Army has struggled on some programs for a
    variety of reasons. For example, while the programs are now performing
    well, moving the Armored Multi-Purpose Fighting Vehicle (AMPV) and
    M109A7 self-propelled howitzer programs into large-scale production
    were plagued with manufacturing and supply challenges. What those
    programs went through is illustrative of the challenge of going from
    small-scale prototyping to large-scale manufacturing. In the area of
    software, the Army has struggled at times to keep programs on budget
    and on schedule, often due to unclear requirements work up front or
    requirements creep during software development. In all these cases, I
    have found that the Army can find a path to success when the problems
    are clearly understood and all the appropriate stakeholders, including
    Congress, are involved in finding solutions.
                                  acquisition
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve
    oversight in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or
    acquisition management processes?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Army Futures
    Command leadership to facilitate collaborative dialog with the Program
    Executive Offices (PEOs) and ASA(ALT) staff throughout the requirements
    determination process. This upfront collaboration allows for the Army's
    trained Acquisition professionals to provide cost, schedule, and
    performance perspective for achievability of a requested capability. In
    the role of Co-Chair for the Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review and
    the development of the Program Objective Memorandum, I would provide
    oversight with an understanding that the Army works in a fiscally
    constrained environment. Managing risk, while considering the best
    capability for the warfighter, will always be first and foremost in my
    considerations for resource allocation during the budgetary process. As
    the Army's Acquisition Executive, I would reserve the right to withhold
    milestone decisionmaking authority for any program, and request the
    PEOs to provide regular program reviews to address risk areas, and
    bring potential issues to light as early in the development lifecycle
    as possible.
                                  acquisition
        Question. What roles do you see for developmental planning,
    prototyping, and experimentation in the fielding of future Army
    capabilities?
        Answer. Developmental planning, prototyping, and experimentation
    will always be key ingredients for the success of defense acquisitions.
    When used appropriately, they can reduce the length and expense of
    programs by gaining valuable insights early in a program.
    Experimentation in realistic conditions can reveal entirely new uses
    for systems and allow the Army to find innovative ways to solve
    military problems. Prototyping is also very useful, but not all
    prototypes are equal. Some are almost ``handmade'' demonstrators, while
    others are very mature after having gone through earlier development
    efforts, often in the private sector. Understanding where a program's
    prototyping effort lies on that spectrum is the most vital factor in
    putting a plan in place to get from prototype to production.
        Question. How would you propose the Army better plan and prepare
    for weapon system sustainment as part of its acquisition activities?
        Answer. I understand the importance of identifying sustainment
    costs and challenges early in the development cycle of a weapon system
    in order to control lifecycle sustainment costs. It is my understanding
    that the Army has several new efforts in this area underway. For
    example, gaining an understanding of a program's sustainment approach
    is directly related to the associated intellectual property (IP)
    approach. If the Army does not plan for IP well in advance, it is very
    difficult to do so later in a program, especially after production has
    begun. Another example is the need to identify early on in a program
    whether advanced manufacturing techniques, including additive
    manufacturing, should be integrated into a weapon system's design to
    enable more flexible sustainment options in the future. A final example
    would be understanding a system's supply chain to ensure that it is
    secure and dependable. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity
    to evaluate the sustainment plans that Army program managers and
    acquisition professionals develop before recommending any additional
    potential changes that may be appropriate.
        Question. Given that Army acquisition failures have often resulted
    from technologically unachievable or conceptually flawed requirements,
    how could you help the Army avoid these pitfalls, if confirmed?
        Answer. Army acquisition receives program requirements from many
    elements of the Army. If confirmed I would work closely with Army
    leaders, such as the CSA, VCSA, AFC Commander, AMC Commander, and the
    Army G-2, to facilitate collaborative dialog throughout the
    requirements determination process. Having trained acquisition
    professionals provide an early assessment of technological
    achievability would help ensure requirements are not written with
    apparent conceptual flaws. As a voting member of the Army Requirement
    Oversight Committee, I would ensure that all new requirements are
    vetted for cost, schedule and performance risks, from a materiel
    perspective. If a requirement is deemed improbable for long-term
    success, I would provide recommendations for change, or non-concur with
    the approval until the concept is modified for achievability.
        Question. How can the Department of Defense and the Army better
    access and integrate commercial and military technology to remain ahead
    of potential adversaries?
        If confirmed, how would you balance the need to undertake
    prototyping, experimentation, and rapid acquisition with the demands of
    managing the execution of the Army's programs using other acquisition
    pathways, such as major capability acquisition?
        Answer. The Army's ability to modernize and maintain a decisive
    advantage over its adversaries requires the ability to effectively
    integrate innovative technologies, including those developed by the
    defense industrial base and those found in the commercial sector. If
    confirmed, I would look to leverage commercial innovation whenever
    appropriate, including in those instances where technologies already
    exist in the private sector and can be adopted quickly by the Army
    either ``off the shelf'' or with minimal development. I would also work
    to focus the Army's development efforts on military-unique capabilities
    that address gaps needed to enable soldiers to have a decisive
    advantage in combat.
        Additionally, if confirmed, I would work to ensure that Army
    develops acquisition strategies that employ the full range of statutory
    authorities, as needed and as appropriate, to ensure the rapid
    development and delivery of capabilities. These strategies may also
    include employing a combination of multiple acquisition pathways to
    obtain value not otherwise available through use of a single pathway,
    or to address specific risks to program objectives. If confirmed, I
    would also work with program managers and PEOs to ensure that
    acquisition strategies successfully balance the need for rapid
    development of new capabilities with the need to ensure that such
    capabilities are effective and safe for soldiers.
                          cost and schedule estimates
        Question. GAO has reported that the Army's use of unrealistically
    optimistic cost and schedule estimates is a major contributor to cost
    growth and program failure.
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that
    cost and schedule estimates for Army programs are fair and independent,
    and that such estimates provide a sound basis for decisionmaking?
        Answer. Gaining insight from a wide a range of cost estimating
    experts both in and outside the Army is essential to properly bounding
    cost risk for a program. In my experience, the ASA(ALT) staff and
    program offices have in recent years developed a positive and
    collaborative working relationship with both the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics office and the OSD Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation office to ensure that the fair and
    independent cost estimates they develop are based on the best available
    program data. I would continue to support those relationships and the
    resulting open dialog, if confirmed.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    improve the estimation of life cycle sustainment costs for Army
    systems?
        Answer. In my view, the Army has made great strides establishing
    Operational Sustainment Reviews (OSRs). While the Army has increased
    the capture of sustainment data in the Global Combat Support System-
    Army, if confirmed, I would look to improve the data quality by
    automating data capture and distributing soldier input using tablet
    computers at the soldier/mechanic-level to provide needed visibility in
    parts and equipment usage data (miles and hours), labor and failure
    data to improve reliability. If confirmed, I would work to improve
    tracking the visibility of both allocation and execution of depot
    maintenance and Sustainment Systems Technical Support linked directly
    to a weapon system.
       software activities and acquisition of information technology (it)
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASA(ALT)
    with respect to the IT acquisition and software activities of the Army?
        Answer. Section 7016 of Title 10 U.S. Code states that the
    principal duty of the ASA(ALT) is the overall supervision of
    acquisition, technology, and logistics matters of the Department of the
    Army. ASA(ALT) oversight includes acquisition and support of
    Information Technology (IT), software and business transformation
    systems; and decision authority for software acquisition pathway
    programs. The ASA(ALT) works closely with the Chief Information Officer
    (CIO) and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, in all matters related to IT and
    ensures that all IT and software systems are designed, built, and
    tested to meet regulatory and statutory requirements including but not
    limited to those related to re-use, interoperability, and
    cybersecurity. ASA(ALT)'s role in IT and software is distinguished from
    the CIO's role of budget review, IT standards compliance,
    interoperability, and requirements generation.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to address systemic and
    persistent cultural, process, and technical barriers to improving the
    Army's treatment of software activities and IT acquisition?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would strengthen ASA(ALT) relationships
    with AFC, the CIO and G6 in order to synchronize and streamline the
    acquisition of software and IT capabilities. I would set policy,
    guidance, standards, and best practices in order to maximize the
    flexibility and speed of the PEOs and PMs to acquire and deploy
    software and IT capabilities. I would also collaborate within the Army,
    the Department of Defense (DOD), and with industry partners to capture
    lessons learned, pain points, and opportunities for increased IT and
    software agility to create a win/win environment for all stakeholders.
    In addition, if confirmed, I would seek to exploit new authorities and
    flexibilities provided by Congress to fundamentally shift software and
    IT development activities out of traditional acquisition pathways and
    into the new software acquisition pathway. It is my understanding that
    the Army already has six software development efforts using this new
    pathway but, in my view, much more can be done in this area.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the research and
    testing community, the Army's Chief Information Officer, and with the
    other Military Services--including their Chief Information Officers--in
    the development and deployment of Army business IT systems?
        Answer. The Army possesses a mature business IT system environment
    and infrastructure across program management, requirements development,
    and testing. If confirmed, I would continue to engage stakeholders
    through the Army Business Council, programming and budgeting forums,
    and Army acquisition decision boards. The Army is assessing how to
    modernize and sustain its business systems and it will leverage
    emerging commercial and government technologies where requirements are
    aligned to save funding and to provide better capability. Also, if
    confirmed, I would continue to engage with partner Military Services
    where similar systems are in development or in fielding to leverage the
    lessons learned and investments made, and to avoid duplication.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your highest priority IT and
    software-related initiatives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize the use of best commercial
    practices for reuse, modularity, development of IT and software
    efforts. For example, I would fully support the use of cloud
    capabilities and open source software that enable data driven decisions
    and standards while ensuring open competition. In my view, the highest
    priority for software and IT should be capitalizing on cloud and data
    technologies, which work hand in hand, and institutionalizing their use
    throughout every aspect of Army operations. The cloud enables the Army
    to separate software and IT development from the management of hosting
    infrastructure, offering the opportunity to do both more efficiently,
    while also allowing the Army to leverage data to improve
    decisionmaking, automate processes, and gain insights that would have
    otherwise gone unknown. A second priority would be moving more Army
    software development efforts into the new software acquisition pathway
    to ensure that the significant flexibilities provided by this new
    pathway are used to the move to a more modern approach to software
    development.
        Question. If confirmed, what major improvements would you make in
    the Army's development and deployment of major IT systems and services
    and software programs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would leverage best practices and
    partnerships that enable data centric and Modular Open System Approach
    (MOSA) that reduces risk for modernization of IT systems and software
    programs. Simultaneously, I would work to ensure the decoupling of
    software from hardware and support cloud capabilities, the use of plug
    and play modules, and the re-use of interfaces across the enterprise. I
    would also promote the use of agile processes and Development, Security
    and Operations (DEVSECOPS) environments in order to achieve the same
    rapid-release cycles that private industry is able to achieve.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate relationship
    between the Army's efforts to implement enterprise IT programs and
    supporting computing services and infrastructure to support Army
    missions, and the efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information
    Systems Agency (DISA)?
        Answer. In my view, Army enterprise IT programs, computing services
    and infrastructure provide a broad set of capabilities in support of
    the Army's mission. Partnering with DISA and utilizing the services as
    appropriate to obtain efficiencies and cost savings will remain a
    consideration and potential course of action. This is critical as the
    Army moves toward joint operations in support of Multi-Domain
    Operations and Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you coordinate the development or
    procurement of cloud computing services within the Army with other
    Department of Defense and Federal Government cloud computing
    initiatives?
        Answer. The 2020 Army Cloud Plan communicates the Army's strategy
    for utilizing cloud computing technologies in order to ensure our
    soldiers and civilians are more skillful than any potential adversary
    and the U.S. maintains overmatch in the information realm. In March
    2021, the Army awarded an enterprise contract for commercial cloud
    computing services, thus providing a single procurement vehicle to
    optimize Army's enterprise cloud spend. The Army contract provides
    critical capabilities required; particularly after the cancellation of
    DOD's Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI). If confirmed, I
    would support Army and DOD enterprise contract initiatives that provide
    the Government with best-in-class performance and cost advantages that
    the Army's significant buying power affords. Today, the Army
    collaborates with the DOD's Cloud Computing Program Office on
    requirements for the new Joint Warfighter Cloud Capability (JWCC)
    contract. If confirmed, I will work diligently with the Army CIO, DOD
    CIO and Service Acquisition Executives to ensure Army's equities are
    included within the JWCC and it provides the capabilities required to
    enable Joint Multi-Domain Operations.
        Question. Where do you believe the best opportunities for
    collaboration and joint execution between the Army and Defense Digital
    Service (DDS) might exist?
        Answer. I understand that the Army has a successful working
    relationship with the Defense Digital Service (DDS) and they report
    directly to the Secretary of the Army. To date, DDS contributes to the
    Cyber Institute at Augusta University and played a significant role in
    Hack-the-Army and Hack-the-Pentagon events. If confirmed, I look
    forward to additional opportunities for collaboration and joint
    execution between the Army and DDS. The DDS office significantly
    contributed in assisting with the Department's COVID response, and is
    capable of adding value to the most challenging cyber security issues.
    The Army will also benefit from continued partnership with DDS
    concerning their work in Counter-UAS.
                            middle tier acquisition
        Question. Section 804 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA authorized DOD
    to employ an acquisition approach (``Middle Tier Acquisition'') that
    was intended to support the rapid delivery of new capability to meet
    emerging operational needs.
        In your view, what benefit has the Department of the Army derived
    from its use of Section 804 authorities?
        Answer. In my view, the use of Middle Tier Section 804 authorities
    has yielded significant benefits to the Army, most notably by
    streamlining the documentation and approval process for the pursuit of
    mature integrated technologies. The rapid prototyping and fielding
    acquisition pathways also facilitate an iterative process for
    developing weapon system requirements that incorporates soldier
    feedback through experimentation with prototypes or proofs of concept.
    These approaches have allowed the Army to develop informed requirements
    and better leverage mature technologies in the development of
    modernized systems. Use of these acquisition pathways also provides
    significantly more flexibility to adjust a program's requirements or
    production quantities to meet new and emerging Army needs as compared
    to the traditional 5000.02 series model. If used carefully, these
    pathways should allow the Army to develop and acquire new capabilities
    much more quickly than in the past.
        Question. What risks have accrued and been accepted by the Army as
    a consequence of the use of these authorities?
        Answer. As with any acquisition program, those programs employing
    the Middle Tier of Acquisition authority do contain some level of risk.
    I believe, the most significant risk is related to the transitioning of
    a prototype effort into production. It is critical that systems have
    reached an appropriate level of maturity before they are transitioned
    into fielding or production in order to ensure producible, safe, and
    effective capabilities are delivered to soldiers. Another risk is cost
    growth. The flexibilities inherent in this new authority, such as not
    having traditional program baselines in many cases, could create
    conditions that allow cost growth if a disciplined management process
    is not in place to control it. If confirmed, I will ensure appropriate
    oversight of the use of this authority, as well as the identification
    and mitigation of any risks.
        Question. If confirmed, what processes would you put in place to
    ensure appropriate oversight of the Department's use of 804
    authorities? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. In creating the 804 authorities, Congress granted the Army
    significant flexibilities compared to traditional acquisition
    processes. With these increased flexibilities comes a responsibility to
    aggressively manage program cost, schedule, and performance risk, as
    well as establishing effective two-way communications with Congress. If
    confirmed, I would comprehensively assess current Army processes to
    ensure that systems developed under the Middle-Tier Acquisition
    authorities are mature and prepared for transition to production. I
    would work with PEOs and program managers to ensure that acquisition
    strategies address specific risks associated with the transition, to
    include compliance with formal program of record requirements where
    appropriate, employment of required developmental and operation testing
    as required, materiel release and safety reviews, and sustainment
    planning, among others. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that these
    and other relevant concerns are addressed in the program's strategy and
    oversight and review processes, and I would implement any changes
    needed.
        Question. What best practices can the Army employ to generate
    realistic and technically achievable specifications, particularly in
    sophisticated, rapidly evolving technical areas such as cybersecurity,
    long range precision fires, and artificial intelligence?
        Answer. I believe the Army employs a number of best practices to
    ensure realistic and technically sound requirements and specifications.
    These include use of early prototyping and experimentation, increased
    use of modeling and simulation and digital engineering tools, use of
    independent technology readiness assessments to ensure technical
    maturity. This also includes close and early collaboration between the
    requirements developers and S&T community in AFC and PMs who oversee
    acquisition efforts. In addition, the use of broad market research and
    constant communication with industry regarding Army capability gaps are
    critical to success in developing new warfighting capabilities. In the
    areas of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence this is especially
    salient as the vast majority of innovation in these areas resides in
    the private sector. If confirmed, I would reinforce the use of these,
    and other, best practices to ensure development of realistic and
    achievable specifications.
        Question. In your view, does the Army have the flexibility to shift
    between acquisition pathways if a program warrants such a change in
    strategy?
        Answer. Yes, in my view the Army has the flexibility it needs to
    shift between acquisition pathways, as appropriate. The Adaptive
    Acquisition Framework provides the Army the ability to use multiple
    pathways to obtain value not otherwise available through use of a
    single pathway. As part of ongoing program oversight through various
    venues, the ASA(ALT) must continuously assess the acquisition strategy,
    program risks, and appropriate mitigation approaches called for in a
    particular program or development effort. For larger programs, any
    shift in pathway would also have to be coordinated with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. If confirmed, I
    would utilize these reviews to determine whether any changes, to
    include a shift in the acquisition pathway, are warranted.
                                  contracting
        Question. What are the major challenges facing the Army with
    respect to contracting activities?
        Answer. There are many challenges with respect to contracting, but
    two in particular stand out. First, I think a major challenge,
    affecting not only the Army, but all of Government, are the barriers to
    entry for companies that would not normally do business with the Army.
    The use of flexible contracting mechanisms, such as Other Transaction
    Authority or the pilot Commercial Solutions Offering, are minimizing
    bureaucratic processes and opening up lines of communication with non-
    traditional defense contractors. In my view, the Army needs to do a
    better job of understanding and applying innovation from the private
    sector.
        A second major challenge is creating and maintaining more
    ``contracting capacity'' to both speed the contracting process and
    provide surge capacity for emergency situations. While having a larger
    contracting workforce is an option, a more likely path of success given
    funding limitations is developing tools and training to increase the
    efficiency of the contracting workforce already in place. In Fiscal
    Year 2020, the Army completed more than 200,000 separate contracting
    actions. Even small gains in efficiency may have outsized results.
        Question. What additional flexible contracting authorities might
    you recommend the Congress enact?
        Answer. I know the Army appreciates the flexible contracting
    authorities already provided by Congress. If confirmed, I look forward
    to the opportunity to serve in the position before recommending any
    potential additional authorities that may be needed.
        Question. Do you perceive that the Army is making appropriate use
    of non-FAR-based contracting approaches, such as Other Transaction
    Authority (OTA)? If confirmed, how might you modify the Army's efforts
    to and processes for the use of these approaches?
        Answer. Yes, I think the Army is making appropriate use of non-FAR
    based contracting approaches. I recently reviewed the findings from the
    DOD Inspector General and General Accountability Office related to the
    award of Other Transactions and noted that the findings highlighted the
    need for more transparency and consistency, especially when awarding
    Other Transactions through consortium based agreements, but did not
    identify any breach of law or procedure by the Army. I am also in
    agreement with recent congressional language related to improving
    accessibility and reporting of information related to the exercise of
    other transaction authority. If confirmed, I intend to improve the
    Army's ability to quickly provide details related to individual
    projects through enhanced reporting.
        Additionally, if confirmed, I intend to work to strike an
    appropriate balance between flexibility and oversight in the execution
    of non-FAR based approaches and evaluate the effectiveness of FAR based
    and non-FAR based approaches to help ensure the appropriate authorities
    are being used to achieve the intended objectives.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Army personnel
    are properly trained in the use of non-FAR-based contracting
    methodologies?
        Answer. In my judgment, proper use of non-FAR based approaches is
    essential to the effective use of these authorities. If confirmed, I
    will support the USD(A&S) ``Back to Basics'' initiatives, and DOD's
    work with the Defense Acquisition University to establish training for
    the use of Other
        Transactions. Within the Army, if confirmed, I will enhance
    training on the use of non-FAR instruments, including the dissemination
    of best practices and lessons learned by the seasoned practitioners,
    and review the minimum requirements for personnel authorized to execute
    these non-FAR based authorities. The requirements strengthen the
    ability to include appropriate safeguards while executing innovative
    approaches.
        Question. In your view, what are the general advantages and
    disadvantages of FAR and non-FAR based contracting approaches,
    respectively?
        Answer. In my view, the FAR-based approach includes numerous
    controls designed to reduce risks to operational, reporting, and
    compliance objectives. These controls help the system operate with
    openness, integrity, and fairness while fulfilling important public
    policy objectives. However, many controls are perceived as inconsistent
    with commercial marketplace practices, and the sheer number of
    accumulated controls has been criticized for endangering the cost,
    schedule, and performance outcomes the system purports to uphold.
        Non-FAR based approaches offer many advantages, including
    flexibility, teaming, increased communication with industry, speed, and
    access to the broadest possible pool of prospective vendors, especially
    with respect to non-traditional contractors. I believe the Army has
    been able to overcome the barriers to entry that non-traditional
    defense contractors often face with traditional FAR-based contract
    arrangements through the use of non-FAR based approaches. The lack of
    controls as compared to the FAR-based approach must be balanced by
    proper judgment to ensure the Government's interests are adequately
    protected.
                        multiyear procurement contracts
        Question. Section 2306b of title 10, United States Code,
    establishes the criteria that are prerequisite to a Military
    Department's exercise of multiyear contract authority.
        What types of programs are appropriate for the use of multiyear
    contracts, in your view?
        Answer. In my view, a multiyear (MY) contract must have stable
    requirements and be expected to remain substantially unchanged during
    contract execution. Contract cost and anticipated cost avoidance
    through the use of a MY contract needs to be realistic and provide
    significant savings when compared to the use of single year contracts.
    In my judgment, the Army should only enter into MY contracts when the
    Army is confident that adequate funds for the program will be
    programmed in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army fully
    complies with the requirements of section 2306b?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the relevant Army
    stakeholders to ensure that analysis has been conducted to satisfy the
    10 USC 2306(a) findings to enter into multiyear contracts. I will
    thoroughly consider these findings to ensure that they are supported by
    facts. Further, for those multiyear contracts that require Secretary of
    Defense certification, I will work with the relevant DOD organizations
    and provide the necessary preliminary findings (10 USC 2306(a)) to
    ensure that they are supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed
    by the Director of Cost assessment and Program Evaluation.
        Question. What is your understanding of the requirement that a
    multiyear contract result in ``significant savings,'' as compared to
    the cost of carrying out a program through annual contracts?
        Answer. I understand that a multiyear (MY) contract needs to result
    in significant savings when compared to a series of single year
    contracts spanning the life of the proposed MY contract. There is no
    official definition for the word ``significant'' when it is referring
    to a specific percentage or a dollar value of savings for a multiyear
    contract. Currently, a goal of a minimum savings of 10 percent is
    expected. Due to a high value of some MY contracts, I believe that a
    percentage less than 10 percent may be acceptable. Each contract needs
    to be evaluated separately and determined to be a significant cost
    savings for the U.S. Government.
        Question. What is your understanding of the requirements regarding
    the timing of a Department of Defense request for legislative
    authorization of a multiyear procurement contract for a particular
    program?
        Answer. I understand that the Army may not enter into a multiyear
    (MY) contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000 unless
    the contract is specifically authorized by a law other than an
    Appropriations Act. In the case of the Apache and Blackhawk programs, I
    understand that the discussions leading to the requested required
    Authorization Act language started years before it was included as part
    of the Fiscal Year 2022 Presidential Budget Request. This has given all
    the concerned entities within the Army and OSD enough time to
    contemplate the benefits of a MY, as well as enough time to program
    funding for such a contract.
        Question. The Navy budget request for fiscal year 2022 included
    insufficient funding to avoid breaking a multiyear contract for the
    DDG-51 destroyer program. The committee views this action as breaking a
    moral commitment from the Department to fully fund multiyear
    procurement programs for the duration of the contract. Such an action
    should only be taken in the direst of circumstances. The Army also
    manages multiyear contracts.
        Can you assure the committee that you intend to fully fund any
    multiyear contracts within the purview of the Army in future budget
    requests and that you would only recommend a budget request that fails
    to do so in a dire emergency?
        Answer. I understand that the Army does lay out future funding in
    the FYDP that covers the cost associated with each multiyear contract.
    Barring any unforeseen national emergency/disaster, I can assure the
    committee that, if confirmed, I will work with the Army financial
    stakeholders to prioritize each multiyear contract for full funding for
    every year that it is active.
                              test and evaluation
        Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it
    appropriate to procure weapons systems and equipment that have not been
    demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
    and operationally suitable?
        Answer. I do not believe it is ever appropriate to procure weapons
    systems the Army intends to field to its soldiers before it is
    adequately tested and proven safe and effective--this is paramount.
    Through testing we are able to determine whether a system is suitable,
    survivable and effective. If confirmed, I will always ensure we
    adequately test all Army systems in order to provide the best equipment
    available to our soldiers to improve their ability to accomplish the
    mission.
        Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
    operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
    acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other streamlined acquisition
    processes?
        Answer. I view the developmental and operational test and
    evaluation processes for rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition and
    other streamlined acquisition processes much the same as the normal
    test and evaluation processes. The challenge is to accomplish the test
    mission quicker to meet the urgent needs of the Warfighter. The Army
    must conduct enough testing to determine the capabilities and
    limitations of any system before fielding. The Army must also ensure
    all systems are safe to use before putting them into the hands of our
    soldiers. One way the Army is helping to speed up the testing process
    is by including soldier touch points earlier during developmental
    testing, thereby gaining critical operational insights much sooner than
    what the Army was able to accomplish in the past.
        Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have
    adequate test and evaluation organizations, resources, and capabilities
    necessary to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
    acquisition, and budget decisions?
        Answer. In my view, the Army's Test and Evaluation Enterprise has
    adequate test and evaluation organizations, resources, and capabilities
    necessary to test and evaluate the Army's priority modernization
    programs and also to provide test services for critical acquisition
    programs across the joint force.
        Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Army should be
    developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
        Answer. The Army is already investing significant resources to
    ensure it can test all Army modernization priority programs. I
    understand it is also leveraging the DOD managed Central Test and
    Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP) funds to procure test
    capabilities when the Army currently has a gap--autonomy is an example
    of a current investment area that is focused on a future test
    requirement. Artificial intelligence, machine learning, electronic
    warfare and cyber are other areas that require attention now. I feel
    that the Army must also ensure that it tests systems in all the
    operational environments the Army intends to use the equipment.
    INDOPACOM, EUCOM and the Arctic present vastly different environments
    from those the Army operated in over the last 20 years. If I am
    confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army Test and Evaluation
    Enterprise is adequately resourced to test all systems to include the
    relevant operational environments of the systems intended use.
        Question. In your view, would there be benefit to the Department's
    establishment of a comparative testing program for domestic commercial
    technologies--perhaps a program modeled on the successful Foreign
    Comparative Testing program?
        Answer. Yes, there would potentially be a benefit. There is always
    benefit if we can find ways to provide advanced technologies for
    warfighters without expensive development costs. Doing this for
    domestic commercial technologies would also keep the Army within the
    bounds of statutory requirements, such as the Buy American Act (which
    requires Federal Agencies to procure domestic materials and products)
    and the Berry Amendment (which requires the Department of Defense to
    use American textile materials and products). The challenge, in my
    view, is working with the requirements community when these
    technologies are close to, but below, the threshold requirements to
    either accept the lower performance or establish an incremental
    improvement path that is timely and affordable. If confirmed, I would
    explore the feasibility of some form of a comparative testing program
    for commercial technologies.
                             technology transition
        Question. The Department of Defense continues to struggle with the
    transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and
    major weapons systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has
    struggled with moving technologies from the Department's programs
    rapidly into the hands of operational users.
        What impediments to technology transition do you perceive to exist
    within the Army?
        Answer. The Army has a mixed record in the area of technology
    transitions, with many successes, but also many situations where a
    promising technology was not able to move rapidly into production and
    fielding. There are many reasons for this situation, but two stand out
    in my view.
        The first is a lack of funding flexibility. Modern congressional
    appropriation and authorization acts prescribe the use of funding in a
    highly detailed manner, including hundreds of specific research and
    development and procurement lines. As a result, there are few large
    scale, flexible pools of funding that the Army can draw on to pursue a
    new opportunity that comes along unless it uses reprogramming
    authority. While reprograming does provide the Army with great
    flexibility, it is a limited resource that the Army must carefully
    manage to ensure that responses to true emergencies, such as a natural
    disasters or unforeseen deployments, can be funded. This necessarily
    limits its use for technology transitions. In cases where Congress has
    provided more flexibility, such as the counter-IED efforts that took
    place during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has been able
    to transition technologies much more rapidly.
        A second impediment is a lack of dialog between the innovators and
    the ``receiving'' elements of the Army regarding what is required to
    transition a prototype or commercial technology to a militarily useful
    system that is fully tested, safe, effective, and sustainable. For
    example, the Army can conduct an experiment to demonstrate a
    technology's combat effectiveness, but often does not--absent some kind
    of emergency need--enter into formal program until the technology is
    sufficiently mature to be tested and qualified against all the safety
    and certification requirements necessary to field a combat capability.
    This can take time, and can lead to understandable frustration on the
    part of the innovators that are trying to bring new technology to the
    Army. In my view, more detailed dialog earlier in technology
    development efforts can help bridge this divide and lead to more
    successful technology transitions.
        Question. To what extent could and should the Army Research
    Laboratory and other Army combat capability development centers play a
    greater role in enabling the transition of promising technologies from
    a successful initial demonstration to a program-of-record, which may
    include working with industry and the desired program executive officer
    (PEO) to develop and assist with a systems engineering plan necessary
    to achieve transition to the PEO?
        Answer. In my assessment, the Army can no longer have technology
    developers work in ``silos-of-excellence.'' I understand the value of
    early collaboration and frequent communication between the
    Requirements, Science and Technology, Acquisition, Test, and
    Sustainment communities; along with the Army's academic and industry
    partners; and, most importantly, soldiers. However, I do not believe
    the Army needs more processes mandated in legislation in this area at
    this time. Instead, I believe the Army needs to better coordinate the
    efforts of those developing innovative solutions with the authorities
    and funding to proceed to production and fielding at scale. The Army
    also needs better metrics to measure success and failure of these
    efforts so our progress can be tracked by Army leaders and Congress. It
    is my understanding that many efforts in this area are underway between
    Army Futures Command and PEOs, but there is always more that can be
    done to facilitate success in this area. If confirmed, I will encourage
    these communities to collaborate and have Army scientists, engineers
    and PEOs work together to mature technologies and provide cutting edge
    capabilities to soldiers.
        Question. In your view, what can be done from a budget, policy, and
    organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies
    from science and technology programs and other sources, including small
    businesses, venture capital-funded companies, and other non-traditional
    defense contractors, into acquisition programs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army is leveraging all
    statutory authorities and acquisition flexibilities to facilitate
    technology transition from science and technology (S&T) efforts,
    including those originating from industry partners, small businesses,
    non-traditional contractors, and venture-capital funded companies.
    Mapping S&T and other technology programs, such as the Small Business
    Innovation Research (SBIR) and Technology Maturation Initiative (TMI)
    programs, to acquisition transition milestones is an effective approach
    to accelerate transformative technology solutions for Army problems.
    Another area to explore is working with OSD level centers of
    innovation, such as DARPA, SCO, DIU, and others, to bring together
    innovators and elements of the Army that need help. I understand that
    the Army has had several successful collaborations with these groups,
    but more can be done. If confirmed, I would also endeavor to work with
    Congress to explore new ways to provide more flexible funding that
    would allow the rapid realignment of available funds to meet unexpected
    opportunities, especially in areas where technology is rapidly
    advancing. If confirmed, I will send a clear message to the American
    innovation community that commercial success and technology partnership
    with the Army are not mutually exclusive.
                          procurement sourcing issues
        Question. How should the Army balance the ``pros'' and ``cons'' of
    supporting the domestic industrial base through Army procurement
    activities, as compared to procuring items from friendly partner
    nations, as further compared to procuring items from commercial
    providers globally, including potentially from China?
        Answer. In my view, the Army should always look first to the
    domestic industrial base for its procurement needs. American companies,
    run by American entrepreneurs and employing hard-working Americans,
    have been and will remain one of our strongest advantages over our
    competitors. At the same time, in a world of integrated and global
    supply chains, we should also always look to see what is available from
    our allies and partner nations. In many cases, American companies work
    closely with international partners in these countries, providing a
    chance for many win-win scenarios. Given the many well-documented cases
    of intellectual property theft, lack of supply chain reliability, and
    security risks of procurements from China, I believe the Army must
    carefully review its procurements from that country. If confirmed, I
    expect to work with appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense that are conducting reviews of domestic sourcing policies.
        Question. What are your views on U.S. and friendly nation content
    requirements, also known colloquially as ``Buy America'' requirements,
    for U.S. Army weapon systems?
        Answer. In general, while ideally all Army needs--in terms of
    quality, quantity, and price would be met by American industry, I
    believe the Army needs flexibility to make informed case-by-case
    decisions on the amount of foreign content allowed in weapon systems.
    In most cases, current laws and policies provide that flexibility.
    However, I support data-driven approaches that lead to increased
    American content in Army equipment while also keeping programs
    affordable.
        There is tremendous variation of domestic versus foreign content
    within the broad range of Army weapon systems. As a result, a metric
    that proposes a rigid percent of content for the entire bill of
    material may make some products with low risk impossible to procure.
    Many unique military items are bought in extremely low density, making
    it uneconomical for a business to sustain production. Once the Army has
    determined which components are at greatest risk, there may be a better
    subset of materials to apply a content-based requirement for
    procurement from U.S. and friendly nations. If confirmed, I would work
    to examine the Army's policies in this area, which are evolving rapidly
    based on new policies being developed across the Federal Government.
        Question. In your view, for which types of U.S. Army weapon
    systems, or which types of components, are such requirements
    appropriate or inappropriate?
        Answer. Generally, in my view, the Army's larger ACAT I programs
    tend to be the most appropriate, along with Information and
    Communication Technologies. If confirmed, I would stress the importance
    of maintaining munition production capability that is tied to a
    resilient supply chain of chemicals and raw materials. I would also
    offer that smaller, more commercial programs are less appropriate for
    the requirement.
                      army-related defense industrial base
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the systems
    and processes for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk among the
    entities that form the Army industrial base, including its organic
    industrial base, and supply chain?
        Answer. I understand that the Army industrial base risk assessment
    process addresses the risks to the industrial base in its resiliency,
    its ability to support and sustain acquisition programs, and the need
    to meet future requirements. It is also important to identify foreign
    dependency and risk mitigations where appropriate. In my view, integral
    to this assessment is ensuring the Organic Industrial Base is factored
    in to address the Army's ability to surge and sustain its systems
    during any emergency.
        Question. What is your view of the current health of the defense
    industrial base, including the organic industrial base that supports
    the Army?
        Answer. In my view, the current industrial base is overall well-
    positioned to support the development and sustainment of weapon
    systems. However, constant attention must be paid to address challenges
    the industrial base faces. Consistent investment in both the commercial
    and organic bases are required to ensure a ready and capable source of
    innovation and sustainment to support the Army's requirements. As in
    the past, I believe the Defense Industrial Base will need to
    consolidate or expand based on available resources and demand.
        Question. How should Army acquisition leaders consider impacts on
    the industrial base when addressing requirements for recapitalization
    or modernization of major end items such as tanks, tactical wheeled
    vehicles, or key repair parts?
        Answer. In my view, the Army should look at recapitalization and
    modernization as opportunities to help strengthen the industrial base,
    both commercial and organic. Ideally, having an existing industrial
    base in production not only provides a surge capability, it also helps
    smooth a transition to a recapitalization or modernization effort. Once
    production ends, the time and cost required to restart a facility or
    train a workforce to recap or modernize increases. Managing a major end
    item already in production requires stable, predictable funding to
    maintain a sustainable rate.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue in
    systems and processes to improve identification, monitoring, and
    assessment of actions to ensure that risk in Army-relevant sectors of
    the defense industrial base is adequately managed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work closely with
    USD(A&S) to address service-level defense industrial base assessments
    and contributions to DOD-wide and whole-of-government assessments.
    Improving the visibility of the risks within the industrial base
    requires a holistic approach to ensure investments are impactful.
    Beyond visibility, policies must be put in place to rapidly address
    industrial base risk where it arises. Many such authorities, such as
    those under the Defense Production Act, already exist, but more may be
    needed given new circumstances. I have no specific recommendations to
    change existing systems and processes at this time. If confirmed, I
    look forward to the opportunity to serve in the position before
    recommending any potential changes that may be appropriate.
        Question. In your view, what actions should the Army take to
    maintain access to critical elements of the defense industrial base?
        Answer. In my view, there are many areas where the Army must do
    more to protect crucial elements of the defense industrial base. In
    particular, I believe the Army needs to continue to invest in
    modernizing munition facilities not only for Army needs but to support
    the other services and coalition partners. The Army should focus
    limited resources on those programs within the Defense Industrial Base
    that provide the capabilities to contest the Army's near peer
    competitors, or where the DOD is the only customer for highly
    specialized items, such as large gun barrels used for artillery
    systems. In addition, I believe the Army must work with DOD to
    synchronize an all-of-government strategy in areas such as Micro-
    Electronics and Battery manufacturing. The Army should also continue to
    support the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
    (CFIUS) process that ensures accessibility to suppliers and prohibits
    the transfer of intellectual property to prohibited nations.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you see as your office's role in
    working with or supporting efforts of the Army Office of Small Business
    Programs?
        Answer. Small businesses play a critical role in all aspects of
    Army acquisition, logistics, and technology. If confirmed, I will work
    with the Army Office of Small Business Programs to ensure the Army
    employs a small-business centric philosophy; reduces barriers to entry;
    and leverages technology development programs such as the Small
    Business Innovation Research (SBIR), xTech prize competitions, and
    Mentor-Protege Program; acquisition programs in support of PEOs and
    PMs; and sustainment or logistic programs in support of Army depots and
    arsenals.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you see as the relationship
    between your office and the Defense Innovation Unit?
        Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's technology-sector
    outpost, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), provides a mechanism for
    the services to connect with small, non-traditional businesses in the
    technology sector. I believe that small businesses across the non-
    traditional technology ecosystem are critical for modernization and
    innovation for the future Army. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
    Army is maximizing collaboration with DIU and other similar technology
    outreach initiatives.
                             science and technology
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role
    that science and technology (S&T) programs have played and will play in
    developing capabilities for current and future Army systems?
        Answer. I understand that the Army's current modernization strategy
    includes nine priority research areas: disruptive energetics, radio
    frequency electronic materials, quantum technology, hypersonic flight,
    artificial intelligence, autonomy, synthetic biology, material by
    design, and additive manufacturing. I agree with those priorities.
    Further, it is my view that Army S&T programs have played and will
    continue to play a crucial role in developing the six Army
    Modernization priorities: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation
    Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, Network, Air & Missile Defense
    and Soldier Lethality, as well as enable even more advanced
    capabilities for the future.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that successful Army
    science and technology programs will transition to operational
    warfighting capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army S&T community and
    program offices to ensure S&T efforts are aligned to the Army
    Modernization Priorities and Programs of Record. One method for
    fostering effective transition pathways is through formalized
    transition agreements from S&T to programs of record and, ultimately,
    to the operational warfighter. These agreements, if overseen and
    managed at the appropriate level, are a proven way to increase the
    Army's rate of success in technology transition. If confirmed, another
    way I would consider increasing success in this area is to make S&T
    transition success the primary duty of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
    of the Army for Research & Technology, who would report directly to me.
        Question. What is the role of university research in supporting
    Army modernization efforts and in developing the Army technical
    workforce for the future?
        Answer. I understand the Army invests in a broad-based portfolio of
    university research in enduring and emerging Army-relevant technical
    areas, including those associated with the Army Modernization
    Priorities. These university-based investments form the basis for
    future applied research and advanced development efforts aligned to the
    modernization priorities, help prevent technological surprise by the
    Army's adversaries, and help to train the next generation of science
    and engineering professionals in areas of interest to the Army and to
    the overall Defense Innovation Base.
                         laboratories and test centers
        Question. What experience do you have in working with the Army's
    labs and test centers?
        Answer. While I have limited experience working directly with the
    Army labs and test centers, I am aware of their accomplishments from my
    previous roles in Congress and in the Army. If confirmed, I look
    forward to increasing my direct knowledge of the various labs, centers
    and most importantly, the expertise that those scientists and engineers
    bring to bear in solving the hard problems facing the soldiers of today
    and tomorrow.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assess and
    enhance the interaction between Army labs and test centers and with the
    acquisition community?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to encourage these
    communities to collaborate and have Army scientists, engineers and PEOs
    work together to mature technologies and develop capabilities for
    warfighters. The Army labs rely on test centers to develop and
    demonstrate their capabilities and I would seek to understand what
    opportunities exist to make it easier to plan and support these
    efforts. I am confident that increasing senior leader oversight of
    efforts to bring these communities together will produce results. In
    addition, if confirmed, I would explore development of new management
    metrics to ensure that results are quantifiable and trackable.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    the Army's labs and test centers can attract and retain a technical
    workforce with the necessary skills and capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to
    expand outreach efforts to attract a diverse, highly skilled technical
    workforce in order to address the Army's unique scientific challenges.
    It is my understanding that Army laboratories and centers have
    benefited from the hiring authorities, provided by Congress, to ensure
    the Army has the necessary technical experts. If confirmed, I will be
    committed to ensuring the Army continues to use these authorities to
    the greatest extent possible to recruit and retain science, technology,
    engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent. I will ensure the Army
    continues to leverage the Army Educational Outreach Program to build a
    pipeline of STEM talent and scholarship for service initiatives like
    the DOD Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation, or
    SMART, program to bring that expertise into the Army workforce.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    the Army's labs and test centers have the resources they need to
    acquire and maintain research and testing infrastructure and equipment?
        Answer. I believe that modern infrastructure and equipment is vital
    to ensuring the Army stays at the cutting edge of technology and
    continues to recruit and retain the most talented personnel. If
    confirmed, I will engage with the appropriate stakeholders to better
    understand the infrastructure challenges, align investment and
    recapitalization priorities of Army laboratories and test facilities,
    and look for possible solutions and unique strategies to ensure the
    Army is making the necessary investments to sustain, restore, and
    modernize laboratories and test ranges.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    the Army's labs and test centers are not inappropriately overburdened
    by bureaucratic Army or DOD regulations and practices that slow their
    processes and inhibit their ability to act as the Army's innovation
    engine?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army laboratories, test
    centers, and the science and engineering workforce to better understand
    the Army and DOD policies and regulations that slow their processes for
    modernizing laboratory and test infrastructure, affect their ability to
    hire the best technical talent, or inhibit their ability to deliver
    innovative technologies for current and future Army priorities. I will
    be committed to identifying and resolving the specific practices that
    delay these processes to ensure the Army's laboratories and test
    centers have the necessary infrastructure and technical personnel to
    act as the Army's innovation engine and be effective in performing
    their missions.
                  senior military and civilian accountability
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve
    individual and organizational accountability in acquisition management?
        Answer. In my view, accountability is fundamentally a function of
    proper management and oversight. In the case of Army acquisition, the
    ``front line'' of accountable officials resides in the Program
    Executive Offices (PEOs) where programs move through their entire life
    cycle. I believe the Army has the policies in place to hold officials
    professionally accountable for their performance. Based on my time as
    Acting Army Acquisition Executive, I can say that the acquisition
    professionals in the PEOs seek and accept responsibility for doing
    their jobs well. As leaders, they also understand that the needs of the
    Army come first, and that they are all subject to relief or replacement
    based on performance.
        Another aspect of accountability is continuous and open
    professional dialog so that when there is a program that runs into
    challenges, the issues driving the problems are well understood and
    communicated appropriately. If confirmed, I would reinforce the
    previous guidance I provided while Acting Army Acquisition Executive:
    that constant communication--especially regarding programs with
    challenges--is the standard of behavior I would expect all Army
    acquisition professionals to follow.
        In addition, I would hold myself personally accountable for the
    performance of Army acquisition programs, and be responsible for
    communications to senior Army leaders, and to Congress, about any
    challenges they are facing.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to hold acquisition
    officials accountable for failing to follow acquisition laws and
    regulations?
        Answer. Generally speaking, acquisition personnel at every level,
    to include the ASA(ALT), PEOs, and PMs, are required to comply with all
    acquisition laws and regulations. If confirmed as the ASA(ALT), I would
    ensure that accountability within individual programs is reinforced
    through routine program reviews, milestone decisions, technical
    reviews, and other program assessments. I would also ensure a close and
    collaborative relationship with the Army Office of General Counsel to
    review the Army's broader compliance with applicable statutes,
    regulations, and policies. Moreover, I would ensure that proper
    training and certification requirements are in place to educate and
    reinforce compliance within the Army acquisition workforce and to
    promote a culture of accountability and stewardship of taxpayer
    resources. Last, if confirmed, I would hold the individuals responsible
    and take appropriate action in response to violations of applicable
    laws and regulations.
        Question. What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of
    accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Army
    with regard to acquisition program failures?
        Answer. In my view, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
    Staff of the Army are ultimately accountable for acquisition program
    outcomes. They are assisted in this effort by the ASA(ALT), PEOs, and
    PMs, who share accountability for the execution of acquisition
    programs. At every level, these civilian and military leaders are
    responsible for providing oversight and ensuring accountability for
    program objectives in terms of cost, schedule, and system performance.
    If confirmed, I would rigorously adhere to this standard and ensure
    that the acquisition workforce understands its shared accountability
    for these outcomes.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    senior leaders of the Army under your supervision and oversight are
    properly held accountable for their actions and performance?
        Answer. If confirmed as the ASA(ALT), I would ensure senior
    acquisition leaders are held accountable through various mechanisms.
    First, I would conduct milestone and other program and technical
    reviews to ensure PEOs and PMs are held accountable to established
    acquisition program baselines and objectives. The ASA(ALT), as the Army
    Acquisition Executive, is also responsible for appointing, managing,
    and evaluating PEOs and direct-reporting program managers, and I would
    ensure that those evaluations accurately reflect the performance of the
    individual. As the Senior Procurement Executive, I would conduct
    routine reviews with the contracting enterprise and leadership to
    ensure proper use of resources when executing Army contracting actions.
    Last, across the acquisition enterprise, I would ensure proper training
    and certification requirements and would establish metrics to ensure
    compliance. In all of these efforts, I would work to promote a culture
    of responsibility and ownership of acquisition outcomes.
          management and development of the army acquisition workforce
        Question. The transformation of the armed forces has brought with
    it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and
    forward-thinking management of the acquisition workforce.
        What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
    acquisition workforce, including the scientific and technical fields?
        Answer. In my judgment, to effectively modernize the Army over the
    next decade and beyond, the Army must continue to develop the necessary
    technical acumen and leadership competency within the acquisition
    workforce. If confirmed, talent management will be one of my top
    priorities and I will ensure we have the processes and tools in place
    for managing talent particularly in the areas of recruitment,
    development and retention. When it comes to competing for talent, the
    Army must continue to be innovative in finding ways to make the
    acquisition workforce a competitive employer including incentives for
    critical acquisition functional areas such as program management,
    contracting, and science and technology management.
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has an appropriately sized
    acquisition workforce, with the proper skills, to manage into the
    future? If not, please describe the gaps you perceive to exist and how
    you would address them.
        Answer. I believe the Army has a need to grow knowledge, skills,
    abilities in assessing and mitigating Supply Chain Risk. Army logicians
    will require additional analytical and critical thinking skills and
    training as part of Army's mission to secure its supply chains. We also
    have significant gaps in the software area. The Army needs to recognize
    that software is growing exponentially and develop strategies, skills
    and expertise to properly manage software intensive programs throughout
    the acquisition system lifecycle with a keen eye on reducing
    operational and sustainment costs.
        Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the
    statutes, regulations, or policies regarding the Army's acquisition
    workforce? If so, what changes would you recommend?
        Answer. The Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration
    Project (AcqDemo) is currently slated to sunset in December 2023.
    Hiring restrictions and complex processes increase hiring timelines,
    exhaust valuable resources, and unnecessarily detract attention from
    the acquisition mission. The streamlined hiring and appointment
    authorities the Army has under AcqDemo are essential to the ability to
    attract and maintain a highly capable, agile, adaptive and professional
    workforce. If confirmed, I would consider pursuing a legislative
    proposal to make AcqDemo permanent.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Defense
    Acquisition University and other educational institutions to improve
    the education and training of all members of the Army acquisition
    workforce?
        Answer. In support of the OUSD A&S memo, dated September 2, 2020,
    ``Back-to-Basics for the Defense Acquisition Workforce'' it is my
    understanding that the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is already
    leading the largest overall change to DOD Acquisition training in 30
    years. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the DAU to minimize
    ``scrap learning,'' focus on job-relevant training, and foster a
    culture of life-long learning.
        Question. In your judgment, how should decisionmakers determine
    which acquisition tasks are best accomplished by government employees,
    military personnel, and support contractors?
        Answer. In my judgment, acquisition tasks require all three
    categories in its workforce. Each brings different training, skills,
    and experience that should be considered when assigning work. Unless
    the task is inherently governmental in nature, which should be done by
    civilian or military personnel, all should be considered.
        Question. How can the Army best make use of the foreign national
    technical talent that is being educated in the United States, so that
    these individuals continue to support U.S. national security efforts
    and are not attracted to work for competitor nations, while at the same
    time ensuring such talent is properly cleared from a security and
    suitability perspective?
        Answer. In my view, it is critical that the Army, in close
    coordination with the Department of Defense, leverages all existing
    authorities to evaluate potential conflicts of interest and security
    concerns when partnering with academia. I believe a whole of government
    approach is required to truly address the problem by sharing grant and
    cooperative agreement award information across agencies and creating
    mechanisms for sharing adverse information across agencies.
                           army defense capabilities
        Question. What is your opinion of the necessity of modernizing Army
    weapons systems in light of current and emerging threats?
        Answer. In my opinion, modernizing Army capabilities must be a top
    priority. There is no responsible alternative. Army forces have lost
    overmatch in some critical areas as our potential adversaries have
    invested to exploit our known capability shortfalls, and new challenges
    often require new capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to balance Army
    readiness for today's conflicts and modernization for future conflicts?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
    Army, the Chief of Staff, and other Army senior leaders to strike the
    best balance between our investments in People, Readiness, and
    Modernization for both today and the future, within allocated
    resources.
        Question. What are the most critical capabilities the Army needs to
    prioritize over the next 10 years, in your view?
        Answer. In my assessment, the most critical capabilities that need
    to be modernized over the next 10 years are clearly represented in the
    Army's six modernization priorities: long-range precision fires, next
    generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, the network, air and
    missile defense, and soldier lethality. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with Army Futures Command and other Army commands to ensure our
    modernization priorities are continuously assessed, and refined when
    needed, to reflect the dynamic operational environment and the defense
    strategy.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to meet both Army
    capability and capacity requirements consistent with the Defense
    Planning Guidance?
        Answer. I believe the Army must maintain sufficient capability and
    capacity in accordance with defense strategic guidance and within
    available resources. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of
    the Army to assess its modernization priorities and adjust them, if
    necessary. Ultimately the Army needs sufficient resources to fulfill
    its role as part of the Joint Force responsible for deterring, and if
    necessary, defeating military aggression that threatens vital U.S.
    interests with acceptable risk to force and mission. If confirmed, I
    plan to work within the Army's allocated funding to ensure the most
    modern, ready, and lethal soldiers possible.
                           long-range precision fires
        Question. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are all are
    pursuing long-range strike capabilities. In your view, what is the
    Army's role in developing and producing these capabilities and what is
    necessary to best position the Services to work together to avoid
    unnecessary duplication?
        Answer. I agree that avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort
    among Service investments and capabilities is important. In my view,
    doing so starts with a Joint Warfighting Concept that clearly defines
    what Service forces are expected to accomplish as part of the Joint
    Force. However, what is perhaps sometimes seen as unnecessary
    duplication of effort within the Joint Force is also seen by potential
    adversaries as multiple, disparate ways to be defeated by US military
    forces. To me, complicating an enemy's calculus is an element of a good
    defense strategy. With regards to the Army as the Nation's land force,
    I take the view that the Army is charged in Federal statute ``for the
    preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of
    war except as otherwise assigned.'' If confirmed, I will work closely
    within the Army and across the Defense enterprise to avoid unnecessary
    duplication, while complicating our enemy's calculus.
        Question. The Army is rapidly fielding the Long-Range Hypersonic
    Weapon system at a substantial cost per glide-body based round.
        What can be done to reduce the cost of subsequent rounds once the
    initial capability is fielded?
        Answer. I believe the Army plans to continue to team with industry
    to improve upon the initial prototype design of the hypersonic missile
    in order to enhance the manufacturability and reduce costs. As
    production quantities increase there is a learning curve and a natural
    decrease in cost per round. As part of the Army's responsibilities in a
    Joint-Service Memorandum of Agreement for Hypersonics development, the
    Army is already actively working with its industry partners to transfer
    hypersonic technology from the government labs and into the commercial
    industrial base, which will further drive efficiencies as the
    technology moves into production. I feel that Congress has also been
    supportive of helping the Army achieve this goal of cost-saving for
    Hypersonics by granting additional congressional funds that have gone
    to the industrial base to directly support development, from which both
    the Army and Navy will benefit.
        8Question. Do you believe the Army should assess possible
    alternative, cheaper capabilities, such as the air-breathing scramjet
    missile being developed by the Air Force?
        Answer. Yes, I believe the Army, in coordination with the other
    services, should continue to assess future hypersonic technologies, to
    include air-breathing scram jet technologies, as they mature for
    integration into the long range fires portfolio. The priority of
    hypersonic development for the Army is the Long Range Hypersonic
    Weapon, which I understand will field in fiscal year 2023, as the
    technology is mature and it will provide a near-term rapid national
    hypersonic capability.
                  integrated visual augmentation system (ivas)
        Question. The Army has made significant progress in a relatively
    short time with its IVAS program, which features Army soldiers are
    working side-by-side with Microsoft engineers to field-test the
    technology and make frequent changes as indicated by such testing.
    Additional improvements are expected.
        In your view, are programs such as IVAS appropriately structured to
    provide the Army with flexibility to continue evolving the system and
    leverage improvements to better meet soldiers' needs?
        Answer. Yes. In my view, all of the Army Middle Tier Acquisition
    (MTA) programs are structured to achieve the desired results within the
    5-year window for either rapid prototyping or rapid fielding. The Army
    MTA rapid prototyping efforts are tailored to leverage as much
    iteration as necessary between soldier feedback and industry
    evolutionary improvements, based on the complexity and technology
    maturity. soldier's needs and reliability are a paramount factor for
    success. IVAS is an excellent example of an MTA rapid prototyping
    effort that is adapting its schedule and funding to continue evolving
    the system to better meet the Army needs, as evidenced by shifting
    Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in order to improve
    functionality and reliability.
        Question. In your view, what factors should the Army consider when
    determining the quantities of quickly evolving systems to acquire?
        Answer. In my view, each case is unique, but in general factors to
    consider are: (1) the rate of change in that area of technology, (2)
    the cost to procure the system, (3) the cost to sustain the system, and
    (4) the possible need for surge capacity for the capability in
    question.
        With regard to the rate of change for a technology, the Army should
    consider how long it would take to field the systems into the hands of
    warfighters and how long the critical technology remains relevant.
        An example of this type of technology is counter-UAS systems which
    are rapidly evolving as threat systems evolve. The Army must be careful
    not to over-invest in something that works today but will no longer be
    relevant a year from now.
        The cost to acquire and sustain a system in a rapidly evolving
    technology area is frequently difficult to estimate. For example, the
    cost to acquire it may be low, but it may require highly specialized
    contractor support, which can prove very costly.
        Surge capacity is a final factor to consider. What can start as a
    ``niche'' capability can, very quickly, become something that is needed
    across a large number of Army units. In this case, understanding
    industry's ability to potentially ramp up production is a critical
    factor.
        Question. Do you think there are ways the Army can position itself
    to build in flexibility for off-ramps or staggered buys when acquiring
    evolving technology?
        Answer. I believe the Army has been successful with this
    acquisition approach when there is flexible funding and authorities are
    provided by Congress that allow a rapid shift of priorities in a
    rapidly evolving technology area. The Army's counter-IED effort--from
    MRAPs to jammers--during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is an
    example. A more recent, though smaller scale, example is the nascent
    counter-UAS efforts providing capability to deployed forces right now.
    Another path to success is designing capability using a Modular Open
    Systems Approach that will facilitate the ability to upgrade capability
    as more advanced technology becomes available. In addition, taking an
    incremental approach to providing system capability over time or
    fielding earlier with Urgent Materiel Releases when appropriate would
    allow for flexibility to keep pace with evolving technology.
                       optionally manned fighting vehicle
        Question. The Army has made several attempts to develop a next-
    generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle to replace the aging Bradley
    Fighting Vehicle, including Future Combat System (FCS), Manned Ground
    Vehicle (MGV), Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), and the initial Optionally
    Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) effort that was halted and restructured.
        What is your assessment of the restructured OMFV effort?
        Answer. My assessment is that the current multiphase OMFV program
    strategy is a balanced way to procure a robust platform with sufficient
    size, weight, and power to integrate additional capabilities over time,
    while remaining responsive to emerging near peer threats in a Multi-
    Domain Operation environment. My understanding is that the shift from
    highly prescriptive requirements to a Characteristics of Need document
    is intended to provide industry trade space to develop optimized,
    achievable alternatives leading to digital design concepts and open
    architecture before committing to prototype builds. If confirmed, I
    will monitor this program closely to ensure that its new approach is
    executed successfully.
        Question. Why do you think the restructured OMFV program will
    succeed where the other efforts failed?
        Answer. In my view, the current OMFV effort is fundamentally
    different than previous similar programs. First, acquisition processes
    have evolved in recent years, and the OMFV program is intended to take
    advantage of innovative approaches that will hopefully create a path to
    success for this vital capability. Most significant is the Adaptive
    Acquisition Framework which established a set of acquisition pathways
    to enable program managers and industry to tailor strategies to deliver
    better solutions faster. The restructured OMFV effort has an improved
    opportunity to succeed because the Army has an updated toolbox to take
    advantage of innovative ideas and the latest technologies surrounding
    design, program management, and manufacturing. Second, the OMFV program
    is pursuing a Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) approach from
    the ground up to ensure that it is upgradable, sustainable, and
    affordable over time.
        Question. Several of the prior efforts failed due to requirements
    that were technologically unachievable and/or conceptually flawed. Do
    you believe the Army's requirements for OMFV are appropriately
    underpinned by robust analysis to avoid these pitfalls?
        Answer. Yes. I am confident the path forward for the Army's
    requirements for the OMFV program, and the underlying analysis, is
    appropriately robust and will continue to evolve as technology and
    threats change. Lessons learned from Future Combat System (FCS) and
    Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) have been foundational to the establishment
    of Cross Functional Teams and codifying requirements commensurate with
    what exists and what the end State is when the Army begins to build a
    new fleet of next generation combat vehicles.
        Question. As part of the Army's Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle
    (OMFV) program, the Army is developing what it refers to as Common
    Modular Open Architecture (CMOA). The Army asserts that CMOA is
    designed to make it easier to plug a subsystem into a vehicle, even if
    the subsystem comes from a different manufacturer, through use of
    common software and hardware connectors. The Army notes that adopting
    CMOA would make it easier to upgrade combat systems; others have
    highlighted the possibility that the shift to modular and open
    architectures will result in increased initial procurement costs, while
    potentially lowering procurement costs later in a weapon system's
    lifespan.
        What are your thoughts on CMOA--both as regards the Army and for
    its potential for interoperability with other Services' platforms?
        Answer. I believe that the CMOA has the potential to fundamentally
    change the way we acquire capabilities as it will move the Army away
    from purchasing an entire platform and toward purchasing severable
    modules that can be used by multiple platforms. This enables better
    buying power, provides clear communication with industry about what
    components are needed and how they will integrate, and will reduce the
    logistics footprint. It will also increase the opportunities for
    horizontal integration and re-use across the Army and the other
    services. However, this design approach, in my view, will likely
    require more time up front, which could add to the program's early cost
    while hopefully paying off through savings later in the program's life.
        I also believe this is the right program to attempt this approach
    at large scale. In my brief time as Acting Army Acquisition Executive,
    I authorized numerous sole-source contract awards as a result of the
    Army having limited intellectual property rights for major weapon
    system components. Hopefully, in the case of the OMFV, the Army can
    maintain competition for major system components that will lead to
    increased innovation and reduced costs.
        Question. In your view, what factors could be considered when
    assessing whether the upfront costs of the CMOA are worth the potential
    savings over the lifetime of the system?
        Answer. I think the Army needs to consider the pace of
    technological change, component obsolescence, and whether the function
    provided by a given module is one that could be effectively used by
    multiple platforms. When technology for a given commodity area changes
    rapidly, the Army needs to keep that module severable so it can adopt
    the latest version. Similarly, I think we can use CMOA to guard against
    obsolete parts and avoid lifetime buys, instead integrating a form/fit/
    functional replacement that may be able to support multiple platforms.
    In addition, the length of time the Army intends to operate a weapon
    system is a critical factor. In my view, in areas where technology is
    changing so quickly that the Army is procuring systems it will only
    operate for a short time, a focus on CMOA is less appropriate.
                   positioning, navigation, and timing (pnt)
        Question. Given the expectation that the Nation's ground forces may
    soon have to operate in GPS limited or denied environments, what
    priority do you think should be placed on developing alternative
    sources of PNT that are not dependent on GPS to function?
        Answer. I believe that alternative sources of PNT are critically
    important to our Nation's ground forces, as well as the entire Joint
    Force. Army Futures Command has a PNT cross functional team, which
    attests to the importance the Army assigns to this capability.
        Question. In your view, will GPS vulnerabilities remain, even after
    GPS is modernized with a new command and control system, M-Code
    satellites, and M-Code enabled receivers for platforms and weapons
    systems? Is there an enduring need for GPS alternatives in general, and
    for weapons guidance in particular?
        Answer. I believe that PNT, like many battlefield capabilities, is
    a continuous competition between counter-measures and counter-counter-
    measures. Modernizing the Army's current capabilities is required, but
    doing so will not guarantee dominance forever. In my view, the Army
    must remain ever vigilant for adversary advancements, as well as new
    opportunities offered by technological advancements within the U.S.
    industrial base and those of our closest allies.
               integrated personnel and pay system--army (ipps-a)
        Question. The Army has recently announced a major delay in
    deploying capabilities as part of the IPPS-A program. This comes after
    many years of cost overruns, schedule delays, and changes in
    acquisition strategy.
        What is your assessment of the causes of the problems that have
    faced the IPPS-A program?
        Answer. I believe the Army is transforming its Human Resource
    processes from aging, disparate software systems to a fully integrated
    solution. This is a vast and complex undertaking that is necessary for
    Army talent management to succeed. Earlier efforts attempted to develop
    multiple major software releases in parallel, which proved too
    technically complex. Decisive steps were taken to re-baseline the
    program and reduce the technical complexity by eliminating the parallel
    software development efforts along with establishing a minimum viable
    solution. I am confident that the Army can resolve these technical
    issues to implement and deliver a fully integrated and working H.R.
    solution that can execute end-to-end Army business processes.
        Question. What role should the Army's technical community,
    including at Army Developmental Command, have to address the technical
    challenges in the program?
        Answer. I understand that the IPPS-A program leverages technical
    expertise from the Army's technical community, including those within
    the PEO EIS organization as well as the Army's Human Resource data
    subject matter experts. In my view, the Army should seek the expertise
    from scientists and engineers who provide the Army with organic
    research and development capability, as well as the office of the Chief
    Information Officer, as appropriate. This must be a collective effort
    where all resources are brought to bear on the challenges and the
    effort must include the right metrics as the program goes through
    development and testing. I am confident that the Army has access to the
    right resources to address the technical challenges in the program.
               integrated personnel and pay system--army (ipps-a)
        Question. What steps will you take to ensure that this program
    takes the appropriate steps to ensure the most effective and efficient
    deployment of this capability to soldiers?
        Answer. I believe the Army understands the importance of this
    project and is greatly committed to delivering a modernized integrated
    Human Resource solution. If confirmed, I will continue to take the
    necessary steps to ensure the successful delivery of Release 3 in
    September 2022, as well as subsequent releases. I will continue to use
    the established metrics to measure and manage progress over time and
    share that data on a regular basis to Army senior leaders. I will also
    ensure the ASA(ALT) staff assists the PEO and PM in working directly
    with the prime contractor to ensure the Army delivers this
    transformational capability.
                                 technical data
        Question. In your view, what are ways the Army can improve the
    process of obtaining the technical data needed to support requirements
    development, maintaining competition in the industrial base,
    developmental and operational testing, and sustaining systems and
    software?
        Answer. In my view, intellectual property (IP), including technical
    data, plays a critical role in the Army's ability to modernize and
    sustain weapons. In order to ensure the Army obtains the appropriate IP
    necessary to achieve these objectives, programs must identify early in
    the process the IP needed in all phases of a system's life cycle, to
    include in sustainment. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that
    programs develop appropriate IP strategies early in the process and
    employ customized approaches to acquiring IP, to include working
    collaboratively with industry to develop mutually beneficial
    arrangements. I believe the Army must ensure adequate expertise is
    resident in the Army to allow programs to effectively identify, pursue,
    and negotiate IP rights and requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure
    that the policies and practices governing intellectual property provide
    the Army with the necessary access to effectively support weapons
    systems.
                              systems engineering
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has the systems engineering
    organizations, resources, and capabilities needed to ensure that there
    is a sound basis for key requirements, acquisition, contract oversight,
    and budget decisions on major defense acquisition programs?
        Answer. In my assessment, the Army has the system engineering (SE)
    organizations that it needs to operate now and in the future; however,
    I think the Army may require additional resources to transition to the
    future operating environment. The digital transformation of Army
    systems engineering comes with a cost to change not only infrastructure
    but culture. I believe the challenge is to maintain and grow the
    engineering workforce through training, education, and SE governance,
    and to recognize the knowledge, skills and behaviors needed to
    continually meet the requirements of the ever-modernizing Army.
        Question. In your view, to what extent could the Army's
    introduction of systems engineering earlier in the acquisition process,
    including component and subsystem prototyping, enable improved
    acquisition outcomes? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. In my view, introducing systems engineering early in the
    acquisition process has the potential to change the Army's approach to
    acquisition writ large. The development and use of government owned
    reference architectures enables modularity and agility through the rest
    of the acquisition process. Establishing a modular government
    architecture communicates to industry what kinds of components are
    needed now and in the future. This enables vendors to align product
    lines to those modules enabling early prototyping and competition and
    long-term technology insertion. Key practices include the use of
    standards-driven architectures, technical management, and risk
    assessments. These key practices support early evaluation of the
    component and subsystem prototyping viable in the current and future
    environments, inform requirements, and expose early opportunities for
    integration.
        Question. In your view, what would be the benefits of using
    advanced engineering methods and technologies, such as digital
    engineering practices?
        Answer. In my judgment, utilization of advanced engineering best
    practices throughout the lifecycle of a capability promotes
    modernization of the Army portfolio and helps the Army recruit and
    retain needed engineering talent that are digital natives. Modern
    advances in engineering technology are only incremental within a given
    discipline, but also transformational in their integration across
    disciplines. Digital engineering practices are about integrating data
    from across engineering disciplines to continuously evaluate whether
    the design of a system/subsystem/component is consistent and meets the
    required design requirements. The result of effectively applying
    digital engineering is more rapid design cycles without sacrificing
    engineering rigor. That is, delivering systems faster and knowing that
    they will work as promised when they are delivered. I believe the
    implementation of digital thread processes and common modular component
    standards should ensure the Army's ability to maximize the benefits of
    digital prototyping, design, simulation, and testing throughout the
    lifecycle of the capability.
                          cyber and electronic warfare
        Question. Do you support establishing the Principal Cyber Advisor
    function in the Army? If confirmed, how would you envision working with
    the Army PCA?
        Answer. I fully support the position of the Principal Cyber
    Advisor. If confirmed, I will support the efforts already in progress
    to identify risk and mitigation priorities for the Army, to develop
    more secure acquisition processes, and to increase the efficacy of the
    cyber workforce.
        Question. Do you believe the Army is organized and postured
    appropriately to address the full spectrum of cyber threats to the
    Army's role in joint, multi-domain operations?
        Answer. I believe the Army has the right plans in place to ensure
    soldiers have the integrated force structure, modernized equipment, and
    interoperable command & control to address the full spectrum of cyber
    threats in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) by 2028. Since 2012, I
    understand the Army has been committed to operationalizing
    capabilities, organizations and forces to meet the challenges posed in
    cyberspace. As an example, one of the Army's top modernization
    priorities includes fielding Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) aligned
    against National Defense Strategy (NDS) key threats, with one MDTF at
    Initial Operational Capability (IOC) recently supporting the INDO-PACOM
    theater during the DEFENDER PACIFIC exercise, and a second MDTF planned
    for the EUCOM theater achieving IOC by the end of fiscal year 2022. The
    MDTF design provides the ability to deliver offensive cyber effects
    while also defending the Department of Defense Information Networks
    (DODIN) and critical infrastructure necessary for ensuring force
    projection. The Army's advanced warfighting platform investment, such
    as the Terrestrial Layer System (TLS) Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) with
    the Long-Range Signals Sensing, Electronic Attack, and Cyber
    Operations, provides capabilities essential to all phases of JADO.
    Finally, the Army established a Cyber Warfare Battalion that will
    eventually include 12 Expeditionary CEMA Teams capable of providing
    downward reinforcing effects at echelon for hard targets requiring
    reach back support from CONUS. Additionally, the Army dedicated
    institutional programs for technology protection, program protection,
    addressing readiness, testing forces in contested environments and in
    the acquisition community. The Army also established the Army Priority
    Vulnerability Management program to make sure systems are delivered and
    remain uncompromised through the entire life cycle. If confirmed, I
    will be committed to this critical challenge and I will work with the
    Hill, Joint Staff, and the other Services to continuously evaluate and
    improve our posture, programs, and capabilities.
        Question. What are your recommendations for improving Army
    acquisition of offensive and defense cyber capabilities?
        Answer. It is my belief that offensive and defensive cyber
    capability acquisition lifecycles are incredibly compressed. The time
    from identification of a requirement through delivery of a capability
    can be measured in months. If confirmed, I will work within existing
    statutory authorities to treat the Army's offensive and defensive cyber
    Program Managers in a manner that allows them to execute at the speed
    demanded by this unique warfighting domain, and provide them with the
    authority to decide how to meet rapidly emerging and evolving validated
    requirements while still maintaining necessary oversight and reporting.
    I will also recommend the continuation of flexible acquisition
    practices such as the Software Acquisition Pathway, Mid-Tier
    Acquisition, and will leverage the use of RDT&E Budget Activity 8
    funding to enable faster and more relevant capability delivery.
    Additionally, the Army must find innovative ways to leverage what is
    being done in the commercial marketplace.
        Whether it is incentivizing the hiring of technical experts or
    being a ``fast follower'' in implementing or modifying commercial
    products for military use, the Army must find ways to continue to keep
    pace. In addition, if confirmed I will work closely with the Army
    Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) to improve the Army's overall approach to
    the acquisition of cyber capabilities, including potential new
    structures to better align the Army with approaches used by other
    services and elements of DOD, as well as the private sector.
        Question. How could the Army better fund the acquisition and
    sustainment of cyber capabilities, particularly given that the rules
    and boundaries of existing funding mechanisms and accounts (research
    and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance) create
    numerous obstacles to timely acquisition outcomes?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Army
    Principal Cyber Advisor on his efforts to assess all Army's cyberspace-
    related investments in order to reduce operational risk and establish a
    new Cyberspace Resourcing Framework IAW recent statutory requirements.
    I will also work in tandem with appropriate stakeholders such as
    ASA(FM&C), DCG G-8 PA&E, DCS G-3/5/7, Army Cyber Command and Army CIO
    to ensure only the most appropriate capabilities are purchased and
    linked to validated requirements thru the PPBE process.
        Question. In your view, what should be the appropriate Army
    contribution to joint EW capabilities, particularly as regards Multi-
    Domain Task Forces?
        Answer. In my view, a capability for Electronic Warfare includes
    the capability itself, any associated analytical and dissemination
    tools to enable the capability, and trained soldiers at all echelons.
    Due to the Multi-Domain Task Force's responsibility across an enormous
    area of terrain the Army must contribute EW capabilities associated
    with the targets delegated to the Army by the theater. This comprises
    both offensive and defensive EW capabilities across air and ground to
    counter threat EW systems--this includes close in penetration phase EW
    capabilities and standoff / deep capabilities during campaigning phase
    and evaluation of competition phase capabilities. This also ensures
    access to national data served by the intelligence community and the
    associated authorities necessary to access, combine, and use the
    exquisite data for EW targeting. The foundational military intelligence
    and signature characterization for threat systems performs a critical
    element of these EW capabilities.
        Through Project Convergence and theater aligned exercises in the
    Pacific and Europe the Army drove the inclusion of MDO experimentation
    including non-kinetic options with the expansion of EW to echelons
    above brigade and multi-Service efforts to develop Joint Electronic
    Battle Management requirements and capabilities.
        Question. Section 1637 of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense
    Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit to
    Congress, as a part of the documentation that supports the President's
    annual budget for the Department of Defense, a consolidated Cyber
    Vulnerability Evaluation and Mitigation budget justification display
    for each major weapons system of the Department of Defense, starting in
    Fiscal Year 2021. This consolidated budget display was not provided, as
    required, for the Fiscal Year 2022 budget.
        If confirmed, will you commit to providing this budget display
    along with the Fiscal Year 2023 budget request?
        Answer. Yes. In continued transparency as outlined in the NDAA, if
    confirmed, I will work with the Army Principal Cyber Advisor to
    determine the adequacy of the budget for all cyber matters and together
    we will provide the information this Committee needs.
        Question. More broadly, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
    ensure that the appropriate planning and budgeting is done to support a
    robust cybersecurity weapon systems program, as part of the traditional
    acquisition process?
        Answer. If confirmed, my office would collaborate with Army Futures
    Command to refine Concepts of Operations and Concepts of Employment for
    cyber capabilities in support of Army formations and missions. As U.S.
    Cyber Command takes a more assertive role in the programming and
    budgeting process, I will work with the Army's corresponding staff
    elements in Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, the Army Budget Office, and the
    Army's Principal Cyber Advisor to ensure coordination and synergy
    between Joint cybersecurity and cyber weapons programs and the Army's
    critical and necessary Service-retained capabilities. Additionally, I
    would encourage requirements developers to ensure appropriate cyber-
    security requirements are included, and would task PEOs to implement
    cyber-security from the start of each program. In my view, the Army
    must include these requirements and costs up front, so they are known
    and resourced parts of the program, as opposed to un-funded
    requirements late in the life cycle.
                                   munitions
        Question. Army munitions inventories, particularly those of
    precision guided munitions, have declined significantly due to high
    operational usage, insufficient procurement, and a requirements system
    that does not adequately account for the ongoing need to transfer
    munitions to our allies and for operations short of major combat.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the Army has
    sufficient inventories of munitions to meet combatant commanders'
    needs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to coordinate with Combatant
    Commanders to support their requirements. I will focus on aligning
    funding to modernize our munitions stock and improve overall inventory
    levels to ensure the Army meets combatant commanders' requirements. I
    will also collaborate with our industry partners to increase production
    and procurement of critical munitions.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to bolster
    the munitions industrial base's depth and surge capacity?
        Answer. I understand the Army is the DOD's Single Manager for
    Conventional Ammunition (SMCA). If confirmed, I would ensure that Army,
    Air Force, and Navy Acquisition Executives, are synchronized on
    ammunition requirements to ensure optimization of the SMCA's ammunition
    procurements and investments in the industrial base. I would ensure
    clear and frequent communications to industry partners to enable them
    to effectively plan and respond to the Army's ammunition needs. If
    confirmed, in order to bolster the munitions organic industrial base, I
    would support the completion of the 15-year Army Ammunition Plant (AAP)
    modernization plan to increase manufacturing readiness and safety,
    increase environmental stewardship, and increase operating
    efficiencies. By resourcing and executing this plan, I believe that
    critical AAPs will be well-postured to safely and effectively produce
    ammunition for warfighters well into the future.
                             energy and acquisition
        Question. How can our acquisition systems better address
    requirements related to the use of energy in military platforms to
    decrease risks to warfighters?
        Answer. In my view, platform-level energy efficiency should be a
    critical element of all new Army systems. By reducing overall energy
    demand, more flexible operations are enabled and fewer logistics
    personnel are put at risk on a highly lethal battlefield. As the Army
    refines its concepts for logistics and sustainment going forward, such
    considerations should become a standard feature of all Army programs.
    However, energy efficiency is secondary to combat effectiveness. As a
    result, energy savings must be pursued in a manner that does not
    compromise a system's combat effectiveness or the safety of the
    soldiers using it.
        Question. What steps would you take to invest upfront in energy
    savings technologies and practices to reduce the life cycle costs of
    Army systems, even if those savings are not realized immediately?
        Answer. In my view, reducing energy demand is key. Current
    technology does not support moving to all electric platforms given the
    capabilities required on a battlefield. However, I understand the Army
    is exploring hybrid technologies that couple today's combustion engines
    with battery storage. When mature, I understand the Army plans to
    invest in these hybrid technologies to reduce demand and improve
    reliability. These same hybrid technologies would also apply to Army
    power generation systems.
        Question. In your view, how can energy supportability that reduces
    contested logistics vulnerabilities best be incorporated as a key
    factors in the requirements process?
        Answer. In my view, an integrated approach that starts with a
    thorough analysis of a contested logistics environment is required to
    fully understand significant changes in approach to system energy
    requirements. If confirmed, I would look to Army logistics experts,
    such as those in Army Materiel Command, to take leadership in
    developing new logistics concepts that would then result in new
    platform level requirements. Once that occurs, in my judgment, it will
    still be critical to look at each system on a case-by-case basis. For
    weapon systems soldiers will use in combat, it is my view that energy
    efficiency must not compromise combat capability or survivability.
        Question. Specifically, how can the Army broadly include
    operational energy improvements in its weapons platforms?
        Answer. Two potential areas for operational energy improvements in
    weapons platforms are the addition of hybrid-electric technologies at
    scale across the Army's fleet of combat vehicles, and the assessment of
    the benefit of changing the policy for a single fuel on the battlefield
    to allow for the potential use of ultra-low sulphur diesel for some
    systems. Additionally, the use of electric vehicles across the Army for
    non-tactical tasks (such as running ranges or on base maintenance) is
    another potential avenue for improvement.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of
    male DOD respondents indicated that they had experienced sexual
    harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work'' in the
    12 months prior to completing the survey.
        Question. Having served since January 2021 as the Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology),
    what is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual
    harassment and gender discrimination in the Office of the ASA(ALT)?
        Answer. I started at ASA(ALT) as the Principal Deputy ASA (ALT) on
    March 8, 2021. During my time in the organization, I have not been made
    aware of any incidents of sexual harassment or gender discrimination.
        Harassment and discrimination jeopardize readiness and mission
    accomplishment, weaken trust among colleagues, and erode organizational
    cohesion. If confirmed, I will focus on maintaining a workplace that
    meets these standards. I am committed and responsible to provide a
    workplace that is free from all unlawful forms of harassment and
    discrimination.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASA(ALT)?
        Answer. Upon receiving, or learning of, a complaint of sexual
    harassment, discrimination, or other harassment from an employee, I
    would ensure the employee receives information regarding their rights,
    due process and avenues of redress; and immediately put them into
    contact with appropriate servicing officials for intake and processing
    (IAW Federal laws, EEOC, DOD, and Army policy).
        If confirmed, I will ensure coordination with my servicing EEO
    Official, legal advisor, and Civilian Personnel Official; support any
    inquiry or response necessary to promptly address and resolve the
    matter(s) at issue; and take appropriate corrective or disciplinary
    action as warranted. Further, I will ensure all necessary and
    appropriate policies and resources for prevention and response are in
    place. I will ensure an unfettered procedure for civilian employees to
    report all forms of harassment or discrimination. Finally, I will
    ensure that all training and education requirements and standards are
    met.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                          army contract writing system
        1. Senator Reed. Mr. Bush, over the summer, the Navy allowed their
    award for a contract writing system to expire before receiving a final
    product. The Army is using the same vendor. If confirmed, do you pledge
    to look into the Army's contract writing system program and report back
    to the committee on the health of that program and the extent to which
    the Army is applying lessons learned from other services' efforts
    developing and procuring contract writing systems?
        Mr. Bush. I believe that the Army Contract Writing System (ACWS)
    capability is critical to the Army's modernization effort, and the
    continued coordination between the Army and the other services to
    identify and apply lessons learned is critical to ACWS success as a
    mission enabler. In my view, the Army continues to closely monitor the
    progress toward finalizing ACWS at every level. If confirmed, I would
    continue to actively assess the program and maintain close
    communications with the Office of Secretary of Defense and other
    service counterparts regarding their efforts to deliver modern and
    adaptable contract writing capabilities. If confirmed, I would report
    back to the committee on the health of this critical program.

        2. Senator Reed. Mr. Bush, the Defense Federal Acquisition
    Regulation Supplement (DFARS) applies to all of DOD and guides
    requirements for contract writing systems. In your view, what
    requirements are truly Army-specific?
        Mr. Bush. The majority of Army-specific requirements are a result
    of the Army continuing to employ three legacy systems that will be
    replaced by ACWS. The Army also uses three Army-specific Enterprise
    Resource Programs that define the business processes between our
    acquisition workforce and the Army's financial and logistics
    communities. Although the services all share a need to procure weapon
    systems, our methods differ widely, thus requiring different systems
    for contract writing. If confirmed, I would continue to actively assess
    the ACWS program and its requirements.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                             night vision strategy
        3. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Bush, how important is the fielding of
    operationally proven next-generation equipment, such as the enhanced
    night vision goggle-binocular (ENVG-B), to our soldiers for the
    continued advancement of the Army's modernization effort?
        Mr. Bush. The ENVG-B provides important capability to soldiers, and
    it is critically important to field operationally proven next-
    generation equipment to our soldiers. For the ENVG-B specifically, I
    believe the Army is balancing the requirement for the ENVG-B with the
    need for the Integrated Visual Augmentation System which provides
    additional capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the current plan
    to field the two systems to the Army.

        4. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Bush, what is your view on whether the Army
    should continue or increase the procurement of ENVG-B systems to ensure
    our soldiers have the most capable night vision systems for deployment?
        Mr. Bush. In my view, the Army must make hard choices that balance
    the procurement rate of existing programs like the ENVG-B with the
    development and procurement of Army modernization priority efforts.
    However, if additional funds for ENVG-B are provided by Congress I
    would support using them to field additional ENVG-B systems to soldiers
    to meet Army requirements for improved night-vision capability.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                         armored multi-purpose vehicle
        5. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, during her confirmation hearing, I
    asked Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth about the Army's
    commitment to providing soldiers with the most modern combat vehicles
    through the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) cross functional
    team. The Army's current personnel carrier, the M113 vehicle, is a
    Vietnam era vintage vehicle that was designed in the 1950's. The Army
    still fields the vehicle today. In 2018, the Army made the Armored
    Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) part of NGCV to replace the M113. All five
    variants of that vehicle are in production and should be fielded to
    soldiers as soon as possible. Unfortunately, funding for the vehicle
    was reduced this year. AMPV is the only NGCV program currently in
    production and begins fielding to soldiers later this year.
        In her response, Secretary Wormuth stated that AMPV and NGCV are
    ``absolutely a capability set that we have to have and that we have to
    modernize.'' More recently, General James McConville, Chief of Staff of
    the Army, affirmed his commitment to fielding the most modernized NGCV
    equipment to soldiers at AUSA. Do you share the Secretary and General
    McConville's commitment to the AMPV program?
        Mr. Bush. I share Secretary Wormuth's and General McConville's view
    that the Army must be absolutely committed to the AMPV program.

        6. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, given the M113's obsolescence, would
    you agreed that the AMPV should replace the M113 as soon as possible?
        Mr. Bush. I agree that the AMPV should replace the M113 in ABCTs as
    quickly as possible, but would caution that AMPV development and
    procurement must synchronize with other Army modernization priorities
    to prudently modernize the ABCT.

        7. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, given the recent funding reductions to
    align with production, can we expect sustained funding increases next
    year and in the Future Years Defense Plan?
        Mr. Bush. Unfortunately, I cannot definitively answer this question
    because any additional funding for the AMPV program is pre-decisional
    at this time. If confirmed, I intend to keep Congress apprised of the
    funding outlook moving forward.

        8. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, will you commit to providing the
    committee the FYDP for AMPV and all other Army programs to enable the
    committee to conduct their oversight responsibility?
        Mr. Bush. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army provides
    timely support to the Secretary of Defense in connection with
    preparation and presentation of the President's Budget Request for
    fiscal year 2023.
                               abrams procurement
        9. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, the Army's budget for fiscal year 2022
    requested funding for less than one full brigade of Abrams tanks,
    coming up short 20 tanks for a brigade which is planned to be fielded
    to the Army National Guard. This decision departed from the Army's
    established funding baseline of at least one full brigade of Abrams per
    annual funding cycle and apparently came as a result of budget
    pressures and not a change in strategy or direction. Ultimately, the
    Army sought funding for a full brigade of Abrams tanks by including the
    required funds on the Army's fiscal year 2022 Unfunded Priorities List.
    In prior testimony before Congress, the Chief of Staff of the Army has
    reiterated his support for funding a full brigade of Abrams and fully
    supported the Army's Unfunded Priorities List to do so.
        Do you support the goal of maintaining funding for one full brigade
    of Abrams tanks per annual funding cycle to fulfill the Army's
    commitments to provide the Army National Guard with the most modern
    tank and to maintain the rate of Abrams modernization that has been
    achieved to support the industrial base and the skilled workforce that
    provides this crucial enduring program that is the strongest element of
    Armored Brigade Combat Team modernization?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would remain committed to the goal of
    maintaining funding for one full brigade of Abrams tanks per annual
    funding cycle. However, I also acknowledge that the Army's ability to
    accomplish that goal is contingent on the availability of funds and
    that the Army must address an ever-evolving array of competing
    priorities.
                     armored vehicle survivability concerns
        10. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, I continue to have concerns about the
    survivability of the Army's armored platforms in near-peer conflict,
    especially those forward-deployed platforms like the Stryker Infantry
    Carrier Vehicle. Outfitting our Stryker brigades with Active Protection
    Systems (APS) would ensure that our forward-deployed units in Europe
    and elsewhere are resilient against advanced threats. Yet, despite
    millions of taxpayer dollars spent on research and development, the
    Army has failed to adequately evaluate and field APS solutions for the
    platform. Can you commit that you will examine the Army's schedule for
    Stryker APS characterization testing and ensure that a system is
    fielded on the platform as quickly as possible?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I am committed to fielding Active
    Protection Systems (APS) as quickly as possible. However, I believe the
    Army must be deliberate to ensure the APS will effectively protect our
    warfighters when fielded. The Army conducted a Stryker-based APS system
    characterization in 2017-2018 and a system demonstration in 2019 and
    determined the APS solutions tested were not suitable for the Stryker
    platform. I am aware that another APS limited characterization is
    scheduled in 2d Quarter Fiscal Year 2022 to assess maturity,
    performance, and integration risk of non-developmental item (NDI) APS
    on Strykers and other platforms. I would anticipate that the results
    from the limited characterization will inform APS suitability for the
    Stryker platform and subsequently lead to a funding and fielding
    determination based on Army modernization priorities.
                 optionally manned fighting vehicle competition
        11. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, I am also concerned that in the event
    of a constrained defense budget the Army will continue to be a ``bill
    payer'' to reduce cuts to other services. I am specifically concerned
    that programs in the Army's ``31+4'' modernization priorities, like the
    Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), will be forced to endure
    funding cuts despite their critical nature to maintaining strategic
    competitiveness with adversaries like Russia and China. As you know,
    the Army is scheduled to award up to three contracts for the second
    phase of the OMFV program, which would ensure that the Army maintains
    competition and technological innovation. Can you commit to ensuring
    that the Army awards three contracts in the second phase of OMFV
    development, even in the event of a constrained budget environment?
        Mr. Bush. I am aware that the Army is currently executing Phase 2
    for the OMFV program with five contractors. Phase 3 is scheduled and on
    track to award up to three contracts in 2d Quarter, Fiscal Year 2023. I
    believe that awarding three contracts in the third phase as planned
    would promote competition. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring the
    Committee is apprised of the Department's progress on this important
    effort.
                 cyber and connected vehicle integrated center
        12. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, the Cyber and Connected Vehicle
    Integration Center at Selfridge Air National Guard Base would be a
    vehicle cyber security proving ground which would help integrate
    industry, academia, and U.S. Government capabilities under one roof.
    This facility is precisely the type of investment the Army needs to be
    making to combat this threat. Can I have your commitment that if
    confirmed, you will work with my office to further the development of
    army vehicles cybersecurity systems and protocols?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I will commit to the further development of
    cybersecurity systems and protocols for Army vehicles; and I will work
    with your office to that end. To best address future threats, I believe
    the Army must leverage the expertise of the science and technology
    community, academia, and industry, to include facilities such as the
    Cyber and Connected Vehicle Integration Center at Selfridge.
                         ground vehicles systems center
        13. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, semi-autonomous robotic tactical
    wheeled vehicles are a key element to modernizing the sustainment
    warfighting function and another reminder that the Ground Vehicle
    Systems Center and Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)
    are instrumental to our national defense.
        Last month, a Leader-Follower truck squad supported a rotational
    unit at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) for the first time,
    setting the conditions for outfitting more vehicles and units with this
    hardware over the next 2 years. How do you foresee incorporating
    software into units' standard maintenance functions to ensure the
    platform's cybersecurity?
        Mr. Bush. Based on my experience, I foresee the Army will improve
    the survivability of all its platforms by leveraging the standard
    maintenance system to make cybersecurity a routine component of overall
    supportability. If confirmed, I would ensure software packages are
    developed with both cybersecurity and supportability best practices,
    which includes identification and mitigation of threat informed risk.
    To improve overall force readiness, if confirmed, I would also work
    with the operational and logistics communities to notify field
    Commanders when new secure versions of software are available and
    identify any accepted risk.

        14. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, with respect to JRTC, are cyber
    threats in an anti-access/area denial setting something we can expect
    to see incorporated into training?
        Mr. Bush. For several years, the Army has incorporated the World
    Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) into its Combat Training Centers (CTC).
    There are several on-going Army initiatives meant to inform the
    appropriate threat exposure and Operational Environment replication of
    adversarial Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities.
        U.S. Army Cyber currently replicates an adversary's information
    warfare capabilities with the OPFOR at the CTCs to provide rotational
    training units with the congested and contested cyber-electromagnetic
    operating environments representative of nation-State threats. In the
    future, the Army plans to expand these capabilities to include a wider
    spectrum of cyber electromagnetic activities threats, such as jamming,
    interference, and degradation across the radiated frequency spectrum to
    include single and upper-side band degradation, interference, and
    manipulation of radiated frequency for space-based assets.
                            ground vehicle autonomy
        15. Senator Peters. Mr. Bush, advances in ground robotics and
    autonomy will provide Army formations new capabilities that will help
    achieve its goals for Multi-Domain Operations. U.S. Army Combat
    Capabilities Development Command's (DEVCOM) Ground Vehicle System
    Center has led the Army's ground vehicle autonomy strategy and
    development of the Robotic Technology Kernel
        (RTK) which is built on a foundation of a Modular Open Systems
    Architecture--with common software products lines and interfaces--to
    enable common unmanned maneuver capabilities across the ground vehicle
    fleet. How do you intend to buildupon the modular open system
    architecture approach for the acquisition and fielding of robotic and
    autonomous systems like Robotic Combat Vehicle and Optionally Manned
    Leader Follower and across the ground vehicle fleet in general?
        Mr. Bush. I would expect advancements in robotic and autonomous
    vehicles, whether the Robotic Combat Vehicle or others, to require
    rapid innovation in software and autonomous behaviors. I believe this
    is a fundamental shift from the Army's traditional methods of ground
    vehicle development and modernization, as rapidly modernizing software
    is now critical for maintaining the latest operational capabilities. If
    confirmed, I would support the Robotic Technology Kernel (RTK), which
    represents the Army's method for instituting a robotic operating system
    that can be quickly adapted, modified with competitively sourced new
    autonomous behaviors, and applied across all the Army's ground vehicle
    platforms with varying degrees of autonomy.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                   federal procurement policy and regulations
        16. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, when it comes to Office of Federal
    Procurement Policy (OFPP) memos regarding category management (CM),
    many small businesses (SB) are concerned that the Best In Class (BIC)
    contracts do not allow room for the SB to engage in the procurement
    process. How will you empower Department of Defense agencies to create
    more strategic sourcing contracts with a small business focus to meet
    CM and small business goals?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the Army
    Office of Small Business Programs on Category Management (CM) and
    increasing those opportunities to current and new small businesses. I
    believe that Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) and Other Transaction
    Authority (OTA) have broadened opportunities for small businesses, and
    I would want to build on that. I consider Small Business participation
    a key factor and, if confirmed, will coordinate with my counterparts
    across the Department of Defense to explore methods to achieve all CM
    and small business goals.

        17. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, with the creation of new
    Government-wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs), many with a large
    business focus, from your perspective, to expand the business pool for
    Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQs) and Blanket Purchase
    Agreement (BPAs) for small businesses, how often should onboarding
    opportunities be allowed?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the Army
    Office of Small Business Programs to ensure small business concerns are
    considered for all Army acquisitions. I would also work to ensure
    contracting officers and program managers conduct market research to
    identify onboarding opportunities on a regular basis for businesses
    that meet the requirements.

        18. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, from my understanding, there is no
    repository of all Government-wide accessible GWACs, IDIQs, BPAs, etc.
    What would you recommend be created/used to offer a more streamlined
    repository to ensure our Contracting Officers know of contracts that
    fit the Government's needs while saving tax dollars?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I would work with the DOD and the General
    Services Administration (GSA), the agency with the most governmentwide
    contracts, to share information on Army contracts suitable for expanded
    use. It is my understanding that GSA currently hosts a repository of
    governmentwide contracts via its publicly accessible website and this
    repository is available to Army and government contracting personnel.
    If confirmed, I would ensure it is easily accessible to the Army
    acquisition workforce and stress its value for market research to
    ensure the DOD is a good steward of tax-payer dollars.

        19. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, as a leader in the Federal
    acquisition workspace, DOD is a Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council
    member with the General Service Administration (GSA) and National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). What policies will you
    review or obtain workforce feedback to improve the process for the
    acquisition workforce (i.e., market research, acquisition strategy
    determination, acquisition regulations) that make it difficult for
    acquisition personnel to do their job?
        Mr. Bush. If confirmed, I am committed to using existing flexible
    acquisition authorities to the maximum extent practical and to gain
    feedback from the Army's acquisition workforce and our partners across
    DOD and the Federal Government to identify areas for further
    acquisition reform. I would work to ensure the Army's acquisition
    workforce has the knowledge, skills, and tools needed to quickly
    acquire cutting-edge technology and that it offers the services needed
    to meet the Army's modernization and readiness priorities.
                          working with small business
        20. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, will you work with agencies such
    as the Small Business Administration, who are very influential in
    driving small business policy, specifically in the NDAA, and socio-
    economical goals to ensure policy changes will not hinder the
    acquisition process but offer equitable opportunities to small
    businesses? (Examples: applying liquidated damages, applying
    subcontracting tier reporting)
        Mr. Bush. Yes. In my view, small businesses provide essential
    supplies and services that enable the Army to maintain readiness while
    building future capability for multi-domain operations. I fully support
    providing maximum practicable opportunities for small businesses to
    participate on Army contracts at the prime and subcontractor level. If
    confirmed, I would work with the Small Business Administration and the
    Army's Office of Small Business Programs to reduce barriers that
    inhibit the ability of small businesses to compete for Army contract
    opportunities, and ensure availability of opportunities for small,
    disadvantaged businesses, women-owned businesses, veteran-owned
    businesses, and businesses in historically underutilized business
    zones.

        21. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, given the outstanding track record
    of GSA small business information technology (IT) GWACs, National
    Institutes of Health's (NIH) Chief Information Officer--Solutions and
    Partners 3 (CIO-SP3) small business GWAC and One Acquisition Solution
    for Integrated Services (OASIS) SB, the abandonment of the acquisition
    approach of these vehicles in their follow-on procurements appears to
    be inconsistent with increasing opportunities for small businesses. Do
    you feel this approach aligns with the Biden administration's increased
    commitment to small business opportunities in Federal procurement?
        Mr. Bush. I believe that the Army is committed to allowing
    opportunities for small business and is the leading agency in the DOD
    for small business achievement. In my view, the Army is in a good
    position to meet the President's commitment to increase small business
    opportunities for small, disadvantaged businesses by 50 percent no
    later than 2025. If confirmed, I would ensure maximum practicable
    opportunity for small business to compete for prime contracts,
    consistent with efficient acquisition execution.

        22. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, GSA is working to obtain more SB-
    related GWACs and created strategic SB initiatives to ensure the
    Federal Government is meeting goals in more challenging socioeconomic
    categories (HUBZone, Women-owned small businesses (WOSB), Service-
    disabled Veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB)). There could be
    additional advantages to using NIH's IT, as some find it much easier to
    order off of, based on the organization of the system. Should all
    agencies consider following that model?
        Mr. Bush. It is my understanding that the Army determines the
    acquisition strategy that best fits the requirement based on extensive
    market research. This includes industry engagement and consideration of
    the number of small businesses who possess the technical capabilities
    to perform at the prime and subcontract level. When the nature of the
    requirement lends itself to establishing an agency-level contract, the
    Army will pursue that acquisition strategy. If confirmed, I would
    ensure acquisition strategies support maximum practicable opportunity
    for small businesses across all socio-economic categories.

        23. Senator Duckworth. Mr. Bush, CIO-SP3, CIO-SP3 Small Business
    and CIO-CS can be used by any Federal civilian or DOD agency to acquire
    information technology services, solutions, and commodities from pre-
    qualified vendors at lower than open-market prices in less time than
    going the traditional full and open route. Do you think this process
    limits the market research process that could impact a small business's
    ability to compete?
        Mr. Bush. The Army works to support small businesses while
    following the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements for
    conducting market research, which includes a review of existing pre-
    negotiated contract vehicles when appropriate. It is my experience that
    contracting officers consider a variety of factors when making the
    sourcing decision, including when the item/service is required, and the
    capability and capacity of small businesses. Generally, small
    businesses who have master contracts are in a good position to compete
    for and win task or delivery order contracts. If confirmed, I would
    work with the Army's Office of Small Business Programs to ensure small
    businesses receive fair opportunity to compete for prime contracts.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                         army modernization priorities
        24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Bush, 4 years ago, the Army identified six
    priority efforts as essential to modernizing the Army for great power
    competition and, if deterrence fails, conflict. The Army has made
    substantial progress on these priorities, but now it's time that these
    efforts transition from development to procurement. What do you see as
    the greatest challenges to procuring and fielding the Army's
    modernization priorities?
        Mr. Bush. I believe that the Army faces several challenges when
    transitioning weapon systems from development to procurement and
    fielding. The Army must demonstrate the systems meet their warfighting
    requirements through operational test and evaluation in order to prove
    the systems are ``effective, suitable, and survivable.'' The Army also
    requires that weapon systems remain affordable to both procure,
    operate, and sustain. Finally, the Army must successfully transition
    the system from successful prototyping to efficient and cost-effective
    large-scale production. However, despite these challenges I am
    confident that the Army can succeed.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
           other transaction authority for the army corp of engineers
        25. Senator Wicker. Mr. Bush, the Department of Defense has
    successfully used Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to access cutting-
    edge technologies and innovation for the defense space by making
    Federal contracting more accessible to non-traditional contractors. The
    Corps of Engineers' lawyers have interpreted the law to mean that Other
    Transaction Authority can be used only to support the Corps' defense
    missions and not the Corps' non-military missions. Given the
    significant volume of the Corps' work for Civil Works and other
    programs, do you think it would be useful for the Corps to have the
    ability to use OTA to support non-military missions?
        Mr. Bush. I agree that OTAs have proven to be a very effective tool
    for making Federal contracting more accessible to nontraditional
    defense contractors, and I see potential application for use of this
    authority in the Civil Works arena. If confirmed, I would further
    review this matter with the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                        ammunition production facilities
        26. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, the Department of the Army has
    testified that they have a multi-billion-dollar requirement for
    recapitalization of the Department of Defenses' conventional ammunition
    production facilities. Many of the facilities were constructed more
    than 75 year ago and do not include modern manufacturing processes. Of
    even more concern, in many of the plants the workers are handling
    ammunition and explosives. Tragically, over the last decade two
    civilian employees were killed in accidents on the production line.
        Most of these projects are funded from ammunition procurement
    funds. If confirmed, what will be your role in modernizing the
    conventional ammunition infrastructure so that the projects are safe,
    environmentally compliant and efficient?
        Mr. Bush. I agree that this is a serious issue. During my time as
    Acting Assistant Secretary earlier this year I visited three ammunition
    production facilities and saw how important the modernization plan is
    to the entire DOD. The Army is executing an Army Ammunition Plant (AAP)
    modernization program to ensure production continuity, safety and
    environmental compliance, and improve the Quality of the Work
    Environment (QWE) at five of its critical Government Owned, Contractor
    Operated (GOCO) AAPs. To directly bolster the munitions organic
    industrial base further, the Army developed a 15-year transformational
    modernization plan that will apply advanced technology, robotics, and
    automation to enable increased manufacturing readiness and safety,
    increased environmental stewardship, and increased operating
    efficiencies. If confirmed, I would make every effort to push these
    modernization efforts forward.

        27. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, will you look to modern manufacturing
    planning tools to include digital twinning to develop efficient,
    flexible, and safe projects?
        Mr. Bush. Yes. The use of modern manufacturing tools for ammunition
    production is being assessed by all the Services. As part of the
    development of the Army's holistic 15-year Organic Industrial Base
    Modernization Strategy, the Army has partnered with Sandia National
    Lab's High Consequence Robotics and Automation Directorate to identify
    potentially different and better methods to produce quality ammunition
    safely. In my judgment, improving manufacturing process
    characterization and mapping, systems modeling, and data collection to
    a digital platform (to include ``digitally twinning'') are key
    recommendations that I would commit to exploring, if confirmed.
                            army corps of engineers
        28. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, the Army Corps of Engineers depends
    on contractors to design, build, and maintain projects. Industry has a
    growing concern that the Corps is adding process that add cost and time
    to both industry and the Government without reducing cost, increasing
    quality, nor expediting project delivery. I am told that none of these
    changes were driven by a change in law. If confirmed will you agree to
    look into each of these issues and get back to the Committee with your
    assessment if the added steps are necessary and improve the performance
    of Government?
        Mr. Bush. Yes. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to review the Corps' project
    management procedures and identify ways to eliminate redundancies and
    streamline processes without sacrificing quality, timeliness, or
    affordability.

        29. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, if you determine that the steps are
    not required by statute and do not improve the delivery of projects,
    will you issue an Acquisition Directive to streamline procurement?
        Mr. Bush. Yes. If there are any unnecessary or burdensome processes
    that could be remedied through an Army-level Acquisition Directive, I
    would, if confirmed, issue any such necessary directives.

        30. Senator Tillis. Mr. Bush, if a change to the law is required,
    will you provide the Committee a draft legislative proposal to remove
    the unnecessary processes?
        Mr. Bush. Yes. If a change to the law is required, if confirmed, I
    will support an Army legislative effort to propose removing any
    unnecessary processes.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                                     china
        50. Senator Scott. Mr. Bush, if the reports on China testing
    hypersonics is true, do you think the United States is comfortably
    ahead of the Chinese on nuclear warheads or is this launch evidence
    that we must modernize our nuclear arsenal and double down on our
    efforts to develop and test the next generation of weapons, including
    hypersonic weapons?
        Mr. Bush. I believe readiness of our Nation's nuclear arsenal is
    outside the purview of the ASA(ALT). That said, I do support a
    modernized and effective nuclear deterrent. In addition, in my view,
    the entire Department of Defense, including the Army, needs to continue
    to work rapidly to improve our hypersonic capabilities. The development
    of the Army's hypersonic weapons to deter and, if necessary, defeat our
    Nation's adversaries does, in my opinion, fall under the oversight of
    the ASA(ALT). If confirmed, I am committed to helping the Army develop
    hypersonic capability as expeditiously as possible, with the goal of
    fielding the first Long Range Hypersonic Weapon battery in fiscal year
    2023.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. Douglas R. Bush, follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Mr. Douglas R. Bush, which was
    transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Douglas R.
    Bush in connection with his nomination follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Mr. Douglas R. Bush was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Reed on October 28, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on February 9, 2022.]

                                     [all]