[Senate Hearing 117-987]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-987
THE NOMINATIONS OF: MS. JILL M. HRUBY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION; MR. FRANK A. ROSE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MS. DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM TO
BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MR. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 27, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-166 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TIM KAINE, Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JONI ERNST, Iowa
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois RICK SCOTT, Florida
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
MARK KELLY, Arizona JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
may 27, 2021
Page
The Nominations of: Ms. Jill M. Hruby to be Under Secretary of 1
Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration; Mr. Frank A. Rose to be Principal
Deputy Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration;
Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and Mr.
Christopher P. Maier to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Manchin, Senator Joe, III........................................ 4
Nunn, Hon. Sam, A Former U.S. Senator............................ 5
Heinrich, Senator Martin......................................... 7
Hruby, Jill M., to be Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear 8
Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 39
Questions for the Record....................................... 52
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 54
Biographical Sketch............................................ 55
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 56
Signature Page................................................. 66
Rose, Frank A., to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National 10
Nuclear Security Administration.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 66
Questions for the Record....................................... 78
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 79
Biographical Sketch............................................ 80
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 81
Signature Page................................................. 97
Rosenblum, Deborah G., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 12
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 97
Questions for the Record....................................... 109
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 112
Biographical Sketch............................................ 113
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 114
Signature Page................................................. 120
Maier, Christopher P., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for 14
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 120
Questions for the Record....................................... 137
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 138
Biographical Sketch............................................ 139
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 142
Signature Page................................................. 148
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATIONS OF: MS. JILL M. HRUBY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION; MR. FRANK A. ROSE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MS. DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM TO
BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MR. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen,
Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Scott, Hawley,
and Tuberville.
Also present Senators Heinrich, Nunn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
First, I would like to begin this morning's hearing by
recognizing the passing of Senator John Warner at the age of
94. Senator Warner was a member of this committee for 21 years,
and either Chairman or Ranking Member for eight years. He was
the consummate public servant, but more importantly, he showed
us all the importance of bipartisanship. His work with Senator
Levin and others is what ensured the National Defense
Authorization Act was passed every year and made this committee
what it is today, and he will be missed.
Turning to today's hearing, the committee meets this
morning to consider the nominations of Ms. Jill Hruby to be
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration;
Mr. Frank Rose to be Principal Deputy Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration; Ms. Deborah Rosenblum
to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs; and Mr. Christopher Maier to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict. I thank the nominees for their long careers
of service to the United States and their willingness to assume
these important roles.
I would also like to welcome the guests and family members
who are here with us today. I want to thank Senator Heinrich
for joining us to introduce Ms. Hruby. Mr. Rose, I welcome I
believe--is your mother here? Well, Ms. Athalyn Rose, welcome,
and your sister, Ms. Nikko Rose, welcome. Ms. Rosenblum, I am
seeing that your husband, Todd Rosenblum, is here also, and
welcome, and I want to thank Senator Nunn, who will introduce
you via Webex. And, Mr. Maier, I believe welcome your wife, Ms.
Emily Louise Franklin, and thank Senator Manchin, who will be
introducing you today.
Ms. Hruby, you are well qualified to be nominated as
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
or NNSA, having previously directed Sandia National Labs and
its 13,000 engineers and scientists who design components for
our nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, there are a number of
challenges that will require your attention.
The United States has not produced plutonium pits in
quantity since the late 1980s. Ms. Hruby, you have supported a
``two site'' pit manufacturing strategy, dividing production
between the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and
the Savannah River site in South Carolina. I would ask that you
share with the committee the rationale for this two-site
solution.
The NNSA is facing its highest workload demand since the
1980s as we modernize our nuclear deterrent, which includes
five warhead programs, and recapitalization of our nuclear
facilities, many of which date back to the Manhattan Project of
World War II.
Finally, last year's NDAA included a provision to ensure
the DOD and the NNSA work closely together in developing
budgets to meet DOD requirements. Ms. Hruby, if confirmed, you
will be the point person interfacing with DOD on this issue and
many others, and I ask that you share with us today how you
would plan to address these challenges.
Mr. Rose, you have been nominated to serve as Deputy
Administrator of the NNSA. Your prior positions as Assistant
Secretary for Arms Control at the State Department and as a
staff member on the House Armed Services Committee handling
strategic forces issues should serve you well as you take on
the larger policy issues facing the NNSA.
If confirmed, you will lead the day-to-day running of the
NNSA and be responsible for addressing a number of
institutional issues within the organization. In the
intermediate term, you will need to maintain the NNSA's federal
workforce of 1,800 specialized nuclear scientists and
engineers, fully a third of whom are eligible to retire. I
would like to know your thoughts on how you will retain or
replace these skilled civil servants.
Ms. Rosenblum, you bring a wealth of experience through
your previous service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and, most recently, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. If confirmed
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs, you will assume a role that is
focused on acquisition and will require an understanding of the
technical nature of nuclear physics and engineering, rather
than just policy. I would be in interested in hearing how you
will adapt your experience to this position.
More importantly, you will oversee the day-to-day
functioning of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which ensures that
the NNSA can meet DOD requirements for our nuclear deterrent.
Last year this committee spent considerable effort to enable
the Council and the NNSA to communicate better and coordinate
more closely, and I seek your commitment in maintaining that
relationship.
Mr. Maier, your role is quite different from our other
three nominees. You have been nominated to be the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, or SOLIC, at a critical time. Your previous
experience serving as the Acting ASD(SO/LIC) and as the
director of the DOD Defeat-ISIS Task Force makes you well-
qualified for this position.
For several years, this committee has focused on empowering
the ASD(SO/LIC) to fulfill its ``service secretary-like''
responsibilities for ensuring the equipping and readiness of
our special operations forces. I strongly support the recently
issued Department of Defense guidance that clearly articulates
the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the oversight of and advocacy
for U.S. Special Operations Command. Though long overdue, this
guidance is a meaningful signal of the Department's commitment
to fully implement the ASD(SO/LIC) reforms mandated by
Congress.
Unfortunately, the position of ASD(SO/LIC) has been without
a Senate-confirmed individual for much of the last few years.
If confirmed, your service will be important to providing
empowered leadership and stability as the office grows in
resources and responsibilities.
Mr. Maier, you will also play a central role in shaping the
Department's policies and operations with respect to
counterterrorism, irregular warfare, counternarcotics,
stability and humanitarian affairs. We look forward to hearing
your views on these issues today.
Thank you again to our nominees. I look forward to your
testimonies. Now let me now recognize Ranking Member Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also for
recognizing Senator Warner. He was a class act, an enjoyable
guy. I remember when he was the chairman of this committee, and
I was brand new here, and he came out to Oklahoma, and he would
keep people laughing the whole time he was there. He had some
unusual characteristics. He did not like to fly in airplanes.
He did not like to ride in boats. So it limited a little bit
some of the things he was able to do. But he was a great guy
and we loved him dearly.
A former Marine, Secretary of the Navy, and lawyer, he had
it all.
Well, I would like to thank our nominees for being with us
and for their willingness to serve the nation.
Our nation's top military and intelligence leaders have
told this committee in recent months that the world is more
dangerous and complex than we have ever had, but we understand
that. That is true. We are more threatened today than we have
ever been before.
This is why I continue to highlight the National Defense
Strategy as the right roadmap to deal with these challenges,
but it requires the right resourcing to make it a reality, and
we have not been resourcing properly.
Modernizing our nation's nuclear deterrent has been a key
priority for the past several years, and we have not done a
very good job. Our senior military officers always tell us
that, whenever they come before this committee. We put off much
needed investments in this area for decades, watching as our
infrastructure crumbled and our most important military
capabilities became harder to keep in working order. We have
got to do a better job than we have been doing with our nuclear
modernization effort.
This demands close cooperation between DOD and NNSA, and
clear-eyed leadership on both sides. We simply cannot afford to
fall further behind our adversaries.
So we have got a problem out there and you guys are going
to have to do a good job, and you are the right ones to take
the horn. Thanks again.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Now
I would like to call on Senator Manchin for the introduction of
Mr. Maier.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. I appreciate very much the ability to go ahead. I have
a committee meeting that we have to go to, and I know Senator
Heinrich does too, so we are going to move on. But anyway, I
want to thank you all. I consider it an honor to serve on the
committee with all of you, and to have the opportunity to
introduce a nominee I believe will excel within the Department
of Defense.
The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has grown into an
essential figure within the DOD due to the demands we placed on
our Special Operations forces, through constant deployments in
support of a wide range of missions, including
counterterrorism, direct action, civil affairs, and preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We depend on
these elite units to always be ready to answer the call while
maintaining the highest levels of quiet professionalism, and
our nominee today certainly exemplifies those requirements.
Chris Maier has had a distinguished career in public
service spanning five presidential administrations, both
Democratic and Republican, but just as important in his career
with the Air National Guard. I am very proud to say that Chris
currently serves as a member of the 130th Airlift Wing out of
Charleston, West Virginia, as an intelligence officer.
After standing on the National Security Council from 2009
to 2013, which is notorious for round-the-clock work and
constant burnout, he decided that he had not had enough and
enlisted with the 130th the same year he finished his
assignment on NSC. Further demonstrating his commitment, he
deployed multiple times with the 130th to Africa, the Middle
East, and Europe, not to mention the monthly trips back to West
Virginia, which I can tell you from personal experience that
the drive is beautiful but it is still long. I felt a personal
responsibility to highlight his service in the Air National
Guard not because it is a direct connection back to my state
but more importantly I believe it speaks volumes of Chris'
character and commitment.
The ability to rise to the challenge of demands within
civilian and military career, and the institutional knowledge
he has gained from working at the National Counterterrorism
Center, to most recently leading the Defeat ISIS Task Force as
its director, will certainly be needed as we continue to
realign the global power competition with our near-peer
adversaries across a number of domains.
Our Special Operations forces are very familiar with
providing flexible support to our national security objectives,
but the next few years will require a leader who can set a
clear example for what is expected of them.
I have no doubt that Chris Maier will set that example. He
exemplifies the impartiality of our civilian leaders and the
sacrifice of our military leaders. I wish him and his wife,
Emily, and their son, Lincoln, the best of luck through this
daunting process. For these reasons and many, many more, I will
support his nomination, and I encourage each and every one of
my colleagues to do the same.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Now it is a great privilege to introduce, via Webex,
Senator Sam Nunn, a former Chairman of this Committee,
distinguished Member of the United States Senate, and among
your remarkable achievements was the Nunn-Lugar legislation
which went a long way in securing loose nukes in the former
Soviet Union.
Senator Nunn, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR
Senator Nunn. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed. Can you
hear me?
Chairman Reed. Yes, sir, we can.
Senator Nunn. Okay. Good.
Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe, let me just say a couple
of words for a personal privilege how honored I am to be before
this committee and how many memories it brings back, and I want
to say amen to the remarks both you and Senator Inhofe made
about John Warner. John put the national interest first. He
treated every person with respect and with dignity. He had
unquestioned integrity, and I think he set an example of
civility for all of us. So John will be deeply, deeply missed.
Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, members of the Armed
Services Committee, I am honored to present Deborah Rosenblum
to the committee, and I strongly recommend that she be
confirmed as our nation's Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, [inaudible] have
a nominee with the experience, the knowledge, and I must add,
the boundless energy that Deborah would bring to this important
role. Deborah has skilled leadership, she has sound judgment,
and she has a deep understanding of today's complex threats.
She also brings a background in spirit, most importantly of
nonpartisanship, and a history of working [inaudible] that
Deborah would lead the Defense Department's efforts in
preparing for and preventing and deterring and mitigating
current and future weapons of mass destruction threats.
Deborah's previous work at DOD and her experience as
Executive Vice President of our organization, called the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, for the last 11 years, has uniquely
prepared her for this very important position.
I currently serve as co-chair of the NTI board of
directors, and I have had the opportunity of working closely
with Deborah over the last 20 years, particularly during my
time as CEO of NTI. Let's correct that--10 years with Deborah,
20 years in that position. But continuing today in my current
role, I work very closely with Deborah on a daily and weekly
basis.
Deborah's contributions to the NTI have been very
impactful, with leadership roles in every aspect of our work.
Deborah serves on NTI's executive leadership team. She helps
oversee the organization's operations, development, and
programs, as well as giving oversight and managing our annual
operating budget. She has provided strong oversight to our NTI
biological program, which works to reduce biological risk and
enhance global biosecurity.
Deborah also manages NTI's work on security issues related
to China, and has traveled there regularly to engage in
dialogue with governmental as well as non-governmental
organizations. She is well versed in the important role that
the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration, NNSA, play in our nuclear posture, and if
confirmed, she would be an outstanding director, staff
director, of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Prior to NTI, Deborah was Vice President of the Cohen group
for 7 years, an international consulting firm led by our
colleague and friend, former Senator and former Secretary of
Defense, Bill Cohen. Deborah's previous work in the Department
of Defense is notable and also very impressive. For
approximately 12 years, she served in senior positions at DOD
in the areas of homeland defense, peacekeeping operations and
support, nuclear forces, and counter-proliferation. While at
DOD, she represented the United States as a member of the
negotiating team with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
on bilateral negotiations concerning its nuclear program.
In conclusion, Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe and members
of the committee, I am confident that Deborah is fully prepared
to serve in this critical role. I strongly support her
nomination by President Biden. I urge the committee's support,
and I urge her confirmation by the full Senate.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe. It is
a great honor to be back in the environment of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, an institution I cherish. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Nunn. Let me now
recognize Senator Heinrich, who will introduce Ms. Hruby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
Senator Heinrich. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, it
is a pleasure to be joining you and the other members of this
great committee as a guest, after serving for a number of years
on this committee. I really appreciate you allowing me to share
a few words about Jill Hruby, President Biden's nominee to
serve as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
at DOE.
This critical national security role safeguards the safety
and the reliability of our nuclear deterrent, and I honestly
cannot think of anyone better suited, or more qualified for it
than Jill Hruby. And, frankly, that is not just because we are
both mechanical engineers.
Over more than three decades at Sandia National
Laboratories, Jill rose from a technical staff position all the
way up to becoming the first woman director to lead one of our
national laboratories. She has developed deep knowledge in
nuclear weapon systems, component design, nuclear
nonproliferation, defense and homeland security technologies
and systems, renewable energy, material science, engineering
sciences, and microsystems technology.
Jill has received the Department of Energy Secretary's
Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security
Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public
Service. She has authored numerous publications and reports,
she holds three patents, and receive an R&D 100 award.
Since her retirement from Sandia in 2017, Jill served as
the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, and Jill has been a member of the Defense
Science Board, the National Nuclear Security Administration
Defense Programs Advisory Committee, and the National Academy
of Science Committee for International Security and Arms
Control.
She is a frequent participant in international dialogues, a
spokesperson for women in engineering, and a mentor for many
emerging leaders. There is even a fellowship named in her honor
at Sandia Labs for women pursuing careers in engineering and
science to ensure national security and global peace.
On a personal note, I always appreciated working with Jill
when she was director at Sandia. She did a remarkable job, and
I greatly appreciate her willingness to once again serve our
country and the American people, and I hope that all of you on
this committee will join me in supporting her confirmation.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Heinrich. And
now, Ms. Hruby, your statement, please, and then we will follow
to Mr. Rose and down the table. Ms. Hruby, please.
STATEMENT OF JILL M. HRUBY, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
and distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to be
considered to lead the United States' nuclear security efforts
at this critical time for both our nation's nuclear deterrent
and international nonproliferation and arms control. I
appreciate the confidence of President Biden and Secretary
Granholm in putting forth my nomination as Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, NNSA.
I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his kind
introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator Heinrich, as
he mentioned, a fellow mechanical engineer, to assure that the
NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on their nuclear security
roles, and simultaneously contribute more broadly to national
security, energy, and economic development.
My husband, our daughters and their families, including a
brand-new granddaughter, our extended family, and my colleagues
and friends are watching this hearing remotely. I thank them
for their love, support, and encouragement as I pursue a
challenging and consuming assignment again.
My life's work has been in the missions of the Department
of Energy and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of
graduate school and have had the opportunity to lead or work in
renewable energy, nuclear weapons, homeland security, nuclear
nonproliferation, nuclear energy, as well as many years
contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and
microsystem sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director
in 2017, I have remained active exploring the intersection of
emerging technologies with national security policy through my
work with non- governmental organizations, the National Academy
of Science, the Defense Science Board. and other boards and
advisory committees.
I believe my background provides me the foundation needed
to quickly contribute to the important issues facing NNSA and
our nation today. The NNSA counts on the world- class expertise
of scientists, engineers, and program managers in our national
security laboratories, dedicated plants and sites, and our
Federal workforce to provide a safe, secure, and reliable
nuclear stockpile that is effective for the required deterrence
and defense missions. Simultaneously, the NNSA enterprise
supports nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to provide a
stable, predictable, and safe world. NNSA also supports the
nuclear reactor program required to power our nuclear Navy's
submarines and ships.
If confirmed, my top priority will be to deliver, in a
cost-effective manner, on the significant commitments in the
NNSA programs across the board. We must meet the critical
deliverables for the stockpile modernization, stockpile
assessment, and infrastructure programs. Pit production,
uranium processing, and other infrastructure programs will take
constant attention, diligence, and transparency throughout the
design, construction, and start-up phases. These unique
facilities are essential to the future of our nation and NNSA's
programs.
In addition, we must continue to bring cutting-edge science
and creativity to sustain and fully understand our stockpile
without testing; provide new technologies and procedures to
lower cost and reduce the time to deliver all mission
requirements; to stay ahead of our adversaries; and to develop
advanced capabilities to enhance nuclear security, arms
control, and Navy reactors.
The other high priority to me is to forge transparent,
productive, and enduring institutional relationships between
the DOE/NNSA and our partners including the labs, plants, and
sites; the Department of Defense; the Department of State;
Congress; and our international allies. We also need to rebuild
technological cooperation with our adversaries on issues such
as monitoring and verification technologies and nuclear
security.
The nation has benefited enormously from the support and
investment in the people and unique facilities of the NNSA
enterprise. Training, recruiting, and retaining experts and
leaders of the future is a foundation that has never been more
critical due to the demographics of the complex, the fast pace
of technological advancement, and the geo-political
environment. Our stockpile, our capabilities, our institutions,
and our creativity are the world's standards. If confirmed, I
will be dedicated to making sure our national capabilities are
unparalleled, our partnerships are enduring, and creative
solutions are provided to the growing national and
international challenges.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee
today and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hruby follows:]
Prepared Statement by Jill Hruby
Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished
Members of the Committee. I am honored to be considered to lead the
United States' nuclear security efforts at this critical time for both
our Nation's nuclear deterrent and for international nonproliferation
and arms control. I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and
Secretary Granholm in putting forth my nomination as Under Secretary
for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, NNSA.
(I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his kind
introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator Heinrich, a fellow
engineer, to assure the NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on their
nuclear security roles, and simultaneously contribute more broadly to
national security, energy, and economic development.)
My husband, our daughters and their families, our extended family,
and colleagues and friends are watching this hearing remotely. I thank
them for their love, support, and encouragement as I pursue a
challenging and consuming assignment again.
My life's work has been in the missions of the Department of Energy
and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of graduate school and
have had the opportunity to lead or work in renewable energy, nuclear
weapons, homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear
energy and nuclear waste repositories, as well as many years
contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and microsystem
sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director in 2017, I have
remained active exploring the intersection of emerging technology with
national security policy through my work with non-governmental
organizations; the National Academy of Science; the Defense Science
Board; and other boards and advisory committees.
I believe my background provides me the foundation needed to
quickly contribute to the important issues facing NNSA and our Nation
today. The NNSA counts on the world-class expertise of scientists,
engineers, and program managers in our national security laboratories,
dedicated plants and sites, and our federal workforce to provide a
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile that is effective for the
required deterrence and defense missions. Simultaneously, the NNSA
enterprise supports nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to
provide a stable, predictable, and safe world. NNSA also supports the
nuclear reactor program required to power our nuclear Navy's submarines
and ships.
If confirmed, my top priority will be to deliver, in a cost-
effective manner, on the significant commitments in the NNSA programs
across the board. We must meet the critical deliverables for the
stockpile modernization, stockpile assessment, and infrastructure
programs. Pit production, uranium processing, and other infrastructure
programs will take constant attention, diligence, and transparency
throughout the design, construction, and start-up phases. These unique
facilities are essential to the future of our Nation and NNSA's
programs. In addition, we must continue to bring cutting-edge science
and creativity to sustain and fully understand our stockpile without
testing; provide new technologies and procedures to lower cost and
reduce the time to deliver all mission requirements; to stay ahead of
our adversaries; and to develop advanced capabilities to enhance
nuclear security, arms control, and Navy reactors.
The other high priority to me is to forge transparent, productive,
and enduring institutional relationships between the DOE/NNSA and our
partners including the labs, plants, and sites; the Department of
Defense; the Department of State; Congress; and our international
allies. We also need to rebuild technological cooperation with our
adversaries on issues such as monitoring and verification technologies
and nuclear security.
The nation has benefited enormously from the support and investment
in the people and remarkable and unique facilities of the NNSA
enterprise. Training, recruiting, and retaining the experts and leaders
of the future is a foundation that has never been more critical due to
the demographics of the complex, the fast pace of technological
advancement, and the geo-political environment. Our stockpile, our
capabilities, our institutions, and our creativity are the world's
standards. If confirmed, I will be dedicated to making sure our
national capabilities are unparalleled, our partnerships are enduring,
and creative solutions are provided to the growing national and
international challenges.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today and
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Mr. Rose, please.
STATEMENT OF FRANK A. ROSE, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rose. Great. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
members of the committee, it is a great honor to appear before
the Senate Armed Services Committee today.
I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary
Granholm for the confidence they have shown in me by nominating
me to be the next Principal Deputy Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA. I would also
like to thank several members of my family, including my
mother, Athalyn, my father, Frank, and my sister, Nikko, for
their support, not just today, but throughout my life.
Mr. Chairman, as the President's March 2021 Interim
National Security Guidance notes, the United States and its
allies face a complex set of current and emerging threats. Some
of the most pressing threats include an increasingly assertive
China, a destabilizing Russia, and the continuing challenge of
nuclear proliferation. To address these threats, the guidance
states that the United States will continue to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, pursue arms control
arrangements, and renew American leadership on
nonproliferation.
NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these threats.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator
to achieve several key priorities. The first priority would be
to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear
deterrent to enable the United States to deter threats to
itself and its allies. This includes plutonium pit production,
uranium processing, completing the various warhead life
extension programs currently underway, modernizing NNSA's aging
infrastructure, and supporting the naval nuclear reactors
program.
Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States
possesses the right tools to address the arms control,
nonproliferation, and verification challenges of the 21st
century. These challenges in this area are fundamentally
different than what we faced in the past, especially with
regard to issues like the monitoring and verification of
nuclear warheads, cyber security, and threats to the nation's
space assets. NNSA and the national laboratories are well
positioned to help the United States government meet these
challenges.
Mr. Chairman, you know, third priority is people. At the
end of the day, NNSA's ability to achieve its mission
ultimately depends on the ability to recruit, develop, and
retain a highly skilled workforce of national security
professionals, especially the ``next generation'' of leaders
and experts. In recent years, significant progress has been
made in this area through programs like NNSA's Graduate
Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding
these types of critical personnel programs, including at the
labs, plants, and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.
And finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by
NNSA alone. To the contrary, it will require partnerships with
Congress, within the Executive branch, and with our allies and
partners around the world. One of the most important attributes
I would bring to the position of Principal Deputy Administrator
is a long history working for, and with, NNSA's key partners.
For example, I previously served as Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; as a
Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services
Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special
Assistant at the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure that NNSA's partnerships remain strong.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before the committee today. I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you and your colleagues may have. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]
Prepared Statement by Frank A. Rose
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee,
it is a great honor for me to appear before the Senate Armed Services
Committee today.
I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary Granholm for
the confidence they have shown in me by nominating me to be the next
Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). I'd also like to thank several members of my
family, including my mother Athalyn, father Frank, sister Nikko, and
the rest of my family for their support, not just today, but throughout
my life.
As the President's March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance
notes, the United States and its allies face a complex set of current
and emerging threats. Some of the most pressing threats include an
increasingly assertive China, a destabilizing Russia, and the
continuing challenge of nuclear proliferation. To address these
threats, the guidance states that the United States will continue to
maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; pursue arms
control arrangements; and renew American leadership on
nonproliferation.
NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these threats. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator to achieve
several key priorities. The first priority would be to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent to enable the United
States to deter threats to itself and its allies. This includes
plutonium pit production; uranium processing; completing the various
warhead life extension programs currently underway; modernizing NNSA's
aging infrastructure; and supporting the naval nuclear reactors
program.
Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States possesses
the right tools to address the arms control, nonproliferation, and
verification challenges of the 21st century. The challenges in this
area are fundamentally different than what we faced in the past,
especially with regard to issues like verification of nuclear warheads,
cyber security, and threats to the Nation's space assets. NNSA and the
national laboratories are well positioned to help the U.S. government
meet these challenges.
My third priority is people. At the end of the day, NNSA's ability
to achieve its mission ultimately depends on the ability to recruit,
develop, and retain a highly skilled workforce of national security
professionals, especially the ``next generation'' of leaders and
experts. In recent years, significant progress has been made in this
area through programs like NNSA's Graduate
Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding these
types of critical personnel programs, including at the labs, plants,
and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.
Finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by NNSA alone. To
the contrary, it will require partnerships with Congress and across the
U.S. Government--the Department of Defense, Department of State--and
with our allies. One of the most important attributes I would bring to
the position of Principal Deputy Administrator is a long history
working for--and with--NNSA's key partners. For example, I previously
served as Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification,
and Compliance; a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services
Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special Assistant at
the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA's
partnerships remain strong.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Rose. Ms.
Rosenblum, please.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Inhofe, and members of the committee for your
consideration of my nomination to be the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If
confirmed, I pledge to work in close coordination with Members
of Congress and this committee on behalf of the American people
and our Armed Forces. And I would like to thank Senator Nunn
for his very gracious words and for his lifetime of leadership
and dedication to our country.
I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me and their
support for my nomination.
I also want to extend a thank-you to my extended family who
has taught me that with hard work, compassion, and resilience,
I can help to make the world a better place. My husband and two
children are my guiding beacons, support, and inspiration.
Senator Nunn gave a wonderful summary of my professional
career. I just want to emphasize how proud I am to have served
my country over so many years, both inside and outside of
government, and to have encouraged and supported the next
generation of U.S. national security leaders. If confirmed, I
will bring breadth of experience and deep understanding to bear
in addressing today's complex nuclear, chemical and biological
threats, including the expansion of Russia, China, and North
Korea's nuclear arsenals, growing global biological threats,
the continued use of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity
threats from our adversaries, and the dangerous potential for
the misuse of emerging technologies and science.
If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the
United States has a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. I agree with Secretary Austin that continuing to
modernize our nuclear deterrent is a critical national security
priority. To do so will require effective and transparent
partnerships with the National Nuclear Security Administration,
the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as with Congress. I also
join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks in supporting
the nuclear triad, the bedrock of our deterrent over the past
70 years.
Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the
devastation that occurs when countries, including the United
States, are not adequately prepared to prevent, detect, and
respond to biological threats. If I am fortunate enough to be
confirmed, I will make improving and investing in chemical and
biological defense capabilities one of my top priorities.
With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to the
discussion this morning.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum follows:]
Prepared Statement by Deborah G. Rosenblum
Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs
Thank you, Senator Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the
committee for your consideration of my nomination to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs. It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If
confirmed, I pledge to work in close coordination with Members of
Congress and this committee on behalf of the American people and our
Armed Forces.
I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me and their support
for my nomination.
I would also like to thank my extended family who has taught me,
that with hard work, compassion and resilience, I can help to make the
world a better place. My husband and two children are my guiding
beacons, support and inspiration.
I began in public service as a career civil servant in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, serving for over 12 years. I was fortunate
to have become a member of the Senior Executive Service. Throughout
this period, I worked on a broad range of defense issues, including
ensuring that the U.S. maintained a robust nuclear deterrent, policies
and programs to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction as well as representing the United States in negotiations
with North Korea over their nuclear program. I also have experience
working with defense and private sector companies as a Vice President
with the Cohen Group, a strategic consulting company. I witnessed
firsthand the innovation that can occur through effective public and
private sector collaborations.
Currently as the Executive Vice President of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, a non-profit dedicated to transforming global security by
driving systemic solutions to nuclear and biological threats, I am
involved in all aspects of the organization's global risk reduction
work, both nuclear and biological, often executed in partnership with
likeminded countries and international organizations.
If confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience and deep
understanding to bear in addressing today's complex nuclear, chemical
and biological threats, including the expansion of Russia and China's
nuclear arsenals, growing global biological threats, the continued use
of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity threats from our
adversaries and the dangerous potential for the misuse of emerging
technologies.
If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the United
States has a safe, secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent.
I agree with Secretary Austin that continuing to modernize our nuclear
deterrent is a critical national security priority. To do so will
require effective partnerships with the National Nuclear Security
Agency, the Nuclear Weapons Council as well as with Congress. I also
join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks in supporting the
nuclear triad, the bedrock of our deterrent for the past 70 years.
Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the
devastation that occurs when countries, including the United States,
are not adequately prepared to prevent, detect and respond to
biological threats. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I will
make improving and investing in chemical and biological defense one of
my top priorities.
With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to our
discussion today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Mr. Maier, please.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. Maier. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear
today as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I
appreciate your consideration of my nomination, and thank
Senator Manchin for his kind introduction.
This committee has long supported the people of our
nation's Special Operations enterprise and the essential
missions they conduct in our defense. I am humbled to be
nominated to serve alongside the women and men of our Special
Operations Forces who continue to inspire us through their
commitment to excellence in executing our nation's most
challenging military missions. We must not lose sight of the
sacrifice that they, as well as their families, continue to
make on our behalf.
I have been blessed with a large and loving family, who
have challenged me throughout my life to seek a calling of
service to others. To my parents, Donna and Paul, your careers
of service to others set the example for all of us. To my wife,
Emily, I thank you for all your support, for your two decades
of service as a Naval officer, and for the mother you are to
our son. I also would like to acknowledge the unsung national
security professionals with whom I have served in the
intelligence community and the Defense Department over my
career, and my fellow airman in the West Virginia Air National
Guard. All of you have modeled the commitment to service that
inspires me today.
I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and
Secretary Austin in nominating me at such a dynamic and
strategically important time for the Special Operations
community. Congress created the position of ASD(SO/LIC) in
1986, and this committee's leadership and continued support for
the organization have been instrumental in strengthening
civilian oversight of Special Operations. The Department's
recent reforms further bolster the roles and responsibilities
of ASD(SO/LIC) through a unique direct- reporting relationship
to the Secretary of Defense, while ensuring special operations
and low-intensity conflict policy is integrated with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with this committee to continue to implement these
reforms.
As the security challenges facing our nation grow
increasingly complex, Special Operations Forces, or SOF, will
remain critical to U.S. efforts in conducting sustainable
counterterrorism, competing for influence with near-peer
rivals, and responding to crises. To meet these new and
evolving missions, the Special Operations enterprise is
undertaking its most comprehensive transformation in a
generation. Broadening of skills, rapid fielding of technology,
creative adaptation of tactics, and partnering for outsized
effects will be even more essential. If confirmed, I will work
every day to ensure ASD(SO/LIC) provides the essential
leadership and guidance to evolve the force and missions.
As part of this transformation, we must redouble our
commitment to ensuring SOF can recruit, develop, and retain the
diversity of talent necessary to compete globally. A more
diverse force integrates new skills, learned experiences, and
perspectives that I believe is an operational imperative. I am
committed to ensuring we are providing the necessary role
models and resources to recruit and retain that talent in our
formations.
We also must ensure that SOF represent the values and
ideals of the nation we serve. If confirmed, I will work
closely with USSOCOM in implementing the recommendations from
its comprehensive review of SOF ethics and culture. Sexual
assault and harassment, extremist behavior, and criminal
activities violate our oath and corrode the force.
Fundamental to the success of SOF is, and will remain, its
people. USSOCOM is the standard-bearer for caring for its
personnel, from the Preservation of the Force and Family, to
the Warrior Care program. As we continue to learn of new
challenges across the physical, psychological, cognitive,
cultural, and spiritual domains, I am committed, if confirmed,
to ensuring that every member of the SOF community receives the
best possible care, and is ready to compete, deter, and win in
a changing global landscape.
I look forward to your questions and thank you again for
the opportunity to appear before you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maier follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Christopher P. Maier
introduction
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
our global posture for DOD's Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Enterprise. As Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus
on ASD SO/LIC's statutory responsibilities for administrative oversight
of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to testify
alongside General Clarke and General Nakasone. I greatly appreciate
their decades of leadership and service in protecting the Nation's
national security interests.
I would like to begin by acknowledging the service, sacrifice, and
success of our Special Operations Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines,
and civilians. U.S. SOF have played a critical role in every major
conflict since the Second World War, and they remain in the fight
today--conducting operations against ISIS, al-Qaeda and its affiliates;
working alongside partners and allies; and providing our Nation's
leaders with flexible and rapid response options to a wide range of
national security emergencies. Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, our SOF community has established a remarkable record of
achievement. From the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in
December 2001, to the complex operations targeting the world's most
notorious terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden, and to the
extraordinary effort to eliminate the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq,
we owe our SOF community our deepest gratitude.
Despite recent reductions in deployments, SOF remain at the
forefront of U.S. combat operations, often operating in remote and
hostile environments. Over the past two years, fifteen members of the
SOF formation were killed in combat operations. Although SOF make up
only approximately three percent of the Joint Force, they have endured
more than half of U.S. combat casualties during that period. Many more
have sustained life-altering injuries or suffer from psychological
trauma. The service and sacrifice of these men and women challenge us
to live up to the high standards they embody.
I would also like to thank Congress for your strong support of the
SOF community as well as your predecessors and their foresight in
recognizing the need to build and sustain special operations
capabilities to respond to an increasingly complex threat environment.
The Nunn-Cohen amendment that established USSOCOM and the position of
ASD SO/LIC in 1986 was prescient in recognizing that future conflicts
would be fought by both state and non-state actors and often through
unconventional and irregular means. The authors of these reforms
rightly understood that dedicated resources for Special Operations-
specific purposes were essential to promoting and sustaining these
capabilities within the Department.
My statement this morning will focus on how the SOF community is
supporting Secretary Austin's three principal priorities as outlined in
his March 3, 2021, ``Message to the Force''--1) Defend the Nation, 2)
Take Care of Our People, and 3) Succeed through Teamwork. In the nearly
two decades following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOF have continued
to develop new technologies and capabilities to become the most
effective counterterrorism (CT) force in history. Today, the SOF
Enterprise is in the midst of a critical period of transition as the
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance (INSSG) challenges us to conduct counterterrorism
operations more sustainably as we also adapt to the challenges of great
power competition. At the same time, I am pleased to report that we
have continued to improve the readiness of the force and reduce the
strain of deployment on our SOF warriors and their families. Your
leadership and support and have been, and will continue to be,
essential in this effort.
defend the nation
Representing approximately two percent of the DOD budget, SOF play
a crucial role within the Joint Force in support of multiple DOD
priorities, and the SOF community continues to make progress in
adapting its capabilities to the challenge of great-power competition
with Russia and China. I emphasize the word ``competition'' because
just as the National Defense Strategy calls on us to develop
traditional military capabilities to deter and respond to threats, we
are also called to strengthen alliances, innovate, and compete more
effectively below the level of armed conflict. Revisionist powers,
rogue states, and non-state actors are actively pursuing
unconventional, irregular, and asymmetric strategies to undermine U.S.
strategic interests, erode democratic institutions, and destabilize and
re-shape the post-WWII world order to their advantage, without
provoking a U.S. conventional military response. Indeed, as the
Department continues to strengthen our traditional military
capabilities, we can expect that our adversaries will increasingly
employ indirect and irregular approaches to achieve their strategic
objectives to capitalize on asymmetries that work to their advantage.
Thus, winning the competition is essential to achieving our near-
term strategic objectives, and to precluding a major conflict. This is
not a theoretical battle to prepare for in the future. This is today's
fight, and the SOF capabilities we have nurtured over the past 30 years
are essential to successfully competing--and winning--in today's
unconventional and irregular battlespaces. In close coordination with
the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commands, including USSOCOM,
my office is leading the implementation of the Irregular Warfare (IW)
Annex to the NDS to institutionalize the Department's approach to IW
throughout the Joint Force and to operationalize it for great power
competition and resource-sustainable counterterrorism. The IW Annex
directs the Joint Force to embrace the potential for irregular warfare
to shape great power competitors' behavior proactively to our
advantage, create dilemmas to deter future aggression, and strengthen
alliances and partnerships.
As we adapt to meet the challenges of great power competition, we
remain focused on ensuring CT operations are sustainable and focused on
the most relevant threats to U.S. national security interests such as
ISIS and al-Qaeda and their affiliates that continue to pose a threat
to Americans and U.S. interests around the globe. Continued U.S.,
allied, and partner nation pressure has helped prevent these groups
from attacking the homeland.
Within this strategic context, and consistent with the INSSG, we
continue to adapt our global posture and develop SOF-unique
capabilities that enable our operators to compete and win in a wide
variety of contingencies, including CT, crisis response, competition
below the level of armed conflict, and as a force multiplier to the
Joint Force if deterrence fails. Although our adversaries increasingly
employ irregular warfare tactics, SOF support can ensure the
Department does not depend only on high-end warfighting and
deterrent capabilities. Today, approximately 40 percent of SOF deployed
forces are tasked with countering malign influence of our great-power
adversaries.
Central to our irregular warfare efforts is a suite of legislative
authorities that underpin our efforts to address these challenges
alongside our international and interagency partners. We appreciate
Congress's support for the extension and expansion of ``Section 1202''
authority to conduct irregular warfare operations and for the
establishment of a new Title 10 funding authority for operational
preparation of the environment activities in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Authorities such as these and
Section 127e of Title 10 are cost-effective, agile ways for the United
States to advance our security interests working by, with, and through
partners.
We continue to invest in technologies and capabilities to empower
SOF to operate in denied areas and conduct high-risk operations in
remote and austere environments, operate seamlessly with our general
purpose force counterparts, and produce scalable precision effects. For
instance, USSOCOM is developing next-generation Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities to enhance situational
awareness for the SOF warfighter, even in contested areas. Similarly,
we are making investments to enhance SOF maritime capabilities,
including surface combatant craft, submersibles, and unmanned
underwater vehicles, and working with the Department of the Navy to
ensure integration of SOF operational concepts and capability
investments related to great power competition.
USSOCOM is pursuing technological advancements designed to enhance
network interoperability, enable secure communications for command and
control, and employ data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and
machine learning (ML) to enable our SOF to operate more effectively. In
close collaboration with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,
USSOCOM is adapting and employing AI to streamline a wide range of
activities, such as intelligence analysis and operational functions.
For instance, USSOCOM is leveraging AI/ML to optimize preventive
maintenance for aircraft of the Army's 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (SOAR) that has demonstrated significant potential
for increasing the operational readiness rate of the unit's fleet of
aircraft.
USSOCOM has also employed innovative acquisition pathways,
including mid-tier acquisitions to execute tailored acquisition
strategies and to streamline capability delivery to the warfighter.
Additionally, USSOCOM is leveraging public-private partnerships and
deepening relationships with academic institutions and non-traditional
partners, including through its pilot project to expand small business
participation in technology development to enhance SOF warfighting
capabilities.
take care of our people
Consistent with the clear priorities outlined in the NDS and the
INSSG, we continue to invest in the readiness of the force and the
resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families. Despite the unique
challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year,
SOF have continued to maintain a high level of operational readiness in
support of strategic priorities. COVID-19-related restrictions on CONUS
and OCONUS movements have reduced flight hours and training
opportunities, particularly alongside our overseas partners. Although
the number of forces deployed overseas is down approximately 15 percent
over the past year, nearly 5,000 SOF are currently deployed to 62
countries.
In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the
high demand for SOF resulted in a near-constant cycle of deployments
for some capabilities. To address the strain caused by that operational
tempo, we have taken a hard look at the forces that we can responsibly
and sustainably provide to support global demand amid multifaceted and
simultaneous mission requirements. Over the past several years, we have
made considerable progress toward meeting the Department's requirement
of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio across the force, meaning that a
typical service member would expect to spend twice as much time at home
station as on deployment. We continue to make progress toward achieving
this target with now more than 90 percent of the force at a 1:2 ratio
or better.
The additional dwell time spent at home station is not only
contributing to increased predictability for the force and improved
work-life balance, it is also enabling additional time for training,
screening, rest, refit, and reintegration. USSOCOM has also continued
to meet the Department's goal of fewer than five percent non-deployable
military personnel.
In addition to monitoring metrics of SOF readiness, we are closely
evaluating how SOF posture relates to our ability to sustain CT and
crisis response operations along with high-priority missions. We are
also focused on limiting SOF deployments to those that require SOF-
specific capabilities and training. For instance, the establishment of
the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade has provided a capable
General Purpose Force option for training and mentoring foreign
security forces. The combination of these efforts has helped ease the
strain of a high and unsustainable rate of overseas deployments for SOF
personnel.
In addition to reducing the strain on the force due to high
operational tempo, the SOF Enterprise is further enhancing readiness by
taking a holistic approach to caring for SOF warriors and their
families. With the strong support of Congress, USSOCOM has continued to
develop its Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program to
address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical, psychological,
social, and spiritual performance. The POTFF program leverages a
combination of USSOCOM, Service, and DOD resources to meet the needs of
the various SOF components and individual unit commanders. These
programs include injury prevention/strength training, performance
nutrition, rehabilitative care, improved access to behavioral health
and suicide prevention, family and community programs, promoting
healthy living, and reinforcing resiliency and spiritual fitness.
Participation in the POTFF human performance program and
neurocognitive baselining are now mandatory for all USSOCOM personnel.
Our SOF warriors recognize POTFF as an invaluable resource for their
readiness and career longevity, and data collected from our SOF
commanders indicates that the program is having a significant and
positive impact on the mission readiness of their units. SO/LIC is
currently collaborating with the command to develop standardized and
quantitative outcome metrics to help inform future resourcing
decisions, and we look forward to working closely with the committee to
ensure we are achieving a solid return on this investment in our
personnel.
Similarly, USSOCOM's Warrior Care program continues to provide
specialized care for soldiers who have suffered physical or
psychological trauma by providing SOF members and their families
support through recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We have no
greater responsibility than to care for our SOF warriors and to provide
them with a path to return to service and/or transition to civilian
careers following their years of service. We appreciate the strong
support of Congress for each of these efforts.
I remain concerned about instances of moral and ethical failings
within the SOF community, and I know General Clarke shares this
concern. Incidents such as these have no place in the military or our
Department, and if not tackled head-on can erode morale and undermine
trust and our moral authority with our partners and allies. I commend
General Clarke for his initiative in directing a comprehensive review
of SOF culture and ethics beginning in August 2019. The review was
directed to address shortfalls and limitations of multiple previous
studies and to build upon them to address enterprise-wide issues and to
analyze data from across the SOF Enterprise.
SO/LIC strongly supported this effort, and SO/LIC personnel
actively participated in the review, which entailed conducting in-depth
interviews with approximately 2,000 personnel of all ranks within more
than 50 SOF commands. Although the comprehensive review did not
identify evidence of a systemic ethics deficiency, it did note that
``in some instances USSOCOM's cultural focus on SOF employment and
mission accomplishment is to the detriment of leadership, discipline
and accountability,'' and it outlined concrete recommendations. My
office is now helping to guide the Comprehensive Review Implementation
Team, established to drive implementation of the review's
recommendations. These recommendations address training and
organization of the force, leader development, and the prevention of
over-exertion on the force that we believe contributes in part to
ethical lapses.
As we address challenges related to SOF culture and ethics,
Secretary Austin has placed special emphasis on combatting sexual
assault and addressing actions associated with extremist or dissident
ideologies within the Department. The men and women who make up the SOF
Enterprise deserve nothing less than a safe and supportive work
environment--free from intimidation, harassment, and racial and
cultural bias of any kind. We recognize that extremist ideology exists
within our military, and we must ensure that our service members honor
the oaths they have taken to uphold and defend our Constitution against
all enemies--foreign and domestic. For this reason, Secretary Austin
directed a Department-wide stand-down to allow senior leaders to
discuss the importance of our oath of office, impermissible behaviors,
and procedures for reporting extremist behaviors. I am committed to
working hand-in-hand with General Clarke in leading this effort on
behalf of the SOF community, ensuring that our efforts are closely
aligned with top-level guidance and actions and policies taken by the
Department and the Military Services.
We recognize that many of the solutions have not yet been fully
implemented and that true cultural change will require a sustained and
focused effort over many years. I look forward to working with you and
your staff as we strengthen the foundation of our culture and ethics
throughout the SOF Enterprise. SO/LIC will continue to support this
effort by focusing on those actions that fall within our administrative
role overseeing the organization and training of SOF personnel and
ensuring these efforts are adequately resourced. Working closely with
USSOCOM and each of the Services, we will continue to develop and
sustain a SOF culture of personal accountability that is worthy of the
men and women that constitute our force.
We are similarly focused on enhancing the diversity within our SOF
formation. As it stands today, our force is not adequately reflective
of the American people. In addition to the moral imperative of
addressing this challenge, we recognize that a more diverse force makes
us more effective operationally by allowing us to draw upon diverse
perspectives and talents and new ideas to enable us to prevail in the
global contest for influence and legitimacy we are faced with today.
Enhancing diversity within the force will become increasingly important
as the Department places greater emphasis on operations in the
information environment against foreign disinformation and malign
influence.
Over the past year, ASD(SO/LIC) served on the Executive Working
Group as part of the Department of Defense's Board on Diversity and
Inclusion. A SOF officer on my staff sat on the DOD Board on Diversity
and Inclusion to ensure that special operations-unique issues were
reflected and considered as part of the overarching DOD efforts. Last
year, SO/LIC, in partnership with USSOCOM's Commander and Senior
Enlisted Leader, issued a memorandum to all SOF personnel emphasizing
that diversity and inclusion is a strategic imperative to the mission
of SOF. I co-chair, along with the USSOCOM Vice Commander, the SOF
Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to oversee and drive the
development and execution of the USSOCOM Diversity and Inclusion
Strategic Plan. I am pleased that USSOCOM has recently hired its first
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, and I look forward to working
with the command as we collectively address this challenge.
In addition to addressing racial and cultural diversity within the
SOF formation, we are also working to ensure that all SOF career fields
are open to all who have the desire and meet the rigorous standards.
Women have filled vital roles within the SOF community for many years,
and we are proud that in the past year, two women have for the first
time successfully completed the Special Forces Qualification Course and
are currently serving as Green Berets. Although we recognize that we
have much more progress to make in this area, these talented soldiers
have blazed a path that we expect many others will follow.
Addressing each of these challenges will require a multifaceted,
sustained approach, with a clear strategy, concrete objectives, and
measurable benchmarks. Additionally, the continued institutionalization
of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command will
provide additional avenues to highlight policy and resource issues
affecting SOF, including diversity, ethics, and accountability. For
instance, regularly occurring readiness briefings from USSOCOM to
ASD(SO/LIC) now address sexual assault and harassment prevention and
response, domestic violence, suicide prevention, COVID-19 vaccination
rates, and accession/promotion by sex and ethnicity. SO/LIC brings
unique perspective to these challenges, and you have my commitment that
we will remain fully engaged.
succeed through teamwork
Secretary Austin's Message to the Force challenges us to join
forces with our partners and allies; work in partnership across U.S.
departments and agencies, with Congress, and with private industry; and
to build unity of effort and missions throughout the Department,
including strengthening civil-military cooperation. The men and women
of the SOF community excel in building strong and lasting partnerships,
including with our foreign, interagency, and private industry partners.
SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to deepen our civilian-military
collaboration across a wide range of issues, including SOF personnel
and readiness, budget and acquisitions, special access programs, and
legislative affairs.
Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our
democracy, and strengthening civilian institutions within the
Department is a key priority of Secretary Austin. As the Secretary
testified before this committee in his confirmation hearing, ``the
safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian control
of our armed forces ... the subordination of military power to the
civil.'' We also recognize and appreciate the Congress's strong
interest in empowering civilian leadership, both within the Special
Operations community and throughout the Department.
The continued institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the
administrative chain of command, as codified in Title 10, is one of
many examples where the Department is making progress in empowering
civilian leadership, oversight, and advocacy within the Department's
decision-making mechanisms. Over the past year, we have made progress
in strengthening civilian oversight of SOF, but we recognize that more
remains to be done to realize the full intent of recent legislative
reforms to strengthen the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role and to establish the
Secretariat for Special Operations. Recent actions include designating
ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations administrative matters, establishing a position
of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to lead the Secretariat and to
assist the ASD with those responsibilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) also has
been added to numerous senior Departmental decision-making bodies, in
many instances marking the first time the SOF Enterprise has had
representation and a voice in these discussions and decisions.
Enhanced civilian leadership and oversight are essential to
advocating for SOF within the Department and tackling key issues
affecting the SOF Enterprise. These elements also help ensure an
independent and objective assessment of military capabilities and
policy issues. Further institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s
administrative chain of command responsibilities will require continued
close coordination with senior DOD leadership, USSOCOM, and Congress. I
fully embrace this role, and I also recognize that there is more work
ahead as we fulfill Congress's intent. As these efforts mature, I look
forward to working with you, General Clarke, and other DOD senior
leaders to ensure that these reforms meet the intent of Congress and
serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of our SOF
community.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the committee
again for its strong support for our special operations personnel, who
serve as a critical linchpin in safeguarding our national security--in
wartime and peacetime. As an integral component of the Joint Force, SOF
bring unique capabilities that complement and strengthen those of our
general purpose forces as well as our interagency and international
partners.
I thank the committee again for the opportunity to testify, and I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Now I will ask a series
of questions required of all civilian nominees. Please respond
appropriately.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
Mr. Maier. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Ms. Hruby. No.
Mr. Rose. No.
Ms. Rosenblum. No.
Mr. Maier. No.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
committee when requested?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
Mr. Maier. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
Mr. Maier. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
Mr. Maier. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
Mr. Maier. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
Mr. Maier. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Let the record show that all of the
witnesses have responded in the affirmative to all of the
questions.
Mr. Hruby, among one of the major challenges that you have
is the production of 80 pits in the next several years. The
original idea was to construct 5,000 square foot modules at Los
Alamos, and roughly the cost per square foot of such
construction was about 20,000. That plan was changed in 2018 to
recondition or refit the MOX facility in Savannah, Georgia,
which is 450,000 square feet, about 25 percent completed. So
there is obviously going to be a cost differential here.
What are your views on the two-facility production plan?
Ms. Hruby. Chairman, thank you for your question. This is
the biggest issue I think facing NNSA today, is delivering the
pit production capability for our nation for the first time in
many decades. The current plan that NNSA has developed, and
that I support, includes producing pits at both Los Alamos and
Savannah River, 30 pits per year minimum at Los Alamos, 50 pits
per year minimum at Savannah River.
The 30 pits per year at Los Alamos is on track to be
delivered in 2026. The 50 pits per year at Savannah River,
originally planned for 2030, is likely to now be somewhere
between 2030 and 2035, a decision that will be made at the
Critical Decision 2 point.
I believe that the two-site solution is a good solution for
a couple of reasons. One is that it is, as expressed by NNSA,
and again, I agree that it is more resilient than a one-site
solution. Should anything go wrong, should there be an
accident, it allows the other site to continue to make pits.
And I think that is quite important and allows the throughput
of pits to be closer to 80 than it would need to be, to hedge
against bets.
The other reason is I think it takes advantage of the
infrastructure at NNSA and the skill sets at NNSA. So the
scientists at Los Alamos, I believe are very important to pit
production. I also believe that the culture of a production
plant that exists at Savannah River is also important. And if
the two organizations work together well, and if confirmed, it
will be my job to make sure that they do, I think we take best
advantage of the infrastructure and the people of NNSA, and we
end up with the most resilient pit production capability in the
country per dollar.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Because of the limited
time, I ask the respondents to be concise, and if we have a
second round I will try to reach everyone. But let me just ask
Ms. Rosenblum. If confirmed, you will be the Executive
Secretary of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and will you assure
us that you will do everything you can to timely coordinate the
budget reviews between DOD and NSA, to guarantee the Council
can meet DOD requirements?
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I am confirmed,
yes, I will. I have reviewed all of the responsibilities that
would be mine, if confirmed as the staff director, and feel
prepared to carry them out, and will do so.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Mr. Maier, you have a dual- hat
responsibility. You report to the Secretary of Defense the
service-like activities of SOCOM, and then you report to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy with respect to policy
matters. Can you briefly give us an idea of how you intend to
discharge those dual responsibilities?
Ms. Maier. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question. So
one way we will look at that is having different staffs that
integrate at a more senior level but work different parts of
that portfolio, and I personally think there is great value in
having ASD(SO/LIC) that does both, because it can speak to the
policy components in parts of those conversations in the
Department but also represents SOCOM and provides that civilian
oversight independently but in a synergistic manner with the
policy.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. And finally, Mr. Rose, just a
quick, in my remaining 5 seconds. You indicated one of your
challenges is maintaining a robust workforce. About a third of
your employees are eligible for retirement, and would likely do
so. You are competing against a very competitive market for
skilled engineers, and particularly anybody that knows anything
about a computer.
So can you give us, very briefly, your thoughts on this
issue?
Mr. Rose. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for the question. I would say recruiting, developing, and
retaining the next generation of nuclear security experts is
absolutely vital. And as I mentioned, there has been a lot of
progress in the past several years, in large part thanks to
this committee. But we still have significant gaps, as you
mentioned.
One of my first objectives, if confirmed in the position,
would be to meet with the leadership of NNSA, the labs, and the
sites to, one, identify where our gaps are with regards to
personnel, and then, two, developing a comprehensive plan to
implement and close those gaps. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Rose. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
think all opening statements were great opening statements. I
commend you on those statements.
Ms. Hruby, last year we had major concerns with the
Secretary of the DOE interfering with the work of the NNSA and
putting our nuclear modernization programs at risk, even
questioning what our role is in developing the budget and some
other things, and it was not a workable thing. In fact, I had
to personally intervene with then President Trump to get things
pretty well straightened out. So we have got to have a clear
understanding at DOE and OMB about the work of the Nuclear
Weapons Council.
Now I like the fact that you--and I told you this before--
came right out with some of your priorities, and stating what
those priorities were, number one, ensuring the success of our
weapons programs, two, updating obsolete infrastructure, and
three, taking care of our people. And I agree with those
priorities. Will you agree to keeping us informed as to how you
are coming along with your priorities?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator. Of course, I would be delighted to
keep you informed, if confirmed.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. And I think also, Mr. Rose, how do
you plan to support Ms. Hruby in these priorities, these three
priorities?
Mr. Rose. Senator, I agree with all of her priorities, and
I will do everything in my power to be a very good deputy, if
confirmed.
Senator Inhofe. That is good. And, Mr. Maier, I want to
talk a little bit about what is happening in Africa right now.
It is a critical theater for implementing our National Defense
Strategy. China and Russia are on the rise. China has opened
its first overseas military base in Djibouti. A lot of people
do not realize that. This is the first time they have done
this, and now they are all the way as far south as the southern
part of Tanzania. They are active in there as well as Russia
being on the rise in that area. So right now ISIS and al Qaeda
are on the increase as well, and to deal with these threats we
only have 6,000 personnel, military personnel, on the entire
continent.
I was critical of the previous administration, because when
they were talking about revamping and changing our priorities
in different parts of the world I really feel that we are
understaffed. That is the only area where we are starting off
understaffed. And I am not anticipating or expecting that you
had a chance to look at and evaluate the personnel and whether
or not it is adequate, but any first thoughts in terms of where
they are in that field?
Mr. Maier. Senator, thanks for the question, and I think
Africa is a very important theater, as you say, for both things
that Special Operations is focused on--obviously 20 years or
more of the counterterrorism fight there, as you mentioned, a
number of ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates there--but then it is
also an arena for competition, as you referenced, in Djibouti.
And I think my objective, if confirmed, is to very much look at
where we are getting return on that investment and where we can
combine some of those missions to get more benefit for the
National Defense Strategy.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I think one of the first things
that I would like to have you do, and share with us, on what
your impression is in terms of adequacy of our resources in
Africa. Would you do that?
Ms. Maier. I would, Senator. If confirmed, I would be glad
to look at that as a first priority.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Lastly, I think that there is going
to be some of the members are going to be talking to you and
Ms. Rosenblum about the issue of no-first-use policy. There is
some confusion as to where you are in some people's minds, and
I will give you one shot to state that before the rest of them
get to you. All right?
Ms. Rosenblum. All right. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate
the opportunity to clarify my view on this. Give the strategic
environment that we face, one that is absolutely challenging
U.S. interests and those of our allies, I do not support a no-
first-use policy.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me now
recognize Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
each of our nominees this morning for your willingness to be
considered for these very important posts and for your
testimony this morning.
I want to begin with you, Mr. Maier, because in your
opening remarks you talked about the importance of diversity in
our Special Operations Forces, and one aspect of that diversity
are the women that we need to have join Operation Forces, yet a
study from 2016 found that 85 percent of Special Operators
opposed allowing women into their specialties, and 71 percent
opposed women in their units.
So this is obviously an ongoing challenge. It is getting
better, I know. We just had our first--we have 50 graduates, I
think, of Ranger School that just happened, and one of our
first Green Berets. But can you talk about what you think some
of the challenges are to better integrating women, and
specifically, reading the report that just came out in April of
Women in Army Special Operations Survey, one of the things that
I found particularly interesting was that one of the biggest
challenges is equipment fitting. And I had the opportunity to
go out to Minot Air Force Base recent with General Brown, and
one of the demonstrations he provided for us, that they are
doing there in Minot, is working to refit the equipment that
women are wearing so that they can operate better with the
equipment we have for our women in the military.
So can you talk about those challenges and how you will
address them?
Ms. Maier. Yes, Senator. I think it is a very important
issue, and I think the first step has been opening all fields
to women, and I think what we are seeing is the evolution of
that. So the survey you cite from U.S. Army Special Operations
was commissioned by them internally, and I think this is
indicative of the ongoing effort to build both the ability for
women to operate on an equal footing and have the acceptance
and, in many cases, the equipment that is required.
If confirmed, this is one of the top priorities I would
have. I think it fits into the Secretary and, by extension, the
President's strive to really have a diverse force. We know, as
we compete globally, we are going to need both genders in the
fight, and we are going to need people with other expertise
that we might not have had as much of in the force at this
state.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. As an aside, if you did not
hear the public radio piece on how women are required to wear
their hair in the military, that was on this morning, I would
urge you to listen to it. It was a very important example of
why we have got to respond to some of these challenges that
women are facing, in a way that is more friendly to the
differences between men and women, which are not worse. They
are just different.
Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, I think this question is for both
of you. We just saw the impact of the cyber hacking into the
Colonial Pipeline and what that meant for the country. How do
we reassure people who have questions about our nuclear
weapons, and our nuclear command and control structure, that
they are not also open to those kinds of cyberattacks?
Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, for the question. Of
course, cyber is a major challenge across the U.S. Government,
and particularly in the places that we want to keep most
secure, the nuclear weapons facilities. The people in the
nuclear weapons, in the NNSA complex, work tirelessly to
protect the networks and have been fairly successful in doing
so. I think we need to continue to find talent, to use that
talent effectively to protect our networks and to share those
lessons across the government. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Rose?
Mr. Rose. Senator, thanks very much for the question. I
agree with everything Ms. Hruby said, and if confirmed, one of
my first priorities would be to hire a new chief information
officer for the NNSA. The most recent officer just retired. But
I fully agree. I actually teach a course at Georgetown
University called ``Outer Space But Strategic Capabilities,''
and it talks about all the interrelationships between cyber,
nuclear, as well as outer space.
So I think you are absolutely right. We have to look at
these strategic issues from a holistic approach. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Ms. Rosenblum,
in a 2019 talk, you described our nuclear forces as being on a,
quote, ``hair trigger,'' end quote. I am concerned by this,
because for the entire time that I have been on this committee,
military and civilian officials, from both the Obama and the
Trump administrations, have consistently argued against this
phrase and the idea that it is meant to foster, which is that
there is something inherently unsafe about our ICBM posture.
Just a few weeks ago, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
we heard General Kehler, the former STRATCOM Commander, explain
again why this is a red herring. In fact, I remember testimony
from the Obama administration that reducing the alert posture
for our ICBM would actually be destabilizing. Senator Shaheen
just spoke about a CODEL that a few of us took to Minot in
North Dakota, the base, where that phrase was also identified
as a red herring.
So do you believe that our alert posture is unsafe or that
it needs to be changed?
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
opportunity to be able to clarify my views with respect to this
issue. I support the current alert posture and believe it is an
important piece to making our nuclear deterrent credible. I
believe that what you are referring to is an op-ed that I had
done in 2019, in the Des Moines Register, in advance of the
Iowa caucuses. The purpose of the op-ed was to encourage Iowans
to be able to engage with the candidates around issues related
to nuclear weapons. It was in an attempt to have that language
be accessible and understandable that I used the phrase ``hair
trigger alert.'' I certainly did not mean any offense by it,
and if I did, I apologize.
Senator Fischer. Well, I thank you for those comments. I
think it is extremely important that all public figures are
careful in terminology that is used with regards to the
security of this nation. As you know, there are numerous
safeguards that are in place, and all the testimony that has
been given to this committee over the years about this, that
``hair trigger'' phrase is such a mischaracterization, and I
believe it is not serving the people of this country well to
have that kind of language out there that does not reflect the
true environment that we live in.
Dr. Hruby, last week in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee I
talked to Dr. Verdon about the relationship between modernizing
NNSA's nuclear complex and how this investment actually reduces
the potential need to [inaudible] nuclear test. Can you talk
about how the relationship is between those two things, how you
view that?
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator Fischer. The
modernization of the NNSA infrastructure is critical to keeping
our stockpile safe, secure, and reliable without testing. And I
want to, in particular, highlight the ability to make plutonium
pits as part of that. We know that pits' performance change
with time, and the planned pit production program allows us to
get ahead of that and make sure that we do not get to a point
where we need to test the weapons in an underground, in a
nuclear explosive test, to make sure they are reliable. Thank
you.
Senator Fischer. Also, Doctor, I appreciated our discussion
about the importance of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program,
and I just wanted to confirm one thing for the record. Do you
believe that the United States must rebuild and maintain the
basic capabilities of design, manufacture, and sustain an
effective nuclear weapons stockpile to support our nation's
deterrent?
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Senator, I do. I think the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program is an excellent program that has been
started within the last few years and will be very important to
the future of our stockpile.
Senator Fischer. And, Mr. Rose, do you agree? Yes or no. I
am sorry to make it so short. I am out of time.
Mr. Rose. Yes, I agree.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you to the
panelists for coming. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now let me
recognize Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and congratulations to each of the nominees. I believe
you are all very well qualified for your positions.
I want to just also say a word about John Warner. It is a
true honor to be a Virginia Senator on the Armed Services
Committee and think about my friend, and feel sad about his
death but also celebrate an amazing life. Senator Warner was in
the Pacific in World War II, and when he came back to the
United States at the end of the war he went to Washington and
Lee to go to college. And my father-in-law was also in the
Pacific during World War II, as a submariner, and then came
back and went to school at Washington and Lee. And they were
very, very dear friends, beginning in 1946.
They built the modern Republican Party in Virginia from
essentially nothing. When my father-in-law was the first
elected governor, Republican governor, in Virginia history,
John was the Secretary of the Navy, and they worked together on
many issues, because Virginia is the center of naval power in
the world. Their friendship was tested but not strained when
they ran against each other for the United States Senate in
1978, and John Warner beat my father-in- law, beat my political
hero, just like he later beat my best friend in politics, Mark
Warner, in a race in 1996, for the
United States Senate.
I knew how important this committee was to John Warner,
when I was mayor and governor and was working with Senator
Warner. His service on this committee was something that he
talked about a lot. I think it was his favorite part of his
30 years in the United States Senate. But by the time I
came to the Senate he had been gone, but then I really wanted
to know even more about John Warner, because I got to meet
people like Jack Reed and John McCain, and Carl Levin, and
others who had served with John on this committee, and I
learned an entirely new dimension of my friend. And I just
wanted to begin my comments today just expressing how sad I
feel that he is gone but how proud I am to be a successor, not
a replacement as a Virginia Senator on the Armed, but I am a
successor to him.
One just personal privilege. When I found that he had died
I knew my father-in-law would be very distraught about this. My
father-in-law will be 98 in September. And my wife just texted
me. She reached her dad this morning to talk to him about it at
the retirement community where he lives, and he was very
stunned and saddened about it. And kept saying, ``But he is a
youngster. He is younger than me.'' That is very much like my
father-in-law to think that a 94-year-old is a youngster.
I want to ask just one question of Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose.
The Navy has published a SIOP Shipyard Industrialization
Optimization Plan that really sort of lays out, quite a ways
into the future, the necessary investments that need to be made
in our public shipyards. Does NNSA have something similar, kind
of a long-term investment document that would help us work with
you to make sure that we are keeping the physical facilities of
the NNSA in the shape they need to be in?
Ms. Hruby. Senator, is the specific question--I just want
to make sure I am answering the right question--about the Navy
Reactor Program, or just in general?
Senator Kaine. Just in general. Does the NNSA programs
within its purview have a similar sort of long-term capital
improvement investment plan that we can assess to determine
whether we are appropriately investing?
Ms. Hruby. Okay. Thank you for the clarification. The NNSA
has worked very hard over the last 5 years or so to develop a
risk-based approach to infrastructure investment needs. It is a
fairly sophisticated approach. The infrastructure needs are
large, and so they have prioritized those by ability to deliver
programs, and there is a long- term plan. And if confirmed, I
want to take a close look at that, but there is a plan.
Senator Kaine. I also know the President is sending us up a
budget today, and I am going to be interested to see the
budgetary proposals to execute on a plan like that.
Thank you. I will yield back to you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. And now
I would like to recognize Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Rosenblum,
welcome to the committee. It is an honor to be introduced by
Sam Nunn. I will overlook your association with Bill Cohen, I
assure you, when it comes time to vote on your nomination.
Please give him my regards.
Ms. Hruby, one of the issues involved with nuclear
modernization is that many Americans do not understand why we
are doing it. Those of us that have lived through prior decades
have to realize the Cold War is in a 30-year rear- view mirror.
Since that time we have had 9/11, we have had the war on
terror, we have had COVID, and so I want to ask you some
questions.
Our essential defense posture for the past 70 years has
been deterrence of others' attacks on us. Is that not true?
Ms. Hruby. That is true, Senator.
Senator King. And deterrence rests upon your adversary
understanding that you have a capacity to make life very
difficult--that is a euphemism--for them and the will to use
it. Is that not correct?
Ms. Hruby. That is correct, Senator.
Senator King. And if your deterrent is out of date, in bad
shape, not modernized, not able to be delivered, then that, in
fact, makes the country less safe, does it not?
Ms. Hruby. That is correct, Senator.
Senator King. And so the modernization that we are talking
about is essential to maintaining the peace. Isn't that
correct?
Ms. Hruby. It is.
Senator King. I think this is important, because people
back home in Maine say, ``Why are we spending all this money on
nuclear weapons?'' And the reason is because we never want to
have a nuclear war. The irony, or the paradox, of nuclear
weapons is we build them so we will never have to use them. And
that strategy has, in fact, worked for over 70 years. Is that
correct?
Ms. Hruby. That is correct.
Senator King. Now let me go to the specifics of that, and I
think the answer is contained in the conversation we have
already had, and I apologize for cross-examining you in this
way, but it is a way of getting through material in a shorter
period of time.
We are going back into the business of making plutonium
pits, which are necessary elements for a nuclear weapon. And I
presume that the reason that is the case is that we have to
modernization and that the pits that were built in earlier
periods are no longer fully dependable and need to be upgraded
along with other parts of the nuclear deterrent. Is that
correct?
Ms. Hruby. Well, the pits today are dependable. The NNSA
plan is to make sure that they can be replaced before they
become not dependable.
Senator King. And that entails reinvigorating pit
production at both Los Alamos, and the other question is, why
do we need two places? Why are we talking about Los Alamos and
Savannah River?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator. The number of pits that are
projected to be needed is a minimum of 80 pits per year. That
is a significant capability at Los Alamos. If we were to do it
all there it would require much more infrastructure investment.
Using the MOX facility shell, which has been built as a Cat-1
facility, a facility that can handle plutonium, allows us to
have a cost-effective program, use the talent across the NNSA
complex.
Senator King. Thank you. Mr. Rose, I want to turn to you. A
couple of things. We had a question a few minutes ago about
cyber, and you said you were going to appoint a new CIO. I want
urgency here, and I do not think--I mean, I am fine with
appointing a new CIO, but I would like you to stand up a team
that aggressively red-teams your systems to test them, because
every CIO says, ``Oh, we are okay,'' and that goes up the line
and you say, ``We are okay.'' I want people who are paid to
hack your system, to demonstrate whether or not you are, in
fact, secure. There is no more important cyber protection than
that of nuclear command and control and communication.
So I hope that you will go beyond a new CIO to an all-
hands-on-deck, urgent, urgent pursuit of cyber defense, of
particularly in the NNSA.
Mr. Rose. Senator, thank you very much. I agree with you
100 percent. You know, we have got to get on our A-game with
regard to cyber, especially that nexus between cyber and
nuclear. One of the things that I have been focused on in my
career over the last 5 years is the challenge of these new
emerging technologies to nuclear deterrence. So if confirmed, I
assure you that I will make your recommendation a priority, and
we will work to get the NNSA's house in order with regard to
cybersecurity.
Senator King. Thank you, sir. If you do not, I will come
and find you.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. I do not know how to respond to the last
comment.
Let me now thank Senator King and recognize, via Webex,
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to each of you on your nominations.
Ms. Hruby, I want to talk about NNSA's out-of-control
nuclear weapons budget. According to the agency's 25-year build
plan, published last December, projected spending on nuclear
weapons activities has risen to $505 billion. That is a
staggering increase of $113 billion, or 29 percent, from the
2020 version of the plan. Now I understand that cost overruns
at the NNSA are the norm, but these figures are mind-boggling.
And when we let the cost of weapons balloon it can crowd out
other important Energy Department national security programs,
such as nonproliferation.
So, Ms. Hruby, I want to ask, will you commit to providing
this committee with cost estimates for major agency projects
that are realistic and not low-balled, and schedules for
completing these projects that are also realistic and not just
a fantasy?
Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, Senator Warren. Yes, the answer
is yes, I will. I do think we need to get better at cost
estimation and schedule estimation within the Department, and
seeking talent to do that and making sure that is done will be
a top priority for me, if confirmed.
Senator Warren. I would only amend what you are saying. You
do not just need to get better. Based on where we are right
now, you need to get a lot better on this. I also want to note
that I am concerned about NNSA's current modernization plan,
which, in addition to being unnecessary has no chance of being
executed on time or on budget.
Now, Ms. Rosenblum, let me ask you, if confirmed, in
addition to be an Assistant Secretary, you will also be the
Staff Director for the Pentagon's Nuclear Weapons Council. Last
year, National Defense Authorization Act significantly
increased the role of the Nuclear Weapons Council in
determining the NNSA budget, decreasing the traditional role of
the Energy Department. This effort prompted an outpouring of
bipartisan opposition in the Senate and the House, but,
unfortunately, key parts of the objectionable language were
retained in the final bill.
So let me ask, Ms. Rosenblum, do you believe the Energy
Secretary should retain the decision authority for the NNSA
budget request?
Ms. Rosenblum. Senator, thank you very much for the
question. I am very familiar with the changes that were made
certainly to the legislation, and it is one that I do support
and believe that the Council is appropriately chaired by the
Department of Defense.
Senator Warren. I am not sure I understand the answer to my
question, and that is, do you believe that the Energy Secretary
should retain decision authority for the NNSA budget request? I
just want to make sure I understand your answer. That is a yes
or no.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, I do, Senator, in consultation.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I just wanted to make
sure I understood.
So, Ms. Hruby, are you concerned that this new law will
negatively impact your ability to set NNSA's budget?
Ms. Hruby. I think that we need forge a better relationship
so things like this do not happen in the future, and I am
confident we can do that and we can work through the legal
requirements as needed.
Senator Warren. Well, I hope that you are right, but I am
very concerned about this.
As my colleagues, Senator Manchin and Senator Murkowski,
wrote last year, the Nuclear Weapons Council, quote, ``has a
narrower focus than the Secretary of Energy, and its
recommendations would likely prioritize nuclear weapons at the
expense of other critical energy department missions,'' end
quote. I fear that this new law will make it harder to rein in
the NNSA's dangerous budget growth, and I will look forward to
working with both of you to make sure that we are able to do
that.
So thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Now let me
recognize Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all four of you for being here today. I really appreciate it.
This question is for Ms. Rosenblum.
In April, the Government Accountability Office issued a
report which highlighted the threat that biological agents
present to our servicemembers on the Korean Peninsula, and
found that the Department needs to improve the preparedness of
U.S. forces to counter chemical and biological weapons.
The DOD manufactured hundreds of thousands of doses of
vaccines last year for both the plague and botulinum toxin, two
threats for which the DOD has longstanding requirements to
provide medical countermeasures. However, as part of the
defense-wide review, the Department terminated the Joint
Vaccine Acquisition Program, ending funding for several medical
programs. This included the vaccine programs for these
biothreats that had already completed Phase 2 clinical trials,
and manufactured 300,000 doses of each vaccine to demonstrate
manufacturing capability.
As we continue to reckon with the challenge of the COVID-19
pandemic, I am concerned about the risk inherent in ending
vaccine development programs that are aimed at protecting our
warfighters. If confirmed, can you commit to reviewing the
Department's policy and expeditiously providing a report back
to the committee on the acquisition strategy for these
vaccines, to include the status of the development, the cost to
complete the development, and the risks to our servicemembers
if development is discontinued?
Ms. Rosenblum. I do, Senator, and I believe it is critical
that our Joint Forces have the protections that they require in
order to be able to counter any kind of threat from weapons of
mass destruction, including biological as well.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Ms. Rosenblum.
Mr. Maier, good to see you again. The National Defense
Strategy Commission has cautioned us of the imbalance in civil-
military relations on critical issues of strategy, development,
and implementation. As you know, Congress has taken steps to
address this imbalance by including important reforms in recent
defense authorization that are designed to enhance the ability
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict to act as the Service Secretary-like
civilian responsible for oversight and advocacy of Special
Operations Forces.
What is the value to both the Special Operations enterprise
and our overall national security in having an empowered
Service Secretary-like civilian in the Pentagon?
Ms. Maier. Senator Kelly, nice to see you again as well.
Thank you for the question. So I think it is critically
important that as we look at our other services they have a
civilian that is empowered that sits above them, and I think
this committee has recognized that there are elements of
Special Operations Command that did not have that. So in the
first order it fills a gap.
I think in the second, and maybe more practical sense, it
is an opportunity for there to be a civilian who is advocating
for the men and women of Special Operations in the building,
both in the policy and then in the administrative chain of
command that today has not existed.
Senator Kelly. Do you think we have made any progress in
moving this forward?
Ms. Maier. I do, Senator. I think the Secretary's recent
announcement of how he intends to proceed with a dual-reporting
chain, including a direct report to him for the administrative
chain of command, in which, if confirmed, I would be that
direct report, significantly empowers the position.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you.
The next question is for Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose. In past
testimony before the committee, the National Nuclear Security
Administration has been candid about the risks posed by the
aging workforce. With more than one-third of the workforce
eligible to retire by 2024, the imperative of recruiting the
next generation of American scientists and engineers is clear.
I am proud to say that the students at the University of
Arizona are among those that are already building relationships
and experience with the National Nuclear Security
Administration through the Minority Serving Institution
Partnership Program.
Can each of you speak to, in the remaining time, which is
not much, can you speak to how you would build on these
programs and other methods to develop a sustainable pipeline in
STEM research?
Ms. Hruby. Yeah, very quickly, we need to work with
community colleges, historically black colleges and university,
minority serving institutions, top research institutions across
the board to rebuild our workforce, and if confirmed, that will
be a top priority.
Mr. Rose. Senator, let me just say, recruiting, developing,
and retaining our nuclear security workforce is one of my
highest priorities, and should I be confirmed, be assured that
I will make it happen.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me recognize
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Ms. Hruby, what was your involvement in the
incorporation of critical race theory or diversity equity and
inclusion training at the Sandia National Labs?
Ms. Hruby. Senator Cotton, thanks for that question. I am
strong believer in diversity, equity, and inclusion training
for our workforce. And, in fact, study after study shows that
the culture of institutions is the reason why we lose top
talent, and particularly women and people of color. So my first
statement is I am a strong supporter and have benefited greatly
personally and been part of an institution that has benefitted
greatly from diversity, equity, and inclusion training.
The issues with the Sandia divisive training occurred after
I left the laboratory, and I understand it has been reviewed,
and if confirmed, I look forward to evaluating those reviews
and making sure that we have high-quality training programs
that will continue into the future.
Senator Cotton. Ms. Hruby, I have heard from concerned
former NNSA officials and lab workers who said these
controversial training regimens were conducted under your
watch. Did you direct or participate in any of what you just
called divisive training sessions?
Ms. Hruby. I did participate in training, diversity,
equity, and inclusion training at the laboratories. The
training that I participated in I never considered divisive nor
did I hear that from any employee that participated in the
training at the laboratory while I was there.
Senator Cotton. Did you personally participate in any
training that instructed white employees to, quote,
``deconstruct their white culture,'' end quote, or to apologize
for bigotries or prejudices that they did not commit?
Ms. Hruby. No, Senator. The classes did explore privilege,
but in my opinion they never were divisive or asked
inappropriate questions or apologize of the white workforce.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that any race is inherently
prejudiced, bigoted, or oppressive?
Ms. Hruby. No, sir.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe that any race is inherently
victimized or oppressed?
Ms. Hruby. No, sir.
Senator Cotton. Do you see any inherent danger in telling
highly skilled technicians who control one of the largest
stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world that they are
working for a country whose roots around on systemic racism?
Ms. Hruby. Well, no, I do, but I do think we need to be
open to the issues that exist, and that the cultures that exist
that do not allow us to fully utilize all Americans in our
science and technology enterprise.
Senator Cotton. So you do not see any danger in teaching
these technicians who are in charge of our nuclear stockpiles
that America is a fundamentally, or systematically racist
country?
Ms. Hruby. I do not think America is a fundamentally racist
country.
Senator Cotton. And so, therefore, you would also not
permit any such training in the agency, should you be
confirmed?
Ms. Hruby. That is correct. I would want to make sure all
of our training was high quality.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think that we can all agree
that if you are an American, no matter your race, sex, creed,
preference, and especially if you are gifted in fields like
math, physics, chemistry, or engineering, that we want you and
we need you at the NNSA. But I hope that we also treat our
workforce with respect and do not subject any of these highly
trained professionals to this very foolish kind of training
that teaches them that one race is inherently guilty by birth
or one race is inherently oppressed by birth or that America is
somehow a fundamentally racist or irredeemable or hateful
country. I would suggest that is a very bad way to chase out
some of our very best employees and put them into the arms of
the private sector.
So thank you very much for your answers today, and thank
you all for your appearance.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Now let me recognize
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses for being here.
Ms. Hruby, let me ask you about the Kansas City National
Security Campus, which is in my home state of Missouri, that we
are very proud of. It does extraordinary work manufacturing, as
you know, the non-nuclear components for the NNSA's warhead
programs.
We know that the Kansas City campus is going to need
additional capacity to meet its production requirements going
forward. If confirmed, can you give me a sense how you will
work to ensure that the campus has the space it needs to
continue its vital work?
Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thank you, Senator Hawley, for that
question. The Kansas City site is a very important part of the
NNSA complex, and it is very active right now, and it is
undersized to produce the components we need. I understand that
there are several options, including lease options, to relieve
some of the pressure on the infrastructure at the site, and if
confirmed, I will look into what those options are and move
forward swiftly with trying to relieve the pressures, the
limitations from the infrastructure options.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
Mr. Maier, let me come to you and let's talk a little bit
about Afghanistan if we could. Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense Helvey testified recently that the U.S. does not
necessarily need the Afghan government in order to achieve our
counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan. Let me ask you if
you agree that if Kabul falls we may be able to work with other
regional and local stakeholders in the country, in Afghanistan,
to maintain the necessary access, gather the intelligence, and
otherwise be able to facilitate our over-the-horizon
operations. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think that it will be immensely more
challenging if the Afghan government falls. While there are
options, as I understand it, underway to look at other outside-
facing locations, that is exacerbated by a fall of the Afghan
security forces who are fighting and dying on the front lines.
Senator Hawley. But surely we have to plan for a number of
contingencies. So my question is, if Kabul falls, will we be
able to conduct the necessary intelligence- gathering, over-
the-horizon operations, et cetera, by working with regional and
local stakeholders?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think we will be, but it is really a
spectrum. It will be better if we are closer and we have more
capability that we can apply against the problem, of course.
Senator Hawley. Fair enough. Let me ask you about Special
Forces, which are such a key part of our effort to maintain
contact and then work with the Northern Alliance in the earlier
days of the war in Afghanistan. Do you think that Special
Operations Forces should play a role in helping to maintain
similar relationships going forward so that we can work with
local partners again to achieve our counterterrorism
objectives, if Kabul falls here, looking at the same scenario?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it is fair to say that SOF was
first into Afghanistan and they be last out, and this is
definitely an option that I would look at, if confirmed.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you about some of the
work that has been going on in the Baltics. They have been
working very closely with U.S. Special Forces again to
strengthen their own resistance capabilities in order to help
deter a Russian invasion. So with that precedent in mind, shift
over to Taiwan. Do you think that Taiwan would benefit from
strengthening its ability to conduct irregular warfare, along
the lines of what the Baltic nations have been doing?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I do think that is something that we
should be considering strongly as we think about competition
across the span of different capabilities we can apply, SOF
being a key contributor to that.
Senator Hawley. Give me a sense of how you think our
Special Operations community can help Taiwan develop this kind
of irregular warfare capabilities.
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think building on some of the areas
that they may not be thinking of, of a fight in depth, if there
is a Chinese military advance, where there could be some
opportunities for, as you say, resistance networks or other
capabilities that would leave behind, if you will, against a
potential enemy, amphibious landing or something like that,
sir.
Senator Hawley. Very good. In what specific ways do you see
our Special Operations Forces contributing to deterring Chinese
aggression, not just at the unconventional level but also in
supporting our conventional forces?
Mr. Maier. I think, Senator, when things work best the SOF
enterprise is in support of the Joint Force, and vice versa,
and I think information operations is a key area where USSOCOM
brings a lot of capability, and we need to, I think, continue
to improve upon that. One of the priorities I certainly have,
in looking at the competition space, is how we can be better in
that information environment, and that, of course, is not only
a SOF capability alone.
Senator Hawley. Give me a sense of, if you are confirmed,
what steps you will take to ensure that our Special Operations
Forces will be able to take the steps that you just outlined
and also maintain their readiness, support over-the-horizon
counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, and perform the
many other additional missions that we ask them to undertake in
multiple other theaters?
Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it is going to be a question of
prioritization and really looking at returns on investment. We
are still going to need to do the counterterrorism fight, and
SOF is best positioned to do that. But some of those
partnerships we built over the years are also applicable to the
competition space. But we need to evolve more towards that as a
national defense strategy. So I think it is going to be a
constant tradeoff and looking for opportunities to get
economies of scale on both of those mission set.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. I believe Senator
King has an additional question.
Senator King. Mr. Rose, as Ms. Rosenblum already learned,
one has to be accountable for writings going back to third
grade, sometimes, but I want to compliment you. You published
an article in December where you had, I think, an important
insight. You said, ``A deterrent posture review, as opposed to
strictly a nuclear posture review, could help the
administration determine the right set of military capabilities
of policies, nuclear and non-nuclear, it requires to better
deter current and emerging threats in a fiscally sustainable
manner.
"Indeed, if a nuclear weapon were ever used, it will
unlikely to be a result of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear
attack, but the result of the escalation of a conventional
conflict. Therefore, the best way to prevent a nuclear war may
be by preventing conventional conflict from occurring in the
first place.''
I think that is an important insight. Could you expand a
bit on that?
Mr. Rose. Thank you very much, Senator. You know, when you
look at the threat landscape we face, during the Cold War we
were very much concerned about that Soviet first strike. When
we look at the current security environment, where we will most
likely have a situation where a conflict could go nuclear would
be in a regional conflict with a great power like Russia.
Senator King. And indeed, Russia has articulated a doctrine
of the use of tactical nuclear weapons called ``Escalate to
Deescalate.'' They are openly talking about this strategy.
Mr. Rose. That is correct, Senator.
Senator King. And therefore, that is a risk that we really
need to think about, and as you say, we need to think about
deterring conventional conflict as well as the massive nuclear
conflict that the doctrine of the '60s, '70s, '80s, and '90s
conflated.
Mr. Rose. Absolutely, sir.
Senator King. Ms. Rosenblum, to move on to look at
deterrence in another way, my nightmare is nuclear weapons in
the hands of terrorists, nonstate actors, and the problem is
that this whole theory of deterrence that we have been talking
about does not work with a group of 30 people who would just as
soon give their lives up for some abstract cause.
Number one, talk to me about how do we keep that from
happening, either indigenous development of these weapons by a
terrorist group or, more likely, purchased from a rogue state
like North Korea.
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is
something, I believe appropriately, we do need to be concerned
about, and is part of the reason that there needs to be
emphasis put on securing nuclear materials, civilian nuclear
materials, throughout the world, particularly as we see the use
of nuclear energy as part of the approach to the climate-
related issue. And if I may, Senator, one other point. I worry
very much also about biological weapons, particularly as --
Senator King. I should have mentioned that. I put that in
almost the same category as nuclear, as we have just learned.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes. Thank you. And particularly with
synthetic biology, which is becoming more and more ubiquitous.
It is allowing a much broader range of actors to have those
tools, in much shorter time frame. And that is something that,
if I am confirmed, I will take a very close look at the
Department of Defense.
Senator King. I hope you will also look at where we are
vulnerable in terms of biological weapons. One of my concerns
is about our water systems. There are something like 60,000
separate water systems in this country, and the question is how
secure are they. And water systems not only give us drinking
water and water we use in our homes but they cool power plants
and enable a lot of other of our activities. So it is not only
a question of the risk but what the downstream--that is a bad
pun, I guess, talking about water, but what the downstream
effects are.
There is something called the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program. Is that something you hope to invigorate, and how much
engagement do we have from our allies, and indeed other
countries around the world, that recognize this weapons of mass
destruction threat?
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator. The Cooperative Threat
Program has been very successful over the past 30 years, and I
believe it is very important that the U.S. continue to work
with allies to close capacity gaps in the fight against
countering weapons of mass destruction. If I am confirmed, I
really look forward to digging into a lot more of the detail
with respect to how the program is currently operating. And
again, if confirmed, I would welcome an opportunity to come
back to talk with you and other members of the committee on how
we are doing with the CTR program.
Senator King. I hope we can do that, because that is the
legacy of Sam Nunn, as a matter of fact, Nunn-Lugar from years
ago, and it is an important one.
While I look forward to continuing to work with you, I
consider the work that you will be doing, assuming you are
confirmed, as among the most important jobs in our government,
so thank you for your willingness. Thanks to all of you for
your willingness to take on these new challenges.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now
recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and I would like to
thank the nominees for testifying, and Ms. Hruby, for meeting
with me recently.
I want to talk a little bit about some things happening, of
course, in Nevada. I am a little worried about explosive
nuclear testing and its possible resumption, because last year
news reports indicated that the previous administration was
considering resuming explosive nuclear testing. The Nevada Test
Site, now known as the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS,
is the only facility in the nation equipped to accommodate
subcritical nuclear experiments. These help to advance our
national security and maintain the integrity of our nuclear
stockpile.
A resumption in explosive testing would not only compromise
the health and safety of Nevadans and harm the surrounding
environment, but it would also undermine future stockpile
stewardship efforts.
So, Ms. Hruby, is your professional opinion that there is
not a current or foreseeable need for the United States to
resume explosive nuclear testing, and if confirmed, how do you
plan to improve the Stockpile Stewardship Program's scientific
capabilities so that we never have to resume explosive nuclear
weapons testing?
Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, Senator Rosen, and I
appreciated our conversation earlier about this as well.
Making sure we have a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile
without nuclear testing is the foundation of the NNSA. And I do
not believe we need to test at this time. There is no technical
indication of any reason to test.
If confirmed, I will make sure that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program continues to advance our laboratory
testing, our subcritical testing, as we are doing now,
advancing our diagnostics at the Nevada Test Site for
subcritical testing, to make sure that nuclear explosive
testing is not needed to understand our stockpile.
In addition, as we talked about earlier, even our
infrastructure programs, and, in particular our pit production
program at the NNSA is also a hedge against future testing, and
if confirmed, I will strongly support maintaining a stockpile
without testing.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to keep a little bit on
the Test Site, because when I was last there I saw the ongoing
construction of the U1a facility for our enhanced capabilities
for those subcritical experiments that we are talking about, or
the ECSE. And I am excited that the NNSS will host the most
capable weapons radiographic system in the world.
And so, Ms. Hruby again, if confirmed, will you ensure that
rapid completion of ongoing upgrades to the U1a complex in
order to enhance the stewardship of our nuclear stockpile, and
might you suggest any additional improvements that we need to
do at the Test Site that would be prudent to ensure our
stockpile safety, and that you can fulfill the mission that we
need to there?
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator, the ECSE program is an important
program on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and if confirmed,
I will certainly try to keep that program moving forward. And I
agree, we need to continue to look for all the capabilities
that could be employed to make sure we have a full science-
based understanding of our nuclear weapons.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move on now to
plutonium removal. In 2018, of course the Department of Energy
secretly shift a half metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium
from South Carolina to the Nevada National Security Site. As
part of an effort to restore trust with the people of Nevada,
NNSA committed to begin the removal of South Carolina material
from Nevada no later than 2021, and complete removal by 2026.
So, Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, can you both commit, if
confirmed, to continue to provide the Nevada delegation and our
staff with updates on the removal of plutonium from Nevada? I
can begin with Ms. Hruby and then go on to Mr. Rose, please.
Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Rosen.
Mr. Rose. Yes, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward
to, if confirmed, working with both of you on making sure that
Nevada National Security Site can complete this mission in the
safest way for our Nevadans and for our country and for our
homeland security and safety. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. I want to thank
the witnesses for their testimony and for their commitment to
public service, both in the past and obviously in the future as
they are moving towards their confirmation, I hope.
With that I would adjourn the hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Jill M. Hruby by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. In accordance with title 42, U.S. Code, section 7132(c))
the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, serves
concurrently as the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), as set forth in title 50, U.S. Code, section
2402. The Under Secretary must have extensive background in national
security, organizational management, and appropriate technical fields,
and be well-qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation,
and materials disposition programs of the NNSA in a manner that
advances and protects the national security of the United States.
What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
qualify you for appoint as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and
Administrator for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)?
Answer. I'm a mechanical engineer and spent 34 years of my
professional career at Sandia National Laboratories before I retired as
Laboratories Director in May 2017. Sandia is an NNSA-sponsored
Federally Funded Research and Development Center and the Nation's
nuclear weapons engineering laboratory with over 10,000 permanent
employees and an annual budget of about $4 billion. During my time at
Sandia, I was engaged either as a technical staff member or manager in
a variety of programs including the science supporting nuclear weapons,
weapon component and system development, nonproliferation, nuclear
security, and more. As the Laboratories Director, I wrote two stockpile
assessment letters. In my various leadership roles at Sandia, I have
experience managing large programs and diverse teams of people.
Since my retirement from Sandia in 2017, I have been active in
nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs through both compensated
and non-compensated employment, and on boards and advisory committees.
I spent a year as the Inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (a non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental
organization) then as a consultant exploring the intersection of
advanced technologies and nuclear policy. In addition, I have been a
special government employee (non-compensated) as a member of the
Defense Science Board and the NNSA Defense Programs Advisory Committee.
I have been a member of boards and advisory committees including the
National Academy of Sciences Committee for International Security and
Arms Control, Los Alamos National Laboratory missions committee, and
CRDF Global.
I have a broad set of technical knowledge and organizational
management skills to lead nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
materials disposition efforts. I know the DOE and NNSA cultures well
and am very familiar with the labs, plants, and sites.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security? Of the duties and functions
of the Administrator, NNSA? Do you perceive there to be any differences
or dissonance between the requirements of each such position? If
confirmed, under whose authority, direction, and control, would you
serve in each such position?
Answer. As Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, if confirmed, I
will be a direct report to Secretary Granholm. In the Under Secretary
role I will help inform and execute the Secretary's vision, and that of
President Biden, in furthering both nuclear security and the overall
mission of the Department of Energy (DOE).
The duties of the Administrator are clearly spelled out in the NNSA
Act. If confirmed, I will be responsible for the execution of the NNSA
mission to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the
nuclear weapons stockpile; to provide the Navy with nuclear propulsion;
to enhance nuclear nonproliferation; to reduce the global threat of
weapons of mass destruction; and to further our leadership in science
and technology, with our labs, plants, and sites and the amazing people
who perform the challenging work.
I believe there will be good alignment between the Secretary of
Energy and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. Secretary Granholm has
expressed her strong support for the DOE's role in national security,
and under her leadership the responsibilities for the Undersecretary
for Nuclear Security and the statutory obligations of the Administrator
are aligned, harmonious, and compatible.
If confirmed, as Administrator, I would be subject to the
authority, direction and control of Secretary Granholm and Deputy
Secretary Turk, as specified in the NNSA Act. Similarly, with respect
to the functions of Under Secretary, I am subject to the authority,
direction, and control of Secretary Granholm and Deputy Secretary Turk.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to develop strong and transparent
relationships with the Secretary of Energy, the DOD Under Secretary of
Acquisition and Sustainment, all members of the Nuclear Weapons Council
including the STRATCOM Commander, and Congress to enhance my ability to
succeed at my duties.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What are the major challenges confronting the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA?
Answer. The biggest challenge is simultaneously modernizing the
physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise while
delivering on the stockpile modernization, science programs, and the
nonproliferation and navy reactor program needs.
Over the past several decades, the NNSA enterprise has re-learned
delivering modernized nuclear weapons and established a science-based
stockpile stewardship program to provide confidence without nuclear
explosive testing. The NNSA now needs to add a robust and trusted
ability to deliver unique infrastructure programs, some that are
substantial in scale and technical challenge. The production
capabilities provided by the infrastructure programs are essential to
modernizing and sustaining our nuclear deterrent for decades to come.
If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to continue the efforts
of my predecessors to modernize our infrastructure to ensure we can re-
establish production capability and retain the stockpile management
capability required to confidently maintain our nuclear deterrent.
NNSA must also ensure that innovative nonproliferation technologies
are ready to go if needed, and enhance nuclear security through
material minimization, emergency response, and counterproliferation
activities. The NNSA must also continue to provide high quality results
for Navy nuclear propulsion.
NNSA can only succeed if we have the right workforce with the right
skills. The nuclear security enterprise is facing a bow-wave of
retirements. It will be critical for NNSA, working with our labs,
plants, and sites, to effectively recruit and retain the next
generation of smart, dedicated, and innovative nuclear security
personnel.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of
Defense (DOD), National Security Council (NSC), Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), and Congress to understand NNSA requirements,
communicate NNSA priorities, and advocate for NNSA funding to meet the
priority needs. I will also forge strong partnerships with the NNSA
complex leadership to deliver the infrastructure and modernization
programs in the timelines required by our customers. Finally, I will
expand on the on-going work between NNSA and our colleagues at the
labs, plants, and sites to help recruit and train the workforce of the
future.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities in each
of the roles for which you have been nominated?
Answer. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure NNSA
continues to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapon
stockpile now and into the future. This includes executing on budget
and schedule the weapon life extensions and modernization activities,
the infrastructure improvements, and the science-based stewardship
program. I will also focus on ensuring the NNSA is at the forefront of
the technology and capability required to support potential arms
control treaties, prevent nuclear material and weapon proliferation,
and support counterterrorism efforts. Finally, I will support the
Navy's nuclear propulsion program to ensure the U.S. nuclear navy can
meet its mission.
As the Under Secretary of Nuclear Security, I will work with other
leaders in DOE to achieve the Department's objectives especially in
areas of mutual interest such as nuclear energy, environmental
management, and high-performance computing.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship
between the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and the Senate Armed
Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?
Answer. The Senate Armed Services Committee, given its oversight
and authorization responsibilities, is well versed in the mission of
the NNSA and has been supportive of NNSA programs. This suggests a
generally good relationship between the former Under Secretaries for
Nuclear Security and the SASC and their staffs. I recognize there are
different points of views between members of SASC and in Congress as a
whole on nuclear weapons issues and NNSA governance, however, the
continuity of bi-partisan support on key issues has been impressive and
strong. I believe the relationship can and should continue to be
strengthened.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?
Answer. I firmly believe communication is key to maintaining good
relations. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA maintains open and timely
communications with Congress, especially the Senate Armed Services
Committee and its Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
nuclear weapons mission and security environment
Question. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the
Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our
stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary
of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking
regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the
nuclear mission.
If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of the Biden
Administration's NPR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take an active role in the NPR process
to ensure NNSA's capabilities and requirements are communicated and
understood as part of this major policy-making process. While nuclear
military requirements are set by the DOD, NNSA has a unique set of
responsibilities it must deliver for America's integrated deterrent to
remain safe, secure, and effective.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you
recommend the Biden Administration consider?
Answer. I am not privy at this time to specifics of the pre-
decisional NPR process. That said, I will make sure NNSA executes the
policy decisions the President and Department of Defense outline in any
update to the U.S. nuclear posture. Whatever policy decision is made,
NNSA must continue its current path of revitalizing our aging Cold War
infrastructure, meet DOD requirements for warhead manufacturing, ensure
sufficient research and development capabilities to avoid the need to
return to nuclear explosive testing, and deliver facilities required to
produce key strategic materials.
Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements to the
U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the
full and timely (question cut off). Should the upcoming NPR call for
the development of additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if
confirmed, to supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully
supports the new requirements?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to fully supporting any
changes, additions, or developments directed by the President, as that
guidance is translated into specific requirements by the Nuclear
Weapons Council, and as those requirements and programs are ultimately
authorized and appropriated by Congress.
overall management
Question. The NNSA Act of 2000, as amended, establishes that the
Administrator, NNSA ``. . . shall be subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such authority,
direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of
Energy, without re-delegation.''
What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
Energy and the Administrator of NNSA in statute and in recent practice?
Answer. Although NNSA is a semi-autonomous organization, per the
NNSA Act, it is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary. As such, the Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of
Energy, and NNSA Administrator must maintain a strong and healthy
relationship. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary Granholm
and Deputy Secretary Turk to ensure cohesion, collaboration, and
alignment across the Department.
Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
forth in the by the NNSA Act, reflected in NNSA's organizational
structure? What makes NNSA different from the domains of the other
Under Secretaries of the Department of Energy (DOE)--in both law and
practice?
Answer. The NNSA Act designates NNSA as a semi-autonomous
organization under DOE to execute its national security programs. This
is a unique authority and differs from the other DOE Under Secretaries.
It gives the Administrator authority over key operational functions,
such as personnel, procurement, and policy development. NNSA's semi-
autonomous nature also empowers the NNSA career staff who specialize in
nuclear security in their work with the Department of Defense. If
confirmed, I will work closely with DOE leadership to continue to build
a strong, collaborative, and mission-focused culture where DOE and NNSA
can better leverage each other's expertise.
Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
operational effectiveness, would you recommend any changes to the
structure of NNSA?
Answer. Independent studies have noted the improvement in NNSA
governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise in recent
years. However, there is still room for improvement. The foundation of
good governance lies in NNSA having healthy relationships with its
stakeholders.
If confirmed, I intend to focus on defining roles and
responsibilities across the NNSA enterprise, improving communication,
and changing the culture to focus on timely and cost-effective delivery
and innovation. I will also focus on sustaining the reforms that have
been started by previous Administrators and recommended by
Congressionally-appointed groups such as the Meis-Augustine Commission.
I will work with the NNSA leadership team to improve NNSA's project
management, program review, and cost estimation expertise.
relationship with the department of defense (dod)
Question. If confirmed, you will be a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC), together with the Under Secretaries of Defense for
Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment, Research and Engineering, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command. Since the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, when it was
designated as the ``Military Liaison Committee,'' the primary purpose
of the NWC is to serve as the civilian-military interface and set the
military requirements for nuclear forces, which form the basis of the
core mission of NNSA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is, in a sense,
NNSA's primary customer.
How would you assess the relationship between NNSA and the DOD, at
both senior management levels, as well as at working levels?
Answer. My assessment is NNSA and the DOD have integrated their
work well, and the relationship has improved in recent years. NNSA and
DOD must continue to successfully integrate each of the unique
departmental capabilities and responsibilities to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent without delays or surprises.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue the work of my
predecessors and maintain regular engagements with my DOD counterparts
to ensure NNSA is fully aware of and ready to deliver DOD requirements.
Additionally, I will take an active role in the NWC.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA is adequately responsive to the
requirements set by the DOD?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure continual
communication and integration with the DOD and, if necessary, improve
NNSA's ability to respond to DOD requirements.
Question. Do you believe it important for the NWC to ensure the
NNSA is adequately funded through the interagency budget process to
meet DOD's requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Energy, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Nuclear
Weapons Council to make sure NNSA understands DOD requirements and
requests the necessary funding to meet those requirements. The NWC is
the appropriate forum for DOD and NNSA to understand respective funding
requirements of the nuclear deterrent and make financial tradeoffs in
cases where there may be budget limitations.
defense programs
Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the
annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.
Do you believe that the United States currently possesses the
capabilities to ensure the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable--
without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. Yes. Each year, the Directors of the National Security
Laboratories and the Commander of United States Strategic Command
assess the state of the nuclear stockpile. They have determined the
United States does not need to conduct nuclear explosive tests at this
time to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. However, NNSA
also maintains test readiness tools to ensure the U.S. remains prepared
to resume nuclear testing, only if required to ensure the safety and
effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal, or to respond to evolving technical
and geopolitical circumstances, and only then under explicit direction
from the President.
The NWC has laid out a schedule for the next 20 years that includes
the completion of four life extension programs (LEPs), as well as
multiple refurbishment programs, the development of the W93 warhead,
and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.
Question. Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule
and, in particular, concurrency between the plants and the
laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the plants and
laboratories on these critical programs to ensure concurrency and the
ability to deliver on time and budget.
Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
If confirmed, how would you support the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program and make full use of the authorities it provides NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support, and request funding
for, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and leverage all possible
avenues across NNSA to ensure we are postured to confront future
challenges with an experienced and practiced workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what are your long-term plans for the
National Ignition Facility and, in particular, how would you execute
the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition, which to date has
not occurred?
Answer. I believe the National Ignition Facility (NIF) is essential
to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program and NIF's contributions extend
beyond ignition. If confirmed, I will work with the laboratory
community to develop a long-term plan for this critical element of
stewardship.
Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
NNSA missions?
Answer. I believe the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
program is essential to provide the high-performance simulation and
computing capabilities that inform critical NNSA stockpile stewardship
decisions. The ASC simulation tools enable broad and deep knowledge of
the individual processes involved in a nuclear weapon explosion, as
well as a comprehensive understanding of the complex interactions among
these processes. ASC will provide and sustain the required confidence
in the nation's nuclear deterrent by developing and deploying credible,
science-based simulation tools to certify the current and future
stockpile.
nnsa budget
Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget before
its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to ensure
it can meet DOD requirements.
If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this provision?
How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to review the
budget before its submission to OMB?
Answer. If confirmed, I will learn what process was used for the
fiscal year 2022 budget, inform Congress of the process used, and
ensure that process is continued for future budgets.
Question. In your opinion, would cross-training between DOD, NNSA,
and DOE programming and financial management personnel improve
interdepartmental coordination on budgetary matters? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. Yes. Many human resource and training experts have
identified cross-training as an effective tool to improve workforce
performance. In addition, the DOD, NNSA, and DOE personnel would gain
insights into each other's best practices and bolster the areas that
need improvement.
personnel
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
civilian employees to perform its mission? If so, please explain your
rationale.
Answer. If confirmed, I will look closely at staffing across NNSA
to ensure adequate staffing, the appropriate skills mix, and structure
so that NNSA continues to meet its mission in an effective manner.
Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
personnel accomplish that NNSA is not able to accomplish today? If
confirmed, which specific components of the NNSA would you recommend
growing? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand NNSA's staffing requirements are consistently
assessed to determine the appropriate size and mix of NNSA's workforce.
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing these assessments and working
to ensure NNSA has the workforce it needs.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.
Answer. The complex would be unable accomplish its essential
missions without the expertise and efforts of the nuclear security
enterprise workforce. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to
maintain the core competencies of the current workforce, and recruit
and retain the highly-skilled professionals and skilled trades
personnel needed to execute its missions.
Question. If not, please explain what capabilities each such
workforce requires to ensure that NNSA is fully mission capable?
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the
necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor
workforces?
Answer. If confirmed, recruiting and retaining world class talent
within NNSA's federal and contractor workforce will be a priority of
mine. I believe it is essential for NNSA to provide meaningful and
challenging professional opportunities that attract and retain
dedicated professionals. Central to this effort is fostering an
enterprise-wide sense of purpose in NNSA's nuclear security mission.
Particular attention must be placed on ensuring that, as the current
NNSA workforce ages, the administration maintains partnerships with the
academic and university communities through pipelines that encourage
and attract the world's best engineers, scientists, and support staff.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both NNSA the civilian and
the contractor workforces?
Answer. In the next five years, a significant portion of the NNSA
and nuclear security enterprise workforce will be eligible to retire.
If confirmed, I will prioritize maintaining those skills and expertise
and provide NNSA support to help the nuclear security enterprise
recruit and retain the highly skilled workforce needed to execute its
national security missions.
Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
additional authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and
maintain the civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its
mission? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will learn more about NNSA's existing
hiring authorities and determine if additional authorities are
required.
construction and project management
Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility, and others.
In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
failures in project management?
Answer. In the past, GAO has identified a number of areas where
NNSA could improve project management, including ill-defined project
requirements; lack of proper cost estimating; and starting projects
before proper sufficient design and technology development is
completed. Over the past decade, NNSA has made significant improvements
which have led to a notable turnaround in NNSA's ability to deliver
projects and GAO has taken NNSA off its high risk list for projects
costing less than $750 million. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen
NNSA practices and to adopt best business practices on its larger
projects to complete such projects on-time and on-budget.
Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
these problems? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Over the past decade, NNSA has made significant
improvements to address project management challenges. If confirmed, I
will champion continued improvement.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that these project management failures are not repeated in the
future? What specific changed in policy, practice, organization, or
regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support strengthening and improving
NNSA's contract and project management. To do so, some of my
recommendations include clarifying lines of authority, holding those
responsible for projects accountable, adding rigor to existing project
management practices, strengthening cost estimating, and ensuring
projects remain within original scope and cost baselines. If confirmed,
I will prioritize understanding NNSA's project management and practices
to further ensure that future projects do not encounter past
challenges.
Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of
these project management failures? Please explain your answer.
Answer. NNSA follows DOE Order 413.3B which governs program and
project management for the acquisition of capital assets. I certainly
agree with the precept that rigorous project management principles
should be applied and that the Federal staff must be given the tools
they need and then be held accountable and responsible for delivering
the work. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed on its detailed
application to NNSA activities and whether any changes are warranted.
Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of the large
project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the
Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE) in the
Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).
In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets
allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide
independent cost estimates and other costing and project management
advice internal to NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review if CEPE is sufficiently
staffed.
Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
data and information to serve its statutory purpose?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review whether CEPE has sufficient
authority and access.
Question. CEPE reports directly to the Undersecretary for Nuclear
Security. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that CEPE
has adequate access to you and other senior leaders in your
organization, as necessary and appropriate?
Answer. I understand the Director of CEPE is a member of the NNSA
senior leadership team and therefore has access to the Administrator
and other NNSA senior leaders. If confirmed, I intend to review ways to
ensure the Director of CEPE has adequate access to me and other senior
leaders.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How would you
balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of
taxpayer dollars?
Answer. I understand the importance of CEPE's cost and resource
analysis capabilities to NNSA and value its independence from the
program offices as being critical to providing independent, data driven
analysis to me. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its
independence and review its staffing and funding.
plutonium strategy
Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former
Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce up to 50
pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not less than 80 pits
per year.
What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its capabilities to
achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of
the ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the Nation's
Center of Excellence for plutonium research, development and
production. LANL has previously demonstrated the ability to manufacture
plutonium pits to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The diligent
execution of current plans to expand existing production capacity will
enable NNSA and LANL to meet the Nation's need to produce no fewer than
30 pits per year in 2026. In April 2021, the Los Alamos Pit Production
Project (LAP4) achieved Critical Decision One, approval of the
conceptual design and cost range, a key step to meet requirements and
execute this important mission. I pledge to work closely with NNSA and
LANL leadership to enable achievement of this critical milestone.
Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the
former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its
pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the
ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. To repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to
support the Nation's plutonium pit production mission, the robust
building structure must be outfitted with specialized processing and
manufacturing equipment. Supporting infrastructure must also be
designed and constructed and safety and security systems must be
installed. This effort requires a training program to provide a
workforce capable for all production and infrastructure for pit
manufacturing. The program must also establish waste processing
capabilities to process hazardous and non-hazardous waste. NNSA is
executing a project that will implement all necessary changes to
achieve production of no fewer than 50 pits per year at the Savannah
River Site.
uranium strategy and tritium production
Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for
tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1
Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be
used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium
nor the technology used to enrich it carries an ``obligation'' from a
foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-
weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending
recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for
unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-
blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for
obtaining unobligated uranium.
Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic
uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?
Answer. Yes, I do. Re-establishing a domestic uranium enrichment
capability would support several NNSA goals, namely maintaining the
nuclear weapons stockpile, supporting nonproliferation efforts
worldwide, and fueling the nuclear navy.
Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a
capability?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing Analysis of
Alternatives and engage with the Administration and Congress on a path
forward that provides the most cost-effective solution to the American
taxpayers.
Question. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2014
entitled ``Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S. Position on
Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium Production'' concluded
that the DOE's policy on identification of obligated uranium was based
on three international agreements and a series of policy decisions. Of
the three agreements, GAO concluded that only one explicitly addressed
tritium production, but that State Department had consistently
interpreted the other two agreements as imposing peaceful use
restrictions on LEU for tritium production.
Do you believe this GAO reading of all three agreements remains
consistent with U.S. policy goals?
Answer. Ensuring a continued supply of tritium is critical to the
success of NNSA's mission. I am committed to the highest
nonproliferation standards and, if confirmed, would ensure NNSA's
production of tritium is consistent with U.S. international agreements
and governmental policy. If confirmed, I will assess the GAO and State
Department interpretations and seek to reach alignment.
Question. Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for fiscal year 2020 directed the Department of Energy to
``determine whether the Agreement [between the United States of America
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] for
Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes,
signed at Washington, July 3, 1958 . . . permits the United States to
obtain low-enriched uranium for the purposes of producing tritium in
the United States.'' The Secretary of Energy affirmed that such
procurement of low enriched uranium can occur.
What are your views on the accuracy of the Secretary of Energy's
determination in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with this Administration to
evaluate the legality of any proposal.
fissile materials disposition
Question. The United States and Russia committed to the disposition
of 34 metric tons (MT) of weapons grade plutonium under the Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) in 2000. The original plan
by the United States was to convert excess weapons grade plutonium to
mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuel for civilian reactors at the Savannah
River Site (SRS). After spending billions of dollars, this project was
subsequently abandoned in favor of diluting the plutonium and disposing
of it at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose
process involves shipping the plutonium pits from Pantex to Los Alamos
to be turned into oxide powder, then shipping then on to SRS for
packaging, followed by final shipment to WIPP for disposal.
What are your views on the dilute and disposal method?
Answer. The dilute and disposal method uses existing, proven
technologies, and will allow the United States to meet its disposition
commitments in less time and at half the cost of the MOX approach.
Question. What are your views on permanent disposal at WIPP?
Answer. Permanent disposal of diluted plutonium at WIPP is a safe,
secure, and environmentally responsible approach. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department works with the State of New Mexico to provide
information to the public on the safety of this disposition method.
Question. What are your views of the logistics of shipping
plutonium between Pantex, Los Alamos, SRS, and WIPP? In your opinion,
could this process be simplified by shipping the pits directly to SRS
to be converted to oxide powder there?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is preparing to
conduct a thorough review of the viability and environmental impact of
conducting oxidation at various locations, including Los Alamos, where
current capabilities exist in PF-4, and Savannah River Site, as well as
any other alternative determined to be reasonable. I further understand
the logistics of each alternative will be considered in the final
analysis.
nuclear safety and security
Question. NNSA was created partially in response to security lapses
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nonetheless, periodic security
lapses have continued to occur, such as in 2012 at the Y-12 facility.
To what extent have the conditions that allowed such lapses to
occur been corrected, in your view?
Answer. I understand a comprehensive review by security experts
identified causes such as divided security responsibilities, degraded
security equipment, and security culture problems, among other factors.
Following the incident, contract and procedural changes were made to
ensure a clear single point of responsibility to integrate security
functions. A comprehensive review and assessment of security
infrastructure across the enterprise led to the development of a
security infrastructure revitalization program to replace aging
security systems. The security organization implemented the NNSA
Security Roadmap (NSR) to provide a vision, a strategy, and a path
forward to drive continuous improvement of its nuclear security
program. Additionally, security culture campaigns were instituted
across the NNSA enterprise to ensure security, like safety, is
integrated in everything NNSA does. If confirmed, I will assess the
effectiveness of the Roadmap and associated activities.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any further changes in
policy, practice, management, or oversight to reduce the frequency of
security issues at NNSA facilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support NNSA's initiatives to improve
security at its facilities, as well as look for additional ways to
improve security especially in light of new technological capabilities.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported a number of accidents at
the national laboratories in recent years. The accidents included
explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that was identified
as a ``near criticality accident'' that led to the partial shutdown of
the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory for several
years--putting both personnel and mission at risk. Yet, while personnel
safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by definition
involves some of the most hazardous materials. Risk cannot be
eliminated completely at the labs while ensuring mission
accomplishment?
Answer. I agree that risk cannot be eliminated at the labs given
the hazardous nature of the work that must be accomplished to fulfill
our national security mission. However, the risk needs to be
recognized, understood, and appropriately controlled while balancing
that with mission execution and ensuring the safety of the public,
workers, and environment.
Question. How should we balance safety, risk, and mission at the
national laboratories?
Answer. For NNSA to be successful in meeting its national security
mission, it must have sustained strong safety performance. High safety
achievement and mission success are compatible and mutually support
each other; having one but not the other is not sustainable. This is
balanced by properly assessing risk and controlling it. If confirmed, I
will emphasize continuous safety improvements and a risk management
culture across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise to execute NNSA's
missions in a safe and secure manner.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
the safety culture at the labs while still meeting mission
requirements?
Answer. Based on my years at Sandia National Laboratories, I
understand how important a positive safety culture environment is in
accomplishing the NNSA mission. The key to this is establishing and
reinforcing expectations by senior leadership. If confirmed, I will
accomplish this through my regular interactions with the leadership of
the Management & Operating partners. I will also emphasize the critical
nature of effectively engaging with employees to provide two-way
feedback while stressing organizational learning so we can continuously
improve. Setting high expectations, ensuring employee engagement, and
embracing organizational learning, will establish the necessary
foundation to improve safety culture at the NNSA labs. To ensure
continual improvement, I will also emphasize the importance of a strong
safety conscious work environment so employees will feel comfortable
raising safety issues and leaders are prepared to effectively address
those issues. This will enable NNSA to collectively work together to
safely accomplish the mission.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
Question. What do you perceive as the highest priorities of the
nuclear nonproliferation programs at NNSA?
Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance highlights a number of critical national and
international security objectives in which NNSA can play a major
contributing role. In my view, chief among these nuclear
nonproliferation priorities are:
1. eliminating stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials, and
vulnerable radioactive sources globally, and minimizing the need for
future use;
2. strengthening U.S. leadership in civil nuclear commerce, arms
control, and nonproliferation globally; and
3. reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons programs of
concern.
NNSA is uniquely positioned to contribute towards each of these
three items, and if confirmed, I will work to advance the
Administration's nonproliferation agenda.
Question. The United States no longer holds a bilateral agreement
with Russia for joint nuclear nonproliferation activities. However, a
number of ongoing nonproliferation programs are focused on countries in
that region.
In your view, are there are additional opportunities for
cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union,
particularly in the Middle East and North Africa? If confirmed, what
would be your priorities in these areas?
Answer. While some of NNSA's earliest nuclear security and
nonproliferation work was with Russia and other regional partners, NNSA
has now expanded its work to over 100 countries, recognizing nuclear
nonproliferation is a global activity.
Consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the
United States has long held that peaceful nuclear technology can and
should be shared for the benefit of humankind. NNSA plays a significant
role in ensuring that those partner countries who pursue the peaceful
use of nuclear technology are able to do so in a manner that ensures
adherence to the highest nonproliferation standards. For the Middle
East and Northern African regions, strengthening the adherence to and
implementation of the highest standard for IAEA safeguards verification
in both regions would help to promote stability and reduce tensions in
these strategically vital areas.
Second, I believe NNSA can build upon its existing nuclear security
accomplishments by working with our partners to strengthen their
ability to combat nuclear smuggling and secure radioactive and nuclear
materials.
Question. What challenges has the new relationship between the
United States and Russia posed in nuclear nonproliferation programs?
Answer. The deterioration of nuclear nonproliferation dialogue and
cooperation between the United States and Russia has posed significant
challenges, not only for bilateral relations overall, but also for
global nuclear security.
Russia has significant inventories of civilian nuclear material and
the United States has not been able to work with or discuss HEU
minimization or consolidation efforts. Additionally, due to the
vastness and complexity of the Russian nuclear complex, the security of
the Russian nuclear material will remain a long-term interest of the
United States. The United States and Russia continue to have a shared
interest and responsibility to ensure abidance to the highest possible
security standards.
There are a number of critical issues that would benefit from
broader United States-Russian dialogue and engagement. I am convinced
that global nuclear security, nonproliferation, and arms control must
be part of the agenda for discussion. If I am confirmed, I look forward
to supporting the Administration's policy toward Russia, while
maintaining NNSA's readiness to build on the joint nuclear
nonproliferation accomplishments already achieved--when and if
appropriate.
Question. What do you believe are the greatest challenges in
nuclear nonproliferation programs with countries other than Russia?
Answer. At the top of the list is the fact that China and North
Korea are improving their nuclear weapons capabilities, including
associated delivery systems. Meanwhile, Iran possesses the largest
missile arsenal in its region. China is aggressively acquiring United
States and allies' technology for economic and military advantage.
Beyond these geopolitical challenges, there are technological
challenges as well. NNSA's technical capabilities and expertise will be
needed to balance the enormous potential benefits to society of
emerging technologies, such as advanced nuclear reactor designs,
additive manufacturing and5G technologies, in ways that do not lower
the barriers to proliferation. These are the cooperative and technical
challenges that NNSA is poised to answer, and if confirmed, I look
forward to being a part of these contributions.
Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs,
if confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or
cooperation would you need to meet such needs?
Answer. In my view, there is still much work to be done globally to
minimize and secure vulnerable and excess radioactive and nuclear
materials so that they do not wind up in the hands of proliferators or
terrorists. While the United States and the international community
have made much progress in this regard, unfortunately it is the more
difficult tasks that remain. Achieving these remaining goals and
managing the minimization going forward will require renewed bilateral
engagement and diplomacy, technological innovations, and NNSA
leadership's support in swaying some key partners' willingness to
collaborate.
Second, I believe there is an ongoing need to confront the
noncompliance threats posed by Iran and North Korea and be prepared for
potential future arms control treaties with Russia or China. For Iran
and North Korea, NNSA in partnership with the IAEA and international
community needs to develop the technological tools and capabilities to
prevent or address noncompliance challenges. In the event of new arms
control discussions with Russia or China, new technologies for
monitoring and verification will be needed for the negotiations and to
support any agreement. All of these efforts require continued research
and development, invigorated human capital management and training
efforts, and sustaining the necessary technical expertise and
infrastructure.
Finally, the third area that I will highlight is the need to keep
pace with--and regulate--emerging technologies to mitigate their
potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of their
promising opportunities. This will likely require not just
technological research and development but also the establishment of
smart multilateral and bilateral policies and partnerships to reduce
these threats.
If confirmed, I look forward to assessing these key NNSA
nonproliferation programs to identify where and what additional efforts
may be required to meet these priorities, and to working with Congress
to discuss resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation needed
nonproliferation research and development (r&d)
Question. NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of R&D efforts.
If confirmed, what would be your nonproliferation R&D priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe NNSA should advance U.S. detection
and characterization capabilities for early observation and persistent
monitoring of foreign nuclear weapons production activities.
Prioritizing the development of new tools and approaches, for example
with R&D on artificial intelligence and leveraging open source and
cross-government data, will enable earlier detection of proliferation
activities and allow for a broader and more effective suite of U.S.
Government options in response.
Priority should also be given to advancing capabilities for global
nuclear explosion monitoring and with targeted R&D on detecting low-
yield and evasive nuclear testing. Both activities maintain our current
capabilities and will develop the next generation of monitoring tools
and expertise to meet emerging test monitoring challenges.
Question. Do you believe that there are R&D areas that need more
attention or funding? Please explain your answer.
Answer. As was highlighted in President Biden's Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance, rapid changes in technology will shape
every aspect of our lives and our national interests, but the direction
and consequences of the technological revolution remain unsettled. As
the pace of global innovation increases, emerging technologies such as
advanced manufacturing or quantum computing will enable quicker and
alternative pathways to weapons development. We must invest in R&D
activities that will both exploit opportunities and assess
vulnerabilities. We also must strengthen a whole-of-government approach
to invest in high-priority innovative ideas and to be more effective at
transitioning technologies to mission partners responsible for
monitoring.
regulation and oversight
Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
external, and that these contribute to the challenges in staying under
cost and on schedule for major projects.
Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do
you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs
and efficient mission execution overall?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation
across the nuclear security enterprise to include protection of the
workforce, the public, and the environment in a way that is synergistic
and supportive of mission execution. One opportunity is ensuring that
safety is properly incorporated into the design and construction of the
new NNSA nuclear facilities. This means early incorporation of safety
expectations which have been established in relevant directives and
regulations, the selection of qualified design and construction firms
to lead projects and operations, with corresponding periodic reviews as
they progress through important milestones, and the proper staffing of
a technically qualified and diverse federal project team. These actions
ensure appropriate safety systems and controls are identified early in
the process and are validated throughout construction with capable
staff to reduce rework and control costs.
If confirmed, my team and I will work closely with the labs,
plants, and sites to define continuous improvement of our regulatory
functions to ensure that they reflect best business and risk management
practices, and enable mission success.
Question. In your view, are the labs are subject to the appropriate
level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or
Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
Answer. Several reports (Mies-Augustine, CRENEL, GAO, NAPA/NAS)
highlighted the need for NNSA to improve and make its oversight more
effective. Based on insights from these external reviews and lessons
learned, I understand NNSA has improved its Site Governance model to
ensure mission objectives are met; protection of the workforce, public,
and the environment; and operations are effectively accomplished in
compliance with contract requirements. I believe it is important to
sustain progress made and to continue to look for additional
improvements, and if confirmed, I would be dedicated to this pursuit.
Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
structures would you recommend, and why?
Answer. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with existing
regulatory and oversight structures to assess the current environment
and what additional changes would offer more improvement.
organizational climate survey
Question. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command
climate survey to the NNSA workforce under your leadership and
management--including the workforces of the labs and other
geographically-separate components of NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to understand the organizational
climate across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise, conduct a survey of
the NNSA leadership and management, and evaluate options for conducting
surveys across the components of NNSA.
sexual harassment
Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the DOE and NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to consult with the NNSA equal
opportunity office (EEO), NNSA Diversity Manager, DOE-Inspector
General, and other stakeholders to obtain information on the current
climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination issues at
DOE and NNSA, and take appropriate action in consultation with the
leadership of DOE and NNSA.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee or contractor of the DOE or NNSA?
Answer. If I become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
gender discrimination from an NNSA employee, I will consult with the
experts at NNSA to ensure NNSA personnel follow all policies and
procedures to ensure such complaints are taken seriously and
investigated. I will ensure any corrective actions identified in the
investigation are quickly carried out. I will re-emphasize to the
responsible managers and supervisors that the employee who raised the
complaint must be treated in accordance with all federal laws and DOE
regulations.
I will also expect M&O partners to ensure their employees work in
an environment free of discrimination, including on the basis of
gender. If I become aware of a claim of sexual harassment or gender
discrimination from a contractor employee, I will work with the NNSA
experts and NNSA team responsible for oversight of that contract to
facilitate contractor compliance with the non-discrimination provisions
of its contract.
I would also look to implement the recommendations in the GAO
review of sexual harassment in the NNSA nuclear security forces. Those
recommendations include better understanding and improving the culture
to get information more complete than waiting for discrimination
complaints.
notification of congress
Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly
notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
nominations
1. Senator Hirono. Ms. Hruby, as part of my responsibility as a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Ms. Hruby. No.
2. Senator Hirono. Ms. Hruby, have any of you ever faced discipline
or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Ms. Hruby. No.
modernizing the nuclear arsenal
3. Senator Hirono. Ms. Hruby, the Biden administration has begun a
series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our
nuclear posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most
pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?
Ms. Hruby. For NNSA, there are two key components to nuclear
modernization: the need to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile
itself, and the need to recapitalize its supporting infrastructure.
Over the past 30 years, weapons modernization programs were postponed,
and infrastructure has been allowed to decay, threatening our critical
capabilities and capacity to ensure the deterrent's viability into the
future. It is imperative that we continue to support efforts to address
both our aging stockpile and our deteriorating infrastructure if we are
to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
domestic tritium supply chain
4. Senator Cramer. Ms. Hruby, regarding the nuclear deterrent, and
the tritium supply chain needed to maintain it, do you agree that using
uranium that is mined, converted, and enriched in the United States,
using fully domestic technology, is the right policy for our Nation -
so that we are never dependent on the good graces of another country
when it comes to maintaining our nuclear arsenal?
Mr. Hruby. Yes. The United States has a longstanding policy that
requires the reactor fuel used to produce tritium to be
``unobligated,'' that is, free from any peaceful use restrictions that
can arise from foreign sources.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
kansas city national nuclear security administration facility
5. Senator Hawley. Ms. Hruby, will you agree to keep me informed as
the courses of actions and decision criteria are developed for the
expansion of the Kansas City National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) facility?
Mr. Hruby. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
modernization
6. Senator Tuberville. Ms. Hruby, nearly 40 percent of NNSA's
facilities date back to World War II. What do you need to modernize
NNSA infrastructure and facilities?
Mr. Hruby. Revitalizing NNSA infrastructure requires maintaining a
unique, geographically dispersed enterprise in which more than half of
the facilities are in insufficient condition and many are at their life
expectancy. Predictable and reliable funding for maintenance,
operations, recapitalization, and other infrastructure activities is
necessary for reversing long-term deferred maintenance trends.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Jill M. Hruby follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Jill M. Hruby, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Jill M.
Hruby in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Ms. Jill M. Hruby was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 22, 2021.]
______
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Frank A. Rose by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
qualification and duties
Question. Section 2403 of title 50, U.S. Code, provides that the
Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) shall be appointed ``from among persons who have
extensive background in organizational management and are well
qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that
advances and protects the national security of the United States.''
What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have over 20 years of experience in positions at the U.S.
Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, and
private sector working on nuclear strategy, deterrence, arms control,
strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging
security challenges. I currently am a senior fellow and the co-director
of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign
Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining
Brookings, I served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms
Control, Verification, and Compliance from 2014-17. From 2009-14, I
served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and
Defense Policy. Additionally, I previously served as a professional
staff member on both the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Administrator? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe my previous experience working in Congress and
the U.S. Departments of State and Defense have prepared me to perform
the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator. However, I strongly
believe in the value of continuous learning.
If confirmed, I would surround myself with a highly trained team
from across NNSA and its nuclear security enterprise. I would also
regularly engage with all elements of NNSA's enterprise to further
understand NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges in order
to ensure NNSA can execute its vitally important missions.
Section 2403 further provides that the Principal Deputy
Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
activities among the elements of the Administration.''
Question. What is your understanding of the role you would play in
the day-to-day administration of the NNSA, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be the alter ego of the Administrator,
ensuring the Administrator's direction for the NNSA is carried out. As
a practical matter, I would expect to be focused on the internal
workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with other
Departmental organizations. This allows the Administrator to address
the strategic challenges and outward facing interactions necessary to
accomplish the NNSA mission.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to the
coordination of activities among the Deputy Administrators, NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would
assist the Administrator in overseeing the NNSA programs that are led
by the Deputy Administrators. I see my role as the Principal Deputy
Administrator to work closely with each of the Deputy Administrators to
ensure they can effectively execute the missions under their
cognizance. In particular, the role of Principal Deputy Administrator
coordinates development and implementation of policy and guidance,
strategic planning, program managements, budgeting, resource
allocation, safeguards and security, emergency management, contracts,
and hiring to be enablers for the primary mission programs of the NNSA.
Question. How, if at all, might your coordinating role be different
with regard to the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors?
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors oversees the
Naval Nuclear Enterprise and naval nuclear laboratories. If confirmed,
I will have responsibilities in oversight of the nuclear security
enterprise, comprised of the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites. My
role as the Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA is to manage the
NNSA support functions to enable the Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors in executing his unique responsibilities in delivering nuclear
propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's operational requirements
Question. Are there any special projects or tasks on which you
would focus, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator and
whatever duties or initiatives she may seek to implement to improve the
NNSA's nuclear security mission. I am ready and willing to take on any
projects or tasks that will benefit our nation's nuclear security
enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you
expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of
the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR)?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Administrator to determine what additional duties and functions I will
be assigned. I stand ready to support the Administrator in furthering
the Administration's efforts to modernize and recapitalize our nation's
nuclear security enterprise.
challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are currently the broad organizational
challenges and priorities for the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's priorities
to ensure NNSA meets our nation's national security requirements, and
NNSA continues to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of
Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. The United States has not adequately
invested the funds to sustain a modern, flexible, and responsive
infrastructure. Most of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old and
nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the Administrator to execute the priorities that
have been identified.
Question. In your view, what are the currently the major challenges
for the next Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. NNSA must modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile,
associated infrastructure, and reestablish production capabilities. In
addition, NNSA must also continue to prevent, counter, monitor, and
respond to proliferation threats around the world. To be successful in
all of NNSA's mission areas, we must recruit and retain a workforce
that is second-to-none. I will work with the Administrator to support
the NNSA Management and Operating (M&O) partners to attract and retain
a top-notch workforce in the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites while
reestablishing the corporate knowledge necessary to modernize our
stockpile.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges, and
on what timeline?
Answer. If confirmed, it will be important for me to work with the
Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy,
each of the NNSA Deputy Administrators, and the leaders in other
federal agencies to identify solutions to these challenges and then
assist to develop appropriate plans and timelines to implement them.
Question. In your view, what should be the main priorities for the
next Principal Deputy Administrator specifically?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on the challenges and priorities
outlined by the Administrator and assigned to me by the Administrator.
It will require critical thinking and planning to address the
challenges and tackle the priorities. I will need to develop close
working relationships with people at NNSA, the laboratories, the
plants, the sites, the Department of Energy, other federal agencies,
Congress, and allies.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate
progress in regard to these priorities?
Answer. I will engage with and empower NNSA leaders to coordinate
with DOD, State Department, the National Security Council, and other
executive branch agencies on defining NNSA requirements, and work
closely with Congress to explain how NNSA will meet the requirements.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the legal and ``in
practice'' relationship between the Principal Deputy Administrator and
each of the following officials. Indicate also if there are any special
considerations that, if confirmed, you would apply to your relationship
with each such official(s):
The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the
absence of the Administrator, I would represent NNSA.
Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.
Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.
Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the NNSA's Deputy
Administrators to ensure each can execute their respective missions.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management.
Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary
of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management
issues that intersect with the needs of NNSA.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
primary interface with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Defense. If confirmed, I will support the
priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Assistant Secretary,
as appropriate.
Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Answer. If confirmed, I will represent and support the priorities
of the Administrator and NNSA to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I will represent the priorities of the
Administrator and NNSA with the Commander of the United States
Strategic Command.
Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
Administrator and NNSA to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and
Navy.
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and
Project Management.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA in
providing support and management oversight for the Associate
Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
Administrator and NNSA to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Question. Nuclear Posture Review.
Answer. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the
Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our
stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary
of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking
regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the
nuclear mission.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of
the Biden Administration's NPR?
Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA, I
will support both the Administrator and the Secretary of Energy as they
navigate the NPR process and represent Department equities. NNSA's
responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of
the nation's nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation,
promoting international nuclear safety and security, and developing
technologies to monitor arms control agreements mean we must be at the
table for discussions of nuclear policy.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you
recommend the Biden Administration consider?
Answer. I am not currently involved in ongoing nuclear policy
discussions within the Administration, but, if confirmed, I would urge
the Biden administration to consider the importance of revitalizing and
investing in the infrastructure and capabilities needed to support our
nation's nuclear deterrent.
Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements in the
U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the
full and timely support of NNSA to the work required to implement those
enhancements?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of
additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to
supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the
new requirements?
Answer. Yes.
overall management
Question. Section 4132(c)(3) of title 41, U.S. Code, establishes
that the Administrator, NNSA `` . . . shall be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such
authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy
Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation.''
What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
Energy and the NNSA in statute and recent practice?
Answer. NNSA can only be successful if there is a positive and
strong working relationship between the Secretary of Energy, Deputy
Secretary of Energy, NNSA Administrator, and NNSA Principal Deputy
Administrator. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure DOE and NNSA
have good working relations.
Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
forth in law, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure? What makes
NNSA different from other components of Department of Energy (DOE)--in
both law and practice?
Answer. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA is designated as a semi-autonomous
organization; the organizations led by other DOE undersecretaries are
not structured in this way. This is a unique authority and
responsibility that gives the NNSA Administrator authority over
functions that also reside in DOE. If confirmed, I will prioritize
building strong, mission-focused, and effective culture and processes
across those functions, in close collaboration with the leadership of
DOE.
Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
operational effectiveness, if confirmed, would you recommend any
changes to the organizational structure of in NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on continuing NNSA's recent
progress in its approach to governance and management by strengthening
communication and integration across the nuclear security enterprise to
make sure we have effective partnerships between federal employees, the
laboratories, plants, and sites, and our interagency mission partners.
I will work with the Administrator and NNSA leadership to clearly
define lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and to
consolidate NNSA's progress in strategic oversight and project
management.
relationship with the department of defense (dod)
Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) sets requirements for
nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of the NNSA.
DOD has been described as NNSA's primary customer, as well as its
partner.
If confirmed, what would be your role in supporting the
Administrator of the NNSA in executing their duties and functions as a
member of the NWC?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in executing
her duties as a member of the NWC by ensuring that there is a
communication flow at the staff, management, and leadership levels to
facilitate discussion and understanding on key issues including
requirements, budget, and stockpile activities.
Question. How would you describe the relationship between NNSA and
the DOD?
Answer. From what I have observed, NNSA's relationship with DOD is
healthy with dialogue and collaboration at both the working and senior
levels.
Question. What is your assessment of the health of that
relationship at both senior- and working-levels?
Answer. From what I have observed, the relationship today is
healthy and, if confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator in
continuing to strengthen this relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what might you recommend to improve this
relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to keeping an open mind on
opportunities to further enhance this relationship. I will work
collaboratively with the Administrator on these efforts.
nnsa budget
Question. In 2015, then-Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz wrote to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding
NNSA's budget allocation for the ensuing five years that ``an
additional $5.2 billion over fiscal year 2018-2021 [was] needed to
establish a viable and sustainable program portfolio'' and that
``[f]ailure to address these requirements in the near term will put the
NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in fiscal year 2018.''
Then-Secretary Moniz added that, if uncorrected, the budget proposal
would ``lack credibility.'' The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
included an additional $3 billion above the President's budget request.
Do you believe that the $3 billion increase was adequate and
sufficient to render the budget request ``credible'', particularly in
light of NNSA's stockpile stewardship responsibilities and the
recommendations of the 2018 NPR? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the $3 billion increase provided in fiscal year
2021 is adequate for this fiscal year as it is the most robust funding
in the history of NNSA. This is an area I will assess further if
confirmed.
Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget
before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
ensure it can meet DOD requirements.
Answer. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this
provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to
review the budget before its submission to OMB?
I do not know the specifics of how NNSA, the NWC, and OMB
mechanically share budget information and comply with the provision. If
confirmed, I am committed to making sure there is open, clear, and
consistent communication regarding NNSA's budget with the NWC.
personnel
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
civilian employees to perform its mission? Please explain your answer.
If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to work with the
Administrator to review staffing needs and challenges across NNSA to
ensure the appropriate skills mix and number of personnel are in place
to accomplish its national security missions.
Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
personnel accomplish that NNSA is unable to accomplish today? If
confirmed, which specific components within the NNSA would you
recommend growing and how much growth would you recommend? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure
that NNSA is equipped to accomplish its missions. I understand that
NNSA's mission has been steadily increasing, and I will work to ensure
staffing levels are commensurate with the expanding workload.
Question. In your view, does NNSA rely too heavily on contractors
and a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator and the
M&O mission partners to ensure we maintain the correct mix of federal
and contracting employees.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.
Answer. Ensuring NNSA has the appropriate capabilities to execute
the mission is critical for the nuclear security enterprise. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator to ensure that
NNSA continues to recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals
needed to execute its missions.
Question. If not, please explain what skill sets, areas of
expertise, or other capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure
that NNSA is fully mission capable?
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the
necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor
workforces?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator to ensure
NNSA is executing a hiring strategy, in partnership with NNSA's M&O
partners, to bring the best and brightest into the nuclear security
enterprise. This should include outreach to colleges and universities
and participation in career fairs near NNSA labs, plants, and sites.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design
capabilities, in the NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the
labs and the plants?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
M&O mission partners to ensure we explore the most effective paths to
recruit and retain the world's best engineers, scientists, and support
personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are
maintained in NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs
and the plants?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources and
training specialists to understand what is already in place and where
there are opportunities for improvement. Where appropriate, I will make
the necessary changes to ensure there is an adequate and appropriate
technical workforce in place. I will also expand communications with
the NNSA labs, plants, and site to understand how NNSA can best support
their recruitment and training requirements.
Question. In your view, does NNSA leadership need any additional
authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the
federal civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources
specialists to assess whether any additional authorities are required.
construction and project management
Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility, and others.
In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
failures in project management?
Answer. I understand that NNSA has made a concerted effort to
address project management challenges over the last decade. Based on my
understanding, these challenges included issues related to ill-defined
project requirements and schedules, improper estimating, contractual
problems, and lack of proper planning.
If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA continues to remain on a path
toward improved project management.
Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
these problems? Please explain your answer.
Answer. NNSA's decision to create the Office of Acquisition and
Project Management in 2011 has led to significant improvements. More
can always be done. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
implementation of best business practices, as well as using lessons
learned to improve early project planning and requirements development
to prevent cost growth. If confirmed, I would also ensure there are
sufficient qualified acquisition and project management specialists
overseeing NNSA's growing portfolio.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that these systemic project management failures are not repeated
in the future? What specific changes in policy, practice, organization,
or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring improved contract
and project management across NNSA. I would recommend rigorous project
management practices and cost estimating, clarified lines of authority,
holding federal and contractor personnel accountable, and providing
independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight.
Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of
these project management failures? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review Departmental regulations that
govern capital acquisition projects and how they apply to NNSA
activities. Until then, I will ensure that NNSA staff have the
resources needed to further projects while staying within Departmental
regulations.
Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of systemic
project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the
Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), in the
Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). CEPE now reports directly to
the Administrator, NNSA
In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets
allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide
independent cost estimates and other additional costing and project
management advice internal to NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to
determine if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.
Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
data and information to execute its statutory mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review CEPE's authority and access to
understand if further improvements are needed.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How will you
balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of
taxpayer dollars?
Answer. CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities are valuable
to NNSA. CEPE's independence is critical to providing both the
Principal Deputy Administrator and the Administrator with independent,
data driven analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its
independence and review the resources available to it.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to facilitating CEPE
personnel access to the Administrator and to you?
Answer. Yes.
safeguards and security
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Principal
Deputy Administrator in ensuring safety and security in the nuclear
weapons complex?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to be
engaged on initiatives to improve safety at NNSA's facilities including
a healthy safety culture. This includes implementing a Governance and
Management structure which emphasizes transparency, trust, and
collaboration to address challenges. I will work with our Management
and Operating partners to establish expectations for sustained safety
performance with successful mission accomplishment. I will reinforce
that sustained safety performance and mission accomplishments can
mutually support each other to achieve mission success.
I will also work with the Administrator and the security program
office to ensure that we have systems and processes in place to prevent
security lapses. I also anticipate being engaged on all initiatives to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security at NNSA's
facilities. Additionally, I will work with NNSA's Management and
Operating partners to make sure our governance and management works to
achieve those objectives while emphasizing continuous improvement in
both safety and security.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. I firmly believe that the safety and security of the NNSA's
facilities and nuclear material are of the utmost importance and it is
critical that the NNSA has the appropriate authorities and funding from
Congress to mitigate these threats. As part of this, addressing the
continued challenges of ageing infrastructure is critically important
to ensure that NNSA is advancing the mission with state-of-the-art
facilities, with modern safety designs. If confirmed, I will work with
the Administrator to emphasize and address NNSA's commitment to operate
safely while accomplishing the mission and mitigate security threats
such as cyber, material, transportation, and physical threats to NNSA's
operations.
Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have in NNSA's
interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?
Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of a healthy
working relationship with the DNFSB and open lines of communication.
While it is my understanding the Deputy Secretary of Energy manages the
Department's overall interface with the DNFSB, if confirmed, I will
work through the Administrator and Deputy Secretary of Energy on
DNFSB's recommendations and advice regarding public health and safety
issues at NNSA's facilities.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported on a number of accidents
at the national laboratories in recent years. These accidents included
explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that led to the
partial shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory--
placing both personnel and mission execution at risk. Yet, while
personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by
definition involves some of the most hazardous materials known to
exist. Thus, if the labs' nuclear mission is to be accomplished, risk
can never be eliminated completely.
In your view, what is the proper balance between safety, risk, and
mission accomplishment at the national laboratories? How should this
balancing be accomplished, in your view?
Answer. NNSA must have sustained, strong safety performance. Safety
and mission success mutually support each other. This is balanced by
properly assessing risk and controlling and managing that risk.
If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will continue to
focus on fostering our partnership between the labs and plants and
emphasize continuous improvement in safely and successfully executing
the NNSA mission. I will also be committed to empowering employees to
anticipate, identify, report, and resolve safety issues.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
safety culture at the labs, while still meeting mission requirements?
Answer. The key to having a positive safety environment is
establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership which I
will do with the Administrator through my interactions with Management
and Operating partners' leadership. I will emphasize the long-term
commitment to safe operations through the establishment of an effective
governance and management culture. I will also emphasize the critical
nature of effectively empowering and engaging with employees to give
feedback while also stressing organizational learning. The
reinforcement of these attributes provides the foundation to improve
safety culture. I will also stress a strong safety conscious work
environment so employees will feel comfortable in raising safety issues
with leaders prepared to effectively address those issues. I will
encourage and provide support to our leadership so they have all the
necessary tools to effectively address any safety concerns.
plutonium strategy
Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former
Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce
approximately 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not
less than 80 pits per year.
What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its ability to
achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of
the ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. I believe work at Los Alamos is on track to achieve the
goal of producing 30 pits per year in 2026, supporting the overall
requirement for 80 pits per year. Moreover, I know that NNSA has to
succeed in this effort. The United States currently does not produce
any war reserve pits and we must do so to maintain our nuclear
deterrence in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to being focused
on making sure Los Alamos does, in fact, get to 30 pits per year in
2026.
Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the
former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its
pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the
ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. The former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, or
MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that
provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in an existing
facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements
for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include
repurposing and transitioning the MFFF into a safe, secure, compliant,
and efficient pit production facility.
uranium strategy and tritium production
Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for
tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1
Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be
used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium
nor the technology used to enrich it carries an ``obligation'' from a
foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-
weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending
recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for
unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-
blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for
obtaining unobligated uranium.
Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic
uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?
Answer. Yes, the United States needs to re-establish a domestic
uranium enrichment capability to ensure a reliable supply of enriched
uranium to support U.S. national security needs. Since the closure of
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, in 2013,
the United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched uranium
free of peaceful use obligations, i.e., unobligated. Mission needs for
enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States'
remaining HEU stockpile (by downblending the HEU to produce LEU), which
is a finite and currently irreplaceable source.
Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a
capability?
Answer. As I understand it, NNSA is currently implementing a long-
term strategy that meets current needs and seeks to re-establish
domestic uranium enrichment capabilities: Downblending HEU to LEU to
extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044; developing enrichment
technology options; and executing an acquisition process to deploy an
enrichment technology. An effective and cost-efficient solution for re-
establishing enrichment capabilities will be identified through an
ongoing Analysis of Alternatives.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
Question. What do you believe should be the highest priorities of
NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs?
Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is the lead
U.S. agency for reducing nuclear and radiological threats globally,
including the threat of nuclear proliferation among hostile states and
terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials. DNN must
continue to provide a comprehensive defense-in-depth against
proliferant states and non-state actors from obtaining, acquiring, and
developing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. NNSA must work
in close cooperation with interagency and international partners to
carry out its nuclear threat reduction programs and to anticipate and
respond to technological advances that may threaten the nation's
security. Finally, NNSA must sustain the unparalleled scientific and
technical prowess at NNSA's national laboratories, plants, and sites,
which is crucial to understanding this evolving threat environment, and
we must maintain these capabilities, including the facilities and
intellectual capital, to reduce global nuclear threats globally.
Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements
needed in the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs? If so, what
improvements would you envision?
Answer. While I would not term these as ``needed improvements,''
necessarily, there are programmatic challenges facing NNSA's nuclear
nonproliferation efforts, including:
Increasingly rapid technological advancements lowering
the bar to proliferation, including the diffusion of dual-use,
emerging, and disruptive technologies;
Eroding nuclear norms and regime cohesion, including the
inability to reach consensus within key multilateral fora (e.g.,
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty);
Hiring challenges posed by the continued attrition and
retirements; and
The ranging political will, practical capabilities, and
absorption ability of international partners.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in
implementing the improvements you envision?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Administrator, other Departmental elements, interagency, and laboratory
colleagues to identify and enable the strategic, technical, human
resource, and diplomatic tools to help address these challenges.
Question. What improvements do you recommend to NNSA's efforts in
verification and monitoring?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and DNN to
evaluate investing in efforts that advance innovative capabilities in
industry, academia, and the national laboratories to support and
sustain solutions for the difficult challenges ahead. NNSA must
continue its support for investments in research and development of
technology to support detection and verification efforts for
nonproliferation and arms control regimes and renew its commitment to
harnessing the power of science to minimize nuclear threats around the
world.
Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs if
confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation
would NNSA require to meet such needs?
Answer. First, I believe there is an ongoing need to address the
threats posed by North Korea and Iran, working with international
partners. Second, there is an enduring need to secure vulnerable and
excess nuclear and radioactive materials globally. Several countries
retain inventories of separated plutonium and excess highly enriched
uranium (HEU), which the United States is unable to remove, or confirm
the disposition of, due to lack of a political path forward. Finally,
we must keep pace with and regulate emerging technologies to mitigate
their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of
their promising opportunities.
Question. What do you think are the five most significant lessons
learned for NNSA from the mismanagement of the MOX project? How will
these lessons learned be implemented in future NNSA projects such as
those related to the dilution and disposal of plutonium?
Answer. I am aware NNSA experienced major project management
challenges with the MOX project. If confirmed, I look forward to
getting briefed on the project to learn more about the intricacies of
the challenges associated with it. Further, I will ensure the lessons
learned from it will be enforced and strengthened for NNSA's other
capital acquisition projects.
regulation and oversight
Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
external, and that this contributes to the challenges in staying under
cost and on schedule for major projects.
Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do
you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs
and efficient mission execution overall?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation of
all NNSA facilities. This is all-encompassing and includes the
protection of the NNSA workforce, the public, and the environment. I
will ensure that safety is properly incorporated into the design and
construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. This is a cradle-to-grave
approach encompassing safety expectations being communicated early in
the conception of the project in accordance with relevant directives
and regulations, periodic review of projects and operations as they
progress through important milestones, the selection of qualified
design and construction firms to lead them, and the proper staffing of
a technically qualified federal project team. I believe this holistic
approach and effective engagement from conception to execution of
projects will reduce rework and control costs.
I recognize the oversight challenges NNSA faces getting alignment
with their partners regarding safety expectations through the
application of directives which have been developed over time; and I
believe there is room for improvement in the implementation of these
directives. I support NNSA's approach to being a learning organization
and learn from our past and leverage best practices. This includes
NNSA's streamline of its directives and requirements, leverage general
industry standards, and management of risk inherent in the construction
of non- hazardous facilities.
I am committed to ensuring NNSA's projects and operations are
conducted in a safe and effective manner and follow all applicable
environmental, safety, and construction rules. I am also committed to
using standard approaches to help streamline execution of NNSA's
mission work in alignment with the complexity of the projects.
Streamlining the construction of low-risk, non-nuclear, commercial-like
construction projects is an area where NNSA (and the bidding community)
can benefit the most.
Through data-informed, priority investment decisions in support of
NNSA's current and future missions, the risk posed by aging
infrastructure to NNSA's workforce, the environment, and its mission
can be significantly reduced.
Question. In your view, are the labs subject to an appropriate
level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or
Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
Answer. Strong governance and management oversight by NNSA are key
pillars in accomplishing the missions and goals of the entire nuclear
security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that a proper
balance exists between oversight and mission execution. Additionally,
if confirmed, I will work to build relationships across the complex
with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government
Accountability Office, and Congress to ensure that there exists a
proper balance between oversight and mission execution. Clear roles and
responsibilities are essential.
Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
structures would you recommend, and why?
Answer. Making sure that NNSA's missions are executed in an
effective, efficient manner is important. If confirmed, I will assess
what changes are necessary to ensure mission execution with proper
regulations and oversight.
defense programs
Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the
annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.
Do you believe that the capabilities exist today to ensure that the
stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons
testing? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program uses a science-
based assessment of the reliability of nuclear weapons to assess and
certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. For the last
23 years, the three NNSA Laboratory Directors have certified that the
stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and that additional
underground nuclear explosive testing is not required at this time.
Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for
the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension
programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the design
of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.
Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and in
particular concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
Programs to minimize risks to meeting schedule requirements.
Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in supporting
the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and making full use of the
authorities it provides NNSA?
Answer. I believe it is important to make investments in personnel,
programs, and technologies that strengthen our ability to respond to
emerging challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program and its goal to expand opportunities for young
scientists and engineers to ensure we have a talented and capable array
of nuclear security personnel across the enterprise.
Question. In your view, what should be the long-term plan for the
National Ignition Facility, and in particular, how would you assist the
Administrator in the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition,
which to date has not occurred?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, NNSA
subject matter experts, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
Congress to best identify the long-term plan for NIF. I do know that
NIF is essential for understanding the physical properties and
characteristics of nuclear weapons performance.
Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
NNSA missions?
Answer. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program,
delivers leading-edge computer platforms, sophisticated physics and
engineering codes, and uniquely qualified staff to support addressing a
wide variety of stockpile issues for design, physics certification,
engineering qualification, and production. While there is certainly a
role for other activities that utilize the ASC program, its primary use
should continue to support stockpile stewardship.
facilities and infrastructure
Question. More than half of NNSA's infrastructure is more than 40
years old, and a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project. As
former Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty testified in 2020, ``[T]ime is
of the essence to recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire
NNSA. Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch these
facilities. We need to make sure that we have state of the art
infrastructure, so we can recapitalize our enterprise and make sure
that we can provide to the Department of Defense the requirements that
they so sorely need to maintain our nuclear deterrent.'' This testimony
post-dated by almost two years the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA directive to
NNSA to establish the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, with the
objective of reducing the backlog of deferred maintenance and repair
needs by at least 30% by 2025.
If confirmed, what factors would you consider in prioritizing work
with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and
Operations to address the required maintenance of NNSA infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to modernize
and sustain NNSA's infrastructure. NNSA must undertake a risk-informed
infrastructure strategy (or management approach) to repair, maintain,
and replace facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. Reducing
deferred maintenance, disposing of process-contaminated facilities, and
streamlining execution of non-nuclear construction projects will be a
key piece of the priorities I set to meet Congressional direction.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend to reduce
risk in future major construction projects, such as those related to
the lithium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will help NNSA ensure that future major
projects are developed and executed utilizing well established program
and project management principles including: ensuring that the project
requirements are clearly defined and prioritized; proper cost estimates
are completed and reviewed independently; sufficient design work and
technological development is completed prior to commencing a project's
construction; and monitoring progress to ensure projects remain on
schedule and on budget.
organizational climate
Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
in ensuring that the NNSA workplace, including that of NNSA's
geographically-separated labs and other components promotes the dignity
of and respect for all persons?
Answer. Respect is one of my core values, and one, if confirmed, I
will ensure at NNSA. If confirmed, I will serve as a role model by
treating each employee with dignity and respect and would ensure that
all employees foster an inclusive environment where every perspective
is recognized and diversity of thought is valued.
sexual harassment
Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to creating a workplace that
is safe and welcoming to all people. As the Principal Deputy
Administrator, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to learn more
about the current NNSA climate and taking steps to improve the
environment.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the DOE, NNSA, or a component
thereof?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take complaints of sexual harassment
or discrimination seriously. All employees have the right to feel safe
in the workplace and must be treated fairly. I will work to ensure such
complaints are reviewed and responded to quickly, including appropriate
corrective action and discipline if warranted.
notification of congress
Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly
notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
nominations
1. Senator Hirono. Mr. Rose, as part of my responsibility as a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Mr. Rose. No.
2. Senator Hirono. Mr. Rose, have any of you ever faced discipline
or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Rose. No.
modernizing the nuclear arsenal
3. Senator Hirono. Mr. Rose, the Biden administration has begun a
series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our
nuclear posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most
pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?
Mr. Rose. Nuclear modernization cannot take place without a skilled
workforce. Given that more than one-third of the NNSA workforce will be
eligible to retire in the next five years, ensuring that the NNSA is
able to recruit and retain the next generation of highly qualified
engineers and scientists is critical to the national security needs of
the United States.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
minuteman iii missiles
4. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Rose, some think we could just keep on
keeping on with the Minuteman III ICBMs. What would keeping those old
weapons on hand look like financially and what would it look like
strategically?
Mr. Rose. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for
decisions concerning the warhead delivery system programs. I would
refer questions regarding the financial and strategic impacts of
maintaining the Minuteman III system to the DOD.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Frank A. Rose follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Frank A. Rose, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Frank A.
Rose in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Mr. Frank A. Rose was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2021.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum
by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
qualification and duties
Question. Section 2403 of title 50, U.S. Code, provides that the
Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) shall be appointed ``from among persons who have
extensive background in organizational management and are well
qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that
advances and protects the national security of the United States.''
What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have over 20 years of experience in positions at the U.S.
Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, and
private sector working on nuclear strategy, deterrence, arms control,
strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging
security challenges. I currently am a senior fellow and the co-director
of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign
Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining
Brookings, I served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms
Control, Verification, and Compliance from 2014-17. From 2009-14, I
served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and
Defense Policy. Additionally, I previously served as a professional
staff member on both the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Administrator? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe my previous experience working in Congress and
the U.S. Departments of State and Defense have prepared me to perform
the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator. However, I strongly
believe in the value of continuous learning.
If confirmed, I would surround myself with a highly trained team
from across NNSA and its nuclear security enterprise. I would also
regularly engage with all elements of NNSA's enterprise to further
understand NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges in order
to ensure NNSA can execute its vitally important missions.
Section 2403 further provides that the Principal Deputy
Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
activities among the elements of the Administration.''
Question. What is your understanding of the role you would play in
the day-to-day administration of the NNSA, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be the alter ego of the Administrator,
ensuring the Administrator's direction for the NNSA is carried out. As
a practical matter, I would expect to be focused on the internal
workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with other
Departmental organizations. This allows the Administrator to address
the strategic challenges and outward facing interactions necessary to
accomplish the NNSA mission.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to the
coordination of activities among the Deputy Administrators, NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would
assist the Administrator in overseeing the NNSA programs that are led
by the Deputy Administrators. I see my role as the Principal Deputy
Administrator to work closely with each of the Deputy Administrators to
ensure they can effectively execute the missions under their
cognizance. In particular, the role of Principal Deputy Administrator
coordinates development and implementation of policy and guidance,
strategic planning, program managements, budgeting, resource
allocation, safeguards and security, emergency management, contracts,
and hiring to be enablers for the primary mission programs of the NNSA.
Question. How, if at all, might your coordinating role be different
with regard to the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors?
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors oversees the
Naval Nuclear Enterprise and naval nuclear laboratories. If confirmed,
I will have responsibilities in oversight of the nuclear security
enterprise, comprised of the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites. My
role as the Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA is to manage the
NNSA support functions to enable the Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors in executing his unique responsibilities in delivering nuclear
propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's operational requirements
Question. Are there any special projects or tasks on which you
would focus, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator and
whatever duties or initiatives she may seek to implement to improve the
NNSA's nuclear security mission. I am ready and willing to take on any
projects or tasks that will benefit our nation's nuclear security
enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you
expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of
the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR)?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Administrator to determine what additional duties and functions I will
be assigned. I stand ready to support the Administrator in furthering
the Administration's efforts to modernize and recapitalize our nation's
nuclear security enterprise.
challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are currently the broad organizational
challenges and priorities for the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's priorities
to ensure NNSA meets our nation's national security requirements, and
NNSA continues to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of
Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. The United States has not adequately
invested the funds to sustain a modern, flexible, and responsive
infrastructure. Most of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old and
nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the Administrator to execute the priorities that
have been identified.
Question. In your view, what are the currently the major challenges
for the next Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. NNSA must modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile,
associated infrastructure, and reestablish production capabilities. In
addition, NNSA must also continue to prevent, counter, monitor, and
respond to proliferation threats around the world. To be successful in
all of NNSA's mission areas, we must recruit and retain a workforce
that is second-to-none. I will work with the Administrator to support
the NNSA Management and Operating (M&O) partners to attract and retain
a top-notch workforce in the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites while
reestablishing the corporate knowledge necessary to modernize our
stockpile.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges, and
on what timeline?
Answer. If confirmed, it will be important for me to work with the
Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy,
each of the NNSA Deputy Administrators, and the leaders in other
federal agencies to identify solutions to these challenges and then
assist to develop appropriate plans and timelines to implement them.
Question. In your view, what should be the main priorities for the
next Principal Deputy Administrator specifically?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on the challenges and priorities
outlined by the Administrator and assigned to me by the Administrator.
It will require critical thinking and planning to address the
challenges and tackle the priorities. I will need to develop close
working relationships with people at NNSA, the laboratories, the
plants, the sites, the Department of Energy, other federal agencies,
Congress, and allies.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate
progress in regard to these priorities?
Answer. I will engage with and empower NNSA leaders to coordinate
with DOD, State Department, the National Security Council, and other
executive branch agencies on defining NNSA requirements, and work
closely with Congress to explain how NNSA will meet the requirements.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the legal and ``in
practice'' relationship between the Principal Deputy Administrator and
each of the following officials. Indicate also if there are any special
considerations that, if confirmed, you would apply to your relationship
with each such official(s):
The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the
absence of the Administrator, I would represent NNSA.
Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.
Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.
Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the NNSA's Deputy
Administrators to ensure each can execute their respective missions.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management.
Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary
of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management
issues that intersect with the needs of NNSA.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical
and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
primary interface with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Defense. If confirmed, I will support the
priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Assistant Secretary,
as appropriate.
Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Answer. If confirmed, I will represent and support the priorities
of the Administrator and NNSA to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I will represent the priorities of the
Administrator and NNSA with the Commander of the United States
Strategic Command.
Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
Administrator and NNSA to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and
Navy.
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and
Project Management.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA in
providing support and management oversight for the Associate
Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
Administrator and NNSA to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Question. Nuclear Posture Review.
Answer. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the
Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our
stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary
of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking
regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and
the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the
nuclear mission.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of
the Biden Administration's NPR?
Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA, I
will support both the Administrator and the Secretary of Energy as they
navigate the NPR process and represent Department equities. NNSA's
responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of
the nation's nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation,
promoting international nuclear safety and security, and developing
technologies to monitor arms control agreements mean we must be at the
table for discussions of nuclear policy.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you
recommend the Biden Administration consider?
Answer. I am not currently involved in ongoing nuclear policy
discussions within the Administration, but, if confirmed, I would urge
the Biden administration to consider the importance of revitalizing and
investing in the infrastructure and capabilities needed to support our
nation's nuclear deterrent.
Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements in the
U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the
full and timely support of NNSA to the work required to implement those
enhancements?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of
additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to
supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the
new requirements?
Answer. Yes.
overall management
Question. Section 4132(c)(3) of title 41, U.S. Code, establishes
that the Administrator, NNSA `` . . . shall be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such
authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy
Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation.''
What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
Energy and the NNSA in statute and recent practice?
Answer. NNSA can only be successful if there is a positive and
strong working relationship between the Secretary of Energy, Deputy
Secretary of Energy, NNSA Administrator, and NNSA Principal Deputy
Administrator. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure DOE and NNSA
have good working relations.
Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
forth in law, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure? What makes
NNSA different from other components of Department of Energy (DOE)--in
both law and practice?
Answer. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA is designated as a semi-autonomous
organization; the organizations led by other DOE undersecretaries are
not structured in this way. This is a unique authority and
responsibility that gives the NNSA Administrator authority over
functions that also reside in DOE. If confirmed, I will prioritize
building strong, mission-focused, and effective culture and processes
across those functions, in close collaboration with the leadership of
DOE.
Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
operational effectiveness, if confirmed, would you recommend any
changes to the organizational structure of in NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on continuing NNSA's recent
progress in its approach to governance and management by strengthening
communication and integration across the nuclear security enterprise to
make sure we have effective partnerships between federal employees, the
laboratories, plants, and sites, and our interagency mission partners.
I will work with the Administrator and NNSA leadership to clearly
define lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and to
consolidate NNSA's progress in strategic oversight and project
management.
relationship with the department of defense (dod)
Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) sets requirements for
nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of the NNSA.
DOD has been described as NNSA's primary customer, as well as its
partner.
If confirmed, what would be your role in supporting the
Administrator of the NNSA in executing their duties and functions as a
member of the NWC?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in executing
her duties as a member of the NWC by ensuring that there is a
communication flow at the staff, management, and leadership levels to
facilitate discussion and understanding on key issues including
requirements, budget, and stockpile activities.
Question. How would you describe the relationship between NNSA and
the DOD?
Answer. From what I have observed, NNSA's relationship with DOD is
healthy with dialogue and collaboration at both the working and senior
levels.
Question. What is your assessment of the health of that
relationship at both senior- and working-levels?
Answer. From what I have observed, the relationship today is
healthy and, if confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator in
continuing to strengthen this relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what might you recommend to improve this
relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to keeping an open mind on
opportunities to further enhance this relationship. I will work
collaboratively with the Administrator on these efforts.
nnsa budget
Question. In 2015, then-Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz wrote to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding
NNSA's budget allocation for the ensuing five years that ``an
additional $5.2 billion over fiscal year 2018-2021 [was] needed to
establish a viable and sustainable program portfolio'' and that
``[f]ailure to address these requirements in the near term will put the
NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in fiscal year 2018.''
Then-Secretary Moniz added that, if uncorrected, the budget proposal
would ``lack credibility.'' The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
included an additional $3 billion above the President's budget request.
Do you believe that the $3 billion increase was adequate and
sufficient to render the budget request ``credible'', particularly in
light of NNSA's stockpile stewardship responsibilities and the
recommendations of the 2018 NPR? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the $3 billion increase provided in fiscal year
2021 is adequate for this fiscal year as it is the most robust funding
in the history of NNSA. This is an area I will assess further if
confirmed.
Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget
before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
ensure it can meet DOD requirements.
Answer. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this
provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to
review the budget before its submission to OMB?
I do not know the specifics of how NNSA, the NWC, and OMB
mechanically share budget information and comply with the provision. If
confirmed, I am committed to making sure there is open, clear, and
consistent communication regarding NNSA's budget with the NWC.
personnel
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
civilian employees to perform its mission? Please explain your answer.
If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to work with the
Administrator to review staffing needs and challenges across NNSA to
ensure the appropriate skills mix and number of personnel are in place
to accomplish its national security missions.
Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
personnel accomplish that NNSA is unable to accomplish today? If
confirmed, which specific components within the NNSA would you
recommend growing and how much growth would you recommend? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure
that NNSA is equipped to accomplish its missions. I understand that
NNSA's mission has been steadily increasing, and I will work to ensure
staffing levels are commensurate with the expanding workload.
Question. In your view, does NNSA rely too heavily on contractors
and a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator and the
M&O mission partners to ensure we maintain the correct mix of federal
and contracting employees.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.
Answer. Ensuring NNSA has the appropriate capabilities to execute
the mission is critical for the nuclear security enterprise. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator to ensure that
NNSA continues to recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals
needed to execute its missions.
Question. If not, please explain what skill sets, areas of
expertise, or other capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure
that NNSA is fully mission capable?
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the
necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor
workforces?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator to ensure
NNSA is executing a hiring strategy, in partnership with NNSA's M&O
partners, to bring the best and brightest into the nuclear security
enterprise. This should include outreach to colleges and universities
and participation in career fairs near NNSA labs, plants, and sites.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design
capabilities, in the NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the
labs and the plants?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
M&O mission partners to ensure we explore the most effective paths to
recruit and retain the world's best engineers, scientists, and support
personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are
maintained in NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs
and the plants?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources and
training specialists to understand what is already in place and where
there are opportunities for improvement. Where appropriate, I will make
the necessary changes to ensure there is an adequate and appropriate
technical workforce in place. I will also expand communications with
the NNSA labs, plants, and site to understand how NNSA can best support
their recruitment and training requirements.
Question. In your view, does NNSA leadership need any additional
authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the
federal civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources
specialists to assess whether any additional authorities are required.
construction and project management
Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility, and others.
In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
failures in project management?
Answer. I understand that NNSA has made a concerted effort to
address project management challenges over the last decade. Based on my
understanding, these challenges included issues related to ill-defined
project requirements and schedules, improper estimating, contractual
problems, and lack of proper planning.
If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA continues to remain on a path
toward improved project management.
Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
these problems? Please explain your answer.
Answer. NNSA's decision to create the Office of Acquisition and
Project Management in 2011 has led to significant improvements. More
can always be done. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
implementation of best business practices, as well as using lessons
learned to improve early project planning and requirements development
to prevent cost growth. If confirmed, I would also ensure there are
sufficient qualified acquisition and project management specialists
overseeing NNSA's growing portfolio.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that these systemic project management failures are not repeated
in the future? What specific changes in policy, practice, organization,
or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring improved contract
and project management across NNSA. I would recommend rigorous project
management practices and cost estimating, clarified lines of authority,
holding federal and contractor personnel accountable, and providing
independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight.
Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of
these project management failures? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review Departmental regulations that
govern capital acquisition projects and how they apply to NNSA
activities. Until then, I will ensure that NNSA staff have the
resources needed to further projects while staying within Departmental
regulations.
Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of systemic
project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the
Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), in the
Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). CEPE now reports directly to
the Administrator, NNSA
In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets
allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide
independent cost estimates and other additional costing and project
management advice internal to NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to
determine if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.
Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
data and information to execute its statutory mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review CEPE's authority and access to
understand if further improvements are needed.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How will you
balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of
taxpayer dollars?
Answer. CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities are valuable
to NNSA. CEPE's independence is critical to providing both the
Principal Deputy Administrator and the Administrator with independent,
data driven analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its
independence and review the resources available to it.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to facilitating CEPE
personnel access to the Administrator and to you?
Answer. Yes.
safeguards and security
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Principal
Deputy Administrator in ensuring safety and security in the nuclear
weapons complex?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to be
engaged on initiatives to improve safety at NNSA's facilities including
a healthy safety culture. This includes implementing a Governance and
Management structure which emphasizes transparency, trust, and
collaboration to address challenges. I will work with our Management
and Operating partners to establish expectations for sustained safety
performance with successful mission accomplishment. I will reinforce
that sustained safety performance and mission accomplishments can
mutually support each other to achieve mission success.
I will also work with the Administrator and the security program
office to ensure that we have systems and processes in place to prevent
security lapses. I also anticipate being engaged on all initiatives to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security at NNSA's
facilities. Additionally, I will work with NNSA's Management and
Operating partners to make sure our governance and management works to
achieve those objectives while emphasizing continuous improvement in
both safety and security.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. I firmly believe that the safety and security of the NNSA's
facilities and nuclear material are of the utmost importance and it is
critical that the NNSA has the appropriate authorities and funding from
Congress to mitigate these threats. As part of this, addressing the
continued challenges of ageing infrastructure is critically important
to ensure that NNSA is advancing the mission with state-of-the-art
facilities, with modern safety designs. If confirmed, I will work with
the Administrator to emphasize and address NNSA's commitment to operate
safely while accomplishing the mission and mitigate security threats
such as cyber, material, transportation, and physical threats to NNSA's
operations.
Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have in NNSA's
interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?
Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of a healthy
working relationship with the DNFSB and open lines of communication.
While it is my understanding the Deputy Secretary of Energy manages the
Department's overall interface with the DNFSB, if confirmed, I will
work through the Administrator and Deputy Secretary of Energy on
DNFSB's recommendations and advice regarding public health and safety
issues at NNSA's facilities.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported on a number of accidents
at the national laboratories in recent years. These accidents included
explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that led to the
partial shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory--
placing both personnel and mission execution at risk. Yet, while
personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by
definition involves some of the most hazardous materials known to
exist. Thus, if the labs' nuclear mission is to be accomplished, risk
can never be eliminated completely.
In your view, what is the proper balance between safety, risk, and
mission accomplishment at the national laboratories? How should this
balancing be accomplished, in your view?
Answer. NNSA must have sustained, strong safety performance. Safety
and mission success mutually support each other. This is balanced by
properly assessing risk and controlling and managing that risk.
If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will continue to
focus on fostering our partnership between the labs and plants and
emphasize continuous improvement in safely and successfully executing
the NNSA mission. I will also be committed to empowering employees to
anticipate, identify, report, and resolve safety issues.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
safety culture at the labs, while still meeting mission requirements?
Answer. The key to having a positive safety environment is
establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership which I
will do with the Administrator through my interactions with Management
and Operating partners' leadership. I will emphasize the long-term
commitment to safe operations through the establishment of an effective
governance and management culture. I will also emphasize the critical
nature of effectively empowering and engaging with employees to give
feedback while also stressing organizational learning. The
reinforcement of these attributes provides the foundation to improve
safety culture. I will also stress a strong safety conscious work
environment so employees will feel comfortable in raising safety issues
with leaders prepared to effectively address those issues. I will
encourage and provide support to our leadership so they have all the
necessary tools to effectively address any safety concerns.
plutonium strategy
Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former
Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce
approximately 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not
less than 80 pits per year.
What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its ability to
achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of
the ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. I believe work at Los Alamos is on track to achieve the
goal of producing 30 pits per year in 2026, supporting the overall
requirement for 80 pits per year. Moreover, I know that NNSA has to
succeed in this effort. The United States currently does not produce
any war reserve pits and we must do so to maintain our nuclear
deterrence in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to being focused
on making sure Los Alamos does, in fact, get to 30 pits per year in
2026.
Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the
former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its
pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the
ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. The former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, or
MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that
provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in an existing
facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements
for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include
repurposing and transitioning the MFFF into a safe, secure, compliant,
and efficient pit production facility.
uranium strategy and tritium production
Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for
tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1
Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be
used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium
nor the technology used to enrich it carries an ``obligation'' from a
foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-
weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending
recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for
unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-
blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for
obtaining unobligated uranium.
Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic
uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?
Answer. Yes, the United States needs to re-establish a domestic
uranium enrichment capability to ensure a reliable supply of enriched
uranium to support U.S. national security needs. Since the closure of
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, in 2013,
the United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched uranium
free of peaceful use obligations, i.e., unobligated. Mission needs for
enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States'
remaining HEU stockpile (by downblending the HEU to produce LEU), which
is a finite and currently irreplaceable source.
Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a
capability?
Answer. As I understand it, NNSA is currently implementing a long-
term strategy that meets current needs and seeks to re-establish
domestic uranium enrichment capabilities: Downblending HEU to LEU to
extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044; developing enrichment
technology options; and executing an acquisition process to deploy an
enrichment technology. An effective and cost-efficient solution for re-
establishing enrichment capabilities will be identified through an
ongoing Analysis of Alternatives.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
Question. What do you believe should be the highest priorities of
NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs?
Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is the lead
U.S. agency for reducing nuclear and radiological threats globally,
including the threat of nuclear proliferation among hostile states and
terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials. DNN must
continue to provide a comprehensive defense-in-depth against
proliferant states and non-state actors from obtaining, acquiring, and
developing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. NNSA must work
in close cooperation with interagency and international partners to
carry out its nuclear threat reduction programs and to anticipate and
respond to technological advances that may threaten the nation's
security. Finally, NNSA must sustain the unparalleled scientific and
technical prowess at NNSA's national laboratories, plants, and sites,
which is crucial to understanding this evolving threat environment, and
we must maintain these capabilities, including the facilities and
intellectual capital, to reduce global nuclear threats globally.
Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements
needed in the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs? If so, what
improvements would you envision?
Answer. While I would not term these as ``needed improvements,''
necessarily, there are programmatic challenges facing NNSA's nuclear
nonproliferation efforts, including:
Increasingly rapid technological advancements lowering
the bar to proliferation, including the diffusion of dual-use,
emerging, and disruptive technologies;
Eroding nuclear norms and regime cohesion, including the
inability to reach consensus within key multilateral fora (e.g.,
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty);
Hiring challenges posed by the continued attrition and
retirements; and
The ranging political will, practical capabilities, and
absorption ability of international partners.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in
implementing the improvements you envision?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Administrator, other Departmental elements, interagency, and laboratory
colleagues to identify and enable the strategic, technical, human
resource, and diplomatic tools to help address these challenges.
Question. What improvements do you recommend to NNSA's efforts in
verification and monitoring?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and DNN to
evaluate investing in efforts that advance innovative capabilities in
industry, academia, and the national laboratories to support and
sustain solutions for the difficult challenges ahead. NNSA must
continue its support for investments in research and development of
technology to support detection and verification efforts for
nonproliferation and arms control regimes and renew its commitment to
harnessing the power of science to minimize nuclear threats around the
world.
Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs if
confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation
would NNSA require to meet such needs?
Answer. First, I believe there is an ongoing need to address the
threats posed by North Korea and Iran, working with international
partners. Second, there is an enduring need to secure vulnerable and
excess nuclear and radioactive materials globally. Several countries
retain inventories of separated plutonium and excess highly enriched
uranium (HEU), which the United States is unable to remove, or confirm
the disposition of, due to lack of a political path forward. Finally,
we must keep pace with and regulate emerging technologies to mitigate
their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of
their promising opportunities.
Question. What do you think are the five most significant lessons
learned for NNSA from the mismanagement of the MOX project? How will
these lessons learned be implemented in future NNSA projects such as
those related to the dilution and disposal of plutonium?
Answer. I am aware NNSA experienced major project management
challenges with the MOX project. If confirmed, I look forward to
getting briefed on the project to learn more about the intricacies of
the challenges associated with it. Further, I will ensure the lessons
learned from it will be enforced and strengthened for NNSA's other
capital acquisition projects.
regulation and oversight
Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
external, and that this contributes to the challenges in staying under
cost and on schedule for major projects.
Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do
you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs
and efficient mission execution overall?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation of
all NNSA facilities. This is all-encompassing and includes the
protection of the NNSA workforce, the public, and the environment. I
will ensure that safety is properly incorporated into the design and
construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. This is a cradle-to-grave
approach encompassing safety expectations being communicated early in
the conception of the project in accordance with relevant directives
and regulations, periodic review of projects and operations as they
progress through important milestones, the selection of qualified
design and construction firms to lead them, and the proper staffing of
a technically qualified federal project team. I believe this holistic
approach and effective engagement from conception to execution of
projects will reduce rework and control costs.
I recognize the oversight challenges NNSA faces getting alignment
with their partners regarding safety expectations through the
application of directives which have been developed over time; and I
believe there is room for improvement in the implementation of these
directives. I support NNSA's approach to being a learning organization
and learn from our past and leverage best practices. This includes
NNSA's streamline of its directives and requirements, leverage general
industry standards, and management of risk inherent in the construction
of non- hazardous facilities.
I am committed to ensuring NNSA's projects and operations are
conducted in a safe and effective manner and follow all applicable
environmental, safety, and construction rules. I am also committed to
using standard approaches to help streamline execution of NNSA's
mission work in alignment with the complexity of the projects.
Streamlining the construction of low-risk, non-nuclear, commercial-like
construction projects is an area where NNSA (and the bidding community)
can benefit the most.
Through data-informed, priority investment decisions in support of
NNSA's current and future missions, the risk posed by aging
infrastructure to NNSA's workforce, the environment, and its mission
can be significantly reduced.
Question. In your view, are the labs subject to an appropriate
level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or
Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
Answer. Strong governance and management oversight by NNSA are key
pillars in accomplishing the missions and goals of the entire nuclear
security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that a proper
balance exists between oversight and mission execution. Additionally,
if confirmed, I will work to build relationships across the complex
with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government
Accountability Office, and Congress to ensure that there exists a
proper balance between oversight and mission execution. Clear roles and
responsibilities are essential.
Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
structures would you recommend, and why?
Answer. Making sure that NNSA's missions are executed in an
effective, efficient manner is important. If confirmed, I will assess
what changes are necessary to ensure mission execution with proper
regulations and oversight.
defense programs
Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the
annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.
Do you believe that the capabilities exist today to ensure that the
stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons
testing? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program uses a science-
based assessment of the reliability of nuclear weapons to assess and
certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. For the last
23 years, the three NNSA Laboratory Directors have certified that the
stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and that additional
underground nuclear explosive testing is not required at this time.
Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for
the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension
programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the design
of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.
Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and in
particular concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
Programs to minimize risks to meeting schedule requirements.
Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in supporting
the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and making full use of the
authorities it provides NNSA?
Answer. I believe it is important to make investments in personnel,
programs, and technologies that strengthen our ability to respond to
emerging challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program and its goal to expand opportunities for young
scientists and engineers to ensure we have a talented and capable array
of nuclear security personnel across the enterprise.
Question. In your view, what should be the long-term plan for the
National Ignition Facility, and in particular, how would you assist the
Administrator in the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition,
which to date has not occurred?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, NNSA
subject matter experts, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
Congress to best identify the long-term plan for NIF. I do know that
NIF is essential for understanding the physical properties and
characteristics of nuclear weapons performance.
Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
NNSA missions?
Answer. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program,
delivers leading-edge computer platforms, sophisticated physics and
engineering codes, and uniquely qualified staff to support addressing a
wide variety of stockpile issues for design, physics certification,
engineering qualification, and production. While there is certainly a
role for other activities that utilize the ASC program, its primary use
should continue to support stockpile stewardship.
facilities and infrastructure
Question. More than half of NNSA's infrastructure is more than 40
years old, and a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project. As
former Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty testified in 2020, ``[T]ime is
of the essence to recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire
NNSA. Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch these
facilities. We need to make sure that we have state of the art
infrastructure, so we can recapitalize our enterprise and make sure
that we can provide to the Department of Defense the requirements that
they so sorely need to maintain our nuclear deterrent.'' This testimony
post-dated by almost two years the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA directive to
NNSA to establish the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, with the
objective of reducing the backlog of deferred maintenance and repair
needs by at least 30% by 2025.
If confirmed, what factors would you consider in prioritizing work
with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and
Operations to address the required maintenance of NNSA infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to modernize
and sustain NNSA's infrastructure. NNSA must undertake a risk-informed
infrastructure strategy (or management approach) to repair, maintain,
and replace facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. Reducing
deferred maintenance, disposing of process-contaminated facilities, and
streamlining execution of non-nuclear construction projects will be a
key piece of the priorities I set to meet Congressional direction.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend to reduce
risk in future major construction projects, such as those related to
the lithium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will help NNSA ensure that future major
projects are developed and executed utilizing well established program
and project management principles including: ensuring that the project
requirements are clearly defined and prioritized; proper cost estimates
are completed and reviewed independently; sufficient design work and
technological development is completed prior to commencing a project's
construction; and monitoring progress to ensure projects remain on
schedule and on budget.
organizational climate
Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
in ensuring that the NNSA workplace, including that of NNSA's
geographically-separated labs and other components promotes the dignity
of and respect for all persons?
Answer. Respect is one of my core values, and one, if confirmed, I
will ensure at NNSA. If confirmed, I will serve as a role model by
treating each employee with dignity and respect and would ensure that
all employees foster an inclusive environment where every perspective
is recognized and diversity of thought is valued.
sexual harassment
Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to creating a workplace that
is safe and welcoming to all people. As the Principal Deputy
Administrator, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to learn more
about the current NNSA climate and taking steps to improve the
environment.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the DOE, NNSA, or a component
thereof?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take complaints of sexual harassment
or discrimination seriously. All employees have the right to feel safe
in the workplace and must be treated fairly. I will work to ensure such
complaints are reviewed and responded to quickly, including appropriate
corrective action and discipline if warranted.
notification of congress
Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly
notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Senator Mazie K. Hirono
nominations
1. Senator Hirono. Ms. Rosenblum, as part of my responsibility as a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Ms. Rosenblum. I have not.
2. Senator Hirono. Ms. Rosenblum, have any of you ever faced
discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of
conduct?
Ms. Rosenblum. I have not.
modernizing the nuclear arsenal
3. Ms. Rosenblum, the Biden administration has begun a series of
reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our nuclear
posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most pressing
nuclear modernization issue we face?
Ms. Rosenblum. Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts
necessary to ensure our nuclear deterrent's long-term viability have
little to no schedule margin. Ensuring that these efforts remain on
track--and that the transition from cold war-era legacy capabilities to
their modern replacements is successful--is the most pressing nuclear
modernization issue we face. Consistent, sustained leadership focus and
funding are required through 2030 and likely beyond to ensure the
Nation's nuclear deterrent is modernized while meeting cost and
schedule milestones. This includes both Department of Defense nuclear
programs as well as the nuclear weapons activities and production
infrastructure programs for which the National Nuclear Security
Administration is responsible, which are integral to the deterrent.
rising threat of north korean capability
4. Ms. Rosenblum, I take the threat of North Korea launching a
ballistic missile toward Hawaii very seriously. If confirmed, you will
be responsible for preparing for, deterring, and mitigating current and
future weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats. Based on your
experience and background, what are your thoughts and top priorities to
prevent such an attack?
Ms. Rosenblum. If confirmed, I will review the full spectrum of
activities that currently are important in defending the U.S. homeland
against WMD, and I will also review proposed activities to enhance U.S.
defenses against future WMD threats. As Secretary Austin has stated,
our relationships with important partners such as the Republic of Korea
and Japan are critical to regional security and stability and provide a
powerful deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I will work
with key U.S. Government stakeholders and with our partners in the
Indo-Pacific region to facilitate nonproliferation activities and
address both the current and emerging threats posed by North Korea's
weapons of mass destruction. At the macro level, and in concert with
the Military Departments and Services and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, I
believe, if I am confirmed, that NCB priorities for North Korea would
include maintaining, or increasing, capabilities related to the
ballistic missile ``Prevent'' mission space, with a focus on
situational awareness, early warning, and detection.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
arm control treaties
5. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, as Assistant Secretary of Defense
(ASD) Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB), you
will be the DOD Treaty Manager and represent the United States on
nuclear issues in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], biological
weapons issues in the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
(UNODA), and chemical weapons issues in the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Please share your thoughts on
the treaties regulating weapons of mass destruction. How should we hold
countries, like Russia and China, who do not abide by international
laws, accountable for violations?
Ms. Rosenblum. One of the pillars of nonproliferation is the
establishment of international norms against the use of these weapons
of mass destruction. Arms control treaties are the baseline by which
these norms can be established. If confirmed, my responsibility as the
DOD Treaty manager will be to ensure the Department upholds its
commitments under applicable Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and
Conventional arms control treaties. I share the priorities of this
Administration to bring outliers to such treaties back into compliance
with their obligations under them. The United States imposed sanctions
against Russia for its violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
including the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. These sanctions, imposed
both on Russian officials and on chemical and biological production
entities, are an example of the range of measures the United States has
available to hold to account those who violate treaties governing the
use of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work with key
U.S. Government stakeholders to ensure a full range of options are
available and are considered for imposition in response to any treaty
violations. I also believe that it is important for the United States
to set an example by complying with all of its treaty obligations.
6. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, if the Administration proceeds
with additional arms control talks, do you believe they will negotiate
in good faith?
Ms. Rosenblum. I believe that the United States is committed to
pursuing arms control negotiations in good faith but that we need to be
clear eyed regarding the intentions of our negotiating partners.
Accordingly, it is very important that any agreement be verifiable,
provide transparency and clearly in the interest of the United States.
technical qualifications
7. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, the position you were nominated
for, ASD (NCB), serves as the advisor to the Secretary of Defense on
nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical biological defense.
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) Number 5134.08 further
explains that one of the requirements of this position is to serve as a
``technical expert in interagency and international activities related
to areas of assigned responsibilities and functions.'' You did not
address specific questions on your technical qualifications for this
position during the hearing or in your advance policy questions. Can
you outline your educational and/or job experience that would address
the technical requirements of this position?
Ms. Rosenblum. I have over thirty years of experience working on
complex national security issues with a particular focus on arms
control, reducing risk and countering weapons of mass destruction.
While working within the Office of the Secretary of Defense I was
responsible for overseeing the management of the submarine leg of the
nuclear triad, technical programs to counter weapons of mass
destruction, technical negotiations regarding the nuclear program of
the DPRK and NATO defense planning. Currently at the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, I provide strategic guidance to the organization's bio-
security program that focuses on reducing risks from science and
technology. Throughout my career, I have led and worked with a broad
range of talented scientists and technology experts to identify the
critical issues needing to be addressed to sustain the US' nuclear
deterrent and to counter weapons of mass destruction. I have also
regularly led efforts to identify the critical policy and leadership
issues embedded in technical details, extensive data and scientific and
technology programs.
biological weapons
8. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, would you agree that human beings
carry a long, shameful history of using naturally occurring pathogens
as weapons? Explain your answer.
Ms. Rosenblum. The use of biological agents is not a new concept,
and history is replete with examples of their use. Infectious diseases
were recognized for their potential impact on people and armies as
early as 600 B.C. The SARS-CoV2 pandemic has also shown us that
naturally occurring pathogens can have a great impact on both a local
and a global scale. This pandemic has brought to light the devastation
that can occur when countries are not adequately prepared for
biological threats. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to improve our
Nation's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats.
china and covid
9. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, China's concern following the
conception and spread of COVID-19 did not extend to the wider global
community. As the flight logs from Wuhan show, China allowed the
unchecked export of COVID at a time when it clearly understood the
danger of the disease and its grave threat to modern society. Several
dates on COVID-19's timeline stand out: January 23d, the day China
locked down Wuhan and January 31st, the day President Trump banned
flights from China to the United States. China took drastic steps to
limit exposure of its own population, locking down more than 500
million people, securing worldwide supplies of PPE [personal protective
equipment], and proclaiming via state-run Xinhua News Agency that the
country boasted the ``most comprehensive, most strict and most thorough
preventative measures.'' Given these facts, would you agree that China
actively sought to not only deceive the global community on the origins
of COVID and the transmission of the disease, but knowingly exported
COVID to democracies around the world? Explain your answer in detail.
Ms. Rosenblum. On May 26, 2021, the White House issued a statement
on the Investigation into the Origins of COVID-19. The President tasked
the U.S. Intelligence Community to prepare a report on the most up-to-
date analysis of the origins of COVID-19, including whether it emerged
from human contact with an infected animal or from a laboratory
accident and subsequently asked for additional followup. If confirmed,
I will support the President's efforts to achieve a better
understanding of the origins of COVID-19, coordinating with our
interagency partners for these purposes and to help prevent future
biological threats, whether they are of natural or unnatural origins.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Deborah G.
Rosenblum in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The nomination of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2021.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Christopher P. Maier
by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 138(b)(2) of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) as one of 15 Assistant Secretaries of Defense in
the Department of Defense (DOD).
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the ASD(SOLIC) as prescribed in current law, DOD issuances, and by
practice?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal civilian
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-
intensity conflict matters. The ASD(SO/LIC)'s principal duty is overall
supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special
operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of
Defense. The ASD(SO/LIC) also is the principal advisor to the Secretary
of Defense on special operations capabilities and authorities,
counternarcotics efforts and resources, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, strategies for building partner capacity, and
stability operations in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy's priorities and guidance.
Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of
command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), performing a ``service secretary-
like'' function for the special-operations peculiar administrative
matters relating to organization, training, and equipping of special
operations forces (SOF).
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. I have spent more than two decades focused on
counterterrorism, special operations, and low-intensity conflict
issues, with positions across DOD, the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. I led DOD's
Defeat-ISIS Task Force from its inception until disestablishment,
charged with policy and strategy development, international
negotiations, and oversight. I have previously served as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Special Operations and
Combating Terrorism (SOCT), where I oversaw the Department's policies,
plans, authorities, and resources related to special operations and
irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare,
information operations, and sensitive special operations. Prior to that
position, I held a number of positions at the NCTC, including Senior
Advisor to the Director, Chief of Strategic Assessments and Regional
Planning, and Chief of Staff in the Directorate of Strategic
Operational Planning, and I served as a Director for Counterterrorism
on the NSC staff. Prior to my government service, I also spent five
years as a strategy and management consultant to a variety of
commercial, government, and nonprofit organizations, after beginning my
government career as an analyst in the Intelligence Community.
Question. What leadership and management experience do you possess
that you would apply to your service as ASD(SOLIC), if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would bring a broad range of relevant
leadership and management experience to the position of ASD(SO/LIC). As
the Director of the Defeat-ISIS Task Force, I led national-level
interagency implementation of the U.S. Government's campaign to achieve
an enduring defeat of ISIS, working closely with dozens of Coalition
partners across the globe. As DASD SOCT, I led a team of more than 50
senior government civilian and military personnel in conducting special
operations, counterterrorism, and irregular warfare policy development
and implementation, as well as oversight of much of USSOCOM's man,
train, and equip programs. My experience as a senior leader at NCTC and
working with the President's national security leadership while on the
NSC staff also provides me with further experience in leading
organizations, in different roles, across the national security
enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
make regarding changes to the organization, management, and resourcing
of the Office of the ASD(SOLIC), so as better to execute its
responsibilities for oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations
Forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the
organizational structure, management, and resourcing of the Office of
the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure it is appropriately resourced and staffed to
fulfill its statutory roles of overseeing Special Operations
administrative matters and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy in policy-related matters.
Question. Are there any additional authorities or resources that,
in your view, would enhance your ability to perform the duties and
functions of the ASD(SOLIC), if confirmed?
Answer. The Department has recently approved a new charter for
ASD(SO/LIC), which details the office's authorities, roles, and
responsibilities within the Department, consistent with the ASD's Title
10 authorities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to carry out these responsibilities
effectively. If confirmed, I will also work with the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress on changes to existing authorities or
resources that would enhance the ASD(SO/LIC)'s ability to fulfill each
of these responsibilities.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with, and
on what issues would you expect to engage with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will perform the duties as the principal
staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
all special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-
peculiar administrative matters, reporting directly to the Secretary as
I exercise authority, direction, control, and oversight
responsibilities related to organizing, training, and equipping of the
SOF enterprise. I will advise and assist the Secretary, and work with
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on sensitive special operations,
operational preparation of the environment, crisis response,
counterterrorism, information operations, and the use of the
instruments of irregular warfare.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy on ASD(SO/LIC)-related equities and policy matters,
including the development and supervision of policy, program planning
and execution, and allocation and use of resources for Information
Operations, Irregular Warfare, combating terrorism, and special
operations activities. I will keep the Under Secretary informed of
major developments within the ASD(SO/LIC) portfolio, including
operational matters that may have an effect on policy development or
outcomes.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security (USD(I&S)).
Answer. If confirmed, I will partner and coordinate with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security on matters related
to sensitive special operations, operational preparation of the
environment, irregular warfare, and other sensitive efforts to achieve
U.S. strategic objectives and improve the SOF enterprise. I would
envision collaborating as well to ensure sufficient intelligence
support to priority special operations disciplines, to include
Information Operations and Irregular Warfare.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Answer. Technology development and advanced technologies are
critical enablers to keep pace with our adversaries and reduce cost
without sacrificing mission capabilities. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering to accelerate the adoption of Artificial Intelligence,
machine learning, unmanned systems, smart munitions and weaponry, new
communications modalities, and other revolutionary technologies into
the SOF enterprise.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.
Answer. Section 138 of 10 U.S.C. authorizes the ASD(SO/LIC) to
``exercise authority, direction, and control of all special-operations
peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training,
and equipping of special operations forces.'' If confirmed, I will
establish a close working relationship with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to ensure special operations
acquisition programs, projects, and priorities are delivered in
accordance with Department priorities, on-time and within budget, to
meet mission needs to best serve our USSOCOM warfighters.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness.
Answer. Talented people are the foundational component of SOF, so
ensuring the SOF enterprise is optimizing the way it recruits, trains,
promotes, and retains talent that is reflective of our Nation's rich
diversity, is critical to SOF's mission success. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to ensure SOF personnel programs and policies
enable the force to deliver ready and lethal SOF capabilities.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the
Service Chiefs.
Answer. SOF relies on Service support in many areas, including
resourcing of Service-common requirements, personnel policies,
recruiting, education, promotion, and force design. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Service Chiefs in these cross-cutting areas and to
ensure adequate support to SOF.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to
develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship
between your office and Congress, and the Senate Armed Services
Committee, in particular?
Answer. The Senate Armed Services Committee and the Congress
provide important oversight for the special operations enterprise and
have been critical in establishing the roles and authorities of the
ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will work with the ASD for Legislative
Affairs to engage the Committee regularly to ensure a transparent and
effective relationship on all issues within the purview of the ASD(SO/
LIC), in addition to providing testimony, briefings, reports, and other
information to help the committee fulfill its oversight and legislative
responsibilities.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would expect to confront if confirmed to be the ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) and the special operations enterprise must
be prepared to meet simultaneously the challenges of great power
competition, counterterrorism, modernizing our forces, enhancing
readiness, and taking care of our people. If confirmed, I will work to
support SOF in adapting to strategic competition with China and Russia,
while balancing the ongoing requirements for counterterrorism
operations through more cost-sustainable methods. If confirmed, I would
also expect to confront continued readiness challenges in overcoming
the COVID-19 pandemic and reducing the strain of high rates of SOF
overseas deployments. The ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM must also continue to
focus on key moral and operational imperatives to address sexual
assault and extremism, implement ongoing reforms related to SOF culture
and ethics, and increase the diversity of SOF.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what management actions would
you take to address each of these challenges?
Answer. Strong civilian oversight will be critical in leading the
SOF enterprise to address these challenges. If confirmed, I will work
closely with Department of Defense leadership and the Congress in
implementing the ongoing reforms to strengthen ASD(SO/LIC) oversight of
these critical issues. I will also partner closely with the Commander,
USSOCOM to ensure that SOF has the necessary authorities, resources,
and capabilities to meet these challenges. Finally, if confirmed, I
would look to strengthen our relationships with our allies and
partners, their SOF contingents and more broadly, to leverage the force
multiplier effect of their strengths and capabilities to address
today's increasingly complex global threat environment.
national defense strategy
Question. The 2018 NDS prioritized ``great power competition and
conflict'' with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which
the United States must contend, together with the imperative of
deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran.
Finally, the framework emphasizes the consolidation of gains in Iraq
and Afghanistan, while moving to a ``more resource sustainable''
approach to counterterrorism.
In your view, does the NDS accurately assess the current strategic
environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the
national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. I agree that the NDS's assessment of the strategic
environment was accurate when written. I also agree with Secretary
Austin that China represents the Department's pacing threat, and that
Russia, Iran, and North Korea represent advanced, persistent threats.
Finally, I believe that foreign terrorist organizations pose an
enduring, threat to our national security. If confirmed, I would help
ensure that the SOF enterprise continues to transform to address the
Department's top priorities, provide options to address the full range
of threats, and becomes more sustainable in its approach to enduring CT
challenges.
Question. Are there aspects of the NDS you believe should be
updated or reassessed?
Answer. I understand that the Department has begun a deliberate
process to develop a new NDS. The Administration's priorities, changes
in the security environment, and other factors should drive that
process. I believe the next NDS should continue to emphasize the
critical shaping role that information operations and irregular
approaches play as part of an integrated national approach against our
highest priority security threats. By imposing costs in competition and
raising the costs of adversaries' malign activities, SOF-led and
enabled approaches can prevent conflict, ensure advantage in
competition, and manage escalation dynamics so that if required, we
enter into conflict on the most favorable terms.
Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the
Commander, USSOCOM appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to
counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives
identified by the NDS?
Answer. I understand that the Commander, USSOCOM, is actively
engaged in ensuring USSOCOM personnel and resources are aligned against
the security objectives identified in the NDS. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure plans and programs
are in alignment with the NDS as well as with national and Departmental
strategies and guidance.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Commander,
USSOCOM has accepted regarding the readiness of Special Operations
Forces to execute the operational plans associated with the NDS?
Answer. From my understanding, the Commander, USSOCOM, works
closely with both the military and civilian chains of command within
the Department of Defense to mitigate risk and ensure USSOCOM forces
are ready to execute assigned plans in furtherance of the NDS.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you
advise the Commander, USSOCOM to make in the command's implementation
of the NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with the Commander of USSOCOM
to ensure SOF strategy is nested under the NDS and establishes a long-
term framework to develop and deliver the necessary SOF capabilities
and resources, to include enabling key capabilities of the Joint Force,
to maximize the Department's effectiveness in implementing the NDS.
Question. Are the Special Operations Forces of each of the Military
Services appropriately sized, structured, and postured to implement the
NDS and the associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that each Service's SOF are
responsible to their Service, to USSOCOM, and to the ASD(SO/LIC) to
ensure they are poised to execute the NDS and associated operational
plans. If confirmed, I will review their force generation, structure,
and readiness to execute their assigned tasks.
civilian control of the military
Question. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the
National Defense Strategy Commission cautioned, ``there is an imbalance
in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy development
and implementation. Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues
at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.''
What is your view of the essential role of the ASD(SOLIC) in
promoting civilian control over the military?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of command
to exercise authority, direction, and control of the Commander,
USSOCOM, for special operations-peculiar administration including the
readiness and organization of special operations forces, resources and
equipment, and civilian personnel. Accordingly, the ASD must clearly
articulate strategic priorities and policies for those matters. As a
Principal Staff Assistant reporting directly to the Secretary of
Defense, the ASD(SO/LIC) must also ensure that the Secretary of Defense
has all the necessary, resource-informed, policy recommendations to
exercise his control of the military, including SOF. It is therefore
essential to maintain a collaborative and cooperative relationship with
the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the best possible civilian-military
advice is provided to the Secretary on the resourcing and employment of
SOF. If confirmed, I intend to exercise my statutory authorities to
further this objective.
The National Defense Strategy Commission report also states, `` . .
. allocating priority--and allocating forces--across theaters of
warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-
military task, decision authority for which is the proper competency
and responsibility of America's civilian leaders.''
Question. Do you agree with the Commission's recommendation that
``the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) . . . [must] fully exercise their
responsibilities for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency
plans?'' Please explain your answer.
Answer. I agree with this recommendation. To me, clear DOD-wide
guidance improves effectiveness and unity of effort within the
Department and with our interagency and international partners during
operations and activities supporting both deliberate and contingency
plans. The Secretary and the USD(P) have a vital role to ensure that
political risks--including the risk of inaction--are weighed by the
United States' civilian leadership. Doing so also enhances effective
civil-military relations throughout the U.S. Government, which is
essential for our national security.
Question. Specifically what would you do, if confirmed, to prepare
guidance for and review contingency plans involving Special Operations
Forces and capabilities and what would you perceived to be the
appropriate role of the USD(P) in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I would align with the USD(P)'s process for
contingency plan review and ensure that the ASD(SO/LIC) is fully
invested and participates in reviewing contingency plans. I would
emphasize that the Department should look holistically at the
competitive landscape and not just focus on high-end war contingency
plans. I endorse a deliberate approach to competition and crisis at all
levels and in close coordination with diplomatic and other interagency
partners. SOF have an important role in this space, and I would provide
my best advice and recommendations to the USD(P) to account for those
areas, prior to armed conflict, where the Department can achieve
outsized effects in the competition and low-intensity conflict arenas.
civilian oversight of the u.s. special operations command
Question. Section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as amplified by
section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021, empowered the ASD(SOLIC)
to serve as the ``service secretary-like'' civilian official with
responsibility for the oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations
Forces. Among other reforms, the law defined the administrative chain
of command for USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the
Secretary of Defense for issues impacting the readiness and
organization of Special Operations Forces, special operations-peculiar
resources and equipment, and civilian personnel management, mirroring
the relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments
and their service chiefs, and placing ASD(SOLIC) immediately
subordinate to the Secretary of Defense in such ``service secretary-
like'' matters. The law also makes plain that otherwise directed by the
President, no officer below the Secretary of Defense may intervene to
exercise authority, direction, or control over the ASD(SOLIC) in the
discharge of such responsibilities.
What is your understanding of the administrative chain of command
specified by section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as amplified by
section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021?
Answer. Section 922 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2017 codified the
administrative chain of command for USSOCOM as running from the
President to the Secretary of Defense, from the Secretary of Defense to
the ASD(SO/LIC), and from the ASD(SO/LIC) to the Commander of USSOCOM.
Section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021 reinforced and
strengthened this role by making the ASD(SOLIC) an immediate
subordinate of the Secretary of Defense. The Department further
reinforced this role by designating the ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal
Staff Assistant reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense for
special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-
peculiar administrative matters.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to exercise the
administrative chain of command and under what circumstances?
Answer. The Department published an updated version of Department
of Defense Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, on May 5, 2021, which
prescribes the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the ASD(SO/
LIC). The Secretary of Defense also emphasized the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role
in the administrative chain of command through a memorandum published
on May 5, 2021. If confirmed, I will seek to exercise the ASD(SO/LIC)'s
role in the administrative chain of command as prescribed by both the
Secretary and the DOD Directive through consistent, constructive, and
transparent communication with the Secretary of Defense and the
Commander, USSOCOM.
Question. If confirmed, how would you distinguish between and
balance the duties and responsibilities associated with the
ASD(SOLIC)'s ``service secretary-like'' role with the ASD(SOLIC)'s
duties and responsibilities related to special operations policy and
operational issues?
Answer. I see extensive synergy between the administrative chain of
command responsibilities and the policy oversight responsibilities of
the ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will endeavor to balance these duties,
prioritizing as necessary relative to pressing requirements, in close
coordination and collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the
USD(P) and the Commander, USSOCOM.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD(SOLIC)
in:
The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget
request.
I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) receives fiscal guidance from the
Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and provides
fiscal guidance to USSOCOM. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC) reviews and
approves the USSOCOM Program Objective Memorandum and President's
Budget submissions.
Approving programs of record and the acquisition of
special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM.
USSOCOM has statutory authority for development and acquisition of
special operations-peculiar equipment. I understand that the ASD(SO/
LIC) participates in the USSOCOM budget and requirements processes to
establish acquisition programs.
Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters and
service components.
The ASD(SO/LIC), as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary
of Defense on special operations matters, must work in partnership with
the Commander, USSOCOM, to implement a shared vision for a SOF
enterprise that meets the nation's special operations requirements. If
confirmed, I will participate in strategic engagements and processes
shaping the organization of USSOCOM and the SOF Service components to
sustain and advance the SOF enterprise.
Ensuring the readiness of Special Operations Forces.
The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for the readiness of SOF, as stated
in section 167 of title 10. If confirmed, I would work closely with the
Commander, USSOCOM, to conduct regular reviews of the readiness of SOF
to meet current, emergent, and future national security requirements.
Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and
accountability of Special Operations Forces.
The ASD(SO/LIC), in partnership with the Commander, USSOCOM, is
responsible for ensuring SOF conduct themselves in a manner
commensurate with the level of trust the public places in them in the
performance of their duties, and consistent with their oath. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to
strengthen further the ethics and accountability of SOF. I also will
support the swift implementation of the recommendations of the
Comprehensive Review of SOF Ethics and Culture to ensure that ethics
and accountability are institutionalized across the SOF enterprise.
Question. In your view, do existing law and DOD policy and guidance
provide sufficient clarity regarding how and in whom responsibility and
accountability vest for all matters affecting Special Operations
Forces? If not, what further changes would you recommend?
Answer. I believe that Title 10 is clear on the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role
as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on
special operations and low-intensity conflict matters and the role in
the administrative chain of command of the Commander, USSOCOM. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Commander USSOCOM to
fulfill these statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will evaluate
potential changes required to existing law that could clarify
responsibility and accountability for special operations matters.
Question. In your view, does the extant administrative chain of
command allow for any official below the Secretary of Defense to
exercise authority, direction, and control over the ASD(SOLIC) with
regard to his/her ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities?
Answer. In my view, the law is clear: Unless otherwise directed by
the President, the administrative chain of command to USSOCOM for the
specific purposes set forth in 10 U.S.C. 167(f)(2) runs (A) from the
President to the Secretary of Defense; (B) from the Secretary of
Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict; and (C) from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to the
Commander of USSOCOM. This chain was also reinforced by the new
chartering directive for the ASD(SO/LIC).
use of military force
Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on the
operational use of Special Operations Forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on validating and, as needed,
updating the capabilities and authorities necessary for SOF to confront
our global challenges. It is my belief we need to have SOF positioned
to disrupt threats to the United States and our partners in a more
sustainable manner, and we need to provide Department and national
security leadership with options that enable flexibility, manage
escalation, and provide high return on investment
If confirmed, I look forward to working across the Department, with
the leadership at USSOCOM, with my counterparts in other U.S.
Government departments and agencies, and with our international
partners to ensure the SOF enterprise is postured and able to execute
our national defense strategy, to include our nation's most challenging
military missions.
I remain concerned about the health of the SOF enterprise, in
particular the hidden impacts that sustained combat deployments have
had on our warfighters and their families. If confirmed, I will
champion the efforts of the Preservation of the Force and Family
program and will seek to identify other ways that we can support
USSOCOM's most important asset--its people.
Question. Do you believe that current legal authorities, including
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the
Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a
level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?
Answer. The 2001 AUMF remains the key domestic legal authority for
ongoing U.S. counterterrorism activities against al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, and their associated forces. The Department has operated under
these current legal authorities for nearly 20 years, but the threats we
face and the operating environments in which SOF operate continue to
evolve. I support President Biden's support for replacing the current
AUMFs with a narrow and specific framework that will ensure our forces
have the authority they need to protect the United States from
continuing terrorist threats. If confirmed, I would expect to work
closely with counterparts in other departments and agencies, and with
the Congress in updating those authorities.
Question. What groups are currently assessed to be associated
forces of al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 Authorization for the Use
of Military Force, and in what countries are U.S. military direct
action operations against such groups authorized?
Answer. The 2001 AUMF is the legal basis for currently authorized
operations against the following groups or individuals: al Qaeda; the
Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent groups affiliated with
al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM); al Qaeda in Syria; and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS).
It is my understanding that the United States has used military
force for counterterrorism direct action operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.
Question. In your view, is a new authorization for the use of
military force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I agree with President Biden's support for replacing the
current AUMFs with a narrow and specific framework that will ensure our
forces have the authority they need to protect the United States from
continuing terrorist threats. The scope or terms of any ``new''
authorization should be informed by an in-depth review of the current
authorities, and by the facts and circumstances to which the
authorities apply. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Department's General Counsel to conduct that evaluation.
Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
recommending to the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) which forces of
other nations should be eligible for collective self-defense by U.S.
Special Operations Forces, and under what conditions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consider the degree to which
collective self-defense would support achieving U.S. national security
and specific mission objectives when operating by, with, and through
our partners. The use of collective self-defense should also seek to
bolster the protection of U.S. forces and facilities abroad and
maintain the resolve of our partners. Rules of engagement authorizing
U.S. forces to defend foreign partner forces should clearly identify
the particular partners eligible for such protection and whether limits
exist on the groups or individuals against which such force may be
used. Any use of force in defense of foreign partner forces must adhere
to the law of armed conflict and also be necessary and proportionate to
address the particular attack or threat of imminent attack against the
partner force.
civilian casualties
Question. Section 936 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 required the
Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy for accounting
for and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from
U.S. military operations.
If confirmed, what would be your role in developing and
implementing the policies resulting from section 936?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the efforts of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who is designated under section
936 as the civilian official responsible for developing, coordinating,
and overseeing compliance with DOD civilian casualty policy. For
example, I would help oversee on-going efforts within the Department to
complete the drafting and coordination of a forthcoming DOD instruction
on civilian harm mitigation and response.
Question. What role do you believe public transparency plays with
respect to accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian
casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. Public transparency about U.S. military operations helps
improve the public's understanding of what the President and the
Secretary of Defense have directed U.S. forces to do, as well the
results of their actions. Although the type of information that can be
made public will inevitably depend on operational and security
requirements, transparency efforts can help the public better
understand the human suffering that is inevitably part of war as well
as the extent to which U.S. forces' go to minimize civilian casualties.
Question. Do you believe DOD has achieved a sufficient level of
transparency on such matters? If not, what additional steps do you
believe are necessary?
Answer. I understand that DOD and its leaders regularly consider
new, more effective ways to communicate with the public on important
issues, including matters related to civilian casualties. If confirmed,
I would actively support these efforts and fulfill any related
responsibilities that may be assigned to the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
forthcoming DOD instruction on civilian harm mitigation and response.
special operations missions
Question. Do you believe the special operations activities
identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and
appropriate?
Answer. Yes, I do. SOF are uniquely manned, trained, and equipped
to undertake these activities.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. At this time, I would not recommend any changes to section
167 of title 10.
Question. Are there special operations missions or activities that
you believe should be transferred to conventional forces or, otherwise
divested by USSOCOM, and, if so, why?
Answer. I believe that the decision to employ SOF should be based
on the following criteria, that a mission or activity: is politically
sensitive; conducted in an austere or remote location without
significant support infrastructure; requires a small footprint; demands
a higher level of precision execution; and there is significant
delegated decision authority to the lowest level of command. SOF have
unique training and capabilities to execute missions under those
criteria. If those criteria are not present, then it may be more
appropriate for conventional forces to conduct the activity or mission.
Question. Are there any additional missions or activities that you
believe should be assigned to USSOCOM? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Not at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Commander, USSOCOM, as well as with the USD(P) and the CJCS, to
ensure USSOCOM is assigned appropriate missions and activities.
future of special operations forces
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges facing U.S.
Special Operations Forces in the near-, mid-, and long-term?
Answer. I believe the major challenge for SOF is balancing the
demands of sustainable counterterrorism while increasing readiness for
crisis response and strategic competition with China and Russia. I do
not believe that SOF should be prioritized to focus on longer-term
challenges that do not require their unique skills, capabilities, and
attributes.
Question. In your assessment, are U.S. Special Operations Forces
appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to address these
challenges? What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
organization, training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations
Forces?
Answer. From my current understanding, I believe SOF are actively
adapting to ensure they are ready to meet these existing and emerging
challenges. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander,
USSOCOM, to ensure SOF are organized, trained, and equipped to the
levels necessary to meet these challenges.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the ASD(SOLIC)
in identifying and implementing efforts regarding the organization,
training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations Forces?
Answer. In my view, the ASD(SO/LIC) should ensure that SOF are
organized, trained, and equipped in alignment with national and
Departmental strategic guidance. I believe that the role of the ASD(SO/
LIC) is to provide appropriate civilian oversight, to include advocacy
within the Department and with Congress, to ensure SOF are optimally
organized and receive the necessary training and equipment to carry out
their assigned missions and activities.
combatting terrorism
Question. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy
and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?
Answer. The U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism is a
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach for integrating military
and non-military efforts to combat the threat of terrorists at home and
abroad. The strategy recognizes that today's terrorist landscape is
more fluid and complex than ever. The United States must be adaptive in
its approach in countering and preventing terrorism. I understand that
USSOCOM plays a key role in this process as the Department's
Coordinating Authority to unify counterterrorism planning across DOD.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure we are focusing on the appropriate
lines of effort and are aligned with the whole-of-government effort.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by Violent
Extremist Organizations (VEOs)?
Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism provides a
framework that has proven effective guiding U.S. action to degrade ISIS
and al-Qa'ida. Our goal must be to evolve to most cost-effective
approaches to degrade the terrorist threats to the United States and
our citizens. If confirmed, I would advocate for establishing clear
policy objectives and effective assessment metrics that make it easier
to review progress and measure success, in close consultation with
interagency partners.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
or associated measures of effectiveness?
Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on how the strategy is being
implemented, and whether the existing measures of effectiveness are
precise and being used in adjusting our CT approaches across the
Department. A standardized assessment methodology and metrics could
enable a more proactive and deliberate approach to CT, which could
enable the Department to put in place more cost-effective and
sustainable approaches enduring terrorism threats.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other VEOs, to the U.S.
Homeland, and western interests, more broadly? Which group or groups,
in your view, currently present the greatest threat to the United
States?
Answer. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
present an enduring threat to U.S. citizens at home and abroad. Our
national interests, and those of our partners and allies, will remain
threatened until these groups are no longer able project power from
their operating areas, or inspire others to carry out violence in their
name.
Question. In your view, what does a ``more resource sustainable''
approach to counterterrorism, as directed by the NDS, mean?
Answer. In my view, a ``more resource-sustainable'' approach would
entail prioritizing effective operational actions against the groups
that pose the greatest threat to Americans, efficient and flexible
employment of limited resources, and wherever possible working by,
with, and through enabled partners to build the capacity of local
authorities to increasingly confront the threats on their own
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
promote a ``more resource sustainable'' approach to counterterrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a collaborative and transparent
effort, in coordination with the leadership of the Joint Staff;
Commander, USSOCOM; and other key officials, to develop Departmental
guidance and priorities for counterterrorism operations, activities,
and investments. I also will work to integrate military
counterterrorism operations into the whole-of-government approach and
with the efforts of allies and partners.
Question. If confirmed, how would you endeavor to manage risk under
this ``more resource sustainable'' approach?
Answer. If confirmed, I would manage strategic risk through a
whole-of-government evaluation of what terrorist entities pose the
greatest threat to the United States, when compared to U.S. and
coalition efforts to disrupt their activities. We need to look
carefully at our terrorism efforts to ensure they are applied against
the most important threats we face, in the context of our regional and
global national security objectives. .
detention operations
Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
addressing matters regarding detention under the law of armed conflict?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage directly on all matters
regarding policy and guidance on detention under the law of armed
conflict.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. Yes, I support the current standards for detainee treatment
in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3. Individuals in
the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to
any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to
interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field
Manual. Any and all detainees must be treated humanely.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the ongoing
triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the NDAA for
fiscal year 2016?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my DOD and Army counterparts
on the triennial review of FM 2-22.3 to ensure that it meets all
applicable legal requirements, and that the practices for interrogation
described in the Army Field Manual do not involve the use or threat of
force in accordance with section 1045 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). I
understand that the USD(I&S) is currently reviewing interrogation
techniques and may publish a DOD manual on the same. I fully support
the elevation of interrogation techniques to a DOD-level manual. If
confirmed, I will work with USD(I&S) to ensure detention operations are
synchronized across DOD.
Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM
2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the policies and
processes outlined in FM 2-22.3 to determine if any revisions may be
required.
intelligence operations
Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the
intelligence activities and programs of Special Operations Forces
delineated between the Office of the USD(I&S) and the Office of the
ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. DOD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, designates the ASD(SO/
LIC) as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense
charged with exercising authority, direction, and control of all
special operations-peculiar administrative matters, and assisting the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop overall policy
pertaining to special operations, low-intensity conflict, and irregular
warfare.
In that context, I believe close coordination with the USD(I&S), as
well as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight (ATSD(IO)) official charged with performing independent
oversight of DOD intelligence and intelligence-related activities
pursuant to DOD Directive 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), is valuable and
necessary for the proper oversight of such SOF activities. If
confirmed, I look forward to partnering with the USD(I&S) and the
ATSD(IO) to ensure that support for SOF is collaborative and
coordinated in accordance with all applicable law and policy.
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by Special Operations Forces different from those carried out by others
in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. In my view, special operations missions require immediate
and detailed intelligence to support operations that are executed on
rapid timelines and in high-risk environments. In light of those
requirements, the key difference is that these intelligence operations
are conducted in direct support of authorized SOF missions supporting
specific Combatant Commander requirements. In contrast, I understand
intelligence operations carried out by others in the intelligence
community typically serve a more strategic purpose and reflect national
priorities.
As such, I believe the main difference is that intelligence
collected and assessed by SOF directly supports special operations task
forces conducting operations in support of the Combatant Commanders.
When select SOF elements carry out intelligence operations in support
of strategic collection requirements, those requirements are fully
coordinated within the IC.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence
activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are properly
coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?
Answer. I understand that SOF sensitive activities are closely
coordinated with the Intelligence Community (IC) as required by
applicable laws, policies, and arrangements. If confirmed, I would
ensure that SOF units comply with all applicable laws, policies, and
directives for the coordination of intelligence activities with the IC.
countering weapons of mass destruction (wmd)
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by WMD to the
United States?
Answer. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continue to be a
significant threat to the Homeland and U.S. Forces, allies, partners,
and interests abroad. Specifically related to terrorists, I understand
that a few groups have expressed intent and taken action seeking to
acquire, develop, and use WMD against the United States and its allies.
Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities
under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's
efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. I understand that the responsibilities of the Commander,
USSOCOM, include providing the Secretary of Defense with
recommendations on priorities and the allocation of resources to
counter weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Commander, USSOCOM, to support him in meeting those
responsibilities and ensure he receives the support needed to undertake
this important mission.
10 u.s.c. 127e operations
Question. Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes
the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
by U.S. Special Operations Forces to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations to
combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. In my experience, section 127e authority provides a cost-
effective means for the United States to advance our security interests
by supporting and enabling partners and allies in pursuing shared
objectives against high-risk terrorist groups. If confirmed, I will
evaluate this authority, including how it supports U.S. strategic
goals, and ensure activities supported by this authority are in
alignment with NDS priorities.
Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend to this
authority?
Answer. The section 127e authority is a proven and effective tool
for U.S. SOF to conduct counterterrorism operations by, with, and
through foreign and irregular partner forces. If confirmed, I will seek
to maintain the efficacy and efficiency of the programs utilizing
section 127e support and to identify areas where we can improve the
authority, or its application, to achieve U.S. national security
objectives and support the needs of Combatant Commanders.
irregular warfare
Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as
irregular warfare and ``gray zone operations.''
What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
adversaries in the domain of irregular warfare?
Answer. It is my understanding that, because of U.S. conventional
overmatch, adversaries of the United States increasingly rely on
indirect and asymmetric approaches to competition in an attempt to
enhance their influence and avoid our advantages. This approach
bypasses our conventional overmatch because state competitors are able
to achieve many of their objectives without needing to cross the
thresholds that would lead us to respond militarily. If confirmed, I
would advocate for carefully calibrated actions that impose costs on
adversaries' destabilizing efforts and support a more integrated
approach to deterring their undesired behaviors.
Question. What should be the guiding principles of any DOD strategy
to counter threats in the ``gray zone,'' in your view?
Answer. Consistent with the Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance, I believe that diplomacy should be our tool of first resort.
DOD's approach to the ``gray zone'' should focus on three key
principles in support of diplomatic efforts: persistent engagement with
allies and partners to demonstrate our commitment and maintain
situational awareness of adversaries' destabilizing efforts;
prioritizing the information space, to seize the initiative and shape
conditions, increase our influence and legitimacy, and combat harmful
disinformation; and bolstering resilience across DOD and among allies
and partners against the subversive and coercive challenges that are
endemic to ``gray zone'' competition.
Question. What do you perceive to be the appropriate role for
Special Operations Forces in executing such a strategy?
Answer. In my view, SOF have a critical role to play in DOD's
approach to the ``gray zone,'' where strategic and conventional
deterrence are insufficient to counter adversaries' strategies.
However, I believe it is important to understand that SOF provide far
more than the direct action and counterterrorism (CT) portfolios that
have dominated the past 20 years. SOF provide a wide range of
capabilities below the threshold of armed conflict that can complement
our traditional deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I would work to
ensure that the capabilities and mission sets associated with irregular
warfare provide the Department with a suite of options to mitigate our
adversaries' malign influence, and also I would factor in a whole-of-
government approach to sustain our interests in competition.
Question. What is your assessment of the status of implementation
of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS, including efforts to
institutionalize and operationalize irregular warfare as an enduring,
core competency of the entire Joint Force?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has made
significant strides since the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS
was signed. The Department released an unclassified summary of this
document to increase awareness among our allies, partners, and the U.S.
public of how it is working to understand the strategic environment and
achieve unity of effort. I also understand that an implementation plan
was developed to maintain accountability of implementation across the
Joint Force--and not just SOF--to institutionalize IW as part of its
approach to strategic competition and armed conflict. If I am
confirmed, I would carefully review this process and advocate for
continued momentum in areas where emphasis on IW can create lasting
strategic impact and operational advantages.
Question. Do you agree with the Department of Defense's public
summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS that states ``we are
unprepared for irregular war?''
Answer. My assessment is that the Department has traditionally
prepared for deterrence of armed conflict or to win a high-intensity
war, but that the lower-intensity conflict associated with ``gray
zone'' activities is more difficult for DOD, and the U.S. Government
more generally, to understand and to deal with effectively. If
confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department continues to make
progress in addressing this issue.
Question. What do you see as the role of the ASD (SOLIC) in
implementing the objectives described in the Irregular Warfare Annex to
the NDS?
Answer. I understand that the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) is the OSD
lead for the Department's effort to implement the strategic guidance
provided by the IW Annex to the 2018 NDS. If confirmed, I would work
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide continued
direction and oversight of the Department's efforts to institutionalize
IW into Joint Force campaigning in both strategic competition and armed
conflict. I would also ensure that the long-standing, necessary reforms
identified in that document are incorporated appropriately in successor
guidance and strategic documents as they are developed.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of the ``section
1202'' authority for support of special operations for irregular
warfare? What modifications, if any, would you recommend to the
``section 1202'' authority?
Answer. I believe the section 1202 authority is an important tool
in SOF's arsenal for competition by, with, and through foreign and
irregular forces supporting our IW efforts. If confirmed, I would work
with USSOCOM to make sure that geographic Combatant Commands understand
the unique value of this authority to achieve effects in competition
within their AORs, and that USSOCOM's subordinate commands have the
necessary resources to utilize section 1202 authority fully and
continue to mature the program. I would engage with Congress to
advocate for responsible and effective growth in this authority's
availability to DOD to help meet growing demand from Combatant
Commanders.
Question. Do you believe that Special Operations Forces have the
appropriate authorities and capabilities to operate effectively in this
domain of warfare? Please explain your answer.
Answer. SOF have a range of authorities, including section 1202 of
the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 and 10 USC sections 127e and 127f, which
enable the conduct of IW-related and other sensitive activities as part
of strategic competition. It is my understanding that SOF have
appropriate IW capabilities that employ those authorities effectively.
If confirmed, I would closely monitor the employment of these
authorities to assess their sufficiency and would continuously evaluate
SOF IW capabilities for effectiveness. I would work to demonstrate
SOF's responsible use of these authorities and ensure the valuable
return on investment in their use, and would look forward to working
with Congress on these important matters.
Question. In your view, do Special Operations Forces require
additional authorities and capabilities to provide support of irregular
warfare? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the Department does not require additional
authorities or capabilities to provide support of irregular warfare at
this time. If confirmed, I would closely review the existing
authorities and provide my recommendations on where additional support
or increased authorities may be essential for our continued irregular
warfare activities.
special operations enabling capabilities
Question. Special Operations Forces rely extensively on enabling
capabilities provided by Military Service general purpose forces to
ensure mission success.
What is the role of the ASD(SOLIC) in ensuring that the special
operations requirements for enabling capabilities are properly
articulated to and provided by the Military Services?
Answer. Major Force Program-11 only funds SOF-unique requirements.
I understand that USSOCOM currently relies on the Military Services and
Defense-Wide organizations to provide $9.0 - $10 billion of support
annually in areas including military personnel, material, and base
operating support. The ASD(SO/LIC) must continue to be the senior
advocate for support to SOF within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, in coordination with Commander, USSOCOM, I will
continue to integrate my staff into Department-level relevant processes
to ensure adequate support to SOF by general purpose forces.
Question. In your view, should Special Operations Forces further
develop organic enabling capabilities, in addition or in place of those
currently provided by general purpose forces?
Answer. I believe that it is necessary and preferable for most
enabling capabilities to be provided by the Military Services; however,
there are requirements derived from SOF's unique missions where I
believe that it is necessary for the enabling capability to be
organized within USSOCOM. The decision to do so must be weighed
carefully within the context of the SOF-peculiar requirement and the
sustainment burden assumed by USSOCOM.
information operations
Question. In your view, are the Department and the broader
interagency appropriately organized to compete with state and non-state
adversaries in the information environment? If not, what
recommendations would you make?
Answer. I understand that the Department is engaged, working within
assigned portfolios, and collaborating with other relevant U.S.
Government departments and agencies, to compete in the information
environment. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the proper
structure responsible for the synchronization of all information-
related capabilities across the Department to achieve U.S. strategic
objectives. I also would make the advancement in the capabilities and
application of information operations a top priority key focus.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department and,
specifically, Special Operations Forces, in the broader information
operations and strategic communications efforts of the U.S. Government?
Answer. I understand the Department has a variety of capabilities
to conduct military operations in the information environment,
including public affairs (PA), military information support operations
(MISO), electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), and cyberspace
operations. When these activities are executed effectively and in
combination with each other and other tools, DOD can achieve its
mission more affordably, and with reduced risk to our operating forces.
If confirmed, I will strive to integrate these capabilities further
into Department activities and in support to our interagency and
foreign partners.
Question. What role should the USSOCOM's Joint MISO WebOps Center
play in supporting these efforts?
Answer. I understand that USSOCOM organized the Joint MISO WebOps
Center to host the capability to support MISO activities that are
funded and conducted by individual geographic Combatant Commands. I
understand that the Center is working and growing, and, if confirmed, I
will continue to support this important capability.
Question. Should Special Operations Forces develop any additional
military capabilities to enable the DOD and the United States to
compete more effectively in the information environment? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. Success in the information environment requires an
integrated approach among a broad spectrum of participants. If
confirmed, I will assess USSOCOM's capabilities in this area and ensure
it continues to be a meaningful part of the effort to create and
deliver timely solutions to warfighters. I will continue to focus on
needs, speed of delivery, effectiveness, and efficiency.
counternarcotics
Question. The ASD(SOLIC) is responsible for coordinating and
overseeing plans, programs and policies pertaining to counternarcotics
(CN).
What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States by
drug trafficking and related activities of transnational criminal
organizations?
Answer. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, more than 81,000 drug overdose deaths occurred in the
United States in the 12 months ending in May 2020, the highest number
of overdose deaths ever recorded in a 12-month period. More than 80
percent of drug overdoses involved opioids, primarily fentanyl and
fentanyl analogs. The Drug Enforcement Administration has stated that
Mexican-based transnational criminal organizations remain the greatest
criminal drug threat to the United States. Transnational criminal
organizations engaged in drug trafficking to the United States are a
serious threat to the health and safety of the American people and are
a destabilizing force globally.
Question. What do you view as the proper role of the Department in
supporting interagency partners tasked with counternarcotics missions,
such as the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department
of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. From what I understand, DOD has a role supporting other
Departments' counterdrug efforts. DOD is the lead Department for
detection and monitoring of potential drugs headed to the United States
by maritime or aerial means. DOD provides capabilities and expertise to
other departments and agencies, when requested, to help reduce the
national security threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the
United States.
special operations command acquisition authorities
Question. Section 167(e)(4) assigns to the Commander, USSOCOM the
authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment,
and to acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and
services. The Commander, USSOCOM is advised and assisted in these
matters by a command acquisition executive.
If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating a
determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel,
supplies, or services is ``special operations-peculiar''?
Answer. My understanding is that ``special operations-peculiar'' is
applicable to any equipment, material, supplies, or services funded by
MFP-11 and required by and unique to SOF to accomplish their missions
or activities.
Question. If confirmed as the ASD(SOLIC)--
What actions would you take to improve each of the three aspects of
the special operations-peculiar acquisition process--requirements,
acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD (A&S) and
USSOCOM on special operations-peculiar acquisition, requirements, and
budgeting processes. I would draw on the annual Planning, Programming,
and Budget Execution (PPBE) process to ensure that USSOCOM's priorities
and resource allocation are in alignment with the Department's
strategic objectives.
Question. What actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that
special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic, technically
achievable, and prioritized?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander,
USSOCOM to ensure that there is a vigorous, disciplined, and systematic
review process to prioritize special operations-peculiar requirements
in alignment with the Department's strategic objectives and continue to
deliver capabilities to the warfighter at the speed of relevance.
Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities in the
acquisition process that should be assigned to the ASD(SOLIC) or the
Commander, USSOCOM, in your view?
Answer. 10 U.S.C. section 138 authorizes the ASD(SO/LIC) to
``exercise authority, direction, and control of all special-operations
peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training,
and equipping of special operations forces.'' If confirmed, should I
identify any changes to authorities or processes that would improve the
functions of the office, I will engage within the Department and with
Congress to make appropriate recommendations.
A natural tension exists between the objectives to ensure that
acquisition programs reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the need
to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--the
objective of the test and evaluation function.
Question. What are the respective roles of the ASD(SOLIC) and the
Commander, USSOCOM in the test and evaluation of special operations-
peculiar acquisition programs? How would you exercise the
responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) in this regard, if confirmed?
Answer. I understand USSOCOM has a number of test and evaluation
programs that support special operations-peculiar acquisitions and
evaluation. If confirmed, I will ensure that USSOCOM appropriately
develops test and evaluation strategy to support the acquisition
process, as well as ensure speed of delivery to the warfighter. I will
also work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Sustainment), Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
and the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive.
Question. How has the Commander, USSOCOM made use of rapid
acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition
processes?
Answer. I understand that the Commander, USSOCOM, and the USSOCOM
Acquisition Executive leverage a wide range of acquisition processes to
facilitate rapid prototyping of special operations-peculiar hardware.
In particular, USSOCOM has been very effective in its use of the Middle
Tier of Acquisition pathway and the non-traditional acquisition tools
such as Other Transaction Authorities.
ethics and accountability
Question. In January 2020, USSOCOM completed a Comprehensive Review
of Special Operations Forces Culture and Ethics. Among other things,
the Comprehensive Review found that ``selective implementation'' of
recommendations from four previous reviews related to the culture and
ethics of Special Operations Forces since 2011, including two such
reviews mandated by Congress, have resulted in continued challenges
related to the assessment and selection of Special Operations Forces,
leader development, and force structure and employment.
What are your views on the current culture of ethics and
accountability in U.S. Special Operations Forces?
Answer. I understand that the Comprehensive Review identified
factors contributing to instances of bad decision-making. If confirmed,
I will continue to monitor the enterprise-wide institutional changes
recommended in the Comprehensive Review to ensure they continue to be
implemented, and I will work closely with Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure
a long-term commitment to and focus on ethics and accountability.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing the
recommendations of the USSOCOM Comprehensive Review?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with Commander, USSOCOM,
to ensure the special operations enterprise continues to implement the
Comprehensive Review's recommended actions with the same speed and
discipline as are the hallmarks of SOF operations. I also will keep
this Committee informed of progress until completed.
Question. What is you understanding of the actions required to
complete full implementation of the 16 recommendations provide by the
Comprehensive Review?
Answer. My understanding is that the CR Implementation Team, which
includes an ASD(SO/LIC) representative, has completed 7 of the 16
recommended actions and is on track to complete all 16 recommended
actions by the end of calendar year 2021.
Question. The USSOCOM Comprehensive Review found that ``a USSOCOM
culture overly focused on force employment and mission accomplishment
creates the contexts or situations allowing for misconduct and
unethical behavior to develop within the SOF enterprise.''
What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment play in
decisions relating to misconduct by Special Operations Forces?
Answer. I believe that decisions on SOF misconduct and unethical
behavior should be evaluated independently from any past mission
accomplishments and commendable actions. Leaders must set the example,
lead by example, maintain the highest standards of moral and ethical
behavior, and hold their personnel accountable for their actions.
health of special operations forces
Question. High operational tempo and demand for special operations
capabilities have contributed to enormous strain on Special Operations
Forces, which is challenging readiness, resilience, and retention.
What is your assessment of the health and readiness of Special
Operations Forces?
Answer. SOF face unique challenges that directly impact readiness,
resiliency, and retention, most notably the stress of repeated combat
deployments and the long-term effects of mild traumatic brain injuries.
If confirmed, I will advocate for continuing studies and programs to
address the effects of the stress of repeated combat deployments and
the long-term effects of mild traumatic brain injuries on the health of
military members and the readiness of the force.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing
the stress on Special Operations Forces?
Answer. USSOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF)
program provides embedded behavioral health providers that are vital in
the continuing effort to promote preventative stress management and
reduce suicides in the SOF community. If confirmed, I will advocate for
the POTFF program and work with the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to sustain support for the well-being of SOF and their
families.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address
suicides in Special Operations Forces?
Answer. USSOCOM has been implementing proactive SOF-specific
suicide prevention programs. If confirmed, I will work with the
Commander, USSOCOM, and the DOD Suicide Prevention Office to help
USSOCOM adopt best practices and innovative research and technologies
to continue strengthening its suicide prevention efforts.
Question. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM's Preservation
of the Force and Families program?
Answer. The Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program
is designed to help Service members and their families cope with SOF-
unique challenges that cannot be addressed through the Service-
sponsored support programs. The POTFF program takes a holistic approach
to the wellbeing of SOF members and their families. It has been
influential in strengthening SOF readiness and resiliency and reducing
suicides. The program focuses on five domains: human performance,
psychological health, cognitive performance, family readiness, and
spiritual wellbeing.
command climate survey
Question. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command
climate survey to the workforce under your leadership and management?
Answer. If confirmed, I will capitalize on the ongoing DOD-wide
effort to conduct the Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) at
all military units and consider administering this or a similar survey
to the personnel assigned to the immediate office of the ASD(SO/LIC).
Also, the Commander, USSOCOM and I will encourage commanders to take
advantage of DEOCS results to help promote positive command climate,
and will hold leaders accountable for promoting a positive command
climate.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced
sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work''
in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. If confirmed, and made aware of such a complaint, I would
direct the case be handled promptly and properly, following the DOD
guidelines and policies, and ensure the employee has access to all
support resources. It is my number one priority to create a work place
that is safe and equitable for all staff and free from hostile or
abusive conduct by anyone.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
communications) and other information from the Department.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
nominations
1. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, as part of my responsibility as a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Mr. Maier. No
2. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, have any of you ever faced discipline
or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Maier. No
culture and ethics in the special forces community
3. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, following several high profile
incidents in recent years, Congress directed U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) to conduct a comprehensive review which found that
while the special operations force does not have a ``systemic ethics
problem'', 2 decades of sustained combat operations and not enough
emphasis on leader and professional development had ``impacted the
force's culture in some troublesome ways''. Do you believe the force
has an ethics or culture problem?
Mr. Maier. I do not think the force as a whole has an ethics or
culture problem, but I am troubled by recent incidents in which members
have not upheld the values expected of them. I support continued
implementation of the Comprehensive Review (CR), through which USSOCOM
has established, or is in the process of establishing, policies and
procedures that will help ensure leaders are present, engaged, and held
accountable. While a heavy deployment tempo was found in the CR to not
be the only contributor, I am committed, if confirmed, to advocating
that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are assigned only to those
missions for which SOF are best qualified and equipped to execute. As I
stated in my testimony, I would prioritize ensuring SOF represent the
values and ideals of the nation we serve, if confirmed.
4. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, if confirmed, what steps do you plan
to take to ensure leaders in the special forces community demonstrate
integrity and demand leadership, discipline, and accountability from
members of their units?
Mr. Maier. If confirmed, I will partner closely with the USSOCOM
Commander, and ask my leadership team to work daily with SOF commanders
and senior staff, to ensure collective implementation of the CR
recommendations. Our goal must be to ensure these changes are
incorporated into permanent policies, and that the policies become
daily practice. The CR recommendations, once implemented, are core to
ensuring SOF is resilient and best prepared to tackle the complex
military challenges of the future.
special forces and great power competition
5. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, for nearly 20 years, our special
operations forces have fought heroically, but our focus has been almost
exclusively on the counter-terrorism mission in the Middle East and
other parts of the world. With the drawdown of all forces from
Afghanistan underway, if confirmed, what steps do you plan to take to
ensure the special operations forces community is prepared to support
the Joint Force in a potential future conflict with either China or
Russia?
Mr. Maier. Although SOF have focused extensively on
counterterrorism over the last two decades, SOF also bring innate
capabilities--such as placement and access, crisis response, and strong
partnerships--that will position the SOF enterprise to compete with
peer competitors, and enable the Joint Force to do so more effectively.
The SOF enterprise has moved out rapidly in revamping itself in
response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the President's Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance (March 2021), and Departmental
guidance directing focus toward China and Russia. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the USSOCOM Commander to ensure that SOF are in
alignment with overarching national and Department guidance, and
encourage the ongoing efforts to incorporate SOF and SOF-peculiar
capabilities into Department planning efforts focused on China and
Russia.
I believe that SOF and SOF capabilities bring a critical component
to competition and can reduce strategic risk for the Joint Force and
support whole-of-government efforts in strategic competition through
concerted engagements with partners and allies prior to conflict. If
confirmed, I will work with the USSOCOM Commander to balance today's
missions with the need to ensure that SOF are best positioned for
future challenges by increasing attention to modernization, training,
and capability development that best support the Joint Force.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Christopher P. Maier
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Christopher P. Maier, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr.
Christopher P. Maier in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Mr. Christopher P. Maier was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 7, 2021.]
[all]