

THE NOMINATIONS OF: MS. JILL M. HRUBY
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NA-
TIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;
MR. FRANK A. ROSE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR NATIONAL NUCLEAR SEC-
URITY ADMINISTRATION; MS. DEBORAH G.
ROSENBLUM TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MR.
CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPER-
ATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 27, 2021

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DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT**

THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2021

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville. Also present Senators Heinrich, Nunn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. I would like to call the hearing to order.

First, I would like to begin this morning's hearing by recognizing the passing of Senator John Warner at the age of 94. Senator Warner was a member of this committee for 21 years, and either Chairman or Ranking Member for eight years. He was the consummate public servant, but more importantly, he showed us all the importance of bipartisanship. His work with Senator Levin and others is what ensured the National Defense Authorization Act was passed every year and made this committee what it is today, and he will be missed.

Turning to today's hearing, the committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of Ms. Jill Hruby to be Administrator of

the National Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. Frank Rose to be Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; Ms. Deborah Rosenblum to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; and Mr. Christopher Maier to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict. I thank the nominees for their long careers of service to the United States and their willingness to assume these important roles.

I would also like to welcome the guests and family members who are here with us today. I want to thank Senator Heinrich for joining us to introduce Ms. Hruby. Mr. Rose, I welcome I believe—is your mother here? Well, Ms. Athalyn Rose, welcome, and your sister, Ms. Nikko Rose, welcome. Ms. Rosenblum, I am seeing that your husband, Todd Rosenblum, is here also, and welcome, and I want to thank Senator Nunn, who will introduce you via Webex. And, Mr. Maier, I believe welcome your wife, Ms. Emily Louise Franklin, and thank Senator Manchin, who will be introducing you today.

Ms. Hruby, you are well qualified to be nominated as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, having previously directed Sandia National Labs and its 13,000 engineers and scientists who design components for our nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, there are a number of challenges that will require your attention.

The United States has not produced plutonium pits in quantity since the late 1980s. Ms. Hruby, you have supported a “two site” pit manufacturing strategy, dividing production between the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River site in South Carolina. I would ask that you share with the committee the rationale for this two-site solution.

The NNSA is facing its highest workload demand since the 1980s as we modernize our nuclear deterrent, which includes five warhead programs, and recapitalization of our nuclear facilities, many of which date back to the Manhattan Project of World War II.

Finally, last year’s NDAA included a provision to ensure the DOD and the NNSA work closely together in developing budgets to meet DOD requirements. Ms. Hruby, if confirmed, you will be the point person interfacing with DOD on this issue and many others, and I ask that you share with us today how you would plan to address these challenges.

Mr. Rose, you have been nominated to serve as Deputy Administrator of the NNSA. Your prior positions as Assistant Secretary for Arms Control at the State Department and as a staff member on the House Armed Services Committee handling strategic forces issues should serve you well as you take on the larger policy issues facing the NNSA.

If confirmed, you will lead the day-to-day running of the NNSA and be responsible for addressing a number of institutional issues within the organization. In the intermediate term, you will need to maintain the NNSA’s federal workforce of 1,800 specialized nuclear scientists and engineers, fully a third of whom are eligible to retire. I would like to know your thoughts on how you will retain or replace these skilled civil servants.

Ms. Rosenblum, you bring a wealth of experience through your previous service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, most recently, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, you will assume a role that is focused on acquisition and will require an understanding of the technical nature of nuclear physics and engineering, rather than just policy. I would be interested in hearing how you will adapt your experience to this position.

More importantly, you will oversee the day-to-day functioning of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which ensures that the NNSA can meet DOD requirements for our nuclear deterrent. Last year this committee spent considerable effort to enable the Council and the NNSA to communicate better and coordinate more closely, and I seek your commitment in maintaining that relationship.

Mr. Maier, your role is quite different from our other three nominees. You have been nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, or SOLIC, at a critical time. Your previous experience serving as the Acting ASD(SO/LIC) and as the director of the DOD Defeat-ISIS Task Force makes you well-qualified for this position.

For several years, this committee has focused on empowering the ASD(SO/LIC) to fulfill its “service secretary-like” responsibilities for ensuring the equipping and readiness of our special operations forces. I strongly support the recently issued Department of Defense guidance that clearly articulates the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the oversight of and advocacy for U.S. Special Operations Command. Though long overdue, this guidance is a meaningful signal of the Department’s commitment to fully implement the ASD(SO/LIC) reforms mandated by Congress.

Unfortunately, the position of ASD(SO/LIC) has been without a Senate-confirmed individual for much of the last few years. If confirmed, your service will be important to providing empowered leadership and stability as the office grows in resources and responsibilities.

Mr. Maier, you will also play a central role in shaping the Department’s policies and operations with respect to counterterrorism, irregular warfare, counternarcotics, stability and humanitarian affairs. We look forward to hearing your views on these issues today.

Thank you again to our nominees. I look forward to your testimonies. Now let me now recognize Ranking Member Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also for recognizing Senator Warner. He was a class act, an enjoyable guy. I remember when he was the chairman of this committee, and I was brand new here, and he came out to Oklahoma, and he would keep people laughing the whole time he was there. He had some unusual characteristics. He did not like to fly in airplanes. He did not like to ride in boats. So it limited a little bit some of the things he was able to do. But he was a great guy and we loved him dearly.

A former Marine, Secretary of the Navy, and lawyer, he had it all.

Well, I would like to thank our nominees for being with us and for their willingness to serve the nation.

Our nation's top military and intelligence leaders have told this committee in recent months that the world is more dangerous and complex than we have ever had, but we understand that. That is true. We are more threatened today than we have ever been before.

This is why I continue to highlight the National Defense Strategy as the right roadmap to deal with these challenges, but it requires the right resourcing to make it a reality, and we have not been resourcing properly.

Modernizing our nation's nuclear deterrent has been a key priority for the past several years, and we have not done a very good job. Our senior military officers always tell us that, whenever they come before this committee. We put off much needed investments in this area for decades, watching as our infrastructure crumbled and our most important military capabilities became harder to keep in working order. We have got to do a better job than we have been doing with our nuclear modernization effort.

This demands close cooperation between DOD and NNSA, and clear-eyed leadership on both sides. We simply cannot afford to fall further behind our adversaries.

So we have got a problem out there and you guys are going to have to do a good job, and you are the right ones to take the horn. Thanks again.

Chairman REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Now I would like to call on Senator Manchin for the introduction of Mr. Maier.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I appreciate very much the ability to go ahead. I have a committee meeting that we have to go to, and I know Senator Heinrich does too, so we are going to move on. But anyway, I want to thank you all. I consider it an honor to serve on the committee with all of you, and to have the opportunity to introduce a nominee I believe will excel within the Department of Defense.

The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has grown into an essential figure within the DOD due to the demands we placed on our Special Operations forces, through constant deployments in support of a wide range of missions, including counterterrorism, direct action, civil affairs, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We depend on these elite units to always be ready to answer the call while maintaining the highest levels of quiet professionalism, and our nominee today certainly exemplifies those requirements.

Chris Maier has had a distinguished career in public service spanning five presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, but just as important in his career with the Air National Guard. I am very proud to say that Chris currently serves as a member of the 130th Airlift Wing out of Charleston, West Virginia, as an intelligence officer.

After standing on the National Security Council from 2009 to 2013, which is notorious for round-the-clock work and constant

burnout, he decided that he had not had enough and enlisted with the 130th the same year he finished his assignment on NSC. Further demonstrating his commitment, he deployed multiple times with the 130th to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, not to mention the monthly trips back to West Virginia, which I can tell you from personal experience that the drive is beautiful but it is still long. I felt a personal responsibility to highlight his service in the Air National Guard not because it is a direct connection back to my state but more importantly I believe it speaks volumes of Chris' character and commitment.

The ability to rise to the challenge of demands within civilian and military career, and the institutional knowledge he has gained from working at the National Counterterrorism Center, to most recently leading the Defeat ISIS Task Force as its director, will certainly be needed as we continue to realign the global power competition with our near-peer adversaries across a number of domains.

Our Special Operations forces are very familiar with providing flexible support to our national security objectives, but the next few years will require a leader who can set a clear example for what is expected of them.

I have no doubt that Chris Maier will set that example. He exemplifies the impartiality of our civilian leaders and the sacrifice of our military leaders. I wish him and his wife, Emily, and their son, Lincoln, the best of luck through this daunting process. For these reasons and many, many more, I will support his nomination, and I encourage each and every one of my colleagues to do the same.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Manchin.

Now it is a great privilege to introduce, via Webex, Senator Sam Nunn, a former Chairman of this Committee, distinguished Member of the United States Senate, and among your remarkable achievements was the Nunn-Lugar legislation which went a long way in securing loose nukes in the former Soviet Union.

Senator Nunn, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed. Can you hear me?

Chairman REED. Yes, sir, we can.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Good.

Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe, let me just say a couple of words for a personal privilege how honored I am to be before this committee and how many memories it brings back, and I want to say amen to the remarks both you and Senator Inhofe made about John Warner. John put the national interest first. He treated every person with respect and with dignity. He had unquestioned integrity, and I think he set an example of civility for all of us. So John will be deeply, deeply missed.

Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, members of the Armed Services Committee, I am honored to present Deborah Rosenblum to the committee, and I strongly recommend that she be confirmed as our

nation's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, [inaudible] have a nominee with the experience, the knowledge, and I must add, the boundless energy that Deborah would bring to this important role. Deborah has skilled leadership, she has sound judgment, and she has a deep understanding of today's complex threats. She also brings a background in spirit, most importantly of nonpartisanship, and a history of working [inaudible] that Deborah would lead the Defense Department's efforts in preparing for and preventing and deterring and mitigating current and future weapons of mass destruction threats.

Deborah's previous work at DOD and her experience as Executive Vice President of our organization, called the Nuclear Threat Initiative, for the last 11 years, has uniquely prepared her for this very important position.

I currently serve as co-chair of the NTI board of directors, and I have had the opportunity of working closely with Deborah over the last 20 years, particularly during my time as CEO of NTI. Let's correct that—10 years with Deborah, 20 years in that position. But continuing today in my current role, I work very closely with Deborah on a daily and weekly basis.

Deborah's contributions to the NTI have been very impactful, with leadership roles in every aspect of our work. Deborah serves on NTI's executive leadership team. She helps oversee the organization's operations, development, and programs, as well as giving oversight and managing our annual operating budget. She has provided strong oversight to our NTI biological program, which works to reduce biological risk and enhance global biosecurity.

Deborah also manages NTI's work on security issues related to China, and has traveled there regularly to engage in dialogue with governmental as well as non-governmental organizations. She is well versed in the important role that the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, play in our nuclear posture, and if confirmed, she would be an outstanding director, staff director, of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Prior to NTI, Deborah was Vice President of the Cohen group for 7 years, an international consulting firm led by our colleague and friend, former Senator and former Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen. Deborah's previous work in the Department of Defense is notable and also very impressive. For approximately 12 years, she served in senior positions at DOD in the areas of homeland defense, peace-keeping operations and support, nuclear forces, and counter-proliferation. While at DOD, she represented the United States as a member of the negotiating team with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on bilateral negotiations concerning its nuclear program.

In conclusion, Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe and members of the committee, I am confident that Deborah is fully prepared to serve in this critical role. I strongly support her nomination by President Biden. I urge the committee's support, and I urge her confirmation by the full Senate.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe. It is a great honor to be back in the environment of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, an institution I cherish. Thank you very much.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Nunn. Let me now recognize Senator Heinrich, who will introduce Ms. Hruby.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

Senator HEINRICH. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, it is a pleasure to be joining you and the other members of this great committee as a guest, after serving for a number of years on this committee. I really appreciate you allowing me to share a few words about Jill Hruby, President Biden's nominee to serve as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration at DOE.

This critical national security role safeguards the safety and the reliability of our nuclear deterrent, and I honestly cannot think of anyone better suited, or more qualified for it than Jill Hruby. And, frankly, that is not just because we are both mechanical engineers.

Over more than three decades at Sandia National Laboratories, Jill rose from a technical staff position all the way up to becoming the first woman director to lead one of our national laboratories. She has developed deep knowledge in nuclear weapon systems, component design, nuclear nonproliferation, defense and homeland security technologies and systems, renewable energy, material science, engineering sciences, and microsystems technology.

Jill has received the Department of Energy Secretary's Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service. She has authored numerous publications and reports, she holds three patents, and receive an R&D 100 award.

Since her retirement from Sandia in 2017, Jill served as the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Jill has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs Advisory Committee, and the National Academy of Science Committee for International Security and Arms Control.

She is a frequent participant in international dialogues, a spokesperson for women in engineering, and a mentor for many emerging leaders. There is even a fellowship named in her honor at Sandia Labs for women pursuing careers in engineering and science to ensure national security and global peace.

On a personal note, I always appreciated working with Jill when she was director at Sandia. She did a remarkable job, and I greatly appreciate her willingness to once again serve our country and the American people, and I hope that all of you on this committee will join me in supporting her confirmation.

Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Heinrich. And now, Ms. Hruby, your statement, please, and then we will follow to Mr. Rose and down the table. Ms. Hruby, please.

**STATEMENT OF JILL M. HRUBY, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION**

Ms. HRUBY. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to be considered to lead the United States' nuclear security efforts at this critical time for both our nation's nuclear deterrent and international nonproliferation and arms control. I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and Secretary Granholm in putting forth my nomination as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA.

I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his kind introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator Heinrich, as he mentioned, a fellow mechanical engineer, to assure that the NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on their nuclear security roles, and simultaneously contribute more broadly to national security, energy, and economic development.

My husband, our daughters and their families, including a brand-new granddaughter, our extended family, and my colleagues and friends are watching this hearing remotely. I thank them for their love, support, and encouragement as I pursue a challenging and consuming assignment again.

My life's work has been in the missions of the Department of Energy and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of graduate school and have had the opportunity to lead or work in renewable energy, nuclear weapons, homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear energy, as well as many years contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and microsystem sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director in 2017, I have remained active exploring the intersection of emerging technologies with national security policy through my work with non-governmental organizations, the National Academy of Science, the Defense Science Board, and other boards and advisory committees.

I believe my background provides me the foundation needed to quickly contribute to the important issues facing NNSA and our nation today. The NNSA counts on the world-class expertise of scientists, engineers, and program managers in our national security laboratories, dedicated plants and sites, and our Federal workforce to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile that is effective for the required deterrence and defense missions. Simultaneously, the NNSA enterprise supports nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to provide a stable, predictable, and safe world. NNSA also supports the nuclear reactor program required to power our nuclear Navy's submarines and ships.

If confirmed, my top priority will be to deliver, in a cost-effective manner, on the significant commitments in the NNSA programs across the board. We must meet the critical deliverables for the stockpile modernization, stockpile assessment, and infrastructure programs. Pit production, uranium processing, and other infrastructure programs will take constant attention, diligence, and transparency throughout the design, construction, and start-up phases. These unique facilities are essential to the future of our nation and NNSA's programs.

In addition, we must continue to bring cutting-edge science and creativity to sustain and fully understand our stockpile without testing; provide new technologies and procedures to lower cost and reduce the time to deliver all mission requirements; to stay ahead of our adversaries; and to develop advanced capabilities to enhance nuclear security, arms control, and Navy reactors.

The other high priority to me is to forge transparent, productive, and enduring institutional relationships between the DOE/NNSA and our partners including the labs, plants, and sites; the Department of Defense; the Department of State; Congress; and our international allies. We also need to rebuild technological cooperation with our adversaries on issues such as monitoring and verification technologies and nuclear security.

The nation has benefited enormously from the support and investment in the people and unique facilities of the NNSA enterprise. Training, recruiting, and retaining experts and leaders of the future is a foundation that has never been more critical due to the demographics of the complex, the fast pace of technological advancement, and the geo-political environment. Our stockpile, our capabilities, our institutions, and our creativity are the world's standards. If confirmed, I will be dedicated to making sure our national capabilities are unparalleled, our partnerships are enduring, and creative solutions are provided to the growing national and international challenges.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee today and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hruby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY JILL HRUBY

Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I am honored to be considered to lead the United States' nuclear security efforts at this critical time for both our Nation's nuclear deterrent and for international nonproliferation and arms control. I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and Secretary Granholm in putting forth my nomination as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA.

(I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his kind introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator Heinrich, a fellow engineer, to assure the NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on their nuclear security roles, and simultaneously contribute more broadly to national security, energy, and economic development.)

My husband, our daughters and their families, our extended family, and colleagues and friends are watching this hearing remotely. I thank them for their love, support, and encouragement as I pursue a challenging and consuming assignment again.

My life's work has been in the missions of the Department of Energy and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of graduate school and have had the opportunity to lead or work in renewable energy, nuclear weapons, homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear energy and nuclear waste repositories, as well as many years contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and micro-system sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director in 2017, I have remained active exploring the intersection of emerging technology with national security policy through my work with non-governmental organizations; the National Academy of Science; the Defense Science Board; and other boards and advisory committees.

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Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you. Mr. Rose, please.

STATEMENT OF FRANK A. ROSE, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. ROSE. Great. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, it is a great honor to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary Granholm for the confidence they have shown in me by nominating me to be the next Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA. I would also like to thank several members of my family, including my mother, Athalyn, my father, Frank, and my sister, Nikko, for their support, not just today, but throughout my life.

Mr. Chairman, as the President's March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance notes, the United States and its allies face a complex set of current and emerging threats. Some of the most pressing threats include an increasingly assertive China, a destabilizing Russia, and the continuing challenge of nuclear proliferation. To address these threats, the guidance states that the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, pursue arms control arrangements, and renew American leadership on nonproliferation.

NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator to achieve several key priorities. The first priority would be to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent to enable the United States to deter threats to itself and its allies. This includes

plutonium pit production, uranium processing, completing the various warhead life extension programs currently underway, modernizing NNSA's aging infrastructure, and supporting the naval nuclear reactors program.

Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States possesses the right tools to address the arms control, nonproliferation, and verification challenges of the 21st century. These challenges in this area are fundamentally different than what we faced in the past, especially with regard to issues like the monitoring and verification of nuclear warheads, cyber security, and threats to the nation's space assets. NNSA and the national laboratories are well positioned to help the United States government meet these challenges.

Mr. Chairman, you know, third priority is people. At the end of the day, NNSA's ability to achieve its mission ultimately depends on the ability to recruit, develop, and retain a highly skilled workforce of national security professionals, especially the "next generation" of leaders and experts. In recent years, significant progress has been made in this area through programs like NNSA's Graduate Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding these types of critical personnel programs, including at the labs, plants, and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.

And finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by NNSA alone. To the contrary, it will require partnerships with Congress, within the Executive branch, and with our allies and partners around the world. One of the most important attributes I would bring to the position of Principal Deputy Administrator is a long history working for, and with, NNSA's key partners. For example, I previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; as a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special Assistant at the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that NNSA's partnerships remain strong.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you and your colleagues may have. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY FRANK A. ROSE

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee, it is a great honor for me to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary Granholm for the confidence they have shown in me by nominating me to be the next Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I'd also like to thank several members of my family, including my mother Athalyn, father Frank, sister Nikko, and the rest of my family for their support, not just today, but throughout my life.

As the President's March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance notes, the United States and its allies face a complex set of current and emerging threats. Some of the most pressing threats include an increasingly assertive China, a destabilizing Russia, and the continuing challenge of nuclear proliferation. To address these threats, the guidance states that the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; pursue arms control arrangements; and renew American leadership on nonproliferation.

NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator to achieve several key priorities. The first pri-

ority would be to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent to enable the United States to deter threats to itself and its allies. This includes plutonium pit production; uranium processing; completing the various warhead life extension programs currently underway; modernizing NNSA's aging infrastructure; and supporting the naval nuclear reactors program.

Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States possesses the right tools to address the arms control, nonproliferation, and verification challenges of the 21st century. The challenges in this area are fundamentally different than what we faced in the past, especially with regard to issues like verification of nuclear warheads, cyber security, and threats to the Nation's space assets. NNSA and the national laboratories are well positioned to help the U.S. government meet these challenges.

My third priority is people. At the end of the day, NNSA's ability to achieve its mission ultimately depends on the ability to recruit, develop, and retain a highly skilled workforce of national security professionals, especially the "next generation" of leaders and experts. In recent years, significant progress has been made in this area through programs like NNSA's Graduate

Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding these types of critical personnel programs, including at the labs, plants, and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.

Finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by NNSA alone. To the contrary, it will require partnerships with Congress and across the U.S. Government—the Department of Defense, Department of State—and with our allies. One of the most important attributes I would bring to the position of Principal Deputy Administrator is a long history working for—and with—NNSA's key partners. For example, I previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special Assistant at the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA's partnerships remain strong.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Rose. Ms. Rosenblum, please.

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee for your consideration of my nomination to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If confirmed, I pledge to work in close coordination with Members of Congress and this committee on behalf of the American people and our Armed Forces. And I would like to thank Senator Nunn for his very gracious words and for his lifetime of leadership and dedication to our country.

I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me and their support for my nomination.

I also want to extend a thank-you to my extended family who has taught me that with hard work, compassion, and resilience, I can help to make the world a better place. My husband and two children are my guiding beacons, support, and inspiration.

Senator Nunn gave a wonderful summary of my professional career. I just want to emphasize how proud I am to have served my country over so many years, both inside and outside of government, and to have encouraged and supported the next generation of U.S. national security leaders. If confirmed, I will bring breadth of experience and deep understanding to bear in addressing today's complex nuclear, chemical and biological threats, including the expan-

sion of Russia, China, and North Korea's nuclear arsenals, growing global biological threats, the continued use of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity threats from our adversaries, and the dangerous potential for the misuse of emerging technologies and science.

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the United States has a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I agree with Secretary Austin that continuing to modernize our nuclear deterrent is a critical national security priority. To do so will require effective and transparent partnerships with the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as with Congress. I also join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks in supporting the nuclear triad, the bedrock of our deterrent over the past 70 years.

Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the devastation that occurs when countries, including the United States, are not adequately prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I will make improving and investing in chemical and biological defense capabilities one of my top priorities.

With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to the discussion this morning.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM

Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

Thank you, Senator Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee for your consideration of my nomination to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If confirmed, I pledge to work in close coordination with Members of Congress and this committee on behalf of the American people and our Armed Forces.

I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me and their support for my nomination.

I would also like to thank my extended family who has taught me, that with hard work, compassion and resilience, I can help to make the world a better place. My husband and two children are my guiding beacons, support and inspiration.

I began in public service as a career civil servant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, serving for over 12 years. I was fortunate to have become a member of the Senior Executive Service. Throughout this period, I worked on a broad range of defense issues, including ensuring that the U.S. maintained a robust nuclear deterrent, policies and programs to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as representing the United States in negotiations with North Korea over their nuclear program. I also have experience working with defense and private sector companies as a Vice President with the Cohen Group, a strategic consulting company. I witnessed firsthand the innovation that can occur through effective public and private sector collaborations.

Currently as the Executive Vice President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-profit dedicated to transforming global security by driving systemic solutions to nuclear and biological threats, I am involved in all aspects of the organization's global risk reduction work, both nuclear and biological, often executed in partnership with like-minded countries and international organizations.

If confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience and deep understanding to bear in addressing today's complex nuclear, chemical and biological threats, including the expansion of Russia and China's nuclear arsenals, growing global biological threats, the continued use of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity threats from our adversaries and the dangerous potential for the misuse of emerging technologies.

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the United States has a safe, secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent. I agree with Secretary Austin

that continuing to modernize our nuclear deterrent is a critical national security priority. To do so will require effective partnerships with the National Nuclear Security Agency, the Nuclear Weapons Council as well as with Congress. I also join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks in supporting the nuclear triad, the bedrock of our deterrent for the past 70 years.

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With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to our discussion today.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much. Mr. Maier, please.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. MAIER. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear today as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I appreciate your consideration of my nomination, and thank Senator Manchin for his kind introduction.

This committee has long supported the people of our nation's Special Operations enterprise and the essential missions they conduct in our defense. I am humbled to be nominated to serve alongside the women and men of our Special Operations Forces who continue to inspire us through their commitment to excellence in executing our nation's most challenging military missions. We must not lose sight of the sacrifice that they, as well as their families, continue to make on our behalf.

I have been blessed with a large and loving family, who have challenged me throughout my life to seek a calling of service to others. To my parents, Donna and Paul, your careers of service to others set the example for all of us. To my wife, Emily, I thank you for all your support, for your two decades of service as a Naval officer, and for the mother you are to our son. I also would like to acknowledge the unsung national security professionals with whom I have served in the intelligence community and the Defense Department over my career, and my fellow airman in the West Virginia Air National Guard. All of you have modeled the commitment to service that inspires me today.

I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and Secretary Austin in nominating me at such a dynamic and strategically important time for the Special Operations community. Congress created the position of ASD(SO/LIC) in 1986, and this committee's leadership and continued support for the organization have been instrumental in strengthening civilian oversight of Special Operations. The Department's recent reforms further bolster the roles and responsibilities of ASD(SO/LIC) through a unique direct-reporting relationship to the Secretary of Defense, while ensuring special operations and low-intensity conflict policy is integrated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee to continue to implement these reforms.

As the security challenges facing our nation grow increasingly complex, Special Operations Forces, or SOF, will remain critical to

U.S. efforts in conducting sustainable counterterrorism, competing for influence with near-peer rivals, and responding to crises. To meet these new and evolving missions, the Special Operations enterprise is undertaking its most comprehensive transformation in a generation. Broadening of skills, rapid fielding of technology, creative adaptation of tactics, and partnering for outsized effects will be even more essential. If confirmed, I will work every day to ensure ASD(SO/LIC) provides the essential leadership and guidance to evolve the force and missions.

As part of this transformation, we must redouble our commitment to ensuring SOF can recruit, develop, and retain the diversity of talent necessary to compete globally. A more diverse force integrates new skills, learned experiences, and perspectives that I believe is an operational imperative. I am committed to ensuring we are providing the necessary role models and resources to recruit and retain that talent in our formations.

We also must ensure that SOF represent the values and ideals of the nation we serve. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM in implementing the recommendations from its comprehensive review of SOF ethics and culture. Sexual assault and harassment, extremist behavior, and criminal activities violate our oath and corrode the force.

Fundamental to the success of SOF is, and will remain, its people. USSOCOM is the standard-bearer for caring for its personnel, from the Preservation of the Force and Family, to the Warrior Care program. As we continue to learn of new challenges across the physical, psychological, cognitive, cultural, and spiritual domains, I am committed, if confirmed, to ensuring that every member of the SOF community receives the best possible care, and is ready to compete, deter, and win in a changing global landscape.

I look forward to your questions and thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maier follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on our global posture for DOD's Special Operations Forces (SOF) Enterprise. As Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus on ASD SO/LIC's statutory responsibilities for administrative oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to testify alongside General Clarke and General Nakasone. I greatly appreciate their decades of leadership and service in protecting the Nation's national security interests.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the service, sacrifice, and success of our Special Operations Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilians. U.S. SOF have played a critical role in every major conflict since the Second World War, and they remain in the fight today—conducting operations against ISIS, al-Qaeda and its affiliates; working alongside partners and allies; and providing our Nation's leaders with flexible and rapid response options to a wide range of national security emergencies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, our SOF community has established a remarkable record of achievement. From the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in December 2001, to the complex operations targeting the world's most notorious terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden, and to the extraordinary effort to eliminate the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq, we owe our SOF community our deepest gratitude.

Despite recent reductions in deployments, SOF remain at the forefront of U.S. combat operations, often operating in remote and hostile environments. Over the

past two years, fifteen members of the SOF formation were killed in combat operations. Although SOF make up only approximately three percent of the Joint Force, they have endured more than half of U.S. combat casualties during that period. Many more have sustained life-altering injuries or suffer from psychological trauma. The service and sacrifice of these men and women challenge us to live up to the high standards they embody.

I would also like to thank Congress for your strong support of the SOF community as well as your predecessors and their foresight in recognizing the need to build and sustain special operations capabilities to respond to an increasingly complex threat environment. The Nunn-Cohen amendment that established USSOCOM and the position of ASD SO/LIC in 1986 was prescient in recognizing that future conflicts would be fought by both state and non-state actors and often through unconventional and irregular means. The authors of these reforms rightly understood that dedicated resources for Special Operations-specific purposes were essential to promoting and sustaining these capabilities within the Department.

My statement this morning will focus on how the SOF community is supporting Secretary Austin's three principal priorities as outlined in his March 3, 2021, "Message to the Force"—1) Defend the Nation, 2) Take Care of Our People, and 3) Succeed through Teamwork. In the nearly two decades following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOF have continued to develop new technologies and capabilities to become the most effective counterterrorism (CT) force in history. Today, the SOF Enterprise is in the midst of a critical period of transition as the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) challenges us to conduct counterterrorism operations more sustainably as we also adapt to the challenges of great power competition. At the same time, I am pleased to report that we have continued to improve the readiness of the force and reduce the strain of deployment on our SOF warriors and their families. Your leadership and support and have been, and will continue to be, essential in this effort.

DEFEND THE NATION

Representing approximately two percent of the DOD budget, SOF play a crucial role within the Joint Force in support of multiple DOD priorities, and the SOF community continues to make progress in adapting its capabilities to the challenge of great-power competition with Russia and China. I emphasize the word "competition" because just as the National Defense Strategy calls on us to develop traditional military capabilities to deter and respond to threats, we are also called to strengthen alliances, innovate, and compete more effectively below the level of armed conflict. Revisionist powers, rogue states, and non-state actors are actively pursuing unconventional, irregular, and asymmetric strategies to undermine U.S. strategic interests, erode democratic institutions, and destabilize and re-shape the post-WWII world order to their advantage, without provoking a U.S. conventional military response. Indeed, as the Department continues to strengthen our traditional military capabilities, we can expect that our adversaries will increasingly employ indirect and irregular approaches to achieve their strategic objectives to capitalize on asymmetries that work to their advantage.

Thus, winning the competition is essential to achieving our near-term strategic objectives, and to precluding a major conflict. This is not a theoretical battle to prepare for in the future. This is today's fight, and the SOF capabilities we have nurtured over the past 30 years are essential to successfully competing—and winning—in today's unconventional and irregular battlespaces. In close coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commands, including USSOCOM, my office is leading the implementation of the Irregular Warfare (IW) Annex to the NDS to institutionalize the Department's approach to IW throughout the Joint Force and to operationalize it for great power competition and resource-sustainable counterterrorism. The IW Annex directs the Joint Force to embrace the potential for irregular warfare to shape great power competitors' behavior proactively to our advantage, create dilemmas to deter future aggression, and strengthen alliances and partnerships.

As we adapt to meet the challenges of great power competition, we remain focused on ensuring CT operations are sustainable and focused on the most relevant threats to U.S. national security interests such as ISIS and al-Qaeda and their affiliates that continue to pose a threat to Americans and U.S. interests around the globe. Continued U.S., allied, and partner nation pressure has helped prevent these groups from attacking the homeland.

Within this strategic context, and consistent with the INSSG, we continue to adapt our global posture and develop SOF-unique capabilities that enable our operators to compete and win in a wide variety of contingencies, including CT, crisis re-

sponse, competition below the level of armed conflict, and as a force multiplier to the Joint Force if deterrence fails. Although our adversaries increasingly employ irregular warfare tactics, SOF support can ensure the

Department does not depend only on high-end warfighting and deterrent capabilities. Today, approximately 40 percent of SOF deployed forces are tasked with countering malign influence of our great-power adversaries.

Central to our irregular warfare efforts is a suite of legislative authorities that underpin our efforts to address these challenges alongside our international and interagency partners. We appreciate Congress's support for the extension and expansion of "Section 1202" authority to conduct irregular warfare operations and for the establishment of a new Title 10 funding authority for operational preparation of the environment activities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Authorities such as these and Section 127e of Title 10 are cost-effective, agile ways for the United States to advance our security interests working by, with, and through partners.

We continue to invest in technologies and capabilities to empower SOF to operate in denied areas and conduct high-risk operations in remote and austere environments, operate seamlessly with our general purpose force counterparts, and produce scalable precision effects. For instance, USSOCOM is developing next-generation Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities to enhance situational awareness for the SOF warfighter, even in contested areas. Similarly, we are making investments to enhance SOF maritime capabilities, including surface combatant craft, submarines, and unmanned underwater vehicles, and working with the Department of the Navy to ensure integration of SOF operational concepts and capability investments related to great power competition.

USSOCOM is pursuing technological advancements designed to enhance network interoperability, enable secure communications for command and control, and employ data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to enable our SOF to operate more effectively. In close collaboration with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, USSOCOM is adapting and employing AI to streamline a wide range of activities, such as intelligence analysis and operational functions. For instance, USSOCOM is leveraging AI/ML to optimize preventive maintenance for aircraft of the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) that has demonstrated significant potential for increasing the operational readiness rate of the unit's fleet of aircraft.

USSOCOM has also employed innovative acquisition pathways, including mid-tier acquisitions to execute tailored acquisition strategies and to streamline capability delivery to the warfighter. Additionally, USSOCOM is leveraging public-private partnerships and deepening relationships with academic institutions and non-traditional partners, including through its pilot project to expand small business participation in technology development to enhance SOF warfighting capabilities.

TAKE CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

Consistent with the clear priorities outlined in the NDS and the INSSG, we continue to invest in the readiness of the force and the resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families. Despite the unique challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year, SOF have continued to maintain a high level of operational readiness in support of strategic priorities. COVID-19-related restrictions on CONUS and OCONUS movements have reduced flight hours and training opportunities, particularly alongside our overseas partners. Although the number of forces deployed overseas is down approximately 15 percent over the past year, nearly 5,000 SOF are currently deployed to 62 countries.

In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the high demand for SOF resulted in a near-constant cycle of deployments for some capabilities. To address the strain caused by that operational tempo, we have taken a hard look at the forces that we can responsibly and sustainably provide to support global demand amid multifaceted and simultaneous mission requirements. Over the past several years, we have made considerable progress toward meeting the Department's requirement of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio across the force, meaning that a typical service member would expect to spend twice as much time at home station as on deployment. We continue to make progress toward achieving this target with now more than 90 percent of the force at a 1:2 ratio or better.

The additional dwell time spent at home station is not only contributing to increased predictability for the force and improved work-life balance, it is also enabling additional time for training, screening, rest, refit, and reintegration. USSOCOM has also continued to meet the Department's goal of fewer than five percent non-deployable military personnel.

In addition to monitoring metrics of SOF readiness, we are closely evaluating how SOF posture relates to our ability to sustain CT and crisis response operations along with high-priority missions. We are also focused on limiting SOF deployments to those that require SOF-specific capabilities and training. For instance, the establishment of the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade has provided a capable General Purpose Force option for training and mentoring foreign security forces. The combination of these efforts has helped ease the strain of a high and unsustainable rate of overseas deployments for SOF personnel.

In addition to reducing the strain on the force due to high operational tempo, the SOF Enterprise is further enhancing readiness by taking a holistic approach to caring for SOF warriors and their families. With the strong support of Congress, USSOCOM has continued to develop its Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program to address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical, psychological, social, and spiritual performance. The POTFF program leverages a combination of USSOCOM, Service, and DOD resources to meet the needs of the various SOF components and individual unit commanders. These programs include injury prevention/strength training, performance nutrition, rehabilitative care, improved access to behavioral health and suicide prevention, family and community programs, promoting healthy living, and reinforcing resiliency and spiritual fitness.

Participation in the POTFF human performance program and neurocognitive baselining are now mandatory for all USSOCOM personnel. Our SOF warriors recognize POTFF as an invaluable resource for their readiness and career longevity, and data collected from our SOF commanders indicates that the program is having a significant and positive impact on the mission readiness of their units. SO/LIC is currently collaborating with the command to develop standardized and quantitative outcome metrics to help inform future resourcing decisions, and we look forward to working closely with the committee to ensure we are achieving a solid return on this investment in our personnel.

Similarly, USSOCOM's Warrior Care program continues to provide specialized care for soldiers who have suffered physical or psychological trauma by providing SOF members and their families support through recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We have no greater responsibility than to care for our SOF warriors and to provide them with a path to return to service and/or transition to civilian careers following their years of service. We appreciate the strong support of Congress for each of these efforts.

I remain concerned about instances of moral and ethical failings within the SOF community, and I know General Clarke shares this concern. Incidents such as these have no place in the military or our Department, and if not tackled head-on can erode morale and undermine trust and our moral authority with our partners and allies. I commend General Clarke for his initiative in directing a comprehensive review of SOF culture and ethics beginning in August 2019. The review was directed to address shortfalls and limitations of multiple previous studies and to build upon them to address enterprise-wide issues and to analyze data from across the SOF Enterprise.

SO/LIC strongly supported this effort, and SO/LIC personnel actively participated in the review, which entailed conducting in-depth interviews with approximately 2,000 personnel of all ranks within more than 50 SOF commands. Although the comprehensive review did not identify evidence of a systemic ethics deficiency, it did note that "in some instances USSOCOM's cultural focus on SOF employment and mission accomplishment is to the detriment of leadership, discipline and accountability," and it outlined concrete recommendations. My office is now helping to guide the Comprehensive Review Implementation Team, established to drive implementation of the review's recommendations. These recommendations address training and organization of the force, leader development, and the prevention of over-exertion on the force that we believe contributes in part to ethical lapses.

As we address challenges related to SOF culture and ethics, Secretary Austin has placed special emphasis on combatting sexual assault and addressing actions associated with extremist or dissident ideologies within the Department. The men and women who make up the SOF Enterprise deserve nothing less than a safe and supportive work environment—free from intimidation, harassment, and racial and cultural bias of any kind. We recognize that extremist ideology exists within our military, and we must ensure that our service members honor the oaths they have taken to uphold and defend our Constitution against all enemies—foreign and domestic. For this reason, Secretary Austin directed a Department-wide stand-down to allow senior leaders to discuss the importance of our oath of office, impermissible behaviors, and procedures for reporting extremist behaviors. I am committed to working hand-in-hand with General Clarke in leading this effort on behalf of the

SOF community, ensuring that our efforts are closely aligned with top-level guidance and actions and policies taken by the Department and the Military Services.

We recognize that many of the solutions have not yet been fully implemented and that true cultural change will require a sustained and focused effort over many years. I look forward to working with you and your staff as we strengthen the foundation of our culture and ethics throughout the SOF Enterprise. SO/LIC will continue to support this effort by focusing on those actions that fall within our administrative role overseeing the organization and training of SOF personnel and ensuring these efforts are adequately resourced. Working closely with USSOCOM and each of the Services, we will continue to develop and sustain a SOF culture of personal accountability that is worthy of the men and women that constitute our force.

We are similarly focused on enhancing the diversity within our SOF formation. As it stands today, our force is not adequately reflective of the American people. In addition to the moral imperative of addressing this challenge, we recognize that a more diverse force makes us more effective operationally by allowing us to draw upon diverse perspectives and talents and new ideas to enable us to prevail in the global contest for influence and legitimacy we are faced with today. Enhancing diversity within the force will become increasingly important as the Department places greater emphasis on operations in the information environment against foreign disinformation and malign influence.

Over the past year, ASD(SO/LIC) served on the Executive Working Group as part of the Department of Defense's Board on Diversity and Inclusion. A SOF officer on my staff sat on the DOD Board on Diversity and Inclusion to ensure that special operations-unique issues were reflected and considered as part of the overarching DOD efforts. Last year, SO/LIC, in partnership with USSOCOM's Commander and Senior Enlisted Leader, issued a memorandum to all SOF personnel emphasizing that diversity and inclusion is a strategic imperative to the mission of SOF. I co-chair, along with the USSOCOM Vice Commander, the SOF Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to oversee and drive the development and execution of the USSOCOM Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. I am pleased that USSOCOM has recently hired its first Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, and I look forward to working with the command as we collectively address this challenge.

In addition to addressing racial and cultural diversity within the SOF formation, we are also working to ensure that all SOF career fields are open to all who have the desire and meet the rigorous standards. Women have filled vital roles within the SOF community for many years, and we are proud that in the past year, two women have for the first time successfully completed the Special Forces Qualification Course and are currently serving as Green Berets. Although we recognize that we have much more progress to make in this area, these talented soldiers have blazed a path that we expect many others will follow.

Addressing each of these challenges will require a multifaceted, sustained approach, with a clear strategy, concrete objectives, and measurable benchmarks. Additionally, the continued institutionalization of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command will provide additional avenues to highlight policy and resource issues affecting SOF, including diversity, ethics, and accountability. For instance, regularly occurring readiness briefings from USSOCOM to ASD(SO/LIC) now address sexual assault and harassment prevention and response, domestic violence, suicide prevention, COVID-19 vaccination rates, and accession/promotion by sex and ethnicity. SO/LIC brings unique perspective to these challenges, and you have my commitment that we will remain fully engaged.

SUCCEED THROUGH TEAMWORK

Secretary Austin's Message to the Force challenges us to join forces with our partners and allies; work in partnership across U.S. departments and agencies, with Congress, and with private industry; and to build unity of effort and missions throughout the Department, including strengthening civil-military cooperation. The men and women of the SOF community excel in building strong and lasting partnerships, including with our foreign, interagency, and private industry partners. SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to deepen our civilian-military collaboration across a wide range of issues, including SOF personnel and readiness, budget and acquisitions, special access programs, and legislative affairs.

Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our democracy, and strengthening civilian institutions within the Department is a key priority of Secretary Austin. As the Secretary testified before this committee in his confirmation hearing, "the safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian control of our armed forces ... the subordination of military power to the civil." We also recognize and appreciate the Congress's strong interest in empowering civilian lead-

ership, both within the Special Operations community and throughout the Department.

The continued institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command, as codified in Title 10, is one of many examples where the Department is making progress in empowering civilian leadership, oversight, and advocacy within the Department's decision-making mechanisms. Over the past year, we have made progress in strengthening civilian oversight of SOF, but we recognize that more remains to be done to realize the full intent of recent legislative reforms to strengthen the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role and to establish the Secretariat for Special Operations. Recent actions include designating ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations administrative matters, establishing a position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to lead the Secretariat and to assist the ASD with those responsibilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) also has been added to numerous senior Departmental decision-making bodies, in many instances marking the first time the SOF Enterprise has had representation and a voice in these discussions and decisions.

Enhanced civilian leadership and oversight are essential to advocating for SOF within the Department and tackling key issues affecting the SOF Enterprise. These elements also help ensure an independent and objective assessment of military capabilities and policy issues. Further institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s administrative chain of command responsibilities will require continued close coordination with senior DOD leadership, USSOCOM, and Congress. I fully embrace this role, and I also recognize that there is more work ahead as we fulfill Congress's intent. As these efforts mature, I look forward to working with you, General Clarke, and other DOD senior leaders to ensure that these reforms meet the intent of Congress and serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of our SOF community.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the committee again for its strong support for our special operations personnel, who serve as a critical linchpin in safeguarding our national security—in wartime and peacetime. As an integral component of the Joint Force, SOF bring unique capabilities that complement and strengthen those of our general purpose forces as well as our interagency and international partners.

I thank the committee again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much. Now I will ask a series of questions required of all civilian nominees. Please respond appropriately.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. Yes.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. Yes.

Chairman REED. Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Ms. HRUBY. No.

Mr. ROSE. No.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. No.

Mr. MAIER. No.

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibility makes it important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this committee when requested?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. Yes.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. Yes.

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such records?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. Yes.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established by this committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. Yes.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. Yes.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. Yes.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes.

Mr. MAIER. Yes.

Chairman REED. Let the record show that all of the witnesses have responded in the affirmative to all of the questions.

Mr. Hruby, among one of the major challenges that you have is the production of 80 pits in the next several years. The original idea was to construct 5,000 square foot modules at Los Alamos, and roughly the cost per square foot of such construction was about 20,000. That plan was changed in 2018 to recondition or refit the MOX facility in Savannah, Georgia, which is 450,000 square feet, about 25 percent completed. So there is obviously going to be a cost differential here.

What are your views on the two-facility production plan?

Ms. HRUBY. Chairman, thank you for your question. This is the biggest issue I think facing NNSA today, is delivering the pit production capability for our nation for the first time in many decades. The current plan that NNSA has developed, and that I support, includes producing pits at both Los Alamos and Savannah River, 30 pits per year minimum at Los Alamos, 50 pits per year minimum at Savannah River.

The 30 pits per year at Los Alamos is on track to be delivered in 2026. The 50 pits per year at Savannah River, originally planned for 2030, is likely to now be somewhere between 2030 and 2035, a decision that will be made at the Critical Decision 2 point.

I believe that the two-site solution is a good solution for a couple of reasons. One is that it is, as expressed by NNSA, and again, I agree that it is more resilient than a one-site solution. Should anything go wrong, should there be an accident, it allows the other site to continue to make pits. And I think that is quite important and allows the throughput of pits to be closer to 80 than it would need to be, to hedge against bets.

The other reason is I think it takes advantage of the infrastructure at NNSA and the skill sets at NNSA. So the scientists at Los Alamos, I believe are very important to pit production. I also believe that the culture of a production plant that exists at Savannah River is also important. And if the two organizations work together well, and if confirmed, it will be my job to make sure that they do, I think we take best advantage of the infrastructure and the people of NNSA, and we end up with the most resilient pit production capability in the country per dollar.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much. Because of the limited time, I ask the respondents to be concise, and if we have a second round I will try to reach everyone. But let me just ask Ms. Rosenblum. If confirmed, you will be the Executive Secretary of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and will you assure us that you will do everything you can to timely coordinate the budget reviews between DOD and NSA, to guarantee the Council can meet DOD requirements?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I am confirmed, yes, I will. I have reviewed all of the responsibilities that would be mine, if confirmed as the staff director, and feel prepared to carry them out, and will do so.

Chairman REED. Thank you. Mr. Maier, you have a dual-hat responsibility. You report to the Secretary of Defense the service-like activities of SOCOM, and then you report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy with respect to policy matters. Can you briefly give us an idea of how you intend to discharge those dual responsibilities?

Ms. MAIER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question. So one way we will look at that is having different staffs that integrate at a more senior level but work different parts of that portfolio, and I personally think there is great value in having ASD(SO/LIC) that does both, because it can speak to the policy components in parts of those conversations in the Department but also represents SOCOM and provides that civilian oversight independently but in a synergistic manner with the policy.

Chairman REED. Thank you. And finally, Mr. Rose, just a quick, in my remaining 5 seconds. You indicated one of your challenges is maintaining a robust workforce. About a third of your employees are eligible for retirement, and would likely do so. You are competing against a very competitive market for skilled engineers, and particularly anybody that knows anything about a computer.

So can you give us, very briefly, your thoughts on this issue?

Mr. ROSE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the question. I would say recruiting, developing, and retaining the next generation of nuclear security experts is absolutely vital. And as I mentioned, there has been a lot of progress in the past

several years, in large part thanks to this committee. But we still have significant gaps, as you mentioned.

One of my first objectives, if confirmed in the position, would be to meet with the leadership of NNSA, the labs, and the sites to, one, identify where our gaps are with regards to personnel, and then, two, developing a comprehensive plan to implement and close those gaps. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Mr. Rose. Senator Inhofe, please.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I think all opening statements were great opening statements. I commend you on those statements.

Ms. Hruby, last year we had major concerns with the Secretary of the DOE interfering with the work of the NNSA and putting our nuclear modernization programs at risk, even questioning what our role is in developing the budget and some other things, and it was not a workable thing. In fact, I had to personally intervene with then President Trump to get things pretty well straightened out. So we have got to have a clear understanding at DOE and OMB about the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Now I like the fact that you—and I told you this before—came right out with some of your priorities, and stating what those priorities were, number one, ensuring the success of our weapons programs, two, updating obsolete infrastructure, and three, taking care of our people. And I agree with those priorities. Will you agree to keeping us informed as to how you are coming along with your priorities?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes, Senator. Of course, I would be delighted to keep you informed, if confirmed.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. And I think also, Mr. Rose, how do you plan to support Ms. Hruby in these priorities, these three priorities?

Mr. ROSE. Senator, I agree with all of her priorities, and I will do everything in my power to be a very good deputy, if confirmed.

Senator INHOFE. That is good. And, Mr. Maier, I want to talk a little bit about what is happening in Africa right now. It is a critical theater for implementing our National Defense Strategy. China and Russia are on the rise. China has opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. A lot of people do not realize that. This is the first time they have done this, and now they are all the way as far south as the southern part of Tanzania. They are active in there as well as Russia being on the rise in that area. So right now ISIS and al Qaeda are on the increase as well, and to deal with these threats we only have 6,000 personnel, military personnel, on the entire continent.

I was critical of the previous administration, because when they were talking about revamping and changing our priorities in different parts of the world I really feel that we are understaffed. That is the only area where we are starting off understaffed. And I am not anticipating or expecting that you had a chance to look at and evaluate the personnel and whether or not it is adequate, but any first thoughts in terms of where they are in that field?

Mr. MAIER. Senator, thanks for the question, and I think Africa is a very important theater, as you say, for both things that Special Operations is focused on—obviously 20 years or more of the

counterterrorism fight there, as you mentioned, a number of ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates there—but then it is also an arena for competition, as you referenced, in Djibouti. And I think my objective, if confirmed, is to very much look at where we are getting return on that investment and where we can combine some of those missions to get more benefit for the National Defense Strategy.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Well, I think one of the first things that I would like to have you do, and share with us, on what your impression is in terms of adequacy of our resources in Africa. Would you do that?

Ms. MAIER. I would, Senator. If confirmed, I would be glad to look at that as a first priority.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Lastly, I think that there is going to be some of the members are going to be talking to you and Ms. Rosenblum about the issue of no-first-use policy. There is some confusion as to where you are in some people's minds, and I will give you one shot to state that before the rest of them get to you. All right?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. All right. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my view on this. Give the strategic environment that we face, one that is absolutely challenging U.S. interests and those of our allies, I do not support a no-first-use policy.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me now recognize Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each of our nominees this morning for your willingness to be considered for these very important posts and for your testimony this morning.

I want to begin with you, Mr. Maier, because in your opening remarks you talked about the importance of diversity in our Special Operations Forces, and one aspect of that diversity are the women that we need to have join Operation Forces, yet a study from 2016 found that 85 percent of Special Operators opposed allowing women into their specialties, and 71 percent opposed women in their units.

So this is obviously an ongoing challenge. It is getting better, I know. We just had our first—we have 50 graduates, I think, of Ranger School that just happened, and one of our first Green Berets. But can you talk about what you think some of the challenges are to better integrating women, and specifically, reading the report that just came out in April of Women in Army Special Operations Survey, one of the things that I found particularly interesting was that one of the biggest challenges is equipment fitting. And I had the opportunity to go out to Minot Air Force Base recent with General Brown, and one of the demonstrations he provided for us, that they are doing there in Minot, is working to refit the equipment that women are wearing so that they can operate better with the equipment we have for our women in the military.

So can you talk about those challenges and how you will address them?

Ms. MAIER. Yes, Senator. I think it is a very important issue, and I think the first step has been opening all fields to women, and I think what we are seeing is the evolution of that. So the survey

you cite from U.S. Army Special Operations was commissioned by them internally, and I think this is indicative of the ongoing effort to build both the ability for women to operate on an equal footing and have the acceptance and, in many cases, the equipment that is required.

If confirmed, this is one of the top priorities I would have. I think it fits into the Secretary and, by extension, the President's strive to really have a diverse force. We know, as we compete globally, we are going to need both genders in the fight, and we are going to need people with other expertise that we might not have had as much of in the force at this state.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. As an aside, if you did not hear the public radio piece on how women are required to wear their hair in the military, that was on this morning, I would urge you to listen to it. It was a very important example of why we have got to respond to some of these challenges that women are facing, in a way that is more friendly to the differences between men and women, which are not worse. They are just different.

Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, I think this question is for both of you. We just saw the impact of the cyber hacking into the Colonial Pipeline and what that meant for the country. How do we reassure people who have questions about our nuclear weapons, and our nuclear command and control structure, that they are not also open to those kinds of cyberattacks?

Ms. HRUBY. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, for the question. Of course, cyber is a major challenge across the U.S. Government, and particularly in the places that we want to keep most secure, the nuclear weapons facilities. The people in the nuclear weapons, in the NNSA complex, work tirelessly to protect the networks and have been fairly successful in doing so. I think we need to continue to find talent, to use that talent effectively to protect our networks and to share those lessons across the government. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Rose?

Mr. ROSE. Senator, thanks very much for the question. I agree with everything Ms. Hruby said, and if confirmed, one of my first priorities would be to hire a new chief information officer for the NNSA. The most recent officer just retired. But I fully agree. I actually teach a course at Georgetown University called "Outer Space But Strategic Capabilities," and it talks about all the interrelationships between cyber, nuclear, as well as outer space.

So I think you are absolutely right. We have to look at these strategic issues from a holistic approach. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Fischer.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Ms. Rosenblum, in a 2019 talk, you described our nuclear forces as being on a, quote, "hair trigger," end quote. I am concerned by this, because for the entire time that I have been on this committee, military and civilian officials, from both the Obama and the Trump administrations, have consistently argued against this phrase and the idea that it is meant to foster, which is that there is something inherently unsafe about our ICBM posture.

Just a few weeks ago, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, we heard General Kehler, the former STRATCOM Commander, explain again why this is a red herring. In fact, I remember testimony from the Obama administration that reducing the alert posture for our ICBM would actually be destabilizing. Senator Shaheen just spoke about a CODEL that a few of us took to Minot in North Dakota, the base, where that phrase was also identified as a red herring.

So do you believe that our alert posture is unsafe or that it needs to be changed?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to clarify my views with respect to this issue. I support the current alert posture and believe it is an important piece to making our nuclear deterrent credible. I believe that what you are referring to is an op-ed that I had done in 2019, in the Des Moines Register, in advance of the Iowa caucuses. The purpose of the op-ed was to encourage Iowans to be able to engage with the candidates around issues related to nuclear weapons. It was in an attempt to have that language be accessible and understandable that I used the phrase “hair trigger alert.” I certainly did not mean any offense by it, and if I did, I apologize.

Senator FISCHER. Well, I thank you for those comments. I think it is extremely important that all public figures are careful in terminology that is used with regards to the security of this nation. As you know, there are numerous safeguards that are in place, and all the testimony that has been given to this committee over the years about this, that “hair trigger” phrase is such a mischaracterization, and I believe it is not serving the people of this country well to have that kind of language out there that does not reflect the true environment that we live in.

Dr. Hruby, last week in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee I talked to Dr. Verdon about the relationship between modernizing NNSA’s nuclear complex and how this investment actually reduces the potential need to [inaudible] nuclear test. Can you talk about how the relationship is between those two things, how you view that?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Senator Fischer. The modernization of the NNSA infrastructure is critical to keeping our stockpile safe, secure, and reliable without testing. And I want to, in particular, highlight the ability to make plutonium pits as part of that. We know that pits’ performance change with time, and the planned pit production program allows us to get ahead of that and make sure that we do not get to a point where we need to test the weapons in an underground, in a nuclear explosive test, to make sure they are reliable. Thank you.

Senator FISCHER. Also, Doctor, I appreciated our discussion about the importance of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program, and I just wanted to confirm one thing for the record. Do you believe that the United States must rebuild and maintain the basic capabilities of design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons stockpile to support our nation’s deterrent?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes, Senator, I do. I think the Stockpile Responsiveness Program is an excellent program that has been start-

ed within the last few years and will be very important to the future of our stockpile.

Senator FISCHER. And, Mr. Rose, do you agree? Yes or no. I am sorry to make it so short. I am out of time.

Mr. ROSE. Yes, I agree.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you very much. Thank you to the panelists for coming. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now let me recognize Senator Kaine.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, and congratulations to each of the nominees. I believe you are all very well qualified for your positions.

I want to just also say a word about John Warner. It is a true honor to be a Virginia Senator on the Armed Services Committee and think about my friend, and feel sad about his death but also celebrate an amazing life. Senator Warner was in the Pacific in World War II, and when he came back to the United States at the end of the war he went to Washington and Lee to go to college. And my father-in-law was also in the Pacific during World War II, as a submariner, and then came back and went to school at Washington and Lee. And they were very, very dear friends, beginning in 1946.

They built the modern Republican Party in Virginia from essentially nothing. When my father-in-law was the first elected governor, Republican governor, in Virginia history, John was the Secretary of the Navy, and they worked together on many issues, because Virginia is the center of naval power in the world. Their friendship was tested but not strained when they ran against each other for the United States Senate in 1978, and John Warner beat my father-in-law, beat my political hero, just like he later beat my best friend in politics, Mark Warner, in a race in 1996, for the United States Senate.

I knew how important this committee was to John Warner, when I was mayor and governor and was working with Senator Warner. His service on this committee was something that he talked about a lot. I think it was his favorite part of his

30 years in the United States Senate. But by the time I came to the Senate he had been gone, but then I really wanted to know even more about John Warner, because I got to meet people like Jack Reed and John McCain, and Carl Levin, and others who had served with John on this committee, and I learned an entirely new dimension of my friend. And I just wanted to begin my comments today just expressing how sad I feel that he is gone but how proud I am to be a successor, not a replacement as a Virginia Senator on the Armed, but I am a successor to him.

One just personal privilege. When I found that he had died I knew my father-in-law would be very distraught about this. My father-in-law will be 98 in September. And my wife just texted me. She reached her dad this morning to talk to him about it at the retirement community where he lives, and he was very stunned and saddened about it. And kept saying, "But he is a youngster. He is younger than me." That is very much like my father-in-law to think that a 94-year-old is a youngster.

I want to ask just one question of Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose. The Navy has published a SIOP Shipyard Industrialization Optimization Plan that really sort of lays out, quite a ways into the future, the necessary investments that need to be made in our public shipyards. Does NNSA have something similar, kind of a long-term investment document that would help us work with you to make sure that we are keeping the physical facilities of the NNSA in the shape they need to be in?

Ms. HRUBY. Senator, is the specific question—I just want to make sure I am answering the right question—about the Navy Reactor Program, or just in general?

Senator KAINE. Just in general. Does the NNSA programs within its purview have a similar sort of long-term capital improvement investment plan that we can assess to determine whether we are appropriately investing?

Ms. HRUBY. Okay. Thank you for the clarification. The NNSA has worked very hard over the last 5 years or so to develop a risk-based approach to infrastructure investment needs. It is a fairly sophisticated approach. The infrastructure needs are large, and so they have prioritized those by ability to deliver programs, and there is a long-term plan. And if confirmed, I want to take a close look at that, but there is a plan.

Senator KAINE. I also know the President is sending us up a budget today, and I am going to be interested to see the budgetary proposals to execute on a plan like that.

Thank you. I will yield back to you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. And now I would like to recognize Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Rosenblum, welcome to the committee. It is an honor to be introduced by Sam Nunn. I will overlook your association with Bill Cohen, I assure you, when it comes time to vote on your nomination. Please give him my regards.

Ms. Hruby, one of the issues involved with nuclear modernization is that many Americans do not understand why we are doing it. Those of us that have lived through prior decades have to realize the Cold War is in a 30-year rear-view mirror. Since that time we have had 9/11, we have had the war on terror, we have had COVID, and so I want to ask you some questions.

Our essential defense posture for the past 70 years has been deterrence of others' attacks on us. Is that not true?

Ms. HRUBY. That is true, Senator.

Senator KING. And deterrence rests upon your adversary understanding that you have a capacity to make life very difficult—that is a euphemism—for them and the will to use it. Is that not correct?

Ms. HRUBY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator KING. And if your deterrent is out of date, in bad shape, not modernized, not able to be delivered, then that, in fact, makes the country less safe, does it not?

Ms. HRUBY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator KING. And so the modernization that we are talking about is essential to maintaining the peace. Isn't that correct?

Ms. HRUBY. It is.

Senator KING. I think this is important, because people back home in Maine say, "Why are we spending all this money on nuclear weapons?" And the reason is because we never want to have a nuclear war. The irony, or the paradox, of nuclear weapons is we build them so we will never have to use them. And that strategy has, in fact, worked for over 70 years. Is that correct?

Ms. HRUBY. That is correct.

Senator KING. Now let me go to the specifics of that, and I think the answer is contained in the conversation we have already had, and I apologize for cross-examining you in this way, but it is a way of getting through material in a shorter period of time.

We are going back into the business of making plutonium pits, which are necessary elements for a nuclear weapon. And I presume that the reason that is the case is that we have to modernization and that the pits that were built in earlier periods are no longer fully dependable and need to be upgraded along with other parts of the nuclear deterrent. Is that correct?

Ms. HRUBY. Well, the pits today are dependable. The NNSA plan is to make sure that they can be replaced before they become not dependable.

Senator KING. And that entails reinvigorating pit production at both Los Alamos, and the other question is, why do we need two places? Why are we talking about Los Alamos and Savannah River?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes, Senator. The number of pits that are projected to be needed is a minimum of 80 pits per year. That is a significant capability at Los Alamos. If we were to do it all there it would require much more infrastructure investment. Using the MOX facility shell, which has been built as a Cat-1 facility, a facility that can handle plutonium, allows us to have a cost-effective program, use the talent across the NNSA complex.

Senator KING. Thank you. Mr. Rose, I want to turn to you. A couple of things. We had a question a few minutes ago about cyber, and you said you were going to appoint a new CIO. I want urgency here, and I do not think—I mean, I am fine with appointing a new CIO, but I would like you to stand up a team that aggressively red-teams your systems to test them, because every CIO says, "Oh, we are okay," and that goes up the line and you say, "We are okay." I want people who are paid to hack your system, to demonstrate whether or not you are, in fact, secure. There is no more important cyber protection than that of nuclear command and control and communication.

So I hope that you will go beyond a new CIO to an all-hands-on-deck, urgent, urgent pursuit of cyber defense, of particularly in the NNSA.

Mr. ROSE. Senator, thank you very much. I agree with you 100 percent. You know, we have got to get on our A-game with regard to cyber, especially that nexus between cyber and nuclear. One of the things that I have been focused on in my career over the last 5 years is the challenge of these new emerging technologies to nuclear deterrence. So if confirmed, I assure you that I will make your recommendation a priority, and we will work to get the NNSA's house in order with regard to cybersecurity.

Senator KING. Thank you, sir. If you do not, I will come and find you.

[Laughter.]

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. I do not know how to respond to the last comment.

Let me now thank Senator King and recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren.

Senator WARREN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations to each of you on your nominations.

Ms. Hruby, I want to talk about NNSA's out-of-control nuclear weapons budget. According to the agency's 25-year build plan, published last December, projected spending on nuclear weapons activities has risen to \$505 billion. That is a staggering increase of \$113 billion, or 29 percent, from the 2020 version of the plan. Now I understand that cost overruns at the NNSA are the norm, but these figures are mind-boggling. And when we let the cost of weapons balloon it can crowd out other important Energy Department national security programs, such as nonproliferation.

So, Ms. Hruby, I want to ask, will you commit to providing this committee with cost estimates for major agency projects that are realistic and not low-balled, and schedules for completing these projects that are also realistic and not just a fantasy?

Ms. HRUBY. Well, thank you, Senator Warren. Yes, the answer is yes, I will. I do think we need to get better at cost estimation and schedule estimation within the Department, and seeking talent to do that and making sure that is done will be a top priority for me, if confirmed.

Senator WARREN. I would only amend what you are saying. You do not just need to get better. Based on where we are right now, you need to get a lot better on this. I also want to note that I am concerned about NNSA's current modernization plan, which, in addition to being unnecessary has no chance of being executed on time or on budget.

Now, Ms. Rosenblum, let me ask you, if confirmed, in addition to be an Assistant Secretary, you will also be the Staff Director for the Pentagon's Nuclear Weapons Council. Last year, National Defense Authorization Act significantly increased the role of the Nuclear Weapons Council in determining the NNSA budget, decreasing the traditional role of the Energy Department. This effort prompted an outpouring of bipartisan opposition in the Senate and the House, but, unfortunately, key parts of the objectionable language were retained in the final bill.

So let me ask, Ms. Rosenblum, do you believe the Energy Secretary should retain the decision authority for the NNSA budget request?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Senator, thank you very much for the question. I am very familiar with the changes that were made certainly to the legislation, and it is one that I do support and believe that the Council is appropriately chaired by the Department of Defense.

Senator WARREN. I am not sure I understand the answer to my question, and that is, do you believe that the Energy Secretary should retain decision authority for the NNSA budget request? I

just want to make sure I understand your answer. That is a yes or no.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes, I do, Senator, in consultation.

Senator WARREN. I appreciate that. I just wanted to make sure I understood.

So, Ms. Hruby, are you concerned that this new law will negatively impact your ability to set NNSA's budget?

Ms. HRUBY. I think that we need forge a better relationship so things like this do not happen in the future, and I am confident we can do that and we can work through the legal requirements as needed.

Senator WARREN. Well, I hope that you are right, but I am very concerned about this.

As my colleagues, Senator Manchin and Senator Murkowski, wrote last year, the Nuclear Weapons Council, quote, "has a narrower focus than the Secretary of Energy, and its recommendations would likely prioritize nuclear weapons at the expense of other critical energy department missions," end quote. I fear that this new law will make it harder to rein in the NNSA's dangerous budget growth, and I will look forward to working with both of you to make sure that we are able to do that.

So thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Warren. Now let me recognize Senator Kelly.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all four of you for being here today. I really appreciate it. This question is for Ms. Rosenblum.

In April, the Government Accountability Office issued a report which highlighted the threat that biological agents present to our servicemembers on the Korean Peninsula, and found that the Department needs to improve the preparedness of U.S. forces to counter chemical and biological weapons.

The DOD manufactured hundreds of thousands of doses of vaccines last year for both the plague and botulinum toxin, two threats for which the DOD has longstanding requirements to provide medical countermeasures. However, as part of the defense-wide review, the Department terminated the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program, ending funding for several medical programs. This included the vaccine programs for these biothreats that had already completed Phase 2 clinical trials, and manufactured 300,000 doses of each vaccine to demonstrate manufacturing capability.

As we continue to reckon with the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, I am concerned about the risk inherent in ending vaccine development programs that are aimed at protecting our warfighters. If confirmed, can you commit to reviewing the Department's policy and expeditiously providing a report back to the committee on the acquisition strategy for these vaccines, to include the status of the development, the cost to complete the development, and the risks to our servicemembers if development is discontinued?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. I do, Senator, and I believe it is critical that our Joint Forces have the protections that they require in order to be able to counter any kind of threat from weapons of mass destruction, including biological as well.

Senator KELLY. Well, thank you, Ms. Rosenblum.

Mr. Maier, good to see you again. The National Defense Strategy Commission has cautioned us of the imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy, development, and implementation. As you know, Congress has taken steps to address this imbalance by including important reforms in recent defense authorization that are designed to enhance the ability of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to act as the Service Secretary-like civilian responsible for oversight and advocacy of Special Operations Forces.

What is the value to both the Special Operations enterprise and our overall national security in having an empowered Service Secretary-like civilian in the Pentagon?

Ms. MAIER. Senator Kelly, nice to see you again as well. Thank you for the question. So I think it is critically important that as we look at our other services they have a civilian that is empowered that sits above them, and I think this committee has recognized that there are elements of Special Operations Command that did not have that. So in the first order it fills a gap.

I think in the second, and maybe more practical sense, it is an opportunity for there to be a civilian who is advocating for the men and women of Special Operations in the building, both in the policy and then in the administrative chain of command that today has not existed.

Senator KELLY. Do you think we have made any progress in moving this forward?

Ms. MAIER. I do, Senator. I think the Secretary's recent announcement of how he intends to proceed with a dual-reporting chain, including a direct report to him for the administrative chain of command, in which, if confirmed, I would be that direct report, significantly empowers the position.

Senator KELLY. Well, thank you.

The next question is for Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose. In past testimony before the committee, the National Nuclear Security Administration has been candid about the risks posed by the aging workforce. With more than one-third of the workforce eligible to retire by 2024, the imperative of recruiting the next generation of American scientists and engineers is clear. I am proud to say that the students at the University of Arizona are among those that are already building relationships and experience with the National Nuclear Security Administration through the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program.

Can each of you speak to, in the remaining time, which is not much, can you speak to how you would build on these programs and other methods to develop a sustainable pipeline in STEM research?

Ms. HRUBY. Yeah, very quickly, we need to work with community colleges, historically black colleges and university, minority serving institutions, top research institutions across the board to rebuild our workforce, and if confirmed, that will be a top priority.

Mr. ROSE. Senator, let me just say, recruiting, developing, and retaining our nuclear security workforce is one of my highest priorities, and should I be confirmed, be assured that I will make it happen.

Senator KELLY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me recognize Senator Cotton, please.

Senator COTTON. Ms. Hruby, what was your involvement in the incorporation of critical race theory or diversity equity and inclusion training at the Sandia National Labs?

Ms. HRUBY. Senator Cotton, thanks for that question. I am strong believer in diversity, equity, and inclusion training for our workforce. And, in fact, study after study shows that the culture of institutions is the reason why we lose top talent, and particularly women and people of color. So my first statement is I am a strong supporter and have benefited greatly personally and been part of an institution that has benefitted greatly from diversity, equity, and inclusion training.

The issues with the Sandia divisive training occurred after I left the laboratory, and I understand it has been reviewed, and if confirmed, I look forward to evaluating those reviews and making sure that we have high-quality training programs that will continue into the future.

Senator COTTON. Ms. Hruby, I have heard from concerned former NNSA officials and lab workers who said these controversial training regimens were conducted under your watch. Did you direct or participate in any of what you just called divisive training sessions?

Ms. HRUBY. I did participate in training, diversity, equity, and inclusion training at the laboratories. The training that I participated in I never considered divisive nor did I hear that from any employee that participated in the training at the laboratory while I was there.

Senator COTTON. Did you personally participate in any training that instructed white employees to, quote, "deconstruct their white culture," end quote, or to apologize for bigotries or prejudices that they did not commit?

Ms. HRUBY. No, Senator. The classes did explore privilege, but in my opinion they never were divisive or asked inappropriate questions or apologize of the white workforce.

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that any race is inherently prejudiced, bigoted, or oppressive?

Ms. HRUBY. No, sir.

Senator COTTON. Do you believe that any race is inherently victimized or oppressed?

Ms. HRUBY. No, sir.

Senator COTTON. Do you see any inherent danger in telling highly skilled technicians who control one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world that they are working for a country whose roots around on systemic racism?

Ms. HRUBY. Well, no, I do, but I do think we need to be open to the issues that exist, and that the cultures that exist that do not allow us to fully utilize all Americans in our science and technology enterprise.

Senator COTTON. So you do not see any danger in teaching these technicians who are in charge of our nuclear stockpiles that America is a fundamentally, or systematically racist country?

Ms. HRUBY. I do not think America is a fundamentally racist country.

Senator COTTON. And so, therefore, you would also not permit any such training in the agency, should you be confirmed?

Ms. HRUBY. That is correct. I would want to make sure all of our training was high quality.

Senator COTTON. Thank you. I think that we can all agree that if you are an American, no matter your race, sex, creed, preference, and especially if you are gifted in fields like math, physics, chemistry, or engineering, that we want you and we need you at the NNSA. But I hope that we also treat our workforce with respect and do not subject any of these highly trained professionals to this very foolish kind of training that teaches them that one race is inherently guilty by birth or one race is inherently oppressed by birth or that America is somehow a fundamentally racist or irredeemable or hateful country. I would suggest that is a very bad way to chase out some of our very best employees and put them into the arms of the private sector.

So thank you very much for your answers today, and thank you all for your appearance.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much. Now let me recognize Senator Hawley, please.

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses for being here.

Ms. Hruby, let me ask you about the Kansas City National Security Campus, which is in my home state of Missouri, that we are very proud of. It does extraordinary work manufacturing, as you know, the non-nuclear components for the NNSA's warhead programs.

We know that the Kansas City campus is going to need additional capacity to meet its production requirements going forward. If confirmed, can you give me a sense how you will work to ensure that the campus has the space it needs to continue its vital work?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes. Thank you, Senator Hawley, for that question. The Kansas City site is a very important part of the NNSA complex, and it is very active right now, and it is undersized to produce the components we need. I understand that there are several options, including lease options, to relieve some of the pressure on the infrastructure at the site, and if confirmed, I will look into what those options are and move forward swiftly with trying to relieve the pressures, the limitations from the infrastructure options.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you for that.

Mr. Maier, let me come to you and let's talk a little bit about Afghanistan if we could. Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Helvey testified recently that the U.S. does not necessarily need the Afghan government in order to achieve our counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan. Let me ask you if you agree that if Kabul falls we may be able to work with other regional and local stakeholders in the country, in Afghanistan, to maintain the necessary access, gather the intelligence, and otherwise be able to facilitate our over-the-horizon operations. Do you agree with that?

Mr. MAIER. Senator, I think that it will be immensely more challenging if the Afghan government falls. While there are options, as I understand it, underway to look at other outside-facing locations,

that is exacerbated by a fall of the Afghan security forces who are fighting and dying on the front lines.

Senator HAWLEY. But surely we have to plan for a number of contingencies. So my question is, if Kabul falls, will we be able to conduct the necessary intelligence-gathering, over-the-horizon operations, et cetera, by working with regional and local stakeholders?

Mr. MAIER. Senator, I think we will be, but it is really a spectrum. It will be better if we are closer and we have more capability that we can apply against the problem, of course.

Senator HAWLEY. Fair enough. Let me ask you about Special Forces, which are such a key part of our effort to maintain contact and then work with the Northern Alliance in the earlier days of the war in Afghanistan. Do you think that Special Operations Forces should play a role in helping to maintain similar relationships going forward so that we can work with local partners again to achieve our counterterrorism objectives, if Kabul falls here, looking at the same scenario?

Mr. MAIER. Senator, I think it is fair to say that SOF was first into Afghanistan and they be last out, and this is definitely an option that I would look at, if confirmed.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Let me ask you about some of the work that has been going on in the Baltics. They have been working very closely with U.S. Special Forces again to strengthen their own resistance capabilities in order to help deter a Russian invasion. So with that precedent in mind, shift over to Taiwan. Do you think that Taiwan would benefit from strengthening its ability to conduct irregular warfare, along the lines of what the Baltic nations have been doing?

Mr. MAIER. Senator, I do think that is something that we should be considering strongly as we think about competition across the span of different capabilities we can apply, SOF being a key contributor to that.

Senator HAWLEY. Give me a sense of how you think our Special Operations community can help Taiwan develop this kind of irregular warfare capabilities.

Mr. MAIER. Senator, I think building on some of the areas that they may not be thinking of, of a fight in depth, if there is a Chinese military advance, where there could be some opportunities for, as you say, resistance networks or other capabilities that would leave behind, if you will, against a potential enemy, amphibious landing or something like that, sir.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. In what specific ways do you see our Special Operations Forces contributing to deterring Chinese aggression, not just at the unconventional level but also in supporting our conventional forces?

Mr. MAIER. I think, Senator, when things work best the SOF enterprise is in support of the Joint Force, and vice versa, and I think information operations is a key area where USSOCOM brings a lot of capability, and we need to, I think, continue to improve upon that. One of the priorities I certainly have, in looking at the competition space, is how we can be better in that information environment, and that, of course, is not only a SOF capability alone.

Senator HAWLEY. Give me a sense of, if you are confirmed, what steps you will take to ensure that our Special Operations Forces will be able to take the steps that you just outlined and also maintain their readiness, support over-the-horizon counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, and perform the many other additional missions that we ask them to undertake in multiple other theaters?

Mr. MAIER. Senator, I think it is going to be a question of prioritization and really looking at returns on investment. We are still going to need to do the counterterrorism fight, and SOF is best positioned to do that. But some of those partnerships we built over the years are also applicable to the competition space. But we need to evolve more towards that as a national defense strategy. So I think it is going to be a constant tradeoff and looking for opportunities to get economies of scale on both of those mission set.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hawley. I believe Senator King has an additional question.

Senator KING. Mr. Rose, as Ms. Rosenblum already learned, one has to be accountable for writings going back to third grade, sometimes, but I want to compliment you. You published an article in December where you had, I think, an important insight. You said, "A deterrent posture review, as opposed to strictly a nuclear posture review, could help the administration determine the right set of military capabilities of policies, nuclear and non-nuclear, it requires to better deter current and emerging threats in a fiscally sustainable manner."

"Indeed, if a nuclear weapon were ever used, it will unlikely to be a result of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack, but the result of the escalation of a conventional conflict. Therefore, the best way to prevent a nuclear war may be by preventing conventional conflict from occurring in the first place."

I think that is an important insight. Could you expand a bit on that?

Mr. ROSE. Thank you very much, Senator. You know, when you look at the threat landscape we face, during the Cold War we were very much concerned about that Soviet first strike. When we look at the current security environment, where we will most likely have a situation where a conflict could go nuclear would be in a regional conflict with a great power like Russia.

Senator KING. And indeed, Russia has articulated a doctrine of the use of tactical nuclear weapons called "Escalate to Deescalate." They are openly talking about this strategy.

Mr. ROSE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator KING. And therefore, that is a risk that we really need to think about, and as you say, we need to think about deterring conventional conflict as well as the massive nuclear conflict that the doctrine of the '60s, '70s, '80s, and '90s conflated.

Mr. ROSE. Absolutely, sir.

Senator KING. Ms. Rosenblum, to move on to look at deterrence in another way, my nightmare is nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, nonstate actors, and the problem is that this whole theory of deterrence that we have been talking about does not work

with a group of 30 people who would just as soon give their lives up for some abstract cause.

Number one, talk to me about how do we keep that from happening, either indigenous development of these weapons by a terrorist group or, more likely, purchased from a rogue state like North Korea.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is something, I believe appropriately, we do need to be concerned about, and is part of the reason that there needs to be emphasis put on securing nuclear materials, civilian nuclear materials, throughout the world, particularly as we see the use of nuclear energy as part of the approach to the climate-related issue. And if I may, Senator, one other point. I worry very much also about biological weapons, particularly as —

Senator KING. I should have mentioned that. I put that in almost the same category as nuclear, as we have just learned.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Yes. Thank you. And particularly with synthetic biology, which is becoming more and more ubiquitous. It is allowing a much broader range of actors to have those tools, in much shorter time frame. And that is something that, if I am confirmed, I will take a very close look at the Department of Defense.

Senator KING. I hope you will also look at where we are vulnerable in terms of biological weapons. One of my concerns is about our water systems. There are something like 60,000 separate water systems in this country, and the question is how secure are they. And water systems not only give us drinking water and water we use in our homes but they cool power plants and enable a lot of other of our activities. So it is not only a question of the risk but what the downstream—that is a bad pun, I guess, talking about water, but what the downstream effects are.

There is something called the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Is that something you hope to invigorate, and how much engagement do we have from our allies, and indeed other countries around the world, that recognize this weapons of mass destruction threat?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Senator. The Cooperative Threat Program has been very successful over the past 30 years, and I believe it is very important that the U.S. continue to work with allies to close capacity gaps in the fight against countering weapons of mass destruction. If I am confirmed, I really look forward to digging into a lot more of the detail with respect to how the program is currently operating. And again, if confirmed, I would welcome an opportunity to come back to talk with you and other members of the committee on how we are doing with the CTR program.

Senator KING. I hope we can do that, because that is the legacy of Sam Nunn, as a matter of fact, Nunn-Lugar from years ago, and it is an important one.

While I look forward to continuing to work with you, I consider the work that you will be doing, assuming you are confirmed, as among the most important jobs in our government, so thank you for your willingness. Thanks to all of you for your willingness to take on these new challenges.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.

Senator ROSEN. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and I would like to thank the nominees for testifying, and Ms. Hruby, for meeting with me recently.

I want to talk a little bit about some things happening, of course, in Nevada. I am a little worried about explosive nuclear testing and its possible resumption, because last year news reports indicated that the previous administration was considering resuming explosive nuclear testing. The Nevada Test Site, now known as the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS, is the only facility in the nation equipped to accommodate subcritical nuclear experiments. These help to advance our national security and maintain the integrity of our nuclear stockpile.

A resumption in explosive testing would not only compromise the health and safety of Nevadans and harm the surrounding environment, but it would also undermine future stockpile stewardship efforts.

So, Ms. Hruby, is your professional opinion that there is not a current or foreseeable need for the United States to resume explosive nuclear testing, and if confirmed, how do you plan to improve the Stockpile Stewardship Program's scientific capabilities so that we never have to resume explosive nuclear weapons testing?

Ms. HRUBY. Well, thank you, Senator Rosen, and I appreciated our conversation earlier about this as well.

Making sure we have a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile without nuclear testing is the foundation of the NNSA. And I do not believe we need to test at this time. There is no technical indication of any reason to test.

If confirmed, I will make sure that the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to advance our laboratory testing, our subcritical testing, as we are doing now, advancing our diagnostics at the Nevada Test Site for subcritical testing, to make sure that nuclear explosive testing is not needed to understand our stockpile.

In addition, as we talked about earlier, even our infrastructure programs, and, in particular our pit production program at the NNSA is also a hedge against future testing, and if confirmed, I will strongly support maintaining a stockpile without testing.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I want to keep a little bit on the Test Site, because when I was last there I saw the ongoing construction of the U1a facility for our enhanced capabilities for those subcritical experiments that we are talking about, or the ECSE. And I am excited that the NNSS will host the most capable weapons radiographic system in the world.

And so, Ms. Hruby again, if confirmed, will you ensure that rapid completion of ongoing upgrades to the U1a complex in order to enhance the stewardship of our nuclear stockpile, and might you suggest any additional improvements that we need to do at the Test Site that would be prudent to ensure our stockpile safety, and that you can fulfill the mission that we need to there?

Ms. HRUBY. Yes, Senator, the ECSE program is an important program on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and if confirmed, I will certainly try to keep that program moving forward. And I

agree, we need to continue to look for all the capabilities that could be employed to make sure we have a full science-based understanding of our nuclear weapons.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I want to move on now to plutonium removal. In 2018, of course the Department of Energy secretly shift a half metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium from South Carolina to the Nevada National Security Site. As part of an effort to restore trust with the people of Nevada, NNSA committed to begin the removal of South Carolina material from Nevada no later than 2021, and complete removal by 2026.

So, Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, can you both commit, if confirmed, to continue to provide the Nevada delegation and our staff with updates on the removal of plutonium from Nevada? I can begin with Ms. Hruby and then go on to Mr. Rose, please.

Ms. HRUBY. Yes, Senator Rosen.

Mr. ROSE. Yes, Senator Rosen.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward to, if confirmed, working with both of you on making sure that Nevada National Security Site can complete this mission in the safest way for our Nevadans and for our country and for our homeland security and safety. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rosen. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and for their commitment to public service, both in the past and obviously in the future as they are moving towards their confirmation, I hope.

With that I would adjourn the hearing. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Jill M. Hruby by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. In accordance with title 42, U.S. Code, section 7132(c) the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, serves concurrently as the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), as set forth in title 50, U.S. Code, section 2402. The Under Secretary must have extensive background in national security, organizational management, and appropriate technical fields, and be well-qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the NNSA in a manner that advances and protects the national security of the United States.

What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that qualify you for appoint as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)?

Answer. I'm a mechanical engineer and spent 34 years of my professional career at Sandia National Laboratories before I retired as Laboratories Director in May 2017. Sandia is an NNSA-sponsored Federally Funded Research and Development Center and the Nation's nuclear weapons engineering laboratory with over 10,000 permanent employees and an annual budget of about \$4 billion. During my time at Sandia, I was engaged either as a technical staff member or manager in a variety of programs including the science supporting nuclear weapons, weapon component and system development, nonproliferation, nuclear security, and more. As the Laboratories Director, I wrote two stockpile assessment letters. In my various leadership roles at Sandia, I have experience managing large programs and diverse teams of people.

Since my retirement from Sandia in 2017, I have been active in nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs through both compensated and non-compensated employment, and on boards and advisory committees. I spent a year as the Inaugural

Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (a non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental organization) then as a consultant exploring the intersection of advanced technologies and nuclear policy. In addition, I have been a special government employee (non-compensated) as a member of the Defense Science Board and the NNSA Defense Programs Advisory Committee. I have been a member of boards and advisory committees including the National Academy of Sciences Committee for International Security and Arms Control, Los Alamos National Laboratory missions committee, and CRDF Global.

I have a broad set of technical knowledge and organizational management skills to lead nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition efforts. I know the DOE and NNSA cultures well and am very familiar with the labs, plants, and sites.

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security? Of the duties and functions of the Administrator, NNSA? Do you perceive there to be any differences or dissonance between the requirements of each such position? If confirmed, under whose authority, direction, and control, would you serve in each such position?

Answer. As Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, if confirmed, I will be a direct report to Secretary Granholm. In the Under Secretary role I will help inform and execute the Secretary's vision, and that of President Biden, in furthering both nuclear security and the overall mission of the Department of Energy (DOE).

The duties of the Administrator are clearly spelled out in the NNSA Act. If confirmed, I will be responsible for the execution of the NNSA mission to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile; to provide the Navy with nuclear propulsion; to enhance nuclear nonproliferation; to reduce the global threat of weapons of mass destruction; and to further our leadership in science and technology, with our labs, plants, and sites and the amazing people who perform the challenging work.

I believe there will be good alignment between the Secretary of Energy and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. Secretary Granholm has expressed her strong support for the DOE's role in national security, and under her leadership the responsibilities for the Undersecretary for Nuclear Security and the statutory obligations of the Administrator are aligned, harmonious, and compatible.

If confirmed, as Administrator, I would be subject to the authority, direction and control of Secretary Granholm and Deputy Secretary Turk, as specified in the NNSA Act. Similarly, with respect to the functions of Under Secretary, I am subject to the authority, direction, and control of Secretary Granholm and Deputy Secretary Turk.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to develop strong and transparent relationships with the Secretary of Energy, the DOD Under Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, all members of the Nuclear Weapons Council including the STRATCOM Commander, and Congress to enhance my ability to succeed at my duties.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. What are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA?

Answer. The biggest challenge is simultaneously modernizing the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise while delivering on the stockpile modernization, science programs, and the nonproliferation and navy reactor program needs.

Over the past several decades, the NNSA enterprise has re-learned delivering modernized nuclear weapons and established a science-based stockpile stewardship program to provide confidence without nuclear explosive testing. The NNSA now needs to add a robust and trusted ability to deliver unique infrastructure programs, some that are substantial in scale and technical challenge. The production capabilities provided by the infrastructure programs are essential to modernizing and sustaining our nuclear deterrent for decades to come. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to continue the efforts of my predecessors to modernize our infrastructure to ensure we can re-establish production capability and retain the stockpile management capability required to confidently maintain our nuclear deterrent.

NNSA must also ensure that innovative nonproliferation technologies are ready to go if needed, and enhance nuclear security through material minimization, emergency response, and counterproliferation activities. The NNSA must also continue to provide high quality results for Navy nuclear propulsion.

NNSA can only succeed if we have the right workforce with the right skills. The nuclear security enterprise is facing a bow-wave of retirements. It will be critical for NNSA, working with our labs, plants, and sites, to effectively recruit and retain the next generation of smart, dedicated, and innovative nuclear security personnel.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of Defense (DOD), National Security Council (NSC), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress to understand NNSA requirements, communicate NNSA priorities, and advocate for NNSA funding to meet the priority needs. I will also forge strong partnerships with the NNSA complex leadership to deliver the infrastructure and modernization programs in the timelines required by our customers. Finally, I will expand on the on-going work between NNSA and our colleagues at the labs, plants, and sites to help recruit and train the workforce of the future.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities in each of the roles for which you have been nominated?

Answer. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure NNSA continues to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapon stockpile now and into the future. This includes executing on budget and schedule the weapon life extensions and modernization activities, the infrastructure improvements, and the science-based stewardship program. I will also focus on ensuring the NNSA is at the forefront of the technology and capability required to support potential arms control treaties, prevent nuclear material and weapon proliferation, and support counterterrorism efforts. Finally, I will support the Navy's nuclear propulsion program to ensure the U.S. nuclear navy can meet its mission.

As the Under Secretary of Nuclear Security, I will work with other leaders in DOE to achieve the Department's objectives especially in areas of mutual interest such as nuclear energy, environmental management, and high-performance computing.

RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

Answer. The Senate Armed Services Committee, given its oversight and authorization responsibilities, is well versed in the mission of the NNSA and has been supportive of NNSA programs. This suggests a generally good relationship between the former Under Secretaries for Nuclear Security and the SASC and their staffs. I recognize there are different points of views between members of SASC and in Congress as a whole on nuclear weapons issues and NNSA governance, however, the continuity of bi-partisan support on key issues has been impressive and strong. I believe the relationship can and should continue to be strengthened.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

Answer. I firmly believe communication is key to maintaining good relations. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA maintains open and timely communications with Congress, especially the Senate Armed Services Committee and its Strategic Forces Subcommittee.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Question. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the nuclear mission.

If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of the Biden Administration's NPR?

Answer. If confirmed, I will take an active role in the NPR process to ensure NNSA's capabilities and requirements are communicated and understood as part of this major policy-making process. While nuclear military requirements are set by the DOD, NNSA has a unique set of responsibilities it must deliver for America's integrated deterrent to remain safe, secure, and effective.

Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you recommend the Biden Administration consider?

Answer. I am not privy at this time to specifics of the pre-decisional NPR process. That said, I will make sure NNSA executes the policy decisions the President and Department of Defense outline in any update to the U.S. nuclear posture. Whatever policy decision is made, NNSA must continue its current path of revitalizing our aging Cold War infrastructure, meet DOD requirements for warhead manufacturing, ensure sufficient research and development capabilities to avoid the need to return to nuclear explosive testing, and deliver facilities required to produce key strategic materials.

Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements to the U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the full and timely (question cut off). Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the new requirements?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to fully supporting any changes, additions, or developments directed by the President, as that guidance is translated into specific requirements by the Nuclear Weapons Council, and as those requirements and programs are ultimately authorized and appropriated by Congress.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. The NNSA Act of 2000, as amended, establishes that the Administrator, NNSA “. . . shall be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation.”

What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA in statute and in recent practice?

Answer. Although NNSA is a semi-autonomous organization, per the NNSA Act, it is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. As such, the Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Energy, and NNSA Administrator must maintain a strong and healthy relationship. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary Granholm and Deputy Secretary Turk to ensure cohesion, collaboration, and alignment across the Department.

Question. How is the “semi-autonomous” nature of the NNSA, as set forth in the by the NNSA Act, reflected in NNSA’s organizational structure? What makes NNSA different from the domains of the other Under Secretaries of the Department of Energy (DOE)—in both law and practice?

Answer. The NNSA Act designates NNSA as a semi-autonomous organization under DOE to execute its national security programs. This is a unique authority and differs from the other DOE Under Secretaries. It gives the Administrator authority over key operational functions, such as personnel, procurement, and policy development. NNSA’s semi-autonomous nature also empowers the NNSA career staff who specialize in nuclear security in their work with the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with DOE leadership to continue to build a strong, collaborative, and mission-focused culture where DOE and NNSA can better leverage each other’s expertise.

Question. With a view to improving organizational management and operational effectiveness, would you recommend any changes to the structure of NNSA?

Answer. Independent studies have noted the improvement in NNSA governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise in recent years. However, there is still room for improvement. The foundation of good governance lies in NNSA having healthy relationships with its stakeholders.

If confirmed, I intend to focus on defining roles and responsibilities across the NNSA enterprise, improving communication, and changing the culture to focus on timely and cost-effective delivery and innovation. I will also focus on sustaining the reforms that have been started by previous Administrators and recommended by Congressionally-appointed groups such as the Meis-Augustine Commission. I will work with the NNSA leadership team to improve NNSA’s project management, program review, and cost estimation expertise.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

Question. If confirmed, you will be a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), together with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment, Research and Engineering, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. Since the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, when it was designated as the “Military Liaison Committee,” the primary purpose of the NWC is to serve as the civilian-military interface and set the military requirements for nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of NNSA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is, in a sense, NNSA’s primary customer.

How would you assess the relationship between NNSA and the DOD, at both senior management levels, as well as at working levels?

Answer. My assessment is NNSA and the DOD have integrated their work well, and the relationship has improved in recent years. NNSA and DOD must continue to successfully integrate each of the unique departmental capabilities and responsibilities to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent without delays or surprises.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve this relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue the work of my predecessors and maintain regular engagements with my DOD counterparts to ensure NNSA is fully aware of and ready to deliver DOD requirements. Additionally, I will take an active role in the NWC.

Question. Do you believe that NNSA is adequately responsive to the requirements set by the DOD?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure continual communication and integration with the DOD and, if necessary, improve NNSA's ability to respond to DOD requirements.

Question. Do you believe it important for the NWC to ensure the NNSA is adequately funded through the interagency budget process to meet DOD's requirements?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Energy, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Nuclear Weapons Council to make sure NNSA understands DOD requirements and requests the necessary funding to meet those requirements. The NWC is the appropriate forum for DOD and NNSA to understand respective funding requirements of the nuclear deterrent and make financial tradeoffs in cases where there may be budget limitations.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.

Do you believe that the United States currently possesses the capabilities to ensure the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable—without nuclear weapons testing?

Answer. Yes. Each year, the Directors of the National Security Laboratories and the Commander of United States Strategic Command assess the state of the nuclear stockpile. They have determined the United States does not need to conduct nuclear explosive tests at this time to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. However, NNSA also maintains test readiness tools to ensure the U.S. remains prepared to resume nuclear testing, only if required to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal, or to respond to evolving technical and geopolitical circumstances, and only then under explicit direction from the President.

The NWC has laid out a schedule for the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the development of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.

Question. Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and, in particular, concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the plants and laboratories on these critical programs to ensure concurrency and the ability to deliver on time and budget.

Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.

If confirmed, how would you support the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and make full use of the authorities it provides NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support, and request funding for, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and leverage all possible avenues across NNSA to ensure we are postured to confront future challenges with an experienced and practiced workforce.

Question. If confirmed, what are your long-term plans for the National Ignition Facility and, in particular, how would you execute the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition, which to date has not occurred?

Answer. I believe the National Ignition Facility (NIF) is essential to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program and NIF's contributions extend beyond ignition. If confirmed, I will work with the laboratory community to develop a long-term plan for this critical element of stewardship.

Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of NNSA missions?

Answer. I believe the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program is essential to provide the high-performance simulation and computing capabilities that inform critical NNSA stockpile stewardship decisions. The ASC simulation tools enable broad and deep knowledge of the individual processes involved in a nuclear weapon explosion, as well as a comprehensive understanding of the complex interactions among these processes. ASC will provide and sustain the required confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent by developing and deploying credible, science-based simulation tools to certify the current and future stockpile.

NNSA BUDGET

Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to ensure it can meet DOD requirements.

If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to review the budget before its submission to OMB?

Answer. If confirmed, I will learn what process was used for the fiscal year 2022 budget, inform Congress of the process used, and ensure that process is continued for future budgets.

Question. In your opinion, would cross-training between DOD, NNSA, and DOE programming and financial management personnel improve interdepartmental coordination on budgetary matters? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. Many human resource and training experts have identified cross-training as an effective tool to improve workforce performance. In addition, the DOD, NNSA, and DOE personnel would gain insights into each other's best practices and bolster the areas that need improvement.

PERSONNEL

Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of civilian employees to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.

Answer. If confirmed, I will look closely at staffing across NNSA to ensure adequate staffing, the appropriate skills mix, and structure so that NNSA continues to meet its mission in an effective manner.

Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional personnel accomplish that NNSA is not able to accomplish today? If confirmed, which specific components of the NNSA would you recommend growing? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I understand NNSA's staffing requirements are consistently assessed to determine the appropriate size and mix of NNSA's workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing these assessments and working to ensure NNSA has the workforce it needs.

Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate capabilities—in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces—to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.

Answer. The complex would be unable accomplish its essential missions without the expertise and efforts of the nuclear security enterprise workforce. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to maintain the core competencies of the current workforce, and recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals and skilled trades personnel needed to execute its missions.

Question. If not, please explain what capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure that NNSA is fully mission capable?

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor workforces?

Answer. If confirmed, recruiting and retaining world class talent within NNSA's federal and contractor workforce will be a priority of mine. I believe it is essential for NNSA to provide meaningful and challenging professional opportunities that attract and retain dedicated professionals. Central to this effort is fostering an enterprise-wide sense of purpose in NNSA's nuclear security mission. Particular attention must be placed on ensuring that, as the current NNSA workforce ages, the administration maintains partnerships with the academic and university communities through pipelines that encourage and attract the world's best engineers, scientists, and support staff.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both NNSA the civilian and the contractor workforces?

Answer. In the next five years, a significant portion of the NNSA and nuclear security enterprise workforce will be eligible to retire. If confirmed, I will prioritize maintaining those skills and expertise and provide NNSA support to help the nuclear security enterprise recruit and retain the highly skilled workforce needed to execute its national security missions.

Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any additional authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will learn more about NNSA's existing hiring authorities and determine if additional authorities are required.

CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays, and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and others.

In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated failures in project management?

Answer. In the past, GAO has identified a number of areas where NNSA could improve project management, including ill-defined project requirements; lack of proper cost estimating; and starting projects before proper sufficient design and technology development is completed. Over the past decade, NNSA has made significant improvements which have led to a notable turnaround in NNSA's ability to deliver projects and GAO has taken NNSA off its high risk list for projects costing less than \$750 million. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen NNSA practices and to adopt best business practices on its larger projects to complete such projects on-time and on-budget.

Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address these problems? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Over the past decade, NNSA has made significant improvements to address project management challenges. If confirmed, I will champion continued improvement.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that these project management failures are not repeated in the future? What specific changed in policy, practice, organization, or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support strengthening and improving NNSA's contract and project management. To do so, some of my recommendations include clarifying lines of authority, holding those responsible for projects accountable, adding rigor to existing project management practices, strengthening cost estimating, and ensuring projects remain within original scope and cost baselines. If confirmed, I will prioritize understanding NNSA's project management and practices to further ensure that future projects do not encounter past challenges.

Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of these project management failures? Please explain your answer.

Answer. NNSA follows DOE Order 413.3B which governs program and project management for the acquisition of capital assets. I certainly agree with the precept that rigorous project management principles should be applied and that the Federal staff must be given the tools they need and then be held accountable and responsible for delivering the work. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed on its detailed application to NNSA activities and whether any changes are warranted.

Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of the large project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE) in the Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).

In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide independent cost estimates and other costing and project management advice internal to NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.

Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE data and information to serve its statutory purpose?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review whether CEPE has sufficient authority and access.

Question. CEPE reports directly to the Undersecretary for Nuclear Security. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that CEPE has adequate access to you and other senior leaders in your organization, as necessary and appropriate?

Answer. I understand the Director of CEPE is a member of the NNSA senior leadership team and therefore has access to the Administrator and other NNSA senior leaders. If confirmed, I intend to review ways to ensure the Director of CEPE has adequate access to me and other senior leaders.

Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How would you balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars?

Answer. I understand the importance of CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities to NNSA and value its independence from the program offices as being critical to providing independent, data driven analysis to me. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its independence and review its staffing and funding.

PLUTONIUM STRATEGY

Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production: Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce up to 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not less than 80 pits per year.

What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its capabilities to achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of the ongoing stockpile program?

Answer. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the Nation's Center of Excellence for plutonium research, development and production. LANL has previously demonstrated the ability to manufacture plutonium pits to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The diligent execution of current plans to expand existing production capacity will enable NNSA and LANL to meet the Nation's need to produce no fewer than 30 pits per year in 2026. In April 2021, the Los Alamos Pit Production Project (LAP4) achieved Critical Decision One, approval of the conceptual design and cost range, a key step to meet requirements and execute this important mission. I pledge to work closely with NNSA and LANL leadership to enable achievement of this critical milestone.

Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the ongoing stockpile program?

Answer. To repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to support the Nation's plutonium pit production mission, the robust building structure must be outfitted with specialized processing and manufacturing equipment. Supporting infrastructure must also be designed and constructed and safety and security systems must be installed. This effort requires a training program to provide a workforce capable for all production and infrastructure for pit manufacturing. The program must also establish waste processing capabilities to process hazardous and non-hazardous waste. NNSA is executing a project that will implement all necessary changes to achieve production of no fewer than 50 pits per year at the Savannah River Site.

URANIUM STRATEGY AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION

Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1 Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium nor the technology used to enrich it carries an "obligation" from a foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for obtaining unobligated uranium.

Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?

Answer. Yes, I do. Re-establishing a domestic uranium enrichment capability would support several NNSA goals, namely maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile, supporting nonproliferation efforts worldwide, and fueling the nuclear navy.

Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a capability?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing Analysis of Alternatives and engage with the Administration and Congress on a path forward that provides the most cost-effective solution to the American taxpayers.

Question. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2014 entitled “Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S. Position on Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium Production” concluded that the DOE’s policy on identification of obligated uranium was based on three international agreements and a series of policy decisions. Of the three agreements, GAO concluded that only one explicitly addressed tritium production, but that State Department had consistently interpreted the other two agreements as imposing peaceful use restrictions on LEU for tritium production.

Do you believe this GAO reading of all three agreements remains consistent with U.S. policy goals?

Answer. Ensuring a continued supply of tritium is critical to the success of NNSA’s mission. I am committed to the highest nonproliferation standards and, if confirmed, would ensure NNSA’s production of tritium is consistent with U.S. international agreements and governmental policy. If confirmed, I will assess the GAO and State Department interpretations and seek to reach alignment.

Question. Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2020 directed the Department of Energy to “determine whether the Agreement [between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, signed at Washington, July 3, 1958 . . . permits the United States to obtain low-enriched uranium for the purposes of producing tritium in the United States.” The Secretary of Energy affirmed that such procurement of low enriched uranium can occur.

What are your views on the accuracy of the Secretary of Energy’s determination in this regard?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with this Administration to evaluate the legality of any proposal.

FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION

Question. The United States and Russia committed to the disposition of 34 metric tons (MT) of weapons grade plutonium under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) in 2000. The original plan by the United States was to convert excess weapons grade plutonium to mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuel for civilian reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS). After spending billions of dollars, this project was subsequently abandoned in favor of diluting the plutonium and disposing of it at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose process involves shipping the plutonium pits from Pantex to Los Alamos to be turned into oxide powder, then shipping then on to SRS for packaging, followed by final shipment to WIPP for disposal.

What are your views on the dilute and disposal method?

Answer. The dilute and disposal method uses existing, proven technologies, and will allow the United States to meet its disposition commitments in less time and at half the cost of the MOX approach.

Question. What are your views on permanent disposal at WIPP?

Answer. Permanent disposal of diluted plutonium at WIPP is a safe, secure, and environmentally responsible approach. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department works with the State of New Mexico to provide information to the public on the safety of this disposition method.

Question. What are your views of the logistics of shipping plutonium between Pantex, Los Alamos, SRS, and WIPP? In your opinion, could this process be simplified by shipping the pits directly to SRS to be converted to oxide powder there?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is preparing to conduct a thorough review of the viability and environmental impact of conducting oxidation at various locations, including Los Alamos, where current capabilities exist in PF-4, and Savannah River Site, as well as any other alternative determined to be reasonable. I further understand the logistics of each alternative will be considered in the final analysis.

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

Question. NNSA was created partially in response to security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nonetheless, periodic security lapses have continued to occur, such as in 2012 at the Y-12 facility.

To what extent have the conditions that allowed such lapses to occur been corrected, in your view?

Answer. I understand a comprehensive review by security experts identified causes such as divided security responsibilities, degraded security equipment, and security culture problems, among other factors. Following the incident, contract and

procedural changes were made to ensure a clear single point of responsibility to integrate security functions. A comprehensive review and assessment of security infrastructure across the enterprise led to the development of a security infrastructure revitalization program to replace aging security systems. The security organization implemented the NNSA Security Roadmap (NSR) to provide a vision, a strategy, and a path forward to drive continuous improvement of its nuclear security program. Additionally, security culture campaigns were instituted across the NNSA enterprise to ensure security, like safety, is integrated in everything NNSA does. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of the Roadmap and associated activities.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any further changes in policy, practice, management, or oversight to reduce the frequency of security issues at NNSA facilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support NNSA's initiatives to improve security at its facilities, as well as look for additional ways to improve security especially in light of new technological capabilities.

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported a number of accidents at the national laboratories in recent years. The accidents included explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that was identified as a "near criticality accident" that led to the partial shutdown of the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory for several years—putting both personnel and mission at risk. Yet, while personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by definition involves some of the most hazardous materials. Risk cannot be eliminated completely at the labs while ensuring mission accomplishment?

Answer. I agree that risk cannot be eliminated at the labs given the hazardous nature of the work that must be accomplished to fulfill our national security mission. However, the risk needs to be recognized, understood, and appropriately controlled while balancing that with mission execution and ensuring the safety of the public, workers, and environment.

Question. How should we balance safety, risk, and mission at the national laboratories?

Answer. For NNSA to be successful in meeting its national security mission, it must have sustained strong safety performance. High safety achievement and mission success are compatible and mutually support each other; having one but not the other is not sustainable. This is balanced by properly assessing risk and controlling it. If confirmed, I will emphasize continuous safety improvements and a risk management culture across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise to execute NNSA's missions in a safe and secure manner.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve the safety culture at the labs while still meeting mission requirements?

Answer. Based on my years at Sandia National Laboratories, I understand how important a positive safety culture environment is in accomplishing the NNSA mission. The key to this is establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership. If confirmed, I will accomplish this through my regular interactions with the leadership of the Management & Operating partners. I will also emphasize the critical nature of effectively engaging with employees to provide two-way feedback while stressing organizational learning so we can continuously improve. Setting high expectations, ensuring employee engagement, and embracing organizational learning, will establish the necessary foundation to improve safety culture at the NNSA labs. To ensure continual improvement, I will also emphasize the importance of a strong safety conscious work environment so employees will feel comfortable raising safety issues and leaders are prepared to effectively address those issues. This will enable NNSA to collectively work together to safely accomplish the mission.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Question. What do you perceive as the highest priorities of the nuclear nonproliferation programs at NNSA?

Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance highlights a number of critical national and international security objectives in which NNSA can play a major contributing role. In my view, chief among these nuclear nonproliferation priorities are:

1. *eliminating* stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials, and vulnerable radioactive sources globally, and minimizing the need for future use;
2. *strengthening* U.S. leadership in civil nuclear commerce, arms control, and nonproliferation globally; and
3. *reducing* the threat posed by nuclear weapons programs of concern.

NNSA is uniquely positioned to contribute towards each of these three items, and if confirmed, I will work to advance the Administration's nonproliferation agenda.

Question. The United States no longer holds a bilateral agreement with Russia for joint nuclear nonproliferation activities. However, a number of ongoing nonproliferation programs are focused on countries in that region.

In your view, are there additional opportunities for cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa? If confirmed, what would be your priorities in these areas?

Answer. While some of NNSA's earliest nuclear security and nonproliferation work was with Russia and other regional partners, NNSA has now expanded its work to over 100 countries, recognizing nuclear nonproliferation is a global activity.

Consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States has long held that peaceful nuclear technology can and should be shared for the benefit of humankind. NNSA plays a significant role in ensuring that those partner countries who pursue the peaceful use of nuclear technology are able to do so in a manner that ensures adherence to the highest nonproliferation standards. For the Middle East and Northern African regions, strengthening the adherence to and implementation of the highest standard for IAEA safeguards verification in both regions would help to promote stability and reduce tensions in these strategically vital areas.

Second, I believe NNSA can build upon its existing nuclear security accomplishments by working with our partners to strengthen their ability to combat nuclear smuggling and secure radioactive and nuclear materials.

Question. What challenges has the new relationship between the United States and Russia posed in nuclear nonproliferation programs?

Answer. The deterioration of nuclear nonproliferation dialogue and cooperation between the United States and Russia has posed significant challenges, not only for bilateral relations overall, but also for global nuclear security.

Russia has significant inventories of civilian nuclear material and the United States has not been able to work with or discuss HEU minimization or consolidation efforts. Additionally, due to the vastness and complexity of the Russian nuclear complex, the security of the Russian nuclear material will remain a long-term interest of the United States. The United States and Russia continue to have a shared interest and responsibility to ensure abidance to the highest possible security standards.

There are a number of critical issues that would benefit from broader United States-Russian dialogue and engagement. I am convinced that global nuclear security, nonproliferation, and arms control must be part of the agenda for discussion. If I am confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration's policy toward Russia, while maintaining NNSA's readiness to build on the joint nuclear nonproliferation accomplishments already achieved—when and if appropriate.

Question. What do you believe are the greatest challenges in nuclear nonproliferation programs with countries other than Russia?

Answer. At the top of the list is the fact that China and North Korea are improving their nuclear weapons capabilities, including associated delivery systems. Meanwhile, Iran possesses the largest missile arsenal in its region. China is aggressively acquiring United States and allies' technology for economic and military advantage.

Beyond these geopolitical challenges, there are technological challenges as well. NNSA's technical capabilities and expertise will be needed to balance the enormous potential benefits to society of emerging technologies, such as advanced nuclear reactor designs, additive manufacturing and 5G technologies, in ways that do not lower the barriers to proliferation. These are the cooperative and technical challenges that NNSA is poised to answer, and if confirmed, I look forward to being a part of these contributions.

Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs, if confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation would you need to meet such needs?

Answer. In my view, there is still much work to be done globally to minimize and secure vulnerable and excess radioactive and nuclear materials so that they do not wind up in the hands of proliferators or terrorists. While the United States and the international community have made much progress in this regard, unfortunately it is the more difficult tasks that remain. Achieving these remaining goals and managing the minimization going forward will require renewed bilateral engagement and diplomacy, technological innovations, and NNSA leadership's support in swaying some key partners' willingness to collaborate.

Second, I believe there is an ongoing need to confront the noncompliance threats posed by Iran and North Korea and be prepared for potential future arms control treaties with Russia or China. For Iran and North Korea, NNSA in partnership with the IAEA and international community needs to develop the technological tools

and capabilities to prevent or address noncompliance challenges. In the event of new arms control discussions with Russia or China, new technologies for monitoring and verification will be needed for the negotiations and to support any agreement. All of these efforts require continued research and development, invigorated human capital management and training efforts, and sustaining the necessary technical expertise and infrastructure.

Finally, the third area that I will highlight is the need to keep pace with—and regulate—emerging technologies to mitigate their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of their promising opportunities. This will likely require not just technological research and development but also the establishment of smart multilateral and bilateral policies and partnerships to reduce these threats.

If confirmed, I look forward to assessing these key NNSA nonproliferation programs to identify where and what additional efforts may be required to meet these priorities, and to working with Congress to discuss resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation needed.

NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)

Question. NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of R&D efforts.

If confirmed, what would be your nonproliferation R&D priorities?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe NNSA should advance U.S. detection and characterization capabilities for early observation and persistent monitoring of foreign nuclear weapons production activities. Prioritizing the development of new tools and approaches, for example with R&D on artificial intelligence and leveraging open source and cross-government data, will enable earlier detection of proliferation activities and allow for a broader and more effective suite of U.S. Government options in response.

Priority should also be given to advancing capabilities for global nuclear explosion monitoring and with targeted R&D on detecting low-yield and evasive nuclear testing. Both activities maintain our current capabilities and will develop the next generation of monitoring tools and expertise to meet emerging test monitoring challenges.

Question. Do you believe that there are R&D areas that need more attention or funding? Please explain your answer.

Answer. As was highlighted in President Biden's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, rapid changes in technology will shape every aspect of our lives and our national interests, but the direction and consequences of the technological revolution remain unsettled. As the pace of global innovation increases, emerging technologies such as advanced manufacturing or quantum computing will enable quicker and alternative pathways to weapons development. We must invest in R&D activities that will both exploit opportunities and assess vulnerabilities. We also must strengthen a whole-of-government approach to invest in high-priority innovative ideas and to be more effective at transitioning technologies to mission partners responsible for monitoring.

REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT

Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and external, and that these contribute to the challenges in staying under cost and on schedule for major projects.

Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs and efficient mission execution overall?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation across the nuclear security enterprise to include protection of the workforce, the public, and the environment in a way that is synergistic and supportive of mission execution. One opportunity is ensuring that safety is properly incorporated into the design and construction of the new NNSA nuclear facilities. This means early incorporation of safety expectations which have been established in relevant directives and regulations, the selection of qualified design and construction firms to lead projects and operations, with corresponding periodic reviews as they progress through important milestones, and the proper staffing of a technically qualified and diverse federal project team. These actions ensure appropriate safety systems and controls are identified early in the process and are validated throughout construction with capable staff to reduce rework and control costs.

If confirmed, my team and I will work closely with the labs, plants, and sites to define continuous improvement of our regulatory functions to ensure that they reflect best business and risk management practices, and enable mission success.

Question. In your view, are the labs are subject to the appropriate level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?

Answer. Several reports (Mies-Augustine, CRENEL, GAO, NAPA/NAS) highlighted the need for NNSA to improve and make its oversight more effective. Based on insights from these external reviews and lessons learned, I understand NNSA has improved its Site Governance model to ensure mission objectives are met; protection of the workforce, public, and the environment; and operations are effectively accomplished in compliance with contract requirements. I believe it is important to sustain progress made and to continue to look for additional improvements, and if confirmed, I would be dedicated to this pursuit.

Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight structures would you recommend, and why?

Answer. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with existing regulatory and oversight structures to assess the current environment and what additional changes would offer more improvement.

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE SURVEY

Question. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command climate survey to the NNSA workforce under your leadership and management—including the workforces of the labs and other geographically-separate components of NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to understand the organizational climate across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise, conduct a survey of the NNSA leadership and management, and evaluate options for conducting surveys across the components of NNSA.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the DOE and NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to consult with the NNSA equal opportunity office (EEO), NNSA Diversity Manager, DOE–Inspector General, and other stakeholders to obtain information on the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination issues at DOE and NNSA, and take appropriate action in consultation with the leadership of DOE and NNSA.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee or contractor of the DOE or NNSA?

Answer. If I become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or gender discrimination from an NNSA employee, I will consult with the experts at NNSA to ensure NNSA personnel follow all policies and procedures to ensure such complaints are taken seriously and investigated. I will ensure any corrective actions identified in the investigation are quickly carried out. I will re-emphasize to the responsible managers and supervisors that the employee who raised the complaint must be treated in accordance with all federal laws and DOE regulations.

I will also expect M&O partners to ensure their employees work in an environment free of discrimination, including on the basis of gender. If I become aware of a claim of sexual harassment or gender discrimination from a contractor employee, I will work with the NNSA experts and NNSA team responsible for oversight of that contract to facilitate contractor compliance with the non-discrimination provisions of its contract.

I would also look to implement the recommendations in the GAO review of sexual harassment in the NNSA nuclear security forces. Those recommendations include better understanding and improving the culture to get information more complete than waiting for discrimination complaints.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

Answer. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of

Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

NOMINATIONS

1. Senator HIRONO. Ms. Hruby, as part of my responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Ms. HRUBY. No.

2. Senator HIRONO. Ms. Hruby, have any of you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

Ms. HRUBY. No.

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL

3. Senator HIRONO. Ms. Hruby, the Biden administration has begun a series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our nuclear posture. Can

you briefly discuss what you see as the most pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?

Ms. HRUBY. For NNSA, there are two key components to nuclear modernization: the need to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile itself, and the need to recapitalize its supporting infrastructure. Over the past 30 years, weapons modernization programs were postponed, and infrastructure has been allowed to decay, threatening our critical capabilities and capacity to ensure the deterrent's viability into the future. It is imperative that we continue to support efforts to address both our aging stockpile and our deteriorating infrastructure if we are to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KEVIN CRAMER

DOMESTIC TRITIUM SUPPLY CHAIN

4. Senator CRAMER. Ms. Hruby, regarding the nuclear deterrent, and the tritium supply chain needed to maintain it, do you agree that using uranium that is mined, converted, and enriched in the United States, using fully domestic technology, is the right policy for our Nation – so that we are never dependent on the good graces of another country when it comes to maintaining our nuclear arsenal?

Mr. HRUBY. Yes. The United States has a longstanding policy that requires the reactor fuel used to produce tritium to be “unobligated,” that is, free from any peaceful use restrictions that can arise from foreign sources.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

KANSAS CITY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FACILITY

5. Senator HAWLEY. Ms. Hruby, will you agree to keep me informed as the courses of actions and decision criteria are developed for the expansion of the Kansas City National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) facility?

Mr. HRUBY. Yes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOMMY TUBERVILLE

MODERNIZATION

6. Senator TUBERVILLE. Ms. Hruby, nearly 40 percent of NNSA's facilities date back to World War II. What do you need to modernize NNSA infrastructure and facilities?

Mr. HRUBY. Revitalizing NNSA infrastructure requires maintaining a unique, geographically dispersed enterprise in which more than half of the facilities are in insufficient condition and many are at their life expectancy. Predictable and reliable funding for maintenance, operations, recapitalization, and other infrastructure activities is necessary for reversing long-term deferred maintenance trends.

[The nomination reference of Ms. Jill M. Hruby follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN401

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 22, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Jill Hruby, of New Mexico, to be Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, vice Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, resigned.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Jill M. Hruby, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Jill Hruby Bio

Jill Hruby, Nominee for Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and the Administrator of the NNSA

Jill Hruby is a mechanical engineer who joined Sandia National Laboratories as a member of the technical staff in 1983 and retired as the Laboratories Director in 2017 after a distinguished 34-year career. At Sandia, Hruby held roles of increasing management responsibilities with experiences in nuclear weapons systems and component design, nuclear non-proliferation, defense and homeland security technologies and systems, renewable energy, materials science, engineering sciences, and microsystems technology. She was the first woman to lead a national security lab.

Since her retirement, Hruby served as the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative from 2018-2019. In addition, she has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs Advisory Committee, and the National Academy of Science Committee for International Security and Arms Control. She has served on a variety of technical advisory committees and non-profit organization boards. She is a frequent participant in international dialogs; a spokesperson for women in engineering; and a mentor for emerging leaders.

Hruby earned her bachelor's degree from Purdue University and her master's degree from the University of California at Berkeley, both in mechanical engineering. She has authored numerous publications and reports, holds three patents, and received an R&D 100 Award. In 2016, she received the Suzanne Jenniches Upward Mobility Award from the Society of Women Engineers. In 2017, Business Insider named her the second most powerful female engineer. Jill has received the Department of Energy Secretary's Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award, and Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Jill M. Hruby in connection with her nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):**
Jill Marie Hruby
2. **Position to which nominated:**
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator for Nuclear Security,
Department of Energy
3. **Date of nomination:**
April 22, 2021
4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college,**

university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

Purdue University, August 1977 – May 1981, Bachelor of Science Mechanical Engineering, conferred May 1981

University of California Berkeley, September 1981 – December 1982, Master of Science Mechanical Engineering, conferred December 1982

5. **Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

Full Time Employment

Inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington D.C. and Albuquerque, NM, November 2018 – November 2019

Laboratories Director, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, July 2015 - May 2017

Vice President for Energy, Non-Proliferation, and High Consequence Security, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, April 2010 – July 2015

Various Staff and Leadership Positions, Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA, January 1983- April 2010

Part-Time Contractor (either as individual before January 2020 or as Jill Hruby Sole Proprietor after January 2020)

Distinguished Fellow, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Albuquerque, NM, November 2019 – November 2020 (half time) and November 2020 – present (quarter time)

Ojeda Technical Services, multiple locations, April 2019 – present, occasional work on request from Lockheed Martin Corporation. Work consisted of one small project and one larger project. The small project (less than one day) was to provide an overview of Sandia management structure to Lockheed employees working with Sandia on transitioning hypersonic missile technology. The larger project was to serve as an independent advisor to review the safety program at the UK Atomic Weapon Establishment (several weeks).

RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C., Consultant on Alert and Warning in

National Security Emergencies, March 2018 – March 2018 (consisted of one presentation).

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Presentations to Program on Nuclear Issues, Washington, D.C., March 2019, and September 2020.

Aerospace Corporation, Albuquerque, NM, Consultant on systems analysis, March 2018 – present (consisted of one two-hour meeting).

6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):

Special Government Employee (non-compensated), Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, 3/2019 – 2/2021 (all members resigned in February 2021 to enable the DoD to conduct a baseline review of advisory committees)

Special Government Employee (non-compensated), National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Program Advisory Committee, 6/2018 – present

Special Government Employee, Department of Defense, Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, 2011 – 2016

7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):

Consultant or Advisor (either as individual before January 2020 or as Jill Hruby Sole Proprietor after January 2020)

Ford Motor Company Technical Advisory Committee, virtual, June 2020 – present (two times per year)

Georgia Tech Research Institute Advisory Committee, Atlanta, Georgia, January 2020 – present (two times per year)

University of Chicago, Argonne National Laboratory, Reviewed national security programs as a member of an ad-hoc committee, Lemont, Illinois, April 2019

TRIAD National Security, LLC, Los Alamos National Laboratory Missions Committee, Los Alamos, NM, February 2019 – present (three times a year).

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Participated in international

dialogs with China in November 2018, November 2019, March 2021

Fermi Research Alliance LLC, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory Strategic Projects Advisory Committee, Batavia, Illinois, October 2018 – present (two times per year)

UT Battelle, Oak Ridge National Laboratory National Security Sciences Advisory Board, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, September 2018 – present (two times per year)

Independent reviewer for U.S. High Performance Research Reactor program, Battelle Pacific Northwest Division, Washington D.C., November 2017 – September 2020 (consisted of two in-person reviews).

Non-Profit Board Member (Non-compensated)

Nuclear Threat Initiative, 12/2019 – present

CRDF Global, 7/2019 – present

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, September 2018 – present

Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, July 2018 - present

National Institute for Hometown Security, October 2018 – July 2019

Advisory Activities (Non-compensated)

National Academy of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, Member of Committee on International Security and Arms Control

Nuclear Threat Initiative Science & Technology Advisory Committee

Artificial Intelligence Advisory Committee to Secretary of Energy Advisory Board

Mentor for the Department of Energy Oppenheimer Science and Energy Leadership Program

8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):

Purdue University Strategic Research Advisory Committee, 2018-2019
Purdue Mechanical Engineering Advisory Committee, 2015 – 2018

Berkeley Engineering Advisory Committee, 2016-2019

National Academy of Science, Engineering and Medicine, Member of Board of Chemical Science and Technology for the National Academy of Sciences, 2011 – 2015

Albuquerque International Association, Officer or Member of Board of Directors, 2012 – 2015, 2017

Louisiana State University, Member of Scientific Advisory Panel for Center for Micro Devices, 2003-2006

Micro and Nano Commercialization Education Foundation, Executive Board Member, 2000-2003

Livermore Chamber of Commerce, Executive Board Member, 2002-2005

9. Political affiliations and activities:

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):

N/A

- b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:

N/A

- c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:

Joe Biden, 2019, \$1000
Martin Heinrich, 2018, \$1000

10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received

for outstanding service or achievements):

Department of Energy Secretary's Exception Service Award, 2017

National Nuclear Security Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award, 2017

Business Insider, Second Most Powerful Female Engineer, 2017

Society of Women Engineers Susanne Jenniches Upward Mobility Award, 2016

Albuquerque International Association International Excellence Award, 2016

Office of Secretary of Defense Award for Exceptional Public Service, 2016

Purdue Distinguished Engineering Alumni Award, 2014

Purdue Outstanding Mechanical Engineering Alumni Award, 2008

R&D100 Award for Solid State Radiation Detectors CZT with Spectrum Plus™, 1999

11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):

1. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2021. *Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. <https://doi.org/10.17226/26088>.
2. Hruby, JM, "Russia's New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems: An Open-Source Technical Review," Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2019.
3. Hruby, JM, "Challenges and Opportunities in Scientific and Technological Support for Monitoring in the Non-proliferation Regime," Springer Proceedings in Physics, ISBN 978-3-030-42913-3, International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation - Proceedings of the XXI Edoardo Amaldi Conference, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, Italy, October 7-8, 2019.
4. Hruby, JM, Manley, DK, Stoltz, RE, Webb, EK, Woodard, JB, "The Evolution of Federally Funded Research & Development Centers," Public Interest Report, Federation of American Scientists, Spring 2011.
5. Morales, AM, Domeier, L, Gonzales, M, Hachman, JT, Hruby, JM, Goods, SH, McLean, DE, Yang, N, Gardea, AD, "Microstructure and mechanical properties of

- nickel microparts electroformed in replicated LIGA molds," Proceedings of SPIE, Micromachining and Microfabrication Process Technology VIII, January 27-29, 2003.
6. Bley, P, Hruby, JM, "Non-IC Compatible Microsystems Manufacturing," Chapter 7, International MEMS Roadmap, ISBN:0-9727333-0-2, 2002.
 7. Domeier, LA, Gonzales, M, Hachman, J, Hruby, JM, Janek, R, Morales, AM, "Microscreen-based replication of electroforming micromolds," Microsystems Technologies 8 (2002), 78-82.
 8. Hruby, JM, Henderson, CC, Morales, AM, Dentinger, PM, "Update and Advances in HARMST at Sandia," HARMST01, June 17-19, 2001.
 9. Hruby JM, "LIGA Technologies and Applications," MRS Bulletin, invited review article, Volume 26, No. 4, April 2001.
 10. Hruby JM, Kasscieh SK, Walsh ST, "A Model for Technology Assessment and Commercialization for Innovative Disruptive Technologies," Proceedings of 2000 IEEE International Engineering and Management Society Conference, Albuquerque, NM, August 2000.
 11. Griffiths SK, Ting A, Hruby JM, "The influence of mask substrate thickness on exposure and development times for the LIGA process," Microsystem Technologies, v. 6(#3), pp. 99-102, February 2000.
 12. Griffiths SK, Hruby JM, Ting A, "The influence of feature sidewall tolerance on minimum absorber thickness for LIGA x-ray masks," Journal of Micromechanics and Microengineering, v. 9(#4), pp. 353-361, December 1999.
 13. Griffiths SK, Hruby JM, "Optimum Doses and Mask Thickness for Synchrotron Exposure of PMMA Resists," Proceedings of the SPIE Symposium on Design, Test and Microfabrication of MEM/MOEMS, Paris, France, March 30-April 1, 1999.
 14. Hruby JM, Griffiths SK, Domeier LA, Morales AM, Boehme DR, Bankert MA, Bonivert WD, Hachman JT, Skala DM, Ting A, "LIGA: Metals, Plastics, and Ceramics," Proceedings of the SPIE Micromachining and Microfabrication Process Technology V, Volume 3874, Sept. 1999.
 15. Boehme D., Hruby JM, Bonivert W.D., Bankert MA, Hachman JT, Morales AM, Skala DM, Griffiths SK, Ting A, Bennett T, Krafcik JS Jr, "LIGA R&D and Prototyping," Proceedings of SEMICON West, San Francisco, CA, July 1999.
 16. Hruby JM, Bankert MA, Bennett TE, Boehme DR, Bonivert WD, Griffiths SK, Hachman JT, Krafcik JS, Morales AM, Ting A, "LIGA Prototyping at Sandia National Laboratories," Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on High Aspect Ratio Microstructure Technology, Kisarazu Chiba Japan, July 13-15, 1999.
 17. Hruby JM, Morales A, Boehme DR, Krafcik JS, "LIGA micromachining: infrastructure establishment," SAND99-8228, February 1999.
 18. Griffiths SK, Nilson RH, Bradshaw RW, Ting A, Bonivert WD, Hruby JM, "Transport Limitations in Electrodeposition for LIGA Microdevice Fabrication," Proceedings of SPIE, Micromachining and Microfabrication Process Technology, September 1998.

19. Griffiths, SK, Nilson, RH, Ting A, Bradshaw, RW, Bonivert, WD, Hruby, JM, "Modeling electrodeposition for LIGA microdevice fabrication," *Microsystem Technologies*, v. 4(#2), pp 98-101, February 1998.
20. Brennan RA, Hecht, MH, Wiberg, DV, Manion, SJ, Bonivert WD, Hruby, JM, Scholz ML, Stowe, TD, Kenny TW, Jackson KH, Malek CK, "Fabrication of collimating grids for an x-ray solar telescope using LIGA methods," *Microsystem Technologies*, v. 3(#3), PP. 91-96, May 1997.
21. Malek CK, Jackson KH, Bonivert WD, Hruby JM, "Masks for high aspect ratio x-ray lithography," *J. Microeng.* v. 6 #2 (1996) 228-235.
22. Jackson KH, Malek CK, Murray LP, Hruby JM, Hachman JT, Chang THP, "Fabrication of miniaturized deflectors using LIGA," *Microlithography and Metrology in Micromachining*, pp204, v. 2640, Austin Texas October 1995.
23. Brennen R, Hecht MH, Wiberg D, Manion SJ, Bonivert WD, Hruby JM, Scholz ML, Stowe TD, Kenny TD, Malek CK, and Jackson KH, "Fabricating subcollimating grids for an x-ray solar imaging spectrometer using LIGA technique," *Microlithography and Metrology in Micromachining*, pp 214, v 2640, Austin Texas October 1995.
24. Whinnery LL, Griffiths SK, Lipkin J, Nilson RH, Goods SH, Dawson DB, Larson S, Swearengen J, Hruby JM, Radloff HD, Long B, "Particle Size Reduction of Propellants by Cryocycling," SAND95-8227.
25. Malek CK, Jackson KH, Brennen RA, Hecht MH, Bonivert WD, Hruby JM, "Deep Etch X-ray Lithography at the Advanced Light Source: First Results," *J. of Vac. sci. and tech.*, B12 4009-12, 1994.
26. Hruby JM, "Summary of Storage Units to Support the Chaps Program," SAND89-8205, March 1989.
27. Thomas GJ, Hruby JM, Costa JE, "Properties of Aged Palladium Tritide Foil," SAND89-8213, March 1989.
28. Hruby J, Steeper R, Evans G, Crowe C., "An Experimental and Numerical Study of Flow and Convective Heat Transfer in a Freely Falling Curtain of Particles," *Journal of Fluids Engineering*, v. 110, pp 172-181, June 1988.
29. Hruby JM, Bartel JJ, Pestanas VV, Flatbush EK, Jones RL, "Monel Pyrotechnic Valve Development: Interim Report," SAND87-8247, January 1988.
30. Hruby JM, "Solid-Particle Solar Receivers: A New Heat Transfer Technology," *Sandia Technology*, v 10, Number 01, October 1986.
31. Hruby JM, "A Technical Feasibility Study of a Solid Particle Solar Central Receiver for High Temperature Applications," SAND86-8211, March 1986.
32. Hruby JM, Falcone PK, "Momentum and Energy Exchange in a Solid Particle Solar Central Receiver," *Proceedings of the 23rd AIChE/ASME National Heat Transfer Conference*, v. 81, 1985.
33. Falcone PK, Noring JE, Hruby JM, "Assessment of a Solid Particle Receiver for a High Temperature Solar Central Receiver System," SAND85-8208, February 1985.
34. Hruby JM, Burolla VP, "Solid Particle Receiver Experiments: Radiant Heat Test," SAND84-8251, December 1984.

35. Burolla VP, Hruby JM, Steele BR, "High Temperature Solar Thermal Energy Absorption with Solid Particles," Proceedings of the 19th Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, v 3, August 1984.
36. Hruby JM, Steele BR, A Solid Particle Central Receiver for Solar Energy, Chemical Engineering Progress, February 1984.

12. **Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).**

No formal speeches over last 5 years.

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple "yes" or "no" response is appropriate.

13. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?**

Yes.

14. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?**

Yes.

15. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?**

Yes.

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes.

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes.

18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes.


19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 10 day of May, 2021

[The nomination of Ms. Jill M. Hruby was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 22, 2021.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Frank A. Rose by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

QUALIFICATION AND DUTIES

Question. Section 2403 of title 50, U.S. Code, provides that the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) shall be appointed "from among persons who have extensive background in organizational management and are well qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that advances and protects the national security of the United States."

What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. I have over 20 years of experience in positions at the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, and private sector working on nuclear strategy, deterrence, arms control, strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging security challenges. I currently am a senior fellow and the co-director of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining Brookings, I served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance from 2014–17. From 2009–14, I served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy. Additionally, I previously served as a professional staff member on both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe my previous experience working in Congress and the U.S. Departments of State and Defense have prepared me to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator. However, I strongly believe in the value of continuous learning.

If confirmed, I would surround myself with a highly trained team from across NNSA and its nuclear security enterprise. I would also regularly engage with all elements of NNSA's enterprise to further understand NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges in order to ensure NNSA can execute its vitally important missions.

Section 2403 further provides that the Principal Deputy Administrator "shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of activities among the elements of the Administration."

Question. What is your understanding of the role you would play in the day-to-day administration of the NNSA, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be the alter ego of the Administrator, ensuring the Administrator's direction for the NNSA is carried out. As a practical matter, I would expect to be focused on the internal workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with other Departmental organizations. This allows the Administrator to address the strategic challenges and outward facing interactions necessary to accomplish the NNSA mission.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to the coordination of activities among the Deputy Administrators, NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would assist the Administrator in overseeing the NNSA programs that are led by the Deputy Administrators. I see my role as the Principal Deputy Administrator to work closely with each of the Deputy Administrators to ensure they can effectively execute the missions under their cognizance. In particular, the role of Principal Deputy Administrator coordinates development and implementation of policy and guidance, strategic planning, program managements, budgeting, resource allocation, safeguards and security, emergency management, contracts, and hiring to be enablers for the primary mission programs of the NNSA.

Question. How, if at all, might your coordinating role be different with regard to the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors?

Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors oversees the Naval Nuclear Enterprise and naval nuclear laboratories. If confirmed, I will have responsibilities in oversight of the nuclear security enterprise, comprised of the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites. My role as the Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA is to manage the NNSA support functions to enable the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors in executing his unique responsibilities in delivering nuclear propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's operational requirements.

Question. Are there any special projects or tasks on which you would focus, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator and whatever duties or initiatives she may seek to implement to improve the NNSA's nuclear security mission. I am ready and willing to take on any projects or tasks that will benefit our nation's nuclear security enterprise.

Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Administrator to determine what additional duties and functions I will be assigned. I stand ready to support the Administrator in furthering the Administration's efforts to modernize and recapitalize our nation's nuclear security enterprise.

CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are currently the broad organizational challenges and priorities for the NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's priorities to ensure NNSA meets our nation's national security requirements, and NNSA continues to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. The United States has not adequately invested the funds to sustain a modern, flexible, and responsive infrastructure. Most of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old and nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator to execute the priorities that have been identified.

Question. In your view, what are the currently the major challenges for the next Principal Deputy Administrator?

Answer. NNSA must modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile, associated infrastructure, and reestablish production capabilities. In addition, NNSA must also continue to prevent, counter, monitor, and respond to proliferation threats around the world. To be successful in all of NNSA's mission areas, we must recruit and retain a workforce that is second-to-none. I will work with the Administrator to support the NNSA Management and Operating (M&O) partners to attract and retain a top-notch workforce in the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites while reestablishing the corporate knowledge necessary to modernize our stockpile.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges, and on what timeline?

Answer. If confirmed, it will be important for me to work with the Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, each of the NNSA Deputy

Administrators, and the leaders in other federal agencies to identify solutions to these challenges and then assist to develop appropriate plans and timelines to implement them.

Question. In your view, what should be the main priorities for the next Principal Deputy Administrator specifically?

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on the challenges and priorities outlined by the Administrator and assigned to me by the Administrator. It will require critical thinking and planning to address the challenges and tackle the priorities. I will need to develop close working relationships with people at NNSA, the laboratories, the plants, the sites, the Department of Energy, other federal agencies, Congress, and allies.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate progress in regard to these priorities?

Answer. I will engage with and empower NNSA leaders to coordinate with DOD, State Department, the National Security Council, and other executive branch agencies on defining NNSA requirements, and work closely with Congress to explain how NNSA will meet the requirements.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the legal and “in practice” relationship between the Principal Deputy Administrator and each of the following officials. Indicate also if there are any special considerations that, if confirmed, you would apply to your relationship with each such official(s):

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the absence of the Administrator, I would represent NNSA.

Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.

Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the NNSA’s Deputy Administrators to ensure each can execute their respective missions.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management.

Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management issues that intersect with the needs of NNSA.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

Answer. NNSA’s Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the primary interface with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense. If confirmed, I will support the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Assistant Secretary, as appropriate.

Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Answer. If confirmed, I will represent and support the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command.

Answer. If confirmed, I will represent the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Commander of the United States Strategic Command.

Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.

Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and Project Management.

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA in providing support and management oversight for the Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management.

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Question. Nuclear Posture Review.

Answer. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the nuclear mission.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of the Biden Administration's NPR?

Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA, I will support both the Administrator and the Secretary of Energy as they navigate the NPR process and represent Department equities. NNSA's responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation, promoting international nuclear safety and security, and developing technologies to monitor arms control agreements mean we must be at the table for discussions of nuclear policy.

Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you recommend the Biden Administration consider?

Answer. I am not currently involved in ongoing nuclear policy discussions within the Administration, but, if confirmed, I would urge the Biden administration to consider the importance of revitalizing and investing in the infrastructure and capabilities needed to support our nation's nuclear deterrent.

Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements in the U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the full and timely support of NNSA to the work required to implement those enhancements?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the new requirements?

Answer. Yes.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. Section 4132(c)(3) of title 41, U.S. Code, establishes that the Administrator, NNSA "... shall be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation."

What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA in statute and recent practice?

Answer. NNSA can only be successful if there is a positive and strong working relationship between the Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Energy, NNSA Administrator, and NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure DOE and NNSA have good working relations.

Question. How is the "semi-autonomous" nature of the NNSA, as set forth in law, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure? What makes NNSA different from other components of Department of Energy (DOE)—in both law and practice?

Answer. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA is designated as a semi-autonomous organization; the organizations led by other DOE undersecretaries are not structured in this way. This is a unique authority and responsibility that gives the NNSA Administrator authority over functions that also reside in DOE. If confirmed, I will prioritize building strong, mission-focused, and effective culture and processes across those functions, in close collaboration with the leadership of DOE.

Question. With a view to improving organizational management and operational effectiveness, if confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the organizational structure of in NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on continuing NNSA's recent progress in its approach to governance and management by strengthening communication and integration across the nuclear security enterprise to make sure we have effective partnerships between federal employees, the laboratories, plants, and sites, and our interagency mission partners. I will work with the Administrator and NNSA leadership to clearly define lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and to consolidate NNSA's progress in strategic oversight and project management.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) sets requirements for nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of the NNSA. DOD has been described as NNSA's primary customer, as well as its partner.

If confirmed, what would be your role in supporting the Administrator of the NNSA in executing their duties and functions as a member of the NWC?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in executing her duties as a member of the NWC by ensuring that there is a communication flow at the staff, management, and leadership levels to facilitate discussion and understanding on key issues including requirements, budget, and stockpile activities.

Question. How would you describe the relationship between NNSA and the DOD?

Answer. From what I have observed, NNSA's relationship with DOD is healthy with dialogue and collaboration at both the working and senior levels.

Question. What is your assessment of the health of that relationship at both senior- and working-levels?

Answer. From what I have observed, the relationship today is healthy and, if confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator in continuing to strengthen this relationship.

Question. If confirmed, what might you recommend to improve this relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to keeping an open mind on opportunities to further enhance this relationship. I will work collaboratively with the Administrator on these efforts.

NNSA BUDGET

Question. In 2015, then-Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz wrote to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding NNSA's budget allocation for the ensuing five years that "an additional \$5.2 billion over fiscal year 2018–2021 [was] needed to establish a viable and sustainable program portfolio" and that "[f]ailure to address these requirements in the near term will put the NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in fiscal year 2018." Then-Secretary Moniz added that, if uncorrected, the budget proposal would "lack credibility." The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 included an additional \$3 billion above the President's budget request.

Do you believe that the \$3 billion increase was adequate and sufficient to render the budget request "credible", particularly in light of NNSA's stockpile stewardship responsibilities and the recommendations of the 2018 NPR? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe the \$3 billion increase provided in fiscal year 2021 is adequate for this fiscal year as it is the most robust funding in the history of NNSA. This is an area I will assess further if confirmed.

Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to ensure it can meet DOD requirements.

Answer. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to review the budget before its submission to OMB?

I do not know the specifics of how NNSA, the NWC, and OMB mechanically share budget information and comply with the provision. If confirmed, I am committed to making sure there is open, clear, and consistent communication regarding NNSA's budget with the NWC.

PERSONNEL

Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of civilian employees to perform its mission? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to work with the Administrator to review staffing needs and challenges across NNSA to ensure the appropriate skills mix and number of personnel are in place to accomplish its national security missions.

Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional personnel accomplish that NNSA is unable to accomplish today? If confirmed, which specific components within the NNSA would you recommend growing and how much growth would you recommend? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure that NNSA is equipped to accomplish its missions. I understand that NNSA's mission has been steadily increasing, and I will work to ensure staffing levels are commensurate with the expanding workload.

Question. In your view, does NNSA rely too heavily on contractors and a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator and the M&O mission partners to ensure we maintain the correct mix of federal and contracting employees.

Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate capabilities—in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces—to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.

Answer. Ensuring NNSA has the appropriate capabilities to execute the mission is critical for the nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work closely with

the Administrator to ensure that NNSA continues to recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals needed to execute its missions.

Question. If not, please explain what skill sets, areas of expertise, or other capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure that NNSA is fully mission capable?

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor workforces?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator to ensure NNSA is executing a hiring strategy, in partnership with NNSA's M&O partners, to bring the best and brightest into the nuclear security enterprise. This should include outreach to colleges and universities and participation in career fairs near NNSA labs, plants, and sites.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design capabilities, in the NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs and the plants?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the M&O mission partners to ensure we explore the most effective paths to recruit and retain the world's best engineers, scientists, and support personnel.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are maintained in NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs and the plants?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources and training specialists to understand what is already in place and where there are opportunities for improvement. Where appropriate, I will make the necessary changes to ensure there is an adequate and appropriate technical workforce in place. I will also expand communications with the NNSA labs, plants, and site to understand how NNSA can best support their recruitment and training requirements.

Question. In your view, does NNSA leadership need any additional authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the federal civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources specialists to assess whether any additional authorities are required.

CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays, and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and others.

In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated failures in project management?

Answer. I understand that NNSA has made a concerted effort to address project management challenges over the last decade. Based on my understanding, these challenges included issues related to ill-defined project requirements and schedules, improper estimating, contractual problems, and lack of proper planning.

If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA continues to remain on a path toward improved project management.

Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address these problems? Please explain your answer.

Answer. NNSA's decision to create the Office of Acquisition and Project Management in 2011 has led to significant improvements. More can always be done. If confirmed, I will continue to support the implementation of best business practices, as well as using lessons learned to improve early project planning and requirements development to prevent cost growth. If confirmed, I would also ensure there are sufficient qualified acquisition and project management specialists overseeing NNSA's growing portfolio.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that these systemic project management failures are not repeated in the future? What specific changes in policy, practice, organization, or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring improved contract and project management across NNSA. I would recommend rigorous project management practices and cost estimating, clarified lines of authority, holding federal and contractor personnel accountable, and providing independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight.

Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of these project management failures? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will review Departmental regulations that govern capital acquisition projects and how they apply to NNSA activities. Until then, I will ensure that NNSA staff have the resources needed to further projects while staying within Departmental regulations.

Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of systemic project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), in the Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). CEPE now reports directly to the Administrator, NNSA.

In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide independent cost estimates and other additional costing and project management advice internal to NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to determine if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.

Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE data and information to execute its statutory mission?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review CEPE's authority and access to understand if further improvements are needed.

Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How will you balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars?

Answer. CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities are valuable to NNSA. CEPE's independence is critical to providing both the Principal Deputy Administrator and the Administrator with independent, data driven analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its independence and review the resources available to it.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to facilitating CEPE personnel access to the Administrator and to you?

Answer. Yes.

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Principal Deputy Administrator in ensuring safety and security in the nuclear weapons complex?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to be engaged on initiatives to improve safety at NNSA's facilities including a healthy safety culture. This includes implementing a Governance and Management structure which emphasizes transparency, trust, and collaboration to address challenges. I will work with our Management and Operating partners to establish expectations for sustained safety performance with successful mission accomplishment. I will reinforce that sustained safety performance and mission accomplishments can mutually support each other to achieve mission success.

I will also work with the Administrator and the security program office to ensure that we have systems and processes in place to prevent security lapses. I also anticipate being engaged on all initiatives to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security at NNSA's facilities. Additionally, I will work with NNSA's Management and Operating partners to make sure our governance and management works to achieve those objectives while emphasizing continuous improvement in both safety and security.

Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?

Answer. I firmly believe that the safety and security of the NNSA's facilities and nuclear material are of the utmost importance and it is critical that the NNSA has the appropriate authorities and funding from Congress to mitigate these threats. As part of this, addressing the continued challenges of ageing infrastructure is critically important to ensure that NNSA is advancing the mission with state-of-the-art facilities, with modern safety designs. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to emphasize and address NNSA's commitment to operate safely while accomplishing the mission and mitigate security threats such as cyber, material, transportation, and physical threats to NNSA's operations.

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have in NNSA's interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?

Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of a healthy working relationship with the DNFSB and open lines of communication. While it is my understanding the Deputy Secretary of Energy manages the Department's overall interface with the DNFSB, if confirmed, I will work through the Administrator and Deputy Secretary of Energy on DNFSB's recommendations and advice regarding public health and safety issues at NNSA's facilities.

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported on a number of accidents at the national laboratories in recent years. These accidents included explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that led to the partial shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory—placing both personnel and mission execution at risk. Yet, while personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by definition involves some of the most hazardous materials known to exist. Thus, if the labs' nuclear mission is to be accomplished, risk can never be eliminated completely.

In your view, what is the proper balance between safety, risk, and mission accomplishment at the national laboratories? How should this balancing be accomplished, in your view?

Answer. NNSA must have sustained, strong safety performance. Safety and mission success mutually support each other. This is balanced by properly assessing risk and controlling and managing that risk.

If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will continue to focus on fostering our partnership between the labs and plants and emphasize continuous improvement in safely and successfully executing the NNSA mission. I will also be committed to empowering employees to anticipate, identify, report, and resolve safety issues.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve safety culture at the labs, while still meeting mission requirements?

Answer. The key to having a positive safety environment is establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership which I will do with the Administrator through my interactions with Management and Operating partners' leadership. I will emphasize the long-term commitment to safe operations through the establishment of an effective governance and management culture. I will also emphasize the critical nature of effectively empowering and engaging with employees to give feedback while also stressing organizational learning. The reinforcement of these attributes provides the foundation to improve safety culture. I will also stress a strong safety conscious work environment so employees will feel comfortable in raising safety issues with leaders prepared to effectively address those issues. I will encourage and provide support to our leadership so they have all the necessary tools to effectively address any safety concerns.

PLUTONIUM STRATEGY

Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production: Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce approximately 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not less than 80 pits per year.

What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its ability to achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of the ongoing stockpile program?

Answer. I believe work at Los Alamos is on track to achieve the goal of producing 30 pits per year in 2026, supporting the overall requirement for 80 pits per year. Moreover, I know that NNSA has to succeed in this effort. The United States currently does not produce any war reserve pits and we must do so to maintain our nuclear deterrence in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to being focused on making sure Los Alamos does, in fact, get to 30 pits per year in 2026.

Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the ongoing stockpile program?

Answer. The former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, or MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in an existing facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include repurposing and transitioning the MFFF into a safe, secure, compliant, and efficient pit production facility.

URANIUM STRATEGY AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION

Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1 Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium nor the technology used to enrich it carries an "obligation" from a foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for unobligated LEU, but the available supply

of recycled HEU for down-blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for obtaining unobligated uranium.

Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?

Answer. Yes, the United States needs to re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to ensure a reliable supply of enriched uranium to support U.S. national security needs. Since the closure of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, in 2013, the United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched uranium free of peaceful use obligations, i.e., unobligated. Mission needs for enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States' remaining HEU stockpile (by downblending the HEU to produce LEU), which is a finite and currently irreplaceable source.

Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a capability?

Answer. As I understand it, NNSA is currently implementing a long-term strategy that meets current needs and seeks to re-establish domestic uranium enrichment capabilities: Downblending HEU to LEU to extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044; developing enrichment technology options; and executing an acquisition process to deploy an enrichment technology. An effective and cost-efficient solution for re-establishing enrichment capabilities will be identified through an ongoing Analysis of Alternatives.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Question. What do you believe should be the highest priorities of NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs?

Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is the lead U.S. agency for reducing nuclear and radiological threats globally, including the threat of nuclear proliferation among hostile states and terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials. DNN must continue to provide a comprehensive defense-in-depth against proliferant states and non-state actors from obtaining, acquiring, and developing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. NNSA must work in close cooperation with interagency and international partners to carry out its nuclear threat reduction programs and to anticipate and respond to technological advances that may threaten the nation's security. Finally, NNSA must sustain the unparalleled scientific and technical prowess at NNSA's national laboratories, plants, and sites, which is crucial to understanding this evolving threat environment, and we must maintain these capabilities, including the facilities and intellectual capital, to reduce global nuclear threats globally.

Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements needed in the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs? If so, what improvements would you envision?

Answer. While I would not term these as "needed improvements," necessarily, there are programmatic challenges facing NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation efforts, including:

- Increasingly rapid technological advancements lowering the bar to proliferation, including the diffusion of dual-use, emerging, and disruptive technologies;
- Eroding nuclear norms and regime cohesion, including the inability to reach consensus within key multilateral fora (e.g., Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty);
- Hiring challenges posed by the continued attrition and retirements; and
- The ranging political will, practical capabilities, and absorption ability of international partners.

Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in implementing the improvements you envision?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Administrator, other Departmental elements, interagency, and laboratory colleagues to identify and enable the strategic, technical, human resource, and diplomatic tools to help address these challenges.

Question. What improvements do you recommend to NNSA's efforts in verification and monitoring?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and DNN to evaluate investing in efforts that advance innovative capabilities in industry, academia, and the national laboratories to support and sustain solutions for the difficult challenges ahead. NNSA must continue its support for investments in research and development of technology to support detection and verification efforts for nonproliferation and arms control regimes and renew its commitment to harnessing the power of science to minimize nuclear threats around the world.

Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs if confirmed? What re-

sources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation would NNSA require to meet such needs?

Answer. First, I believe there is an ongoing need to address the threats posed by North Korea and Iran, working with international partners. Second, there is an enduring need to secure vulnerable and excess nuclear and radioactive materials globally. Several countries retain inventories of separated plutonium and excess highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the United States is unable to remove, or confirm the disposition of, due to lack of a political path forward. Finally, we must keep pace with and regulate emerging technologies to mitigate their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of their promising opportunities.

Question. What do you think are the five most significant lessons learned for NNSA from the mismanagement of the MOX project? How will these lessons learned be implemented in future NNSA projects such as those related to the dilution and disposal of plutonium?

Answer. I am aware NNSA experienced major project management challenges with the MOX project. If confirmed, I look forward to getting briefed on the project to learn more about the intricacies of the challenges associated with it. Further, I will ensure the lessons learned from it will be enforced and strengthened for NNSA's other capital acquisition projects.

REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT

Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and external, and that this contributes to the challenges in staying under cost and on schedule for major projects.

Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs and efficient mission execution overall?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation of all NNSA facilities. This is all-encompassing and includes the protection of the NNSA workforce, the public, and the environment. I will ensure that safety is properly incorporated into the design and construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. This is a cradle-to-grave approach encompassing safety expectations being communicated early in the conception of the project in accordance with relevant directives and regulations, periodic review of projects and operations as they progress through important milestones, the selection of qualified design and construction firms to lead them, and the proper staffing of a technically qualified federal project team. I believe this holistic approach and effective engagement from conception to execution of projects will reduce rework and control costs.

I recognize the oversight challenges NNSA faces getting alignment with their partners regarding safety expectations through the application of directives which have been developed over time; and I believe there is room for improvement in the implementation of these directives. I support NNSA's approach to being a learning organization and learn from our past and leverage best practices. This includes NNSA's streamline of its directives and requirements, leverage general industry standards, and management of risk inherent in the construction of non-hazardous facilities.

I am committed to ensuring NNSA's projects and operations are conducted in a safe and effective manner and follow all applicable environmental, safety, and construction rules. I am also committed to using standard approaches to help streamline execution of NNSA's mission work in alignment with the complexity of the projects. Streamlining the construction of low-risk, non-nuclear, commercial-like construction projects is an area where NNSA (and the bidding community) can benefit the most.

Through data-informed, priority investment decisions in support of NNSA's current and future missions, the risk posed by aging infrastructure to NNSA's workforce, the environment, and its mission can be significantly reduced.

Question. In your view, are the labs subject to an appropriate level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?

Answer. Strong governance and management oversight by NNSA are key pillars in accomplishing the missions and goals of the entire nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that a proper balance exists between oversight and mission execution. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work to build relationships across the complex with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office, and Congress to ensure that there exists a proper bal-

ance between oversight and mission execution. Clear roles and responsibilities are essential.

Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight structures would you recommend, and why?

Answer. Making sure that NNSA's missions are executed in an effective, efficient manner is important. If confirmed, I will assess what changes are necessary to ensure mission execution with proper regulations and oversight.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.

Do you believe that the capabilities exist today to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program uses a science-based assessment of the reliability of nuclear weapons to assess and certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. For the last 23 years, the three NNSA Laboratory Directors have certified that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and that additional underground nuclear explosive testing is not required at this time.

Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the design of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.

Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and in particular concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the Programs to minimize risks to meeting schedule requirements.

Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.

If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in supporting the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and making full use of the authorities it provides NNSA?

Answer. I believe it is important to make investments in personnel, programs, and technologies that strengthen our ability to respond to emerging challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and its goal to expand opportunities for young scientists and engineers to ensure we have a talented and capable array of nuclear security personnel across the enterprise.

Question. In your view, what should be the long-term plan for the National Ignition Facility, and in particular, how would you assist the Administrator in the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition, which to date has not occurred?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, NNSA subject matter experts, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Congress to best identify the long-term plan for NIF. I do know that NIF is essential for understanding the physical properties and characteristics of nuclear weapons performance.

Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of NNSA missions?

Answer. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, delivers leading-edge computer platforms, sophisticated physics and engineering codes, and uniquely qualified staff to support addressing a wide variety of stockpile issues for design, physics certification, engineering qualification, and production. While there is certainly a role for other activities that utilize the ASC program, its primary use should continue to support stockpile stewardship.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. More than half of NNSA's infrastructure is more than 40 years old, and a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project. As former Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty testified in 2020, "[T]ime is of the essence to recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire NNSA. Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch these facilities. We need to make sure that we have state of the art infrastructure, so we can recapitalize our enterprise and make sure that we can provide to the Department of Defense the requirements that they so sorely need to maintain our nuclear deterrent." This testimony post-dated by almost two years the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA directive to NNSA to establish the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, with the objective of reducing the backlog of deferred maintenance and repair needs by at least 30% by 2025.

If confirmed, what factors would you consider in prioritizing work with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to address the required maintenance of NNSA infrastructure?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to modernize and sustain NNSA's infrastructure. NNSA must undertake a risk-informed infrastructure strategy (or management approach) to repair, maintain, and replace facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. Reducing deferred maintenance, disposing of process-contaminated facilities, and streamlining execution of non-nuclear construction projects will be a key piece of the priorities I set to meet Congressional direction.

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend to reduce risk in future major construction projects, such as those related to the lithium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will help NNSA ensure that future major projects are developed and executed utilizing well established program and project management principles including: ensuring that the project requirements are clearly defined and prioritized; proper cost estimates are completed and reviewed independently; sufficient design work and technological development is completed prior to commencing a project's construction; and monitoring progress to ensure projects remain on schedule and on budget.

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE

Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in ensuring that the NNSA workplace, including that of NNSA's geographically-separated labs and other components promotes the dignity of and respect for all persons?

Answer. Respect is one of my core values, and one, if confirmed, I will ensure at NNSA. If confirmed, I will serve as a role model by treating each employee with dignity and respect and would ensure that all employees foster an inclusive environment where every perspective is recognized and diversity of thought is valued.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to creating a workplace that is safe and welcoming to all people. As the Principal Deputy Administrator, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to learn more about the current NNSA climate and taking steps to improve the environment.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the DOE, NNSA, or a component thereof?

Answer. If confirmed, I will take complaints of sexual harassment or discrimination seriously. All employees have the right to feel safe in the workplace and must be treated fairly. I will work to ensure such complaints are reviewed and responded to quickly, including appropriate corrective action and discipline if warranted.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

Answer. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

NOMINATIONS

1. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Rose, as part of my responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Mr. ROSE. No.

2. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Rose, have any of you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

Mr. ROSE. No.

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL

3. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Rose, the Biden administration has begun a series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our nuclear posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?

Mr. ROSE. Nuclear modernization cannot take place without a skilled workforce. Given that more than one-third of the NNSA workforce will be eligible to retire in the next five years, ensuring that the NNSA is able to recruit and retain the next generation of highly qualified engineers and scientists is critical to the national security needs of the United States.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOMMY TUBERVILLE

MINUTEMAN III MISSILES

4. Senator TUBERVILLE. Mr. Rose, some think we could just keep on keeping on with the Minuteman III ICBMs. What would keeping those old weapons on hand look like financially and what would it look like strategically?

Mr. ROSE. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for decisions concerning the warhead delivery system programs. I would refer questions regarding the financial and strategic impacts of maintaining the Minuteman III system to the DOD.

[The nomination reference of Mr. Frank A. Rose follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN429

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 27, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Frank A. Rose, of Massachusetts, to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice William Bookless.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Frank A. Rose, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Frank Rose Bio

Frank Rose, Nominee for Principal Deputy Administrator for National Nuclear Security, Department of Energy

Frank A. Rose is a senior fellow and co-director of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining Brookings, Rose served as U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance from 2014-17. From 2009-14, Rose served as the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for space and defense policy. He has also held positions at the U.S. Department of Defense, in the U.S. Congress, and the private sector. Rose received his bachelor's degree in history from American University in 1994 and a master's degree in war studies from King's College, University of London in 1999.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Frank A. Rose in connection with his nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 – 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of “yes”, “no”, or “not applicable” is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):**
 - Frank A. Rose
2. **Position to which nominated:**
 - Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
3. **Date of nomination:**
 - Tuesday, April 27, 2021
4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-**

line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

- Kings' College, University of London, Masters in War Studies, 1998-1999. Degree granted in December 1999.
 - American University, Bachelors in History, 1990-1994. Degree granted May 1994.
 - Plymouth South High School, 1986-1990. High school diploma.
5. **Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**
- Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Foreign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. March 2018-Present. Conduct research on international security issues.
 - Adjunct Assistant Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. January 2021-Present. Teach graduate-level course on outer space security, strategic technologies, and the future of international security.
 - Visiting Fellow, Robert Bosch Stiftung, Berlin, Germany, August-December 2019. Conducted research on German foreign and security policy.
 - Principal Director and Chief of Government Relations, The Aerospace Corporation, Arlington, VA. July 2017-March 2018. Served as the company's lead government affairs representative in Washington
 - Casual Employee/Consultant, March 2018-July 2019.
 - Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. December 2014-January 2017. Served as lead advisor to the Secretary of State on arms control and strategic policy issues.
 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy, Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. June 2009-December 2014. Responsible for managing outer space, missile defense, and conventional arms control issues.

- Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. January 2007-June 2009. Responsible for overseeing U.S. missile defense programs from the committee.
6. **Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**
- None.
7. **Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):**
- None.
8. **Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):**
- Member, Nuclear Security Working Group, 2017-Present
 - Member, Missile Defense Project Advisory Board, 2017-Present
 - Non-resident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council, 2017-2018
 - Member, National Security Leaders for Biden, 2020-2021
 - Board Member, Arlington Community Residences, 1995-1998
 - Chair, Taste of Arlington, 1997-1998
9. **Political affiliations and activities:**
- a. **If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):**
- N/A

b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:

- Member, Biden for President National Security Working Group
- Advisor, Steve Bullock for President

c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:

• 11-04-20:	Biden Victory Fund	\$100.00
• 11-01-20:	Biden Victory Fund	\$100.00
• 10-31-20:	Biden Victory Fund	\$100.00
• 10-27-20	Joe Biden	\$120.00
• 10-23-20	Joe Biden	\$1,000.00
• 10-21-20	Steve Bullock	\$250.00
• 10-12-20	Abigail Spanberger	\$250.00
• 10-12-20	Jamie Harrison	\$250.00
• 10-07-20	Joe Biden	\$1,000.00
• 09-23-20	Joe Biden	\$500.00
• 09-02-20	Joe Biden	\$250.00
• 09-02-20	Joe Biden	\$250.00
• 07-10-20	Joe Biden	\$250.00
• 06-05-20	Evelyn Farkas	\$250.00
• 06-04-20	Joe Biden	\$500.00
• 03-30-20	Steve Bullock	\$250.00
• 03-20-20	Evelyn Farkas	\$500.00
• 03-08-20	Joe Biden	\$250.00
• 01-15-20	Joe Biden	\$1,000.00
• 06-28-19	Steve Bullock	\$1,000.00
• 05-09-19	Steve Bullock	\$1,000.00
• 05-08-19	Elissa Slotkin	\$250.00
• 10-29-18	Tom Malinowski	\$200.00
• 10-13-18	Abigail Spanberger	\$600.00
• 09-10-18	Elissa Slotkin	\$250.00
• 04-11-18	Tim Kaine	\$500.00
• 03-23-18	Tom Malinowski	\$500.00
• 02-18-18	Big Sky Values PAC	\$1,000.00
• 02-07-18	Elissa Slotkin	\$200.00
• 02-14-18	Dan Ward	\$100.00
• 02-07-18	Dan Ward	\$100.00

- 11-28-17 Moulton Leadership Fund \$300.00
- 10-18-16 Hillary Clinton \$250.00
- 07-24-16 Hillary Clinton \$250.00

10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):

- Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Award
- Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence
- Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service
- U.S. State Department Superior Honor Award
- Ordinul National Serviciul Credincios from Romania

11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):

2021

- "Assessing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review," National Defense Academy of Japan, Center for Global Security, March 2021.
- "U.S.-China Strategic Stability in Outer Space," U.S. Institute for Peace, April 2021.

2020

- "The US Defense Space Strategy Works on Paper, but Will It Be Implemented?" Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 11, 2020.
- "Starting off on the right foot: Biden's near-term arms control and strategic policy challenge," Brookings Institution, December 4, 2020.
- "What leaders overseas will want to ask of the Biden administration," Brookings Institution, November 13, 2020.
- "Extend New START with Russia," Brookings Institution, October 27, 2020.
- "Not in my backyard: Land-based missiles, democratic states, and Asia's conventional military balance," Brookings Institution, September 10, 2020.
- "Managing geopolitical competition in the strategic domains," New Perspectives, July 15, 2020.

- "The U.S. Defense Space Strategy works on paper, but will it be implemented?," Brookings Institution, July 6, 2020
- "The U.S. Defense Space Strategy Works on Paper, but Will it be Implemented?" Lawfare July 14, 2020.
- "Ein Abzug macht Europa weniger sicher," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 9, 2020.
- "Why Germany's nuclear mission matters," The Brookings Institution, June 9, 2020
- "Why Germany's Nuclear Mission Matters," Hudson Institute, June 9, 2020.
- "Managing China's rise in outer space, Brookings Institution," April 2020
- "NATO and outer space: Now what?" Space Watch, April 22, 2020
- "NATO and outer space: Now what?" Brookings Institution, April 22, 2020
- "Stuck inside? Brookings Foreign Policy recommends movies and shows to watch," Brookings Institution, March 27, 2020.
- "Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect," Brookings Institution, March 3, 2020.
- "Deterrence, modernization, and alliance cohesion: The case for extending New START with Russia," Brookings Institution, January 16, 2020.
- "The Case for Extending New START with Russia," Lawfare, January 28, 2020

2019

- "Bringing China into the fold on arms control and strategic stability issues," Brookings Institution, September 25, 2019.
- "2020 Democrats can't give Trump the high ground on national security," The Hill, June 18, 2019.
- "Democratic presidential candidates shouldn't give in to demand they slash defense spending," USA Today, June 13, 2019.

- "Democratic presidential candidates shouldn't give in to demand they slash defense spending," Brookings Institution, June 17, 2019.
- "India's anti-satellite test presents a window of opportunity for the Trump administration: Will it take advantage," Brookings Institution, May 10, 2019.
- Reassuring allies and strengthening strategic stability: An approach to nuclear modernization for Democrats," War on the Rocks, April 16, 2019.
- "The end of an era? The INF Treaty, New START, and the future of strategic stability," Brookings Institution, February 12, 2019.
- "Managing risk: Nuclear weapons in the new geopolitics," Brookings Institution, February 2019.
- "The Trump administration's new Missile Defense Review is a mixed bag," The Brookings Institution, January 25, 2019.
- "Brookings experts react to the new Missile Defense Review," Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019.
- "Re-establishing U.S. Space Command is a great idea," Brookings Institution, January 3, 2019.

2018

- "How space-based missile defenses could make us less safe, not more," Brookings Institution, December 14, 2018.
- "Bad Idea: Space-Based Interceptors and Space-Based Directed Energy Systems," CSIS, December 13, 2018.
- "As Russia and China improve their conventional military capabilities, should the US rethink its assumptions on extended nuclear deterrence?" Brookings Institution October 23, 2018.
- "Pompeo and Mattis should add space cooperation to the US-India strategic partnership," Space News, September 10, 2018.
- "Two halves of the same walnut": The politics of New START extension and strategic nuclear modernization, Brookings Institution, August 30, 2018.
- "For-Those-Keeping-Score: Putin-1 Trump-0," Instick Media, July 19, 2018.

- “Safeguarding the heavens: The United States and the future of norms of behavior in outer space,” Brookings Institution, June 2018.
- “Is the 2018 NPR as bad as the critics claim?” Brookings Institution, April 2018.
- “Around the Halls: Brookings experts discuss the implications of President Trump’s Iran nuclear deal announcement,” Brookings Institution, May 8, 2018.

2017

- “Five myths about a controversial weapon,” War on the Rocks, June 20, 2017.
- “Russia violated our nuclear arms treaty. Here’s how we respond,” The Hill, April 21, 2017.

12. **Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).**

2021

- **April 15:** Panelist, Center for Strategic and International Studies event on space security
 - <https://www.csis.org/events/defense-against-dark-arts-space>
- **March 26:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Angus Lapsley, Director General for International Security, British Ministry of Defense, on the UK Integrated Review
- **March 19:** Moderator, Brookings event with Lt Gen B. Chance Saltzman on space security
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/remembering-the-first-space-war-a-discussion-with-lt-gen-b-chance-saltzman/>
- **March 4:** Moderator, Brookings events on the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/strategic-nuclear-modernization-in-the-united-states/>
- **Feb 18:** Panelist, Advanced Nuclear Weapons Alliance event on strategic nuclear modernization

- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFWymjJ8_tg&t=1s

- **January 27th:** Moderator, Brookings event on the evolving air and missile threat
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/challenges-for-the-biden-administration-addressing-the-evolving-air-and-missile-threat/>

2020

- **December 28:** Speaker, University of California Los Angeles podcast/documentary on space security
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8SvBV2V4so>
- **December 10:** Speaker, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory private event on the future of arms control
- **December 9:** Speaker, University of Glasgow private event on the future of arms control
- **December 2:** Moderator, Brookings event with Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/us-russia-relations-a-conversation-with-russian-ambassador-anatoly-antonov/>
- **October 22:** Panelist, Brookings event on Chinese perspectives on arms control and strategic stability
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/arms-control-and-strategic-stability-chinese-perspectives/>
- **October 19:** Speaker, private event with John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory on space security
- **October 12:** Panelist, MITRE Corporation event on space security
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUK8o6wGleY>
- **October 12:** Guest, Burn Bag podcast on outer space security
 - <https://burnbagpod.com/2020/10/12/ep-17-out-of-this-world-us-space-policy-with-brookings-senior-fellow-frank-rose/>

- **September 15:** Panelist, Brookings event on the defense policy and the 2020 election
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/defense-policy-and-the-2020-election/>
- **August 13:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN), Chair, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, on strategic nuclear modernization
- **August 4:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Lt Gen David Thompson, Vice Chief, U.S. Space Force, on space security
- **July 21:** Panelist, International Institute for Strategic Studies event on space security
 - <https://www.iiss.org/events/2020/07/space-conflict>
- **July 20:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Steve Kitay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, on space security issues
- **July 8:** Moderator, Brookings/EU event on the future of arms control
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/webinar-eu-defense-washington-forum/>
- **July 1:** Panelist, Brookings event with Chief of Staff of the Air Force David Goldfein
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/assessing-the-state-of-the-air-force-a-conversation-with-general-david-goldfein/>
- **June 24:** Speaker, Defense Threat Reduction Agency private event on space security
- **May 26:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Greg Weaver, Deputy J-5, Joint Staff, discussing the future on deterrence and strategic nuclear modernization
- **May 26:** Panelist, Brookings event on the future of high tech warfare
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/webinar-the-future-of-high-tech-warfare/>
- **May 13:** Moderator, Brookings event on orbital debris
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/webinar-space-junk-addressing-the-orbital-debris-challenge/>
- **May 8:** Panelist, Brookings event on China's technological reach in the world
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/webinar-global-china-assessing-chinas->

technological-reach-in-the-world/

- **May 5:** Panelist, Aerospace Corporation event on Japan's space security policy
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBkB4SfnGMQ>
- **April 23:** Panelist, Heritage Foundation event on nuclear stability and arms control
 - <https://www.heritage.org/arms-control/event/webinar-nuclear-stability-or-russian-advantage-will-extending-new-start-serve>
- **March 5:** Panelist, Indiana University panel on National Security Challenges in the 2020s
 - https://iu.mediaspace.kaltura.com/media/t/1_spiwymgo
- **Feb 12:** Keynote speaker, Maine Mid-coast Forum event on space security
 - <https://www.mainepublic.org/show/speaking-in-maine/2020-02-12/outer-space-cooperation-or-confrontation>

2019

- **Nov 25:** Speaker, Hamburg Center on Security and Peace Research conference on the future of international security
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B79n-udsag4>
- **Sept. 30:** Speaker, University of Bonn private conference on the future of international security
- **July 31:** Panelist, Brookings event on threats to space security
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/assessing-space-security-threat-and-response/>
- **July 19:** Panelist, Sasakawa Peace Foundation event on the future of arms control and nuclear deterrence
- **June 3:** Panelist, Brookings event on conflict scenarios with Russia and China
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/conflict-scenarios-with-russia-and-china/>
- **May 8:** Speaker, Mitchell Institute event on missile defense

- **April 30: Speaker**, Nonproliferation Education Policy Center event on proliferation and extended deterrence
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j3Jazn90AVg>
- **April 24: Moderator**, Brookings event on the future of U.S. extended deterrence
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-u-s-extended-deterrence/>
- **April 11: Guest**, Center for Strategic and International Studies video on the founding of the Space Force
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b8SXT6-mr0M>
- **March 28: Keynote speaker**, Stockholm Free World Forum event on the future of arms control and strategic stability
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jLZesvCD6Y>
- **March 26: Keynote speaker**, Finnish Institute for International Affairs event on the future of arms control, deterrence, and strategic stability
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLpPsONt9_U
- **March 21: Panelist**, Georgetown University conference on nuclear arms control and deterrence
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vZa3wxaLUM>
- **March 19: Witness**, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology hearing on America's future in space
 - <https://www.usinnovation.org/video/hearing-america-space-future-visions-current-issues>
- **March 22: Moderator**, Brookings event on the future of arms control after the INF Treaty
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-end-of-an-era-the-inf-treaty-new-start-and-the-future-of-strategic-stability/>
- **February 13: Panelist**, Royal United Services Institute missile defense conference

- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=exhSKil-tKc>
- **Feb 4:** Guest, Brookings podcast on the end of the INF Treaty
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/5-on-45-What-the-demise-of-the-INF-treaty-means.pdf>
- **Jan 29:** Panelist and Moderator, Brookings event on the 2019 U.S. Missile Defense Review
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/a-discussion-on-the-2019-missile-defense-review/>
- **Jan 7:** Moderator, Brookings events on arms control and the future of strategic nuclear modernization.
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/falling-apart-the-politics-of-new-start-and-strategic-modernization/>

2018

- **Dec 12:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, on nuclear deterrence and stockpile issue
- **Dec. 6:** Panelist, École Militaire panel on arms control and strategic stability
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrRHmChgirc>
- **Dec 3:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Dr. Scott Pace, Executive Secretary to the National Space Council, on U.S. space policy
- **Nov 20:** Panelist, Brookings panel on the future of the U.S. defense budget
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-the-defense-budget/>
- **Oct 28: April 27:** Speaker, NDU Nuclear Deterrence Breakfast Series
 - https://03236830-405f-4141-9f5c-3491199e4d86.filesusr.com/ugd/a2dd91_1b409ba654bb47eaa49267652dafa31.pdf
- **October 16:** Moderator, Brookings private event with General John Hyten, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

- **August 30:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Affairs Guy Roberts on U.S. strategic nuclear modernization
- **Jul 30:** Panelist, Brookings panel on the U.S. Space Force
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/events/space-force-the-pros-and-cons-of-creating-a-new-military-branch/>
- **July 26:** Panelist, Royal United Services Institute, Missile Defense Conference
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBS2ZTi4C0c>
- **June 18:** Witness, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade hearing on Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals: posture, proliferation, and the future of arms control.
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-arsenals-posture-proliferation-and-the-future-of-arms-control/>
- **June 20:** Guest, Brookings podcast on the U.S. Space Force
 - <https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/does-the-us-need-a-space-force/>
- **May 11:** Moderator, Brookings private event with Lt Gen Jack Weinstein, Assistant Chief of Staff for Nuclear Policy, on U.S. nuclear modernization
- **April 27:** Speaker, Mitchell Institute event on arms control and strategic deterrence requirements
- **April 12:** Keynote speaker, private conference for Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies on arms control and deterrence

2017

- **May 10:** Panelist, CSIS Panel on European Missile Defense
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iCvIULK6FHI>
- **March 30:** Witness, House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Hearing on INF Treaty
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uaO0IjI-7JU>

- **Feb. 16:** Panelist, CSIS Panel on Missile Defense
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2a0z2ISMj4>

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.


13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?
 - Yes.
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?
 - Yes.
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?
 - Yes.
16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

- Yes.
17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?
- Yes.
18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?
- Yes.
19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?
- Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 4 day of May, 2021

[The nomination of Mr. Frank A. Rose was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2021.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**QUALIFICATION AND DUTIES**

Question. Section 2403 of title 50, U.S. Code, provides that the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) shall be appointed "from among persons who have extensive background in organizational management and are well qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that advances and protects the national security of the United States."

What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. I have over 20 years of experience in positions at the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, and private sector working on nuclear strategy, deterrence, arms control, strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging security challenges. I currently am a senior fellow and the co-director of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining Brookings, I served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance from 2014–17. From 2009–14, I served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy. Additionally, I previously served as a professional staff member on both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe my previous experience working in Congress and the U.S. Departments of State and Defense have prepared me to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator. However, I strongly believe in the value of continuous learning.

If confirmed, I would surround myself with a highly trained team from across NNSA and its nuclear security enterprise. I would also regularly engage with all elements of NNSA's enterprise to further understand NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges in order to ensure NNSA can execute its vitally important missions.

Section 2403 further provides that the Principal Deputy Administrator "shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of activities among the elements of the Administration."

Question. What is your understanding of the role you would play in the day-to-day administration of the NNSA, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be the alter ego of the Administrator, ensuring the Administrator's direction for the NNSA is carried out. As a practical matter, I would expect to be focused on the internal workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with other Departmental organizations. This allows the Administrator to address the strategic challenges and outward facing interactions necessary to accomplish the NNSA mission.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to the coordination of activities among the Deputy Administrators, NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would assist the Administrator in overseeing the NNSA programs that are led by the Deputy Administrators. I see my role as the Principal Deputy Administrator to work closely with each of the Deputy Administrators to ensure they can effectively execute the missions under their cognizance. In particular, the role of Principal Deputy Administrator coordinates development and implementation of policy and guidance, strategic planning, program managements, budgeting, resource allocation, safeguards and security, emergency management, contracts, and hiring to be enablers for the primary mission programs of the NNSA.

Question. How, if at all, might your coordinating role be different with regard to the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors?

Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors oversees the Naval Nuclear Enterprise and naval nuclear laboratories. If confirmed, I will have responsibilities in oversight of the nuclear security enterprise, comprised of the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites. My role as the Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA is to manage the NNSA support functions to enable the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors in executing his unique responsibilities in delivering nuclear propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's operational requirements.

Question. Are there any special projects or tasks on which you would focus, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator and whatever duties or initiatives she may seek to implement to improve the NNSA's nuclear security mission. I am ready and willing to take on any projects or tasks that will benefit our nation's nuclear security enterprise.

Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Administrator to determine what additional duties and functions I will be assigned. I stand ready to support the Administrator in furthering the Administration's efforts to modernize and recapitalize our nation's nuclear security enterprise.

CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are currently the broad organizational challenges and priorities for the NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's priorities to ensure NNSA meets our nation's national security requirements, and NNSA continues to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. The United States has not adequately invested the funds to sustain a modern, flexible, and responsive infrastructure. Most of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old and nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator to execute the priorities that have been identified.

Question. In your view, what are the currently the major challenges for the next Principal Deputy Administrator?

Answer. NNSA must modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile, associated infrastructure, and reestablish production capabilities. In addition, NNSA must also continue to prevent, counter, monitor, and respond to proliferation threats around the world. To be successful in all of NNSA's mission areas, we must recruit and retain a workforce that is second-to-none. I will work with the Administrator to support the NNSA Management and Operating (M&O) partners to attract and retain a top-notch workforce in the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites while reestablishing the corporate knowledge necessary to modernize our stockpile.

Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges, and on what timeline?

Answer. If confirmed, it will be important for me to work with the Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, each of the NNSA Deputy

Administrators, and the leaders in other federal agencies to identify solutions to these challenges and then assist to develop appropriate plans and timelines to implement them.

Question. In your view, what should be the main priorities for the next Principal Deputy Administrator specifically?

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on the challenges and priorities outlined by the Administrator and assigned to me by the Administrator. It will require critical thinking and planning to address the challenges and tackle the priorities. I will need to develop close working relationships with people at NNSA, the laboratories, the plants, the sites, the Department of Energy, other federal agencies, Congress, and allies.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate progress in regard to these priorities?

Answer. I will engage with and empower NNSA leaders to coordinate with DOD, State Department, the National Security Council, and other executive branch agencies on defining NNSA requirements, and work closely with Congress to explain how NNSA will meet the requirements.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the legal and “in practice” relationship between the Principal Deputy Administrator and each of the following officials. Indicate also if there are any special considerations that, if confirmed, you would apply to your relationship with each such official(s):

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the absence of the Administrator, I would represent NNSA.

Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.

Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the NNSA’s Deputy Administrators to ensure each can execute their respective missions.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management.

Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management issues that intersect with the needs of NNSA.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

Answer. NNSA’s Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the primary interface with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense. If confirmed, I will support the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Assistant Secretary, as appropriate.

Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Answer. If confirmed, I will represent and support the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command.

Answer. If confirmed, I will represent the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Commander of the United States Strategic Command.

Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.

Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and Project Management.

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA in providing support and management oversight for the Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management.

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the Administrator and NNSA to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Question. Nuclear Posture Review.

Answer. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the nuclear mission.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of the Biden Administration's NPR?

Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA, I will support both the Administrator and the Secretary of Energy as they navigate the NPR process and represent Department equities. NNSA's responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation, promoting international nuclear safety and security, and developing technologies to monitor arms control agreements mean we must be at the table for discussions of nuclear policy.

Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you recommend the Biden Administration consider?

Answer. I am not currently involved in ongoing nuclear policy discussions within the Administration, but, if confirmed, I would urge the Biden administration to consider the importance of revitalizing and investing in the infrastructure and capabilities needed to support our nation's nuclear deterrent.

Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements in the U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the full and timely support of NNSA to the work required to implement those enhancements?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the new requirements?

Answer. Yes.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. Section 4132(c)(3) of title 41, U.S. Code, establishes that the Administrator, NNSA "... shall be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation."

What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA in statute and recent practice?

Answer. NNSA can only be successful if there is a positive and strong working relationship between the Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Energy, NNSA Administrator, and NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure DOE and NNSA have good working relations.

Question. How is the "semi-autonomous" nature of the NNSA, as set forth in law, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure? What makes NNSA different from other components of Department of Energy (DOE)—in both law and practice?

Answer. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA is designated as a semi-autonomous organization; the organizations led by other DOE undersecretaries are not structured in this way. This is a unique authority and responsibility that gives the NNSA Administrator authority over functions that also reside in DOE. If confirmed, I will prioritize building strong, mission-focused, and effective culture and processes across those functions, in close collaboration with the leadership of DOE.

Question. With a view to improving organizational management and operational effectiveness, if confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the organizational structure of in NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on continuing NNSA's recent progress in its approach to governance and management by strengthening communication and integration across the nuclear security enterprise to make sure we have effective partnerships between federal employees, the laboratories, plants, and sites, and our interagency mission partners. I will work with the Administrator and NNSA leadership to clearly define lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and to consolidate NNSA's progress in strategic oversight and project management.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)

Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) sets requirements for nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of the NNSA. DOD has been described as NNSA's primary customer, as well as its partner.

If confirmed, what would be your role in supporting the Administrator of the NNSA in executing their duties and functions as a member of the NWC?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in executing her duties as a member of the NWC by ensuring that there is a communication flow at the staff, management, and leadership levels to facilitate discussion and understanding on key issues including requirements, budget, and stockpile activities.

Question. How would you describe the relationship between NNSA and the DOD?

Answer. From what I have observed, NNSA's relationship with DOD is healthy with dialogue and collaboration at both the working and senior levels.

Question. What is your assessment of the health of that relationship at both senior- and working-levels?

Answer. From what I have observed, the relationship today is healthy and, if confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator in continuing to strengthen this relationship.

Question. If confirmed, what might you recommend to improve this relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to keeping an open mind on opportunities to further enhance this relationship. I will work collaboratively with the Administrator on these efforts.

NNSA BUDGET

Question. In 2015, then-Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz wrote to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding NNSA's budget allocation for the ensuing five years that "an additional \$5.2 billion over fiscal year 2018–2021 [was] needed to establish a viable and sustainable program portfolio" and that "[f]ailure to address these requirements in the near term will put the NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in fiscal year 2018." Then-Secretary Moniz added that, if uncorrected, the budget proposal would "lack credibility." The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 included an additional \$3 billion above the President's budget request.

Do you believe that the \$3 billion increase was adequate and sufficient to render the budget request "credible", particularly in light of NNSA's stockpile stewardship responsibilities and the recommendations of the 2018 NPR? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe the \$3 billion increase provided in fiscal year 2021 is adequate for this fiscal year as it is the most robust funding in the history of NNSA. This is an area I will assess further if confirmed.

Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to ensure it can meet DOD requirements.

Answer. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to review the budget before its submission to OMB?

I do not know the specifics of how NNSA, the NWC, and OMB mechanically share budget information and comply with the provision. If confirmed, I am committed to making sure there is open, clear, and consistent communication regarding NNSA's budget with the NWC.

PERSONNEL

Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of civilian employees to perform its mission? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to work with the Administrator to review staffing needs and challenges across NNSA to ensure the appropriate skills mix and number of personnel are in place to accomplish its national security missions.

Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional personnel accomplish that NNSA is unable to accomplish today? If confirmed, which specific components within the NNSA would you recommend growing and how much growth would you recommend? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure that NNSA is equipped to accomplish its missions. I understand that NNSA's mission has been steadily increasing, and I will work to ensure staffing levels are commensurate with the expanding workload.

Question. In your view, does NNSA rely too heavily on contractors and a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator and the M&O mission partners to ensure we maintain the correct mix of federal and contracting employees.

Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate capabilities—in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces—to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.

Answer. Ensuring NNSA has the appropriate capabilities to execute the mission is critical for the nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work closely with

the Administrator to ensure that NNSA continues to recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals needed to execute its missions.

Question. If not, please explain what skill sets, areas of expertise, or other capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure that NNSA is fully mission capable?

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor workforces?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator to ensure NNSA is executing a hiring strategy, in partnership with NNSA's M&O partners, to bring the best and brightest into the nuclear security enterprise. This should include outreach to colleges and universities and participation in career fairs near NNSA labs, plants, and sites.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design capabilities, in the NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs and the plants?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the M&O mission partners to ensure we explore the most effective paths to recruit and retain the world's best engineers, scientists, and support personnel.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are maintained in NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs and the plants?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources and training specialists to understand what is already in place and where there are opportunities for improvement. Where appropriate, I will make the necessary changes to ensure there is an adequate and appropriate technical workforce in place. I will also expand communications with the NNSA labs, plants, and site to understand how NNSA can best support their recruitment and training requirements.

Question. In your view, does NNSA leadership need any additional authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the federal civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources specialists to assess whether any additional authorities are required.

CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays, and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and others.

In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated failures in project management?

Answer. I understand that NNSA has made a concerted effort to address project management challenges over the last decade. Based on my understanding, these challenges included issues related to ill-defined project requirements and schedules, improper estimating, contractual problems, and lack of proper planning.

If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA continues to remain on a path toward improved project management.

Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address these problems? Please explain your answer.

Answer. NNSA's decision to create the Office of Acquisition and Project Management in 2011 has led to significant improvements. More can always be done. If confirmed, I will continue to support the implementation of best business practices, as well as using lessons learned to improve early project planning and requirements development to prevent cost growth. If confirmed, I would also ensure there are sufficient qualified acquisition and project management specialists overseeing NNSA's growing portfolio.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to ensure that these systemic project management failures are not repeated in the future? What specific changes in policy, practice, organization, or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring improved contract and project management across NNSA. I would recommend rigorous project management practices and cost estimating, clarified lines of authority, holding federal and contractor personnel accountable, and providing independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight.

Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of these project management failures? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will review Departmental regulations that govern capital acquisition projects and how they apply to NNSA activities. Until then, I will ensure that NNSA staff have the resources needed to further projects while staying within Departmental regulations.

Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of systemic project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), in the Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). CEPE now reports directly to the Administrator, NNSA.

In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide independent cost estimates and other additional costing and project management advice internal to NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to determine if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.

Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE data and information to execute its statutory mission?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review CEPE's authority and access to understand if further improvements are needed.

Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How will you balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars?

Answer. CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities are valuable to NNSA. CEPE's independence is critical to providing both the Principal Deputy Administrator and the Administrator with independent, data driven analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its independence and review the resources available to it.

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to facilitating CEPE personnel access to the Administrator and to you?

Answer. Yes.

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Principal Deputy Administrator in ensuring safety and security in the nuclear weapons complex?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to be engaged on initiatives to improve safety at NNSA's facilities including a healthy safety culture. This includes implementing a Governance and Management structure which emphasizes transparency, trust, and collaboration to address challenges. I will work with our Management and Operating partners to establish expectations for sustained safety performance with successful mission accomplishment. I will reinforce that sustained safety performance and mission accomplishments can mutually support each other to achieve mission success.

I will also work with the Administrator and the security program office to ensure that we have systems and processes in place to prevent security lapses. I also anticipate being engaged on all initiatives to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security at NNSA's facilities. Additionally, I will work with NNSA's Management and Operating partners to make sure our governance and management works to achieve those objectives while emphasizing continuous improvement in both safety and security.

Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?

Answer. I firmly believe that the safety and security of the NNSA's facilities and nuclear material are of the utmost importance and it is critical that the NNSA has the appropriate authorities and funding from Congress to mitigate these threats. As part of this, addressing the continued challenges of ageing infrastructure is critically important to ensure that NNSA is advancing the mission with state-of-the-art facilities, with modern safety designs. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to emphasize and address NNSA's commitment to operate safely while accomplishing the mission and mitigate security threats such as cyber, material, transportation, and physical threats to NNSA's operations.

Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have in NNSA's interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?

Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of a healthy working relationship with the DNFSB and open lines of communication. While it is my understanding the Deputy Secretary of Energy manages the Department's overall interface with the DNFSB, if confirmed, I will work through the Administrator and Deputy Secretary of Energy on DNFSB's recommendations and advice regarding public health and safety issues at NNSA's facilities.

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported on a number of accidents at the national laboratories in recent years. These accidents included explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that led to the partial shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory—placing both personnel and mission execution at risk. Yet, while personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by definition involves some of the most hazardous materials known to exist. Thus, if the labs' nuclear mission is to be accomplished, risk can never be eliminated completely.

In your view, what is the proper balance between safety, risk, and mission accomplishment at the national laboratories? How should this balancing be accomplished, in your view?

Answer. NNSA must have sustained, strong safety performance. Safety and mission success mutually support each other. This is balanced by properly assessing risk and controlling and managing that risk.

If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will continue to focus on fostering our partnership between the labs and plants and emphasize continuous improvement in safely and successfully executing the NNSA mission. I will also be committed to empowering employees to anticipate, identify, report, and resolve safety issues.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve safety culture at the labs, while still meeting mission requirements?

Answer. The key to having a positive safety environment is establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership which I will do with the Administrator through my interactions with Management and Operating partners' leadership. I will emphasize the long-term commitment to safe operations through the establishment of an effective governance and management culture. I will also emphasize the critical nature of effectively empowering and engaging with employees to give feedback while also stressing organizational learning. The reinforcement of these attributes provides the foundation to improve safety culture. I will also stress a strong safety conscious work environment so employees will feel comfortable in raising safety issues with leaders prepared to effectively address those issues. I will encourage and provide support to our leadership so they have all the necessary tools to effectively address any safety concerns.

PLUTONIUM STRATEGY

Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production: Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce approximately 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not less than 80 pits per year.

What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its ability to achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of the ongoing stockpile program?

Answer. I believe work at Los Alamos is on track to achieve the goal of producing 30 pits per year in 2026, supporting the overall requirement for 80 pits per year. Moreover, I know that NNSA has to succeed in this effort. The United States currently does not produce any war reserve pits and we must do so to maintain our nuclear deterrence in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to being focused on making sure Los Alamos does, in fact, get to 30 pits per year in 2026.

Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the ongoing stockpile program?

Answer. The former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, or MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in an existing facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include repurposing and transitioning the MFFF into a safe, secure, compliant, and efficient pit production facility.

URANIUM STRATEGY AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION

Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1 Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium nor the technology used to enrich it carries an "obligation" from a foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for unobligated LEU, but the available supply

of recycled HEU for down-blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for obtaining unobligated uranium.

Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?

Answer. Yes, the United States needs to re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to ensure a reliable supply of enriched uranium to support U.S. national security needs. Since the closure of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, in 2013, the United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched uranium free of peaceful use obligations, i.e., unobligated. Mission needs for enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States' remaining HEU stockpile (by downblending the HEU to produce LEU), which is a finite and currently irreplaceable source.

Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a capability?

Answer. As I understand it, NNSA is currently implementing a long-term strategy that meets current needs and seeks to re-establish domestic uranium enrichment capabilities: Downblending HEU to LEU to extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044; developing enrichment technology options; and executing an acquisition process to deploy an enrichment technology. An effective and cost-efficient solution for re-establishing enrichment capabilities will be identified through an ongoing Analysis of Alternatives.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Question. What do you believe should be the highest priorities of NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs?

Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is the lead U.S. agency for reducing nuclear and radiological threats globally, including the threat of nuclear proliferation among hostile states and terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials. DNN must continue to provide a comprehensive defense-in-depth against proliferant states and non-state actors from obtaining, acquiring, and developing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. NNSA must work in close cooperation with interagency and international partners to carry out its nuclear threat reduction programs and to anticipate and respond to technological advances that may threaten the nation's security. Finally, NNSA must sustain the unparalleled scientific and technical prowess at NNSA's national laboratories, plants, and sites, which is crucial to understanding this evolving threat environment, and we must maintain these capabilities, including the facilities and intellectual capital, to reduce global nuclear threats globally.

Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements needed in the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs? If so, what improvements would you envision?

Answer. While I would not term these as "needed improvements," necessarily, there are programmatic challenges facing NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation efforts, including:

- Increasingly rapid technological advancements lowering the bar to proliferation, including the diffusion of dual-use, emerging, and disruptive technologies;
- Eroding nuclear norms and regime cohesion, including the inability to reach consensus within key multilateral fora (e.g., Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty);
- Hiring challenges posed by the continued attrition and retirements; and
- The ranging political will, practical capabilities, and absorption ability of international partners.

Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in implementing the improvements you envision?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Administrator, other Departmental elements, interagency, and laboratory colleagues to identify and enable the strategic, technical, human resource, and diplomatic tools to help address these challenges.

Question. What improvements do you recommend to NNSA's efforts in verification and monitoring?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and DNN to evaluate investing in efforts that advance innovative capabilities in industry, academia, and the national laboratories to support and sustain solutions for the difficult challenges ahead. NNSA must continue its support for investments in research and development of technology to support detection and verification efforts for nonproliferation and arms control regimes and renew its commitment to harnessing the power of science to minimize nuclear threats around the world.

Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs if confirmed? What re-

sources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation would NNSA require to meet such needs?

Answer. First, I believe there is an ongoing need to address the threats posed by North Korea and Iran, working with international partners. Second, there is an enduring need to secure vulnerable and excess nuclear and radioactive materials globally. Several countries retain inventories of separated plutonium and excess highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the United States is unable to remove, or confirm the disposition of, due to lack of a political path forward. Finally, we must keep pace with and regulate emerging technologies to mitigate their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of their promising opportunities.

Question. What do you think are the five most significant lessons learned for NNSA from the mismanagement of the MOX project? How will these lessons learned be implemented in future NNSA projects such as those related to the dilution and disposal of plutonium?

Answer. I am aware NNSA experienced major project management challenges with the MOX project. If confirmed, I look forward to getting briefed on the project to learn more about the intricacies of the challenges associated with it. Further, I will ensure the lessons learned from it will be enforced and strengthened for NNSA's other capital acquisition projects.

REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT

Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and external, and that this contributes to the challenges in staying under cost and on schedule for major projects.

Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs and efficient mission execution overall?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation of all NNSA facilities. This is all-encompassing and includes the protection of the NNSA workforce, the public, and the environment. I will ensure that safety is properly incorporated into the design and construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. This is a cradle-to-grave approach encompassing safety expectations being communicated early in the conception of the project in accordance with relevant directives and regulations, periodic review of projects and operations as they progress through important milestones, the selection of qualified design and construction firms to lead them, and the proper staffing of a technically qualified federal project team. I believe this holistic approach and effective engagement from conception to execution of projects will reduce rework and control costs.

I recognize the oversight challenges NNSA faces getting alignment with their partners regarding safety expectations through the application of directives which have been developed over time; and I believe there is room for improvement in the implementation of these directives. I support NNSA's approach to being a learning organization and learn from our past and leverage best practices. This includes NNSA's streamline of its directives and requirements, leverage general industry standards, and management of risk inherent in the construction of non-hazardous facilities.

I am committed to ensuring NNSA's projects and operations are conducted in a safe and effective manner and follow all applicable environmental, safety, and construction rules. I am also committed to using standard approaches to help streamline execution of NNSA's mission work in alignment with the complexity of the projects. Streamlining the construction of low-risk, non-nuclear, commercial-like construction projects is an area where NNSA (and the bidding community) can benefit the most.

Through data-informed, priority investment decisions in support of NNSA's current and future missions, the risk posed by aging infrastructure to NNSA's workforce, the environment, and its mission can be significantly reduced.

Question. In your view, are the labs subject to an appropriate level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?

Answer. Strong governance and management oversight by NNSA are key pillars in accomplishing the missions and goals of the entire nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that a proper balance exists between oversight and mission execution. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work to build relationships across the complex with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office, and Congress to ensure that there exists a proper bal-

ance between oversight and mission execution. Clear roles and responsibilities are essential.

Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight structures would you recommend, and why?

Answer. Making sure that NNSA's missions are executed in an effective, efficient manner is important. If confirmed, I will assess what changes are necessary to ensure mission execution with proper regulations and oversight.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.

Do you believe that the capabilities exist today to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program uses a science-based assessment of the reliability of nuclear weapons to assess and certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. For the last 23 years, the three NNSA Laboratory Directors have certified that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and that additional underground nuclear explosive testing is not required at this time.

Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the design of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.

Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and in particular concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the Programs to minimize risks to meeting schedule requirements.

Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.

If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in supporting the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and making full use of the authorities it provides NNSA?

Answer. I believe it is important to make investments in personnel, programs, and technologies that strengthen our ability to respond to emerging challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and its goal to expand opportunities for young scientists and engineers to ensure we have a talented and capable array of nuclear security personnel across the enterprise.

Question. In your view, what should be the long-term plan for the National Ignition Facility, and in particular, how would you assist the Administrator in the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition, which to date has not occurred?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, NNSA subject matter experts, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Congress to best identify the long-term plan for NIF. I do know that NIF is essential for understanding the physical properties and characteristics of nuclear weapons performance.

Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of NNSA missions?

Answer. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, delivers leading-edge computer platforms, sophisticated physics and engineering codes, and uniquely qualified staff to support addressing a wide variety of stockpile issues for design, physics certification, engineering qualification, and production. While there is certainly a role for other activities that utilize the ASC program, its primary use should continue to support stockpile stewardship.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. More than half of NNSA's infrastructure is more than 40 years old, and a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project. As former Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty testified in 2020, "[T]ime is of the essence to recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire NNSA. Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch these facilities. We need to make sure that we have state of the art infrastructure, so we can recapitalize our enterprise and make sure that we can provide to the Department of Defense the requirements that they so sorely need to maintain our nuclear deterrent." This testimony post-dated by almost two years the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA directive to NNSA to establish the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, with the objective of reducing the backlog of deferred maintenance and repair needs by at least 30% by 2025.

If confirmed, what factors would you consider in prioritizing work with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to address the required maintenance of NNSA infrastructure?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to modernize and sustain NNSA's infrastructure. NNSA must undertake a risk-informed infrastructure strategy (or management approach) to repair, maintain, and replace facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. Reducing deferred maintenance, disposing of process-contaminated facilities, and streamlining execution of non-nuclear construction projects will be a key piece of the priorities I set to meet Congressional direction.

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend to reduce risk in future major construction projects, such as those related to the lithium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will help NNSA ensure that future major projects are developed and executed utilizing well established program and project management principles including: ensuring that the project requirements are clearly defined and prioritized; proper cost estimates are completed and reviewed independently; sufficient design work and technological development is completed prior to commencing a project's construction; and monitoring progress to ensure projects remain on schedule and on budget.

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE

Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in ensuring that the NNSA workplace, including that of NNSA's geographically-separated labs and other components promotes the dignity of and respect for all persons?

Answer. Respect is one of my core values, and one, if confirmed, I will ensure at NNSA. If confirmed, I will serve as a role model by treating each employee with dignity and respect and would ensure that all employees foster an inclusive environment where every perspective is recognized and diversity of thought is valued.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the NNSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to creating a workplace that is safe and welcoming to all people. As the Principal Deputy Administrator, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to learn more about the current NNSA climate and taking steps to improve the environment.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the DOE, NNSA, or a component thereof?

Answer. If confirmed, I will take complaints of sexual harassment or discrimination seriously. All employees have the right to feel safe in the workplace and must be treated fairly. I will work to ensure such complaints are reviewed and responded to quickly, including appropriate corrective action and discipline if warranted.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

Answer. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

NOMINATIONS

1. Senator HIRONO. Ms. Rosenblum, as part of my responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. I have not.

2. Senator HIRONO. Ms. Rosenblum, have any of you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. I have not.

MODERNIZING THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL

3. Ms. Rosenblum, the Biden administration has begun a series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our nuclear posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary to ensure our nuclear deterrent's long-term viability have little to no schedule margin. Ensuring that these efforts remain on track—and that the transition from cold war-era legacy capabilities to their modern replacements is successful—is the most pressing nuclear modernization issue we face. Consistent, sustained leadership focus and funding are required through 2030 and likely beyond to ensure the Nation's nuclear deterrent is modernized while meeting cost and schedule milestones. This includes both Department of Defense nuclear programs as well as the nuclear weapons activities and production infrastructure programs for which the National Nuclear Security Administration is responsible, which are integral to the deterrent.

RIISING THREAT OF NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITY

4. Ms. Rosenblum, I take the threat of North Korea launching a ballistic missile toward Hawaii very seriously. If confirmed, you will be responsible for preparing for, deterring, and mitigating current and future weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats. Based on your experience and background, what are your thoughts and top priorities to prevent such an attack?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. If confirmed, I will review the full spectrum of activities that currently are important in defending the U.S. homeland against WMD, and I will also review proposed activities to enhance U.S. defenses against future WMD threats. As Secretary Austin has stated, our relationships with important partners such as the Republic of Korea and Japan are critical to regional security and stability and provide a powerful deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I will work with key U.S. Government stakeholders and with our partners in the Indo-Pacific region to facilitate nonproliferation activities and address both the current and emerging threats posed by North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. At the macro level, and in concert with the Military Departments and Services and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, I believe, if I am confirmed, that NCB priorities for North Korea would include maintaining, or increasing, capabilities related to the ballistic missile "Prevent" mission space, with a focus on situational awareness, early warning, and detection.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR M. MICHAEL ROUNDS

ARM CONTROL TREATIES

5. Senator ROUNDS. Ms. Rosenblum, as Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB), you will be the DOD Treaty Manager and represent the United States on nuclear issues in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], biological weapons issues in the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and chemical weapons issues in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Please share your thoughts on the treaties regulating weapons of mass destruction. How should we hold countries, like Russia and China, who do not abide by international laws, accountable for violations?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. One of the pillars of nonproliferation is the establishment of international norms against the use of these weapons of mass destruction. Arms control treaties are the baseline by which these norms can be established. If confirmed, my responsibility as the DOD Treaty manager will be to ensure the Department upholds its commitments under applicable Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Conventional arms control treaties. I share the priorities of this Administration to bring outliers to such treaties back into compliance with their obligations under them. The United States imposed sanctions against Russia for its violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. These sanctions, imposed both on Russian officials and on chemical and biological production entities, are an example of the range of measures the United States has available to hold to account those who violate treaties governing the use of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work with key U.S. Government stakeholders to ensure a full range of options are available and are considered for imposition in response to any treaty violations. I also believe that it is important for the United States to set an example by complying with all of its treaty obligations.

6. Senator ROUNDS. Ms. Rosenblum, if the Administration proceeds with additional arms control talks, do you believe they will negotiate in good faith?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. I believe that the United States is committed to pursuing arms control negotiations in good faith but that we need to be clear eyed regarding the intentions of our negotiating partners. Accordingly, it is very important that any agreement be verifiable, provide transparency and clearly in the interest of the United States.

TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS

7. Senator ROUNDS. Ms. Rosenblum, the position you were nominated for, ASD (NCB), serves as the advisor to the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical biological defense. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) Number 5134.08 further explains that one of the requirements of this position is to serve as a "technical expert in interagency and international activities related to areas of assigned responsibilities and functions." You did not address spe-

cific questions on your technical qualifications for this position during the hearing or in your advance policy questions. Can you outline your educational and/or job experience that would address the technical requirements of this position?

Ms. ROSENBLUM. I have over thirty years of experience working on complex national security issues with a particular focus on arms control, reducing risk and countering weapons of mass destruction. While working within the Office of the Secretary of Defense I was responsible for overseeing the management of the submarine leg of the nuclear triad, technical programs to counter weapons of mass destruction, technical negotiations regarding the nuclear program of the DPRK and NATO defense planning. Currently at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, I provide strategic guidance to the organization's bio-security program that focuses on reducing risks from science and technology. Throughout my career, I have led and worked with a broad range of talented scientists and technology experts to identify the critical issues needing to be addressed to sustain the US' nuclear deterrent and to counter weapons of mass destruction. I have also regularly led efforts to identify the critical policy and leadership issues embedded in technical details, extensive data and scientific and technology programs.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

8. Senator ROUNDS. Ms. Rosenblum, would you agree that human beings carry a long, shameful history of using naturally occurring pathogens as weapons? Explain your answer.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. The use of biological agents is not a new concept, and history is replete with examples of their use. Infectious diseases were recognized for their potential impact on people and armies as early as 600 B.C. The SARS-CoV2 pandemic has also shown us that naturally occurring pathogens can have a great impact on both a local and a global scale. This pandemic has brought to light the devastation that can occur when countries are not adequately prepared for biological threats. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to improve our Nation's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats.

CHINA AND COVID

9. Senator ROUNDS. Ms. Rosenblum, China's concern following the conception and spread of COVID-19 did not extend to the wider global community. As the flight logs from Wuhan show, China allowed the unchecked export of COVID at a time when it clearly understood the danger of the disease and its grave threat to modern society. Several dates on COVID-19's timeline stand out: January 23d, the day China locked down Wuhan and January 31st, the day President Trump banned flights from China to the United States. China took drastic steps to limit exposure of its own population, locking down more than 500 million people, securing worldwide supplies of PPE [personal protective equipment], and proclaiming via state-run Xinhua News Agency that the country boasted the "most comprehensive, most strict and most thorough preventative measures." Given these facts, would you agree that China actively sought to not only deceive the global community on the origins of COVID and the transmission of the disease, but knowingly exported COVID to democracies around the world? Explain your answer in detail.

Ms. ROSENBLUM. On May 26, 2021, the White House issued a statement on the Investigation into the Origins of COVID-19. The President tasked the U.S. Intelligence Community to prepare a report on the most up-to-date analysis of the origins of COVID-19, including whether it emerged from human contact with an infected animal or from a laboratory accident and subsequently asked for additional followup. If confirmed, I will support the President's efforts to achieve a better understanding of the origins of COVID-19, coordinating with our interagency partners for these purposes and to help prevent future biological threats, whether they are of natural or unnatural origins.

[The nomination reference of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN430

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 27, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Deborah G. Rosenblum, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Guy B. Roberts, resigned.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Deborah G. Rosenblum**Education:**

Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, attended 9/1980 – 6/1984, received a B.A in political science and French, degree granted 6/1984

Columbia University, School of International and Political Affairs, New York, New York, attended 9/1987 – 5/1989, received a Masters Degree in International Affairs, granted 5/1989.

Employment Record:

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- a. **The Irving Trust Bank Company (Now Bank of New York)**, New York, New York February 1985 – August 1987, Bank Training Program (1 year) Corporate Loan Officer (Feb 1986 – August 1987).
- b. **Columbia University, New York, New York** Research Assistant, January 1988 – May 1989. I left after I graduated from Columbia University.
- c. **Congressional Research Service, Washington DC**, September 1989 – December 1989. Research Assistant. I conducted research for congressional members.
- d. **The Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Department of Defense, Washington DC**, December 1989 – September 2002. From December, 1989 – December, 1991, I served as a President Management Intern. The remaining time, I served in a succession of positions of increasing responsibility culminating in my becoming a member of the Senior Executive Service and serving as the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, December 1991 – September 2001.
- e. **The US Department of State, Senior Seminar, Washington DC** September 2001 – September 2002. I was the representative from the US Department of Defense to a senior executive training program that was run by the US Department of State.
- f. **The Cohen Group, Washington DC**, September 2002 – August 2009. I was a Vice President at the Cohen Group, **The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Washington DC**, August 2009 – present. At the NTI I am the Executive Vice President.

Honors and Awards:

- Phi Beta Kappa Society, Middlebury College, May 1984
- Fellowship/Scholarship to Columbia University, School for International and Public Affairs (January 1988 – May 1989)
- Superior Honor Award, US Department of State (August 2001)
- Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award (2002)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum in connection with her nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. Name (Include any former names you have used):

Deborah Gleason Rosenblum (Maiden name: Deborah Gleason Hannon)

2. Position to which nominated:

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense

3. Date of nomination:

27 April 2021

4. Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended,

degree received, and date degree granted):

Laurel School – Secondary school, Shaker Heights, Ohio, September, 1976 – June, 1980, high school diploma

Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, attended 9/1980 – 6/1984, received a B.A in political science and French, degree granted 6/1984

Columbia University, School of International and Political Affairs, New York, New York, attended 9/1987 – 5/1989, received a Master's Degree in International Affairs, granted 5/1989.

5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Washington DC,
Executive Vice President,
August 2009 – present.

6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):

a. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Department of Defense, Washington DC,

December, 1989 – December, 1991, President Management Intern in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

December 1991 – September 2001, succession of career civil servant positions of increasing responsibility culminating in the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics.

b. The US Department of State, Senior Seminar, Washington DC

September 2001 – September 2002. I was the representative from the US Department of Defense to a career civil servant senior executive training program that was run by the US Department of State.

7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):

Nuclear Threat Initiative – Officer
The Herbert Scoville Peace Fellowship - President of the Board

8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):

Volunteer with DC Central Kitchen
Volunteer DC Mutual Aid Society (tutor).
Volunteer Susan T Komen Foundation

9. Political affiliations and activities:

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):

No

- b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:

None

- c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:

3/24/2016 – Hillary for America - \$250
4/14/2016 – Hillary for America - \$250
07/22/2016 – Hilary Clinton - \$710
08/24/2016 – Hilary Clinton - \$1,000

10/08/2016 – Hillary Victory Fund - \$1,000
 09/01/2018 – Jennifer Wexton - \$250
 09/01/2018 – Leslie Cockburn - \$250
 09/01/2018 – Democratic Party of Virginia- \$250
 10/07/2018- Abigail Spanberger - \$250
 5/05/2019 – Laura Galente (VA House of Delegates race)
 06/17/2019 – Pete Buttigieg presidential campaign- \$500
 5/15/2019 – Foreign Policy for America - \$100
 06/28/2019 – Kamala Harris presidential campaign- \$750
 08/29/2019 – Abigail Spanberger - \$250
 12/30/2019 – Evelyn Farkas Congressional Primary, NY - \$100
 2/27/2020 – Virginia Democrats - \$100
 4/23/2020 – Biden for President - \$250
 5/07/2020 – Biden Victory Fund - \$1,000
 6/09/2020 – Biden Victory Fund - \$1,000
 7/16/2020 – Biden Victory Fund - \$250
 08/25/2020 – Biden Victory Fund - \$500
 7/20/2020 – Foreign Policy for America - \$500
 7/21/2020 – Gina Ortiz-Jones Congressional Race - \$100
 7/28/2020 – Ed Markey Senate Primary - \$100
 9/17/2020 – Abigail Spanberger congressional campaign - \$100
 9/22/2020 – Andy Kim congressional campaign - \$100
 12/19/2020 – Foreign Policy for America - \$500

9. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):

- Phi Beta Kappa Society, Middlebury College, May 1984
- Fellowship/Scholarship to Columbia University, School for International and Public Affairs (January 1988 – May 1989)
- Superior Honor Award, US Department of State (August 2001);
- Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award (2002)

10. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):

[Iowans should ask hard questions on nuclear policy](https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/2019/11/18/iowans-should-ask-hard-questions-on-nuclear-policy)
[https://www.desmoinesregister.com › story › 2019/11/18](https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/2019/11/18/iowans-should-ask-hard-questions-on-nuclear-policy)

11. **Speeches** (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).

Remarks by NTI Vice President Deborah Rosenblum at the International Forum of Terrorism Risk (Re)insurance Pools
JUNE 28, 2017

Remarks to Amman Nuclear Forum
NOVEMBER 19, 2015

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

12. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?

Yes

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?

Yes

14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other

appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

Yes

18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes

19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.

Deborah Rosenblum

This 13th day of May, 2021

[The nomination of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2021.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Christopher P. Maier by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 138(b)(2) of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) as one of 15 Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Department of Defense (DOD). What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) as prescribed in current law, DOD issuances, and by practice?

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. The ASD(SO/LIC)'s principal duty is overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. The ASD(SO/LIC) also is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations capabilities and authorities, counternarcotics efforts and resources, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, strategies for building partner capacity, and stability operations in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's priorities and guidance.

Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), performing a "service secretary-like" function for the special operations peculiar administrative matters relating to organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces (SOF).

Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties and responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC)?

Answer. I have spent more than two decades focused on counterterrorism, special operations, and low-intensity conflict issues, with positions across DOD, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. I led DOD's Defeat-ISIS Task Force from its inception until disestablishment, charged with policy and strategy development, international negotiations, and oversight. I have previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (SOCT), where I oversaw the Department's policies, plans, authorities, and resources related to special operations and irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, information operations, and sensitive special operations. Prior to that position, I held a number of positions at the NCTC, including Senior Advisor to the Director, Chief of Strategic Assessments and Regional Planning, and Chief of Staff in the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, and I served as a Director for Counterter-

rorism on the NSC staff. Prior to my government service, I also spent five years as a strategy and management consultant to a variety of commercial, government, and nonprofit organizations, after beginning my government career as an analyst in the Intelligence Community.

Question. What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as ASD(SOLIC), if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I would bring a broad range of relevant leadership and management experience to the position of ASD(SO/LIC). As the Director of the Defeat-ISIS Task Force, I led national-level interagency implementation of the U.S. Government's campaign to achieve an enduring defeat of ISIS, working closely with dozens of Coalition partners across the globe. As DASD SOCT, I led a team of more than 50 senior government civilian and military personnel in conducting special operations, counterterrorism, and irregular warfare policy development and implementation, as well as oversight of much of USSOCOM's man, train, and equip programs. My experience as a senior leader at NCTC and working with the President's national security leadership while on the NSC staff also provides me with further experience in leading organizations, in different roles, across the national security enterprise.

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make regarding changes to the organization, management, and resourcing of the Office of the ASD(SOLIC), so as better to execute its responsibilities for oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations Forces?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the organizational structure, management, and resourcing of the Office of the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure it is appropriately resourced and staffed to fulfill its statutory roles of overseeing Special Operations administrative matters and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in policy-related matters.

Question. Are there any additional authorities or resources that, in your view, would enhance your ability to perform the duties and functions of the ASD(SOLIC), if confirmed?

Answer. The Department has recently approved a new charter for ASD(SO/LIC), which details the office's authorities, roles, and responsibilities within the Department, consistent with the ASD's Title 10 authorities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to carry out these responsibilities effectively. If confirmed, I will also work with the Secretary of Defense and the Congress on changes to existing authorities or resources that would enhance the ASD(SO/LIC)'s ability to fulfill each of these responsibilities.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with, and on what issues would you expect to engage with:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. If confirmed, I will perform the duties as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-peculiar administrative matters, reporting directly to the Secretary as I exercise authority, direction, control, and oversight responsibilities related to organizing, training, and equipping of the SOF enterprise. I will advise and assist the Secretary, and work with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on sensitive special operations, operational preparation of the environment, crisis response, counterterrorism, information operations, and the use of the instruments of irregular warfare.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on ASD(SO/LIC)-related equities and policy matters, including the development and supervision of policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for Information Operations, Irregular Warfare, combating terrorism, and special operations activities. I will keep the Under Secretary informed of major developments within the ASD(SO/LIC) portfolio, including operational matters that may have an effect on policy development or outcomes.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)).

Answer. If confirmed, I will partner and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security on matters related to sensitive special operations, operational preparation of the environment, irregular warfare, and other sensitive efforts to achieve U.S. strategic objectives and improve the SOF enterprise. I would envision collaborating as well to ensure sufficient intelligence support to pri-

ority special operations disciplines, to include Information Operations and Irregular Warfare.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Answer. Technology development and advanced technologies are critical enablers to keep pace with our adversaries and reduce cost without sacrificing mission capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to accelerate the adoption of Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, unmanned systems, smart munitions and weaponry, new communications modalities, and other revolutionary technologies into the SOF enterprise.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

Answer. Section 138 of 10 U.S.C. authorizes the ASD(SO/LIC) to “exercise authority, direction, and control of all special-operations peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces.” If confirmed, I will establish a close working relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to ensure special operations acquisition programs, projects, and priorities are delivered in accordance with Department priorities, on-time and within budget, to meet mission needs to best serve our USSOCOM warfighters.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness.

Answer. Talented people are the foundational component of SOF, so ensuring the SOF enterprise is optimizing the way it recruits, trains, promotes, and retains talent that is reflective of our Nation’s rich diversity, is critical to SOF’s mission success. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure SOF personnel programs and policies enable the force to deliver ready and lethal SOF capabilities.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs.

Answer. SOF relies on Service support in many areas, including resourcing of Service-common requirements, personnel policies, recruiting, education, promotion, and force design. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs in these cross-cutting areas and to ensure adequate support to SOF.

Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between your office and Congress, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in particular?

Answer. The Senate Armed Services Committee and the Congress provide important oversight for the special operations enterprise and have been critical in establishing the roles and authorities of the ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will work with the ASD for Legislative Affairs to engage the Committee regularly to ensure a transparent and effective relationship on all issues within the purview of the ASD(SO/LIC), in addition to providing testimony, briefings, reports, and other information to help the committee fulfill its oversight and legislative responsibilities.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you would expect to confront if confirmed to be the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) and the special operations enterprise must be prepared to meet simultaneously the challenges of great power competition, counterterrorism, modernizing our forces, enhancing readiness, and taking care of our people. If confirmed, I will work to support SOF in adapting to strategic competition with China and Russia, while balancing the ongoing requirements for counterterrorism operations through more cost-sustainable methods. If confirmed, I would also expect to confront continued readiness challenges in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic and reducing the strain of high rates of SOF overseas deployments. The ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM must also continue to focus on key moral and operational imperatives to address sexual assault and extremism, implement ongoing reforms related to SOF culture and ethics, and increase the diversity of SOF.

Question. If confirmed, specifically what management actions would you take to address each of these challenges?

Answer. Strong civilian oversight will be critical in leading the SOF enterprise to address these challenges. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department of Defense leadership and the Congress in implementing the ongoing reforms to strengthen ASD(SO/LIC) oversight of these critical issues. I will also partner closely with the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure that SOF has the necessary authorities, resources, and capabilities to meet these challenges. Finally, if confirmed, I would look to strengthen our relationships with our allies and partners, their SOF contingents and more broadly, to leverage the force multiplier effect of their strengths and capabilities to address today’s increasingly complex global threat environment.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. The 2018 NDS prioritized “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with the imperative of deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally, the framework emphasizes the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

In your view, does the NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I agree that the NDS’s assessment of the strategic environment was accurate when written. I also agree with Secretary Austin that China represents the Department’s pacing threat, and that Russia, Iran, and North Korea represent advanced, persistent threats. Finally, I believe that foreign terrorist organizations pose an enduring threat to our national security. If confirmed, I would help ensure that the SOF enterprise continues to transform to address the Department’s top priorities, provide options to address the full range of threats, and becomes more sustainable in its approach to enduring CT challenges.

Question. Are there aspects of the NDS you believe should be updated or reassessed?

Answer. I understand that the Department has begun a deliberate process to develop a new NDS. The Administration’s priorities, changes in the security environment, and other factors should drive that process. I believe the next NDS should continue to emphasize the critical shaping role that information operations and irregular approaches play as part of an integrated national approach against our highest priority security threats. By imposing costs in competition and raising the costs of adversaries’ malign activities, SOF-led and enabled approaches can prevent conflict, ensure advantage in competition, and manage escalation dynamics so that if required, we enter into conflict on the most favorable terms.

Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the Commander, USSOCOM appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS?

Answer. I understand that the Commander, USSOCOM, is actively engaged in ensuring USSOCOM personnel and resources are aligned against the security objectives identified in the NDS. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure plans and programs are in alignment with the NDS as well as with national and Departmental strategies and guidance.

Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Commander, USSOCOM has accepted regarding the readiness of Special Operations Forces to execute the operational plans associated with the NDS?

Answer. From my understanding, the Commander, USSOCOM, works closely with both the military and civilian chains of command within the Department of Defense to mitigate risk and ensure USSOCOM forces are ready to execute assigned plans in furtherance of the NDS.

Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you advise the Commander, USSOCOM to make in the command’s implementation of the NDS?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with the Commander of USSOCOM to ensure SOF strategy is nested under the NDS and establishes a long-term framework to develop and deliver the necessary SOF capabilities and resources, to include enabling key capabilities of the Joint Force, to maximize the Department’s effectiveness in implementing the NDS.

Question. Are the Special Operations Forces of each of the Military Services appropriately sized, structured, and postured to implement the NDS and the associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.

Answer. It is my understanding that each Service’s SOF are responsible to their Service, to USSOCOM, and to the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure they are poised to execute the NDS and associated operational plans. If confirmed, I will review their force generation, structure, and readiness to execute their assigned tasks.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Question. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the National Defense Strategy Commission cautioned, “there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy development and implementation. Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.”

What is your view of the essential role of the ASD(SOLIC) in promoting civilian control over the military?

Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of command to exercise authority, direction, and control of the Commander, USSOCOM, for special operations forces, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. Accordingly, the ASD must clearly articulate strategic priorities and policies for those matters. As a Principal Staff Assistant reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, the ASD(SO/LIC) must also ensure that the Secretary of Defense has all the necessary, resource-informed, policy recommendations to exercise his control of the military, including SOF. It is therefore essential to maintain a collaborative and cooperative relationship with the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the best possible civilian-military advice is provided to the Secretary on the resourcing and employment of SOF. If confirmed, I intend to exercise my statutory authorities to further this objective.

The National Defense Strategy Commission report also states, "... allocating priority—and allocating forces—across theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the proper competency and responsibility of America's civilian leaders."

Question. Do you agree with the Commission's recommendation that "the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) ... [must] fully exercise their responsibilities for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans?" Please explain your answer.

Answer. I agree with this recommendation. To me, clear DOD-wide guidance improves effectiveness and unity of effort within the Department and with our interagency and international partners during operations and activities supporting both deliberate and contingency plans. The Secretary and the USD(P) have a vital role to ensure that political risks—including the risk of inaction—are weighed by the United States' civilian leadership. Doing so also enhances effective civil-military relations throughout the U.S. Government, which is essential for our national security.

Question. Specifically what would you do, if confirmed, to prepare guidance for and review contingency plans involving Special Operations Forces and capabilities and what would you perceived to be the appropriate role of the USD(P) in this regard?

Answer. If confirmed, I would align with the USD(P)'s process for contingency plan review and ensure that the ASD(SO/LIC) is fully invested and participates in reviewing contingency plans. I would emphasize that the Department should look holistically at the competitive landscape and not just focus on high-end war contingency plans. I endorse a deliberate approach to competition and crisis at all levels and in close coordination with diplomatic and other interagency partners. SOF have an important role in this space, and I would provide my best advice and recommendations to the USD(P) to account for those areas, prior to armed conflict, where the Department can achieve outsized effects in the competition and low-intensity conflict arenas.

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. Section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as amplified by section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021, empowered the ASD(SOLIC) to serve as the "service secretary-like" civilian official with responsibility for the oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations Forces. Among other reforms, the law defined the administrative chain of command for USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense for issues impacting the readiness and organization of Special Operations Forces, special operations-peculiar resources and equipment, and civilian personnel management, mirroring the relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their service chiefs, and placing ASD(SOLIC) immediately subordinate to the Secretary of Defense in such "service secretary-like" matters. The law also makes plain that otherwise directed by the President, no officer below the Secretary of Defense may intervene to exercise authority, direction, or control over the ASD(SOLIC) in the discharge of such responsibilities.

What is your understanding of the administrative chain of command specified by section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as amplified by section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021?

Answer. Section 922 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2017 codified the administrative chain of command for USSOCOM as running from the President to the Secretary of Defense, from the Secretary of Defense to the ASD(SO/LIC), and from the ASD(SO/LIC) to the Commander of USSOCOM. Section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021 reinforced and strengthened this role by making the ASD(SOLIC) an immediate subordinate of the Secretary of Defense. The Department further reinforced this role by designating the ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal Staff Assistant reporting

directly to the Secretary of Defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-peculiar administrative matters.

Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to exercise the administrative chain of command and under what circumstances?

Answer. The Department published an updated version of Department of Defense Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, on May 5, 2021, which prescribes the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the ASD(SO/LIC). The Secretary of Defense also emphasized the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command through a memorandum published on May 5, 2021. If confirmed, I will seek to exercise the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command as prescribed by both the Secretary and the DOD Directive through consistent, constructive, and transparent communication with the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, USSOCOM.

Question. If confirmed, how would you distinguish between and balance the duties and responsibilities associated with the ASD(SO/LIC)'s "service secretary-like" role with the ASD(SO/LIC)'s duties and responsibilities related to special operations policy and operational issues?

Answer. I see extensive synergy between the administrative chain of command responsibilities and the policy oversight responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will endeavor to balance these duties, prioritizing as necessary relative to pressing requirements, in close coordination and collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the USD(P) and the Commander, USSOCOM.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in:

- The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget request.

I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) receives fiscal guidance from the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and provides fiscal guidance to USSOCOM. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC) reviews and approves the USSOCOM Program Objective Memorandum and President's Budget submissions.

- Approving programs of record and the acquisition of special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM.

USSOCOM has statutory authority for development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment. I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) participates in the USSOCOM budget and requirements processes to establish acquisition programs.

- Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters and service components.

The ASD(SO/LIC), as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations matters, must work in partnership with the Commander, USSOCOM, to implement a shared vision for a SOF enterprise that meets the nation's special operations requirements. If confirmed, I will participate in strategic engagements and processes shaping the organization of USSOCOM and the SOF Service components to sustain and advance the SOF enterprise.

- Ensuring the readiness of Special Operations Forces.

The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for the readiness of SOF, as stated in section 167 of title 10. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to conduct regular reviews of the readiness of SOF to meet current, emergent, and future national security requirements.

- Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and accountability of Special Operations Forces.

The ASD(SO/LIC), in partnership with the Commander, USSOCOM, is responsible for ensuring SOF conduct themselves in a manner commensurate with the level of trust the public places in them in the performance of their duties, and consistent with their oath. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to strengthen further the ethics and accountability of SOF. I also will support the swift implementation of the recommendations of the Comprehensive Review of SOF Ethics and Culture to ensure that ethics and accountability are institutionalized across the SOF enterprise.

Question. In your view, do existing law and DOD policy and guidance provide sufficient clarity regarding how and in whom responsibility and accountability vest for all matters affecting Special Operations Forces? If not, what further changes would you recommend?

Answer. I believe that Title 10 is clear on the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters and the role in the administrative chain of command of the Commander, USSOCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Commander USSOCOM to fulfill these statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will evaluate potential changes required to existing law that could clarify responsibility and accountability for special operations matters.

Question. In your view, does the extant administrative chain of command allow for any official below the Secretary of Defense to exercise authority, direction, and control over the ASD(SOLIC) with regard to his/her “service secretary-like” responsibilities?

Answer. In my view, the law is clear: Unless otherwise directed by the President, the administrative chain of command to USSOCOM for the specific purposes set forth in 10 U.S.C. 167(f)(2) runs (A) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; (B) from the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; and (C) from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to the Commander of USSOCOM. This chain was also reinforced by the new chartering directive for the ASD(SO/LIC).

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on the operational use of Special Operations Forces?

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on validating and, as needed, updating the capabilities and authorities necessary for SOF to confront our global challenges. It is my belief we need to have SOF positioned to disrupt threats to the United States and our partners in a more sustainable manner, and we need to provide Department and national security leadership with options that enable flexibility, manage escalation, and provide high return on investment.

If confirmed, I look forward to working across the Department, with the leadership at USSOCOM, with my counterparts in other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and with our international partners to ensure the SOF enterprise is postured and able to execute our national defense strategy, to include our nation’s most challenging military missions.

I remain concerned about the health of the SOF enterprise, in particular the hidden impacts that sustained combat deployments have had on our warfighters and their families. If confirmed, I will champion the efforts of the Preservation of the Force and Family program and will seek to identify other ways that we can support USSOCOM’s most important asset—its people.

Question. Do you believe that current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?

Answer. The 2001 AUMF remains the key domestic legal authority for ongoing U.S. counterterrorism activities against al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and their associated forces. The Department has operated under these current legal authorities for nearly 20 years, but the threats we face and the operating environments in which SOF operate continue to evolve. I support President Biden’s support for replacing the current AUMFs with a narrow and specific framework that will ensure our forces have the authority they need to protect the United States from continuing terrorist threats. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with counterparts in other departments and agencies, and with the Congress in updating those authorities.

Question. What groups are currently assessed to be associated forces of al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, and in what countries are U.S. military direct action operations against such groups authorized?

Answer. The 2001 AUMF is the legal basis for currently authorized operations against the following groups or individuals: al Qaeda; the Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); al Qaeda in Syria; and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

It is my understanding that the United States has used military force for counterterrorism direct action operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.

Question. In your view, is a new authorization for the use of military force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I agree with President Biden’s support for replacing the current AUMFs with a narrow and specific framework that will ensure our forces have the authority they need to protect the United States from continuing terrorist threats. The scope or terms of any “new” authorization should be informed by an in-depth review of the current authorities, and by the facts and circumstances to which the authorities apply. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department’s General Counsel to conduct that evaluation.

Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in recommending to the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) which forces of other nations should be eligible for collective self-defense by U.S. Special Operations Forces, and under what conditions?

Answer. If confirmed, I would consider the degree to which collective self-defense would support achieving U.S. national security and specific mission objectives when operating by, with, and through our partners. The use of collective self-defense should also seek to bolster the protection of U.S. forces and facilities abroad and maintain the resolve of our partners. Rules of engagement authorizing U.S. forces to defend foreign partner forces should clearly identify the particular partners eligible for such protection and whether limits exist on the groups or individuals against which such force may be used. Any use of force in defense of foreign partner forces must adhere to the law of armed conflict and also be necessary and proportionate to address the particular attack or threat of imminent attack against the partner force.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Question. Section 936 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy for accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations.

If confirmed, what would be your role in developing and implementing the policies resulting from section 936?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the efforts of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who is designated under section 936 as the civilian official responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing compliance with DOD civilian casualty policy. For example, I would help oversee on-going efforts within the Department to complete the drafting and coordination of a forthcoming DOD instruction on civilian harm mitigation and response.

Question. What role do you believe public transparency plays with respect to accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?

Answer. Public transparency about U.S. military operations helps improve the public's understanding of what the President and the Secretary of Defense have directed U.S. forces to do, as well the results of their actions. Although the type of information that can be made public will inevitably depend on operational and security requirements, transparency efforts can help the public better understand the human suffering that is inevitably part of war as well as the extent to which U.S. forces' go to minimize civilian casualties.

Question. Do you believe DOD has achieved a sufficient level of transparency on such matters? If not, what additional steps do you believe are necessary?

Answer. I understand that DOD and its leaders regularly consider new, more effective ways to communicate with the public on important issues, including matters related to civilian casualties. If confirmed, I would actively support these efforts and fulfill any related responsibilities that may be assigned to the ASD(SO/LIC) in the forthcoming DOD instruction on civilian harm mitigation and response.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. Do you believe the special operations activities identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and appropriate?

Answer. Yes, I do. SOF are uniquely manned, trained, and equipped to undertake these activities.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. At this time, I would not recommend any changes to section 167 of title 10.

Question. Are there special operations missions or activities that you believe should be transferred to conventional forces or, otherwise divested by USSOCOM, and, if so, why?

Answer. I believe that the decision to employ SOF should be based on the following criteria, that a mission or activity: is politically sensitive; conducted in an austere or remote location without significant support infrastructure; requires a small footprint; demands a higher level of precision execution; and there is significant delegated decision authority to the lowest level of command. SOF have unique training and capabilities to execute missions under those criteria. If those criteria are not present, then it may be more appropriate for conventional forces to conduct the activity or mission.

Question. Are there any additional missions or activities that you believe should be assigned to USSOCOM? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Not at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, as well as with the USD(P) and the CJCS, to ensure USSOCOM is assigned appropriate missions and activities.

FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges facing U.S. Special Operations Forces in the near-, mid-, and long-term?

Answer. I believe the major challenge for SOF is balancing the demands of sustainable counterterrorism while increasing readiness for crisis response and strategic competition with China and Russia. I do not believe that SOF should be prioritized to focus on longer-term challenges that do not require their unique skills, capabilities, and attributes.

Question. In your assessment, are U.S. Special Operations Forces appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to address these challenges? What changes, if any, would you recommend to the organization, training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations Forces?

Answer. From my current understanding, I believe SOF are actively adapting to ensure they are ready to meet these existing and emerging challenges. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure SOF are organized, trained, and equipped to the levels necessary to meet these challenges.

Question. In your view, what should be the role of the ASD(SOLIC) in identifying and implementing efforts regarding the organization, training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations Forces?

Answer. In my view, the ASD(SO/LIC) should ensure that SOF are organized, trained, and equipped in alignment with national and Departmental strategic guidance. I believe that the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide appropriate civilian oversight, to include advocacy within the Department and with Congress, to ensure SOF are optimally organized and receive the necessary training and equipment to carry out their assigned missions and activities.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Question. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?

Answer. The U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism is a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach for integrating military and non-military efforts to combat the threat of terrorists at home and abroad. The strategy recognizes that today's terrorist landscape is more fluid and complex than ever. The United States must be adaptive in its approach in countering and preventing terrorism. I understand that USSOCOM plays a key role in this process as the Department's Coordinating Authority to unify counterterrorism planning across DOD. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we are focusing on the appropriate lines of effort and are aligned with the whole-of-government effort.

Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)?

Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism provides a framework that has proven effective guiding U.S. action to degrade ISIS and al-Qa'ida. Our goal must be to evolve to most cost-effective approaches to degrade the terrorist threats to the United States and our citizens. If confirmed, I would advocate for establishing clear policy objectives and effective assessment metrics that make it easier to review progress and measure success, in close consultation with interagency partners.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy or associated measures of effectiveness?

Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on how the strategy is being implemented, and whether the existing measures of effectiveness are precise and being used in adjusting our CT approaches across the Department. A standardized assessment methodology and metrics could enable a more proactive and deliberate approach to CT, which could enable the Department to put in place more cost-effective and sustainable approaches enduring terrorism threats.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other VEOs, to the U.S. Homeland, and western interests, more broadly? Which group or groups, in your view, currently present the greatest threat to the United States?

Answer. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) present an enduring threat to U.S. citizens at home and abroad. Our national interests, and those of our partners and allies, will remain threatened until these groups are no longer able project power from their operating areas, or inspire others to carry out violence in their name.

Question. In your view, what does a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism, as directed by the NDS, mean?

Answer. In my view, a “more resource-sustainable” approach would entail prioritizing effective operational actions against the groups that pose the greatest threat to Americans, efficient and flexible employment of limited resources, and wherever possible working by, with, and through enabled partners to build the capacity of local authorities to increasingly confront the threats on their own.

Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to promote a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a collaborative and transparent effort, in coordination with the leadership of the Joint Staff; Commander, USSOCOM; and other key officials, to develop Departmental guidance and priorities for counterterrorism operations, activities, and investments. I also will work to integrate military counterterrorism operations into the whole-of-government approach and with the efforts of allies and partners.

Question. If confirmed, how would you endeavor to manage risk under this “more resource sustainable” approach?

Answer. If confirmed, I would manage strategic risk through a whole-of-government evaluation of what terrorist entities pose the greatest threat to the United States, when compared to U.S. and coalition efforts to disrupt their activities. We need to look carefully at our terrorism efforts to ensure they are applied against the most important threats we face, in the context of our regional and global national security objectives. .

DETENTION OPERATIONS

Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in addressing matters regarding detention under the law of armed conflict?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage directly on all matters regarding policy and guidance on detention under the law of armed conflict.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?

Answer. Yes, I support the current standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3. Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. Any and all detainees must be treated humanely.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the ongoing triennial review and revision of FM 2–22.3 mandated by the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my DOD and Army counterparts on the triennial review of FM 2–22.3 to ensure that it meets all applicable legal requirements, and that the practices for interrogation described in the Army Field Manual do not involve the use or threat of force in accordance with section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92). I understand that the USD(I&S) is currently reviewing interrogation techniques and may publish a DOD manual on the same. I fully support the elevation of interrogation techniques to a DOD-level manual. If confirmed, I will work with USD(I&S) to ensure detention operations are synchronized across DOD.

Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM 2–22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the policies and processes outlined in FM 2–22.3 to determine if any revisions may be required.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the intelligence activities and programs of Special Operations Forces delineated between the Office of the USD(I&S) and the Office of the ASD(SOLIC)?

Answer. DOD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, designates the ASD(SO/LIC) as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense charged with exercising authority, direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar administrative matters, and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop overall policy pertaining to special operations, low-intensity conflict, and irregular warfare.

In that context, I believe close coordination with the USD(I&S), as well as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) official charged with performing independent oversight of DOD intelligence and intel-

ligence-related activities pursuant to DOD Directive 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), is valuable and necessary for the proper oversight of such SOF activities. If confirmed, I look forward to partnering with the USD(I&S) and the ATSD(IO) to ensure that support for SOF is collaborative and coordinated in accordance with all applicable law and policy.

Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by Special Operations Forces different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?

Answer. In my view, special operations missions require immediate and detailed intelligence to support operations that are executed on rapid timelines and in high-risk environments. In light of those requirements, the key difference is that these intelligence operations are conducted in direct support of authorized SOF missions supporting specific Combatant Commander requirements. In contrast, I understand intelligence operations carried out by others in the intelligence community typically serve a more strategic purpose and reflect national priorities.

As such, I believe the main difference is that intelligence collected and assessed by SOF directly supports special operations task forces conducting operations in support of the Combatant Commanders. When select SOF elements carry out intelligence operations in support of strategic collection requirements, those requirements are fully coordinated within the IC.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are properly coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?

Answer. I understand that SOF sensitive activities are closely coordinated with the Intelligence Community (IC) as required by applicable laws, policies, and arrangements. If confirmed, I would ensure that SOF units comply with all applicable laws, policies, and directives for the coordination of intelligence activities with the IC.

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by WMD to the United States?

Answer. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continue to be a significant threat to the Homeland and U.S. Forces, allies, partners, and interests abroad. Specifically related to terrorists, I understand that a few groups have expressed intent and taken action seeking to acquire, develop, and use WMD against the United States and its allies.

Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?

Answer. I understand that the responsibilities of the Commander, USSOCOM, include providing the Secretary of Defense with recommendations on priorities and the allocation of resources to counter weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to support him in meeting those responsibilities and ensure he receives the support needed to undertake this important mission.

10 U.S.C. 127E OPERATIONS

Question. Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) by U.S. Special Operations Forces to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

Answer. In my experience, section 127e authority provides a cost-effective means for the United States to advance our security interests by supporting and enabling partners and allies in pursuing shared objectives against high-risk terrorist groups. If confirmed, I will evaluate this authority, including how it supports U.S. strategic goals, and ensure activities supported by this authority are in alignment with NDS priorities.

Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend to this authority?

Answer. The section 127e authority is a proven and effective tool for U.S. SOF to conduct counterterrorism operations by, with, and through foreign and irregular partner forces. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain the efficacy and efficiency of the programs utilizing section 127e support and to identify areas where we can improve the authority, or its application, to achieve U.S. national security objectives and support the needs of Combatant Commanders.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as irregular warfare and “gray zone operations.”

What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by adversaries in the domain of irregular warfare?

Answer. It is my understanding that, because of U.S. conventional overmatch, adversaries of the United States increasingly rely on indirect and asymmetric approaches to competition in an attempt to enhance their influence and avoid our advantages. This approach bypasses our conventional overmatch because state competitors are able to achieve many of their objectives without needing to cross the thresholds that would lead us to respond militarily. If confirmed, I would advocate for carefully calibrated actions that impose costs on adversaries’ destabilizing efforts and support a more integrated approach to deterring their undesired behaviors.

Question. What should be the guiding principles of any DOD strategy to counter threats in the “gray zone,” in your view?

Answer. Consistent with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, I believe that diplomacy should be our tool of first resort. DOD’s approach to the “gray zone” should focus on three key principles in support of diplomatic efforts: persistent engagement with allies and partners to demonstrate our commitment and maintain situational awareness of adversaries’ destabilizing efforts; prioritizing the information space, to seize the initiative and shape conditions, increase our influence and legitimacy, and combat harmful disinformation; and bolstering resilience across DOD and among allies and partners against the subversive and coercive challenges that are endemic to “gray zone” competition.

Question. What do you perceive to be the appropriate role for Special Operations Forces in executing such a strategy?

Answer. In my view, SOF have a critical role to play in DOD’s approach to the “gray zone,” where strategic and conventional deterrence are insufficient to counter adversaries’ strategies. However, I believe it is important to understand that SOF provide far more than the direct action and counterterrorism (CT) portfolios that have dominated the past 20 years. SOF provide a wide range of capabilities below the threshold of armed conflict that can complement our traditional deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the capabilities and mission sets associated with irregular warfare provide the Department with a suite of options to mitigate our adversaries’ malign influence, and also I would factor in a whole-of-government approach to sustain our interests in competition.

Question. What is your assessment of the status of implementation of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS, including efforts to institutionalize and operationalize irregular warfare as an enduring, core competency of the entire Joint Force?

Answer. My understanding is that the Department has made significant strides since the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS was signed. The Department released an unclassified summary of this document to increase awareness among our allies, partners, and the U.S. public of how it is working to understand the strategic environment and achieve unity of effort. I also understand that an implementation plan was developed to maintain accountability of implementation across the Joint Force—and not just SOF—to institutionalize IW as part of its approach to strategic competition and armed conflict. If I am confirmed, I would carefully review this process and advocate for continued momentum in areas where emphasis on IW can create lasting strategic impact and operational advantages.

Question. Do you agree with the Department of Defense’s public summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS that states “we are unprepared for irregular war?”

Answer. My assessment is that the Department has traditionally prepared for deterrence of armed conflict or to win a high-intensity war, but that the lower-intensity conflict associated with “gray zone” activities is more difficult for DOD, and the U.S. Government more generally, to understand and to deal with effectively. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department continues to make progress in addressing this issue.

Question. What do you see as the role of the ASD (SOLIC) in implementing the objectives described in the Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS?

Answer. I understand that the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) is the OSD lead for the Department’s effort to implement the strategic guidance provided by the IW Annex to the 2018 NDS. If confirmed, I would work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide continued direction and oversight of the Department’s efforts to

institutionalize IW into Joint Force campaigning in both strategic competition and armed conflict. I would also ensure that the long-standing, necessary reforms identified in that document are incorporated appropriately in successor guidance and strategic documents as they are developed.

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the “section 1202” authority for support of special operations for irregular warfare? What modifications, if any, would you recommend to the “section 1202” authority?

Answer. I believe the section 1202 authority is an important tool in SOF’s arsenal for competition by, with, and through foreign and irregular forces supporting our IW efforts. If confirmed, I would work with USSOCOM to make sure that geographic Combatant Commands understand the unique value of this authority to achieve effects in competition within their AORs, and that USSOCOM’s subordinate commands have the necessary resources to utilize section 1202 authority fully and continue to mature the program. I would engage with Congress to advocate for responsible and effective growth in this authority’s availability to DOD to help meet growing demand from Combatant Commanders.

Question. Do you believe that Special Operations Forces have the appropriate authorities and capabilities to operate effectively in this domain of warfare? Please explain your answer.

Answer. SOF have a range of authorities, including section 1202 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 and 10 USC sections 127e and 127f, which enable the conduct of IW-related and other sensitive activities as part of strategic competition. It is my understanding that SOF have appropriate IW capabilities that employ those authorities effectively. If confirmed, I would closely monitor the employment of these authorities to assess their sufficiency and would continuously evaluate SOF IW capabilities for effectiveness. I would work to demonstrate SOF’s responsible use of these authorities and ensure the valuable return on investment in their use, and would look forward to working with Congress on these important matters.

Question. In your view, do Special Operations Forces require additional authorities and capabilities to provide support of irregular warfare? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe the Department does not require additional authorities or capabilities to provide support of irregular warfare at this time. If confirmed, I would closely review the existing authorities and provide my recommendations on where additional support or increased authorities may be essential for our continued irregular warfare activities.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Question. Special Operations Forces rely extensively on enabling capabilities provided by Military Service general purpose forces to ensure mission success.

What is the role of the ASD(SOLIC) in ensuring that the special operations requirements for enabling capabilities are properly articulated to and provided by the Military Services?

Answer. Major Force Program-11 only funds SOF-unique requirements. I understand that USSOCOM currently relies on the Military Services and Defense-Wide organizations to provide \$9.0 - \$10 billion of support annually in areas including military personnel, material, and base operating support. The ASD(SO/LIC) must continue to be the senior advocate for support to SOF within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, in coordination with Commander, USSOCOM, I will continue to integrate my staff into Department-level relevant processes to ensure adequate support to SOF by general purpose forces.

Question. In your view, should Special Operations Forces further develop organic enabling capabilities, in addition or in place of those currently provided by general purpose forces?

Answer. I believe that it is necessary and preferable for most enabling capabilities to be provided by the Military Services; however, there are requirements derived from SOF’s unique missions where I believe that it is necessary for the enabling capability to be organized within USSOCOM. The decision to do so must be weighed carefully within the context of the SOF-peculiar requirement and the sustainment burden assumed by USSOCOM.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, are the Department and the broader interagency appropriately organized to compete with state and non-state adversaries in the information environment? If not, what recommendations would you make?

Answer. I understand that the Department is engaged, working within assigned portfolios, and collaborating with other relevant U.S. Government departments and

agencies, to compete in the information environment. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the proper structure responsible for the synchronization of all information-related capabilities across the Department to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. I also would make the advancement in the capabilities and application of information operations a top priority key focus.

Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department and, specifically, Special Operations Forces, in the broader information operations and strategic communications efforts of the U.S. Government?

Answer. I understand the Department has a variety of capabilities to conduct military operations in the information environment, including public affairs (PA), military information support operations (MISO), electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), and cyberspace operations. When these activities are executed effectively and in combination with each other and other tools, DOD can achieve its mission more affordably, and with reduced risk to our operating forces. If confirmed, I will strive to integrate these capabilities further into Department activities and in support to our interagency and foreign partners.

Question. What role should the USSOCOM's Joint MISO WebOps Center play in supporting these efforts?

Answer. I understand that USSOCOM organized the Joint MISO WebOps Center to host the capability to support MISO activities that are funded and conducted by individual geographic Combatant Commands. I understand that the Center is working and growing, and, if confirmed, I will continue to support this important capability.

Question. Should Special Operations Forces develop any additional military capabilities to enable the DOD and the United States to compete more effectively in the information environment? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Success in the information environment requires an integrated approach among a broad spectrum of participants. If confirmed, I will assess USSOCOM's capabilities in this area and ensure it continues to be a meaningful part of the effort to create and deliver timely solutions to warfighters. I will continue to focus on needs, speed of delivery, effectiveness, and efficiency.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Question. The ASD(SOLIC) is responsible for coordinating and overseeing plans, programs and policies pertaining to counternarcotics (CN).

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States by drug trafficking and related activities of transnational criminal organizations?

Answer. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 81,000 drug overdose deaths occurred in the United States in the 12 months ending in May 2020, the highest number of overdose deaths ever recorded in a 12-month period. More than 80 percent of drug overdoses involved opioids, primarily fentanyl and fentanyl analogs. The Drug Enforcement Administration has stated that Mexican-based transnational criminal organizations remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States. Transnational criminal organizations engaged in drug trafficking to the United States are a serious threat to the health and safety of the American people and are a destabilizing force globally.

Question. What do you view as the proper role of the Department in supporting interagency partners tasked with counternarcotics missions, such as the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security?

Answer. From what I understand, DOD has a role supporting other Departments' counterdrug efforts. DOD is the lead Department for detection and monitoring of potential drugs headed to the United States by maritime or aerial means. DOD provides capabilities and expertise to other departments and agencies, when requested, to help reduce the national security threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the United States.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Question. Section 167(e)(4) assigns to the Commander, USSOCOM the authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, and to acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services. The Commander, USSOCOM is advised and assisted in these matters by a command acquisition executive.

If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating a determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel, supplies, or services is "special operations-peculiar"?

Answer. My understanding is that “special operations-peculiar” is applicable to any equipment, material, supplies, or services funded by MFP-11 and required by and unique to SOF to accomplish their missions or activities.

Question. If confirmed as the ASD(SOLIC)—

What actions would you take to improve each of the three aspects of the special operations-peculiar acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD (A&S) and USSOCOM on special operations-peculiar acquisition, requirements, and budgeting processes. I would draw on the annual Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution (PPBE) process to ensure that USSOCOM’s priorities and resource allocation are in alignment with the Department’s strategic objectives.

Question. What actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure that there is a vigorous, disciplined, and systematic review process to prioritize special operations-peculiar requirements in alignment with the Department’s strategic objectives and continue to deliver capabilities to the warfighter at the speed of relevance.

Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities in the acquisition process that should be assigned to the ASD(SOLIC) or the Commander, USSOCOM, in your view?

Answer. 10 U.S.C. section 138 authorizes the ASD(SO/LIC) to “exercise authority, direction, and control of all special-operations peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces.” If confirmed, should I identify any changes to authorities or processes that would improve the functions of the office, I will engage within the Department and with Congress to make appropriate recommendations.

A natural tension exists between the objectives to ensure that acquisition programs reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications—the objective of the test and evaluation function.

Question. What are the respective roles of the ASD(SOLIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM in the test and evaluation of special operations-peculiar acquisition programs? How would you exercise the responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) in this regard, if confirmed?

Answer. I understand USSOCOM has a number of test and evaluation programs that support special operations-peculiar acquisitions and evaluation. If confirmed, I will ensure that USSOCOM appropriately develops test and evaluation strategy to support the acquisition process, as well as ensure speed of delivery to the warfighter. I will also work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment), Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive.

Question. How has the Commander, USSOCOM made use of rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?

Answer. I understand that the Commander, USSOCOM, and the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive leverage a wide range of acquisition processes to facilitate rapid prototyping of special operations-peculiar hardware. In particular, USSOCOM has been very effective in its use of the Middle Tier of Acquisition pathway and the non-traditional acquisition tools such as Other Transaction Authorities.

ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. In January 2020, USSOCOM completed a Comprehensive Review of Special Operations Forces Culture and Ethics. Among other things, the Comprehensive Review found that “selective implementation” of recommendations from four previous reviews related to the culture and ethics of Special Operations Forces since 2011, including two such reviews mandated by Congress, have resulted in continued challenges related to the assessment and selection of Special Operations Forces, leader development, and force structure and employment.

What are your views on the current culture of ethics and accountability in U.S. Special Operations Forces?

Answer. I understand that the Comprehensive Review identified factors contributing to instances of bad decision-making. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor the enterprise-wide institutional changes recommended in the Comprehensive Review to ensure they continue to be implemented, and I will work closely with Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure a long-term commitment to and focus on ethics and accountability.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing the recommendations of the USSOCOM Comprehensive Review?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure the special operations enterprise continues to implement the Comprehensive Review's recommended actions with the same speed and discipline as are the hallmarks of SOF operations. I also will keep this Committee informed of progress until completed.

Question. What is your understanding of the actions required to complete full implementation of the 16 recommendations provided by the Comprehensive Review?

Answer. My understanding is that the CR Implementation Team, which includes an ASD(SO/LIC) representative, has completed 7 of the 16 recommended actions and is on track to complete all 16 recommended actions by the end of calendar year 2021.

Question. The USSOCOM Comprehensive Review found that "a USSOCOM culture overly focused on force employment and mission accomplishment creates the contexts or situations allowing for misconduct and unethical behavior to develop within the SOF enterprise."

What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment play in decisions relating to misconduct by Special Operations Forces?

Answer. I believe that decisions on SOF misconduct and unethical behavior should be evaluated independently from any past mission accomplishments and commendable actions. Leaders must set the example, lead by example, maintain the highest standards of moral and ethical behavior, and hold their personnel accountable for their actions.

HEALTH OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. High operational tempo and demand for special operations capabilities have contributed to enormous strain on Special Operations Forces, which is challenging readiness, resilience, and retention.

What is your assessment of the health and readiness of Special Operations Forces?

Answer. SOF face unique challenges that directly impact readiness, resiliency, and retention, most notably the stress of repeated combat deployments and the long-term effects of mild traumatic brain injuries. If confirmed, I will advocate for continuing studies and programs to address the effects of the stress of repeated combat deployments and the long-term effects of mild traumatic brain injuries on the health of military members and the readiness of the force.

Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing the stress on Special Operations Forces?

Answer. USSOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program provides embedded behavioral health providers that are vital in the continuing effort to promote preventative stress management and reduce suicides in the SOF community. If confirmed, I will advocate for the POTFF program and work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to sustain support for the well-being of SOF and their families.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address suicides in Special Operations Forces?

Answer. USSOCOM has been implementing proactive SOF-specific suicide prevention programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, USSOCOM, and the DOD Suicide Prevention Office to help USSOCOM adopt best practices and innovative research and technologies to continue strengthening its suicide prevention efforts.

Question. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Families program?

Answer. The Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program is designed to help Service members and their families cope with SOF-unique challenges that cannot be addressed through the Service-sponsored support programs. The POTFF program takes a holistic approach to the wellbeing of SOF members and their families. It has been influential in strengthening SOF readiness and resiliency and reducing suicides. The program focuses on five domains: human performance, psychological health, cognitive performance, family readiness, and spiritual wellbeing.

COMMAND CLIMATE SURVEY

Question. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command climate survey to the workforce under your leadership and management?

Answer. If confirmed, I will capitalize on the ongoing DOD-wide effort to conduct the Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) at all military units and con-

sider administering this or a similar survey to the personnel assigned to the immediate office of the ASD(SO/LIC). Also, the Commander, USSOCOM and I will encourage commanders to take advantage of DEOCS results to help promote positive command climate, and will hold leaders accountable for promoting a positive command climate.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(SOLIC)?

Answer. If confirmed, and made aware of such a complaint, I would direct the case be handled promptly and properly, following the DOD guidelines and policies, and ensure the employee has access to all support resources. It is my number one priority to create a work place that is safe and equitable for all staff and free from hostile or abusive conduct by anyone.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications) and other information from the Department.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

NOMINATIONS

1. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Maier, as part of my responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Mr. MAIER. No

2. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Maier, have any of you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

Mr. MAIER. No

CULTURE AND ETHICS IN THE SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNITY

3. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Maier, following several high profile incidents in recent years, Congress directed U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to conduct a comprehensive review which found that while the special operations force does not have a “systemic ethics problem”, 2 decades of sustained combat operations and not enough emphasis on leader and professional development had “impacted the force’s culture in some troublesome ways”. Do you believe the force has an ethics or culture problem?

Mr. MAIER. I do not think the force as a whole has an ethics or culture problem, but I am troubled by recent incidents in which members have not upheld the values expected of them. I support continued implementation of the Comprehensive Review (CR), through which USSOCOM has established, or is in the process of establishing, policies and procedures that will help ensure leaders are present, engaged, and held accountable. While a heavy deployment tempo was found in the CR to not be the only contributor, I am committed, if confirmed, to advocating that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are assigned only to those missions for which SOF are best qualified and equipped to execute. As I stated in my testimony, I would prioritize ensuring SOF represent the values and ideals of the nation we serve, if confirmed.

4. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Maier, if confirmed, what steps do you plan to take to ensure leaders in the special forces community demonstrate integrity and demand leadership, discipline, and accountability from members of their units?

Mr. MAIER. If confirmed, I will partner closely with the USSOCOM Commander, and ask my leadership team to work daily with SOF commanders and senior staff, to ensure collective implementation of the CR recommendations. Our goal must be to ensure these changes are incorporated into permanent policies, and that the policies become daily practice. The CR recommendations, once implemented, are core to ensuring SOF is resilient and best prepared to tackle the complex military challenges of the future.

SPECIAL FORCES AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION

5. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Maier, for nearly 20 years, our special operations forces have fought heroically, but our focus has been almost exclusively on the counterterrorism mission in the Middle East and other parts of the world. With the draw-down of all forces from Afghanistan underway, if confirmed, what steps do you plan to take to ensure the special operations forces community is prepared to support the Joint Force in a potential future conflict with either China or Russia?

Mr. MAIER. Although SOF have focused extensively on counterterrorism over the last two decades, SOF also bring innate capabilities—such as placement and access, crisis response, and strong partnerships—that will position the SOF enterprise to compete with peer competitors, and enable the Joint Force to do so more effectively. The SOF enterprise has moved out rapidly in revamping itself in response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the President’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (March 2021), and Departmental guidance directing focus toward China and Russia. If confirmed, I will work closely with the USSOCOM Commander to ensure that SOF are in alignment with overarching national and Department guidance, and encourage the ongoing efforts to incorporate SOF and SOF-peculiar capabilities into Department planning efforts focused on China and Russia.

I believe that SOF and SOF capabilities bring a critical component to competition and can reduce strategic risk for the Joint Force and support whole-of-government efforts in strategic competition through concerted engagements with partners and allies prior to conflict. If confirmed, I will work with the USSOCOM Commander to balance today's missions with the need to ensure that SOF are best positioned for future challenges by increasing attention to modernization, training, and capability development that best support the Joint Force.

[The nomination reference of Mr. Christopher P. Maier follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN487

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 28, 2021.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Christopher Paul Maier, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Owen West.

_____, 2021.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Mr. Christopher P. Maier, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Bio
Christopher P. Maier

Education:

- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
 - August 1999 to May 2001
 - Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy
- University of California, Berkeley
 - January 1997 to May 1999
 - Bachelor of Arts, Political Science
- United States Naval Academy
 - July 1994 to September 1996
 - No degree; Honorable Discharge in December 1996

Employment Record:

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, The Pentagon
 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
 - April 28, 2021 to Present
- Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, The Pentagon
 - Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (in the Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense billet)
 - January 20, 2021 to April 27, 2021
- Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy – International Security Affairs, The Pentagon
 - Director, Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Task Force
 - March 2017 to November 30, 2020 (on Administrative Leave until December 31, 2020)
- Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy – Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, The Pentagon
 - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
 - July 2015 to September 2017

- National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Office of the Director, McLean, VA
 - Senior Advisor to the Director
 - November 2013 to May 2014; and March 2015 to July 2015
- United States Air Force, Air National Guard, 130th Airlift Wing, Charleston, WV
 - Intelligence Officer (Specialty Code: 14N)
 - March 7, 2013 to Present
 - Deployments to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe in support of contingency operations and multinational deployments
- National Security Council (NSC) Staff, Executive Office of the President, The White House, Washington, DC
 - Director for Counterterrorism (detailed from NCTC)
 - August 2009 to October 2013
- National Counterterrorism Center, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, McLean, VA
 - Group Chief, Strategic Assessments and Regional Planning
 - September 2006 to August 2009
- Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., McLean, VA
 - Strategy and Management Consultant
 - June 2001 to August 2006
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Directorate of Intelligence, Langley, VA
 - Graduate Fellow and Intelligence Analyst
 - May 2000 to May 2001
- Tufts University, Department of Political Science, Medford, MA
 - Graduate Research Assistant
 - March 2000 to April 2001 (break during the summer)
- Department of State, American Consulate, Munich, Germany
 - Intern, Political Section
 - June 1998 to August 1998

Honors and Awards:

- Military Awards
 - Air Force Commendation Medal
 - Air Force Outstanding Unit Award
 - National Defense Service Medal
 - Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal

- Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
 - Air Force Expeditionary Service Ribbon
 - Air Force Training Ribbon
- Federal Civilian Awards
 - The Director's Award, National Counterterrorism Center
 - Secretary of Defense Outstanding Public Service Award
- Academic Awards
 - Neufield Scholar Athlete. University of California, Berkeley. Highest academic honor for graduating scholar-athlete
 - Owen D. Young Prize. University of California, Berkeley. Most outstanding university paper in international relations
- Other Awards
 - Academic All American in Track and Field, 1999

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Christopher P. Maier in connection with his nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):** Christopher Paul Maier
2. **Position to which nominated:** Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict
3. **Date of nomination:** April 28, 2021
4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):**

Amador Valley High School, Pleasanton, CA. September 1990 to June 1994
High School Diploma, June 17, 1994

United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. July 1, 1994 to December 20, 1996
No degree; honorable discharge (December 1996). Left school to travel home on
September 10, 1996 due to mother's illness.

University of California, Berkeley. Berkeley, CA. January 1997 to May 1999
B.A., Political Science, May 1999

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA. August 1999 to
May 2001
Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD), May 2001.

5. **Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Special Operations
/ Low-Intensity Conflict,
April 28, 2021 to Present
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
The Pentagon

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Special Operations
/ Low-Intensity Conflict,
January 20, 2021 to April 27, 2021
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (in Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense billet)
The Pentagon

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Policy
March 2017 to November 30, 2020 (placed on Administrative Leave until December 31,
2020)
Director, Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Task Force, The Pentagon

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Office of the Secretary of Defense – Policy, Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
July 2015 to September 2017
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Special Operations and Combating
Terrorism, The Pentagon

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE (Active Duty: Permanent Change of Station and
Temporary Duty)
May 2014 to March 2015

Intelligence Officer
San Angelo, TX; Charleston, WV; and N'djamena, Chad

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC)
November 2013 to May 2014; and March 2015 to July 2015
Senior Advisor to the Director
McLean, VA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) Staff, Executive Office of the President,
The White House
August 2009 to October 2013
Director for Counterterrorism (detailed from NCTC)
Washington, DC

- 6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP)
September 2006 to August 2009
Group Chief, Strategic Assessments and Regional Planning

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Directorate of Intelligence
May 2000 to May 2001
Graduate Fellow and Intelligence Analyst, West Africa Team

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, American Consulate in Munich, Germany
June 1998 to August 1998
Intern, Political Section

- 7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):** None
- 8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):** None
- 9. Political affiliations and activities:**

- a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable): Not Applicable
 - b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years: None
 - c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period: None
10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):
- Military Awards
 - Air Force Commendation Medal
 - Air Force Outstanding Unit Award
 - National Defense Service Medal
 - Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
 - Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
 - Air Force Expeditionary Service Ribbon
 - Air Force Training Ribbon
 - Federal Civilian Awards
 - The Director's Award, National Counterterrorism Center
 - Secretary of Defense Outstanding Public Service Award
 - Academic Awards
 - Neufield Scholar Athlete. University of California, Berkeley. Highest academic honor for graduating scholar-athlete
 - Owen D. Young Prize. University of California, Berkeley. Most outstanding university paper in international relations
 - Other Awards

- o Academic All American in Track and Field, 1999

11. **Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):**

"The Political Economy of Cote d'Ivoire," in the Berkeley Journal of International Affairs, May-June 1999

12. **Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated). Not applicable**

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple "yes" or "no" response is appropriate.

13. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress? Yes**
14. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely? Yes**
15. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Yes**
16. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic**


communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Yes

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Yes
18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Yes
19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Yes

[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Christopher P. Maier", written over a horizontal line.

This 20th day of May, 2021

[The nomination of Mr. Christopher P. Maier was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 7, 2021.]

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