    [Senate Hearing 117-987]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 117-987

     THE NOMINATIONS OF: MS. JILL M. HRUBY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
       FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION; MR. FRANK A. ROSE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
     NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MS. DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM TO
    BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
    DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MR. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
          OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW	INTENSITY CONFLICT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 27, 2021

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
                                       _______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    63-166 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2026

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                                JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire             JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York           ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut           DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii                   TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                       MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine                 JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts           THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan                  DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia            KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois                 RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                       MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                       JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
                                              TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

                          Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
                      John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                  may 27, 2021

                                                                       Page
    The Nominations of: Ms. Jill M. Hruby to be Under Secretary of        1
      Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration; Mr. Frank A. Rose to be Principal
      Deputy Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration;
      Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs and Mr.
      Christopher P. Maier to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Manchin, Senator Joe, III........................................     4

    Nunn, Hon. Sam, A Former U.S. Senator............................     5

    Heinrich, Senator Martin.........................................     7

    Hruby, Jill M., to be Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear           8
      Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
      Administration.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    39

      Questions for the Record.......................................    52

      Nomination Reference and Report................................    54

      Biographical Sketch............................................    55

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    56

      Signature Page.................................................    66

    Rose, Frank A., to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National       10
      Nuclear Security Administration.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    66

      Questions for the Record.......................................    78

      Nomination Reference and Report................................    79

      Biographical Sketch............................................    80

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    81

      Signature Page.................................................    97

    Rosenblum, Deborah G., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for      12
      Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    97

      Questions for the Record.......................................   109

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   112

      Biographical Sketch............................................   113

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   114

      Signature Page.................................................   120

    Maier, Christopher P., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for      14
      Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................   120

      Questions for the Record.......................................   137

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   138

      Biographical Sketch............................................   139

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   142

      Signature Page.................................................   148

                                     (iii)

                  This hearing is printed to include all available
                    information
                    requested or required to be inserted for the
                    record.

                                      (iv)

     THE NOMINATIONS OF: MS. JILL M. HRUBY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
       FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION; MR. FRANK A. ROSE TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
     NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MS. DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM TO
    BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
    DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND MR. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
          OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin, Rosen,
    Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Scott, Hawley,
    and Tuberville.
        Also present Senators Heinrich, Nunn.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
        First, I would like to begin this morning's hearing by
    recognizing the passing of Senator John Warner at the age of
    94. Senator Warner was a member of this committee for 21 years,
    and either Chairman or Ranking Member for eight years. He was
    the consummate public servant, but more importantly, he showed
    us all the importance of bipartisanship. His work with Senator
    Levin and others is what ensured the National Defense
    Authorization Act was passed every year and made this committee
    what it is today, and he will be missed.
        Turning to today's hearing, the committee meets this
    morning to consider the nominations of Ms. Jill Hruby to be
    Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration;
    Mr. Frank Rose to be Principal Deputy Administrator of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration; Ms. Deborah Rosenblum
    to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
    Biological Defense Programs; and Mr. Christopher Maier to be
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
    Intensity Conflict. I thank the nominees for their long careers
    of service to the United States and their willingness to assume
    these important roles.
        I would also like to welcome the guests and family members
    who are here with us today. I want to thank Senator Heinrich
    for joining us to introduce Ms. Hruby. Mr. Rose, I welcome I
    believe--is your mother here? Well, Ms. Athalyn Rose, welcome,
    and your sister, Ms. Nikko Rose, welcome. Ms. Rosenblum, I am
    seeing that your husband, Todd Rosenblum, is here also, and
    welcome, and I want to thank Senator Nunn, who will introduce
    you via Webex. And, Mr. Maier, I believe welcome your wife, Ms.
    Emily Louise Franklin, and thank Senator Manchin, who will be
    introducing you today.
        Ms. Hruby, you are well qualified to be nominated as
    Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
    or NNSA, having previously directed Sandia National Labs and
    its 13,000 engineers and scientists who design components for
    our nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, there are a number of
    challenges that will require your attention.
        The United States has not produced plutonium pits in
    quantity since the late 1980s. Ms. Hruby, you have supported a
    ``two site'' pit manufacturing strategy, dividing production
    between the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and
    the Savannah River site in South Carolina. I would ask that you
    share with the committee the rationale for this two-site
    solution.
        The NNSA is facing its highest workload demand since the
    1980s as we modernize our nuclear deterrent, which includes
    five warhead programs, and recapitalization of our nuclear
    facilities, many of which date back to the Manhattan Project of
    World War II.
        Finally, last year's NDAA included a provision to ensure
    the DOD and the NNSA work closely together in developing
    budgets to meet DOD requirements. Ms. Hruby, if confirmed, you
    will be the point person interfacing with DOD on this issue and
    many others, and I ask that you share with us today how you
    would plan to address these challenges.
        Mr. Rose, you have been nominated to serve as Deputy
    Administrator of the NNSA. Your prior positions as Assistant
    Secretary for Arms Control at the State Department and as a
    staff member on the House Armed Services Committee handling
    strategic forces issues should serve you well as you take on
    the larger policy issues facing the NNSA.
        If confirmed, you will lead the day-to-day running of the
    NNSA and be responsible for addressing a number of
    institutional issues within the organization. In the
    intermediate term, you will need to maintain the NNSA's federal
    workforce of 1,800 specialized nuclear scientists and
    engineers, fully a third of whom are eligible to retire. I
    would like to know your thoughts on how you will retain or
    replace these skilled civil servants.
        Ms. Rosenblum, you bring a wealth of experience through
    your previous service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and, most recently, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. If confirmed
    as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
    Biological Defense Programs, you will assume a role that is
    focused on acquisition and will require an understanding of the
    technical nature of nuclear physics and engineering, rather
    than just policy. I would be in interested in hearing how you
    will adapt your experience to this position.
        More importantly, you will oversee the day-to-day
    functioning of the Nuclear Weapons Council, which ensures that
    the NNSA can meet DOD requirements for our nuclear deterrent.
    Last year this committee spent considerable effort to enable
    the Council and the NNSA to communicate better and coordinate
    more closely, and I seek your commitment in maintaining that
    relationship.
        Mr. Maier, your role is quite different from our other
    three nominees. You have been nominated to be the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
    Conflict, or SOLIC, at a critical time. Your previous
    experience serving as the Acting ASD(SO/LIC) and as the
    director of the DOD Defeat-ISIS Task Force makes you well-
    qualified for this position.
        For several years, this committee has focused on empowering
    the ASD(SO/LIC) to fulfill its ``service secretary-like''
    responsibilities for ensuring the equipping and readiness of
    our special operations forces. I strongly support the recently
    issued Department of Defense guidance that clearly articulates
    the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the oversight of and advocacy
    for U.S. Special Operations Command. Though long overdue, this
    guidance is a meaningful signal of the Department's commitment
    to fully implement the ASD(SO/LIC) reforms mandated by
    Congress.
        Unfortunately, the position of ASD(SO/LIC) has been without
    a Senate-confirmed individual for much of the last few years.
    If confirmed, your service will be important to providing
    empowered leadership and stability as the office grows in
    resources and responsibilities.
        Mr. Maier, you will also play a central role in shaping the
    Department's policies and operations with respect to
    counterterrorism, irregular warfare, counternarcotics,
    stability and humanitarian affairs. We look forward to hearing
    your views on these issues today.
        Thank you again to our nominees. I look forward to your
    testimonies. Now let me now recognize Ranking Member Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also for
    recognizing Senator Warner. He was a class act, an enjoyable
    guy. I remember when he was the chairman of this committee, and
    I was brand new here, and he came out to Oklahoma, and he would
    keep people laughing the whole time he was there. He had some
    unusual characteristics. He did not like to fly in airplanes.
    He did not like to ride in boats. So it limited a little bit
    some of the things he was able to do. But he was a great guy
    and we loved him dearly.
        A former Marine, Secretary of the Navy, and lawyer, he had
    it all.
        Well, I would like to thank our nominees for being with us
    and for their willingness to serve the nation.
        Our nation's top military and intelligence leaders have
    told this committee in recent months that the world is more
    dangerous and complex than we have ever had, but we understand
    that. That is true. We are more threatened today than we have
    ever been before.
        This is why I continue to highlight the National Defense
    Strategy as the right roadmap to deal with these challenges,
    but it requires the right resourcing to make it a reality, and
    we have not been resourcing properly.
        Modernizing our nation's nuclear deterrent has been a key
    priority for the past several years, and we have not done a
    very good job. Our senior military officers always tell us
    that, whenever they come before this committee. We put off much
    needed investments in this area for decades, watching as our
    infrastructure crumbled and our most important military
    capabilities became harder to keep in working order. We have
    got to do a better job than we have been doing with our nuclear
    modernization effort.
        This demands close cooperation between DOD and NNSA, and
    clear-eyed leadership on both sides. We simply cannot afford to
    fall further behind our adversaries.
        So we have got a problem out there and you guys are going
    to have to do a good job, and you are the right ones to take
    the horn. Thanks again.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Now
    I would like to call on Senator Manchin for the introduction of
    Mr. Maier.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
    Member. I appreciate very much the ability to go ahead. I have
    a committee meeting that we have to go to, and I know Senator
    Heinrich does too, so we are going to move on. But anyway, I
    want to thank you all. I consider it an honor to serve on the
    committee with all of you, and to have the opportunity to
    introduce a nominee I believe will excel within the Department
    of Defense.
        The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has grown into an
    essential figure within the DOD due to the demands we placed on
    our Special Operations forces, through constant deployments in
    support of a wide range of missions, including
    counterterrorism, direct action, civil affairs, and preventing
    the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We depend on
    these elite units to always be ready to answer the call while
    maintaining the highest levels of quiet professionalism, and
    our nominee today certainly exemplifies those requirements.
        Chris Maier has had a distinguished career in public
    service spanning five presidential administrations, both
    Democratic and Republican, but just as important in his career
    with the Air National Guard. I am very proud to say that Chris
    currently serves as a member of the 130th Airlift Wing out of
    Charleston, West Virginia, as an intelligence officer.
        After standing on the National Security Council from 2009
    to 2013, which is notorious for round-the-clock work and
    constant burnout, he decided that he had not had enough and
    enlisted with the 130th the same year he finished his
    assignment on NSC. Further demonstrating his commitment, he
    deployed multiple times with the 130th to Africa, the Middle
    East, and Europe, not to mention the monthly trips back to West
    Virginia, which I can tell you from personal experience that
    the drive is beautiful but it is still long. I felt a personal
    responsibility to highlight his service in the Air National
    Guard not because it is a direct connection back to my state
    but more importantly I believe it speaks volumes of Chris'
    character and commitment.
        The ability to rise to the challenge of demands within
    civilian and military career, and the institutional knowledge
    he has gained from working at the National Counterterrorism
    Center, to most recently leading the Defeat ISIS Task Force as
    its director, will certainly be needed as we continue to
    realign the global power competition with our near-peer
    adversaries across a number of domains.
        Our Special Operations forces are very familiar with
    providing flexible support to our national security objectives,
    but the next few years will require a leader who can set a
    clear example for what is expected of them.
        I have no doubt that Chris Maier will set that example. He
    exemplifies the impartiality of our civilian leaders and the
    sacrifice of our military leaders. I wish him and his wife,
    Emily, and their son, Lincoln, the best of luck through this
    daunting process. For these reasons and many, many more, I will
    support his nomination, and I encourage each and every one of
    my colleagues to do the same.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Now it is a great privilege to introduce, via Webex,
    Senator Sam Nunn, a former Chairman of this Committee,
    distinguished Member of the United States Senate, and among
    your remarkable achievements was the Nunn-Lugar legislation
    which went a long way in securing loose nukes in the former
    Soviet Union.
        Senator Nunn, please.

           STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A FORMER U.S. SENATOR

        Senator Nunn. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed. Can you
    hear me?
        Chairman Reed. Yes, sir, we can.
        Senator Nunn. Okay. Good.
        Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe, let me just say a couple
    of words for a personal privilege how honored I am to be before
    this committee and how many memories it brings back, and I want
    to say amen to the remarks both you and Senator Inhofe made
    about John Warner. John put the national interest first. He
    treated every person with respect and with dignity. He had
    unquestioned integrity, and I think he set an example of
    civility for all of us. So John will be deeply, deeply missed.
        Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, members of the Armed
    Services Committee, I am honored to present Deborah Rosenblum
    to the committee, and I strongly recommend that she be
    confirmed as our nation's Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, [inaudible] have
    a nominee with the experience, the knowledge, and I must add,
    the boundless energy that Deborah would bring to this important
    role. Deborah has skilled leadership, she has sound judgment,
    and she has a deep understanding of today's complex threats.
    She also brings a background in spirit, most importantly of
    nonpartisanship, and a history of working [inaudible] that
    Deborah would lead the Defense Department's efforts in
    preparing for and preventing and deterring and mitigating
    current and future weapons of mass destruction threats.
        Deborah's previous work at DOD and her experience as
    Executive Vice President of our organization, called the
    Nuclear Threat Initiative, for the last 11 years, has uniquely
    prepared her for this very important position.
        I currently serve as co-chair of the NTI board of
    directors, and I have had the opportunity of working closely
    with Deborah over the last 20 years, particularly during my
    time as CEO of NTI. Let's correct that--10 years with Deborah,
    20 years in that position. But continuing today in my current
    role, I work very closely with Deborah on a daily and weekly
    basis.
        Deborah's contributions to the NTI have been very
    impactful, with leadership roles in every aspect of our work.
    Deborah serves on NTI's executive leadership team. She helps
    oversee the organization's operations, development, and
    programs, as well as giving oversight and managing our annual
    operating budget. She has provided strong oversight to our NTI
    biological program, which works to reduce biological risk and
    enhance global biosecurity.
        Deborah also manages NTI's work on security issues related
    to China, and has traveled there regularly to engage in
    dialogue with governmental as well as non-governmental
    organizations. She is well versed in the important role that
    the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, NNSA, play in our nuclear posture, and if
    confirmed, she would be an outstanding director, staff
    director, of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        Prior to NTI, Deborah was Vice President of the Cohen group
    for 7 years, an international consulting firm led by our
    colleague and friend, former Senator and former Secretary of
    Defense, Bill Cohen. Deborah's previous work in the Department
    of Defense is notable and also very impressive. For
    approximately 12 years, she served in senior positions at DOD
    in the areas of homeland defense, peacekeeping operations and
    support, nuclear forces, and counter-proliferation. While at
    DOD, she represented the United States as a member of the
    negotiating team with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    on bilateral negotiations concerning its nuclear program.
        In conclusion, Chairman Reed and Senator Inhofe and members
    of the committee, I am confident that Deborah is fully prepared
    to serve in this critical role. I strongly support her
    nomination by President Biden. I urge the committee's support,
    and I urge her confirmation by the full Senate.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe. It is
    a great honor to be back in the environment of the Senate Armed
    Services Committee, an institution I cherish. Thank you very
    much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Nunn. Let me now
    recognize Senator Heinrich, who will introduce Ms. Hruby.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

        Senator Heinrich. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, it
    is a pleasure to be joining you and the other members of this
    great committee as a guest, after serving for a number of years
    on this committee. I really appreciate you allowing me to share
    a few words about Jill Hruby, President Biden's nominee to
    serve as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and
    Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
    at DOE.
        This critical national security role safeguards the safety
    and the reliability of our nuclear deterrent, and I honestly
    cannot think of anyone better suited, or more qualified for it
    than Jill Hruby. And, frankly, that is not just because we are
    both mechanical engineers.
        Over more than three decades at Sandia National
    Laboratories, Jill rose from a technical staff position all the
    way up to becoming the first woman director to lead one of our
    national laboratories. She has developed deep knowledge in
    nuclear weapon systems, component design, nuclear
    nonproliferation, defense and homeland security technologies
    and systems, renewable energy, material science, engineering
    sciences, and microsystems technology.
        Jill has received the Department of Energy Secretary's
    Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security
    Administrator's Distinguished Service Gold Award, and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public
    Service. She has authored numerous publications and reports,
    she holds three patents, and receive an R&D 100 award.
        Since her retirement from Sandia in 2017, Jill served as
    the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear
    Threat Initiative, and Jill has been a member of the Defense
    Science Board, the National Nuclear Security Administration
    Defense Programs Advisory Committee, and the National Academy
    of Science Committee for International Security and Arms
    Control.
        She is a frequent participant in international dialogues, a
    spokesperson for women in engineering, and a mentor for many
    emerging leaders. There is even a fellowship named in her honor
    at Sandia Labs for women pursuing careers in engineering and
    science to ensure national security and global peace.
        On a personal note, I always appreciated working with Jill
    when she was director at Sandia. She did a remarkable job, and
    I greatly appreciate her willingness to once again serve our
    country and the American people, and I hope that all of you on
    this committee will join me in supporting her confirmation.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Heinrich. And
    now, Ms. Hruby, your statement, please, and then we will follow
    to Mr. Rose and down the table. Ms. Hruby, please.

    STATEMENT OF JILL M. HRUBY, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR
     NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    and distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to be
    considered to lead the United States' nuclear security efforts
    at this critical time for both our nation's nuclear deterrent
    and international nonproliferation and arms control. I
    appreciate the confidence of President Biden and Secretary
    Granholm in putting forth my nomination as Under Secretary for
    Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear
    Security Administration, NNSA.
        I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his kind
    introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator Heinrich, as
    he mentioned, a fellow mechanical engineer, to assure that the
    NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on their nuclear security
    roles, and simultaneously contribute more broadly to national
    security, energy, and economic development.
        My husband, our daughters and their families, including a
    brand-new granddaughter, our extended family, and my colleagues
    and friends are watching this hearing remotely. I thank them
    for their love, support, and encouragement as I pursue a
    challenging and consuming assignment again.
        My life's work has been in the missions of the Department
    of Energy and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of
    graduate school and have had the opportunity to lead or work in
    renewable energy, nuclear weapons, homeland security, nuclear
    nonproliferation, nuclear energy, as well as many years
    contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and
    microsystem sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director
    in 2017, I have remained active exploring the intersection of
    emerging technologies with national security policy through my
    work with non- governmental organizations, the National Academy
    of Science, the Defense Science Board. and other boards and
    advisory committees.
        I believe my background provides me the foundation needed
    to quickly contribute to the important issues facing NNSA and
    our nation today. The NNSA counts on the world- class expertise
    of scientists, engineers, and program managers in our national
    security laboratories, dedicated plants and sites, and our
    Federal workforce to provide a safe, secure, and reliable
    nuclear stockpile that is effective for the required deterrence
    and defense missions. Simultaneously, the NNSA enterprise
    supports nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to provide a
    stable, predictable, and safe world. NNSA also supports the
    nuclear reactor program required to power our nuclear Navy's
    submarines and ships.
        If confirmed, my top priority will be to deliver, in a
    cost-effective manner, on the significant commitments in the
    NNSA programs across the board. We must meet the critical
    deliverables for the stockpile modernization, stockpile
    assessment, and infrastructure programs. Pit production,
    uranium processing, and other infrastructure programs will take
    constant attention, diligence, and transparency throughout the
    design, construction, and start-up phases. These unique
    facilities are essential to the future of our nation and NNSA's
    programs.
        In addition, we must continue to bring cutting-edge science
    and creativity to sustain and fully understand our stockpile
    without testing; provide new technologies and procedures to
    lower cost and reduce the time to deliver all mission
    requirements; to stay ahead of our adversaries; and to develop
    advanced capabilities to enhance nuclear security, arms
    control, and Navy reactors.
        The other high priority to me is to forge transparent,
    productive, and enduring institutional relationships between
    the DOE/NNSA and our partners including the labs, plants, and
    sites; the Department of Defense; the Department of State;
    Congress; and our international allies. We also need to rebuild
    technological cooperation with our adversaries on issues such
    as monitoring and verification technologies and nuclear
    security.
        The nation has benefited enormously from the support and
    investment in the people and unique facilities of the NNSA
    enterprise. Training, recruiting, and retaining experts and
    leaders of the future is a foundation that has never been more
    critical due to the demographics of the complex, the fast pace
    of technological advancement, and the geo-political
    environment. Our stockpile, our capabilities, our institutions,
    and our creativity are the world's standards. If confirmed, I
    will be dedicated to making sure our national capabilities are
    unparalleled, our partnerships are enduring, and creative
    solutions are provided to the growing national and
    international challenges.
        Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee
    today and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Hruby follows:]

                        Prepared Statement by Jill Hruby
        Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee. I am honored to be considered to lead the
    United States' nuclear security efforts at this critical time for both
    our Nation's nuclear deterrent and for international nonproliferation
    and arms control. I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and
    Secretary Granholm in putting forth my nomination as Under Secretary
    for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, NNSA.
        (I would also like to thank Senator Heinrich for his kind
    introduction. I have enjoyed working with Senator Heinrich, a fellow
    engineer, to assure the NNSA labs deliver, without exception, on their
    nuclear security roles, and simultaneously contribute more broadly to
    national security, energy, and economic development.)
        My husband, our daughters and their families, our extended family,
    and colleagues and friends are watching this hearing remotely. I thank
    them for their love, support, and encouragement as I pursue a
    challenging and consuming assignment again.
        My life's work has been in the missions of the Department of Energy
    and the NNSA. I joined Sandia Labs fresh out of graduate school and
    have had the opportunity to lead or work in renewable energy, nuclear
    weapons, homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear
    energy and nuclear waste repositories, as well as many years
    contributing to the underlying engineering, materials, and microsystem
    sciences. Since retiring as the Sandia Lab Director in 2017, I have
    remained active exploring the intersection of emerging technology with
    national security policy through my work with non-governmental
    organizations; the National Academy of Science; the Defense Science
    Board; and other boards and advisory committees.
        I believe my background provides me the foundation needed to
    quickly contribute to the important issues facing NNSA and our Nation
    today. The NNSA counts on the world-class expertise of scientists,
    engineers, and program managers in our national security laboratories,
    dedicated plants and sites, and our federal workforce to provide a
    safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile that is effective for the
    required deterrence and defense missions. Simultaneously, the NNSA
    enterprise supports nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to
    provide a stable, predictable, and safe world. NNSA also supports the
    nuclear reactor program required to power our nuclear Navy's submarines
    and ships.
        If confirmed, my top priority will be to deliver, in a cost-
    effective manner, on the significant commitments in the NNSA programs
    across the board. We must meet the critical deliverables for the
    stockpile modernization, stockpile assessment, and infrastructure
    programs. Pit production, uranium processing, and other infrastructure
    programs will take constant attention, diligence, and transparency
    throughout the design, construction, and start-up phases. These unique
    facilities are essential to the future of our Nation and NNSA's
    programs. In addition, we must continue to bring cutting-edge science
    and creativity to sustain and fully understand our stockpile without
    testing; provide new technologies and procedures to lower cost and
    reduce the time to deliver all mission requirements; to stay ahead of
    our adversaries; and to develop advanced capabilities to enhance
    nuclear security, arms control, and Navy reactors.
        The other high priority to me is to forge transparent, productive,
    and enduring institutional relationships between the DOE/NNSA and our
    partners including the labs, plants, and sites; the Department of
    Defense; the Department of State; Congress; and our international
    allies. We also need to rebuild technological cooperation with our
    adversaries on issues such as monitoring and verification technologies
    and nuclear security.
        The nation has benefited enormously from the support and investment
    in the people and remarkable and unique facilities of the NNSA
    enterprise. Training, recruiting, and retaining the experts and leaders
    of the future is a foundation that has never been more critical due to
    the demographics of the complex, the fast pace of technological
    advancement, and the geo-political environment. Our stockpile, our
    capabilities, our institutions, and our creativity are the world's
    standards. If confirmed, I will be dedicated to making sure our
    national capabilities are unparalleled, our partnerships are enduring,
    and creative solutions are provided to the growing national and
    international challenges.
        Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today and
    I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Mr. Rose, please.

          STATEMENT OF FRANK A. ROSE, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
        ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Rose. Great. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    members of the committee, it is a great honor to appear before
    the Senate Armed Services Committee today.
        I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary
    Granholm for the confidence they have shown in me by nominating
    me to be the next Principal Deputy Administrator of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA. I would also
    like to thank several members of my family, including my
    mother, Athalyn, my father, Frank, and my sister, Nikko, for
    their support, not just today, but throughout my life.
        Mr. Chairman, as the President's March 2021 Interim
    National Security Guidance notes, the United States and its
    allies face a complex set of current and emerging threats. Some
    of the most pressing threats include an increasingly assertive
    China, a destabilizing Russia, and the continuing challenge of
    nuclear proliferation. To address these threats, the guidance
    states that the United States will continue to maintain a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, pursue arms control
    arrangements, and renew American leadership on
    nonproliferation.
        NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these threats.
    If confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator
    to achieve several key priorities. The first priority would be
    to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear
    deterrent to enable the United States to deter threats to
    itself and its allies. This includes plutonium pit production,
    uranium processing, completing the various warhead life
    extension programs currently underway, modernizing NNSA's aging
    infrastructure, and supporting the naval nuclear reactors
    program.
        Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States
    possesses the right tools to address the arms control,
    nonproliferation, and verification challenges of the 21st
    century. These challenges in this area are fundamentally
    different than what we faced in the past, especially with
    regard to issues like the monitoring and verification of
    nuclear warheads, cyber security, and threats to the nation's
    space assets. NNSA and the national laboratories are well
    positioned to help the United States government meet these
    challenges.
        Mr. Chairman, you know, third priority is people. At the
    end of the day, NNSA's ability to achieve its mission
    ultimately depends on the ability to recruit, develop, and
    retain a highly skilled workforce of national security
    professionals, especially the ``next generation'' of leaders
    and experts. In recent years, significant progress has been
    made in this area through programs like NNSA's Graduate
    Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding
    these types of critical personnel programs, including at the
    labs, plants, and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.
        And finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by
    NNSA alone. To the contrary, it will require partnerships with
    Congress, within the Executive branch, and with our allies and
    partners around the world. One of the most important attributes
    I would bring to the position of Principal Deputy Administrator
    is a long history working for, and with, NNSA's key partners.
    For example, I previously served as Assistant Secretary of
    State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; as a
    Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services
    Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special
    Assistant at the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will
    work to ensure that NNSA's partnerships remain strong.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before the committee today. I would be pleased to answer any
    questions that you and your colleagues may have. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Frank A. Rose
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the Committee,
    it is a great honor for me to appear before the Senate Armed Services
    Committee today.
        I would like to thank President Biden and Secretary Granholm for
    the confidence they have shown in me by nominating me to be the next
    Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA). I'd also like to thank several members of my
    family, including my mother Athalyn, father Frank, sister Nikko, and
    the rest of my family for their support, not just today, but throughout
    my life.
        As the President's March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance
    notes, the United States and its allies face a complex set of current
    and emerging threats. Some of the most pressing threats include an
    increasingly assertive China, a destabilizing Russia, and the
    continuing challenge of nuclear proliferation. To address these
    threats, the guidance states that the United States will continue to
    maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; pursue arms
    control arrangements; and renew American leadership on
    nonproliferation.
        NNSA plays a critical role in responding to these threats. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator to achieve
    several key priorities. The first priority would be to maintain a safe,
    secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent to enable the United
    States to deter threats to itself and its allies. This includes
    plutonium pit production; uranium processing; completing the various
    warhead life extension programs currently underway; modernizing NNSA's
    aging infrastructure; and supporting the naval nuclear reactors
    program.
        Secondly, I would work to ensure that the United States possesses
    the right tools to address the arms control, nonproliferation, and
    verification challenges of the 21st century. The challenges in this
    area are fundamentally different than what we faced in the past,
    especially with regard to issues like verification of nuclear warheads,
    cyber security, and threats to the Nation's space assets. NNSA and the
    national laboratories are well positioned to help the U.S. government
    meet these challenges.
        My third priority is people. At the end of the day, NNSA's ability
    to achieve its mission ultimately depends on the ability to recruit,
    develop, and retain a highly skilled workforce of national security
    professionals, especially the ``next generation'' of leaders and
    experts. In recent years, significant progress has been made in this
    area through programs like NNSA's Graduate
        Fellowship Program. If confirmed, building on and expanding these
    types of critical personnel programs, including at the labs, plants,
    and sites, will be one of my highest priorities.
        Finally, none of these priorities can be achieved by NNSA alone. To
    the contrary, it will require partnerships with Congress and across the
    U.S. Government--the Department of Defense, Department of State--and
    with our allies. One of the most important attributes I would bring to
    the position of Principal Deputy Administrator is a long history
    working for--and with--NNSA's key partners. For example, I previously
    served as Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification,
    and Compliance; a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services
    Committee; and as a Foreign Affairs Specialist and Special Assistant at
    the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA's
    partnerships remain strong.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.
    I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Rose. Ms.
    Rosenblum, please.

    STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, and members of the committee for your
    consideration of my nomination to be the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
    It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If
    confirmed, I pledge to work in close coordination with Members
    of Congress and this committee on behalf of the American people
    and our Armed Forces. And I would like to thank Senator Nunn
    for his very gracious words and for his lifetime of leadership
    and dedication to our country.
        I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
    Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me and their
    support for my nomination.
        I also want to extend a thank-you to my extended family who
    has taught me that with hard work, compassion, and resilience,
    I can help to make the world a better place. My husband and two
    children are my guiding beacons, support, and inspiration.
        Senator Nunn gave a wonderful summary of my professional
    career. I just want to emphasize how proud I am to have served
    my country over so many years, both inside and outside of
    government, and to have encouraged and supported the next
    generation of U.S. national security leaders. If confirmed, I
    will bring breadth of experience and deep understanding to bear
    in addressing today's complex nuclear, chemical and biological
    threats, including the expansion of Russia, China, and North
    Korea's nuclear arsenals, growing global biological threats,
    the continued use of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity
    threats from our adversaries, and the dangerous potential for
    the misuse of emerging technologies and science.
        If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the
    United States has a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent. I agree with Secretary Austin that continuing to
    modernize our nuclear deterrent is a critical national security
    priority. To do so will require effective and transparent
    partnerships with the National Nuclear Security Administration,
    the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as with Congress. I also
    join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks in supporting
    the nuclear triad, the bedrock of our deterrent over the past
    70 years.
        Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the
    devastation that occurs when countries, including the United
    States, are not adequately prepared to prevent, detect, and
    respond to biological threats. If I am fortunate enough to be
    confirmed, I will make improving and investing in chemical and
    biological defense capabilities one of my top priorities.
        With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to the
    discussion this morning.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Deborah G. Rosenblum
        Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical
    and Biological Defense Programs
        Thank you, Senator Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the
    committee for your consideration of my nomination to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense
    Programs. It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If
    confirmed, I pledge to work in close coordination with Members of
    Congress and this committee on behalf of the American people and our
    Armed Forces.
        I wish to thank President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
    Secretary Austin for their trust and confidence in me and their support
    for my nomination.
        I would also like to thank my extended family who has taught me,
    that with hard work, compassion and resilience, I can help to make the
    world a better place. My husband and two children are my guiding
    beacons, support and inspiration.
        I began in public service as a career civil servant in the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, serving for over 12 years. I was fortunate
    to have become a member of the Senior Executive Service. Throughout
    this period, I worked on a broad range of defense issues, including
    ensuring that the U.S. maintained a robust nuclear deterrent, policies
    and programs to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction as well as representing the United States in negotiations
    with North Korea over their nuclear program. I also have experience
    working with defense and private sector companies as a Vice President
    with the Cohen Group, a strategic consulting company. I witnessed
    firsthand the innovation that can occur through effective public and
    private sector collaborations.
        Currently as the Executive Vice President of the Nuclear Threat
    Initiative, a non-profit dedicated to transforming global security by
    driving systemic solutions to nuclear and biological threats, I am
    involved in all aspects of the organization's global risk reduction
    work, both nuclear and biological, often executed in partnership with
    likeminded countries and international organizations.
        If confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience and deep
    understanding to bear in addressing today's complex nuclear, chemical
    and biological threats, including the expansion of Russia and China's
    nuclear arsenals, growing global biological threats, the continued use
    of chemical weapons as well as cybersecurity threats from our
    adversaries and the dangerous potential for the misuse of emerging
    technologies.
        If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that the United
    States has a safe, secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent.
    I agree with Secretary Austin that continuing to modernize our nuclear
    deterrent is a critical national security priority. To do so will
    require effective partnerships with the National Nuclear Security
    Agency, the Nuclear Weapons Council as well as with Congress. I also
    join Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks in supporting the
    nuclear triad, the bedrock of our deterrent for the past 70 years.
        Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the
    devastation that occurs when countries, including the United States,
    are not adequately prepared to prevent, detect and respond to
    biological threats. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I will
    make improving and investing in chemical and biological defense one of
    my top priorities.
        With that, I welcome your questions and look forward to our
    discussion today.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Mr. Maier, please.

    STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Mr. Maier. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear
    today as President Biden's nominee for Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I
    appreciate your consideration of my nomination, and thank
    Senator Manchin for his kind introduction.
        This committee has long supported the people of our
    nation's Special Operations enterprise and the essential
    missions they conduct in our defense. I am humbled to be
    nominated to serve alongside the women and men of our Special
    Operations Forces who continue to inspire us through their
    commitment to excellence in executing our nation's most
    challenging military missions. We must not lose sight of the
    sacrifice that they, as well as their families, continue to
    make on our behalf.
        I have been blessed with a large and loving family, who
    have challenged me throughout my life to seek a calling of
    service to others. To my parents, Donna and Paul, your careers
    of service to others set the example for all of us. To my wife,
    Emily, I thank you for all your support, for your two decades
    of service as a Naval officer, and for the mother you are to
    our son. I also would like to acknowledge the unsung national
    security professionals with whom I have served in the
    intelligence community and the Defense Department over my
    career, and my fellow airman in the West Virginia Air National
    Guard. All of you have modeled the commitment to service that
    inspires me today.
        I appreciate the confidence of President Biden and
    Secretary Austin in nominating me at such a dynamic and
    strategically important time for the Special Operations
    community. Congress created the position of ASD(SO/LIC) in
    1986, and this committee's leadership and continued support for
    the organization have been instrumental in strengthening
    civilian oversight of Special Operations. The Department's
    recent reforms further bolster the roles and responsibilities
    of ASD(SO/LIC) through a unique direct- reporting relationship
    to the Secretary of Defense, while ensuring special operations
    and low-intensity conflict policy is integrated with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward
    to working with this committee to continue to implement these
    reforms.
        As the security challenges facing our nation grow
    increasingly complex, Special Operations Forces, or SOF, will
    remain critical to U.S. efforts in conducting sustainable
    counterterrorism, competing for influence with near-peer
    rivals, and responding to crises. To meet these new and
    evolving missions, the Special Operations enterprise is
    undertaking its most comprehensive transformation in a
    generation. Broadening of skills, rapid fielding of technology,
    creative adaptation of tactics, and partnering for outsized
    effects will be even more essential. If confirmed, I will work
    every day to ensure ASD(SO/LIC) provides the essential
    leadership and guidance to evolve the force and missions.
        As part of this transformation, we must redouble our
    commitment to ensuring SOF can recruit, develop, and retain the
    diversity of talent necessary to compete globally. A more
    diverse force integrates new skills, learned experiences, and
    perspectives that I believe is an operational imperative. I am
    committed to ensuring we are providing the necessary role
    models and resources to recruit and retain that talent in our
    formations.
        We also must ensure that SOF represent the values and
    ideals of the nation we serve. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with USSOCOM in implementing the recommendations from
    its comprehensive review of SOF ethics and culture. Sexual
    assault and harassment, extremist behavior, and criminal
    activities violate our oath and corrode the force.
        Fundamental to the success of SOF is, and will remain, its
    people. USSOCOM is the standard-bearer for caring for its
    personnel, from the Preservation of the Force and Family, to
    the Warrior Care program. As we continue to learn of new
    challenges across the physical, psychological, cognitive,
    cultural, and spiritual domains, I am committed, if confirmed,
    to ensuring that every member of the SOF community receives the
    best possible care, and is ready to compete, deter, and win in
    a changing global landscape.
        I look forward to your questions and thank you again for
    the opportunity to appear before you today.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Maier follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Mr. Christopher P. Maier
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    our global posture for DOD's Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    Enterprise. As Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus
    on ASD SO/LIC's statutory responsibilities for administrative oversight
    of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to testify
    alongside General Clarke and General Nakasone. I greatly appreciate
    their decades of leadership and service in protecting the Nation's
    national security interests.
        I would like to begin by acknowledging the service, sacrifice, and
    success of our Special Operations Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines,
    and civilians. U.S. SOF have played a critical role in every major
    conflict since the Second World War, and they remain in the fight
    today--conducting operations against ISIS, al-Qaeda and its affiliates;
    working alongside partners and allies; and providing our Nation's
    leaders with flexible and rapid response options to a wide range of
    national security emergencies. Since the terrorist attacks of September
    11, our SOF community has established a remarkable record of
    achievement. From the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in
    December 2001, to the complex operations targeting the world's most
    notorious terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden, and to the
    extraordinary effort to eliminate the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq,
    we owe our SOF community our deepest gratitude.
        Despite recent reductions in deployments, SOF remain at the
    forefront of U.S. combat operations, often operating in remote and
    hostile environments. Over the past two years, fifteen members of the
    SOF formation were killed in combat operations. Although SOF make up
    only approximately three percent of the Joint Force, they have endured
    more than half of U.S. combat casualties during that period. Many more
    have sustained life-altering injuries or suffer from psychological
    trauma. The service and sacrifice of these men and women challenge us
    to live up to the high standards they embody.
        I would also like to thank Congress for your strong support of the
    SOF community as well as your predecessors and their foresight in
    recognizing the need to build and sustain special operations
    capabilities to respond to an increasingly complex threat environment.
    The Nunn-Cohen amendment that established USSOCOM and the position of
    ASD SO/LIC in 1986 was prescient in recognizing that future conflicts
    would be fought by both state and non-state actors and often through
    unconventional and irregular means. The authors of these reforms
    rightly understood that dedicated resources for Special Operations-
    specific purposes were essential to promoting and sustaining these
    capabilities within the Department.
        My statement this morning will focus on how the SOF community is
    supporting Secretary Austin's three principal priorities as outlined in
    his March 3, 2021, ``Message to the Force''--1) Defend the Nation, 2)
    Take Care of Our People, and 3) Succeed through Teamwork. In the nearly
    two decades following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOF have continued
    to develop new technologies and capabilities to become the most
    effective counterterrorism (CT) force in history. Today, the SOF
    Enterprise is in the midst of a critical period of transition as the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance (INSSG) challenges us to conduct counterterrorism
    operations more sustainably as we also adapt to the challenges of great
    power competition. At the same time, I am pleased to report that we
    have continued to improve the readiness of the force and reduce the
    strain of deployment on our SOF warriors and their families. Your
    leadership and support and have been, and will continue to be,
    essential in this effort.
                               defend the nation
        Representing approximately two percent of the DOD budget, SOF play
    a crucial role within the Joint Force in support of multiple DOD
    priorities, and the SOF community continues to make progress in
    adapting its capabilities to the challenge of great-power competition
    with Russia and China. I emphasize the word ``competition'' because
    just as the National Defense Strategy calls on us to develop
    traditional military capabilities to deter and respond to threats, we
    are also called to strengthen alliances, innovate, and compete more
    effectively below the level of armed conflict. Revisionist powers,
    rogue states, and non-state actors are actively pursuing
    unconventional, irregular, and asymmetric strategies to undermine U.S.
    strategic interests, erode democratic institutions, and destabilize and
    re-shape the post-WWII world order to their advantage, without
    provoking a U.S. conventional military response. Indeed, as the
    Department continues to strengthen our traditional military
    capabilities, we can expect that our adversaries will increasingly
    employ indirect and irregular approaches to achieve their strategic
    objectives to capitalize on asymmetries that work to their advantage.
        Thus, winning the competition is essential to achieving our near-
    term strategic objectives, and to precluding a major conflict. This is
    not a theoretical battle to prepare for in the future. This is today's
    fight, and the SOF capabilities we have nurtured over the past 30 years
    are essential to successfully competing--and winning--in today's
    unconventional and irregular battlespaces. In close coordination with
    the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commands, including USSOCOM,
    my office is leading the implementation of the Irregular Warfare (IW)
    Annex to the NDS to institutionalize the Department's approach to IW
    throughout the Joint Force and to operationalize it for great power
    competition and resource-sustainable counterterrorism. The IW Annex
    directs the Joint Force to embrace the potential for irregular warfare
    to shape great power competitors' behavior proactively to our
    advantage, create dilemmas to deter future aggression, and strengthen
    alliances and partnerships.
        As we adapt to meet the challenges of great power competition, we
    remain focused on ensuring CT operations are sustainable and focused on
    the most relevant threats to U.S. national security interests such as
    ISIS and al-Qaeda and their affiliates that continue to pose a threat
    to Americans and U.S. interests around the globe. Continued U.S.,
    allied, and partner nation pressure has helped prevent these groups
    from attacking the homeland.
        Within this strategic context, and consistent with the INSSG, we
    continue to adapt our global posture and develop SOF-unique
    capabilities that enable our operators to compete and win in a wide
    variety of contingencies, including CT, crisis response, competition
    below the level of armed conflict, and as a force multiplier to the
    Joint Force if deterrence fails. Although our adversaries increasingly
    employ irregular warfare tactics, SOF support can ensure the
        Department does not depend only on high-end warfighting and
    deterrent capabilities. Today, approximately 40 percent of SOF deployed
    forces are tasked with countering malign influence of our great-power
    adversaries.
        Central to our irregular warfare efforts is a suite of legislative
    authorities that underpin our efforts to address these challenges
    alongside our international and interagency partners. We appreciate
    Congress's support for the extension and expansion of ``Section 1202''
    authority to conduct irregular warfare operations and for the
    establishment of a new Title 10 funding authority for operational
    preparation of the environment activities in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Authorities such as these and
    Section 127e of Title 10 are cost-effective, agile ways for the United
    States to advance our security interests working by, with, and through
    partners.
        We continue to invest in technologies and capabilities to empower
    SOF to operate in denied areas and conduct high-risk operations in
    remote and austere environments, operate seamlessly with our general
    purpose force counterparts, and produce scalable precision effects. For
    instance, USSOCOM is developing next-generation Intelligence
    Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities to enhance situational
    awareness for the SOF warfighter, even in contested areas. Similarly,
    we are making investments to enhance SOF maritime capabilities,
    including surface combatant craft, submersibles, and unmanned
    underwater vehicles, and working with the Department of the Navy to
    ensure integration of SOF operational concepts and capability
    investments related to great power competition.
        USSOCOM is pursuing technological advancements designed to enhance
    network interoperability, enable secure communications for command and
    control, and employ data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and
    machine learning (ML) to enable our SOF to operate more effectively. In
    close collaboration with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,
    USSOCOM is adapting and employing AI to streamline a wide range of
    activities, such as intelligence analysis and operational functions.
    For instance, USSOCOM is leveraging AI/ML to optimize preventive
    maintenance for aircraft of the Army's 160th Special Operations
    Aviation Regiment (SOAR) that has demonstrated significant potential
    for increasing the operational readiness rate of the unit's fleet of
    aircraft.
        USSOCOM has also employed innovative acquisition pathways,
    including mid-tier acquisitions to execute tailored acquisition
    strategies and to streamline capability delivery to the warfighter.
    Additionally, USSOCOM is leveraging public-private partnerships and
    deepening relationships with academic institutions and non-traditional
    partners, including through its pilot project to expand small business
    participation in technology development to enhance SOF warfighting
    capabilities.
                            take care of our people
        Consistent with the clear priorities outlined in the NDS and the
    INSSG, we continue to invest in the readiness of the force and the
    resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families. Despite the unique
    challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year,
    SOF have continued to maintain a high level of operational readiness in
    support of strategic priorities. COVID-19-related restrictions on CONUS
    and OCONUS movements have reduced flight hours and training
    opportunities, particularly alongside our overseas partners. Although
    the number of forces deployed overseas is down approximately 15 percent
    over the past year, nearly 5,000 SOF are currently deployed to 62
    countries.
        In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the
    high demand for SOF resulted in a near-constant cycle of deployments
    for some capabilities. To address the strain caused by that operational
    tempo, we have taken a hard look at the forces that we can responsibly
    and sustainably provide to support global demand amid multifaceted and
    simultaneous mission requirements. Over the past several years, we have
    made considerable progress toward meeting the Department's requirement
    of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio across the force, meaning that a
    typical service member would expect to spend twice as much time at home
    station as on deployment. We continue to make progress toward achieving
    this target with now more than 90 percent of the force at a 1:2 ratio
    or better.
        The additional dwell time spent at home station is not only
    contributing to increased predictability for the force and improved
    work-life balance, it is also enabling additional time for training,
    screening, rest, refit, and reintegration. USSOCOM has also continued
    to meet the Department's goal of fewer than five percent non-deployable
    military personnel.
        In addition to monitoring metrics of SOF readiness, we are closely
    evaluating how SOF posture relates to our ability to sustain CT and
    crisis response operations along with high-priority missions. We are
    also focused on limiting SOF deployments to those that require SOF-
    specific capabilities and training. For instance, the establishment of
    the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade has provided a capable
    General Purpose Force option for training and mentoring foreign
    security forces. The combination of these efforts has helped ease the
    strain of a high and unsustainable rate of overseas deployments for SOF
    personnel.
        In addition to reducing the strain on the force due to high
    operational tempo, the SOF Enterprise is further enhancing readiness by
    taking a holistic approach to caring for SOF warriors and their
    families. With the strong support of Congress, USSOCOM has continued to
    develop its Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program to
    address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical, psychological,
    social, and spiritual performance. The POTFF program leverages a
    combination of USSOCOM, Service, and DOD resources to meet the needs of
    the various SOF components and individual unit commanders. These
    programs include injury prevention/strength training, performance
    nutrition, rehabilitative care, improved access to behavioral health
    and suicide prevention, family and community programs, promoting
    healthy living, and reinforcing resiliency and spiritual fitness.
        Participation in the POTFF human performance program and
    neurocognitive baselining are now mandatory for all USSOCOM personnel.
    Our SOF warriors recognize POTFF as an invaluable resource for their
    readiness and career longevity, and data collected from our SOF
    commanders indicates that the program is having a significant and
    positive impact on the mission readiness of their units. SO/LIC is
    currently collaborating with the command to develop standardized and
    quantitative outcome metrics to help inform future resourcing
    decisions, and we look forward to working closely with the committee to
    ensure we are achieving a solid return on this investment in our
    personnel.
        Similarly, USSOCOM's Warrior Care program continues to provide
    specialized care for soldiers who have suffered physical or
    psychological trauma by providing SOF members and their families
    support through recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We have no
    greater responsibility than to care for our SOF warriors and to provide
    them with a path to return to service and/or transition to civilian
    careers following their years of service. We appreciate the strong
    support of Congress for each of these efforts.
        I remain concerned about instances of moral and ethical failings
    within the SOF community, and I know General Clarke shares this
    concern. Incidents such as these have no place in the military or our
    Department, and if not tackled head-on can erode morale and undermine
    trust and our moral authority with our partners and allies. I commend
    General Clarke for his initiative in directing a comprehensive review
    of SOF culture and ethics beginning in August 2019. The review was
    directed to address shortfalls and limitations of multiple previous
    studies and to build upon them to address enterprise-wide issues and to
    analyze data from across the SOF Enterprise.
        SO/LIC strongly supported this effort, and SO/LIC personnel
    actively participated in the review, which entailed conducting in-depth
    interviews with approximately 2,000 personnel of all ranks within more
    than 50 SOF commands. Although the comprehensive review did not
    identify evidence of a systemic ethics deficiency, it did note that
    ``in some instances USSOCOM's cultural focus on SOF employment and
    mission accomplishment is to the detriment of leadership, discipline
    and accountability,'' and it outlined concrete recommendations. My
    office is now helping to guide the Comprehensive Review Implementation
    Team, established to drive implementation of the review's
    recommendations. These recommendations address training and
    organization of the force, leader development, and the prevention of
    over-exertion on the force that we believe contributes in part to
    ethical lapses.
        As we address challenges related to SOF culture and ethics,
    Secretary Austin has placed special emphasis on combatting sexual
    assault and addressing actions associated with extremist or dissident
    ideologies within the Department. The men and women who make up the SOF
    Enterprise deserve nothing less than a safe and supportive work
    environment--free from intimidation, harassment, and racial and
    cultural bias of any kind. We recognize that extremist ideology exists
    within our military, and we must ensure that our service members honor
    the oaths they have taken to uphold and defend our Constitution against
    all enemies--foreign and domestic. For this reason, Secretary Austin
    directed a Department-wide stand-down to allow senior leaders to
    discuss the importance of our oath of office, impermissible behaviors,
    and procedures for reporting extremist behaviors. I am committed to
    working hand-in-hand with General Clarke in leading this effort on
    behalf of the SOF community, ensuring that our efforts are closely
    aligned with top-level guidance and actions and policies taken by the
    Department and the Military Services.
        We recognize that many of the solutions have not yet been fully
    implemented and that true cultural change will require a sustained and
    focused effort over many years. I look forward to working with you and
    your staff as we strengthen the foundation of our culture and ethics
    throughout the SOF Enterprise. SO/LIC will continue to support this
    effort by focusing on those actions that fall within our administrative
    role overseeing the organization and training of SOF personnel and
    ensuring these efforts are adequately resourced. Working closely with
    USSOCOM and each of the Services, we will continue to develop and
    sustain a SOF culture of personal accountability that is worthy of the
    men and women that constitute our force.
        We are similarly focused on enhancing the diversity within our SOF
    formation. As it stands today, our force is not adequately reflective
    of the American people. In addition to the moral imperative of
    addressing this challenge, we recognize that a more diverse force makes
    us more effective operationally by allowing us to draw upon diverse
    perspectives and talents and new ideas to enable us to prevail in the
    global contest for influence and legitimacy we are faced with today.
    Enhancing diversity within the force will become increasingly important
    as the Department places greater emphasis on operations in the
    information environment against foreign disinformation and malign
    influence.
        Over the past year, ASD(SO/LIC) served on the Executive Working
    Group as part of the Department of Defense's Board on Diversity and
    Inclusion. A SOF officer on my staff sat on the DOD Board on Diversity
    and Inclusion to ensure that special operations-unique issues were
    reflected and considered as part of the overarching DOD efforts. Last
    year, SO/LIC, in partnership with USSOCOM's Commander and Senior
    Enlisted Leader, issued a memorandum to all SOF personnel emphasizing
    that diversity and inclusion is a strategic imperative to the mission
    of SOF. I co-chair, along with the USSOCOM Vice Commander, the SOF
    Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to oversee and drive the
    development and execution of the USSOCOM Diversity and Inclusion
    Strategic Plan. I am pleased that USSOCOM has recently hired its first
    Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, and I look forward to working
    with the command as we collectively address this challenge.
        In addition to addressing racial and cultural diversity within the
    SOF formation, we are also working to ensure that all SOF career fields
    are open to all who have the desire and meet the rigorous standards.
    Women have filled vital roles within the SOF community for many years,
    and we are proud that in the past year, two women have for the first
    time successfully completed the Special Forces Qualification Course and
    are currently serving as Green Berets. Although we recognize that we
    have much more progress to make in this area, these talented soldiers
    have blazed a path that we expect many others will follow.
        Addressing each of these challenges will require a multifaceted,
    sustained approach, with a clear strategy, concrete objectives, and
    measurable benchmarks. Additionally, the continued institutionalization
    of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command will
    provide additional avenues to highlight policy and resource issues
    affecting SOF, including diversity, ethics, and accountability. For
    instance, regularly occurring readiness briefings from USSOCOM to
    ASD(SO/LIC) now address sexual assault and harassment prevention and
    response, domestic violence, suicide prevention, COVID-19 vaccination
    rates, and accession/promotion by sex and ethnicity. SO/LIC brings
    unique perspective to these challenges, and you have my commitment that
    we will remain fully engaged.
                            succeed through teamwork
        Secretary Austin's Message to the Force challenges us to join
    forces with our partners and allies; work in partnership across U.S.
    departments and agencies, with Congress, and with private industry; and
    to build unity of effort and missions throughout the Department,
    including strengthening civil-military cooperation. The men and women
    of the SOF community excel in building strong and lasting partnerships,
    including with our foreign, interagency, and private industry partners.
    SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to deepen our civilian-military
    collaboration across a wide range of issues, including SOF personnel
    and readiness, budget and acquisitions, special access programs, and
    legislative affairs.
        Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our
    democracy, and strengthening civilian institutions within the
    Department is a key priority of Secretary Austin. As the Secretary
    testified before this committee in his confirmation hearing, ``the
    safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian control
    of our armed forces ... the subordination of military power to the
    civil.'' We also recognize and appreciate the Congress's strong
    interest in empowering civilian leadership, both within the Special
    Operations community and throughout the Department.
        The continued institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the
    administrative chain of command, as codified in Title 10, is one of
    many examples where the Department is making progress in empowering
    civilian leadership, oversight, and advocacy within the Department's
    decision-making mechanisms. Over the past year, we have made progress
    in strengthening civilian oversight of SOF, but we recognize that more
    remains to be done to realize the full intent of recent legislative
    reforms to strengthen the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role and to establish the
    Secretariat for Special Operations. Recent actions include designating
    ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
    for Special Operations administrative matters, establishing a position
    of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to lead the Secretariat and to
    assist the ASD with those responsibilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) also has
    been added to numerous senior Departmental decision-making bodies, in
    many instances marking the first time the SOF Enterprise has had
    representation and a voice in these discussions and decisions.
        Enhanced civilian leadership and oversight are essential to
    advocating for SOF within the Department and tackling key issues
    affecting the SOF Enterprise. These elements also help ensure an
    independent and objective assessment of military capabilities and
    policy issues. Further institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s
    administrative chain of command responsibilities will require continued
    close coordination with senior DOD leadership, USSOCOM, and Congress. I
    fully embrace this role, and I also recognize that there is more work
    ahead as we fulfill Congress's intent. As these efforts mature, I look
    forward to working with you, General Clarke, and other DOD senior
    leaders to ensure that these reforms meet the intent of Congress and
    serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of our SOF
    community.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the committee
    again for its strong support for our special operations personnel, who
    serve as a critical linchpin in safeguarding our national security--in
    wartime and peacetime. As an integral component of the Joint Force, SOF
    bring unique capabilities that complement and strengthen those of our
    general purpose forces as well as our interagency and international
    partners.
        I thank the committee again for the opportunity to testify, and I
    look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Now I will ask a series
    of questions required of all civilian nominees. Please respond
    appropriately.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Ms. Hruby. No.
        Mr. Rose. No.
        Ms. Rosenblum. No.
        Mr. Maier. No.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    committee when requested?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
    regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in
    providing such records?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Let the record show that all of the
    witnesses have responded in the affirmative to all of the
    questions.
        Mr. Hruby, among one of the major challenges that you have
    is the production of 80 pits in the next several years. The
    original idea was to construct 5,000 square foot modules at Los
    Alamos, and roughly the cost per square foot of such
    construction was about 20,000. That plan was changed in 2018 to
    recondition or refit the MOX facility in Savannah, Georgia,
    which is 450,000 square feet, about 25 percent completed. So
    there is obviously going to be a cost differential here.
        What are your views on the two-facility production plan?
        Ms. Hruby. Chairman, thank you for your question. This is
    the biggest issue I think facing NNSA today, is delivering the
    pit production capability for our nation for the first time in
    many decades. The current plan that NNSA has developed, and
    that I support, includes producing pits at both Los Alamos and
    Savannah River, 30 pits per year minimum at Los Alamos, 50 pits
    per year minimum at Savannah River.
        The 30 pits per year at Los Alamos is on track to be
    delivered in 2026. The 50 pits per year at Savannah River,
    originally planned for 2030, is likely to now be somewhere
    between 2030 and 2035, a decision that will be made at the
    Critical Decision 2 point.
        I believe that the two-site solution is a good solution for
    a couple of reasons. One is that it is, as expressed by NNSA,
    and again, I agree that it is more resilient than a one-site
    solution. Should anything go wrong, should there be an
    accident, it allows the other site to continue to make pits.
    And I think that is quite important and allows the throughput
    of pits to be closer to 80 than it would need to be, to hedge
    against bets.
        The other reason is I think it takes advantage of the
    infrastructure at NNSA and the skill sets at NNSA. So the
    scientists at Los Alamos, I believe are very important to pit
    production. I also believe that the culture of a production
    plant that exists at Savannah River is also important. And if
    the two organizations work together well, and if confirmed, it
    will be my job to make sure that they do, I think we take best
    advantage of the infrastructure and the people of NNSA, and we
    end up with the most resilient pit production capability in the
    country per dollar.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Because of the limited
    time, I ask the respondents to be concise, and if we have a
    second round I will try to reach everyone. But let me just ask
    Ms. Rosenblum. If confirmed, you will be the Executive
    Secretary of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and will you assure
    us that you will do everything you can to timely coordinate the
    budget reviews between DOD and NSA, to guarantee the Council
    can meet DOD requirements?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I am confirmed,
    yes, I will. I have reviewed all of the responsibilities that
    would be mine, if confirmed as the staff director, and feel
    prepared to carry them out, and will do so.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Mr. Maier, you have a dual- hat
    responsibility. You report to the Secretary of Defense the
    service-like activities of SOCOM, and then you report to the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy with respect to policy
    matters. Can you briefly give us an idea of how you intend to
    discharge those dual responsibilities?
        Ms. Maier. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question. So
    one way we will look at that is having different staffs that
    integrate at a more senior level but work different parts of
    that portfolio, and I personally think there is great value in
    having ASD(SO/LIC) that does both, because it can speak to the
    policy components in parts of those conversations in the
    Department but also represents SOCOM and provides that civilian
    oversight independently but in a synergistic manner with the
    policy.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. And finally, Mr. Rose, just a
    quick, in my remaining 5 seconds. You indicated one of your
    challenges is maintaining a robust workforce. About a third of
    your employees are eligible for retirement, and would likely do
    so. You are competing against a very competitive market for
    skilled engineers, and particularly anybody that knows anything
    about a computer.
        So can you give us, very briefly, your thoughts on this
    issue?
        Mr. Rose. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    for the question. I would say recruiting, developing, and
    retaining the next generation of nuclear security experts is
    absolutely vital. And as I mentioned, there has been a lot of
    progress in the past several years, in large part thanks to
    this committee. But we still have significant gaps, as you
    mentioned.
        One of my first objectives, if confirmed in the position,
    would be to meet with the leadership of NNSA, the labs, and the
    sites to, one, identify where our gaps are with regards to
    personnel, and then, two, developing a comprehensive plan to
    implement and close those gaps. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Rose. Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
    think all opening statements were great opening statements. I
    commend you on those statements.
        Ms. Hruby, last year we had major concerns with the
    Secretary of the DOE interfering with the work of the NNSA and
    putting our nuclear modernization programs at risk, even
    questioning what our role is in developing the budget and some
    other things, and it was not a workable thing. In fact, I had
    to personally intervene with then President Trump to get things
    pretty well straightened out. So we have got to have a clear
    understanding at DOE and OMB about the work of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council.
        Now I like the fact that you--and I told you this before--
    came right out with some of your priorities, and stating what
    those priorities were, number one, ensuring the success of our
    weapons programs, two, updating obsolete infrastructure, and
    three, taking care of our people. And I agree with those
    priorities. Will you agree to keeping us informed as to how you
    are coming along with your priorities?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator. Of course, I would be delighted to
    keep you informed, if confirmed.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. And I think also, Mr. Rose, how do
    you plan to support Ms. Hruby in these priorities, these three
    priorities?
        Mr. Rose. Senator, I agree with all of her priorities, and
    I will do everything in my power to be a very good deputy, if
    confirmed.
        Senator Inhofe. That is good. And, Mr. Maier, I want to
    talk a little bit about what is happening in Africa right now.
    It is a critical theater for implementing our National Defense
    Strategy. China and Russia are on the rise. China has opened
    its first overseas military base in Djibouti. A lot of people
    do not realize that. This is the first time they have done
    this, and now they are all the way as far south as the southern
    part of Tanzania. They are active in there as well as Russia
    being on the rise in that area. So right now ISIS and al Qaeda
    are on the increase as well, and to deal with these threats we
    only have 6,000 personnel, military personnel, on the entire
    continent.
        I was critical of the previous administration, because when
    they were talking about revamping and changing our priorities
    in different parts of the world I really feel that we are
    understaffed. That is the only area where we are starting off
    understaffed. And I am not anticipating or expecting that you
    had a chance to look at and evaluate the personnel and whether
    or not it is adequate, but any first thoughts in terms of where
    they are in that field?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, thanks for the question, and I think
    Africa is a very important theater, as you say, for both things
    that Special Operations is focused on--obviously 20 years or
    more of the counterterrorism fight there, as you mentioned, a
    number of ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates there--but then it is
    also an arena for competition, as you referenced, in Djibouti.
    And I think my objective, if confirmed, is to very much look at
    where we are getting return on that investment and where we can
    combine some of those missions to get more benefit for the
    National Defense Strategy.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I think one of the first things
    that I would like to have you do, and share with us, on what
    your impression is in terms of adequacy of our resources in
    Africa. Would you do that?
        Ms. Maier. I would, Senator. If confirmed, I would be glad
    to look at that as a first priority.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Lastly, I think that there is going
    to be some of the members are going to be talking to you and
    Ms. Rosenblum about the issue of no-first-use policy. There is
    some confusion as to where you are in some people's minds, and
    I will give you one shot to state that before the rest of them
    get to you. All right?
        Ms. Rosenblum. All right. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate
    the opportunity to clarify my view on this. Give the strategic
    environment that we face, one that is absolutely challenging
    U.S. interests and those of our allies, I do not support a no-
    first-use policy.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much. Mr.
    Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me now
    recognize Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    each of our nominees this morning for your willingness to be
    considered for these very important posts and for your
    testimony this morning.
        I want to begin with you, Mr. Maier, because in your
    opening remarks you talked about the importance of diversity in
    our Special Operations Forces, and one aspect of that diversity
    are the women that we need to have join Operation Forces, yet a
    study from 2016 found that 85 percent of Special Operators
    opposed allowing women into their specialties, and 71 percent
    opposed women in their units.
        So this is obviously an ongoing challenge. It is getting
    better, I know. We just had our first--we have 50 graduates, I
    think, of Ranger School that just happened, and one of our
    first Green Berets. But can you talk about what you think some
    of the challenges are to better integrating women, and
    specifically, reading the report that just came out in April of
    Women in Army Special Operations Survey, one of the things that
    I found particularly interesting was that one of the biggest
    challenges is equipment fitting. And I had the opportunity to
    go out to Minot Air Force Base recent with General Brown, and
    one of the demonstrations he provided for us, that they are
    doing there in Minot, is working to refit the equipment that
    women are wearing so that they can operate better with the
    equipment we have for our women in the military.
        So can you talk about those challenges and how you will
    address them?
        Ms. Maier. Yes, Senator. I think it is a very important
    issue, and I think the first step has been opening all fields
    to women, and I think what we are seeing is the evolution of
    that. So the survey you cite from U.S. Army Special Operations
    was commissioned by them internally, and I think this is
    indicative of the ongoing effort to build both the ability for
    women to operate on an equal footing and have the acceptance
    and, in many cases, the equipment that is required.
        If confirmed, this is one of the top priorities I would
    have. I think it fits into the Secretary and, by extension, the
    President's strive to really have a diverse force. We know, as
    we compete globally, we are going to need both genders in the
    fight, and we are going to need people with other expertise
    that we might not have had as much of in the force at this
    state.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. As an aside, if you did not
    hear the public radio piece on how women are required to wear
    their hair in the military, that was on this morning, I would
    urge you to listen to it. It was a very important example of
    why we have got to respond to some of these challenges that
    women are facing, in a way that is more friendly to the
    differences between men and women, which are not worse. They
    are just different.
        Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, I think this question is for both
    of you. We just saw the impact of the cyber hacking into the
    Colonial Pipeline and what that meant for the country. How do
    we reassure people who have questions about our nuclear
    weapons, and our nuclear command and control structure, that
    they are not also open to those kinds of cyberattacks?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, for the question. Of
    course, cyber is a major challenge across the U.S. Government,
    and particularly in the places that we want to keep most
    secure, the nuclear weapons facilities. The people in the
    nuclear weapons, in the NNSA complex, work tirelessly to
    protect the networks and have been fairly successful in doing
    so. I think we need to continue to find talent, to use that
    talent effectively to protect our networks and to share those
    lessons across the government. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen. Mr. Rose?
        Mr. Rose. Senator, thanks very much for the question. I
    agree with everything Ms. Hruby said, and if confirmed, one of
    my first priorities would be to hire a new chief information
    officer for the NNSA. The most recent officer just retired. But
    I fully agree. I actually teach a course at Georgetown
    University called ``Outer Space But Strategic Capabilities,''
    and it talks about all the interrelationships between cyber,
    nuclear, as well as outer space.
        So I think you are absolutely right. We have to look at
    these strategic issues from a holistic approach. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Ms. Rosenblum,
    in a 2019 talk, you described our nuclear forces as being on a,
    quote, ``hair trigger,'' end quote. I am concerned by this,
    because for the entire time that I have been on this committee,
    military and civilian officials, from both the Obama and the
    Trump administrations, have consistently argued against this
    phrase and the idea that it is meant to foster, which is that
    there is something inherently unsafe about our ICBM posture.
        Just a few weeks ago, in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
    we heard General Kehler, the former STRATCOM Commander, explain
    again why this is a red herring. In fact, I remember testimony
    from the Obama administration that reducing the alert posture
    for our ICBM would actually be destabilizing. Senator Shaheen
    just spoke about a CODEL that a few of us took to Minot in
    North Dakota, the base, where that phrase was also identified
    as a red herring.
        So do you believe that our alert posture is unsafe or that
    it needs to be changed?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
    opportunity to be able to clarify my views with respect to this
    issue. I support the current alert posture and believe it is an
    important piece to making our nuclear deterrent credible. I
    believe that what you are referring to is an op-ed that I had
    done in 2019, in the Des Moines Register, in advance of the
    Iowa caucuses. The purpose of the op-ed was to encourage Iowans
    to be able to engage with the candidates around issues related
    to nuclear weapons. It was in an attempt to have that language
    be accessible and understandable that I used the phrase ``hair
    trigger alert.'' I certainly did not mean any offense by it,
    and if I did, I apologize.
        Senator Fischer. Well, I thank you for those comments. I
    think it is extremely important that all public figures are
    careful in terminology that is used with regards to the
    security of this nation. As you know, there are numerous
    safeguards that are in place, and all the testimony that has
    been given to this committee over the years about this, that
    ``hair trigger'' phrase is such a mischaracterization, and I
    believe it is not serving the people of this country well to
    have that kind of language out there that does not reflect the
    true environment that we live in.
        Dr. Hruby, last week in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee I
    talked to Dr. Verdon about the relationship between modernizing
    NNSA's nuclear complex and how this investment actually reduces
    the potential need to [inaudible] nuclear test. Can you talk
    about how the relationship is between those two things, how you
    view that?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator Fischer. The
    modernization of the NNSA infrastructure is critical to keeping
    our stockpile safe, secure, and reliable without testing. And I
    want to, in particular, highlight the ability to make plutonium
    pits as part of that. We know that pits' performance change
    with time, and the planned pit production program allows us to
    get ahead of that and make sure that we do not get to a point
    where we need to test the weapons in an underground, in a
    nuclear explosive test, to make sure they are reliable. Thank
    you.
        Senator Fischer. Also, Doctor, I appreciated our discussion
    about the importance of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program,
    and I just wanted to confirm one thing for the record. Do you
    believe that the United States must rebuild and maintain the
    basic capabilities of design, manufacture, and sustain an
    effective nuclear weapons stockpile to support our nation's
    deterrent?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Senator, I do. I think the Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program is an excellent program that has been
    started within the last few years and will be very important to
    the future of our stockpile.
        Senator Fischer. And, Mr. Rose, do you agree? Yes or no. I
    am sorry to make it so short. I am out of time.
        Mr. Rose. Yes, I agree.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you to the
    panelists for coming. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now let me
    recognize Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and congratulations to each of the nominees. I believe
    you are all very well qualified for your positions.
        I want to just also say a word about John Warner. It is a
    true honor to be a Virginia Senator on the Armed Services
    Committee and think about my friend, and feel sad about his
    death but also celebrate an amazing life. Senator Warner was in
    the Pacific in World War II, and when he came back to the
    United States at the end of the war he went to Washington and
    Lee to go to college. And my father-in-law was also in the
    Pacific during World War II, as a submariner, and then came
    back and went to school at Washington and Lee. And they were
    very, very dear friends, beginning in 1946.
        They built the modern Republican Party in Virginia from
    essentially nothing. When my father-in-law was the first
    elected governor, Republican governor, in Virginia history,
    John was the Secretary of the Navy, and they worked together on
    many issues, because Virginia is the center of naval power in
    the world. Their friendship was tested but not strained when
    they ran against each other for the United States Senate in
    1978, and John Warner beat my father-in- law, beat my political
    hero, just like he later beat my best friend in politics, Mark
    Warner, in a race in 1996, for the
        United States Senate.
        I knew how important this committee was to John Warner,
    when I was mayor and governor and was working with Senator
    Warner. His service on this committee was something that he
    talked about a lot. I think it was his favorite part of his
        30 years in the United States Senate. But by the time I
    came to the Senate he had been gone, but then I really wanted
    to know even more about John Warner, because I got to meet
    people like Jack Reed and John McCain, and Carl Levin, and
    others who had served with John on this committee, and I
    learned an entirely new dimension of my friend. And I just
    wanted to begin my comments today just expressing how sad I
    feel that he is gone but how proud I am to be a successor, not
    a replacement as a Virginia Senator on the Armed, but I am a
    successor to him.
        One just personal privilege. When I found that he had died
    I knew my father-in-law would be very distraught about this. My
    father-in-law will be 98 in September. And my wife just texted
    me. She reached her dad this morning to talk to him about it at
    the retirement community where he lives, and he was very
    stunned and saddened about it. And kept saying, ``But he is a
    youngster. He is younger than me.'' That is very much like my
    father-in-law to think that a 94-year-old is a youngster.
        I want to ask just one question of Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose.
    The Navy has published a SIOP Shipyard Industrialization
    Optimization Plan that really sort of lays out, quite a ways
    into the future, the necessary investments that need to be made
    in our public shipyards. Does NNSA have something similar, kind
    of a long-term investment document that would help us work with
    you to make sure that we are keeping the physical facilities of
    the NNSA in the shape they need to be in?
        Ms. Hruby. Senator, is the specific question--I just want
    to make sure I am answering the right question--about the Navy
    Reactor Program, or just in general?
        Senator Kaine. Just in general. Does the NNSA programs
    within its purview have a similar sort of long-term capital
    improvement investment plan that we can assess to determine
    whether we are appropriately investing?
        Ms. Hruby. Okay. Thank you for the clarification. The NNSA
    has worked very hard over the last 5 years or so to develop a
    risk-based approach to infrastructure investment needs. It is a
    fairly sophisticated approach. The infrastructure needs are
    large, and so they have prioritized those by ability to deliver
    programs, and there is a long- term plan. And if confirmed, I
    want to take a close look at that, but there is a plan.
        Senator Kaine. I also know the President is sending us up a
    budget today, and I am going to be interested to see the
    budgetary proposals to execute on a plan like that.
        Thank you. I will yield back to you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. And now
    I would like to recognize Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Rosenblum,
    welcome to the committee. It is an honor to be introduced by
    Sam Nunn. I will overlook your association with Bill Cohen, I
    assure you, when it comes time to vote on your nomination.
    Please give him my regards.
        Ms. Hruby, one of the issues involved with nuclear
    modernization is that many Americans do not understand why we
    are doing it. Those of us that have lived through prior decades
    have to realize the Cold War is in a 30-year rear- view mirror.
    Since that time we have had 9/11, we have had the war on
    terror, we have had COVID, and so I want to ask you some
    questions.
        Our essential defense posture for the past 70 years has
    been deterrence of others' attacks on us. Is that not true?
        Ms. Hruby. That is true, Senator.
        Senator King. And deterrence rests upon your adversary
    understanding that you have a capacity to make life very
    difficult--that is a euphemism--for them and the will to use
    it. Is that not correct?
        Ms. Hruby. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. And if your deterrent is out of date, in bad
    shape, not modernized, not able to be delivered, then that, in
    fact, makes the country less safe, does it not?
        Ms. Hruby. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. And so the modernization that we are talking
    about is essential to maintaining the peace. Isn't that
    correct?
        Ms. Hruby. It is.
        Senator King. I think this is important, because people
    back home in Maine say, ``Why are we spending all this money on
    nuclear weapons?'' And the reason is because we never want to
    have a nuclear war. The irony, or the paradox, of nuclear
    weapons is we build them so we will never have to use them. And
    that strategy has, in fact, worked for over 70 years. Is that
    correct?
        Ms. Hruby. That is correct.
        Senator King. Now let me go to the specifics of that, and I
    think the answer is contained in the conversation we have
    already had, and I apologize for cross-examining you in this
    way, but it is a way of getting through material in a shorter
    period of time.
        We are going back into the business of making plutonium
    pits, which are necessary elements for a nuclear weapon. And I
    presume that the reason that is the case is that we have to
    modernization and that the pits that were built in earlier
    periods are no longer fully dependable and need to be upgraded
    along with other parts of the nuclear deterrent. Is that
    correct?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, the pits today are dependable. The NNSA
    plan is to make sure that they can be replaced before they
    become not dependable.
        Senator King. And that entails reinvigorating pit
    production at both Los Alamos, and the other question is, why
    do we need two places? Why are we talking about Los Alamos and
    Savannah River?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator. The number of pits that are
    projected to be needed is a minimum of 80 pits per year. That
    is a significant capability at Los Alamos. If we were to do it
    all there it would require much more infrastructure investment.
    Using the MOX facility shell, which has been built as a Cat-1
    facility, a facility that can handle plutonium, allows us to
    have a cost-effective program, use the talent across the NNSA
    complex.
        Senator King. Thank you. Mr. Rose, I want to turn to you. A
    couple of things. We had a question a few minutes ago about
    cyber, and you said you were going to appoint a new CIO. I want
    urgency here, and I do not think--I mean, I am fine with
    appointing a new CIO, but I would like you to stand up a team
    that aggressively red-teams your systems to test them, because
    every CIO says, ``Oh, we are okay,'' and that goes up the line
    and you say, ``We are okay.'' I want people who are paid to
    hack your system, to demonstrate whether or not you are, in
    fact, secure. There is no more important cyber protection than
    that of nuclear command and control and communication.
        So I hope that you will go beyond a new CIO to an all-
    hands-on-deck, urgent, urgent pursuit of cyber defense, of
    particularly in the NNSA.
        Mr. Rose. Senator, thank you very much. I agree with you
    100 percent. You know, we have got to get on our A-game with
    regard to cyber, especially that nexus between cyber and
    nuclear. One of the things that I have been focused on in my
    career over the last 5 years is the challenge of these new
    emerging technologies to nuclear deterrence. So if confirmed, I
    assure you that I will make your recommendation a priority, and
    we will work to get the NNSA's house in order with regard to
    cybersecurity.
        Senator King. Thank you, sir. If you do not, I will come
    and find you.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. I do not know how to respond to the last
    comment.
        Let me now thank Senator King and recognize, via Webex,
    Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    congratulations to each of you on your nominations.
        Ms. Hruby, I want to talk about NNSA's out-of-control
    nuclear weapons budget. According to the agency's 25-year build
    plan, published last December, projected spending on nuclear
    weapons activities has risen to $505 billion. That is a
    staggering increase of $113 billion, or 29 percent, from the
    2020 version of the plan. Now I understand that cost overruns
    at the NNSA are the norm, but these figures are mind-boggling.
    And when we let the cost of weapons balloon it can crowd out
    other important Energy Department national security programs,
    such as nonproliferation.
        So, Ms. Hruby, I want to ask, will you commit to providing
    this committee with cost estimates for major agency projects
    that are realistic and not low-balled, and schedules for
    completing these projects that are also realistic and not just
    a fantasy?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, Senator Warren. Yes, the answer
    is yes, I will. I do think we need to get better at cost
    estimation and schedule estimation within the Department, and
    seeking talent to do that and making sure that is done will be
    a top priority for me, if confirmed.
        Senator Warren. I would only amend what you are saying. You
    do not just need to get better. Based on where we are right
    now, you need to get a lot better on this. I also want to note
    that I am concerned about NNSA's current modernization plan,
    which, in addition to being unnecessary has no chance of being
    executed on time or on budget.
        Now, Ms. Rosenblum, let me ask you, if confirmed, in
    addition to be an Assistant Secretary, you will also be the
    Staff Director for the Pentagon's Nuclear Weapons Council. Last
    year, National Defense Authorization Act significantly
    increased the role of the Nuclear Weapons Council in
    determining the NNSA budget, decreasing the traditional role of
    the Energy Department. This effort prompted an outpouring of
    bipartisan opposition in the Senate and the House, but,
    unfortunately, key parts of the objectionable language were
    retained in the final bill.
        So let me ask, Ms. Rosenblum, do you believe the Energy
    Secretary should retain the decision authority for the NNSA
    budget request?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Senator, thank you very much for the
    question. I am very familiar with the changes that were made
    certainly to the legislation, and it is one that I do support
    and believe that the Council is appropriately chaired by the
    Department of Defense.
        Senator Warren. I am not sure I understand the answer to my
    question, and that is, do you believe that the Energy Secretary
    should retain decision authority for the NNSA budget request? I
    just want to make sure I understand your answer. That is a yes
    or no.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, I do, Senator, in consultation.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I just wanted to make
    sure I understood.
        So, Ms. Hruby, are you concerned that this new law will
    negatively impact your ability to set NNSA's budget?
        Ms. Hruby. I think that we need forge a better relationship
    so things like this do not happen in the future, and I am
    confident we can do that and we can work through the legal
    requirements as needed.
        Senator Warren. Well, I hope that you are right, but I am
    very concerned about this.
        As my colleagues, Senator Manchin and Senator Murkowski,
    wrote last year, the Nuclear Weapons Council, quote, ``has a
    narrower focus than the Secretary of Energy, and its
    recommendations would likely prioritize nuclear weapons at the
    expense of other critical energy department missions,'' end
    quote. I fear that this new law will make it harder to rein in
    the NNSA's dangerous budget growth, and I will look forward to
    working with both of you to make sure that we are able to do
    that.
        So thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Now let me
    recognize Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    all four of you for being here today. I really appreciate it.
    This question is for Ms. Rosenblum.
        In April, the Government Accountability Office issued a
    report which highlighted the threat that biological agents
    present to our servicemembers on the Korean Peninsula, and
    found that the Department needs to improve the preparedness of
    U.S. forces to counter chemical and biological weapons.
        The DOD manufactured hundreds of thousands of doses of
    vaccines last year for both the plague and botulinum toxin, two
    threats for which the DOD has longstanding requirements to
    provide medical countermeasures. However, as part of the
    defense-wide review, the Department terminated the Joint
    Vaccine Acquisition Program, ending funding for several medical
    programs. This included the vaccine programs for these
    biothreats that had already completed Phase 2 clinical trials,
    and manufactured 300,000 doses of each vaccine to demonstrate
    manufacturing capability.
        As we continue to reckon with the challenge of the COVID-19
    pandemic, I am concerned about the risk inherent in ending
    vaccine development programs that are aimed at protecting our
    warfighters. If confirmed, can you commit to reviewing the
    Department's policy and expeditiously providing a report back
    to the committee on the acquisition strategy for these
    vaccines, to include the status of the development, the cost to
    complete the development, and the risks to our servicemembers
    if development is discontinued?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I do, Senator, and I believe it is critical
    that our Joint Forces have the protections that they require in
    order to be able to counter any kind of threat from weapons of
    mass destruction, including biological as well.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Ms. Rosenblum.
        Mr. Maier, good to see you again. The National Defense
    Strategy Commission has cautioned us of the imbalance in civil-
    military relations on critical issues of strategy, development,
    and implementation. As you know, Congress has taken steps to
    address this imbalance by including important reforms in recent
    defense authorization that are designed to enhance the ability
    of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
    and Low-Intensity Conflict to act as the Service Secretary-like
    civilian responsible for oversight and advocacy of Special
    Operations Forces.
        What is the value to both the Special Operations enterprise
    and our overall national security in having an empowered
    Service Secretary-like civilian in the Pentagon?
        Ms. Maier. Senator Kelly, nice to see you again as well.
    Thank you for the question. So I think it is critically
    important that as we look at our other services they have a
    civilian that is empowered that sits above them, and I think
    this committee has recognized that there are elements of
    Special Operations Command that did not have that. So in the
    first order it fills a gap.
        I think in the second, and maybe more practical sense, it
    is an opportunity for there to be a civilian who is advocating
    for the men and women of Special Operations in the building,
    both in the policy and then in the administrative chain of
    command that today has not existed.
        Senator Kelly. Do you think we have made any progress in
    moving this forward?
        Ms. Maier. I do, Senator. I think the Secretary's recent
    announcement of how he intends to proceed with a dual-reporting
    chain, including a direct report to him for the administrative
    chain of command, in which, if confirmed, I would be that
    direct report, significantly empowers the position.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you.
        The next question is for Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose. In past
    testimony before the committee, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration has been candid about the risks posed by the
    aging workforce. With more than one-third of the workforce
    eligible to retire by 2024, the imperative of recruiting the
    next generation of American scientists and engineers is clear.
    I am proud to say that the students at the University of
    Arizona are among those that are already building relationships
    and experience with the National Nuclear Security
    Administration through the Minority Serving Institution
    Partnership Program.
        Can each of you speak to, in the remaining time, which is
    not much, can you speak to how you would build on these
    programs and other methods to develop a sustainable pipeline in
    STEM research?
        Ms. Hruby. Yeah, very quickly, we need to work with
    community colleges, historically black colleges and university,
    minority serving institutions, top research institutions across
    the board to rebuild our workforce, and if confirmed, that will
    be a top priority.
        Mr. Rose. Senator, let me just say, recruiting, developing,
    and retaining our nuclear security workforce is one of my
    highest priorities, and should I be confirmed, be assured that
    I will make it happen.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me recognize
    Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Hruby, what was your involvement in the
    incorporation of critical race theory or diversity equity and
    inclusion training at the Sandia National Labs?
        Ms. Hruby. Senator Cotton, thanks for that question. I am
    strong believer in diversity, equity, and inclusion training
    for our workforce. And, in fact, study after study shows that
    the culture of institutions is the reason why we lose top
    talent, and particularly women and people of color. So my first
    statement is I am a strong supporter and have benefited greatly
    personally and been part of an institution that has benefitted
    greatly from diversity, equity, and inclusion training.
        The issues with the Sandia divisive training occurred after
    I left the laboratory, and I understand it has been reviewed,
    and if confirmed, I look forward to evaluating those reviews
    and making sure that we have high-quality training programs
    that will continue into the future.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Hruby, I have heard from concerned
    former NNSA officials and lab workers who said these
    controversial training regimens were conducted under your
    watch. Did you direct or participate in any of what you just
    called divisive training sessions?
        Ms. Hruby. I did participate in training, diversity,
    equity, and inclusion training at the laboratories. The
    training that I participated in I never considered divisive nor
    did I hear that from any employee that participated in the
    training at the laboratory while I was there.
        Senator Cotton. Did you personally participate in any
    training that instructed white employees to, quote,
    ``deconstruct their white culture,'' end quote, or to apologize
    for bigotries or prejudices that they did not commit?
        Ms. Hruby. No, Senator. The classes did explore privilege,
    but in my opinion they never were divisive or asked
    inappropriate questions or apologize of the white workforce.
        Senator Cotton. Do you believe that any race is inherently
    prejudiced, bigoted, or oppressive?
        Ms. Hruby. No, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Do you believe that any race is inherently
    victimized or oppressed?
        Ms. Hruby. No, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Do you see any inherent danger in telling
    highly skilled technicians who control one of the largest
    stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world that they are
    working for a country whose roots around on systemic racism?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, no, I do, but I do think we need to be
    open to the issues that exist, and that the cultures that exist
    that do not allow us to fully utilize all Americans in our
    science and technology enterprise.
        Senator Cotton. So you do not see any danger in teaching
    these technicians who are in charge of our nuclear stockpiles
    that America is a fundamentally, or systematically racist
    country?
        Ms. Hruby. I do not think America is a fundamentally racist
    country.
        Senator Cotton. And so, therefore, you would also not
    permit any such training in the agency, should you be
    confirmed?
        Ms. Hruby. That is correct. I would want to make sure all
    of our training was high quality.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think that we can all agree
    that if you are an American, no matter your race, sex, creed,
    preference, and especially if you are gifted in fields like
    math, physics, chemistry, or engineering, that we want you and
    we need you at the NNSA. But I hope that we also treat our
    workforce with respect and do not subject any of these highly
    trained professionals to this very foolish kind of training
    that teaches them that one race is inherently guilty by birth
    or one race is inherently oppressed by birth or that America is
    somehow a fundamentally racist or irredeemable or hateful
    country. I would suggest that is a very bad way to chase out
    some of our very best employees and put them into the arms of
    the private sector.
        So thank you very much for your answers today, and thank
    you all for your appearance.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Now let me recognize
    Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
    witnesses for being here.
        Ms. Hruby, let me ask you about the Kansas City National
    Security Campus, which is in my home state of Missouri, that we
    are very proud of. It does extraordinary work manufacturing, as
    you know, the non-nuclear components for the NNSA's warhead
    programs.
        We know that the Kansas City campus is going to need
    additional capacity to meet its production requirements going
    forward. If confirmed, can you give me a sense how you will
    work to ensure that the campus has the space it needs to
    continue its vital work?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes. Thank you, Senator Hawley, for that
    question. The Kansas City site is a very important part of the
    NNSA complex, and it is very active right now, and it is
    undersized to produce the components we need. I understand that
    there are several options, including lease options, to relieve
    some of the pressure on the infrastructure at the site, and if
    confirmed, I will look into what those options are and move
    forward swiftly with trying to relieve the pressures, the
    limitations from the infrastructure options.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
        Mr. Maier, let me come to you and let's talk a little bit
    about Afghanistan if we could. Acting Assistant Secretary of
    Defense Helvey testified recently that the U.S. does not
    necessarily need the Afghan government in order to achieve our
    counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan. Let me ask you if
    you agree that if Kabul falls we may be able to work with other
    regional and local stakeholders in the country, in Afghanistan,
    to maintain the necessary access, gather the intelligence, and
    otherwise be able to facilitate our over-the-horizon
    operations. Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think that it will be immensely more
    challenging if the Afghan government falls. While there are
    options, as I understand it, underway to look at other outside-
    facing locations, that is exacerbated by a fall of the Afghan
    security forces who are fighting and dying on the front lines.
        Senator Hawley. But surely we have to plan for a number of
    contingencies. So my question is, if Kabul falls, will we be
    able to conduct the necessary intelligence- gathering, over-
    the-horizon operations, et cetera, by working with regional and
    local stakeholders?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think we will be, but it is really a
    spectrum. It will be better if we are closer and we have more
    capability that we can apply against the problem, of course.
        Senator Hawley. Fair enough. Let me ask you about Special
    Forces, which are such a key part of our effort to maintain
    contact and then work with the Northern Alliance in the earlier
    days of the war in Afghanistan. Do you think that Special
    Operations Forces should play a role in helping to maintain
    similar relationships going forward so that we can work with
    local partners again to achieve our counterterrorism
    objectives, if Kabul falls here, looking at the same scenario?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it is fair to say that SOF was
    first into Afghanistan and they be last out, and this is
    definitely an option that I would look at, if confirmed.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you about some of the
    work that has been going on in the Baltics. They have been
    working very closely with U.S. Special Forces again to
    strengthen their own resistance capabilities in order to help
    deter a Russian invasion. So with that precedent in mind, shift
    over to Taiwan. Do you think that Taiwan would benefit from
    strengthening its ability to conduct irregular warfare, along
    the lines of what the Baltic nations have been doing?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I do think that is something that we
    should be considering strongly as we think about competition
    across the span of different capabilities we can apply, SOF
    being a key contributor to that.
        Senator Hawley. Give me a sense of how you think our
    Special Operations community can help Taiwan develop this kind
    of irregular warfare capabilities.
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think building on some of the areas
    that they may not be thinking of, of a fight in depth, if there
    is a Chinese military advance, where there could be some
    opportunities for, as you say, resistance networks or other
    capabilities that would leave behind, if you will, against a
    potential enemy, amphibious landing or something like that,
    sir.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. In what specific ways do you see
    our Special Operations Forces contributing to deterring Chinese
    aggression, not just at the unconventional level but also in
    supporting our conventional forces?
        Mr. Maier. I think, Senator, when things work best the SOF
    enterprise is in support of the Joint Force, and vice versa,
    and I think information operations is a key area where USSOCOM
    brings a lot of capability, and we need to, I think, continue
    to improve upon that. One of the priorities I certainly have,
    in looking at the competition space, is how we can be better in
    that information environment, and that, of course, is not only
    a SOF capability alone.
        Senator Hawley. Give me a sense of, if you are confirmed,
    what steps you will take to ensure that our Special Operations
    Forces will be able to take the steps that you just outlined
    and also maintain their readiness, support over-the-horizon
    counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, and perform the
    many other additional missions that we ask them to undertake in
    multiple other theaters?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it is going to be a question of
    prioritization and really looking at returns on investment. We
    are still going to need to do the counterterrorism fight, and
    SOF is best positioned to do that. But some of those
    partnerships we built over the years are also applicable to the
    competition space. But we need to evolve more towards that as a
    national defense strategy. So I think it is going to be a
    constant tradeoff and looking for opportunities to get
    economies of scale on both of those mission set.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. I believe Senator
    King has an additional question.
        Senator King. Mr. Rose, as Ms. Rosenblum already learned,
    one has to be accountable for writings going back to third
    grade, sometimes, but I want to compliment you. You published
    an article in December where you had, I think, an important
    insight. You said, ``A deterrent posture review, as opposed to
    strictly a nuclear posture review, could help the
    administration determine the right set of military capabilities
    of policies, nuclear and non-nuclear, it requires to better
    deter current and emerging threats in a fiscally sustainable
    manner.
        "Indeed, if a nuclear weapon were ever used, it will
    unlikely to be a result of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear
    attack, but the result of the escalation of a conventional
    conflict. Therefore, the best way to prevent a nuclear war may
    be by preventing conventional conflict from occurring in the
    first place.''
        I think that is an important insight. Could you expand a
    bit on that?
        Mr. Rose. Thank you very much, Senator. You know, when you
    look at the threat landscape we face, during the Cold War we
    were very much concerned about that Soviet first strike. When
    we look at the current security environment, where we will most
    likely have a situation where a conflict could go nuclear would
    be in a regional conflict with a great power like Russia.
        Senator King. And indeed, Russia has articulated a doctrine
    of the use of tactical nuclear weapons called ``Escalate to
    Deescalate.'' They are openly talking about this strategy.
        Mr. Rose. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. And therefore, that is a risk that we really
    need to think about, and as you say, we need to think about
    deterring conventional conflict as well as the massive nuclear
    conflict that the doctrine of the '60s, '70s, '80s, and '90s
    conflated.
        Mr. Rose. Absolutely, sir.
        Senator King. Ms. Rosenblum, to move on to look at
    deterrence in another way, my nightmare is nuclear weapons in
    the hands of terrorists, nonstate actors, and the problem is
    that this whole theory of deterrence that we have been talking
    about does not work with a group of 30 people who would just as
    soon give their lives up for some abstract cause.
        Number one, talk to me about how do we keep that from
    happening, either indigenous development of these weapons by a
    terrorist group or, more likely, purchased from a rogue state
    like North Korea.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator, for the question. It is
    something, I believe appropriately, we do need to be concerned
    about, and is part of the reason that there needs to be
    emphasis put on securing nuclear materials, civilian nuclear
    materials, throughout the world, particularly as we see the use
    of nuclear energy as part of the approach to the climate-
    related issue. And if I may, Senator, one other point. I worry
    very much also about biological weapons, particularly as --
        Senator King. I should have mentioned that. I put that in
    almost the same category as nuclear, as we have just learned.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes. Thank you. And particularly with
    synthetic biology, which is becoming more and more ubiquitous.
    It is allowing a much broader range of actors to have those
    tools, in much shorter time frame. And that is something that,
    if I am confirmed, I will take a very close look at the
    Department of Defense.
        Senator King. I hope you will also look at where we are
    vulnerable in terms of biological weapons. One of my concerns
    is about our water systems. There are something like 60,000
    separate water systems in this country, and the question is how
    secure are they. And water systems not only give us drinking
    water and water we use in our homes but they cool power plants
    and enable a lot of other of our activities. So it is not only
    a question of the risk but what the downstream--that is a bad
    pun, I guess, talking about water, but what the downstream
    effects are.
        There is something called the Cooperative Threat Reduction
    Program. Is that something you hope to invigorate, and how much
    engagement do we have from our allies, and indeed other
    countries around the world, that recognize this weapons of mass
    destruction threat?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Senator. The Cooperative Threat
    Program has been very successful over the past 30 years, and I
    believe it is very important that the U.S. continue to work
    with allies to close capacity gaps in the fight against
    countering weapons of mass destruction. If I am confirmed, I
    really look forward to digging into a lot more of the detail
    with respect to how the program is currently operating. And
    again, if confirmed, I would welcome an opportunity to come
    back to talk with you and other members of the committee on how
    we are doing with the CTR program.
        Senator King. I hope we can do that, because that is the
    legacy of Sam Nunn, as a matter of fact, Nunn-Lugar from years
    ago, and it is an important one.
        While I look forward to continuing to work with you, I
    consider the work that you will be doing, assuming you are
    confirmed, as among the most important jobs in our government,
    so thank you for your willingness. Thanks to all of you for
    your willingness to take on these new challenges.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and I would like to
    thank the nominees for testifying, and Ms. Hruby, for meeting
    with me recently.
        I want to talk a little bit about some things happening, of
    course, in Nevada. I am a little worried about explosive
    nuclear testing and its possible resumption, because last year
    news reports indicated that the previous administration was
    considering resuming explosive nuclear testing. The Nevada Test
    Site, now known as the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS,
    is the only facility in the nation equipped to accommodate
    subcritical nuclear experiments. These help to advance our
    national security and maintain the integrity of our nuclear
    stockpile.
        A resumption in explosive testing would not only compromise
    the health and safety of Nevadans and harm the surrounding
    environment, but it would also undermine future stockpile
    stewardship efforts.
        So, Ms. Hruby, is your professional opinion that there is
    not a current or foreseeable need for the United States to
    resume explosive nuclear testing, and if confirmed, how do you
    plan to improve the Stockpile Stewardship Program's scientific
    capabilities so that we never have to resume explosive nuclear
    weapons testing?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, Senator Rosen, and I
    appreciated our conversation earlier about this as well.
        Making sure we have a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile
    without nuclear testing is the foundation of the NNSA. And I do
    not believe we need to test at this time. There is no technical
    indication of any reason to test.
        If confirmed, I will make sure that the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program continues to advance our laboratory
    testing, our subcritical testing, as we are doing now,
    advancing our diagnostics at the Nevada Test Site for
    subcritical testing, to make sure that nuclear explosive
    testing is not needed to understand our stockpile.
        In addition, as we talked about earlier, even our
    infrastructure programs, and, in particular our pit production
    program at the NNSA is also a hedge against future testing, and
    if confirmed, I will strongly support maintaining a stockpile
    without testing.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to keep a little bit on
    the Test Site, because when I was last there I saw the ongoing
    construction of the U1a facility for our enhanced capabilities
    for those subcritical experiments that we are talking about, or
    the ECSE. And I am excited that the NNSS will host the most
    capable weapons radiographic system in the world.
        And so, Ms. Hruby again, if confirmed, will you ensure that
    rapid completion of ongoing upgrades to the U1a complex in
    order to enhance the stewardship of our nuclear stockpile, and
    might you suggest any additional improvements that we need to
    do at the Test Site that would be prudent to ensure our
    stockpile safety, and that you can fulfill the mission that we
    need to there?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator, the ECSE program is an important
    program on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and if confirmed,
    I will certainly try to keep that program moving forward. And I
    agree, we need to continue to look for all the capabilities
    that could be employed to make sure we have a full science-
    based understanding of our nuclear weapons.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move on now to
    plutonium removal. In 2018, of course the Department of Energy
    secretly shift a half metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium
    from South Carolina to the Nevada National Security Site. As
    part of an effort to restore trust with the people of Nevada,
    NNSA committed to begin the removal of South Carolina material
    from Nevada no later than 2021, and complete removal by 2026.
        So, Ms. Hruby and Mr. Rose, can you both commit, if
    confirmed, to continue to provide the Nevada delegation and our
    staff with updates on the removal of plutonium from Nevada? I
    can begin with Ms. Hruby and then go on to Mr. Rose, please.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, Senator Rosen.
        Mr. Rose. Yes, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward
    to, if confirmed, working with both of you on making sure that
    Nevada National Security Site can complete this mission in the
    safest way for our Nevadans and for our country and for our
    homeland security and safety. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. I want to thank
    the witnesses for their testimony and for their commitment to
    public service, both in the past and obviously in the future as
    they are moving towards their confirmation, I hope.
        With that I would adjourn the hearing. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Jill M. Hruby by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. In accordance with title 42, U.S. Code, section 7132(c))
    the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, serves
    concurrently as the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA), as set forth in title 50, U.S. Code, section
    2402. The Under Secretary must have extensive background in national
    security, organizational management, and appropriate technical fields,
    and be well-qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation,
    and materials disposition programs of the NNSA in a manner that
    advances and protects the national security of the United States.
        What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
    qualify you for appoint as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and
    Administrator for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA)?
        Answer. I'm a mechanical engineer and spent 34 years of my
    professional career at Sandia National Laboratories before I retired as
    Laboratories Director in May 2017. Sandia is an NNSA-sponsored
    Federally Funded Research and Development Center and the Nation's
    nuclear weapons engineering laboratory with over 10,000 permanent
    employees and an annual budget of about $4 billion. During my time at
    Sandia, I was engaged either as a technical staff member or manager in
    a variety of programs including the science supporting nuclear weapons,
    weapon component and system development, nonproliferation, nuclear
    security, and more. As the Laboratories Director, I wrote two stockpile
    assessment letters. In my various leadership roles at Sandia, I have
    experience managing large programs and diverse teams of people.
        Since my retirement from Sandia in 2017, I have been active in
    nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs through both compensated
    and non-compensated employment, and on boards and advisory committees.
    I spent a year as the Inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the
    Nuclear Threat Initiative (a non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental
    organization) then as a consultant exploring the intersection of
    advanced technologies and nuclear policy. In addition, I have been a
    special government employee (non-compensated) as a member of the
    Defense Science Board and the NNSA Defense Programs Advisory Committee.
    I have been a member of boards and advisory committees including the
    National Academy of Sciences Committee for International Security and
    Arms Control, Los Alamos National Laboratory missions committee, and
    CRDF Global.
        I have a broad set of technical knowledge and organizational
    management skills to lead nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
    materials disposition efforts. I know the DOE and NNSA cultures well
    and am very familiar with the labs, plants, and sites.
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security? Of the duties and functions
    of the Administrator, NNSA? Do you perceive there to be any differences
    or dissonance between the requirements of each such position? If
    confirmed, under whose authority, direction, and control, would you
    serve in each such position?
        Answer. As Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, if confirmed, I
    will be a direct report to Secretary Granholm. In the Under Secretary
    role I will help inform and execute the Secretary's vision, and that of
    President Biden, in furthering both nuclear security and the overall
    mission of the Department of Energy (DOE).
        The duties of the Administrator are clearly spelled out in the NNSA
    Act. If confirmed, I will be responsible for the execution of the NNSA
    mission to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the
    nuclear weapons stockpile; to provide the Navy with nuclear propulsion;
    to enhance nuclear nonproliferation; to reduce the global threat of
    weapons of mass destruction; and to further our leadership in science
    and technology, with our labs, plants, and sites and the amazing people
    who perform the challenging work.
        I believe there will be good alignment between the Secretary of
    Energy and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. Secretary Granholm has
    expressed her strong support for the DOE's role in national security,
    and under her leadership the responsibilities for the Undersecretary
    for Nuclear Security and the statutory obligations of the Administrator
    are aligned, harmonious, and compatible.
        If confirmed, as Administrator, I would be subject to the
    authority, direction and control of Secretary Granholm and Deputy
    Secretary Turk, as specified in the NNSA Act. Similarly, with respect
    to the functions of Under Secretary, I am subject to the authority,
    direction, and control of Secretary Granholm and Deputy Secretary Turk.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under
    Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to develop strong and transparent
    relationships with the Secretary of Energy, the DOD Under Secretary of
    Acquisition and Sustainment, all members of the Nuclear Weapons Council
    including the STRATCOM Commander, and Congress to enhance my ability to
    succeed at my duties.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What are the major challenges confronting the Under
    Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator, NNSA?
        Answer. The biggest challenge is simultaneously modernizing the
    physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise while
    delivering on the stockpile modernization, science programs, and the
    nonproliferation and navy reactor program needs.
        Over the past several decades, the NNSA enterprise has re-learned
    delivering modernized nuclear weapons and established a science-based
    stockpile stewardship program to provide confidence without nuclear
    explosive testing. The NNSA now needs to add a robust and trusted
    ability to deliver unique infrastructure programs, some that are
    substantial in scale and technical challenge. The production
    capabilities provided by the infrastructure programs are essential to
    modernizing and sustaining our nuclear deterrent for decades to come.
    If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to continue the efforts
    of my predecessors to modernize our infrastructure to ensure we can re-
    establish production capability and retain the stockpile management
    capability required to confidently maintain our nuclear deterrent.
        NNSA must also ensure that innovative nonproliferation technologies
    are ready to go if needed, and enhance nuclear security through
    material minimization, emergency response, and counterproliferation
    activities. The NNSA must also continue to provide high quality results
    for Navy nuclear propulsion.
        NNSA can only succeed if we have the right workforce with the right
    skills. The nuclear security enterprise is facing a bow-wave of
    retirements. It will be critical for NNSA, working with our labs,
    plants, and sites, to effectively recruit and retain the next
    generation of smart, dedicated, and innovative nuclear security
    personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of
    Defense (DOD), National Security Council (NSC), Office of Management
    and Budget (OMB), and Congress to understand NNSA requirements,
    communicate NNSA priorities, and advocate for NNSA funding to meet the
    priority needs. I will also forge strong partnerships with the NNSA
    complex leadership to deliver the infrastructure and modernization
    programs in the timelines required by our customers. Finally, I will
    expand on the on-going work between NNSA and our colleagues at the
    labs, plants, and sites to help recruit and train the workforce of the
    future.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities in each
    of the roles for which you have been nominated?
        Answer. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure NNSA
    continues to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapon
    stockpile now and into the future. This includes executing on budget
    and schedule the weapon life extensions and modernization activities,
    the infrastructure improvements, and the science-based stewardship
    program. I will also focus on ensuring the NNSA is at the forefront of
    the technology and capability required to support potential arms
    control treaties, prevent nuclear material and weapon proliferation,
    and support counterterrorism efforts. Finally, I will support the
    Navy's nuclear propulsion program to ensure the U.S. nuclear navy can
    meet its mission.
        As the Under Secretary of Nuclear Security, I will work with other
    leaders in DOE to achieve the Department's objectives especially in
    areas of mutual interest such as nuclear energy, environmental
    management, and high-performance computing.
                            relations with congress
        Question. What are your views on the state of the relationship
    between the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and the Senate Armed
    Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?
        Answer. The Senate Armed Services Committee, given its oversight
    and authorization responsibilities, is well versed in the mission of
    the NNSA and has been supportive of NNSA programs. This suggests a
    generally good relationship between the former Under Secretaries for
    Nuclear Security and the SASC and their staffs. I recognize there are
    different points of views between members of SASC and in Congress as a
    whole on nuclear weapons issues and NNSA governance, however, the
    continuity of bi-partisan support on key issues has been impressive and
    strong. I believe the relationship can and should continue to be
    strengthened.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
    productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
    the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?
        Answer. I firmly believe communication is key to maintaining good
    relations. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA maintains open and timely
    communications with Congress, especially the Senate Armed Services
    Committee and its Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
                nuclear weapons mission and security environment
        Question. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the
    Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our
    stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary
    of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking
    regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and
    the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the
    nuclear mission.
        If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of the Biden
    Administration's NPR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will take an active role in the NPR process
    to ensure NNSA's capabilities and requirements are communicated and
    understood as part of this major policy-making process. While nuclear
    military requirements are set by the DOD, NNSA has a unique set of
    responsibilities it must deliver for America's integrated deterrent to
    remain safe, secure, and effective.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you
    recommend the Biden Administration consider?
        Answer. I am not privy at this time to specifics of the pre-
    decisional NPR process. That said, I will make sure NNSA executes the
    policy decisions the President and Department of Defense outline in any
    update to the U.S. nuclear posture. Whatever policy decision is made,
    NNSA must continue its current path of revitalizing our aging Cold War
    infrastructure, meet DOD requirements for warhead manufacturing, ensure
    sufficient research and development capabilities to avoid the need to
    return to nuclear explosive testing, and deliver facilities required to
    produce key strategic materials.
        Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements to the
    U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the
    full and timely (question cut off). Should the upcoming NPR call for
    the development of additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if
    confirmed, to supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully
    supports the new requirements?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to fully supporting any
    changes, additions, or developments directed by the President, as that
    guidance is translated into specific requirements by the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, and as those requirements and programs are ultimately
    authorized and appropriated by Congress.
                               overall management
        Question. The NNSA Act of 2000, as amended, establishes that the
    Administrator, NNSA ``. . . shall be subject to the authority,
    direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such authority,
    direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of
    Energy, without re-delegation.''
        What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
    Energy and the Administrator of NNSA in statute and in recent practice?
        Answer. Although NNSA is a semi-autonomous organization, per the
    NNSA Act, it is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
    Secretary. As such, the Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of
    Energy, and NNSA Administrator must maintain a strong and healthy
    relationship. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary Granholm
    and Deputy Secretary Turk to ensure cohesion, collaboration, and
    alignment across the Department.
        Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
    forth in the by the NNSA Act, reflected in NNSA's organizational
    structure? What makes NNSA different from the domains of the other
    Under Secretaries of the Department of Energy (DOE)--in both law and
    practice?
        Answer. The NNSA Act designates NNSA as a semi-autonomous
    organization under DOE to execute its national security programs. This
    is a unique authority and differs from the other DOE Under Secretaries.
    It gives the Administrator authority over key operational functions,
    such as personnel, procurement, and policy development. NNSA's semi-
    autonomous nature also empowers the NNSA career staff who specialize in
    nuclear security in their work with the Department of Defense. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with DOE leadership to continue to build
    a strong, collaborative, and mission-focused culture where DOE and NNSA
    can better leverage each other's expertise.
        Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
    operational effectiveness, would you recommend any changes to the
    structure of NNSA?
        Answer. Independent studies have noted the improvement in NNSA
    governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise in recent
    years. However, there is still room for improvement. The foundation of
    good governance lies in NNSA having healthy relationships with its
    stakeholders.
        If confirmed, I intend to focus on defining roles and
    responsibilities across the NNSA enterprise, improving communication,
    and changing the culture to focus on timely and cost-effective delivery
    and innovation. I will also focus on sustaining the reforms that have
    been started by previous Administrators and recommended by
    Congressionally-appointed groups such as the Meis-Augustine Commission.
    I will work with the NNSA leadership team to improve NNSA's project
    management, program review, and cost estimation expertise.
               relationship with the department of defense (dod)
        Question. If confirmed, you will be a member of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council (NWC), together with the Under Secretaries of Defense for
    Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment, Research and Engineering, the Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S.
    Strategic Command. Since the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, when it was
    designated as the ``Military Liaison Committee,'' the primary purpose
    of the NWC is to serve as the civilian-military interface and set the
    military requirements for nuclear forces, which form the basis of the
    core mission of NNSA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is, in a sense,
    NNSA's primary customer.
        How would you assess the relationship between NNSA and the DOD, at
    both senior management levels, as well as at working levels?
        Answer. My assessment is NNSA and the DOD have integrated their
    work well, and the relationship has improved in recent years. NNSA and
    DOD must continue to successfully integrate each of the unique
    departmental capabilities and responsibilities to maintain a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent without delays or surprises.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
    this relationship?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to continue the work of my
    predecessors and maintain regular engagements with my DOD counterparts
    to ensure NNSA is fully aware of and ready to deliver DOD requirements.
    Additionally, I will take an active role in the NWC.
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA is adequately responsive to the
    requirements set by the DOD?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure continual
    communication and integration with the DOD and, if necessary, improve
    NNSA's ability to respond to DOD requirements.
        Question. Do you believe it important for the NWC to ensure the
    NNSA is adequately funded through the interagency budget process to
    meet DOD's requirements?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Energy, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Nuclear
    Weapons Council to make sure NNSA understands DOD requirements and
    requests the necessary funding to meet those requirements. The NWC is
    the appropriate forum for DOD and NNSA to understand respective funding
    requirements of the nuclear deterrent and make financial tradeoffs in
    cases where there may be budget limitations.
                                defense programs
        Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the
    annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.
        Do you believe that the United States currently possesses the
    capabilities to ensure the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable--
    without nuclear weapons testing?
        Answer. Yes. Each year, the Directors of the National Security
    Laboratories and the Commander of United States Strategic Command
    assess the state of the nuclear stockpile. They have determined the
    United States does not need to conduct nuclear explosive tests at this
    time to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. However, NNSA
    also maintains test readiness tools to ensure the U.S. remains prepared
    to resume nuclear testing, only if required to ensure the safety and
    effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal, or to respond to evolving technical
    and geopolitical circumstances, and only then under explicit direction
    from the President.
        The NWC has laid out a schedule for the next 20 years that includes
    the completion of four life extension programs (LEPs), as well as
    multiple refurbishment programs, the development of the W93 warhead,
    and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.
        Question. Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule
    and, in particular, concurrency between the plants and the
    laboratories?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the plants and
    laboratories on these critical programs to ensure concurrency and the
    ability to deliver on time and budget.
        Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
    Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
    engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
    authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
        If confirmed, how would you support the Stockpile Responsiveness
    Program and make full use of the authorities it provides NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support, and request funding
    for, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and leverage all possible
    avenues across NNSA to ensure we are postured to confront future
    challenges with an experienced and practiced workforce.
        Question. If confirmed, what are your long-term plans for the
    National Ignition Facility and, in particular, how would you execute
    the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition, which to date has
    not occurred?
        Answer. I believe the National Ignition Facility (NIF) is essential
    to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program and NIF's contributions extend
    beyond ignition. If confirmed, I will work with the laboratory
    community to develop a long-term plan for this critical element of
    stewardship.
        Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
    what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
    NNSA missions?
        Answer. I believe the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
    program is essential to provide the high-performance simulation and
    computing capabilities that inform critical NNSA stockpile stewardship
    decisions. The ASC simulation tools enable broad and deep knowledge of
    the individual processes involved in a nuclear weapon explosion, as
    well as a comprehensive understanding of the complex interactions among
    these processes. ASC will provide and sustain the required confidence
    in the nation's nuclear deterrent by developing and deploying credible,
    science-based simulation tools to certify the current and future
    stockpile.
                                  nnsa budget
        Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
    Authorization Act requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget before
    its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to ensure
    it can meet DOD requirements.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this provision?
    How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to review the
    budget before its submission to OMB?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will learn what process was used for the
    fiscal year 2022 budget, inform Congress of the process used, and
    ensure that process is continued for future budgets.
        Question. In your opinion, would cross-training between DOD, NNSA,
    and DOE programming and financial management personnel improve
    interdepartmental coordination on budgetary matters? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. Yes. Many human resource and training experts have
    identified cross-training as an effective tool to improve workforce
    performance. In addition, the DOD, NNSA, and DOE personnel would gain
    insights into each other's best practices and bolster the areas that
    need improvement.
                                   personnel
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
    civilian employees to perform its mission? If so, please explain your
    rationale.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will look closely at staffing across NNSA
    to ensure adequate staffing, the appropriate skills mix, and structure
    so that NNSA continues to meet its mission in an effective manner.
        Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
    civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
    personnel accomplish that NNSA is not able to accomplish today? If
    confirmed, which specific components of the NNSA would you recommend
    growing? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand NNSA's staffing requirements are consistently
    assessed to determine the appropriate size and mix of NNSA's workforce.
    If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing these assessments and working
    to ensure NNSA has the workforce it needs.
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
    capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
    to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.
        Answer. The complex would be unable accomplish its essential
    missions without the expertise and efforts of the nuclear security
    enterprise workforce. If confirmed, one of my priorities will be to
    maintain the core competencies of the current workforce, and recruit
    and retain the highly-skilled professionals and skilled trades
    personnel needed to execute its missions.
        Question. If not, please explain what capabilities each such
    workforce requires to ensure that NNSA is fully mission capable?
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the
    necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor
    workforces?
        Answer. If confirmed, recruiting and retaining world class talent
    within NNSA's federal and contractor workforce will be a priority of
    mine. I believe it is essential for NNSA to provide meaningful and
    challenging professional opportunities that attract and retain
    dedicated professionals. Central to this effort is fostering an
    enterprise-wide sense of purpose in NNSA's nuclear security mission.
    Particular attention must be placed on ensuring that, as the current
    NNSA workforce ages, the administration maintains partnerships with the
    academic and university communities through pipelines that encourage
    and attract the world's best engineers, scientists, and support staff.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both NNSA the civilian and
    the contractor workforces?
        Answer. In the next five years, a significant portion of the NNSA
    and nuclear security enterprise workforce will be eligible to retire.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize maintaining those skills and expertise
    and provide NNSA support to help the nuclear security enterprise
    recruit and retain the highly skilled workforce needed to execute its
    national security missions.
        Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
    additional authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and
    maintain the civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its
    mission? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will learn more about NNSA's existing
    hiring authorities and determine if additional authorities are
    required.
                      construction and project management
        Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
    and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
    facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry
    and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel
    Fabrication Facility, and others.
        In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
    failures in project management?
        Answer. In the past, GAO has identified a number of areas where
    NNSA could improve project management, including ill-defined project
    requirements; lack of proper cost estimating; and starting projects
    before proper sufficient design and technology development is
    completed. Over the past decade, NNSA has made significant improvements
    which have led to a notable turnaround in NNSA's ability to deliver
    projects and GAO has taken NNSA off its high risk list for projects
    costing less than $750 million. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen
    NNSA practices and to adopt best business practices on its larger
    projects to complete such projects on-time and on-budget.
        Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
    practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
    these problems? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Over the past decade, NNSA has made significant
    improvements to address project management challenges. If confirmed, I
    will champion continued improvement.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    ensure that these project management failures are not repeated in the
    future? What specific changed in policy, practice, organization, or
    regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support strengthening and improving
    NNSA's contract and project management. To do so, some of my
    recommendations include clarifying lines of authority, holding those
    responsible for projects accountable, adding rigor to existing project
    management practices, strengthening cost estimating, and ensuring
    projects remain within original scope and cost baselines. If confirmed,
    I will prioritize understanding NNSA's project management and practices
    to further ensure that future projects do not encounter past
    challenges.
        Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
    additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of
    these project management failures? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. NNSA follows DOE Order 413.3B which governs program and
    project management for the acquisition of capital assets. I certainly
    agree with the precept that rigorous project management principles
    should be applied and that the Federal staff must be given the tools
    they need and then be held accountable and responsible for delivering
    the work. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed on its detailed
    application to NNSA activities and whether any changes are warranted.
        Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of the large
    project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the
    Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE) in the
    Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).
        In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets
    allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide
    independent cost estimates and other costing and project management
    advice internal to NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review if CEPE is sufficiently
    staffed.
        Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
    data and information to serve its statutory purpose?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review whether CEPE has sufficient
    authority and access.
        Question. CEPE reports directly to the Undersecretary for Nuclear
    Security. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that CEPE
    has adequate access to you and other senior leaders in your
    organization, as necessary and appropriate?
        Answer. I understand the Director of CEPE is a member of the NNSA
    senior leadership team and therefore has access to the Administrator
    and other NNSA senior leaders. If confirmed, I intend to review ways to
    ensure the Director of CEPE has adequate access to me and other senior
    leaders.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
    support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How would you
    balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of
    taxpayer dollars?
        Answer. I understand the importance of CEPE's cost and resource
    analysis capabilities to NNSA and value its independence from the
    program offices as being critical to providing independent, data driven
    analysis to me. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its
    independence and review its staffing and funding.
                               plutonium strategy
        Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
    Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former
    Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce up to 50
    pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not less than 80 pits
    per year.
        What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its capabilities to
    achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of
    the ongoing stockpile program?
        Answer. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the Nation's
    Center of Excellence for plutonium research, development and
    production. LANL has previously demonstrated the ability to manufacture
    plutonium pits to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The diligent
    execution of current plans to expand existing production capacity will
    enable NNSA and LANL to meet the Nation's need to produce no fewer than
    30 pits per year in 2026. In April 2021, the Los Alamos Pit Production
    Project (LAP4) achieved Critical Decision One, approval of the
    conceptual design and cost range, a key step to meet requirements and
    execute this important mission. I pledge to work closely with NNSA and
    LANL leadership to enable achievement of this critical milestone.
        Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the
    former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its
    pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the
    ongoing stockpile program?
        Answer. To repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to
    support the Nation's plutonium pit production mission, the robust
    building structure must be outfitted with specialized processing and
    manufacturing equipment. Supporting infrastructure must also be
    designed and constructed and safety and security systems must be
    installed. This effort requires a training program to provide a
    workforce capable for all production and infrastructure for pit
    manufacturing. The program must also establish waste processing
    capabilities to process hazardous and non-hazardous waste. NNSA is
    executing a project that will implement all necessary changes to
    achieve production of no fewer than 50 pits per year at the Savannah
    River Site.
                    uranium strategy and tritium production
        Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for
    tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the
    Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1
    Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be
    used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium
    nor the technology used to enrich it carries an ``obligation'' from a
    foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-
    weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
    ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending
    recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for
    unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-
    blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for
    obtaining unobligated uranium.
        Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic
    uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?
        Answer. Yes, I do. Re-establishing a domestic uranium enrichment
    capability would support several NNSA goals, namely maintaining the
    nuclear weapons stockpile, supporting nonproliferation efforts
    worldwide, and fueling the nuclear navy.
        Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a
    capability?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing Analysis of
    Alternatives and engage with the Administration and Congress on a path
    forward that provides the most cost-effective solution to the American
    taxpayers.
        Question. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2014
    entitled ``Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S. Position on
    Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium Production'' concluded
    that the DOE's policy on identification of obligated uranium was based
    on three international agreements and a series of policy decisions. Of
    the three agreements, GAO concluded that only one explicitly addressed
    tritium production, but that State Department had consistently
    interpreted the other two agreements as imposing peaceful use
    restrictions on LEU for tritium production.
        Do you believe this GAO reading of all three agreements remains
    consistent with U.S. policy goals?
        Answer. Ensuring a continued supply of tritium is critical to the
    success of NNSA's mission. I am committed to the highest
    nonproliferation standards and, if confirmed, would ensure NNSA's
    production of tritium is consistent with U.S. international agreements
    and governmental policy. If confirmed, I will assess the GAO and State
    Department interpretations and seek to reach alignment.
        Question. Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for fiscal year 2020 directed the Department of Energy to
    ``determine whether the Agreement [between the United States of America
    and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] for
    Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes,
    signed at Washington, July 3, 1958 . . . permits the United States to
    obtain low-enriched uranium for the purposes of producing tritium in
    the United States.'' The Secretary of Energy affirmed that such
    procurement of low enriched uranium can occur.
        What are your views on the accuracy of the Secretary of Energy's
    determination in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with this Administration to
    evaluate the legality of any proposal.
                         fissile materials disposition
        Question. The United States and Russia committed to the disposition
    of 34 metric tons (MT) of weapons grade plutonium under the Plutonium
    Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) in 2000. The original plan
    by the United States was to convert excess weapons grade plutonium to
    mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuel for civilian reactors at the Savannah
    River Site (SRS). After spending billions of dollars, this project was
    subsequently abandoned in favor of diluting the plutonium and disposing
    of it at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose
    process involves shipping the plutonium pits from Pantex to Los Alamos
    to be turned into oxide powder, then shipping then on to SRS for
    packaging, followed by final shipment to WIPP for disposal.
        What are your views on the dilute and disposal method?
        Answer. The dilute and disposal method uses existing, proven
    technologies, and will allow the United States to meet its disposition
    commitments in less time and at half the cost of the MOX approach.
        Question. What are your views on permanent disposal at WIPP?
        Answer. Permanent disposal of diluted plutonium at WIPP is a safe,
    secure, and environmentally responsible approach. If confirmed, I will
    ensure the Department works with the State of New Mexico to provide
    information to the public on the safety of this disposition method.
        Question. What are your views of the logistics of shipping
    plutonium between Pantex, Los Alamos, SRS, and WIPP? In your opinion,
    could this process be simplified by shipping the pits directly to SRS
    to be converted to oxide powder there?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is preparing to
    conduct a thorough review of the viability and environmental impact of
    conducting oxidation at various locations, including Los Alamos, where
    current capabilities exist in PF-4, and Savannah River Site, as well as
    any other alternative determined to be reasonable. I further understand
    the logistics of each alternative will be considered in the final
    analysis.
                          nuclear safety and security
        Question. NNSA was created partially in response to security lapses
    at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nonetheless, periodic security
    lapses have continued to occur, such as in 2012 at the Y-12 facility.
        To what extent have the conditions that allowed such lapses to
    occur been corrected, in your view?
        Answer. I understand a comprehensive review by security experts
    identified causes such as divided security responsibilities, degraded
    security equipment, and security culture problems, among other factors.
    Following the incident, contract and procedural changes were made to
    ensure a clear single point of responsibility to integrate security
    functions. A comprehensive review and assessment of security
    infrastructure across the enterprise led to the development of a
    security infrastructure revitalization program to replace aging
    security systems. The security organization implemented the NNSA
    Security Roadmap (NSR) to provide a vision, a strategy, and a path
    forward to drive continuous improvement of its nuclear security
    program. Additionally, security culture campaigns were instituted
    across the NNSA enterprise to ensure security, like safety, is
    integrated in everything NNSA does. If confirmed, I will assess the
    effectiveness of the Roadmap and associated activities.
        Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any further changes in
    policy, practice, management, or oversight to reduce the frequency of
    security issues at NNSA facilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support NNSA's initiatives to improve
    security at its facilities, as well as look for additional ways to
    improve security especially in light of new technological capabilities.
        Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
    Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported a number of accidents at
    the national laboratories in recent years. The accidents included
    explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that was identified
    as a ``near criticality accident'' that led to the partial shutdown of
    the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory for several
    years--putting both personnel and mission at risk. Yet, while personnel
    safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by definition
    involves some of the most hazardous materials. Risk cannot be
    eliminated completely at the labs while ensuring mission
    accomplishment?
        Answer. I agree that risk cannot be eliminated at the labs given
    the hazardous nature of the work that must be accomplished to fulfill
    our national security mission. However, the risk needs to be
    recognized, understood, and appropriately controlled while balancing
    that with mission execution and ensuring the safety of the public,
    workers, and environment.
        Question. How should we balance safety, risk, and mission at the
    national laboratories?
        Answer. For NNSA to be successful in meeting its national security
    mission, it must have sustained strong safety performance. High safety
    achievement and mission success are compatible and mutually support
    each other; having one but not the other is not sustainable. This is
    balanced by properly assessing risk and controlling it. If confirmed, I
    will emphasize continuous safety improvements and a risk management
    culture across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise to execute NNSA's
    missions in a safe and secure manner.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
    the safety culture at the labs while still meeting mission
    requirements?
        Answer. Based on my years at Sandia National Laboratories, I
    understand how important a positive safety culture environment is in
    accomplishing the NNSA mission. The key to this is establishing and
    reinforcing expectations by senior leadership. If confirmed, I will
    accomplish this through my regular interactions with the leadership of
    the Management & Operating partners. I will also emphasize the critical
    nature of effectively engaging with employees to provide two-way
    feedback while stressing organizational learning so we can continuously
    improve. Setting high expectations, ensuring employee engagement, and
    embracing organizational learning, will establish the necessary
    foundation to improve safety culture at the NNSA labs. To ensure
    continual improvement, I will also emphasize the importance of a strong
    safety conscious work environment so employees will feel comfortable
    raising safety issues and leaders are prepared to effectively address
    those issues. This will enable NNSA to collectively work together to
    safely accomplish the mission.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        Question. What do you perceive as the highest priorities of the
    nuclear nonproliferation programs at NNSA?
        Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration's Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance highlights a number of critical national and
    international security objectives in which NNSA can play a major
    contributing role. In my view, chief among these nuclear
    nonproliferation priorities are:
        1.  eliminating stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials, and
    vulnerable radioactive sources globally, and minimizing the need for
    future use;
        2.  strengthening U.S. leadership in civil nuclear commerce, arms
    control, and nonproliferation globally; and
        3.  reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons programs of
    concern.
        NNSA is uniquely positioned to contribute towards each of these
    three items, and if confirmed, I will work to advance the
    Administration's nonproliferation agenda.
        Question. The United States no longer holds a bilateral agreement
    with Russia for joint nuclear nonproliferation activities. However, a
    number of ongoing nonproliferation programs are focused on countries in
    that region.
        In your view, are there are additional opportunities for
    cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union,
    particularly in the Middle East and North Africa? If confirmed, what
    would be your priorities in these areas?
        Answer. While some of NNSA's earliest nuclear security and
    nonproliferation work was with Russia and other regional partners, NNSA
    has now expanded its work to over 100 countries, recognizing nuclear
    nonproliferation is a global activity.
        Consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the
    United States has long held that peaceful nuclear technology can and
    should be shared for the benefit of humankind. NNSA plays a significant
    role in ensuring that those partner countries who pursue the peaceful
    use of nuclear technology are able to do so in a manner that ensures
    adherence to the highest nonproliferation standards. For the Middle
    East and Northern African regions, strengthening the adherence to and
    implementation of the highest standard for IAEA safeguards verification
    in both regions would help to promote stability and reduce tensions in
    these strategically vital areas.
        Second, I believe NNSA can build upon its existing nuclear security
    accomplishments by working with our partners to strengthen their
    ability to combat nuclear smuggling and secure radioactive and nuclear
    materials.
        Question. What challenges has the new relationship between the
    United States and Russia posed in nuclear nonproliferation programs?
        Answer. The deterioration of nuclear nonproliferation dialogue and
    cooperation between the United States and Russia has posed significant
    challenges, not only for bilateral relations overall, but also for
    global nuclear security.
        Russia has significant inventories of civilian nuclear material and
    the United States has not been able to work with or discuss HEU
    minimization or consolidation efforts. Additionally, due to the
    vastness and complexity of the Russian nuclear complex, the security of
    the Russian nuclear material will remain a long-term interest of the
    United States. The United States and Russia continue to have a shared
    interest and responsibility to ensure abidance to the highest possible
    security standards.
        There are a number of critical issues that would benefit from
    broader United States-Russian dialogue and engagement. I am convinced
    that global nuclear security, nonproliferation, and arms control must
    be part of the agenda for discussion. If I am confirmed, I look forward
    to supporting the Administration's policy toward Russia, while
    maintaining NNSA's readiness to build on the joint nuclear
    nonproliferation accomplishments already achieved--when and if
    appropriate.
        Question. What do you believe are the greatest challenges in
    nuclear nonproliferation programs with countries other than Russia?
        Answer. At the top of the list is the fact that China and North
    Korea are improving their nuclear weapons capabilities, including
    associated delivery systems. Meanwhile, Iran possesses the largest
    missile arsenal in its region. China is aggressively acquiring United
    States and allies' technology for economic and military advantage.
        Beyond these geopolitical challenges, there are technological
    challenges as well. NNSA's technical capabilities and expertise will be
    needed to balance the enormous potential benefits to society of
    emerging technologies, such as advanced nuclear reactor designs,
    additive manufacturing and5G technologies, in ways that do not lower
    the barriers to proliferation. These are the cooperative and technical
    challenges that NNSA is poised to answer, and if confirmed, I look
    forward to being a part of these contributions.
        Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
    nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs,
    if confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or
    cooperation would you need to meet such needs?
        Answer. In my view, there is still much work to be done globally to
    minimize and secure vulnerable and excess radioactive and nuclear
    materials so that they do not wind up in the hands of proliferators or
    terrorists. While the United States and the international community
    have made much progress in this regard, unfortunately it is the more
    difficult tasks that remain. Achieving these remaining goals and
    managing the minimization going forward will require renewed bilateral
    engagement and diplomacy, technological innovations, and NNSA
    leadership's support in swaying some key partners' willingness to
    collaborate.
        Second, I believe there is an ongoing need to confront the
    noncompliance threats posed by Iran and North Korea and be prepared for
    potential future arms control treaties with Russia or China. For Iran
    and North Korea, NNSA in partnership with the IAEA and international
    community needs to develop the technological tools and capabilities to
    prevent or address noncompliance challenges. In the event of new arms
    control discussions with Russia or China, new technologies for
    monitoring and verification will be needed for the negotiations and to
    support any agreement. All of these efforts require continued research
    and development, invigorated human capital management and training
    efforts, and sustaining the necessary technical expertise and
    infrastructure.
        Finally, the third area that I will highlight is the need to keep
    pace with--and regulate--emerging technologies to mitigate their
    potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of their
    promising opportunities. This will likely require not just
    technological research and development but also the establishment of
    smart multilateral and bilateral policies and partnerships to reduce
    these threats.
        If confirmed, I look forward to assessing these key NNSA
    nonproliferation programs to identify where and what additional efforts
    may be required to meet these priorities, and to working with Congress
    to discuss resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation needed

               nonproliferation research and development (r&d)

        Question. NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of R&D efforts.
        If confirmed, what would be your nonproliferation R&D priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I believe NNSA should advance U.S. detection
    and characterization capabilities for early observation and persistent
    monitoring of foreign nuclear weapons production activities.
    Prioritizing the development of new tools and approaches, for example
    with R&D on artificial intelligence and leveraging open source and
    cross-government data, will enable earlier detection of proliferation
    activities and allow for a broader and more effective suite of U.S.
    Government options in response.
        Priority should also be given to advancing capabilities for global
    nuclear explosion monitoring and with targeted R&D on detecting low-
    yield and evasive nuclear testing. Both activities maintain our current
    capabilities and will develop the next generation of monitoring tools
    and expertise to meet emerging test monitoring challenges.
        Question. Do you believe that there are R&D areas that need more
    attention or funding? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. As was highlighted in President Biden's Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance, rapid changes in technology will shape
    every aspect of our lives and our national interests, but the direction
    and consequences of the technological revolution remain unsettled. As
    the pace of global innovation increases, emerging technologies such as
    advanced manufacturing or quantum computing will enable quicker and
    alternative pathways to weapons development. We must invest in R&D
    activities that will both exploit opportunities and assess
    vulnerabilities. We also must strengthen a whole-of-government approach
    to invest in high-priority innovative ideas and to be more effective at
    transitioning technologies to mission partners responsible for
    monitoring.
                            regulation and oversight
        Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
    they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
    external, and that these contribute to the challenges in staying under
    cost and on schedule for major projects.
        Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
    regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do
    you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs
    and efficient mission execution overall?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation
    across the nuclear security enterprise to include protection of the
    workforce, the public, and the environment in a way that is synergistic
    and supportive of mission execution. One opportunity is ensuring that
    safety is properly incorporated into the design and construction of the
    new NNSA nuclear facilities. This means early incorporation of safety
    expectations which have been established in relevant directives and
    regulations, the selection of qualified design and construction firms
    to lead projects and operations, with corresponding periodic reviews as
    they progress through important milestones, and the proper staffing of
    a technically qualified and diverse federal project team. These actions
    ensure appropriate safety systems and controls are identified early in
    the process and are validated throughout construction with capable
    staff to reduce rework and control costs.
        If confirmed, my team and I will work closely with the labs,
    plants, and sites to define continuous improvement of our regulatory
    functions to ensure that they reflect best business and risk management
    practices, and enable mission success.
        Question. In your view, are the labs are subject to the appropriate
    level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
    Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or
    Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
    duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
        Answer. Several reports (Mies-Augustine, CRENEL, GAO, NAPA/NAS)
    highlighted the need for NNSA to improve and make its oversight more
    effective. Based on insights from these external reviews and lessons
    learned, I understand NNSA has improved its Site Governance model to
    ensure mission objectives are met; protection of the workforce, public,
    and the environment; and operations are effectively accomplished in
    compliance with contract requirements. I believe it is important to
    sustain progress made and to continue to look for additional
    improvements, and if confirmed, I would be dedicated to this pursuit.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
    structures would you recommend, and why?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with existing
    regulatory and oversight structures to assess the current environment
    and what additional changes would offer more improvement.
                         organizational climate survey
        Question. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command
    climate survey to the NNSA workforce under your leadership and
    management--including the workforces of the labs and other
    geographically-separate components of NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work to understand the organizational
    climate across NNSA's nuclear security enterprise, conduct a survey of
    the NNSA leadership and management, and evaluate options for conducting
    surveys across the components of NNSA.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
    sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the DOE and NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to consult with the NNSA equal
    opportunity office (EEO), NNSA Diversity Manager, DOE-Inspector
    General, and other stakeholders to obtain information on the current
    climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination issues at
    DOE and NNSA, and take appropriate action in consultation with the
    leadership of DOE and NNSA.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee or contractor of the DOE or NNSA?
        Answer. If I become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    gender discrimination from an NNSA employee, I will consult with the
    experts at NNSA to ensure NNSA personnel follow all policies and
    procedures to ensure such complaints are taken seriously and
    investigated. I will ensure any corrective actions identified in the
    investigation are quickly carried out. I will re-emphasize to the
    responsible managers and supervisors that the employee who raised the
    complaint must be treated in accordance with all federal laws and DOE
    regulations.
        I will also expect M&O partners to ensure their employees work in
    an environment free of discrimination, including on the basis of
    gender. If I become aware of a claim of sexual harassment or gender
    discrimination from a contractor employee, I will work with the NNSA
    experts and NNSA team responsible for oversight of that contract to
    facilitate contractor compliance with the non-discrimination provisions
    of its contract.
        I would also look to implement the recommendations in the GAO
    review of sexual harassment in the NNSA nuclear security forces. Those
    recommendations include better understanding and improving the culture
    to get information more complete than waiting for discrimination
    complaints.
                            notification of congress
        Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly
    notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
    security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
        Answer. Yes.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                  nominations
        1. Senator Hirono. Ms. Hruby, as part of my responsibility as a
    member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
    of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
    of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
    to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
    adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
    or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Ms. Hruby. No.

        2. Senator Hirono. Ms. Hruby, have any of you ever faced discipline
    or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Ms. Hruby. No.
                        modernizing the nuclear arsenal
        3. Senator Hirono. Ms. Hruby, the Biden administration has begun a
    series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our
    nuclear posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most
    pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?
        Ms. Hruby. For NNSA, there are two key components to nuclear
    modernization: the need to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile
    itself, and the need to recapitalize its supporting infrastructure.
    Over the past 30 years, weapons modernization programs were postponed,
    and infrastructure has been allowed to decay, threatening our critical
    capabilities and capacity to ensure the deterrent's viability into the
    future. It is imperative that we continue to support efforts to address
    both our aging stockpile and our deteriorating infrastructure if we are
    to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
                         domestic tritium supply chain
        4. Senator Cramer. Ms. Hruby, regarding the nuclear deterrent, and
    the tritium supply chain needed to maintain it, do you agree that using
    uranium that is mined, converted, and enriched in the United States,
    using fully domestic technology, is the right policy for our Nation -
    so that we are never dependent on the good graces of another country
    when it comes to maintaining our nuclear arsenal?
        Mr. Hruby. Yes. The United States has a longstanding policy that
    requires the reactor fuel used to produce tritium to be
    ``unobligated,'' that is, free from any peaceful use restrictions that
    can arise from foreign sources.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
         kansas city national nuclear security administration facility
        5. Senator Hawley. Ms. Hruby, will you agree to keep me informed as
    the courses of actions and decision criteria are developed for the
    expansion of the Kansas City National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) facility?
        Mr. Hruby. Yes.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                                 modernization
        6. Senator Tuberville. Ms. Hruby, nearly 40 percent of NNSA's
    facilities date back to World War II. What do you need to modernize
    NNSA infrastructure and facilities?
        Mr. Hruby. Revitalizing NNSA infrastructure requires maintaining a
    unique, geographically dispersed enterprise in which more than half of
    the facilities are in insufficient condition and many are at their life
    expectancy. Predictable and reliable funding for maintenance,
    operations, recapitalization, and other infrastructure activities is
    necessary for reversing long-term deferred maintenance trends.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Ms. Jill M. Hruby follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Ms. Jill M. Hruby, which was
    transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Jill M.
    Hruby in connection with her nomination follows:]

         [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Ms. Jill M. Hruby was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on July 22, 2021.]
                                     ______

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Frank A. Rose by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                            qualification and duties
        Question. Section 2403 of title 50, U.S. Code, provides that the
    Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) shall be appointed ``from among persons who have
    extensive background in organizational management and are well
    qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
    materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that
    advances and protects the national security of the United States.''
        What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. I have over 20 years of experience in positions at the U.S.
    Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, and
    private sector working on nuclear strategy, deterrence, arms control,
    strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging
    security challenges. I currently am a senior fellow and the co-director
    of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign
    Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining
    Brookings, I served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms
    Control, Verification, and Compliance from 2014-17. From 2009-14, I
    served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and
    Defense Policy. Additionally, I previously served as a professional
    staff member on both the House Permanent Select Committee on
    Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
    Administrator? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe my previous experience working in Congress and
    the U.S. Departments of State and Defense have prepared me to perform
    the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator. However, I strongly
    believe in the value of continuous learning.
        If confirmed, I would surround myself with a highly trained team
    from across NNSA and its nuclear security enterprise. I would also
    regularly engage with all elements of NNSA's enterprise to further
    understand NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges in order
    to ensure NNSA can execute its vitally important missions.
        Section 2403 further provides that the Principal Deputy
    Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
    the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
    activities among the elements of the Administration.''
        Question. What is your understanding of the role you would play in
    the day-to-day administration of the NNSA, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be the alter ego of the Administrator,
    ensuring the Administrator's direction for the NNSA is carried out. As
    a practical matter, I would expect to be focused on the internal
    workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with other
    Departmental organizations. This allows the Administrator to address
    the strategic challenges and outward facing interactions necessary to
    accomplish the NNSA mission.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to the
    coordination of activities among the Deputy Administrators, NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would
    assist the Administrator in overseeing the NNSA programs that are led
    by the Deputy Administrators. I see my role as the Principal Deputy
    Administrator to work closely with each of the Deputy Administrators to
    ensure they can effectively execute the missions under their
    cognizance. In particular, the role of Principal Deputy Administrator
    coordinates development and implementation of policy and guidance,
    strategic planning, program managements, budgeting, resource
    allocation, safeguards and security, emergency management, contracts,
    and hiring to be enablers for the primary mission programs of the NNSA.
        Question. How, if at all, might your coordinating role be different
    with regard to the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors?
        Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors oversees the
    Naval Nuclear Enterprise and naval nuclear laboratories. If confirmed,
    I will have responsibilities in oversight of the nuclear security
    enterprise, comprised of the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites. My
    role as the Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA is to manage the
    NNSA support functions to enable the Deputy Administrator for Naval
    Reactors in executing his unique responsibilities in delivering nuclear
    propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's operational requirements
        Question. Are there any special projects or tasks on which you
    would focus, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator and
    whatever duties or initiatives she may seek to implement to improve the
    NNSA's nuclear security mission. I am ready and willing to take on any
    projects or tasks that will benefit our nation's nuclear security
    enterprise.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you
    expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of
    the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Administrator to determine what additional duties and functions I will
    be assigned. I stand ready to support the Administrator in furthering
    the Administration's efforts to modernize and recapitalize our nation's
    nuclear security enterprise.
                           challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are currently the broad organizational
    challenges and priorities for the NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's priorities
    to ensure NNSA meets our nation's national security requirements, and
    NNSA continues to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of
    Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. The United States has not adequately
    invested the funds to sustain a modern, flexible, and responsive
    infrastructure. Most of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old and
    nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. If confirmed, I
    will work closely with the Administrator to execute the priorities that
    have been identified.
        Question. In your view, what are the currently the major challenges
    for the next Principal Deputy Administrator?
        Answer. NNSA must modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile,
    associated infrastructure, and reestablish production capabilities. In
    addition, NNSA must also continue to prevent, counter, monitor, and
    respond to proliferation threats around the world. To be successful in
    all of NNSA's mission areas, we must recruit and retain a workforce
    that is second-to-none. I will work with the Administrator to support
    the NNSA Management and Operating (M&O) partners to attract and retain
    a top-notch workforce in the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites while
    reestablishing the corporate knowledge necessary to modernize our
    stockpile.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges, and
    on what timeline?
        Answer. If confirmed, it will be important for me to work with the
    Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy,
    each of the NNSA Deputy Administrators, and the leaders in other
    federal agencies to identify solutions to these challenges and then
    assist to develop appropriate plans and timelines to implement them.
        Question. In your view, what should be the main priorities for the
    next Principal Deputy Administrator specifically?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on the challenges and priorities
    outlined by the Administrator and assigned to me by the Administrator.
    It will require critical thinking and planning to address the
    challenges and tackle the priorities. I will need to develop close
    working relationships with people at NNSA, the laboratories, the
    plants, the sites, the Department of Energy, other federal agencies,
    Congress, and allies.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate
    progress in regard to these priorities?
        Answer. I will engage with and empower NNSA leaders to coordinate
    with DOD, State Department, the National Security Council, and other
    executive branch agencies on defining NNSA requirements, and work
    closely with Congress to explain how NNSA will meet the requirements.
                                 relationships
        Question. Please describe your understanding of the legal and ``in
    practice'' relationship between the Principal Deputy Administrator and
    each of the following officials. Indicate also if there are any special
    considerations that, if confirmed, you would apply to your relationship
    with each such official(s):
        The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to
    the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the
    absence of the Administrator, I would represent NNSA.
        Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.
        Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the NNSA's Deputy
    Administrators to ensure each can execute their respective missions.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
    Management.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary
    of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management
    issues that intersect with the needs of NNSA.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical
    and Biological Defense Programs.
        Answer. NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
    primary interface with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical and Biological Defense. If confirmed, I will support the
    priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Assistant Secretary,
    as appropriate.
        Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will represent and support the priorities
    of the Administrator and NNSA to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council.
        Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will represent the priorities of the
    Administrator and NNSA with the Commander of the United States
    Strategic Command.
        Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
    Administrator and NNSA to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and
    Navy.
        Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and
    Project Management.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA in
    providing support and management oversight for the Associate
    Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management.
        Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
    Administrator and NNSA to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
        Question. Nuclear Posture Review.
        Answer. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the
    Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our
    stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary
    of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking
    regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and
    the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the
    nuclear mission.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of
    the Biden Administration's NPR?
        Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA, I
    will support both the Administrator and the Secretary of Energy as they
    navigate the NPR process and represent Department equities. NNSA's
    responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of
    the nation's nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation,
    promoting international nuclear safety and security, and developing
    technologies to monitor arms control agreements mean we must be at the
    table for discussions of nuclear policy.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you
    recommend the Biden Administration consider?
        Answer. I am not currently involved in ongoing nuclear policy
    discussions within the Administration, but, if confirmed, I would urge
    the Biden administration to consider the importance of revitalizing and
    investing in the infrastructure and capabilities needed to support our
    nation's nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements in the
    U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the
    full and timely support of NNSA to the work required to implement those
    enhancements?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of
    additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to
    supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the
    new requirements?
        Answer. Yes.
                               overall management
        Question. Section 4132(c)(3) of title 41, U.S. Code, establishes
    that the Administrator, NNSA `` . . . shall be subject to the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such
    authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy
    Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation.''
        What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
    Energy and the NNSA in statute and recent practice?
        Answer. NNSA can only be successful if there is a positive and
    strong working relationship between the Secretary of Energy, Deputy
    Secretary of Energy, NNSA Administrator, and NNSA Principal Deputy
    Administrator. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure DOE and NNSA
    have good working relations.
        Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
    forth in law, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure? What makes
    NNSA different from other components of Department of Energy (DOE)--in
    both law and practice?
        Answer. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA is designated as a semi-autonomous
    organization; the organizations led by other DOE undersecretaries are
    not structured in this way. This is a unique authority and
    responsibility that gives the NNSA Administrator authority over
    functions that also reside in DOE. If confirmed, I will prioritize
    building strong, mission-focused, and effective culture and processes
    across those functions, in close collaboration with the leadership of
    DOE.
        Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
    operational effectiveness, if confirmed, would you recommend any
    changes to the organizational structure of in NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on continuing NNSA's recent
    progress in its approach to governance and management by strengthening
    communication and integration across the nuclear security enterprise to
    make sure we have effective partnerships between federal employees, the
    laboratories, plants, and sites, and our interagency mission partners.
    I will work with the Administrator and NNSA leadership to clearly
    define lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and to
    consolidate NNSA's progress in strategic oversight and project
    management.
               relationship with the department of defense (dod)
        Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) sets requirements for
    nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of the NNSA.
    DOD has been described as NNSA's primary customer, as well as its
    partner.
        If confirmed, what would be your role in supporting the
    Administrator of the NNSA in executing their duties and functions as a
    member of the NWC?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in executing
    her duties as a member of the NWC by ensuring that there is a
    communication flow at the staff, management, and leadership levels to
    facilitate discussion and understanding on key issues including
    requirements, budget, and stockpile activities.
        Question. How would you describe the relationship between NNSA and
    the DOD?
        Answer. From what I have observed, NNSA's relationship with DOD is
    healthy with dialogue and collaboration at both the working and senior
    levels.
        Question. What is your assessment of the health of that
    relationship at both senior- and working-levels?
        Answer. From what I have observed, the relationship today is
    healthy and, if confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator in
    continuing to strengthen this relationship.
        Question. If confirmed, what might you recommend to improve this
    relationship?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to keeping an open mind on
    opportunities to further enhance this relationship. I will work
    collaboratively with the Administrator on these efforts.
                                  nnsa budget
        Question. In 2015, then-Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz wrote to
    the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding
    NNSA's budget allocation for the ensuing five years that ``an
    additional $5.2 billion over fiscal year 2018-2021 [was] needed to
    establish a viable and sustainable program portfolio'' and that
    ``[f]ailure to address these requirements in the near term will put the
    NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in fiscal year 2018.''
    Then-Secretary Moniz added that, if uncorrected, the budget proposal
    would ``lack credibility.'' The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
    included an additional $3 billion above the President's budget request.
        Do you believe that the $3 billion increase was adequate and
    sufficient to render the budget request ``credible'', particularly in
    light of NNSA's stockpile stewardship responsibilities and the
    recommendations of the 2018 NPR? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe the $3 billion increase provided in fiscal year
    2021 is adequate for this fiscal year as it is the most robust funding
    in the history of NNSA. This is an area I will assess further if
    confirmed.
        Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget
    before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
    ensure it can meet DOD requirements.
        Answer. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this
    provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to
    review the budget before its submission to OMB?
        I do not know the specifics of how NNSA, the NWC, and OMB
    mechanically share budget information and comply with the provision. If
    confirmed, I am committed to making sure there is open, clear, and
    consistent communication regarding NNSA's budget with the NWC.
                                   personnel
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
    civilian employees to perform its mission? Please explain your answer.
        If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to work with the
    Administrator to review staffing needs and challenges across NNSA to
    ensure the appropriate skills mix and number of personnel are in place
    to accomplish its national security missions.
        Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
    civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
    personnel accomplish that NNSA is unable to accomplish today? If
    confirmed, which specific components within the NNSA would you
    recommend growing and how much growth would you recommend? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure
    that NNSA is equipped to accomplish its missions. I understand that
    NNSA's mission has been steadily increasing, and I will work to ensure
    staffing levels are commensurate with the expanding workload.
        Question. In your view, does NNSA rely too heavily on contractors
    and a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator and the
    M&O mission partners to ensure we maintain the correct mix of federal
    and contracting employees.
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
    capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
    to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.
        Answer. Ensuring NNSA has the appropriate capabilities to execute
    the mission is critical for the nuclear security enterprise. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator to ensure that
    NNSA continues to recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals
    needed to execute its missions.
        Question. If not, please explain what skill sets, areas of
    expertise, or other capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure
    that NNSA is fully mission capable?
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the
    necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor
    workforces?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator to ensure
    NNSA is executing a hiring strategy, in partnership with NNSA's M&O
    partners, to bring the best and brightest into the nuclear security
    enterprise. This should include outreach to colleges and universities
    and participation in career fairs near NNSA labs, plants, and sites.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend to
    retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design
    capabilities, in the NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the
    labs and the plants?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
    M&O mission partners to ensure we explore the most effective paths to
    recruit and retain the world's best engineers, scientists, and support
    personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
    the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are
    maintained in NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs
    and the plants?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources and
    training specialists to understand what is already in place and where
    there are opportunities for improvement. Where appropriate, I will make
    the necessary changes to ensure there is an adequate and appropriate
    technical workforce in place. I will also expand communications with
    the NNSA labs, plants, and site to understand how NNSA can best support
    their recruitment and training requirements.
        Question. In your view, does NNSA leadership need any additional
    authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the
    federal civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources
    specialists to assess whether any additional authorities are required.
                      construction and project management
        Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
    and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
    facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry
    and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel
    Fabrication Facility, and others.
        In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
    failures in project management?
        Answer. I understand that NNSA has made a concerted effort to
    address project management challenges over the last decade. Based on my
    understanding, these challenges included issues related to ill-defined
    project requirements and schedules, improper estimating, contractual
    problems, and lack of proper planning.
        If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA continues to remain on a path
    toward improved project management.
        Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
    practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
    these problems? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. NNSA's decision to create the Office of Acquisition and
    Project Management in 2011 has led to significant improvements. More
    can always be done. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
    implementation of best business practices, as well as using lessons
    learned to improve early project planning and requirements development
    to prevent cost growth. If confirmed, I would also ensure there are
    sufficient qualified acquisition and project management specialists
    overseeing NNSA's growing portfolio.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    ensure that these systemic project management failures are not repeated
    in the future? What specific changes in policy, practice, organization,
    or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring improved contract
    and project management across NNSA. I would recommend rigorous project
    management practices and cost estimating, clarified lines of authority,
    holding federal and contractor personnel accountable, and providing
    independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight.
        Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
    additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of
    these project management failures? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review Departmental regulations that
    govern capital acquisition projects and how they apply to NNSA
    activities. Until then, I will ensure that NNSA staff have the
    resources needed to further projects while staying within Departmental
    regulations.
        Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of systemic
    project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the
    Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), in the
    Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). CEPE now reports directly to
    the Administrator, NNSA
        In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets
    allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide
    independent cost estimates and other additional costing and project
    management advice internal to NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to
    determine if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.
        Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
    data and information to execute its statutory mission?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review CEPE's authority and access to
    understand if further improvements are needed.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
    support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How will you
    balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of
    taxpayer dollars?
        Answer. CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities are valuable
    to NNSA. CEPE's independence is critical to providing both the
    Principal Deputy Administrator and the Administrator with independent,
    data driven analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its
    independence and review the resources available to it.
        Question. If confirmed, will you commit to facilitating CEPE
    personnel access to the Administrator and to you?
        Answer. Yes.
                            safeguards and security
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Principal
    Deputy Administrator in ensuring safety and security in the nuclear
    weapons complex?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to be
    engaged on initiatives to improve safety at NNSA's facilities including
    a healthy safety culture. This includes implementing a Governance and
    Management structure which emphasizes transparency, trust, and
    collaboration to address challenges. I will work with our Management
    and Operating partners to establish expectations for sustained safety
    performance with successful mission accomplishment. I will reinforce
    that sustained safety performance and mission accomplishments can
    mutually support each other to achieve mission success.
        I will also work with the Administrator and the security program
    office to ensure that we have systems and processes in place to prevent
    security lapses. I also anticipate being engaged on all initiatives to
    improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security at NNSA's
    facilities. Additionally, I will work with NNSA's Management and
    Operating partners to make sure our governance and management works to
    achieve those objectives while emphasizing continuous improvement in
    both safety and security.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
    threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?
        Answer. I firmly believe that the safety and security of the NNSA's
    facilities and nuclear material are of the utmost importance and it is
    critical that the NNSA has the appropriate authorities and funding from
    Congress to mitigate these threats. As part of this, addressing the
    continued challenges of ageing infrastructure is critically important
    to ensure that NNSA is advancing the mission with state-of-the-art
    facilities, with modern safety designs. If confirmed, I will work with
    the Administrator to emphasize and address NNSA's commitment to operate
    safely while accomplishing the mission and mitigate security threats
    such as cyber, material, transportation, and physical threats to NNSA's
    operations.
        Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have in NNSA's
    interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?
        Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of a healthy
    working relationship with the DNFSB and open lines of communication.
    While it is my understanding the Deputy Secretary of Energy manages the
    Department's overall interface with the DNFSB, if confirmed, I will
    work through the Administrator and Deputy Secretary of Energy on
    DNFSB's recommendations and advice regarding public health and safety
    issues at NNSA's facilities.
        Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
    Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported on a number of accidents
    at the national laboratories in recent years. These accidents included
    explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that led to the
    partial shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory--
    placing both personnel and mission execution at risk. Yet, while
    personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by
    definition involves some of the most hazardous materials known to
    exist. Thus, if the labs' nuclear mission is to be accomplished, risk
    can never be eliminated completely.
        In your view, what is the proper balance between safety, risk, and
    mission accomplishment at the national laboratories? How should this
    balancing be accomplished, in your view?
        Answer. NNSA must have sustained, strong safety performance. Safety
    and mission success mutually support each other. This is balanced by
    properly assessing risk and controlling and managing that risk.
        If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will continue to
    focus on fostering our partnership between the labs and plants and
    emphasize continuous improvement in safely and successfully executing
    the NNSA mission. I will also be committed to empowering employees to
    anticipate, identify, report, and resolve safety issues.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
    safety culture at the labs, while still meeting mission requirements?
        Answer. The key to having a positive safety environment is
    establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership which I
    will do with the Administrator through my interactions with Management
    and Operating partners' leadership. I will emphasize the long-term
    commitment to safe operations through the establishment of an effective
    governance and management culture. I will also emphasize the critical
    nature of effectively empowering and engaging with employees to give
    feedback while also stressing organizational learning. The
    reinforcement of these attributes provides the foundation to improve
    safety culture. I will also stress a strong safety conscious work
    environment so employees will feel comfortable in raising safety issues
    with leaders prepared to effectively address those issues. I will
    encourage and provide support to our leadership so they have all the
    necessary tools to effectively address any safety concerns.
                               plutonium strategy
        Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
    Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former
    Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce
    approximately 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not
    less than 80 pits per year.
        What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its ability to
    achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of
    the ongoing stockpile program?
        Answer. I believe work at Los Alamos is on track to achieve the
    goal of producing 30 pits per year in 2026, supporting the overall
    requirement for 80 pits per year. Moreover, I know that NNSA has to
    succeed in this effort. The United States currently does not produce
    any war reserve pits and we must do so to maintain our nuclear
    deterrence in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to being focused
    on making sure Los Alamos does, in fact, get to 30 pits per year in
    2026.
        Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the
    former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its
    pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the
    ongoing stockpile program?
        Answer. The former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, or
    MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that
    provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in an existing
    facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements
    for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include
    repurposing and transitioning the MFFF into a safe, secure, compliant,
    and efficient pit production facility.
                    uranium strategy and tritium production
        Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for
    tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the
    Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1
    Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be
    used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium
    nor the technology used to enrich it carries an ``obligation'' from a
    foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-
    weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
    ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending
    recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for
    unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-
    blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for
    obtaining unobligated uranium.
        Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic
    uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?
        Answer. Yes, the United States needs to re-establish a domestic
    uranium enrichment capability to ensure a reliable supply of enriched
    uranium to support U.S. national security needs. Since the closure of
    the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, in 2013,
    the United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched uranium
    free of peaceful use obligations, i.e., unobligated. Mission needs for
    enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States'
    remaining HEU stockpile (by downblending the HEU to produce LEU), which
    is a finite and currently irreplaceable source.
        Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a
    capability?
        Answer. As I understand it, NNSA is currently implementing a long-
    term strategy that meets current needs and seeks to re-establish
    domestic uranium enrichment capabilities: Downblending HEU to LEU to
    extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044; developing enrichment
    technology options; and executing an acquisition process to deploy an
    enrichment technology. An effective and cost-efficient solution for re-
    establishing enrichment capabilities will be identified through an
    ongoing Analysis of Alternatives.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        Question. What do you believe should be the highest priorities of
    NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs?
        Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is the lead
    U.S. agency for reducing nuclear and radiological threats globally,
    including the threat of nuclear proliferation among hostile states and
    terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials. DNN must
    continue to provide a comprehensive defense-in-depth against
    proliferant states and non-state actors from obtaining, acquiring, and
    developing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. NNSA must work
    in close cooperation with interagency and international partners to
    carry out its nuclear threat reduction programs and to anticipate and
    respond to technological advances that may threaten the nation's
    security. Finally, NNSA must sustain the unparalleled scientific and
    technical prowess at NNSA's national laboratories, plants, and sites,
    which is crucial to understanding this evolving threat environment, and
    we must maintain these capabilities, including the facilities and
    intellectual capital, to reduce global nuclear threats globally.
        Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements
    needed in the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs? If so, what
    improvements would you envision?
        Answer. While I would not term these as ``needed improvements,''
    necessarily, there are programmatic challenges facing NNSA's nuclear
    nonproliferation efforts, including:
          Increasingly rapid technological advancements lowering
    the bar to proliferation, including the diffusion of dual-use,
    emerging, and disruptive technologies;
          Eroding nuclear norms and regime cohesion, including the
    inability to reach consensus within key multilateral fora (e.g.,
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty);
          Hiring challenges posed by the continued attrition and
    retirements; and
          The ranging political will, practical capabilities, and
    absorption ability of international partners.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in
    implementing the improvements you envision?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Administrator, other Departmental elements, interagency, and laboratory
    colleagues to identify and enable the strategic, technical, human
    resource, and diplomatic tools to help address these challenges.
        Question. What improvements do you recommend to NNSA's efforts in
    verification and monitoring?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and DNN to
    evaluate investing in efforts that advance innovative capabilities in
    industry, academia, and the national laboratories to support and
    sustain solutions for the difficult challenges ahead. NNSA must
    continue its support for investments in research and development of
    technology to support detection and verification efforts for
    nonproliferation and arms control regimes and renew its commitment to
    harnessing the power of science to minimize nuclear threats around the
    world.
        Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
    nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs if
    confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation
    would NNSA require to meet such needs?
        Answer. First, I believe there is an ongoing need to address the
    threats posed by North Korea and Iran, working with international
    partners. Second, there is an enduring need to secure vulnerable and
    excess nuclear and radioactive materials globally. Several countries
    retain inventories of separated plutonium and excess highly enriched
    uranium (HEU), which the United States is unable to remove, or confirm
    the disposition of, due to lack of a political path forward. Finally,
    we must keep pace with and regulate emerging technologies to mitigate
    their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of
    their promising opportunities.
        Question. What do you think are the five most significant lessons
    learned for NNSA from the mismanagement of the MOX project? How will
    these lessons learned be implemented in future NNSA projects such as
    those related to the dilution and disposal of plutonium?
        Answer. I am aware NNSA experienced major project management
    challenges with the MOX project. If confirmed, I look forward to
    getting briefed on the project to learn more about the intricacies of
    the challenges associated with it. Further, I will ensure the lessons
    learned from it will be enforced and strengthened for NNSA's other
    capital acquisition projects.
                            regulation and oversight
        Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
    they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
    external, and that this contributes to the challenges in staying under
    cost and on schedule for major projects.
        Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
    regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do
    you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs
    and efficient mission execution overall?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation of
    all NNSA facilities. This is all-encompassing and includes the
    protection of the NNSA workforce, the public, and the environment. I
    will ensure that safety is properly incorporated into the design and
    construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. This is a cradle-to-grave
    approach encompassing safety expectations being communicated early in
    the conception of the project in accordance with relevant directives
    and regulations, periodic review of projects and operations as they
    progress through important milestones, the selection of qualified
    design and construction firms to lead them, and the proper staffing of
    a technically qualified federal project team. I believe this holistic
    approach and effective engagement from conception to execution of
    projects will reduce rework and control costs.
        I recognize the oversight challenges NNSA faces getting alignment
    with their partners regarding safety expectations through the
    application of directives which have been developed over time; and I
    believe there is room for improvement in the implementation of these
    directives. I support NNSA's approach to being a learning organization
    and learn from our past and leverage best practices. This includes
    NNSA's streamline of its directives and requirements, leverage general
    industry standards, and management of risk inherent in the construction
    of non- hazardous facilities.
        I am committed to ensuring NNSA's projects and operations are
    conducted in a safe and effective manner and follow all applicable
    environmental, safety, and construction rules. I am also committed to
    using standard approaches to help streamline execution of NNSA's
    mission work in alignment with the complexity of the projects.
    Streamlining the construction of low-risk, non-nuclear, commercial-like
    construction projects is an area where NNSA (and the bidding community)
    can benefit the most.
        Through data-informed, priority investment decisions in support of
    NNSA's current and future missions, the risk posed by aging
    infrastructure to NNSA's workforce, the environment, and its mission
    can be significantly reduced.
        Question. In your view, are the labs subject to an appropriate
    level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
    Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or
    Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
    duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
        Answer. Strong governance and management oversight by NNSA are key
    pillars in accomplishing the missions and goals of the entire nuclear
    security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that a proper
    balance exists between oversight and mission execution. Additionally,
    if confirmed, I will work to build relationships across the complex
    with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government
    Accountability Office, and Congress to ensure that there exists a
    proper balance between oversight and mission execution. Clear roles and
    responsibilities are essential.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
    structures would you recommend, and why?
        Answer. Making sure that NNSA's missions are executed in an
    effective, efficient manner is important. If confirmed, I will assess
    what changes are necessary to ensure mission execution with proper
    regulations and oversight.
                                defense programs
        Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the
    annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.
        Do you believe that the capabilities exist today to ensure that the
    stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons
    testing? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program uses a science-
    based assessment of the reliability of nuclear weapons to assess and
    certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. For the last
    23 years, the three NNSA Laboratory Directors have certified that the
    stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and that additional
    underground nuclear explosive testing is not required at this time.
        Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for
    the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension
    programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the design
    of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.
        Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and in
    particular concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
    Programs to minimize risks to meeting schedule requirements.
        Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
    Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
    engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
    authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
        If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in supporting
    the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and making full use of the
    authorities it provides NNSA?
        Answer. I believe it is important to make investments in personnel,
    programs, and technologies that strengthen our ability to respond to
    emerging challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program and its goal to expand opportunities for young
    scientists and engineers to ensure we have a talented and capable array
    of nuclear security personnel across the enterprise.
        Question. In your view, what should be the long-term plan for the
    National Ignition Facility, and in particular, how would you assist the
    Administrator in the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition,
    which to date has not occurred?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, NNSA
    subject matter experts, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
    Congress to best identify the long-term plan for NIF. I do know that
    NIF is essential for understanding the physical properties and
    characteristics of nuclear weapons performance.
        Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
    what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
    NNSA missions?
        Answer. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program,
    delivers leading-edge computer platforms, sophisticated physics and
    engineering codes, and uniquely qualified staff to support addressing a
    wide variety of stockpile issues for design, physics certification,
    engineering qualification, and production. While there is certainly a
    role for other activities that utilize the ASC program, its primary use
    should continue to support stockpile stewardship.
                         facilities and infrastructure
        Question. More than half of NNSA's infrastructure is more than 40
    years old, and a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project. As
    former Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty testified in 2020, ``[T]ime is
    of the essence to recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire
    NNSA. Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch these
    facilities. We need to make sure that we have state of the art
    infrastructure, so we can recapitalize our enterprise and make sure
    that we can provide to the Department of Defense the requirements that
    they so sorely need to maintain our nuclear deterrent.'' This testimony
    post-dated by almost two years the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA directive to
    NNSA to establish the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, with the
    objective of reducing the backlog of deferred maintenance and repair
    needs by at least 30% by 2025.
        If confirmed, what factors would you consider in prioritizing work
    with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and
    Operations to address the required maintenance of NNSA infrastructure?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Associate
    Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to modernize
    and sustain NNSA's infrastructure. NNSA must undertake a risk-informed
    infrastructure strategy (or management approach) to repair, maintain,
    and replace facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. Reducing
    deferred maintenance, disposing of process-contaminated facilities, and
    streamlining execution of non-nuclear construction projects will be a
    key piece of the priorities I set to meet Congressional direction.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend to reduce
    risk in future major construction projects, such as those related to
    the lithium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will help NNSA ensure that future major
    projects are developed and executed utilizing well established program
    and project management principles including: ensuring that the project
    requirements are clearly defined and prioritized; proper cost estimates
    are completed and reviewed independently; sufficient design work and
    technological development is completed prior to commencing a project's
    construction; and monitoring progress to ensure projects remain on
    schedule and on budget.
                             organizational climate
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
    in ensuring that the NNSA workplace, including that of NNSA's
    geographically-separated labs and other components promotes the dignity
    of and respect for all persons?
        Answer. Respect is one of my core values, and one, if confirmed, I
    will ensure at NNSA. If confirmed, I will serve as a role model by
    treating each employee with dignity and respect and would ensure that
    all employees foster an inclusive environment where every perspective
    is recognized and diversity of thought is valued.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
    sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to creating a workplace that
    is safe and welcoming to all people. As the Principal Deputy
    Administrator, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to learn more
    about the current NNSA climate and taking steps to improve the
    environment.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the DOE, NNSA, or a component
    thereof?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will take complaints of sexual harassment
    or discrimination seriously. All employees have the right to feel safe
    in the workplace and must be treated fairly. I will work to ensure such
    complaints are reviewed and responded to quickly, including appropriate
    corrective action and discipline if warranted.
                            notification of congress
        Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly
    notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
    security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
        Answer. Yes.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                  nominations
        1. Senator Hirono. Mr. Rose, as part of my responsibility as a
    member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
    of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
    of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
    to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
    adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
    or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Mr. Rose. No.

        2. Senator Hirono. Mr. Rose, have any of you ever faced discipline
    or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Mr. Rose. No.
                        modernizing the nuclear arsenal
        3. Senator Hirono. Mr. Rose, the Biden administration has begun a
    series of reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our
    nuclear posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most
    pressing nuclear modernization issue we face?
        Mr. Rose. Nuclear modernization cannot take place without a skilled
    workforce. Given that more than one-third of the NNSA workforce will be
    eligible to retire in the next five years, ensuring that the NNSA is
    able to recruit and retain the next generation of highly qualified
    engineers and scientists is critical to the national security needs of
    the United States.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                             minuteman iii missiles
        4. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Rose, some think we could just keep on
    keeping on with the Minuteman III ICBMs. What would keeping those old
    weapons on hand look like financially and what would it look like
    strategically?
        Mr. Rose. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for
    decisions concerning the warhead delivery system programs. I would
    refer questions regarding the financial and strategic impacts of
    maintaining the Minuteman III system to the DOD.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. Frank A. Rose follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Mr. Frank A. Rose, which was
    transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Frank A.
    Rose in connection with his nomination follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Mr. Frank A. Rose was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2021.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum
    by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                            qualification and duties
        Question. Section 2403 of title 50, U.S. Code, provides that the
    Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) shall be appointed ``from among persons who have
    extensive background in organizational management and are well
    qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
    materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that
    advances and protects the national security of the United States.''
        What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. I have over 20 years of experience in positions at the U.S.
    Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, and
    private sector working on nuclear strategy, deterrence, arms control,
    strategic stability, missile defense, outer space, and emerging
    security challenges. I currently am a senior fellow and the co-director
    of the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign
    Policy program at the Brookings Institution. Prior to joining
    Brookings, I served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms
    Control, Verification, and Compliance from 2014-17. From 2009-14, I
    served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and
    Defense Policy. Additionally, I previously served as a professional
    staff member on both the House Permanent Select Committee on
    Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
    Administrator? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe my previous experience working in Congress and
    the U.S. Departments of State and Defense have prepared me to perform
    the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator. However, I strongly
    believe in the value of continuous learning.
        If confirmed, I would surround myself with a highly trained team
    from across NNSA and its nuclear security enterprise. I would also
    regularly engage with all elements of NNSA's enterprise to further
    understand NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges in order
    to ensure NNSA can execute its vitally important missions.
        Section 2403 further provides that the Principal Deputy
    Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
    the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
    activities among the elements of the Administration.''
        Question. What is your understanding of the role you would play in
    the day-to-day administration of the NNSA, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be the alter ego of the Administrator,
    ensuring the Administrator's direction for the NNSA is carried out. As
    a practical matter, I would expect to be focused on the internal
    workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with other
    Departmental organizations. This allows the Administrator to address
    the strategic challenges and outward facing interactions necessary to
    accomplish the NNSA mission.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to the
    coordination of activities among the Deputy Administrators, NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would
    assist the Administrator in overseeing the NNSA programs that are led
    by the Deputy Administrators. I see my role as the Principal Deputy
    Administrator to work closely with each of the Deputy Administrators to
    ensure they can effectively execute the missions under their
    cognizance. In particular, the role of Principal Deputy Administrator
    coordinates development and implementation of policy and guidance,
    strategic planning, program managements, budgeting, resource
    allocation, safeguards and security, emergency management, contracts,
    and hiring to be enablers for the primary mission programs of the NNSA.
        Question. How, if at all, might your coordinating role be different
    with regard to the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors?
        Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors oversees the
    Naval Nuclear Enterprise and naval nuclear laboratories. If confirmed,
    I will have responsibilities in oversight of the nuclear security
    enterprise, comprised of the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites. My
    role as the Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA is to manage the
    NNSA support functions to enable the Deputy Administrator for Naval
    Reactors in executing his unique responsibilities in delivering nuclear
    propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's operational requirements
        Question. Are there any special projects or tasks on which you
    would focus, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator and
    whatever duties or initiatives she may seek to implement to improve the
    NNSA's nuclear security mission. I am ready and willing to take on any
    projects or tasks that will benefit our nation's nuclear security
    enterprise.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you
    expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) would prescribe for you, particularly in light of
    the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Administrator to determine what additional duties and functions I will
    be assigned. I stand ready to support the Administrator in furthering
    the Administration's efforts to modernize and recapitalize our nation's
    nuclear security enterprise.
                           challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are currently the broad organizational
    challenges and priorities for the NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's priorities
    to ensure NNSA meets our nation's national security requirements, and
    NNSA continues to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of
    Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. The United States has not adequately
    invested the funds to sustain a modern, flexible, and responsive
    infrastructure. Most of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old and
    nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. If confirmed, I
    will work closely with the Administrator to execute the priorities that
    have been identified.
        Question. In your view, what are the currently the major challenges
    for the next Principal Deputy Administrator?
        Answer. NNSA must modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile,
    associated infrastructure, and reestablish production capabilities. In
    addition, NNSA must also continue to prevent, counter, monitor, and
    respond to proliferation threats around the world. To be successful in
    all of NNSA's mission areas, we must recruit and retain a workforce
    that is second-to-none. I will work with the Administrator to support
    the NNSA Management and Operating (M&O) partners to attract and retain
    a top-notch workforce in the NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites while
    reestablishing the corporate knowledge necessary to modernize our
    stockpile.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges, and
    on what timeline?
        Answer. If confirmed, it will be important for me to work with the
    Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy,
    each of the NNSA Deputy Administrators, and the leaders in other
    federal agencies to identify solutions to these challenges and then
    assist to develop appropriate plans and timelines to implement them.
        Question. In your view, what should be the main priorities for the
    next Principal Deputy Administrator specifically?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on the challenges and priorities
    outlined by the Administrator and assigned to me by the Administrator.
    It will require critical thinking and planning to address the
    challenges and tackle the priorities. I will need to develop close
    working relationships with people at NNSA, the laboratories, the
    plants, the sites, the Department of Energy, other federal agencies,
    Congress, and allies.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to effectuate
    progress in regard to these priorities?
        Answer. I will engage with and empower NNSA leaders to coordinate
    with DOD, State Department, the National Security Council, and other
    executive branch agencies on defining NNSA requirements, and work
    closely with Congress to explain how NNSA will meet the requirements.
                                 relationships
        Question. Please describe your understanding of the legal and ``in
    practice'' relationship between the Principal Deputy Administrator and
    each of the following officials. Indicate also if there are any special
    considerations that, if confirmed, you would apply to your relationship
    with each such official(s):
        The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to
    the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the
    absence of the Administrator, I would represent NNSA.
        Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.
        Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the NNSA's Deputy
    Administrators to ensure each can execute their respective missions.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
    Management.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary
    of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management
    issues that intersect with the needs of NNSA.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical
    and Biological Defense Programs.
        Answer. NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
    primary interface with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical and Biological Defense. If confirmed, I will support the
    priorities of the Administrator and NNSA with the Assistant Secretary,
    as appropriate.
        Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will represent and support the priorities
    of the Administrator and NNSA to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council.
        Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will represent the priorities of the
    Administrator and NNSA with the Commander of the United States
    Strategic Command.
        Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
    Administrator and NNSA to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and
    Navy.
        Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and
    Project Management.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA in
    providing support and management oversight for the Associate
    Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management.
        Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the priorities of the
    Administrator and NNSA to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
        Question. Nuclear Posture Review.
        Answer. The Biden Administration is considering conducting a new
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The last NPR, conducted in 2018 by the
    Trump Administration, emphasized the importance of modernizing our
    stockpile, NNSA facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary
    of Defense is the primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking
    regarding nuclear weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and
    the Administrator of NNSA are crucial to successful execution of the
    nuclear mission.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in the conduct of
    the Biden Administration's NPR?
        Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator for NNSA, I
    will support both the Administrator and the Secretary of Energy as they
    navigate the NPR process and represent Department equities. NNSA's
    responsibilities for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of
    the nation's nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation,
    promoting international nuclear safety and security, and developing
    technologies to monitor arms control agreements mean we must be at the
    table for discussions of nuclear policy.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes to the 2018 NPR would you
    recommend the Biden Administration consider?
        Answer. I am not currently involved in ongoing nuclear policy
    discussions within the Administration, but, if confirmed, I would urge
    the Biden administration to consider the importance of revitalizing and
    investing in the infrastructure and capabilities needed to support our
    nation's nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Should the upcoming NPR recommend enhancements in the
    U.S. nuclear posture, will you commit, if confirmed, to providing the
    full and timely support of NNSA to the work required to implement those
    enhancements?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of
    additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to
    supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the
    new requirements?
        Answer. Yes.
                               overall management
        Question. Section 4132(c)(3) of title 41, U.S. Code, establishes
    that the Administrator, NNSA `` . . . shall be subject to the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such
    authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy
    Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation.''
        What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
    Energy and the NNSA in statute and recent practice?
        Answer. NNSA can only be successful if there is a positive and
    strong working relationship between the Secretary of Energy, Deputy
    Secretary of Energy, NNSA Administrator, and NNSA Principal Deputy
    Administrator. If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure DOE and NNSA
    have good working relations.
        Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
    forth in law, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure? What makes
    NNSA different from other components of Department of Energy (DOE)--in
    both law and practice?
        Answer. Under the NNSA Act, NNSA is designated as a semi-autonomous
    organization; the organizations led by other DOE undersecretaries are
    not structured in this way. This is a unique authority and
    responsibility that gives the NNSA Administrator authority over
    functions that also reside in DOE. If confirmed, I will prioritize
    building strong, mission-focused, and effective culture and processes
    across those functions, in close collaboration with the leadership of
    DOE.
        Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
    operational effectiveness, if confirmed, would you recommend any
    changes to the organizational structure of in NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on continuing NNSA's recent
    progress in its approach to governance and management by strengthening
    communication and integration across the nuclear security enterprise to
    make sure we have effective partnerships between federal employees, the
    laboratories, plants, and sites, and our interagency mission partners.
    I will work with the Administrator and NNSA leadership to clearly
    define lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and to
    consolidate NNSA's progress in strategic oversight and project
    management.
               relationship with the department of defense (dod)
        Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) sets requirements for
    nuclear forces, which form the basis of the core mission of the NNSA.
    DOD has been described as NNSA's primary customer, as well as its
    partner.
        If confirmed, what would be your role in supporting the
    Administrator of the NNSA in executing their duties and functions as a
    member of the NWC?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in executing
    her duties as a member of the NWC by ensuring that there is a
    communication flow at the staff, management, and leadership levels to
    facilitate discussion and understanding on key issues including
    requirements, budget, and stockpile activities.
        Question. How would you describe the relationship between NNSA and
    the DOD?
        Answer. From what I have observed, NNSA's relationship with DOD is
    healthy with dialogue and collaboration at both the working and senior
    levels.
        Question. What is your assessment of the health of that
    relationship at both senior- and working-levels?
        Answer. From what I have observed, the relationship today is
    healthy and, if confirmed, I will work to support the Administrator in
    continuing to strengthen this relationship.
        Question. If confirmed, what might you recommend to improve this
    relationship?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to keeping an open mind on
    opportunities to further enhance this relationship. I will work
    collaboratively with the Administrator on these efforts.
                                  nnsa budget
        Question. In 2015, then-Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz wrote to
    the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding
    NNSA's budget allocation for the ensuing five years that ``an
    additional $5.2 billion over fiscal year 2018-2021 [was] needed to
    establish a viable and sustainable program portfolio'' and that
    ``[f]ailure to address these requirements in the near term will put the
    NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in fiscal year 2018.''
    Then-Secretary Moniz added that, if uncorrected, the budget proposal
    would ``lack credibility.'' The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
    included an additional $3 billion above the President's budget request.
        Do you believe that the $3 billion increase was adequate and
    sufficient to render the budget request ``credible'', particularly in
    light of NNSA's stockpile stewardship responsibilities and the
    recommendations of the 2018 NPR? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe the $3 billion increase provided in fiscal year
    2021 is adequate for this fiscal year as it is the most robust funding
    in the history of NNSA. This is an area I will assess further if
    confirmed.
        Question. Section 1632 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the NWC to examine the NNSA budget
    before its submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
    ensure it can meet DOD requirements.
        Answer. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with this
    provision? How would you ensure the NWC is accorded adequate time to
    review the budget before its submission to OMB?
        I do not know the specifics of how NNSA, the NWC, and OMB
    mechanically share budget information and comply with the provision. If
    confirmed, I am committed to making sure there is open, clear, and
    consistent communication regarding NNSA's budget with the NWC.
                                   personnel
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
    civilian employees to perform its mission? Please explain your answer.
        If confirmed, one of my key priorities will be to work with the
    Administrator to review staffing needs and challenges across NNSA to
    ensure the appropriate skills mix and number of personnel are in place
    to accomplish its national security missions.
        Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
    civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
    personnel accomplish that NNSA is unable to accomplish today? If
    confirmed, which specific components within the NNSA would you
    recommend growing and how much growth would you recommend? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure
    that NNSA is equipped to accomplish its missions. I understand that
    NNSA's mission has been steadily increasing, and I will work to ensure
    staffing levels are commensurate with the expanding workload.
        Question. In your view, does NNSA rely too heavily on contractors
    and a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator and the
    M&O mission partners to ensure we maintain the correct mix of federal
    and contracting employees.
        Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
    capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
    to perform its mission? If so, please explain your rationale.
        Answer. Ensuring NNSA has the appropriate capabilities to execute
    the mission is critical for the nuclear security enterprise. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Administrator to ensure that
    NNSA continues to recruit and retain the highly-skilled professionals
    needed to execute its missions.
        Question. If not, please explain what skill sets, areas of
    expertise, or other capabilities each such workforce requires to ensure
    that NNSA is fully mission capable?
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to acquire the
    necessary capabilities in both the NNSA civilian and contractor
    workforces?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Administrator to ensure
    NNSA is executing a hiring strategy, in partnership with NNSA's M&O
    partners, to bring the best and brightest into the nuclear security
    enterprise. This should include outreach to colleges and universities
    and participation in career fairs near NNSA labs, plants, and sites.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend to
    retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design
    capabilities, in the NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the
    labs and the plants?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
    M&O mission partners to ensure we explore the most effective paths to
    recruit and retain the world's best engineers, scientists, and support
    personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
    the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are
    maintained in NNSA federal civilian workforce, as well as at the labs
    and the plants?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources and
    training specialists to understand what is already in place and where
    there are opportunities for improvement. Where appropriate, I will make
    the necessary changes to ensure there is an adequate and appropriate
    technical workforce in place. I will also expand communications with
    the NNSA labs, plants, and site to understand how NNSA can best support
    their recruitment and training requirements.
        Question. In your view, does NNSA leadership need any additional
    authorities or personnel system flexibilities to build and maintain the
    federal civilian workforce the NNSA needs to accomplish its mission?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with NNSA's human resources
    specialists to assess whether any additional authorities are required.
                      construction and project management
        Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
    and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
    facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Chemistry
    and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the Mixed Oxide Fuel
    Fabrication Facility, and others.
        In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
    failures in project management?
        Answer. I understand that NNSA has made a concerted effort to
    address project management challenges over the last decade. Based on my
    understanding, these challenges included issues related to ill-defined
    project requirements and schedules, improper estimating, contractual
    problems, and lack of proper planning.
        If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA continues to remain on a path
    toward improved project management.
        Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
    practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
    these problems? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. NNSA's decision to create the Office of Acquisition and
    Project Management in 2011 has led to significant improvements. More
    can always be done. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
    implementation of best business practices, as well as using lessons
    learned to improve early project planning and requirements development
    to prevent cost growth. If confirmed, I would also ensure there are
    sufficient qualified acquisition and project management specialists
    overseeing NNSA's growing portfolio.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    ensure that these systemic project management failures are not repeated
    in the future? What specific changes in policy, practice, organization,
    or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring improved contract
    and project management across NNSA. I would recommend rigorous project
    management practices and cost estimating, clarified lines of authority,
    holding federal and contractor personnel accountable, and providing
    independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight.
        Question. In your view, does the Administrator, NNSA need any
    additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root causes of
    these project management failures? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review Departmental regulations that
    govern capital acquisition projects and how they apply to NNSA
    activities. Until then, I will ensure that NNSA staff have the
    resources needed to further projects while staying within Departmental
    regulations.
        Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of systemic
    project management failures, Congress mandated the creation of the
    Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE), in the
    Department of Energy. CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost
    Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). CEPE now reports directly to
    the Administrator, NNSA
        In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed (in terms of billets
    allocated and billets encumbered by qualified personnel) to provide
    independent cost estimates and other additional costing and project
    management advice internal to NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to
    determine if CEPE is sufficiently staffed.
        Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
    data and information to execute its statutory mission?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review CEPE's authority and access to
    understand if further improvements are needed.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
    support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence? How will you
    balance these efforts with the mandate to be a responsible steward of
    taxpayer dollars?
        Answer. CEPE's cost and resource analysis capabilities are valuable
    to NNSA. CEPE's independence is critical to providing both the
    Principal Deputy Administrator and the Administrator with independent,
    data driven analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure CEPE maintains its
    independence and review the resources available to it.
        Question. If confirmed, will you commit to facilitating CEPE
    personnel access to the Administrator and to you?
        Answer. Yes.
                            safeguards and security
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Principal
    Deputy Administrator in ensuring safety and security in the nuclear
    weapons complex?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to be
    engaged on initiatives to improve safety at NNSA's facilities including
    a healthy safety culture. This includes implementing a Governance and
    Management structure which emphasizes transparency, trust, and
    collaboration to address challenges. I will work with our Management
    and Operating partners to establish expectations for sustained safety
    performance with successful mission accomplishment. I will reinforce
    that sustained safety performance and mission accomplishments can
    mutually support each other to achieve mission success.
        I will also work with the Administrator and the security program
    office to ensure that we have systems and processes in place to prevent
    security lapses. I also anticipate being engaged on all initiatives to
    improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security at NNSA's
    facilities. Additionally, I will work with NNSA's Management and
    Operating partners to make sure our governance and management works to
    achieve those objectives while emphasizing continuous improvement in
    both safety and security.
        Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
    threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?
        Answer. I firmly believe that the safety and security of the NNSA's
    facilities and nuclear material are of the utmost importance and it is
    critical that the NNSA has the appropriate authorities and funding from
    Congress to mitigate these threats. As part of this, addressing the
    continued challenges of ageing infrastructure is critically important
    to ensure that NNSA is advancing the mission with state-of-the-art
    facilities, with modern safety designs. If confirmed, I will work with
    the Administrator to emphasize and address NNSA's commitment to operate
    safely while accomplishing the mission and mitigate security threats
    such as cyber, material, transportation, and physical threats to NNSA's
    operations.
        Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have in NNSA's
    interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?
        Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance of a healthy
    working relationship with the DNFSB and open lines of communication.
    While it is my understanding the Deputy Secretary of Energy manages the
    Department's overall interface with the DNFSB, if confirmed, I will
    work through the Administrator and Deputy Secretary of Energy on
    DNFSB's recommendations and advice regarding public health and safety
    issues at NNSA's facilities.
        Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
    Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported on a number of accidents
    at the national laboratories in recent years. These accidents included
    explosions, exposure to radiation, and one incident that led to the
    partial shutdown of facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory--
    placing both personnel and mission execution at risk. Yet, while
    personnel safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by
    definition involves some of the most hazardous materials known to
    exist. Thus, if the labs' nuclear mission is to be accomplished, risk
    can never be eliminated completely.
        In your view, what is the proper balance between safety, risk, and
    mission accomplishment at the national laboratories? How should this
    balancing be accomplished, in your view?
        Answer. NNSA must have sustained, strong safety performance. Safety
    and mission success mutually support each other. This is balanced by
    properly assessing risk and controlling and managing that risk.
        If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will continue to
    focus on fostering our partnership between the labs and plants and
    emphasize continuous improvement in safely and successfully executing
    the NNSA mission. I will also be committed to empowering employees to
    anticipate, identify, report, and resolve safety issues.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
    safety culture at the labs, while still meeting mission requirements?
        Answer. The key to having a positive safety environment is
    establishing and reinforcing expectations by senior leadership which I
    will do with the Administrator through my interactions with Management
    and Operating partners' leadership. I will emphasize the long-term
    commitment to safe operations through the establishment of an effective
    governance and management culture. I will also emphasize the critical
    nature of effectively empowering and engaging with employees to give
    feedback while also stressing organizational learning. The
    reinforcement of these attributes provides the foundation to improve
    safety culture. I will also stress a strong safety conscious work
    environment so employees will feel comfortable in raising safety issues
    with leaders prepared to effectively address those issues. I will
    encourage and provide support to our leadership so they have all the
    necessary tools to effectively address any safety concerns.
                               plutonium strategy
        Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
    Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the former
    Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site will produce
    approximately 50 pits per year, for a projected two-site total of not
    less than 80 pits per year.
        What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its ability to
    achieve its pits per year production target to support the demands of
    the ongoing stockpile program?
        Answer. I believe work at Los Alamos is on track to achieve the
    goal of producing 30 pits per year in 2026, supporting the overall
    requirement for 80 pits per year. Moreover, I know that NNSA has to
    succeed in this effort. The United States currently does not produce
    any war reserve pits and we must do so to maintain our nuclear
    deterrence in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to being focused
    on making sure Los Alamos does, in fact, get to 30 pits per year in
    2026.
        Question. In your view, what changes are necessary to convert the
    former Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at the Savannah River Site to achieve its
    pits-per-year production target to support the requirements of the
    ongoing stockpile program?
        Answer. The former Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, or
    MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that
    provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in an existing
    facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements
    for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include
    repurposing and transitioning the MFFF into a safe, secure, compliant,
    and efficient pit production facility.
                    uranium strategy and tritium production
        Question. NNSA currently meets national security requirements for
    tritium production by providing low-enriched uranium (LEU) to the
    Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to irradiate in the Watts-Bar 1
    Reactor. DOE has maintained a policy that only unobligated LEU can be
    used for national security purposes, meaning that neither the uranium
    nor the technology used to enrich it carries an ``obligation'' from a
    foreign country requiring that the material only be used for non-
    weapons purposes. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
    ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on down-blending
    recycled high-enriched uranium (HEU) to meet requirements for
    unobligated LEU, but the available supply of recycled HEU for down-
    blending is finite. NNSA is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives for
    obtaining unobligated uranium.
        Do you believe the United States should re-establish a domestic
    uranium enrichment capability to support NNSA needs?
        Answer. Yes, the United States needs to re-establish a domestic
    uranium enrichment capability to ensure a reliable supply of enriched
    uranium to support U.S. national security needs. Since the closure of
    the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, in 2013,
    the United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched uranium
    free of peaceful use obligations, i.e., unobligated. Mission needs for
    enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States'
    remaining HEU stockpile (by downblending the HEU to produce LEU), which
    is a finite and currently irreplaceable source.
        Question. What are your ideas for the re-establishment of such a
    capability?
        Answer. As I understand it, NNSA is currently implementing a long-
    term strategy that meets current needs and seeks to re-establish
    domestic uranium enrichment capabilities: Downblending HEU to LEU to
    extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044; developing enrichment
    technology options; and executing an acquisition process to deploy an
    enrichment technology. An effective and cost-efficient solution for re-
    establishing enrichment capabilities will be identified through an
    ongoing Analysis of Alternatives.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        Question. What do you believe should be the highest priorities of
    NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs?
        Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is the lead
    U.S. agency for reducing nuclear and radiological threats globally,
    including the threat of nuclear proliferation among hostile states and
    terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials. DNN must
    continue to provide a comprehensive defense-in-depth against
    proliferant states and non-state actors from obtaining, acquiring, and
    developing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology. NNSA must work
    in close cooperation with interagency and international partners to
    carry out its nuclear threat reduction programs and to anticipate and
    respond to technological advances that may threaten the nation's
    security. Finally, NNSA must sustain the unparalleled scientific and
    technical prowess at NNSA's national laboratories, plants, and sites,
    which is crucial to understanding this evolving threat environment, and
    we must maintain these capabilities, including the facilities and
    intellectual capital, to reduce global nuclear threats globally.
        Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements
    needed in the NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs? If so, what
    improvements would you envision?
        Answer. While I would not term these as ``needed improvements,''
    necessarily, there are programmatic challenges facing NNSA's nuclear
    nonproliferation efforts, including:
          Increasingly rapid technological advancements lowering
    the bar to proliferation, including the diffusion of dual-use,
    emerging, and disruptive technologies;
          Eroding nuclear norms and regime cohesion, including the
    inability to reach consensus within key multilateral fora (e.g.,
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty);
          Hiring challenges posed by the continued attrition and
    retirements; and
          The ranging political will, practical capabilities, and
    absorption ability of international partners.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in
    implementing the improvements you envision?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Administrator, other Departmental elements, interagency, and laboratory
    colleagues to identify and enable the strategic, technical, human
    resource, and diplomatic tools to help address these challenges.
        Question. What improvements do you recommend to NNSA's efforts in
    verification and monitoring?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and DNN to
    evaluate investing in efforts that advance innovative capabilities in
    industry, academia, and the national laboratories to support and
    sustain solutions for the difficult challenges ahead. NNSA must
    continue its support for investments in research and development of
    technology to support detection and verification efforts for
    nonproliferation and arms control regimes and renew its commitment to
    harnessing the power of science to minimize nuclear threats around the
    world.
        Question. In your view, what are the three greatest unmet nuclear
    nonproliferation needs? How would you propose to address these needs if
    confirmed? What resources, authorities, flexibilities, or cooperation
    would NNSA require to meet such needs?
        Answer. First, I believe there is an ongoing need to address the
    threats posed by North Korea and Iran, working with international
    partners. Second, there is an enduring need to secure vulnerable and
    excess nuclear and radioactive materials globally. Several countries
    retain inventories of separated plutonium and excess highly enriched
    uranium (HEU), which the United States is unable to remove, or confirm
    the disposition of, due to lack of a political path forward. Finally,
    we must keep pace with and regulate emerging technologies to mitigate
    their potential proliferation threat while making the greatest use of
    their promising opportunities.
        Question. What do you think are the five most significant lessons
    learned for NNSA from the mismanagement of the MOX project? How will
    these lessons learned be implemented in future NNSA projects such as
    those related to the dilution and disposal of plutonium?
        Answer. I am aware NNSA experienced major project management
    challenges with the MOX project. If confirmed, I look forward to
    getting briefed on the project to learn more about the intricacies of
    the challenges associated with it. Further, I will ensure the lessons
    learned from it will be enforced and strengthened for NNSA's other
    capital acquisition projects.
                            regulation and oversight
        Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
    they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
    external, and that this contributes to the challenges in staying under
    cost and on schedule for major projects.
        Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
    regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations? Do
    you believe these regulations support effective performance by the labs
    and efficient mission execution overall?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe operation of
    all NNSA facilities. This is all-encompassing and includes the
    protection of the NNSA workforce, the public, and the environment. I
    will ensure that safety is properly incorporated into the design and
    construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. This is a cradle-to-grave
    approach encompassing safety expectations being communicated early in
    the conception of the project in accordance with relevant directives
    and regulations, periodic review of projects and operations as they
    progress through important milestones, the selection of qualified
    design and construction firms to lead them, and the proper staffing of
    a technically qualified federal project team. I believe this holistic
    approach and effective engagement from conception to execution of
    projects will reduce rework and control costs.
        I recognize the oversight challenges NNSA faces getting alignment
    with their partners regarding safety expectations through the
    application of directives which have been developed over time; and I
    believe there is room for improvement in the implementation of these
    directives. I support NNSA's approach to being a learning organization
    and learn from our past and leverage best practices. This includes
    NNSA's streamline of its directives and requirements, leverage general
    industry standards, and management of risk inherent in the construction
    of non- hazardous facilities.
        I am committed to ensuring NNSA's projects and operations are
    conducted in a safe and effective manner and follow all applicable
    environmental, safety, and construction rules. I am also committed to
    using standard approaches to help streamline execution of NNSA's
    mission work in alignment with the complexity of the projects.
    Streamlining the construction of low-risk, non-nuclear, commercial-like
    construction projects is an area where NNSA (and the bidding community)
    can benefit the most.
        Through data-informed, priority investment decisions in support of
    NNSA's current and future missions, the risk posed by aging
    infrastructure to NNSA's workforce, the environment, and its mission
    can be significantly reduced.
        Question. In your view, are the labs subject to an appropriate
    level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
    Safety Board, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and/or
    Congress? Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
    duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
        Answer. Strong governance and management oversight by NNSA are key
    pillars in accomplishing the missions and goals of the entire nuclear
    security enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that a proper
    balance exists between oversight and mission execution. Additionally,
    if confirmed, I will work to build relationships across the complex
    with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government
    Accountability Office, and Congress to ensure that there exists a
    proper balance between oversight and mission execution. Clear roles and
    responsibilities are essential.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
    structures would you recommend, and why?
        Answer. Making sure that NNSA's missions are executed in an
    effective, efficient manner is important. If confirmed, I will assess
    what changes are necessary to ensure mission execution with proper
    regulations and oversight.
                                defense programs
        Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has supported the
    annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.
        Do you believe that the capabilities exist today to ensure that the
    stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons
    testing? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program uses a science-
    based assessment of the reliability of nuclear weapons to assess and
    certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. For the last
    23 years, the three NNSA Laboratory Directors have certified that the
    stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and that additional
    underground nuclear explosive testing is not required at this time.
        Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for
    the next 20 years that includes the completion of four life extension
    programs (LEPs), as well as multiple refurbishment programs, the design
    of the W93 warhead, and the maintenance of the existing stockpile.
        Do you have any concerns with this ambitious schedule and in
    particular concurrency between the plants and the laboratories?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the
    Programs to minimize risks to meeting schedule requirements.
        Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
    Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
    engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
    authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
        If confirmed, how would you assist the Administrator in supporting
    the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and making full use of the
    authorities it provides NNSA?
        Answer. I believe it is important to make investments in personnel,
    programs, and technologies that strengthen our ability to respond to
    emerging challenges. If confirmed, I will support the Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program and its goal to expand opportunities for young
    scientists and engineers to ensure we have a talented and capable array
    of nuclear security personnel across the enterprise.
        Question. In your view, what should be the long-term plan for the
    National Ignition Facility, and in particular, how would you assist the
    Administrator in the long term effort to achieve sustained ignition,
    which to date has not occurred?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, NNSA
    subject matter experts, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
    Congress to best identify the long-term plan for NIF. I do know that
    NIF is essential for understanding the physical properties and
    characteristics of nuclear weapons performance.
        Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
    what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
    NNSA missions?
        Answer. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program,
    delivers leading-edge computer platforms, sophisticated physics and
    engineering codes, and uniquely qualified staff to support addressing a
    wide variety of stockpile issues for design, physics certification,
    engineering qualification, and production. While there is certainly a
    role for other activities that utilize the ASC program, its primary use
    should continue to support stockpile stewardship.
                         facilities and infrastructure
        Question. More than half of NNSA's infrastructure is more than 40
    years old, and a quarter of it dates back to the Manhattan Project. As
    former Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty testified in 2020, ``[T]ime is
    of the essence to recapitalize our infrastructure throughout the entire
    NNSA. Long gone are the days where we would be able to just patch these
    facilities. We need to make sure that we have state of the art
    infrastructure, so we can recapitalize our enterprise and make sure
    that we can provide to the Department of Defense the requirements that
    they so sorely need to maintain our nuclear deterrent.'' This testimony
    post-dated by almost two years the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA directive to
    NNSA to establish the Infrastructure Modernization Initiative, with the
    objective of reducing the backlog of deferred maintenance and repair
    needs by at least 30% by 2025.
        If confirmed, what factors would you consider in prioritizing work
    with the Associate Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and
    Operations to address the required maintenance of NNSA infrastructure?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Associate
    Administrator for Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations to modernize
    and sustain NNSA's infrastructure. NNSA must undertake a risk-informed
    infrastructure strategy (or management approach) to repair, maintain,
    and replace facilities across the nuclear security enterprise. Reducing
    deferred maintenance, disposing of process-contaminated facilities, and
    streamlining execution of non-nuclear construction projects will be a
    key piece of the priorities I set to meet Congressional direction.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures would you recommend to reduce
    risk in future major construction projects, such as those related to
    the lithium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will help NNSA ensure that future major
    projects are developed and executed utilizing well established program
    and project management principles including: ensuring that the project
    requirements are clearly defined and prioritized; proper cost estimates
    are completed and reviewed independently; sufficient design work and
    technological development is completed prior to commencing a project's
    construction; and monitoring progress to ensure projects remain on
    schedule and on budget.
                             organizational climate
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
    in ensuring that the NNSA workplace, including that of NNSA's
    geographically-separated labs and other components promotes the dignity
    of and respect for all persons?
        Answer. Respect is one of my core values, and one, if confirmed, I
    will ensure at NNSA. If confirmed, I will serve as a role model by
    treating each employee with dignity and respect and would ensure that
    all employees foster an inclusive environment where every perspective
    is recognized and diversity of thought is valued.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
    sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the NNSA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to creating a workplace that
    is safe and welcoming to all people. As the Principal Deputy
    Administrator, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to learn more
    about the current NNSA climate and taking steps to improve the
    environment.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
    receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the DOE, NNSA, or a component
    thereof?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will take complaints of sexual harassment
    or discrimination seriously. All employees have the right to feel safe
    in the workplace and must be treated fairly. I will work to ensure such
    complaints are reviewed and responded to quickly, including appropriate
    corrective action and discipline if warranted.
                            notification of congress
        Question. Will you commit that if confirmed, you would promptly
    notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
    security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
        Answer. Yes.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                            Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                  nominations
        1. Senator Hirono. Ms. Rosenblum, as part of my responsibility as a
    member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
    of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
    of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
    to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
    adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
    or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I have not.

        2. Senator Hirono. Ms. Rosenblum, have any of you ever faced
    discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of
    conduct?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I have not.
                        modernizing the nuclear arsenal
        3. Ms. Rosenblum, the Biden administration has begun a series of
    reviews of the U.S. national security posture, including our nuclear
    posture. Can you briefly discuss what you see as the most pressing
    nuclear modernization issue we face?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts
    necessary to ensure our nuclear deterrent's long-term viability have
    little to no schedule margin. Ensuring that these efforts remain on
    track--and that the transition from cold war-era legacy capabilities to
    their modern replacements is successful--is the most pressing nuclear
    modernization issue we face. Consistent, sustained leadership focus and
    funding are required through 2030 and likely beyond to ensure the
    Nation's nuclear deterrent is modernized while meeting cost and
    schedule milestones. This includes both Department of Defense nuclear
    programs as well as the nuclear weapons activities and production
    infrastructure programs for which the National Nuclear Security
    Administration is responsible, which are integral to the deterrent.
                    rising threat of north korean capability
        4. Ms. Rosenblum, I take the threat of North Korea launching a
    ballistic missile toward Hawaii very seriously. If confirmed, you will
    be responsible for preparing for, deterring, and mitigating current and
    future weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats. Based on your
    experience and background, what are your thoughts and top priorities to
    prevent such an attack?
        Ms. Rosenblum. If confirmed, I will review the full spectrum of
    activities that currently are important in defending the U.S. homeland
    against WMD, and I will also review proposed activities to enhance U.S.
    defenses against future WMD threats. As Secretary Austin has stated,
    our relationships with important partners such as the Republic of Korea
    and Japan are critical to regional security and stability and provide a
    powerful deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I will work
    with key U.S. Government stakeholders and with our partners in the
    Indo-Pacific region to facilitate nonproliferation activities and
    address both the current and emerging threats posed by North Korea's
    weapons of mass destruction. At the macro level, and in concert with
    the Military Departments and Services and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, I
    believe, if I am confirmed, that NCB priorities for North Korea would
    include maintaining, or increasing, capabilities related to the
    ballistic missile ``Prevent'' mission space, with a focus on
    situational awareness, early warning, and detection.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
                              arm control treaties
        5. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, as Assistant Secretary of Defense
    (ASD) Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (NCB), you
    will be the DOD Treaty Manager and represent the United States on
    nuclear issues in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], biological
    weapons issues in the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
    (UNODA), and chemical weapons issues in the Organisation for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Please share your thoughts on
    the treaties regulating weapons of mass destruction. How should we hold
    countries, like Russia and China, who do not abide by international
    laws, accountable for violations?
        Ms. Rosenblum. One of the pillars of nonproliferation is the
    establishment of international norms against the use of these weapons
    of mass destruction. Arms control treaties are the baseline by which
    these norms can be established. If confirmed, my responsibility as the
    DOD Treaty manager will be to ensure the Department upholds its
    commitments under applicable Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and
    Conventional arms control treaties. I share the priorities of this
    Administration to bring outliers to such treaties back into compliance
    with their obligations under them. The United States imposed sanctions
    against Russia for its violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
    including the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. These sanctions, imposed
    both on Russian officials and on chemical and biological production
    entities, are an example of the range of measures the United States has
    available to hold to account those who violate treaties governing the
    use of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work with key
    U.S. Government stakeholders to ensure a full range of options are
    available and are considered for imposition in response to any treaty
    violations. I also believe that it is important for the United States
    to set an example by complying with all of its treaty obligations.

        6. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, if the Administration proceeds
    with additional arms control talks, do you believe they will negotiate
    in good faith?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I believe that the United States is committed to
    pursuing arms control negotiations in good faith but that we need to be
    clear eyed regarding the intentions of our negotiating partners.
    Accordingly, it is very important that any agreement be verifiable,
    provide transparency and clearly in the interest of the United States.
                            technical qualifications
        7. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, the position you were nominated
    for, ASD (NCB), serves as the advisor to the Secretary of Defense on
    nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and chemical biological defense.
    Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) Number 5134.08 further
    explains that one of the requirements of this position is to serve as a
    ``technical expert in interagency and international activities related
    to areas of assigned responsibilities and functions.'' You did not
    address specific questions on your technical qualifications for this
    position during the hearing or in your advance policy questions. Can
    you outline your educational and/or job experience that would address
    the technical requirements of this position?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I have over thirty years of experience working on
    complex national security issues with a particular focus on arms
    control, reducing risk and countering weapons of mass destruction.
    While working within the Office of the Secretary of Defense I was
    responsible for overseeing the management of the submarine leg of the
    nuclear triad, technical programs to counter weapons of mass
    destruction, technical negotiations regarding the nuclear program of
    the DPRK and NATO defense planning. Currently at the Nuclear Threat
    Initiative, I provide strategic guidance to the organization's bio-
    security program that focuses on reducing risks from science and
    technology. Throughout my career, I have led and worked with a broad
    range of talented scientists and technology experts to identify the
    critical issues needing to be addressed to sustain the US' nuclear
    deterrent and to counter weapons of mass destruction. I have also
    regularly led efforts to identify the critical policy and leadership
    issues embedded in technical details, extensive data and scientific and
    technology programs.
                               biological weapons
        8. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, would you agree that human beings
    carry a long, shameful history of using naturally occurring pathogens
    as weapons? Explain your answer.
        Ms. Rosenblum. The use of biological agents is not a new concept,
    and history is replete with examples of their use. Infectious diseases
    were recognized for their potential impact on people and armies as
    early as 600 B.C. The SARS-CoV2 pandemic has also shown us that
    naturally occurring pathogens can have a great impact on both a local
    and a global scale. This pandemic has brought to light the devastation
    that can occur when countries are not adequately prepared for
    biological threats. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to improve our
    Nation's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats.
                                china and covid
        9. Senator Rounds. Ms. Rosenblum, China's concern following the
    conception and spread of COVID-19 did not extend to the wider global
    community. As the flight logs from Wuhan show, China allowed the
    unchecked export of COVID at a time when it clearly understood the
    danger of the disease and its grave threat to modern society. Several
    dates on COVID-19's timeline stand out: January 23d, the day China
    locked down Wuhan and January 31st, the day President Trump banned
    flights from China to the United States. China took drastic steps to
    limit exposure of its own population, locking down more than 500
    million people, securing worldwide supplies of PPE [personal protective
    equipment], and proclaiming via state-run Xinhua News Agency that the
    country boasted the ``most comprehensive, most strict and most thorough
    preventative measures.'' Given these facts, would you agree that China
    actively sought to not only deceive the global community on the origins
    of COVID and the transmission of the disease, but knowingly exported
    COVID to democracies around the world? Explain your answer in detail.
        Ms. Rosenblum. On May 26, 2021, the White House issued a statement
    on the Investigation into the Origins of COVID-19. The President tasked
    the U.S. Intelligence Community to prepare a report on the most up-to-
    date analysis of the origins of COVID-19, including whether it emerged
    from human contact with an infected animal or from a laboratory
    accident and subsequently asked for additional followup. If confirmed,
    I will support the President's efforts to achieve a better
    understanding of the origins of COVID-19, coordinating with our
    interagency partners for these purposes and to help prevent future
    biological threats, whether they are of natural or unnatural origins.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum
    follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum, which
    was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Deborah G.
    Rosenblum in connection with her nomination follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    ------

        [The nomination of Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on July 29, 2021.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Christopher P. Maier
    by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. Section 138(b)(2) of title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
    Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) as one of 15 Assistant Secretaries of Defense in
    the Department of Defense (DOD).
        What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
    the ASD(SOLIC) as prescribed in current law, DOD issuances, and by
    practice?
        Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
    and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is the principal civilian
    advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-
    intensity conflict matters. The ASD(SO/LIC)'s principal duty is overall
    supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special
    operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of
    Defense. The ASD(SO/LIC) also is the principal advisor to the Secretary
    of Defense on special operations capabilities and authorities,
    counternarcotics efforts and resources, humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief, strategies for building partner capacity, and
    stability operations in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy's priorities and guidance.
        Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of
    command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, U.S.
    Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), performing a ``service secretary-
    like'' function for the special-operations peculiar administrative
    matters relating to organization, training, and equipping of special
    operations forces (SOF).
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that
    qualify you to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
    ASD(SOLIC)?
        Answer. I have spent more than two decades focused on
    counterterrorism, special operations, and low-intensity conflict
    issues, with positions across DOD, the National Counterterrorism Center
    (NCTC), and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. I led DOD's
    Defeat-ISIS Task Force from its inception until disestablishment,
    charged with policy and strategy development, international
    negotiations, and oversight. I have previously served as the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Special Operations and
    Combating Terrorism (SOCT), where I oversaw the Department's policies,
    plans, authorities, and resources related to special operations and
    irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare,
    information operations, and sensitive special operations. Prior to that
    position, I held a number of positions at the NCTC, including Senior
    Advisor to the Director, Chief of Strategic Assessments and Regional
    Planning, and Chief of Staff in the Directorate of Strategic
    Operational Planning, and I served as a Director for Counterterrorism
    on the NSC staff. Prior to my government service, I also spent five
    years as a strategy and management consultant to a variety of
    commercial, government, and nonprofit organizations, after beginning my
    government career as an analyst in the Intelligence Community.
        Question. What leadership and management experience do you possess
    that you would apply to your service as ASD(SOLIC), if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would bring a broad range of relevant
    leadership and management experience to the position of ASD(SO/LIC). As
    the Director of the Defeat-ISIS Task Force, I led national-level
    interagency implementation of the U.S. Government's campaign to achieve
    an enduring defeat of ISIS, working closely with dozens of Coalition
    partners across the globe. As DASD SOCT, I led a team of more than 50
    senior government civilian and military personnel in conducting special
    operations, counterterrorism, and irregular warfare policy development
    and implementation, as well as oversight of much of USSOCOM's man,
    train, and equip programs. My experience as a senior leader at NCTC and
    working with the President's national security leadership while on the
    NSC staff also provides me with further experience in leading
    organizations, in different roles, across the national security
    enterprise.
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
    make regarding changes to the organization, management, and resourcing
    of the Office of the ASD(SOLIC), so as better to execute its
    responsibilities for oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations
    Forces?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the
    organizational structure, management, and resourcing of the Office of
    the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure it is appropriately resourced and staffed to
    fulfill its statutory roles of overseeing Special Operations
    administrative matters and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy in policy-related matters.
        Question. Are there any additional authorities or resources that,
    in your view, would enhance your ability to perform the duties and
    functions of the ASD(SOLIC), if confirmed?
        Answer. The Department has recently approved a new charter for
    ASD(SO/LIC), which details the office's authorities, roles, and
    responsibilities within the Department, consistent with the ASD's Title
    10 authorities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense
    and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to carry out these responsibilities
    effectively. If confirmed, I will also work with the Secretary of
    Defense and the Congress on changes to existing authorities or
    resources that would enhance the ASD(SO/LIC)'s ability to fulfill each
    of these responsibilities.
                                 relationships
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with, and
    on what issues would you expect to engage with:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will perform the duties as the principal
    staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
    all special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-
    peculiar administrative matters, reporting directly to the Secretary as
    I exercise authority, direction, control, and oversight
    responsibilities related to organizing, training, and equipping of the
    SOF enterprise. I will advise and assist the Secretary, and work with
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on sensitive special operations,
    operational preparation of the environment, crisis response,
    counterterrorism, information operations, and the use of the
    instruments of irregular warfare.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy on ASD(SO/LIC)-related equities and policy matters,
    including the development and supervision of policy, program planning
    and execution, and allocation and use of resources for Information
    Operations, Irregular Warfare, combating terrorism, and special
    operations activities. I will keep the Under Secretary informed of
    major developments within the ASD(SO/LIC) portfolio, including
    operational matters that may have an effect on policy development or
    outcomes.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
    Security (USD(I&S)).
        Answer. If confirmed, I will partner and coordinate with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security on matters related
    to sensitive special operations, operational preparation of the
    environment, irregular warfare, and other sensitive efforts to achieve
    U.S. strategic objectives and improve the SOF enterprise. I would
    envision collaborating as well to ensure sufficient intelligence
    support to priority special operations disciplines, to include
    Information Operations and Irregular Warfare.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering.
        Answer. Technology development and advanced technologies are
    critical enablers to keep pace with our adversaries and reduce cost
    without sacrificing mission capabilities. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering to accelerate the adoption of Artificial Intelligence,
    machine learning, unmanned systems, smart munitions and weaponry, new
    communications modalities, and other revolutionary technologies into
    the SOF enterprise.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Sustainment.
        Answer. Section 138 of 10 U.S.C. authorizes the ASD(SO/LIC) to
    ``exercise authority, direction, and control of all special-operations
    peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training,
    and equipping of special operations forces.'' If confirmed, I will
    establish a close working relationship with the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to ensure special operations
    acquisition programs, projects, and priorities are delivered in
    accordance with Department priorities, on-time and within budget, to
    meet mission needs to best serve our USSOCOM warfighters.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness.
        Answer. Talented people are the foundational component of SOF, so
    ensuring the SOF enterprise is optimizing the way it recruits, trains,
    promotes, and retains talent that is reflective of our Nation's rich
    diversity, is critical to SOF's mission success. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness to ensure SOF personnel programs and policies
    enable the force to deliver ready and lethal SOF capabilities.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the
    Service Chiefs.
        Answer. SOF relies on Service support in many areas, including
    resourcing of Service-common requirements, personnel policies,
    recruiting, education, promotion, and force design. If confirmed, I
    look forward to working with the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments and the Service Chiefs in these cross-cutting areas and to
    ensure adequate support to SOF.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to
    develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship
    between your office and Congress, and the Senate Armed Services
    Committee, in particular?
        Answer. The Senate Armed Services Committee and the Congress
    provide important oversight for the special operations enterprise and
    have been critical in establishing the roles and authorities of the
    ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will work with the ASD for Legislative
    Affairs to engage the Committee regularly to ensure a transparent and
    effective relationship on all issues within the purview of the ASD(SO/
    LIC), in addition to providing testimony, briefings, reports, and other
    information to help the committee fulfill its oversight and legislative
    responsibilities.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
    would expect to confront if confirmed to be the ASD(SOLIC)?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) and the special operations enterprise must
    be prepared to meet simultaneously the challenges of great power
    competition, counterterrorism, modernizing our forces, enhancing
    readiness, and taking care of our people. If confirmed, I will work to
    support SOF in adapting to strategic competition with China and Russia,
    while balancing the ongoing requirements for counterterrorism
    operations through more cost-sustainable methods. If confirmed, I would
    also expect to confront continued readiness challenges in overcoming
    the COVID-19 pandemic and reducing the strain of high rates of SOF
    overseas deployments. The ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM must also continue to
    focus on key moral and operational imperatives to address sexual
    assault and extremism, implement ongoing reforms related to SOF culture
    and ethics, and increase the diversity of SOF.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what management actions would
    you take to address each of these challenges?
        Answer. Strong civilian oversight will be critical in leading the
    SOF enterprise to address these challenges. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with Department of Defense leadership and the Congress in
    implementing the ongoing reforms to strengthen ASD(SO/LIC) oversight of
    these critical issues. I will also partner closely with the Commander,
    USSOCOM to ensure that SOF has the necessary authorities, resources,
    and capabilities to meet these challenges. Finally, if confirmed, I
    would look to strengthen our relationships with our allies and
    partners, their SOF contingents and more broadly, to leverage the force
    multiplier effect of their strengths and capabilities to address
    today's increasingly complex global threat environment.
                           national defense strategy
        Question. The 2018 NDS prioritized ``great power competition and
    conflict'' with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which
    the United States must contend, together with the imperative of
    deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran.
    Finally, the framework emphasizes the consolidation of gains in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, while moving to a ``more resource sustainable''
    approach to counterterrorism.
        In your view, does the NDS accurately assess the current strategic
    environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the
    national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. I agree that the NDS's assessment of the strategic
    environment was accurate when written. I also agree with Secretary
    Austin that China represents the Department's pacing threat, and that
    Russia, Iran, and North Korea represent advanced, persistent threats.
    Finally, I believe that foreign terrorist organizations pose an
    enduring, threat to our national security. If confirmed, I would help
    ensure that the SOF enterprise continues to transform to address the
    Department's top priorities, provide options to address the full range
    of threats, and becomes more sustainable in its approach to enduring CT
    challenges.
        Question. Are there aspects of the NDS you believe should be
    updated or reassessed?
        Answer. I understand that the Department has begun a deliberate
    process to develop a new NDS. The Administration's priorities, changes
    in the security environment, and other factors should drive that
    process. I believe the next NDS should continue to emphasize the
    critical shaping role that information operations and irregular
    approaches play as part of an integrated national approach against our
    highest priority security threats. By imposing costs in competition and
    raising the costs of adversaries' malign activities, SOF-led and
    enabled approaches can prevent conflict, ensure advantage in
    competition, and manage escalation dynamics so that if required, we
    enter into conflict on the most favorable terms.
        Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the
    Commander, USSOCOM appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to
    counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives
    identified by the NDS?
        Answer. I understand that the Commander, USSOCOM, is actively
    engaged in ensuring USSOCOM personnel and resources are aligned against
    the security objectives identified in the NDS. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure plans and programs
    are in alignment with the NDS as well as with national and Departmental
    strategies and guidance.
        Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Commander,
    USSOCOM has accepted regarding the readiness of Special Operations
    Forces to execute the operational plans associated with the NDS?
        Answer. From my understanding, the Commander, USSOCOM, works
    closely with both the military and civilian chains of command within
    the Department of Defense to mitigate risk and ensure USSOCOM forces
    are ready to execute assigned plans in furtherance of the NDS.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you
    advise the Commander, USSOCOM to make in the command's implementation
    of the NDS?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with the Commander of USSOCOM
    to ensure SOF strategy is nested under the NDS and establishes a long-
    term framework to develop and deliver the necessary SOF capabilities
    and resources, to include enabling key capabilities of the Joint Force,
    to maximize the Department's effectiveness in implementing the NDS.
        Question. Are the Special Operations Forces of each of the Military
    Services appropriately sized, structured, and postured to implement the
    NDS and the associated operational plans? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. It is my understanding that each Service's SOF are
    responsible to their Service, to USSOCOM, and to the ASD(SO/LIC) to
    ensure they are poised to execute the NDS and associated operational
    plans. If confirmed, I will review their force generation, structure,
    and readiness to execute their assigned tasks.
                        civilian control of the military
        Question. In its 2018 report, Providing for the Common Defense, the
    National Defense Strategy Commission cautioned, ``there is an imbalance
    in civil-military relations on critical issues of strategy development
    and implementation. Civilian voices appear relatively muted on issues
    at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy.''
        What is your view of the essential role of the ASD(SOLIC) in
    promoting civilian control over the military?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is in the administrative chain of command
    to exercise authority, direction, and control of the Commander,
    USSOCOM, for special operations-peculiar administration including the
    readiness and organization of special operations forces, resources and
    equipment, and civilian personnel. Accordingly, the ASD must clearly
    articulate strategic priorities and policies for those matters. As a
    Principal Staff Assistant reporting directly to the Secretary of
    Defense, the ASD(SO/LIC) must also ensure that the Secretary of Defense
    has all the necessary, resource-informed, policy recommendations to
    exercise his control of the military, including SOF. It is therefore
    essential to maintain a collaborative and cooperative relationship with
    the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the best possible civilian-military
    advice is provided to the Secretary on the resourcing and employment of
    SOF. If confirmed, I intend to exercise my statutory authorities to
    further this objective.
        The National Defense Strategy Commission report also states, `` . .
    . allocating priority--and allocating forces--across theaters of
    warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-
    military task, decision authority for which is the proper competency
    and responsibility of America's civilian leaders.''
        Question. Do you agree with the Commission's recommendation that
    ``the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) . . . [must] fully exercise their
    responsibilities for preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency
    plans?'' Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I agree with this recommendation. To me, clear DOD-wide
    guidance improves effectiveness and unity of effort within the
    Department and with our interagency and international partners during
    operations and activities supporting both deliberate and contingency
    plans. The Secretary and the USD(P) have a vital role to ensure that
    political risks--including the risk of inaction--are weighed by the
    United States' civilian leadership. Doing so also enhances effective
    civil-military relations throughout the U.S. Government, which is
    essential for our national security.
        Question. Specifically what would you do, if confirmed, to prepare
    guidance for and review contingency plans involving Special Operations
    Forces and capabilities and what would you perceived to be the
    appropriate role of the USD(P) in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would align with the USD(P)'s process for
    contingency plan review and ensure that the ASD(SO/LIC) is fully
    invested and participates in reviewing contingency plans. I would
    emphasize that the Department should look holistically at the
    competitive landscape and not just focus on high-end war contingency
    plans. I endorse a deliberate approach to competition and crisis at all
    levels and in close coordination with diplomatic and other interagency
    partners. SOF have an important role in this space, and I would provide
    my best advice and recommendations to the USD(P) to account for those
    areas, prior to armed conflict, where the Department can achieve
    outsized effects in the competition and low-intensity conflict arenas.
           civilian oversight of the u.s. special operations command
        Question. Section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as amplified by
    section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021, empowered the ASD(SOLIC)
    to serve as the ``service secretary-like'' civilian official with
    responsibility for the oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations
    Forces. Among other reforms, the law defined the administrative chain
    of command for USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the
    Secretary of Defense for issues impacting the readiness and
    organization of Special Operations Forces, special operations-peculiar
    resources and equipment, and civilian personnel management, mirroring
    the relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments
    and their service chiefs, and placing ASD(SOLIC) immediately
    subordinate to the Secretary of Defense in such ``service secretary-
    like'' matters. The law also makes plain that otherwise directed by the
    President, no officer below the Secretary of Defense may intervene to
    exercise authority, direction, or control over the ASD(SOLIC) in the
    discharge of such responsibilities.
        What is your understanding of the administrative chain of command
    specified by section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as amplified by
    section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021?
        Answer. Section 922 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2017 codified the
    administrative chain of command for USSOCOM as running from the
    President to the Secretary of Defense, from the Secretary of Defense to
    the ASD(SO/LIC), and from the ASD(SO/LIC) to the Commander of USSOCOM.
    Section 902 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021 reinforced and
    strengthened this role by making the ASD(SOLIC) an immediate
    subordinate of the Secretary of Defense. The Department further
    reinforced this role by designating the ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal
    Staff Assistant reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense for
    special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-
    peculiar administrative matters.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to exercise the
    administrative chain of command and under what circumstances?
        Answer. The Department published an updated version of Department
    of Defense Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, on May 5, 2021, which
    prescribes the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the ASD(SO/
    LIC). The Secretary of Defense also emphasized the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role
    in the administrative chain of command through a memorandum published
    on May 5, 2021. If confirmed, I will seek to exercise the ASD(SO/LIC)'s
    role in the administrative chain of command as prescribed by both the
    Secretary and the DOD Directive through consistent, constructive, and
    transparent communication with the Secretary of Defense and the
    Commander, USSOCOM.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you distinguish between and
    balance the duties and responsibilities associated with the
    ASD(SOLIC)'s ``service secretary-like'' role with the ASD(SOLIC)'s
    duties and responsibilities related to special operations policy and
    operational issues?
        Answer. I see extensive synergy between the administrative chain of
    command responsibilities and the policy oversight responsibilities of
    the ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will endeavor to balance these duties,
    prioritizing as necessary relative to pressing requirements, in close
    coordination and collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the
    USD(P) and the Commander, USSOCOM.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD(SOLIC)
    in:
          The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget
    request.
        I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) receives fiscal guidance from the
    Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and provides
    fiscal guidance to USSOCOM. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC) reviews and
    approves the USSOCOM Program Objective Memorandum and President's
    Budget submissions.
          Approving programs of record and the acquisition of
    special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM.
        USSOCOM has statutory authority for development and acquisition of
    special operations-peculiar equipment. I understand that the ASD(SO/
    LIC) participates in the USSOCOM budget and requirements processes to
    establish acquisition programs.
          Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters and
    service components.
        The ASD(SO/LIC), as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary
    of Defense on special operations matters, must work in partnership with
    the Commander, USSOCOM, to implement a shared vision for a SOF
    enterprise that meets the nation's special operations requirements. If
    confirmed, I will participate in strategic engagements and processes
    shaping the organization of USSOCOM and the SOF Service components to
    sustain and advance the SOF enterprise.
          Ensuring the readiness of Special Operations Forces.
        The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for the readiness of SOF, as stated
    in section 167 of title 10. If confirmed, I would work closely with the
    Commander, USSOCOM, to conduct regular reviews of the readiness of SOF
    to meet current, emergent, and future national security requirements.
          Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and
    accountability of Special Operations Forces.
        The ASD(SO/LIC), in partnership with the Commander, USSOCOM, is
    responsible for ensuring SOF conduct themselves in a manner
    commensurate with the level of trust the public places in them in the
    performance of their duties, and consistent with their oath. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to
    strengthen further the ethics and accountability of SOF. I also will
    support the swift implementation of the recommendations of the
    Comprehensive Review of SOF Ethics and Culture to ensure that ethics
    and accountability are institutionalized across the SOF enterprise.
        Question. In your view, do existing law and DOD policy and guidance
    provide sufficient clarity regarding how and in whom responsibility and
    accountability vest for all matters affecting Special Operations
    Forces? If not, what further changes would you recommend?
        Answer. I believe that Title 10 is clear on the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role
    as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on
    special operations and low-intensity conflict matters and the role in
    the administrative chain of command of the Commander, USSOCOM. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Commander USSOCOM to
    fulfill these statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will evaluate
    potential changes required to existing law that could clarify
    responsibility and accountability for special operations matters.
        Question. In your view, does the extant administrative chain of
    command allow for any official below the Secretary of Defense to
    exercise authority, direction, and control over the ASD(SOLIC) with
    regard to his/her ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities?
        Answer. In my view, the law is clear: Unless otherwise directed by
    the President, the administrative chain of command to USSOCOM for the
    specific purposes set forth in 10 U.S.C. 167(f)(2) runs (A) from the
    President to the Secretary of Defense; (B) from the Secretary of
    Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
    and Low-Intensity Conflict; and (C) from the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to the
    Commander of USSOCOM. This chain was also reinforced by the new
    chartering directive for the ASD(SO/LIC).
                             use of military force
        Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on the
    operational use of Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on validating and, as needed,
    updating the capabilities and authorities necessary for SOF to confront
    our global challenges. It is my belief we need to have SOF positioned
    to disrupt threats to the United States and our partners in a more
    sustainable manner, and we need to provide Department and national
    security leadership with options that enable flexibility, manage
    escalation, and provide high return on investment
        If confirmed, I look forward to working across the Department, with
    the leadership at USSOCOM, with my counterparts in other U.S.
    Government departments and agencies, and with our international
    partners to ensure the SOF enterprise is postured and able to execute
    our national defense strategy, to include our nation's most challenging
    military missions.
        I remain concerned about the health of the SOF enterprise, in
    particular the hidden impacts that sustained combat deployments have
    had on our warfighters and their families. If confirmed, I will
    champion the efforts of the Preservation of the Force and Family
    program and will seek to identify other ways that we can support
    USSOCOM's most important asset--its people.
        Question. Do you believe that current legal authorities, including
    the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the
    Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a
    level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?
        Answer. The 2001 AUMF remains the key domestic legal authority for
    ongoing U.S. counterterrorism activities against al-Qa'ida, the
    Taliban, and their associated forces. The Department has operated under
    these current legal authorities for nearly 20 years, but the threats we
    face and the operating environments in which SOF operate continue to
    evolve. I support President Biden's support for replacing the current
    AUMFs with a narrow and specific framework that will ensure our forces
    have the authority they need to protect the United States from
    continuing terrorist threats. If confirmed, I would expect to work
    closely with counterparts in other departments and agencies, and with
    the Congress in updating those authorities.
        Question. What groups are currently assessed to be associated
    forces of al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 Authorization for the Use
    of Military Force, and in what countries are U.S. military direct
    action operations against such groups authorized?
        Answer. The 2001 AUMF is the legal basis for currently authorized
    operations against the following groups or individuals: al Qaeda; the
    Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent groups affiliated with
    al-Qa'ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
    (AQIM); al Qaeda in Syria; and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
    (ISIS).
        It is my understanding that the United States has used military
    force for counterterrorism direct action operations in Afghanistan,
    Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.
        Question. In your view, is a new authorization for the use of
    military force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I agree with President Biden's support for replacing the
    current AUMFs with a narrow and specific framework that will ensure our
    forces have the authority they need to protect the United States from
    continuing terrorist threats. The scope or terms of any ``new''
    authorization should be informed by an in-depth review of the current
    authorities, and by the facts and circumstances to which the
    authorities apply. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Department's General Counsel to conduct that evaluation.
        Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
    recommending to the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) which forces of
    other nations should be eligible for collective self-defense by U.S.
    Special Operations Forces, and under what conditions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would consider the degree to which
    collective self-defense would support achieving U.S. national security
    and specific mission objectives when operating by, with, and through
    our partners. The use of collective self-defense should also seek to
    bolster the protection of U.S. forces and facilities abroad and
    maintain the resolve of our partners. Rules of engagement authorizing
    U.S. forces to defend foreign partner forces should clearly identify
    the particular partners eligible for such protection and whether limits
    exist on the groups or individuals against which such force may be
    used. Any use of force in defense of foreign partner forces must adhere
    to the law of armed conflict and also be necessary and proportionate to
    address the particular attack or threat of imminent attack against the
    partner force.
                              civilian casualties
        Question. Section 936 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 required the
    Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy for accounting
    for and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from
    U.S. military operations.
        If confirmed, what would be your role in developing and
    implementing the policies resulting from section 936?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the efforts of the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who is designated under section
    936 as the civilian official responsible for developing, coordinating,
    and overseeing compliance with DOD civilian casualty policy. For
    example, I would help oversee on-going efforts within the Department to
    complete the drafting and coordination of a forthcoming DOD instruction
    on civilian harm mitigation and response.
        Question. What role do you believe public transparency plays with
    respect to accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian
    casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?
        Answer. Public transparency about U.S. military operations helps
    improve the public's understanding of what the President and the
    Secretary of Defense have directed U.S. forces to do, as well the
    results of their actions. Although the type of information that can be
    made public will inevitably depend on operational and security
    requirements, transparency efforts can help the public better
    understand the human suffering that is inevitably part of war as well
    as the extent to which U.S. forces' go to minimize civilian casualties.
        Question. Do you believe DOD has achieved a sufficient level of
    transparency on such matters? If not, what additional steps do you
    believe are necessary?
        Answer. I understand that DOD and its leaders regularly consider
    new, more effective ways to communicate with the public on important
    issues, including matters related to civilian casualties. If confirmed,
    I would actively support these efforts and fulfill any related
    responsibilities that may be assigned to the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
    forthcoming DOD instruction on civilian harm mitigation and response.
                          special operations missions
        Question. Do you believe the special operations activities
    identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and
    appropriate?
        Answer. Yes, I do. SOF are uniquely manned, trained, and equipped
    to undertake these activities.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
        Answer. At this time, I would not recommend any changes to section
    167 of title 10.
        Question. Are there special operations missions or activities that
    you believe should be transferred to conventional forces or, otherwise
    divested by USSOCOM, and, if so, why?
        Answer. I believe that the decision to employ SOF should be based
    on the following criteria, that a mission or activity: is politically
    sensitive; conducted in an austere or remote location without
    significant support infrastructure; requires a small footprint; demands
    a higher level of precision execution; and there is significant
    delegated decision authority to the lowest level of command. SOF have
    unique training and capabilities to execute missions under those
    criteria. If those criteria are not present, then it may be more
    appropriate for conventional forces to conduct the activity or mission.
        Question. Are there any additional missions or activities that you
    believe should be assigned to USSOCOM? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Not at this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    the Commander, USSOCOM, as well as with the USD(P) and the CJCS, to
    ensure USSOCOM is assigned appropriate missions and activities.
                      future of special operations forces
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges facing U.S.
    Special Operations Forces in the near-, mid-, and long-term?
        Answer. I believe the major challenge for SOF is balancing the
    demands of sustainable counterterrorism while increasing readiness for
    crisis response and strategic competition with China and Russia. I do
    not believe that SOF should be prioritized to focus on longer-term
    challenges that do not require their unique skills, capabilities, and
    attributes.
        Question. In your assessment, are U.S. Special Operations Forces
    appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to address these
    challenges? What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
    organization, training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations
    Forces?
        Answer. From my current understanding, I believe SOF are actively
    adapting to ensure they are ready to meet these existing and emerging
    challenges. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander,
    USSOCOM, to ensure SOF are organized, trained, and equipped to the
    levels necessary to meet these challenges.
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of the ASD(SOLIC)
    in identifying and implementing efforts regarding the organization,
    training, and equipping of U.S. Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. In my view, the ASD(SO/LIC) should ensure that SOF are
    organized, trained, and equipped in alignment with national and
    Departmental strategic guidance. I believe that the role of the ASD(SO/
    LIC) is to provide appropriate civilian oversight, to include advocacy
    within the Department and with Congress, to ensure SOF are optimally
    organized and receive the necessary training and equipment to carry out
    their assigned missions and activities.
                              combatting terrorism
        Question. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy
    and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?
        Answer. The U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism is a
    comprehensive, whole-of-government approach for integrating military
    and non-military efforts to combat the threat of terrorists at home and
    abroad. The strategy recognizes that today's terrorist landscape is
    more fluid and complex than ever. The United States must be adaptive in
    its approach in countering and preventing terrorism. I understand that
    USSOCOM plays a key role in this process as the Department's
    Coordinating Authority to unify counterterrorism planning across DOD.
    If confirmed, I will work to ensure we are focusing on the appropriate
    lines of effort and are aligned with the whole-of-government effort.
        Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
    counterterrorism strategy in addressing the threat posed by Violent
    Extremist Organizations (VEOs)?
        Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism provides a
    framework that has proven effective guiding U.S. action to degrade ISIS
    and al-Qa'ida. Our goal must be to evolve to most cost-effective
    approaches to degrade the terrorist threats to the United States and
    our citizens. If confirmed, I would advocate for establishing clear
    policy objectives and effective assessment metrics that make it easier
    to review progress and measure success, in close consultation with
    interagency partners.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
    or associated measures of effectiveness?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on how the strategy is being
    implemented, and whether the existing measures of effectiveness are
    precise and being used in adjusting our CT approaches across the
    Department. A standardized assessment methodology and metrics could
    enable a more proactive and deliberate approach to CT, which could
    enable the Department to put in place more cost-effective and
    sustainable approaches enduring terrorism threats.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda,
    the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other VEOs, to the U.S.
    Homeland, and western interests, more broadly? Which group or groups,
    in your view, currently present the greatest threat to the United
    States?
        Answer. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
    present an enduring threat to U.S. citizens at home and abroad. Our
    national interests, and those of our partners and allies, will remain
    threatened until these groups are no longer able project power from
    their operating areas, or inspire others to carry out violence in their
    name.
        Question. In your view, what does a ``more resource sustainable''
    approach to counterterrorism, as directed by the NDS, mean?
        Answer. In my view, a ``more resource-sustainable'' approach would
    entail prioritizing effective operational actions against the groups
    that pose the greatest threat to Americans, efficient and flexible
    employment of limited resources, and wherever possible working by,
    with, and through enabled partners to build the capacity of local
    authorities to increasingly confront the threats on their own
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    promote a ``more resource sustainable'' approach to counterterrorism?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a collaborative and transparent
    effort, in coordination with the leadership of the Joint Staff;
    Commander, USSOCOM; and other key officials, to develop Departmental
    guidance and priorities for counterterrorism operations, activities,
    and investments. I also will work to integrate military
    counterterrorism operations into the whole-of-government approach and
    with the efforts of allies and partners.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you endeavor to manage risk under
    this ``more resource sustainable'' approach?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would manage strategic risk through a
    whole-of-government evaluation of what terrorist entities pose the
    greatest threat to the United States, when compared to U.S. and
    coalition efforts to disrupt their activities. We need to look
    carefully at our terrorism efforts to ensure they are applied against
    the most important threats we face, in the context of our regional and
    global national security objectives. .
                              detention operations
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
    addressing matters regarding detention under the law of armed conflict?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will engage directly on all matters
    regarding policy and guidance on detention under the law of armed
    conflict.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
        Answer. Yes, I support the current standards for detainee treatment
    in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3. Individuals in
    the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to
    any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to
    interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field
    Manual. Any and all detainees must be treated humanely.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the ongoing
    triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the NDAA for
    fiscal year 2016?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my DOD and Army counterparts
    on the triennial review of FM 2-22.3 to ensure that it meets all
    applicable legal requirements, and that the practices for interrogation
    described in the Army Field Manual do not involve the use or threat of
    force in accordance with section 1045 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). I
    understand that the USD(I&S) is currently reviewing interrogation
    techniques and may publish a DOD manual on the same. I fully support
    the elevation of interrogation techniques to a DOD-level manual. If
    confirmed, I will work with USD(I&S) to ensure detention operations are
    synchronized across DOD.
        Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM
    2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the policies and
    processes outlined in FM 2-22.3 to determine if any revisions may be
    required.
                            intelligence operations
        Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the
    intelligence activities and programs of Special Operations Forces
    delineated between the Office of the USD(I&S) and the Office of the
    ASD(SOLIC)?
        Answer. DOD Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, designates the ASD(SO/
    LIC) as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary of Defense
    charged with exercising authority, direction, and control of all
    special operations-peculiar administrative matters, and assisting the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop overall policy
    pertaining to special operations, low-intensity conflict, and irregular
    warfare.
        In that context, I believe close coordination with the USD(I&S), as
    well as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
    Oversight (ATSD(IO)) official charged with performing independent
    oversight of DOD intelligence and intelligence-related activities
    pursuant to DOD Directive 5148.11, Assistant to the Secretary of
    Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), is valuable and
    necessary for the proper oversight of such SOF activities. If
    confirmed, I look forward to partnering with the USD(I&S) and the
    ATSD(IO) to ensure that support for SOF is collaborative and
    coordinated in accordance with all applicable law and policy.
        Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
    by Special Operations Forces different from those carried out by others
    in the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. In my view, special operations missions require immediate
    and detailed intelligence to support operations that are executed on
    rapid timelines and in high-risk environments. In light of those
    requirements, the key difference is that these intelligence operations
    are conducted in direct support of authorized SOF missions supporting
    specific Combatant Commander requirements. In contrast, I understand
    intelligence operations carried out by others in the intelligence
    community typically serve a more strategic purpose and reflect national
    priorities.
        As such, I believe the main difference is that intelligence
    collected and assessed by SOF directly supports special operations task
    forces conducting operations in support of the Combatant Commanders.
    When select SOF elements carry out intelligence operations in support
    of strategic collection requirements, those requirements are fully
    coordinated within the IC.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence
    activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are properly
    coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. I understand that SOF sensitive activities are closely
    coordinated with the Intelligence Community (IC) as required by
    applicable laws, policies, and arrangements. If confirmed, I would
    ensure that SOF units comply with all applicable laws, policies, and
    directives for the coordination of intelligence activities with the IC.
                  countering weapons of mass destruction (wmd)
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by WMD to the
    United States?
        Answer. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continue to be a
    significant threat to the Homeland and U.S. Forces, allies, partners,
    and interests abroad. Specifically related to terrorists, I understand
    that a few groups have expressed intent and taken action seeking to
    acquire, develop, and use WMD against the United States and its allies.
        Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities
    under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's
    efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?
        Answer. I understand that the responsibilities of the Commander,
    USSOCOM, include providing the Secretary of Defense with
    recommendations on priorities and the allocation of resources to
    counter weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Commander, USSOCOM, to support him in meeting those
    responsibilities and ensure he receives the support needed to undertake
    this important mission.
                           10 u.s.c. 127e operations
        Question. Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes
    the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
    by U.S. Special Operations Forces to regular forces, irregular forces,
    and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations to
    combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. In my experience, section 127e authority provides a cost-
    effective means for the United States to advance our security interests
    by supporting and enabling partners and allies in pursuing shared
    objectives against high-risk terrorist groups. If confirmed, I will
    evaluate this authority, including how it supports U.S. strategic
    goals, and ensure activities supported by this authority are in
    alignment with NDS priorities.
        Question. What modifications, if any, would you recommend to this
    authority?
        Answer. The section 127e authority is a proven and effective tool
    for U.S. SOF to conduct counterterrorism operations by, with, and
    through foreign and irregular partner forces. If confirmed, I will seek
    to maintain the efficacy and efficiency of the programs utilizing
    section 127e support and to identify areas where we can improve the
    authority, or its application, to achieve U.S. national security
    objectives and support the needs of Combatant Commanders.
                               irregular warfare
        Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
    U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
    below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as
    irregular warfare and ``gray zone operations.''
        What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
    adversaries in the domain of irregular warfare?
        Answer. It is my understanding that, because of U.S. conventional
    overmatch, adversaries of the United States increasingly rely on
    indirect and asymmetric approaches to competition in an attempt to
    enhance their influence and avoid our advantages. This approach
    bypasses our conventional overmatch because state competitors are able
    to achieve many of their objectives without needing to cross the
    thresholds that would lead us to respond militarily. If confirmed, I
    would advocate for carefully calibrated actions that impose costs on
    adversaries' destabilizing efforts and support a more integrated
    approach to deterring their undesired behaviors.
        Question. What should be the guiding principles of any DOD strategy
    to counter threats in the ``gray zone,'' in your view?
        Answer. Consistent with the Interim National Security Strategic
    Guidance, I believe that diplomacy should be our tool of first resort.
    DOD's approach to the ``gray zone'' should focus on three key
    principles in support of diplomatic efforts: persistent engagement with
    allies and partners to demonstrate our commitment and maintain
    situational awareness of adversaries' destabilizing efforts;
    prioritizing the information space, to seize the initiative and shape
    conditions, increase our influence and legitimacy, and combat harmful
    disinformation; and bolstering resilience across DOD and among allies
    and partners against the subversive and coercive challenges that are
    endemic to ``gray zone'' competition.
        Question. What do you perceive to be the appropriate role for
    Special Operations Forces in executing such a strategy?
        Answer. In my view, SOF have a critical role to play in DOD's
    approach to the ``gray zone,'' where strategic and conventional
    deterrence are insufficient to counter adversaries' strategies.
    However, I believe it is important to understand that SOF provide far
    more than the direct action and counterterrorism (CT) portfolios that
    have dominated the past 20 years. SOF provide a wide range of
    capabilities below the threshold of armed conflict that can complement
    our traditional deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I would work to
    ensure that the capabilities and mission sets associated with irregular
    warfare provide the Department with a suite of options to mitigate our
    adversaries' malign influence, and also I would factor in a whole-of-
    government approach to sustain our interests in competition.
        Question. What is your assessment of the status of implementation
    of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS, including efforts to
    institutionalize and operationalize irregular warfare as an enduring,
    core competency of the entire Joint Force?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Department has made
    significant strides since the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 NDS
    was signed. The Department released an unclassified summary of this
    document to increase awareness among our allies, partners, and the U.S.
    public of how it is working to understand the strategic environment and
    achieve unity of effort. I also understand that an implementation plan
    was developed to maintain accountability of implementation across the
    Joint Force--and not just SOF--to institutionalize IW as part of its
    approach to strategic competition and armed conflict. If I am
    confirmed, I would carefully review this process and advocate for
    continued momentum in areas where emphasis on IW can create lasting
    strategic impact and operational advantages.
        Question. Do you agree with the Department of Defense's public
    summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS that states ``we are
    unprepared for irregular war?''
        Answer. My assessment is that the Department has traditionally
    prepared for deterrence of armed conflict or to win a high-intensity
    war, but that the lower-intensity conflict associated with ``gray
    zone'' activities is more difficult for DOD, and the U.S. Government
    more generally, to understand and to deal with effectively. If
    confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department continues to make
    progress in addressing this issue.
        Question. What do you see as the role of the ASD (SOLIC) in
    implementing the objectives described in the Irregular Warfare Annex to
    the NDS?
        Answer. I understand that the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) is the OSD
    lead for the Department's effort to implement the strategic guidance
    provided by the IW Annex to the 2018 NDS. If confirmed, I would work
    with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide continued
    direction and oversight of the Department's efforts to institutionalize
    IW into Joint Force campaigning in both strategic competition and armed
    conflict. I would also ensure that the long-standing, necessary reforms
    identified in that document are incorporated appropriately in successor
    guidance and strategic documents as they are developed.
        Question. What is your assessment of the value of the ``section
    1202'' authority for support of special operations for irregular
    warfare? What modifications, if any, would you recommend to the
    ``section 1202'' authority?
        Answer. I believe the section 1202 authority is an important tool
    in SOF's arsenal for competition by, with, and through foreign and
    irregular forces supporting our IW efforts. If confirmed, I would work
    with USSOCOM to make sure that geographic Combatant Commands understand
    the unique value of this authority to achieve effects in competition
    within their AORs, and that USSOCOM's subordinate commands have the
    necessary resources to utilize section 1202 authority fully and
    continue to mature the program. I would engage with Congress to
    advocate for responsible and effective growth in this authority's
    availability to DOD to help meet growing demand from Combatant
    Commanders.
        Question. Do you believe that Special Operations Forces have the
    appropriate authorities and capabilities to operate effectively in this
    domain of warfare? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. SOF have a range of authorities, including section 1202 of
    the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 and 10 USC sections 127e and 127f, which
    enable the conduct of IW-related and other sensitive activities as part
    of strategic competition. It is my understanding that SOF have
    appropriate IW capabilities that employ those authorities effectively.
    If confirmed, I would closely monitor the employment of these
    authorities to assess their sufficiency and would continuously evaluate
    SOF IW capabilities for effectiveness. I would work to demonstrate
    SOF's responsible use of these authorities and ensure the valuable
    return on investment in their use, and would look forward to working
    with Congress on these important matters.
        Question. In your view, do Special Operations Forces require
    additional authorities and capabilities to provide support of irregular
    warfare? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe the Department does not require additional
    authorities or capabilities to provide support of irregular warfare at
    this time. If confirmed, I would closely review the existing
    authorities and provide my recommendations on where additional support
    or increased authorities may be essential for our continued irregular
    warfare activities.
                    special operations enabling capabilities
        Question. Special Operations Forces rely extensively on enabling
    capabilities provided by Military Service general purpose forces to
    ensure mission success.
        What is the role of the ASD(SOLIC) in ensuring that the special
    operations requirements for enabling capabilities are properly
    articulated to and provided by the Military Services?
        Answer. Major Force Program-11 only funds SOF-unique requirements.
    I understand that USSOCOM currently relies on the Military Services and
    Defense-Wide organizations to provide $9.0 - $10 billion of support
    annually in areas including military personnel, material, and base
    operating support. The ASD(SO/LIC) must continue to be the senior
    advocate for support to SOF within the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense. If confirmed, in coordination with Commander, USSOCOM, I will
    continue to integrate my staff into Department-level relevant processes
    to ensure adequate support to SOF by general purpose forces.
        Question. In your view, should Special Operations Forces further
    develop organic enabling capabilities, in addition or in place of those
    currently provided by general purpose forces?
        Answer. I believe that it is necessary and preferable for most
    enabling capabilities to be provided by the Military Services; however,
    there are requirements derived from SOF's unique missions where I
    believe that it is necessary for the enabling capability to be
    organized within USSOCOM. The decision to do so must be weighed
    carefully within the context of the SOF-peculiar requirement and the
    sustainment burden assumed by USSOCOM.
                             information operations
        Question. In your view, are the Department and the broader
    interagency appropriately organized to compete with state and non-state
    adversaries in the information environment? If not, what
    recommendations would you make?
        Answer. I understand that the Department is engaged, working within
    assigned portfolios, and collaborating with other relevant U.S.
    Government departments and agencies, to compete in the information
    environment. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the proper
    structure responsible for the synchronization of all information-
    related capabilities across the Department to achieve U.S. strategic
    objectives. I also would make the advancement in the capabilities and
    application of information operations a top priority key focus.
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department and,
    specifically, Special Operations Forces, in the broader information
    operations and strategic communications efforts of the U.S. Government?
        Answer. I understand the Department has a variety of capabilities
    to conduct military operations in the information environment,
    including public affairs (PA), military information support operations
    (MISO), electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), and cyberspace
    operations. When these activities are executed effectively and in
    combination with each other and other tools, DOD can achieve its
    mission more affordably, and with reduced risk to our operating forces.
    If confirmed, I will strive to integrate these capabilities further
    into Department activities and in support to our interagency and
    foreign partners.
        Question. What role should the USSOCOM's Joint MISO WebOps Center
    play in supporting these efforts?
        Answer. I understand that USSOCOM organized the Joint MISO WebOps
    Center to host the capability to support MISO activities that are
    funded and conducted by individual geographic Combatant Commands. I
    understand that the Center is working and growing, and, if confirmed, I
    will continue to support this important capability.
        Question. Should Special Operations Forces develop any additional
    military capabilities to enable the DOD and the United States to
    compete more effectively in the information environment? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. Success in the information environment requires an
    integrated approach among a broad spectrum of participants. If
    confirmed, I will assess USSOCOM's capabilities in this area and ensure
    it continues to be a meaningful part of the effort to create and
    deliver timely solutions to warfighters. I will continue to focus on
    needs, speed of delivery, effectiveness, and efficiency.
                                counternarcotics
        Question. The ASD(SOLIC) is responsible for coordinating and
    overseeing plans, programs and policies pertaining to counternarcotics
    (CN).
        What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States by
    drug trafficking and related activities of transnational criminal
    organizations?
        Answer. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention, more than 81,000 drug overdose deaths occurred in the
    United States in the 12 months ending in May 2020, the highest number
    of overdose deaths ever recorded in a 12-month period. More than 80
    percent of drug overdoses involved opioids, primarily fentanyl and
    fentanyl analogs. The Drug Enforcement Administration has stated that
    Mexican-based transnational criminal organizations remain the greatest
    criminal drug threat to the United States. Transnational criminal
    organizations engaged in drug trafficking to the United States are a
    serious threat to the health and safety of the American people and are
    a destabilizing force globally.
        Question. What do you view as the proper role of the Department in
    supporting interagency partners tasked with counternarcotics missions,
    such as the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department
    of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security?
        Answer. From what I understand, DOD has a role supporting other
    Departments' counterdrug efforts. DOD is the lead Department for
    detection and monitoring of potential drugs headed to the United States
    by maritime or aerial means. DOD provides capabilities and expertise to
    other departments and agencies, when requested, to help reduce the
    national security threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the
    United States.
               special operations command acquisition authorities
        Question. Section 167(e)(4) assigns to the Commander, USSOCOM the
    authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment,
    and to acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and
    services. The Commander, USSOCOM is advised and assisted in these
    matters by a command acquisition executive.
        If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating a
    determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel,
    supplies, or services is ``special operations-peculiar''?
        Answer. My understanding is that ``special operations-peculiar'' is
    applicable to any equipment, material, supplies, or services funded by
    MFP-11 and required by and unique to SOF to accomplish their missions
    or activities.
        Question. If confirmed as the ASD(SOLIC)--
        What actions would you take to improve each of the three aspects of
    the special operations-peculiar acquisition process--requirements,
    acquisition, and budgeting?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD (A&S) and
    USSOCOM on special operations-peculiar acquisition, requirements, and
    budgeting processes. I would draw on the annual Planning, Programming,
    and Budget Execution (PPBE) process to ensure that USSOCOM's priorities
    and resource allocation are in alignment with the Department's
    strategic objectives.
        Question. What actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that
    special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic, technically
    achievable, and prioritized?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander,
    USSOCOM to ensure that there is a vigorous, disciplined, and systematic
    review process to prioritize special operations-peculiar requirements
    in alignment with the Department's strategic objectives and continue to
    deliver capabilities to the warfighter at the speed of relevance.
        Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities in the
    acquisition process that should be assigned to the ASD(SOLIC) or the
    Commander, USSOCOM, in your view?
        Answer. 10 U.S.C. section 138 authorizes the ASD(SO/LIC) to
    ``exercise authority, direction, and control of all special-operations
    peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training,
    and equipping of special operations forces.'' If confirmed, should I
    identify any changes to authorities or processes that would improve the
    functions of the office, I will engage within the Department and with
    Congress to make appropriate recommendations.
        A natural tension exists between the objectives to ensure that
    acquisition programs reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the need
    to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--the
    objective of the test and evaluation function.
        Question. What are the respective roles of the ASD(SOLIC) and the
    Commander, USSOCOM in the test and evaluation of special operations-
    peculiar acquisition programs? How would you exercise the
    responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) in this regard, if confirmed?
        Answer. I understand USSOCOM has a number of test and evaluation
    programs that support special operations-peculiar acquisitions and
    evaluation. If confirmed, I will ensure that USSOCOM appropriately
    develops test and evaluation strategy to support the acquisition
    process, as well as ensure speed of delivery to the warfighter. I will
    also work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
    Sustainment), Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    and the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive.
        Question. How has the Commander, USSOCOM made use of rapid
    acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition
    processes?
        Answer. I understand that the Commander, USSOCOM, and the USSOCOM
    Acquisition Executive leverage a wide range of acquisition processes to
    facilitate rapid prototyping of special operations-peculiar hardware.
    In particular, USSOCOM has been very effective in its use of the Middle
    Tier of Acquisition pathway and the non-traditional acquisition tools
    such as Other Transaction Authorities.
                           ethics and accountability
        Question. In January 2020, USSOCOM completed a Comprehensive Review
    of Special Operations Forces Culture and Ethics. Among other things,
    the Comprehensive Review found that ``selective implementation'' of
    recommendations from four previous reviews related to the culture and
    ethics of Special Operations Forces since 2011, including two such
    reviews mandated by Congress, have resulted in continued challenges
    related to the assessment and selection of Special Operations Forces,
    leader development, and force structure and employment.
        What are your views on the current culture of ethics and
    accountability in U.S. Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. I understand that the Comprehensive Review identified
    factors contributing to instances of bad decision-making. If confirmed,
    I will continue to monitor the enterprise-wide institutional changes
    recommended in the Comprehensive Review to ensure they continue to be
    implemented, and I will work closely with Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure
    a long-term commitment to and focus on ethics and accountability.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in implementing the
    recommendations of the USSOCOM Comprehensive Review?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with Commander, USSOCOM,
    to ensure the special operations enterprise continues to implement the
    Comprehensive Review's recommended actions with the same speed and
    discipline as are the hallmarks of SOF operations. I also will keep
    this Committee informed of progress until completed.
        Question. What is you understanding of the actions required to
    complete full implementation of the 16 recommendations provide by the
    Comprehensive Review?
        Answer. My understanding is that the CR Implementation Team, which
    includes an ASD(SO/LIC) representative, has completed 7 of the 16
    recommended actions and is on track to complete all 16 recommended
    actions by the end of calendar year 2021.
        Question. The USSOCOM Comprehensive Review found that ``a USSOCOM
    culture overly focused on force employment and mission accomplishment
    creates the contexts or situations allowing for misconduct and
    unethical behavior to develop within the SOF enterprise.''
        What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment play in
    decisions relating to misconduct by Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. I believe that decisions on SOF misconduct and unethical
    behavior should be evaluated independently from any past mission
    accomplishments and commendable actions. Leaders must set the example,
    lead by example, maintain the highest standards of moral and ethical
    behavior, and hold their personnel accountable for their actions.
                      health of special operations forces
        Question. High operational tempo and demand for special operations
    capabilities have contributed to enormous strain on Special Operations
    Forces, which is challenging readiness, resilience, and retention.
        What is your assessment of the health and readiness of Special
    Operations Forces?
        Answer. SOF face unique challenges that directly impact readiness,
    resiliency, and retention, most notably the stress of repeated combat
    deployments and the long-term effects of mild traumatic brain injuries.
    If confirmed, I will advocate for continuing studies and programs to
    address the effects of the stress of repeated combat deployments and
    the long-term effects of mild traumatic brain injuries on the health of
    military members and the readiness of the force.
        Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing
    the stress on Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. USSOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF)
    program provides embedded behavioral health providers that are vital in
    the continuing effort to promote preventative stress management and
    reduce suicides in the SOF community. If confirmed, I will advocate for
    the POTFF program and work with the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments to sustain support for the well-being of SOF and their
    families.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address
    suicides in Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. USSOCOM has been implementing proactive SOF-specific
    suicide prevention programs. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Commander, USSOCOM, and the DOD Suicide Prevention Office to help
    USSOCOM adopt best practices and innovative research and technologies
    to continue strengthening its suicide prevention efforts.
        Question. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM's Preservation
    of the Force and Families program?
        Answer. The Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program
    is designed to help Service members and their families cope with SOF-
    unique challenges that cannot be addressed through the Service-
    sponsored support programs. The POTFF program takes a holistic approach
    to the wellbeing of SOF members and their families. It has been
    influential in strengthening SOF readiness and resiliency and reducing
    suicides. The program focuses on five domains: human performance,
    psychological health, cognitive performance, family readiness, and
    spiritual wellbeing.
                             command climate survey
        Question. If confirmed, would you plan to administer a command
    climate survey to the workforce under your leadership and management?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will capitalize on the ongoing DOD-wide
    effort to conduct the Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) at
    all military units and consider administering this or a similar survey
    to the personnel assigned to the immediate office of the ASD(SO/LIC).
    Also, the Commander, USSOCOM and I will encourage commanders to take
    advantage of DEOCS results to help promote positive command climate,
    and will hold leaders accountable for promoting a positive command
    climate.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
    5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced
    sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work''
    in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
    otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the Office of the ASD(SOLIC)?
        Answer. If confirmed, and made aware of such a complaint, I would
    direct the case be handled promptly and properly, following the DOD
    guidelines and policies, and ensure the employee has access to all
    support resources. It is my number one priority to create a work place
    that is safe and equitable for all staff and free from hostile or
    abusive conduct by anyone.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
    communications) and other information from the Department.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
    communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                  nominations
        1. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, as part of my responsibility as a
    member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and to ensure the fitness
    of nominees for appointment to senior positions within the Department
    of Defense I will be asking the same two questions that I ask nominees
    to all of the committees on which I serve. Since you became a legal
    adult, have any of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors,
    or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Mr. Maier. No

        2. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, have any of you ever faced discipline
    or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Mr. Maier. No
               culture and ethics in the special forces community
        3. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, following several high profile
    incidents in recent years, Congress directed U.S. Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM) to conduct a comprehensive review which found that
    while the special operations force does not have a ``systemic ethics
    problem'', 2 decades of sustained combat operations and not enough
    emphasis on leader and professional development had ``impacted the
    force's culture in some troublesome ways''. Do you believe the force
    has an ethics or culture problem?
        Mr. Maier. I do not think the force as a whole has an ethics or
    culture problem, but I am troubled by recent incidents in which members
    have not upheld the values expected of them. I support continued
    implementation of the Comprehensive Review (CR), through which USSOCOM
    has established, or is in the process of establishing, policies and
    procedures that will help ensure leaders are present, engaged, and held
    accountable. While a heavy deployment tempo was found in the CR to not
    be the only contributor, I am committed, if confirmed, to advocating
    that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are assigned only to those
    missions for which SOF are best qualified and equipped to execute. As I
    stated in my testimony, I would prioritize ensuring SOF represent the
    values and ideals of the nation we serve, if confirmed.

        4. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, if confirmed, what steps do you plan
    to take to ensure leaders in the special forces community demonstrate
    integrity and demand leadership, discipline, and accountability from
    members of their units?
        Mr. Maier. If confirmed, I will partner closely with the USSOCOM
    Commander, and ask my leadership team to work daily with SOF commanders
    and senior staff, to ensure collective implementation of the CR
    recommendations. Our goal must be to ensure these changes are
    incorporated into permanent policies, and that the policies become
    daily practice. The CR recommendations, once implemented, are core to
    ensuring SOF is resilient and best prepared to tackle the complex
    military challenges of the future.
                   special forces and great power competition
        5. Senator Hirono. Mr. Maier, for nearly 20 years, our special
    operations forces have fought heroically, but our focus has been almost
    exclusively on the counter-terrorism mission in the Middle East and
    other parts of the world. With the drawdown of all forces from
    Afghanistan underway, if confirmed, what steps do you plan to take to
    ensure the special operations forces community is prepared to support
    the Joint Force in a potential future conflict with either China or
    Russia?
        Mr. Maier. Although SOF have focused extensively on
    counterterrorism over the last two decades, SOF also bring innate
    capabilities--such as placement and access, crisis response, and strong
    partnerships--that will position the SOF enterprise to compete with
    peer competitors, and enable the Joint Force to do so more effectively.
    The SOF enterprise has moved out rapidly in revamping itself in
    response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the President's Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance (March 2021), and Departmental
    guidance directing focus toward China and Russia. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with the USSOCOM Commander to ensure that SOF are in
    alignment with overarching national and Department guidance, and
    encourage the ongoing efforts to incorporate SOF and SOF-peculiar
    capabilities into Department planning efforts focused on China and
    Russia.
        I believe that SOF and SOF capabilities bring a critical component
    to competition and can reduce strategic risk for the Joint Force and
    support whole-of-government efforts in strategic competition through
    concerted engagements with partners and allies prior to conflict. If
    confirmed, I will work with the USSOCOM Commander to balance today's
    missions with the need to ensure that SOF are best positioned for
    future challenges by increasing attention to modernization, training,
    and capability development that best support the Joint Force.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. Christopher P. Maier
    follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Mr. Christopher P. Maier, which
    was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr.
    Christopher P. Maier in connection with his nomination
    follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Mr. Christopher P. Maier was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 10, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on August 7, 2021.]

                                     [all]