[Senate Hearing 117-981]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-981
THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL
McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER] AND THE
HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO
BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 11, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-873 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
may 11, 2021
Page
The Nomination of the Honorable Michael McCord, Nominee to be 1
Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller] and the Honorable
Ronald Moultrie, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 5
Witness Statements
McCord, The Honorable Michael, Nominee to be Under Secretary of 9
Defense [Comptroller].
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 42
Questions for the Record....................................... 59
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 61
Biographical Sketch............................................ 62
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 64
Signature Page................................................. 71
Moultrie, The Honorable Ronald, Nominee to be Under Secretary of 11
Defense for Intelligence and Security.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 71
Questions for the Record....................................... 96
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 104
Biographical Sketch............................................ 105
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 108
Signature Page................................................. 115
(iii)
THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE
MICHAEL McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER]
AND THE HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
morning. The Committee meets this morning to consider the
nominations of Mr. Michael McCord to be Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), and Mr. Ronald Moultrie, to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. On behalf
of the Committee I want to thank you both for your willingness
to return to public service.
Mr. McCord, I would like to welcome your wife, Ms. Donna
Miller Rostant, who is with us this morning, and I thank
Secretary Chuck Hagel for joining us today to introduce Mr.
McCord.
Mr. Moultrie, I welcome your wife, Mrs. Darlene Moultrie,
who is also here, and I want to send out a very special
recognition to your mother, Ethel Moultrie, who is celebrating
her 91st birthday today, and we hope she is watching her son
and telling everyone around how smart he is. Thank you.
Let me also thank Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell, former
Director of National Intelligence and former Director of the
National Security Agency who will introduce Mr. Moultrie via
Webex.
I would also like to thank Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger,
representative of Maryland's Second District, who I know wanted
to introduce Mr. Moultrie today but is unable to do so.
Representative Ruppersberger has instead sent us a letter of
support which will be entered in the record. Without objection,
so ordered.
[The letter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Reed. I am sure both of you have additional family
members who would have liked to have been here this morning,
but because of the pandemic restrictions they are watching from
home, so we thank them for their continued support of your
service to our Nation.
Mr. McCord is a highly regarded national security and
defense policy expert with extensive government experience. He
is well known to this committee, having served as a
professional staff member for more than 20 years, and is well
prepared for the Comptroller job, having been nominated and
confirmed to that position under President Obama. The
Comptroller is instrumental in preparing and executing the
Department's budget, ensuring the resources that Congress
provides are allocated to the troops efficiently and
effectively. Additionally, the Comptroller is a key player in
the Department's efforts to achieve a clean audit and to
modernize its financial management system. Mr. McCord is the
right person to have in this role at this time.
While Mr. McCord has not played a role in developing the
budget for this year, it should be pointed out that this year
is an inflection point in how the Department prioritizes the
resources it needs to accomplish its missions, given that the
fiscal year 2022 budget will not be constrained by the Budget
Control Act. While we await the release of the detailed budget
request, we know the recommended top line for the Department of
Defense (DOD) is $715 billion. Some of my colleagues feel that
that number should be increased, while others will argue for
reduction. The key, however, is what we buy with that top line,
and this committee will do a thorough analysis of the request
when we receive it.
Mr. McCord, as we discussed during our office call, there
are also a number of functions within the Department that are
in need of transformation. The PPBE [Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution] process, was first implemented in the
McNamara era in the 1960s and may not be conducive to many of
DOD's requirements to adopt new technology in a rapid, agile
manner to compete with China and Russia. Further, the
Department continues to struggle to achieve a clean audit,
something that has been required at law for over 30 years. I
hope you will share your views on the role of the Comptroller
regarding these challenges at this important moment for the
Department of Defense.
Mr. Moultrie has had a long and distinguished career in
intelligence with extensive service at the NSA [National
Security Agency] as well as the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency], ODNI [Office of the Director of National
Intelligence], and DOD. Since retiring as NSA's Director of
Operations, he has had a successful career in the private
sector while remaining active in public policy. If confirmed,
Mr. Moultrie, you will serve as the principal intelligence
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and will be dual-hatted as
the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
The scope and complexity of the global threat environments
we face are unprecedented. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
and many other state and non State actors pose increasingly
serious challenges, especially in their hybrid warfare and gray
zone tactics. It is more important than ever that this
committee and the Department of Defense ensure that the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise is appropriately equipped to integrate
and prioritize intelligence resources and capabilities.
In particular, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency (DCSA), which you will supervise, has had a slew of new
and challenging missions assigned to it that are critical for
DOD, and is growing significantly in size and responsibility.
Many of the functions that DCSA is now required to perform
support other parts of the government and customers in DOD and
beyond USD(I&S). It is important for DCSA to have a customer-
focused culture, and your leadership will be necessary to
achieve that.
Further DOD's new all-domain/cross-domain warfighting
concepts require that the defense intelligence agencies,
chiefly the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office], NGA [The
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], and NSA, transform
themselves to provide proliferated satellites and rapid and
agile tasking and processing to support the military. If
confirmed, it will be your responsibility to ensure that these
agencies are responsive to these emerging military
requirements. Mr. Moultrie, I welcome your thoughts about how
you intend to foster this transformation and ensure that the
military has timely and accurate intelligence to defend the
Nation in the midst of a competitive security environment.
We face many challenges that will require strong leadership
and the ability to make tough decisions. I thank the nominees
again for your willingness to serve our Nation. I look forward
to your testimony.
Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses for being with us and for their willingness to serve.
Our Nation's top military and intelligence leaders have told
this committee in recent months that the world is the most
dangerous place that we have had to experience.
In 2018, the National Defense Strategy provides a roadmap,
and here it is. This is one, and really, we have one of our
authors here as a witness, as a nominee, in Michael McCord, and
so it is quite a complimentary thing that you are one who has
put this thing together.
Voice. Is there a place to----
Senator Inhofe. What was that all about?
Chairman Reed. That was a message from above.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Or below.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. All right. We have quite a few challenges
that you will oversee, and we understand that you are certainly
the two that are the best qualified around that we could hope
to have in these positions.
Insufficient and uncertain funding has hamstrung our
military for years. We must do a better job of resourcing this
strategy, improve our ability to quickly make decisions and to
invest in the right capabilities to keep up with China and
Russia. We must also continue the momentum on the Pentagon's
financial audit and improve the transparency of the budget in
Congress and the American people.
In the area of intelligence, we are still losing the
information war. Just recently, we heard about all of the
combatant commanders complaining that they cannot get
declassified intelligence to fight back against our
adversaries' lies.
Just last week, I published an article about how much China
and Russia truly spend on defense, which is much more than many
people have been led to believe. We hear over and over again
the notion that somehow we are spending more than China and
Russia put together, and they do not realize that the most
expensive thing that we do is taking care of our troops, taking
care of the housing. Those countries, they do not do that, and
we all understand that.
We must do a better job of understanding our adversaries
and articulating the threats they pose to the American public.
We have no time to lose. Our military advantages are going or
eroding in key areas. We still do not have a handle on how to
prevent the Chinese from stealing our technology for military
and commercial purposes. The Nation and the Department of
Defense must tackle these problems head-on if we hope to
preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do is
harm.
If you would have the honor, after your confirmation, to
support the team of Americans who represent everything that is
noble and best in our Nation. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, space guardians, civilian servants, and our military
families, do everything we ask of them, and more. The
Department requires strong civilian leadership that I believe
the two of you will be able to provide, and so we are looking
forward to that.
Also, nice to see Chuck Hagel back again. It has been quite
a long period of time, and I want to welcome you back. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and now
let me recognize, via Webex, Vice Admiral McConnell, for his
introduction of Mr. Moultrie. Admiral?
Admiral McConnell. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to introduce Mr. Ron Moultrie, the President's
nominee to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security.
Ron Moultrie is a highly regarded [inaudible] who has
successfully served in many of the Nation's most demanding
intelligence community positions. A man of the highest moral
character, keen intellect, and strategic vision, Mr. Moultrie
has demonstrated leadership and management skills to address
and resolve the most challenging issues. [Inaudible] first as
the Director of the National Security Agency [inaudible] and
later as the Director of National Intelligence.
I also know his wonderful wife of 33 years, Darlene. Both
served in the United States Air Force and are service veterans
who served the Nation well.
Mr. Moultrie is a former [inaudible] who applied those
skills in the Air Force and at NSA as we engaged in
[inaudible]. Moving to NSA as a civilian as a signals
intelligence analyst, he quickly moved through the ranks, and
based on his drive, energy, and exceptional performance, he
advanced.
NSA is where we met when I was serving as the agency's
director in the early 1990s. When I needed help to address some
of the Nation's most sensitive operations and change
requirements, on the advice of the agency's most senior
leadership I chose Mr. Moultrie for the position of Senior
Executive Assistant. In that role, he served as my confidante
and my alter ego, as we adjusted from the Cold War focus to
address the new challenges facing the Nation, not only emerging
threats in signals intelligence but also emerging, new
cybersecurity threats due to the widespread embrace of emerging
network technologies, not only by the U.S. Government but by
the private sector. Any time a large organization undergoes
significant change there is always confusion and resistance.
Ron Moultrie helped me navigate these changes, because of his
understanding of the technology, the workforce, and the
changing mission needs.
Being confident in his own abilities and a natural
coalition builder, Mr. Moultrie was asked to serve as a member
of the CIA's Senior Intelligence Service to foster closer
collaboration between two of the Nation's premier intelligence
organizations. This is where we met to work again together.
When President Bush asked me to serve as the Nation's second
Director of National Intelligence, relieving Ambassador
Negroponte, I asked Mr. Moultrie to again serve as my Senior
Executive Assistant.
As a member of the DNI's leadership team, Mr. Moultrie
helped me manage the intelligence community's new Executive
Committee and the new Deputy Executive Committee that we formed
to address collaboration and coordination issues that existed
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Nation. He also
helped update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act due to
information technology changes, revised for the President's
signature Executive Order 12333, launched the National
Comprehensive Community Initiative, and create the Joint Duty
Intelligence Program.
On returning to NSA after his service with ODNI, Mr.
Moultrie rose to become the agency's third-ranking official,
serving as the Director of Signals Intelligence Operations. The
first minority member to serve in this challenging position,
Mr. Moultrie helped the agency enjoy some of its greatest
successes in the global war on terrorism and other enduring
intelligence challenges.
After retirement from NSA, in addition to his service in
the private sector, Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Spencer,
seeking a national security official with a comprehensive
understanding of cybersecurity and technology, asked Mr.
Moultrie to chair the review of the Navy's information
management structure. The review, completed in July of 2019,
led to the immediate establishment of a single, accountable CIO
[Chief Information Officer] to bolster the department's
warfighting and cybersecurity capabilities and to provide the
Navy and Marine Corps a decisive information advantage in
intelligence technology, big data, and artificial intelligence.
Without hesitation, I strongly recommend favorable
consideration for Mr. Ronald Moultrie to become the Nation's
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. It is
my distinct honor to introduce him to this distinguished
committee. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Now let me
recognize former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Chuck
Hagel. Secretary Hagel.
Mr. Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Inhofe, and other Members of
the Committee. First, before I introduce Mike McCord, I want to
recognize Mr. Moultrie and congratulate him for his service and
for the responsibilities that he is soon to take up, pending
confirmation of this committee. So, to Mr. Moultrie, thank you
and congratulations.
I appreciate the opportunity to introduce Michael J. McCord
in support of the President's nomination of him to be Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). You all have records of
Mike McCord's bio and impressive comprehensive work record of
36 years' experience in national security and finance, so I am
not going to repeat what you already have. Instead, I am going
to tell you a little bit about how I know Mike McCord, my own
experience with him, and knowledge of him.
I have known and worked with Mike McCord since 1997, during
my 12 years in the Senate, in my 4 years as co- chairman of the
President's Intelligence Advisory Board. When I was confirmed
as Secretary of Defense in February 2013, Mike McCord became an
important part of my team at DOD. He was the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, working with the Under Secretary
(Comptroller), Bob Hale.
The first few days I was in the Secretary's office we were
presented with sequestration. Many of you were here at that
time and recall the disastrous results of sequestrations for
DOD. We had to find an additional unplanned $30 billion in
cuts, on top of the $45 billion in cuts that had already been
budgeted for under the 2011 Budget Control Act. I looked to
Mike McCord and Under Secretary Hale for guidance and
leadership in how we handle this massive unbudgeted cut. It was
a difficult time for every part of the defense enterprise.
Mike's leadership, experience, and ability were critical in
helping DOD get through this time. I relied on and expected a
great deal from Mike McCord.
In the fall of 2013, and again some of you will remember,
we were confronted with one of the longest government shutdowns
in history, furloughing people, most people not coming to work
for weeks, and all of the waste and threats to national
security that went along with this unproductive insanity of
long government shutdowns. Again, Deputy Comptroller McCord was
called on for his help in dealing with the long shutdown.
Again, I relied on Mike for advice and direction. This was also
at the time Comptroller Hale had informed me that he wished to
retire after a long, distinguished career. So there was
uncertainty in the Comptroller's Office and within the Pentagon
as to who would replace Hale. Mike handled it professionally,
with clear, competent direction and judgment.
In late 2013, I recommend Mike McCord to replace Bob Hale
as Comptroller and Under Secretary of Defense to President
Obama, and in January 2014, Mike was nominated by President
Obama for the position, and he was confirmed by this committee
and the Senate in June 2014. We continued to work very closely
together until I left the Pentagon in February 2015.
Some of the projects Mike led and worked tirelessly on were
the creation of the new European Reassurance Initiative. Many
of you will remember that initiative in the summer of 2014, in
response to Russia's invasion of Eastern Ukraine and occupation
of Crimea. The reprogramming of $1 billion in 2014 to
underwrite the Ebola crisis, where DOD managed and took
responsibility for the Ebola logistics in West Africa, to
support the whole of U.S. Government effort. How quickly this
was accomplished, with minimal delays, was a clear example of
how the government congressional Oversight Committees trusted
Mike. As we all know, trust is the coin of the realm, in all
things.
In my years in the private sector and in public service, I
have seen and experienced the qualities that make a person
successful. They do not change. They are not complicated. It is
not just how smart you are or how well- educated you are.
Everyone on this committee recognizes the qualities--
character, first, integrity, courage, and judgment. If any of
these are missing, the journey will not end well. If the person
does not possess a sense of humanity and decency and dignity,
they are not fit for leadership. Michael J. McCord possesses
all these indispensable requisites and the successful
experience to warrant his confirmation.
I am very proud to appear here today before this committee
to introduce Mike McCord. Thank you for allowing me to present
my introduction of Mike McCord and for your serious
consideration of President Biden's nomination of him to be
Under Secretary of Defense and Comptroller.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
statement and also for your distinguished service, both
in the United States Senate and in the Department of
Defense. Thank you very much.
Now let me recognize Mr. McCord for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER]
Mr. McCord. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you this morning as you consider my nomination
for the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
and Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense.
I want to express my gratitude to President Biden for
nominating me to this important position, and to Secretary
Austin and Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks for their
confidence in me. If I am confirmed, it would be an honor to
serve as part of their team. I also want to thank former
Senator and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for introducing
me. His support is especially meaningful as I seek to become
the first person to be confirmed for this position twice, as he
selected and recommended me, as he described, to President
Obama when I was confirmed for this role in 2014.
It is also a pleasure to be back before this committee
where I served on the staff for 21 years. I cherished the
opportunity to had to learn from the outstanding Senators who
have led this committee during my career here: former Chairmen
Nunn, Thurmond, Warner, and Levin. I send my best wishes, as I
know you do, to former Senator and Chairman Carl Levin, my boss
for 11 years, as he battles lung cancer today.
I also had the privilege of working on this committee with
three Senators who went on to chair it after I left the staff
for the Department: the late Senator John McCain, Senator
Inhofe, and Chairman Reed. Your leadership follows in the great
bipartisan tradition of this committee, and it is a key reason
it continues to be so highly respected.
Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family,
especially my wife, Donna. I could not undertake this mission
without her love and full support. She is the heart and soul of
everything we are able to do as a team, for our family, our
community, and our country. My mother, my daughters, and my
brother and sister have also been with me throughout my career
in public service. Although my family and my wife's family
cannot join us here today due to the pandemic, they are with me
in spirit and I appreciate their support along this journey.
If confirmed, I look forward to returning to the Department
of Defense to serve our Nation, promote our national security,
and support our servicemembers. The sense of mission among the
civilian and military personnel in the Department is a
remarkable thing to be part of.
Should I be confirmed, my top priority will be to help the
Secretary and other senior leaders build the best defense
budget we can to meet our strategic needs and carefully steward
the resources Congress provides us.
Second, I would prioritize a strong relationship with the
congressional defense committees, and ensure the Department
provides the information you need on that budget. The stronger
the partnership between the Department and the Congress, the
stronger our national security will be.
Third, I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department gives
full effort and attention to the financial audit so that we can
build on and accelerate the progress that has been made toward
the goal of a clean opinion.
Fourth, working with other senior leaders, I would work to
re-engine the Department's management reforms in light of the
dis-establishment of the Chief Management Officer position. I
look forward to the opportunity, should I be confirmed, to
focus on making DOD more effective.
If confirmed, I will be a full partner with Members of this
Committee in ensuring that we carry out our respective
responsibilities for our national security.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions and I ask that
my complete statement be included in the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection, the statement will be
included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCord follows:]
Prepared Statement by Prepared Statement of Michael McCord
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning in
connection with my nomination for the position of Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer of the Department of
Defense (DOD).
I want to express my gratitude to President Biden for nominating me
to this important position, and to Secretary Austin and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Hicks for their confidence in me. If I am
confirmed, it would be an honor to serve as part of their team. I also
want to thank former Senator and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for
introducing me today. His support is especially meaningful as I seek to
become the first person to be confirmed for this position for a second
time, as he selected and recommended me to President Obama when I was
previously nominated and confirmed to hold this position in 2014.
It is an honor and a pleasure to be here in front of this committee
where I served on the staff for 21 years and had the opportunity to
learn from the examples set by the outstanding senators who have led
this committee during my career. As a staff member here, I served under
Chairmen Nunn, Thurmond, Warner and Levin. I want take this opportunity
to send my best wishes to former Senator and Chairman Carl Levin, my
boss for 11 years, in his battle with lung cancer.
In addition, I had the privilege of working with three Senators who
went on to chair this committee after I left the staff for DOD: the
late Senator John McCain, Senator Inhofe and Chairman Reed. Your
leadership follows in the great bipartisan tradition of this Committee,
and it is a key reason it continues to be so highly respected.
Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family,
especially my wife, Donna Miller Rostant. I could not undertake this
service without her love and full support. My mother, my daughters, and
my brother and sister have been with me throughout my career in public
service. Although my family and my wife's family cannot join us here
today due to the health restrictions necessitated by the pandemic, they
are with Donna and me in spirit and I thank them for supporting me in
this journey.
Should I be confirmed, I look forward to returning to the
Department of Defense for another opportunity to serve our Nation,
promote our national security, and support our servicemembers. The
sense of mission among the civilian and military workforce in the
Department of Defense is remarkable.
My top priority, if confirmed, will be to help the Secretary and
other senior leaders build the best defense budget we can to meet our
strategic needs; to ensure the Department provides the defense
committees the information they need on that budget; and then
faithfully steward the resources the Congress sees fit to provide for
our common defense.
Second, if confirmed, I will prioritize a strong relationship with
the congressional defense committees on all matters under my purview.
The stronger the partnership between the Department and the Congress,
the stronger our national security will be.
Third, I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department gives full
effort and attention to the financial audit so that we can build on and
accelerate the progress that has been made toward the goal of a clean
opinion.
Fourth, working with other senior leaders, I would work to continue
and build upon efforts to improve the Department's performance in light
of the dis-establishment of the Chief Management Officer position in
the fiscal year 2021 defense authorization bill. I look forward to the
opportunity, if confirmed, to focus on making DOD more effective.
After I left DOD four years ago, I served on the Commission on the
National Defense Strategy for the United States. I took two strong
lessons from my time as a commissioner. First, the United States faces
serious national security challenges that in turn require leaders in
both the executive and legislative branches to attack those challenges
with a seriousness of purpose.
Second, our strategic competitors use all the tools of their
national power against us, and we must ensure we are capable of doing
likewise. The Department of Defense, no matter how capable or well-
funded, cannot by itself ensure we prevail in this competition.
If confirmed, I will be a full partner with you in ensuring we
carry out our respective responsibilities for our national security.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Mr. Moultrie, your statement, please.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Mr. Moultrie. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and for your
consideration of my nomination to serve as the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
I want to thank DNI McConnell for his kind introductory
words. His mentorship and tutelage have tremendously shaped my
career.
I am honored for the trust and confidence that President
Biden and Secretary Austin have placed in me, and if confirmed,
I look forward to serving with our Nation's outstanding
intelligence and security professionals.
I am blessed to have met my wife, Darlene, while we served
on active duty, and to have benefitted from her love and wisdom
for over 33 years.
I am also grateful to have a family that embodies service.
My father served in the Korean War and in Vietnam, and rose to
the rank of Army Sergeant Major. My mother's brother made the
ultimate sacrifice while serving with the 101st Airborne in
Vietnam.
Duty, honor, and sacrifice. These principles have been
instilled in me since childhood and drive me to this day.
Defending against all enemies, foreign and domestic, takes
on new meaning for all in the intelligence and security
profession. China, our pacing challenge, a global pandemic,
malign actors, and other existential threats pose risks to the
global order and threaten our way of life. Domestic extremism
and sexual harassment tear at the fabric of our society and
threaten to undermine order in the Defense Department's ranks,
and our warfighters need a ``decisive, secure information
advantage'' and our troops must be safe, regardless of their
environment.
If confirmed, these will be among my top priorities. I am
confident that we can overcome these challenges and build upon
our global leadership role.
We must innovatively explore, and rapidly adapt, emerging
technologies that will enable us to defend our Nation against
those seeking to erode our technological and intellectual
advantages. We must build and embrace partnerships across our
government, with the private sector and academia, and with our
key foreign partners and allies, and we must have a close
working relationship with Congress.
Most importantly we must have the support and trust of our
citizens. They are the inspiration for all that we do and
ultimately why we serve.
If confirmed, I will strive to accomplish these and other
priorities as determined by the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. I will always serve with the utmost honor
and integrity.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. I ask that
my full remarks be placed in the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection, the full remarks will be
placed in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ronald Moultrie
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for your consideration of my nomination to serve as the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
I want to thank DNI McConnell for his kind introductory words. His
mentorship and tutelage have tremendously shaped my career.
I am honored for the trust and confidence that President Biden and
Secretary Austin have placed in me, and if confirmed, I look forward to
serving with our Nation's outstanding intelligence and security
professionals.
I am blessed to have met my wife, Darlene, while we served on
active duty and to have benefitted from her love and wisdom for over 33
years.
I am grateful to have a family that embodies service. My father
served in the Korean War and in Vietnam and rose to the rank of Army
Sergeant Major. My mother's brother made the ultimate sacrifice while
serving with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.
Duty, honor, and sacrifice. These principles have been instilled in
me since childhood and drive me to this day.
Defending ``against all enemies, foreign and domestic'' takes on
new meaning for all in the intelligence and security profession:
China, our pacing challenge, a global pandemic, malign
actors, and other existential threats pose risks to the global order
and threaten our way of life;
Domestic extremism and sexual harassment tear at the
fabric of our society and threaten to undermine order in the Defense
Department's ranks; and,
Warfighters need a ``decisive, secure information
advantage'' and our troops must be safe, regardless of their
environment.
If confirmed, these challenges will be among my top priorities.
I am confident that we can overcome these challenges and build upon
our global leadership role.
We must also innovatively explore, and rapidly adapt, emerging
technologies that will enable us to defend our Nation against those
seeking to erode our technological and intellectual advantages.
We must build and embrace partnerships across our government, with
the private sector and academia, and with our key foreign partners and
allies.
We must have a close working relationship with Congress.
Most importantly we must have the support and trust of our
citizens. They are the inspiration for all that we do and ultimately
why we serve.
If confirmed, I will strive to accomplish these and other
priorities as determined by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
I will always serve with the utmost honor and integrity.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Gentlemen, I am going to address questions
that are required of all nominees. Please respond
appropriately.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. McCord. No.
Mr. Moultrie. No.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
committee when requested?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. McCord. Yes.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, gentleman. Now, Mr.
McCord, let me address a question to you. We have been looking
very closely at the PPBE process--Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution. You are aware, probably better than
anyone, that it began in the 1960s with McNamara and the Whiz
Kids. It has not changed very much, and we are in a different
post-industrial age. Can you give us your views on reforming
the PPBE process? What is within your scope in the Department
of Defense, by regulation? What legislation might be necessary,
and also whether it would be wise to propose a commission to
look more carefully at this process?
Mr. McCord. Thank you for that. Mr. Chairman, the process,
as a whole, is heavily legislated in what I would call the
back-end execution. There are thousands of pages of laws and
regulation governing how government funds may be expended. It
is very lightly legislated on the front end, the planning and
programming process, in particular. So as you move through the
process, the amount of statutory and regulatory guidance
increases fairly exponentially, with regard to how taxpayer
funds are used.
The process itself I think has--as you said, it has been in
place a long time, and it is sort of foundational to how the
Pentagon works at this point. I think it has some benefits that
should be preserved as we look at reforming, in particular that
the Secretary and the Deputy have a lot of flexibility on what
topics they choose to focus on, what analysis they want to rely
on, and who is in the room, who is not in the room. So I think
those are some of the things that we would want to preserve,
but as you say, I think we need to look at how we can have
maybe greater agility to go with accountability in that
process, and I do think it is something the Department can work
with the committees on, and perhaps with a commission as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. The audit has been an
issue of concern for decades. There are some that suggest that
while achieving an audit would not reveal sort of adequate
guidance to changes in the Department, there are others that
think the audit is a powerful weapon for change and
efficiencies. Where do you come down on this, and how will you
conduct the audit?
Mr. McCord. Chairman, the audit, as you know, is required
by law, and it is something that the Department is behind other
Cabinet agencies on, and it is a priority for, I think,
Secretary Austin and for myself. It is not the answer to every
question, certainly. An audit will not tell you whether the
particular airplane you bought was the right airplane for the
mission, for example, or whether the contractor overcharged
you. Those are all different aspects of controls that are above
and beyond the financial audit.
But that said, it does help identify where resources may be
being wasted or improperly used or inefficiently used, and the
controls that are one of the big hurdles between where the
Department stands today and achieving that audit, getting all
the controls in place I think takes on new meaning in this era
of cyber intrusions. So I think that the business process
reforms that are necessary for an audit are things the
Department needs to be doing anyway, and the audit is a good
forcing function for the direction the Department needs to go.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Moultrie, the current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff emphasized joint and cross-domain capability
requirements that the military services have not prioritized or
are not responsible for developing, such as joint all- domain
command and control, JADC2 [Joint All Domain Command and
Control]. JADC2 demands ubiquitous interoperability, automated
decision aids, and systems assistance integration. Indeed, this
is probably, in my view, one of the key levers to continue our
superiority, vis-a-vis our rivals around the world.
Within your office, how are you going to confront these
challenges and hopefully delivery a robust system of joint and
cross-domain capability?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the JADC2 concept is extremely
important for us to be able to counter our adversaries in
whatever domain that we may need to counter them in. As you
know, it will provide this ubiquitous connectivity that you
talked about. But we must ensure that it is also secure and
reliable, regardless of the environment, and it must connect
across all domains. So it must be able to connect our land,
air, sea forces, and space forces, as necessary.
Within the Office of the USD(I&S), if I am confirmed, I
would work towards ensuring that we understand the requirements
for the JADC2 concept. I would ensure that we understand what
the responsibilities are of the other components in the other
services and what they need to deliver, and then we need to
ensure that we can test this capability. We need to be able to
prove it in combat, but we also need to ensure that is has the
redundancy that it needs so that it can provide our warfighters
with the real-time connectivity and capabilities to fight the
war, and, if confirmed, I would commit myself to supporting the
JADC2 concept.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Moultrie. Again, I
think this is one of the most significant issues that we face
collectively in the Department of Defense, and I urge you to
follow through, if confirmed.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, MR. Chairman. I just have one
question for each one. I have already expressed my feelings
about the two nominees and how fortunate we are that they are
willing to do this, and I am sure they will be confirmed.
General Townsend, the Commander of United States Africa
Command (AFRICOM), recently testified about China's ruling
military presence in Africa. China built its first overseas
military base in Djibouti and is aggressively pursuing a naval
base on the west coast of Africa, which General Townsend
called, using his quote he said, ``the number one global power
competition concern,'' and I agree with that.
I am very familiar with the AFRICOM, and I was somewhat
instrumental in making that a reality back in 2007. In a way,
though, I failed. We got AFRICOM--well, the continent of Africa
used to be divided among three different COMs, so at least it
is all under one COM now, but we never did adequately get the
resources necessary. Now, because it has become so much more
important in the fact that China--you know, that people do not
realize China--Djibouti is the first time that they started an
overseas operation. They have done everything else in their
back yard, always up to now. So it is kind of a big deal there.
So I would ask you, Mr. Moultrie, I am going to ask you if
you will try to do something I failed to be able to do, and
that is commit to me that you will take a close look at our
intelligence capabilities in Africa, that you will ensure that
our efforts there get the attention and resources they need.
Now, I know you will get the cooperation of this committee,
but it is going to be your responsibility to spend the time and
the resources to encourage the administration to make that a
reality. What are your feelings about that, and are you willing
to try to do that?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, yes. China has been a challenge for
a number of years, really a number of decades as it pertains to
Africa, and I closely followed that when I was the Director of
Operations at the National Security Agency. They have diplomat,
they have military and economic ambitions. There are a lot of
reasons to focus on Africa, as you know, Senator, the ports
that they have there. It is a mineral-rich continent that the
Chinese seek, and they are using all of their tools,
techniques, coercion, and malign influence to actually try to
move into that continent.
I have not been briefed on it, but I understand the
challenges there. I understand, I think, what the Chinese have
tried to do there. If confirmed, I would work across the
interagency. I would also work with our partners and allies,
because they are also focused, in some ways, on China, to
ensure that we understand what the Chinese are doing and what
their plans are, and that we would be prepared to support the
Secretary in deterring the Chinese challenge there and
providing support to our warfighters and commanders forward.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and specifically, though, in trying to
get the resources from us that, again, we failed to get done
previously. That is a major concern that I have there.
Lastly, with Mr. McCord, first of all, you are very
familiar this committee, and we are very familiar with you, and
we appreciate the fact that you are taking on this
responsibility. It is particularly interesting that you are one
of the 12 listed on this document, and I do not think that even
you believed the attention this document would get when you
first developed it.
So one of the items in there that is pretty specific is the
need for the 3 to 5 percent real growth in the defense budget
to effectively implement the national defense system. I know
that when Deputy Secretary Hicks was before this committee, she
also was one of the authors of this, one of the 12 authors of
this document, and she agree that the 3 to 5 percent real
growth was really something that is as realistic today as it
was in 2018. Do you agree with Secretary Hicks and her comments
and the necessity of the resources in order to get the job
done?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. The Commission, as you said,
found that that was an appropriate resource range for the
National Defense Strategy that Secretary Mattis laid out, and,
of course, if confirmed, my job would be to work with Secretary
Austin as he undertakes his strategy review and similarly find
the right resource level for his strategy.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, and I think that you found it,
and so I appreciate that in the document and your efforts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me recognize
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Gentlemen, congratulations on
your nominations. Thank you for your willingness to stand for
those positions at these challenging times.
I want to begin with you, Mr. McCord, because I think your
background in cybersecurity and information management makes
you a particular good choice at this critical time. As we saw
over the weekend, from the attack on Colonial Pipeline, and the
potential impacts on the East Coast's access to gasoline, we
need someone who understands the challenges. I wonder, if this
had been a terrorist attack on the pipeline, would we have
reacted the same way? Given your background at DOD, how do you
think we might have reacted if it had been a terrorist attack?
Did I call you McCord instead of Mr. Moultrie? If I did, I am
sorry.
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, that is fine. I understand the
question. The attack on Colonial Pipeline, Senator, is
extremely concerning. These attacks, probably intrusions and
attacks probably occur much more frequently than what we know.
We only see what I call the tip of the iceberg as it pertains
to these. While I have not been briefed on this, what I have
read in the media is that it was a ransomware attacks, which
was not necessarily directed by a hostile target, but as we
know, there are hacktivists who are members of foreign
governments, who hire themselves out to do these attacks. We
have been fortunate, over the last year, year and a half, to
dodge bullets, that there has not been malicious intent.
I think it is important, Senator, and if confirmed, I would
look at this as a public-private issue that we need to have the
government work closely with industry. We need to work closer,
among ourselves in the interagency, and we need to understand
what the challenges are. We need to get the word out to
industry. We need to partner with them to help them solve these
challenges. We have been fortunate, but we have to do more.
Senator Shaheen. Would you agree that our laws and our
responses have not kept up with the technology that is
available to do those kinds of cyber intrusions, and that we
need to do a better job of updating how we respond, both in
terms of our technology, that response, but also the laws that
we pass to respond?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I would say that we certainly need
to look at the laws, but we also need to look at the processes
that we have in place----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Moultrie.--for alerting people. So it would be a
combination.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am also concerned about the
amount of information that we currently classify. In a January
2020 memo that was sent by nine U.S. combatant commanders to
the Acting DNI, the commanders highlighted what they called,
and I quote, ``pernicious conduct of our adversaries'
information operations across the world, and underscored the
need to improve deep classification of information in order to
more effectively compete in their respective domains.''
I would argue that one of the places where we have done too
much classification has been around our response to those
government officials who have been attacked by what is known as
the Havana Syndrome, where information has been very dispersed,
very classified. Sometimes I am not sure that one agency talks
to the other agency in terms of what we are doing. Certainly
under the Biden administration there has been more of an effort
to respond to this. But would you agree with the combatant
commanders that signed that memo, that improving our
declassification efforts would actually be helpful in terms of
how we respond to certain situations?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not read this combatant
commanders memo. I have read about it in the media. My
understanding is that there is information out there on malign
activities that should make its way to our warfighter and to
our combatant commanders. So I agree with you 100 percent on
that, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Well, would you commit to doing everything
you can to doing everything you can to ensure that there is an
unclassified accounting of facts on the issues surrounding
those who have been attacked by these electro--radio waves,
under what is called the Havana Syndrome, so that there is both
consistent information that is going to Congress and the public
and also very real information that we receive about what is
going on?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, if confirmed, I would look into what
we know on these directed energy attacks, as they call them, to
understand what is going on, and work with the DNI and others
to find ways to disseminate this information to our citizens
and to those who need to know in our installations and
facilities around the world.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking both of your for your
continued service to our country. I would like to begin with
Mr. McCord. Looking back, you began work on the Senate Armed
Services Committee in 1987, during the first year of the
implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition to
reorganizing the Department to better execute joint operations,
this act required the submission of a National Security
Strategy, the first time a strategy was ever required in our
Nation's history.
Furthermore, the act actually calls for the NSS to be
submitted to Congress at the same time that the President
submits his budget. As you know, this has not happened, and yet
at the same time, while we do a National Defense Strategy, my
thoughts right now, as we look at a pipeline which has been
hacked, and we have people that are wondering how we work
through the issue of providing defense to individuals within
our country, how do we coordinate between the different
departments, how do we break down the silos, and shouldn't we
be looking, on a regular basis, at how we defend not just
through the NDS but a national security for the entire country?
I am just curious. Wouldn't this help to have this continue to
be submitted, as was originally envisioned in 1987?
Mr. McCord. Senator, thank you. Yes, I am familiar with the
National Security Strategy documents. My recollection is that
they have not, over these 30 or so years, been routinely
submitted every single calendar year but have been a little
more sporadic than some of the defense documents have been. I
am aware that National Security Advisor Sullivan put out an
Interim Strategic Guidance for this administration a few weeks
ago. As a private citizen, I am not privy to the schedule for
formalizing such a document, whatever might be envisioned by
the White House at this time.
As far as the processes, though, responding to more
specific threats and challenges as you were describing, and
Senator Shaheen also, from the outside, where I sit, it looks
like the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, the
processes that are used to respond to the specific events look
fairly familiar to what has been used over many
administrations. So I think there is a process in place, but
your point is well taken that, you know, defense strategy is
always best when it nests inside a National Security Strategy.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Moultrie, let me continue along that same line, and I
would like to preface it with I appreciated the opportunity to
visit with you yesterday. With this pipeline hack, it brings to
mind the need to really focus, as you suggested earlier, not
just on the challenges we have, air, land, and sea, but space
and cyberspace, as we look at our adversaries, and not just
Russia and China and Iran and North Korea, but also the fact
that we have criminal elements, sometimes in collusion with but
sometimes on their own, attacking the infrastructure within the
United States--financial services, transportation, electrics,
electric utilities, and now we find out the distribution of our
energy resources.
Mr. Moultrie, you were one of the individuals who worked on
the Navy's review, and I must admit, a very refreshing review,
of the challenges facing the Navy alone with regard to its
independent contractors, defending the information from those
who would steal it, protecting its secrets, and recognizing the
vulnerabilities that the Department of the Navy had in the
cyber world. So I recognize and I appreciate the work that you
did in that respect.
Having just gone through and looked at what happened here
within the most recent hacking of the pipeline, it seems to me
that the lessons learned on this would suggest that the silos
we have been the different departments, the different branches
within the departments, and, most certainly, those that come
from not just the Department of Defense trying to defend
against those attacks from the outside but then to try to
coordinate with Homeland Security to protect not just the DOD's
interests but also the interests of the American public on an
infrastructure basis, it seems to me that there is a real
lesson to be learned here about a coordination that has to
occur.
Would you care to share a little bit about what you learned
about your thoughts with regard to breaking down those silos,
and anything else that we might have learned that could be
beneficial to the entire Department of Defense that you saw
within the review of the Department of the Navy?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I will be brief about this.
What we found was that the cyber threat was pervasive, it is
real. The adversary knows what our vulnerabilities are better
than we do. They study this. We are probably the most connected
but most underprotected society in the world. We found that the
industrial base was a prime target of our adversary, and we
found that we did not have a comprehensive plan for getting
after that.
So we recommended that leadership, at least the Secretary
of the Navy, in this instance, transmit commanders intent as to
what he would want to do, how to get after it, and that we
organize ourselves not in silos but horizontally, so that we
could cross-communicate throughout the Department and work on
those various areas. The Navy, I want to say they have done a
good job at that.
I think our Government is moving in that direction, based
on President Biden's announcements of nominations for a
National Cyber Director, and I think that there are lessons
learned for the Department of Defense that could be emulated
from the Navy study, and, if confirmed, I would look forward to
working with all of the principals in the Department who have a
piece of cyber to support that initiative.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds, and let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Moultrie, your statement that you just said is exactly what you
and I discussed. You said we are the most connected but the
most underprotected. That is extremely disturbing, and I know
that you have an ambition to begin to address that, as you just
said.
It is important to our national security's success that the
military intelligence apparatus operates in sync with the
entire intelligence community, especially the CIA, and that our
intelligence entities are not autonomous or siloed against each
other, and I have heard many examples of this, which is deeply
concerning. I was very happy to have your commitment to work
closely with DNI Haines to make sure this happens correctly.
Do you have any additional thoughts that you want to share
on areas where integration between our military and civilian
intelligence entities can improve?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I believe that what you just
laid out would be the foundation that we ought to pursue.
Working with DNI Haines and her cadre, working with Director
Burns and Deputy Director Cohen at the CIA are important, but
there are aspects of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise that
have a piece of this. There are multiple pieces of this.
We have to rally around the priorities and a sense of
purpose and unify around the concept of we each have a shared
responsibility as it pertains to this challenge. If confirmed,
I would work to build that understanding, further understanding
within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I think we have
great commanders who understand it today, but I would further
the facilitation and working across those elements to ensure
that we are working as a unit and that we understand that this
threat is more than a threat. It is not something that somebody
is threatening to do. It is something that is happening today.
Senator, you have my commitment to devote myself to making
this happen, if confirmed as the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Security.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. Moultrie, ODNI's Annual
Threat Assessment noted that white nationalists or right-wing
extremist groups have conducted at least 26 attacks that have
killed more than 141 people over the last 5 years. Further,
Australia, Germany, Norway, and the UK all consider racist
extremist groups the fastest-growing terror threat that they
face. What role would you say you and your office might have in
evaluating this threat, in particular, and given that you would
be the senior official overseeing our insider threat program,
do you have any specific plans to deter or detect extremists
who may have infiltrated the Department or the military?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, extremism should not exist in our
ranks, regardless of how pervasive it may be. It undermines
readiness and it undermines the strong values that we have. I
was very pleased to see that Secretary Austin has charted a
counter-extremism working group to help define the problem and
to help provide recommendations for the problem. The Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Security has an organization
that helps train and helps monitor, to ensure that we do not
have a proliferation of any extremist views by any group.
I believe that there is a key role that I can play in
overseeing the activities and helping those professionals who
are already moving in that direction, and, Senator, if
confirmed, you have my commitment to ensure that we move in
that direction, ensuring that we eliminate extremism throughout
the Department of Defense.
Senator Gillibrand. With regard to China, obviously it
poses the most significant national security and intelligence
threat to the United States across the board. As you are aware,
China uses a number of cyber technical and human intelligence
tools to achieve this end. It will take the full strength of
our military and the civilian intelligence community to deter
them.
Are you confident in the military's ability to monitor and
counter China's building global military intelligence
footprint, including in more remote areas of the world such as
Latin America, Africa, and South Asia?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I have not been briefed on the
current collection posture of the intelligence community or the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I can tell you I am confident,
Senator, that we understand what the challenge is. But I would
want to withhold judgment as to whether or now I am confident
we could actually monitor, on a global basis, until, if
confirmed, I have the opportunity to understand what we are
doing and where we are on that issue today.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Moultrie.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me
recognize Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
you so much. It was great to have phone conversations with both
of you, and I really appreciate the opportunity to get to know
you both better. We certainly appreciate your time this morning
in giving testimony on these topics. If both of you are
confirmed, you do have challenging roads ahead, to make sure
that we are providing the very best of intelligence and
resources to our warfighters, to help them accomplish their
mission, and I look forward to working with both of you to
ensure that America succeeds.
Mr. Moultrie, I would love to start with you first, sir,
and as evidence by your resume and the phone conversation that
we had, you and your family have extensive experience in the
intelligence community. I think we do continue, of course, to
struggle to eliminate certain gaps between the various agencies
in the Federal Government and really provide that common
operating picture across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
If you could, I know we spoke on this on the phone, but if
you could for everyone else that might be catching up now, how
do we close those gaps in information between the different
agencies? How do we improving the sharing, the collaboration
between our agencies to make sure that the Department of
Defense always has the cutting-edge information necessary to
accomplish our mission?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. The need for greater
collaboration, and real-time collaboration, is extremely
important, probably no more important so than it is today. I
believe it is important that we work with the Director of
National Intelligence, who works a National Intelligence
Priorities Framework, to understand that the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise and our warfighters needs are, in many
ways, aligned closely with our national policymaker needs.
So when we are looking at real-time collection, analysis,
dissemination to the President of the United States and
policymakers, we need to ensure that that same information is
getting to the warfighter and getting to those in the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise.
I believe that it is a matter of building that
understanding, what the collective missions are, and building
that trust, and you have my commitment, Senator, that if I am
confirmed, I will work to have trusted relationships with the
DNI and others throughout the intelligence enterprise, and we
will get back to you on the progress that we are making, or not
making, in this area.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, and as you may know,
many of our operational elements are using lagging programs of
record, like the Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS, to
provide a common operating picture to those ground commanders.
How would you intend to modernize intelligence infrastructures
and architectures throughout the DOD to enhance those
warfighters' understanding of the operational environment?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the real-time dissemination of
intelligence to the warfighter should be the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise's top priority. In my experience, there
has not been this common operating picture that you discussed.
We have a number of operating pictures, but not a universal
common operating picture, if you will.
I have not been briefed on the DCGS concept of where it is
today, but you have my commitment that the warfighter is the
reason that we exist. They are the reason that we are here. You
have my commitment that if I am confirmed in this position that
I will do all that I can and work with the intelligence
enterprise to ensure that the warfighter has the information
that they need.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that very much and
our conversation.
Mr. McCord, in the final moments that I have, certainly I
have been really paying attention to the audit of the DOD and
making sure that we have a clean audit at some point. Can you
just explain to us how you intend to make sure the Department
gives full effort and attention to this financial audit?
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the Secretary has
already, I think, stated that it is an important priority of
his. That is important. It will be a top priority of mine. I
know it is of this committee, that the defense committees have
been full partners with us and have, I think, given us
appropriate level of patience, while still keep pushing us, as
you need to do.
The effort will take a few more years, but the one thing I
will say, the Department has done everything in the last 10
years or so that it has said it would do, when it said it would
do it. So as we move from statement of budgetary resource,
state audits, to full audits of each military department, to
full audit of the Department, we have done the things that we
have said we would do to the committees.
I think to the topic you have just been discussing,
including controls and information access are probably the key
leverage point, in my view, of what I would intend to look at
first, if confirmed.
Senator Ernst. Well, and thank you, and I do believe it is
important that we continue with the audit, to make sure that we
are communicating to our taxpayers that their resources are
being used appropriately within the Department of Defense.
Gentlemen, I look forward to supporting both of your
confirmations. Thank you so much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. I now recognize
Senator Hirono, via Webex.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord and Mr. Moultrie, I ask the following two
questions of every nominee who comes before any of the
committees on which I sit.
Since you became a legal adult, have either of you ever
made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any
verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Mr. McCord. No.
Mr. Moultrie. No.
Senator Hirono. Did both of you say no? Thank you.
Have either of you ever faced discipline or entered into a
settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Mr. McCord. No.
Mr. Moultrie. No.
Senator Hirono. Mr. McCord, as Comptroller you will oversee
the Defense Contract Audit agency, which performs financial
oversight of government contracts and is critical to ensuring
DOD gets the best value for every dollar spent on defense
contracting by reporting potential problems it finds to the
Defense Contract Management Agency, which administers all DOD
contracts and DOD IG, when appropriate. In your view, is the
Defense Contract Audit Agency appropriately staffed to conduct
adequate oversight of the 300,000 contracts DOD is
administering at any given time?
Mr. McCord. Senator, if confirmed, I would certainly
consult with the Director of DCAA [Defense Contract Audit
Agency], who would report to me, about the workload versus the
staffing levels as it exists today. When I left 4 years ago,
the agency had suffered a bit from a downturn driven by the
sequestration level reductions in staff that had been imposed
across the Department, had gotten the backlog up to an
unacceptable level. We had made progress in bringing that down.
I believe the staffing levels are probably about right, but I
would want to consult further with the Director of DCAA, if
confirmed.
Senator Hirono. When we talk about 300,000 contracts, it
runs the gamut from very large contracts to smaller contracts,
I assume?
Mr. McCord. Senator, yes. DCAA audits contracts of various
different sizes. What they focus on is contracts especially
that are not competed, so it is the type more so than the size
that is a key determinant of where they focus, for example, on
commercially available items versus ones that are more unique.
Senator Hirono. Yes, so those unique contracts probably
require auditors who also understand what the contract provides
and what is expected.
What is your opinion of the Defense Contract Audit Agency's
relationship with the Defense Contract Management Agency and
the DOD IG, and is the current arrangement referring potential
problems the most efficient way for DOD to identify, deter, and
eliminate contracting fraud, waste, and abuse?
Mr. McCord. Senator, DCAA is required to be independent of
DCMA, of the contract management folks. That is, in fact, why
DCAA is under the Comptroller and out of the acquisition chain.
As your question illuminates, there is a little bit of a nuance
there in that they have to talk, they have to communicate, but
they also have to be independent of each other. The inspector
generals, of course, always assert that they are independent of
management, but we also work closely with them. So it is
definitely a bit of a delicate dance to have independent actors
who need to communicate and cooperate but who have to also
maintain a little bit of independence from each other to do
their roles as assigned.
Senator Hirono. So are you saying that the current
situation is the most efficient way to detect fraud, waste, and
abuse?
Mr. McCord. Senator, I would certainly not assert that no
improvements can be made, but I am just making the point that
there is only so close that they can be, given that the
contract auditors have to have some degree of separation from
the contract managers.
Senator Hirono. I understand the independence issue.
Mr. Moultrie, I am increasingly concerned about the
emergence of ``deep fakes"--that is in quote, quotation marks--
a term which describes realistic but forced photos, audios, and
videos produced via artificial intelligence, and how they could
be utilize to erode public trust, embarrass, or blackmail key
officials or inflame or incite violence.
What are your views on this emerging technology as it
relates to national security, and how might our adversaries
seek to exploit it?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes. Senator, I believe that the deep fake
issue is one that could pose a great threat to national
security. If an adversary has the ability to emulate a
commander, or someone in authority, and actually looked as if
they are saying something, that could pose a challenge if
someone took that deep fake to be a realistic individual or
person.
AI, artificial intelligence, has a number of facets that we
have to ensure that we understand. We have to develop the
countermeasures to ensure that we can compare the real
information to fake information. Senator, as I am sure you are
aware, there has been a lot of work done in this regard, where
you can look at the subtle differences between images and see
where some things are slightly off.
If confirmed, I would be very concerned about this, but I
would also ensure that I would work with those across the
interagency, the Department, and with counterintelligence so we
can identify these counterintelligence threats and immediately
either nullify them or alert to the fact that they exist.
Senator Hirono. So do you think that we are adequately--
that we have the adequate capacity to deal with these deep fake
images, audios, et cetera?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not been briefed on the
current status or what our capabilities are, what our
processing and computing capabilities are to discern between a
real image and a fake image, but if confirmed, I would review
that and get back to you.
Senator Hirono. I cannot tell whether my time is up or not,
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Reed. Yes, it is, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
today. Congratulations to you both on your nominations.
Mr. McCord, in your answers to the advanced policy
questions you affirmed the NDS Commission, on which you served,
had found that 3 to 5 percent of real growth was, quote,
``illustrative of what was needed for the 2018 National Defense
Strategy,'' end quote. But you also state that the DOD should
be able to carry on its missions under the announced fiscal
year 2022 funding level, which is below inflation. How can the
committee reconcile these two views?
Mr. McCord. Senator, the way I would state it is, first of
all, of course, neither you nor I have seen the details and the
specific choices made inside the 2022 budget, so we will all be
able to learn more about how we feel about the budget and what
is in there, when it is available in a week or two.
With respect to the funding level, just as an aggregate
number, what Secretary Mattis said at the time and what the
commission sort of spoke to was averaging 3 to 5 percent over a
5-year period, and the fiscal year 2022 request is still in
that range from where the budget was 5 years ago when I left.
So I think in that respect there is a certain consistency.
Senator Cotton. Well, we will see what it says in a week or
two. The reports I hear are not reassuring. Hopefully once you
are confirmed you can exert influence inside the interagency
process and with OMB to make sure the Department of Defense is
fully funded as the threats we face continue to grow.
I also want to ask you a question about the Overseas
Contingency Operations account. I have seen some novel
budgeting tricks used with that OCO spending account during my
8 years in the Congress. At the same time, I think it is
important that we be able to track what we are spending on
overseas conflict. So by doing away with OCO spending, how is
it that we will be able to track, inside the Department of
Defense and for Congress, what we are spending on those
conflicts?
Mr. McCord. Senator, the Department, when I was there, and
I know continues to this day and I would insist that we
continue, if confirmed, does what is called a Cost of War
report. It has moved from, I believe, maybe monthly to
quarterly over the years, that is done to track obligations
that are chargeable against operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.
That can continue with or without separate appropriations, and
I think it would be necessary that it continue for the very
reasons you cite, that there is accountability and transparency
of what is still being spent on these operations.
Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you. I just think it is very
important that we maintain a clear picture of what we are
spending on our forces, that excludes any kind of contingency
operations overseas. Now the OCO account was used in some funny
ways to get around budgetary spending caps over the last decade
that are no longer in place, so it cannot be used in that way
anymore. But I want to make sure that we have a very crystal
clear picture of what we are spending on our manning, training,
equipping, so we understand what the force needs in the future,
separate from what we have to spend on a year-to-year basis,
wherever our forces are operating overseas.
Mr. Moultrie, supply chain security has always been a
critical component of our national security. It grows even more
so as our forces' equipment and weapons get more
technologically advanced. What do you view as the biggest
threats to our technology supply chains, and how would you work
to mitigate those threats?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the supply chain, our supply chain
is inherently vulnerable, is what I would say. Our adversaries,
specifically China and others, understand the defense
industrial base. We are fortunate, based on my past knowledge
and experience, to have organizations, especially within the
Intelligence Security Enterprise, such as the Defense
Counterintelligence Security Agency, that has programs that
actually enable us to go out and talk to those individuals and
companies and facilities that are part of our critical supply
infrastructure for the Department of Defense.
I think we have to ensure that we continue to identify what
our vulnerabilities are in those key areas, in those key
industries, in those key organizations. We have to make them
aware, Senator, of what the challenges really are what the
threat actually is. That means we have to have, when I talk
about public-private partnerships, to be able to go out and
talk to them, make sure that they understand this. If
confirmed, I would work vigorously to ensure that we are doing
all that we can to support the mitigation of risk in our supply
chain as it exists today.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. Last year I sponsored the
American Founders Act with several other Senators, to
reinvigorate semiconductor manufacturing here at home. I
believe offshoring this critical capability has presented a
grave threat to our national security. What importance do you
assign to our leadership in microelectronics design and
manufacturing, and what risk to U.S. security will our supply
chains face if we do not have that critical manufacturing
capability here at home?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator, I have not been briefed on what
is currently occurring within the DOD on foundries. I am aware
of the microchip shortage and the challenges that we are having
in that regard. I think it is important that wherever our chips
are manufactured that they are secure, that, you know,
offshoring of microchips can or cannot induce vulnerabilities
into the process that we have there. But if confirmed, I would
work to understand where those chips are being manufactured to
support the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and work across the
Department and the interagency to ensure that we are securing
the supply chain of getting chips to our military and to our
critical industries.
Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you. I agree with that. It is
kind of dangerous to have 80 to 90 percent of the world's
semiconductors manufactured within short-range missile range of
mainland China, in a place against which Beijing has
irredentist claims. Thank you both.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member Inhofe.
Congratulations to the nominees for your willingness to tackle
these important responsibilities.
Mr. McCord, let me begin with you. As you know, because of
your long tenure with the committee and then at the Pentagon,
it has been a significant interest here to get the DOD to full
audit, and we have made significant progress in that effort. I
give some real credit to David Norquist. I think he did a good
job of moving the Pentagon further toward that goal.
One of my interests in the audit has always been beyond
just passing, using the audit as a way not just to promote best
financial practices but also best operational practices,
finding in the audit strategies where we can consolidate
duplication and then use the dollars saved there to promote
better national security.
So I would like you to just talk to the committee a bit
about the way you see the audit, and how you can use the audit
not only to assure financial compliance but also use it to
advance the national security mission of the Pentagon.
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the audit, as you say,
ultimately comes down to pass-fail, and that is the standard.
But as with studying for a test, the process of learning and
getting there, improving yourself, is almost as important as
the grade you get if you are trying to be proficient or more
proficient at something.
Inventory is probably the chief area where audit promotes
better practices that can reduce waste, help the warfighter,
make sure that we know what we have and it is in the right
place. There are one or two aspects of the audit, in
particular, valuing property that are less connected to that.
But the second area I would say, and this morning's hearing
really brings this out, in the area of controls and cyber
controls, cybersecurity. A large part of the findings that the
auditors have made are that our controls still need to be
better, in terms of access to information and only the
authorized people being able to access information. So I think
that the audit and businesses practices that go with the audit
can be synergistic with the improved cybersecurity that we want
for ourselves and, of course, that we want for industry
partners as well.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that answer, and I very much
encourage you to take this use of the audit seriously, as I
know that you will.
Mr. Moultrie, I was the chair, along with Senator Sullivan
as my ranking, on a Readiness Subcommittee hearing about two
weeks ago, and we were looking at acquisition kind of hits and
misses, and trying to extract some best practices from them.
One of the witnesses that we had was Dr. Ray O'Toole, who is
the Acting Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation
Office. In the course of his testimony, which was in an open
setting, he said that in fiscal year 2020, none of the weapons
systems assessed by his office were able to pass a simulated
cyberattack. Every single one of them was vulnerable to
simulated cyberattacks.
When he testified to that, Senator Sullivan and I looked at
each other and said, ``That is not good,'' and then Senator
Sullivan said, ``I hope our adversaries are not watching this
hearing.'' Dr. O'Toole said, ``In writing my testimony I was so
worried about making this statement that I actually checked to
make sure, from a security standpoint, I could, and it cleared
security, but it is something I am really worried about.''
So should you be confirmed, what might you do, working
together with our acquisition professionals and others, so that
we build in protection against cyber vulnerability very, very
early in any sort of acquisition platform?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I believe that closely working
with acquisition and sustainment is one of the key roles that
the USD(I&S) has to ensure that we are looking at the
determination needs of acquisition to ensure that adversaries
have not perpetrated our industry, our companies, if you will,
and that they are not stealing our secrets, because once they
have stolen those secrets, as you know, there are built-in
vulnerabilities that those systems are going to have.
More importantly today, Senator, I think it is important
that we understand where vulnerabilities and breaches have
occurred, and then that we find a way of incorporating that
information back into not just the acquisition of the new
platforms but the current deployed platforms. So an adversary
steals plans, blueprints, what have you, we need today to get
that information back into the production cycle and into the
current force so that they cannot be degraded when they are
actually doing an operation in the field.
I have not had access to what is being done today, Senator.
If confirmed, you have my commitment to look at this and come
back and talk to you in closed committee about it, because I
think it is a very potentially serious problem, and there are
probably things occurring today that we do not want to talk
about in an open hearing, but our adversaries probably already
know.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Moultrie, thank you for that. I look
forward to following up, should you be confirmed, and I am
confident you will be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Can you hear me?
So first I want to thank both of you for your willingness
to serve.
Mr. Moultrie, what do you believe China's plans are with
regard to Taiwan? Do you believe that Communist China has the
intention to take Taiwan by force?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not been briefed on the
current intelligence as it pertains to Taiwan, but as you know,
their stated intent has been the eventual acclimation of Taiwan
back into what they call the Mainland. As to whether or not
force is in their doctrine, they will execute all means
available to them to ensure that they are protecting what they
feel is in their national interest.
Senator Scott. So we have seen pretty aggressive behavior
by Communist China the last few years, whether it is their
military attacks or building their military strength. What do
you think General Secretary Xi's ultimate goal is with these
cyberattacks and with this aggressive behavior, not just Taiwan
but their actions towards Australia and even the United States?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I believe that the cyberattacks that
China has executed are directed at a number of areas, one, to
bolster their research and development, where they do not spend
nearly as much as we do in the United States. So this is a way
of getting easy and cheap research and development, if I can go
out and steal it. Two, it is to further their economic gains,
and three, diplomacy and undermine our diplomatic efforts, and
as I started with, at the forefront would really be that
military gain that they get from the cyberattacks.
Senator Scott. So we have had, for decades, strategic
ambiguity with regard to Taiwan, and so I have a bill that is
called the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which basically
eliminates the ambiguity. It is clear that the United States,
if Taiwan is attacked, will show up and defend them. What are
your thoughts on something like this? Because, I mean, if you
look at, what we are doing is not working. I mean, Communist
China is getting more aggressive every day, it seems like?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I do not subscribe to the view that
war is inevitable between the U.S. and China or our allied
forces and China. If confirmed, I would support--I have not
seen your bill, so I cannot comment, Senator, on your bill. If
confirmed, I would love to read that, and will read it, if
confirmed. I would support the Department's policies and
Secretary Austin's policies as they pertain to deterrence as it
pertains to China.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Mr. McCord, you responded to Senator Cotton with regard to
the Biden administration's proposal to grow defense spending is
less than it has been, and I understand what you said is that
over a period of time it is still in the 3 to 5 percent range.
But do you believe that this initial proposal will send the
wrong message to Communist China and to Russia and our
adversaries?
Mr. McCord. Senator, I do not believe so, but I think the
meat of the proposal is yet to arrive, right, is what are the
specific choices made on the triad, on the joint strike
fighter, on readiness. I think that is really where the
Committee will need to focus and where, if confirmed, I would
want to focus, on what choices were made, which I just have no
information on as a private citizen.
Senator Scott. Okay. I think it is my understanding that
you, in the past, have supported increasing the spending 3 to 5
percent, so if this year we do not do that, how many years
could we do that without having an adverse impact on our
military?
Mr. McCord. Senator, there are a couple of levers that you
always have, I think, in terms of the capability that you are
getting out of the funds that you have. It is how large of a
force do you think you need, how ready do you feel you need to
keep people, you know, the compensation for the troops. So
there is a mixture of choices, that it would be responsibility,
if confirmed, to advise the Secretary and the Deputy on as to
how we get the best capability we have.
You know, there also may be proposals to find efficiencies
to retire our legacy system. I have no information of what
choices might be about to be proposed to you, having not had a
role in building this budget. But if confirmed, my task would
be to work with the Secretary and other leaders to build the
2023 budget, the 2024 budget, and to make the best choices that
we can to present to you.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Manchin,
please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for your service, and I appreciate very much you being
here.
Mr. Moultrie, I am pleased to hear that you say we need to
increase the coordination of our Federal cyber response, and I
agree with you, you are right on the Colonial attack. So my
question would be, how do you intend to ensure that
intelligence that DOD is gathering about cyber threats and
shared across Federal Government, which we have a hard time
coordinating right now, and are you aware of the mechanisms to
share that information with private industry organizations that
also might be directly threatened?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I believe that the sharing of
intelligence across what I call the intelligence enterprise,
which I include in that the intelligence community and the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise, is extremely important. I look
forward to working with Director Haines on whether those
mechanisms that are in place today to provide that information
to Department of Homeland Security and others----
Senator Manchin. What seems to be the biggest obstacle,
sir? I mean, it seems like it is common sense they would share
freely, but then it is almost like it is, that is ours, not
yours.
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I think there are concerns about
authorities when you start looking at----
Senator Manchin. Would it concern any leaks at all? Would
they be concerned of leaks, if they are sharing it, it might be
easier to be compromised?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I don't know if those are the
concerns, but I do know, historically, there has been
jurisdictional, law enforcement versus national security
concerns that are there. I think the processes and the
realization that we need to put those processes in place and do
exactly what you are talking about, to have that smooth
interconnectivity between the interagency, but more
importantly, between the private sector and the public sectors
are the realizations here. If confirmed, I would do all I can,
because this something----
Senator Manchin. I appreciate that. I really do, and I
think you are going to have to really go after it pretty hard
and make sure they start working together so we do have one
connected cyber preventive.
I want to talk about withdrawing assets from Afghanistan,
and I am very much kind of concerned about this, and I have
been concerned, and I have been thinking about it. You know, we
want to make sure that we return all of our assets, if humanly
possible, and those that we do not think that we need to
return, should return, they are destroying. I guess my question
would be, and I will start, Mr. McCord with you, with your
recent position in the Department, are you satisfied with what
you are seeing in the efforts that are being put forth, and do
you believe that is the best policy for the United States of
America, after all that we have spent, after all that we have
endured, after all the blood that has been shed there by
Americans, that on top of that now we destroy everything that
we are leaving, to even make them think, ``Who are these
Americans? They have no value for anything whatsoever.'' So
rather than having someone that might get use out of it, we
just destroy it. Are we afraid it is going to get into the
wrong hands, because I do not know who the right hands are over
there. So I would assume it has all been the wrong hands. So
why start destroying stuff now?
Mr. McCord. Senator, when I left 4 years ago we were not in
that position. I do not have current information. I am sorry. I
would have to get briefed and get back to you on what is or is
not being destroyed. I assume that there are some calculations
being made about the cost of transporting something back
versus----
Senator Manchin. I am just saying--okay, let me ask you,
just in the hypothetical realm then, just your thought process.
If you think you can speak out on this, do you think we should
be destroying what is not economically feasible for us to
return, just to destroy it for the sake of destroying it so no
one else can use it? Because we are not in that area anymore.
Are we afraid they are going to use it against us? If we turned
everything over to the people that we do trust, or think we
trust, shouldn't we leave it up to them then to make those
decisions, so it is not a wasteful appearance?
Mr. McCord. Senator, if I were confirmed and were part of
these discussions it would certainly be a discriminator, in my
view, as to whether, as I said, the asset had useful life, but
also what its purpose was. I mean, I would make a different
judgment on a truck versus munitions----
Senator Manchin. Mr. Moultrie----
Mr. McCord.--versus communications equipment.
Senator Manchin.--do you have any thought process on this?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, you know, I have read the media, and
I would concur with Mr. McCord that there is a cost calculation
that is probably being made there.
Senator Manchin. No, I understand that. But I am just
saying, you know, I have seen the headlines here and everything
the Associated Press put out there. It has the pictures, if you
will, of all the things we destroyed in there. Here is the
final thing. It says that, to those who are there at that base,
they said, ``What they are doing is a betrayal of Afghans. They
should leave,'' said Mir. ``Like they have destroyed this
vehicle, they have destroyed us.''
I am just saying, it has not been a successful 20 years, so
we are back where we started, I guess. But on top of that, to
see the Americans' mindset of assets and value and cost and
things of that sort, I just don't know if it is doing that--I
guess it is the same as interrogation. If you are interrogating
someone, do you think the brutality of interrogation or trying
to get them to have a comfort level to talk? Everyone has a
different approach, I am sure.
This does not make any sense to me. It might above where
you are. I do not want to put you in a position that causes a
problem for your response, but I would like for everybody to
think about that, because I tell you, it is something we should
be thinking about, just for the sake of destroying something
for what we have already invested in that area.
Thank you both. I appreciate it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator
Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to each of you for your time to be here. Mr. McCord, I so
enjoyed my conversation with you and talking about the Stennis
Center and the work there. I enjoyed my time on their board.
Mr. Moultrie, we have talked some about China and the China
threat. You and I discussed that on the phone. As we look at
the cyberattack that we are currently enduring, I guess you
would say, I would like for you to talk a little bit about how
you would go about assessing the China threat in the non-
INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] AORs [areas of
responsibility]. Because we know this is global. You and I
discussed Djibouti and the Horn of Africa and the way China is
trying to play there.
So for the record, just a little bit about how you would
handle that assessment in that non-INDOPACOM area.
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the Chinese ambitions, as we
discussed, are global, and they are using economic coercion,
these initiatives, the Road and Belt Initiative, and other
financial inducements, if I can call them that, that lure
countries in. They use vaccine diplomacy and a number of other
things to spread their influence.
In terms of truly understanding how we ought to approach
it, I think it is part academic, understanding the long-term
goal of the Chinese. I have always said they play a long-term
game. It is a society that is several thousand years old. They
do not look at things necessarily the way we do.
Senator Blackburn. Right. The hundred-year marathon.
Mr. Moultrie. Exactly. That is exactly right.
Senator Blackburn. So you would assess it more on a long
term?
Mr. Moultrie. I think that their ambitions are long- term
ambitions.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. I appreciate that. Let me ask you
this. As we look at what transpired with the cyberattack, and
we have a lot of small and mid-sized businesses that are
contractors, so as you work with them, what would be your
advice, and how would we share information with them to protect
themselves from attack, as they are contracting with our U.S.
military?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I think you are hitting upon a
key point here. The defense industrial base is particularly
under attack by nation states and hacktivists and others. My
understanding is that the intelligence and security
organization has programs that enable it to go out and work
with thousands of contractors, to provide them with the
standards that they need and provide them with the oversight
that they need to protect themselves.
I think that we have to continue to not only have those
types of programs but the public-private partnerships that will
enable us to share information with them, and the encouraging
of these companies to understand the threat and to take good
hygiene methods to protect themselves. If confirmed, I would
devote myself to really pushing in that area, Senator.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. Mr. McCord, part of this would
come to you, and working with some of our suppliers, and in the
work that you would do in the Comptroller's Office. There is a
lot of technology that could be utilized within DOD and that
structure to achieve efficiencies and to build out securities.
But that means we have got to go outside of DOD to do this.
So I would like for you, for the record, just to comment a
little bit on achieving those efficiencies, and as you and I
talked, I know we have talked a lot about the audit today, but
the way we do purchasing and acquisitions is so broken. Having
so many P-cards through the system, whether it is DOD or the
VA, this leads to inefficiencies. So if you will just touch on
this risk tolerance for utilizing new technologies and
reforming the way we handle purchasing and acquisitions.
Mr. McCord. Senator, thank you. Yes, the Department has
both a large, as you know, acquisition workforce and a fairly
large financial management workforce, at about 50,000 people.
There are a lot of players with responsibilities up and down
the chain, and I take your point and I agree with you that we
should look at ways that we could streamline and maybe have
purchasing be at higher levels, or more efficiently structured.
We do have, for a variety of reasons, somewhat of a
decentralized execution model in the Defense Department. Each
state's National Guard has its own people responsible for its
finances, for example. Every command has its own. That is
something that, I agree, we should look at, whether modern
technology allows us to streamline and centralize perhaps a
little more, without losing the ability for someone on the
ground to be able to raise their hand and solve a problem that
they know about that somebody up here at headquarters does not.
Senator Blackburn. Well, indeed, there is room for
improvements, and we hope that when it comes to the financial
management and also the purchasing and acquisitions we can see
some of that improvement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator
Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses,
thank you.
Mr. Moultrie, the past year and a half has certainly
reiterated the value of medical intelligence and the importance
of expertise and the need to optimize our capabilities in that
area. Some believe that the National Center for Medical
Intelligence should be expanded and given increased visibility
and influence. What are your thoughts on a potential expansion?
Does that make sense to you, and if so, what should we be
thinking about?
Mr. Moultrie. Sir, I am not familiar with the expansion
plans right now for the medical center. I do believe that
intelligence can play a role in helping us understand threats
and, to use a term that is used elsewhere, enabling us to
defend forward against these threats, such as pandemics, that
may originate in a location overseas and then migrate to the
United States. But I am not familiar with the expansion of the
center, as you laid that out, sir.
Senator Peters. Well, very well. That may mean my next
question may not make a lot of sense, because based on your
understanding, while there are folks that have thought of
reorganizing out of the DIA, but it sounds as if you are not as
familiar with this unit to make a----
Mr. Moultrie. I just have not been briefed on that,
Senator. If confirmed, I would come back and give you my views
on the expansion of that center and how that should be done.
Senator Peters. Well, clearly medical intelligence is
incredibly important, as we know, and so if confirmed, I would
look forward to having an opportunity to sit down with you to
discuss that further, and decide which is the best way to
approach it.
Mr. Moultrie, my next question is related to a GAO study
that found that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence and Security is not well postured to assess
effectiveness of the intelligence and security enterprises
because it has, quote, ``not defined goals, desired outcomes,
and performance metrics.'' All the while the office has taken
on, as you know, many more responsibilities over the past
several years.
So my question to you is, in your view, is the office
exceeding its capacity to effectively develop policy and also
conduct oversight?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not been briefed on the
specific metrics that exist in the office today and how those
metrics are being collected, and more importantly, how they are
being analyzed. So, if confirmed, I would need to come back and
talk to you about that.
I will say that the oversight of the intelligence and
security policies and practices would be my top concern. We
have to ensure that we have effective, efficient processes in
place, and if confirmed, you have my commitment to focus on
this area and report back to you with my findings.
Senator Peters. Very well. Mr. McCord, having served in
senior leadership positions at the Comptroller Office for over
20 years, on the staff of the committee, you certainly are very
qualified for this position. But my question is, how have you
prepared for the addition of the former Chief Management
Officer's duties, specifically those related to improving
business processes?
Mr. McCord. Senator, as you know, the authorization bill
terminated that position. I think that was a reasonable
judgment by the Congress that it was time to try something new.
Deputy Secretary Norquist, then-Deputy Secretary Norquist, set
up a structure on his way out, to leave for this administration
to fall in on, of how he would propose to divide up those
duties, and, as you say, many of those would come to the
Comptroller organization.
Should I be confirmed, one of my earliest tasks would be to
sit down with Deputy Secretary Hicks, and as others are
confirmed in that space, the CAPE Director, who has been
nominated, and the Chief Information Officer I believe has not
been nominated yet, all those players would have a role in the
structure that Deputy Secretary Norquist left.
We need to examine, you know, what Deputy Secretary Hicks
wants to do moving forward. My focus would be on whatever stays
with Comptroller is to make the Department more effective, and
I think we have doubled down to the point of maybe overdoing it
over the last decade on trying to focus only on efficiency and
cutting billets. I think we need to focus more on outcomes and
effectiveness. If that role stays with Comptroller, I would
need, if confirmed, to hire a somewhat different type of
workforce and move them over, if they have not left the
Department, from the CMO office. The Comptroller has budget
analysts, which are not exactly the same as the program
managers and program analysts we would need.
But I do look forward to working on that. I just would need
to sit down with the Deputy Secretary and decide if she accepts
or wants to modify the structure that Mr. Norquist left for us.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters, and for the
benefit of my colleagues we have two votes scheduled to begin
at 11:30, so I would ask if you could try your best to adhere
to the 5-minute limit.
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
thanks for your service, and congratulations on your
nominations.
Mr. McCord, I appreciated our discussion yesterday, and I
know you have already talked about it, but I just want to
reconfirm. You know, your work on the National Defense Strategy
Commission I think is much appreciated. A lot of us have looked
at the recommendations of that commission and have really
guided us in a lot of what we have done here, in a bipartisan
way, on the committee.
As you know, that commission focused on a 3 to 5 percent
annual increase, and you mentioned to me yesterday you
generally agreed with that. Is that correct?
Mr. McCord. That is correct, that the commission felt, that
I was part of, that that was an appropriate range for the
Mattis strategy.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I certainly hope that, if
confirmed, and I think it is very likely you will be, that you
can continue to press for that, within the building, within the
administration. I worry, and I know a number of us worry, the
Biden administration has a lot of internal and external forces
that want to dramatically cut defense spending, and I think
this is not the time, it is not the place. I will not help our
country. Going back to the last term of Obama-Biden, when
defense spending was slashed by 25 percent, what do you think
happened to readiness during that time?
Mr. McCord. Senator, as you recall, readiness took a severe
hit when the sequester was imposed. It took the services years
to sort of dig out of that $30-plus billion that we had to cut
in just 6 months. The whole era of Budget Control Act, the sort
of constraints of is the budget going to be up here, if
sequester is not changed it is going to be down here, and then
it would get negotiated in 2-year increments up to some number
in between was a very suboptimal way to budget.
Senator Sullivan. So I think it is good if you can commit
to this committee to be a voice on that.
You and I talked about this. I often give this book, and I
am going to provide it to you here today, and we talked about
it. This is a book by an Army officer called T.R. Fehrenbach,
This Kind of War. Most of the senior military, uniformed
leaders in the Pentagon will have read it. It is a cautionary
tale about what happens when you dramatically cut defense
spending, this time in terms of the Korean War, and thousands
of young Americans were killed because we could not stop a
third-world peasant army in 1950, the North Korean Army,
because we were not ready.
I would like you to have the book, take a look at it. But
it is required reading in most services, and it talks about
what happens when we are not ready. It is not just airplanes
cannot fly. It is young Americans die, and we can never let
that happen again. The Army talks about never again having what
was called ``Task Force Smith.'' That was the first unit that
went to Korea, and they were pretty much destroyed.
Let me ask real quick again on the Arctic. You know, this
committee, in a bipartisan way, has been very focused on our
strategic interests there, the need to build up our forces
there. The Secretary, Secretary Austin, the Deputy Secretary
Hicks, have both committed to me, in their confirmations, to
fully resource the new Arctic strategies that are coming from
the services. Can I get your commitment on that as well.
Mr. McCord. Yes, Senator. The Arctic has certainly elevated
in importance in our thinking and in policy thinking. I would
need to get more information in terms of how it has moved into
a budgeting structure without a unified or sub-unified command,
as most other ways that we focus have. But yes, I would fully
support the strategies of the Secretary and the Deputy on the
Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Moultrie, let me ask a question. This used to be so
non-controversial that I would not even ask it. Now we are
starting to get hesitation, kind of equivocating. The DIA
official, when he was up for his confirmation a couple of weeks
ago, in my view completely whiffed this question, which is a
pretty much intel, National Security 101. Is it better for the
United States' national security to be a major energy
superpower? That means that we produce world record levels of
oil, of gas, of renewables. We are now at that stage. Everybody
used to say, ``Of course, Senator, a net exporter of energy is
critical.'' What is your view on that?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I believe if the United States can
lower its dependence in almost any area, then we are a more
secure nation. So I may have rephrased your statement
somewhat----
Senator Sullivan. It is a good rephasing, I would say.
Mr. Moultrie.--but that is the way I would look at it. We
need to lower our dependencies across a number of areas and
vectors.
Senator Sullivan. Say, Russian oil? Lower dependency of
Russian oil? Is that a good thing?
Mr. Moultrie. I do not know what the ratio is today, but I
would just say, in general, reducing dependencies as much as
possible is important for our Nation.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Hawley,
please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both the witnesses for being here. Mr. Moultrie, let me just
start with you. The National Geospace Intelligence Agency in my
home state, Missouri, in St. Louis, is going to be home to many
of the agency's most advance capabilities. We are very proud of
that. How do you see this campus, and, more broadly, the NGA
contributing to our efforts to maintain an intelligence
advantage over China and Russia in the coming years?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, NGA plays a critical role, a
critical role, and having campuses in different locations I
think is important, for a lot of different reasons--to attract
talent, for survivability reasons. There are just a number of
reasons that we want to do that.
I was somewhat familiar with that when I was in a few years
ago and was energized by it. So, if confirmed, I would continue
to support that. I think there are a number of benefits of
having campuses in different locations.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you an ISR question.
U.S. Central Command has regularly requested and received a
preponderance of the Department's ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]. My own view is that is going
to be hard to continue if we are going to be able to ensure
that our forces in the Pacific and elsewhere have the ISR that
they need to perform their critical missions.
So let me just ask you, if you are confirmed, how will you
ensure that CENTCOM [United States Central Command] uses its
in-theater ISR as effectively as possible so that it can do
more with what it has and some of those other assets, other ISR
assets, can be given back for other uses?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, as you know, ISR, there is an
insatiable appetite for ISR, across the commands. I am not
familiar with the specific CENTCOM usage rate today, but if
confirmed, you have my commitment to ensure that we are getting
the ISR capabilities to satisfy the critical needs of the
commanders who need that capability.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you about China and
the situation with regard to Taiwan. Both DOD, the National
Strategy Defense Commission, and others have been warning now
for years about the growing threat of the Chinese fait
accompli, with regard to Taiwan. One of the most important
thing we need for deterring such an attack is timely indication
and warning.
If you are confirmed, how will you ensure that the
President, the Department leadership, and our forces in PACOM
have as much warning as possible before any attempted fait
accompli on the part of Chinese forces?
Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I think that the PACOM ability to do
I&W [Intelligence and Warning] is just absolutely essential. I
do not have the current laydown of the sensors that we have out
there or the mechanisms for dissemination of real-time
intelligence to the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] and others,
but if confirmed, you would have my commitment to ensuring that
the Defense Intelligence Center works with the DNI and others
to look at what are laid out is across all the INTs to ensure
that we can do that real- time indications, warning, and
dissemination to the national command authority.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. McCord, let me ask you a little bit about the match
between the Department strategy and the resources that are
available to meet that strategy. My own concern is there
appears to be a bit of a mismatch. On the one hand, we are
withdrawing from Afghanistan, which will free up resources. I
am 100 percent in favor of that. I think that is good. On the
other hand, the administration has indicated that we will
retain most, if not all of our other defense commitments, and
in some instances actually plus-up those commitments. The
administration has also told the Department to prioritize
additional missions like climate change and biological defense,
and it has done all of the above while effectively cutting
defense spending.
So my question is, what steps does the Department need to
take in order to ensure that our strategic ends align with the
means that are actually available to it?
Mr. McCord. Senator, Secretary Austin is required, as all
Secretaries are, by law, to develop a strategy, and I believe
that effort is probably underway. If confirmed, I would look
forward, as a senior leader, to being part of that review.
You are exactly right that the balancing is very much a key
to what DOD is always trying to do, because you can have a top
priority, a second priority. People expect the Department of
Defense to do many things well. Readiness, as Senator Sullivan
was saying, you know, there is sort of a floor there where it
is not appropriate to send people out who are not trained.
So I think really the variables you need to look at the
most are the size of the force. Do we have a force that is big
enough to do what our strategy asks of it, but also not so big
that we cannot afford to maintain it?
On some areas like climate change, I am hopeful, not being
inside right now, that that can be accomplished by making sure
that, you know, if you are going to recapitalize your
infrastructure you are doing it in the smartest way, and that
it is not necessarily a big addition of resources. I agree with
you that Afghanistan should free up some resources that can be
redirected to other uses, but we have, as you say, many
competing demands that need to be balanced.
Senator Hawley. Very good. I have got another question or
two for both of you. I will give those to you, though, for the
record, because my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, and, of
course, Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and,
of course, to Mr. McCord and Mr. Moultrie for their willingness
to serve and for being here today.
So I would like to talk a little bit about, of course we
know about the Solar Winds attack, we know we have an attack
workforce shortage, and our civilian cyber reserve. So, Mr.
Moultrie, some experts are calling the SolarWinds attacks on
networks of multiple government agencies and private companies
the greatest act of cyber espionage to date in our history. As
a nation, as we continue to grapple with the aftermath of this
attack, the United States is expected to face a shortage of
about 3.4 million skilled technical workers by next year, with
particularly large gaps in the cybersecurity area.
So to address this shortfall and promote our cybersecurity
workforce, Senator Blackburn and I recently introduced the
Civilian Cybersecurity Reserve Act, to establish a civilian
cyber reserve corps, modeled after a recommendation from the
National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service
report. According to the report, and I am going to quote, ``A
reserve program that permits agencies to call up cybersecurity
experts could ensure additional cyber capacity at times of
greatest need.''
So, Mr. Moultrie, of course in your written response to the
committee you noted DOD's challenges in this area, competitive
requirements that we need. So given your experience, could a
civilian cyber reserve corps really boost up what you do,
especially if we had people who are former military personnel
in that cyber corps as well, and would you work with me to just
be sure that we are able to address these issues?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator, I agree wholeheartedly with
your premise that we are faced with a shortage in skills, our
STEM skills, especially cybersecurity. Other agencies have
reserves that they use. When individuals retire or individuals
leave they can join that reserve, if you will.
If confirmed, you have my commitment to working with you to
explore this idea and to determine what we need to do to ensure
that we have the skills that we need to support our needs
across this and other areas.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, I want to actually build
upon the tech area, cyber area, and really talk about another
point. The DOD inspector general noted that one of the top
management challenges we have is sustaining our technological
dominance, specifically in the areas of artificial intelligence
and machine learning. These fields can really transform the
kinds of work that we do, the information and knowledge that we
have, and harnessing this technology is going to require
continued collaboration between DOD and, again, private
industry.
So, Mr. Moultrie, how would you guide DOD to continue to
improve the public-private coordination in current and emergent
technologies as AI becomes better and better, machine learning,
all of those things?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator, as you know, much of the
innovation that is done in a number of areas, including
artificial intelligence and machine learning, is actually done
in academia or it is done in the industrial base. We need to
harness that. We need to ensure that we understand how it will
change our future missions, and we need to understand how our
adversaries will use it against us. So there is both a need to
understand this so we can do our missions more effectively, and
also to protect ourselves. If confirmed, I would work with the
Director of National Intelligence and across the interagency to
ensure that we are doing what we can to establish these public-
private partnerships and to look at AI, ML [machine learning],
and a number of other emerging technologies, Senator.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, you know, we think about
building our workforce, we think about the public-private
partnerships, and all of that, but then we also have to cyber-
collaborate with our allies, as we see attacks and threats,
threat-hunting, as we see all of this around the world. So this
is going to help us collectively with our allies to harden our
own resources.
How would you enhance, Mr. Moultrie, our intelligence
sharing and cooperation with our partners and allies around the
world to execute, prevent, mitigate, recover from cyberattacks,
and we just saw one on our pipelines this last week? They are
going to keep coming, so we need to work with people around the
world.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. As you know, many of at least
the detected cyberattacks that we see are coming from overseas
locations, if you will. Our partners, our key allies and
partners, actually in many instances are on the front end of
detecting those, and they have tremendous expertise that can
help us not only detect and analyze but also deter these
threats. I believe that having those right coalition partners,
having those right allies, and having those nation states that
are allied with us to help us in this effort is absolutely
critical, and you have my commitment to work with the DNI, and
under the authorities granted to the Secretary of Defense, to
build on the partnerships that we have, and if we need new
ones, to explore new partnerships.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. My time has expired. I appreciate
it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me recognize
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, I want to follow up a little bit on some of the
discussion we had earlier about Defense Department audit,
follow-up on Senator Kaine's question. I am not asking you to
repeat something you have already gone through, so if that is
the case and I was not in the room just please let me know.
But as we all know, the Defense Department has the
distinction of being the only Federal agency that is yet to
pass an annual financial audit. I am a strong supporter of our
national defense--we spoke about this yesterday--and our
military has to have the resources it needs to defend against
the threats we face and to maintain our competitive advantage.
But we also must ensure that taxpayer funds are used as
accountably and as effectively as possible. This was an issue
that was really important to one of the former Armed Services
Committee chairman, and the man whose term I was sworn in, in
December, to complete, Senator John McCain.
So, Mr. McCord, you have served in the Comptroller's Office
before, and you understand these challenges. But I am looking
for any other specifics that you might do or put into place to
improve the Department's ability to pass an audit and ensure
accountability to the taxpayer.
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I fully agree that
this is an important effort for the Department to keep faith
with the taxpayers. Over 40 percent of all individual tax
receipts are consumed by the Department of Defense's budget, so
it is a huge--I understand the responsibility we have to the
taxpayer.
The Department has made considerable progress in the last
10 years, but unfortunately it is going to be a couple more
before we get to that clean audit stage, that is the ultimate
pass-fail, you know, mark on the wall. But as we have discussed
throughout this hearing, I think, when we see, in particular,
the cyberattacks and the importance of controlling your
information, controlling access to your information, I think
that is the key area I will be looking forward to, if
confirmed, to getting with the staff and seeing how we can
press on that particular area. Even though there are other
areas we also need to look at to pass the audit, ultimately I
think that is the key leverage point in my mind, is getting the
controls right, because the auditors keep noticing that we have
more work to do on that front.
Senator Kelly. What do you envision as an optimistic
timeline for getting this done?
Mr. McCord. I understand that in testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee within the last 2 or 3 weeks, the
Department said 2027 or 2028 as their estimate. We did not have
a timeline for a full Department audit when I left 4 years ago,
so while I do not have the exact basis of the information that
the Department used to come up with that figure, because it
postdates my time with the Department, I would get with the
audit staff very early, if confirmed, to assess what is the
basis of that date and what can we do to try and move that to
the left and accelerate it, if possible, and what are the key
factors. Again, I think internal controls and information
controls are, in my mind, the first thing I would want to look
at.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
Mr. Moultrie, I had the chance recently to visit the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca in
Arizona. I am proud that we are training some of the finest
intelligence professionals there in my state. Our 309th
Military Intelligence Battalion supports a range of critical
career fields, from human intelligence and interpreters to
ground surveillance radar techs, and has provided critical
skill sets in operations across the globe, from El Salvador to
Afghanistan and South Korea.
Mr. Moultrie, as our Nation endures changing threats from
near-peer competitors, can you speak to the importance of
keeping our military intelligence capabilities sharp, and if
confirmed, how will you ensure that military intelligence
pipelines, like the Army Intelligence Center of Excellence,
remain well-resourced and able to prepare our operators to
address the range of emerging threats and technologies that
they will face?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. Our military intelligence
capabilities are some of our longest-standing capabilities. You
go back wars, if you will, and they are the foundation of the
intelligence apparatus that we have today. So some of our
Nation's best and brightest professionals have come from
military intelligence, and they are the lifeline, if you will,
of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
If confirmed, you have my commitment to not only continue
to work across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to groom and
grow and to support these individuals and to support bases like
Fort Huachuca and others, but also to do what I can to ensure
that we are providing the pipeline to bring new people in, to
get them trained so they can be the intelligence professionals
of the future. You have my commitment, if confirmed, Senator,
to do that.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Gentlemen, thank
you for your testimony today, which was quite thoughtful and
convincing. Thank you also for your distinguished service to
the country over many, many years. Thank you again for your
willingness to serve again.
I think it is only fitting, the final comment would be to
once again to wish Mrs. Moultrie a happy 91st birthday.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to The Honorable Michael J.
McCord by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
10 u.s.c. 135
Question. Section 135 of title 10, U.S. Code, as implemented in
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5118.03, prescribes the duties
and powers of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).
Among such duties, the Under Secretary serves as the Department of
Defense Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for purposes of sections 901-903
of title 31, U.S. Code, and performs the duties assigned in section
2222 of title 10.
In your view, what are the duties and powers of the Under Secretary
most critical to the national defense at this time?
Answer. The duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) are described in section 135 of title 10 and in Section
902 of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act. It includes supporting
the Secretary of Defense by advising on all financial management
matters; overseeing the financial management activities of the
Department to include establishing and supervising the execution of
policies; developing and maintaining integrated agency accounting and
financial management systems; supervising and directing the preparation
of budget estimates of the Department of Defense; monitoring the
financial execution of the budget including the approval of
reprogramming requests for submission to the Congress; overseeing the
preparation and submission of financial statements, and supporting the
recruitment and training of the financial management workforce.
The most critical duties to the national defense at this time are
preparing the budget to ensure the Department has the resources to
accomplish its mission and using the financial statement audits to
drive improvements in the Department's financial management activities,
systems and reports.
Question. What do you believe are the most important duties and
responsibilities of the CFO?
Answer. By designating the USD (Comptroller) as the CFO of the
Department of Defense this specifically incorporates the
responsibilities identified in the CFO Act. I included those
responsibilities in my description of the duties and functions of the
Comptroller because they are interconnected. However, to the extent
that some see the term Comptroller as primarily relating to the budget,
the addition of the title CFO highlights and emphasizes the
responsibilities for accounting, financial systems, and internal
controls. I believe that a major responsibility of the CFO over the
next several years is to support the audits of the services and defense
agencies and to develop, implement and oversee an effective process of
fixing issues identified during the audit.
Question. If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you
expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in
light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS)?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense would
require me to provide him expert and timely advice on all issues
related to the budgetary and financial management of the Department. I
also expect he would want me to ensure the men and women serving the
Department of Defense would have the resources they need to support the
President's National Defense Strategy. Finally, I believe the Secretary
would expect the Comptroller and all senior DOD leaders to collaborate
across their areas of specific statutory responsibility to provide him
our best advice and to make the Department as effective as possible.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as USD(C) fulfills the fundamental requirement for
civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution
and other laws?
Answer. I believe in the bedrock American principle of civilian
control of the military. That civilian control is central to the
stability of our democracy. If confirmed, I will ensure this tenet is
at the forefront of any internal or interagency interactions, and in
engagements with the U.S. Congress. Although resources are obligated by
both military and civilian personnel across the Department, the
requirement for a Senate-confirmed Comptroller of the Department, and
of the assistant secretaries for financial management of the military
departments, ensures that the ultimate control of and responsibility
for the expenditure of DOD resources rests with civilian leaders
accountable to the President, the Secretary, and the Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller?
Answer. If confirmed, I would partner with the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Comptroller to ensure that the duties required
of our office are met. The Deputy Comptroller should be capable at any
time of carrying out the responsibilities of the Comptroller if
necessary. Duties assigned to the Deputy, which would be determined
based on her/his experience and skills, could include developing or
overseeing plans for remediation of issues identified during the
financial audit, or leadership of some management or performance
improvement functions that may be newly assigned to the Comptroller
organization. Finally, the Deputy might be assigned leadership of
specific emerging projects that I cannot predict at this time, similar
to my role in managing the Department's Recovery Act programs when I
served as Deputy Comptroller.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
providing to the Secretary of Defense to enhance the efficiency and
performance of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and the two Defense Agencies under the authority,
direction, and control of the Under Secretary?
Answer. I believe building and leading high performing teams
requires excellent communication and transparency. If confirmed, I will
emphasize these characteristics and will look for opportunities to
improve the overall efficiency and performance of the Comptroller team
to ensure we are as effective as possible. I would also look for
opportunities to expand the progress and power of data analytics that
the office has made in recent years.
qualifications
Question. Section 135 further provides that the USD(C) shall be
appointed from among persons who have significant budget, financial
management, or audit experience in complex organizations.
What significant experience and education do you possess in the
domains of budget, financial management, and/or the audit of complex
organizations?
Answer. I believe that my previous experience from 2009 to 2017 as
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) demonstrates my qualification for
this position. I am intimately familiar with the budgetary and
financial issues that pertain to the Department.
I also served for 24 years in the legislative branch, including for
21 years as a Professional Staff member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee overseeing the DOD budget and providing expert analysis on
issues such as funding overseas contingency operations, the fiscal
impact of legislation, reprogramming of funds to meet emerging needs,
questions of fiscal law and financial management, the analysis of
alternative courses of action with respect to specific programs, and
knowledge of the federal budget process.
Question. In particular, what leadership and management experience
do you possess that you would apply to your service as USD(C) if
confirmed?
Answer. I believe my previous leadership and management experience
serving as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will allow me to once
again be successful in this role.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and execute the
powers of the USD(C)?
Answer. Although I have previously served as the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), the vast breadth of the Department's programs
and policies require me to constantly enhance my expertise as they
relate to the Department's budget and financial management issues.
relationships
Question. Describe the relationship you would foster, if confirmed
as the USD(C), with the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, particularly in light of the independence and direct
reporting relationships and responsibilities accorded to the Director
in law.
Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate and work closely with the
Director for Cost, Assessment and Program Evaluation in providing
advice, assessments, and options to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.
CAPE, Comptroller, and Policy have always been strong partners in the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process and I do not
expect that to change.
Question. If confirmed, on what projects would you expect to
collaborate with the Director?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director to ensure that
a robust and successful program/budget review is conducted and that our
programs are aligned with and managed in accordance with the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary's guidance. I would, if confirmed, also expect to
explore opportunities to improve the quality and consistency of our
data for budget and cost accounting purposes, and, in concert with
other senior leaders under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, to
develop a plan to re-engineer the management and performance
improvement functions that were formerly assigned to the Chief
Management Officer.
Question. Describe the relationships you would foster, if confirmed
as the USD(C), with the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for
Financial Management and the Military Department and Fourth Estate
Budget Directors.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant
Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments and
the Fourth Estate Budget Directors in the development and execution of
budgetary matters, fiscal policy, and initiatives of the President and
the Secretary of Defense. During my previous tenure as Comptroller, it
was my practice to meet at least once each week with the Assistant
Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments to
synchronize our efforts, and it would be my plan to continue that
partnership if confirmed.
Question. On what projects would you expect to collaborate with
these officials?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Assistant
Secretaries and Fourth Estate Budget Directors in contributing to the
successful development and implementation of effective DOD policies and
programs and management of the defense budget, to include development
of the budget, execution reviews and reprogramming requests, management
of our internal controls and financial audit efforts, and programs for
the development of the financial management workforce.
Question. Describe the relationship you would foster, if confirmed
as the USD(C), with the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
Answer. If confirmed, I will, in coordination where appropriate
with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, work very closely with the
Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and with the Program Associate Director for National Security, and
foster a relationship of cooperation and transparency.
Question. If confirmed, on what projects would you expect to
collaborate with the Director?
Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Office of Management
and Budget on the preparation and execution of the Department's
budgets, on reprogramming requests, on legislative requests, on the
financial audit, and the advancement of both the Administration's and
the Department's management priorities. I will work with the Director
to assess the Department's topline requirements and ensure that the
President's national security priorities are appropriately reflected in
the annual budget request.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to develop and
sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between
Congress--the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations
Committees, in particular--and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) and the Defense Agencies subject to
your authority, direction, and control?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to working with the Armed
Services and Appropriations committees to resolve any matter relating
to the authorization or appropriation of the Department's funding. I
will continue to respect the prerogatives of the Department's oversight
committees, and will work closely with the committees, through open and
honest communication, to achieve a consensus necessary to meet our
defense needs.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What are the most significant challenges you would face
if confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)?
Answer. The USD (Comptroller) faces a number of ongoing challenges.
The first is developing defense budgets that are consistent with the
Department's mission of protecting the vital interests of the United
States. The second challenge is the audit. The Department must use the
audit to drive effective corrective action plans. The audit will
provide a baseline of the current financial management status, and it
will take time and consistent attention to implement the corrective
actions necessary to achieve a clean opinion. The third challenge is to
continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department.
The fourth challenge is to continue workforce development. The
Department's success with the budget, the audit and implementing
reforms depends in large part on the skill set and experience of the
DOD financial management workforce.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what management actions would
you take, and in what order of priority, to address each of these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary and other leaders across the Department and within the
OUSD (Comptroller) to tackle these challenges head on. For the budget I
would use the PPBE process as a means to develop and justify a defense
budget that supports the President's and the Secretary's vision. For
the audit I would begin by reviewing the status of existing DOD efforts
to assess key leverage points that could be used to accelerate the
process. On defense reform, I would look for ways to continue and
expand the reform effort through the Comptroller organization.
Developing and sustaining a professional financial management workforce
is the foundation for meeting each of these challenges. DOD has a
strong program already in place and I would look to build on that
existing program.
2018 national defense strategy (nds)
Question. The 2018 NDS outlines that the United States faces a
rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue
regimes and global terrorism.
Are the programs and resources required to generate the
capabilities necessary to implement the NDS properly prioritized in the
DOD the budget?
Answer. I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year 2022
budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary to ensure all programs and resources are properly prioritized
to support the President's strategy and manage advanced and persistent
threats.
Question. Are there areas in which the budget is not aligned with
the NDS?
Answer. I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year (FY)
2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the alignment of the
budget with the President's strategy and any new strategic guidance
documents produced by the Adminstration.
Question. If confirmed, how would you realign or refocus DOD
programs and funding, if at all?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is preparing to
initiate a National Defense Strategy review to ensure DOD's strategic
priorities are properly aligned to the President's interim National
Security Strategic Guidance. If confirmed, I intend to play an active
role in the review and implementation of any necessary realignment of
DOD resources.
Question. Are we properly resourcing those capabilities that have
been established since the release of the 2018 NDS (e.g., U.S. Space
Force)?
Answer. I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year (FY)
2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary to ensure proper resourcing of the capabilities that will
determine our military and national security advantage in the future.
Question. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you
recommend to the Secretary of Defense regarding DOD's resourcing and
implementation of the 2018 NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to play an active role in the review
and recommendation of any necessary resource revisions or adjustments
required to implement the President's strategy.
In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission
recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an
average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Question. Do you believe that 3-5% real budgetary growth through
the FYDP is required to implement the 2018 NDS effectively? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. As the commission stated, that resource level was
illustrative of what was needed for the 2018 NDS. Secretary Austin is
required by law to update that strategy in the coming months. If
confirmed, my goal will be to use the resources available to the
Department wisely to realize the strategic aims of the Department as
identified in Secretary Austin's review and ensure the Nation has the
military technologies and capabilities to compete and win. Under any
resourcing level, the Department must balance readiness, force
structure, and modernization while pursuing savings through critical
reviews of ongoing missions and activities, and the phasing out of
systems and approaches developed for an earlier era.
Question. Under the funding levels specified in the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2022, does DOD have adequate resources
to implement the 2018 NDS and other national defense priorities? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I believe budgets should match resources to strategic
national priorities and must strive to maximize our capabilities. At
the same time, budgets for any agency, including DOD, are subject to
fiscal realities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary to set priorities and make hard choices to deter
conflict and strengthen our competitive military edge. While I have not
seen the specifics of the FY 2022 budget, which has not yet been
released, I believe the Department should be able to carry out its
missions with a properly balanced program at the announced funding
level.
Question. What types of resource shortfalls are likely to hamper
DOD's execution of the 2018 NDS and other national defense priorities,
in your view?
Answer. There will always be fiscal constraints largely brought on
by unforeseen events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the scope of
the challenges we face, Congress and the Department will need to work
together to make some hard choices.
Question. In your opinion, in what areas of the implementation of
the 2018 NDS is the Department taking the most risk in terms of
resources allocated?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other senior DOD leaders to
review the allocation of resources to help the Secretary ensure that
resources are matched to strategic national priorities and will work
with Congress to identify and mitigate risk.
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of DOD funding going forward?
Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the
Department's funding by our ability to defend this Nation--to execute
our chosen strategy, maintain the Nation's technological edge, preserve
the health of the joint force, and provide options to the President
that support his foreign policy and national defense goals.
post-budget control act and the overseas contingency operations (oco)
account
Question. The FY 2022 budget request will be the first to be
unconstrained by the statutory caps of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of
2011. The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account has
been debated for several years, primarily because OCO dollars were
exempt from the caps of the BCA and some charged that DOD was using OCO
as a ``slush fund'' for base budget requirements.
What are your views about the use of the OCO account in the
Department of Defense's annual budgeting?
Answer. It is imperative that adequate resources are available to
support U.S. troops deployed to combat or combat support locations
around the world. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget has
been a useful tool for the Department of Defense, and the Congress, to
provide this critical funding in a transparent manner.
Question. Should DOD continue to use the OCO account?
Answer. It is my understanding, based on the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Summary of the President's Discretionary Funding
Request, dated April 9, 2021, that the Administration intends to
discontinue requests for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as a
separate funding category. I believe that this is appropriate, assuming
an appropriate transfer of funding for enduring programs into the base
budget. With the drawdown in troops from Afghanistan, the vast majority
of remaining efforts will be enduring requirements and should fold into
the base budget for better long-term planning.
Question. If DOD continues to use the OCO account, will you commit,
if confirmed, to update the guidelines regarding the budget items that
may be covered by OCO, in accordance with section 1524 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2018?
Answer. It is my understanding, based on the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Summary of the President's Discretionary Funding
Request, dated April 9, 2021, that the Administration intends to
discontinue requests for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as a
separate funding category. If confirmed, however, I would look forward
to working with the congressional defense oversight committees and the
OMB to support discussions on funding criteria for current or future
contingencies.
Question. How should the Department seek to account for its
supplemental or emergency budgetary needs and how should the Department
identify and account for conflict-related funding?
Answer. It is important that the Department of Defense (DOD) retain
some budget flexibility to deal with unforeseen or emergent needs,
especially given the uncertainty of world events. If confirmed, I will
work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that we have
adequate funding tools to support U.S. troops and DOD missions
worldwide. Ultimately the Department can only address such needs with
the support of Congress.
Question. In addition to passing spending bills on time, what more
can Congress do, in your view, to afford DOD the resource stability and
flexibility it needs?
Answer. Beyond the significant budgetary challenges that repeated
and lengthy continuing resolutions create for the Department, timely
congressional review and approval of reprogramming requests and funding
notifications is critical to the Department's operations. In addition,
it is important that the Congress provides an adequate level of general
transfer authority, especially with the elimination of the OCO account
and the likely elimination of the special transfer authority. This
transfer authority provides critical budget flexibility to deal with
emergent needs without requiring additional resources.
Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
later than 10 days after the President's submission of the defense
budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander must
submit to the congressional defense committees a report that lists his
or her unfunded priorities, including military construction projects.
If confirmed, would you support the Service Chiefs and Combatant
Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities lists to Congress in
a timely manner?
Answer. Yes, I would support the submission of unfunded priorities
lists as required by law.
Question. If confirmed, would you ensure adherence to the
restrictions placed upon the National Guard unfunded priorities list as
specified in Section 1006 of the NDAA for FY 2021?
Answer. Yes, I would recommend the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau follow the law.
anti-deficiency act
Question. The USD(C) is charged to maintain effective control and
accountability over the use of all financial resources of the
Department. Such responsibilities necessarily include ensuring DOD-wide
compliance with the laws and regulations governing the obligation and
expenditure of federal funds. On April 27, 2020, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) submitted to the Senate its compilation of
Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) reports submitted by federal agencies for FY
2019. The ADA prohibits federal agencies from obligating or expending
federal funds in advance or in excess of an appropriation, and from
accepting voluntary services. The GAO report for FY 2019 comprised nine
reports of ADA violations, four of which derived from DOD.
What is your level of confidence that DOD has in place the policies
and procedures to ensure the identification of all potential ADA
violations?
Answer. I am confident that DOD has robust policies and procedures
to ensure the defense agencies and military departments can detect
potential ADA violations, however I believe all processes can benefit
from ongoing reviews.
Question. What are your ideas for better preventing ADA violations
from occurring in DOD and for identifying, and correcting them sooner?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department includes a full
understanding of the requirements of the ADA as a focus area during
annual reviews and financial manager training, with an emphasis on
promptly and accurately recording obligations.
10 u.s.c. 2222--improvement and integration of performance and
financial information
Question. Earlier this year, GAO again designated DOD's business
systems modernization program and DOD Financial Management operations
as ``high risk.''
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to improve
financial management systems so that GAO can remove them from the
``high risk'' category during your term in office?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts focused on
streamlining and simplifying our IT environment. By consolidating
systems into a modern IT environment supported by streamlined
processes, the Department will reduce hours spent on manual processes
and rework, better visibility to funds execution, and have the ability
to accurately portray its financial position. I have not yet been able
to review the latest state of the Department's financial management
systems but, if confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to review
and improve them.
Question. DOD still lacks consistent financial data elements and
definitions that would enable it to accurately compile data across the
Department and compare costs across different programs and
organizations. Critical information on program performance is
maintained in one-off local systems that do not feed into the
Department's official records.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to establish a common,
enterprise-wide ``dictionary'' of financial data elements and their
definitions to be applied across DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, I will promote the use and refinement of the
Standard Financial Information structure (SFIS) across the Department.
SFIS is intended to standardize financial reporting and enable revenues
and expenses to be reported by programs that align with major goals,
rather than basing reporting only on appropriation categories.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take or direct to
link financial data and information to performance monitoring and
measurement mechanisms, so as to enable improved decision making about
the Department's programs and investments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will promote the use of SFIS as a key
enabler of linking financial data with performance monitoring,
encourage the components to manage their balance sheet as one of their
key metrics, and expand the use of data analytics.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that,
as appropriate, timely access to all financial datasets is provided to
all components of the DOD?
Answer. Ensuring that timely access to all financial datasets is
provided to all Components of the DOD will be one of the primary
benefits of our system standardization and consolidation initiatives.
If confirmed, I will review what actions, if any may be necessary to
support these efforts.
Question. In your view, what specific actions are required to
implement consistent accounting approaches across DOD, with a view to
enabling the assignment of ``whole of Department'' costs to programs
and organizations, and to setting accurate prices for reimbursable
activities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage Components to directly trace
and report the full costs of outputs wherever feasible and practical.
This will require Components to improve their ability to account for
interdepartmental costs and transactions. A shift toward automation in
reconciliations will be necessary as opposed to tedious and resource-
intensive manual reconciliations.
audit and financial management
Question. 2020 was the 30th anniversary of the passage of the Chief
Financial Officer's Act, which mandated that federal agencies complete
financial audits. DOD is the only federal agency unable to complete a
financial audit in accordance with the law, despite having invested
billions of dollars over the past decades to do so. In FY 2020, DOD
completed a comprehensive audit and received a Disclaimer of Opinion.
In your view, how, if at all, do the audit and its remediation
activities support the 2018 NDS?
Answer. The audit and its remediation activities highlight and
validate areas for improvement in DOD's internal controls and
processes. As the DOD remediates audit findings and improves its
overall financial management processes and information, decision makers
will have better access to reliable and timely information. If
confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in the DOD to use one source
of financial data for both financial statement preparation and
investment decision making. This will emphasize the importance of
reliable financial information and will directly link performance and
financial management.
Question. What challenges are unique to conducting an audit of DOD?
Answer. The size and complexity of DOD affects the timeliness in
which we are able to get to a clean audit opinion. DOD is larger, in
terms of assets and resources, than any organization which has gotten a
clean audit opinion. The Department's mix of classified and
unclassified transactions and multiplicity of ``feeder'' systems that
contain information auditors need to verify have also been challenges.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to overcome those
challenges to ensure that the Department continues to make demonstrable
progress towards a clean audit opinion?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working to use the notices
of findings and recommendations (NFRs) to target, track and hold the
appropriate individuals accountable for the timely implementation of
corrective action plans. I will direct my leadership team to track and
analyze audit findings by Component, as they are issued, and to closely
monitor metrics to quantify our progress and assess remaining levels of
effort to receive a positive opinion.
Question. How would you characterize the progress made since the
change in strategy to begin audits despite the Department not being
audit-ready?
Answer. I believe the progress being made is encouraging. However,
we still have a lot of work to do collectively as a Department. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to undergo full
financial statement audits and uses auditor feedback to identify areas
that need corrective actions or further audit remediation work.
Question. In what year do you expect the Department as a whole to
receive a modified audit opinion?
Answer. At this point, I can't say, but if confirmed, I will ensure
the Department has actionable and achievable plans in place to keep
making progress toward an audit opinion.
Question. In what year do you expect the Department as a whole to
receive an unmodified audit opinion?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to this process and work
to implement practical and pragmatic corrective action plans for the
financial management and operations of the Department. The changes
required are complex and we fully expect that progress will steadily
continue.
Question. What metrics should the Congress be tracking to monitor
the continuous progress of the Department towards achieving an
unmodified audit opinion?
Answer. Congress can track the following metrics to monitor
progress toward DOD achieving an unmodified opinion:
Resolution or downgrade of prior year material
weaknesses.
Closure of notices of findings and recommendations (NFRs)
identified as contributing to material weaknesses.
Composition of NFRs by Component in regards to new versus
reissued.
Status of Component audit opinion progression on a year-
over-year basis
Question. If confirmed, would you direct the Military Services,
Defense Agencies, and Field Activities to develop their own individual
schedules for achieving a clean audit for their own organizations and
metrics to track their progress towards that goal?
Answer. Each reporting entity under standalone audit with a
disclaimer audit opinion is maintaining an audit roadmap. Each audit
roadmap details corrective action completion dates by fiscal year and
financial statement line item or audit focus area. If confirmed, I will
continue to utilize these roadmaps to track progress by Component
toward significant milestones and hold the appropriate individuals
accountable for the achievement of these milestones in a timely manner.
Question. If so, what would you do to ensure compliance with your
directive?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with the
Military Service Secretaries and Component leadership to review audit
finding metrics and progress toward the development, implementation and
auditor validation of closure of these findings
Question. In your view, what incentives need to be in place to
ensure senior leaders in each DOD Component--not only the financial
management community--are fully invested and engaged in the process of
achieving a clean audit opinion?
Answer. It would be very valuable to have a range of tools and
incentives in place to build and sustain senior leadership support and
accountability for achieving a clean audit opinion. I am not aware of
all the tools currently in use in the Department or how effective they
are. Should I be confirmed, I would make it a priority to examine these
options and provide my recommendations to the Committee. Having senior
executive performance plans depend in part on audit efforts has been
one such tool that should be reviewed.
Question. Are those incentives currently in place in the
Department?
Answer. I am not aware of all the tools currently available to the
Department or how effective they are. Should I be confirmed, I would
make it a priority to examine these options and provide my
recommendations to the Committee.
Question. What disincentives or structural impediments, if any,
preclude or hamper such senior leader engagement, in your view, and
what can be done to eliminate such impediments?
Answer. I am not currently aware of any specific structural
impediments. However, senior leaders in the Department always have many
competing priorities for their time and attention, and as with any
large, complex organization, there is always the risk of certain
capabilities or solutions becoming siloed, but I believe our financial
reporting, property and IT functional councils will continue to play an
effective role in encouraging cross-cutting solutions and breaking down
organizational silos. If confirmed, I will look to eliminate any
impediments to senior leader engagement.
Question. Specifically, what measures should be used to hold senior
leaders accountable if they do not meet statutory deadlines for DOD
auditability?
Answer. Audit metrics intended to track audit opinion progression
can be used to hold senior personnel accountable in future performance
evaluations. I think you can and should expect to see significant
progress toward addressing and resolving audit findings from previous
years.
USD(C) leads the ADVANA (Advanced Analytics) effort for the entire
Department of Defense. This effort, begun in support of the audit, has
made significant progress in moving the Department toward modern data
management practices.
Question. What do you view as the main challenges and opportunities
in moving toward improved usage of data in decision-making?
Answer. Among the data challenges that the Department needs to
address is the fact that the Department has old systems that make it
difficult to access data of good quality in a timely manner, and the
DOD has a ways to go in cultivating a data culture that attracts the
right skills. If confirmed, I will be working with the DOD CIO, CDO,
and other senior leaders to implement the DOD Data Strategy in order
address these challenges. It is my understanding that the Department is
making progress and I look forward to engaging directly to help build
on that progress.
Question. How do you view the relationship between USD(C) and the
DOD Chief Data Officer in managing ADVANA?
Answer. As I understand it, the roles of the CDO and USD(C) are
complementary and critical to implementing the DOD Data Strategy. Both
offices share a clear focus on improving the Department's use of data
to drive better decisions and outcomes. The CDO provides the strategy,
policy, and guidance for data management practices. The USD(C) is the
primary lead for the financial statement audit, and the Department has
seen success in using the audit as a lever for operationalizing good
enterprise data management. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to
ensure we are leveraging both the USD(C) and CDO's skills and missions
to promote the use of data and analytics across the Department.
Some commentators have asserted that efforts to achieve a clean
audit opinion on DOD financial statements may be not be the best use of
limited resources in a time of constrained budgets.
Question. Do you agree with this assertion? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. The value of the audit is not so much in DOD being able to
say it has a clean audit opinion, but in the audit recommendations that
bring insight into how the Department can improve its operations. The
audit can improve the Department's operations on many levels--in the
form of more reliable information for decision-making, improved
inventory management, and cybersecurity. With time, I expect that the
value and contributions that flow from the audit will grow.
the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (ppbe) process
Question. In 1961, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
created the framework of the current PPBE process. As the core decision
making process by which DOD decides how and on what it spends its
money, the PPBE process operates to connect strategic objectives with
resources. The USD(C) is charged to administer and provide analysis for
the budgeting and execution phases of DOD's PPBE process, as well as to
make recommendations on matters relating to the planning and
programming phases of the PPBE process.
Do you believe the current PPBE process is adequately connected to
implementation of the 2018 NDS?
Answer. PPBE, if implemented as envisioned, allows for a strategy
driven and structured approach to ultimately building a budget that
aligns with the Department's strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure
OUSDC continually emphasizes and assesses NDS alignment throughout the
PPBE interactions.
Question. In your view, do the DOD Components (particularly OSD)
have the human and automated analytic decision support capability and
capacity to facilitate informed strategic decision making in a relevant
timeframe?
Answer. DOD has a very experienced, dedicated workforce capable of
facilitating informed strategic decision making. If confirmed, I will
make it a priority to ensure we are leveraging both the skills and
missions to promote the use of data and analytics to improve and
accelerate the decision making process across the Department.
Question. Do you believe that the PPBE process accords too much
weight to Military Service priorities, rather than to Departmental
priorities?
Answer. I believe PPBE allows for an appropriate balance of all
stakeholder views. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the future joint
requirements are assessed and considered for funding.
Question. In your view, are Combatant Commanders' priorities
adequately reflected in the PPBE process?
Answer. Combatant Commanders, in general, do not control resources
in the PPBE process the way the military services do, so their roles
are significantly different. That said, all parties have a voice and
the opportunity to participate, and Combatant Commander priorities are
afforded ample opportunity to influence the Service and Department-
level PPBE development process.
Question. If confirmed, what changes would you make, if any, to the
PPBE process to improve both resourcing decisions within DOD and
information flow about those decisions to the Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Deputy
Secretary and other Department leaders to ensure that the PPBE process
aligns resources to the defense strategy. This includes identifying
analytically-informed strategic choices about the size and shape of the
future force. Communication with Congress is critical to ensuring our
Nation's defense needs are met. If confirmed, I will review the
Department's communication process on budgetary decisions with the
intent to ensure information flow to the Congress is both timely and
effective.
Question. In your view, is there value in the Department, the
Congress, or an independent commission conducting a holistic review and
reform of the PPBE process? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The PPBE process provides an effective, neutral, and open
framework to allow the leadership of the Department to make well-
informed choices about resource allocation in support of the
Department's strategic priorities. I am committed to ensuring this
process works effectively and, if confirmed, will seek to make any
necessary adjustments to meet the Nation's defense needs. I would look
forward, if confirmed, to working with the congressional defense
committees or others to review the PPBE process for potential
improvements.
Some commentators have observed that in matters related to the
realignment of strategic objectives with resources via the PPBE
process, DOD's size, structure, and culture favor the ``status quo.''
Question. Do you agree with this assessment? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. In my experience, the PPBE process demands rigor in program
decisions, which may require time to accomplish. However, over time the
Department can shift resources toward strategic ends. The Department
must also closely work with Congress to gain support for the proposed
strategic shifts in resources. Any tendency to favor the status quo is,
in my view, not specific to or a direct result of the PPBE process.
Question. Can the PPBE cycle iterate fast enough to respond to
changes in strategic or programmatic direction, in your view? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the PPBE process is flexible enough to react to
changing strategic or programmatic direction. Leadership priorities and
attention are essential to full implementation of strategic direction.
I also believe it's important to have a rigorous assessment of options
and analytic underpinning for strategic shifts. The PPBE process is
only the internal portion of the larger federal budget process and any
analysis of the speed or efficacy of our budget process should, in my
view, look at all parts of the budget process.
Question. In your view, is the PPBE process flexible enough to
enable DOD to make programmatic changes within the annual budget cycle?
Answer. Yes, the PPBE process is flexible enough to react to urgent
programmatic changes within the budget cycle. However, the greater the
change being contemplated, the more of a challenge implementing that
change will be, in both the internal (PPBE) and congressional review
phases of the budget process.
Question. In your view, would DOD benefit, particularly in relation
to implementation of the NDS, if the obligation availability of
Operation and Maintenance funds were changed? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. Yes, I think extending the availability of some portion of
Operation and Maintenance funds would provide additional flexibility to
deal with emergent requirements at the start of a new fiscal year as
well as the loss of funds resulting from operational changes late in a
fiscal year. In addition, this may help in eliminating the ``use it or
lose it'' mind set and result in better decisions by financial managers
throughout the year.
Question. Given the frequency of continuing resolutions, at least
for some part of each fiscal year, would DOD benefit from the authority
to ``carryover'' some percentage of Operation and Maintenance funds
from year to year?
Answer. Yes, it's my understanding that some domestic agencies have
authority to keep up to 50 percent of unobligated Operation and
Maintenance balances available for an additional fiscal year, and this
would certainly be beneficial to the DOD.
Question. Are there other flexibilities of this sort for other
appropriations that you would recommend?
Answer. Flexibility would also be useful for portions of the
military personnel appropriations such as permanent change of station
(PCS) moves, which peak in the last quarter of the fiscal year (summer
months) and are frequently impacted by unforeseen operational changes.
Some similar carryover authority might also be beneficial with respect
to the costs of reserve component drill costs, which can sometimes be
difficult to predict precisely. If confirmed, I look forward to
discussing recommended flexibilities with the Defense Committees.
Question. Nearly a decade ago, Congress changed the Department of
Veterans Affairs health care budget to comprise both regular current-
year and advance appropriations.
In your view, would DOD benefit in moving to a similar system for
at least some portion of the defense budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I would want to consult with appropriate
financial managers in the Department of Veterans Affairs to learn their
assessment of the impact of this change. If VA can show clear
advantages, then DOD might well benefit in moving to a similar system
for the Defense Health Program portion of the budget.
Question. If so, which portion(s) of the budget would be best
suited to such an approach, and why?
Answer. The Defense Health Program budget is the best suited to
such an approach. Much like the VA health appropriation, DOD produces
health care through organic clinics and hospitals as well as the
private sector health care network. Health care demand can vary widely
from year-to-year and allocating single year discretionary funding for
health care often places significant risk on non-health defense
priorities to ensure DOD can continue to deliver care. Use of
``advanced appropriations'' similar to the VA process that estimates
health care requirements for the following two fiscal years, would
allow DOD to spread the risk for health care delivery across multiple
fiscal years while more efficiently using resources for both health and
non-health defense priorities.
the dod financial management workforce
Question. The USD(C) is charged to provide guidance and oversight
of the recruiting, retention, training, and professional development of
the DOD financial management workforce.
If confirmed, how would you assess the quality of the DOD financial
management workforce?
Answer. It is hard to know from outside the organization. However,
should I be confirmed, I will be uniquely positioned to assess the
quality of the DOD financial management workforce by evaluating
improvements in auditability and associated processes since I last held
the position, and by evaluating the status of the Department's
financial management workforce development program, which should now be
at an appropriate level of maturity to judge its efficacy. Reviewing
such metrics, audit results, and major program improvements will
provide a sense of overall capability.
Question. How can the DOD financial management workforce best be
developed?
Answer. It is important to maintain an agile and responsive DOD
financial management workforce capable of meeting tomorrow's mission.
If confirmed, I hope to accomplish this with regular requirement scans
and workforce health assessments to identify capability and skill gaps,
as well as to stay ahead of emergent workforce trends. Ensuring access
to the right tools and resources (to include training, professional
development, networking and collaboration) will better enable the DOD
FM workforce to fill capability gaps and reach individual and
organization goals.
Question. What role can exchange programs with industry or
partnerships with educational institutions play in developing the DOD
financial management workforce?
Answer. I believe that exchange programs with industry or
partnerships with educational institutions can play a beneficial role
in developing the DOD financial management workforce. Exposure to
industry and academic institutions increases innovation, thought
leadership, and collaboration, allowing DOD participants to test new
concepts/approaches and return to DOD as improved critical thinkers and
innovative problem solvers.
Question. Is the DOD financial management workforce properly sized,
in your view?
Answer. I cannot say at this point, however, if confirmed, I will
be uniquely positioned to assess the size of the DOD financial
management workforce and determine if there are any efficiencies to be
gained through automation and process improvements.
Question. Does the DOD financial management workforce have the
appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly
distributed, in your view?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether the financial
management workforce has the appropriate capabilities, and work with
the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military
departments to ensure that those capabilities are distributed properly
in order to meet mission requirements. I believe ongoing evaluation
will be necessary to identify emergent trends and deficiencies.
Question. What else would you do, if confirmed, to improve the
capacity and capability of the DOD financial management workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the capacity and capability of
the DOD financial management workforce and of its workforce development
programs. I will look for any lessons learned during the pandemic and
review current processes and available technology to identify
efficiencies to be gained through automation.
Question. Do you believe the OUSD(C) and the DOD financial
management workforce have the capability and capacity to assume the
additional duties assigned to them by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense
Norquist after the statutory dissolution of the Chief Management
Officer? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand Deputy Secretary Hicks has begun or will soon
begin a review of those initial decisions and assess the best placement
of all OCMO functions. If confirmed, I will be prepared to participate
in those deliberations. Depending on which, if any, of such management
functions were assigned to the Comptroller organization, I believe
additional personnel with different skill sets, such as program
management rather than budget analysis backgrounds, might need to be
hired or transferred to the Comptroller organization.
Question. When you were last serving as the USD(C), the Department
created a new professional certification process for the DOD financial
management workforce.
In your judgement, how does the financial management certification
program improve the Department's ability to produce a professional and
capable financial management workforce?
Answer. In my judgement, the DOD Financial Management Certification
Program improves the Department's ability to produce a professional and
capable financial management (FM) workforce by ensuring the proficiency
baseline necessary to maintain a competent and ready FM workforce, and
establishes a framework to guide DOD FM professional development. It
provides a consistent, disciplined approach to ensure appropriate
training in key areas such as DOD audit and remediation, fiscal law,
and ethics.
Question. What performance metrics associated with the financial
management certification program demonstrate the program's
effectiveness and utility?
Answer. As I understand it, the Department has metrics in place to
measure the percentage of the financial management (FM) workforce who
are compliant in their certification and continuing education and that
metric is part of the Department's annual performance plan. If
confirmed, I will review the current performance indicators and
determine if there are initiatives we can pursue to increase the
utility of the program.
Question. How does the DOD financial management certification
compare to other government financial management credentials (e.g.,
Certified Defense Financial Manager)?
Answer. The mission of the FM Certification Program is to develop
and maintain a competent FM workforce with the baseline knowledge,
skills, abilities, and behaviors necessary to successfully perform FM
occupational functions. DOD's internal program was intended to
complement, not replace or displace, the CDFM program. If confirmed, I
would review the degree to which these programs overlap or complement
each other.
defense agencies
The USD(C) is charged to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency,
economy, and performance of the Defense Agencies subject to the Under
Secretary's authority, direction, and control, and is accountable to
the Secretary of Defense for the mission performance of such agencies.
defense contract audit agency (dcaa)
Question. What have been some of the successes (especially in terms
of savings to DOD and the taxpayer) from the work of DCAA?
Answer. DCAA's role in the financial oversight of government
contracts is critical to ensure the Department and the Nation get the
best value for every dollar spent on defense contracting. Its work
benefits our men and women in uniform, as well as the American
taxpayer. I believe DCAA provides examples of the savings to the
taxpayers and other achievements in their annual report.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve DCAA's
ability to execute its designated missions?
Answer. DCAA's primary function is to conduct contract audits and
related financial services. If confirmed, I will support DCAA's efforts
to execute its designated missions, including increasing collaboration
with customers and industry, as well as efforts to provide value added
information through comprehensive analysis of their individual audits.
The timeliness of DCAA's contract audits would also be an area I would
review if confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, what new investments in technology,
training, and workforce would you recommend to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of DCAA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage and support any on-going
DCAA technology, training and workforce initiatives that will help
improve auditor efficiency and effectiveness.
dfas
Question. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was
established to consolidate finance and accounting functions previously
performed by the Military Services.
In your view, does DFAS continue to add value to DOD-wide financial
management and accounting systems and processes? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. DOD established DFAS in 1991 to consolidate, standardize,
and integrate finance and accounting functions within the DOD to create
efficiencies. I believe they have a solid history of adding value to
DOD-wide financial management and continue to envision, lead and add
value.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve DFAS's
ability to execute its designated missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would enable an environment in which DFAS
could continue to drive standardization across the Department. I will
review DFAS's ongoing work with the components to address the issues
that drive the need for manual input and error correction at the
functional source. Standardization in the data delivered to DFAS is
recognized as a critical component of the Department's ability to
automate its financial reporting and improve its audit position.
Question. If confirmed, what new investments in technology,
training, and workforce would you recommend to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of DFAS?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with DFAS leadership, and
consult with DFAS customers across the Department, in order to review
what opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DFAS
are in line with the NDS and possible within fiscal constraints and
competing priorities. Amplified use of data analytics and technology
tools such as robotics and artificial intelligence to increase
automation of transaction processing and the delivery of business
insights are some potential areas to consider to effectively manage the
Department's resources.
working capital funds
Question. More than two decades ago, DOD created several working
capital funds as part of an effort to streamline defense business
processes.
What do you perceive to be the value of working capital funds?
Answer. Working capital funds (WCFs), especially when used in
concert with policies that provide DOD customers with the full cost of
goods or services provided by WCF activities, help facilitate a cost-
conscious culture, imparting a corporate view across the department,
enabling a more efficient optimization of limited resources. They act
as a ``shock absorber'' to minimize the impact of demand and cost
variations to the customers, allowing for price stability in the year
of execution. WCFs allow for purchase of supply items in advance of
customer need, enabling supply activities to have the right parts on
the shelf in the right quantities when the customers need them. They
are easily scalable to changes in the DOD's operating requirements.
They allow for economies of scale, spreading overhead costs over the
entire customer base.
Question. If confirmed, would you consider any reforms to, or
expansion of, existing working capital funds?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my team, DOD
leadership, OMB, and Congress to determine if any reforms to or
expansion of working capital funds would benefit the Secretary's and
the Administration's priorities.
Question. Are there other defense business operations that would
benefit from the creation of a new working capital fund to promote
operational efficiency or cost savings?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my team, DOD
leadership, OMB, and Congress to determine if any business areas not
already in the WCF regime would benefit from the value proposition
stated previously.
reprogramming
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to follow the well-
established precedent to wait for ``4-way'' congressional approval
before transferring funds between appropriations accounts or
reprogramming funding above the threshold established in enacted
appropriations bills?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your view of the efficacy of the current transfer
and reprogramming process?
Answer. Throughout my previous service with the Department, the
Department used reprogramming actions to address the highest priority
emerging requirements, and no prior approval reprogramming action was
implemented unless and until all of the congressional defense
committees approved the Department's request. In my view, this well-
established process, although sometimes lengthy in certain cases, met
the needs of the Department and the Congress. If confirmed, I will
scrupulously ensure that the Department abides by its longstanding
agreements with the congressional defense committees, which are
designed to preserve Congress' oversight of the appropriations process
and the Department's financial management.
Question. Do the dollar thresholds associated with the
reprogramming process remain appropriate in the current day? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. Over the years, Congress has reduced the Below Threshold
Reprogramming (BTR) amount thresholds for some appropriation accounts.
This has restricted the Department's flexibility and has increased the
volume of Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) actions that are
submitted to the Congress for their prior approval. If confirmed, I
will review this topic with the staff and then come back to the
Congress if I believe any changes are warranted. I believe some changes
are probably warranted.
Question. In your view, how might the reprogramming process be
improved to meet DOD's need for flexibility, while maintaining trust
and transparency with Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current process and provide
any recommendations.
management headquarters activities (mha) report
Question. On June 20, 2019, the Department submitted the report
required by section 931 of the NDAA for FY 2019, certifying the average
percentage of amounts authorized to be appropriated during the 10
fiscal years ending with FY 2018 that have been expended on certain
Management Headquarters Activities (MHA) across the Department.
Additionally, the committee has learned that as a result of MHA cuts,
the Army, for example, elected to eliminate roughly one third of their
personnel who oversaw the Military Housing Privatization Initiative.
Are you aware of other examples of mission impacts that have
occurred because of the MHA reductions? If so, please describe them.
Answer. As the details of cuts affecting Major DOD Headquarters
Activities (MHA) are part of the program and budget reviews, I am not
privy to specifics. If confirmed, I will review past reductions against
ongoing operational needs and address specific impacts, as appropriate
and with coordination and collaboration with DOD Component heads.
Question. Civilian control of the military is directly tied to the
health and robustness of DOD's civilian professionals, especially those
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Are you aware of any
resource shortfalls for positions or capability within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense over the last few years?
Answer. I have heard anecdotal references to the reductions against
OSD--to comply with Section 346(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (the ``25% cut'' to headquarters
baselines)--having a significant impact on the health and robustness of
the civilian headquarters support to the Secretary of Defense. While
efficiency reductions should be considered, mandatory or arbitrary
reduction targets can create disruptive capability shortfalls in both
lower and higher priority functions. If confirmed, I would work closely
with the other OSD Principal Staff Assistants and DOD Component heads
to ensure that the civilian support to the Secretary of Defense is
sufficiently resourced and provides the right balance of positions and
capability within OSD.
acquisition reform
Question. Congress has enacted significant reform of the defense
acquisition enterprise, to include establishing and expanding
authorities related to special acquisition pathways and the use of
streamlined acquisition methodologies.
If confirmed, what changes would you make to DOD financial
management regulations to afford financial management, comptroller, and
acquisition personnel the flexibility required to support novel
acquisition approaches?
Answer. I believe that acquisition reform is critical to our
success. In many cases, the budget process is neutral with respect to
what type of contracting vehicle or process is used. However, if
confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and
Sustainment and other key stakeholders to ensure the financial
management regulations are updated to enable any specific permissions
or flexibilities afforded the Department and to look for opportunities
to look for additional innovations or improvements.
Question. If confirmed, what changes would you make to DOD
financial management regulations to afford financial management,
comptroller, and acquisition personnel the flexibility required to
apply resources to take advantage of emerging technologies and
responding to emerging threats in a timely fashion?
Answer. I believe that timely acquisition is critical to
implementing the NDS. If confirmed, I will work with the Under
Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment and other key stakeholders to
ensure the financial management regulations and acquisition workforce
training enable the Department to effectively implement any specific
permissions or flexibilities afforded the Department to take advantage
of emerging technologies and emerging threats.
Question. In your view, to what extent have recent acquisition
reforms have been successful and achieved better outcomes?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide a detailed impact
analysis at this time, but I believe reforms such as the Middle Tier
Acquisition, the Software Acquisition Pathway, and the Software and
Digital Technology Programs Pilot have great potential. If confirmed, I
would like to continue these efforts for two to three more years and
then assess the outcomes and determine best practices moving forward.
There is always more that can be done. Just as technology advances, so
must our acquisition of that technology.
Question. Do you see the need for additional changes in
legislation? If so, provide examples.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Department
leadership and Congress in order to identify any legislative changes
that would allow the Department to pursue and develop emerging
technologies.
personnel costs
Question. Military personnel costs continue to grow rapidly and
comprise an increasing share of the DOD budget. A large portion of the
military compensation package consists of in-kind benefits--health
care, housing, tax-free shopping in military exchanges, taxpayer
subsidized commissaries--that complement competitive salaries and a
generous military retirement benefit.
In your view, how can DOD manage and better plan for this growth?
Answer. The Department must continually strive to assess personnel
costs in all forms and determine the most efficient ways to deliver a
competitive compensation package that enables DOD to attract and retain
the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. Should the DOD's personnel costs grow at the rate of
inflation?
Answer. The topline for the defense budget, and personnel budgets
within the topline, should depend, not on an arbitrary inflation
factor, but on the Department's mission, the appropriate force
structure to achieve that mission and the competitive compensation
package required to recruit and retain the force size and quality
needed.
Question. Do you believe the Employment Cost Index (ECI) is the
most appropriate metric to assess inflation for the purpose to
determining military pay increases?
Answer. Yes, I believe ECI is the right metric to ensure military
basic pay remains competitive and keeps pace with private sector wage
growth. However, compensation levels (of which basic pay is only one
component) must be continually reviewed and adjustments to an annual
basic pay raise at percentages other than the ECI metric could
sometimes be warranted.
Question. The most recent Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation (QRMC) endorsed a further study and a pilot program for a
time-in-grade based military pay table. In your judgment, would a time-
in-grade pay table potentially help reduce long-term military personnel
cost growth?
Answer. It is my understanding that a time-in-grade pay table does
potentially have some advantages including: incentivizing higher
performance than a time-in-service pay table; providing stronger
retention incentives more efficiently; and attracting lateral entrants
to the DOD workforce. However, the major disadvantage of the time-in-
grade pay table seems to be that the transition would involve a cost to
the Department of Defense, and it would be disruptive to a significant
fraction of the force. Estimates from the 13th QRMC indicate that just
under one-third of the active force would experience a basic pay
reduction in the transition to a time-in-grade pay table (especially
among officers with significant prior enlisted service), with an
average reduction in basic pay of 6.0 percent among those who would
experience a pay reduction. If confirmed I will consult with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to understand the
Department's assessment of the recommendation and whether or not the
disadvantages of a time-in-grade pay table (even a pilot program)
outweigh the potential advantages.
Question. The QRMC also recommended refraining from ``providing
target pay raises at this time.'' How should the DOD and Congress
determine whether military pay raises are necessary?
Answer. OUSD Personnel and Readiness and the Services continually
assess recruiting and retention challenges, as well as other force
management factors such as assignments, promotions, skill and grade
mix, etc., to determine if compensation levels need to be adjusted to
maintain DOD's competitive compensation package.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced
sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work''
in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(C)?
Answer. If confirmed, the action I would take upon receiving or
becoming aware of a sexual harassment or discrimination complaint is to
immediately conduct an independent inquiry into the matter, in
coordination with the HR and EEO office. I would take these matters
seriously, enforce accountability, leverage opportunities to train and
educate leaders and the staff, and reiterate my stance against
inappropriate behavior that has no place in the workplace or anywhere
else. I would also ensure OUSDC has workplace policies and practices
that promote respect, civility, and inclusion for all.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
transparency in contracts
1. Senator Peters. Mr. McCord, Congress has previously requested
that the Department of Defense provide better transparency over
contract services expenditures in its budget submission. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) identified this problem in a February 18,
2016 audit, ``DOD Service Acquisition: Improved Use of Available Data
Needed to Better Manage and Forecast Service Contract Requirements''
(GAO-16-119), and most recently continued to retain the management of
services contracts on its high risk list in a February 22, 2021
assessment of the Department's report to Congress. See, GAO-21-267R,
``Service Acquisitions: DOD's Report to Congress Identifies Steps Taken
To Improve Management, But Does Not Address Some Key Planning Issues.''
Most notably, one of the key planning issues not addressed is the
subject of the original 2016 audit, the failure to establish better
transparency over services contracts spending means the Department's
``budget exhibits on contract services provide limited visibility to
Congress on planned spending, and the primary exhibit for contracted
services does not meet statutory reporting requirements. . .without a
roadmap of future service contract spending needs, Congress has limited
visibility into an area that constitutes more than half of DOD's annual
contract spending.'' Having worked in the Department of Defense when
this audit finding was first made, do you recognize this as a problem
that needs to be addressed?
Mr. McCord. Yes. Transparency over DOD contract services
expenditures is an important element in ensuring Americans' taxpayer
dollars are spent wisely. If confirmed, I will work with my team and
the acquisition community to ensure Congress has the appropriate
visibility to conduct its oversight responsibility.
administrative efficiencies
2. Senator Peters. Mr. McCord, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in
her private capacity last year wrote in a March 2020 ``Foreign
Affairs'' article entitled, ``Getting to Less: The Truth About Defense
Spending,'' the following: ``Predictably, for example, even though
Congress directed the Defense Department to cut $10 billion through
administrative efficiencies between 2015 and 2019, the Pentagon failed
to substantiate that it had achieved those savings. The reason those
efforts rarely succeed is that they merely shift the work being done by
civilian employees to others, such as military personnel or defense
contractors.'' How can we avoid encouraging such shell games in the
future?
Mr. McCord. During my previous tenure as Comptroller, I
participated in some of the ``administrative efficiencies'' efforts and
can confirm that they were more than a shell game. From Secretary
Gates' ``Efficiency Review,'' Secretary Hagel's ``Strategic Choices and
Management Review,'' ``Fourth-Estate'' reductions, and sequestration-
driven efficiency reductions, DOD absorbed significant, real budget and
manpower cuts. If confirmed, I will participate in any review of DOD's
administrative expenses and potential efficiencies to help ensure the
level of administrative support is sufficient to meet the Department's
requirements within the funding levels provided by Congress and will,
if need be, advise where I think the funding levels and requirements
may be incompatible.
3. Senator Peters. Mr. McCord, when this is happening, what good is
financial auditability without also some good managerial accounting
principles to inform wiser decisions?
Mr. McCord. The two are congruent. Financial auditability drives
timelier and more accurate data with which to inform decision making.
Better data will increase the transparency of DOD's financial
activities, as well as DOD's accountability for the use of the assets
entrusted to it. Further, better data and insight into DOD's financial
activity can drive greater efficiency in the use of its appropriations
(e.g., lower de-obligations and cancelled funding returned to
Treasury). The annual audit provides annual, independent validation of
the progress DOD is making towards these goals, as well as
recommendations to guide further progress.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
emerging technologies
4. Senator Blackburn. Mr. McCord, what opportunities do you see for
``data-driven'' decision support tools within the office to which you
have been nominated?
Mr. McCord. To institutionalize the benefits of the audit in
driving the DOD toward common business systems and better data, it is
necessary to demonstrate to data owners the value of the change that
would result. The prior manual, labor-intensive approach to gathering
and presenting data to inform decision makers at times resulted in
PowerPoint slides that were debated and disputed, rather than
supporting the intended discussion about the meaning of the data
presented. It is important to automate the generation of timely,
reliable information that could be used for analysis to save time for
discussion of what the data show, rather than contesting the data.
Data-based decisions are a fundamental principle of the Planning,
Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) system.
The Department began building an advancing analytics (Advana) tool
in 2016 that expanded the boundaries of a standard data warehouse to
arm military and business decision makers with decision support
analytics, visualization products, and data tools. If confirmed I would
continue using the power of the audited data for decision making and
attempt to recruit top talent that can help the Department use data for
better decision making.
audit
5. Senator Blackburn. Mr. McCord, given the findings of the
previous two DOD audits, what specific actions would you take with
respect to business reform--to include consolidating information
technology and improving enterprise buying power?
Mr. McCord. If confirmed, I would make sure there are quantifiable
metrics to measure progress and hold components accountable for planned
corrective actions and system reductions. I would engage the Office of
the Chief Information Officer to jointly reduce the numbers of systems
and duplicate functionality among DOD systems to reduce information
technology cost and inconsistency. Additionally, I would look for
opportunities to partner with the Chief Data Officer and the military
departments to identify opportunities for efficiency.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
burden-sharing
6. Senator Hawley. Mr. McCord, would you agree that asking more of
our allies and partners in Europe and other regions could help to
alleviate some of the burdens facing the Department of Defense, so that
DOD can focus more of its scarce resources on our top priorities--above
all, deterring China?
Mr. McCord. Our Allies and partners have responded to our calls to
more equitably share the responsibility of providing for our common
defense. For example, I understand NATO is entering its seventh
consecutive year of increased defense spending, and that the
Departments of State and Defense continue to encourage our Allies to
fulfill the 2014 Wales Summit Defense Investment Pledge. Allies and
partners also made significant troop contributions to U.S.-led, NATO,
and multinational missions in the Middle East and elsewhere. However,
as you note, they can always do more. If confirmed, I will work through
the Department's normal program and budget review process to seek ways
to make tradeoffs from lower priority missions to higher priority
missions, including deterrence of China. Reviewing our burden sharing
arrangements should normally be part of the scope of such reviews.
______
[The nomination reference of Honorable Michael J. McCord
follows:]
______
[The biographical sketch of Honorable Michael J. McCord,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Honorable
Michael J. McCord in connection with his nomination follows:]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
______
[The nomination of Honorable Michael J. McCord was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Reed on May 20, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 28, 2021.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties, qualifications, and relationships
Question. If confirmed as USD(I&S), what do you believe would be
your most critical duties and responsibilities?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security (USD(I&S)) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of
Defense in discharging his intelligence and security responsibilities
and authorities including under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United
States Code.
I understand that the responsibilities of the USD(I&S) are assigned
in DOD Directive 5143.01 and include: serving as the Principal Staff
Assistant and advisor regarding intelligence, counterintelligence,
security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters;
exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary
of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Geospatial-intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency / Central
Security Service, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency; establishing policy and
priorities for, and providing oversight of, the defense intelligence
and security enterprises; exercising oversight of personnel policy to
ensure that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are
staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of
the Department; ensuring that the DOD intelligence components that are
also elements of the intelligence community are responsive to the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's
authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided
with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that
counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and
managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that certain sensitive
activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and
managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of
assigned DOD security policies and programs to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness; and serving as the Program Executive for the Military
Intelligence Program.
Question. What is your understanding of the differences between the
title 10 and title 50 duties of the USD(I&S)?
Answer. My understanding is that the USD(I&S) assists the Secretary
of Defense in satisfying all of the Secretary's title 10 and title 50
statutory responsibilities in the areas of intelligence and security
and that the duties of the USD(I&S) are prescribed in DOD Directive
(DODD) 5143.01.
Pursuant to subsection 3038(a) of title 50, the Secretary of
Defense has the following responsibilities, which are to be conducted
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence: (1) ensure
that the budgets of the intelligence community (IC) elements within the
Department of Defense (DOD) are adequate to satisfy the overall DOD
intelligence needs; (2) ensure appropriate implementation of the
policies and resource decisions of the Director of National
Intelligence by DOD Components within the National Intelligence Program
(NIP); (3) ensure that DOD tactical intelligence activities complement
and are compatible with intelligence activities under the NIP; (4)
ensure that the IC elements within DOD are responsive and timely with
respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces; (5)
eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication among the DOD intelligence
activities; and (6) ensure that DOD intelligence activities are
conducted jointly where appropriate.
Question. What leadership and management experience do you possess
that you would apply to your service as USD(I&S), if confirmed?
Answer. I have had the privilege of serving at the highest echelons
of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community.
Serving over a combined 17 years as a member of the Defense
Intelligence Senior Executive Service and the CIA's Senior Intelligence
Service, I led some of our Nation's most sensitive multi-intelligence
missions and served with some of the most technically adept and
dedicated professionals in the U.S. Government. Having served in
leadership positions in operations, science and technology, staff and
budget, legislative affairs, and joint organizations has enabled me to
provide objective, time-sensitive intelligence to the warfighter,
policymakers, and senior government leaders. As the Operations Director
for the National Security Agency, I worked with many departments and
agencies including across the Intelligence Community on critical
challenges and established many trusted bilateral and multi-lateral
foreign partnerships with our key allies.
If confirmed, I would use my coalition building skills and
experience in the private sector to enable our Nation to stay ahead of
its adversaries. Also, I would continue to mentor the next generation
of intelligence and security professionals. If confirmed, I would
always serve with integrity while practicing servitude leadership.
Last, I would use my decades of resource stewardship to ensure that the
defense intelligence and security enterprise operates in an effective
and efficient manner.
Question. Please provide an example of a situation in which you led
and brought to conclusion a management improvement/change initiative in
a complex organization.
Answer. In a prior role as one of an agency's most senior
operations leaders, I realized that the processes for after-hours and
weekend decisionmaking lacked the content and authorization specificity
needed to conduct operations. In coordination with the agency's senior
leadership team, I crafted the inaugural guidance to establish
governance framework for such decisionmaking. This guidance is employed
globally today and enables the agency to identify, assess, and respond
24/7 to critical events worldwide, which in-turn enhances the quality
and timeliness of intelligence provided to our government's most senior
leaders.
Question. What is your experience across the domain of intelligence
matters? Security matters?
Answer. My career has been a series of foundational intelligence
experiences and assignments each preparing me for additional
responsibility. As a member of the U.S. Air Force, I trained as a
linguist at the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center and
subsequently served a 3-year tour in Asia, which launched me on a
professional intelligence trajectory. As a civilian leader at the
National Security Agency (NSA), I addressed a wide spectrum of issues
as I led NSA's efforts against several intelligence priorities. My
responsibilities were comprehensive as I worked to satisfy intelligence
requirements, served as the director of NSA's collection and processing
organization, and led analytical and reporting efforts, culminating in
my appointment as the director of operations. I was also a senior
leader in the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate and had an
important role while serving in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI). I played a key role in advising the Secretary of
the Navy on cybersecurity, emerging technology, and data issues.
I built strong relationships across the interagency working with
the defense intelligence enterprise and organizations such as the ODNI,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury,
the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I was selected
to lead to major damage assessments and equity reviews of two of our
Nation's highest profile data compromises.
Last, I received a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence
(MSSI) degree in Russian studies from the National Intelligence
University (NIU), the preeminent academic institution for the
Intelligence Community. In 2020, I served as a member of the NIU's
Board of Visitors, reportedly becoming the first graduate to ever to
serve in this capacity.
Question. Are there are any actions you would take to enhance your
ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the USD(I&S)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately begin to re-establish my
close working relationships within the Pentagon, the ODNI, the other IC
elements, and entire the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what specific duties might you expect the
Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the
lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?
Answer. I believe my duties, aligned with the Secretary's 2021
Interim Defense Strategic Guidance, would include posturing the Defense
Intelligence and Security Enterprises against the threat of China,
countering Russia's malign influence activities, and the persistent
regional threat posed by Iran and North Korea, while fostering the
expansion of interagency cooperation and international partnerships to
address national security priorities. Additionally, the Department must
protect our personnel at home and abroad, a task that includes
developing a collaborative and accountable culture that does not accept
harassment or violent extremism within its military and civilian ranks.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence &
Security?
Answer. If confirmed and within the limits of policy and the law, I
would ensure that the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security are sufficiently
broad such that my deputy would serve as a full partner.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as USD(I&S) fulfills the fundamental requirement for
civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution
and other laws?
Answer. I am committed to civilian control of the Armed Forces in
accordance with the U.S. Constitution and other applicable law. I
recognize that the Department's civilian and military personnel
together, with the support of DOD contractors, enable our mission
success, and civilian control of the Armed Forces ensures
accountability to the will of the people through our elected
representatives.
Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? On what matters would you
expect to collaborate with the ODNI, if confirmed?
Answer. I am aware that the OUSD(I&S) works closely with the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The partnership and
integration between OUSD(I&S) and ODNI enables the Intelligence
Community to deliver national intelligence support to policymakers and
warfighters on threats to our national security.
The USD(I&S) is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence
within the ODNI. There is also a military officer who serves as the
DNI's Advisor on Military Affairs (DAMA). I believe their staffs
coordinate to effectively and efficiently ensure quality intelligence
is provided in support of our national leadership and warfighters. As a
principal member of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance
Accountability Council (PAC), the USD(I&S) works with the DNI, who is
the Security Executive Agent and also a principal member of the PAC.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship and
division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), particularly as
regards policy and programs for information operations, including
military deception and operations security (OPSEC)?
Answer. My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD(P)) is the Principal Staff Assistant for information
operations. I also understand that the USD(I&S) has responsibility for
coordination of DOD IO activities with the Intelligence Community, as
well as the development and implementation of DOD policy, programs, and
guidance for DOD deception and operations security.
Question. In your view, what would be the appropriate relationship
between the USD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
regard to providing operational intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security support to the warfighter?
Answer. I believe the relationship between the USD(I&S) and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of mutual support and
consultation to ensure that the defense intelligence enterprise
provides the warfighters with the best intelligence possible, which
enables the Chairman to provide the best military advice to the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the
activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between
the OUSD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?
Answer. I understand that USD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))
acting together are the primary oversight officials for all Special
Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and programs. If confirmed, I will partner with ASD(SO/LIC)
to ensure that our oversight of SOF is coordinated and collaborative.
Question. Are there any programs currently overseen by the
OUSD(I&S) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD(SOLIC), in
your view?
Answer. I am unaware of any such programs. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that together we provide
the Secretary of Defense with the best organizational alignment to
accomplish U.S. national security objectives.
Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
responsibilities between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) in
regard to both unclassified and classified contract efforts?
Answer. I understand the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment
(OUSD(A&S)) is one of cooperation and collaboration. If confirmed, I
look forward to partnering with the USD(A&S) to ensure that DOD
acquisition programs receive the intelligence needed to acquire
superior defense capabilities and that appropriate consideration is
given to the central role of security throughout the acquisition
process to protect the integrity of our acquisitions in the face of the
persistent threat of compromise by our adversaries.
Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the DOD Chief Information
Officer, particularly with respect to the cybersecurity mission;
developing interoperability requirements applicable to information
systems architectures for processing intelligence and
counterintelligence information; and the certification of intelligence
information systems?
Answer. I view the relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO) as one
predicated on collaboration and partnership to ensure synchronization
between security policymakers and information technology service
providers. I understand that OUSD(I&S) is responsible for development
and oversight of information security and physical security policy. The
DOD CIO advises the Secretary of Defense on information technology,
including national security systems and defense business systems, and
develops DOD strategy and policy for all DOD information technology and
information systems. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) maintains a
close partnership with the DOD CIO to enable the necessary security
architecture to protect intelligence and counterintelligence
information while effectively enabling the mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship and
division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) for the
Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)? For the
identification of DOD language capability requirements?
Answer. It is my understanding that the USD(I&S) develops the
policies for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System in
close coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness (USD(P&R)). I also understand that USD(P&R) works with
USD(I&S) and the intelligence community to set and prioritize DOD
foreign language capability requirements. If confirmed, I will study
the relationship between USD(I&S) and USD(P&R) in identifying DOD
language capability requirements.
Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the heads of the
Intelligence Components of the Military Departments?
Answer. I believe that the OUSD(I&S) staff works closely with the
heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components of the
Military Departments. I understand that the USD(I&S) provides input to
the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the duty performance of
the senior intelligence officer within each Military Department.
The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense with authority delegated from the Secretary of Defense to
establish policy for defense intelligence, counterintelligence,
security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.
The Directors for Defense Intelligence within the Office of the
USD(I&S) (OUSD(I&S)) have specific programmatic responsibilities and
support the Under Secretary in carrying out the responsibilities
assigned and exercising the authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) by
the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority,
direction, and control over all components within their respective
Departments. So the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence
components within the Military Departments are under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of the Military Department and
subject to policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).
Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the OUSD(I&S) with
regard to the Reserve Component intelligence elements of Military
Services?
Answer. I understand that, in accordance with DOD Instruction
5143.01, which outlines the responsibilities and functions,
relationships, and authorities of the USD(I&S), OUSD(I&S) develops and
provides policy guidance, resource advocacy, and oversight for the
integration of Reserve Component intelligence elements, and ensures the
Department effectively employs and resources Reserve Component
intelligence elements to best support the National Defense Strategy.
The programmatic role of OUSD(I&S) is the same with respect to the
Active and Reserve Components of the Military Services. Like the Active
Components, the Reserve Components intelligence elements are under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the relevant
Military Department in which they are located and subject to policy
oversight of the OUSD(I&S).
Question. What is your understanding of the USD(I&S)'s
responsibility and authority for the management and oversight of
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and National Intelligence Program
(NIP) funding? How do the processes employed by the USD(I&S) in the
execution of these responsibilities differ from the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process applicable to all
other DOD organizations and funding?
Answer. As the MIP Executive Agent, the USD(I&S) has management and
oversight of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The USD(I&S), in
his role as the Director of Defense Intelligence, has visibility into
the NIP through participation in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) resource decision forums. Additionally, I
understand that the DNI and the USD(I&S) jointly sign out intelligence
programming guidance to closely synchronize NIP and MIP programs to
ensure that the Department's priorities are communicated to the
intelligence community. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI
in ensuring that DOD intelligence requirements are supported within the
NIP budget.
With respect to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) process, it is my understanding the USD(I&S) is a full
participant in the Department's PPBE process and that military
intelligence requirements compete with the other DOD requirements.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to
develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship
between Congress--the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations
Committees, in particular--and the OUSD(I&S) and the Defense Agencies
under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S)?
Answer. I am committed to assist the Secretary of Defense in
sustaining an open, transparent, and productive relationship between
the Department and Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging
with the defense oversight committees on a routine basis to explain the
Department's defense intelligence, counterintelligence, security,
sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure both
that this Committee is provided with the notifications required under
provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, section 2723, and that any such
notification is accurate, complete, and timely?
Answer. I am committed to fulfilling the USD(I&S)'s responsibility
under DOD Directive 5143.01 to make determinations on behalf of the
Secretary of Defense, except for those related to nuclear, chemical,
and biological security, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
as appropriate, and to notify Congress, as required by section 2723. If
confirmed, I will ensure such notifications are accurate, complete, and
timely.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you would face if confirmed as the USD(I&S) and what
specific actions would you take to address each of these challenges?
Answer. Rebuilding trust and establishing close working
relationships between the USD(I&S) and DOD senior leaders would be
among the most significant challenges. The rebuilding of trust and
establishing close working relationships with senior leaders of foreign
partners would also be a challenge and priority. If confirmed, I would
engage in sustained outreach with these leaders on mutual priorities
and objectives with the goal of developing a strategic dialog and
viable courses of action on key issues.
supervision, and oversight of the defense intelligence and security
enterprise
Question. The USD(I&S) is vested with responsibility for the
overall direction and supervision of the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprise in the execution of intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other
intelligence-related matters across DOD. Subject to USD(I&S) oversight,
responsibility for executing policies and programs in these domains
vests primarily in the Military Departments and Services, elements of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Agencies.
What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I&S) in
coordinating the activities of the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise?
Answer. In my understanding, the USD(I&S) is responsible for
ensuring the actions of all of these elements are integrated to meet
the needs of the Department and the Nation. The USD(I&S) does so by
issuing policy, ensuring compliance, exercising control over the
Military Intelligence Program, coordinating with ODNI on the National
Intelligence Program, and by leading development of decisions affecting
the Defense Security and Security Enterprise.
Question. In your view, does the USD(I&S) have the authority,
organizational structure, and resources to provide appropriate
oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise? If not,
what additional authorities or resources does the OUSD(I&S) require, in
your view?
Answer. I believe that the USD(I&S) has sufficient authority to
provide policy oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the OUSD(I&S) staff to
determine if additional authorities or resources may be required and to
standardize OUSD(I&S) practices for effective oversight.
national defense strategy
Question. The 2018 NDS focused DOD on ``great power competition and
conflict'' with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which
the United States must contend, together with the imperative of
deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran.
Finally, the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to
the United States and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and
Afghanistan, while moving to a ``more resource sustainable'' approach
to counterterrorism.
In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical
and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
its allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the 2018 National Defense Strategy helped
consolidate a consensus around the importance of addressing the erosion
of U.S. military advantage, in key strategic areas. I agree with
Secretary Austin that China represents DOD's pacing threat, given its
increasing scope and scale of military modernization, its aggressive
behavior. The Department must also work to address advanced, persistent
threats--such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and VEOs. Additionally, I
believe the Department must take steps to address the profound impact
cross-cutting challenges, including climate change, COVID-19 and other
biological threats, that will influence our national security.
Question. In your view, what role(s) must the Defense Intelligence
and Security Enterprise play in the implementation of the NDS?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise is a
crucial pillar supporting the National Defense Strategy. The enterprise
must support decisionmakers, help ensure decision advantage for the
U.S. allies and partners and safeguard personnel, information,
operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against a wide
range of threats and challenges.
Question. How would you assess the current readiness and
capabilities of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to
execute the NDS?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise serve is a
crucial pillar supporting the National Defense Strategy (NDS). I
understand that it is postured to support the Department's execution of
the NDS. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to develop my own
assessment of the enterprise's readiness and capabilities to execute
the NDS.
Question. Does the OUSD(I&S) have the analytic tools and expertise
to assist you, if confirmed, in evaluating the readiness of the Defense
Intelligence and Security Enterprise to engage effectively across the
spectrum of challenges presented by the current strategic environment--
from low intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, high-intensity
warfare with major-power rivals? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that OUSD(I&S) possesses significant expertise
to assist me in evaluating readiness. If confirmed, I will review and
leverage the available decision-support analytic tools and develop
standardized, metrics-based approaches to reliably assess, monitor, and
evaluate the posture and performance of the enterprise to enable
effective engagements across the spectrum of challenges and achieve
desired outcomes.
Question. What do you believe are the main resource or capability
shortfalls that could hamper the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise's execution of the NDS?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has realigned
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) resources to better support the
National Defense Strategy (NDS). As the Department makes further
adjustments to its warfighting capabilities to support the NDS, I
expect this will impose additional requirements on intelligence and
security that will need to be addressed. If confirmed, I will work with
the OSD(I&S) staff to identify promptly any obstacles likely to hamper
execution of the Interim Guidance.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to address any gaps
or shortfalls in the ability of the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise to meet the demands placed on it by the NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Department to ensure
any capability gaps and shortfalls are identified and resourced
throughout the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's
implementation of the 2018 NDS with respect to intelligence and
security?
Answer. I am supportive of the tremendous efforts the Department
has made to date in implementing the National Defense Strategy. If
confirmed, once I am up to speed on efforts to execute the Defense
Intelligence Strategy, I will develop recommendations for the Secretary
of Defense. It is critical that all efforts continue to accelerate
support to the Department's posture with China as the pacing challenge.
The NDS affirms that ``[m]ore than any other nation, America can
expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to challenge our
competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength.''
Question. What role can the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise play in ``expand[ing] the competitive space,'' in your
opinion?
Answer. The enterprise has a pivotal role in enabling the
Department to expand the competitive space. It can help identify
technologies, tools, tradecraft, skills, resources, and processes that
the United States could use to create advantage relative to its
competitors. The enterprise is also essential in safeguarding DOD
personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and
facilities against a wide range of threats and challenges. If
confirmed, I will work with the Director of National Intelligence to
ensure that DOD and the Intelligence Community are fully integrated to
collectively seize that competitive space.
Question. Competing in the information space is a major concern as
reflected in the ``36-star'' letter sent by nine U.S. Combatant
Commanders to the Acting DNI via the USD(I&S) on January 15, 2020. If
confirmed, what steps would you take help address this challenge to
assist Combatant Commanders executing messaging and influence
operations around the globe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate efforts to mitigate
influence-related activities against key adversaries. I will also work
to help prioritize resources to support operations in the information
environment and participate in Intelligence Community focus groups to
help drive key concepts related to these activities. I understand that
in response to the 36-star memo, the Performing the Duty of the
USD(I&S) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) have been
examining how to improve upon current processes to use intelligence to
counter malign influence operations against the United States, its
allies, and its partners. If confirmed, I look forward to partnering
closely with the DNI, the Combatant Commanders, and the Directors of
the Combat Support Agencies to further those efforts in alignment with
national policy objectives.
Question. What revisions or adjustments would you recommend that
the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues to ensure the
Department considers geo-political shifts, intensifying competition
with China, transnational threats (including climate change, COVID-19
and other biological threats), and the evolving technology landscape in
its review and development of the next NDS.
strengthening alliances and attracting new partners
Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are
crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great
power. To this end, the NDS stresses the importance of strengthening
existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new
ones, and promoting ``mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and
accountability'' in these relationships.
How would you characterize your familiarity with the leadership of
cooperative foreign defense establishments, the intelligence and
security services of foreign governments, and intelligence and
security-related international organizations?
Answer. My past experience in the Intelligence Community and the
Department of Defense has afforded me familiarity with cooperative
foreign governments, their defense, intelligence, and security
services, and their leadership, as well as related international
organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to strengthening U.S. ties
with defense and intelligence counterparts around the globe, and
collaborating on areas of shared interest and concern.
Question. If confirmed as USD(I&S), what specific actions would you
take to strengthen and synchronize existing intelligence and
counterintelligence relationships with foreign governments and
international organizations?
Answer. I believe that allies and partners are force multipliers
who bring a wealth of valuable and unique intelligence insight, access,
and expertise to the partnerships.
If confirmed, I commit to fostering strong defense intelligence and
counterintelligence relationships with allies and partners focused on
our shared concerns, including malign activities by China and Russia. I
will work in close collaboration with our allies and partners to
exchange valuable intelligence, synchronize our intelligence and
counterintelligence efforts where mutually beneficial, implement
economies of force, close intelligence gaps, and improve our overall
understanding of the national and global security challenges that we
face today.
Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in
rendering decisions on the disclosure and release of intelligence to
foreign governments and international organizations, including in
support of combatant commanders' expressed desire for better
intelligence and intelligence sharing to counter foreign malign
activities?
Answer. I understand that the National Disclosure Policy sets out
the factors that must be weighed for the foreign disclosure of U.S.
classified military information, including military intelligence. If
confirmed, I would support combatant command requirements for military
and national intelligence support to counter foreign malign activities.
I agree broadly that the responsible foreign disclosure of military
intelligence to friendly foreign governments and international
organizations can further mutual defense and security objectives.
Question. Do you agree with Admiral Davidson, the commander of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), that his ability to strengthen
alliances and partnerships would be greatly assisted by the funding of
a ``Mission Partner Environment'' that would help provide a secure
communications network with partners and allies throughout the region,
similar to what exists in the U.S. European Command area of
responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to get a better understanding of
how the Mission Partner Environment Information Sharing Capability is
being implemented pursuant to DOD Instruction 8110.01 within
USINDOPACOM.
joint requirements oversight council (jroc) and the joint capabilities
integration and development systems (jcids)
Question. Per section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, the JROC is
vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities;
establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure
interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint
military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of
operation. The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and
duplication in Military Services' programs by providing the information
the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational
performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.
How do you assess the effectiveness of the JROC and JCIDS in
identifying and establishing joint warfighter capability requirements
in the domains of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security?
Answer. The JROC and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) use threat assessments from the Intelligence Community
to inform Joint Force capability requirements and to guide requirements
and capability development, including in the areas of military
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. The USD(I&S), as a
statutory advisor to the JROC and its subordinate boards, provides
advice that supports effective intelligence-related capability
requirements and associated key performance parameters. If confirmed, I
would closely coordinate with JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process
continues to validate effective military intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security requirements.
Question. In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that
shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's
ability to assess joint performance requirements in the military
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security domains?
Answer. I understand that the recent reforms have transferred
acquisition Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) from USD(A&S) to the
Services, including for intelligence programs. One example is that the
Air Force is now the MDA for the MIP-funded Next Generation Overhead
Persistent Infrared satellites to provide missile warning. Changes in
MDA, however, have not changed how DOD addresses requirements, as the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process
has not changed. The JROC continues to assess and validate effective
joint performance requirements in the areas of military intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security through its oversight of the JCIDS
process, which still includes an Intelligence Support Certification
that is required to complete the requirements validation process needed
prior to an Acquisition Milestone Decision. If confirmed, I will work
closely with JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process continues to
validate effective military intelligence, counterintelligence, and
security requirements.
Question. The current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has emphasized joint and cross-domain capability requirements that the
Military Services have not prioritized or are not responsible for
developing, such as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). JADC2
demands ubiquitous interoperability, automated decision aids, and
systems-of-systems integration.
How would you ensure that the Defense combat support intelligence
agencies and the National Reconnaissance Office comply with the JADC2
requirements promulgated by the JROC?
Answer. In addition to participating in both the Department and IC
requirements development and system acquisition processes, OUSD(I&S)
conducts an annual portfolio review to ensure MIP-funded efforts
deliver the capabilities needed by the warfighters. If confirmed, I
would work to ensure the OUSD(I&S) processes are working to provide the
right data, to the right people, at the right time.
Question. Given the role that National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
assets have in providing intelligence for warfighting functions, the
JROC reviews NRO acquisition programs to ensure DOD requirements are
being met.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that NRO's close relationship
with the JROC continues?
Answer. Consideration of both DOD and IC requirements is central to
the USD(I&S) role. OUSD(I&S) facilitates the common gatekeeping
function between the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) and the Intelligence Community Capability Requirements
(ICCR) Process. If confirmed, I will work to maintain open
communication throughout this process, and work closely with the Joint
Staff and Intelligence Community during the requirements validation
process for NRO capabilities.
Question. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities
enacted in Section 804 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) sought to speed fielding of advanced
technologies and systems.
What is your opinion of the effects of efforts to use of 804
authorities in intelligence-, counterintelligence-, or security-related
acquisitions?
Answer. I believe that technological advances and development are
outpacing DOD's ability to modernize and field capability using
standard acquisition processes. Section 804 provides authority to the
DOD to rapidly prototype and/or rapidly field capabilities under a new
pathway, distinct from the traditional acquisition system. I understand
this authority provides a pathway for the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprises to develop, test, and field emerging technology to
maintain pace with, or counter, adversary capability development.
intelligence support to the warfighter
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the need for the
combat support Defense intelligence agencies to provide intelligence
support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support
to policymakers?
Answer. My understanding and belief is that balancing these needs
will be one of my primary responsibilities. In today's environment of
global and regional threats, most issues are relevant to both
warfighting commands and policymakers. Where there are tactical and
operational differences, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the DIE
continues to satisfy requirements for operationally-relevant
intelligence that directly enables warfighter success, and I would work
collaboratively with policymakers to ensure the intelligence needs of
senior national policymakers are met in order to support decisionmaking
by our national leaders.
Question. In your view, what opportunities exist across the
Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the
warfighter? If confirmed, what would you do to leverage these
opportunities?
Answer. I believe in the importance of and the continued
opportunity to improve collaboration across the Intelligence Community
to better support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would engage early
and often with the Combatant Commanders to improve my understanding of
their needs, and I would frequently engage leaders within the
Intelligence Community to obtain support to meet those warfighter
needs.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and
prioritizing their intelligence needs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the OUSD(I&S) has multiple
forums to engage with the Combatant Commands--for example, I understand
there are monthly VTCs with all Combatant Command J2s. If confirmed, I
will strive to ensure this and similar channels of communication are
open and used routinely.
Question. In your view, are the Joint Intelligence Operations
Centers and Service Intelligence Centers organized and resourced to
most effectively support warfighter requirements under the NDS, to
include support to near-real time, multi-sensor joint detection,
tracking, and targeting for the combatant commands? What changes may be
required to optimize cooperative, cross-agency targeting support?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate how to best resource the
Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) and the
Service Intelligence Centers (SICs) to support the NDS. I understand
that some of the JIOCs are currently undergoing manpower studies to
determine the appropriate manpower levels to meet the mission
requirements of the Combatant Commands. It would be incumbent upon the
OUSD(I&S) to attempt to resource the Commands to help them meet their
requirements, including in the area of targeting. If confirmed, I will
support periodic reviews and re-alignment efforts to ensure priorities
are met and resources effectively used to support the warfighter.
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by special operations forces different from those carried out by the
Intelligence Community?
Answer. In general, the key difference is that these intelligence
operations are conducted in direct support of special operations forces
missions that support tactical operations. I understand that special
operations missions require immediate and detailed intelligence to
support operations that are executed on rapid timelines and in high-
risk environments. In most cases, similar capability or capacity does
not exist or is not readily available within the Intelligence Community
or Department of Defense. I also understand other defense intelligence
operations typically serve a more strategic purpose and reflect
national priorities through its work as part of the Intelligence
Community. While special operation forces generally conduct
intelligence to directly support task forces conducting operations in
support of the combatant commands, they are aware of national
collection priorities and the strategic importance of their mission.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work across the Defense
Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
the CIA to ensure that intelligence activities carried out by special
operations forces are properly coordinated with activities carried out
by the Intelligence Community?
Answer. My understanding is that special operations forces
intelligence activities are closely coordinated with the intelligence
community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. If
confirmed, I would continue to work closely with the ASD SO/LIC,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, and
other DOD senior intelligence officials to ensure special operations
forces units comply with all applicable policies and directives.
Additionally, I would welcome a continued dialog with the committee to
ensure clear and consistent reporting to the congressional oversight
committees of intelligence activities carried out by special operations
forces.
The OUSD(I&S) is charged to develop and oversee implementation of
DOD strategy, programs, and policy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and to integrate tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) solutions.
Question. Is the OUSD(I&S) participating in the JADC2 cross-
functional team led by the Joint Staff J6? Do you intend to use the
authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) to leverage information
technology and innovative concepts to support the JADC2 initiative to
develop an interoperable, joint command, control, communications,
computer intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture
and capability to support the warfare of the future?
Answer. It is my understanding that the USD(I&S) is a full
participant in the Department's Joint All Domain Command and Control
(JADC2) initiative intended to connect distributed sensors, shooters,
and data from and in all domains to all forces. If confirmed, I will
continue to work closely with the DNI to shape required improvements to
the C4ISR architecture to increase timely support to decisionmaking at
the strategic and operational levels.
In a February 27, 2020, New York Times Op-ed, Eric Schmidt, the
chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
(NSCAI) and former chairman and CEO of Google, stated, ``[i]f A.I.
advances elsewhere outpace those of U.S. companies and the U.S.
Government, and give commercial and military advantages to our rivals,
the resulting disadvantage to the United States could endanger U.S.
national security and global stability. The same could be said for
other emerging technologies.'' The report of the NSCAI emphasized this
fundamental conclusion.
Question. Do you agree that American pre-eminence in AI is critical
for national and economic security? If confirmed, what priority would
you assign to ensuring that the Defense intelligence enterprise invests
in AI applications?
Answer. I agree that American pre-eminence in AI is critical for
national and economic security. I concur with the NSCAI commissions'
conclusion that ``we must win the AI competition that is intensifying
strategic competition with China.''
The application of AI and algorithms are part of a class of data-
centered capabilities that we must aggressively pursue to ensure DOD AI
military dominance and information advantage in competition and
conflict.
If confirmed, I will assign the highest priority to implementing
data capabilities. I will also place emphasis on building AI training
data to ensure we are turning our archived and daily intelligence into
the data we need for the Department.
Question. Do you agree that the Defense intelligence components
should take maximum advantage of the foundational AI platform that the
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is sponsoring to develop AI
applications for intelligence? If confirmed, what actions would you
take to support this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I will need more time to study this matter,
but I believe Project Maven and other IC initiatives have built AI
foundries that are operational today and were purpose-built for Defense
Intelligence. I suspect those initiatives are much farther along,
fitted more tightly to Defense Intelligence requirements and bring the
speed and flexibility we need to bring AI at scale to our many
intelligence data feeds. I will use the authorities granted to me in
the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5143.01 to weigh and
assess the proper AI technologies Defense Intelligence requires.
Question. What is your understanding of efforts by the OUSD(I&S) to
develop and implement systems for the use of Artificial Intelligence to
bring greater efficiencies to intelligence analysis, including
opportunities to condense the time required by a human analyst to
locate and prioritize potential targets and convert those observations
to actionable intelligence for input to military decisionmaking?
Answer. Speed, scale, and accuracy are USD(I&S) goals for
transforming Defense Intelligence using data technologies such as AI.
We want to be as early as possible on the sense-understand continuum to
give us maximum time to respond to national threats. To achieve earlier
warning and targeting timeframes, we will rely on data technologies
such as AI that make sense of data faster than humans. Machines will
accomplish tasks that in the past needed humans to accomplish, such as
extracting objects from imagery, or writing reports.
We envision a world where we globally surveil areas of interest
hundreds of times per day and understand the smallest changes in
seconds, and only machines equipped with AI will allow us to do this.
Our product-focused approach to delivering intelligence will change
from static, text-based artifacts to continuous data streams. Bringing
forward these technologies at scale so that all Defense Intelligence
sensors are first processed by accredited AIs and detections are then
passed to humans for context, decision, and action will emerge as the
new way of warfighting.
If confirmed, I look forward to presiding over these important
transformations. Yet, I appreciate that achieving these results will
require more than technology. Department leaders must also invest time
to preside over the necessary human-centered changes that accompany the
technology in order to guarantee successful adoption of these
disruptive technologies.
counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security
Question. What is your assessment of current and anticipated
counterintelligence threats to DOD? Which threats do you assess to be
the most concerning and why?
Answer. The Chinese and Russian intelligence services are the
greatest foreign intelligence threats to the technological superiority
and lethality of the Joint Force. I understand that China is using its
intelligence services and proxies to threaten our military advantage by
undermining our economic strength and innovation advantage through the
wholesale theft of intellectual property and cutting-edge technology. I
understand Russia is in a race to do the same and also intends to
weaken American confidence in the U.S. Government and the U.S. military
through sophisticated malign foreign influence campaigns.
Question. What is your understanding of the roles and
responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) to provide strategic direction and
oversight of implementation of counterintelligence policy, programs,
guidance, and training to ensure they are responsive to validated DOD
and national counterintelligence priorities? What changes, if any, in
these roles and responsibilities would you recommend, if confirmed?
Answer. I understand the USD(I&S) has broad responsibility for
oversight of DOD counterintelligence (CI). This includes development
and oversight of Department CI policy, programs, guidance, and training
of CI personnel. The USD(I&S) works closely with the Defense
Intelligence Agency for development of CI strategies and supporting
campaigns to ensure alignment with national level priorities. The
USD(I&S) is a standing member of the National CI and Security Center's
National CI Policy Board, and the National CI Strategy Board, and
through these forums and related working groups, coordinates and
collaborates within the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I will play an
active role with my government counterparts to ensure the right balance
of CI roles and responsibilities across the Federal Government.
Question. In your view, how has the Department's security posture
benefited from the integration of the intelligence,
counterintelligence, and law enforcement functions under the auspices
of a single Under Secretary?
Answer. DOD faces complex security challenges and must adapt to
changing threats and environments using targeted yet multidimensional
mitigation strategies and countermeasures. Integrating policy oversight
of intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement, along with
foundational security functions has enabled the Department to increase
collaboration and leverage a wider variety of tools to respond to a
given scenario. Our intelligence professionals and special agents
strive every day to collect information, detect, and disrupt the
capabilities, opportunities, and intentions of our adversaries. Working
side by side with our security professionals allows them to develop
effective policies, standard and repeatable procedures, and sufficient
controls to deter, and deny our strategic competitors intentions. If
confirmed, I will continue ensure that all communities under the
authority direction and control of the Under Secretary continue to
integrate seamlessly and continue to deny adversaries freedom of
maneuver.
Question. Does the integration of these functions under a single
official raise civil liberties concerns? If so, what do you believe to
be the most effective way to address those concerns?
Answer. No. I understand that integration of these functions within
OUSD(I&S) provides uniform, Department-level oversight of these
disciplines through alignment of policy, strategy, and resource
prioritization. If confirmed, I will ensure that all intelligence and
security activities, including counterintelligence and law enforcement
are conducted throughout the Department in a manner that respects civil
liberties and protect any right or privilege secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States.
Question. Does the USD(I&S) have adequate authorities and resources
to execute the law enforcement policy function? If not, what additional
authorities or resources are required, in your view?
Answer. I understand the law enforcement policy function resides
within the Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security portfolio
in USD(I&S), and that the staff is augmented with liaison officers and
cleared contractors. Although I have not been briefed on the full range
of current activities, if confirmed I will review this portfolio and
ensure I&S has the right alignment of authorities and resources to
perform the policy oversight function.
Question. In the role of the DOD Senior Agency Official for
Security, the USD(I&S) represents the Department on the Interagency
Security Committee (ISC), created by President Clinton in 1995, 6
months after the Oklahoma City bombing, to develop security standards
applicable to all non-military federally owned and leased facilities.
The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency
Committee Standard, sets forth a number of ``best practices'' for
determining a facility's security level and customizing physical
security countermeasures.
In your view, has DOD benefited from the adoption of any of the
``best practices'' endorsed by the ISC? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that DOD has benefited from the ISC's work. I
believe this benefits DOD by keeping DOD's physical security standards
for its leased spaces aligned with the physical security standards of
other Federal leases, reducing build-out costs and reconstruction time
when DOD moves into a space previously occupied by another Federal
tenant. It also benefits DOD by better integrating DOD's security
requirements into leased facilities DOD shares with other Federal
tenants.
personnel security and insider threat
Question. The USD(I&S) is accountable for managing and overseeing
DOD's insider threat, personnel security, and the National Industrial
Security programs. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider
threats--attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD
personnel, as well as to the loss of highly classified information
critical to national security. The Secretary of Defense established the
Department of Defense Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center
(DITMAC) in 2014 to oversee the mitigation of insider threat risks to
the Department and specific actions on insider threat cases. In
November 2018, the National Insider Threat Task Force published the
Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework.
Congress transferred responsibility for personnel security from the
Office of Personnel Management to DOD at a time when a backlog of
clearance investigations reached near-crisis levels, while mandating
that DOD transform the clearance process through modern data
acquisition and continuous monitoring technologies. Congress also
mandated that DOD significantly improve its abilities to support the
integrity of the acquisition process by determining the beneficial
ownership and responsibility determinations of companies and
individuals with whom the Department contracts by applying similar
continuous monitoring techniques. At the same time, the Department and
Congress expect the intelligence and security components of DOD under
the purview of the USD(I&S) to substantially increase the protection of
the National Security Innovation Base from technology theft and
subversion from foreign adversaries, while ensuring that American
industry and academic institutions continue to be welcoming magnets for
foreign personnel.
Most of these very challenging new and enhanced requirements have
been assigned to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
(DCSA). What is your current assessment of the ability of DCSA to
transform itself to meet these objectives?
Answer. I understand that the Department's intent for DCSA is to
optimize the trustworthiness of the U.S. Government's workforce, the
integrity of its cleared contractor support and the uncompromised
nature of its technologies, services, and supply chains through
vetting, industry engagement, counterintelligence support, and
education. I further understand that DCSA has successfully merged three
organizations, the Defense Security Service, the National Background
Investigations Bureau and the Department of Defense Consolidated
Adjudications Facility. The magnitude of what DCSA has already
accomplished leads me to be optimistic that continued transformation of
the agency to meet current and future critical technology protection
requirements will remain on track.
Question. These DCSA-assigned missions are critical to DOD's
innovation strategy led by the Under Secretaries of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment and Research and Engineering. How would you
ensure that DCSA is focused on meeting the needs of senior DOD
officials outside of the OUSD(I&S)?
Answer. I understand that DCSA's Critical Technology Protection
mission supports the agency's overarching responsibilities to protect
national security by clearing industrial facilities, personnel and
associated information systems and the DCSA serves as the primary
interface between the Federal Government and industry providing daily
oversight, advise and assistance to cleared companies and ultimately
determining the ability of those companies to protect classified
research, development, and delivery on behalf of the DOD and 33 other
Federal agencies. I understand the importance of their mission with A&S
and R&E in protecting the Nation's critical technology. If confirmed, I
will ensure that I&S and the leadership within DCSA are in constant
collaboration with my counterparts within the Department and the
Federal Government.
Question. Specifically, if confirmed, how would you ensure that
DCSA is highly responsive to the needs of the USD(A&S) for vetting DOD
contractors in responsibility determinations?
Answer. The Director, DCSA, operates under the authority,
direction, and control of the USD(I&S). The timeliness of all
background investigations conducted by DCSA will be closely monitored
by USD(I&S) in cooperation with the Security and Suitability Executive
Agents to ensure it meets its performance standards. To date, I
understand that DCSA has greatly reduced the inventory and the amount
of time it takes to conduct background investigations and expect the
upcoming Trusted Workforce 2.0 will result in continued improvement in
the timeliness of those investigations.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of development,
approval, and implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative?
Answer. I understand that the initial steps are already underway,
and that I&S continues to work closely with the Security Executive
Agent (SecEA), Suitability Executive Agent (SuitEA), and the
Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council
(PAC) Performance Management Office (PMO) to complete development of
Trusted Workforce 2.0 policy while working toward full implementation
in the coming months. These efforts have included the enrollment of
nearly all of the DOD cleared workforce in Continuous Evaluation (CE),
which will enable the discontinuation of traditional and costly
periodic reinvestigation practices.
Question. What is your understanding of the remaining challenges in
achieving reciprocity of clearances and access to classified
information across government components and their contractors?
Answer. I understand that while significant strides have been made
in reducing timelines for reciprocal security determinations, there is
always room for further progress, and workforce mobility continues to
be a priority for the Department. I&S continues to work closely with
the SecEA, the SuitEA, and Federal partners to further refine policies
related to reciprocity through Trusted Workforce 2.0, leverage
technology to develop modern solutions for information sharing between
agencies, and to oversee reform efforts as they are implemented.
Question. How, if at all, should the Department change its data
ownership and governance policies to facilitate DITMAC's ability to
access data from, and make correlations across, the intelligence,
counter-intelligence, law enforcement, physical security, personnel
security, human resources, network monitoring, and cybersecurity
organizations across the DOD?
Answer. Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these
issues, I believe it is imperative that DITMAC and the DOD Insider
Threat Enterprise have access to data from across these various
relevant pillars to identify and mitigate potential threats from
insiders, which will be especially critical as we modernize vetting to
continuously review the trustworthiness of the workforce. If confirmed,
I will ensure a continuous effort to eliminate stove-piping and remove
barriers to data sharing, as allowed by law.
Question. How should insider threat architecture and activities
overseen by USD(I&S) be integrated and coordinated with the
Department's cybersecurity architecture and activities, in your view?
Can network activity monitoring for cybersecurity, especially on DOD's
unclassified network, inform and augment insider threat detection? Can
user activity monitoring for insider threat detection inform
cybersecurity?
Answer. I understand I&S maintains a close relationship with the
office of the DOD CIO, which fosters exceptional integration and
collaboration relevant to insider threat, user activity monitoring, and
cybersecurity. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this relationship
continues and seek ways to enhance our efforts to find areas of common
interest, force multiplication, and implement efficiencies across both
mission of insider threat detection and cybersecurity.
Question. In your view, does the OUSD(I&S) have the requisite
authority and technical expertise to guide the development of a
comprehensive capability that uses modern information technology to
integrate all sources of information for identifying insider threats?
Answer. Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these
programs, I believe the Department should maximize authorities and take
a broad approach with respect to threat vector and population in the
detection, prevention, and mitigation of an insider threat. This
includes the technical capability to share data seamlessly between data
sources. If confirmed, I will ensure a comprehensive Counter Insider
Threat strategy and an innovative, directive approach, seeking to
implement cutting edge data management policies and technologies that
capture an ``all source,'' shared picture of potential insider threats.
Question. What is your understanding of the technical and systems
integration challenges involved in improving personnel security
processes and insider threat detection and prevention within DOD?
Answer. While I have not been briefed on the programs or
challenges, I believe that DOD confronts the common challenges faced by
many organizations when developing large scale information technology
systems that ingest, disseminate, and retain large volumes of data with
interfaces across numerous platforms and missions. However, if
confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure the integration challenges are
minimized and mission effectiveness in personnel security and insider
threat is increased.
Question. What is your understanding of the cultural and
organizational resistance to improvements in the personnel security
processes and insider threat detection and prevention in DOD?
Answer. I understand that the Department as a whole can be
resistant to change due to its size, complexity, and culture. Although
I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these issues, I believe any
cultural or organizational resistance can be overcome by an emphasis on
the benefit of increased security, conducted more efficiently and at an
improved cost-to-benefit ratio, due to the improvement of current
processes. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward overcoming the
cultural and organizational resistance to forthcoming adjustments in
these key security domains.
Question. Given that several recent insider threats were from
contractor employees, is it advisable and appropriate, in your view,
for the DITMAC to have access to or be integrated in DOD contractors'
data systems? If so, how might such a program be implemented? If such a
program is not feasible, advisable, or suitable, what might you suggest
as an alternative for mitigating the risk that contractor employees
will engage in insider threat activities?
Answer. Effective sharing of information between the government and
contractors is critical to our ability to collectively mitigate insider
threats. Additionally, this enhances the vetting programs required for
issuing forms of identification, which grant access to Federal
facilities, as described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
12. It is my understanding that the DITMAC serves an essential role as
the over-arching DOD Insider Threat hub, and if confirmed I will
examine more closely how DITMAC can be leveraged as an asset for
additional insider threat mitigation and for strengthening connections
with our industry partners.
Question. In your view, how should DCSA posture the Department to
deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they harm national
security?
Answer. The designation and continuing transformation of DCSA
brings together two national security missions instrumental to
deterring, detecting, and mitigating threats to the Department--the
continuous vetting of personnel and stand-alone programs throughout the
DOD enterprise designed to counter threats posed by insiders. This
convergence enables these separate but complementary missions to more
easily share data, coordinate necessary actions, and streamline
processes and capabilities to deter, detect, and mitigate insider
threats. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DCSA to ensure
this new organization reaches its full potential.
Question. What can the OUSD(I&S) do to ensure that senior leaders
in each DOD Component--not only the intelligence or counterintelligence
communities--are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities,
information from insider threats as a core mission objective?
Answer. A key component to detecting, preventing, and mitigating
insider threats is ensuring management and leadership awareness of the
risks to the Department and their role and responsibility in promoting
awareness in the workforce. This includes ensuring that the
organization's insider threat programs--specifically programs
responsible for determining suitability and fitness, issuing
credentials, and vetting personnel--meet requirements and are resourced
for success in order to enhance and further such programs. It also
means setting standards of conduct for the workforce, fostering
positive workplace climates and cultures, and encouraging reporting of
concerning behaviors and indicators. If confirmed, I will work with
Senior Leaders across the Department to prioritize insider threat
programs, including appropriate funding and resourcing to support this
critical mission.
Question. How should vetting policies and processes applicable to
foreign military students enrolled in DOD training and educational
programs help to mitigate risk to U.S. personnel, facilities, and
equipment?
Answer. Following the terrorist attack at Naval Air Station
Pensacola in December 2019, I understand that DOD took steps to more
closely align vetting and security processes for international military
students (IMS) and their accompanying family members with that of U.S.
military personnel. In parallel with the implementation of these DOD-
established installation security measures, I appreciate that relevant
new U.S. law was enacted on January 1, 2021, as part of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Section 1090 of that
Act was in response to the same terrorist attack. The new law requires
DOD to establish vetting procedures as well as physical security
requirements for non-U.S. individuals accepted for training on DOD
installations in the United States. The implementation of the DOD
requirements, as well as future implementation of the Section 1090
requirements will provide a greater level of security for both U.S.
personnel and our allies and partners training with us on DOD
installations. If confirmed, I will work to advance vetting policies
and processes within the Department to help mitigate risks to U.S.
personnel, facilities, and equipment.
Question. The Department of Defense is pursuing a wide-ranging
strategy to engage with commercial entities engaged in cutting-edge
research and development. The Department recognizes that it needs new
acquisition policies and practices to enable the Department to engage
the private sector with the necessary speed, agility and flexibility.
Two related obstacles are the time and difficulty involved in the
security clearance process and the hurdles that non-traditional
contractors face in getting access to data to test and demonstrate new
information technology and software. The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), for example, concluded that it lacked the
authority to share even its unclassified imagery data with companies
and universities it hoped could develop dramatically improved
exploitation capabilities through machine learning-based artificial
intelligence algorithms.
How might DOD's security apparatus adapt and tailor its
requirements and procedures better to support the Department's
innovation activities, in your view?
Answer. The Department must overcome its reliance on traditional
policies and practices when it comes to identifying and implementing
innovation. Future Public-Private partnerships will be essential to the
Department's innovation aspirations, and authorities can and should be
changed if they inhibit creativity and progress provided those changes
do not create unacceptable risk. Regarding background investigations, I
understand there have been significant improvements in overall
timeliness that should mitigate against delays in getting the right
people on board. With respect to increasing collaboration with non-
traditional contractors and academic researchers, I am aware of a range
of initiatives underway in the Department that could help in this area.
If confirmed, I will work closely with our Acquisition and Research
colleagues in OSD and the Congress to continue to identify improvements
in policy and oversight to ensure the Department is effectively engaged
across the National Security Innovation Base.
Question. Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the
Protecting Critical Technology Task Force in late-2018, reporting to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Task Force was one component of DOD's response to
Intelligence Community warnings that China and Russia are engaged in
campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary information, and other
forms of intellectual property from the United States, through
infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition of knowledge by
foreign students at U.S. universities, and other nefarious means--all
as part of a strategic technology acquisition program.
How would you characterize the threat posed by foreign nations to
the integrity of the National Security Innovation Base? Which threats
do you assess as most concerning, and why?
Answer. Although I have not been briefed on the details, I am aware
from open source reporting that the threat is significant and
concerning. I am aware that foreign nations are continuously probing
our supply chains to identify and exploit weak links, poor or
insufficient security practices, and insider threats. Threats that
erode US technology superiority are of the highest concern given the
negative effects they have on our ability to maintain a military
advantage over future adversaries.
Question. In your view, is the OUSD(I&S) appropriately resourced
and organized to ensure the security of the National Security
Innovation Base, critical technology, and related intellectual property
that are critical to the DOD? What changes, if any, would you
recommend?
Answer. Protecting the National Security Innovation Base requires
tight collaboration across the Intelligence, Security, Acquisition, and
Research enterprises within DOD, as well as equally strong
collaboration with our interagency partners. Although I am not aware of
any pressing resource or organizational challenges within I&S, if
confirmed I will make it a priority to assess the full measure of
support requirements and work closely across the enterprise to ensure
we have the right alignment to counter the threat.
Question. How would you propose to improve the support provided by
the DCSA, the DOD counterintelligence organizations, and the national
Intelligence Community to better protect the National Security
Innovation Base, and enhance the Department's innovation strategy,
especially with respect to technology companies that are non-
traditional DOD contractors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance DOD
counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security capabilities,
leveraging DOD's interagency partners, especially the FBI, to detect,
deter, and disrupt the attempts of China and other adversaries to
penetrate and exploit the National Security Innovation Base and the
Defense Industrial Base it supports.
collection & special programs
Question. In light of the rapidly evolving nature of the national
security environment, to include significant advances by adversarial
nations in the development and fielding of capabilities that could
challenge DOD tradecraft, technologies, methodologies, and processes,
what do you see as the most pressing challenges to DOD's ability to
conduct technical and human intelligence collection activities?
Answer. It is clear the technology environment today has created
pressing challenges in the conduct of traditional collection
activities. Increasingly, adversary development of advanced
technologies, such as computing, artificial intelligence, and secure
communications, as well as the diffusion of sophisticated capabilities
worldwide, complicate the information environment and reduce our
national security advantage. In addition, the volume of commercially
available data on individuals and their activity and the proliferation
of both networked, correlated, and automated systems as well as
algorithms that can exploit the information could pose a challenge to
DOD human intelligence collection activities.
If confirmed, I would work to ensure that sufficient focus and
resources are devoted to Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise
efforts to address these global realities and pursue additional
resources if there are critical technical and human intelligence
collection shortfalls. These challenges are not unique to the
Department and, if confirmed, I would work with our IC partners to
integrate and synchronize DOD and IC efforts and resources for
addressing threats such as Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS),
enabled by rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and
machine learning (ML). Maintaining freedom of action in the physical or
virtual world is paramount to the Department's ability to leverage all
available collection platforms especially because cyberspace is now a
contested domain. Our ability to collect in and through cyberspace must
remain a priority. As with the physical domain, freedom in cyberspace
is challenged by malign actors and the proliferation of AI and ML.
Last, I also believe that recruiting and retaining the right
cultural and technical expertise is a challenge to overcome. Due to
complex collection requirements, and the aggressive global posture of
strategic competitors, with extensive CI capabilities we require a
cadre of collectors that culturally understand, look, speak, and act
like our adversaries wherever they challenge global norms. Diversity in
the IC is a mission imperative--we must create a pathway that attracts
the right individuals while not compromising the professional ethics
that our enterprise is built upon.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to approach these
challenges to ensure that the DOD intelligence enterprise is postured
to operate in an increasingly contested security and intelligence
environment?
Answer. I believe the major challenges confronting the Department
include adapting to and providing timely awareness and insights into a
diverse, complex and ever-changing array of security challenges. If
confirmed, I will lead the continuous review of processes and policies
to support warfighters and decisionmakers in this changing environment.
This may require changes in how DOD personnel train and use tradecraft,
technologies, methodologies, as well as process adjustments for
collection analysis. Aggressive efforts to ensure DOD is leveraging the
best commercial technologies will remain essential, as will our ability
to rapidly field technologies where required.
intelligence oversight
Question. In your view, what is the role of the OUSD(I&S) in
ensuring that sensitive activities across DOD are consistently
conducted in accordance with standards of legality and propriety?
Answer. I understand the USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant
and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense
regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive
activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The USD(I&S)
establishes policy and provides oversight and direction for the
coordination, assessment, reporting, and conduct of Department of
Defense (DOD) intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive
activities, the Defense Cover Program, special communications,
technical collection support to intelligence activities, defense
sensitive support, and the clandestine use of technology. If confirmed,
I would work closely with relevant defense and interagency stakeholders
to ensure DOD sensitive activities are conducted consistent with law
and DOD policy.
Question. In your view, how should the OUSD(I&S) engage with the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board and on what matters?
Answer. Based on my experience, the process in which the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))
notifies the PIOB of Questionable Intelligence Activities and
Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters is effective. If confirmed, I
look forward to fostering a positive relationship with the ATSD(IO) and
PIOB during my tenure, and ensuring that my office provides subject-
matter expertise, as required by DOD policy, to support the ATSD(IO)'s
inspection, investigative, and reporting activities, including
notifications to the PIOB.
information operations
Question. The Russian government conducted, mainly through
cyberspace, an aggressive information operations campaign against the
United States in 2016 and again in 2020, in an attempt to influence
Presidential elections and undermine faith in America's democratic
system and institutions. In 2016, in particular, DOD, and the Federal
Government as a whole, were ill-prepared to detect, defend against, and
respond to these operations.
What are your views on the roles, responsibilities, and
preparedness of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to
deter and defend against strategic information operations?
Answer. I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must
improve its ability to compete in the information environment and to
inform and shape the perceptions of specific audiences in order to gain
or maintain a competitive advantage. My view is that the Department of
Defense should conduct military operations in the information
environment, including clandestine operations as defined in section
1631 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,
across multiple domains to counter foreign malign actors and advance
U.S. national security. Our efforts to deter and defend against foreign
strategic information operations should be prioritized with appropriate
resources and must include more robust coordination and collaboration
across the Department, including the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy acting as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Information
Operations Advisor, and the executive branch. If confirmed, I will work
to ensure this happens.
Question. Section 1631 of the FY2020 NDAA required the designation
of a Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA) to the Secretary
of Defense and a Joint Force Trainer and Joint Force Provider for
Information Operations. The Secretary of Defense designated the USD(P)
as the PIOA but the Committee is unaware that any Joint Force Provider/
Trainer designation has been made. In addition, shortly before he left
office, Acting Secretary of Defense Miller rescinded the PIOA
designation and directed the creation in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense of a Directorate for Strategic Competition, the Director of
which would become PIOA and manage a task force. Acting Secretary
Miller further directed the integration of the USD(I&S)-led Strategic
Competition and Influence Task Force (SCITF) with the Directorate for
Strategic Competition. The Committee has been informed that Acting
Secretary Miller's decisions have been put on hold pending review and
direction by Secretary Austin.
What are your views on the role that the OUSD(I&S) should play in
the development and supervision of the implementation of Information
Operations policy, strategy, and resource sponsorship? Should there be
a separate Task Force on Strategic Competition and Influence in your
view?
Answer. I understand that the Department continues to review its
strategy, policy, and resources for information operations. I believe
the USD(I&S) should play a key role in these efforts as the designated
Principal Staff Assistant for certain information-related capabilities.
If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P), the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD leaders to present the Secretary of
Defense with the best possible organizational approach to address these
issues.
Question. What are your views regarding the designation of an
Information Operations Joint Force Provider and Trainer?
Answer. I have not been briefed on this initiative, but if
confirmed, I look forward to studying it in further detail.
Question. On March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti, then Commander,
U.S. European Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that U.S. efforts to counter Russian influence operations
still lacked ``effective unification across the interagency'' and that
the United States has yet to develop ``a multi-faceted strategy to
counter Russia.''
Do you agree with General Scaparrotti's assessment in this regard?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I agree that we must improve our interagency efforts to
counter foreign malign influence. I understand that the Director of
National Intelligence is establishing a Foreign Malign Influence and
Response Center to improve the unified, whole-of-government effort to
counter foreign malign influence from countries like Russia, China and
Iran. If confirmed, I will ensure the USD(I&S) staff coordinates with
this new Center and collaborates to ensure the Department's activities
are synchronized, as appropriate.
Question. In your view, how might the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprise best contribute to efforts to counter Russian
influence operations?
Answer. I understand the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise (DISE) is shifting its collection and other activities
toward China and Russia. This includes the DISE contributing to efforts
that counter Russian influence operations by developing frameworks that
can be rapidly operationalized against key foreign target audiences to
shape the collection focus and prioritization. If confirmed, I will
continue to place emphasis on strategic competition with Russia and
China and work to ensure DOD efforts are coordinated and integrated
within a whole-of-government approach. I will also work to ensure
appropriate planning, programming, and budgeting for DOD activities
that are required to effectively engage in this mission space, such as
foreign target audience analysis, key influencer identification, and
early indicators & warnings of adversary disinformation.
Question. In January 2020, nine combatant commanders sent a letter
to the Director of National Intelligence requesting better and more
timely support from the intelligence community to publicly illuminate
malign influence and coercive activities by China and Russia.
In your view, how can the Defense Intelligence Enterprise better
support the requirements of the combatant commanders?
Answer. I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must
improve its ability to support combatant commanders by fully
understanding adversarial goals in the information environment; by
engaging with those who are impacted by foreign malign influence and
coercive operations; and by enabling efforts, in alignment with
national and defense priorities, to inform and shape the perceptions of
specific foreign audiences to gain or maintain a competitive U.S.
national security advantage.
Question. In your view, would the illumination of these malign
activities help to dissuade or deter China and Russia?
Answer. I believe DOD efforts to expose Russian and Chinese
disinformation should be prioritized, supported, resourced, and
executed to dissuade or deter their malign activities. If confirmed, I
will make it a priority to attribute, expose, and counter foreign
malign activities that harm U.S. national security interests.
Question. In September 2018, DOD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy.
The Strategy charges DOD to ``defend forward, shape the day-to-day
competition, and prepare for war'' in the cyber domain.
In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Defense
Intelligence and Security Enterprise in operationalizing the ``defend
forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war''
concepts animating the Department's 2018 Cyber Strategy?
Answer. These concepts require the DISE to provide intelligence
support to DOD components at a speed and scale that enables current and
future cyber operations. Therefore, I believe that intelligence support
to cyberspace operations must accomplish the following objectives:
supporting the Joint Force in execution of critical missions in a
contested cyberspace domain; maximizing integrated information sharing
and collaboration with foreign allies and partners, interagency
stakeholders, and the public and private sectors; and normalizing
intelligence support to cyberspace operations using business practices
and processes similar to those used in other domains, while providing
the DISE clarity of roles, missions, and functions in cyberspace
operations.
DISE knowledge of the domestic risk landscape and work with the
private sector informs DOD's defend forward efforts to preempt, defeat,
and deter malicious cyber activity outside the U.S. that is, for
example, targeting our critical infrastructure. DOD's ``defend
forward'' operations also inform and guide efforts at DHS to anticipate
adversary action, understand potential risks to critical
infrastructure, and empower our private sector stakeholders with the
information they need to secure their enterprise.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to remediate
any gap between Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise capacity
and capabilities and the goals of the Cyber Strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Department stakeholders, the
DISE, and IC to enable the continued implementation of the USD(I&S)
Defense Intelligence Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. This strategy
provides overarching direction to the DISE in closing gaps with the
Cyber Strategy as identified in the 2018 Cyber Posture Review.
If confirmed, I would continue efforts to clarify intelligence
roles and responsibilities to include those responsible for developing
foundational military intelligence for cyberspace operations;
incorporate and standardize cyber requirements into intelligence
business processes and human capital management; develop the supporting
infrastructure for optimizing and augmenting intelligence with advanced
technologies, while continuing to support tool development; and
emphasize the development of partnerships with allies and industry to
include increased collaboration with the Defense Industrial Base and
other government stakeholders in the Intelligence Community, law
enforcement, and cybersecurity to improve intelligence support for
whole of government operations.
Question. What role should DOD, and the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprise in particular, including the National Security
Agency and the intelligence elements of United States Cyber Command,
occupy in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
conducted via social media?
Answer. I expect that foreign states will continue to use malign
influence measures in their attempts to sway U.S. voters' preferences
and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United
States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our
democratic process. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DOD and the
DISE are postured to support the whole-of-government effort, using all
elements of national power, to expose and counter clandestinely
disseminated malign influence and information campaigns, propaganda,
and disinformation.
Question. What role should DOD and the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprise in particular, play in anticipating or responding
to cyber attacks on commercial entities, in your view?
Answer. DOD is responsible for threat response to DOD cyber
incidents affecting DOD assets and the DOD Information Network (DODIN).
DOD can also support civil authorities for cyber incidents outside the
DODIN when requested by, for example, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) when such support is approved by the appropriate DOD
official, or directed by the President. Such support would be provided
based upon the needs of the incident, the capabilities required, and
the readiness of available forces. DOD, thru the DISE, actively
characterizes and assesses foreign cybersecurity threats and informs
relevant interagency partners of current and potential malicious cyber
activity. Upon request, the DISE components may provide technical
assistance to other U.S. departments and agencies. Other DOD Components
may provide support to civil authorities in accordance with applicable
law and policy.
Question. What are your views as to whether the ``dual hatting'' of
the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National
Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?
Answer. I understand that the Department, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence, has been studying this question
closely to ensure that any decision concerning the future of the dual-
hat leadership arrangement is fully informed and addresses potential
risks to national security and to the operational effectiveness of U.S.
Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. I am also aware of the
legal requirement for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to make certain certifications before this
arrangement could be terminated. If confirmed, I would ensure that a
review of this question is comprehensive so that decisionmakers are
fully informed about the impact on national security of any change to
the dual-hat leadership arrangement.
Question. Should intelligence support (under the oversight of
OUSD(I&S)) to the overall DOD cybersecurity mission (under the
oversight of the Principal Cyber Advisor) be enhanced, in your view?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that a close and continuing partnership between
the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Principal Cyber Advisor, and
OUSD(I&S) is essential to best align intelligence policies and
capabilities with policy objectives outlined in the DOD Cyber Strategy.
I do not currently have sufficient information to have a perspective
about the adequacy of the support at this time, but if confirmed, I
will ensure OUSD(I&S) remains a valued partner in the DOD cybersecurity
mission.
torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the standards for detainee
treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued
in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program,
dated August 19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18,
2020), and required by Section 1045 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92).
Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing
triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the NDAA for
fiscal year 2016?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the OUSD(I&S) staff to
ensure that the review is thorough and that appropriate recommendations
are provided to the Secretary. My understanding is that the review is
examining the intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques in
the FM based on lessons learned over the past several years.
Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM
2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I am not currently aware of any provisions in the FM that
may need to be revised, but if confirmed I will make my assessment.
Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S. Code, defines grave
breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including
torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.
In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a way that
provides U.S. detainees in the custody of other nations, as well as
foreign detainees in U.S. custody appropriate protections from abusive
treatment?
Answer. Yes. Section 2441 applies to war crimes, including grave
breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, committed by or
against a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a U.S. national. I believe
that we must to continue to hold ourselves to the highest standards for
the humane treatment of detainees, and that we must make clear to our
foreign partners that we expect them to do the same.
imperative for independent intelligence analysis
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that DOD intelligence analysts, including those seconded to offices
that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are
independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of
command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits
a particular policy preference?
Answer. I believe that defense intelligence assessments must remain
unbiased, objective, and free from political interference.
I understand that ensuring the objectivity of defense intelligence
analysis is a critical part of the USD(I&S) oversight role. If
confirmed, I will hold senior leaders of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise accountable to providing fact-based, unbiased analysis,
independent of political factors in accordance with all applicable laws
and professional standards.
the defense intelligence workforce
Question. The USD(I&S) exercises policy oversight of the Defense
Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) to ensure that defense
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components are
structured; manned; trained--including joint intelligence training,
certification, education, and professional development; and equipped to
execute their missions.
Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce properly sized, in your
view? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the size and
capability of the defense civilian intelligence workforce, but I
believe people are the most important part of any organization. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
sufficiently sized to provide timely and reasoned intelligence products
to the warfighters and policymakers.
Question. Does the DOD civilian intelligence workforce have the
appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly
distributed, in your view?
Answer. I do not have sufficient information to provide a
perspective at this time. However, based on my experience in
intelligence, and particularly my time at the National Security Agency,
it is my impression that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
providing quality and timely intelligence to the warfighter and
policymaker. However, as with any organization, missions evolve and
adjustments to the workforce may be needed. If confirmed, I will work
to assess our workforce alignment to national defense priorities and
propose such actions as may be deemed beneficial.
Question. Are the number and quality of candidates referred and
available for consideration and selection by intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security community hiring officials adequate
to sustain and enhance the capabilities of the civilian intelligence
workforce?
Answer. I have not received any information on candidate pools.
However, I believe people are the most important part of any
organization. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we have the most
qualified intelligence and security professionals, and that we
persistently and aggressively seek opportunities to expand candidate
pools to acquire both the skills and diversity necessary to accomplish
DOD intelligence and security missions.
Question. If confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be
most important to you in selecting a candidate for appointment in the
Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)? As a Defense
Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) official?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)
provides the executive leadership for the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprise. I believe the Senior Executives Service Core
Qualifications--Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven,
Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions--provide a sound underlying
basis for executive selections. I believe there should be a premium
placed on a proven ability to collaborate effectively across
boundaries.
Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) employees complement the
executive leadership of DISES by providing the extraordinary
substantive and technical expertise, in combination with the
demonstrated talent for personal leadership, within critical career
fields. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on identifying,
selecting, and developing all personnel to accomplish our mission
objectives, including DISES and DISL.
Question. If confirmed, how would you go about ensuring that DISES
and DISL under your authority are held accountable for both
organizational performance and the rigorous performance management of
their subordinate employees?
Answer. We can accomplish what we can measure. If confirmed, I
intend to use the executive performance management system to maintain
oversight of executive and senior level performance.
Question. Are you satisfied with the subject matter and rigor of
DISES and DISL professional development programs currently available
across DOD? If not, what changes would you make to these programs, if
confirmed?
Answer. I have not yet been briefed on the content and rigor of
these professional development programs within DOD. However, if
confirmed, I intend to assess the effectiveness of these programs. I
believe that a talented and effective leadership cadre is critical to
successfully delivering quality intelligence to the warfighter and
policymaker.
Question. Are you satisfied that the process employed by the
OUSD(I&S) to validate whether a vacant DISES/DISL position should be
rehired, restructured, or eliminated is effective in responding to
current and emergent mission needs of the Defense Intelligence and
Security Enterprise? If confirmed as the USD(I&S), what would be your
role in this process?
Answer. I have not yet been fully briefed on the processes in place
for validation of DISES and DISL positions. However, I recognize that
continuous evaluation of requirements is an essential mechanism to
ensure our leadership positions are appropriately manned and
structured. Every executive wants maximum flexibility to adapt their
organization to support mission success, and if confirmed, I will
ensure oversight processes are in place that support an agile and
adaptive Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise.
Question. The Intelligence Community ``Joint Duty'' program was
established in response to the requirements set forth in the 2004
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that service in more
than one IC element be a condition for promotion to the senior
executive level.
Do members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce participate
in the ``Joint Duty'' program? If so, to what extent does DOD
participate?
Answer. I understand that the DOD civilian intelligence workforce
participates fully in the Joint Duty program. DOD Instruction 1400.36
implements the Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignment (JDA)
Program within the Department and provides that JDA Program
certification is a requirement for DISL and DISES positions. It is also
my understanding that joint duty is encouraged in all defense
intelligence components as a key element of an individual's career
development.
Question. What are your views on the merit and utility of the
``Joint Duty'' program as a professional development experience for
members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce?
Answer. I believe the civilian joint duty program is an essential
element of the professional development experience for members of the
DOD civilian intelligence workforce. It is key that our civilian
intelligence professionals understand the relationships among the
members of the intelligence community and that throughout their careers
they build deep and enduring professional relationships across the
Intelligence Community (IC). Joint experience supports a fully
integrated and collaborative intelligence community. Similar to the way
that the military joint duty requirements from the Goldwater-Nichols
Act has paid dividends for the military services, the civilian joint
duty program is vital to building a more integrated, interoperable, and
effective IC.
Question. What other innovative ideas do you have for the
professional development of non-executive members of the DOD civilian
intelligence workforce?
Answer. At this time, I do not have the requisite information about
current efforts to recommend specific ideas. I believe that continuing
professional development throughout one's career is critical to both
developing the most effective intelligence capabilities and retaining
the expertise behind it. Based on my experience at NSA, I believe that
if we are to maintain our competitive advantage, we will need to build
more effective public-private partnerships, both with academia and
industry. We must find ways to enable seamless mobility between
government and the private sector throughout an employee's career,
particularly in out most demanding technical areas, to ensure we have
the expert, professional, and motivated workforce the 21st century
demands. If confirmed, I will pursue efforts to increase opportunities
for professional development within the workforce that enable the
career mobility necessary to build the diversity and capability of the
workforce.
Question. Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce prepared to
sustain requisite capacity and capability during the impending
workforce ``bath tub''--a descriptor often used to graphically
illustrate the impending potential loss of civilian workforce expertise
due to the retirement of large numbers of ``baby boomers'' and the lack
of experienced people to fill the vacancies?
Answer. I have not been fully briefed on all aspects of the DOD
civilian intelligence workforce hiring and personnel authorities. For
any organization, understanding the dynamics of the workforce through
effective workforce analytics is critical to plan for workforce
requirement changes driven by evolution of mission--we must measure
what we intend to achieve. If confirmed, I would ensure the OUSD(I&S)
is taking necessary efforts to require active succession planning for
the enterprise while aggressively projecting workforce requirements and
that the authorities provided to the Secretary of Defense for the
defense intelligence workforce provide the flexibilities necessary to
address, maintain, and build workforce capability.
Question. Does the USD(I&S) need additional hiring, development,
recruitment, retention, or compensation authorities to enable further
improvements in the capacity and capability of the DCIPS? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. In general, I understand that the authorities under title
10 provide the Department with flexibility to address capacity and
capability requirements of the civilian workforce. However, I am also
aware that challenges continue to exist in DOD's ability to address
competitive requirements for certain key skill areas, such as those in
the cyber and STEM fields. I understand that the Department has limited
pay authorities applicable to the National Security Agency needed to
address a critical compensation shortfall in their cyber workforce. If
confirmed, I will review the authorities available to the Department
and assess whether any additional authorities are required to address
DCIPS challenges.
whistleblower protection
Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or
threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of
the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication.
Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to
Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications
include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside
of the chain of command, including the Congress.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that military
and civilian members of the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement--
including in classified programs--to appropriate authorities within or
outside the chain of command--are protected from reprisal and
retaliation, including from the very highest levels of DOD and the
broader Intelligence Community?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring protections are
afforded to DISE personnel who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross
mismanagement, in a manner consistent with law and regulation.
Additionally, I will ensure that personnel who pursue retaliatory
actions upon protected personnel are addressed appropriately, as
established by law and regulation.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring
consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower
protections across the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carry out my responsibilities to
ensure that the DOD policy implementing such protections is applied
consistently and uniformly in accordance with law.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 ODOD Civilian Employee
Workplace and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17717.7 percent of
female and 5.88 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had
experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone
at work'' in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(I&S)?
Answer. There is no place for this conduct in the Department of
Defense or Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will exercise my
oversight responsibilities for the Defense Intelligence and Security
Enterprise to ensure that reports of sexual harassment or gender
discrimination are dealt with swiftly and in accordance with law and
policy.
space
Question. In the past 2 years the United States has stood up the
U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) and assigned it responsibility for the
operational planning of DOD space missions and activities. As well, the
U.S. Space Force was established as a sixth Military Service, charged
with the Title 10 responsibilities for the space domain.
If confirmed, specifically what would be your approach to enhancing
the interface and synchronization of space-based capabilities resident
in the Intelligence Community with military space organizations?
Answer. The DOD and IC have a long history of collaboration in
fielding and operating space systems, and USD(I&S) plays an important
role in the synchronization of these efforts. Space system development
and operations benefits from collaboration across agency boundaries and
the effectiveness of those systems improves with improved integration.
If confirmed, I will continue to look for opportunities to expand
collaboration between NRO and other military space organizations to
enable sharing of capabilities that are mutually beneficial to DOD and
IC.
Question. How would you recommend deconflicting tasking
requirements in the space warfighting domain across DOD with tasking
requirements from Intelligence Community customers?
Answer. Deconfliction for tasking intelligence collection is
executed through the Functional Manager roles, which consider both DOD
and IC priorities. As with other domains, intelligence support to space
warfighting requires balancing tasking requirements among the numerous
stakeholders served by national collection. There will likely be growth
in the collection and analytical needs of space intelligence and
defense missions and, if confirmed, I will work with the functional
managers on ways to better streamline the tasking process to increase
access, agility, and responsiveness to best satisfy these unique space
intelligence requirements.
Question. NRO recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the U.S. Army for a tactical space layer to provide alternative
Position, Navigation and Timing, as well to provide Army ground
stations with tactical battlefield situational awareness and ISR.
In your view, is the NRO moving to more of a direct support role to
the Services?
Answer. The NRO provides critical intelligence to the Services to
meet tactical to strategic requirements. I understand that NRO is
working diligently to develop advanced space capabilities and resilient
architectures to provide real time support to the warfighter. If
confirmed, I will work with the NRO and the Department to develop end-
to-end space architectures that can meet National, Service and
Combatant Command requirements.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Space Force and
NRO are not duplicating capabilities and responsibilities for the Joint
Force?
Answer. My understanding is that there is strong coordination
between the Space Force and NRO which is reinforced through the mature
DOD Budgeting Programming and requirements process. The USD(I&S)
participates in these requirements through validation, resourcing, and
oversight processes. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) has a
continued active role in these processes.
Question. In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of
command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in
ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and allied space
assets? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The key to an effective ``protect and defend'' strategy is
the seamless execution of space defense actions, synchronized across
DOD and IC platforms under a collaborative unity of effort. The
National Space Defense Center is where this unified defense comes
together. As adversaries increasingly threaten US freedom of action in
space, the DOD and IC must continue to strengthen partnerships to
maintain a competitive advantage. Enhanced space cooperation within the
U.S. Government and with the international community and commercial
sector will provide a durable strategic advantage for the U.S. and our
allies and partners and serve as a force multiplier to protect and
defend against adversary use of space for purposes hostile to U.S.
interests.
I believe that we succeed when we train as we intend to fight.
Wargames, exercises, and planning activities continue to inform the
development of space protect-and-defend tactics, techniques, and
procedures. DOD is committed to an approach to space defense that
balances the need to protect national space assets and continue the
space-based intelligence mission that is critical to win in space and
in support of other domains.
Question. How best could members of the defense intelligence
workforce--both military and civilian--be utilized in support of the
U.S. Space Force?
Answer. The defense intelligence workforce offers a variety of
capabilities to the U.S. Space Force (USSF), including intelligence
support to space, technical and acquisitions expertise, and satellite
operations. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise will continue to align
resources and manpower to support the USSF in response to current and
future space threats and enable effective deterrence and defense. If
confirmed, I will work with the Department and across the IC to ensure
the Space Force has access to intelligence personnel and capabilities.
Question. The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency not
designated as a combat support agency (CSA). Historically, the NRO has
asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not
make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and
controls. In NRO's view, others, principally its mission partners--NSA
and NGA--which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining
the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational
tasking of deployed satellites. Now, however, there exists a class of
operational decisions for which the NRO Director is responsible: in
situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threat of same,
the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions
regarding space control.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the NRO is sufficiently
integrated with and responsive to the U.S. Space Force? To U.S. Space
Command?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen collaboration
between NRO and U.S. Space Force and the US Space Command in both
development and operations. I believe the addition of the Director of
the NRO as a member of the Space Force Acquisition Council will improve
collaboration in space system development. For operations, the National
Space Defense Center (NSDC) is the central point of integration and
unity of effort. Accordingly, I would work with U.S. Space Command to
ensure NSDC has a unified structure that fully integrates DOD and IC
space defense plans and capabilities.
Question. Given that NRO would be required to respond operationally
to active threats to reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a
conflict, should the Department consider designating NRO as a CSA?
Answer. No, I believe the NRO has a unique role which is different
from that of any of the Combat Support Agencies. For operational
decisions regarding space control, the NRO and US Space Command have
established a unified defense concept of operations at the National
Space Defense Center to ensure integrated operations in times of
conflict. In my opinion, this agreement provides the necessary unity of
effort without designating NRO as a Combat Support Agency.
Additionally, the Combat Support Agencies (NGA and NSA) are the
functional managers and develop the collection priorities for the NRO
assets.
Question. How is the NRO synchronizing its acquisition efforts with
the DOD Space enterprise and architecture?
Answer. Space system development benefits from collaboration across
agency boundaries and the effectiveness of those systems improves with
better interagency integration. If confirmed, I will consider how
OUSD(I&S) can expand collaboration opportunities as the Department and
the Intelligence Community (IC) move forward to orchestrate the
development and fielding of a future threat-driven National Defense
Space Architecture.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
beneficial ownership
1. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, foreign adversaries such as Russia
and China are also taking advantage of our open markets to engage in
malign financial influence activities, including seeking to gain
ownership or control over companies contracting with the Department of
Defense (DOD) and other private businesses so as to get access to
sensitive information or technologies. In too many cases, the
Department lacks information on who the beneficial owners of its
contractors or subcontractors are to protect against this threat. That
is, DOD may think it's working with an American company, but it may
actually be a third or fourth level subsidiary of a parent company that
is actually owned or controlled by Russia, China, or another strategic
competitor. Do you share the concern that DOD needs a better
understanding of the true ownership behind its contractors and
subcontractors for our national security?
Mr. Moultrie. I do share your concern and believe that DOD needs a
better understanding and continuing awareness of foreign ownership,
control, or influence of DOD contractors and subcontractors for
purposes of national security. If confirmed, I will make this a top
priority.
2. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, there is a provision enacted as part
of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that
requires DOD to improve the processes and procedures for the assessment
and mitigation of risks related to beneficial ownership/foreign
ownership, control, or influence [FOCI] of contractors and
subcontractors doing business with the Department in order to mitigate
risks from malign foreign influence. If confirmed, you will oversee the
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, which has the lead in
formulating these regulations. Are you of this provision?
Mr. Moultrie. I am aware of Section 847 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment to develop the regulations pursuant to Section 847.
3. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, will you commit to prioritize the
formulation and implementation of these new regulations?
Mr. Moultrie. If confirmed, I will prioritize the development and
implementation of such regulations in coordination with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.
insider threat protections on unclassified networks
4. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, the Department has made great
progress against combatting insider threats over the last 10 years,
notably through comprehensive user activity coverage of the classified
enterprise. Intelligence indicates that more expansive insider threat
protections are needed across the unclassified networks to further
address threats such as data exfiltration, espionage, and harm to self
and others. In addition, an April 9th memo from the Secretary of
Defense on countering extremism in the Department, directs the newly
established Countering Extremism Working Group to strengthen the
Department's insider threat programs and expand user activity
monitoring on both the classified and unclassified systems. How do you
propose furthering this strategy to provide more expansive insider
threat protections through user activity monitoring on the unclassified
network?
Mr. Moultrie. I understand the Department is working a number of
efforts to advance its Counter Insider Threat capabilities and that
user monitoring is one of these efforts. I agree with this approach and
believe it is crucial for the Department to keep pace with the evolving
risk. If confirmed, I will engage with the DOD Chief Information
Officer to develop a user monitoring strategy for all systems
consistent with all applicable law and policy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
coordination with the strategic capabilities office
5. Senator Hirono. Mr. Moultrie the Defense Department's Strategic
Capabilities Office (SCO) is tasked with developing new and innovative
ways to shape and counter emerging threats across all domains,
synchronizing the joint force's efforts through coordination with the
military services, Intelligence Community, and combatant commanders. If
confirmed, how do you plan to synchronize the DOD's intelligence
apparatus with the Strategic Capabilities Office to more quickly
identify emerging threats and shorten the timeline to fielding weapons
systems to counter those threats?
Mr. Moultrie. It is my understanding that the Strategic
Capabilities Office (SCO) participates in the annual review of
Battlespace Awareness capability needs and programs conducted by the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
If confirmed, I will assess whether the SCO's participation in this
review is sufficient to synchronize defense intelligence and the SCO's
efforts to identify and promptly address such threats.
background checks
6. Senator Hirono. Mr. Moultrie, in order to recruit and attract
the talent the Department needs, it has been given special hiring
authorities, yet oftentimes there is a delay in onboarding these
valuable civil servants due to lengthy but important background checks
which has caused a large backlog. While I believe an extensive vetting
process to receive and maintain a security clearance is extremely
important, if confirmed, what guidance do you plan to give to the
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to reduce this backlog?
Mr. Moultrie. I share your concerns regarding the Department's
ability to recruit, hire, and retain quality individuals. After the
transfer of the background investigation mission to the Department, I
understand that DCSA reduced the inventory to fewer than 200,000 cases,
which is a significant improvement from the prior backlog of more than
700,000 cases. If confirmed, I will work in close partnership with the
U.S. Government's Security and Suitability Executive Agents to reform
personnel vetting in order to further improve timeliness and continue
to reduce the backlog.
7. Senator Hirono. Mr. Moultrie, do you think the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency needs additional personnel to
adequately deal with this issue?
Mr. Moultrie. Although I have not been briefed on the personnel
needs of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), I
am a firm believer in embracing technological solutions to reduce
manual burdens for this and other missions across the Department. If
confirmed, I will ensure that DCSA is focused on innovation,
automation, incorporation of emerging technologies, and continual
process improvements before adding personnel.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resourcing
8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, the Armed Services Committee has
heard from combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Africa Command and
U.S. Southern Command, in recent weeks regarding the importance of the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Transfer Fund
which, up until fiscal year 2021, was a congressionally appropriated
fund to support emerging combatant command ISR requirements, often
through the use of contracted ISR solutions. What is your understanding
of the effectiveness of the ISR Transfer Fund in supporting combatant
command ISR requirements in recent years?
Mr. Moultrie. From my conversations with Department leadership, I
understand that the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) Transfer Fund was very effective in addressing urgent Combatant
Command ISR requirements, particularly in the U.S. Central Command area
of operations. Given the insatiable demand for ISR across the Combatant
Commands, I believe it is important that the Department balance
resources to maintain an appropriate force structure of airborne ISR
systems for both the current fight and future contingencies. If
confirmed, I will explore ways the Department can better align ISR to
counter current threats, while developing future capabilities to
address future challenges.
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, what is your view on whether the
Department of Defense should formally request funding for the ISR
Transfer Fund, or a similar funding arrangement, in future fiscal
years?
Mr. Moultrie. I do not have a view at this time. If confirmed, I
would focus my efforts to ensure the annual President's Budget Request
accurately reflects the ISR requirements of the Combatant Commands.
10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, what steps will you take, if
confirmed, to address unfunded ISR requirements in ``economy of force''
theaters like U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command?
Mr. Moultrie. As I stated previously, the Combatant Command (CCMD)
demand for ISR, particularly airborne ISR, is much greater than the
Department's capacity. If confirmed, I will work to understand the
unfunded ISR requirements and seek to align those with DOD resources
and emerging capabilities. In cooperation with the Joint Staff, I would
use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs process to address urgent ISR
shortfalls assessed by the CCMDs to pose a risk to life or success of
ongoing operations.
leveraging u.s. commercial space isr capabilities
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, if confirmed, how would you seek
to leverage U.S. commercial space intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities, such as U.S. commercial satellite mapping,
to support Department of Defense requirements?
Mr. Moultrie. The U.S. commercial remote sensing industry
contributes significantly to satisfy Department of Defense
requirements. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department
continues to leverage purchases from that industry as a robust,
diverse, and affordable means of obtaining data for mapping, charting,
and geodesy.
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, what, in your view, are the
primary challenges to promoting and sustaining a healthy U.S.
commercial space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
industrial base and, if confirmed, how would you seek to address these
challenges?
Mr. Moultrie. Growth of the U.S. commercial remote sensing market
is dominated by the market forces of consumer demand. In my view,
industry is up to the challenge of continued innovation and expanded
analytical services needed to increase value for their customers. The
U.S. Government is an important customer and has the opportunity to
influence industry not only by the product it buys, but by the demand
signal it sends. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of
National Intelligence to maintain a steady demand signal for diverse
and innovative products and services to answer today's hard
intelligence problems.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
assuring the availability and competition for commercial remote sensing
capabilities
13. Senator Wicker. Mr. Moultrie, the recent and significant
expansion of commercially available geospatial-intelligence (GEOINT)
capabilities provides the Government significant opportunity for
innovative solutions to mission requirements, as well as cost savings
through competitive pricing and developmental cost avoidance. Section
1612 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of National Intelligence to ``leverage, to the extent
practicable, the capabilities of the industry of the United States,
including through the use of domestic commercial geospatial-
intelligence services and acquisition of domestic commercial satellite
imagery.''
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) appears to be interpreting
the intent of section 1612 in a manner that far exceeds the intent of
Congress and will restrict competition by U.S. based competitors rather
than increase it as intended by the statute. This interpretation has
resulted in a very strict policy that labels U.S. companies with
ownership from our most trusted allies as ``foreign'' and ineligible
for NRO contracts. This policy will limit access to competitive, and
sometimes best commercial capabilities, and limit U.S. companies from
investing and growing in the United States.
As important, NRO's policy would incorrectly exclude U.S. companies
with Special Security Agreement (SSA) or Proxy status (as governed by
the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency) who are otherwise
trusted to work on highly sensitive U.S. matters for the benefit of the
warfighters, the U.S. defense industrial base, and the U.S. taxpayers.
This action risks our access to competitive and innovative alternatives
to meet missions across the Government, and will impact some of the
U.S. Government's most important and trusted suppliers.
Will you commit to working with the Director of National
Intelligence to conduct a thorough review of the National
Reconnaissance Office policy to exclude fully cleared U.S. SSA and
Proxy companies from participating in commercial remote sensing
contracts and report back your views on this action?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Director of National Intelligence to examine this issue very closely.
It is important to leverage domestic capabilities and safeguard
sensitive information from our adversaries. I am confident we can
strike an appropriate balance and work together on a solution.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
energy independence and national security
14. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, in 2019, the United States
became a net energy exporter for the first time since 1952. Do you
believe being a net exporter of energy helps bolster our country's
national security?
Mr. Moultrie. It is my belief that if the United States can lower
its dependence on foreign imports in almost any area, particularly
those related to national security, then we are a more secure Nation.
15. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe being a net
importer of energy reduces our country's national security?
Mr. Moultrie. The U.S. Government should continue to reduce
dependence on foreign sources and pursue diversified energy sources as
a vital element of our national security and economic interests. It is
in our national security interest to pursue long-term, sustainable
energy solutions.
16. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe the United
States exporting energy to Europe and Asia--thereby reducing our allies
and partners reliance on countries like Russia and Iran--helps or hurts
regional security?
Mr. Moultrie. Being able to export energy to our foreign allies and
partners helps regional security in those areas and bolsters our own
national security interests. Our being an energy exporting nation
provides our foreign partners with options and increases leverage in
dealing with our global competitors.
defense intelligence resources and talent
17. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, given the Department's shift in
priorities from a focus on counterterrorism to one on great power
competition--as laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy--do you
believe the defense intelligence community is appropriately shifting
resources to this new focus area?
Mr. Moultrie. It is my understanding that the Department has
realigned its resources in support of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy. As the Department makes further adjustments to its
warfighting capabilities, I expect these adjustments will impose
additional requirements on intelligence and security that will need to
be addressed.
18. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, what concerns--if any--do you
have regarding the talent available that is knowledgeable and maintains
expertise on the Indo-Pacific region? If you do have concerns, please
detail them and how you plan to address them in your position as an
Under Secretary.
Mr. Moultrie. My understanding is that the Department has worked
closely with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to ensure it has the requisite
expertise to meet the Command's requirements. I appreciate, however,
expertise on the Indo-Pacific region is required throughout the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more
about the potential challenges for such expertise and plan to visit the
Indo-Pacific area of operations at my earliest opportunity.
national security agency alaska
19. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, my State hosts the National
Security Agency Alaska which is a critical Intelligence Community
asset. It provides threat warning support to U.S. and Coalition forces,
the Intelligence Community, and combatant commanders. Given its
geostrategic location, do you see value in expanding capacity or
capability offered by this vital entity? If so, please detail what
capacity or capability you see most value in adding.
Mr. Moultrie. While serving on Active Duty and as a civilian at the
National Security Agency (NSA), I became familiar with the NSA
capabilities in Alaska. I anticipate that with the focus in the 2018
National Defense Strategy (NDS) on strategic competition with China and
Russia, our defense intelligence posture in Alaska will be increasingly
important to support the Department's efforts to secure the national
security objectives in the NDS. If confirmed, I look forward to
assessing NSA Alaska's continuing role in securing the Department's
national security interests.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
chinese intelligence threat
20. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, do you view the challenges
associated with countering Beijing as a driver for innovative
intelligence capabilities and tradecraft, or do you regard such efforts
as too threat specific?
Mr. Moultrie. China is a pacing threat for the Department because
of its innovative and advancing technology and strategy to pursue its
regional and global interests. Countering China is a driver for
innovative intelligence capabilities and tradecraft. However, it cannot
be the only driver for advancing our intelligence capabilities and
tradecraft because we must seek to preserve our competitive edge
against all adversaries. If confirmed, I will guide the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise in evaluating and assessing innovative
technologies, appropriately investing in our intelligence workforce,
and ensuring that we maintain our information and military advantage
against all adversaries and in all domains.
emerging technologies
21. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, across the myriad rapidly
advancing technologies, where would you prioritize investment to
improve DOD driven collection, analysis, and exploitation of
intelligence?
Mr. Moultrie. My understanding is that the Department is developing
new Joint Warfighting Concepts to counter the pacing threats. DOD
collection, analysis, and exploitation efforts need to inform and
enable these future concepts. I believe that, like the Joint Force,
many organizations within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE)
will also require modernization. If confirmed, I will make it a
priority to evaluate the capability and capacity of the DIE to support
the Joint Force and the Nation, and commit to keeping Congress
appraised of the necessary investments for DOD collection, analysis,
and exploitation capabilities.
22. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, Project Maven, one of DOD's
success stories in developing critical Artificial Intelligence's (AI)
tools is expected to transition to the National Geospatial--
Intelligence Agency by fiscal year 2023. Can you walk us through your
strategy to execute a smooth transition so that Maven's continued
success is ensured?
Mr. Moultrie. I understand that the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) and Project Maven have been working closely
together since Project Maven was established. If confirmed, I would
seek to ensure an appropriate transition by evaluating the current
scope of MAVEN operations and their alignment with NGA's DOD and IC
Missions, and develop a phased, conditions-based approach to
transferring Project Maven's geospatial lines of effort to NGA.
23. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, the cooperative relationship
between DOD and the Intelligence Community is a critical component to
our national security. What are some of your priorities to further
develop the Department's strategy to leverage AI and machine learning
for the intelligence mission sets?
Mr. Moultrie. I believe that data is the key to developing superior
AI capabilities. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that DOD and
Intelligence Community (IC) efforts are closely coordinated to focus
attention on building and securing our data and consolidating
artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) programs to mature
from many AI/ML prototypes to industrial-scale processing. Furthermore,
I believe DOD and the IC should work together to incorporate AI on the
widest possible array of intelligence data streams so that we can
optimize and expeditiously realize AI's full potential.
intelligence oversight
24. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, what are your thoughts on
enterprise-wide management of counterintelligence (CI)?
Mr. Moultrie. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
serves as the Defense Counterintelligence (CI) Manager, and I
understand he has prioritized the strengthening of enterprise-wide
management of DOD CI. I believe there is value in having a common
enterprise vision to guide Defense CI capacity and capability,
resources, and operational decisions. If confirmed, I look forward to
engaging with the Director, DIA, to ensure the effectiveness of the CI
enterprise.
25. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, should all training standards,
certifications, and scoping for CI be standardized across DOD?
Mr. Moultrie. I understand that DOD policy identifies baseline
standards and training coordination requirements and requires joint
certification for all training that produces certified CI personnel. I
further understand that DOD Components with CI elements participate in
setting the standards, training, and certification of CI professionals.
In addition, I believe that the Military Department CI Organizations
have unique missions and authorities and provide tailored basic CI
training.
afghanistan
26. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe that the
scheduled withdrawal from Afghanistan will diminish our ability to
collect intelligence and act on threats emanating from Afghanistan and
the region?
Mr. Moultrie. Although I have not been briefed on the intelligence
collection posture, I believe that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from
Afghanistan will impact our ability to collect intelligence and respond
to threats emanating from Afghanistan, requiring the United States to
posture for an ``over the horizon'' collection strategy in coordination
with our allies and partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
chinese counter-intelligence concerns
27. Senator Hawley. Mr. Moultrie, many of the Department's
suppliers maintain a presence in China and may employ members of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). When I asked Secretary Lloyd Austin
about this, he wrote that DOD has ``an interest in knowing whether
[its] suppliers have employees who are members of the Chinese Communist
Party.'' Do you agree with Secretary Austin that the Department of
Defense should know if its suppliers employ members of the CCP?
Mr. Moultrie. I agree with Secretary Austin. The Department does
have an interest in knowing whether its suppliers are under the
influence of the People's Republic of China. If confirmed, I will work
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
address these concerns.
28. Senator Hawley. Mr. Moultrie, from a counterintelligence
standpoint, why is it important for the Department to know if its
suppliers employ members of the CCP?
Mr. Moultrie. China's intelligence services employ traditional and
non-traditional collection methods specifically and aggressively
targeting U.S. technologies and the Defense Industrial Base. Access by
China to ``cutting edge'' U.S. technologies and other sensitive
information is of grave concern because it helps China advance its
strategic goals for comprehensive national power and military
modernization. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment to protect warfighting technologies and
their enabling supply chains.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Ronald S.
Moultrie in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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[The nomination of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on May 20, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 28, 2021.]
[all]