

THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL  
McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER] AND THE  
HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO  
BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

\_\_\_\_\_  
MAY 11, 2021  
\_\_\_\_\_

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MICHAEL McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER]  
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SECURITY**

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**TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2021**

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED**

Chairman REED. Let me call the hearing to order. Good morning. The Committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of Mr. Michael McCord to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and Mr. Ronald Moultrie, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. On behalf of the Committee I want to thank you both for your willingness to return to public service.

Mr. McCord, I would like to welcome your wife, Ms. Donna Miller Rostant, who is with us this morning, and I thank Secretary Chuck Hagel for joining us today to introduce Mr. McCord.

Mr. Moultrie, I welcome your wife, Mrs. Darlene Moultrie, who is also here, and I want to send out a very special recognition to your mother, Ethel Moultrie, who is celebrating her 91st birthday today, and we hope she is watching her son and telling everyone around how smart he is. Thank you.

Let me also thank Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence and former Director of the National Security Agency who will introduce Mr. Moultrie via Webex.

I would also like to thank Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger, representative of Maryland's Second District, who I know wanted to introduce Mr. Moultrie today but is unable to do so. Representa-

tive Ruppertsberger has instead sent us a letter of support which will be entered in the record. Without objection, so ordered.  
[The letter follows:]

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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
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May 7, 2021

The Honorable Jack Reed  
Chairman  
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
228 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable James Inhofe  
Ranking Member  
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
228 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Reed and Ranking Member Inhofe:

I am writing to endorse the confirmation of Mr. Ronald Moultrie as the next Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security.

As you well know, leveraging technology and modernization are key pillars of our national defense strategy and cyberspace is now a contested domain, requiring leaders within our Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) to be both visionary and technically adept. They must be able to speak truth to power, while also ensuring policymakers are provided the very best intelligence products possible. Not only is he an expert in the niche nexus of technology and defense intelligence, with proven experience leading large organizations, but I know Ron to be a man of high character and integrity with broad respect across industry and government.

I have known Ron for over a decade since he was the Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate at the National Security Agency (NSA), located in my congressional district in Maryland. In that position and among his many other senior intelligence community roles at NSA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency and in the U.S. Air Force, Ron led large civilian and military workforces and successfully guided missions critical to the success of our national security priorities. Ron also recently served as a senior advisor to the Secretary of the Navy.

During my time as Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (2011-2015) I had the opportunity to travel with Mr. Moultrie on several occasions and witnessed the respect afforded to him by international leaders and his dedication to our nation firsthand. He truly honors and respects the DoD and IC workforces because he has been part of those communities his entire life – in fact, Ron's family is a model of service to our country. His father served in the Army for 30 years and was awarded the Purple Heart during the Korean War and was decorated later for his service in Vietnam. His mother is a Gold Star sibling with her brother killed in action during the Vietnam War while serving in the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division.

Ron's leadership experience is exemplary and his numerous honors were detailed in an Extension of Remarks I entered into the Congressional Record during the 114<sup>th</sup> Congress on the occasion of Ron's retirement from NSA.

"Throughout Mr. Moultrie's career he has been awarded numerous honors including, the USAF Meritorious Service Medal (1983), Defense Meritorious Service Medal (1986), NSA Meritorious Civilian Service Award (1996, 1998), NSA Exceptional Civilian Service Award (2000, 2001, 2015), NSA Director's Distinguished Service Medal (2004), National Intelligence Superior Service Medal (2008), Presidential Rank Award: Meritorious Executive (2011), and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (2014)."<sup>1</sup>

It does not surprise me that, since then, he was awarded two Department of the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Awards – one in February 2019 and another in March of last year – for his role as a "key principal on the Secretary of the Navy's Cybersecurity Readiness Review [which] subsequently led [to] the creation of the Department's digital roadmap focused on cybersecurity, data, and emerging technologies such as AI, 5G, and Quantum computing."<sup>2</sup>

I strongly encourage Mr. Moultrie's confirmation and I am confident he will be an asset not only to the Department of Defense but to the broader intelligence community – and his renewed government service undoubtedly an asset to our country's national security. I appreciate your attention to this matter. Should you require any further information please contact Elliott Phaup, on my staff, at [Elliott.Phaup@mail.house.gov](mailto:Elliott.Phaup@mail.house.gov) or (202) 225-3061.

Sincerely,



C.A. Dutch Ruppertsberger  
Member of Congress

<sup>1</sup> Ruppertsberger, C.A. Dutch. 2015. Extension of Remarks Honoring Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie. *Congressional Record – Proceedings and Debates of the 114<sup>th</sup> Congress*. Accessed via <https://www.congress.gov/114/crec/2015/10/29/CREC-2015-10-29-pt1-PgE1564-4.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> The White House. 2021. President Biden Announces his Intent to Nominate Key Members for the Department of Defense. *White House Briefing Room – Statements and Releases*. Accessed via <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/02/president-biden-announces-his-intent-to-nominate-key-members-for-the-department-of-defense/>.

Chairman REED. I am sure both of you have additional family members who would have liked to have been here this morning, but because of the pandemic restrictions they are watching from home, so we thank them for their continued support of your service to our Nation.

Mr. McCord is a highly regarded national security and defense policy expert with extensive government experience. He is well known to this committee, having served as a professional staff member for more than 20 years, and is well prepared for the Comptroller job, having been nominated and confirmed to that position under President Obama. The Comptroller is instrumental in preparing and executing the Department's budget, ensuring the resources that Congress provides are allocated to the troops efficiently and effectively. Additionally, the Comptroller is a key player in the Department's efforts to achieve a clean audit and to modernize its financial management system. Mr. McCord is the right person to have in this role at this time.

While Mr. McCord has not played a role in developing the budget for this year, it should be pointed out that this year is an inflection point in how the Department prioritizes the resources it needs to accomplish its missions, given that the fiscal year 2022 budget will not be constrained by the Budget Control Act. While we await the release of the detailed budget request, we know the recommended top line for the Department of Defense (DOD) is \$715 billion. Some of my colleagues feel that that number should be increased, while others will argue for reduction. The key, however, is what we buy with that top line, and this committee will do a thorough analysis of the request when we receive it.

Mr. McCord, as we discussed during our office call, there are also a number of functions within the Department that are in need of transformation. The PPBE [Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution] process, was first implemented in the McNamara era in the 1960s and may not be conducive to many of DOD's requirements to adopt new technology in a rapid, agile manner to compete with China and Russia. Further, the Department continues to struggle to achieve a clean audit, something that has been required at law for over 30 years. I hope you will share your views on the role of the Comptroller regarding these challenges at this important moment for the Department of Defense.

Mr. Moultrie has had a long and distinguished career in intelligence with extensive service at the NSA [National Security Agency] as well as the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], ODNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence], and DOD. Since retiring as NSA's Director of Operations, he has had a successful career in the private sector while remaining active in public policy. If confirmed, Mr. Moultrie, you will serve as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and will be dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The scope and complexity of the global threat environments we face are unprecedented. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and many other state and non State actors pose increasingly serious challenges, especially in their hybrid warfare and gray zone tactics. It is more important than ever that this committee and the Depart-

ment of Defense ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is appropriately equipped to integrate and prioritize intelligence resources and capabilities.

In particular, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), which you will supervise, has had a slew of new and challenging missions assigned to it that are critical for DOD, and is growing significantly in size and responsibility. Many of the functions that DCSA is now required to perform support other parts of the government and customers in DOD and beyond USD(I&S). It is important for DCSA to have a customer-focused culture, and your leadership will be necessary to achieve that.

Further DOD's new all-domain/cross-domain warfighting concepts require that the defense intelligence agencies, chiefly the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office], NGA [The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], and NSA, transform themselves to provide proliferated satellites and rapid and agile tasking and processing to support the military. If confirmed, it will be your responsibility to ensure that these agencies are responsive to these emerging military requirements. Mr. Moultrie, I welcome your thoughts about how you intend to foster this transformation and ensure that the military has timely and accurate intelligence to defend the Nation in the midst of a competitive security environment.

We face many challenges that will require strong leadership and the ability to make tough decisions. I thank the nominees again for your willingness to serve our Nation. I look forward to your testimony.

Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE**

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for being with us and for their willingness to serve. Our Nation's top military and intelligence leaders have told this committee in recent months that the world is the most dangerous place that we have had to experience.

In 2018, the National Defense Strategy provides a roadmap, and here it is. This is one, and really, we have one of our authors here as a witness, as a nominee, in Michael McCord, and so it is quite a complimentary thing that you are one who has put this thing together.

VOICE. Is there a place to——

Senator INHOFE. What was that all about?

Chairman REED. That was a message from above.

[Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. Or below.

[Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. All right. We have quite a few challenges that you will oversee, and we understand that you are certainly the two that are the best qualified around that we could hope to have in these positions.

Insufficient and uncertain funding has hamstrung our military for years. We must do a better job of resourcing this strategy, improve our ability to quickly make decisions and to invest in the right capabilities to keep up with China and Russia. We must also continue the momentum on the Pentagon's financial audit and im-

prove the transparency of the budget in Congress and the American people.

In the area of intelligence, we are still losing the information war. Just recently, we heard about all of the combatant commanders complaining that they cannot get declassified intelligence to fight back against our adversaries' lies.

Just last week, I published an article about how much China and Russia truly spend on defense, which is much more than many people have been led to believe. We hear over and over again the notion that somehow we are spending more than China and Russia put together, and they do not realize that the most expensive thing that we do is taking care of our troops, taking care of the housing. Those countries, they do not do that, and we all understand that.

We must do a better job of understanding our adversaries and articulating the threats they pose to the American public. We have no time to lose. Our military advantages are going or eroding in key areas. We still do not have a handle on how to prevent the Chinese from stealing our technology for military and commercial purposes. The Nation and the Department of Defense must tackle these problems head-on if we hope to preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do us harm.

If you would have the honor, after your confirmation, to support the team of Americans who represent everything that is noble and best in our Nation. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, space guardians, civilian servants, and our military families, do everything we ask of them, and more. The Department requires strong civilian leadership that I believe the two of you will be able to provide, and so we are looking forward to that.

Also, nice to see Chuck Hagel back again. It has been quite a long period of time, and I want to welcome you back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and now let me recognize, via Webex, Vice Admiral McConnell, for his introduction of Mr. Moultrie. Admiral?

Admiral MCCONNELL. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to introduce Mr. Ron Moultrie, the President's nominee to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

Ron Moultrie is a highly regarded [inaudible] who has successfully served in many of the Nation's most demanding intelligence community positions. A man of the highest moral character, keen intellect, and strategic vision, Mr. Moultrie has demonstrated leadership and management skills to address and resolve the most challenging issues. [Inaudible] first as the Director of the National Security Agency [inaudible] and later as the Director of National Intelligence.

I also know his wonderful wife of 33 years, Darlene. Both served in the United States Air Force and are service veterans who served the Nation well.

Mr. Moultrie is a former [inaudible] who applied those skills in the Air Force and at NSA as we engaged in [inaudible]. Moving to NSA as a civilian as a signals intelligence analyst, he quickly

moved through the ranks, and based on his drive, energy, and exceptional performance, he advanced.

NSA is where we met when I was serving as the agency's director in the early 1990s. When I needed help to address some of the Nation's most sensitive operations and change requirements, on the advice of the agency's most senior leadership I chose Mr. Moultrie for the position of Senior Executive Assistant. In that role, he served as my confidante and my alter ego, as we adjusted from the Cold War focus to address the new challenges facing the Nation, not only emerging threats in signals intelligence but also emerging, new cybersecurity threats due to the widespread embrace of emerging network technologies, not only by the U.S. Government but by the private sector. Any time a large organization undergoes significant change there is always confusion and resistance. Ron Moultrie helped me navigate these changes, because of his understanding of the technology, the workforce, and the changing mission needs.

Being confident in his own abilities and a natural coalition builder, Mr. Moultrie was asked to serve as a member of the CIA's Senior Intelligence Service to foster closer collaboration between two of the Nation's premier intelligence organizations. This is where we met to work again together. When President Bush asked me to serve as the Nation's second Director of National Intelligence, relieving Ambassador Negroponte, I asked Mr. Moultrie to again serve as my Senior Executive Assistant.

As a member of the DNI's leadership team, Mr. Moultrie helped me manage the intelligence community's new Executive Committee and the new Deputy Executive Committee that we formed to address collaboration and coordination issues that existed prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Nation. He also helped update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act due to information technology changes, revised for the President's signature Executive Order 12333, launched the National Comprehensive Community Initiative, and create the Joint Duty Intelligence Program.

On returning to NSA after his service with ODNI, Mr. Moultrie rose to become the agency's third-ranking official, serving as the Director of Signals Intelligence Operations. The first minority member to serve in this challenging position, Mr. Moultrie helped the agency enjoy some of its greatest successes in the global war on terrorism and other enduring intelligence challenges.

After retirement from NSA, in addition to his service in the private sector, Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Spencer, seeking a national security official with a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity and technology, asked Mr. Moultrie to chair the review of the Navy's information management structure. The review, completed in July of 2019, led to the immediate establishment of a single, accountable CIO [Chief Information Officer] to bolster the department's warfighting and cybersecurity capabilities and to provide the Navy and Marine Corps a decisive information advantage in intelligence technology, big data, and artificial intelligence.

Without hesitation, I strongly recommend favorable consideration for Mr. Ronald Moultrie to become the Nation's Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. It is my distinct honor to introduce him to this distinguished committee. Thank you so much.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Admiral. Now let me recognize former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Chuck Hagel. Secretary Hagel.

Mr. HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other Members of the Committee. First, before I introduce Mike McCord, I want to recognize Mr. Moultrie and congratulate him for his service and for the responsibilities that he is soon to take up, pending confirmation of this committee. So, to Mr. Moultrie, thank you and congratulations.

I appreciate the opportunity to introduce Michael J. McCord in support of the President's nomination of him to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). You all have records of Mike McCord's bio and impressive comprehensive work record of 36 years' experience in national security and finance, so I am not going to repeat what you already have. Instead, I am going to tell you a little bit about how I know Mike McCord, my own experience with him, and knowledge of him.

I have known and worked with Mike McCord since 1997, during my 12 years in the Senate, in my 4 years as co-chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. When I was confirmed as Secretary of Defense in February 2013, Mike McCord became an important part of my team at DOD. He was the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, working with the Under Secretary (Comptroller), Bob Hale.

The first few days I was in the Secretary's office we were presented with sequestration. Many of you were here at that time and recall the disastrous results of sequestrations for DOD. We had to find an additional unplanned \$30 billion in cuts, on top of the \$45 billion in cuts that had already been budgeted for under the 2011 Budget Control Act. I looked to Mike McCord and Under Secretary Hale for guidance and leadership in how we handle this massive unbudgeted cut. It was a difficult time for every part of the defense enterprise. Mike's leadership, experience, and ability were critical in helping DOD get through this time. I relied on and expected a great deal from Mike McCord.

In the fall of 2013, and again some of you will remember, we were confronted with one of the longest government shutdowns in history, furloughing people, most people not coming to work for weeks, and all of the waste and threats to national security that went along with this unproductive insanity of long government shutdowns. Again, Deputy Comptroller McCord was called on for his help in dealing with the long shutdown. Again, I relied on Mike for advice and direction. This was also at the time Comptroller Hale had informed me that he wished to retire after a long, distinguished career. So there was uncertainty in the Comptroller's Office and within the Pentagon as to who would replace Hale. Mike handled it professionally, with clear, competent direction and judgment.

In late 2013, I recommend Mike McCord to replace Bob Hale as Comptroller and Under Secretary of Defense to President Obama, and in January 2014, Mike was nominated by President Obama for the position, and he was confirmed by this committee and the Senate in June 2014. We continued to work very closely together until I left the Pentagon in February 2015.



Some of the projects Mike led and worked tirelessly on were the creation of the new European Reassurance Initiative. Many of you will remember that initiative in the summer of 2014, in response to Russia's invasion of Eastern Ukraine and occupation of Crimea. The reprogramming of \$1 billion in 2014 to underwrite the Ebola crisis, where DOD managed and took responsibility for the Ebola logistics in West Africa, to support the whole of U.S. Government effort. How quickly this was accomplished, with minimal delays, was a clear example of how the government congressional Oversight Committees trusted Mike. As we all know, trust is the coin of the realm, in all things.

In my years in the private sector and in public service, I have seen and experienced the qualities that make a person successful. They do not change. They are not complicated. It is not just how smart you are or how well- educated you are.

Everyone on this committee recognizes the qualities—character, first, integrity, courage, and judgment. If any of these are missing, the journey will not end well. If the person does not possess a sense of humanity and decency and dignity, they are not fit for leadership. Michael J. McCord possesses all these indispensable requisites and the successful experience to warrant his confirmation.

I am very proud to appear here today before this committee to introduce Mike McCord. Thank you for allowing me to present my introduction of Mike McCord and for your serious consideration of President Biden's nomination of him to be Under Secretary of Defense and Comptroller.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement and also for your distinguished service, both in the United States Senate and in the Department of Defense. Thank you very much.

Now let me recognize Mr. McCord for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER]**

Mr. McCORD. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning as you consider my nomination for the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense.

I want to express my gratitude to President Biden for nominating me to this important position, and to Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks for their confidence in me. If I am confirmed, it would be an honor to serve as part of their team. I also want to thank former Senator and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for introducing me. His support is especially meaningful as I seek to become the first person to be confirmed for this position twice, as he selected and recommended me, as he described, to President Obama when I was confirmed for this role in 2014.

It is also a pleasure to be back before this committee where I served on the staff for 21 years. I cherished the opportunity to had to learn from the outstanding Senators who have led this committee during my career here: former Chairmen Nunn, Thurmond,

Warner, and Levin. I send my best wishes, as I know you do, to former Senator and Chairman Carl Levin, my boss for 11 years, as he battles lung cancer today.

I also had the privilege of working on this committee with three Senators who went on to chair it after I left the staff for the Department: the late Senator John McCain, Senator Inhofe, and Chairman Reed. Your leadership follows in the great bipartisan tradition of this committee, and it is a key reason it continues to be so highly respected.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family, especially my wife, Donna. I could not undertake this mission without her love and full support. She is the heart and soul of everything we are able to do as a team, for our family, our community, and our country. My mother, my daughters, and my brother and sister have also been with me throughout my career in public service. Although my family and my wife's family cannot join us here today due to the pandemic, they are with me in spirit and I appreciate their support along this journey.

If confirmed, I look forward to returning to the Department of Defense to serve our Nation, promote our national security, and support our servicemembers. The sense of mission among the civilian and military personnel in the Department is a remarkable thing to be part of.

Should I be confirmed, my top priority will be to help the Secretary and other senior leaders build the best defense budget we can to meet our strategic needs and carefully steward the resources Congress provides us.

Second, I would prioritize a strong relationship with the congressional defense committees, and ensure the Department provides the information you need on that budget. The stronger the partnership between the Department and the Congress, the stronger our national security will be.

Third, I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department gives full effort and attention to the financial audit so that we can build on and accelerate the progress that has been made toward the goal of a clean opinion.

Fourth, working with other senior leaders, I would work to re-engineer the Department's management reforms in light of the disestablishment of the Chief Management Officer position. I look forward to the opportunity, should I be confirmed, to focus on making DOD more effective.

If confirmed, I will be a full partner with Members of this Committee in ensuring that we carry out our respective responsibilities for our national security.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions and I ask that my complete statement be included in the record.

Chairman REED. Without objection, the statement will be included in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCord follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MCCORD

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning in connection with my

nomination for the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense (DOD).

I want to express my gratitude to President Biden for nominating me to this important position, and to Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks for their confidence in me. If I am confirmed, it would be an honor to serve as part of their team. I also want to thank former Senator and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for introducing me today. His support is especially meaningful as I seek to become the first person to be confirmed for this position for a second time, as he selected and recommended me to President Obama when I was previously nominated and confirmed to hold this position in 2014.

It is an honor and a pleasure to be here in front of this committee where I served on the staff for 21 years and had the opportunity to learn from the examples set by the outstanding senators who have led this committee during my career. As a staff member here, I served under Chairmen Nunn, Thurmond, Warner and Levin. I want take this opportunity to send my best wishes to former Senator and Chairman Carl Levin, my boss for 11 years, in his battle with lung cancer.

In addition, I had the privilege of working with three Senators who went on to chair this committee after I left the staff for DOD: the late Senator John McCain, Senator Inhofe and Chairman Reed. Your leadership follows in the great bipartisan tradition of this Committee, and it is a key reason it continues to be so highly respected.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family, especially my wife, Donna Miller Rostant. I could not undertake this service without her love and full support. My mother, my daughters, and my brother and sister have been with me throughout my career in public service. Although my family and my wife's family cannot join us here today due to the health restrictions necessitated by the pandemic, they are with Donna and me in spirit and I thank them for supporting me in this journey.

Should I be confirmed, I look forward to returning to the Department of Defense for another opportunity to serve our Nation, promote our national security, and support our servicemembers. The sense of mission among the civilian and military workforce in the Department of Defense is remarkable.

My top priority, if confirmed, will be to help the Secretary and other senior leaders build the best defense budget we can to meet our strategic needs; to ensure the Department provides the defense committees the information they need on that budget; and then faithfully steward the resources the Congress sees fit to provide for our common defense.

Second, if confirmed, I will prioritize a strong relationship with the congressional defense committees on all matters under my purview. The stronger the partnership between the Department and the Congress, the stronger our national security will be.

Third, I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department gives full effort and attention to the financial audit so that we can build on and accelerate the progress that has been made toward the goal of a clean opinion.

Fourth, working with other senior leaders, I would work to continue and build upon efforts to improve the Department's performance in light of the dis-establishment of the Chief Management Officer position in the fiscal year 2021 defense authorization bill. I look forward to the opportunity, if confirmed, to focus on making DOD more effective.

After I left DOD four years ago, I served on the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States. I took two strong lessons from my time as a commissioner. First, the United States faces serious national security challenges that in turn require leaders in both the executive and legislative branches to attack those challenges with a seriousness of purpose.

Second, our strategic competitors use all the tools of their national power against us, and we must ensure we are capable of doing likewise. The Department of Defense, no matter how capable or well-funded, cannot by itself ensure we prevail in this competition.

If confirmed, I will be a full partner with you in ensuring we carry out our respective responsibilities for our national security.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Mr. Moultrie, your statement, please.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY**

Mr. MOULTRIE. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your consideration of my nomination to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

I want to thank DNI McConnell for his kind introductory words. His mentorship and tutelage have tremendously shaped my career.

I am honored for the trust and confidence that President Biden and Secretary Austin have placed in me, and if confirmed, I look forward to serving with our Nation's outstanding intelligence and security professionals.

I am blessed to have met my wife, Darlene, while we served on active duty, and to have benefitted from her love and wisdom for over 33 years.

I am also grateful to have a family that embodies service. My father served in the Korean War and in Vietnam, and rose to the rank of Army Sergeant Major. My mother's brother made the ultimate sacrifice while serving with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.

Duty, honor, and sacrifice. These principles have been instilled in me since childhood and drive me to this day.

Defending against all enemies, foreign and domestic, takes on new meaning for all in the intelligence and security profession. China, our pacing challenge, a global pandemic, malign actors, and other existential threats pose risks to the global order and threaten our way of life. Domestic extremism and sexual harassment tear at the fabric of our society and threaten to undermine order in the Defense Department's ranks, and our warfighters need a "decisive, secure information advantage" and our troops must be safe, regardless of their environment.

If confirmed, these will be among my top priorities. I am confident that we can overcome these challenges and build upon our global leadership role.

We must innovatively explore, and rapidly adapt, emerging technologies that will enable us to defend our Nation against those seeking to erode our technological and intellectual advantages. We must build and embrace partnerships across our government, with the private sector and academia, and with our key foreign partners and allies, and we must have a close working relationship with Congress.

Most importantly we must have the support and trust of our citizens. They are the inspiration for all that we do and ultimately why we serve.

If confirmed, I will strive to accomplish these and other priorities as determined by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I will always serve with the utmost honor and integrity.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. I ask that my full remarks be placed in the record.

Chairman REED. Without objection, the full remarks will be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT BY RONALD MOULTRIE

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Defending "against all enemies, foreign and domestic" takes on new meaning for all in the intelligence and security profession:

- China, our pacing challenge, a global pandemic, malign actors, and other existential threats pose risks to the global order and threaten our way of life;
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I will always serve with the utmost honor and integrity.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Gentlemen, I am going to address questions that are required of all nominees. Please respond appropriately.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Mr. MCCORD. Yes.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes.

Chairman REED. Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Mr. MCCORD. No.

Mr. MOULTRIE. No.

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibility makes it important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this committee when requested?

Mr. MCCORD. Yes.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes.

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such records?

Mr. McCORD. Yes.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established by this committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

Mr. McCORD. Yes.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Mr. McCORD. Yes.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Mr. McCORD. Yes.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, gentleman. Now, Mr. McCord, let me address a question to you. We have been looking very closely at the PPBE process—Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution. You are aware, probably better than anyone, that it began in the 1960s with McNamara and the Whiz Kids. It has not changed very much, and we are in a different post-industrial age. Can you give us your views on reforming the PPBE process? What is within your scope in the Department of Defense, by regulation? What legislation might be necessary, and also whether it would be wise to propose a commission to look more carefully at this process?

Mr. McCORD. Thank you for that. Mr. Chairman, the process, as a whole, is heavily legislated in what I would call the back-end execution. There are thousands of pages of laws and regulation governing how government funds may be expended. It is very lightly legislated on the front end, the planning and programming process, in particular. So as you move through the process, the amount of statutory and regulatory guidance increases fairly exponentially, with regard to how taxpayer funds are used.

The process itself I think has—as you said, it has been in place a long time, and it is sort of foundational to how the Pentagon works at this point. I think it has some benefits that should be preserved as we look at reforming, in particular that the Secretary and the Deputy have a lot of flexibility on what topics they choose to focus on, what analysis they want to rely on, and who is in the room, who is not in the room. So I think those are some of the things that we would want to preserve, but as you say, I think we need to look at how we can have maybe greater agility to go with accountability in that process, and I do think it is something the Department can work with the committees on, and perhaps with a commission as well.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much. The audit has been an issue of concern for decades. There are some that suggest that

while achieving an audit would not reveal sort of adequate guidance to changes in the Department, there are others that think the audit is a powerful weapon for change and efficiencies. Where do you come down on this, and how will you conduct the audit?

Mr. McCORD. Chairman, the audit, as you know, is required by law, and it is something that the Department is behind other Cabinet agencies on, and it is a priority for, I think, Secretary Austin and for myself. It is not the answer to every question, certainly. An audit will not tell you whether the particular airplane you bought was the right airplane for the mission, for example, or whether the contractor overcharged you. Those are all different aspects of controls that are above and beyond the financial audit.

But that said, it does help identify where resources may be being wasted or improperly used or inefficiently used, and the controls that are one of the big hurdles between where the Department stands today and achieving that audit, getting all the controls in place I think takes on new meaning in this era of cyber intrusions. So I think that the business process reforms that are necessary for an audit are things the Department needs to be doing anyway, and the audit is a good forcing function for the direction the Department needs to go.

Chairman REED. Thank you.

Mr. Moultrie, the current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized joint and cross-domain capability requirements that the military services have not prioritized or are not responsible for developing, such as joint all-domain command and control, JADC2 [Joint All Domain Command and Control]. JADC2 demands ubiquitous interoperability, automated decision aids, and systems assistance integration. Indeed, this is probably, in my view, one of the key levers to continue our superiority, vis-à-vis our rivals around the world.

Within your office, how are you going to confront these challenges and hopefully deliver a robust system of joint and cross-domain capability?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, the JADC2 concept is extremely important for us to be able to counter our adversaries in whatever domain that we may need to counter them in. As you know, it will provide this ubiquitous connectivity that you talked about. But we must ensure that it is also secure and reliable, regardless of the environment, and it must connect across all domains. So it must be able to connect our land, air, sea forces, and space forces, as necessary.

Within the Office of the USD(I&S), if I am confirmed, I would work towards ensuring that we understand the requirements for the JADC2 concept. I would ensure that we understand what the responsibilities are of the other components in the other services and what they need to deliver, and then we need to ensure that we can test this capability. We need to be able to prove it in combat, but we also need to ensure that it has the redundancy that it needs so that it can provide our warfighters with the real-time connectivity and capabilities to fight the war, and, if confirmed, I would commit myself to supporting the JADC2 concept.

Chairman REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Moultrie. Again, I think this is one of the most significant issues that we face collectively

in the Department of Defense, and I urge you to follow through, if confirmed.

Thank you very much, gentlemen. Senator Inhofe, please.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, MR. Chairman. I just have one question for each one. I have already expressed my feelings about the two nominees and how fortunate we are that they are willing to do this, and I am sure they will be confirmed.

General Townsend, the Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), recently testified about China's ruling military presence in Africa. China built its first overseas military base in Djibouti and is aggressively pursuing a naval base on the west coast of Africa, which General Townsend called, using his quote he said, "the number one global power competition concern," and I agree with that.

I am very familiar with the AFRICOM, and I was somewhat instrumental in making that a reality back in 2007. In a way, though, I failed. We got AFRICOM—well, the continent of Africa used to be divided among three different COMs, so at least it is all under one COM now, but we never did adequately get the resources necessary. Now, because it has become so much more important in the fact that China—you know, that people do not realize China—Djibouti is the first time that they started an overseas operation. They have done everything else in their back yard, always up to now. So it is kind of a big deal there.

So I would ask you, Mr. Moultrie, I am going to ask you if you will try to do something I failed to be able to do, and that is commit to me that you will take a close look at our intelligence capabilities in Africa, that you will ensure that our efforts there get the attention and resources they need.

Now, I know you will get the cooperation of this committee, but it is going to be your responsibility to spend the time and the resources to encourage the administration to make that a reality. What are your feelings about that, and are you willing to try to do that?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, yes. China has been a challenge for a number of years, really a number of decades as it pertains to Africa, and I closely followed that when I was the Director of Operations at the National Security Agency. They have diplomat, they have military and economic ambitions. There are a lot of reasons to focus on Africa, as you know, Senator, the ports that they have there. It is a mineral-rich continent that the Chinese seek, and they are using all of their tools, techniques, coercion, and malign influence to actually try to move into that continent.

I have not been briefed on it, but I understand the challenges there. I understand, I think, what the Chinese have tried to do there. If confirmed, I would work across the interagency. I would also work with our partners and allies, because they are also focused, in some ways, on China, to ensure that we understand what the Chinese are doing and what their plans are, and that we would be prepared to support the Secretary in deterring the Chinese challenge there and providing support to our warfighters and commanders forward.



Senator INHOFE. Yes, and specifically, though, in trying to get the resources from us that, again, we failed to get done previously. That is a major concern that I have there.

Lastly, with Mr. McCord, first of all, you are very familiar this committee, and we are very familiar with you, and we appreciate the fact that you are taking on this responsibility. It is particularly interesting that you are one of the 12 listed on this document, and I do not think that even you believed the attention this document would get when you first developed it.

So one of the items in there that is pretty specific is the need for the 3 to 5 percent real growth in the defense budget to effectively implement the national defense system. I know that when Deputy Secretary Hicks was before this committee, she also was one of the authors of this, one of the 12 authors of this document, and she agree that the 3 to 5 percent real growth was really something that is as realistic today as it was in 2018. Do you agree with Secretary Hicks and her comments and the necessity of the resources in order to get the job done?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. The Commission, as you said, found that that was an appropriate resource range for the National Defense Strategy that Secretary Mattis laid out, and, of course, if confirmed, my job would be to work with Secretary Austin as he undertakes his strategy review and similarly find the right resource level for his strategy.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Well, and I think that you found it, and so I appreciate that in the document and your efforts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me recognize Senator Shaheen, please.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Gentlemen, congratulations on your nominations. Thank you for your willingness to stand for those positions at these challenging times.

I want to begin with you, Mr. McCord, because I think your background in cybersecurity and information management makes you a particular good choice at this critical time. As we saw over the weekend, from the attack on Colonial Pipeline, and the potential impacts on the East Coast's access to gasoline, we need someone who understands the challenges. I wonder, if this had been a terrorist attack on the pipeline, would we have reacted the same way? Given your background at DOD, how do you think we might have reacted if it had been a terrorist attack? Did I call you McCord instead of Mr. Moultrie? If I did, I am sorry.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, that is fine. I understand the question. The attack on Colonial Pipeline, Senator, is extremely concerning. These attacks, probably intrusions and attacks probably occur much more frequently than what we know. We only see what I call the tip of the iceberg as it pertains to these. While I have not been briefed on this, what I have read in the media is that it was a ransomware attacks, which was not necessarily directed by a hostile target, but as we know, there are hacktivists who are members of foreign governments, who hire themselves out to do these attacks. We have been fortunate, over the last year, year and a half, to dodge bullets, that there has not been malicious intent.

I think it is important, Senator, and if confirmed, I would look at this as a public-private issue that we need to have the government work closely with industry. We need to work closer, among ourselves in the interagency, and we need to understand what the challenges are. We need to get the word out to industry. We need to partner with them to help them solve these challenges. We have been fortunate, but we have to do more.

Senator SHAHEEN. Would you agree that our laws and our responses have not kept up with the technology that is available to do those kinds of cyber intrusions, and that we need to do a better job of updating how we respond, both in terms of our technology, that response, but also the laws that we pass to respond?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I would say that we certainly need to look at the laws, but we also need to look at the processes that we have in place—

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

Mr. MOULTRIE.—for alerting people. So it would be a combination.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I am also concerned about the amount of information that we currently classify. In a January 2020 memo that was sent by nine U.S. combatant commanders to the Acting DNI, the commanders highlighted what they called, and I quote, “pernicious conduct of our adversaries’ information operations across the world, and underscored the need to improve deep classification of information in order to more effectively compete in their respective domains.”

I would argue that one of the places where we have done too much classification has been around our response to those government officials who have been attacked by what is known as the Havana Syndrome, where information has been very dispersed, very classified. Sometimes I am not sure that one agency talks to the other agency in terms of what we are doing. Certainly under the Biden administration there has been more of an effort to respond to this. But would you agree with the combatant commanders that signed that memo, that improving our declassification efforts would actually be helpful in terms of how we respond to certain situations?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I have not read this combatant commanders memo. I have read about it in the media. My understanding is that there is information out there on malign activities that should make its way to our warfighter and to our combatant commanders. So I agree with you 100 percent on that, Senator.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, would you commit to doing everything you can to doing everything you can to ensure that there is an unclassified accounting of facts on the issues surrounding those who have been attacked by these electro—radio waves, under what is called the Havana Syndrome, so that there is both consistent information that is going to Congress and the public and also very real information that we receive about what is going on?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, if confirmed, I would look into what we know on these directed energy attacks, as they call them, to understand what is going on, and work with the DNI and others to find ways to disseminate this information to our citizens and to those

who need to know in our installations and facilities around the world.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking both of you for your continued service to our country. I would like to begin with Mr. McCord. Looking back, you began work on the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1987, during the first year of the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition to reorganizing the Department to better execute joint operations, this act required the submission of a National Security Strategy, the first time a strategy was ever required in our Nation's history.

Furthermore, the act actually calls for the NSS to be submitted to Congress at the same time that the President submits his budget. As you know, this has not happened, and yet at the same time, while we do a National Defense Strategy, my thoughts right now, as we look at a pipeline which has been hacked, and we have people that are wondering how we work through the issue of providing defense to individuals within our country, how do we coordinate between the different departments, how do we break down the silos, and shouldn't we be looking, on a regular basis, at how we defend not just through the NDS but a national security for the entire country? I am just curious. Wouldn't this help to have this continue to be submitted, as was originally envisioned in 1987?

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, thank you. Yes, I am familiar with the National Security Strategy documents. My recollection is that they have not, over these 30 or so years, been routinely submitted every single calendar year but have been a little more sporadic than some of the defense documents have been. I am aware that National Security Advisor Sullivan put out an Interim Strategic Guidance for this administration a few weeks ago. As a private citizen, I am not privy to the schedule for formalizing such a document, whatever might be envisioned by the White House at this time.

As far as the processes, though, responding to more specific threats and challenges as you were describing, and Senator Shaheen also, from the outside, where I sit, it looks like the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, the processes that are used to respond to the specific events look fairly familiar to what has been used over many administrations. So I think there is a process in place, but your point is well taken that, you know, defense strategy is always best when it nests inside a National Security Strategy.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Moultrie, let me continue along that same line, and I would like to preface it with I appreciated the opportunity to visit with you yesterday. With this pipeline hack, it brings to mind the need to really focus, as you suggested earlier, not just on the challenges we have, air, land, and sea, but space and cyberspace, as we look at our adversaries, and not just Russia and China and Iran and North Korea, but also the fact that we have criminal elements, sometimes in collusion with but sometimes on their own, attacking the infrastructure within the United States—financial services,

transportation, electrics, electric utilities, and now we find out the distribution of our energy resources.

Mr. Moultrie, you were one of the individuals who worked on the Navy's review, and I must admit, a very refreshing review, of the challenges facing the Navy alone with regard to its independent contractors, defending the information from those who would steal it, protecting its secrets, and recognizing the vulnerabilities that the Department of the Navy had in the cyber world. So I recognize and I appreciate the work that you did in that respect.

Having just gone through and looked at what happened here within the most recent hacking of the pipeline, it seems to me that the lessons learned on this would suggest that the silos we have been the different departments, the different branches within the departments, and, most certainly, those that come from not just the Department of Defense trying to defend against those attacks from the outside but then to try to coordinate with Homeland Security to protect not just the DOD's interests but also the interests of the American public on an infrastructure basis, it seems to me that there is a real lesson to be learned here about a coordination that has to occur.

Would you care to share a little bit about what you learned about your thoughts with regard to breaking down those silos, and anything else that we might have learned that could be beneficial to the entire Department of Defense that you saw within the review of the Department of the Navy?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. I will be brief about this. What we found was that the cyber threat was pervasive, it is real. The adversary knows what our vulnerabilities are better than we do. They study this. We are probably the most connected but most underprotected society in the world. We found that the industrial base was a prime target of our adversary, and we found that we did not have a comprehensive plan for getting after that.

So we recommended that leadership, at least the Secretary of the Navy, in this instance, transmit commanders intent as to what he would want to do, how to get after it, and that we organize ourselves not in silos but horizontally, so that we could cross-communicate throughout the Department and work on those various areas. The Navy, I want to say they have done a good job at that.

I think our Government is moving in that direction, based on President Biden's announcements of nominations for a National Cyber Director, and I think that there are lessons learned for the Department of Defense that could be emulated from the Navy study, and, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with all of the principals in the Department who have a piece of cyber to support that initiative.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rounds, and let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Moultrie, your statement that you just said is exactly what you and I discussed. You said we are the most connected but the most underprotected. That is extremely disturbing, and I know that you have an ambition to begin to address that, as you just said.

It is important to our national security's success that the military intelligence apparatus operates in sync with the entire intelligence community, especially the CIA, and that our intelligence entities are not autonomous or siloed against each other, and I have heard many examples of this, which is deeply concerning. I was very happy to have your commitment to work closely with DNI Haines to make sure this happens correctly.

Do you have any additional thoughts that you want to share on areas where integration between our military and civilian intelligence entities can improve?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. I believe that what you just laid out would be the foundation that we ought to pursue. Working with DNI Haines and her cadre, working with Director Burns and Deputy Director Cohen at the CIA are important, but there are aspects of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise that have a piece of this. There are multiple pieces of this.

We have to rally around the priorities and a sense of purpose and unify around the concept of we each have a shared responsibility as it pertains to this challenge. If confirmed, I would work to build that understanding, further understanding within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I think we have great commanders who understand it today, but I would further the facilitation and working across those elements to ensure that we are working as a unit and that we understand that this threat is more than a threat. It is not something that somebody is threatening to do. It is something that is happening today.

Senator, you have my commitment to devote myself to making this happen, if confirmed as the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. Mr. Moultrie, ODN's Annual Threat Assessment noted that white nationalists or right-wing extremist groups have conducted at least 26 attacks that have killed more than 141 people over the last 5 years. Further, Australia, Germany, Norway, and the UK all consider racist extremist groups the fastest-growing terror threat that they face. What role would you say you and your office might have in evaluating this threat, in particular, and given that you would be the senior official overseeing our insider threat program, do you have any specific plans to deter or detect extremists who may have infiltrated the Department or the military?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, extremism should not exist in our ranks, regardless of how pervasive it may be. It undermines readiness and it undermines the strong values that we have. I was very pleased to see that Secretary Austin has charted a counter-extremism working group to help define the problem and to help provide recommendations for the problem. The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security has an organization that helps train and helps monitor, to ensure that we do not have a proliferation of any extremist views by any group.

I believe that there is a key role that I can play in overseeing the activities and helping those professionals who are already moving in that direction, and, Senator, if confirmed, you have my commitment to ensure that we move in that direction, ensuring that we eliminate extremism throughout the Department of Defense.

Senator GILLIBRAND. With regard to China, obviously it poses the most significant national security and intelligence threat to the United States across the board. As you are aware, China uses a number of cyber technical and human intelligence tools to achieve this end. It will take the full strength of our military and the civilian intelligence community to deter them.

Are you confident in the military's ability to monitor and counter China's building global military intelligence footprint, including in more remote areas of the world such as Latin America, Africa, and South Asia?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. I have not been briefed on the current collection posture of the intelligence community or the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I can tell you I am confident, Senator, that we understand what the challenge is. But I would want to withhold judgment as to whether or now I am confident we could actually monitor, on a global basis, until, if confirmed, I have the opportunity to understand what we are doing and where we are on that issue today.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Moultrie.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me recognize Senator Ernst, please.

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank you so much. It was great to have phone conversations with both of you, and I really appreciate the opportunity to get to know you both better. We certainly appreciate your time this morning in giving testimony on these topics. If both of you are confirmed, you do have challenging roads ahead, to make sure that we are providing the very best of intelligence and resources to our warfighters, to help them accomplish their mission, and I look forward to working with both of you to ensure that America succeeds.

Mr. Moultrie, I would love to start with you first, sir, and as evidence by your resume and the phone conversation that we had, you and your family have extensive experience in the intelligence community. I think we do continue, of course, to struggle to eliminate certain gaps between the various agencies in the Federal Government and really provide that common operating picture across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

If you could, I know we spoke on this on the phone, but if you could for everyone else that might be catching up now, how do we close those gaps in information between the different agencies? How do we improving the sharing, the collaboration between our agencies to make sure that the Department of Defense always has the cutting-edge information necessary to accomplish our mission?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. The need for greater collaboration, and real-time collaboration, is extremely important, probably no more important so than it is today. I believe it is important that we work with the Director of National Intelligence, who works a National Intelligence Priorities Framework, to understand that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and our warfighters needs are, in many ways, aligned closely with our national policymaker needs.

So when we are looking at real-time collection, analysis, dissemination to the President of the United States and policymakers, we need to ensure that that same information is getting to the

warfighter and getting to those in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

I believe that it is a matter of building that understanding, what the collective missions are, and building that trust, and you have my commitment, Senator, that if I am confirmed, I will work to have trusted relationships with the DNI and others throughout the intelligence enterprise, and we will get back to you on the progress that we are making, or not making, in this area.

Senator ERNST. Thank you very much, and as you may know, many of our operational elements are using lagging programs of record, like the Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS, to provide a common operating picture to those ground commanders. How would you intend to modernize intelligence infrastructures and architectures throughout the DOD to enhance those warfighters' understanding of the operational environment?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, the real-time dissemination of intelligence to the warfighter should be the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's top priority. In my experience, there has not been this common operating picture that you discussed. We have a number of operating pictures, but not a universal common operating picture, if you will.

I have not been briefed on the DCGS concept of where it is today, but you have my commitment that the warfighter is the reason that we exist. They are the reason that we are here. You have my commitment that if I am confirmed in this position that I will do all that I can and work with the intelligence enterprise to ensure that the warfighter has the information that they need.

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I appreciate that very much and our conversation.

Mr. McCord, in the final moments that I have, certainly I have been really paying attention to the audit of the DOD and making sure that we have a clean audit at some point. Can you just explain to us how you intend to make sure the Department gives full effort and attention to this financial audit?

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the Secretary has already, I think, stated that it is an important priority of his. That is important. It will be a top priority of mine. I know it is of this committee, that the defense committees have been full partners with us and have, I think, given us appropriate level of patience, while still keep pushing us, as you need to do.

The effort will take a few more years, but the one thing I will say, the Department has done everything in the last 10 years or so that it has said it would do, when it said it would do it. So as we move from statement of budgetary resource, state audits, to full audits of each military department, to full audit of the Department, we have done the things that we have said we would do to the committees.

I think to the topic you have just been discussing, including controls and information access are probably the key leverage point, in my view, of what I would intend to look at first, if confirmed.

Senator ERNST. Well, and thank you, and I do believe it is important that we continue with the audit, to make sure that we are communicating to our taxpayers that their resources are being used appropriately within the Department of Defense. Gentlemen,

I look forward to supporting both of your confirmations. Thank you so much.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Ernst. I now recognize Senator Hirono, via Webex.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCord and Mr. Moultrie, I ask the following two questions of every nominee who comes before any of the committees on which I sit.

Since you became a legal adult, have either of you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Mr. McCORD. No.

Mr. MOULTRIE. No.

Senator HIRONO. Did both of you say no? Thank you.

Have either of you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

Mr. McCORD. No.

Mr. MOULTRIE. No.

Senator HIRONO. Mr. McCord, as Comptroller you will oversee the Defense Contract Audit agency, which performs financial oversight of government contracts and is critical to ensuring DOD gets the best value for every dollar spent on defense contracting by reporting potential problems it finds to the Defense Contract Management Agency, which administers all DOD contracts and DOD IG, when appropriate. In your view, is the Defense Contract Audit Agency appropriately staffed to conduct adequate oversight of the 300,000 contracts DOD is administering at any given time?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, if confirmed, I would certainly consult with the Director of DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency], who would report to me, about the workload versus the staffing levels as it exists today. When I left 4 years ago, the agency had suffered a bit from a downturn driven by the sequestration level reductions in staff that had been imposed across the Department, had gotten the backlog up to an unacceptable level. We had made progress in bringing that down. I believe the staffing levels are probably about right, but I would want to consult further with the Director of DCAA, if confirmed.

Senator HIRONO. When we talk about 300,000 contracts, it runs the gamut from very large contracts to smaller contracts, I assume?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, yes. DCAA audits contracts of various different sizes. What they focus on is contracts especially that are not competed, so it is the type more so than the size that is a key determinant of where they focus, for example, on commercially available items versus ones that are more unique.

Senator HIRONO. Yes, so those unique contracts probably require auditors who also understand what the contract provides and what is expected.

What is your opinion of the Defense Contract Audit Agency's relationship with the Defense Contract Management Agency and the DOD IG, and is the current arrangement referring potential problems the most efficient way for DOD to identify, deter, and eliminate contracting fraud, waste, and abuse?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, DCAA is required to be independent of DCMA, of the contract management folks. That is, in fact, why



DCAA is under the Comptroller and out of the acquisition chain. As your question illuminates, there is a little bit of a nuance there in that they have to talk, they have to communicate, but they also have to be independent of each other. The inspector generals, of course, always assert that they are independent of management, but we also work closely with them. So it is definitely a bit of a delicate dance to have independent actors who need to communicate and cooperate but who have to also maintain a little bit of independence from each other to do their roles as assigned.

Senator HIRONO. So are you saying that the current situation is the most efficient way to detect fraud, waste, and abuse?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, I would certainly not assert that no improvements can be made, but I am just making the point that there is only so close that they can be, given that the contract auditors have to have some degree of separation from the contract managers.

Senator HIRONO. I understand the independence issue.

Mr. Moultrie, I am increasingly concerned about the emergence of “deep fakes”—that is in quote, quotation marks—a term which describes realistic but forced photos, audios, and videos produced via artificial intelligence, and how they could be utilized to erode public trust, embarrass, or blackmail key officials or inflame or incite violence.

What are your views on this emerging technology as it relates to national security, and how might our adversaries seek to exploit it?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator, I believe that the deep fake issue is one that could pose a great threat to national security. If an adversary has the ability to emulate a commander, or someone in authority, and actually looked as if they are saying something, that could pose a challenge if someone took that deep fake to be a realistic individual or person.

AI, artificial intelligence, has a number of facets that we have to ensure that we understand. We have to develop the countermeasures to ensure that we can compare the real information to fake information. Senator, as I am sure you are aware, there has been a lot of work done in this regard, where you can look at the subtle differences between images and see where some things are slightly off.

If confirmed, I would be very concerned about this, but I would also ensure that I would work with those across the interagency, the Department, and with counterintelligence so we can identify these counterintelligence threats and immediately either nullify them or alert to the fact that they exist.

Senator HIRONO. So do you think that we are adequately—that we have the adequate capacity to deal with these deep fake images, audios, et cetera?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I have not been briefed on the current status or what our capabilities are, what our processing and computing capabilities are to discern between a real image and a fake image, but if confirmed, I would review that and get back to you.

Senator HIRONO. I cannot tell whether my time is up or not, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman REED. Yes, it is, ma'am.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton, please.

Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance today. Congratulations to you both on your nominations.

Mr. McCord, in your answers to the advanced policy questions you affirmed the NDS Commission, on which you served, had found that 3 to 5 percent of real growth was, quote, “illustrative of what was needed for the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” end quote. But you also state that the DOD should be able to carry on its missions under the announced fiscal year 2022 funding level, which is below inflation. How can the committee reconcile these two views?

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, the way I would state it is, first of all, of course, neither you nor I have seen the details and the specific choices made inside the 2022 budget, so we will all be able to learn more about how we feel about the budget and what is in there, when it is available in a week or two.

With respect to the funding level, just as an aggregate number, what Secretary Mattis said at the time and what the commission sort of spoke to was averaging 3 to 5 percent over a 5-year period, and the fiscal year 2022 request is still in that range from where the budget was 5 years ago when I left. So I think in that respect there is a certain consistency.

Senator COTTON. Well, we will see what it says in a week or two. The reports I hear are not reassuring. Hopefully once you are confirmed you can exert influence inside the interagency process and with OMB to make sure the Department of Defense is fully funded as the threats we face continue to grow.

I also want to ask you a question about the Overseas Contingency Operations account. I have seen some novel budgeting tricks used with that OCO spending account during my 8 years in the Congress. At the same time, I think it is important that we be able to track what we are spending on overseas conflict. So by doing away with OCO spending, how is it that we will be able to track, inside the Department of Defense and for Congress, what we are spending on those conflicts?

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, the Department, when I was there, and I know continues to this day and I would insist that we continue, if confirmed, does what is called a Cost of War report. It has moved from, I believe, maybe monthly to quarterly over the years, that is done to track obligations that are chargeable against operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. That can continue with or without separate appropriations, and I think it would be necessary that it continue for the very reasons you cite, that there is accountability and transparency of what is still being spent on these operations.

Senator COTTON. Good. Thank you. I just think it is very important that we maintain a clear picture of what we are spending on our forces, that excludes any kind of contingency operations overseas. Now the OCO account was used in some funny ways to get around budgetary spending caps over the last decade that are no longer in place, so it cannot be used in that way anymore. But I want to make sure that we have a very crystal clear picture of what we are spending on our manning, training, equipping, so we understand what the force needs in the future, separate from what

we have to spend on a year-to-year basis, wherever our forces are operating overseas.

Mr. Moultrie, supply chain security has always been a critical component of our national security. It grows even more so as our forces' equipment and weapons get more technologically advanced. What do you view as the biggest threats to our technology supply chains, and how would you work to mitigate those threats?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, the supply chain, our supply chain is inherently vulnerable, is what I would say. Our adversaries, specifically China and others, understand the defense industrial base. We are fortunate, based on my past knowledge and experience, to have organizations, especially within the Intelligence Security Enterprise, such as the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, that has programs that actually enable us to go out and talk to those individuals and companies and facilities that are part of our critical supply infrastructure for the Department of Defense.

I think we have to ensure that we continue to identify what our vulnerabilities are in those key areas, in those key industries, in those key organizations. We have to make them aware, Senator, of what the challenges really are what the threat actually is. That means we have to have, when I talk about public-private partnerships, to be able to go out and talk to them, make sure that they understand this. If confirmed, I would work vigorously to ensure that we are doing all that we can to support the mitigation of risk in our supply chain as it exists today.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Thank you. Last year I sponsored the American Founders Act with several other Senators, to reinvigorate semiconductor manufacturing here at home. I believe offshoring this critical capability has presented a grave threat to our national security. What importance do you assign to our leadership in microelectronics design and manufacturing, and what risk to U.S. security will our supply chains face if we do not have that critical manufacturing capability here at home?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator, I have not been briefed on what is currently occurring within the DOD on foundries. I am aware of the microchip shortage and the challenges that we are having in that regard. I think it is important that wherever our chips are manufactured that they are secure, that, you know, offshoring of microchips can or cannot induce vulnerabilities into the process that we have there. But if confirmed, I would work to understand where those chips are being manufactured to support the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and work across the Department and the interagency to ensure that we are securing the supply chain of getting chips to our military and to our critical industries.

Senator COTTON. Good. Thank you. I agree with that. It is kind of dangerous to have 80 to 90 percent of the world's semiconductors manufactured within short-range missile range of mainland China, in a place against which Beijing has irredentist claims. Thank you both.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine, please.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member Inhofe. Congratulations to the nominees for your willingness to tackle these important responsibilities.

Mr. McCord, let me begin with you. As you know, because of your long tenure with the committee and then at the Pentagon, it has been a significant interest here to get the DOD to full audit, and we have made significant progress in that effort. I give some real credit to David Norquist. I think he did a good job of moving the Pentagon further toward that goal.

One of my interests in the audit has always been beyond just passing, using the audit as a way not just to promote best financial practices but also best operational practices, finding in the audit strategies where we can consolidate duplication and then use the dollars saved there to promote better national security.

So I would like you to just talk to the committee a bit about the way you see the audit, and how you can use the audit not only to assure financial compliance but also use it to advance the national security mission of the Pentagon.

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the audit, as you say, ultimately comes down to pass-fail, and that is the standard. But as with studying for a test, the process of learning and getting there, improving yourself, is almost as important as the grade you get if you are trying to be proficient or more proficient at something.

Inventory is probably the chief area where audit promotes better practices that can reduce waste, help the warfighter, make sure that we know what we have and it is in the right place. There are one or two aspects of the audit, in particular, valuing property that are less connected to that.

But the second area I would say, and this morning's hearing really brings this out, in the area of controls and cyber controls, cybersecurity. A large part of the findings that the auditors have made are that our controls still need to be better, in terms of access to information and only the authorized people being able to access information. So I think that the audit and businesses practices that go with the audit can be synergistic with the improved cybersecurity that we want for ourselves and, of course, that we want for industry partners as well.

Senator KAINE. Thank you for that answer, and I very much encourage you to take this use of the audit seriously, as I know that you will.

Mr. Moultrie, I was the chair, along with Senator Sullivan as my ranking, on a Readiness Subcommittee hearing about two weeks ago, and we were looking at acquisition kind of hits and misses, and trying to extract some best practices from them. One of the witnesses that we had was Dr. Ray O'Toole, who is the Acting Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation Office. In the course of his testimony, which was in an open setting, he said that in fiscal year 2020, none of the weapons systems assessed by his office were able to pass a simulated cyberattack. Every single one of them was vulnerable to simulated cyberattacks.

When he testified to that, Senator Sullivan and I looked at each other and said, "That is not good," and then Senator Sullivan said, "I hope our adversaries are not watching this hearing." Dr. O'Toole said, "In writing my testimony I was so worried about making this statement that I actually checked to make sure, from a security standpoint, I could, and it cleared security, but it is something I am really worried about."

So should you be confirmed, what might you do, working together with our acquisition professionals and others, so that we build in protection against cyber vulnerability very, very early in any sort of acquisition platform?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. I believe that closely working with acquisition and sustainment is one of the key roles that the USD(I&S) has to ensure that we are looking at the determination needs of acquisition to ensure that adversaries have not perpetrated our industry, our companies, if you will, and that they are not stealing our secrets, because once they have stolen those secrets, as you know, there are built-in vulnerabilities that those systems are going to have.

More importantly today, Senator, I think it is important that we understand where vulnerabilities and breaches have occurred, and then that we find a way of incorporating that information back into not just the acquisition of the new platforms but the current deployed platforms. So an adversary steals plans, blueprints, what have you, we need today to get that information back into the production cycle and into the current force so that they cannot be degraded when they are actually doing an operation in the field.

I have not had access to what is being done today, Senator. If confirmed, you have my commitment to look at this and come back and talk to you in closed committee about it, because I think it is a very potentially serious problem, and there are probably things occurring today that we do not want to talk about in an open hearing, but our adversaries probably already know.

Senator KAINE. Mr. Moultrie, thank you for that. I look forward to following up, should you be confirmed, and I am confident you will be.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Scott, please.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Chairman. Can you hear me?

So first I want to thank both of you for your willingness to serve.

Mr. Moultrie, what do you believe China's plans are with regard to Taiwan? Do you believe that Communist China has the intention to take Taiwan by force?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I have not been briefed on the current intelligence as it pertains to Taiwan, but as you know, their stated intent has been the eventual acclimation of Taiwan back into what they call the Mainland. As to whether or not force is in their doctrine, they will execute all means available to them to ensure that they are protecting what they feel is in their national interest.

Senator SCOTT. So we have seen pretty aggressive behavior by Communist China the last few years, whether it is their military attacks or building their military strength. What do you think General Secretary Xi's ultimate goal is with these cyberattacks and with this aggressive behavior, not just Taiwan but their actions towards Australia and even the United States?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I believe that the cyberattacks that China has executed are directed at a number of areas, one, to bolster their research and development, where they do not spend nearly as much as we do in the United States. So this is a way of getting easy and cheap research and development, if I can go out

and steal it. Two, it is to further their economic gains, and three, diplomacy and undermine our diplomatic efforts, and as I started with, at the forefront would really be that military gain that they get from the cyberattacks.

Senator SCOTT. So we have had, for decades, strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan, and so I have a bill that is called the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which basically eliminates the ambiguity. It is clear that the United States, if Taiwan is attacked, will show up and defend them. What are your thoughts on something like this? Because, I mean, if you look at, what we are doing is not working. I mean, Communist China is getting more aggressive every day, it seems like?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I do not subscribe to the view that war is inevitable between the U.S. and China or our allied forces and China. If confirmed, I would support—I have not seen your bill, so I cannot comment, Senator, on your bill. If confirmed, I would love to read that, and will read it, if confirmed. I would support the Department's policies and Secretary Austin's policies as they pertain to deterrence as it pertains to China.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. McCord, you responded to Senator Cotton with regard to the Biden administration's proposal to grow defense spending is less than it has been, and I understand what you said is that over a period of time it is still in the 3 to 5 percent range. But do you believe that this initial proposal will send the wrong message to Communist China and to Russia and our adversaries?

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, I do not believe so, but I think the meat of the proposal is yet to arrive, right, is what are the specific choices made on the triad, on the joint strike fighter, on readiness. I think that is really where the Committee will need to focus and where, if confirmed, I would want to focus, on what choices were made, which I just have no information on as a private citizen.

Senator SCOTT. Okay. I think it is my understanding that you, in the past, have supported increasing the spending 3 to 5 percent, so if this year we do not do that, how many years could we do that without having an adverse impact on our military?

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, there are a couple of levers that you always have, I think, in terms of the capability that you are getting out of the funds that you have. It is how large of a force do you think you need, how ready do you feel you need to keep people, you know, the compensation for the troops. So there is a mixture of choices, that it would be responsibility, if confirmed, to advise the Secretary and the Deputy on as to how we get the best capability we have.

You know, there also may be proposals to find efficiencies to retire our legacy system. I have no information of what choices might be about to be proposed to you, having not had a role in building this budget. But if confirmed, my task would be to work with the Secretary and other leaders to build the 2023 budget, the 2024 budget, and to make the best choices that we can to present to you.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Manchin, please.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for your service, and I appreciate very much you being here.

Mr. Moultrie, I am pleased to hear that you say we need to increase the coordination of our Federal cyber response, and I agree with you, you are right on the Colonial attack. So my question would be, how do you intend to ensure that intelligence that DOD is gathering about cyber threats and shared across Federal Government, which we have a hard time coordinating right now, and are you aware of the mechanisms to share that information with private industry organizations that also might be directly threatened?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I believe that the sharing of intelligence across what I call the intelligence enterprise, which I include in that the intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, is extremely important. I look forward to working with Director Haines on whether those mechanisms that are in place today to provide that information to Department of Homeland Security and others—

Senator MANCHIN. What seems to be the biggest obstacle, sir? I mean, it seems like it is common sense they would share freely, but then it is almost like it is, that is ours, not yours.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I think there are concerns about authorities when you start looking at—

Senator MANCHIN. Would it concern any leaks at all? Would they be concerned of leaks, if they are sharing it, it might be easier to be compromised?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I don't know if those are the concerns, but I do know, historically, there has been jurisdictional, law enforcement versus national security concerns that are there. I think the processes and the realization that we need to put those processes in place and do exactly what you are talking about, to have that smooth interconnectivity between the interagency, but more importantly, between the private sector and the public sectors are the realizations here. If confirmed, I would do all I can, because this something—

Senator MANCHIN. I appreciate that. I really do, and I think you are going to have to really go after it pretty hard and make sure they start working together so we do have one connected cyber preventive.

I want to talk about withdrawing assets from Afghanistan, and I am very much kind of concerned about this, and I have been concerned, and I have been thinking about it. You know, we want to make sure that we return all of our assets, if humanly possible, and those that we do not think that we need to return, should return, they are destroying. I guess my question would be, and I will start, Mr. McCord with you, with your recent position in the Department, are you satisfied with what you are seeing in the efforts that are being put forth, and do you believe that is the best policy for the United States of America, after all that we have spent, after all that we have endured, after all the blood that has been shed there by Americans, that on top of that now we destroy everything that we are leaving, to even make them think, "Who are these Americans? They have no value for anything whatsoever." So rather than having someone that might get use out of it, we just destroy it. Are we afraid it is going to get into the wrong hands, be-

cause I do not know who the right hands are over there. So I would assume it has all been the wrong hands. So why start destroying stuff now?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, when I left 4 years ago we were not in that position. I do not have current information. I am sorry. I would have to get briefed and get back to you on what is or is not being destroyed. I assume that there are some calculations being made about the cost of transporting something back versus—

Senator MANCHIN. I am just saying—okay, let me ask you, just in the hypothetical realm then, just your thought process. If you think you can speak out on this, do you think we should be destroying what is not economically feasible for us to return, just to destroy it for the sake of destroying it so no one else can use it? Because we are not in that area anymore. Are we afraid they are going to use it against us? If we turned everything over to the people that we do trust, or think we trust, shouldn't we leave it up to them then to make those decisions, so it is not a wasteful appearance?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, if I were confirmed and were part of these discussions it would certainly be a discriminator, in my view, as to whether, as I said, the asset had useful life, but also what its purpose was. I mean, I would make a different judgment on a truck versus munitions—

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Moultrie—

Mr. McCORD.—versus communications equipment.

Senator MANCHIN.—do you have any thought process on this?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, you know, I have read the media, and I would concur with Mr. McCord that there is a cost calculation that is probably being made there.

Senator MANCHIN. No, I understand that. But I am just saying, you know, I have seen the headlines here and everything the Associated Press put out there. It has the pictures, if you will, of all the things we destroyed in there. Here is the final thing. It says that, to those who are there at that base, they said, "What they are doing is a betrayal of Afghans. They should leave," said Mir. "Like they have destroyed this vehicle, they have destroyed us."

I am just saying, it has not been a successful 20 years, so we are back where we started, I guess. But on top of that, to see the Americans' mindset of assets and value and cost and things of that sort, I just don't know if it is doing that—I guess it is the same as interrogation. If you are interrogating someone, do you think the brutality of interrogation or trying to get them to have a comfort level to talk? Everyone has a different approach, I am sure.

This does not make any sense to me. It might above where you are. I do not want to put you in a position that causes a problem for your response, but I would like for everybody to think about that, because I tell you, it is something we should be thinking about, just for the sake of destroying something for what we have already invested in that area.

Thank you both. I appreciate it.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Blackburn, please.

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each of you for your time to be here. Mr. McCord, I so enjoyed



my conversation with you and talking about the Stennis Center and the work there. I enjoyed my time on their board.

Mr. Moultrie, we have talked some about China and the China threat. You and I discussed that on the phone. As we look at the cyberattack that we are currently enduring, I guess you would say, I would like for you to talk a little bit about how you would go about assessing the China threat in the non-INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] AORs [areas of responsibility]. Because we know this is global. You and I discussed Djibouti and the Horn of Africa and the way China is trying to play there.

So for the record, just a little bit about how you would handle that assessment in that non-INDOPACOM area.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, the Chinese ambitions, as we discussed, are global, and they are using economic coercion, these initiatives, the Road and Belt Initiative, and other financial inducements, if I can call them that, that lure countries in. They use vaccine diplomacy and a number of other things to spread their influence.

In terms of truly understanding how we ought to approach it, I think it is part academic, understanding the long-term goal of the Chinese. I have always said they play a long-term game. It is a society that is several thousand years old. They do not look at things necessarily the way we do.

Senator BLACKBURN. Right. The hundred-year marathon.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Exactly. That is exactly right.

Senator BLACKBURN. So you would assess it more on a long term?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I think that their ambitions are long-term ambitions.

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. I appreciate that. Let me ask you this. As we look at what transpired with the cyberattack, and we have a lot of small and mid-sized businesses that are contractors, so as you work with them, what would be your advice, and how would we share information with them to protect themselves from attack, as they are contracting with our U.S. military?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. I think you are hitting upon a key point here. The defense industrial base is particularly under attack by nation states and hacktivists and others. My understanding is that the intelligence and security organization has programs that enable it to go out and work with thousands of contractors, to provide them with the standards that they need and provide them with the oversight that they need to protect themselves.

I think that we have to continue to not only have those types of programs but the public-private partnerships that will enable us to share information with them, and the encouraging of these companies to understand the threat and to take good hygiene methods to protect themselves. If confirmed, I would devote myself to really pushing in that area, Senator.

Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. Mr. McCord, part of this would come to you, and working with some of our suppliers, and in the work that you would do in the Comptroller's Office. There is a lot of technology that could be utilized within DOD and that structure to achieve efficiencies and to build out securities. But that means we have got to go outside of DOD to do this.

So I would like for you, for the record, just to comment a little bit on achieving those efficiencies, and as you and I talked, I know we have talked a lot about the audit today, but the way we do purchasing and acquisitions is so broken. Having so many P-cards through the system, whether it is DOD or the VA, this leads to inefficiencies. So if you will just touch on this risk tolerance for utilizing new technologies and reforming the way we handle purchasing and acquisitions.

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, thank you. Yes, the Department has both a large, as you know, acquisition workforce and a fairly large financial management workforce, at about 50,000 people. There are a lot of players with responsibilities up and down the chain, and I take your point and I agree with you that we should look at ways that we could streamline and maybe have purchasing be at higher levels, or more efficiently structured.

We do have, for a variety of reasons, somewhat of a decentralized execution model in the Defense Department. Each state's National Guard has its own people responsible for its finances, for example. Every command has its own. That is something that, I agree, we should look at, whether modern technology allows us to streamline and centralize perhaps a little more, without losing the ability for someone on the ground to be able to raise their hand and solve a problem that they know about that somebody up here at headquarters does not.

Senator BLACKBURN. Well, indeed, there is room for improvements, and we hope that when it comes to the financial management and also the purchasing and acquisitions we can see some of that improvement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator Peters, please.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses, thank you.

Mr. Moultrie, the past year and a half has certainly reiterated the value of medical intelligence and the importance of expertise and the need to optimize our capabilities in that area. Some believe that the National Center for Medical Intelligence should be expanded and given increased visibility and influence. What are your thoughts on a potential expansion? Does that make sense to you, and if so, what should we be thinking about?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Sir, I am not familiar with the expansion plans right now for the medical center. I do believe that intelligence can play a role in helping us understand threats and, to use a term that is used elsewhere, enabling us to defend forward against these threats, such as pandemics, that may originate in a location overseas and then migrate to the United States. But I am not familiar with the expansion of the center, as you laid that out, sir.

Senator PETERS. Well, very well. That may mean my next question may not make a lot of sense, because based on your understanding, while there are folks that have thought of reorganizing out of the DIA, but it sounds as if you are not as familiar with this unit to make a—

Mr. MOULTRIE. I just have not been briefed on that, Senator. If confirmed, I would come back and give you my views on the expansion of that center and how that should be done.

Senator PETERS. Well, clearly medical intelligence is incredibly important, as we know, and so if confirmed, I would look forward to having an opportunity to sit down with you to discuss that further, and decide which is the best way to approach it.

Mr. Moultrie, my next question is related to a GAO study that found that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security is not well postured to assess effectiveness of the intelligence and security enterprises because it has, quote, "not defined goals, desired outcomes, and performance metrics." All the while the office has taken on, as you know, many more responsibilities over the past several years.

So my question to you is, in your view, is the office exceeding its capacity to effectively develop policy and also conduct oversight?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I have not been briefed on the specific metrics that exist in the office today and how those metrics are being collected, and more importantly, how they are being analyzed. So, if confirmed, I would need to come back and talk to you about that.

I will say that the oversight of the intelligence and security policies and practices would be my top concern. We have to ensure that we have effective, efficient processes in place, and if confirmed, you have my commitment to focus on this area and report back to you with my findings.

Senator PETERS. Very well. Mr. McCord, having served in senior leadership positions at the Comptroller Office for over 20 years, on the staff of the committee, you certainly are very qualified for this position. But my question is, how have you prepared for the addition of the former Chief Management Officer's duties, specifically those related to improving business processes?

Mr. MCCORD. Senator, as you know, the authorization bill terminated that position. I think that was a reasonable judgment by the Congress that it was time to try something new. Deputy Secretary Norquist, then-Deputy Secretary Norquist, set up a structure on his way out, to leave for this administration to fall in on, of how he would propose to divide up those duties, and, as you say, many of those would come to the Comptroller organization.

Should I be confirmed, one of my earliest tasks would be to sit down with Deputy Secretary Hicks, and as others are confirmed in that space, the CAPE Director, who has been nominated, and the Chief Information Officer I believe has not been nominated yet, all those players would have a role in the structure that Deputy Secretary Norquist left.

We need to examine, you know, what Deputy Secretary Hicks wants to do moving forward. My focus would be on whatever stays with Comptroller is to make the Department more effective, and I think we have doubled down to the point of maybe overdoing it over the last decade on trying to focus only on efficiency and cutting billets. I think we need to focus more on outcomes and effectiveness. If that role stays with Comptroller, I would need, if confirmed, to hire a somewhat different type of workforce and move them over, if they have not left the Department, from the CMO of-

fice. The Comptroller has budget analysts, which are not exactly the same as the program managers and program analysts we would need.

But I do look forward to working on that. I just would need to sit down with the Deputy Secretary and decide if she accepts or wants to modify the structure that Mr. Norquist left for us.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Peters, and for the benefit of my colleagues we have two votes scheduled to begin at 11:30, so I would ask if you could try your best to adhere to the 5-minute limit.

Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thanks for your service, and congratulations on your nominations.

Mr. McCord, I appreciated our discussion yesterday, and I know you have already talked about it, but I just want to reconfirm. You know, your work on the National Defense Strategy Commission I think is much appreciated. A lot of us have looked at the recommendations of that commission and have really guided us in a lot of what we have done here, in a bipartisan way, on the committee.

As you know, that commission focused on a 3 to 5 percent annual increase, and you mentioned to me yesterday you generally agreed with that. Is that correct?

Mr. McCORD. That is correct, that the commission felt, that I was part of, that that was an appropriate range for the Mattis strategy.

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, I certainly hope that, if confirmed, and I think it is very likely you will be, that you can continue to press for that, within the building, within the administration. I worry, and I know a number of us worry, the Biden administration has a lot of internal and external forces that want to dramatically cut defense spending, and I think this is not the time, it is not the place. I will not help our country. Going back to the last term of Obama-Biden, when defense spending was slashed by 25 percent, what do you think happened to readiness during that time?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, as you recall, readiness took a severe hit when the sequester was imposed. It took the services years to sort of dig out of that \$30-plus billion that we had to cut in just 6 months. The whole era of Budget Control Act, the sort of constraints of is the budget going to be up here, if sequester is not changed it is going to be down here, and then it would get negotiated in 2-year increments up to some number in between was a very suboptimal way to budget.

Senator SULLIVAN. So I think it is good if you can commit to this committee to be a voice on that.

You and I talked about this. I often give this book, and I am going to provide it to you here today, and we talked about it. This is a book by an Army officer called T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*. Most of the senior military, uniformed leaders in the Pentagon will have read it. It is a cautionary tale about what happens when you dramatically cut defense spending, this time in terms of the Korean War, and thousands of young Americans were killed be-

cause we could not stop a third-world peasant army in 1950, the North Korean Army, because we were not ready.

I would like you to have the book, take a look at it. But it is required reading in most services, and it talks about what happens when we are not ready. It is not just airplanes cannot fly. It is young Americans die, and we can never let that happen again. The Army talks about never again having what was called "Task Force Smith." That was the first unit that went to Korea, and they were pretty much destroyed.

Let me ask real quick again on the Arctic. You know, this committee, in a bipartisan way, has been very focused on our strategic interests there, the need to build up our forces there. The Secretary, Secretary Austin, the Deputy Secretary Hicks, have both committed to me, in their confirmations, to fully resource the new Arctic strategies that are coming from the services. Can I get your commitment on that as well.

Mr. McCORD. Yes, Senator. The Arctic has certainly elevated in importance in our thinking and in policy thinking. I would need to get more information in terms of how it has moved into a budgeting structure without a unified or sub-unified command, as most other ways that we focus have. But yes, I would fully support the strategies of the Secretary and the Deputy on the Arctic.

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you.

Mr. Moultrie, let me ask a question. This used to be so non-controversial that I would not even ask it. Now we are starting to get hesitation, kind of equivocating. The DIA official, when he was up for his confirmation a couple of weeks ago, in my view completely whiffed this question, which is a pretty much intel, National Security 101. Is it better for the United States' national security to be a major energy superpower? That means that we produce world record levels of oil, of gas, of renewables. We are now at that stage. Everybody used to say, "Of course, Senator, a net exporter of energy is critical." What is your view on that?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I believe if the United States can lower its dependence in almost any area, then we are a more secure nation. So I may have rephrased your statement somewhat—

Senator SULLIVAN. It is a good rephrasing, I would say.

Mr. MOULTRIE.—but that is the way I would look at it. We need to lower our dependencies across a number of areas and vectors.

Senator SULLIVAN. Say, Russian oil? Lower dependency of Russian oil? Is that a good thing?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I do not know what the ratio is today, but I would just say, in general, reducing dependencies as much as possible is important for our Nation.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Hawley, please.

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both the witnesses for being here. Mr. Moultrie, let me just start with you. The National Geospace Intelligence Agency in my home state, Missouri, in St. Louis, is going to be home to many of the agency's most advance capabilities. We are very proud of that. How do you see this campus, and, more broadly, the NGA contributing

to our efforts to maintain an intelligence advantage over China and Russia in the coming years?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, NGA plays a critical role, a critical role, and having campuses in different locations I think is important, for a lot of different reasons—to attract talent, for survivability reasons. There are just a number of reasons that we want to do that.

I was somewhat familiar with that when I was in a few years ago and was energized by it. So, if confirmed, I would continue to support that. I think there are a number of benefits of having campuses in different locations.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Let me ask you an ISR question. U.S. Central Command has regularly requested and received a preponderance of the Department's ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]. My own view is that is going to be hard to continue if we are going to be able to ensure that our forces in the Pacific and elsewhere have the ISR that they need to perform their critical missions.

So let me just ask you, if you are confirmed, how will you ensure that CENTCOM [United States Central Command] uses its in-theater ISR as effectively as possible so that it can do more with what it has and some of those other assets, other ISR assets, can be given back for other uses?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, as you know, ISR, there is an insatiable appetite for ISR, across the commands. I am not familiar with the specific CENTCOM usage rate today, but if confirmed, you have my commitment to ensure that we are getting the ISR capabilities to satisfy the critical needs of the commanders who need that capability.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Let me ask you about China and the situation with regard to Taiwan. Both DOD, the National Strategy Defense Commission, and others have been warning now for years about the growing threat of the Chinese fait accompli, with regard to Taiwan. One of the most important thing we need for deterring such an attack is timely indication and warning.

If you are confirmed, how will you ensure that the President, the Department leadership, and our forces in PACOM have as much warning as possible before any attempted fait accompli on the part of Chinese forces?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Senator, I think that the PACOM ability to do I&W [Intelligence and Warning] is just absolutely essential. I do not have the current laydown of the sensors that we have out there or the mechanisms for dissemination of real-time intelligence to the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] and others, but if confirmed, you would have my commitment to ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Center works with the DNI and others to look at what are laid out is across all the INTs to ensure that we can do that real-time indications, warning, and dissemination to the national command authority.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. McCord, let me ask you a little bit about the match between the Department strategy and the resources that are available to meet that strategy. My own concern is there appears to be a bit of a mismatch. On the one hand, we are withdrawing from Afghanistan, which will free up resources. I am 100 percent in favor of

that. I think that is good. On the other hand, the administration has indicated that we will retain most, if not all of our other defense commitments, and in some instances actually plus-up those commitments. The administration has also told the Department to prioritize additional missions like climate change and biological defense, and it has done all of the above while effectively cutting defense spending.

So my question is, what steps does the Department need to take in order to ensure that our strategic ends align with the means that are actually available to it?

Mr. McCORD. Senator, Secretary Austin is required, as all Secretaries are, by law, to develop a strategy, and I believe that effort is probably underway. If confirmed, I would look forward, as a senior leader, to being part of that review.

You are exactly right that the balancing is very much a key to what DOD is always trying to do, because you can have a top priority, a second priority. People expect the Department of Defense to do many things well. Readiness, as Senator Sullivan was saying, you know, there is sort of a floor there where it is not appropriate to send people out who are not trained.

So I think really the variables you need to look at the most are the size of the force. Do we have a force that is big enough to do what our strategy asks of it, but also not so big that we cannot afford to maintain it?

On some areas like climate change, I am hopeful, not being inside right now, that that can be accomplished by making sure that, you know, if you are going to recapitalize your infrastructure you are doing it in the smartest way, and that it is not necessarily a big addition of resources. I agree with you that Afghanistan should free up some resources that can be redirected to other uses, but we have, as you say, many competing demands that need to be balanced.

Senator HAWLEY. Very good. I have got another question or two for both of you. I will give those to you, though, for the record, because my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.

Senator ROSEN. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, and, of course, Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and, of course, to Mr. McCord and Mr. Moultrie for their willingness to serve and for being here today.

So I would like to talk a little bit about, of course we know about the Solar Winds attack, we know we have an attack workforce shortage, and our civilian cyber reserve. So, Mr. Moultrie, some experts are calling the SolarWinds attacks on networks of multiple government agencies and private companies the greatest act of cyber espionage to date in our history. As a nation, as we continue to grapple with the aftermath of this attack, the United States is expected to face a shortage of about 3.4 million skilled technical workers by next year, with particularly large gaps in the cybersecurity area.

So to address this shortfall and promote our cybersecurity workforce, Senator Blackburn and I recently introduced the Civilian Cybersecurity Reserve Act, to establish a civilian cyber reserve corps,

modeled after a recommendation from the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service report. According to the report, and I am going to quote, “A reserve program that permits agencies to call up cybersecurity experts could ensure additional cyber capacity at times of greatest need.”

So, Mr. Moultrie, of course in your written response to the committee you noted DOD’s challenges in this area, competitive requirements that we need. So given your experience, could a civilian cyber reserve corps really boost up what you do, especially if we had people who are former military personnel in that cyber corps as well, and would you work with me to just be sure that we are able to address these issues?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator, I agree wholeheartedly with your premise that we are faced with a shortage in skills, our STEM skills, especially cybersecurity. Other agencies have reserves that they use. When individuals retire or individuals leave they can join that reserve, if you will.

If confirmed, you have my commitment to working with you to explore this idea and to determine what we need to do to ensure that we have the skills that we need to support our needs across this and other areas.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. Well, I want to actually build upon the tech area, cyber area, and really talk about another point. The DOD inspector general noted that one of the top management challenges we have is sustaining our technological dominance, specifically in the areas of artificial intelligence and machine learning. These fields can really transform the kinds of work that we do, the information and knowledge that we have, and harnessing this technology is going to require continued collaboration between DOD and, again, private industry.

So, Mr. Moultrie, how would you guide DOD to continue to improve the public-private coordination in current and emergent technologies as AI becomes better and better, machine learning, all of those things?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator, as you know, much of the innovation that is done in a number of areas, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, is actually done in academia or it is done in the industrial base. We need to harness that. We need to ensure that we understand how it will change our future missions, and we need to understand how our adversaries will use it against us. So there is both a need to understand this so we can do our missions more effectively, and also to protect ourselves. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of National Intelligence and across the interagency to ensure that we are doing what we can to establish these public-private partnerships and to look at AI, ML [machine learning], and a number of other emerging technologies, Senator.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. Well, you know, we think about building our workforce, we think about the public-private partnerships, and all of that, but then we also have to cyber-collaborate with our allies, as we see attacks and threats, threat-hunting, as we see all of this around the world. So this is going to help us collectively with our allies to harden our own resources.



How would you enhance, Mr. Moultrie, our intelligence sharing and cooperation with our partners and allies around the world to execute, prevent, mitigate, recover from cyberattacks, and we just saw one on our pipelines this last week? They are going to keep coming, so we need to work with people around the world.

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. As you know, many of at least the detected cyberattacks that we see are coming from overseas locations, if you will. Our partners, our key allies and partners, actually in many instances are on the front end of detecting those, and they have tremendous expertise that can help us not only detect and analyze but also deter these threats. I believe that having those right coalition partners, having those right allies, and having those nation states that are allied with us to help us in this effort is absolutely critical, and you have my commitment to work with the DNI, and under the authorities granted to the Secretary of Defense, to build on the partnerships that we have, and if we need new ones, to explore new partnerships.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. My time has expired. I appreciate it.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me recognize Senator Kelly, please.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCord, I want to follow up a little bit on some of the discussion we had earlier about Defense Department audit, follow-up on Senator Kaine's question. I am not asking you to repeat something you have already gone through, so if that is the case and I was not in the room just please let me know.

But as we all know, the Defense Department has the distinction of being the only Federal agency that is yet to pass an annual financial audit. I am a strong supporter of our national defense—we spoke about this yesterday—and our military has to have the resources it needs to defend against the threats we face and to maintain our competitive advantage. But we also must ensure that taxpayer funds are used as accountably and as effectively as possible. This was an issue that was really important to one of the former Armed Services Committee chairman, and the man whose term I was sworn in, in December, to complete, Senator John McCain.

So, Mr. McCord, you have served in the Comptroller's Office before, and you understand these challenges. But I am looking for any other specifics that you might do or put into place to improve the Department's ability to pass an audit and ensure accountability to the taxpayer.

Mr. MCCORD. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I fully agree that this is an important effort for the Department to keep faith with the taxpayers. Over 40 percent of all individual tax receipts are consumed by the Department of Defense's budget, so it is a huge—I understand the responsibility we have to the taxpayer.

The Department has made considerable progress in the last 10 years, but unfortunately it is going to be a couple more before we get to that clean audit stage, that is the ultimate pass-fail, you know, mark on the wall. But as we have discussed throughout this hearing, I think, when we see, in particular, the cyberattacks and the importance of controlling your information, controlling access to your information, I think that is the key area I will be looking forward to, if confirmed, to getting with the staff and seeing how we

can press on that particular area. Even though there are other areas we also need to look at to pass the audit, ultimately I think that is the key leverage point in my mind, is getting the controls right, because the auditors keep noticing that we have more work to do on that front.

Senator KELLY. What do you envision as an optimistic timeline for getting this done?

Mr. McCORD. I understand that in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee within the last 2 or 3 weeks, the Department said 2027 or 2028 as their estimate. We did not have a timeline for a full Department audit when I left 4 years ago, so while I do not have the exact basis of the information that the Department used to come up with that figure, because it postdates my time with the Department, I would get with the audit staff very early, if confirmed, to assess what is the basis of that date and what can we do to try and move that to the left and accelerate it, if possible, and what are the key factors. Again, I think internal controls and information controls are, in my mind, the first thing I would want to look at.

Senator KELLY. Thank you.

Mr. Moultrie, I had the chance recently to visit the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca in Arizona. I am proud that we are training some of the finest intelligence professionals there in my state. Our 309th Military Intelligence Battalion supports a range of critical career fields, from human intelligence and interpreters to ground surveillance radar techs, and has provided critical skill sets in operations across the globe, from El Salvador to Afghanistan and South Korea.

Mr. Moultrie, as our Nation endures changing threats from near-peer competitors, can you speak to the importance of keeping our military intelligence capabilities sharp, and if confirmed, how will you ensure that military intelligence pipelines, like the Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, remain well-resourced and able to prepare our operators to address the range of emerging threats and technologies that they will face?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes, Senator. Our military intelligence capabilities are some of our longest-standing capabilities. You go back wars, if you will, and they are the foundation of the intelligence apparatus that we have today. So some of our Nation's best and brightest professionals have come from military intelligence, and they are the lifeline, if you will, of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

If confirmed, you have my commitment to not only continue to work across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to groom and grow and to support these individuals and to support bases like Fort Huachuca and others, but also to do what I can to ensure that we are providing the pipeline to bring new people in, to get them trained so they can be the intelligence professionals of the future. You have my commitment, if confirmed, Senator, to do that.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today, which was quite thoughtful and convincing. Thank you also for your distinguished service to the coun-

try over many, many years. Thank you again for your willingness to serve again.

I think it is only fitting, the final comment would be to once again to wish Mrs. Moultrie a happy 91st birthday.

With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to The Honorable Michael J. McCord by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

##### DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

10 U.S.C. 135

*Question.* Section 135 of title 10, U.S. Code, as implemented in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5118.03, prescribes the duties and powers of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)). Among such duties, the Under Secretary serves as the Department of Defense Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for purposes of sections 901–903 of title 31, U.S. Code, and performs the duties assigned in section 2222 of title 10.

In your view, what are the duties and powers of the Under Secretary most critical to the national defense at this time?

*Answer.* The duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) are described in section 135 of title 10 and in Section 902 of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act. It includes supporting the Secretary of Defense by advising on all financial management matters; overseeing the financial management activities of the Department to include establishing and supervising the execution of policies; developing and maintaining integrated agency accounting and financial management systems; supervising and directing the preparation of budget estimates of the Department of Defense; monitoring the financial execution of the budget including the approval of reprogramming requests for submission to the Congress; overseeing the preparation and submission of financial statements, and supporting the recruitment and training of the financial management workforce.

The most critical duties to the national defense at this time are preparing the budget to ensure the Department has the resources to accomplish its mission and using the financial statement audits to drive improvements in the Department's financial management activities, systems and reports.

*Question.* What do you believe are the most important duties and responsibilities of the CFO?

*Answer.* By designating the USD (Comptroller) as the CFO of the Department of Defense this specifically incorporates the responsibilities identified in the CFO Act. I included those responsibilities in my description of the duties and functions of the Comptroller because they are interconnected. However, to the extent that some see the term Comptroller as primarily relating to the budget, the addition of the title CFO highlights and emphasizes the responsibilities for accounting, financial systems, and internal controls. I believe that a major responsibility of the CFO over the next several years is to support the audits of the services and defense agencies and to develop, implement and oversee an effective process of fixing issues identified during the audit.

*Question.* If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense would require me to provide him expert and timely advice on all issues related to the budgetary and financial management of the Department. I also expect he would want me to ensure the men and women serving the Department of Defense would have the resources they need to support the President's National Defense Strategy. Finally, I believe the Secretary would expect the Comptroller and all senior DOD leaders to collaborate across their areas of specific statutory responsibility to provide him our best advice and to make the Department as effective as possible.

*Question.* If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as USD(C) fulfills the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

Answer. I believe in the bedrock American principle of civilian control of the military. That civilian control is central to the stability of our democracy. If confirmed, I will ensure this tenet is at the forefront of any internal or interagency interactions, and in engagements with the U.S. Congress. Although resources are obligated by both military and civilian personnel across the Department, the requirement for a Senate-confirmed Comptroller of the Department, and of the assistant secretaries for financial management of the military departments, ensures that the ultimate control of and responsibility for the expenditure of DOD resources rests with civilian leaders accountable to the President, the Secretary, and the Congress.

*Question.* If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller?

Answer. If confirmed, I would partner with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller to ensure that the duties required of our office are met. The Deputy Comptroller should be capable at any time of carrying out the responsibilities of the Comptroller if necessary. Duties assigned to the Deputy, which would be determined based on her/his experience and skills, could include developing or overseeing plans for remediation of issues identified during the financial audit, or leadership of some management or performance improvement functions that may be newly assigned to the Comptroller organization. Finally, the Deputy might be assigned leadership of specific emerging projects that I cannot predict at this time, similar to my role in managing the Department's Recovery Act programs when I served as Deputy Comptroller.

*Question.* If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of Defense to enhance the efficiency and performance of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the two Defense Agencies under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary?

Answer. I believe building and leading high performing teams requires excellent communication and transparency. If confirmed, I will emphasize these characteristics and will look for opportunities to improve the overall efficiency and performance of the Comptroller team to ensure we are as effective as possible. I would also look for opportunities to expand the progress and power of data analytics that the office has made in recent years.

#### QUALIFICATIONS

*Question.* Section 135 further provides that the USD(C) shall be appointed from among persons who have significant budget, financial management, or audit experience in complex organizations.

What significant experience and education do you possess in the domains of budget, financial management, and/or the audit of complex organizations?

Answer. I believe that my previous experience from 2009 to 2017 as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) demonstrates my qualification for this position. I am intimately familiar with the budgetary and financial issues that pertain to the Department.

I also served for 24 years in the legislative branch, including for 21 years as a Professional Staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee overseeing the DOD budget and providing expert analysis on issues such as funding overseas contingency operations, the fiscal impact of legislation, reprogramming of funds to meet emerging needs, questions of fiscal law and financial management, the analysis of alternative courses of action with respect to specific programs, and knowledge of the federal budget process.

*Question.* In particular, what leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as USD(C) if confirmed?

Answer. I believe my previous leadership and management experience serving as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will allow me to once again be successful in this role.

*Question.* Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and execute the powers of the USD(C)?

Answer. Although I have previously served as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the vast breadth of the Department's programs and policies require me to constantly enhance my expertise as they relate to the Department's budget and financial management issues.

#### RELATIONSHIPS

*Question.* Describe the relationship you would foster, if confirmed as the USD(C), with the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, particularly in light of the independence and direct reporting relationships and responsibilities accorded to the Director in law.

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will coordinate and work closely with the Director for Cost, Assessment and Program Evaluation in providing advice, assessments, and options to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. CAPE, Comptroller, and Policy have always been strong partners in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process and I do not expect that to change.

*Question.* If confirmed, on what projects would you expect to collaborate with the Director?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with the Director to ensure that a robust and successful program/budget review is conducted and that our programs are aligned with and managed in accordance with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary's guidance. I would, if confirmed, also expect to explore opportunities to improve the quality and consistency of our data for budget and cost accounting purposes, and, in concert with other senior leaders under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, to develop a plan to re-engineer the management and performance improvement functions that were formerly assigned to the Chief Management Officer.

*Question.* Describe the relationships you would foster, if confirmed as the USD(C), with the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and the Military Department and Fourth Estate Budget Directors.

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments and the Fourth Estate Budget Directors in the development and execution of budgetary matters, fiscal policy, and initiatives of the President and the Secretary of Defense. During my previous tenure as Comptroller, it was my practice to meet at least once each week with the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments to synchronize our efforts, and it would be my plan to continue that partnership if confirmed.

*Question.* On what projects would you expect to collaborate with these officials?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Assistant Secretaries and Fourth Estate Budget Directors in contributing to the successful development and implementation of effective DOD policies and programs and management of the defense budget, to include development of the budget, execution reviews and reprogramming requests, management of our internal controls and financial audit efforts, and programs for the development of the financial management workforce.

*Question.* Describe the relationship you would foster, if confirmed as the USD(C), with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will, in coordination where appropriate with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, work very closely with the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and with the Program Associate Director for National Security, and foster a relationship of cooperation and transparency.

*Question.* If confirmed, on what projects would you expect to collaborate with the Director?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will interact with the Office of Management and Budget on the preparation and execution of the Department's budgets, on reprogramming requests, on legislative requests, on the financial audit, and the advancement of both the Administration's and the Department's management priorities. I will work with the Director to assess the Department's topline requirements and ensure that the President's national security priorities are appropriately reflected in the annual budget request.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take to develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between Congress—the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees, in particular—and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) and the Defense Agencies subject to your authority, direction, and control?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will commit to working with the Armed Services and Appropriations committees to resolve any matter relating to the authorization or appropriation of the Department's funding. I will continue to respect the prerogatives of the Department's oversight committees, and will work closely with the committees, through open and honest communication, to achieve a consensus necessary to meet our defense needs.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* What are the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)?

*Answer.* The USD (Comptroller) faces a number of ongoing challenges. The first is developing defense budgets that are consistent with the Department's mission of protecting the vital interests of the United States. The second challenge is the audit. The Department must use the audit to drive effective corrective action plans. The

audit will provide a baseline of the current financial management status, and it will take time and consistent attention to implement the corrective actions necessary to achieve a clean opinion. The third challenge is to continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department. The fourth challenge is to continue workforce development. The Department's success with the budget, the audit and implementing reforms depends in large part on the skill set and experience of the DOD financial management workforce.

*Question.* If confirmed, specifically what management actions would you take, and in what order of priority, to address each of these challenges?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and other leaders across the Department and within the OUSD (Comptroller) to tackle these challenges head on. For the budget I would use the PPBE process as a means to develop and justify a defense budget that supports the President's and the Secretary's vision. For the audit I would begin by reviewing the status of existing DOD efforts to assess key leverage points that could be used to accelerate the process. On defense reform, I would look for ways to continue and expand the reform effort through the Comptroller organization. Developing and sustaining a professional financial management workforce is the foundation for meeting each of these challenges. DOD has a strong program already in place and I would look to build on that existing program.

#### 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS)

*Question.* The 2018 NDS outlines that the United States faces a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism.

Are the programs and resources required to generate the capabilities necessary to implement the NDS properly prioritized in the DOD the budget?

*Answer.* I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year 2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to ensure all programs and resources are properly prioritized to support the President's strategy and manage advanced and persistent threats.

*Question.* Are there areas in which the budget is not aligned with the NDS?

*Answer.* I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the alignment of the budget with the President's strategy and any new strategic guidance documents produced by the Administration.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you realign or refocus DOD programs and funding, if at all?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the Department is preparing to initiate a National Defense Strategy review to ensure DOD's strategic priorities are properly aligned to the President's interim National Security Strategic Guidance. If confirmed, I intend to play an active role in the review and implementation of any necessary realignment of DOD resources.

*Question.* Are we properly resourcing those capabilities that have been established since the release of the 2018 NDS (e.g., U.S. Space Force)?

*Answer.* I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to ensure proper resourcing of the capabilities that will determine our military and national security advantage in the future.

*Question.* If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you recommend to the Secretary of Defense regarding DOD's resourcing and implementation of the 2018 NDS?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I intend to play an active role in the review and recommendation of any necessary resource revisions or adjustments required to implement the President's strategy.

In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

*Question.* Do you believe that 3–5% real budgetary growth through the FYDP is required to implement the 2018 NDS effectively? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* As the commission stated, that resource level was illustrative of what was needed for the 2018 NDS. Secretary Austin is required by law to update that strategy in the coming months. If confirmed, my goal will be to use the resources available to the Department wisely to realize the strategic aims of the Department as identified in Secretary Austin's review and ensure the Nation has the military technologies and capabilities to compete and win. Under any resourcing level, the Department must balance readiness, force structure, and modernization while pur-

suings savings through critical reviews of ongoing missions and activities, and the phasing out of systems and approaches developed for an earlier era.

*Question.* Under the funding levels specified in the President's budget request for fiscal year 2022, does DOD have adequate resources to implement the 2018 NDS and other national defense priorities? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe budgets should match resources to strategic national priorities and must strive to maximize our capabilities. At the same time, budgets for any agency, including DOD, are subject to fiscal realities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to set priorities and make hard choices to deter conflict and strengthen our competitive military edge. While I have not seen the specifics of the FY 2022 budget, which has not yet been released, I believe the Department should be able to carry out its missions with a properly balanced program at the announced funding level.

*Question.* What types of resource shortfalls are likely to hamper DOD's execution of the 2018 NDS and other national defense priorities, in your view?

*Answer.* There will always be fiscal constraints largely brought on by unforeseen events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the scope of the challenges we face, Congress and the Department will need to work together to make some hard choices.

*Question.* In your opinion, in what areas of the implementation of the 2018 NDS is the Department taking the most risk in terms of resources allocated?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with other senior DOD leaders to review the allocation of resources to help the Secretary ensure that resources are matched to strategic national priorities and will work with Congress to identify and mitigate risk.

*Question.* If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of DOD funding going forward?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the Department's funding by our ability to defend this Nation—to execute our chosen strategy, maintain the Nation's technological edge, preserve the health of the joint force, and provide options to the President that support his foreign policy and national defense goals.

#### POST-BUDGET CONTROL ACT AND THE OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OCO) ACCOUNT

*Question.* The FY 2022 budget request will be the first to be unconstrained by the statutory caps of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account has been debated for several years, primarily because OCO dollars were exempt from the caps of the BCA and some charged that DOD was using OCO as a "slush fund" for base budget requirements.

What are your views about the use of the OCO account in the Department of Defense's annual budgeting?

*Answer.* It is imperative that adequate resources are available to support U.S. troops deployed to combat or combat support locations around the world. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget has been a useful tool for the Department of Defense, and the Congress, to provide this critical funding in a transparent manner.

*Question.* Should DOD continue to use the OCO account?

*Answer.* It is my understanding, based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Summary of the President's Discretionary Funding Request, dated April 9, 2021, that the Administration intends to discontinue requests for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as a separate funding category. I believe that this is appropriate, assuming an appropriate transfer of funding for enduring programs into the base budget. With the drawdown in troops from Afghanistan, the vast majority of remaining efforts will be enduring requirements and should fold into the base budget for better long-term planning.

*Question.* If DOD continues to use the OCO account, will you commit, if confirmed, to update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be covered by OCO, in accordance with section 1524 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2018?

*Answer.* It is my understanding, based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Summary of the President's Discretionary Funding Request, dated April 9, 2021, that the Administration intends to discontinue requests for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as a separate funding category. If confirmed, however, I would look forward to working with the congressional defense oversight committees and the OMB to support discussions on funding criteria for current or future contingencies.

*Question.* How should the Department seek to account for its supplemental or emergency budgetary needs and how should the Department identify and account for conflict-related funding?

*Answer.* It is important that the Department of Defense (DOD) retain some budget flexibility to deal with unforeseen or emergent needs, especially given the uncertainty of world events. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that we have adequate funding tools to support U.S. troops and DOD missions worldwide. Ultimately the Department can only address such needs with the support of Congress.

*Question.* In addition to passing spending bills on time, what more can Congress do, in your view, to afford DOD the resource stability and flexibility it needs?

*Answer.* Beyond the significant budgetary challenges that repeated and lengthy continuing resolutions create for the Department, timely congressional review and approval of reprogramming requests and funding notifications is critical to the Department's operations. In addition, it is important that the Congress provides an adequate level of general transfer authority, especially with the elimination of the OCC account and the likely elimination of the special transfer authority. This transfer authority provides critical budget flexibility to deal with emergent needs without requiring additional resources.

*Question.* Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not later than 10 days after the President's submission of the defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that lists his or her unfunded priorities, including military construction projects.

If confirmed, would you support the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities lists to Congress in a timely manner?

*Answer.* Yes, I would support the submission of unfunded priorities lists as required by law.

*Question.* If confirmed, would you ensure adherence to the restrictions placed upon the National Guard unfunded priorities list as specified in Section 1006 of the NDAA for FY 2021?

*Answer.* Yes, I would recommend the Chief of the National Guard Bureau follow the law.

#### ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT

*Question.* The USD(C) is charged to maintain effective control and accountability over the use of all financial resources of the Department. Such responsibilities necessarily include ensuring DOD-wide compliance with the laws and regulations governing the obligation and expenditure of federal funds. On April 27, 2020, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) submitted to the Senate its compilation of Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) reports submitted by federal agencies for FY 2019. The ADA prohibits federal agencies from obligating or expending federal funds in advance or in excess of an appropriation, and from accepting voluntary services. The GAO report for FY 2019 comprised nine reports of ADA violations, four of which derived from DOD.

What is your level of confidence that DOD has in place the policies and procedures to ensure the identification of all potential ADA violations?

*Answer.* I am confident that DOD has robust policies and procedures to ensure the defense agencies and military departments can detect potential ADA violations, however I believe all processes can benefit from ongoing reviews.

*Question.* What are your ideas for better preventing ADA violations from occurring in DOD and for identifying, and correcting them sooner?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure the Department includes a full understanding of the requirements of the ADA as a focus area during annual reviews and financial manager training, with an emphasis on promptly and accurately recording obligations.

#### 10 U.S.C. 2222—IMPROVEMENT AND INTEGRATION OF PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION

*Question.* Earlier this year, GAO again designated DOD's business systems modernization program and DOD Financial Management operations as "high risk."

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to improve financial management systems so that GAO can remove them from the "high risk" category during your term in office?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts focused on streamlining and simplifying our IT environment. By consolidating systems into a modern IT environment supported by streamlined processes, the Department will reduce hours spent on



manual processes and rework, better visibility to funds execution, and have the ability to accurately portray its financial position. I have not yet been able to review the latest state of the Department's financial management systems but, if confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to review and improve them.

*Question.* DOD still lacks consistent financial data elements and definitions that would enable it to accurately compile data across the Department and compare costs across different programs and organizations. Critical information on program performance is maintained in one-off local systems that do not feed into the Department's official records.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to establish a common, enterprise-wide "dictionary" of financial data elements and their definitions to be applied across DOD?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will promote the use and refinement of the Standard Financial Information structure (SFIS) across the Department. SFIS is intended to standardize financial reporting and enable revenues and expenses to be reported by programs that align with major goals, rather than basing reporting only on appropriation categories.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take or direct to link financial data and information to performance monitoring and measurement mechanisms, so as to enable improved decision making about the Department's programs and investments?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will promote the use of SFIS as a key enabler of linking financial data with performance monitoring, encourage the components to manage their balance sheet as one of their key metrics, and expand the use of data analytics.

*Question.* If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that, as appropriate, timely access to all financial datasets is provided to all components of the DOD?

*Answer.* Ensuring that timely access to all financial datasets is provided to all Components of the DOD will be one of the primary benefits of our system standardization and consolidation initiatives. If confirmed, I will review what actions, if any may be necessary to support these efforts.

*Question.* In your view, what specific actions are required to implement consistent accounting approaches across DOD, with a view to enabling the assignment of "whole of Department" costs to programs and organizations, and to setting accurate prices for reimbursable activities?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will encourage Components to directly trace and report the full costs of outputs wherever feasible and practical. This will require Components to improve their ability to account for interdepartmental costs and transactions. A shift toward automation in reconciliations will be necessary as opposed to tedious and resource-intensive manual reconciliations.

#### AUDIT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

*Question.* 2020 was the 30th anniversary of the passage of the Chief Financial Officer's Act, which mandated that federal agencies complete financial audits. DOD is the only federal agency unable to complete a financial audit in accordance with the law, despite having invested billions of dollars over the past decades to do so. In FY 2020, DOD completed a comprehensive audit and received a Disclaimer of Opinion.

In your view, how, if at all, do the audit and its remediation activities support the 2018 NDS?

*Answer.* The audit and its remediation activities highlight and validate areas for improvement in DOD's internal controls and processes. As the DOD remediates audit findings and improves its overall financial management processes and information, decision makers will have better access to reliable and timely information. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in the DOD to use one source of financial data for both financial statement preparation and investment decision making. This will emphasize the importance of reliable financial information and will directly link performance and financial management.

*Question.* What challenges are unique to conducting an audit of DOD?

*Answer.* The size and complexity of DOD affects the timeliness in which we are able to get to a clean audit opinion. DOD is larger, in terms of assets and resources, than any organization which has gotten a clean audit opinion. The Department's mix of classified and unclassified transactions and multiplicity of "feeder" systems that contain information auditors need to verify have also been challenges.

*Question.* If confirmed, how do you plan to overcome those challenges to ensure that the Department continues to make demonstrable progress towards a clean audit opinion?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I look forward to working to use the notices of findings and recommendations (NFRs) to target, track and hold the appropriate individuals accountable for the timely implementation of corrective action plans. I will direct my leadership team to track and analyze audit findings by Component, as they are issued, and to closely monitor metrics to quantify our progress and assess remaining levels of effort to receive a positive opinion.

*Question.* How would you characterize the progress made since the change in strategy to begin audits despite the Department not being audit-ready?

*Answer.* I believe the progress being made is encouraging. However, we still have a lot of work to do collectively as a Department. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to undergo full financial statement audits and uses auditor feedback to identify areas that need corrective actions or further audit remediation work.

*Question.* In what year do you expect the Department as a whole to receive a modified audit opinion?

*Answer.* At this point, I can't say, but if confirmed, I will ensure the Department has actionable and achievable plans in place to keep making progress toward an audit opinion.

*Question.* In what year do you expect the Department as a whole to receive an unmodified audit opinion?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will be committed to this process and work to implement practical and pragmatic corrective action plans for the financial management and operations of the Department. The changes required are complex and we fully expect that progress will steadily continue.

*Question.* What metrics should the Congress be tracking to monitor the continuous progress of the Department towards achieving an unmodified audit opinion?

*Answer.* Congress can track the following metrics to monitor progress toward DOD achieving an unmodified opinion:

- Resolution or downgrade of prior year material weaknesses.
- Closure of notices of findings and recommendations (NFRs) identified as contributing to material weaknesses.
- Composition of NFRs by Component in regards to new versus reissued.
- Status of Component audit opinion progression on a year-over-year basis

*Question.* If confirmed, would you direct the Military Services, Defense Agencies, and Field Activities to develop their own individual schedules for achieving a clean audit for their own organizations and metrics to track their progress towards that goal?

*Answer.* Each reporting entity under standalone audit with a disclaimer audit opinion is maintaining an audit roadmap. Each audit roadmap details corrective action completion dates by fiscal year and financial statement line item or audit focus area. If confirmed, I will continue to utilize these roadmaps to track progress by Component toward significant milestones and hold the appropriate individuals accountable for the achievement of these milestones in a timely manner.

*Question.* If so, what would you do to ensure compliance with your directive?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will look forward to working with the Military Service Secretaries and Component leadership to review audit finding metrics and progress toward the development, implementation and auditor validation of closure of these findings

*Question.* In your view, what incentives need to be in place to ensure senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the financial management community—are fully invested and engaged in the process of achieving a clean audit opinion?

*Answer.* It would be very valuable to have a range of tools and incentives in place to build and sustain senior leadership support and accountability for achieving a clean audit opinion. I am not aware of all the tools currently in use in the Department or how effective they are. Should I be confirmed, I would make it a priority to examine these options and provide my recommendations to the Committee. Having senior executive performance plans depend in part on audit efforts has been one such tool that should be reviewed.

*Question.* Are those incentives currently in place in the Department?

*Answer.* I am not aware of all the tools currently available to the Department or how effective they are. Should I be confirmed, I would make it a priority to examine these options and provide my recommendations to the Committee.

*Question.* What disincentives or structural impediments, if any, preclude or hamper such senior leader engagement, in your view, and what can be done to eliminate such impediments?

Answer. I am not currently aware of any specific structural impediments. However, senior leaders in the Department always have many competing priorities for their time and attention, and as with any large, complex organization, there is always the risk of certain capabilities or solutions becoming siloed, but I believe our financial reporting, property and IT functional councils will continue to play an effective role in encouraging cross-cutting solutions and breaking down organizational silos. If confirmed, I will look to eliminate any impediments to senior leader engagement.

*Question.* Specifically, what measures should be used to hold senior leaders accountable if they do not meet statutory deadlines for DOD auditability?

Answer. Audit metrics intended to track audit opinion progression can be used to hold senior personnel accountable in future performance evaluations. I think you can and should expect to see significant progress toward addressing and resolving audit findings from previous years.

USD(C) leads the ADVANA (Advanced Analytics) effort for the entire Department of Defense. This effort, begun in support of the audit, has made significant progress in moving the Department toward modern data management practices.

*Question.* What do you view as the main challenges and opportunities in moving toward improved usage of data in decision-making?

Answer. Among the data challenges that the Department needs to address is the fact that the Department has old systems that make it difficult to access data of good quality in a timely manner, and the DOD has a ways to go in cultivating a data culture that attracts the right skills. If confirmed, I will be working with the DOD CIO, CDO, and other senior leaders to implement the DOD Data Strategy in order address these challenges. It is my understanding that the Department is making progress and I look forward to engaging directly to help build on that progress.

*Question.* How do you view the relationship between USD(C) and the DOD Chief Data Officer in managing ADVANA?

Answer. As I understand it, the roles of the CDO and USD(C) are complementary and critical to implementing the DOD Data Strategy. Both offices share a clear focus on improving the Department's use of data to drive better decisions and outcomes. The CDO provides the strategy, policy, and guidance for data management practices. The USD(C) is the primary lead for the financial statement audit, and the Department has seen success in using the audit as a lever for operationalizing good enterprise data management. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure we are leveraging both the USD(C) and CDO's skills and missions to promote the use of data and analytics across the Department.

Some commentators have asserted that efforts to achieve a clean audit opinion on DOD financial statements may be not be the best use of limited resources in a time of constrained budgets.

*Question.* Do you agree with this assertion? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The value of the audit is not so much in DOD being able to say it has a clean audit opinion, but in the audit recommendations that bring insight into how the Department can improve its operations. The audit can improve the Department's operations on many levels—in the form of more reliable information for decision-making, improved inventory management, and cybersecurity. With time, I expect that the value and contributions that flow from the audit will grow.

#### THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION (PPBE) PROCESS

*Question.* In 1961, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara created the framework of the current PPBE process. As the core decision making process by which DOD decides how and on what it spends its money, the PPBE process operates to connect strategic objectives with resources. The USD(C) is charged to administer and provide analysis for the budgeting and execution phases of DOD's PPBE process, as well as to make recommendations on matters relating to the planning and programming phases of the PPBE process.

Do you believe the current PPBE process is adequately connected to implementation of the 2018 NDS?

Answer. PPBE, if implemented as envisioned, allows for a strategy driven and structured approach to ultimately building a budget that aligns with the Department's strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSDC continually emphasizes and assesses NDS alignment throughout the PPBE interactions.

*Question.* In your view, do the DOD Components (particularly OSD) have the human and automated analytic decision support capability and capacity to facilitate informed strategic decision making in a relevant timeframe?

Answer. DOD has a very experienced, dedicated workforce capable of facilitating informed strategic decision making. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure

we are leveraging both the skills and missions to promote the use of data and analytics to improve and accelerate the decision making process across the Department.

*Question.* Do you believe that the PPBE process accords too much weight to Military Service priorities, rather than to Departmental priorities?

Answer. I believe PPBE allows for an appropriate balance of all stakeholder views. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the future joint requirements are assessed and considered for funding.

*Question.* In your view, are Combatant Commanders' priorities adequately reflected in the PPBE process?

Answer. Combatant Commanders, in general, do not control resources in the PPBE process the way the military services do, so their roles are significantly different. That said, all parties have a voice and the opportunity to participate, and Combatant Commander priorities are afforded ample opportunity to influence the Service and Department-level PPBE development process.

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes would you make, if any, to the PPBE process to improve both resourcing decisions within DOD and information flow about those decisions to the Congress?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Deputy Secretary and other Department leaders to ensure that the PPBE process aligns resources to the defense strategy. This includes identifying analytically-informed strategic choices about the size and shape of the future force. Communication with Congress is critical to ensuring our Nation's defense needs are met. If confirmed, I will review the Department's communication process on budgetary decisions with the intent to ensure information flow to the Congress is both timely and effective.

*Question.* In your view, is there value in the Department, the Congress, or an independent commission conducting a holistic review and reform of the PPBE process? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The PPBE process provides an effective, neutral, and open framework to allow the leadership of the Department to make well-informed choices about resource allocation in support of the Department's strategic priorities. I am committed to ensuring this process works effectively and, if confirmed, will seek to make any necessary adjustments to meet the Nation's defense needs. I would look forward, if confirmed, to working with the congressional defense committees or others to review the PPBE process for potential improvements.

Some commentators have observed that in matters related to the realignment of strategic objectives with resources via the PPBE process, DOD's size, structure, and culture favor the "status quo."

*Question.* Do you agree with this assessment? Please explain your answer.

Answer. In my experience, the PPBE process demands rigor in program decisions, which may require time to accomplish. However, over time the Department can shift resources toward strategic ends. The Department must also closely work with Congress to gain support for the proposed strategic shifts in resources. Any tendency to favor the status quo is, in my view, not specific to or a direct result of the PPBE process.

*Question.* Can the PPBE cycle iterate fast enough to respond to changes in strategic or programmatic direction, in your view? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I believe the PPBE process is flexible enough to react to changing strategic or programmatic direction. Leadership priorities and attention are essential to full implementation of strategic direction. I also believe it's important to have a rigorous assessment of options and analytic underpinning for strategic shifts. The PPBE process is only the internal portion of the larger federal budget process and any analysis of the speed or efficacy of our budget process should, in my view, look at all parts of the budget process.

*Question.* In your view, is the PPBE process flexible enough to enable DOD to make programmatic changes within the annual budget cycle?

Answer. Yes, the PPBE process is flexible enough to react to urgent programmatic changes within the budget cycle. However, the greater the change being contemplated, the more of a challenge implementing that change will be, in both the internal (PPBE) and congressional review phases of the budget process.

*Question.* In your view, would DOD benefit, particularly in relation to implementation of the NDS, if the obligation availability of Operation and Maintenance funds were changed? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes, I think extending the availability of some portion of Operation and Maintenance funds would provide additional flexibility to deal with emergent requirements at the start of a new fiscal year as well as the loss of funds resulting from operational changes late in a fiscal year. In addition, this may help in eliminating the "use it or lose it" mind set and result in better decisions by financial managers throughout the year.

*Question.* Given the frequency of continuing resolutions, at least for some part of each fiscal year, would DOD benefit from the authority to “carryover” some percentage of Operation and Maintenance funds from year to year?

*Answer.* Yes, it’s my understanding that some domestic agencies have authority to keep up to 50 percent of unobligated Operation and Maintenance balances available for an additional fiscal year, and this would certainly be beneficial to the DOD.

*Question.* Are there other flexibilities of this sort for other appropriations that you would recommend?

*Answer.* Flexibility would also be useful for portions of the military personnel appropriations such as permanent change of station (PCS) moves, which peak in the last quarter of the fiscal year (summer months) and are frequently impacted by unforeseen operational changes. Some similar carryover authority might also be beneficial with respect to the costs of reserve component drill costs, which can sometimes be difficult to predict precisely. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing recommended flexibilities with the Defense Committees.

*Question.* Nearly a decade ago, Congress changed the Department of Veterans Affairs health care budget to comprise both regular current-year and advance appropriations.

In your view, would DOD benefit in moving to a similar system for at least some portion of the defense budget?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would want to consult with appropriate financial managers in the Department of Veterans Affairs to learn their assessment of the impact of this change. If VA can show clear advantages, then DOD might well benefit in moving to a similar system for the Defense Health Program portion of the budget.

*Question.* If so, which portion(s) of the budget would be best suited to such an approach, and why?

*Answer.* The Defense Health Program budget is the best suited to such an approach. Much like the VA health appropriation, DOD produces health care through organic clinics and hospitals as well as the private sector health care network. Health care demand can vary widely from year-to-year and allocating single year discretionary funding for health care often places significant risk on non-health defense priorities to ensure DOD can continue to deliver care. Use of “advanced appropriations” similar to the VA process that estimates health care requirements for the following two fiscal years, would allow DOD to spread the risk for health care delivery across multiple fiscal years while more efficiently using resources for both health and non-health defense priorities.

#### THE DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT WORKFORCE

*Question.* The USD(C) is charged to provide guidance and oversight of the recruiting, retention, training, and professional development of the DOD financial management workforce.

If confirmed, how would you assess the quality of the DOD financial management workforce?

*Answer.* It is hard to know from outside the organization. However, should I be confirmed, I will be uniquely positioned to assess the quality of the DOD financial management workforce by evaluating improvements in auditability and associated processes since I last held the position, and by evaluating the status of the Department’s financial management workforce development program, which should now be at an appropriate level of maturity to judge its efficacy. Reviewing such metrics, audit results, and major program improvements will provide a sense of overall capability.

*Question.* How can the DOD financial management workforce best be developed?

*Answer.* It is important to maintain an agile and responsive DOD financial management workforce capable of meeting tomorrow’s mission. If confirmed, I hope to accomplish this with regular requirement scans and workforce health assessments to identify capability and skill gaps, as well as to stay ahead of emergent workforce trends. Ensuring access to the right tools and resources (to include training, professional development, networking and collaboration) will better enable the DOD FM workforce to fill capability gaps and reach individual and organization goals.

*Question.* What role can exchange programs with industry or partnerships with educational institutions play in developing the DOD financial management workforce?

*Answer.* I believe that exchange programs with industry or partnerships with educational institutions can play a beneficial role in developing the DOD financial management workforce. Exposure to industry and academic institutions increases innovation, thought leadership, and collaboration, allowing DOD participants to test new

concepts/approaches and return to DOD as improved critical thinkers and innovative problem solvers.

*Question.* Is the DOD financial management workforce properly sized, in your view?

Answer. I cannot say at this point, however, if confirmed, I will be uniquely positioned to assess the size of the DOD financial management workforce and determine if there are any efficiencies to be gained through automation and process improvements.

*Question.* Does the DOD financial management workforce have the appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly distributed, in your view?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether the financial management workforce has the appropriate capabilities, and work with the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments to ensure that those capabilities are distributed properly in order to meet mission requirements. I believe ongoing evaluation will be necessary to identify emergent trends and deficiencies.

*Question.* What else would you do, if confirmed, to improve the capacity and capability of the DOD financial management workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the capacity and capability of the DOD financial management workforce and of its workforce development programs. I will look for any lessons learned during the pandemic and review current processes and available technology to identify efficiencies to be gained through automation.

*Question.* Do you believe the OUSD(C) and the DOD financial management workforce have the capability and capacity to assume the additional duties assigned to them by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Norquist after the statutory dissolution of the Chief Management Officer? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I understand Deputy Secretary Hicks has begun or will soon begin a review of those initial decisions and assess the best placement of all OCMO functions. If confirmed, I will be prepared to participate in those deliberations. Depending on which, if any, of such management functions were assigned to the Comptroller organization, I believe additional personnel with different skill sets, such as program management rather than budget analysis backgrounds, might need to be hired or transferred to the Comptroller organization.

*Question.* When you were last serving as the USD(C), the Department created a new professional certification process for the DOD financial management workforce.

In your judgement, how does the financial management certification program improve the Department's ability to produce a professional and capable financial management workforce?

Answer. In my judgement, the DOD Financial Management Certification Program improves the Department's ability to produce a professional and capable financial management (FM) workforce by ensuring the proficiency baseline necessary to maintain a competent and ready FM workforce, and establishes a framework to guide DOD FM professional development. It provides a consistent, disciplined approach to ensure appropriate training in key areas such as DOD audit and remediation, fiscal law, and ethics.

*Question.* What performance metrics associated with the financial management certification program demonstrate the program's effectiveness and utility?

Answer. As I understand it, the Department has metrics in place to measure the percentage of the financial management (FM) workforce who are compliant in their certification and continuing education and that metric is part of the Department's annual performance plan. If confirmed, I will review the current performance indicators and determine if there are initiatives we can pursue to increase the utility of the program.

*Question.* How does the DOD financial management certification compare to other government financial management credentials (e.g., Certified Defense Financial Manager)?

Answer. The mission of the FM Certification Program is to develop and maintain a competent FM workforce with the baseline knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviors necessary to successfully perform FM occupational functions. DOD's internal program was intended to complement, not replace or displace, the CDFM program. If confirmed, I would review the degree to which these programs overlap or complement each other.

#### DEFENSE AGENCIES

The USD(C) is charged to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and performance of the Defense Agencies subject to the Under Secretary's authority, direction, and control, and is accountable to the Secretary of Defense for the mission performance of such agencies.

## DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY (DCAA)

*Question.* What have been some of the successes (especially in terms of savings to DOD and the taxpayer) from the work of DCAA?

Answer. DCAA's role in the financial oversight of government contracts is critical to ensure the Department and the Nation get the best value for every dollar spent on defense contracting. Its work benefits our men and women in uniform, as well as the American taxpayer. I believe DCAA provides examples of the savings to the taxpayers and other achievements in their annual report.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve DCAA's ability to execute its designated missions?

Answer. DCAA's primary function is to conduct contract audits and related financial services. If confirmed, I will support DCAA's efforts to execute its designated missions, including increasing collaboration with customers and industry, as well as efforts to provide value added information through comprehensive analysis of their individual audits. The timeliness of DCAA's contract audits would also be an area I would review if confirmed.

*Question.* If confirmed, what new investments in technology, training, and workforce would you recommend to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DCAA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage and support any on-going DCAA technology, training and workforce initiatives that will help improve auditor efficiency and effectiveness.

## DFAS

*Question.* The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was established to consolidate finance and accounting functions previously performed by the Military Services.

In your view, does DFAS continue to add value to DOD-wide financial management and accounting systems and processes? Please explain your answer.

Answer. DOD established DFAS in 1991 to consolidate, standardize, and integrate finance and accounting functions within the DOD to create efficiencies. I believe they have a solid history of adding value to DOD-wide financial management and continue to envision, lead and add value.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve DFAS's ability to execute its designated missions?

Answer. If confirmed, I would enable an environment in which DFAS could continue to drive standardization across the Department. I will review DFAS's ongoing work with the components to address the issues that drive the need for manual input and error correction at the functional source. Standardization in the data delivered to DFAS is recognized as a critical component of the Department's ability to automate its financial reporting and improve its audit position.

*Question.* If confirmed, what new investments in technology, training, and workforce would you recommend to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DFAS?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with DFAS leadership, and consult with DFAS customers across the Department, in order to review what opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DFAS are in line with the NDS and possible within fiscal constraints and competing priorities. Amplified use of data analytics and technology tools such as robotics and artificial intelligence to increase automation of transaction processing and the delivery of business insights are some potential areas to consider to effectively manage the Department's resources.

## WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS

*Question.* More than two decades ago, DOD created several working capital funds as part of an effort to streamline defense business processes.

What do you perceive to be the value of working capital funds?

Answer. Working capital funds (WCFs), especially when used in concert with policies that provide DOD customers with the full cost of goods or services provided by WCF activities, help facilitate a cost-conscious culture, imparting a corporate view across the department, enabling a more efficient optimization of limited resources. They act as a "shock absorber" to minimize the impact of demand and cost variations to the customers, allowing for price stability in the year of execution. WCFs allow for purchase of supply items in advance of customer need, enabling supply activities to have the right parts on the shelf in the right quantities when the customers need them. They are easily scalable to changes in the DOD's operating requirements. They allow for economies of scale, spreading overhead costs over the entire customer base.

*Question.* If confirmed, would you consider any reforms to, or expansion of, existing working capital funds?

*Answer.* Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my team, DOD leadership, OMB, and Congress to determine if any reforms to or expansion of working capital funds would benefit the Secretary's and the Administration's priorities.

*Question.* Are there other defense business operations that would benefit from the creation of a new working capital fund to promote operational efficiency or cost savings?

*Answer.* Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my team, DOD leadership, OMB, and Congress to determine if any business areas not already in the WCF regime would benefit from the value proposition stated previously.

#### REPROGRAMMING

*Question.* If confirmed, do you commit to follow the well-established precedent to wait for "4-way" congressional approval before transferring funds between appropriations accounts or reprogramming funding above the threshold established in enacted appropriations bills?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* What is your view of the efficacy of the current transfer and reprogramming process?

*Answer.* Throughout my previous service with the Department, the Department used reprogramming actions to address the highest priority emerging requirements, and no prior approval reprogramming action was implemented unless and until all of the congressional defense committees approved the Department's request. In my view, this well-established process, although sometimes lengthy in certain cases, met the needs of the Department and the Congress. If confirmed, I will scrupulously ensure that the Department abides by its longstanding agreements with the congressional defense committees, which are designed to preserve Congress' oversight of the appropriations process and the Department's financial management.

*Question.* Do the dollar thresholds associated with the reprogramming process remain appropriate in the current day? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* Over the years, Congress has reduced the Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR) amount thresholds for some appropriation accounts. This has restricted the Department's flexibility and has increased the volume of Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) actions that are submitted to the Congress for their prior approval. If confirmed, I will review this topic with the staff and then come back to the Congress if I believe any changes are warranted. I believe some changes are probably warranted.

*Question.* In your view, how might the reprogramming process be improved to meet DOD's need for flexibility, while maintaining trust and transparency with Congress?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will review the current process and provide any recommendations.

#### MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES (MHA) REPORT

*Question.* On June 20, 2019, the Department submitted the report required by section 931 of the NDAA for FY 2019, certifying the average percentage of amounts authorized to be appropriated during the 10 fiscal years ending with FY 2018 that have been expended on certain Management Headquarters Activities (MHA) across the Department. Additionally, the committee has learned that as a result of MHA cuts, the Army, for example, elected to eliminate roughly one third of their personnel who oversaw the Military Housing Privatization Initiative.

Are you aware of other examples of mission impacts that have occurred because of the MHA reductions? If so, please describe them.

*Answer.* As the details of cuts affecting Major DOD Headquarters Activities (MHA) are part of the program and budget reviews, I am not privy to specifics. If confirmed, I will review past reductions against ongoing operational needs and address specific impacts, as appropriate and with coordination and collaboration with DOD Component heads.

*Question.* Civilian control of the military is directly tied to the health and robustness of DOD's civilian professionals, especially those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Are you aware of any resource shortfalls for positions or capability within the Office of the Secretary of Defense over the last few years?

*Answer.* I have heard anecdotal references to the reductions against OSD—to comply with Section 346(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (the "25% cut" to headquarters baselines)—having a significant impact on the health and robustness of the civilian headquarters support to the Secretary



of Defense. While efficiency reductions should be considered, mandatory or arbitrary reduction targets can create disruptive capability shortfalls in both lower and higher priority functions. If confirmed, I would work closely with the other OSD Principal Staff Assistants and DOD Component heads to ensure that the civilian support to the Secretary of Defense is sufficiently resourced and provides the right balance of positions and capability within OSD.

#### ACQUISITION REFORM

*Question.* Congress has enacted significant reform of the defense acquisition enterprise, to include establishing and expanding authorities related to special acquisition pathways and the use of streamlined acquisition methodologies.

If confirmed, what changes would you make to DOD financial management regulations to afford financial management, comptroller, and acquisition personnel the flexibility required to support novel acquisition approaches?

*Answer.* I believe that acquisition reform is critical to our success. In many cases, the budget process is neutral with respect to what type of contracting vehicle or process is used. However, if confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment and other key stakeholders to ensure the financial management regulations are updated to enable any specific permissions or flexibilities afforded the Department and to look for opportunities to look for additional innovations or improvements.

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes would you make to DOD financial management regulations to afford financial management, comptroller, and acquisition personnel the flexibility required to apply resources to take advantage of emerging technologies and responding to emerging threats in a timely fashion?

*Answer.* I believe that timely acquisition is critical to implementing the NDS. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment and other key stakeholders to ensure the financial management regulations and acquisition workforce training enable the Department to effectively implement any specific permissions or flexibilities afforded the Department to take advantage of emerging technologies and emerging threats.

*Question.* In your view, to what extent have recent acquisition reforms have been successful and achieved better outcomes?

*Answer.* I am not in a position to provide a detailed impact analysis at this time, but I believe reforms such as the Middle Tier Acquisition, the Software Acquisition Pathway, and the Software and Digital Technology Programs Pilot have great potential. If confirmed, I would like to continue these efforts for two to three more years and then assess the outcomes and determine best practices moving forward. There is always more that can be done. Just as technology advances, so must our acquisition of that technology.

*Question.* Do you see the need for additional changes in legislation? If so, provide examples.

*Answer.* If confirmed, I look forward to working with Department leadership and Congress in order to identify any legislative changes that would allow the Department to pursue and develop emerging technologies.

#### PERSONNEL COSTS

*Question.* Military personnel costs continue to grow rapidly and comprise an increasing share of the DOD budget. A large portion of the military compensation package consists of in-kind benefits—health care, housing, tax-free shopping in military exchanges, taxpayer subsidized commissaries—that complement competitive salaries and a generous military retirement benefit.

In your view, how can DOD manage and better plan for this growth?

*Answer.* The Department must continually strive to assess personnel costs in all forms and determine the most efficient ways to deliver a competitive compensation package that enables DOD to attract and retain the All-Volunteer Force.

*Question.* Should the DOD's personnel costs grow at the rate of inflation?

*Answer.* The topline for the defense budget, and personnel budgets within the topline, should depend, not on an arbitrary inflation factor, but on the Department's mission, the appropriate force structure to achieve that mission and the competitive compensation package required to recruit and retain the force size and quality needed.

*Question.* Do you believe the Employment Cost Index (ECI) is the most appropriate metric to assess inflation for the purpose to determining military pay increases?

*Answer.* Yes, I believe ECI is the right metric to ensure military basic pay remains competitive and keeps pace with private sector wage growth. However, com-

pensation levels (of which basic pay is only one component) must be continually reviewed and adjustments to an annual basic pay raise at percentages other than the ECI metric could sometimes be warranted.

*Question.* The most recent Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) endorsed a further study and a pilot program for a time-in-grade based military pay table. In your judgment, would a time-in-grade pay table potentially help reduce long-term military personnel cost growth?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that a time-in-grade pay table does potentially have some advantages including: incentivizing higher performance than a time-in-service pay table; providing stronger retention incentives more efficiently; and attracting lateral entrants to the DOD workforce. However, the major disadvantage of the time-in-grade pay table seems to be that the transition would involve a cost to the Department of Defense, and it would be disruptive to a significant fraction of the force. Estimates from the 13th QRMC indicate that just under one-third of the active force would experience a basic pay reduction in the transition to a time-in-grade pay table (especially among officers with significant prior enlisted service), with an average reduction in basic pay of 6.0 percent among those who would experience a pay reduction. If confirmed I will consult with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to understand the Department's assessment of the recommendation and whether or not the disadvantages of a time-in-grade pay table (even a pilot program) outweigh the potential advantages.

*Question.* The QRMC also recommended refraining from "providing target pay raises at this time." How should the DOD and Congress determine whether military pay raises are necessary?

*Answer.* OUSD Personnel and Readiness and the Services continually assess recruiting and retention challenges, as well as other force management factors such as assignments, promotions, skill and grade mix, etc., to determine if compensation levels need to be adjusted to maintain DOD's competitive compensation package.

#### SEXUAL HARASSMENT

*Question.* In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by "someone at work" in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(C)?

*Answer.* If confirmed, the action I would take upon receiving or becoming aware of a sexual harassment or discrimination complaint is to immediately conduct an independent inquiry into the matter, in coordination with the HR and EEO office. I would take these matters seriously, enforce accountability, leverage opportunities to train and educate leaders and the staff, and reiterate my stance against inappropriate behavior that has no place in the workplace or anywhere else. I would also ensure OUSDC has workplace policies and practices that promote respect, civility, and inclusion for all.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communica-

tions, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GARY PETERS

##### TRANSPARENCY IN CONTRACTS

1. Senator PETERS. Mr. McCord, Congress has previously requested that the Department of Defense provide better transparency over contract services expenditures in its budget submission. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified this problem in a February 18, 2016 audit, “DOD Service Acquisition: Improved Use of Available Data Needed to Better Manage and Forecast Service Contract Requirements” (GAO-16-119), and most recently continued to retain the management of services contracts on its high risk list in a February 22, 2021 assessment of the Department’s report to Congress. See, GAO-21-267R, “Service Acquisitions: DOD’s Report to Congress Identifies Steps Taken To Improve Management, But Does Not Address Some Key Planning Issues.” Most notably, one of the key planning issues not addressed is the subject of the original 2016 audit, the failure to establish better transparency over services contracts spending means the Department’s “budget exhibits on contract services provide limited visibility to Congress on planned spending, and the primary exhibit for contracted services does not meet statutory reporting requirements. . . without a roadmap of future service contract spending needs, Congress has limited visibility into an area that constitutes more than half of DOD’s annual contract spending.” Having worked in the Department of Defense when this audit finding was first made, do you recognize this as a problem that needs to be addressed?

Mr. MCCORD. Yes. Transparency over DOD contract services expenditures is an important element in ensuring Americans’ taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. If confirmed, I will work with my team and the acquisition community to ensure Congress has the appropriate visibility to conduct its oversight responsibility.

##### ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCIES

2. Senator PETERS. Mr. McCord, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in her private capacity last year wrote in a March 2020 “Foreign Affairs” article entitled, “Getting to Less: The Truth About Defense Spending,” the following: “Predictably, for example, even though Congress directed the Defense Department to cut \$10 billion through administrative efficiencies between 2015 and 2019, the Pentagon failed to substantiate that it had achieved those savings. The reason those efforts rarely succeed is that they merely shift the work being done by civilian employees to others, such as military personnel or defense contractors.” How can we avoid encouraging such shell games in the future?

Mr. McCORD. During my previous tenure as Comptroller, I participated in some of the “administrative efficiencies” efforts and can confirm that they were more than a shell game. From Secretary Gates’ “Efficiency Review,” Secretary Hagel’s “Strategic Choices and Management Review,” “Fourth-Estate” reductions, and sequestration-driven efficiency reductions, DOD absorbed significant, real budget and manpower cuts. If confirmed, I will participate in any review of DOD’s administrative expenses and potential efficiencies to help ensure the level of administrative support is sufficient to meet the Department’s requirements within the funding levels provided by Congress and will, if need be, advise where I think the funding levels and requirements may be incompatible.

3. Senator PETERS. Mr. McCord, when this is happening, what good is financial auditability without also some good managerial accounting principles to inform wiser decisions?

Mr. McCORD. The two are congruent. Financial auditability drives timelier and more accurate data with which to inform decision making. Better data will increase the transparency of DOD’s financial activities, as well as DOD’s accountability for the use of the assets entrusted to it. Further, better data and insight into DOD’s financial activity can drive greater efficiency in the use of its appropriations (e.g., lower de-obligations and cancelled funding returned to Treasury). The annual audit provides annual, independent validation of the progress DOD is making towards these goals, as well as recommendations to guide further progress.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

##### EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

4. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. McCord, what opportunities do you see for “data-driven” decision support tools within the office to which you have been nominated?

Mr. McCORD. To institutionalize the benefits of the audit in driving the DOD toward common business systems and better data, it is necessary to demonstrate to data owners the value of the change that would result. The prior manual, labor-intensive approach to gathering and presenting data to inform decision makers at times resulted in PowerPoint slides that were debated and disputed, rather than supporting the intended discussion about the meaning of the data presented. It is important to automate the generation of timely, reliable information that could be used for analysis to save time for discussion of what the data show, rather than contesting the data. Data-based decisions are a fundamental principle of the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) system.

The Department began building an advancing analytics (Advana) tool in 2016 that expanded the boundaries of a standard data warehouse to arm military and business decision makers with decision support analytics, visualization products, and data tools. If confirmed I would continue using the power of the audited data for decision making and attempt to recruit top talent that can help the Department use data for better decision making.

##### AUDIT

5. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. McCord, given the findings of the previous two DOD audits, what specific actions would you take with respect to business reform—to include consolidating information technology and improving enterprise buying power?

Mr. McCORD. If confirmed, I would make sure there are quantifiable metrics to measure progress and hold components accountable for planned corrective actions and system reductions. I would engage the Office of the Chief Information Officer to jointly reduce the numbers of systems and duplicate functionality among DOD systems to reduce information technology cost and inconsistency. Additionally, I would look for opportunities to partner with the Chief Data Officer and the military departments to identify opportunities for efficiency.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

##### BURDEN-SHARING

6. Senator HAWLEY. Mr. McCord, would you agree that asking more of our allies and partners in Europe and other regions could help to alleviate some of the burdens facing the Department of Defense, so that DOD can focus more of its scarce resources on our top priorities—above all, deterring China?

Mr. MCCORD. Our Allies and partners have responded to our calls to more equitably share the responsibility of providing for our common defense. For example, I understand NATO is entering its seventh consecutive year of increased defense spending, and that the Departments of State and Defense continue to encourage our Allies to fulfill the 2014 Wales Summit Defense Investment Pledge. Allies and partners also made significant troop contributions to U.S.-led, NATO, and multinational missions in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, as you note, they can always do more. If confirmed, I will work through the Department's normal program and budget review process to seek ways to make tradeoffs from lower priority missions to higher priority missions, including deterrence of China. Reviewing our burden sharing arrangements should normally be part of the scope of such reviews.

[The nomination reference of Honorable Michael J. McCord follows:]

**NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT**

**PN260**

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
April 12, 2021.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Michael J. McCord, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), vice David L. Norquist, resigned.

\_\_\_\_\_, 2021.  
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

**■ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.**

[The biographical sketch of Honorable Michael J. McCord, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Bio**  
**Michael J. McCord**

**Education:**

- The Ohio State University
  - September 1977-June 1981
  - Bachelor of Art in Economics with honors in the liberal arts, June 1981
- The University of Pennsylvania
  - September 1981 – May 1984
  - Master of Arts in Public Policy, May 1984

**Employment Record:**

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- Congressional Budget Office, Washington DC
  - Assistant Analyst
  - December 1984 to January 1987
- Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC
  - Professional Staff Member
  - January 1987 to January 2003
- House Budget Committee, Washington DC
  - Budget Analyst
  - January 2003 to February 2004
- Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC
  - Professional Staff Member
  - March 2004 to January 2009
- Department of Defense, Washington DC
  - Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
  - January 2009 to June 2014.
- Department of Defense, Washington DC,
  - Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer
  - June 2014 to January 2017
- Stennis Center for Public Service, U.S. Congress, Washington DC,

- Director, Civil-Military Programs
  - February 2017 to present.
- Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria VA
  - Adjunct Research Staff Member
  - July 2017 to present.
- The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo CA
  - Trustee
  - September 2020 to present.

**Honors and Awards:**

- Federal Civilian Awards
  - Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2011
  - Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2013
  - Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2015
  - Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2017
- Academic Awards
  - National Merit Scholarship, The Ohio State University, 1977-1981
  - Phi Beta Kappa, The Ohio State University, 1981
- Other Awards
  - American Society of Military Comptrollers, National President's Award, 2017



[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Honorable Michael J. McCord in connection with his nomination follows:]

117<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
ROOM SR-228  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050  
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE  
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

**NOTE:** Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

**BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC**

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):** Michael McCord
2. **Position to which nominated:** Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
3. **Date of nomination:** April 12, 2021
4. **Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):**
  - River Valley High School, Marion, Ohio, Fall 1972 - Spring 1977, high school diploma received May 1977
  - The Ohio State University, September 1977 - June 1981, Bachelor of Art in Economics with honors in the liberal arts, June 1981

- The University of Pennsylvania, September 1981 – May 1984, Master of Arts in Public Policy, May 1984
5. **Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):**
    - a. Department of Defense, Washington DC, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), January 21, 2009 to June 26, 2014.
    - b. Department of Defense, Washington DC, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer, June 27, 2014 to January 20, 2017.
    - c. Stennis Center for Public Service, U.S. Congress, Washington DC, Director, Civil-Military Programs, February 2017-present.
    - d. Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria VA, Cost Analysis and Research Division, Adjunct Research Staff Member, July 2017-present.
    - e. The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo CA, Member, Trustee, September 2020-present.
  6. **Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):**
    - a. Consultant, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington DC, March 2021-present
    - b. Member, Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, Washington DC, July 2017-November 2018.
    - c. Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration, November 2017-present. Provide advice to federal agencies on study panels.
    - d. Volunteer, Biden-Harris Transition (PT Fund, Inc), Department of Defense Agency Review Team, October 2020-January 2021.
    - e. Member, President-Elect's Transition Team, Department of Defense, November 2008-December 2008.
    - f. Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington DC, January 1987-January 2003 and March 2004-January 2009.
    - g. Budget Analyst, House Budget Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington DC, January 2003-February 2004.
    - h. Assistant Analyst, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress Washington DC, December 1984-January 1987.
  7. **Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any**

**educational or other institution):**

- a. Mike McCord & Associates LLC, also doing business as MC2 Strategies LLC  
Reston VA, Owner/Manager
- b. The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo CA, Trustee
- c. Reston Runners Club, Reston VA (501(c)3), President
- d. Reston Runners Community Fund, Reston VA (501(c)3), Secretary

**8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):**

- a. Reston Runners Club, Reston VA, President; former Vice President
- b. Reston Runners Community Fund, Reston VA, Secretary; former President
- c. National Academy of Public Administration, Washington DC, Fellow
- d. American Society of Military Comptrollers, Alexandria VA, Member
- e. Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, Washington DC, formerly Secretary and Treasurer
- f. Economics Advisory Board, The Ohio State University, former member

**9. Political affiliations and activities:**

- a. **If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):** None.

- b. **List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:**

Member, Fairfax County Democratic Committee, Fairfax VA  
Volunteer, Biden for President, Defense Working Group

- c. **Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:**

See attached document

**10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):**

National Merit Scholarship, The Ohio State University, 1977-1981  
 Phi Beta Kappa, The Ohio State University, 1981  
 Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2011  
 Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2013  
 Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2015  
 Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2017  
 American Society of Military Comptrollers National President's Award, 2017

**11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):**

**Testimony as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)**

Hearing on termination of the C-17 aircraft program, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 13, 2010. Statement attached as separate document.

Hearing on the impact of budget sequestration on defense industrial base, House Small Business Committee, September 20, 2012. Statement attached as separate document.

**Testimony as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)**

Hearing on auditing the Department of Defense, House Armed Services Committee, June 15, 2016. Statement attached as separate document.

**Testimony from Previous Nomination Hearings**

Opening Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing for Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) nomination, March 23, 2010. Statement attached as separate document.

Opening Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing for Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) nomination, February 25, 2014.

Statement attached as separate document.

#### **Other Published Writings**

*Avoiding a shutdown is not enough*, Defense News, April 25, 2017  
<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/04/25/avoiding-a-shutdown-is-not-enough-commentary/>

*Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission*, U.S. Institute of Peace, November 2018 (co-author). <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf>

*Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Organizational Assessment*, National Academy of Public Administration, November 2018 (co-author).  
[https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy\\_Studies/Revised\\_NAPA\\_DNFSB\\_Final\\_Report.pdf](https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/Revised_NAPA_DNFSB_Final_Report.pdf)

*Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability*, Stimson Center, May 2018 (co-author).  
[https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT\\_Spending\\_Report\\_0.pdf](https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf)

*Power Struggle Over the Wall: Presidential Emergency Powers vs. Congressional Power of the Purse*, <https://www.justsecurity.org> February 21, 2019

*Honesty is the best policy if we are going to get a budget deal*, Defense and Aerospace Report, June 2019, <https://defaeroreport.com/2019/06/08/mccord-honesty-is-the-best-policy-if-we-are-going-to-get-a-budget-deal/>

*DoD "To-Be" Process Alternatives to Track the Budget Line Item from Enactment Through Execution*, Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2019 (IDA Document NS D-10806, FOUO) (co-author).

*Science and Technology Policy Assessment: A Congressionally Directed Review*, National Academy of Public Administration, October 2019 (co-author).  
[https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy\\_Studies/NAPA\\_FinalReport\\_forCRS\\_110119.pdf](https://www.napawash.org/uploads/Academy_Studies/NAPA_FinalReport_forCRS_110119.pdf)

Testimony to House Committee on Science, Space and Technology on meeting Science and Technology needs of the Congress, December 5, 2019.  
<https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/McCord%20Testimony.pdf>



*Election 2020: Advance the Nation's Long-Term Fiscal Health*, National Academy of Public Administration, October 2020 (co-author)

12. **Speeches** (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).

Briefing to press on FY2017 Department of Defense Budget, February 9, 2016  
<https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/653530>

#### **COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**NOTE:** In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress? Yes
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely? Yes
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Yes
16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization

previously provided? Yes


17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Yes
18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Yes
19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Yes

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[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein, and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This 19<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2021

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[The nomination of Honorable Michael J. McCord was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on May 20, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 28, 2021.]

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[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES****DUTIES, QUALIFICATIONS, AND RELATIONSHIPS**

*Question.* If confirmed as USD(I&S), what do you believe would be your most critical duties and responsibilities?

*Answer.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence and security responsibilities and authorities including under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code.

I understand that the responsibilities of the USD(I&S) are assigned in DOD Directive 5143.01 and include: serving as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency / Central Security Service, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency; establishing policy and priorities for, and providing oversight of, the defense intelligence and security enterprises; exercising oversight of personnel policy to ensure that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Depart-



ment; ensuring that the DOD intelligence components that are also elements of the intelligence community are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that certain sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of assigned DOD security policies and programs to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; and serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the differences between the title 10 and title 50 duties of the USD(I&S)?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the USD(I&S) assists the Secretary of Defense in satisfying all of the Secretary's title 10 and title 50 statutory responsibilities in the areas of intelligence and security and that the duties of the USD(I&S) are prescribed in DOD Directive (DODD) 5143.01.

Pursuant to subsection 3038(a) of title 50, the Secretary of Defense has the following responsibilities, which are to be conducted in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence: (1) ensure that the budgets of the intelligence community (IC) elements within the Department of Defense (DOD) are adequate to satisfy the overall DOD intelligence needs; (2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of National Intelligence by DOD Components within the National Intelligence Program (NIP); (3) ensure that DOD tactical intelligence activities complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under the NIP; (4) ensure that the IC elements within DOD are responsive and timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces; (5) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication among the DOD intelligence activities; and (6) ensure that DOD intelligence activities are conducted jointly where appropriate.

*Question.* What leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as USD(I&S), if confirmed?

*Answer.* I have had the privilege of serving at the highest echelons of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community. Serving over a combined 17 years as a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service and the CIA's Senior Intelligence Service, I led some of our Nation's most sensitive multi-intelligence missions and served with some of the most technically adept and dedicated professionals in the U.S. Government. Having served in leadership positions in operations, science and technology, staff and budget, legislative affairs, and joint organizations has enabled me to provide objective, time-sensitive intelligence to the warfighter, policymakers, and senior government leaders. As the Operations Director for the National Security Agency, I worked with many departments and agencies including across the Intelligence Community on critical challenges and established many trusted bilateral and multi-lateral foreign partnerships with our key allies.

If confirmed, I would use my coalition building skills and experience in the private sector to enable our Nation to stay ahead of its adversaries. Also, I would continue to mentor the next generation of intelligence and security professionals. If confirmed, I would always serve with integrity while practicing servitude leadership. Last, I would use my decades of resource stewardship to ensure that the defense intelligence and security enterprise operates in an effective and efficient manner.

*Question.* Please provide an example of a situation in which you led and brought to conclusion a management improvement/change initiative in a complex organization.

*Answer.* In a prior role as one of an agency's most senior operations leaders, I realized that the processes for after-hours and weekend decisionmaking lacked the content and authorization specificity needed to conduct operations. In coordination with the agency's senior leadership team, I crafted the inaugural guidance to establish governance framework for such decisionmaking. This guidance is employed globally today and enables the agency to identify, assess, and respond 24/7 to critical events worldwide, which in-turn enhances the quality and timeliness of intelligence provided to our government's most senior leaders.

*Question.* What is your experience across the domain of intelligence matters? Security matters?

*Answer.* My career has been a series of foundational intelligence experiences and assignments each preparing me for additional responsibility. As a member of the U.S. Air Force, I trained as a linguist at the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center and subsequently served a 3-year tour in Asia, which launched me on a professional intelligence trajectory. As a civilian leader at the National Security Agency (NSA), I addressed a wide spectrum of issues as I led NSA's efforts against several intelligence priorities. My responsibilities were comprehensive as I worked

to satisfy intelligence requirements, served as the director of NSA's collection and processing organization, and led analytical and reporting efforts, culminating in my appointment as the director of operations. I was also a senior leader in the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate and had an important role while serving in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). I played a key role in advising the Secretary of the Navy on cybersecurity, emerging technology, and data issues.

I built strong relationships across the interagency working with the defense intelligence enterprise and organizations such as the ODNI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I was selected to lead to major damage assessments and equity reviews of two of our Nation's highest profile data compromises.

Last, I received a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree in Russian studies from the National Intelligence University (NIU), the preeminent academic institution for the Intelligence Community. In 2020, I served as a member of the NIU's Board of Visitors, reportedly becoming the first graduate to ever to serve in this capacity.

*Question.* Are there any actions you would take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the USD(I&S)?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would immediately begin to re-establish my close working relationships within the Pentagon, the ODNI, the other IC elements, and entire the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

*Question.* If confirmed, what specific duties might you expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

*Answer.* I believe my duties, aligned with the Secretary's 2021 Interim Defense Strategic Guidance, would include posturing the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprises against the threat of China, countering Russia's malign influence activities, and the persistent regional threat posed by Iran and North Korea, while fostering the expansion of interagency cooperation and international partnerships to address national security priorities. Additionally, the Department must protect our personnel at home and abroad, a task that includes developing a collaborative and accountable culture that does not accept harassment or violent extremism within its military and civilian ranks.

*Question.* If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security?

*Answer.* If confirmed and within the limits of policy and the law, I would ensure that the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security are sufficiently broad such that my deputy would serve as a full partner.

*Question.* If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as USD(I&S) fulfills the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

*Answer.* I am committed to civilian control of the Armed Forces in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and other applicable law. I recognize that the Department's civilian and military personnel together, with the support of DOD contractors, enable our mission success, and civilian control of the Armed Forces ensures accountability to the will of the people through our elected representatives.

*Question.* How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? On what matters would you expect to collaborate with the ODNI, if confirmed?

*Answer.* I am aware that the OUSD(I&S) works closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The partnership and integration between OUSD(I&S) and ODNI enables the Intelligence Community to deliver national intelligence support to policymakers and warfighters on threats to our national security.

The USD(I&S) is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence within the ODNI. There is also a military officer who serves as the DNI's Advisor on Military Affairs (DAMA). I believe their staffs coordinate to effectively and efficiently ensure quality intelligence is provided in support of our national leadership and warfighters. As a principal member of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC), the USD(I&S) works with the DNI, who is the Security Executive Agent and also a principal member of the PAC.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), particularly as regards policy and programs for information operations, including military deception and operations security (OPSEC)?

Answer. My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the Principal Staff Assistant for information operations. I also understand that the USD(I&S) has responsibility for coordination of DOD IO activities with the Intelligence Community, as well as the development and implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for DOD deception and operations security.

*Question.* In your view, what would be the appropriate relationship between the USD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to providing operational intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support to the warfighter?

Answer. I believe the relationship between the USD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of mutual support and consultation to ensure that the defense intelligence enterprise provides the warfighters with the best intelligence possible, which enables the Chairman to provide the best military advice to the Secretary of Defense.

*Question.* How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between the OUSD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?

Answer. I understand that USD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) acting together are the primary oversight officials for all Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs. If confirmed, I will partner with ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that our oversight of SOF is coordinated and collaborative.

*Question.* Are there any programs currently overseen by the OUSD(I&S) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD(SOLIC), in your view?

Answer. I am unaware of any such programs. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that together we provide the Secretary of Defense with the best organizational alignment to accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

*Question.* How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) in regard to both unclassified and classified contract efforts?

Answer. I understand the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) is one of cooperation and collaboration. If confirmed, I look forward to partnering with the USD(A&S) to ensure that DOD acquisition programs receive the intelligence needed to acquire superior defense capabilities and that appropriate consideration is given to the central role of security throughout the acquisition process to protect the integrity of our acquisitions in the face of the persistent threat of compromise by our adversaries.

*Question.* How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the DOD Chief Information Officer, particularly with respect to the cybersecurity mission; developing interoperability requirements applicable to information systems architectures for processing intelligence and counterintelligence information; and the certification of intelligence information systems?

Answer. I view the relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO) as one predicated on collaboration and partnership to ensure synchronization between security policymakers and information technology service providers. I understand that OUSD(I&S) is responsible for development and oversight of information security and physical security policy. The DOD CIO advises the Secretary of Defense on information technology, including national security systems and defense business systems, and develops DOD strategy and policy for all DOD information technology and information systems. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) maintains a close partnership with the DOD CIO to enable the necessary security architecture to protect intelligence and counterintelligence information while effectively enabling the mission.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)? For the identification of DOD language capability requirements?

Answer. It is my understanding that the USD(I&S) develops the policies for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System in close coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)). I also understand that USD(P&R) works with USD(I&S) and the intelligence community to set and prioritize DOD foreign language capability requirements. If confirmed, I will study the relationship between USD(I&S) and USD(P&R) in identifying DOD language capability requirements.

*Question.* How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the heads of the Intelligence Components of the Military Departments?

*Answer.* I believe that the OUSD(I&S) staff works closely with the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components of the Military Departments. I understand that the USD(I&S) provides input to the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the duty performance of the senior intelligence officer within each Military Department.

The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with authority delegated from the Secretary of Defense to establish policy for defense intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The Directors for Defense Intelligence within the Office of the USD(I&S) (OUSD(I&S)) have specific programmatic responsibilities and support the Under Secretary in carrying out the responsibilities assigned and exercising the authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) by the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control over all components within their respective Departments. So the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components within the Military Departments are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Military Department and subject to policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).

*Question.* What do you perceive to be the role of the OUSD(I&S) with regard to the Reserve Component intelligence elements of Military Services?

*Answer.* I understand that, in accordance with DOD Instruction 5143.01, which outlines the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the USD(I&S), OUSD(I&S) develops and provides policy guidance, resource advocacy, and oversight for the integration of Reserve Component intelligence elements, and ensures the Department effectively employs and resources Reserve Component intelligence elements to best support the National Defense Strategy. The programmatic role of OUSD(I&S) is the same with respect to the Active and Reserve Components of the Military Services. Like the Active Components, the Reserve Components intelligence elements are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the relevant Military Department in which they are located and subject to policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).

*Question.* What is your understanding of the USD(I&S)'s responsibility and authority for the management and oversight of Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and National Intelligence Program (NIP) funding? How do the processes employed by the USD(I&S) in the execution of these responsibilities differ from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process applicable to all other DOD organizations and funding?

*Answer.* As the MIP Executive Agent, the USD(I&S) has management and oversight of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The USD(I&S), in his role as the Director of Defense Intelligence, has visibility into the NIP through participation in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) resource decision forums. Additionally, I understand that the DNI and the USD(I&S) jointly sign out intelligence programming guidance to closely synchronize NIP and MIP programs to ensure that the Department's priorities are communicated to the intelligence community. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI in ensuring that DOD intelligence requirements are supported within the NIP budget.

With respect to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, it is my understanding the USD(I&S) is a full participant in the Department's PPBE process and that military intelligence requirements compete with the other DOD requirements.

*Question.* If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between Congress—the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees, in particular—and the OUSD(I&S) and the Defense Agencies under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S)?

*Answer.* I am committed to assist the Secretary of Defense in sustaining an open, transparent, and productive relationship between the Department and Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with the defense oversight committees on a routine basis to explain the Department's defense intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure both that this Committee is provided with the notifications required under provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, section 2723, and that any such notification is accurate, complete, and timely?

*Answer.* I am committed to fulfilling the USD(I&S)'s responsibility under DOD Directive 5143.01 to make determinations on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, except for those related to nuclear, chemical, and biological security, in consultation with

the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as appropriate, and to notify Congress, as required by section 2723. If confirmed, I will ensure such notifications are accurate, complete, and timely.

#### MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

*Question.* What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as the USD(I&S) and what specific actions would you take to address each of these challenges?

*Answer.* Rebuilding trust and establishing close working relationships between the USD(I&S) and DOD senior leaders would be among the most significant challenges. The rebuilding of trust and establishing close working relationships with senior leaders of foreign partners would also be a challenge and priority. If confirmed, I would engage in sustained outreach with these leaders on mutual priorities and objectives with the goal of developing a strategic dialog and viable courses of action on key issues.

#### SUPERVISION, AND OVERSIGHT OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ENTERPRISE

*Question.* The USD(I&S) is vested with responsibility for the overall direction and supervision of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise in the execution of intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters across DOD. Subject to USD(I&S) oversight, responsibility for executing policies and programs in these domains vests primarily in the Military Departments and Services, elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Agencies.

What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I&S) in coordinating the activities of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise?

*Answer.* In my understanding, the USD(I&S) is responsible for ensuring the actions of all of these elements are integrated to meet the needs of the Department and the Nation. The USD(I&S) does so by issuing policy, ensuring compliance, exercising control over the Military Intelligence Program, coordinating with ODNI on the National Intelligence Program, and by leading development of decisions affecting the Defense Security and Security Enterprise.

*Question.* In your view, does the USD(I&S) have the authority, organizational structure, and resources to provide appropriate oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise? If not, what additional authorities or resources does the OUSD(I&S) require, in your view?

*Answer.* I believe that the USD(I&S) has sufficient authority to provide policy oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the OUSD(I&S) staff to determine if additional authorities or resources may be required and to standardize OUSD(I&S) practices for effective oversight.

#### NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

*Question.* The 2018 NDS focused DOD on “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with the imperative of deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally, the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the United States and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe the 2018 National Defense Strategy helped consolidate a consensus around the importance of addressing the erosion of U.S. military advantage, in key strategic areas. I agree with Secretary Austin that China represents DOD’s pacing threat, given its increasing scope and scale of military modernization, its aggressive behavior. The Department must also work to address advanced, persistent threats—such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and VEOs. Additionally, I believe the Department must take steps to address the profound impact cross-cutting challenges, including climate change, COVID-19 and other biological threats, that will influence our national security.

*Question.* In your view, what role(s) must the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise play in the implementation of the NDS?

*Answer.* The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise is a crucial pillar supporting the National Defense Strategy. The enterprise must support decisionmakers, help ensure decision advantage for the U.S. allies and partners and safeguard per-

sonnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against a wide range of threats and challenges.

*Question.* How would you assess the current readiness and capabilities of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to execute the NDS?

*Answer.* The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise serve is a crucial pillar supporting the National Defense Strategy (NDS). I understand that it is postured to support the Department's execution of the NDS. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to develop my own assessment of the enterprise's readiness and capabilities to execute the NDS.

*Question.* Does the OUSD(I&S) have the analytic tools and expertise to assist you, if confirmed, in evaluating the readiness of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to engage effectively across the spectrum of challenges presented by the current strategic environment—from low intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, high-intensity warfare with major-power rivals? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I understand that OUSD(I&S) possesses significant expertise to assist me in evaluating readiness. If confirmed, I will review and leverage the available decision-support analytic tools and develop standardized, metrics-based approaches to reliably assess, monitor, and evaluate the posture and performance of the enterprise to enable effective engagements across the spectrum of challenges and achieve desired outcomes.

*Question.* What do you believe are the main resource or capability shortfalls that could hamper the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise's execution of the NDS?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the Department has realigned Military Intelligence Program (MIP) resources to better support the National Defense Strategy (NDS). As the Department makes further adjustments to its warfighting capabilities to support the NDS, I expect this will impose additional requirements on intelligence and security that will need to be addressed. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD(I&S) staff to identify promptly any obstacles likely to hamper execution of the Interim Guidance.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you propose to address any gaps or shortfalls in the ability of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to meet the demands placed on it by the NDS?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work across the Department to ensure any capability gaps and shortfalls are identified and resourced throughout the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.

*Question.* If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's implementation of the 2018 NDS with respect to intelligence and security?

*Answer.* I am supportive of the tremendous efforts the Department has made to date in implementing the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, once I am up to speed on efforts to execute the Defense Intelligence Strategy, I will develop recommendations for the Secretary of Defense. It is critical that all efforts continue to accelerate support to the Department's posture with China as the pacing challenge.

The NDS affirms that "[m]ore than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength."

*Question.* What role can the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise play in "expand[ing] the competitive space," in your opinion?

*Answer.* The enterprise has a pivotal role in enabling the Department to expand the competitive space. It can help identify technologies, tools, tradecraft, skills, resources, and processes that the United States could use to create advantage relative to its competitors. The enterprise is also essential in safeguarding DOD personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against a wide range of threats and challenges. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that DOD and the Intelligence Community are fully integrated to collectively seize that competitive space.

*Question.* Competing in the information space is a major concern as reflected in the "36-star" letter sent by nine U.S. Combatant Commanders to the Acting DNI via the USD(I&S) on January 15, 2020. If confirmed, what steps would you take help address this challenge to assist Combatant Commanders executing messaging and influence operations around the globe?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will evaluate efforts to mitigate influence-related activities against key adversaries. I will also work to help prioritize resources to support operations in the information environment and participate in Intelligence Community focus groups to help drive key concepts related to these activities. I understand that in response to the 36-star memo, the Performing the Duty of the USD(I&S) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) have been examining how to improve upon

current processes to use intelligence to counter malign influence operations against the United States, its allies, and its partners. If confirmed, I look forward to partnering closely with the DNI, the Combatant Commanders, and the Directors of the Combat Support Agencies to further those efforts in alignment with national policy objectives.

*Question.* What revisions or adjustments would you recommend that the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues to ensure the Department considers geo-political shifts, intensifying competition with China, transnational threats (including climate change, COVID-19 and other biological threats), and the evolving technology landscape in its review and development of the next NDS.

#### STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES AND ATTRACTING NEW PARTNERS

*Question.* Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in these relationships.

How would you characterize your familiarity with the leadership of cooperative foreign defense establishments, the intelligence and security services of foreign governments, and intelligence and security-related international organizations?

Answer. My past experience in the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense has afforded me familiarity with cooperative foreign governments, their defense, intelligence, and security services, and their leadership, as well as related international organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to strengthening U.S. ties with defense and intelligence counterparts around the globe, and collaborating on areas of shared interest and concern.

*Question.* If confirmed as USD(I&S), what specific actions would you take to strengthen and synchronize existing intelligence and counterintelligence relationships with foreign governments and international organizations?

Answer. I believe that allies and partners are force multipliers who bring a wealth of valuable and unique intelligence insight, access, and expertise to the partnerships.

If confirmed, I commit to fostering strong defense intelligence and counterintelligence relationships with allies and partners focused on our shared concerns, including malign activities by China and Russia. I will work in close collaboration with our allies and partners to exchange valuable intelligence, synchronize our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts where mutually beneficial, implement economies of force, close intelligence gaps, and improve our overall understanding of the national and global security challenges that we face today.

*Question.* If confirmed, what factors would you consider in rendering decisions on the disclosure and release of intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations, including in support of combatant commanders’ expressed desire for better intelligence and intelligence sharing to counter foreign malign activities?

Answer. I understand that the National Disclosure Policy sets out the factors that must be weighed for the foreign disclosure of U.S. classified military information, including military intelligence. If confirmed, I would support combatant command requirements for military and national intelligence support to counter foreign malign activities. I agree broadly that the responsible foreign disclosure of military intelligence to friendly foreign governments and international organizations can further mutual defense and security objectives.

*Question.* Do you agree with Admiral Davidson, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), that his ability to strengthen alliances and partnerships would be greatly assisted by the funding of a “Mission Partner Environment” that would help provide a secure communications network with partners and allies throughout the region, similar to what exists in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to get a better understanding of how the Mission Partner Environment Information Sharing Capability is being implemented pursuant to DOD Instruction 8110.01 within USINDOPACOM.

#### JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (JROC) AND THE JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS (JCIDS)

*Question.* Per section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, the JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on advances in technology and con-

cepts of operation. The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and duplication in Military Services' programs by providing the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.

How do you assess the effectiveness of the JROC and JCIDS in identifying and establishing joint warfighter capability requirements in the domains of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security?

Answer. The JROC and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) use threat assessments from the Intelligence Community to inform Joint Force capability requirements and to guide requirements and capability development, including in the areas of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. The USD(I&S), as a statutory advisor to the JROC and its subordinate boards, provides advice that supports effective intelligence-related capability requirements and associated key performance parameters. If confirmed, I would closely coordinate with JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process continues to validate effective military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

*Question.* In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's ability to assess joint performance requirements in the military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security domains?

Answer. I understand that the recent reforms have transferred acquisition Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) from USD(A&S) to the Services, including for intelligence programs. One example is that the Air Force is now the MDA for the MIP-funded Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellites to provide missile warning. Changes in MDA, however, have not changed how DOD addresses requirements, as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process has not changed. The JROC continues to assess and validate effective joint performance requirements in the areas of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security through its oversight of the JCIDS process, which still includes an Intelligence Support Certification that is required to complete the requirements validation process needed prior to an Acquisition Milestone Decision. If confirmed, I will work closely with JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process continues to validate effective military intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

*Question.* The current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has emphasized joint and cross-domain capability requirements that the Military Services have not prioritized or are not responsible for developing, such as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). JADC2 demands ubiquitous interoperability, automated decision aids, and systems-of-systems integration.

How would you ensure that the Defense combat support intelligence agencies and the National Reconnaissance Office comply with the JADC2 requirements promulgated by the JROC?

Answer. In addition to participating in both the Department and IC requirements development and system acquisition processes, OUSD(I&S) conducts an annual portfolio review to ensure MIP-funded efforts deliver the capabilities needed by the warfighters. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the OUSD(I&S) processes are working to provide the right data, to the right people, at the right time.

*Question.* Given the role that National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assets have in providing intelligence for warfighting functions, the JROC reviews NRO acquisition programs to ensure DOD requirements are being met.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that NRO's close relationship with the JROC continues?

Answer. Consideration of both DOD and IC requirements is central to the USD(I&S) role. OUSD(I&S) facilitates the common gatekeeping function between the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Intelligence Community Capability Requirements (ICCR) Process. If confirmed, I will work to maintain open communication throughout this process, and work closely with the Joint Staff and Intelligence Community during the requirements validation process for NRO capabilities.

*Question.* The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities enacted in Section 804 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) sought to speed fielding of advanced technologies and systems.

What is your opinion of the effects of efforts to use of 804 authorities in intelligence, counterintelligence, or security-related acquisitions?

Answer. I believe that technological advances and development are outpacing DOD's ability to modernize and field capability using standard acquisition processes. Section 804 provides authority to the DOD to rapidly prototype and/or rapidly field capabilities under a new pathway, distinct from the traditional acquisition system. I understand this authority provides a pathway for the Defense Intelligence and Se-



curity Enterprises to develop, test, and field emerging technology to maintain pace with, or counter, adversary capability development.

#### INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you balance the need for the combat support Defense intelligence agencies to provide intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policymakers?

*Answer.* My understanding and belief is that balancing these needs will be one of my primary responsibilities. In today's environment of global and regional threats, most issues are relevant to both warfighting commands and policymakers. Where there are tactical and operational differences, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the DIE continues to satisfy requirements for operationally-relevant intelligence that directly enables warfighter success, and I would work collaboratively with policymakers to ensure the intelligence needs of senior national policymakers are met in order to support decisionmaking by our national leaders.

*Question.* In your view, what opportunities exist across the Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the warfighter? If confirmed, what would you do to leverage these opportunities?

*Answer.* I believe in the importance of and the continued opportunity to improve collaboration across the Intelligence Community to better support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would engage early and often with the Combatant Commanders to improve my understanding of their needs, and I would frequently engage leaders within the Intelligence Community to obtain support to meet those warfighter needs.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the OUSD(I&S) has multiple forums to engage with the Combatant Commands—for example, I understand there are monthly VTCs with all Combatant Command J2s. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure this and similar channels of communication are open and used routinely.

*Question.* In your view, are the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers and Service Intelligence Centers organized and resourced to most effectively support warfighter requirements under the NDS, to include support to near-real time, multi-sensor joint detection, tracking, and targeting for the combatant commands? What changes may be required to optimize cooperative, cross-agency targeting support?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will evaluate how to best resource the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) and the Service Intelligence Centers (SICs) to support the NDS. I understand that some of the JIOCs are currently undergoing manpower studies to determine the appropriate manpower levels to meet the mission requirements of the Combatant Commands. It would be incumbent upon the OUSD(I&S) to attempt to resource the Commands to help them meet their requirements, including in the area of targeting. If confirmed, I will support periodic reviews and re-alignment efforts to ensure priorities are met and resources effectively used to support the warfighter.

*Question.* In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations forces different from those carried out by the Intelligence Community?

*Answer.* In general, the key difference is that these intelligence operations are conducted in direct support of special operations forces missions that support tactical operations. I understand that special operations missions require immediate and detailed intelligence to support operations that are executed on rapid timelines and in high-risk environments. In most cases, similar capability or capacity does not exist or is not readily available within the Intelligence Community or Department of Defense. I also understand other defense intelligence operations typically serve a more strategic purpose and reflect national priorities through its work as part of the Intelligence Community. While special operation forces generally conduct intelligence to directly support task forces conducting operations in support of the combatant commands, they are aware of national collection priorities and the strategic importance of their mission.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you work across the Defense Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the CIA to ensure that intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are properly coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?

*Answer.* My understanding is that special operations forces intelligence activities are closely coordinated with the intelligence community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. If confirmed, I would continue to work closely with the ASD SO/LIC, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, and other DOD senior intelligence officials to ensure special operations forces units com-

ply with all applicable policies and directives. Additionally, I would welcome a continued dialog with the committee to ensure clear and consistent reporting to the congressional oversight committees of intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces.

The OUSD(I&S) is charged to develop and oversee implementation of DOD strategy, programs, and policy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and to integrate tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) solutions.

*Question.* Is the OUSD(I&S) participating in the JADC2 cross-functional team led by the Joint Staff J6? Do you intend to use the authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) to leverage information technology and innovative concepts to support the JADC2 initiative to develop an interoperable, joint command, control, communications, computer intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture and capability to support the warfare of the future?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the USD(I&S) is a full participant in the Department's Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiative intended to connect distributed sensors, shooters, and data from and in all domains to all forces. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the DNI to shape required improvements to the C4ISR architecture to increase timely support to decisionmaking at the strategic and operational levels.

In a February 27, 2020, New York Times Op-ed, Eric Schmidt, the chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) and former chairman and CEO of Google, stated, "[i]f A.I. advances elsewhere outpace those of U.S. companies and the U.S. Government, and give commercial and military advantages to our rivals, the resulting disadvantage to the United States could endanger U.S. national security and global stability. The same could be said for other emerging technologies." The report of the NSCAI emphasized this fundamental conclusion.

*Question.* Do you agree that American pre-eminence in AI is critical for national and economic security? If confirmed, what priority would you assign to ensuring that the Defense intelligence enterprise invests in AI applications?

*Answer.* I agree that American pre-eminence in AI is critical for national and economic security. I concur with the NSCAI commissions' conclusion that "we must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China."

The application of AI and algorithms are part of a class of data-centered capabilities that we must aggressively pursue to ensure DOD AI military dominance and information advantage in competition and conflict.

If confirmed, I will assign the highest priority to implementing data capabilities. I will also place emphasis on building AI training data to ensure we are turning our archived and daily intelligence into the data we need for the Department.

*Question.* Do you agree that the Defense intelligence components should take maximum advantage of the foundational AI platform that the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is sponsoring to develop AI applications for intelligence? If confirmed, what actions would you take to support this effort?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will need more time to study this matter, but I believe Project Maven and other IC initiatives have built AI foundries that are operational today and were purpose-built for Defense Intelligence. I suspect those initiatives are much farther along, fitted more tightly to Defense Intelligence requirements and bring the speed and flexibility we need to bring AI at scale to our many intelligence data feeds. I will use the authorities granted to me in the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5143.01 to weigh and assess the proper AI technologies Defense Intelligence requires.

*Question.* What is your understanding of efforts by the OUSD(I&S) to develop and implement systems for the use of Artificial Intelligence to bring greater efficiencies to intelligence analysis, including opportunities to condense the time required by a human analyst to locate and prioritize potential targets and convert those observations to actionable intelligence for input to military decisionmaking?

*Answer.* Speed, scale, and accuracy are USD(I&S) goals for transforming Defense Intelligence using data technologies such as AI. We want to be as early as possible on the sense-understand continuum to give us maximum time to respond to national threats. To achieve earlier warning and targeting timeframes, we will rely on data technologies such as AI that make sense of data faster than humans. Machines will accomplish tasks that in the past needed humans to accomplish, such as extracting objects from imagery, or writing reports.

We envision a world where we globally surveil areas of interest hundreds of times per day and understand the smallest changes in seconds, and only machines equipped with AI will allow us to do this. Our product-focused approach to delivering intelligence will change from static, text-based artifacts to continuous data streams. Bringing forward these technologies at scale so that all Defense Intel-

ligence sensors are first processed by accredited AIs and detections are then passed to humans for context, decision, and action will emerge as the new way of warfighting.

If confirmed, I look forward to presiding over these important transformations. Yet, I appreciate that achieving these results will require more than technology. Department leaders must also invest time to preside over the necessary human-centered changes that accompany the technology in order to guarantee successful adoption of these disruptive technologies.

#### COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND SECURITY

*Question.* What is your assessment of current and anticipated counterintelligence threats to DOD? Which threats do you assess to be the most concerning and why?

*Answer.* The Chinese and Russian intelligence services are the greatest foreign intelligence threats to the technological superiority and lethality of the Joint Force. I understand that China is using its intelligence services and proxies to threaten our military advantage by undermining our economic strength and innovation advantage through the wholesale theft of intellectual property and cutting-edge technology. I understand Russia is in a race to do the same and also intends to weaken American confidence in the U.S. Government and the U.S. military through sophisticated malign foreign influence campaigns.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) to provide strategic direction and oversight of implementation of counterintelligence policy, programs, guidance, and training to ensure they are responsive to validated DOD and national counterintelligence priorities? What changes, if any, in these roles and responsibilities would you recommend, if confirmed?

*Answer.* I understand the USD(I&S) has broad responsibility for oversight of DOD counterintelligence (CI). This includes development and oversight of Department CI policy, programs, guidance, and training of CI personnel. The USD(I&S) works closely with the Defense Intelligence Agency for development of CI strategies and supporting campaigns to ensure alignment with national level priorities. The USD(I&S) is a standing member of the National CI and Security Center's National CI Policy Board, and the National CI Strategy Board, and through these forums and related working groups, coordinates and collaborates within the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I will play an active role with my government counterparts to ensure the right balance of CI roles and responsibilities across the Federal Government.

*Question.* In your view, how has the Department's security posture benefited from the integration of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement functions under the auspices of a single Under Secretary?

*Answer.* DOD faces complex security challenges and must adapt to changing threats and environments using targeted yet multidimensional mitigation strategies and countermeasures. Integrating policy oversight of intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement, along with foundational security functions has enabled the Department to increase collaboration and leverage a wider variety of tools to respond to a given scenario. Our intelligence professionals and special agents strive every day to collect information, detect, and disrupt the capabilities, opportunities, and intentions of our adversaries. Working side by side with our security professionals allows them to develop effective policies, standard and repeatable procedures, and sufficient controls to deter, and deny our strategic competitors intentions. If confirmed, I will continue ensure that all communities under the authority direction and control of the Under Secretary continue to integrate seamlessly and continue to deny adversaries freedom of maneuver.

*Question.* Does the integration of these functions under a single official raise civil liberties concerns? If so, what do you believe to be the most effective way to address those concerns?

*Answer.* No. I understand that integration of these functions within OUSD(I&S) provides uniform, Department-level oversight of these disciplines through alignment of policy, strategy, and resource prioritization. If confirmed, I will ensure that all intelligence and security activities, including counterintelligence and law enforcement are conducted throughout the Department in a manner that respects civil liberties and protect any right or privilege secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

*Question.* Does the USD(I&S) have adequate authorities and resources to execute the law enforcement policy function? If not, what additional authorities or resources are required, in your view?

*Answer.* I understand the law enforcement policy function resides within the Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security portfolio in USD(I&S), and that the staff is augmented with liaison officers and cleared contractors. Although I have

not been briefed on the full range of current activities, if confirmed I will review this portfolio and ensure I&S has the right alignment of authorities and resources to perform the policy oversight function.

*Question.* In the role of the DOD Senior Agency Official for Security, the USD(I&S) represents the Department on the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), created by President Clinton in 1995, 6 months after the Oklahoma City bombing, to develop security standards applicable to all non-military federally owned and leased facilities. The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Committee Standard, sets forth a number of “best practices” for determining a facility’s security level and customizing physical security countermeasures.

In your view, has DOD benefited from the adoption of any of the “best practices” endorsed by the ISC? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe that DOD has benefited from the ISC’s work. I believe this benefits DOD by keeping DOD’s physical security standards for its leased spaces aligned with the physical security standards of other Federal leases, reducing build-out costs and reconstruction time when DOD moves into a space previously occupied by another Federal tenant. It also benefits DOD by better integrating DOD’s security requirements into leased facilities DOD shares with other Federal tenants.

#### PERSONNEL SECURITY AND INSIDER THREAT

*Question.* The USD(I&S) is accountable for managing and overseeing DOD’s insider threat, personnel security, and the National Industrial Security programs. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly classified information critical to national security. The Secretary of Defense established the Department of Defense Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) in 2014 to oversee the mitigation of insider threat risks to the Department and specific actions on insider threat cases. In November 2018, the National Insider Threat Task Force published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework.

Congress transferred responsibility for personnel security from the Office of Personnel Management to DOD at a time when a backlog of clearance investigations reached near-crisis levels, while mandating that DOD transform the clearance process through modern data acquisition and continuous monitoring technologies. Congress also mandated that DOD significantly improve its abilities to support the integrity of the acquisition process by determining the beneficial ownership and responsibility determinations of companies and individuals with whom the Department contracts by applying similar continuous monitoring techniques. At the same time, the Department and Congress expect the intelligence and security components of DOD under the purview of the USD(I&S) to substantially increase the protection of the National Security Innovation Base from technology theft and subversion from foreign adversaries, while ensuring that American industry and academic institutions continue to be welcoming magnets for foreign personnel.

Most of these very challenging new and enhanced requirements have been assigned to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). What is your current assessment of the ability of DCSA to transform itself to meet these objectives?

*Answer.* I understand that the Department’s intent for DCSA is to optimize the trustworthiness of the U.S. Government’s workforce, the integrity of its cleared contractor support and the uncompromised nature of its technologies, services, and supply chains through vetting, industry engagement, counterintelligence support, and education. I further understand that DCSA has successfully merged three organizations, the Defense Security Service, the National Background Investigations Bureau and the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility. The magnitude of what DCSA has already accomplished leads me to be optimistic that continued transformation of the agency to meet current and future critical technology protection requirements will remain on track.

*Question.* These DCSA-assigned missions are critical to DOD’s innovation strategy led by the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Research and Engineering. How would you ensure that DCSA is focused on meeting the needs of senior DOD officials outside of the OUSD(I&S)?

*Answer.* I understand that DCSA’s Critical Technology Protection mission supports the agency’s overarching responsibilities to protect national security by clearing industrial facilities, personnel and associated information systems and the DCSA serves as the primary interface between the Federal Government and industry providing daily oversight, advise and assistance to cleared companies and ultimately determining the ability of those companies to protect classified research, de-

velopment, and delivery on behalf of the DOD and 33 other Federal agencies. I understand the importance of their mission with A&S and R&E in protecting the Nation's critical technology. If confirmed, I will ensure that I&S and the leadership within DCSA are in constant collaboration with my counterparts within the Department and the Federal Government.

*Question.* Specifically, if confirmed, how would you ensure that DCSA is highly responsive to the needs of the USD(A&S) for vetting DOD contractors in responsibility determinations?

*Answer.* The Director, DCSA, operates under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S). The timeliness of all background investigations conducted by DCSA will be closely monitored by USD(I&S) in cooperation with the Security and Suitability Executive Agents to ensure it meets its performance standards. To date, I understand that DCSA has greatly reduced the inventory and the amount of time it takes to conduct background investigations and expect the upcoming Trusted Workforce 2.0 will result in continued improvement in the timeliness of those investigations.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the status of development, approval, and implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative?

*Answer.* I understand that the initial steps are already underway, and that I&S continues to work closely with the Security Executive Agent (SecEA), Suitability Executive Agent (SuitEA), and the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC) Performance Management Office (PMO) to complete development of Trusted Workforce 2.0 policy while working toward full implementation in the coming months. These efforts have included the enrollment of nearly all of the DOD cleared workforce in Continuous Evaluation (CE), which will enable the discontinuation of traditional and costly periodic reinvestigation practices.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the remaining challenges in achieving reciprocity of clearances and access to classified information across government components and their contractors?

*Answer.* I understand that while significant strides have been made in reducing timelines for reciprocal security determinations, there is always room for further progress, and workforce mobility continues to be a priority for the Department. I&S continues to work closely with the SecEA, the SuitEA, and Federal partners to further refine policies related to reciprocity through Trusted Workforce 2.0, leverage technology to develop modern solutions for information sharing between agencies, and to oversee reform efforts as they are implemented.

*Question.* How, if at all, should the Department change its data ownership and governance policies to facilitate DITMAC's ability to access data from, and make correlations across, the intelligence, counter-intelligence, law enforcement, physical security, personnel security, human resources, network monitoring, and cybersecurity organizations across the DOD?

*Answer.* Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these issues, I believe it is imperative that DITMAC and the DOD Insider Threat Enterprise have access to data from across these various relevant pillars to identify and mitigate potential threats from insiders, which will be especially critical as we modernize vetting to continuously review the trustworthiness of the workforce. If confirmed, I will ensure a continuous effort to eliminate stove-piping and remove barriers to data sharing, as allowed by law.

*Question.* How should insider threat architecture and activities overseen by USD(I&S) be integrated and coordinated with the Department's cybersecurity architecture and activities, in your view? Can network activity monitoring for cybersecurity, especially on DOD's unclassified network, inform and augment insider threat detection? Can user activity monitoring for insider threat detection inform cybersecurity?

*Answer.* I understand I&S maintains a close relationship with the office of the DOD CIO, which fosters exceptional integration and collaboration relevant to insider threat, user activity monitoring, and cybersecurity. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this relationship continues and seek ways to enhance our efforts to find areas of common interest, force multiplication, and implement efficiencies across both mission of insider threat detection and cybersecurity.

*Question.* In your view, does the OUSD(I&S) have the requisite authority and technical expertise to guide the development of a comprehensive capability that uses modern information technology to integrate all sources of information for identifying insider threats?

*Answer.* Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these programs, I believe the Department should maximize authorities and take a broad approach with respect to threat vector and population in the detection, prevention, and mitigation of an insider threat. This includes the technical capability to share data seamlessly

between data sources. If confirmed, I will ensure a comprehensive Counter Insider Threat strategy and an innovative, directive approach, seeking to implement cutting edge data management policies and technologies that capture an “all source,” shared picture of potential insider threats.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the technical and systems integration challenges involved in improving personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention within DOD?

*Answer.* While I have not been briefed on the programs or challenges, I believe that DOD confronts the common challenges faced by many organizations when developing large scale information technology systems that ingest, disseminate, and retain large volumes of data with interfaces across numerous platforms and missions. However, if confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure the integration challenges are minimized and mission effectiveness in personnel security and insider threat is increased.

*Question.* What is your understanding of the cultural and organizational resistance to improvements in the personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention in DOD?

*Answer.* I understand that the Department as a whole can be resistant to change due to its size, complexity, and culture. Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these issues, I believe any cultural or organizational resistance can be overcome by an emphasis on the benefit of increased security, conducted more efficiently and at an improved cost-to-benefit ratio, due to the improvement of current processes. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward overcoming the cultural and organizational resistance to forthcoming adjustments in these key security domains.

*Question.* Given that several recent insider threats were from contractor employees, is it advisable and appropriate, in your view, for the DITMAC to have access to or be integrated in DOD contractors’ data systems? If so, how might such a program be implemented? If such a program is not feasible, advisable, or suitable, what might you suggest as an alternative for mitigating the risk that contractor employees will engage in insider threat activities?

*Answer.* Effective sharing of information between the government and contractors is critical to our ability to collectively mitigate insider threats. Additionally, this enhances the vetting programs required for issuing forms of identification, which grant access to Federal facilities, as described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12. It is my understanding that the DITMAC serves an essential role as the over-arching DOD Insider Threat hub, and if confirmed I will examine more closely how DITMAC can be leveraged as an asset for additional insider threat mitigation and for strengthening connections with our industry partners.

*Question.* In your view, how should DCSA posture the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they harm national security?

*Answer.* The designation and continuing transformation of DCSA brings together two national security missions instrumental to deterring, detecting, and mitigating threats to the Department—the continuous vetting of personnel and stand-alone programs throughout the DOD enterprise designed to counter threats posed by insiders. This convergence enables these separate but complementary missions to more easily share data, coordinate necessary actions, and streamline processes and capabilities to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DCSA to ensure this new organization reaches its full potential.

*Question.* What can the OUSD(I&S) do to ensure that senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the intelligence or counterintelligence communities—are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities, information from insider threats as a core mission objective?

*Answer.* A key component to detecting, preventing, and mitigating insider threats is ensuring management and leadership awareness of the risks to the Department and their role and responsibility in promoting awareness in the workforce. This includes ensuring that the organization’s insider threat programs—specifically programs responsible for determining suitability and fitness, issuing credentials, and vetting personnel—meet requirements and are resourced for success in order to enhance and further such programs. It also means setting standards of conduct for the workforce, fostering positive workplace climates and cultures, and encouraging reporting of concerning behaviors and indicators. If confirmed, I will work with Senior Leaders across the Department to prioritize insider threat programs, including appropriate funding and resourcing to support this critical mission.

*Question.* How should vetting policies and processes applicable to foreign military students enrolled in DOD training and educational programs help to mitigate risk to U.S. personnel, facilities, and equipment?

Answer. Following the terrorist attack at Naval Air Station Pensacola in December 2019, I understand that DOD took steps to more closely align vetting and security processes for international military students (IMS) and their accompanying family members with that of U.S. military personnel. In parallel with the implementation of these DOD-established installation security measures, I appreciate that relevant new U.S. law was enacted on January 1, 2021, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Section 1090 of that Act was in response to the same terrorist attack. The new law requires DOD to establish vetting procedures as well as physical security requirements for non-U.S. individuals accepted for training on DOD installations in the United States. The implementation of the DOD requirements, as well as future implementation of the Section 1090 requirements will provide a greater level of security for both U.S. personnel and our allies and partners training with us on DOD installations. If confirmed, I will work to advance vetting policies and processes within the Department to help mitigate risks to U.S. personnel, facilities, and equipment.

*Question.* The Department of Defense is pursuing a wide-ranging strategy to engage with commercial entities engaged in cutting-edge research and development. The Department recognizes that it needs new acquisition policies and practices to enable the Department to engage the private sector with the necessary speed, agility and flexibility. Two related obstacles are the time and difficulty involved in the security clearance process and the hurdles that non-traditional contractors face in getting access to data to test and demonstrate new information technology and software. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), for example, concluded that it lacked the authority to share even its unclassified imagery data with companies and universities it hoped could develop dramatically improved exploitation capabilities through machine learning-based artificial intelligence algorithms.

How might DOD's security apparatus adapt and tailor its requirements and procedures better to support the Department's innovation activities, in your view?

Answer. The Department must overcome its reliance on traditional policies and practices when it comes to identifying and implementing innovation. Future Public-Private partnerships will be essential to the Department's innovation aspirations, and authorities can and should be changed if they inhibit creativity and progress provided those changes do not create unacceptable risk. Regarding background investigations, I understand there have been significant improvements in overall timeliness that should mitigate against delays in getting the right people on board. With respect to increasing collaboration with non-traditional contractors and academic researchers, I am aware of a range of initiatives underway in the Department that could help in this area. If confirmed, I will work closely with our Acquisition and Research colleagues in OSD and the Congress to continue to identify improvements in policy and oversight to ensure the Department is effectively engaged across the National Security Innovation Base.

*Question.* Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force in late-2018, reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Task Force was one component of DOD's response to Intelligence Community warnings that China and Russia are engaged in campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary information, and other forms of intellectual property from the United States, through infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition of knowledge by foreign students at U.S. universities, and other nefarious means—all as part of a strategic technology acquisition program.

How would you characterize the threat posed by foreign nations to the integrity of the National Security Innovation Base? Which threats do you assess as most concerning, and why?

Answer. Although I have not been briefed on the details, I am aware from open source reporting that the threat is significant and concerning. I am aware that foreign nations are continuously probing our supply chains to identify and exploit weak links, poor or insufficient security practices, and insider threats. Threats that erode US technology superiority are of the highest concern given the negative effects they have on our ability to maintain a military advantage over future adversaries.

*Question.* In your view, is the OUSD(I&S) appropriately resourced and organized to ensure the security of the National Security Innovation Base, critical technology, and related intellectual property that are critical to the DOD? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. Protecting the National Security Innovation Base requires tight collaboration across the Intelligence, Security, Acquisition, and Research enterprises within DOD, as well as equally strong collaboration with our interagency partners. Although I am not aware of any pressing resource or organizational challenges within I&S, if confirmed I will make it a priority to assess the full measure of support re-

quirements and work closely across the enterprise to ensure we have the right alignment to counter the threat.

*Question.* How would you propose to improve the support provided by the DCSA, the DOD counterintelligence organizations, and the national Intelligence Community to better protect the National Security Innovation Base, and enhance the Department's innovation strategy, especially with respect to technology companies that are non-traditional DOD contractors?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work to advance DOD counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security capabilities, leveraging DOD's interagency partners, especially the FBI, to detect, deter, and disrupt the attempts of China and other adversaries to penetrate and exploit the National Security Innovation Base and the Defense Industrial Base it supports.

#### COLLECTION & SPECIAL PROGRAMS

*Question.* In light of the rapidly evolving nature of the national security environment, to include significant advances by adversarial nations in the development and fielding of capabilities that could challenge DOD tradecraft, technologies, methodologies, and processes, what do you see as the most pressing challenges to DOD's ability to conduct technical and human intelligence collection activities?

*Answer.* It is clear the technology environment today has created pressing challenges in the conduct of traditional collection activities. Increasingly, adversary development of advanced technologies, such as computing, artificial intelligence, and secure communications, as well as the diffusion of sophisticated capabilities worldwide, complicate the information environment and reduce our national security advantage. In addition, the volume of commercially available data on individuals and their activity and the proliferation of both networked, correlated, and automated systems as well as algorithms that can exploit the information could pose a challenge to DOD human intelligence collection activities.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that sufficient focus and resources are devoted to Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise efforts to address these global realities and pursue additional resources if there are critical technical and human intelligence collection shortfalls. These challenges are not unique to the Department and, if confirmed, I would work with our IC partners to integrate and synchronize DOD and IC efforts and resources for addressing threats such as Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS), enabled by rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). Maintaining freedom of action in the physical or virtual world is paramount to the Department's ability to leverage all available collection platforms especially because cyberspace is now a contested domain. Our ability to collect in and through cyberspace must remain a priority. As with the physical domain, freedom in cyberspace is challenged by malign actors and the proliferation of AI and ML.

Last, I also believe that recruiting and retaining the right cultural and technical expertise is a challenge to overcome. Due to complex collection requirements, and the aggressive global posture of strategic competitors, with extensive CI capabilities we require a cadre of collectors that culturally understand, look, speak, and act like our adversaries wherever they challenge global norms. Diversity in the IC is a mission imperative—we must create a pathway that attracts the right individuals while not compromising the professional ethics that our enterprise is built upon.

*Question.* If confirmed, how do you intend to approach these challenges to ensure that the DOD intelligence enterprise is postured to operate in an increasingly contested security and intelligence environment?

*Answer.* I believe the major challenges confronting the Department include adapting to and providing timely awareness and insights into a diverse, complex and ever-changing array of security challenges. If confirmed, I will lead the continuous review of processes and policies to support warfighters and decisionmakers in this changing environment. This may require changes in how DOD personnel train and use tradecraft, technologies, methodologies, as well as process adjustments for collection analysis. Aggressive efforts to ensure DOD is leveraging the best commercial technologies will remain essential, as will our ability to rapidly field technologies where required.

#### INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In your view, what is the role of the OUSD(I&S) in ensuring that sensitive activities across DOD are consistently conducted in accordance with standards of legality and propriety?

*Answer.* I understand the USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence,



counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The USD(I&S) establishes policy and provides oversight and direction for the coordination, assessment, reporting, and conduct of Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities, the Defense Cover Program, special communications, technical collection support to intelligence activities, defense sensitive support, and the clandestine use of technology. If confirmed, I would work closely with relevant defense and interagency stakeholders to ensure DOD sensitive activities are conducted consistent with law and DOD policy.

*Question.* In your view, how should the OUSD(I&S) engage with the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and on what matters?

*Answer.* Based on my experience, the process in which the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) notifies the PIOB of Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters is effective. If confirmed, I look forward to fostering a positive relationship with the ATSD(IO) and PIOB during my tenure, and ensuring that my office provides subject-matter expertise, as required by DOD policy, to support the ATSD(IO)'s inspection, investigative, and reporting activities, including notifications to the PIOB.

#### INFORMATION OPERATIONS

*Question.* The Russian government conducted, mainly through cyberspace, an aggressive information operations campaign against the United States in 2016 and again in 2020, in an attempt to influence Presidential elections and undermine faith in America's democratic system and institutions. In 2016, in particular, DOD, and the Federal Government as a whole, were ill-prepared to detect, defend against, and respond to these operations.

What are your views on the roles, responsibilities, and preparedness of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to deter and defend against strategic information operations?

*Answer.* I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must improve its ability to compete in the information environment and to inform and shape the perceptions of specific audiences in order to gain or maintain a competitive advantage. My view is that the Department of Defense should conduct military operations in the information environment, including clandestine operations as defined in section 1631 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, across multiple domains to counter foreign malign actors and advance U.S. national security. Our efforts to deter and defend against foreign strategic information operations should be prioritized with appropriate resources and must include more robust coordination and collaboration across the Department, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy acting as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Information Operations Advisor, and the executive branch. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this happens.

*Question.* Section 1631 of the FY2020 NDAA required the designation of a Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA) to the Secretary of Defense and a Joint Force Trainer and Joint Force Provider for Information Operations. The Secretary of Defense designated the USD(P) as the PIOA but the Committee is unaware that any Joint Force Provider/Trainer designation has been made. In addition, shortly before he left office, Acting Secretary of Defense Miller rescinded the PIOA designation and directed the creation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense of a Directorate for Strategic Competition, the Director of which would become PIOA and manage a task force. Acting Secretary Miller further directed the integration of the USD(I&S)-led Strategic Competition and Influence Task Force (SCITF) with the Directorate for Strategic Competition. The Committee has been informed that Acting Secretary Miller's decisions have been put on hold pending review and direction by Secretary Austin.

What are your views on the role that the OUSD(I&S) should play in the development and supervision of the implementation of Information Operations policy, strategy, and resource sponsorship? Should there be a separate Task Force on Strategic Competition and Influence in your view?

*Answer.* I understand that the Department continues to review its strategy, policy, and resources for information operations. I believe the USD(I&S) should play a key role in these efforts as the designated Principal Staff Assistant for certain information-related capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD leaders to present the Secretary of Defense with the best possible organizational approach to address these issues.

*Question.* What are your views regarding the designation of an Information Operations Joint Force Provider and Trainer?

Answer. I have not been briefed on this initiative, but if confirmed, I look forward to studying it in further detail.

*Question.* On March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti, then Commander, U.S. European Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. efforts to counter Russian influence operations still lacked “effective unification across the interagency” and that the United States has yet to develop “a multi-faceted strategy to counter Russia.”

Do you agree with General Scaparrotti’s assessment in this regard? Please explain your answer.

Answer. I agree that we must improve our interagency efforts to counter foreign malign influence. I understand that the Director of National Intelligence is establishing a Foreign Malign Influence and Response Center to improve the unified, whole-of-government effort to counter foreign malign influence from countries like Russia, China and Iran. If confirmed, I will ensure the USD(I&S) staff coordinates with this new Center and collaborates to ensure the Department’s activities are synchronized, as appropriate.

*Question.* In your view, how might the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise best contribute to efforts to counter Russian influence operations?

Answer. I understand the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise (DISE) is shifting its collection and other activities toward China and Russia. This includes the DISE contributing to efforts that counter Russian influence operations by developing frameworks that can be rapidly operationalized against key foreign target audiences to shape the collection focus and prioritization. If confirmed, I will continue to place emphasis on strategic competition with Russia and China and work to ensure DOD efforts are coordinated and integrated within a whole-of-government approach. I will also work to ensure appropriate planning, programming, and budgeting for DOD activities that are required to effectively engage in this mission space, such as foreign target audience analysis, key influencer identification, and early indicators & warnings of adversary disinformation.

*Question.* In January 2020, nine combatant commanders sent a letter to the Director of National Intelligence requesting better and more timely support from the intelligence community to publicly illuminate malign influence and coercive activities by China and Russia.

In your view, how can the Defense Intelligence Enterprise better support the requirements of the combatant commanders?

Answer. I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must improve its ability to support combatant commanders by fully understanding adversarial goals in the information environment; by engaging with those who are impacted by foreign malign influence and coercive operations; and by enabling efforts, in alignment with national and defense priorities, to inform and shape the perceptions of specific foreign audiences to gain or maintain a competitive U.S. national security advantage.

*Question.* In your view, would the illumination of these malign activities help to dissuade or deter China and Russia?

Answer. I believe DOD efforts to expose Russian and Chinese disinformation should be prioritized, supported, resourced, and executed to dissuade or deter their malign activities. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to attribute, expose, and counter foreign malign activities that harm U.S. national security interests.

*Question.* In September 2018, DOD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy. The Strategy charges DOD to “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” in the cyber domain.

In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise in operationalizing the “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war” concepts animating the Department’s 2018 Cyber Strategy?

Answer. These concepts require the DISE to provide intelligence support to DOD components at a speed and scale that enables current and future cyber operations. Therefore, I believe that intelligence support to cyberspace operations must accomplish the following objectives: supporting the Joint Force in execution of critical missions in a contested cyberspace domain; maximizing integrated information sharing and collaboration with foreign allies and partners, interagency stakeholders, and the public and private sectors; and normalizing intelligence support to cyberspace operations using business practices and processes similar to those used in other domains, while providing the DISE clarity of roles, missions, and functions in cyberspace operations.

DISE knowledge of the domestic risk landscape and work with the private sector informs DOD’s defend forward efforts to preempt, defeat, and deter malicious cyber activity outside the U.S. that is, for example, targeting our critical infrastructure. DOD’s “defend forward” operations also inform and guide efforts at DHS to anti-

pate adversary action, understand potential risks to critical infrastructure, and empower our private sector stakeholders with the information they need to secure their enterprise.

*Question.* What actions would you take, if confirmed, to remediate any gap between Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise capacity and capabilities and the goals of the Cyber Strategy?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with Department stakeholders, the DISE, and IC to enable the continued implementation of the USD(I&S) Defense Intelligence Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. This strategy provides overarching direction to the DISE in closing gaps with the Cyber Strategy as identified in the 2018 Cyber Posture Review.

If confirmed, I would continue efforts to clarify intelligence roles and responsibilities to include those responsible for developing foundational military intelligence for cyberspace operations; incorporate and standardize cyber requirements into intelligence business processes and human capital management; develop the supporting infrastructure for optimizing and augmenting intelligence with advanced technologies, while continuing to support tool development; and emphasize the development of partnerships with allies and industry to include increased collaboration with the Defense Industrial Base and other government stakeholders in the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and cybersecurity to improve intelligence support for whole of government operations.

*Question.* What role should DOD, and the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise in particular, including the National Security Agency and the intelligence elements of United States Cyber Command, occupy in combating foreign influence operations, especially those conducted via social media?

*Answer.* I expect that foreign states will continue to use malign influence measures in their attempts to sway U.S. voters' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our democratic process. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DOD and the DISE are postured to support the whole-of-government effort, using all elements of national power, to expose and counter clandestinely disseminated malign influence and information campaigns, propaganda, and disinformation.

*Question.* What role should DOD and the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise in particular, play in anticipating or responding to cyber attacks on commercial entities, in your view?

*Answer.* DOD is responsible for threat response to DOD cyber incidents affecting DOD assets and the DOD Information Network (DODIN). DOD can also support civil authorities for cyber incidents outside the DODIN when requested by, for example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when such support is approved by the appropriate DOD official, or directed by the President. Such support would be provided based upon the needs of the incident, the capabilities required, and the readiness of available forces. DOD, thru the DISE, actively characterizes and assesses foreign cybersecurity threats and informs relevant interagency partners of current and potential malicious cyber activity. Upon request, the DISE components may provide technical assistance to other U.S. departments and agencies. Other DOD Components may provide support to civil authorities in accordance with applicable law and policy.

*Question.* What are your views as to whether the "dual hatting" of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?

*Answer.* I understand that the Department, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, has been studying this question closely to ensure that any decision concerning the future of the dual-hat leadership arrangement is fully informed and addresses potential risks to national security and to the operational effectiveness of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. I am also aware of the legal requirement for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make certain certifications before this arrangement could be terminated. If confirmed, I would ensure that a review of this question is comprehensive so that decisionmakers are fully informed about the impact on national security of any change to the dual-hat leadership arrangement.

*Question.* Should intelligence support (under the oversight of OUSD(I&S)) to the overall DOD cybersecurity mission (under the oversight of the Principal Cyber Advisor) be enhanced, in your view? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I believe that a close and continuing partnership between the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Principal Cyber Advisor, and OUSD(I&S) is essential to best align intelligence policies and capabilities with policy objectives outlined in the DOD Cyber Strategy. I do not currently have sufficient information to have a per-

spective about the adequacy of the support at this time, but if confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) remains a valued partner in the DOD cybersecurity mission.

#### TORTURE AND ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

*Question.* Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18, 2020), and required by Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92).

*Question.* If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing triennial review and revision of FM 2–22.3 mandated by the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with the OUSD(I&S) staff to ensure that the review is thorough and that appropriate recommendations are provided to the Secretary. My understanding is that the review is examining the intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques in the FM based on lessons learned over the past several years.

*Question.* Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM 2–22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I am not currently aware of any provisions in the FM that may need to be revised, but if confirmed I will make my assessment.

*Question.* Section 2441 of title 18, U.S. Code, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a way that provides U.S. detainees in the custody of other nations, as well as foreign detainees in U.S. custody appropriate protections from abusive treatment?

*Answer.* Yes. Section 2441 applies to war crimes, including grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, committed by or against a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a U.S. national. I believe that we must to continue to hold ourselves to the highest standards for the humane treatment of detainees, and that we must make clear to our foreign partners that we expect them to do the same.

#### IMPERATIVE FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

*Question.* If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that DOD intelligence analysts, including those seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?

*Answer.* I believe that defense intelligence assessments must remain unbiased, objective, and free from political interference.

I understand that ensuring the objectivity of defense intelligence analysis is a critical part of the USD(I&S) oversight role. If confirmed, I will hold senior leaders of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise accountable to providing fact-based, unbiased analysis, independent of political factors in accordance with all applicable laws and professional standards.

#### THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE

*Question.* The USD(I&S) exercises policy oversight of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) to ensure that defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components are structured; manned; trained—including joint intelligence training, certification, education, and professional development; and equipped to execute their missions.

Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce properly sized, in your view? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the size and capability of the defense civilian intelligence workforce, but I believe people are the most important part of any organization. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is sufficiently sized to provide timely and reasoned intelligence products to the warfighters and policymakers.

*Question.* Does the DOD civilian intelligence workforce have the appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly distributed, in your view?

Answer. I do not have sufficient information to provide a perspective at this time. However, based on my experience in intelligence, and particularly my time at the National Security Agency, it is my impression that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is providing quality and timely intelligence to the warfighter and policymaker. However, as with any organization, missions evolve and adjustments to the workforce may be needed. If confirmed, I will work to assess our workforce alignment to national defense priorities and propose such actions as may be deemed beneficial.

*Question.* Are the number and quality of candidates referred and available for consideration and selection by intelligence, counterintelligence, and security community hiring officials adequate to sustain and enhance the capabilities of the civilian intelligence workforce?

Answer. I have not received any information on candidate pools. However, I believe people are the most important part of any organization. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we have the most qualified intelligence and security professionals, and that we persistently and aggressively seek opportunities to expand candidate pools to acquire both the skills and diversity necessary to accomplish DOD intelligence and security missions.

*Question.* If confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be most important to you in selecting a candidate for appointment in the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)? As a Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) official?

Answer. The Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES) provides the executive leadership for the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise. I believe the Senior Executives Service Core Qualifications—Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions—provide a sound underlying basis for executive selections. I believe there should be a premium placed on a proven ability to collaborate effectively across boundaries.

Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) employees complement the executive leadership of DISES by providing the extraordinary substantive and technical expertise, in combination with the demonstrated talent for personal leadership, within critical career fields. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on identifying, selecting, and developing all personnel to accomplish our mission objectives, including DISES and DISL.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you go about ensuring that DISES and DISL under your authority are held accountable for both organizational performance and the rigorous performance management of their subordinate employees?

Answer. We can accomplish what we can measure. If confirmed, I intend to use the executive performance management system to maintain oversight of executive and senior level performance.

*Question.* Are you satisfied with the subject matter and rigor of DISES and DISL professional development programs currently available across DOD? If not, what changes would you make to these programs, if confirmed?

Answer. I have not yet been briefed on the content and rigor of these professional development programs within DOD. However, if confirmed, I intend to assess the effectiveness of these programs. I believe that a talented and effective leadership cadre is critical to successfully delivering quality intelligence to the warfighter and policymaker.

*Question.* Are you satisfied that the process employed by the OUSD(I&S) to validate whether a vacant DISES/DISL position should be rehired, restructured, or eliminated is effective in responding to current and emergent mission needs of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise? If confirmed as the USD(I&S), what would be your role in this process?

Answer. I have not yet been fully briefed on the processes in place for validation of DISES and DISL positions. However, I recognize that continuous evaluation of requirements is an essential mechanism to ensure our leadership positions are appropriately manned and structured. Every executive wants maximum flexibility to adapt their organization to support mission success, and if confirmed, I will ensure oversight processes are in place that support an agile and adaptive Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise.

*Question.* The Intelligence Community “Joint Duty” program was established in response to the requirements set forth in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that service in more than one IC element be a condition for promotion to the senior executive level.

Do members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce participate in the “Joint Duty” program? If so, to what extent does DOD participate?

Answer. I understand that the DOD civilian intelligence workforce participates fully in the Joint Duty program. DOD Instruction 1400.36 implements the Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignment (JDA) Program within the Department and provides that JDA Program certification is a requirement for DISL and DISES posi-

tions. It is also my understanding that joint duty is encouraged in all defense intelligence components as a key element of an individual's career development.

*Question.* What are your views on the merit and utility of the "Joint Duty" program as a professional development experience for members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce?

*Answer.* I believe the civilian joint duty program is an essential element of the professional development experience for members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce. It is key that our civilian intelligence professionals understand the relationships among the members of the intelligence community and that throughout their careers they build deep and enduring professional relationships across the Intelligence Community (IC). Joint experience supports a fully integrated and collaborative intelligence community. Similar to the way that the military joint duty requirements from the Goldwater-Nichols Act has paid dividends for the military services, the civilian joint duty program is vital to building a more integrated, interoperable, and effective IC.

*Question.* What other innovative ideas do you have for the professional development of non-executive members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce?

*Answer.* At this time, I do not have the requisite information about current efforts to recommend specific ideas. I believe that continuing professional development throughout one's career is critical to both developing the most effective intelligence capabilities and retaining the expertise behind it. Based on my experience at NSA, I believe that if we are to maintain our competitive advantage, we will need to build more effective public-private partnerships, both with academia and industry. We must find ways to enable seamless mobility between government and the private sector throughout an employee's career, particularly in our most demanding technical areas, to ensure we have the expert, professional, and motivated workforce the 21st century demands. If confirmed, I will pursue efforts to increase opportunities for professional development within the workforce that enable the career mobility necessary to build the diversity and capability of the workforce.

*Question.* Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce prepared to sustain requisite capacity and capability during the impending workforce "bath tub"—a descriptor often used to graphically illustrate the impending potential loss of civilian workforce expertise due to the retirement of large numbers of "baby boomers" and the lack of experienced people to fill the vacancies?

*Answer.* I have not been fully briefed on all aspects of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce hiring and personnel authorities. For any organization, understanding the dynamics of the workforce through effective workforce analytics is critical to plan for workforce requirement changes driven by evolution of mission—we must measure what we intend to achieve. If confirmed, I would ensure the OUSD(I&S) is taking necessary efforts to require active succession planning for the enterprise while aggressively projecting workforce requirements and that the authorities provided to the Secretary of Defense for the defense intelligence workforce provide the flexibilities necessary to address, maintain, and build workforce capability.

*Question.* Does the USD(I&S) need additional hiring, development, recruitment, retention, or compensation authorities to enable further improvements in the capacity and capability of the DCIPS? Please explain your answer.

*Answer.* In general, I understand that the authorities under title 10 provide the Department with flexibility to address capacity and capability requirements of the civilian workforce. However, I am also aware that challenges continue to exist in DOD's ability to address competitive requirements for certain key skill areas, such as those in the cyber and STEM fields. I understand that the Department has limited pay authorities applicable to the National Security Agency needed to address a critical compensation shortfall in their cyber workforce. If confirmed, I will review the authorities available to the Department and assess whether any additional authorities are required to address DCIPS challenges.

#### WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

*Question.* Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication. Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside of the chain of command, including the Congress.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that military and civilian members of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement—including in classified programs—to

appropriate authorities within or outside the chain of command—are protected from reprisal and retaliation, including from the very highest levels of DOD and the broader Intelligence Community?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring protections are afforded to DISE personnel who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement, in a manner consistent with law and regulation. Additionally, I will ensure that personnel who pursue retaliatory actions upon protected personnel are addressed appropriately, as established by law and regulation.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower protections across the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise?

Answer. If confirmed, I will carry out my responsibilities to ensure that the DOD policy implementing such protections is applied consistently and uniformly in accordance with law.

#### SEXUAL HARASSMENT

*Question.* In responding to the 2018 ODOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17717.7 percent of female and 5.88 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(I&S)?

Answer. There is no place for this conduct in the Department of Defense or Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will exercise my oversight responsibilities for the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to ensure that reports of sexual harassment or gender discrimination are dealt with swiftly and in accordance with law and policy.

#### SPACE

*Question.* In the past 2 years the United States has stood up the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) and assigned it responsibility for the operational planning of DOD space missions and activities. As well, the U.S. Space Force was established as a sixth Military Service, charged with the Title 10 responsibilities for the space domain.

If confirmed, specifically what would be your approach to enhancing the interface and synchronization of space-based capabilities resident in the Intelligence Community with military space organizations?

Answer. The DOD and IC have a long history of collaboration in fielding and operating space systems, and USD(I&S) plays an important role in the synchronization of these efforts. Space system development and operations benefits from collaboration across agency boundaries and the effectiveness of those systems improves with improved integration. If confirmed, I will continue to look for opportunities to expand collaboration between NRO and other military space organizations to enable sharing of capabilities that are mutually beneficial to DOD and IC.

*Question.* How would you recommend deconflicting tasking requirements in the space warfighting domain across DOD with tasking requirements from Intelligence Community customers?

Answer. Deconfliction for tasking intelligence collection is executed through the Functional Manager roles, which consider both DOD and IC priorities. As with other domains, intelligence support to space warfighting requires balancing tasking requirements among the numerous stakeholders served by national collection. There will likely be growth in the collection and analytical needs of space intelligence and defense missions and, if confirmed, I will work with the functional managers on ways to better streamline the tasking process to increase access, agility, and responsiveness to best satisfy these unique space intelligence requirements.

*Question.* NRO recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Army for a tactical space layer to provide alternative Position, Navigation and Timing, as well to provide Army ground stations with tactical battlefield situational awareness and ISR.

In your view, is the NRO moving to more of a direct support role to the Services?

Answer. The NRO provides critical intelligence to the Services to meet tactical to strategic requirements. I understand that NRO is working diligently to develop advanced space capabilities and resilient architectures to provide real time support to the warfighter. If confirmed, I will work with the NRO and the Department to de-

velop end-to-end space architectures that can meet National, Service and Combatant Command requirements.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would you ensure the Space Force and NRO are not duplicating capabilities and responsibilities for the Joint Force?

Answer. My understanding is that there is strong coordination between the Space Force and NRO which is reinforced through the mature DOD Budgeting Programming and requirements process. The USD(I&S) participates in these requirements through validation, resourcing, and oversight processes. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) has a continued active role in these processes.

*Question.* In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and allied space assets? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The key to an effective “protect and defend” strategy is the seamless execution of space defense actions, synchronized across DOD and IC platforms under a collaborative unity of effort. The National Space Defense Center is where this unified defense comes together. As adversaries increasingly threaten US freedom of action in space, the DOD and IC must continue to strengthen partnerships to maintain a competitive advantage. Enhanced space cooperation within the U.S. Government and with the international community and commercial sector will provide a durable strategic advantage for the U.S. and our allies and partners and serve as a force multiplier to protect and defend against adversary use of space for purposes hostile to U.S. interests.

I believe that we succeed when we train as we intend to fight. Wargames, exercises, and planning activities continue to inform the development of space protect-and- defend tactics, techniques, and procedures. DOD is committed to an approach to space defense that balances the need to protect national space assets and continue the space-based intelligence mission that is critical to win in space and in support of other domains.

*Question.* How best could members of the defense intelligence workforce—both military and civilian—be utilized in support of the U.S. Space Force?

Answer. The defense intelligence workforce offers a variety of capabilities to the U.S. Space Force (USSF), including intelligence support to space, technical and acquisitions expertise, and satellite operations. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise will continue to align resources and manpower to support the USSF in response to current and future space threats and enable effective deterrence and defense. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and across the IC to ensure the Space Force has access to intelligence personnel and capabilities.

*Question.* The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency not designated as a combat support agency (CSA). Historically, the NRO has asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and controls. In NRO’s view, others, principally its mission partners—NSA and NGA—which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational tasking of deployed satellites. Now, however, there exists a class of operational decisions for which the NRO Director is responsible: in situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threat of same, the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions regarding space control.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the NRO is sufficiently integrated with and responsive to the U.S. Space Force? To U.S. Space Command?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen collaboration between NRO and U.S. Space Force and the US Space Command in both development and operations. I believe the addition of the Director of the NRO as a member of the Space Force Acquisition Council will improve collaboration in space system development. For operations, the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) is the central point of integration and unity of effort. Accordingly, I would work with U.S. Space Command to ensure NSDC has a unified structure that fully integrates DOD and IC space defense plans and capabilities.

*Question.* Given that NRO would be required to respond operationally to active threats to reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a conflict, should the Department consider designating NRO as a CSA?

Answer. No, I believe the NRO has a unique role which is different from that of any of the Combat Support Agencies. For operational decisions regarding space control, the NRO and US Space Command have established a unified defense concept of operations at the National Space Defense Center to ensure integrated operations in times of conflict. In my opinion, this agreement provides the necessary unity of effort without designating NRO as a Combat Support Agency. Additionally, the Combat Support Agencies (NGA and NSA) are the functional managers and develop the collection priorities for the NRO assets.



*Question.* How is the NRO synchronizing its acquisition efforts with the DOD Space enterprise and architecture?

*Answer.* Space system development benefits from collaboration across agency boundaries and the effectiveness of those systems improves with better interagency integration. If confirmed, I will consider how OUSD(I&S) can expand collaboration opportunities as the Department and the Intelligence Community (IC) move forward to orchestrate the development and fielding of a future threat-driven National Defense Space Architecture.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

*Question.* In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

*Answer.* Yes.

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

##### BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

1. Senator REED. Mr. Moultrie, foreign adversaries such as Russia and China are also taking advantage of our open markets to engage in malign financial influence activities, including seeking to gain ownership or control over companies contracting with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other private businesses so as to get access to sensitive information or technologies. In too many cases, the Department

lacks information on who the beneficial owners of its contractors or subcontractors are to protect against this threat. That is, DOD may think it's working with an American company, but it may actually be a third or fourth level subsidiary of a parent company that is actually owned or controlled by Russia, China, or another strategic competitor. Do you share the concern that DOD needs a better understanding of the true ownership behind its contractors and subcontractors for our national security?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I do share your concern and believe that DOD needs a better understanding and continuing awareness of foreign ownership, control, or influence of DOD contractors and subcontractors for purposes of national security. If confirmed, I will make this a top priority.

2. Senator REED. Mr. Moultrie, there is a provision enacted as part of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that requires DOD to improve the processes and procedures for the assessment and mitigation of risks related to beneficial ownership/foreign ownership, control, or influence [FOCI] of contractors and subcontractors doing business with the Department in order to mitigate risks from malign foreign influence. If confirmed, you will oversee the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, which has the lead in formulating these regulations. Are you of this provision?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I am aware of Section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to develop the regulations pursuant to Section 847.

3. Senator REED. Mr. Moultrie, will you commit to prioritize the formulation and implementation of these new regulations?

Mr. MOULTRIE. If confirmed, I will prioritize the development and implementation of such regulations in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

#### INSIDER THREAT PROTECTIONS ON UNCLASSIFIED NETWORKS

4. Senator REED. Mr. Moultrie, the Department has made great progress against combatting insider threats over the last 10 years, notably through comprehensive user activity coverage of the classified enterprise. Intelligence indicates that more expansive insider threat protections are needed across the unclassified networks to further address threats such as data exfiltration, espionage, and harm to self and others. In addition, an April 9th memo from the Secretary of Defense on countering extremism in the Department, directs the newly established Countering Extremism Working Group to strengthen the Department's insider threat programs and expand user activity monitoring on both the classified and unclassified systems. How do you propose furthering this strategy to provide more expansive insider threat protections through user activity monitoring on the unclassified network?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I understand the Department is working a number of efforts to advance its Counter Insider Threat capabilities and that user monitoring is one of these efforts. I agree with this approach and believe it is crucial for the Department to keep pace with the evolving risk. If confirmed, I will engage with the DOD Chief Information Officer to develop a user monitoring strategy for all systems consistent with all applicable law and policy.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

##### COORDINATION WITH THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OFFICE

5. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Moultrie the Defense Department's Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) is tasked with developing new and innovative ways to shape and counter emerging threats across all domains, synchronizing the joint force's efforts through coordination with the military services, Intelligence Community, and combatant commanders. If confirmed, how do you plan to synchronize the DOD's intelligence apparatus with the Strategic Capabilities Office to more quickly identify emerging threats and shorten the timeline to fielding weapons systems to counter those threats?

Mr. MOULTRIE. It is my understanding that the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) participates in the annual review of Battlespace Awareness capability needs and programs conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. If confirmed, I will assess whether the SCO's participation in

this review is sufficient to synchronize defense intelligence and the SCO's efforts to identify and promptly address such threats.

#### BACKGROUND CHECKS

6. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Moultrie, in order to recruit and attract the talent the Department needs, it has been given special hiring authorities, yet oftentimes there is a delay in onboarding these valuable civil servants due to lengthy but important background checks which has caused a large backlog. While I believe an extensive vetting process to receive and maintain a security clearance is extremely important, if confirmed, what guidance do you plan to give to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to reduce this backlog?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I share your concerns regarding the Department's ability to recruit, hire, and retain quality individuals. After the transfer of the background investigation mission to the Department, I understand that DCSA reduced the inventory to fewer than 200,000 cases, which is a significant improvement from the prior backlog of more than 700,000 cases. If confirmed, I will work in close partnership with the U.S. Government's Security and Suitability Executive Agents to reform personnel vetting in order to further improve timeliness and continue to reduce the backlog.

7. Senator HIRONO. Mr. Moultrie, do you think the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency needs additional personnel to adequately deal with this issue?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Although I have not been briefed on the personnel needs of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), I am a firm believer in embracing technological solutions to reduce manual burdens for this and other missions across the Department. If confirmed, I will ensure that DCSA is focused on innovation, automation, incorporation of emerging technologies, and continual process improvements before adding personnel.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

##### INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCING

8. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Moultrie, the Armed Services Committee has heard from combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command, in recent weeks regarding the importance of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Transfer Fund which, up until fiscal year 2021, was a congressionally appropriated fund to support emerging combatant command ISR requirements, often through the use of contracted ISR solutions. What is your understanding of the effectiveness of the ISR Transfer Fund in supporting combatant command ISR requirements in recent years?

Mr. MOULTRIE. From my conversations with Department leadership, I understand that the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Transfer Fund was very effective in addressing urgent Combatant Command ISR requirements, particularly in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. Given the insatiable demand for ISR across the Combatant Commands, I believe it is important that the Department balance resources to maintain an appropriate force structure of airborne ISR systems for both the current fight and future contingencies. If confirmed, I will explore ways the Department can better align ISR to counter current threats, while developing future capabilities to address future challenges.

9. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Moultrie, what is your view on whether the Department of Defense should formally request funding for the ISR Transfer Fund, or a similar funding arrangement, in future fiscal years?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I do not have a view at this time. If confirmed, I would focus my efforts to ensure the annual President's Budget Request accurately reflects the ISR requirements of the Combatant Commands.

10. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Moultrie, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to address unfunded ISR requirements in "economy of force" theaters like U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command?

Mr. MOULTRIE. As I stated previously, the Combatant Command (CCMD) demand for ISR, particularly airborne ISR, is much greater than the Department's capacity. If confirmed, I will work to understand the unfunded ISR requirements and seek to align those with DOD resources and emerging capabilities. In cooperation with the Joint Staff, I would use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs process to address

urgent ISR shortfalls assessed by the CCMDs to pose a risk to life or success of on-going operations.

#### LEVERAGING U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE ISR CAPABILITIES

11. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Moultrie, if confirmed, how would you seek to leverage U.S. commercial space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, such as U.S. commercial satellite mapping, to support Department of Defense requirements?

Mr. MOULTRIE. The U.S. commercial remote sensing industry contributes significantly to satisfy Department of Defense requirements. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues to leverage purchases from that industry as a robust, diverse, and affordable means of obtaining data for mapping, charting, and geodesy.

12. Senator INHOFE. Mr. Moultrie, what, in your view, are the primary challenges to promoting and sustaining a healthy U.S. commercial space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance industrial base and, if confirmed, how would you seek to address these challenges?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Growth of the U.S. commercial remote sensing market is dominated by the market forces of consumer demand. In my view, industry is up to the challenge of continued innovation and expanded analytical services needed to increase value for their customers. The U.S. Government is an important customer and has the opportunity to influence industry not only by the product it buys, but by the demand signal it sends. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence to maintain a steady demand signal for diverse and innovative products and services to answer today's hard intelligence problems.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

##### ASSURING THE AVAILABILITY AND COMPETITION FOR COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING CAPABILITIES

13. Senator WICKER. Mr. Moultrie, the recent and significant expansion of commercially available geospatial-intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities provides the Government significant opportunity for innovative solutions to mission requirements, as well as cost savings through competitive pricing and developmental cost avoidance. Section 1612 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to "leverage, to the extent practicable, the capabilities of the industry of the United States, including through the use of domestic commercial geospatial-intelligence services and acquisition of domestic commercial satellite imagery."

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) appears to be interpreting the intent of section 1612 in a manner that far exceeds the intent of Congress and will restrict competition by U.S. based competitors rather than increase it as intended by the statute. This interpretation has resulted in a very strict policy that labels U.S. companies with ownership from our most trusted allies as "foreign" and ineligible for NRO contracts. This policy will limit access to competitive, and sometimes best commercial capabilities, and limit U.S. companies from investing and growing in the United States.

As important, NRO's policy would incorrectly exclude U.S. companies with Special Security Agreement (SSA) or Proxy status (as governed by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency) who are otherwise trusted to work on highly sensitive U.S. matters for the benefit of the warfighters, the U.S. defense industrial base, and the U.S. taxpayers. This action risks our access to competitive and innovative alternatives to meet missions across the Government, and will impact some of the U.S. Government's most important and trusted suppliers.

Will you commit to working with the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a thorough review of the National Reconnaissance Office policy to exclude fully cleared U.S. SSA and Proxy companies from participating in commercial remote sensing contracts and report back your views on this action?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence to examine this issue very closely. It is important to leverage domestic capabilities and safeguard sensitive information from our adversaries. I am confident we can strike an appropriate balance and work together on a solution.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

## ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

14. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Moultrie, in 2019, the United States became a net energy exporter for the first time since 1952. Do you believe being a net exporter of energy helps bolster our country's national security?

Mr. MOULTRIE. It is my belief that if the United States can lower its dependence on foreign imports in almost any area, particularly those related to national security, then we are a more secure Nation.

15. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe being a net importer of energy reduces our country's national security?

Mr. MOULTRIE. The U.S. Government should continue to reduce dependence on foreign sources and pursue diversified energy sources as a vital element of our national security and economic interests. It is in our national security interest to pursue long-term, sustainable energy solutions.

16. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe the United States exporting energy to Europe and Asia—thereby reducing our allies and partners reliance on countries like Russia and Iran—helps or hurts regional security?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Being able to export energy to our foreign allies and partners helps regional security in those areas and bolsters our own national security interests. Our being an energy exporting nation provides our foreign partners with options and increases leverage in dealing with our global competitors.

## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES AND TALENT

17. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Moultrie, given the Department's shift in priorities from a focus on counterterrorism to one on great power competition—as laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy—do you believe the defense intelligence community is appropriately shifting resources to this new focus area?

Mr. MOULTRIE. It is my understanding that the Department has realigned its resources in support of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. As the Department makes further adjustments to its warfighting capabilities, I expect these adjustments will impose additional requirements on intelligence and security that will need to be addressed.

18. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Moultrie, what concerns—if any—do you have regarding the talent available that is knowledgeable and maintains expertise on the Indo-Pacific region? If you do have concerns, please detail them and how you plan to address them in your position as an Under Secretary.

Mr. MOULTRIE. My understanding is that the Department has worked closely with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to ensure it has the requisite expertise to meet the Command's requirements. I appreciate, however, expertise on the Indo-Pacific region is required throughout the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the potential challenges for such expertise and plan to visit the Indo-Pacific area of operations at my earliest opportunity.

## NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ALASKA

19. Senator SULLIVAN. Mr. Moultrie, my State hosts the National Security Agency Alaska which is a critical Intelligence Community asset. It provides threat warning support to U.S. and Coalition forces, the Intelligence Community, and combatant commanders. Given its geostrategic location, do you see value in expanding capacity or capability offered by this vital entity? If so, please detail what capacity or capability you see most value in adding.

Mr. MOULTRIE. While serving on Active Duty and as a civilian at the National Security Agency (NSA), I became familiar with the NSA capabilities in Alaska. I anticipate that with the focus in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) on strategic competition with China and Russia, our defense intelligence posture in Alaska will be increasingly important to support the Department's efforts to secure the national security objectives in the NDS. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing NSA Alaska's continuing role in securing the Department's national security interests.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

## CHINESE INTELLIGENCE THREAT

20. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, do you view the challenges associated with countering Beijing as a driver for innovative intelligence capabilities and tradecraft, or do you regard such efforts as too threat specific?

Mr. MOULTRIE. China is a pacing threat for the Department because of its innovative and advancing technology and strategy to pursue its regional and global interests. Countering China is a driver for innovative intelligence capabilities and tradecraft. However, it cannot be the only driver for advancing our intelligence capabilities and tradecraft because we must seek to preserve our competitive edge against all adversaries. If confirmed, I will guide the Defense Intelligence Enterprise in evaluating and assessing innovative technologies, appropriately investing in our intelligence workforce, and ensuring that we maintain our information and military advantage against all adversaries and in all domains.

## EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

21. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, across the myriad rapidly advancing technologies, where would you prioritize investment to improve DOD driven collection, analysis, and exploitation of intelligence?

Mr. MOULTRIE. My understanding is that the Department is developing new Joint Warfighting Concepts to counter the pacing threats. DOD collection, analysis, and exploitation efforts need to inform and enable these future concepts. I believe that, like the Joint Force, many organizations within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) will also require modernization. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to evaluate the capability and capacity of the DIE to support the Joint Force and the Nation, and commit to keeping Congress apprised of the necessary investments for DOD collection, analysis, and exploitation capabilities.

22. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, Project Maven, one of DOD's success stories in developing critical Artificial Intelligence's (AI) tools is expected to transition to the National Geospatial—Intelligence Agency by fiscal year 2023. Can you walk us through your strategy to execute a smooth transition so that Maven's continued success is ensured?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I understand that the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and Project Maven have been working closely together since Project Maven was established. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure an appropriate transition by evaluating the current scope of MAVEN operations and their alignment with NGA's DOD and IC Missions, and develop a phased, conditions-based approach to transferring Project Maven's geospatial lines of effort to NGA.

23. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, the cooperative relationship between DOD and the Intelligence Community is a critical component to our national security. What are some of your priorities to further develop the Department's strategy to leverage AI and machine learning for the intelligence mission sets?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I believe that data is the key to developing superior AI capabilities. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) efforts are closely coordinated to focus attention on building and securing our data and consolidating artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) programs to mature from many AI/ML prototypes to industrial-scale processing. Furthermore, I believe DOD and the IC should work together to incorporate AI on the widest possible array of intelligence data streams so that we can optimize and expeditiously realize AI's full potential.

## INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

24. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, what are your thoughts on enterprise-wide management of counterintelligence (CI)?

Mr. MOULTRIE. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), serves as the Defense Counterintelligence (CI) Manager, and I understand he has prioritized the strengthening of enterprise-wide management of DOD CI. I believe there is value in having a common enterprise vision to guide Defense CI capacity and capability, resources, and operational decisions. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with the Director, DIA, to ensure the effectiveness of the CI enterprise.

25. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, should all training standards, certifications, and scoping for CI be standardized across DOD?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I understand that DOD policy identifies baseline standards and training coordination requirements and requires joint certification for all training

that produces certified CI personnel. I further understand that DOD Components with CI elements participate in setting the standards, training, and certification of CI professionals. In addition, I believe that the Military Department CI Organizations have unique missions and authorities and provide tailored basic CI training.

#### AFGHANISTAN

26. Senator BLACKBURN. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe that the scheduled withdrawal from Afghanistan will diminish our ability to collect intelligence and act on threats emanating from Afghanistan and the region?

Mr. MOULTRIE. Although I have not been briefed on the intelligence collection posture, I believe that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan will impact our ability to collect intelligence and respond to threats emanating from Afghanistan, requiring the United States to posture for an “over the horizon” collection strategy in coordination with our allies and partners.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

##### CHINESE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS

27. Senator HAWLEY. Mr. Moultrie, many of the Department’s suppliers maintain a presence in China and may employ members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). When I asked Secretary Lloyd Austin about this, he wrote that DOD has “an interest in knowing whether [its] suppliers have employees who are members of the Chinese Communist Party.” Do you agree with Secretary Austin that the Department of Defense should know if its suppliers employ members of the CCP?

Mr. MOULTRIE. I agree with Secretary Austin. The Department does have an interest in knowing whether its suppliers are under the influence of the People’s Republic of China. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to address these concerns.

28. Senator HAWLEY. Mr. Moultrie, from a counterintelligence standpoint, why is it important for the Department to know if its suppliers employ members of the CCP?

Mr. MOULTRIE. China’s intelligence services employ traditional and non-traditional collection methods specifically and aggressively targeting U.S. technologies and the Defense Industrial Base. Access by China to “cutting edge” U.S. technologies and other sensitive information is of grave concern because it helps China advance its strategic goals for comprehensive national power and military modernization. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to protect warfighting technologies and their enabling supply chains.

[The nomination reference of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie follows:]

**NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT**

**PN261**

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
April 12, 2021.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Ronald S. Moultrie, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, vice Joseph Kernan, resigned.

\_\_\_\_\_, 2021.  
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed \_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

**☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.**



[The biographical sketch of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Bio**

**Ronald S. Moultrie**

**Education:**

- Certificate -- Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Senior Executive studies, 2004
- Masters of Science in Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) – National Intelligence University, formerly Defense Intelligence College, Russian Studies, 1987-1991, degree granted 1991
- Bachelors of Arts (BA) - University of Maryland, Business Management, 1980-1985, degree granted 1984
- Russian Language Degree, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA, 1979
- Community College of the Air Force, Associates degree, 1979-1982, degree 1982
- Rutgers University, Rutgers College, 1977-1978 transfer credits (no degree received)
- Pemberton Township HS, NJ, Diploma, 1973-1977

**Employment Record:**

List all jobs held since college including title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

- Oceanus Security Strategies, LLC,
  - President and CEO, Riva Maryland,
  - November 2015 – present
- Department of the Navy
  - Special Government Employee, Pentagon, Virginia
  - September 2018 -- present
- National Security Agency/Central Security Service
  - Various leadership positions, culminating in Operations Director, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
  - December 2010 – October 2015
- Central Intelligence Agency

- Directorate of Science and Technology/Office Director, Langley, Virginia
  - February 2004 – November 2010
- National Security Agency/Central Security Service
  - Various leadership positions, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
  - August 1986 – January 2004
- United States Air Force
  - Russian Linguist/Analyst, Misawa, Japan and Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
  - February 1979 – May 1986

**Honors and Awards:**

- **Military Awards**
  - Department of Defense, Defense Meritorious Service Medal
  - United States Air Force, Meritorious Service Medal
  - Basic Training, Honor Graduate
- **Federal Civilian Awards**
  - Congressional Record, Remarks Honoring Career Service, Hon. Congressman Ruppertsberger
  - Presidential Rank Award, Meritorious Executive
  - Department of the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award (second award)
  - Department of the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award (first award)
  - Director of National Intelligence, Seal Medallion
  - National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal
  - National Intelligence Superior Service Medal
  - National Security Agency, Director's Distinguished Service Medal (second award)
  - National Security Agency, Director's Distinguished Service Medal (first award)
  - National Security Agency, Exceptional Civilian Service Award (third award)
  - National Security Agency, Exceptional Civilian Service Award (second award)
  - National Security Agency, Exceptional Civilian Service Award (first award)
  - National Security Agency, Meritorious Civilian Service Award (second award)
  - National Security Agency, Meritorious Civilian Service Award (first award)

- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Medal of Distinguished Performance
- Central Intelligence Agency, National Clandestine Service, Donovan Award
- National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, Media Leaks Task Force
- National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, Joint Operation Abbottabad, Intelligence Community Integration Team
- National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team Co-Lead

- **Academic Awards**

- Phi Kappa Phi, National Honor Society
- Alpha Sigma Lambda, National Honor Society
- University of Maryland, College Park, BA, *Magna Cum Laude*
- Pemberton Township High School, NJ, Graduating Class "Most Likely to Succeed"

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie in connection with his nomination follows:]

117<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, 2020 -- 2021  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
ROOM SR-228  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050  
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE  
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

**NOTE:** Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. Name (Include any former names you have used):

Ronald Steven Moultrie; Ron

2. Position to which nominated:

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

3. Date of nomination:

12 April 2021

4. Education (List names of secondary and higher education institution

attended, type of school [vocational, technical, trade school, college, university, military college, correspondence, distance, extension, and on-line], dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted):

- Certificate -- Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Senior Executive studies, 2004
- Masters of Science in Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) – National Intelligence University, formerly Defense Intelligence College, Russian Studies, 1987-1991, degree granted 1991
- Bachelors of Arts (BA) - University of Maryland, Business Management, 1980-1985, degree granted 1984
- Russian Language Degree, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA, 1979
- Community College of the Air Force, Associates degree, 1979-1982, degree 1982
- Rutgers University, Rutgers College, 1977-1978 transfer credits (no degree received)
- Pemberton Township HS, NJ, Diploma, 1973-1977

5. Employment record (List all jobs held since college, or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of the job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military duty station as a separate period of employment):

- Oceanus Security Strategies, LLC, President and CEO, Riva MD, 2016 – present
- National Security Agency, Director of Operations, formerly SIGINT, Ft. George G. Meade MD, 2014-2015
- National Security Agency, Deputy Director of Operations, formerly SIGINT, Ft. George G. Meade MD, 2010-2014

6. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in response to question 5, above):

- National Intelligence University, Board of Visitors, Fall 2019 – February 2021



- Chairperson, Department of the Navy, CIO Advisory Group, SGE, January 2020-February 2021 (virtual only)
  - Team Leader, Department of the Navy, Integrated Management Tiger Team, April – December 2019
  - Principal, Department of the Navy, Cybersecurity Readiness Review team, August 2018 – March 2019
7. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):
- Auburn Seminary, Board member
  - Altamira Technologies Corporation, Board member
  - G2K Labs, Board member
  - Icapital Network, Inc., Board member
  - Sequoia Inc., Board member
  - The Better Angels Society, Board Member
  - Deep Water Point, Consultant
  - Vibrant Emotional Health, Board Member
  - BlueVoyant, Consultant
  - MITRE, Intelligence Advisory Board member
  - Nira, Consultant
  - Oceanus Security Strategies, LLC, President/CEO
  - Pallas Advisors, Advisory Board member
  - Prime Movers Lab, LLC, Advisor
  - Resolute Public Affairs, Consultant
  - Resolute Strategic Services, Advisory Board member
  - Yahya Technologies, Consultant
  - Ronald & Darlene Moultrie Family Trust, Trustee
  - Naval Postgraduate School Foundation, Advisory Council
  - National Intelligence University, Board of Visitors
8. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held in

professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations):

- None

9. Political affiliations and activities:

a. If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s); whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):

- N/A

b. List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years:

- N/A

c. Itemize all individual political contributions of \$100 or more to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity during the past 5 years. List each individual contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity) over this period:

- N/A

10. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):

A. Intelligence Community & DoD (Civilian)

- Congressional Record, Remarks Honoring Career Service, Hon. Congressman Ruppertsberger
- Presidential Rank Award, Meritorious Executive
- Department of the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award (second award)

- Department of the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award (first award)
- Director of National Intelligence, Seal Medallion
- National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal
- National Intelligence Superior Service Medal
- National Security Agency, Director's Distinguished Service Medal (second award)
- National Security Agency, Director's Distinguished Service Medal (first award)
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- National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, Media Leaks Task Force
- National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, Joint Operation Abbottabad, Intelligence Community Integration Team
- National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, EP-3 Cryptologic Assessment Team Co-Lead

#### B. Active-Duty Military

- Department of Defense, Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- United States Air Force, Meritorious Service Medal
- Basic Training, Honor Graduate

#### C. Academic

- Phi Kappa Phi, National Honor Society
- Alpha Sigma Lambda, National Honor Society
- University of Maryland, College Park, BA, *Magna Cum Laude*



- Pemberton Township High School, NJ, Graduating Class “Most Likely to Succeed”
11. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials that you have written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including articles and blogs published on the internet):
    - Worth Magazine article titled – “Exceeding All Expectations: A Journey of Adversity, Triumph and Eternal Optimism,” September 16<sup>th</sup>, 2020, authored
  12. Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years—of which you have copies—in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to which you have been nominated).
    - N/A

#### COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?
  - Yes
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?

- Yes

15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

- Yes

16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

- Yes

17. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

- Yes

18. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

- Yes

19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

- Yes


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[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.

\_\_\_\_\_

This 22nd day of April, 2021

\_\_\_\_\_  
[The nomination of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on May 20, 2021, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 28, 2021.]