    [Senate Hearing 117-981]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 117-981

                 THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL
                  McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
                  OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER] AND THE
                  HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO
                  BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                  INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 11, 2021

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    62-873 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2026
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
     KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
     TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
     JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
     JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
     MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

     		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
       		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                 C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                  may 11, 2021

                                                                       Page

    The Nomination of the Honorable Michael McCord, Nominee to be         1
      Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller] and the Honorable
      Ronald Moultrie, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for
      Intelligence and Security.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     5

                               Witness Statements

    McCord, The Honorable Michael, Nominee to be Under Secretary of       9
      Defense [Comptroller].

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    42

      Questions for the Record.......................................    59

      Nomination Reference and Report................................    61

      Biographical Sketch............................................    62

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    64

      Signature Page.................................................    71

    Moultrie, The Honorable Ronald, Nominee to be Under Secretary of     11
      Defense for Intelligence and Security.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    71

      Questions for the Record.......................................    96

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   104

      Biographical Sketch............................................   105

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   108

      Signature Page.................................................   115

                                     (iii)

                        THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE
    MICHAEL McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER]
      AND THE HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
                          DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
                                    SECURITY

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
    Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
    morning. The Committee meets this morning to consider the
    nominations of Mr. Michael McCord to be Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller), and Mr. Ronald Moultrie, to be Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. On behalf
    of the Committee I want to thank you both for your willingness
    to return to public service.
        Mr. McCord, I would like to welcome your wife, Ms. Donna
    Miller Rostant, who is with us this morning, and I thank
    Secretary Chuck Hagel for joining us today to introduce Mr.
    McCord.
        Mr. Moultrie, I welcome your wife, Mrs. Darlene Moultrie,
    who is also here, and I want to send out a very special
    recognition to your mother, Ethel Moultrie, who is celebrating
    her 91st birthday today, and we hope she is watching her son
    and telling everyone around how smart he is. Thank you.
        Let me also thank Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell, former
    Director of National Intelligence and former Director of the
    National Security Agency who will introduce Mr. Moultrie via
    Webex.
        I would also like to thank Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger,
    representative of Maryland's Second District, who I know wanted
    to introduce Mr. Moultrie today but is unable to do so.
    Representative Ruppersberger has instead sent us a letter of
    support which will be entered in the record. Without objection,
    so ordered.
        [The letter follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Reed. I am sure both of you have additional family
    members who would have liked to have been here this morning,
    but because of the pandemic restrictions they are watching from
    home, so we thank them for their continued support of your
    service to our Nation.
        Mr. McCord is a highly regarded national security and
    defense policy expert with extensive government experience. He
    is well known to this committee, having served as a
    professional staff member for more than 20 years, and is well
    prepared for the Comptroller job, having been nominated and
    confirmed to that position under President Obama. The
    Comptroller is instrumental in preparing and executing the
    Department's budget, ensuring the resources that Congress
    provides are allocated to the troops efficiently and
    effectively. Additionally, the Comptroller is a key player in
    the Department's efforts to achieve a clean audit and to
    modernize its financial management system. Mr. McCord is the
    right person to have in this role at this time.
        While Mr. McCord has not played a role in developing the
    budget for this year, it should be pointed out that this year
    is an inflection point in how the Department prioritizes the
    resources it needs to accomplish its missions, given that the
    fiscal year 2022 budget will not be constrained by the Budget
    Control Act. While we await the release of the detailed budget
    request, we know the recommended top line for the Department of
    Defense (DOD) is $715 billion. Some of my colleagues feel that
    that number should be increased, while others will argue for
    reduction. The key, however, is what we buy with that top line,
    and this committee will do a thorough analysis of the request
    when we receive it.
        Mr. McCord, as we discussed during our office call, there
    are also a number of functions within the Department that are
    in need of transformation. The PPBE [Planning, Programming,
    Budgeting, and Execution] process, was first implemented in the
    McNamara era in the 1960s and may not be conducive to many of
    DOD's requirements to adopt new technology in a rapid, agile
    manner to compete with China and Russia. Further, the
    Department continues to struggle to achieve a clean audit,
    something that has been required at law for over 30 years. I
    hope you will share your views on the role of the Comptroller
    regarding these challenges at this important moment for the
    Department of Defense.
        Mr. Moultrie has had a long and distinguished career in
    intelligence with extensive service at the NSA [National
    Security Agency] as well as the CIA [Central Intelligence
    Agency], ODNI [Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence], and DOD. Since retiring as NSA's Director of
    Operations, he has had a successful career in the private
    sector while remaining active in public policy. If confirmed,
    Mr. Moultrie, you will serve as the principal intelligence
    advisor to the Secretary of Defense and will be dual-hatted as
    the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence.
        The scope and complexity of the global threat environments
    we face are unprecedented. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
    and many other state and non State actors pose increasingly
    serious challenges, especially in their hybrid warfare and gray
    zone tactics. It is more important than ever that this
    committee and the Department of Defense ensure that the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise is appropriately equipped to integrate
    and prioritize intelligence resources and capabilities.
        In particular, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
    Agency (DCSA), which you will supervise, has had a slew of new
    and challenging missions assigned to it that are critical for
    DOD, and is growing significantly in size and responsibility.
    Many of the functions that DCSA is now required to perform
    support other parts of the government and customers in DOD and
    beyond USD(I&S). It is important for DCSA to have a customer-
    focused culture, and your leadership will be necessary to
    achieve that.
        Further DOD's new all-domain/cross-domain warfighting
    concepts require that the defense intelligence agencies,
    chiefly the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office], NGA [The
    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], and NSA, transform
    themselves to provide proliferated satellites and rapid and
    agile tasking and processing to support the military. If
    confirmed, it will be your responsibility to ensure that these
    agencies are responsive to these emerging military
    requirements. Mr. Moultrie, I welcome your thoughts about how
    you intend to foster this transformation and ensure that the
    military has timely and accurate intelligence to defend the
    Nation in the midst of a competitive security environment.
        We face many challenges that will require strong leadership
    and the ability to make tough decisions. I thank the nominees
    again for your willingness to serve our Nation. I look forward
    to your testimony.
        Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
    witnesses for being with us and for their willingness to serve.
    Our Nation's top military and intelligence leaders have told
    this committee in recent months that the world is the most
    dangerous place that we have had to experience.
        In 2018, the National Defense Strategy provides a roadmap,
    and here it is. This is one, and really, we have one of our
    authors here as a witness, as a nominee, in Michael McCord, and
    so it is quite a complimentary thing that you are one who has
    put this thing together.
        Voice. Is there a place to----
        Senator Inhofe. What was that all about?
        Chairman Reed. That was a message from above.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe. Or below.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe. All right. We have quite a few challenges
    that you will oversee, and we understand that you are certainly
    the two that are the best qualified around that we could hope
    to have in these positions.
        Insufficient and uncertain funding has hamstrung our
    military for years. We must do a better job of resourcing this
    strategy, improve our ability to quickly make decisions and to
    invest in the right capabilities to keep up with China and
    Russia. We must also continue the momentum on the Pentagon's
    financial audit and improve the transparency of the budget in
    Congress and the American people.
        In the area of intelligence, we are still losing the
    information war. Just recently, we heard about all of the
    combatant commanders complaining that they cannot get
    declassified intelligence to fight back against our
    adversaries' lies.
        Just last week, I published an article about how much China
    and Russia truly spend on defense, which is much more than many
    people have been led to believe. We hear over and over again
    the notion that somehow we are spending more than China and
    Russia put together, and they do not realize that the most
    expensive thing that we do is taking care of our troops, taking
    care of the housing. Those countries, they do not do that, and
    we all understand that.
        We must do a better job of understanding our adversaries
    and articulating the threats they pose to the American public.
    We have no time to lose. Our military advantages are going or
    eroding in key areas. We still do not have a handle on how to
    prevent the Chinese from stealing our technology for military
    and commercial purposes. The Nation and the Department of
    Defense must tackle these problems head-on if we hope to
    preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do is
    harm.
        If you would have the honor, after your confirmation, to
    support the team of Americans who represent everything that is
    noble and best in our Nation. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, space guardians, civilian servants, and our military
    families, do everything we ask of them, and more. The
    Department requires strong civilian leadership that I believe
    the two of you will be able to provide, and so we are looking
    forward to that.
        Also, nice to see Chuck Hagel back again. It has been quite
    a long period of time, and I want to welcome you back. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and now
    let me recognize, via Webex, Vice Admiral McConnell, for his
    introduction of Mr. Moultrie. Admiral?
        Admiral McConnell. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to introduce Mr. Ron Moultrie, the President's
    nominee to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence and Security.
        Ron Moultrie is a highly regarded [inaudible] who has
    successfully served in many of the Nation's most demanding
    intelligence community positions. A man of the highest moral
    character, keen intellect, and strategic vision, Mr. Moultrie
    has demonstrated leadership and management skills to address
    and resolve the most challenging issues. [Inaudible] first as
    the Director of the National Security Agency [inaudible] and
    later as the Director of National Intelligence.
        I also know his wonderful wife of 33 years, Darlene. Both
    served in the United States Air Force and are service veterans
    who served the Nation well.
        Mr. Moultrie is a former [inaudible] who applied those
    skills in the Air Force and at NSA as we engaged in
    [inaudible]. Moving to NSA as a civilian as a signals
    intelligence analyst, he quickly moved through the ranks, and
    based on his drive, energy, and exceptional performance, he
    advanced.
        NSA is where we met when I was serving as the agency's
    director in the early 1990s. When I needed help to address some
    of the Nation's most sensitive operations and change
    requirements, on the advice of the agency's most senior
    leadership I chose Mr. Moultrie for the position of Senior
    Executive Assistant. In that role, he served as my confidante
    and my alter ego, as we adjusted from the Cold War focus to
    address the new challenges facing the Nation, not only emerging
    threats in signals intelligence but also emerging, new
    cybersecurity threats due to the widespread embrace of emerging
    network technologies, not only by the U.S. Government but by
    the private sector. Any time a large organization undergoes
    significant change there is always confusion and resistance.
    Ron Moultrie helped me navigate these changes, because of his
    understanding of the technology, the workforce, and the
    changing mission needs.
        Being confident in his own abilities and a natural
    coalition builder, Mr. Moultrie was asked to serve as a member
    of the CIA's Senior Intelligence Service to foster closer
    collaboration between two of the Nation's premier intelligence
    organizations. This is where we met to work again together.
    When President Bush asked me to serve as the Nation's second
    Director of National Intelligence, relieving Ambassador
    Negroponte, I asked Mr. Moultrie to again serve as my Senior
    Executive Assistant.
        As a member of the DNI's leadership team, Mr. Moultrie
    helped me manage the intelligence community's new Executive
    Committee and the new Deputy Executive Committee that we formed
    to address collaboration and coordination issues that existed
    prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Nation. He also
    helped update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act due to
    information technology changes, revised for the President's
    signature Executive Order 12333, launched the National
    Comprehensive Community Initiative, and create the Joint Duty
    Intelligence Program.
        On returning to NSA after his service with ODNI, Mr.
    Moultrie rose to become the agency's third-ranking official,
    serving as the Director of Signals Intelligence Operations. The
    first minority member to serve in this challenging position,
    Mr. Moultrie helped the agency enjoy some of its greatest
    successes in the global war on terrorism and other enduring
    intelligence challenges.
        After retirement from NSA, in addition to his service in
    the private sector, Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Richard Spencer,
    seeking a national security official with a comprehensive
    understanding of cybersecurity and technology, asked Mr.
    Moultrie to chair the review of the Navy's information
    management structure. The review, completed in July of 2019,
    led to the immediate establishment of a single, accountable CIO
    [Chief Information Officer] to bolster the department's
    warfighting and cybersecurity capabilities and to provide the
    Navy and Marine Corps a decisive information advantage in
    intelligence technology, big data, and artificial intelligence.
        Without hesitation, I strongly recommend favorable
    consideration for Mr. Ronald Moultrie to become the Nation's
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. It is
    my distinct honor to introduce him to this distinguished
    committee. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Now let me
    recognize former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Chuck
    Hagel. Secretary Hagel.
        Mr. Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Good morning, Mr.
    Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Inhofe, and other Members of
    the Committee. First, before I introduce Mike McCord, I want to
    recognize Mr. Moultrie and congratulate him for his service and
    for the responsibilities that he is soon to take up, pending
    confirmation of this committee. So, to Mr. Moultrie, thank you
    and congratulations.
        I appreciate the opportunity to introduce Michael J. McCord
    in support of the President's nomination of him to be Under
    Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). You all have records of
    Mike McCord's bio and impressive comprehensive work record of
    36 years' experience in national security and finance, so I am
    not going to repeat what you already have. Instead, I am going
    to tell you a little bit about how I know Mike McCord, my own
    experience with him, and knowledge of him.
        I have known and worked with Mike McCord since 1997, during
    my 12 years in the Senate, in my 4 years as co- chairman of the
    President's Intelligence Advisory Board. When I was confirmed
    as Secretary of Defense in February 2013, Mike McCord became an
    important part of my team at DOD. He was the Principal Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense, working with the Under Secretary
    (Comptroller), Bob Hale.
        The first few days I was in the Secretary's office we were
    presented with sequestration. Many of you were here at that
    time and recall the disastrous results of sequestrations for
    DOD. We had to find an additional unplanned $30 billion in
    cuts, on top of the $45 billion in cuts that had already been
    budgeted for under the 2011 Budget Control Act. I looked to
    Mike McCord and Under Secretary Hale for guidance and
    leadership in how we handle this massive unbudgeted cut. It was
    a difficult time for every part of the defense enterprise.
    Mike's leadership, experience, and ability were critical in
    helping DOD get through this time. I relied on and expected a
    great deal from Mike McCord.
        In the fall of 2013, and again some of you will remember,
    we were confronted with one of the longest government shutdowns
    in history, furloughing people, most people not coming to work
    for weeks, and all of the waste and threats to national
    security that went along with this unproductive insanity of
    long government shutdowns. Again, Deputy Comptroller McCord was
    called on for his help in dealing with the long shutdown.
    Again, I relied on Mike for advice and direction. This was also
    at the time Comptroller Hale had informed me that he wished to
    retire after a long, distinguished career. So there was
    uncertainty in the Comptroller's Office and within the Pentagon
    as to who would replace Hale. Mike handled it professionally,
    with clear, competent direction and judgment.
        In late 2013, I recommend Mike McCord to replace Bob Hale
    as Comptroller and Under Secretary of Defense to President
    Obama, and in January 2014, Mike was nominated by President
    Obama for the position, and he was confirmed by this committee
    and the Senate in June 2014. We continued to work very closely
    together until I left the Pentagon in February 2015.
        Some of the projects Mike led and worked tirelessly on were
    the creation of the new European Reassurance Initiative. Many
    of you will remember that initiative in the summer of 2014, in
    response to Russia's invasion of Eastern Ukraine and occupation
    of Crimea. The reprogramming of $1 billion in 2014 to
    underwrite the Ebola crisis, where DOD managed and took
    responsibility for the Ebola logistics in West Africa, to
    support the whole of U.S. Government effort. How quickly this
    was accomplished, with minimal delays, was a clear example of
    how the government congressional Oversight Committees trusted
    Mike. As we all know, trust is the coin of the realm, in all
    things.
        In my years in the private sector and in public service, I
    have seen and experienced the qualities that make a person
    successful. They do not change. They are not complicated. It is
    not just how smart you are or how well- educated you are.
        Everyone on this committee recognizes the qualities--
    character, first, integrity, courage, and judgment. If any of
    these are missing, the journey will not end well. If the person
    does not possess a sense of humanity and decency and dignity,
    they are not fit for leadership. Michael J. McCord possesses
    all these indispensable requisites and the successful
    experience to warrant his confirmation.
        I am very proud to appear here today before this committee
    to introduce Mike McCord. Thank you for allowing me to present
    my introduction of Mike McCord and for your serious
    consideration of President Biden's nomination of him to be
    Under Secretary of Defense and Comptroller.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
    statement and also for your distinguished service, both
        in the United States Senate and in the Department of
    Defense. Thank you very much.
        Now let me recognize Mr. McCord for his opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL McCORD, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER
                   SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [COMPTROLLER]

        Mr. McCord. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you this morning as you consider my nomination
    for the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
    and Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense.
        I want to express my gratitude to President Biden for
    nominating me to this important position, and to Secretary
    Austin and Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks for their
    confidence in me. If I am confirmed, it would be an honor to
    serve as part of their team. I also want to thank former
    Senator and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for introducing
    me. His support is especially meaningful as I seek to become
    the first person to be confirmed for this position twice, as he
    selected and recommended me, as he described, to President
    Obama when I was confirmed for this role in 2014.
        It is also a pleasure to be back before this committee
    where I served on the staff for 21 years. I cherished the
    opportunity to had to learn from the outstanding Senators who
    have led this committee during my career here: former Chairmen
    Nunn, Thurmond, Warner, and Levin. I send my best wishes, as I
    know you do, to former Senator and Chairman Carl Levin, my boss
    for 11 years, as he battles lung cancer today.
        I also had the privilege of working on this committee with
    three Senators who went on to chair it after I left the staff
    for the Department: the late Senator John McCain, Senator
    Inhofe, and Chairman Reed. Your leadership follows in the great
    bipartisan tradition of this committee, and it is a key reason
    it continues to be so highly respected.
        Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family,
    especially my wife, Donna. I could not undertake this mission
    without her love and full support. She is the heart and soul of
    everything we are able to do as a team, for our family, our
    community, and our country. My mother, my daughters, and my
    brother and sister have also been with me throughout my career
    in public service. Although my family and my wife's family
    cannot join us here today due to the pandemic, they are with me
    in spirit and I appreciate their support along this journey.
        If confirmed, I look forward to returning to the Department
    of Defense to serve our Nation, promote our national security,
    and support our servicemembers. The sense of mission among the
    civilian and military personnel in the Department is a
    remarkable thing to be part of.
        Should I be confirmed, my top priority will be to help the
    Secretary and other senior leaders build the best defense
    budget we can to meet our strategic needs and carefully steward
    the resources Congress provides us.
        Second, I would prioritize a strong relationship with the
    congressional defense committees, and ensure the Department
    provides the information you need on that budget. The stronger
    the partnership between the Department and the Congress, the
    stronger our national security will be.
        Third, I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department gives
    full effort and attention to the financial audit so that we can
    build on and accelerate the progress that has been made toward
    the goal of a clean opinion.
        Fourth, working with other senior leaders, I would work to
    re-engine the Department's management reforms in light of the
    dis-establishment of the Chief Management Officer position. I
    look forward to the opportunity, should I be confirmed, to
    focus on making DOD more effective.
        If confirmed, I will be a full partner with Members of this
    Committee in ensuring that we carry out our respective
    responsibilities for our national security.
        Thank you. I look forward to your questions and I ask that
    my complete statement be included in the record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection, the statement will be
    included in the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McCord follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Prepared Statement of Michael McCord
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning in
    connection with my nomination for the position of Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer of the Department of
    Defense (DOD).
        I want to express my gratitude to President Biden for nominating me
    to this important position, and to Secretary Austin and Deputy
    Secretary of Defense Hicks for their confidence in me. If I am
    confirmed, it would be an honor to serve as part of their team. I also
    want to thank former Senator and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for
    introducing me today. His support is especially meaningful as I seek to
    become the first person to be confirmed for this position for a second
    time, as he selected and recommended me to President Obama when I was
    previously nominated and confirmed to hold this position in 2014.
        It is an honor and a pleasure to be here in front of this committee
    where I served on the staff for 21 years and had the opportunity to
    learn from the examples set by the outstanding senators who have led
    this committee during my career. As a staff member here, I served under
    Chairmen Nunn, Thurmond, Warner and Levin. I want take this opportunity
    to send my best wishes to former Senator and Chairman Carl Levin, my
    boss for 11 years, in his battle with lung cancer.
        In addition, I had the privilege of working with three Senators who
    went on to chair this committee after I left the staff for DOD: the
    late Senator John McCain, Senator Inhofe and Chairman Reed. Your
    leadership follows in the great bipartisan tradition of this Committee,
    and it is a key reason it continues to be so highly respected.
        Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family,
    especially my wife, Donna Miller Rostant. I could not undertake this
    service without her love and full support. My mother, my daughters, and
    my brother and sister have been with me throughout my career in public
    service. Although my family and my wife's family cannot join us here
    today due to the health restrictions necessitated by the pandemic, they
    are with Donna and me in spirit and I thank them for supporting me in
    this journey.
        Should I be confirmed, I look forward to returning to the
    Department of Defense for another opportunity to serve our Nation,
    promote our national security, and support our servicemembers. The
    sense of mission among the civilian and military workforce in the
    Department of Defense is remarkable.
        My top priority, if confirmed, will be to help the Secretary and
    other senior leaders build the best defense budget we can to meet our
    strategic needs; to ensure the Department provides the defense
    committees the information they need on that budget; and then
    faithfully steward the resources the Congress sees fit to provide for
    our common defense.
        Second, if confirmed, I will prioritize a strong relationship with
    the congressional defense committees on all matters under my purview.
    The stronger the partnership between the Department and the Congress,
    the stronger our national security will be.
        Third, I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department gives full
    effort and attention to the financial audit so that we can build on and
    accelerate the progress that has been made toward the goal of a clean
    opinion.
        Fourth, working with other senior leaders, I would work to continue
    and build upon efforts to improve the Department's performance in light
    of the dis-establishment of the Chief Management Officer position in
    the fiscal year 2021 defense authorization bill. I look forward to the
    opportunity, if confirmed, to focus on making DOD more effective.
        After I left DOD four years ago, I served on the Commission on the
    National Defense Strategy for the United States. I took two strong
    lessons from my time as a commissioner. First, the United States faces
    serious national security challenges that in turn require leaders in
    both the executive and legislative branches to attack those challenges
    with a seriousness of purpose.
        Second, our strategic competitors use all the tools of their
    national power against us, and we must ensure we are capable of doing
    likewise. The Department of Defense, no matter how capable or well-
    funded, cannot by itself ensure we prevail in this competition.
        If confirmed, I will be a full partner with you in ensuring we
    carry out our respective responsibilities for our national security.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Mr. Moultrie, your statement, please.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD MOULTRIE, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER
           SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

        Mr. Moultrie. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today and for your
    consideration of my nomination to serve as the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
        I want to thank DNI McConnell for his kind introductory
    words. His mentorship and tutelage have tremendously shaped my
    career.
        I am honored for the trust and confidence that President
    Biden and Secretary Austin have placed in me, and if confirmed,
    I look forward to serving with our Nation's outstanding
    intelligence and security professionals.
        I am blessed to have met my wife, Darlene, while we served
    on active duty, and to have benefitted from her love and wisdom
    for over 33 years.
        I am also grateful to have a family that embodies service.
    My father served in the Korean War and in Vietnam, and rose to
    the rank of Army Sergeant Major. My mother's brother made the
    ultimate sacrifice while serving with the 101st Airborne in
    Vietnam.
        Duty, honor, and sacrifice. These principles have been
    instilled in me since childhood and drive me to this day.
        Defending against all enemies, foreign and domestic, takes
    on new meaning for all in the intelligence and security
    profession. China, our pacing challenge, a global pandemic,
    malign actors, and other existential threats pose risks to the
    global order and threaten our way of life. Domestic extremism
    and sexual harassment tear at the fabric of our society and
    threaten to undermine order in the Defense Department's ranks,
    and our warfighters need a ``decisive, secure information
    advantage'' and our troops must be safe, regardless of their
    environment.
        If confirmed, these will be among my top priorities. I am
    confident that we can overcome these challenges and build upon
    our global leadership role.
        We must innovatively explore, and rapidly adapt, emerging
    technologies that will enable us to defend our Nation against
    those seeking to erode our technological and intellectual
    advantages. We must build and embrace partnerships across our
    government, with the private sector and academia, and with our
    key foreign partners and allies, and we must have a close
    working relationship with Congress.
        Most importantly we must have the support and trust of our
    citizens. They are the inspiration for all that we do and
    ultimately why we serve.
        If confirmed, I will strive to accomplish these and other
    priorities as determined by the Secretary and the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense. I will always serve with the utmost honor
    and integrity.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. I ask that
    my full remarks be placed in the record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection, the full remarks will be
    placed in the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Ronald Moultrie
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today and for your consideration of my nomination to serve as the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
        I want to thank DNI McConnell for his kind introductory words. His
    mentorship and tutelage have tremendously shaped my career.
        I am honored for the trust and confidence that President Biden and
    Secretary Austin have placed in me, and if confirmed, I look forward to
    serving with our Nation's outstanding intelligence and security
    professionals.
        I am blessed to have met my wife, Darlene, while we served on
    active duty and to have benefitted from her love and wisdom for over 33
    years.
        I am grateful to have a family that embodies service. My father
    served in the Korean War and in Vietnam and rose to the rank of Army
    Sergeant Major. My mother's brother made the ultimate sacrifice while
    serving with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.
        Duty, honor, and sacrifice. These principles have been instilled in
    me since childhood and drive me to this day.
        Defending ``against all enemies, foreign and domestic'' takes on
    new meaning for all in the intelligence and security profession:
          China, our pacing challenge, a global pandemic, malign
    actors, and other existential threats pose risks to the global order
    and threaten our way of life;
          Domestic extremism and sexual harassment tear at the
    fabric of our society and threaten to undermine order in the Defense
    Department's ranks; and,
          Warfighters need a ``decisive, secure information
    advantage'' and our troops must be safe, regardless of their
    environment.
        If confirmed, these challenges will be among my top priorities.
        I am confident that we can overcome these challenges and build upon
    our global leadership role.
        We must also innovatively explore, and rapidly adapt, emerging
    technologies that will enable us to defend our Nation against those
    seeking to erode our technological and intellectual advantages.
        We must build and embrace partnerships across our government, with
    the private sector and academia, and with our key foreign partners and
    allies.
        We must have a close working relationship with Congress.
        Most importantly we must have the support and trust of our
    citizens. They are the inspiration for all that we do and ultimately
    why we serve.
        If confirmed, I will strive to accomplish these and other
    priorities as determined by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense.
        I will always serve with the utmost honor and integrity.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Gentlemen, I am going to address questions
    that are required of all nominees. Please respond
    appropriately.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Mr. McCord. Yes.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Mr. McCord. No.
        Mr. Moultrie. No.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    committee when requested?
        Mr. McCord. Yes.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
    regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in
    providing such records?
        Mr. McCord. Yes.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        Mr. McCord. Yes.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Mr. McCord. Yes.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Mr. McCord. Yes.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, gentleman. Now, Mr.
    McCord, let me address a question to you. We have been looking
    very closely at the PPBE process--Planning, Programming,
    Budgeting, and Execution. You are aware, probably better than
    anyone, that it began in the 1960s with McNamara and the Whiz
    Kids. It has not changed very much, and we are in a different
    post-industrial age. Can you give us your views on reforming
    the PPBE process? What is within your scope in the Department
    of Defense, by regulation? What legislation might be necessary,
    and also whether it would be wise to propose a commission to
    look more carefully at this process?
        Mr. McCord. Thank you for that. Mr. Chairman, the process,
    as a whole, is heavily legislated in what I would call the
    back-end execution. There are thousands of pages of laws and
    regulation governing how government funds may be expended. It
    is very lightly legislated on the front end, the planning and
    programming process, in particular. So as you move through the
    process, the amount of statutory and regulatory guidance
    increases fairly exponentially, with regard to how taxpayer
    funds are used.
        The process itself I think has--as you said, it has been in
    place a long time, and it is sort of foundational to how the
    Pentagon works at this point. I think it has some benefits that
    should be preserved as we look at reforming, in particular that
    the Secretary and the Deputy have a lot of flexibility on what
    topics they choose to focus on, what analysis they want to rely
    on, and who is in the room, who is not in the room. So I think
    those are some of the things that we would want to preserve,
    but as you say, I think we need to look at how we can have
    maybe greater agility to go with accountability in that
    process, and I do think it is something the Department can work
    with the committees on, and perhaps with a commission as well.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. The audit has been an
    issue of concern for decades. There are some that suggest that
    while achieving an audit would not reveal sort of adequate
    guidance to changes in the Department, there are others that
    think the audit is a powerful weapon for change and
    efficiencies. Where do you come down on this, and how will you
    conduct the audit?
        Mr. McCord. Chairman, the audit, as you know, is required
    by law, and it is something that the Department is behind other
    Cabinet agencies on, and it is a priority for, I think,
    Secretary Austin and for myself. It is not the answer to every
    question, certainly. An audit will not tell you whether the
    particular airplane you bought was the right airplane for the
    mission, for example, or whether the contractor overcharged
    you. Those are all different aspects of controls that are above
    and beyond the financial audit.
        But that said, it does help identify where resources may be
    being wasted or improperly used or inefficiently used, and the
    controls that are one of the big hurdles between where the
    Department stands today and achieving that audit, getting all
    the controls in place I think takes on new meaning in this era
    of cyber intrusions. So I think that the business process
    reforms that are necessary for an audit are things the
    Department needs to be doing anyway, and the audit is a good
    forcing function for the direction the Department needs to go.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        Mr. Moultrie, the current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff emphasized joint and cross-domain capability
    requirements that the military services have not prioritized or
    are not responsible for developing, such as joint all- domain
    command and control, JADC2 [Joint All Domain Command and
    Control]. JADC2 demands ubiquitous interoperability, automated
    decision aids, and systems assistance integration. Indeed, this
    is probably, in my view, one of the key levers to continue our
    superiority, vis-a-vis our rivals around the world.
        Within your office, how are you going to confront these
    challenges and hopefully delivery a robust system of joint and
    cross-domain capability?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the JADC2 concept is extremely
    important for us to be able to counter our adversaries in
    whatever domain that we may need to counter them in. As you
    know, it will provide this ubiquitous connectivity that you
    talked about. But we must ensure that it is also secure and
    reliable, regardless of the environment, and it must connect
    across all domains. So it must be able to connect our land,
    air, sea forces, and space forces, as necessary.
        Within the Office of the USD(I&S), if I am confirmed, I
    would work towards ensuring that we understand the requirements
    for the JADC2 concept. I would ensure that we understand what
    the responsibilities are of the other components in the other
    services and what they need to deliver, and then we need to
    ensure that we can test this capability. We need to be able to
    prove it in combat, but we also need to ensure that is has the
    redundancy that it needs so that it can provide our warfighters
    with the real-time connectivity and capabilities to fight the
    war, and, if confirmed, I would commit myself to supporting the
    JADC2 concept.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Moultrie. Again, I
    think this is one of the most significant issues that we face
    collectively in the Department of Defense, and I urge you to
    follow through, if confirmed.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen. Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, MR. Chairman. I just have one
    question for each one. I have already expressed my feelings
    about the two nominees and how fortunate we are that they are
    willing to do this, and I am sure they will be confirmed.
        General Townsend, the Commander of United States Africa
    Command (AFRICOM), recently testified about China's ruling
    military presence in Africa. China built its first overseas
    military base in Djibouti and is aggressively pursuing a naval
    base on the west coast of Africa, which General Townsend
    called, using his quote he said, ``the number one global power
    competition concern,'' and I agree with that.
        I am very familiar with the AFRICOM, and I was somewhat
    instrumental in making that a reality back in 2007. In a way,
    though, I failed. We got AFRICOM--well, the continent of Africa
    used to be divided among three different COMs, so at least it
    is all under one COM now, but we never did adequately get the
    resources necessary. Now, because it has become so much more
    important in the fact that China--you know, that people do not
    realize China--Djibouti is the first time that they started an
    overseas operation. They have done everything else in their
    back yard, always up to now. So it is kind of a big deal there.
        So I would ask you, Mr. Moultrie, I am going to ask you if
    you will try to do something I failed to be able to do, and
    that is commit to me that you will take a close look at our
    intelligence capabilities in Africa, that you will ensure that
    our efforts there get the attention and resources they need.
        Now, I know you will get the cooperation of this committee,
    but it is going to be your responsibility to spend the time and
    the resources to encourage the administration to make that a
    reality. What are your feelings about that, and are you willing
    to try to do that?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, yes. China has been a challenge for
    a number of years, really a number of decades as it pertains to
    Africa, and I closely followed that when I was the Director of
    Operations at the National Security Agency. They have diplomat,
    they have military and economic ambitions. There are a lot of
    reasons to focus on Africa, as you know, Senator, the ports
    that they have there. It is a mineral-rich continent that the
    Chinese seek, and they are using all of their tools,
    techniques, coercion, and malign influence to actually try to
    move into that continent.
        I have not been briefed on it, but I understand the
    challenges there. I understand, I think, what the Chinese have
    tried to do there. If confirmed, I would work across the
    interagency. I would also work with our partners and allies,
    because they are also focused, in some ways, on China, to
    ensure that we understand what the Chinese are doing and what
    their plans are, and that we would be prepared to support the
    Secretary in deterring the Chinese challenge there and
    providing support to our warfighters and commanders forward.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, and specifically, though, in trying to
    get the resources from us that, again, we failed to get done
    previously. That is a major concern that I have there.
        Lastly, with Mr. McCord, first of all, you are very
    familiar this committee, and we are very familiar with you, and
    we appreciate the fact that you are taking on this
    responsibility. It is particularly interesting that you are one
    of the 12 listed on this document, and I do not think that even
    you believed the attention this document would get when you
    first developed it.
        So one of the items in there that is pretty specific is the
    need for the 3 to 5 percent real growth in the defense budget
    to effectively implement the national defense system. I know
    that when Deputy Secretary Hicks was before this committee, she
    also was one of the authors of this, one of the 12 authors of
    this document, and she agree that the 3 to 5 percent real
    growth was really something that is as realistic today as it
    was in 2018. Do you agree with Secretary Hicks and her comments
    and the necessity of the resources in order to get the job
    done?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. The Commission, as you said,
    found that that was an appropriate resource range for the
    National Defense Strategy that Secretary Mattis laid out, and,
    of course, if confirmed, my job would be to work with Secretary
    Austin as he undertakes his strategy review and similarly find
    the right resource level for his strategy.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, and I think that you found it,
    and so I appreciate that in the document and your efforts.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me recognize
    Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Gentlemen, congratulations on
    your nominations. Thank you for your willingness to stand for
    those positions at these challenging times.
        I want to begin with you, Mr. McCord, because I think your
    background in cybersecurity and information management makes
    you a particular good choice at this critical time. As we saw
    over the weekend, from the attack on Colonial Pipeline, and the
    potential impacts on the East Coast's access to gasoline, we
    need someone who understands the challenges. I wonder, if this
    had been a terrorist attack on the pipeline, would we have
    reacted the same way? Given your background at DOD, how do you
    think we might have reacted if it had been a terrorist attack?
    Did I call you McCord instead of Mr. Moultrie? If I did, I am
    sorry.
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, that is fine. I understand the
    question. The attack on Colonial Pipeline, Senator, is
    extremely concerning. These attacks, probably intrusions and
    attacks probably occur much more frequently than what we know.
    We only see what I call the tip of the iceberg as it pertains
    to these. While I have not been briefed on this, what I have
    read in the media is that it was a ransomware attacks, which
    was not necessarily directed by a hostile target, but as we
    know, there are hacktivists who are members of foreign
    governments, who hire themselves out to do these attacks. We
    have been fortunate, over the last year, year and a half, to
    dodge bullets, that there has not been malicious intent.
        I think it is important, Senator, and if confirmed, I would
    look at this as a public-private issue that we need to have the
    government work closely with industry. We need to work closer,
    among ourselves in the interagency, and we need to understand
    what the challenges are. We need to get the word out to
    industry. We need to partner with them to help them solve these
    challenges. We have been fortunate, but we have to do more.
        Senator Shaheen. Would you agree that our laws and our
    responses have not kept up with the technology that is
    available to do those kinds of cyber intrusions, and that we
    need to do a better job of updating how we respond, both in
    terms of our technology, that response, but also the laws that
    we pass to respond?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I would say that we certainly need
    to look at the laws, but we also need to look at the processes
    that we have in place----
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        Mr. Moultrie.--for alerting people. So it would be a
    combination.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am also concerned about the
    amount of information that we currently classify. In a January
    2020 memo that was sent by nine U.S. combatant commanders to
    the Acting DNI, the commanders highlighted what they called,
    and I quote, ``pernicious conduct of our adversaries'
    information operations across the world, and underscored the
    need to improve deep classification of information in order to
    more effectively compete in their respective domains.''
        I would argue that one of the places where we have done too
    much classification has been around our response to those
    government officials who have been attacked by what is known as
    the Havana Syndrome, where information has been very dispersed,
    very classified. Sometimes I am not sure that one agency talks
    to the other agency in terms of what we are doing. Certainly
    under the Biden administration there has been more of an effort
    to respond to this. But would you agree with the combatant
    commanders that signed that memo, that improving our
    declassification efforts would actually be helpful in terms of
    how we respond to certain situations?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not read this combatant
    commanders memo. I have read about it in the media. My
    understanding is that there is information out there on malign
    activities that should make its way to our warfighter and to
    our combatant commanders. So I agree with you 100 percent on
    that, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, would you commit to doing everything
    you can to doing everything you can to ensure that there is an
    unclassified accounting of facts on the issues surrounding
    those who have been attacked by these electro--radio waves,
    under what is called the Havana Syndrome, so that there is both
    consistent information that is going to Congress and the public
    and also very real information that we receive about what is
    going on?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, if confirmed, I would look into what
    we know on these directed energy attacks, as they call them, to
    understand what is going on, and work with the DNI and others
    to find ways to disseminate this information to our citizens
    and to those who need to know in our installations and
    facilities around the world.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now let me
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking both of your for your
    continued service to our country. I would like to begin with
    Mr. McCord. Looking back, you began work on the Senate Armed
    Services Committee in 1987, during the first year of the
    implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition to
    reorganizing the Department to better execute joint operations,
    this act required the submission of a National Security
    Strategy, the first time a strategy was ever required in our
    Nation's history.
        Furthermore, the act actually calls for the NSS to be
    submitted to Congress at the same time that the President
    submits his budget. As you know, this has not happened, and yet
    at the same time, while we do a National Defense Strategy, my
    thoughts right now, as we look at a pipeline which has been
    hacked, and we have people that are wondering how we work
    through the issue of providing defense to individuals within
    our country, how do we coordinate between the different
    departments, how do we break down the silos, and shouldn't we
    be looking, on a regular basis, at how we defend not just
    through the NDS but a national security for the entire country?
    I am just curious. Wouldn't this help to have this continue to
    be submitted, as was originally envisioned in 1987?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, thank you. Yes, I am familiar with the
    National Security Strategy documents. My recollection is that
    they have not, over these 30 or so years, been routinely
    submitted every single calendar year but have been a little
    more sporadic than some of the defense documents have been. I
    am aware that National Security Advisor Sullivan put out an
    Interim Strategic Guidance for this administration a few weeks
    ago. As a private citizen, I am not privy to the schedule for
    formalizing such a document, whatever might be envisioned by
    the White House at this time.
        As far as the processes, though, responding to more
    specific threats and challenges as you were describing, and
    Senator Shaheen also, from the outside, where I sit, it looks
    like the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, the
    processes that are used to respond to the specific events look
    fairly familiar to what has been used over many
    administrations. So I think there is a process in place, but
    your point is well taken that, you know, defense strategy is
    always best when it nests inside a National Security Strategy.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Moultrie, let me continue along that same line, and I
    would like to preface it with I appreciated the opportunity to
    visit with you yesterday. With this pipeline hack, it brings to
    mind the need to really focus, as you suggested earlier, not
    just on the challenges we have, air, land, and sea, but space
    and cyberspace, as we look at our adversaries, and not just
    Russia and China and Iran and North Korea, but also the fact
    that we have criminal elements, sometimes in collusion with but
    sometimes on their own, attacking the infrastructure within the
    United States--financial services, transportation, electrics,
    electric utilities, and now we find out the distribution of our
    energy resources.
        Mr. Moultrie, you were one of the individuals who worked on
    the Navy's review, and I must admit, a very refreshing review,
    of the challenges facing the Navy alone with regard to its
    independent contractors, defending the information from those
    who would steal it, protecting its secrets, and recognizing the
    vulnerabilities that the Department of the Navy had in the
    cyber world. So I recognize and I appreciate the work that you
    did in that respect.
        Having just gone through and looked at what happened here
    within the most recent hacking of the pipeline, it seems to me
    that the lessons learned on this would suggest that the silos
    we have been the different departments, the different branches
    within the departments, and, most certainly, those that come
    from not just the Department of Defense trying to defend
    against those attacks from the outside but then to try to
    coordinate with Homeland Security to protect not just the DOD's
    interests but also the interests of the American public on an
    infrastructure basis, it seems to me that there is a real
    lesson to be learned here about a coordination that has to
    occur.
        Would you care to share a little bit about what you learned
    about your thoughts with regard to breaking down those silos,
    and anything else that we might have learned that could be
    beneficial to the entire Department of Defense that you saw
    within the review of the Department of the Navy?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I will be brief about this.
    What we found was that the cyber threat was pervasive, it is
    real. The adversary knows what our vulnerabilities are better
    than we do. They study this. We are probably the most connected
    but most underprotected society in the world. We found that the
    industrial base was a prime target of our adversary, and we
    found that we did not have a comprehensive plan for getting
    after that.
        So we recommended that leadership, at least the Secretary
    of the Navy, in this instance, transmit commanders intent as to
    what he would want to do, how to get after it, and that we
    organize ourselves not in silos but horizontally, so that we
    could cross-communicate throughout the Department and work on
    those various areas. The Navy, I want to say they have done a
    good job at that.
        I think our Government is moving in that direction, based
    on President Biden's announcements of nominations for a
    National Cyber Director, and I think that there are lessons
    learned for the Department of Defense that could be emulated
    from the Navy study, and, if confirmed, I would look forward to
    working with all of the principals in the Department who have a
    piece of cyber to support that initiative.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds, and let me
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
    Moultrie, your statement that you just said is exactly what you
    and I discussed. You said we are the most connected but the
    most underprotected. That is extremely disturbing, and I know
    that you have an ambition to begin to address that, as you just
    said.
        It is important to our national security's success that the
    military intelligence apparatus operates in sync with the
    entire intelligence community, especially the CIA, and that our
    intelligence entities are not autonomous or siloed against each
    other, and I have heard many examples of this, which is deeply
    concerning. I was very happy to have your commitment to work
    closely with DNI Haines to make sure this happens correctly.
        Do you have any additional thoughts that you want to share
    on areas where integration between our military and civilian
    intelligence entities can improve?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I believe that what you just
    laid out would be the foundation that we ought to pursue.
    Working with DNI Haines and her cadre, working with Director
    Burns and Deputy Director Cohen at the CIA are important, but
    there are aspects of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise that
    have a piece of this. There are multiple pieces of this.
        We have to rally around the priorities and a sense of
    purpose and unify around the concept of we each have a shared
    responsibility as it pertains to this challenge. If confirmed,
    I would work to build that understanding, further understanding
    within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I think we have
    great commanders who understand it today, but I would further
    the facilitation and working across those elements to ensure
    that we are working as a unit and that we understand that this
    threat is more than a threat. It is not something that somebody
    is threatening to do. It is something that is happening today.
        Senator, you have my commitment to devote myself to making
    this happen, if confirmed as the Under Secretary for
    Intelligence and Security.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. Moultrie, ODNI's Annual
    Threat Assessment noted that white nationalists or right-wing
    extremist groups have conducted at least 26 attacks that have
    killed more than 141 people over the last 5 years. Further,
    Australia, Germany, Norway, and the UK all consider racist
    extremist groups the fastest-growing terror threat that they
    face. What role would you say you and your office might have in
    evaluating this threat, in particular, and given that you would
    be the senior official overseeing our insider threat program,
    do you have any specific plans to deter or detect extremists
    who may have infiltrated the Department or the military?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, extremism should not exist in our
    ranks, regardless of how pervasive it may be. It undermines
    readiness and it undermines the strong values that we have. I
    was very pleased to see that Secretary Austin has charted a
    counter-extremism working group to help define the problem and
    to help provide recommendations for the problem. The Under
    Secretary for Intelligence and Security has an organization
    that helps train and helps monitor, to ensure that we do not
    have a proliferation of any extremist views by any group.
        I believe that there is a key role that I can play in
    overseeing the activities and helping those professionals who
    are already moving in that direction, and, Senator, if
    confirmed, you have my commitment to ensure that we move in
    that direction, ensuring that we eliminate extremism throughout
    the Department of Defense.
        Senator Gillibrand. With regard to China, obviously it
    poses the most significant national security and intelligence
    threat to the United States across the board. As you are aware,
    China uses a number of cyber technical and human intelligence
    tools to achieve this end. It will take the full strength of
    our military and the civilian intelligence community to deter
    them.
        Are you confident in the military's ability to monitor and
    counter China's building global military intelligence
    footprint, including in more remote areas of the world such as
    Latin America, Africa, and South Asia?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I have not been briefed on the
    current collection posture of the intelligence community or the
    Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I can tell you I am confident,
    Senator, that we understand what the challenge is. But I would
    want to withhold judgment as to whether or now I am confident
    we could actually monitor, on a global basis, until, if
    confirmed, I have the opportunity to understand what we are
    doing and where we are on that issue today.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Moultrie.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me
    recognize Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
    you so much. It was great to have phone conversations with both
    of you, and I really appreciate the opportunity to get to know
    you both better. We certainly appreciate your time this morning
    in giving testimony on these topics. If both of you are
    confirmed, you do have challenging roads ahead, to make sure
    that we are providing the very best of intelligence and
    resources to our warfighters, to help them accomplish their
    mission, and I look forward to working with both of you to
    ensure that America succeeds.
        Mr. Moultrie, I would love to start with you first, sir,
    and as evidence by your resume and the phone conversation that
    we had, you and your family have extensive experience in the
    intelligence community. I think we do continue, of course, to
    struggle to eliminate certain gaps between the various agencies
    in the Federal Government and really provide that common
    operating picture across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
        If you could, I know we spoke on this on the phone, but if
    you could for everyone else that might be catching up now, how
    do we close those gaps in information between the different
    agencies? How do we improving the sharing, the collaboration
    between our agencies to make sure that the Department of
    Defense always has the cutting-edge information necessary to
    accomplish our mission?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. The need for greater
    collaboration, and real-time collaboration, is extremely
    important, probably no more important so than it is today. I
    believe it is important that we work with the Director of
    National Intelligence, who works a National Intelligence
    Priorities Framework, to understand that the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise and our warfighters needs are, in many
    ways, aligned closely with our national policymaker needs.
        So when we are looking at real-time collection, analysis,
    dissemination to the President of the United States and
    policymakers, we need to ensure that that same information is
    getting to the warfighter and getting to those in the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise.
        I believe that it is a matter of building that
    understanding, what the collective missions are, and building
    that trust, and you have my commitment, Senator, that if I am
    confirmed, I will work to have trusted relationships with the
    DNI and others throughout the intelligence enterprise, and we
    will get back to you on the progress that we are making, or not
    making, in this area.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, and as you may know,
    many of our operational elements are using lagging programs of
    record, like the Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS, to
    provide a common operating picture to those ground commanders.
    How would you intend to modernize intelligence infrastructures
    and architectures throughout the DOD to enhance those
    warfighters' understanding of the operational environment?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the real-time dissemination of
    intelligence to the warfighter should be the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise's top priority. In my experience, there
    has not been this common operating picture that you discussed.
    We have a number of operating pictures, but not a universal
    common operating picture, if you will.
        I have not been briefed on the DCGS concept of where it is
    today, but you have my commitment that the warfighter is the
    reason that we exist. They are the reason that we are here. You
    have my commitment that if I am confirmed in this position that
    I will do all that I can and work with the intelligence
    enterprise to ensure that the warfighter has the information
    that they need.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that very much and
    our conversation.
        Mr. McCord, in the final moments that I have, certainly I
    have been really paying attention to the audit of the DOD and
    making sure that we have a clean audit at some point. Can you
    just explain to us how you intend to make sure the Department
    gives full effort and attention to this financial audit?
        Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the Secretary has
    already, I think, stated that it is an important priority of
    his. That is important. It will be a top priority of mine. I
    know it is of this committee, that the defense committees have
    been full partners with us and have, I think, given us
    appropriate level of patience, while still keep pushing us, as
    you need to do.
        The effort will take a few more years, but the one thing I
    will say, the Department has done everything in the last 10
    years or so that it has said it would do, when it said it would
    do it. So as we move from statement of budgetary resource,
    state audits, to full audits of each military department, to
    full audit of the Department, we have done the things that we
    have said we would do to the committees.
        I think to the topic you have just been discussing,
    including controls and information access are probably the key
    leverage point, in my view, of what I would intend to look at
    first, if confirmed.
        Senator Ernst. Well, and thank you, and I do believe it is
    important that we continue with the audit, to make sure that we
    are communicating to our taxpayers that their resources are
    being used appropriately within the Department of Defense.
    Gentlemen, I look forward to supporting both of your
    confirmations. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. I now recognize
    Senator Hirono, via Webex.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McCord and Mr. Moultrie, I ask the following two
    questions of every nominee who comes before any of the
    committees on which I sit.
        Since you became a legal adult, have either of you ever
    made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any
    verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        Mr. McCord. No.
        Mr. Moultrie. No.
        Senator Hirono. Did both of you say no? Thank you.
        Have either of you ever faced discipline or entered into a
    settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Mr. McCord. No.
        Mr. Moultrie. No.
        Senator Hirono. Mr. McCord, as Comptroller you will oversee
    the Defense Contract Audit agency, which performs financial
    oversight of government contracts and is critical to ensuring
    DOD gets the best value for every dollar spent on defense
    contracting by reporting potential problems it finds to the
    Defense Contract Management Agency, which administers all DOD
    contracts and DOD IG, when appropriate. In your view, is the
    Defense Contract Audit Agency appropriately staffed to conduct
    adequate oversight of the 300,000 contracts DOD is
    administering at any given time?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, if confirmed, I would certainly
    consult with the Director of DCAA [Defense Contract Audit
    Agency], who would report to me, about the workload versus the
    staffing levels as it exists today. When I left 4 years ago,
    the agency had suffered a bit from a downturn driven by the
    sequestration level reductions in staff that had been imposed
    across the Department, had gotten the backlog up to an
    unacceptable level. We had made progress in bringing that down.
    I believe the staffing levels are probably about right, but I
    would want to consult further with the Director of DCAA, if
    confirmed.
        Senator Hirono. When we talk about 300,000 contracts, it
    runs the gamut from very large contracts to smaller contracts,
    I assume?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, yes. DCAA audits contracts of various
    different sizes. What they focus on is contracts especially
    that are not competed, so it is the type more so than the size
    that is a key determinant of where they focus, for example, on
    commercially available items versus ones that are more unique.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, so those unique contracts probably
    require auditors who also understand what the contract provides
    and what is expected.
        What is your opinion of the Defense Contract Audit Agency's
    relationship with the Defense Contract Management Agency and
    the DOD IG, and is the current arrangement referring potential
    problems the most efficient way for DOD to identify, deter, and
    eliminate contracting fraud, waste, and abuse?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, DCAA is required to be independent of
    DCMA, of the contract management folks. That is, in fact, why
    DCAA is under the Comptroller and out of the acquisition chain.
    As your question illuminates, there is a little bit of a nuance
    there in that they have to talk, they have to communicate, but
    they also have to be independent of each other. The inspector
    generals, of course, always assert that they are independent of
    management, but we also work closely with them. So it is
    definitely a bit of a delicate dance to have independent actors
    who need to communicate and cooperate but who have to also
    maintain a little bit of independence from each other to do
    their roles as assigned.
        Senator Hirono. So are you saying that the current
    situation is the most efficient way to detect fraud, waste, and
    abuse?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, I would certainly not assert that no
    improvements can be made, but I am just making the point that
    there is only so close that they can be, given that the
    contract auditors have to have some degree of separation from
    the contract managers.
        Senator Hirono. I understand the independence issue.
        Mr. Moultrie, I am increasingly concerned about the
    emergence of ``deep fakes"--that is in quote, quotation marks--
    a term which describes realistic but forced photos, audios, and
    videos produced via artificial intelligence, and how they could
    be utilize to erode public trust, embarrass, or blackmail key
    officials or inflame or incite violence.
        What are your views on this emerging technology as it
    relates to national security, and how might our adversaries
    seek to exploit it?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes. Senator, I believe that the deep fake
    issue is one that could pose a great threat to national
    security. If an adversary has the ability to emulate a
    commander, or someone in authority, and actually looked as if
    they are saying something, that could pose a challenge if
    someone took that deep fake to be a realistic individual or
    person.
        AI, artificial intelligence, has a number of facets that we
    have to ensure that we understand. We have to develop the
    countermeasures to ensure that we can compare the real
    information to fake information. Senator, as I am sure you are
    aware, there has been a lot of work done in this regard, where
    you can look at the subtle differences between images and see
    where some things are slightly off.
        If confirmed, I would be very concerned about this, but I
    would also ensure that I would work with those across the
    interagency, the Department, and with counterintelligence so we
    can identify these counterintelligence threats and immediately
    either nullify them or alert to the fact that they exist.
        Senator Hirono. So do you think that we are adequately--
    that we have the adequate capacity to deal with these deep fake
    images, audios, et cetera?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not been briefed on the
    current status or what our capabilities are, what our
    processing and computing capabilities are to discern between a
    real image and a fake image, but if confirmed, I would review
    that and get back to you.
        Senator Hirono. I cannot tell whether my time is up or not,
    Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. Yes, it is, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
    today. Congratulations to you both on your nominations.
        Mr. McCord, in your answers to the advanced policy
    questions you affirmed the NDS Commission, on which you served,
    had found that 3 to 5 percent of real growth was, quote,
    ``illustrative of what was needed for the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy,'' end quote. But you also state that the DOD should
    be able to carry on its missions under the announced fiscal
    year 2022 funding level, which is below inflation. How can the
    committee reconcile these two views?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, the way I would state it is, first of
    all, of course, neither you nor I have seen the details and the
    specific choices made inside the 2022 budget, so we will all be
    able to learn more about how we feel about the budget and what
    is in there, when it is available in a week or two.
        With respect to the funding level, just as an aggregate
    number, what Secretary Mattis said at the time and what the
    commission sort of spoke to was averaging 3 to 5 percent over a
    5-year period, and the fiscal year 2022 request is still in
    that range from where the budget was 5 years ago when I left.
    So I think in that respect there is a certain consistency.
        Senator Cotton. Well, we will see what it says in a week or
    two. The reports I hear are not reassuring. Hopefully once you
    are confirmed you can exert influence inside the interagency
    process and with OMB to make sure the Department of Defense is
    fully funded as the threats we face continue to grow.
        I also want to ask you a question about the Overseas
    Contingency Operations account. I have seen some novel
    budgeting tricks used with that OCO spending account during my
    8 years in the Congress. At the same time, I think it is
    important that we be able to track what we are spending on
    overseas conflict. So by doing away with OCO spending, how is
    it that we will be able to track, inside the Department of
    Defense and for Congress, what we are spending on those
    conflicts?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, the Department, when I was there, and
    I know continues to this day and I would insist that we
    continue, if confirmed, does what is called a Cost of War
    report. It has moved from, I believe, maybe monthly to
    quarterly over the years, that is done to track obligations
    that are chargeable against operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.
    That can continue with or without separate appropriations, and
    I think it would be necessary that it continue for the very
    reasons you cite, that there is accountability and transparency
    of what is still being spent on these operations.
        Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you. I just think it is very
    important that we maintain a clear picture of what we are
    spending on our forces, that excludes any kind of contingency
    operations overseas. Now the OCO account was used in some funny
    ways to get around budgetary spending caps over the last decade
    that are no longer in place, so it cannot be used in that way
    anymore. But I want to make sure that we have a very crystal
    clear picture of what we are spending on our manning, training,
    equipping, so we understand what the force needs in the future,
    separate from what we have to spend on a year-to-year basis,
    wherever our forces are operating overseas.
        Mr. Moultrie, supply chain security has always been a
    critical component of our national security. It grows even more
    so as our forces' equipment and weapons get more
    technologically advanced. What do you view as the biggest
    threats to our technology supply chains, and how would you work
    to mitigate those threats?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the supply chain, our supply chain
    is inherently vulnerable, is what I would say. Our adversaries,
    specifically China and others, understand the defense
    industrial base. We are fortunate, based on my past knowledge
    and experience, to have organizations, especially within the
    Intelligence Security Enterprise, such as the Defense
    Counterintelligence Security Agency, that has programs that
    actually enable us to go out and talk to those individuals and
    companies and facilities that are part of our critical supply
    infrastructure for the Department of Defense.
        I think we have to ensure that we continue to identify what
    our vulnerabilities are in those key areas, in those key
    industries, in those key organizations. We have to make them
    aware, Senator, of what the challenges really are what the
    threat actually is. That means we have to have, when I talk
    about public-private partnerships, to be able to go out and
    talk to them, make sure that they understand this. If
    confirmed, I would work vigorously to ensure that we are doing
    all that we can to support the mitigation of risk in our supply
    chain as it exists today.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. Last year I sponsored the
    American Founders Act with several other Senators, to
    reinvigorate semiconductor manufacturing here at home. I
    believe offshoring this critical capability has presented a
    grave threat to our national security. What importance do you
    assign to our leadership in microelectronics design and
    manufacturing, and what risk to U.S. security will our supply
    chains face if we do not have that critical manufacturing
    capability here at home?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator, I have not been briefed on what
    is currently occurring within the DOD on foundries. I am aware
    of the microchip shortage and the challenges that we are having
    in that regard. I think it is important that wherever our chips
    are manufactured that they are secure, that, you know,
    offshoring of microchips can or cannot induce vulnerabilities
    into the process that we have there. But if confirmed, I would
    work to understand where those chips are being manufactured to
    support the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and work across the
    Department and the interagency to ensure that we are securing
    the supply chain of getting chips to our military and to our
    critical industries.
        Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you. I agree with that. It is
    kind of dangerous to have 80 to 90 percent of the world's
    semiconductors manufactured within short-range missile range of
    mainland China, in a place against which Beijing has
    irredentist claims. Thank you both.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member Inhofe.
    Congratulations to the nominees for your willingness to tackle
    these important responsibilities.
        Mr. McCord, let me begin with you. As you know, because of
    your long tenure with the committee and then at the Pentagon,
    it has been a significant interest here to get the DOD to full
    audit, and we have made significant progress in that effort. I
    give some real credit to David Norquist. I think he did a good
    job of moving the Pentagon further toward that goal.
        One of my interests in the audit has always been beyond
    just passing, using the audit as a way not just to promote best
    financial practices but also best operational practices,
    finding in the audit strategies where we can consolidate
    duplication and then use the dollars saved there to promote
    better national security.
        So I would like you to just talk to the committee a bit
    about the way you see the audit, and how you can use the audit
    not only to assure financial compliance but also use it to
    advance the national security mission of the Pentagon.
        Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the audit, as you say,
    ultimately comes down to pass-fail, and that is the standard.
    But as with studying for a test, the process of learning and
    getting there, improving yourself, is almost as important as
    the grade you get if you are trying to be proficient or more
    proficient at something.
        Inventory is probably the chief area where audit promotes
    better practices that can reduce waste, help the warfighter,
    make sure that we know what we have and it is in the right
    place. There are one or two aspects of the audit, in
    particular, valuing property that are less connected to that.
        But the second area I would say, and this morning's hearing
    really brings this out, in the area of controls and cyber
    controls, cybersecurity. A large part of the findings that the
    auditors have made are that our controls still need to be
    better, in terms of access to information and only the
    authorized people being able to access information. So I think
    that the audit and businesses practices that go with the audit
    can be synergistic with the improved cybersecurity that we want
    for ourselves and, of course, that we want for industry
    partners as well.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you for that answer, and I very much
    encourage you to take this use of the audit seriously, as I
    know that you will.
        Mr. Moultrie, I was the chair, along with Senator Sullivan
    as my ranking, on a Readiness Subcommittee hearing about two
    weeks ago, and we were looking at acquisition kind of hits and
    misses, and trying to extract some best practices from them.
    One of the witnesses that we had was Dr. Ray O'Toole, who is
    the Acting Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation
    Office. In the course of his testimony, which was in an open
    setting, he said that in fiscal year 2020, none of the weapons
    systems assessed by his office were able to pass a simulated
    cyberattack. Every single one of them was vulnerable to
    simulated cyberattacks.
        When he testified to that, Senator Sullivan and I looked at
    each other and said, ``That is not good,'' and then Senator
    Sullivan said, ``I hope our adversaries are not watching this
    hearing.'' Dr. O'Toole said, ``In writing my testimony I was so
    worried about making this statement that I actually checked to
    make sure, from a security standpoint, I could, and it cleared
    security, but it is something I am really worried about.''
        So should you be confirmed, what might you do, working
    together with our acquisition professionals and others, so that
    we build in protection against cyber vulnerability very, very
    early in any sort of acquisition platform?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I believe that closely working
    with acquisition and sustainment is one of the key roles that
    the USD(I&S) has to ensure that we are looking at the
    determination needs of acquisition to ensure that adversaries
    have not perpetrated our industry, our companies, if you will,
    and that they are not stealing our secrets, because once they
    have stolen those secrets, as you know, there are built-in
    vulnerabilities that those systems are going to have.
        More importantly today, Senator, I think it is important
    that we understand where vulnerabilities and breaches have
    occurred, and then that we find a way of incorporating that
    information back into not just the acquisition of the new
    platforms but the current deployed platforms. So an adversary
    steals plans, blueprints, what have you, we need today to get
    that information back into the production cycle and into the
    current force so that they cannot be degraded when they are
    actually doing an operation in the field.
        I have not had access to what is being done today, Senator.
    If confirmed, you have my commitment to look at this and come
    back and talk to you in closed committee about it, because I
    think it is a very potentially serious problem, and there are
    probably things occurring today that we do not want to talk
    about in an open hearing, but our adversaries probably already
    know.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Moultrie, thank you for that. I look
    forward to following up, should you be confirmed, and I am
    confident you will be.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Can you hear me?
        So first I want to thank both of you for your willingness
    to serve.
        Mr. Moultrie, what do you believe China's plans are with
    regard to Taiwan? Do you believe that Communist China has the
    intention to take Taiwan by force?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not been briefed on the
    current intelligence as it pertains to Taiwan, but as you know,
    their stated intent has been the eventual acclimation of Taiwan
    back into what they call the Mainland. As to whether or not
    force is in their doctrine, they will execute all means
    available to them to ensure that they are protecting what they
    feel is in their national interest.
        Senator Scott. So we have seen pretty aggressive behavior
    by Communist China the last few years, whether it is their
    military attacks or building their military strength. What do
    you think General Secretary Xi's ultimate goal is with these
    cyberattacks and with this aggressive behavior, not just Taiwan
    but their actions towards Australia and even the United States?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I believe that the cyberattacks that
    China has executed are directed at a number of areas, one, to
    bolster their research and development, where they do not spend
    nearly as much as we do in the United States. So this is a way
    of getting easy and cheap research and development, if I can go
    out and steal it. Two, it is to further their economic gains,
    and three, diplomacy and undermine our diplomatic efforts, and
    as I started with, at the forefront would really be that
    military gain that they get from the cyberattacks.
        Senator Scott. So we have had, for decades, strategic
    ambiguity with regard to Taiwan, and so I have a bill that is
    called the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, which basically
    eliminates the ambiguity. It is clear that the United States,
    if Taiwan is attacked, will show up and defend them. What are
    your thoughts on something like this? Because, I mean, if you
    look at, what we are doing is not working. I mean, Communist
    China is getting more aggressive every day, it seems like?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I do not subscribe to the view that
    war is inevitable between the U.S. and China or our allied
    forces and China. If confirmed, I would support--I have not
    seen your bill, so I cannot comment, Senator, on your bill. If
    confirmed, I would love to read that, and will read it, if
    confirmed. I would support the Department's policies and
    Secretary Austin's policies as they pertain to deterrence as it
    pertains to China.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Mr. McCord, you responded to Senator Cotton with regard to
    the Biden administration's proposal to grow defense spending is
    less than it has been, and I understand what you said is that
    over a period of time it is still in the 3 to 5 percent range.
    But do you believe that this initial proposal will send the
    wrong message to Communist China and to Russia and our
    adversaries?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, I do not believe so, but I think the
    meat of the proposal is yet to arrive, right, is what are the
    specific choices made on the triad, on the joint strike
    fighter, on readiness. I think that is really where the
    Committee will need to focus and where, if confirmed, I would
    want to focus, on what choices were made, which I just have no
    information on as a private citizen.
        Senator Scott. Okay. I think it is my understanding that
    you, in the past, have supported increasing the spending 3 to 5
    percent, so if this year we do not do that, how many years
    could we do that without having an adverse impact on our
    military?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, there are a couple of levers that you
    always have, I think, in terms of the capability that you are
    getting out of the funds that you have. It is how large of a
    force do you think you need, how ready do you feel you need to
    keep people, you know, the compensation for the troops. So
    there is a mixture of choices, that it would be responsibility,
    if confirmed, to advise the Secretary and the Deputy on as to
    how we get the best capability we have.
        You know, there also may be proposals to find efficiencies
    to retire our legacy system. I have no information of what
    choices might be about to be proposed to you, having not had a
    role in building this budget. But if confirmed, my task would
    be to work with the Secretary and other leaders to build the
    2023 budget, the 2024 budget, and to make the best choices that
    we can to present to you.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Manchin,
    please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    both for your service, and I appreciate very much you being
    here.
        Mr. Moultrie, I am pleased to hear that you say we need to
    increase the coordination of our Federal cyber response, and I
    agree with you, you are right on the Colonial attack. So my
    question would be, how do you intend to ensure that
    intelligence that DOD is gathering about cyber threats and
    shared across Federal Government, which we have a hard time
    coordinating right now, and are you aware of the mechanisms to
    share that information with private industry organizations that
    also might be directly threatened?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I believe that the sharing of
    intelligence across what I call the intelligence enterprise,
    which I include in that the intelligence community and the
    Defense Intelligence Enterprise, is extremely important. I look
    forward to working with Director Haines on whether those
    mechanisms that are in place today to provide that information
    to Department of Homeland Security and others----
        Senator Manchin. What seems to be the biggest obstacle,
    sir? I mean, it seems like it is common sense they would share
    freely, but then it is almost like it is, that is ours, not
    yours.
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I think there are concerns about
    authorities when you start looking at----
        Senator Manchin. Would it concern any leaks at all? Would
    they be concerned of leaks, if they are sharing it, it might be
    easier to be compromised?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I don't know if those are the
    concerns, but I do know, historically, there has been
    jurisdictional, law enforcement versus national security
    concerns that are there. I think the processes and the
    realization that we need to put those processes in place and do
    exactly what you are talking about, to have that smooth
    interconnectivity between the interagency, but more
    importantly, between the private sector and the public sectors
    are the realizations here. If confirmed, I would do all I can,
    because this something----
        Senator Manchin. I appreciate that. I really do, and I
    think you are going to have to really go after it pretty hard
    and make sure they start working together so we do have one
    connected cyber preventive.
        I want to talk about withdrawing assets from Afghanistan,
    and I am very much kind of concerned about this, and I have
    been concerned, and I have been thinking about it. You know, we
    want to make sure that we return all of our assets, if humanly
    possible, and those that we do not think that we need to
    return, should return, they are destroying. I guess my question
    would be, and I will start, Mr. McCord with you, with your
    recent position in the Department, are you satisfied with what
    you are seeing in the efforts that are being put forth, and do
    you believe that is the best policy for the United States of
    America, after all that we have spent, after all that we have
    endured, after all the blood that has been shed there by
    Americans, that on top of that now we destroy everything that
    we are leaving, to even make them think, ``Who are these
    Americans? They have no value for anything whatsoever.'' So
    rather than having someone that might get use out of it, we
    just destroy it. Are we afraid it is going to get into the
    wrong hands, because I do not know who the right hands are over
    there. So I would assume it has all been the wrong hands. So
    why start destroying stuff now?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, when I left 4 years ago we were not in
    that position. I do not have current information. I am sorry. I
    would have to get briefed and get back to you on what is or is
    not being destroyed. I assume that there are some calculations
    being made about the cost of transporting something back
    versus----
        Senator Manchin. I am just saying--okay, let me ask you,
    just in the hypothetical realm then, just your thought process.
    If you think you can speak out on this, do you think we should
    be destroying what is not economically feasible for us to
    return, just to destroy it for the sake of destroying it so no
    one else can use it? Because we are not in that area anymore.
    Are we afraid they are going to use it against us? If we turned
    everything over to the people that we do trust, or think we
    trust, shouldn't we leave it up to them then to make those
    decisions, so it is not a wasteful appearance?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, if I were confirmed and were part of
    these discussions it would certainly be a discriminator, in my
    view, as to whether, as I said, the asset had useful life, but
    also what its purpose was. I mean, I would make a different
    judgment on a truck versus munitions----
        Senator Manchin. Mr. Moultrie----
        Mr. McCord.--versus communications equipment.
        Senator Manchin.--do you have any thought process on this?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, you know, I have read the media, and
    I would concur with Mr. McCord that there is a cost calculation
    that is probably being made there.
        Senator Manchin. No, I understand that. But I am just
    saying, you know, I have seen the headlines here and everything
    the Associated Press put out there. It has the pictures, if you
    will, of all the things we destroyed in there. Here is the
    final thing. It says that, to those who are there at that base,
    they said, ``What they are doing is a betrayal of Afghans. They
    should leave,'' said Mir. ``Like they have destroyed this
    vehicle, they have destroyed us.''
        I am just saying, it has not been a successful 20 years, so
    we are back where we started, I guess. But on top of that, to
    see the Americans' mindset of assets and value and cost and
    things of that sort, I just don't know if it is doing that--I
    guess it is the same as interrogation. If you are interrogating
    someone, do you think the brutality of interrogation or trying
    to get them to have a comfort level to talk? Everyone has a
    different approach, I am sure.
        This does not make any sense to me. It might above where
    you are. I do not want to put you in a position that causes a
    problem for your response, but I would like for everybody to
    think about that, because I tell you, it is something we should
    be thinking about, just for the sake of destroying something
    for what we have already invested in that area.
        Thank you both. I appreciate it.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator
    Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to each of you for your time to be here. Mr. McCord, I so
    enjoyed my conversation with you and talking about the Stennis
    Center and the work there. I enjoyed my time on their board.
        Mr. Moultrie, we have talked some about China and the China
    threat. You and I discussed that on the phone. As we look at
    the cyberattack that we are currently enduring, I guess you
    would say, I would like for you to talk a little bit about how
    you would go about assessing the China threat in the non-
    INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] AORs [areas of
    responsibility]. Because we know this is global. You and I
    discussed Djibouti and the Horn of Africa and the way China is
    trying to play there.
        So for the record, just a little bit about how you would
    handle that assessment in that non-INDOPACOM area.
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, the Chinese ambitions, as we
    discussed, are global, and they are using economic coercion,
    these initiatives, the Road and Belt Initiative, and other
    financial inducements, if I can call them that, that lure
    countries in. They use vaccine diplomacy and a number of other
    things to spread their influence.
        In terms of truly understanding how we ought to approach
    it, I think it is part academic, understanding the long-term
    goal of the Chinese. I have always said they play a long-term
    game. It is a society that is several thousand years old. They
    do not look at things necessarily the way we do.
        Senator Blackburn. Right. The hundred-year marathon.
        Mr. Moultrie. Exactly. That is exactly right.
        Senator Blackburn. So you would assess it more on a long
    term?
        Mr. Moultrie. I think that their ambitions are long- term
    ambitions.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. I appreciate that. Let me ask you
    this. As we look at what transpired with the cyberattack, and
    we have a lot of small and mid-sized businesses that are
    contractors, so as you work with them, what would be your
    advice, and how would we share information with them to protect
    themselves from attack, as they are contracting with our U.S.
    military?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. I think you are hitting upon a
    key point here. The defense industrial base is particularly
    under attack by nation states and hacktivists and others. My
    understanding is that the intelligence and security
    organization has programs that enable it to go out and work
    with thousands of contractors, to provide them with the
    standards that they need and provide them with the oversight
    that they need to protect themselves.
        I think that we have to continue to not only have those
    types of programs but the public-private partnerships that will
    enable us to share information with them, and the encouraging
    of these companies to understand the threat and to take good
    hygiene methods to protect themselves. If confirmed, I would
    devote myself to really pushing in that area, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Mr. McCord, part of this would
    come to you, and working with some of our suppliers, and in the
    work that you would do in the Comptroller's Office. There is a
    lot of technology that could be utilized within DOD and that
    structure to achieve efficiencies and to build out securities.
    But that means we have got to go outside of DOD to do this.
        So I would like for you, for the record, just to comment a
    little bit on achieving those efficiencies, and as you and I
    talked, I know we have talked a lot about the audit today, but
    the way we do purchasing and acquisitions is so broken. Having
    so many P-cards through the system, whether it is DOD or the
    VA, this leads to inefficiencies. So if you will just touch on
    this risk tolerance for utilizing new technologies and
    reforming the way we handle purchasing and acquisitions.
        Mr. McCord. Senator, thank you. Yes, the Department has
    both a large, as you know, acquisition workforce and a fairly
    large financial management workforce, at about 50,000 people.
    There are a lot of players with responsibilities up and down
    the chain, and I take your point and I agree with you that we
    should look at ways that we could streamline and maybe have
    purchasing be at higher levels, or more efficiently structured.
        We do have, for a variety of reasons, somewhat of a
    decentralized execution model in the Defense Department. Each
    state's National Guard has its own people responsible for its
    finances, for example. Every command has its own. That is
    something that, I agree, we should look at, whether modern
    technology allows us to streamline and centralize perhaps a
    little more, without losing the ability for someone on the
    ground to be able to raise their hand and solve a problem that
    they know about that somebody up here at headquarters does not.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, indeed, there is room for
    improvements, and we hope that when it comes to the financial
    management and also the purchasing and acquisitions we can see
    some of that improvement.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator
    Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses,
    thank you.
        Mr. Moultrie, the past year and a half has certainly
    reiterated the value of medical intelligence and the importance
    of expertise and the need to optimize our capabilities in that
    area. Some believe that the National Center for Medical
    Intelligence should be expanded and given increased visibility
    and influence. What are your thoughts on a potential expansion?
    Does that make sense to you, and if so, what should we be
    thinking about?
        Mr. Moultrie. Sir, I am not familiar with the expansion
    plans right now for the medical center. I do believe that
    intelligence can play a role in helping us understand threats
    and, to use a term that is used elsewhere, enabling us to
    defend forward against these threats, such as pandemics, that
    may originate in a location overseas and then migrate to the
    United States. But I am not familiar with the expansion of the
    center, as you laid that out, sir.
        Senator Peters. Well, very well. That may mean my next
    question may not make a lot of sense, because based on your
    understanding, while there are folks that have thought of
    reorganizing out of the DIA, but it sounds as if you are not as
    familiar with this unit to make a----
        Mr. Moultrie. I just have not been briefed on that,
    Senator. If confirmed, I would come back and give you my views
    on the expansion of that center and how that should be done.
        Senator Peters. Well, clearly medical intelligence is
    incredibly important, as we know, and so if confirmed, I would
    look forward to having an opportunity to sit down with you to
    discuss that further, and decide which is the best way to
    approach it.
        Mr. Moultrie, my next question is related to a GAO study
    that found that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Intelligence and Security is not well postured to assess
    effectiveness of the intelligence and security enterprises
    because it has, quote, ``not defined goals, desired outcomes,
    and performance metrics.'' All the while the office has taken
    on, as you know, many more responsibilities over the past
    several years.
        So my question to you is, in your view, is the office
    exceeding its capacity to effectively develop policy and also
    conduct oversight?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I have not been briefed on the
    specific metrics that exist in the office today and how those
    metrics are being collected, and more importantly, how they are
    being analyzed. So, if confirmed, I would need to come back and
    talk to you about that.
        I will say that the oversight of the intelligence and
    security policies and practices would be my top concern. We
    have to ensure that we have effective, efficient processes in
    place, and if confirmed, you have my commitment to focus on
    this area and report back to you with my findings.
        Senator Peters. Very well. Mr. McCord, having served in
    senior leadership positions at the Comptroller Office for over
    20 years, on the staff of the committee, you certainly are very
    qualified for this position. But my question is, how have you
    prepared for the addition of the former Chief Management
    Officer's duties, specifically those related to improving
    business processes?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, as you know, the authorization bill
    terminated that position. I think that was a reasonable
    judgment by the Congress that it was time to try something new.
    Deputy Secretary Norquist, then-Deputy Secretary Norquist, set
    up a structure on his way out, to leave for this administration
    to fall in on, of how he would propose to divide up those
    duties, and, as you say, many of those would come to the
    Comptroller organization.
        Should I be confirmed, one of my earliest tasks would be to
    sit down with Deputy Secretary Hicks, and as others are
    confirmed in that space, the CAPE Director, who has been
    nominated, and the Chief Information Officer I believe has not
    been nominated yet, all those players would have a role in the
    structure that Deputy Secretary Norquist left.
        We need to examine, you know, what Deputy Secretary Hicks
    wants to do moving forward. My focus would be on whatever stays
    with Comptroller is to make the Department more effective, and
    I think we have doubled down to the point of maybe overdoing it
    over the last decade on trying to focus only on efficiency and
    cutting billets. I think we need to focus more on outcomes and
    effectiveness. If that role stays with Comptroller, I would
    need, if confirmed, to hire a somewhat different type of
    workforce and move them over, if they have not left the
    Department, from the CMO office. The Comptroller has budget
    analysts, which are not exactly the same as the program
    managers and program analysts we would need.
        But I do look forward to working on that. I just would need
    to sit down with the Deputy Secretary and decide if she accepts
    or wants to modify the structure that Mr. Norquist left for us.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters, and for the
    benefit of my colleagues we have two votes scheduled to begin
    at 11:30, so I would ask if you could try your best to adhere
    to the 5-minute limit.
        Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thanks for your service, and congratulations on your
    nominations.
        Mr. McCord, I appreciated our discussion yesterday, and I
    know you have already talked about it, but I just want to
    reconfirm. You know, your work on the National Defense Strategy
    Commission I think is much appreciated. A lot of us have looked
    at the recommendations of that commission and have really
    guided us in a lot of what we have done here, in a bipartisan
    way, on the committee.
        As you know, that commission focused on a 3 to 5 percent
    annual increase, and you mentioned to me yesterday you
    generally agreed with that. Is that correct?
        Mr. McCord. That is correct, that the commission felt, that
    I was part of, that that was an appropriate range for the
    Mattis strategy.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I certainly hope that, if
    confirmed, and I think it is very likely you will be, that you
    can continue to press for that, within the building, within the
    administration. I worry, and I know a number of us worry, the
    Biden administration has a lot of internal and external forces
    that want to dramatically cut defense spending, and I think
    this is not the time, it is not the place. I will not help our
    country. Going back to the last term of Obama-Biden, when
    defense spending was slashed by 25 percent, what do you think
    happened to readiness during that time?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, as you recall, readiness took a severe
    hit when the sequester was imposed. It took the services years
    to sort of dig out of that $30-plus billion that we had to cut
    in just 6 months. The whole era of Budget Control Act, the sort
    of constraints of is the budget going to be up here, if
    sequester is not changed it is going to be down here, and then
    it would get negotiated in 2-year increments up to some number
    in between was a very suboptimal way to budget.
        Senator Sullivan. So I think it is good if you can commit
    to this committee to be a voice on that.
        You and I talked about this. I often give this book, and I
    am going to provide it to you here today, and we talked about
    it. This is a book by an Army officer called T.R. Fehrenbach,
    This Kind of War. Most of the senior military, uniformed
    leaders in the Pentagon will have read it. It is a cautionary
    tale about what happens when you dramatically cut defense
    spending, this time in terms of the Korean War, and thousands
    of young Americans were killed because we could not stop a
    third-world peasant army in 1950, the North Korean Army,
    because we were not ready.
        I would like you to have the book, take a look at it. But
    it is required reading in most services, and it talks about
    what happens when we are not ready. It is not just airplanes
    cannot fly. It is young Americans die, and we can never let
    that happen again. The Army talks about never again having what
    was called ``Task Force Smith.'' That was the first unit that
    went to Korea, and they were pretty much destroyed.
        Let me ask real quick again on the Arctic. You know, this
    committee, in a bipartisan way, has been very focused on our
    strategic interests there, the need to build up our forces
    there. The Secretary, Secretary Austin, the Deputy Secretary
    Hicks, have both committed to me, in their confirmations, to
    fully resource the new Arctic strategies that are coming from
    the services. Can I get your commitment on that as well.
        Mr. McCord. Yes, Senator. The Arctic has certainly elevated
    in importance in our thinking and in policy thinking. I would
    need to get more information in terms of how it has moved into
    a budgeting structure without a unified or sub-unified command,
    as most other ways that we focus have. But yes, I would fully
    support the strategies of the Secretary and the Deputy on the
    Arctic.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Mr. Moultrie, let me ask a question. This used to be so
    non-controversial that I would not even ask it. Now we are
    starting to get hesitation, kind of equivocating. The DIA
    official, when he was up for his confirmation a couple of weeks
    ago, in my view completely whiffed this question, which is a
    pretty much intel, National Security 101. Is it better for the
    United States' national security to be a major energy
    superpower? That means that we produce world record levels of
    oil, of gas, of renewables. We are now at that stage. Everybody
    used to say, ``Of course, Senator, a net exporter of energy is
    critical.'' What is your view on that?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I believe if the United States can
    lower its dependence in almost any area, then we are a more
    secure nation. So I may have rephrased your statement
    somewhat----
        Senator Sullivan. It is a good rephasing, I would say.
        Mr. Moultrie.--but that is the way I would look at it. We
    need to lower our dependencies across a number of areas and
    vectors.
        Senator Sullivan. Say, Russian oil? Lower dependency of
    Russian oil? Is that a good thing?
        Mr. Moultrie. I do not know what the ratio is today, but I
    would just say, in general, reducing dependencies as much as
    possible is important for our Nation.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Hawley,
    please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    both the witnesses for being here. Mr. Moultrie, let me just
    start with you. The National Geospace Intelligence Agency in my
    home state, Missouri, in St. Louis, is going to be home to many
    of the agency's most advance capabilities. We are very proud of
    that. How do you see this campus, and, more broadly, the NGA
    contributing to our efforts to maintain an intelligence
    advantage over China and Russia in the coming years?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, NGA plays a critical role, a
    critical role, and having campuses in different locations I
    think is important, for a lot of different reasons--to attract
    talent, for survivability reasons. There are just a number of
    reasons that we want to do that.
        I was somewhat familiar with that when I was in a few years
    ago and was energized by it. So, if confirmed, I would continue
    to support that. I think there are a number of benefits of
    having campuses in different locations.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you an ISR question.
    U.S. Central Command has regularly requested and received a
    preponderance of the Department's ISR [Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]. My own view is that is going
    to be hard to continue if we are going to be able to ensure
    that our forces in the Pacific and elsewhere have the ISR that
    they need to perform their critical missions.
        So let me just ask you, if you are confirmed, how will you
    ensure that CENTCOM [United States Central Command] uses its
    in-theater ISR as effectively as possible so that it can do
    more with what it has and some of those other assets, other ISR
    assets, can be given back for other uses?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, as you know, ISR, there is an
    insatiable appetite for ISR, across the commands. I am not
    familiar with the specific CENTCOM usage rate today, but if
    confirmed, you have my commitment to ensure that we are getting
    the ISR capabilities to satisfy the critical needs of the
    commanders who need that capability.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you about China and
    the situation with regard to Taiwan. Both DOD, the National
    Strategy Defense Commission, and others have been warning now
    for years about the growing threat of the Chinese fait
    accompli, with regard to Taiwan. One of the most important
    thing we need for deterring such an attack is timely indication
    and warning.
        If you are confirmed, how will you ensure that the
    President, the Department leadership, and our forces in PACOM
    have as much warning as possible before any attempted fait
    accompli on the part of Chinese forces?
        Mr. Moultrie. Senator, I think that the PACOM ability to do
    I&W [Intelligence and Warning] is just absolutely essential. I
    do not have the current laydown of the sensors that we have out
    there or the mechanisms for dissemination of real-time
    intelligence to the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] and others,
    but if confirmed, you would have my commitment to ensuring that
    the Defense Intelligence Center works with the DNI and others
    to look at what are laid out is across all the INTs to ensure
    that we can do that real- time indications, warning, and
    dissemination to the national command authority.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        Mr. McCord, let me ask you a little bit about the match
    between the Department strategy and the resources that are
    available to meet that strategy. My own concern is there
    appears to be a bit of a mismatch. On the one hand, we are
    withdrawing from Afghanistan, which will free up resources. I
    am 100 percent in favor of that. I think that is good. On the
    other hand, the administration has indicated that we will
    retain most, if not all of our other defense commitments, and
    in some instances actually plus-up those commitments. The
    administration has also told the Department to prioritize
    additional missions like climate change and biological defense,
    and it has done all of the above while effectively cutting
    defense spending.
        So my question is, what steps does the Department need to
    take in order to ensure that our strategic ends align with the
    means that are actually available to it?
        Mr. McCord. Senator, Secretary Austin is required, as all
    Secretaries are, by law, to develop a strategy, and I believe
    that effort is probably underway. If confirmed, I would look
    forward, as a senior leader, to being part of that review.
        You are exactly right that the balancing is very much a key
    to what DOD is always trying to do, because you can have a top
    priority, a second priority. People expect the Department of
    Defense to do many things well. Readiness, as Senator Sullivan
    was saying, you know, there is sort of a floor there where it
    is not appropriate to send people out who are not trained.
        So I think really the variables you need to look at the
    most are the size of the force. Do we have a force that is big
    enough to do what our strategy asks of it, but also not so big
    that we cannot afford to maintain it?
        On some areas like climate change, I am hopeful, not being
    inside right now, that that can be accomplished by making sure
    that, you know, if you are going to recapitalize your
    infrastructure you are doing it in the smartest way, and that
    it is not necessarily a big addition of resources. I agree with
    you that Afghanistan should free up some resources that can be
    redirected to other uses, but we have, as you say, many
    competing demands that need to be balanced.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. I have got another question or
    two for both of you. I will give those to you, though, for the
    record, because my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, and, of
    course, Ranking Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and,
    of course, to Mr. McCord and Mr. Moultrie for their willingness
    to serve and for being here today.
        So I would like to talk a little bit about, of course we
    know about the Solar Winds attack, we know we have an attack
    workforce shortage, and our civilian cyber reserve. So, Mr.
    Moultrie, some experts are calling the SolarWinds attacks on
    networks of multiple government agencies and private companies
    the greatest act of cyber espionage to date in our history. As
    a nation, as we continue to grapple with the aftermath of this
    attack, the United States is expected to face a shortage of
    about 3.4 million skilled technical workers by next year, with
    particularly large gaps in the cybersecurity area.
        So to address this shortfall and promote our cybersecurity
    workforce, Senator Blackburn and I recently introduced the
    Civilian Cybersecurity Reserve Act, to establish a civilian
    cyber reserve corps, modeled after a recommendation from the
    National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service
    report. According to the report, and I am going to quote, ``A
    reserve program that permits agencies to call up cybersecurity
    experts could ensure additional cyber capacity at times of
    greatest need.''
        So, Mr. Moultrie, of course in your written response to the
    committee you noted DOD's challenges in this area, competitive
    requirements that we need. So given your experience, could a
    civilian cyber reserve corps really boost up what you do,
    especially if we had people who are former military personnel
    in that cyber corps as well, and would you work with me to just
    be sure that we are able to address these issues?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator, I agree wholeheartedly with
    your premise that we are faced with a shortage in skills, our
    STEM skills, especially cybersecurity. Other agencies have
    reserves that they use. When individuals retire or individuals
    leave they can join that reserve, if you will.
        If confirmed, you have my commitment to working with you to
    explore this idea and to determine what we need to do to ensure
    that we have the skills that we need to support our needs
    across this and other areas.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, I want to actually build
    upon the tech area, cyber area, and really talk about another
    point. The DOD inspector general noted that one of the top
    management challenges we have is sustaining our technological
    dominance, specifically in the areas of artificial intelligence
    and machine learning. These fields can really transform the
    kinds of work that we do, the information and knowledge that we
    have, and harnessing this technology is going to require
    continued collaboration between DOD and, again, private
    industry.
        So, Mr. Moultrie, how would you guide DOD to continue to
    improve the public-private coordination in current and emergent
    technologies as AI becomes better and better, machine learning,
    all of those things?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator, as you know, much of the
    innovation that is done in a number of areas, including
    artificial intelligence and machine learning, is actually done
    in academia or it is done in the industrial base. We need to
    harness that. We need to ensure that we understand how it will
    change our future missions, and we need to understand how our
    adversaries will use it against us. So there is both a need to
    understand this so we can do our missions more effectively, and
    also to protect ourselves. If confirmed, I would work with the
    Director of National Intelligence and across the interagency to
    ensure that we are doing what we can to establish these public-
    private partnerships and to look at AI, ML [machine learning],
    and a number of other emerging technologies, Senator.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, you know, we think about
    building our workforce, we think about the public-private
    partnerships, and all of that, but then we also have to cyber-
    collaborate with our allies, as we see attacks and threats,
    threat-hunting, as we see all of this around the world. So this
    is going to help us collectively with our allies to harden our
    own resources.
        How would you enhance, Mr. Moultrie, our intelligence
    sharing and cooperation with our partners and allies around the
    world to execute, prevent, mitigate, recover from cyberattacks,
    and we just saw one on our pipelines this last week? They are
    going to keep coming, so we need to work with people around the
    world.
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. As you know, many of at least
    the detected cyberattacks that we see are coming from overseas
    locations, if you will. Our partners, our key allies and
    partners, actually in many instances are on the front end of
    detecting those, and they have tremendous expertise that can
    help us not only detect and analyze but also deter these
    threats. I believe that having those right coalition partners,
    having those right allies, and having those nation states that
    are allied with us to help us in this effort is absolutely
    critical, and you have my commitment to work with the DNI, and
    under the authorities granted to the Secretary of Defense, to
    build on the partnerships that we have, and if we need new
    ones, to explore new partnerships.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. My time has expired. I appreciate
    it.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me recognize
    Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McCord, I want to follow up a little bit on some of the
    discussion we had earlier about Defense Department audit,
    follow-up on Senator Kaine's question. I am not asking you to
    repeat something you have already gone through, so if that is
    the case and I was not in the room just please let me know.
        But as we all know, the Defense Department has the
    distinction of being the only Federal agency that is yet to
    pass an annual financial audit. I am a strong supporter of our
    national defense--we spoke about this yesterday--and our
    military has to have the resources it needs to defend against
    the threats we face and to maintain our competitive advantage.
    But we also must ensure that taxpayer funds are used as
    accountably and as effectively as possible. This was an issue
    that was really important to one of the former Armed Services
    Committee chairman, and the man whose term I was sworn in, in
    December, to complete, Senator John McCain.
        So, Mr. McCord, you have served in the Comptroller's Office
    before, and you understand these challenges. But I am looking
    for any other specifics that you might do or put into place to
    improve the Department's ability to pass an audit and ensure
    accountability to the taxpayer.
        Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I fully agree that
    this is an important effort for the Department to keep faith
    with the taxpayers. Over 40 percent of all individual tax
    receipts are consumed by the Department of Defense's budget, so
    it is a huge--I understand the responsibility we have to the
    taxpayer.
        The Department has made considerable progress in the last
    10 years, but unfortunately it is going to be a couple more
    before we get to that clean audit stage, that is the ultimate
    pass-fail, you know, mark on the wall. But as we have discussed
    throughout this hearing, I think, when we see, in particular,
    the cyberattacks and the importance of controlling your
    information, controlling access to your information, I think
    that is the key area I will be looking forward to, if
    confirmed, to getting with the staff and seeing how we can
    press on that particular area. Even though there are other
    areas we also need to look at to pass the audit, ultimately I
    think that is the key leverage point in my mind, is getting the
    controls right, because the auditors keep noticing that we have
    more work to do on that front.
        Senator Kelly. What do you envision as an optimistic
    timeline for getting this done?
        Mr. McCord. I understand that in testimony before the House
    Armed Services Committee within the last 2 or 3 weeks, the
    Department said 2027 or 2028 as their estimate. We did not have
    a timeline for a full Department audit when I left 4 years ago,
    so while I do not have the exact basis of the information that
    the Department used to come up with that figure, because it
    postdates my time with the Department, I would get with the
    audit staff very early, if confirmed, to assess what is the
    basis of that date and what can we do to try and move that to
    the left and accelerate it, if possible, and what are the key
    factors. Again, I think internal controls and information
    controls are, in my mind, the first thing I would want to look
    at.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Mr. Moultrie, I had the chance recently to visit the U.S.
    Army Intelligence Center of Excellence at Fort Huachuca in
    Arizona. I am proud that we are training some of the finest
    intelligence professionals there in my state. Our 309th
    Military Intelligence Battalion supports a range of critical
    career fields, from human intelligence and interpreters to
    ground surveillance radar techs, and has provided critical
    skill sets in operations across the globe, from El Salvador to
    Afghanistan and South Korea.
        Mr. Moultrie, as our Nation endures changing threats from
    near-peer competitors, can you speak to the importance of
    keeping our military intelligence capabilities sharp, and if
    confirmed, how will you ensure that military intelligence
    pipelines, like the Army Intelligence Center of Excellence,
    remain well-resourced and able to prepare our operators to
    address the range of emerging threats and technologies that
    they will face?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Senator. Our military intelligence
    capabilities are some of our longest-standing capabilities. You
    go back wars, if you will, and they are the foundation of the
    intelligence apparatus that we have today. So some of our
    Nation's best and brightest professionals have come from
    military intelligence, and they are the lifeline, if you will,
    of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
        If confirmed, you have my commitment to not only continue
    to work across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to groom and
    grow and to support these individuals and to support bases like
    Fort Huachuca and others, but also to do what I can to ensure
    that we are providing the pipeline to bring new people in, to
    get them trained so they can be the intelligence professionals
    of the future. You have my commitment, if confirmed, Senator,
    to do that.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your testimony today, which was quite thoughtful and
    convincing. Thank you also for your distinguished service to
    the country over many, many years. Thank you again for your
    willingness to serve again.
        I think it is only fitting, the final comment would be to
    once again to wish Mrs. Moultrie a happy 91st birthday.
        With that, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to The Honorable Michael J.
    McCord by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
                                 10 u.s.c. 135
        Question. Section 135 of title 10, U.S. Code, as implemented in
    Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5118.03, prescribes the duties
    and powers of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).
    Among such duties, the Under Secretary serves as the Department of
    Defense Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for purposes of sections 901-903
    of title 31, U.S. Code, and performs the duties assigned in section
    2222 of title 10.
        In your view, what are the duties and powers of the Under Secretary
    most critical to the national defense at this time?
        Answer. The duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller) are described in section 135 of title 10 and in Section
    902 of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act. It includes supporting
    the Secretary of Defense by advising on all financial management
    matters; overseeing the financial management activities of the
    Department to include establishing and supervising the execution of
    policies; developing and maintaining integrated agency accounting and
    financial management systems; supervising and directing the preparation
    of budget estimates of the Department of Defense; monitoring the
    financial execution of the budget including the approval of
    reprogramming requests for submission to the Congress; overseeing the
    preparation and submission of financial statements, and supporting the
    recruitment and training of the financial management workforce.
        The most critical duties to the national defense at this time are
    preparing the budget to ensure the Department has the resources to
    accomplish its mission and using the financial statement audits to
    drive improvements in the Department's financial management activities,
    systems and reports.
        Question. What do you believe are the most important duties and
    responsibilities of the CFO?
        Answer. By designating the USD (Comptroller) as the CFO of the
    Department of Defense this specifically incorporates the
    responsibilities identified in the CFO Act. I included those
    responsibilities in my description of the duties and functions of the
    Comptroller because they are interconnected. However, to the extent
    that some see the term Comptroller as primarily relating to the budget,
    the addition of the title CFO highlights and emphasizes the
    responsibilities for accounting, financial systems, and internal
    controls. I believe that a major responsibility of the CFO over the
    next several years is to support the audits of the services and defense
    agencies and to develop, implement and oversee an effective process of
    fixing issues identified during the audit.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you
    expect the Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in
    light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy (NDS)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense would
    require me to provide him expert and timely advice on all issues
    related to the budgetary and financial management of the Department. I
    also expect he would want me to ensure the men and women serving the
    Department of Defense would have the resources they need to support the
    President's National Defense Strategy. Finally, I believe the Secretary
    would expect the Comptroller and all senior DOD leaders to collaborate
    across their areas of specific statutory responsibility to provide him
    our best advice and to make the Department as effective as possible.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that your tenure as USD(C) fulfills the fundamental requirement for
    civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution
    and other laws?
        Answer. I believe in the bedrock American principle of civilian
    control of the military. That civilian control is central to the
    stability of our democracy. If confirmed, I will ensure this tenet is
    at the forefront of any internal or interagency interactions, and in
    engagements with the U.S. Congress. Although resources are obligated by
    both military and civilian personnel across the Department, the
    requirement for a Senate-confirmed Comptroller of the Department, and
    of the assistant secretaries for financial management of the military
    departments, ensures that the ultimate control of and responsibility
    for the expenditure of DOD resources rests with civilian leaders
    accountable to the President, the Secretary, and the Congress.
        Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
    assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would partner with the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Comptroller to ensure that the duties required
    of our office are met. The Deputy Comptroller should be capable at any
    time of carrying out the responsibilities of the Comptroller if
    necessary. Duties assigned to the Deputy, which would be determined
    based on her/his experience and skills, could include developing or
    overseeing plans for remediation of issues identified during the
    financial audit, or leadership of some management or performance
    improvement functions that may be newly assigned to the Comptroller
    organization. Finally, the Deputy might be assigned leadership of
    specific emerging projects that I cannot predict at this time, similar
    to my role in managing the Department's Recovery Act programs when I
    served as Deputy Comptroller.
        Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
    providing to the Secretary of Defense to enhance the efficiency and
    performance of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller) and the two Defense Agencies under the authority,
    direction, and control of the Under Secretary?
        Answer. I believe building and leading high performing teams
    requires excellent communication and transparency. If confirmed, I will
    emphasize these characteristics and will look for opportunities to
    improve the overall efficiency and performance of the Comptroller team
    to ensure we are as effective as possible. I would also look for
    opportunities to expand the progress and power of data analytics that
    the office has made in recent years.
                                 qualifications
        Question. Section 135 further provides that the USD(C) shall be
    appointed from among persons who have significant budget, financial
    management, or audit experience in complex organizations.
        What significant experience and education do you possess in the
    domains of budget, financial management, and/or the audit of complex
    organizations?
        Answer. I believe that my previous experience from 2009 to 2017 as
    the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) demonstrates my qualification for
    this position. I am intimately familiar with the budgetary and
    financial issues that pertain to the Department.
        I also served for 24 years in the legislative branch, including for
    21 years as a Professional Staff member of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee overseeing the DOD budget and providing expert analysis on
    issues such as funding overseas contingency operations, the fiscal
    impact of legislation, reprogramming of funds to meet emerging needs,
    questions of fiscal law and financial management, the analysis of
    alternative courses of action with respect to specific programs, and
    knowledge of the federal budget process.
        Question. In particular, what leadership and management experience
    do you possess that you would apply to your service as USD(C) if
    confirmed?
        Answer. I believe my previous leadership and management experience
    serving as the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Principal
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will allow me to once
    again be successful in this role.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and execute the
    powers of the USD(C)?
        Answer. Although I have previously served as the Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller), the vast breadth of the Department's programs
    and policies require me to constantly enhance my expertise as they
    relate to the Department's budget and financial management issues.
                                 relationships
        Question. Describe the relationship you would foster, if confirmed
    as the USD(C), with the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation, particularly in light of the independence and direct
    reporting relationships and responsibilities accorded to the Director
    in law.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate and work closely with the
    Director for Cost, Assessment and Program Evaluation in providing
    advice, assessments, and options to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.
    CAPE, Comptroller, and Policy have always been strong partners in the
    Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process and I do not
    expect that to change.
        Question. If confirmed, on what projects would you expect to
    collaborate with the Director?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director to ensure that
    a robust and successful program/budget review is conducted and that our
    programs are aligned with and managed in accordance with the Secretary
    and Deputy Secretary's guidance. I would, if confirmed, also expect to
    explore opportunities to improve the quality and consistency of our
    data for budget and cost accounting purposes, and, in concert with
    other senior leaders under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, to
    develop a plan to re-engineer the management and performance
    improvement functions that were formerly assigned to the Chief
    Management Officer.
        Question. Describe the relationships you would foster, if confirmed
    as the USD(C), with the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for
    Financial Management and the Military Department and Fourth Estate
    Budget Directors.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Assistant
    Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments and
    the Fourth Estate Budget Directors in the development and execution of
    budgetary matters, fiscal policy, and initiatives of the President and
    the Secretary of Defense. During my previous tenure as Comptroller, it
    was my practice to meet at least once each week with the Assistant
    Secretaries for Financial Management of the military departments to
    synchronize our efforts, and it would be my plan to continue that
    partnership if confirmed.
        Question. On what projects would you expect to collaborate with
    these officials?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Assistant
    Secretaries and Fourth Estate Budget Directors in contributing to the
    successful development and implementation of effective DOD policies and
    programs and management of the defense budget, to include development
    of the budget, execution reviews and reprogramming requests, management
    of our internal controls and financial audit efforts, and programs for
    the development of the financial management workforce.
        Question. Describe the relationship you would foster, if confirmed
    as the USD(C), with the Director of the Office of Management and
    Budget.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will, in coordination where appropriate
    with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, work very closely with the
    Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
    and with the Program Associate Director for National Security, and
    foster a relationship of cooperation and transparency.
        Question. If confirmed, on what projects would you expect to
    collaborate with the Director?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Office of Management
    and Budget on the preparation and execution of the Department's
    budgets, on reprogramming requests, on legislative requests, on the
    financial audit, and the advancement of both the Administration's and
    the Department's management priorities. I will work with the Director
    to assess the Department's topline requirements and ensure that the
    President's national security priorities are appropriately reflected in
    the annual budget request.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to develop and
    sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship between
    Congress--the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations
    Committees, in particular--and the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) and the Defense Agencies subject to
    your authority, direction, and control?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to working with the Armed
    Services and Appropriations committees to resolve any matter relating
    to the authorization or appropriation of the Department's funding. I
    will continue to respect the prerogatives of the Department's oversight
    committees, and will work closely with the committees, through open and
    honest communication, to achieve a consensus necessary to meet our
    defense needs.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What are the most significant challenges you would face
    if confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)?
        Answer. The USD (Comptroller) faces a number of ongoing challenges.
    The first is developing defense budgets that are consistent with the
    Department's mission of protecting the vital interests of the United
    States. The second challenge is the audit. The Department must use the
    audit to drive effective corrective action plans. The audit will
    provide a baseline of the current financial management status, and it
    will take time and consistent attention to implement the corrective
    actions necessary to achieve a clean opinion. The third challenge is to
    continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department.
    The fourth challenge is to continue workforce development. The
    Department's success with the budget, the audit and implementing
    reforms depends in large part on the skill set and experience of the
    DOD financial management workforce.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what management actions would
    you take, and in what order of priority, to address each of these
    challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and
    Deputy Secretary and other leaders across the Department and within the
    OUSD (Comptroller) to tackle these challenges head on. For the budget I
    would use the PPBE process as a means to develop and justify a defense
    budget that supports the President's and the Secretary's vision. For
    the audit I would begin by reviewing the status of existing DOD efforts
    to assess key leverage points that could be used to accelerate the
    process. On defense reform, I would look for ways to continue and
    expand the reform effort through the Comptroller organization.
    Developing and sustaining a professional financial management workforce
    is the foundation for meeting each of these challenges. DOD has a
    strong program already in place and I would look to build on that
    existing program.
                      2018 national defense strategy (nds)
        Question. The 2018 NDS outlines that the United States faces a
    rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue
    regimes and global terrorism.
        Are the programs and resources required to generate the
    capabilities necessary to implement the NDS properly prioritized in the
    DOD the budget?
        Answer. I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year 2022
    budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary to ensure all programs and resources are properly prioritized
    to support the President's strategy and manage advanced and persistent
    threats.
        Question. Are there areas in which the budget is not aligned with
    the NDS?
        Answer. I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year (FY)
    2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the alignment of the
    budget with the President's strategy and any new strategic guidance
    documents produced by the Adminstration.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you realign or refocus DOD
    programs and funding, if at all?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is preparing to
    initiate a National Defense Strategy review to ensure DOD's strategic
    priorities are properly aligned to the President's interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance. If confirmed, I intend to play an active
    role in the review and implementation of any necessary realignment of
    DOD resources.
        Question. Are we properly resourcing those capabilities that have
    been established since the release of the 2018 NDS (e.g., U.S. Space
    Force)?
        Answer. I have not yet been able to review the fiscal year (FY)
    2022 budget. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary to ensure proper resourcing of the capabilities that will
    determine our military and national security advantage in the future.
        Question. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you
    recommend to the Secretary of Defense regarding DOD's resourcing and
    implementation of the 2018 NDS?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to play an active role in the review
    and recommendation of any necessary resource revisions or adjustments
    required to implement the President's strategy.
        In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission
    recommended that Congress increase the base defense budget at an
    average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
        Question. Do you believe that 3-5% real budgetary growth through
    the FYDP is required to implement the 2018 NDS effectively? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. As the commission stated, that resource level was
    illustrative of what was needed for the 2018 NDS. Secretary Austin is
    required by law to update that strategy in the coming months. If
    confirmed, my goal will be to use the resources available to the
    Department wisely to realize the strategic aims of the Department as
    identified in Secretary Austin's review and ensure the Nation has the
    military technologies and capabilities to compete and win. Under any
    resourcing level, the Department must balance readiness, force
    structure, and modernization while pursuing savings through critical
    reviews of ongoing missions and activities, and the phasing out of
    systems and approaches developed for an earlier era.
        Question. Under the funding levels specified in the President's
    budget request for fiscal year 2022, does DOD have adequate resources
    to implement the 2018 NDS and other national defense priorities? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe budgets should match resources to strategic
    national priorities and must strive to maximize our capabilities. At
    the same time, budgets for any agency, including DOD, are subject to
    fiscal realities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and
    Deputy Secretary to set priorities and make hard choices to deter
    conflict and strengthen our competitive military edge. While I have not
    seen the specifics of the FY 2022 budget, which has not yet been
    released, I believe the Department should be able to carry out its
    missions with a properly balanced program at the announced funding
    level.
        Question. What types of resource shortfalls are likely to hamper
    DOD's execution of the 2018 NDS and other national defense priorities,
    in your view?
        Answer. There will always be fiscal constraints largely brought on
    by unforeseen events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the scope of
    the challenges we face, Congress and the Department will need to work
    together to make some hard choices.
        Question. In your opinion, in what areas of the implementation of
    the 2018 NDS is the Department taking the most risk in terms of
    resources allocated?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other senior DOD leaders to
    review the allocation of resources to help the Secretary ensure that
    resources are matched to strategic national priorities and will work
    with Congress to identify and mitigate risk.
        Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
    adequacy of DOD funding going forward?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the
    Department's funding by our ability to defend this Nation--to execute
    our chosen strategy, maintain the Nation's technological edge, preserve
    the health of the joint force, and provide options to the President
    that support his foreign policy and national defense goals.
     post-budget control act and the overseas contingency operations (oco)
                                    account
        Question. The FY 2022 budget request will be the first to be
    unconstrained by the statutory caps of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of
    2011. The use of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account has
    been debated for several years, primarily because OCO dollars were
    exempt from the caps of the BCA and some charged that DOD was using OCO
    as a ``slush fund'' for base budget requirements.
        What are your views about the use of the OCO account in the
    Department of Defense's annual budgeting?
        Answer. It is imperative that adequate resources are available to
    support U.S. troops deployed to combat or combat support locations
    around the world. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget has
    been a useful tool for the Department of Defense, and the Congress, to
    provide this critical funding in a transparent manner.
        Question. Should DOD continue to use the OCO account?
        Answer. It is my understanding, based on the Office of Management
    and Budget (OMB) Summary of the President's Discretionary Funding
    Request, dated April 9, 2021, that the Administration intends to
    discontinue requests for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as a
    separate funding category. I believe that this is appropriate, assuming
    an appropriate transfer of funding for enduring programs into the base
    budget. With the drawdown in troops from Afghanistan, the vast majority
    of remaining efforts will be enduring requirements and should fold into
    the base budget for better long-term planning.
        Question. If DOD continues to use the OCO account, will you commit,
    if confirmed, to update the guidelines regarding the budget items that
    may be covered by OCO, in accordance with section 1524 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2018?
        Answer. It is my understanding, based on the Office of Management
    and Budget (OMB) Summary of the President's Discretionary Funding
    Request, dated April 9, 2021, that the Administration intends to
    discontinue requests for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as a
    separate funding category. If confirmed, however, I would look forward
    to working with the congressional defense oversight committees and the
    OMB to support discussions on funding criteria for current or future
    contingencies.
        Question. How should the Department seek to account for its
    supplemental or emergency budgetary needs and how should the Department
    identify and account for conflict-related funding?
        Answer. It is important that the Department of Defense (DOD) retain
    some budget flexibility to deal with unforeseen or emergent needs,
    especially given the uncertainty of world events. If confirmed, I will
    work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that we have
    adequate funding tools to support U.S. troops and DOD missions
    worldwide. Ultimately the Department can only address such needs with
    the support of Congress.
        Question. In addition to passing spending bills on time, what more
    can Congress do, in your view, to afford DOD the resource stability and
    flexibility it needs?
        Answer. Beyond the significant budgetary challenges that repeated
    and lengthy continuing resolutions create for the Department, timely
    congressional review and approval of reprogramming requests and funding
    notifications is critical to the Department's operations. In addition,
    it is important that the Congress provides an adequate level of general
    transfer authority, especially with the elimination of the OCO account
    and the likely elimination of the special transfer authority. This
    transfer authority provides critical budget flexibility to deal with
    emergent needs without requiring additional resources.
        Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
    later than 10 days after the President's submission of the defense
    budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander must
    submit to the congressional defense committees a report that lists his
    or her unfunded priorities, including military construction projects.
        If confirmed, would you support the Service Chiefs and Combatant
    Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities lists to Congress in
    a timely manner?
        Answer. Yes, I would support the submission of unfunded priorities
    lists as required by law.
        Question. If confirmed, would you ensure adherence to the
    restrictions placed upon the National Guard unfunded priorities list as
    specified in Section 1006 of the NDAA for FY 2021?
        Answer. Yes, I would recommend the Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau follow the law.
                              anti-deficiency act
        Question. The USD(C) is charged to maintain effective control and
    accountability over the use of all financial resources of the
    Department. Such responsibilities necessarily include ensuring DOD-wide
    compliance with the laws and regulations governing the obligation and
    expenditure of federal funds. On April 27, 2020, the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) submitted to the Senate its compilation of
    Anti-deficiency Act (ADA) reports submitted by federal agencies for FY
    2019. The ADA prohibits federal agencies from obligating or expending
    federal funds in advance or in excess of an appropriation, and from
    accepting voluntary services. The GAO report for FY 2019 comprised nine
    reports of ADA violations, four of which derived from DOD.
        What is your level of confidence that DOD has in place the policies
    and procedures to ensure the identification of all potential ADA
    violations?
        Answer. I am confident that DOD has robust policies and procedures
    to ensure the defense agencies and military departments can detect
    potential ADA violations, however I believe all processes can benefit
    from ongoing reviews.
        Question. What are your ideas for better preventing ADA violations
    from occurring in DOD and for identifying, and correcting them sooner?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department includes a full
    understanding of the requirements of the ADA as a focus area during
    annual reviews and financial manager training, with an emphasis on
    promptly and accurately recording obligations.
        10 u.s.c. 2222--improvement and integration of performance and
                             financial information
        Question. Earlier this year, GAO again designated DOD's business
    systems modernization program and DOD Financial Management operations
    as ``high risk.''
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to improve
    financial management systems so that GAO can remove them from the
    ``high risk'' category during your term in office?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts focused on
    streamlining and simplifying our IT environment. By consolidating
    systems into a modern IT environment supported by streamlined
    processes, the Department will reduce hours spent on manual processes
    and rework, better visibility to funds execution, and have the ability
    to accurately portray its financial position. I have not yet been able
    to review the latest state of the Department's financial management
    systems but, if confirmed, I will take the necessary steps to review
    and improve them.
        Question. DOD still lacks consistent financial data elements and
    definitions that would enable it to accurately compile data across the
    Department and compare costs across different programs and
    organizations. Critical information on program performance is
    maintained in one-off local systems that do not feed into the
    Department's official records.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to establish a common,
    enterprise-wide ``dictionary'' of financial data elements and their
    definitions to be applied across DOD?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will promote the use and refinement of the
    Standard Financial Information structure (SFIS) across the Department.
    SFIS is intended to standardize financial reporting and enable revenues
    and expenses to be reported by programs that align with major goals,
    rather than basing reporting only on appropriation categories.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take or direct to
    link financial data and information to performance monitoring and
    measurement mechanisms, so as to enable improved decision making about
    the Department's programs and investments?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will promote the use of SFIS as a key
    enabler of linking financial data with performance monitoring,
    encourage the components to manage their balance sheet as one of their
    key metrics, and expand the use of data analytics.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that,
    as appropriate, timely access to all financial datasets is provided to
    all components of the DOD?
        Answer. Ensuring that timely access to all financial datasets is
    provided to all Components of the DOD will be one of the primary
    benefits of our system standardization and consolidation initiatives.
    If confirmed, I will review what actions, if any may be necessary to
    support these efforts.
        Question. In your view, what specific actions are required to
    implement consistent accounting approaches across DOD, with a view to
    enabling the assignment of ``whole of Department'' costs to programs
    and organizations, and to setting accurate prices for reimbursable
    activities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage Components to directly trace
    and report the full costs of outputs wherever feasible and practical.
    This will require Components to improve their ability to account for
    interdepartmental costs and transactions. A shift toward automation in
    reconciliations will be necessary as opposed to tedious and resource-
    intensive manual reconciliations.
                         audit and financial management
        Question. 2020 was the 30th anniversary of the passage of the Chief
    Financial Officer's Act, which mandated that federal agencies complete
    financial audits. DOD is the only federal agency unable to complete a
    financial audit in accordance with the law, despite having invested
    billions of dollars over the past decades to do so. In FY 2020, DOD
    completed a comprehensive audit and received a Disclaimer of Opinion.
        In your view, how, if at all, do the audit and its remediation
    activities support the 2018 NDS?
        Answer. The audit and its remediation activities highlight and
    validate areas for improvement in DOD's internal controls and
    processes. As the DOD remediates audit findings and improves its
    overall financial management processes and information, decision makers
    will have better access to reliable and timely information. If
    confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in the DOD to use one source
    of financial data for both financial statement preparation and
    investment decision making. This will emphasize the importance of
    reliable financial information and will directly link performance and
    financial management.
        Question. What challenges are unique to conducting an audit of DOD?
        Answer. The size and complexity of DOD affects the timeliness in
    which we are able to get to a clean audit opinion. DOD is larger, in
    terms of assets and resources, than any organization which has gotten a
    clean audit opinion. The Department's mix of classified and
    unclassified transactions and multiplicity of ``feeder'' systems that
    contain information auditors need to verify have also been challenges.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to overcome those
    challenges to ensure that the Department continues to make demonstrable
    progress towards a clean audit opinion?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working to use the notices
    of findings and recommendations (NFRs) to target, track and hold the
    appropriate individuals accountable for the timely implementation of
    corrective action plans. I will direct my leadership team to track and
    analyze audit findings by Component, as they are issued, and to closely
    monitor metrics to quantify our progress and assess remaining levels of
    effort to receive a positive opinion.
        Question. How would you characterize the progress made since the
    change in strategy to begin audits despite the Department not being
    audit-ready?
        Answer. I believe the progress being made is encouraging. However,
    we still have a lot of work to do collectively as a Department. If
    confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to undergo full
    financial statement audits and uses auditor feedback to identify areas
    that need corrective actions or further audit remediation work.
        Question. In what year do you expect the Department as a whole to
    receive a modified audit opinion?
        Answer. At this point, I can't say, but if confirmed, I will ensure
    the Department has actionable and achievable plans in place to keep
    making progress toward an audit opinion.
        Question. In what year do you expect the Department as a whole to
    receive an unmodified audit opinion?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to this process and work
    to implement practical and pragmatic corrective action plans for the
    financial management and operations of the Department. The changes
    required are complex and we fully expect that progress will steadily
    continue.
        Question. What metrics should the Congress be tracking to monitor
    the continuous progress of the Department towards achieving an
    unmodified audit opinion?
        Answer. Congress can track the following metrics to monitor
    progress toward DOD achieving an unmodified opinion:
          Resolution or downgrade of prior year material
    weaknesses.
          Closure of notices of findings and recommendations (NFRs)
    identified as contributing to material weaknesses.
          Composition of NFRs by Component in regards to new versus
    reissued.
          Status of Component audit opinion progression on a year-
    over-year basis
        Question. If confirmed, would you direct the Military Services,
    Defense Agencies, and Field Activities to develop their own individual
    schedules for achieving a clean audit for their own organizations and
    metrics to track their progress towards that goal?
        Answer. Each reporting entity under standalone audit with a
    disclaimer audit opinion is maintaining an audit roadmap. Each audit
    roadmap details corrective action completion dates by fiscal year and
    financial statement line item or audit focus area. If confirmed, I will
    continue to utilize these roadmaps to track progress by Component
    toward significant milestones and hold the appropriate individuals
    accountable for the achievement of these milestones in a timely manner.
        Question. If so, what would you do to ensure compliance with your
    directive?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with the
    Military Service Secretaries and Component leadership to review audit
    finding metrics and progress toward the development, implementation and
    auditor validation of closure of these findings
        Question. In your view, what incentives need to be in place to
    ensure senior leaders in each DOD Component--not only the financial
    management community--are fully invested and engaged in the process of
    achieving a clean audit opinion?
        Answer. It would be very valuable to have a range of tools and
    incentives in place to build and sustain senior leadership support and
    accountability for achieving a clean audit opinion. I am not aware of
    all the tools currently in use in the Department or how effective they
    are. Should I be confirmed, I would make it a priority to examine these
    options and provide my recommendations to the Committee. Having senior
    executive performance plans depend in part on audit efforts has been
    one such tool that should be reviewed.
        Question. Are those incentives currently in place in the
    Department?
        Answer. I am not aware of all the tools currently available to the
    Department or how effective they are. Should I be confirmed, I would
    make it a priority to examine these options and provide my
    recommendations to the Committee.
        Question. What disincentives or structural impediments, if any,
    preclude or hamper such senior leader engagement, in your view, and
    what can be done to eliminate such impediments?
        Answer. I am not currently aware of any specific structural
    impediments. However, senior leaders in the Department always have many
    competing priorities for their time and attention, and as with any
    large, complex organization, there is always the risk of certain
    capabilities or solutions becoming siloed, but I believe our financial
    reporting, property and IT functional councils will continue to play an
    effective role in encouraging cross-cutting solutions and breaking down
    organizational silos. If confirmed, I will look to eliminate any
    impediments to senior leader engagement.
        Question. Specifically, what measures should be used to hold senior
    leaders accountable if they do not meet statutory deadlines for DOD
    auditability?
        Answer. Audit metrics intended to track audit opinion progression
    can be used to hold senior personnel accountable in future performance
    evaluations. I think you can and should expect to see significant
    progress toward addressing and resolving audit findings from previous
    years.
        USD(C) leads the ADVANA (Advanced Analytics) effort for the entire
    Department of Defense. This effort, begun in support of the audit, has
    made significant progress in moving the Department toward modern data
    management practices.
        Question. What do you view as the main challenges and opportunities
    in moving toward improved usage of data in decision-making?
        Answer. Among the data challenges that the Department needs to
    address is the fact that the Department has old systems that make it
    difficult to access data of good quality in a timely manner, and the
    DOD has a ways to go in cultivating a data culture that attracts the
    right skills. If confirmed, I will be working with the DOD CIO, CDO,
    and other senior leaders to implement the DOD Data Strategy in order
    address these challenges. It is my understanding that the Department is
    making progress and I look forward to engaging directly to help build
    on that progress.
        Question. How do you view the relationship between USD(C) and the
    DOD Chief Data Officer in managing ADVANA?
        Answer. As I understand it, the roles of the CDO and USD(C) are
    complementary and critical to implementing the DOD Data Strategy. Both
    offices share a clear focus on improving the Department's use of data
    to drive better decisions and outcomes. The CDO provides the strategy,
    policy, and guidance for data management practices. The USD(C) is the
    primary lead for the financial statement audit, and the Department has
    seen success in using the audit as a lever for operationalizing good
    enterprise data management. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to
    ensure we are leveraging both the USD(C) and CDO's skills and missions
    to promote the use of data and analytics across the Department.
        Some commentators have asserted that efforts to achieve a clean
    audit opinion on DOD financial statements may be not be the best use of
    limited resources in a time of constrained budgets.
        Question. Do you agree with this assertion? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. The value of the audit is not so much in DOD being able to
    say it has a clean audit opinion, but in the audit recommendations that
    bring insight into how the Department can improve its operations. The
    audit can improve the Department's operations on many levels--in the
    form of more reliable information for decision-making, improved
    inventory management, and cybersecurity. With time, I expect that the
    value and contributions that flow from the audit will grow.
       the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (ppbe) process
        Question. In 1961, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
    created the framework of the current PPBE process. As the core decision
    making process by which DOD decides how and on what it spends its
    money, the PPBE process operates to connect strategic objectives with
    resources. The USD(C) is charged to administer and provide analysis for
    the budgeting and execution phases of DOD's PPBE process, as well as to
    make recommendations on matters relating to the planning and
    programming phases of the PPBE process.
        Do you believe the current PPBE process is adequately connected to
    implementation of the 2018 NDS?
        Answer. PPBE, if implemented as envisioned, allows for a strategy
    driven and structured approach to ultimately building a budget that
    aligns with the Department's strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure
    OUSDC continually emphasizes and assesses NDS alignment throughout the
    PPBE interactions.
        Question. In your view, do the DOD Components (particularly OSD)
    have the human and automated analytic decision support capability and
    capacity to facilitate informed strategic decision making in a relevant
    timeframe?
        Answer. DOD has a very experienced, dedicated workforce capable of
    facilitating informed strategic decision making. If confirmed, I will
    make it a priority to ensure we are leveraging both the skills and
    missions to promote the use of data and analytics to improve and
    accelerate the decision making process across the Department.
        Question. Do you believe that the PPBE process accords too much
    weight to Military Service priorities, rather than to Departmental
    priorities?
        Answer. I believe PPBE allows for an appropriate balance of all
    stakeholder views. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the future joint
    requirements are assessed and considered for funding.
        Question. In your view, are Combatant Commanders' priorities
    adequately reflected in the PPBE process?
        Answer. Combatant Commanders, in general, do not control resources
    in the PPBE process the way the military services do, so their roles
    are significantly different. That said, all parties have a voice and
    the opportunity to participate, and Combatant Commander priorities are
    afforded ample opportunity to influence the Service and Department-
    level PPBE development process.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes would you make, if any, to the
    PPBE process to improve both resourcing decisions within DOD and
    information flow about those decisions to the Congress?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Deputy
    Secretary and other Department leaders to ensure that the PPBE process
    aligns resources to the defense strategy. This includes identifying
    analytically-informed strategic choices about the size and shape of the
    future force. Communication with Congress is critical to ensuring our
    Nation's defense needs are met. If confirmed, I will review the
    Department's communication process on budgetary decisions with the
    intent to ensure information flow to the Congress is both timely and
    effective.
        Question. In your view, is there value in the Department, the
    Congress, or an independent commission conducting a holistic review and
    reform of the PPBE process? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The PPBE process provides an effective, neutral, and open
    framework to allow the leadership of the Department to make well-
    informed choices about resource allocation in support of the
    Department's strategic priorities. I am committed to ensuring this
    process works effectively and, if confirmed, will seek to make any
    necessary adjustments to meet the Nation's defense needs. I would look
    forward, if confirmed, to working with the congressional defense
    committees or others to review the PPBE process for potential
    improvements.
        Some commentators have observed that in matters related to the
    realignment of strategic objectives with resources via the PPBE
    process, DOD's size, structure, and culture favor the ``status quo.''
        Question. Do you agree with this assessment? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. In my experience, the PPBE process demands rigor in program
    decisions, which may require time to accomplish. However, over time the
    Department can shift resources toward strategic ends. The Department
    must also closely work with Congress to gain support for the proposed
    strategic shifts in resources. Any tendency to favor the status quo is,
    in my view, not specific to or a direct result of the PPBE process.
        Question. Can the PPBE cycle iterate fast enough to respond to
    changes in strategic or programmatic direction, in your view? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe the PPBE process is flexible enough to react to
    changing strategic or programmatic direction. Leadership priorities and
    attention are essential to full implementation of strategic direction.
    I also believe it's important to have a rigorous assessment of options
    and analytic underpinning for strategic shifts. The PPBE process is
    only the internal portion of the larger federal budget process and any
    analysis of the speed or efficacy of our budget process should, in my
    view, look at all parts of the budget process.
        Question. In your view, is the PPBE process flexible enough to
    enable DOD to make programmatic changes within the annual budget cycle?
        Answer. Yes, the PPBE process is flexible enough to react to urgent
    programmatic changes within the budget cycle. However, the greater the
    change being contemplated, the more of a challenge implementing that
    change will be, in both the internal (PPBE) and congressional review
    phases of the budget process.
        Question. In your view, would DOD benefit, particularly in relation
    to implementation of the NDS, if the obligation availability of
    Operation and Maintenance funds were changed? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. Yes, I think extending the availability of some portion of
    Operation and Maintenance funds would provide additional flexibility to
    deal with emergent requirements at the start of a new fiscal year as
    well as the loss of funds resulting from operational changes late in a
    fiscal year. In addition, this may help in eliminating the ``use it or
    lose it'' mind set and result in better decisions by financial managers
    throughout the year.
        Question. Given the frequency of continuing resolutions, at least
    for some part of each fiscal year, would DOD benefit from the authority
    to ``carryover'' some percentage of Operation and Maintenance funds
    from year to year?
        Answer. Yes, it's my understanding that some domestic agencies have
    authority to keep up to 50 percent of unobligated Operation and
    Maintenance balances available for an additional fiscal year, and this
    would certainly be beneficial to the DOD.
        Question. Are there other flexibilities of this sort for other
    appropriations that you would recommend?
        Answer. Flexibility would also be useful for portions of the
    military personnel appropriations such as permanent change of station
    (PCS) moves, which peak in the last quarter of the fiscal year (summer
    months) and are frequently impacted by unforeseen operational changes.
    Some similar carryover authority might also be beneficial with respect
    to the costs of reserve component drill costs, which can sometimes be
    difficult to predict precisely. If confirmed, I look forward to
    discussing recommended flexibilities with the Defense Committees.
        Question. Nearly a decade ago, Congress changed the Department of
    Veterans Affairs health care budget to comprise both regular current-
    year and advance appropriations.
        In your view, would DOD benefit in moving to a similar system for
    at least some portion of the defense budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would want to consult with appropriate
    financial managers in the Department of Veterans Affairs to learn their
    assessment of the impact of this change. If VA can show clear
    advantages, then DOD might well benefit in moving to a similar system
    for the Defense Health Program portion of the budget.
        Question. If so, which portion(s) of the budget would be best
    suited to such an approach, and why?
        Answer. The Defense Health Program budget is the best suited to
    such an approach. Much like the VA health appropriation, DOD produces
    health care through organic clinics and hospitals as well as the
    private sector health care network. Health care demand can vary widely
    from year-to-year and allocating single year discretionary funding for
    health care often places significant risk on non-health defense
    priorities to ensure DOD can continue to deliver care. Use of
    ``advanced appropriations'' similar to the VA process that estimates
    health care requirements for the following two fiscal years, would
    allow DOD to spread the risk for health care delivery across multiple
    fiscal years while more efficiently using resources for both health and
    non-health defense priorities.
                     the dod financial management workforce
        Question. The USD(C) is charged to provide guidance and oversight
    of the recruiting, retention, training, and professional development of
    the DOD financial management workforce.
        If confirmed, how would you assess the quality of the DOD financial
    management workforce?
        Answer. It is hard to know from outside the organization. However,
    should I be confirmed, I will be uniquely positioned to assess the
    quality of the DOD financial management workforce by evaluating
    improvements in auditability and associated processes since I last held
    the position, and by evaluating the status of the Department's
    financial management workforce development program, which should now be
    at an appropriate level of maturity to judge its efficacy. Reviewing
    such metrics, audit results, and major program improvements will
    provide a sense of overall capability.
        Question. How can the DOD financial management workforce best be
    developed?
        Answer. It is important to maintain an agile and responsive DOD
    financial management workforce capable of meeting tomorrow's mission.
    If confirmed, I hope to accomplish this with regular requirement scans
    and workforce health assessments to identify capability and skill gaps,
    as well as to stay ahead of emergent workforce trends. Ensuring access
    to the right tools and resources (to include training, professional
    development, networking and collaboration) will better enable the DOD
    FM workforce to fill capability gaps and reach individual and
    organization goals.
        Question. What role can exchange programs with industry or
    partnerships with educational institutions play in developing the DOD
    financial management workforce?
        Answer. I believe that exchange programs with industry or
    partnerships with educational institutions can play a beneficial role
    in developing the DOD financial management workforce. Exposure to
    industry and academic institutions increases innovation, thought
    leadership, and collaboration, allowing DOD participants to test new
    concepts/approaches and return to DOD as improved critical thinkers and
    innovative problem solvers.
        Question. Is the DOD financial management workforce properly sized,
    in your view?
        Answer. I cannot say at this point, however, if confirmed, I will
    be uniquely positioned to assess the size of the DOD financial
    management workforce and determine if there are any efficiencies to be
    gained through automation and process improvements.
        Question. Does the DOD financial management workforce have the
    appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly
    distributed, in your view?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess whether the financial
    management workforce has the appropriate capabilities, and work with
    the Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the military
    departments to ensure that those capabilities are distributed properly
    in order to meet mission requirements. I believe ongoing evaluation
    will be necessary to identify emergent trends and deficiencies.
        Question. What else would you do, if confirmed, to improve the
    capacity and capability of the DOD financial management workforce?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the capacity and capability of
    the DOD financial management workforce and of its workforce development
    programs. I will look for any lessons learned during the pandemic and
    review current processes and available technology to identify
    efficiencies to be gained through automation.
        Question. Do you believe the OUSD(C) and the DOD financial
    management workforce have the capability and capacity to assume the
    additional duties assigned to them by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense
    Norquist after the statutory dissolution of the Chief Management
    Officer? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand Deputy Secretary Hicks has begun or will soon
    begin a review of those initial decisions and assess the best placement
    of all OCMO functions. If confirmed, I will be prepared to participate
    in those deliberations. Depending on which, if any, of such management
    functions were assigned to the Comptroller organization, I believe
    additional personnel with different skill sets, such as program
    management rather than budget analysis backgrounds, might need to be
    hired or transferred to the Comptroller organization.
        Question. When you were last serving as the USD(C), the Department
    created a new professional certification process for the DOD financial
    management workforce.
        In your judgement, how does the financial management certification
    program improve the Department's ability to produce a professional and
    capable financial management workforce?
        Answer. In my judgement, the DOD Financial Management Certification
    Program improves the Department's ability to produce a professional and
    capable financial management (FM) workforce by ensuring the proficiency
    baseline necessary to maintain a competent and ready FM workforce, and
    establishes a framework to guide DOD FM professional development. It
    provides a consistent, disciplined approach to ensure appropriate
    training in key areas such as DOD audit and remediation, fiscal law,
    and ethics.
        Question. What performance metrics associated with the financial
    management certification program demonstrate the program's
    effectiveness and utility?
        Answer. As I understand it, the Department has metrics in place to
    measure the percentage of the financial management (FM) workforce who
    are compliant in their certification and continuing education and that
    metric is part of the Department's annual performance plan. If
    confirmed, I will review the current performance indicators and
    determine if there are initiatives we can pursue to increase the
    utility of the program.
        Question. How does the DOD financial management certification
    compare to other government financial management credentials (e.g.,
    Certified Defense Financial Manager)?
        Answer. The mission of the FM Certification Program is to develop
    and maintain a competent FM workforce with the baseline knowledge,
    skills, abilities, and behaviors necessary to successfully perform FM
    occupational functions. DOD's internal program was intended to
    complement, not replace or displace, the CDFM program. If confirmed, I
    would review the degree to which these programs overlap or complement
    each other.
                                defense agencies
        The USD(C) is charged to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency,
    economy, and performance of the Defense Agencies subject to the Under
    Secretary's authority, direction, and control, and is accountable to
    the Secretary of Defense for the mission performance of such agencies.
                      defense contract audit agency (dcaa)
        Question. What have been some of the successes (especially in terms
    of savings to DOD and the taxpayer) from the work of DCAA?
        Answer. DCAA's role in the financial oversight of government
    contracts is critical to ensure the Department and the Nation get the
    best value for every dollar spent on defense contracting. Its work
    benefits our men and women in uniform, as well as the American
    taxpayer. I believe DCAA provides examples of the savings to the
    taxpayers and other achievements in their annual report.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve DCAA's
    ability to execute its designated missions?
        Answer. DCAA's primary function is to conduct contract audits and
    related financial services. If confirmed, I will support DCAA's efforts
    to execute its designated missions, including increasing collaboration
    with customers and industry, as well as efforts to provide value added
    information through comprehensive analysis of their individual audits.
    The timeliness of DCAA's contract audits would also be an area I would
    review if confirmed.
        Question. If confirmed, what new investments in technology,
    training, and workforce would you recommend to improve the
    effectiveness and efficiency of DCAA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage and support any on-going
    DCAA technology, training and workforce initiatives that will help
    improve auditor efficiency and effectiveness.
                                      dfas
        Question. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) was
    established to consolidate finance and accounting functions previously
    performed by the Military Services.
        In your view, does DFAS continue to add value to DOD-wide financial
    management and accounting systems and processes? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. DOD established DFAS in 1991 to consolidate, standardize,
    and integrate finance and accounting functions within the DOD to create
    efficiencies. I believe they have a solid history of adding value to
    DOD-wide financial management and continue to envision, lead and add
    value.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve DFAS's
    ability to execute its designated missions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would enable an environment in which DFAS
    could continue to drive standardization across the Department. I will
    review DFAS's ongoing work with the components to address the issues
    that drive the need for manual input and error correction at the
    functional source. Standardization in the data delivered to DFAS is
    recognized as a critical component of the Department's ability to
    automate its financial reporting and improve its audit position.
        Question. If confirmed, what new investments in technology,
    training, and workforce would you recommend to improve the
    effectiveness and efficiency of DFAS?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with DFAS leadership, and
    consult with DFAS customers across the Department, in order to review
    what opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DFAS
    are in line with the NDS and possible within fiscal constraints and
    competing priorities. Amplified use of data analytics and technology
    tools such as robotics and artificial intelligence to increase
    automation of transaction processing and the delivery of business
    insights are some potential areas to consider to effectively manage the
    Department's resources.
                             working capital funds
        Question. More than two decades ago, DOD created several working
    capital funds as part of an effort to streamline defense business
    processes.
        What do you perceive to be the value of working capital funds?
        Answer. Working capital funds (WCFs), especially when used in
    concert with policies that provide DOD customers with the full cost of
    goods or services provided by WCF activities, help facilitate a cost-
    conscious culture, imparting a corporate view across the department,
    enabling a more efficient optimization of limited resources. They act
    as a ``shock absorber'' to minimize the impact of demand and cost
    variations to the customers, allowing for price stability in the year
    of execution. WCFs allow for purchase of supply items in advance of
    customer need, enabling supply activities to have the right parts on
    the shelf in the right quantities when the customers need them. They
    are easily scalable to changes in the DOD's operating requirements.
    They allow for economies of scale, spreading overhead costs over the
    entire customer base.
        Question. If confirmed, would you consider any reforms to, or
    expansion of, existing working capital funds?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my team, DOD
    leadership, OMB, and Congress to determine if any reforms to or
    expansion of working capital funds would benefit the Secretary's and
    the Administration's priorities.
        Question. Are there other defense business operations that would
    benefit from the creation of a new working capital fund to promote
    operational efficiency or cost savings?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with my team, DOD
    leadership, OMB, and Congress to determine if any business areas not
    already in the WCF regime would benefit from the value proposition
    stated previously.
                                 reprogramming
        Question. If confirmed, do you commit to follow the well-
    established precedent to wait for ``4-way'' congressional approval
    before transferring funds between appropriations accounts or
    reprogramming funding above the threshold established in enacted
    appropriations bills?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. What is your view of the efficacy of the current transfer
    and reprogramming process?
        Answer. Throughout my previous service with the Department, the
    Department used reprogramming actions to address the highest priority
    emerging requirements, and no prior approval reprogramming action was
    implemented unless and until all of the congressional defense
    committees approved the Department's request. In my view, this well-
    established process, although sometimes lengthy in certain cases, met
    the needs of the Department and the Congress. If confirmed, I will
    scrupulously ensure that the Department abides by its longstanding
    agreements with the congressional defense committees, which are
    designed to preserve Congress' oversight of the appropriations process
    and the Department's financial management.
        Question. Do the dollar thresholds associated with the
    reprogramming process remain appropriate in the current day? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. Over the years, Congress has reduced the Below Threshold
    Reprogramming (BTR) amount thresholds for some appropriation accounts.
    This has restricted the Department's flexibility and has increased the
    volume of Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) actions that are
    submitted to the Congress for their prior approval. If confirmed, I
    will review this topic with the staff and then come back to the
    Congress if I believe any changes are warranted. I believe some changes
    are probably warranted.
        Question. In your view, how might the reprogramming process be
    improved to meet DOD's need for flexibility, while maintaining trust
    and transparency with Congress?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current process and provide
    any recommendations.
                management headquarters activities (mha) report
        Question. On June 20, 2019, the Department submitted the report
    required by section 931 of the NDAA for FY 2019, certifying the average
    percentage of amounts authorized to be appropriated during the 10
    fiscal years ending with FY 2018 that have been expended on certain
    Management Headquarters Activities (MHA) across the Department.
    Additionally, the committee has learned that as a result of MHA cuts,
    the Army, for example, elected to eliminate roughly one third of their
    personnel who oversaw the Military Housing Privatization Initiative.
        Are you aware of other examples of mission impacts that have
    occurred because of the MHA reductions? If so, please describe them.
        Answer. As the details of cuts affecting Major DOD Headquarters
    Activities (MHA) are part of the program and budget reviews, I am not
    privy to specifics. If confirmed, I will review past reductions against
    ongoing operational needs and address specific impacts, as appropriate
    and with coordination and collaboration with DOD Component heads.
        Question. Civilian control of the military is directly tied to the
    health and robustness of DOD's civilian professionals, especially those
    in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Are you aware of any
    resource shortfalls for positions or capability within the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense over the last few years?
        Answer. I have heard anecdotal references to the reductions against
    OSD--to comply with Section 346(b) of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (the ``25% cut'' to headquarters
    baselines)--having a significant impact on the health and robustness of
    the civilian headquarters support to the Secretary of Defense. While
    efficiency reductions should be considered, mandatory or arbitrary
    reduction targets can create disruptive capability shortfalls in both
    lower and higher priority functions. If confirmed, I would work closely
    with the other OSD Principal Staff Assistants and DOD Component heads
    to ensure that the civilian support to the Secretary of Defense is
    sufficiently resourced and provides the right balance of positions and
    capability within OSD.
                               acquisition reform
        Question. Congress has enacted significant reform of the defense
    acquisition enterprise, to include establishing and expanding
    authorities related to special acquisition pathways and the use of
    streamlined acquisition methodologies.
        If confirmed, what changes would you make to DOD financial
    management regulations to afford financial management, comptroller, and
    acquisition personnel the flexibility required to support novel
    acquisition approaches?
        Answer. I believe that acquisition reform is critical to our
    success. In many cases, the budget process is neutral with respect to
    what type of contracting vehicle or process is used. However, if
    confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and
    Sustainment and other key stakeholders to ensure the financial
    management regulations are updated to enable any specific permissions
    or flexibilities afforded the Department and to look for opportunities
    to look for additional innovations or improvements.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes would you make to DOD
    financial management regulations to afford financial management,
    comptroller, and acquisition personnel the flexibility required to
    apply resources to take advantage of emerging technologies and
    responding to emerging threats in a timely fashion?
        Answer. I believe that timely acquisition is critical to
    implementing the NDS. If confirmed, I will work with the Under
    Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment and other key stakeholders to
    ensure the financial management regulations and acquisition workforce
    training enable the Department to effectively implement any specific
    permissions or flexibilities afforded the Department to take advantage
    of emerging technologies and emerging threats.
        Question. In your view, to what extent have recent acquisition
    reforms have been successful and achieved better outcomes?
        Answer. I am not in a position to provide a detailed impact
    analysis at this time, but I believe reforms such as the Middle Tier
    Acquisition, the Software Acquisition Pathway, and the Software and
    Digital Technology Programs Pilot have great potential. If confirmed, I
    would like to continue these efforts for two to three more years and
    then assess the outcomes and determine best practices moving forward.
    There is always more that can be done. Just as technology advances, so
    must our acquisition of that technology.
        Question. Do you see the need for additional changes in
    legislation? If so, provide examples.
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Department
    leadership and Congress in order to identify any legislative changes
    that would allow the Department to pursue and develop emerging
    technologies.
                                personnel costs
        Question. Military personnel costs continue to grow rapidly and
    comprise an increasing share of the DOD budget. A large portion of the
    military compensation package consists of in-kind benefits--health
    care, housing, tax-free shopping in military exchanges, taxpayer
    subsidized commissaries--that complement competitive salaries and a
    generous military retirement benefit.
        In your view, how can DOD manage and better plan for this growth?
        Answer. The Department must continually strive to assess personnel
    costs in all forms and determine the most efficient ways to deliver a
    competitive compensation package that enables DOD to attract and retain
    the All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. Should the DOD's personnel costs grow at the rate of
    inflation?
        Answer. The topline for the defense budget, and personnel budgets
    within the topline, should depend, not on an arbitrary inflation
    factor, but on the Department's mission, the appropriate force
    structure to achieve that mission and the competitive compensation
    package required to recruit and retain the force size and quality
    needed.
        Question. Do you believe the Employment Cost Index (ECI) is the
    most appropriate metric to assess inflation for the purpose to
    determining military pay increases?
        Answer. Yes, I believe ECI is the right metric to ensure military
    basic pay remains competitive and keeps pace with private sector wage
    growth. However, compensation levels (of which basic pay is only one
    component) must be continually reviewed and adjustments to an annual
    basic pay raise at percentages other than the ECI metric could
    sometimes be warranted.
        Question. The most recent Quadrennial Review of Military
    Compensation (QRMC) endorsed a further study and a pilot program for a
    time-in-grade based military pay table. In your judgment, would a time-
    in-grade pay table potentially help reduce long-term military personnel
    cost growth?
        Answer. It is my understanding that a time-in-grade pay table does
    potentially have some advantages including: incentivizing higher
    performance than a time-in-service pay table; providing stronger
    retention incentives more efficiently; and attracting lateral entrants
    to the DOD workforce. However, the major disadvantage of the time-in-
    grade pay table seems to be that the transition would involve a cost to
    the Department of Defense, and it would be disruptive to a significant
    fraction of the force. Estimates from the 13th QRMC indicate that just
    under one-third of the active force would experience a basic pay
    reduction in the transition to a time-in-grade pay table (especially
    among officers with significant prior enlisted service), with an
    average reduction in basic pay of 6.0 percent among those who would
    experience a pay reduction. If confirmed I will consult with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to understand the
    Department's assessment of the recommendation and whether or not the
    disadvantages of a time-in-grade pay table (even a pilot program)
    outweigh the potential advantages.
        Question. The QRMC also recommended refraining from ``providing
    target pay raises at this time.'' How should the DOD and Congress
    determine whether military pay raises are necessary?
        Answer. OUSD Personnel and Readiness and the Services continually
    assess recruiting and retention challenges, as well as other force
    management factors such as assignments, promotions, skill and grade
    mix, etc., to determine if compensation levels need to be adjusted to
    maintain DOD's competitive compensation package.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
    5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced
    sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work''
    in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
    otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(C)?
        Answer. If confirmed, the action I would take upon receiving or
    becoming aware of a sexual harassment or discrimination complaint is to
    immediately conduct an independent inquiry into the matter, in
    coordination with the HR and EEO office. I would take these matters
    seriously, enforce accountability, leverage opportunities to train and
    educate leaders and the staff, and reiterate my stance against
    inappropriate behavior that has no place in the workplace or anywhere
    else. I would also ensure OUSDC has workplace policies and practices
    that promote respect, civility, and inclusion for all.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                           transparency in contracts
        1. Senator Peters. Mr. McCord, Congress has previously requested
    that the Department of Defense provide better transparency over
    contract services expenditures in its budget submission. The Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) identified this problem in a February 18,
    2016 audit, ``DOD Service Acquisition: Improved Use of Available Data
    Needed to Better Manage and Forecast Service Contract Requirements''
    (GAO-16-119), and most recently continued to retain the management of
    services contracts on its high risk list in a February 22, 2021
    assessment of the Department's report to Congress. See, GAO-21-267R,
    ``Service Acquisitions: DOD's Report to Congress Identifies Steps Taken
    To Improve Management, But Does Not Address Some Key Planning Issues.''
    Most notably, one of the key planning issues not addressed is the
    subject of the original 2016 audit, the failure to establish better
    transparency over services contracts spending means the Department's
    ``budget exhibits on contract services provide limited visibility to
    Congress on planned spending, and the primary exhibit for contracted
    services does not meet statutory reporting requirements. . .without a
    roadmap of future service contract spending needs, Congress has limited
    visibility into an area that constitutes more than half of DOD's annual
    contract spending.'' Having worked in the Department of Defense when
    this audit finding was first made, do you recognize this as a problem
    that needs to be addressed?
        Mr. McCord. Yes. Transparency over DOD contract services
    expenditures is an important element in ensuring Americans' taxpayer
    dollars are spent wisely. If confirmed, I will work with my team and
    the acquisition community to ensure Congress has the appropriate
    visibility to conduct its oversight responsibility.
                          administrative efficiencies
        2. Senator Peters. Mr. McCord, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in
    her private capacity last year wrote in a March 2020 ``Foreign
    Affairs'' article entitled, ``Getting to Less: The Truth About Defense
    Spending,'' the following: ``Predictably, for example, even though
    Congress directed the Defense Department to cut $10 billion through
    administrative efficiencies between 2015 and 2019, the Pentagon failed
    to substantiate that it had achieved those savings. The reason those
    efforts rarely succeed is that they merely shift the work being done by
    civilian employees to others, such as military personnel or defense
    contractors.'' How can we avoid encouraging such shell games in the
    future?
        Mr. McCord. During my previous tenure as Comptroller, I
    participated in some of the ``administrative efficiencies'' efforts and
    can confirm that they were more than a shell game. From Secretary
    Gates' ``Efficiency Review,'' Secretary Hagel's ``Strategic Choices and
    Management Review,'' ``Fourth-Estate'' reductions, and sequestration-
    driven efficiency reductions, DOD absorbed significant, real budget and
    manpower cuts. If confirmed, I will participate in any review of DOD's
    administrative expenses and potential efficiencies to help ensure the
    level of administrative support is sufficient to meet the Department's
    requirements within the funding levels provided by Congress and will,
    if need be, advise where I think the funding levels and requirements
    may be incompatible.

        3. Senator Peters. Mr. McCord, when this is happening, what good is
    financial auditability without also some good managerial accounting
    principles to inform wiser decisions?
        Mr. McCord. The two are congruent. Financial auditability drives
    timelier and more accurate data with which to inform decision making.
    Better data will increase the transparency of DOD's financial
    activities, as well as DOD's accountability for the use of the assets
    entrusted to it. Further, better data and insight into DOD's financial
    activity can drive greater efficiency in the use of its appropriations
    (e.g., lower de-obligations and cancelled funding returned to
    Treasury). The annual audit provides annual, independent validation of
    the progress DOD is making towards these goals, as well as
    recommendations to guide further progress.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                             emerging technologies
        4. Senator Blackburn. Mr. McCord, what opportunities do you see for
    ``data-driven'' decision support tools within the office to which you
    have been nominated?
        Mr. McCord. To institutionalize the benefits of the audit in
    driving the DOD toward common business systems and better data, it is
    necessary to demonstrate to data owners the value of the change that
    would result. The prior manual, labor-intensive approach to gathering
    and presenting data to inform decision makers at times resulted in
    PowerPoint slides that were debated and disputed, rather than
    supporting the intended discussion about the meaning of the data
    presented. It is important to automate the generation of timely,
    reliable information that could be used for analysis to save time for
    discussion of what the data show, rather than contesting the data.
    Data-based decisions are a fundamental principle of the Planning,
    Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) system.
        The Department began building an advancing analytics (Advana) tool
    in 2016 that expanded the boundaries of a standard data warehouse to
    arm military and business decision makers with decision support
    analytics, visualization products, and data tools. If confirmed I would
    continue using the power of the audited data for decision making and
    attempt to recruit top talent that can help the Department use data for
    better decision making.
                                     audit
        5. Senator Blackburn. Mr. McCord, given the findings of the
    previous two DOD audits, what specific actions would you take with
    respect to business reform--to include consolidating information
    technology and improving enterprise buying power?
        Mr. McCord. If confirmed, I would make sure there are quantifiable
    metrics to measure progress and hold components accountable for planned
    corrective actions and system reductions. I would engage the Office of
    the Chief Information Officer to jointly reduce the numbers of systems
    and duplicate functionality among DOD systems to reduce information
    technology cost and inconsistency. Additionally, I would look for
    opportunities to partner with the Chief Data Officer and the military
    departments to identify opportunities for efficiency.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                 burden-sharing
        6. Senator Hawley. Mr. McCord, would you agree that asking more of
    our allies and partners in Europe and other regions could help to
    alleviate some of the burdens facing the Department of Defense, so that
    DOD can focus more of its scarce resources on our top priorities--above
    all, deterring China?
        Mr. McCord. Our Allies and partners have responded to our calls to
    more equitably share the responsibility of providing for our common
    defense. For example, I understand NATO is entering its seventh
    consecutive year of increased defense spending, and that the
    Departments of State and Defense continue to encourage our Allies to
    fulfill the 2014 Wales Summit Defense Investment Pledge. Allies and
    partners also made significant troop contributions to U.S.-led, NATO,
    and multinational missions in the Middle East and elsewhere. However,
    as you note, they can always do more. If confirmed, I will work through
    the Department's normal program and budget review process to seek ways
    to make tradeoffs from lower priority missions to higher priority
    missions, including deterrence of China. Reviewing our burden sharing
    arrangements should normally be part of the scope of such reviews.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Honorable Michael J. McCord
    follows:]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Honorable Michael J. McCord,
    which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Honorable
    Michael J. McCord in connection with his nomination follows:]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Honorable Michael J. McCord was reported
    to the Senate by Chairman Reed on May 20, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on May 28, 2021.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                   duties, qualifications, and relationships
        Question. If confirmed as USD(I&S), what do you believe would be
    your most critical duties and responsibilities?
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
    Security (USD(I&S)) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of
    Defense in discharging his intelligence and security responsibilities
    and authorities including under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United
    States Code.
        I understand that the responsibilities of the USD(I&S) are assigned
    in DOD Directive 5143.01 and include: serving as the Principal Staff
    Assistant and advisor regarding intelligence, counterintelligence,
    security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters;
    exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary
    of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
    Geospatial-intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency / Central
    Security Service, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense
    Counterintelligence and Security Agency; establishing policy and
    priorities for, and providing oversight of, the defense intelligence
    and security enterprises; exercising oversight of personnel policy to
    ensure that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are
    staffed, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of
    the Department; ensuring that the DOD intelligence components that are
    also elements of the intelligence community are responsive to the
    Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's
    authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided
    with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that
    counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and
    managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that certain sensitive
    activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and
    managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of
    assigned DOD security policies and programs to ensure efficiency and
    effectiveness; and serving as the Program Executive for the Military
    Intelligence Program.
        Question. What is your understanding of the differences between the
    title 10 and title 50 duties of the USD(I&S)?
        Answer. My understanding is that the USD(I&S) assists the Secretary
    of Defense in satisfying all of the Secretary's title 10 and title 50
    statutory responsibilities in the areas of intelligence and security
    and that the duties of the USD(I&S) are prescribed in DOD Directive
    (DODD) 5143.01.
        Pursuant to subsection 3038(a) of title 50, the Secretary of
    Defense has the following responsibilities, which are to be conducted
    in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence: (1) ensure
    that the budgets of the intelligence community (IC) elements within the
    Department of Defense (DOD) are adequate to satisfy the overall DOD
    intelligence needs; (2) ensure appropriate implementation of the
    policies and resource decisions of the Director of National
    Intelligence by DOD Components within the National Intelligence Program
    (NIP); (3) ensure that DOD tactical intelligence activities complement
    and are compatible with intelligence activities under the NIP; (4)
    ensure that the IC elements within DOD are responsive and timely with
    respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces; (5)
    eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication among the DOD intelligence
    activities; and (6) ensure that DOD intelligence activities are
    conducted jointly where appropriate.
        Question. What leadership and management experience do you possess
    that you would apply to your service as USD(I&S), if confirmed?
        Answer. I have had the privilege of serving at the highest echelons
    of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community.
    Serving over a combined 17 years as a member of the Defense
    Intelligence Senior Executive Service and the CIA's Senior Intelligence
    Service, I led some of our Nation's most sensitive multi-intelligence
    missions and served with some of the most technically adept and
    dedicated professionals in the U.S. Government. Having served in
    leadership positions in operations, science and technology, staff and
    budget, legislative affairs, and joint organizations has enabled me to
    provide objective, time-sensitive intelligence to the warfighter,
    policymakers, and senior government leaders. As the Operations Director
    for the National Security Agency, I worked with many departments and
    agencies including across the Intelligence Community on critical
    challenges and established many trusted bilateral and multi-lateral
    foreign partnerships with our key allies.
        If confirmed, I would use my coalition building skills and
    experience in the private sector to enable our Nation to stay ahead of
    its adversaries. Also, I would continue to mentor the next generation
    of intelligence and security professionals. If confirmed, I would
    always serve with integrity while practicing servitude leadership.
    Last, I would use my decades of resource stewardship to ensure that the
    defense intelligence and security enterprise operates in an effective
    and efficient manner.
        Question. Please provide an example of a situation in which you led
    and brought to conclusion a management improvement/change initiative in
    a complex organization.
        Answer. In a prior role as one of an agency's most senior
    operations leaders, I realized that the processes for after-hours and
    weekend decisionmaking lacked the content and authorization specificity
    needed to conduct operations. In coordination with the agency's senior
    leadership team, I crafted the inaugural guidance to establish
    governance framework for such decisionmaking. This guidance is employed
    globally today and enables the agency to identify, assess, and respond
    24/7 to critical events worldwide, which in-turn enhances the quality
    and timeliness of intelligence provided to our government's most senior
    leaders.
        Question. What is your experience across the domain of intelligence
    matters? Security matters?
        Answer. My career has been a series of foundational intelligence
    experiences and assignments each preparing me for additional
    responsibility. As a member of the U.S. Air Force, I trained as a
    linguist at the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center and
    subsequently served a 3-year tour in Asia, which launched me on a
    professional intelligence trajectory. As a civilian leader at the
    National Security Agency (NSA), I addressed a wide spectrum of issues
    as I led NSA's efforts against several intelligence priorities. My
    responsibilities were comprehensive as I worked to satisfy intelligence
    requirements, served as the director of NSA's collection and processing
    organization, and led analytical and reporting efforts, culminating in
    my appointment as the director of operations. I was also a senior
    leader in the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate and had an
    important role while serving in the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence (ODNI). I played a key role in advising the Secretary of
    the Navy on cybersecurity, emerging technology, and data issues.
        I built strong relationships across the interagency working with
    the defense intelligence enterprise and organizations such as the ODNI,
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury,
    the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
    Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I was selected
    to lead to major damage assessments and equity reviews of two of our
    Nation's highest profile data compromises.
        Last, I received a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence
    (MSSI) degree in Russian studies from the National Intelligence
    University (NIU), the preeminent academic institution for the
    Intelligence Community. In 2020, I served as a member of the NIU's
    Board of Visitors, reportedly becoming the first graduate to ever to
    serve in this capacity.
        Question. Are there are any actions you would take to enhance your
    ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the USD(I&S)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately begin to re-establish my
    close working relationships within the Pentagon, the ODNI, the other IC
    elements, and entire the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific duties might you expect the
    Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, particularly in light of the
    lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?
        Answer. I believe my duties, aligned with the Secretary's 2021
    Interim Defense Strategic Guidance, would include posturing the Defense
    Intelligence and Security Enterprises against the threat of China,
    countering Russia's malign influence activities, and the persistent
    regional threat posed by Iran and North Korea, while fostering the
    expansion of interagency cooperation and international partnerships to
    address national security priorities. Additionally, the Department must
    protect our personnel at home and abroad, a task that includes
    developing a collaborative and accountable culture that does not accept
    harassment or violent extremism within its military and civilian ranks.
        Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
    assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence &
    Security?
        Answer. If confirmed and within the limits of policy and the law, I
    would ensure that the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security are sufficiently
    broad such that my deputy would serve as a full partner.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that your tenure as USD(I&S) fulfills the fundamental requirement for
    civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution
    and other laws?
        Answer. I am committed to civilian control of the Armed Forces in
    accordance with the U.S. Constitution and other applicable law. I
    recognize that the Department's civilian and military personnel
    together, with the support of DOD contractors, enable our mission
    success, and civilian control of the Armed Forces ensures
    accountability to the will of the people through our elected
    representatives.
        Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
    responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)? On what matters would you
    expect to collaborate with the ODNI, if confirmed?
        Answer. I am aware that the OUSD(I&S) works closely with the Office
    of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The partnership and
    integration between OUSD(I&S) and ODNI enables the Intelligence
    Community to deliver national intelligence support to policymakers and
    warfighters on threats to our national security.
        The USD(I&S) is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence
    within the ODNI. There is also a military officer who serves as the
    DNI's Advisor on Military Affairs (DAMA). I believe their staffs
    coordinate to effectively and efficiently ensure quality intelligence
    is provided in support of our national leadership and warfighters. As a
    principal member of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance
    Accountability Council (PAC), the USD(I&S) works with the DNI, who is
    the Security Executive Agent and also a principal member of the PAC.
        Question. What is your understanding of the relationship and
    division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Office of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), particularly as
    regards policy and programs for information operations, including
    military deception and operations security (OPSEC)?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy (USD(P)) is the Principal Staff Assistant for information
    operations. I also understand that the USD(I&S) has responsibility for
    coordination of DOD IO activities with the Intelligence Community, as
    well as the development and implementation of DOD policy, programs, and
    guidance for DOD deception and operations security.
        Question. In your view, what would be the appropriate relationship
    between the USD(I&S) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
    regard to providing operational intelligence, counterintelligence, and
    security support to the warfighter?
        Answer. I believe the relationship between the USD(I&S) and the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of mutual support and
    consultation to ensure that the defense intelligence enterprise
    provides the warfighters with the best intelligence possible, which
    enables the Chairman to provide the best military advice to the
    Secretary of Defense.
        Question. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the
    activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between
    the OUSD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))?
        Answer. I understand that USD(I&S) and the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))
    acting together are the primary oversight officials for all Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence and intelligence-related
    activities and programs. If confirmed, I will partner with ASD(SO/LIC)
    to ensure that our oversight of SOF is coordinated and collaborative.
        Question. Are there any programs currently overseen by the
    OUSD(I&S) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD(SOLIC), in
    your view?
        Answer. I am unaware of any such programs. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure that together we provide
    the Secretary of Defense with the best organizational alignment to
    accomplish U.S. national security objectives.
        Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
    responsibilities between OUSD(I&S) and the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) in
    regard to both unclassified and classified contract efforts?
        Answer. I understand the relationship between OUSD(I&S) and the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment
    (OUSD(A&S)) is one of cooperation and collaboration. If confirmed, I
    look forward to partnering with the USD(A&S) to ensure that DOD
    acquisition programs receive the intelligence needed to acquire
    superior defense capabilities and that appropriate consideration is
    given to the central role of security throughout the acquisition
    process to protect the integrity of our acquisitions in the face of the
    persistent threat of compromise by our adversaries.
        Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
    responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the DOD Chief Information
    Officer, particularly with respect to the cybersecurity mission;
    developing interoperability requirements applicable to information
    systems architectures for processing intelligence and
    counterintelligence information; and the certification of intelligence
    information systems?
        Answer. I view the relationship between the OUSD(I&S) and the
    Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO) as one
    predicated on collaboration and partnership to ensure synchronization
    between security policymakers and information technology service
    providers. I understand that OUSD(I&S) is responsible for development
    and oversight of information security and physical security policy. The
    DOD CIO advises the Secretary of Defense on information technology,
    including national security systems and defense business systems, and
    develops DOD strategy and policy for all DOD information technology and
    information systems. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) maintains a
    close partnership with the DOD CIO to enable the necessary security
    architecture to protect intelligence and counterintelligence
    information while effectively enabling the mission.
        Question. What is your understanding of the relationship and
    division of responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) for the
    Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)? For the
    identification of DOD language capability requirements?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the USD(I&S) develops the
    policies for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System in
    close coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
    and Readiness (USD(P&R)). I also understand that USD(P&R) works with
    USD(I&S) and the intelligence community to set and prioritize DOD
    foreign language capability requirements. If confirmed, I will study
    the relationship between USD(I&S) and USD(P&R) in identifying DOD
    language capability requirements.
        Question. How do you view the relationship and division of
    responsibilities between the OUSD(I&S) and the heads of the
    Intelligence Components of the Military Departments?
        Answer. I believe that the OUSD(I&S) staff works closely with the
    heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence components of the
    Military Departments. I understand that the USD(I&S) provides input to
    the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the duty performance of
    the senior intelligence officer within each Military Department.
        The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of
    Defense with authority delegated from the Secretary of Defense to
    establish policy for defense intelligence, counterintelligence,
    security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.
    The Directors for Defense Intelligence within the Office of the
    USD(I&S) (OUSD(I&S)) have specific programmatic responsibilities and
    support the Under Secretary in carrying out the responsibilities
    assigned and exercising the authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) by
    the Secretary of Defense.
        The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority,
    direction, and control over all components within their respective
    Departments. So the heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence
    components within the Military Departments are under the authority,
    direction, and control of the Secretary of the Military Department and
    subject to policy oversight of the OUSD(I&S).
        Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the OUSD(I&S) with
    regard to the Reserve Component intelligence elements of Military
    Services?
        Answer. I understand that, in accordance with DOD Instruction
    5143.01, which outlines the responsibilities and functions,
    relationships, and authorities of the USD(I&S), OUSD(I&S) develops and
    provides policy guidance, resource advocacy, and oversight for the
    integration of Reserve Component intelligence elements, and ensures the
    Department effectively employs and resources Reserve Component
    intelligence elements to best support the National Defense Strategy.
    The programmatic role of OUSD(I&S) is the same with respect to the
    Active and Reserve Components of the Military Services. Like the Active
    Components, the Reserve Components intelligence elements are under the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the relevant
    Military Department in which they are located and subject to policy
    oversight of the OUSD(I&S).
        Question. What is your understanding of the USD(I&S)'s
    responsibility and authority for the management and oversight of
    Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and National Intelligence Program
    (NIP) funding? How do the processes employed by the USD(I&S) in the
    execution of these responsibilities differ from the Planning,
    Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process applicable to all
    other DOD organizations and funding?
        Answer. As the MIP Executive Agent, the USD(I&S) has management and
    oversight of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The USD(I&S), in
    his role as the Director of Defense Intelligence, has visibility into
    the NIP through participation in the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence (ODNI) resource decision forums. Additionally, I
    understand that the DNI and the USD(I&S) jointly sign out intelligence
    programming guidance to closely synchronize NIP and MIP programs to
    ensure that the Department's priorities are communicated to the
    intelligence community. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI
    in ensuring that DOD intelligence requirements are supported within the
    NIP budget.
        With respect to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
    (PPBE) process, it is my understanding the USD(I&S) is a full
    participant in the Department's PPBE process and that military
    intelligence requirements compete with the other DOD requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to
    develop and sustain an open, transparent, and productive relationship
    between Congress--the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations
    Committees, in particular--and the OUSD(I&S) and the Defense Agencies
    under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S)?
        Answer. I am committed to assist the Secretary of Defense in
    sustaining an open, transparent, and productive relationship between
    the Department and Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging
    with the defense oversight committees on a routine basis to explain the
    Department's defense intelligence, counterintelligence, security,
    sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure both
    that this Committee is provided with the notifications required under
    provisions of title 10, U.S. Code, section 2723, and that any such
    notification is accurate, complete, and timely?
        Answer. I am committed to fulfilling the USD(I&S)'s responsibility
    under DOD Directive 5143.01 to make determinations on behalf of the
    Secretary of Defense, except for those related to nuclear, chemical,
    and biological security, in consultation with the Director of National
    Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    as appropriate, and to notify Congress, as required by section 2723. If
    confirmed, I will ensure such notifications are accurate, complete, and
    timely.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you would face if confirmed as the USD(I&S) and what
    specific actions would you take to address each of these challenges?
        Answer. Rebuilding trust and establishing close working
    relationships between the USD(I&S) and DOD senior leaders would be
    among the most significant challenges. The rebuilding of trust and
    establishing close working relationships with senior leaders of foreign
    partners would also be a challenge and priority. If confirmed, I would
    engage in sustained outreach with these leaders on mutual priorities
    and objectives with the goal of developing a strategic dialog and
    viable courses of action on key issues.
      supervision, and oversight of the defense intelligence and security
                                   enterprise
        Question. The USD(I&S) is vested with responsibility for the
    overall direction and supervision of the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprise in the execution of intelligence,
    counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other
    intelligence-related matters across DOD. Subject to USD(I&S) oversight,
    responsibility for executing policies and programs in these domains
    vests primarily in the Military Departments and Services, elements of
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Agencies.
        What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I&S) in
    coordinating the activities of the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise?
        Answer. In my understanding, the USD(I&S) is responsible for
    ensuring the actions of all of these elements are integrated to meet
    the needs of the Department and the Nation. The USD(I&S) does so by
    issuing policy, ensuring compliance, exercising control over the
    Military Intelligence Program, coordinating with ODNI on the National
    Intelligence Program, and by leading development of decisions affecting
    the Defense Security and Security Enterprise.
        Question. In your view, does the USD(I&S) have the authority,
    organizational structure, and resources to provide appropriate
    oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise? If not,
    what additional authorities or resources does the OUSD(I&S) require, in
    your view?
        Answer. I believe that the USD(I&S) has sufficient authority to
    provide policy oversight of the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the OUSD(I&S) staff to
    determine if additional authorities or resources may be required and to
    standardize OUSD(I&S) practices for effective oversight.
                           national defense strategy
        Question. The 2018 NDS focused DOD on ``great power competition and
    conflict'' with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which
    the United States must contend, together with the imperative of
    deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran.
    Finally, the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to
    the United States and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, while moving to a ``more resource sustainable'' approach
    to counterterrorism.
        In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the current
    strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical
    and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
    its allies? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe the 2018 National Defense Strategy helped
    consolidate a consensus around the importance of addressing the erosion
    of U.S. military advantage, in key strategic areas. I agree with
    Secretary Austin that China represents DOD's pacing threat, given its
    increasing scope and scale of military modernization, its aggressive
    behavior. The Department must also work to address advanced, persistent
    threats--such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and VEOs. Additionally, I
    believe the Department must take steps to address the profound impact
    cross-cutting challenges, including climate change, COVID-19 and other
    biological threats, that will influence our national security.
        Question. In your view, what role(s) must the Defense Intelligence
    and Security Enterprise play in the implementation of the NDS?
        Answer. The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise is a
    crucial pillar supporting the National Defense Strategy. The enterprise
    must support decisionmakers, help ensure decision advantage for the
    U.S. allies and partners and safeguard personnel, information,
    operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against a wide
    range of threats and challenges.
        Question. How would you assess the current readiness and
    capabilities of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to
    execute the NDS?
        Answer. The Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise serve is a
    crucial pillar supporting the National Defense Strategy (NDS). I
    understand that it is postured to support the Department's execution of
    the NDS. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders to develop my own
    assessment of the enterprise's readiness and capabilities to execute
    the NDS.
        Question. Does the OUSD(I&S) have the analytic tools and expertise
    to assist you, if confirmed, in evaluating the readiness of the Defense
    Intelligence and Security Enterprise to engage effectively across the
    spectrum of challenges presented by the current strategic environment--
    from low intensity, gray-zone conflicts to protracted, high-intensity
    warfare with major-power rivals? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that OUSD(I&S) possesses significant expertise
    to assist me in evaluating readiness. If confirmed, I will review and
    leverage the available decision-support analytic tools and develop
    standardized, metrics-based approaches to reliably assess, monitor, and
    evaluate the posture and performance of the enterprise to enable
    effective engagements across the spectrum of challenges and achieve
    desired outcomes.
        Question. What do you believe are the main resource or capability
    shortfalls that could hamper the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise's execution of the NDS?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has realigned
    Military Intelligence Program (MIP) resources to better support the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS). As the Department makes further
    adjustments to its warfighting capabilities to support the NDS, I
    expect this will impose additional requirements on intelligence and
    security that will need to be addressed. If confirmed, I will work with
    the OSD(I&S) staff to identify promptly any obstacles likely to hamper
    execution of the Interim Guidance.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to address any gaps
    or shortfalls in the ability of the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise to meet the demands placed on it by the NDS?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Department to ensure
    any capability gaps and shortfalls are identified and resourced
    throughout the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
    you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's
    implementation of the 2018 NDS with respect to intelligence and
    security?
        Answer. I am supportive of the tremendous efforts the Department
    has made to date in implementing the National Defense Strategy. If
    confirmed, once I am up to speed on efforts to execute the Defense
    Intelligence Strategy, I will develop recommendations for the Secretary
    of Defense. It is critical that all efforts continue to accelerate
    support to the Department's posture with China as the pacing challenge.
        The NDS affirms that ``[m]ore than any other nation, America can
    expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to challenge our
    competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength.''
        Question. What role can the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise play in ``expand[ing] the competitive space,'' in your
    opinion?
        Answer. The enterprise has a pivotal role in enabling the
    Department to expand the competitive space. It can help identify
    technologies, tools, tradecraft, skills, resources, and processes that
    the United States could use to create advantage relative to its
    competitors. The enterprise is also essential in safeguarding DOD
    personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and
    facilities against a wide range of threats and challenges. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Director of National Intelligence to
    ensure that DOD and the Intelligence Community are fully integrated to
    collectively seize that competitive space.
        Question. Competing in the information space is a major concern as
    reflected in the ``36-star'' letter sent by nine U.S. Combatant
    Commanders to the Acting DNI via the USD(I&S) on January 15, 2020. If
    confirmed, what steps would you take help address this challenge to
    assist Combatant Commanders executing messaging and influence
    operations around the globe?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate efforts to mitigate
    influence-related activities against key adversaries. I will also work
    to help prioritize resources to support operations in the information
    environment and participate in Intelligence Community focus groups to
    help drive key concepts related to these activities. I understand that
    in response to the 36-star memo, the Performing the Duty of the
    USD(I&S) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) have been
    examining how to improve upon current processes to use intelligence to
    counter malign influence operations against the United States, its
    allies, and its partners. If confirmed, I look forward to partnering
    closely with the DNI, the Combatant Commanders, and the Directors of
    the Combat Support Agencies to further those efforts in alignment with
    national policy objectives.
        Question. What revisions or adjustments would you recommend that
    the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues to ensure the
    Department considers geo-political shifts, intensifying competition
    with China, transnational threats (including climate change, COVID-19
    and other biological threats), and the evolving technology landscape in
    its review and development of the next NDS.
              strengthening alliances and attracting new partners
        Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are
    crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great
    power. To this end, the NDS stresses the importance of strengthening
    existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new
    ones, and promoting ``mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and
    accountability'' in these relationships.
        How would you characterize your familiarity with the leadership of
    cooperative foreign defense establishments, the intelligence and
    security services of foreign governments, and intelligence and
    security-related international organizations?
        Answer. My past experience in the Intelligence Community and the
    Department of Defense has afforded me familiarity with cooperative
    foreign governments, their defense, intelligence, and security
    services, and their leadership, as well as related international
    organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to strengthening U.S. ties
    with defense and intelligence counterparts around the globe, and
    collaborating on areas of shared interest and concern.
        Question. If confirmed as USD(I&S), what specific actions would you
    take to strengthen and synchronize existing intelligence and
    counterintelligence relationships with foreign governments and
    international organizations?
        Answer. I believe that allies and partners are force multipliers
    who bring a wealth of valuable and unique intelligence insight, access,
    and expertise to the partnerships.
        If confirmed, I commit to fostering strong defense intelligence and
    counterintelligence relationships with allies and partners focused on
    our shared concerns, including malign activities by China and Russia. I
    will work in close collaboration with our allies and partners to
    exchange valuable intelligence, synchronize our intelligence and
    counterintelligence efforts where mutually beneficial, implement
    economies of force, close intelligence gaps, and improve our overall
    understanding of the national and global security challenges that we
    face today.
        Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in
    rendering decisions on the disclosure and release of intelligence to
    foreign governments and international organizations, including in
    support of combatant commanders' expressed desire for better
    intelligence and intelligence sharing to counter foreign malign
    activities?
        Answer. I understand that the National Disclosure Policy sets out
    the factors that must be weighed for the foreign disclosure of U.S.
    classified military information, including military intelligence. If
    confirmed, I would support combatant command requirements for military
    and national intelligence support to counter foreign malign activities.
    I agree broadly that the responsible foreign disclosure of military
    intelligence to friendly foreign governments and international
    organizations can further mutual defense and security objectives.
        Question. Do you agree with Admiral Davidson, the commander of U.S.
    Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), that his ability to strengthen
    alliances and partnerships would be greatly assisted by the funding of
    a ``Mission Partner Environment'' that would help provide a secure
    communications network with partners and allies throughout the region,
    similar to what exists in the U.S. European Command area of
    responsibility?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to get a better understanding of
    how the Mission Partner Environment Information Sharing Capability is
    being implemented pursuant to DOD Instruction 8110.01 within
    USINDOPACOM.
    joint requirements oversight council (jroc) and the joint capabilities
                  integration and development systems (jcids)
        Question. Per section 181 of title 10, U.S. Code, the JROC is
    vested with the responsibility to assess joint military capabilities;
    establish and approve joint performance requirements that ensure
    interoperability between military capabilities; and identify new joint
    military capabilities based on advances in technology and concepts of
    operation. The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and
    duplication in Military Services' programs by providing the information
    the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and associated operational
    performance requirements needed by the joint warfighter.
        How do you assess the effectiveness of the JROC and JCIDS in
    identifying and establishing joint warfighter capability requirements
    in the domains of military intelligence, counterintelligence, and
    security?
        Answer. The JROC and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
    System (JCIDS) use threat assessments from the Intelligence Community
    to inform Joint Force capability requirements and to guide requirements
    and capability development, including in the areas of military
    intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. The USD(I&S), as a
    statutory advisor to the JROC and its subordinate boards, provides
    advice that supports effective intelligence-related capability
    requirements and associated key performance parameters. If confirmed, I
    would closely coordinate with JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process
    continues to validate effective military intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and security requirements.
        Question. In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that
    shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's
    ability to assess joint performance requirements in the military
    intelligence, counterintelligence, and security domains?
        Answer. I understand that the recent reforms have transferred
    acquisition Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) from USD(A&S) to the
    Services, including for intelligence programs. One example is that the
    Air Force is now the MDA for the MIP-funded Next Generation Overhead
    Persistent Infrared satellites to provide missile warning. Changes in
    MDA, however, have not changed how DOD addresses requirements, as the
    Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process
    has not changed. The JROC continues to assess and validate effective
    joint performance requirements in the areas of military intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and security through its oversight of the JCIDS
    process, which still includes an Intelligence Support Certification
    that is required to complete the requirements validation process needed
    prior to an Acquisition Milestone Decision. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with JROC members to ensure the JCIDS process continues to
    validate effective military intelligence, counterintelligence, and
    security requirements.
        Question. The current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    has emphasized joint and cross-domain capability requirements that the
    Military Services have not prioritized or are not responsible for
    developing, such as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). JADC2
    demands ubiquitous interoperability, automated decision aids, and
    systems-of-systems integration.
        How would you ensure that the Defense combat support intelligence
    agencies and the National Reconnaissance Office comply with the JADC2
    requirements promulgated by the JROC?
        Answer. In addition to participating in both the Department and IC
    requirements development and system acquisition processes, OUSD(I&S)
    conducts an annual portfolio review to ensure MIP-funded efforts
    deliver the capabilities needed by the warfighters. If confirmed, I
    would work to ensure the OUSD(I&S) processes are working to provide the
    right data, to the right people, at the right time.
        Question. Given the role that National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
    assets have in providing intelligence for warfighting functions, the
    JROC reviews NRO acquisition programs to ensure DOD requirements are
    being met.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure that NRO's close relationship
    with the JROC continues?
        Answer. Consideration of both DOD and IC requirements is central to
    the USD(I&S) role. OUSD(I&S) facilitates the common gatekeeping
    function between the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
    System (JCIDS) and the Intelligence Community Capability Requirements
    (ICCR) Process. If confirmed, I will work to maintain open
    communication throughout this process, and work closely with the Joint
    Staff and Intelligence Community during the requirements validation
    process for NRO capabilities.
        Question. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities
    enacted in Section 804 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) sought to speed fielding of advanced
    technologies and systems.
        What is your opinion of the effects of efforts to use of 804
    authorities in intelligence-, counterintelligence-, or security-related
    acquisitions?
        Answer. I believe that technological advances and development are
    outpacing DOD's ability to modernize and field capability using
    standard acquisition processes. Section 804 provides authority to the
    DOD to rapidly prototype and/or rapidly field capabilities under a new
    pathway, distinct from the traditional acquisition system. I understand
    this authority provides a pathway for the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprises to develop, test, and field emerging technology to
    maintain pace with, or counter, adversary capability development.
                     intelligence support to the warfighter
        Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the need for the
    combat support Defense intelligence agencies to provide intelligence
    support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support
    to policymakers?
        Answer. My understanding and belief is that balancing these needs
    will be one of my primary responsibilities. In today's environment of
    global and regional threats, most issues are relevant to both
    warfighting commands and policymakers. Where there are tactical and
    operational differences, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the DIE
    continues to satisfy requirements for operationally-relevant
    intelligence that directly enables warfighter success, and I would work
    collaboratively with policymakers to ensure the intelligence needs of
    senior national policymakers are met in order to support decisionmaking
    by our national leaders.
        Question. In your view, what opportunities exist across the
    Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the
    warfighter? If confirmed, what would you do to leverage these
    opportunities?
        Answer. I believe in the importance of and the continued
    opportunity to improve collaboration across the Intelligence Community
    to better support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would engage early
    and often with the Combatant Commanders to improve my understanding of
    their needs, and I would frequently engage leaders within the
    Intelligence Community to obtain support to meet those warfighter
    needs.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and
    prioritizing their intelligence needs?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the OUSD(I&S) has multiple
    forums to engage with the Combatant Commands--for example, I understand
    there are monthly VTCs with all Combatant Command J2s. If confirmed, I
    will strive to ensure this and similar channels of communication are
    open and used routinely.
        Question. In your view, are the Joint Intelligence Operations
    Centers and Service Intelligence Centers organized and resourced to
    most effectively support warfighter requirements under the NDS, to
    include support to near-real time, multi-sensor joint detection,
    tracking, and targeting for the combatant commands? What changes may be
    required to optimize cooperative, cross-agency targeting support?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate how to best resource the
    Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) and the
    Service Intelligence Centers (SICs) to support the NDS. I understand
    that some of the JIOCs are currently undergoing manpower studies to
    determine the appropriate manpower levels to meet the mission
    requirements of the Combatant Commands. It would be incumbent upon the
    OUSD(I&S) to attempt to resource the Commands to help them meet their
    requirements, including in the area of targeting. If confirmed, I will
    support periodic reviews and re-alignment efforts to ensure priorities
    are met and resources effectively used to support the warfighter.
        Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
    by special operations forces different from those carried out by the
    Intelligence Community?
        Answer. In general, the key difference is that these intelligence
    operations are conducted in direct support of special operations forces
    missions that support tactical operations. I understand that special
    operations missions require immediate and detailed intelligence to
    support operations that are executed on rapid timelines and in high-
    risk environments. In most cases, similar capability or capacity does
    not exist or is not readily available within the Intelligence Community
    or Department of Defense. I also understand other defense intelligence
    operations typically serve a more strategic purpose and reflect
    national priorities through its work as part of the Intelligence
    Community. While special operation forces generally conduct
    intelligence to directly support task forces conducting operations in
    support of the combatant commands, they are aware of national
    collection priorities and the strategic importance of their mission.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work across the Defense
    Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
    the CIA to ensure that intelligence activities carried out by special
    operations forces are properly coordinated with activities carried out
    by the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. My understanding is that special operations forces
    intelligence activities are closely coordinated with the intelligence
    community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. If
    confirmed, I would continue to work closely with the ASD SO/LIC,
    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, and
    other DOD senior intelligence officials to ensure special operations
    forces units comply with all applicable policies and directives.
    Additionally, I would welcome a continued dialog with the committee to
    ensure clear and consistent reporting to the congressional oversight
    committees of intelligence activities carried out by special operations
    forces.
        The OUSD(I&S) is charged to develop and oversee implementation of
    DOD strategy, programs, and policy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and to integrate tasking, processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) solutions.
        Question. Is the OUSD(I&S) participating in the JADC2 cross-
    functional team led by the Joint Staff J6? Do you intend to use the
    authorities delegated to the USD(I&S) to leverage information
    technology and innovative concepts to support the JADC2 initiative to
    develop an interoperable, joint command, control, communications,
    computer intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture
    and capability to support the warfare of the future?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the USD(I&S) is a full
    participant in the Department's Joint All Domain Command and Control
    (JADC2) initiative intended to connect distributed sensors, shooters,
    and data from and in all domains to all forces. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work closely with the DNI to shape required improvements to
    the C4ISR architecture to increase timely support to decisionmaking at
    the strategic and operational levels.
        In a February 27, 2020, New York Times Op-ed, Eric Schmidt, the
    chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
    (NSCAI) and former chairman and CEO of Google, stated, ``[i]f A.I.
    advances elsewhere outpace those of U.S. companies and the U.S.
    Government, and give commercial and military advantages to our rivals,
    the resulting disadvantage to the United States could endanger U.S.
    national security and global stability. The same could be said for
    other emerging technologies.'' The report of the NSCAI emphasized this
    fundamental conclusion.
        Question. Do you agree that American pre-eminence in AI is critical
    for national and economic security? If confirmed, what priority would
    you assign to ensuring that the Defense intelligence enterprise invests
    in AI applications?
        Answer. I agree that American pre-eminence in AI is critical for
    national and economic security. I concur with the NSCAI commissions'
    conclusion that ``we must win the AI competition that is intensifying
    strategic competition with China.''
        The application of AI and algorithms are part of a class of data-
    centered capabilities that we must aggressively pursue to ensure DOD AI
    military dominance and information advantage in competition and
    conflict.
        If confirmed, I will assign the highest priority to implementing
    data capabilities. I will also place emphasis on building AI training
    data to ensure we are turning our archived and daily intelligence into
    the data we need for the Department.
        Question. Do you agree that the Defense intelligence components
    should take maximum advantage of the foundational AI platform that the
    Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is sponsoring to develop AI
    applications for intelligence? If confirmed, what actions would you
    take to support this effort?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will need more time to study this matter,
    but I believe Project Maven and other IC initiatives have built AI
    foundries that are operational today and were purpose-built for Defense
    Intelligence. I suspect those initiatives are much farther along,
    fitted more tightly to Defense Intelligence requirements and bring the
    speed and flexibility we need to bring AI at scale to our many
    intelligence data feeds. I will use the authorities granted to me in
    the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5143.01 to weigh and
    assess the proper AI technologies Defense Intelligence requires.
        Question. What is your understanding of efforts by the OUSD(I&S) to
    develop and implement systems for the use of Artificial Intelligence to
    bring greater efficiencies to intelligence analysis, including
    opportunities to condense the time required by a human analyst to
    locate and prioritize potential targets and convert those observations
    to actionable intelligence for input to military decisionmaking?
        Answer. Speed, scale, and accuracy are USD(I&S) goals for
    transforming Defense Intelligence using data technologies such as AI.
    We want to be as early as possible on the sense-understand continuum to
    give us maximum time to respond to national threats. To achieve earlier
    warning and targeting timeframes, we will rely on data technologies
    such as AI that make sense of data faster than humans. Machines will
    accomplish tasks that in the past needed humans to accomplish, such as
    extracting objects from imagery, or writing reports.
        We envision a world where we globally surveil areas of interest
    hundreds of times per day and understand the smallest changes in
    seconds, and only machines equipped with AI will allow us to do this.
    Our product-focused approach to delivering intelligence will change
    from static, text-based artifacts to continuous data streams. Bringing
    forward these technologies at scale so that all Defense Intelligence
    sensors are first processed by accredited AIs and detections are then
    passed to humans for context, decision, and action will emerge as the
    new way of warfighting.
        If confirmed, I look forward to presiding over these important
    transformations. Yet, I appreciate that achieving these results will
    require more than technology. Department leaders must also invest time
    to preside over the necessary human-centered changes that accompany the
    technology in order to guarantee successful adoption of these
    disruptive technologies.
               counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security
        Question. What is your assessment of current and anticipated
    counterintelligence threats to DOD? Which threats do you assess to be
    the most concerning and why?
        Answer. The Chinese and Russian intelligence services are the
    greatest foreign intelligence threats to the technological superiority
    and lethality of the Joint Force. I understand that China is using its
    intelligence services and proxies to threaten our military advantage by
    undermining our economic strength and innovation advantage through the
    wholesale theft of intellectual property and cutting-edge technology. I
    understand Russia is in a race to do the same and also intends to
    weaken American confidence in the U.S. Government and the U.S. military
    through sophisticated malign foreign influence campaigns.
        Question. What is your understanding of the roles and
    responsibilities of the OUSD(I&S) to provide strategic direction and
    oversight of implementation of counterintelligence policy, programs,
    guidance, and training to ensure they are responsive to validated DOD
    and national counterintelligence priorities? What changes, if any, in
    these roles and responsibilities would you recommend, if confirmed?
        Answer. I understand the USD(I&S) has broad responsibility for
    oversight of DOD counterintelligence (CI). This includes development
    and oversight of Department CI policy, programs, guidance, and training
    of CI personnel. The USD(I&S) works closely with the Defense
    Intelligence Agency for development of CI strategies and supporting
    campaigns to ensure alignment with national level priorities. The
    USD(I&S) is a standing member of the National CI and Security Center's
    National CI Policy Board, and the National CI Strategy Board, and
    through these forums and related working groups, coordinates and
    collaborates within the U.S. Government. If confirmed, I will play an
    active role with my government counterparts to ensure the right balance
    of CI roles and responsibilities across the Federal Government.
        Question. In your view, how has the Department's security posture
    benefited from the integration of the intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and law enforcement functions under the auspices
    of a single Under Secretary?
        Answer. DOD faces complex security challenges and must adapt to
    changing threats and environments using targeted yet multidimensional
    mitigation strategies and countermeasures. Integrating policy oversight
    of intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement, along with
    foundational security functions has enabled the Department to increase
    collaboration and leverage a wider variety of tools to respond to a
    given scenario. Our intelligence professionals and special agents
    strive every day to collect information, detect, and disrupt the
    capabilities, opportunities, and intentions of our adversaries. Working
    side by side with our security professionals allows them to develop
    effective policies, standard and repeatable procedures, and sufficient
    controls to deter, and deny our strategic competitors intentions. If
    confirmed, I will continue ensure that all communities under the
    authority direction and control of the Under Secretary continue to
    integrate seamlessly and continue to deny adversaries freedom of
    maneuver.
        Question. Does the integration of these functions under a single
    official raise civil liberties concerns? If so, what do you believe to
    be the most effective way to address those concerns?
        Answer. No. I understand that integration of these functions within
    OUSD(I&S) provides uniform, Department-level oversight of these
    disciplines through alignment of policy, strategy, and resource
    prioritization. If confirmed, I will ensure that all intelligence and
    security activities, including counterintelligence and law enforcement
    are conducted throughout the Department in a manner that respects civil
    liberties and protect any right or privilege secured by the
    Constitution or the laws of the United States.
        Question. Does the USD(I&S) have adequate authorities and resources
    to execute the law enforcement policy function? If not, what additional
    authorities or resources are required, in your view?
        Answer. I understand the law enforcement policy function resides
    within the Counterintelligence, Law Enforcement, and Security portfolio
    in USD(I&S), and that the staff is augmented with liaison officers and
    cleared contractors. Although I have not been briefed on the full range
    of current activities, if confirmed I will review this portfolio and
    ensure I&S has the right alignment of authorities and resources to
    perform the policy oversight function.
        Question. In the role of the DOD Senior Agency Official for
    Security, the USD(I&S) represents the Department on the Interagency
    Security Committee (ISC), created by President Clinton in 1995, 6
    months after the Oklahoma City bombing, to develop security standards
    applicable to all non-military federally owned and leased facilities.
    The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency
    Committee Standard, sets forth a number of ``best practices'' for
    determining a facility's security level and customizing physical
    security countermeasures.
        In your view, has DOD benefited from the adoption of any of the
    ``best practices'' endorsed by the ISC? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe that DOD has benefited from the ISC's work. I
    believe this benefits DOD by keeping DOD's physical security standards
    for its leased spaces aligned with the physical security standards of
    other Federal leases, reducing build-out costs and reconstruction time
    when DOD moves into a space previously occupied by another Federal
    tenant. It also benefits DOD by better integrating DOD's security
    requirements into leased facilities DOD shares with other Federal
    tenants.
                     personnel security and insider threat
        Question. The USD(I&S) is accountable for managing and overseeing
    DOD's insider threat, personnel security, and the National Industrial
    Security programs. DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider
    threats--attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD
    personnel, as well as to the loss of highly classified information
    critical to national security. The Secretary of Defense established the
    Department of Defense Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center
    (DITMAC) in 2014 to oversee the mitigation of insider threat risks to
    the Department and specific actions on insider threat cases. In
    November 2018, the National Insider Threat Task Force published the
    Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework.
        Congress transferred responsibility for personnel security from the
    Office of Personnel Management to DOD at a time when a backlog of
    clearance investigations reached near-crisis levels, while mandating
    that DOD transform the clearance process through modern data
    acquisition and continuous monitoring technologies. Congress also
    mandated that DOD significantly improve its abilities to support the
    integrity of the acquisition process by determining the beneficial
    ownership and responsibility determinations of companies and
    individuals with whom the Department contracts by applying similar
    continuous monitoring techniques. At the same time, the Department and
    Congress expect the intelligence and security components of DOD under
    the purview of the USD(I&S) to substantially increase the protection of
    the National Security Innovation Base from technology theft and
    subversion from foreign adversaries, while ensuring that American
    industry and academic institutions continue to be welcoming magnets for
    foreign personnel.
        Most of these very challenging new and enhanced requirements have
    been assigned to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency
    (DCSA). What is your current assessment of the ability of DCSA to
    transform itself to meet these objectives?
        Answer. I understand that the Department's intent for DCSA is to
    optimize the trustworthiness of the U.S. Government's workforce, the
    integrity of its cleared contractor support and the uncompromised
    nature of its technologies, services, and supply chains through
    vetting, industry engagement, counterintelligence support, and
    education. I further understand that DCSA has successfully merged three
    organizations, the Defense Security Service, the National Background
    Investigations Bureau and the Department of Defense Consolidated
    Adjudications Facility. The magnitude of what DCSA has already
    accomplished leads me to be optimistic that continued transformation of
    the agency to meet current and future critical technology protection
    requirements will remain on track.
        Question. These DCSA-assigned missions are critical to DOD's
    innovation strategy led by the Under Secretaries of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment and Research and Engineering. How would you
    ensure that DCSA is focused on meeting the needs of senior DOD
    officials outside of the OUSD(I&S)?
        Answer. I understand that DCSA's Critical Technology Protection
    mission supports the agency's overarching responsibilities to protect
    national security by clearing industrial facilities, personnel and
    associated information systems and the DCSA serves as the primary
    interface between the Federal Government and industry providing daily
    oversight, advise and assistance to cleared companies and ultimately
    determining the ability of those companies to protect classified
    research, development, and delivery on behalf of the DOD and 33 other
    Federal agencies. I understand the importance of their mission with A&S
    and R&E in protecting the Nation's critical technology. If confirmed, I
    will ensure that I&S and the leadership within DCSA are in constant
    collaboration with my counterparts within the Department and the
    Federal Government.
        Question. Specifically, if confirmed, how would you ensure that
    DCSA is highly responsive to the needs of the USD(A&S) for vetting DOD
    contractors in responsibility determinations?
        Answer. The Director, DCSA, operates under the authority,
    direction, and control of the USD(I&S). The timeliness of all
    background investigations conducted by DCSA will be closely monitored
    by USD(I&S) in cooperation with the Security and Suitability Executive
    Agents to ensure it meets its performance standards. To date, I
    understand that DCSA has greatly reduced the inventory and the amount
    of time it takes to conduct background investigations and expect the
    upcoming Trusted Workforce 2.0 will result in continued improvement in
    the timeliness of those investigations.
        Question. What is your understanding of the status of development,
    approval, and implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative?
        Answer. I understand that the initial steps are already underway,
    and that I&S continues to work closely with the Security Executive
    Agent (SecEA), Suitability Executive Agent (SuitEA), and the
    Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council
    (PAC) Performance Management Office (PMO) to complete development of
    Trusted Workforce 2.0 policy while working toward full implementation
    in the coming months. These efforts have included the enrollment of
    nearly all of the DOD cleared workforce in Continuous Evaluation (CE),
    which will enable the discontinuation of traditional and costly
    periodic reinvestigation practices.
        Question. What is your understanding of the remaining challenges in
    achieving reciprocity of clearances and access to classified
    information across government components and their contractors?
        Answer. I understand that while significant strides have been made
    in reducing timelines for reciprocal security determinations, there is
    always room for further progress, and workforce mobility continues to
    be a priority for the Department. I&S continues to work closely with
    the SecEA, the SuitEA, and Federal partners to further refine policies
    related to reciprocity through Trusted Workforce 2.0, leverage
    technology to develop modern solutions for information sharing between
    agencies, and to oversee reform efforts as they are implemented.
        Question. How, if at all, should the Department change its data
    ownership and governance policies to facilitate DITMAC's ability to
    access data from, and make correlations across, the intelligence,
    counter-intelligence, law enforcement, physical security, personnel
    security, human resources, network monitoring, and cybersecurity
    organizations across the DOD?
        Answer. Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these
    issues, I believe it is imperative that DITMAC and the DOD Insider
    Threat Enterprise have access to data from across these various
    relevant pillars to identify and mitigate potential threats from
    insiders, which will be especially critical as we modernize vetting to
    continuously review the trustworthiness of the workforce. If confirmed,
    I will ensure a continuous effort to eliminate stove-piping and remove
    barriers to data sharing, as allowed by law.
        Question. How should insider threat architecture and activities
    overseen by USD(I&S) be integrated and coordinated with the
    Department's cybersecurity architecture and activities, in your view?
    Can network activity monitoring for cybersecurity, especially on DOD's
    unclassified network, inform and augment insider threat detection? Can
    user activity monitoring for insider threat detection inform
    cybersecurity?
        Answer. I understand I&S maintains a close relationship with the
    office of the DOD CIO, which fosters exceptional integration and
    collaboration relevant to insider threat, user activity monitoring, and
    cybersecurity. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this relationship
    continues and seek ways to enhance our efforts to find areas of common
    interest, force multiplication, and implement efficiencies across both
    mission of insider threat detection and cybersecurity.
        Question. In your view, does the OUSD(I&S) have the requisite
    authority and technical expertise to guide the development of a
    comprehensive capability that uses modern information technology to
    integrate all sources of information for identifying insider threats?
        Answer. Although I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these
    programs, I believe the Department should maximize authorities and take
    a broad approach with respect to threat vector and population in the
    detection, prevention, and mitigation of an insider threat. This
    includes the technical capability to share data seamlessly between data
    sources. If confirmed, I will ensure a comprehensive Counter Insider
    Threat strategy and an innovative, directive approach, seeking to
    implement cutting edge data management policies and technologies that
    capture an ``all source,'' shared picture of potential insider threats.
        Question. What is your understanding of the technical and systems
    integration challenges involved in improving personnel security
    processes and insider threat detection and prevention within DOD?
        Answer. While I have not been briefed on the programs or
    challenges, I believe that DOD confronts the common challenges faced by
    many organizations when developing large scale information technology
    systems that ingest, disseminate, and retain large volumes of data with
    interfaces across numerous platforms and missions. However, if
    confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure the integration challenges are
    minimized and mission effectiveness in personnel security and insider
    threat is increased.
        Question. What is your understanding of the cultural and
    organizational resistance to improvements in the personnel security
    processes and insider threat detection and prevention in DOD?
        Answer. I understand that the Department as a whole can be
    resistant to change due to its size, complexity, and culture. Although
    I have not yet been fully briefed on all of these issues, I believe any
    cultural or organizational resistance can be overcome by an emphasis on
    the benefit of increased security, conducted more efficiently and at an
    improved cost-to-benefit ratio, due to the improvement of current
    processes. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward overcoming the
    cultural and organizational resistance to forthcoming adjustments in
    these key security domains.
        Question. Given that several recent insider threats were from
    contractor employees, is it advisable and appropriate, in your view,
    for the DITMAC to have access to or be integrated in DOD contractors'
    data systems? If so, how might such a program be implemented? If such a
    program is not feasible, advisable, or suitable, what might you suggest
    as an alternative for mitigating the risk that contractor employees
    will engage in insider threat activities?
        Answer. Effective sharing of information between the government and
    contractors is critical to our ability to collectively mitigate insider
    threats. Additionally, this enhances the vetting programs required for
    issuing forms of identification, which grant access to Federal
    facilities, as described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
    12. It is my understanding that the DITMAC serves an essential role as
    the over-arching DOD Insider Threat hub, and if confirmed I will
    examine more closely how DITMAC can be leveraged as an asset for
    additional insider threat mitigation and for strengthening connections
    with our industry partners.
        Question. In your view, how should DCSA posture the Department to
    deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they harm national
    security?
        Answer. The designation and continuing transformation of DCSA
    brings together two national security missions instrumental to
    deterring, detecting, and mitigating threats to the Department--the
    continuous vetting of personnel and stand-alone programs throughout the
    DOD enterprise designed to counter threats posed by insiders. This
    convergence enables these separate but complementary missions to more
    easily share data, coordinate necessary actions, and streamline
    processes and capabilities to deter, detect, and mitigate insider
    threats. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DCSA to ensure
    this new organization reaches its full potential.
        Question. What can the OUSD(I&S) do to ensure that senior leaders
    in each DOD Component--not only the intelligence or counterintelligence
    communities--are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities,
    information from insider threats as a core mission objective?
        Answer. A key component to detecting, preventing, and mitigating
    insider threats is ensuring management and leadership awareness of the
    risks to the Department and their role and responsibility in promoting
    awareness in the workforce. This includes ensuring that the
    organization's insider threat programs--specifically programs
    responsible for determining suitability and fitness, issuing
    credentials, and vetting personnel--meet requirements and are resourced
    for success in order to enhance and further such programs. It also
    means setting standards of conduct for the workforce, fostering
    positive workplace climates and cultures, and encouraging reporting of
    concerning behaviors and indicators. If confirmed, I will work with
    Senior Leaders across the Department to prioritize insider threat
    programs, including appropriate funding and resourcing to support this
    critical mission.
        Question. How should vetting policies and processes applicable to
    foreign military students enrolled in DOD training and educational
    programs help to mitigate risk to U.S. personnel, facilities, and
    equipment?
        Answer. Following the terrorist attack at Naval Air Station
    Pensacola in December 2019, I understand that DOD took steps to more
    closely align vetting and security processes for international military
    students (IMS) and their accompanying family members with that of U.S.
    military personnel. In parallel with the implementation of these DOD-
    established installation security measures, I appreciate that relevant
    new U.S. law was enacted on January 1, 2021, as part of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Section 1090 of that
    Act was in response to the same terrorist attack. The new law requires
    DOD to establish vetting procedures as well as physical security
    requirements for non-U.S. individuals accepted for training on DOD
    installations in the United States. The implementation of the DOD
    requirements, as well as future implementation of the Section 1090
    requirements will provide a greater level of security for both U.S.
    personnel and our allies and partners training with us on DOD
    installations. If confirmed, I will work to advance vetting policies
    and processes within the Department to help mitigate risks to U.S.
    personnel, facilities, and equipment.
        Question. The Department of Defense is pursuing a wide-ranging
    strategy to engage with commercial entities engaged in cutting-edge
    research and development. The Department recognizes that it needs new
    acquisition policies and practices to enable the Department to engage
    the private sector with the necessary speed, agility and flexibility.
    Two related obstacles are the time and difficulty involved in the
    security clearance process and the hurdles that non-traditional
    contractors face in getting access to data to test and demonstrate new
    information technology and software. The National Geospatial-
    Intelligence Agency (NGA), for example, concluded that it lacked the
    authority to share even its unclassified imagery data with companies
    and universities it hoped could develop dramatically improved
    exploitation capabilities through machine learning-based artificial
    intelligence algorithms.
        How might DOD's security apparatus adapt and tailor its
    requirements and procedures better to support the Department's
    innovation activities, in your view?
        Answer. The Department must overcome its reliance on traditional
    policies and practices when it comes to identifying and implementing
    innovation. Future Public-Private partnerships will be essential to the
    Department's innovation aspirations, and authorities can and should be
    changed if they inhibit creativity and progress provided those changes
    do not create unacceptable risk. Regarding background investigations, I
    understand there have been significant improvements in overall
    timeliness that should mitigate against delays in getting the right
    people on board. With respect to increasing collaboration with non-
    traditional contractors and academic researchers, I am aware of a range
    of initiatives underway in the Department that could help in this area.
    If confirmed, I will work closely with our Acquisition and Research
    colleagues in OSD and the Congress to continue to identify improvements
    in policy and oversight to ensure the Department is effectively engaged
    across the National Security Innovation Base.
        Question. Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis established the
    Protecting Critical Technology Task Force in late-2018, reporting to
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. The Task Force was one component of DOD's response to
    Intelligence Community warnings that China and Russia are engaged in
    campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary information, and other
    forms of intellectual property from the United States, through
    infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition of knowledge by
    foreign students at U.S. universities, and other nefarious means--all
    as part of a strategic technology acquisition program.
        How would you characterize the threat posed by foreign nations to
    the integrity of the National Security Innovation Base? Which threats
    do you assess as most concerning, and why?
        Answer. Although I have not been briefed on the details, I am aware
    from open source reporting that the threat is significant and
    concerning. I am aware that foreign nations are continuously probing
    our supply chains to identify and exploit weak links, poor or
    insufficient security practices, and insider threats. Threats that
    erode US technology superiority are of the highest concern given the
    negative effects they have on our ability to maintain a military
    advantage over future adversaries.
        Question. In your view, is the OUSD(I&S) appropriately resourced
    and organized to ensure the security of the National Security
    Innovation Base, critical technology, and related intellectual property
    that are critical to the DOD? What changes, if any, would you
    recommend?
        Answer. Protecting the National Security Innovation Base requires
    tight collaboration across the Intelligence, Security, Acquisition, and
    Research enterprises within DOD, as well as equally strong
    collaboration with our interagency partners. Although I am not aware of
    any pressing resource or organizational challenges within I&S, if
    confirmed I will make it a priority to assess the full measure of
    support requirements and work closely across the enterprise to ensure
    we have the right alignment to counter the threat.
        Question. How would you propose to improve the support provided by
    the DCSA, the DOD counterintelligence organizations, and the national
    Intelligence Community to better protect the National Security
    Innovation Base, and enhance the Department's innovation strategy,
    especially with respect to technology companies that are non-
    traditional DOD contractors?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance DOD
    counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security capabilities,
    leveraging DOD's interagency partners, especially the FBI, to detect,
    deter, and disrupt the attempts of China and other adversaries to
    penetrate and exploit the National Security Innovation Base and the
    Defense Industrial Base it supports.
                         collection & special programs
        Question. In light of the rapidly evolving nature of the national
    security environment, to include significant advances by adversarial
    nations in the development and fielding of capabilities that could
    challenge DOD tradecraft, technologies, methodologies, and processes,
    what do you see as the most pressing challenges to DOD's ability to
    conduct technical and human intelligence collection activities?
        Answer. It is clear the technology environment today has created
    pressing challenges in the conduct of traditional collection
    activities. Increasingly, adversary development of advanced
    technologies, such as computing, artificial intelligence, and secure
    communications, as well as the diffusion of sophisticated capabilities
    worldwide, complicate the information environment and reduce our
    national security advantage. In addition, the volume of commercially
    available data on individuals and their activity and the proliferation
    of both networked, correlated, and automated systems as well as
    algorithms that can exploit the information could pose a challenge to
    DOD human intelligence collection activities.
        If confirmed, I would work to ensure that sufficient focus and
    resources are devoted to Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise
    efforts to address these global realities and pursue additional
    resources if there are critical technical and human intelligence
    collection shortfalls. These challenges are not unique to the
    Department and, if confirmed, I would work with our IC partners to
    integrate and synchronize DOD and IC efforts and resources for
    addressing threats such as Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS),
    enabled by rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and
    machine learning (ML). Maintaining freedom of action in the physical or
    virtual world is paramount to the Department's ability to leverage all
    available collection platforms especially because cyberspace is now a
    contested domain. Our ability to collect in and through cyberspace must
    remain a priority. As with the physical domain, freedom in cyberspace
    is challenged by malign actors and the proliferation of AI and ML.
        Last, I also believe that recruiting and retaining the right
    cultural and technical expertise is a challenge to overcome. Due to
    complex collection requirements, and the aggressive global posture of
    strategic competitors, with extensive CI capabilities we require a
    cadre of collectors that culturally understand, look, speak, and act
    like our adversaries wherever they challenge global norms. Diversity in
    the IC is a mission imperative--we must create a pathway that attracts
    the right individuals while not compromising the professional ethics
    that our enterprise is built upon.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to approach these
    challenges to ensure that the DOD intelligence enterprise is postured
    to operate in an increasingly contested security and intelligence
    environment?
        Answer. I believe the major challenges confronting the Department
    include adapting to and providing timely awareness and insights into a
    diverse, complex and ever-changing array of security challenges. If
    confirmed, I will lead the continuous review of processes and policies
    to support warfighters and decisionmakers in this changing environment.
    This may require changes in how DOD personnel train and use tradecraft,
    technologies, methodologies, as well as process adjustments for
    collection analysis. Aggressive efforts to ensure DOD is leveraging the
    best commercial technologies will remain essential, as will our ability
    to rapidly field technologies where required.
                             intelligence oversight
        Question. In your view, what is the role of the OUSD(I&S) in
    ensuring that sensitive activities across DOD are consistently
    conducted in accordance with standards of legality and propriety?
        Answer. I understand the USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant
    and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense
    regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive
    activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The USD(I&S)
    establishes policy and provides oversight and direction for the
    coordination, assessment, reporting, and conduct of Department of
    Defense (DOD) intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive
    activities, the Defense Cover Program, special communications,
    technical collection support to intelligence activities, defense
    sensitive support, and the clandestine use of technology. If confirmed,
    I would work closely with relevant defense and interagency stakeholders
    to ensure DOD sensitive activities are conducted consistent with law
    and DOD policy.
        Question. In your view, how should the OUSD(I&S) engage with the
    President's Intelligence Oversight Board and on what matters?
        Answer. Based on my experience, the process in which the Assistant
    to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))
    notifies the PIOB of Questionable Intelligence Activities and
    Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters is effective. If confirmed, I
    look forward to fostering a positive relationship with the ATSD(IO) and
    PIOB during my tenure, and ensuring that my office provides subject-
    matter expertise, as required by DOD policy, to support the ATSD(IO)'s
    inspection, investigative, and reporting activities, including
    notifications to the PIOB.
                             information operations
        Question. The Russian government conducted, mainly through
    cyberspace, an aggressive information operations campaign against the
    United States in 2016 and again in 2020, in an attempt to influence
    Presidential elections and undermine faith in America's democratic
    system and institutions. In 2016, in particular, DOD, and the Federal
    Government as a whole, were ill-prepared to detect, defend against, and
    respond to these operations.
        What are your views on the roles, responsibilities, and
    preparedness of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise to
    deter and defend against strategic information operations?
        Answer. I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must
    improve its ability to compete in the information environment and to
    inform and shape the perceptions of specific audiences in order to gain
    or maintain a competitive advantage. My view is that the Department of
    Defense should conduct military operations in the information
    environment, including clandestine operations as defined in section
    1631 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,
    across multiple domains to counter foreign malign actors and advance
    U.S. national security. Our efforts to deter and defend against foreign
    strategic information operations should be prioritized with appropriate
    resources and must include more robust coordination and collaboration
    across the Department, including the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy acting as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Information
    Operations Advisor, and the executive branch. If confirmed, I will work
    to ensure this happens.
        Question. Section 1631 of the FY2020 NDAA required the designation
    of a Principal Information Operations Advisor (PIOA) to the Secretary
    of Defense and a Joint Force Trainer and Joint Force Provider for
    Information Operations. The Secretary of Defense designated the USD(P)
    as the PIOA but the Committee is unaware that any Joint Force Provider/
    Trainer designation has been made. In addition, shortly before he left
    office, Acting Secretary of Defense Miller rescinded the PIOA
    designation and directed the creation in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense of a Directorate for Strategic Competition, the Director of
    which would become PIOA and manage a task force. Acting Secretary
    Miller further directed the integration of the USD(I&S)-led Strategic
    Competition and Influence Task Force (SCITF) with the Directorate for
    Strategic Competition. The Committee has been informed that Acting
    Secretary Miller's decisions have been put on hold pending review and
    direction by Secretary Austin.
        What are your views on the role that the OUSD(I&S) should play in
    the development and supervision of the implementation of Information
    Operations policy, strategy, and resource sponsorship? Should there be
    a separate Task Force on Strategic Competition and Influence in your
    view?
        Answer. I understand that the Department continues to review its
    strategy, policy, and resources for information operations. I believe
    the USD(I&S) should play a key role in these efforts as the designated
    Principal Staff Assistant for certain information-related capabilities.
    If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P), the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and other DOD leaders to present the Secretary of
    Defense with the best possible organizational approach to address these
    issues.
        Question. What are your views regarding the designation of an
    Information Operations Joint Force Provider and Trainer?
        Answer. I have not been briefed on this initiative, but if
    confirmed, I look forward to studying it in further detail.
        Question. On March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti, then Commander,
    U.S. European Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services
    Committee that U.S. efforts to counter Russian influence operations
    still lacked ``effective unification across the interagency'' and that
    the United States has yet to develop ``a multi-faceted strategy to
    counter Russia.''
        Do you agree with General Scaparrotti's assessment in this regard?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I agree that we must improve our interagency efforts to
    counter foreign malign influence. I understand that the Director of
    National Intelligence is establishing a Foreign Malign Influence and
    Response Center to improve the unified, whole-of-government effort to
    counter foreign malign influence from countries like Russia, China and
    Iran. If confirmed, I will ensure the USD(I&S) staff coordinates with
    this new Center and collaborates to ensure the Department's activities
    are synchronized, as appropriate.
        Question. In your view, how might the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprise best contribute to efforts to counter Russian
    influence operations?
        Answer. I understand the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise (DISE) is shifting its collection and other activities
    toward China and Russia. This includes the DISE contributing to efforts
    that counter Russian influence operations by developing frameworks that
    can be rapidly operationalized against key foreign target audiences to
    shape the collection focus and prioritization. If confirmed, I will
    continue to place emphasis on strategic competition with Russia and
    China and work to ensure DOD efforts are coordinated and integrated
    within a whole-of-government approach. I will also work to ensure
    appropriate planning, programming, and budgeting for DOD activities
    that are required to effectively engage in this mission space, such as
    foreign target audience analysis, key influencer identification, and
    early indicators & warnings of adversary disinformation.
        Question. In January 2020, nine combatant commanders sent a letter
    to the Director of National Intelligence requesting better and more
    timely support from the intelligence community to publicly illuminate
    malign influence and coercive activities by China and Russia.
        In your view, how can the Defense Intelligence Enterprise better
    support the requirements of the combatant commanders?
        Answer. I believe that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must
    improve its ability to support combatant commanders by fully
    understanding adversarial goals in the information environment; by
    engaging with those who are impacted by foreign malign influence and
    coercive operations; and by enabling efforts, in alignment with
    national and defense priorities, to inform and shape the perceptions of
    specific foreign audiences to gain or maintain a competitive U.S.
    national security advantage.
        Question. In your view, would the illumination of these malign
    activities help to dissuade or deter China and Russia?
        Answer. I believe DOD efforts to expose Russian and Chinese
    disinformation should be prioritized, supported, resourced, and
    executed to dissuade or deter their malign activities. If confirmed, I
    will make it a priority to attribute, expose, and counter foreign
    malign activities that harm U.S. national security interests.
        Question. In September 2018, DOD released its 2018 Cyber Strategy.
    The Strategy charges DOD to ``defend forward, shape the day-to-day
    competition, and prepare for war'' in the cyber domain.
        In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Defense
    Intelligence and Security Enterprise in operationalizing the ``defend
    forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war''
    concepts animating the Department's 2018 Cyber Strategy?
        Answer. These concepts require the DISE to provide intelligence
    support to DOD components at a speed and scale that enables current and
    future cyber operations. Therefore, I believe that intelligence support
    to cyberspace operations must accomplish the following objectives:
    supporting the Joint Force in execution of critical missions in a
    contested cyberspace domain; maximizing integrated information sharing
    and collaboration with foreign allies and partners, interagency
    stakeholders, and the public and private sectors; and normalizing
    intelligence support to cyberspace operations using business practices
    and processes similar to those used in other domains, while providing
    the DISE clarity of roles, missions, and functions in cyberspace
    operations.
        DISE knowledge of the domestic risk landscape and work with the
    private sector informs DOD's defend forward efforts to preempt, defeat,
    and deter malicious cyber activity outside the U.S. that is, for
    example, targeting our critical infrastructure. DOD's ``defend
    forward'' operations also inform and guide efforts at DHS to anticipate
    adversary action, understand potential risks to critical
    infrastructure, and empower our private sector stakeholders with the
    information they need to secure their enterprise.
        Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to remediate
    any gap between Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise capacity
    and capabilities and the goals of the Cyber Strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Department stakeholders, the
    DISE, and IC to enable the continued implementation of the USD(I&S)
    Defense Intelligence Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. This strategy
    provides overarching direction to the DISE in closing gaps with the
    Cyber Strategy as identified in the 2018 Cyber Posture Review.
        If confirmed, I would continue efforts to clarify intelligence
    roles and responsibilities to include those responsible for developing
    foundational military intelligence for cyberspace operations;
    incorporate and standardize cyber requirements into intelligence
    business processes and human capital management; develop the supporting
    infrastructure for optimizing and augmenting intelligence with advanced
    technologies, while continuing to support tool development; and
    emphasize the development of partnerships with allies and industry to
    include increased collaboration with the Defense Industrial Base and
    other government stakeholders in the Intelligence Community, law
    enforcement, and cybersecurity to improve intelligence support for
    whole of government operations.
        Question. What role should DOD, and the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprise in particular, including the National Security
    Agency and the intelligence elements of United States Cyber Command,
    occupy in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
    conducted via social media?
        Answer. I expect that foreign states will continue to use malign
    influence measures in their attempts to sway U.S. voters' preferences
    and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United
    States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our
    democratic process. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DOD and the
    DISE are postured to support the whole-of-government effort, using all
    elements of national power, to expose and counter clandestinely
    disseminated malign influence and information campaigns, propaganda,
    and disinformation.
        Question. What role should DOD and the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprise in particular, play in anticipating or responding
    to cyber attacks on commercial entities, in your view?
        Answer. DOD is responsible for threat response to DOD cyber
    incidents affecting DOD assets and the DOD Information Network (DODIN).
    DOD can also support civil authorities for cyber incidents outside the
    DODIN when requested by, for example, the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) when such support is approved by the appropriate DOD
    official, or directed by the President. Such support would be provided
    based upon the needs of the incident, the capabilities required, and
    the readiness of available forces. DOD, thru the DISE, actively
    characterizes and assesses foreign cybersecurity threats and informs
    relevant interagency partners of current and potential malicious cyber
    activity. Upon request, the DISE components may provide technical
    assistance to other U.S. departments and agencies. Other DOD Components
    may provide support to civil authorities in accordance with applicable
    law and policy.
        Question. What are your views as to whether the ``dual hatting'' of
    the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director of the National
    Security Agency should be maintained or terminated?
        Answer. I understand that the Department, in coordination with the
    Director of National Intelligence, has been studying this question
    closely to ensure that any decision concerning the future of the dual-
    hat leadership arrangement is fully informed and addresses potential
    risks to national security and to the operational effectiveness of U.S.
    Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. I am also aware of the
    legal requirement for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff to make certain certifications before this
    arrangement could be terminated. If confirmed, I would ensure that a
    review of this question is comprehensive so that decisionmakers are
    fully informed about the impact on national security of any change to
    the dual-hat leadership arrangement.
        Question. Should intelligence support (under the oversight of
    OUSD(I&S)) to the overall DOD cybersecurity mission (under the
    oversight of the Principal Cyber Advisor) be enhanced, in your view?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe that a close and continuing partnership between
    the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Principal Cyber Advisor, and
    OUSD(I&S) is essential to best align intelligence policies and
    capabilities with policy objectives outlined in the DOD Cyber Strategy.
    I do not currently have sufficient information to have a perspective
    about the adequacy of the support at this time, but if confirmed, I
    will ensure OUSD(I&S) remains a valued partner in the DOD cybersecurity
    mission.
                 torture and enhanced interrogation techniques
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the standards for detainee
    treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued
    in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program,
    dated August 19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18,
    2020), and required by Section 1045 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92).
        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing
    triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the NDAA for
    fiscal year 2016?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the OUSD(I&S) staff to
    ensure that the review is thorough and that appropriate recommendations
    are provided to the Secretary. My understanding is that the review is
    examining the intelligence interrogation approaches and techniques in
    the FM based on lessons learned over the past several years.
        Question. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM
    2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I am not currently aware of any provisions in the FM that
    may need to be revised, but if confirmed I will make my assessment.
        Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S. Code, defines grave
    breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including
    torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.
        In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a way that
    provides U.S. detainees in the custody of other nations, as well as
    foreign detainees in U.S. custody appropriate protections from abusive
    treatment?
        Answer. Yes. Section 2441 applies to war crimes, including grave
    breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, committed by or
    against a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a U.S. national. I believe
    that we must to continue to hold ourselves to the highest standards for
    the humane treatment of detainees, and that we must make clear to our
    foreign partners that we expect them to do the same.
                imperative for independent intelligence analysis
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that DOD intelligence analysts, including those seconded to offices
    that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are
    independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of
    command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits
    a particular policy preference?
        Answer. I believe that defense intelligence assessments must remain
    unbiased, objective, and free from political interference.
        I understand that ensuring the objectivity of defense intelligence
    analysis is a critical part of the USD(I&S) oversight role. If
    confirmed, I will hold senior leaders of the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise accountable to providing fact-based, unbiased analysis,
    independent of political factors in accordance with all applicable laws
    and professional standards.
                       the defense intelligence workforce
        Question. The USD(I&S) exercises policy oversight of the Defense
    Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) to ensure that defense
    intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components are
    structured; manned; trained--including joint intelligence training,
    certification, education, and professional development; and equipped to
    execute their missions.
        Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce properly sized, in your
    view? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the size and
    capability of the defense civilian intelligence workforce, but I
    believe people are the most important part of any organization. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
    sufficiently sized to provide timely and reasoned intelligence products
    to the warfighters and policymakers.
        Question. Does the DOD civilian intelligence workforce have the
    appropriate capabilities, and are those capabilities properly
    distributed, in your view?
        Answer. I do not have sufficient information to provide a
    perspective at this time. However, based on my experience in
    intelligence, and particularly my time at the National Security Agency,
    it is my impression that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
    providing quality and timely intelligence to the warfighter and
    policymaker. However, as with any organization, missions evolve and
    adjustments to the workforce may be needed. If confirmed, I will work
    to assess our workforce alignment to national defense priorities and
    propose such actions as may be deemed beneficial.
        Question. Are the number and quality of candidates referred and
    available for consideration and selection by intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and security community hiring officials adequate
    to sustain and enhance the capabilities of the civilian intelligence
    workforce?
        Answer. I have not received any information on candidate pools.
    However, I believe people are the most important part of any
    organization. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we have the most
    qualified intelligence and security professionals, and that we
    persistently and aggressively seek opportunities to expand candidate
    pools to acquire both the skills and diversity necessary to accomplish
    DOD intelligence and security missions.
        Question. If confirmed, what factors and characteristics would be
    most important to you in selecting a candidate for appointment in the
    Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)? As a Defense
    Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) official?
        Answer. The Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES)
    provides the executive leadership for the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprise. I believe the Senior Executives Service Core
    Qualifications--Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven,
    Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions--provide a sound underlying
    basis for executive selections. I believe there should be a premium
    placed on a proven ability to collaborate effectively across
    boundaries.
        Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL) employees complement the
    executive leadership of DISES by providing the extraordinary
    substantive and technical expertise, in combination with the
    demonstrated talent for personal leadership, within critical career
    fields. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on identifying,
    selecting, and developing all personnel to accomplish our mission
    objectives, including DISES and DISL.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you go about ensuring that DISES
    and DISL under your authority are held accountable for both
    organizational performance and the rigorous performance management of
    their subordinate employees?
        Answer. We can accomplish what we can measure. If confirmed, I
    intend to use the executive performance management system to maintain
    oversight of executive and senior level performance.
        Question. Are you satisfied with the subject matter and rigor of
    DISES and DISL professional development programs currently available
    across DOD? If not, what changes would you make to these programs, if
    confirmed?
        Answer. I have not yet been briefed on the content and rigor of
    these professional development programs within DOD. However, if
    confirmed, I intend to assess the effectiveness of these programs. I
    believe that a talented and effective leadership cadre is critical to
    successfully delivering quality intelligence to the warfighter and
    policymaker.
        Question. Are you satisfied that the process employed by the
    OUSD(I&S) to validate whether a vacant DISES/DISL position should be
    rehired, restructured, or eliminated is effective in responding to
    current and emergent mission needs of the Defense Intelligence and
    Security Enterprise? If confirmed as the USD(I&S), what would be your
    role in this process?
        Answer. I have not yet been fully briefed on the processes in place
    for validation of DISES and DISL positions. However, I recognize that
    continuous evaluation of requirements is an essential mechanism to
    ensure our leadership positions are appropriately manned and
    structured. Every executive wants maximum flexibility to adapt their
    organization to support mission success, and if confirmed, I will
    ensure oversight processes are in place that support an agile and
    adaptive Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise.
        Question. The Intelligence Community ``Joint Duty'' program was
    established in response to the requirements set forth in the 2004
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that service in more
    than one IC element be a condition for promotion to the senior
    executive level.
        Do members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce participate
    in the ``Joint Duty'' program? If so, to what extent does DOD
    participate?
        Answer. I understand that the DOD civilian intelligence workforce
    participates fully in the Joint Duty program. DOD Instruction 1400.36
    implements the Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignment (JDA)
    Program within the Department and provides that JDA Program
    certification is a requirement for DISL and DISES positions. It is also
    my understanding that joint duty is encouraged in all defense
    intelligence components as a key element of an individual's career
    development.
        Question. What are your views on the merit and utility of the
    ``Joint Duty'' program as a professional development experience for
    members of the DOD civilian intelligence workforce?
        Answer. I believe the civilian joint duty program is an essential
    element of the professional development experience for members of the
    DOD civilian intelligence workforce. It is key that our civilian
    intelligence professionals understand the relationships among the
    members of the intelligence community and that throughout their careers
    they build deep and enduring professional relationships across the
    Intelligence Community (IC). Joint experience supports a fully
    integrated and collaborative intelligence community. Similar to the way
    that the military joint duty requirements from the Goldwater-Nichols
    Act has paid dividends for the military services, the civilian joint
    duty program is vital to building a more integrated, interoperable, and
    effective IC.
        Question. What other innovative ideas do you have for the
    professional development of non-executive members of the DOD civilian
    intelligence workforce?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have the requisite information about
    current efforts to recommend specific ideas. I believe that continuing
    professional development throughout one's career is critical to both
    developing the most effective intelligence capabilities and retaining
    the expertise behind it. Based on my experience at NSA, I believe that
    if we are to maintain our competitive advantage, we will need to build
    more effective public-private partnerships, both with academia and
    industry. We must find ways to enable seamless mobility between
    government and the private sector throughout an employee's career,
    particularly in out most demanding technical areas, to ensure we have
    the expert, professional, and motivated workforce the 21st century
    demands. If confirmed, I will pursue efforts to increase opportunities
    for professional development within the workforce that enable the
    career mobility necessary to build the diversity and capability of the
    workforce.
        Question. Is the DOD civilian intelligence workforce prepared to
    sustain requisite capacity and capability during the impending
    workforce ``bath tub''--a descriptor often used to graphically
    illustrate the impending potential loss of civilian workforce expertise
    due to the retirement of large numbers of ``baby boomers'' and the lack
    of experienced people to fill the vacancies?
        Answer. I have not been fully briefed on all aspects of the DOD
    civilian intelligence workforce hiring and personnel authorities. For
    any organization, understanding the dynamics of the workforce through
    effective workforce analytics is critical to plan for workforce
    requirement changes driven by evolution of mission--we must measure
    what we intend to achieve. If confirmed, I would ensure the OUSD(I&S)
    is taking necessary efforts to require active succession planning for
    the enterprise while aggressively projecting workforce requirements and
    that the authorities provided to the Secretary of Defense for the
    defense intelligence workforce provide the flexibilities necessary to
    address, maintain, and build workforce capability.
        Question. Does the USD(I&S) need additional hiring, development,
    recruitment, retention, or compensation authorities to enable further
    improvements in the capacity and capability of the DCIPS? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. In general, I understand that the authorities under title
    10 provide the Department with flexibility to address capacity and
    capability requirements of the civilian workforce. However, I am also
    aware that challenges continue to exist in DOD's ability to address
    competitive requirements for certain key skill areas, such as those in
    the cyber and STEM fields. I understand that the Department has limited
    pay authorities applicable to the National Security Agency needed to
    address a critical compensation shortfall in their cyber workforce. If
    confirmed, I will review the authorities available to the Department
    and assess whether any additional authorities are required to address
    DCIPS challenges.
                            whistleblower protection
        Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S. Code, prohibits taking or
    threatening to take an unfavorable personnel action against a member of
    the armed forces in retaliation for making a protected communication.
    Section 2302 of title 5, U.S. Code, provides similar protections to
    Federal civilian employees. By definition, protected communications
    include communications to certain individuals and organizations outside
    of the chain of command, including the Congress.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that military
    and civilian members of the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross mismanagement--
    including in classified programs--to appropriate authorities within or
    outside the chain of command--are protected from reprisal and
    retaliation, including from the very highest levels of DOD and the
    broader Intelligence Community?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring protections are
    afforded to DISE personnel who report fraud, waste, and abuse, or gross
    mismanagement, in a manner consistent with law and regulation.
    Additionally, I will ensure that personnel who pursue retaliatory
    actions upon protected personnel are addressed appropriately, as
    established by law and regulation.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring
    consistency in the application and interpretation of whistleblower
    protections across the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will carry out my responsibilities to
    ensure that the DOD policy implementing such protections is applied
    consistently and uniformly in accordance with law.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 ODOD Civilian Employee
    Workplace and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17717.7 percent of
    female and 5.88 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had
    experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone
    at work'' in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
    otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(I&S)?
        Answer. There is no place for this conduct in the Department of
    Defense or Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will exercise my
    oversight responsibilities for the Defense Intelligence and Security
    Enterprise to ensure that reports of sexual harassment or gender
    discrimination are dealt with swiftly and in accordance with law and
    policy.
                                     space
        Question. In the past 2 years the United States has stood up the
    U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) and assigned it responsibility for the
    operational planning of DOD space missions and activities. As well, the
    U.S. Space Force was established as a sixth Military Service, charged
    with the Title 10 responsibilities for the space domain.
        If confirmed, specifically what would be your approach to enhancing
    the interface and synchronization of space-based capabilities resident
    in the Intelligence Community with military space organizations?
        Answer. The DOD and IC have a long history of collaboration in
    fielding and operating space systems, and USD(I&S) plays an important
    role in the synchronization of these efforts. Space system development
    and operations benefits from collaboration across agency boundaries and
    the effectiveness of those systems improves with improved integration.
    If confirmed, I will continue to look for opportunities to expand
    collaboration between NRO and other military space organizations to
    enable sharing of capabilities that are mutually beneficial to DOD and
    IC.
        Question. How would you recommend deconflicting tasking
    requirements in the space warfighting domain across DOD with tasking
    requirements from Intelligence Community customers?
        Answer. Deconfliction for tasking intelligence collection is
    executed through the Functional Manager roles, which consider both DOD
    and IC priorities. As with other domains, intelligence support to space
    warfighting requires balancing tasking requirements among the numerous
    stakeholders served by national collection. There will likely be growth
    in the collection and analytical needs of space intelligence and
    defense missions and, if confirmed, I will work with the functional
    managers on ways to better streamline the tasking process to increase
    access, agility, and responsiveness to best satisfy these unique space
    intelligence requirements.
        Question. NRO recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
    the U.S. Army for a tactical space layer to provide alternative
    Position, Navigation and Timing, as well to provide Army ground
    stations with tactical battlefield situational awareness and ISR.
        In your view, is the NRO moving to more of a direct support role to
    the Services?
        Answer. The NRO provides critical intelligence to the Services to
    meet tactical to strategic requirements. I understand that NRO is
    working diligently to develop advanced space capabilities and resilient
    architectures to provide real time support to the warfighter. If
    confirmed, I will work with the NRO and the Department to develop end-
    to-end space architectures that can meet National, Service and
    Combatant Command requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Space Force and
    NRO are not duplicating capabilities and responsibilities for the Joint
    Force?
        Answer. My understanding is that there is strong coordination
    between the Space Force and NRO which is reinforced through the mature
    DOD Budgeting Programming and requirements process. The USD(I&S)
    participates in these requirements through validation, resourcing, and
    oversight processes. If confirmed, I will ensure OUSD(I&S) has a
    continued active role in these processes.
        Question. In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of
    command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in
    ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and allied space
    assets? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The key to an effective ``protect and defend'' strategy is
    the seamless execution of space defense actions, synchronized across
    DOD and IC platforms under a collaborative unity of effort. The
    National Space Defense Center is where this unified defense comes
    together. As adversaries increasingly threaten US freedom of action in
    space, the DOD and IC must continue to strengthen partnerships to
    maintain a competitive advantage. Enhanced space cooperation within the
    U.S. Government and with the international community and commercial
    sector will provide a durable strategic advantage for the U.S. and our
    allies and partners and serve as a force multiplier to protect and
    defend against adversary use of space for purposes hostile to U.S.
    interests.
        I believe that we succeed when we train as we intend to fight.
    Wargames, exercises, and planning activities continue to inform the
    development of space protect-and-defend tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. DOD is committed to an approach to space defense that
    balances the need to protect national space assets and continue the
    space-based intelligence mission that is critical to win in space and
    in support of other domains.
        Question. How best could members of the defense intelligence
    workforce--both military and civilian--be utilized in support of the
    U.S. Space Force?
        Answer. The defense intelligence workforce offers a variety of
    capabilities to the U.S. Space Force (USSF), including intelligence
    support to space, technical and acquisitions expertise, and satellite
    operations. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise will continue to align
    resources and manpower to support the USSF in response to current and
    future space threats and enable effective deterrence and defense. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Department and across the IC to ensure
    the Space Force has access to intelligence personnel and capabilities.
        Question. The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency not
    designated as a combat support agency (CSA). Historically, the NRO has
    asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not
    make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and
    controls. In NRO's view, others, principally its mission partners--NSA
    and NGA--which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining
    the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational
    tasking of deployed satellites. Now, however, there exists a class of
    operational decisions for which the NRO Director is responsible: in
    situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threat of same,
    the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions
    regarding space control.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure that the NRO is sufficiently
    integrated with and responsive to the U.S. Space Force? To U.S. Space
    Command?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen collaboration
    between NRO and U.S. Space Force and the US Space Command in both
    development and operations. I believe the addition of the Director of
    the NRO as a member of the Space Force Acquisition Council will improve
    collaboration in space system development. For operations, the National
    Space Defense Center (NSDC) is the central point of integration and
    unity of effort. Accordingly, I would work with U.S. Space Command to
    ensure NSDC has a unified structure that fully integrates DOD and IC
    space defense plans and capabilities.
        Question. Given that NRO would be required to respond operationally
    to active threats to reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a
    conflict, should the Department consider designating NRO as a CSA?
        Answer. No, I believe the NRO has a unique role which is different
    from that of any of the Combat Support Agencies. For operational
    decisions regarding space control, the NRO and US Space Command have
    established a unified defense concept of operations at the National
    Space Defense Center to ensure integrated operations in times of
    conflict. In my opinion, this agreement provides the necessary unity of
    effort without designating NRO as a Combat Support Agency.
    Additionally, the Combat Support Agencies (NGA and NSA) are the
    functional managers and develop the collection priorities for the NRO
    assets.
        Question. How is the NRO synchronizing its acquisition efforts with
    the DOD Space enterprise and architecture?
        Answer. Space system development benefits from collaboration across
    agency boundaries and the effectiveness of those systems improves with
    better interagency integration. If confirmed, I will consider how
    OUSD(I&S) can expand collaboration opportunities as the Department and
    the Intelligence Community (IC) move forward to orchestrate the
    development and fielding of a future threat-driven National Defense
    Space Architecture.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                              beneficial ownership
        1. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, foreign adversaries such as Russia
    and China are also taking advantage of our open markets to engage in
    malign financial influence activities, including seeking to gain
    ownership or control over companies contracting with the Department of
    Defense (DOD) and other private businesses so as to get access to
    sensitive information or technologies. In too many cases, the
    Department lacks information on who the beneficial owners of its
    contractors or subcontractors are to protect against this threat. That
    is, DOD may think it's working with an American company, but it may
    actually be a third or fourth level subsidiary of a parent company that
    is actually owned or controlled by Russia, China, or another strategic
    competitor. Do you share the concern that DOD needs a better
    understanding of the true ownership behind its contractors and
    subcontractors for our national security?
        Mr. Moultrie. I do share your concern and believe that DOD needs a
    better understanding and continuing awareness of foreign ownership,
    control, or influence of DOD contractors and subcontractors for
    purposes of national security. If confirmed, I will make this a top
    priority.

        2. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, there is a provision enacted as part
    of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that
    requires DOD to improve the processes and procedures for the assessment
    and mitigation of risks related to beneficial ownership/foreign
    ownership, control, or influence [FOCI] of contractors and
    subcontractors doing business with the Department in order to mitigate
    risks from malign foreign influence. If confirmed, you will oversee the
    Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, which has the lead in
    formulating these regulations. Are you of this provision?
        Mr. Moultrie. I am aware of Section 847 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. If confirmed, I look forward to
    working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Sustainment to develop the regulations pursuant to Section 847.

        3. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, will you commit to prioritize the
    formulation and implementation of these new regulations?
        Mr. Moultrie. If confirmed, I will prioritize the development and
    implementation of such regulations in coordination with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.
              insider threat protections on unclassified networks
        4. Senator Reed. Mr. Moultrie, the Department has made great
    progress against combatting insider threats over the last 10 years,
    notably through comprehensive user activity coverage of the classified
    enterprise. Intelligence indicates that more expansive insider threat
    protections are needed across the unclassified networks to further
    address threats such as data exfiltration, espionage, and harm to self
    and others. In addition, an April 9th memo from the Secretary of
    Defense on countering extremism in the Department, directs the newly
    established Countering Extremism Working Group to strengthen the
    Department's insider threat programs and expand user activity
    monitoring on both the classified and unclassified systems. How do you
    propose furthering this strategy to provide more expansive insider
    threat protections through user activity monitoring on the unclassified
    network?
        Mr. Moultrie. I understand the Department is working a number of
    efforts to advance its Counter Insider Threat capabilities and that
    user monitoring is one of these efforts. I agree with this approach and
    believe it is crucial for the Department to keep pace with the evolving
    risk. If confirmed, I will engage with the DOD Chief Information
    Officer to develop a user monitoring strategy for all systems
    consistent with all applicable law and policy.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
              coordination with the strategic capabilities office
        5. Senator Hirono. Mr. Moultrie the Defense Department's Strategic
    Capabilities Office (SCO) is tasked with developing new and innovative
    ways to shape and counter emerging threats across all domains,
    synchronizing the joint force's efforts through coordination with the
    military services, Intelligence Community, and combatant commanders. If
    confirmed, how do you plan to synchronize the DOD's intelligence
    apparatus with the Strategic Capabilities Office to more quickly
    identify emerging threats and shorten the timeline to fielding weapons
    systems to counter those threats?
        Mr. Moultrie. It is my understanding that the Strategic
    Capabilities Office (SCO) participates in the annual review of
    Battlespace Awareness capability needs and programs conducted by the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
    If confirmed, I will assess whether the SCO's participation in this
    review is sufficient to synchronize defense intelligence and the SCO's
    efforts to identify and promptly address such threats.
                               background checks
        6. Senator Hirono. Mr. Moultrie, in order to recruit and attract
    the talent the Department needs, it has been given special hiring
    authorities, yet oftentimes there is a delay in onboarding these
    valuable civil servants due to lengthy but important background checks
    which has caused a large backlog. While I believe an extensive vetting
    process to receive and maintain a security clearance is extremely
    important, if confirmed, what guidance do you plan to give to the
    Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to reduce this backlog?
        Mr. Moultrie. I share your concerns regarding the Department's
    ability to recruit, hire, and retain quality individuals. After the
    transfer of the background investigation mission to the Department, I
    understand that DCSA reduced the inventory to fewer than 200,000 cases,
    which is a significant improvement from the prior backlog of more than
    700,000 cases. If confirmed, I will work in close partnership with the
    U.S. Government's Security and Suitability Executive Agents to reform
    personnel vetting in order to further improve timeliness and continue
    to reduce the backlog.

        7. Senator Hirono. Mr. Moultrie, do you think the Defense
    Counterintelligence and Security Agency needs additional personnel to
    adequately deal with this issue?
        Mr. Moultrie. Although I have not been briefed on the personnel
    needs of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), I
    am a firm believer in embracing technological solutions to reduce
    manual burdens for this and other missions across the Department. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that DCSA is focused on innovation,
    automation, incorporation of emerging technologies, and continual
    process improvements before adding personnel.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
           intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resourcing
        8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, the Armed Services Committee has
    heard from combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Africa Command and
    U.S. Southern Command, in recent weeks regarding the importance of the
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Transfer Fund
    which, up until fiscal year 2021, was a congressionally appropriated
    fund to support emerging combatant command ISR requirements, often
    through the use of contracted ISR solutions. What is your understanding
    of the effectiveness of the ISR Transfer Fund in supporting combatant
    command ISR requirements in recent years?
        Mr. Moultrie. From my conversations with Department leadership, I
    understand that the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    (ISR) Transfer Fund was very effective in addressing urgent Combatant
    Command ISR requirements, particularly in the U.S. Central Command area
    of operations. Given the insatiable demand for ISR across the Combatant
    Commands, I believe it is important that the Department balance
    resources to maintain an appropriate force structure of airborne ISR
    systems for both the current fight and future contingencies. If
    confirmed, I will explore ways the Department can better align ISR to
    counter current threats, while developing future capabilities to
    address future challenges.

        9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, what is your view on whether the
    Department of Defense should formally request funding for the ISR
    Transfer Fund, or a similar funding arrangement, in future fiscal
    years?
        Mr. Moultrie. I do not have a view at this time. If confirmed, I
    would focus my efforts to ensure the annual President's Budget Request
    accurately reflects the ISR requirements of the Combatant Commands.

        10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, what steps will you take, if
    confirmed, to address unfunded ISR requirements in ``economy of force''
    theaters like U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command?
        Mr. Moultrie. As I stated previously, the Combatant Command (CCMD)
    demand for ISR, particularly airborne ISR, is much greater than the
    Department's capacity. If confirmed, I will work to understand the
    unfunded ISR requirements and seek to align those with DOD resources
    and emerging capabilities. In cooperation with the Joint Staff, I would
    use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs process to address urgent ISR
    shortfalls assessed by the CCMDs to pose a risk to life or success of
    ongoing operations.
               leveraging u.s. commercial space isr capabilities
        11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, if confirmed, how would you seek
    to leverage U.S. commercial space intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capabilities, such as U.S. commercial satellite mapping,
    to support Department of Defense requirements?
        Mr. Moultrie. The U.S. commercial remote sensing industry
    contributes significantly to satisfy Department of Defense
    requirements. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department
    continues to leverage purchases from that industry as a robust,
    diverse, and affordable means of obtaining data for mapping, charting,
    and geodesy.

        12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Moultrie, what, in your view, are the
    primary challenges to promoting and sustaining a healthy U.S.
    commercial space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    industrial base and, if confirmed, how would you seek to address these
    challenges?
        Mr. Moultrie. Growth of the U.S. commercial remote sensing market
    is dominated by the market forces of consumer demand. In my view,
    industry is up to the challenge of continued innovation and expanded
    analytical services needed to increase value for their customers. The
    U.S. Government is an important customer and has the opportunity to
    influence industry not only by the product it buys, but by the demand
    signal it sends. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of
    National Intelligence to maintain a steady demand signal for diverse
    and innovative products and services to answer today's hard
    intelligence problems.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
    assuring the availability and competition for commercial remote sensing
                                  capabilities
        13. Senator Wicker. Mr. Moultrie, the recent and significant
    expansion of commercially available geospatial-intelligence (GEOINT)
    capabilities provides the Government significant opportunity for
    innovative solutions to mission requirements, as well as cost savings
    through competitive pricing and developmental cost avoidance. Section
    1612 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2021 requires the Secretary of Defense and the
    Director of National Intelligence to ``leverage, to the extent
    practicable, the capabilities of the industry of the United States,
    including through the use of domestic commercial geospatial-
    intelligence services and acquisition of domestic commercial satellite
    imagery.''
        The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) appears to be interpreting
    the intent of section 1612 in a manner that far exceeds the intent of
    Congress and will restrict competition by U.S. based competitors rather
    than increase it as intended by the statute. This interpretation has
    resulted in a very strict policy that labels U.S. companies with
    ownership from our most trusted allies as ``foreign'' and ineligible
    for NRO contracts. This policy will limit access to competitive, and
    sometimes best commercial capabilities, and limit U.S. companies from
    investing and growing in the United States.
        As important, NRO's policy would incorrectly exclude U.S. companies
    with Special Security Agreement (SSA) or Proxy status (as governed by
    the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency) who are otherwise
    trusted to work on highly sensitive U.S. matters for the benefit of the
    warfighters, the U.S. defense industrial base, and the U.S. taxpayers.
    This action risks our access to competitive and innovative alternatives
    to meet missions across the Government, and will impact some of the
    U.S. Government's most important and trusted suppliers.
        Will you commit to working with the Director of National
    Intelligence to conduct a thorough review of the National
    Reconnaissance Office policy to exclude fully cleared U.S. SSA and
    Proxy companies from participating in commercial remote sensing
    contracts and report back your views on this action?
        Mr. Moultrie. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
    Director of National Intelligence to examine this issue very closely.
    It is important to leverage domestic capabilities and safeguard
    sensitive information from our adversaries. I am confident we can
    strike an appropriate balance and work together on a solution.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                   energy independence and national security
        14. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, in 2019, the United States
    became a net energy exporter for the first time since 1952. Do you
    believe being a net exporter of energy helps bolster our country's
    national security?
        Mr. Moultrie. It is my belief that if the United States can lower
    its dependence on foreign imports in almost any area, particularly
    those related to national security, then we are a more secure Nation.

        15. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe being a net
    importer of energy reduces our country's national security?
        Mr. Moultrie. The U.S. Government should continue to reduce
    dependence on foreign sources and pursue diversified energy sources as
    a vital element of our national security and economic interests. It is
    in our national security interest to pursue long-term, sustainable
    energy solutions.

        16. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe the United
    States exporting energy to Europe and Asia--thereby reducing our allies
    and partners reliance on countries like Russia and Iran--helps or hurts
    regional security?
        Mr. Moultrie. Being able to export energy to our foreign allies and
    partners helps regional security in those areas and bolsters our own
    national security interests. Our being an energy exporting nation
    provides our foreign partners with options and increases leverage in
    dealing with our global competitors.
                   defense intelligence resources and talent
        17. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, given the Department's shift in
    priorities from a focus on counterterrorism to one on great power
    competition--as laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy--do you
    believe the defense intelligence community is appropriately shifting
    resources to this new focus area?
        Mr. Moultrie. It is my understanding that the Department has
    realigned its resources in support of the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy. As the Department makes further adjustments to its
    warfighting capabilities, I expect these adjustments will impose
    additional requirements on intelligence and security that will need to
    be addressed.

        18. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, what concerns--if any--do you
    have regarding the talent available that is knowledgeable and maintains
    expertise on the Indo-Pacific region? If you do have concerns, please
    detail them and how you plan to address them in your position as an
    Under Secretary.
        Mr. Moultrie. My understanding is that the Department has worked
    closely with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to ensure it has the requisite
    expertise to meet the Command's requirements. I appreciate, however,
    expertise on the Indo-Pacific region is required throughout the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more
    about the potential challenges for such expertise and plan to visit the
    Indo-Pacific area of operations at my earliest opportunity.
                        national security agency alaska
        19. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Moultrie, my State hosts the National
    Security Agency Alaska which is a critical Intelligence Community
    asset. It provides threat warning support to U.S. and Coalition forces,
    the Intelligence Community, and combatant commanders. Given its
    geostrategic location, do you see value in expanding capacity or
    capability offered by this vital entity? If so, please detail what
    capacity or capability you see most value in adding.
        Mr. Moultrie. While serving on Active Duty and as a civilian at the
    National Security Agency (NSA), I became familiar with the NSA
    capabilities in Alaska. I anticipate that with the focus in the 2018
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) on strategic competition with China and
    Russia, our defense intelligence posture in Alaska will be increasingly
    important to support the Department's efforts to secure the national
    security objectives in the NDS. If confirmed, I look forward to
    assessing NSA Alaska's continuing role in securing the Department's
    national security interests.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                          chinese intelligence threat
        20. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, do you view the challenges
    associated with countering Beijing as a driver for innovative
    intelligence capabilities and tradecraft, or do you regard such efforts
    as too threat specific?
        Mr. Moultrie. China is a pacing threat for the Department because
    of its innovative and advancing technology and strategy to pursue its
    regional and global interests. Countering China is a driver for
    innovative intelligence capabilities and tradecraft. However, it cannot
    be the only driver for advancing our intelligence capabilities and
    tradecraft because we must seek to preserve our competitive edge
    against all adversaries. If confirmed, I will guide the Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise in evaluating and assessing innovative
    technologies, appropriately investing in our intelligence workforce,
    and ensuring that we maintain our information and military advantage
    against all adversaries and in all domains.
                             emerging technologies
        21. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, across the myriad rapidly
    advancing technologies, where would you prioritize investment to
    improve DOD driven collection, analysis, and exploitation of
    intelligence?
        Mr. Moultrie. My understanding is that the Department is developing
    new Joint Warfighting Concepts to counter the pacing threats. DOD
    collection, analysis, and exploitation efforts need to inform and
    enable these future concepts. I believe that, like the Joint Force,
    many organizations within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE)
    will also require modernization. If confirmed, I will make it a
    priority to evaluate the capability and capacity of the DIE to support
    the Joint Force and the Nation, and commit to keeping Congress
    appraised of the necessary investments for DOD collection, analysis,
    and exploitation capabilities.

        22. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, Project Maven, one of DOD's
    success stories in developing critical Artificial Intelligence's (AI)
    tools is expected to transition to the National Geospatial--
    Intelligence Agency by fiscal year 2023. Can you walk us through your
    strategy to execute a smooth transition so that Maven's continued
    success is ensured?
        Mr. Moultrie. I understand that the National Geospatial-
    Intelligence Agency (NGA) and Project Maven have been working closely
    together since Project Maven was established. If confirmed, I would
    seek to ensure an appropriate transition by evaluating the current
    scope of MAVEN operations and their alignment with NGA's DOD and IC
    Missions, and develop a phased, conditions-based approach to
    transferring Project Maven's geospatial lines of effort to NGA.

        23. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, the cooperative relationship
    between DOD and the Intelligence Community is a critical component to
    our national security. What are some of your priorities to further
    develop the Department's strategy to leverage AI and machine learning
    for the intelligence mission sets?
        Mr. Moultrie. I believe that data is the key to developing superior
    AI capabilities. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that DOD and
    Intelligence Community (IC) efforts are closely coordinated to focus
    attention on building and securing our data and consolidating
    artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) programs to mature
    from many AI/ML prototypes to industrial-scale processing. Furthermore,
    I believe DOD and the IC should work together to incorporate AI on the
    widest possible array of intelligence data streams so that we can
    optimize and expeditiously realize AI's full potential.
                             intelligence oversight
        24. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, what are your thoughts on
    enterprise-wide management of counterintelligence (CI)?
        Mr. Moultrie. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
    serves as the Defense Counterintelligence (CI) Manager, and I
    understand he has prioritized the strengthening of enterprise-wide
    management of DOD CI. I believe there is value in having a common
    enterprise vision to guide Defense CI capacity and capability,
    resources, and operational decisions. If confirmed, I look forward to
    engaging with the Director, DIA, to ensure the effectiveness of the CI
    enterprise.
        25. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, should all training standards,
    certifications, and scoping for CI be standardized across DOD?
        Mr. Moultrie. I understand that DOD policy identifies baseline
    standards and training coordination requirements and requires joint
    certification for all training that produces certified CI personnel. I
    further understand that DOD Components with CI elements participate in
    setting the standards, training, and certification of CI professionals.
    In addition, I believe that the Military Department CI Organizations
    have unique missions and authorities and provide tailored basic CI
    training.
                                  afghanistan
        26. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe that the
    scheduled withdrawal from Afghanistan will diminish our ability to
    collect intelligence and act on threats emanating from Afghanistan and
    the region?
        Mr. Moultrie. Although I have not been briefed on the intelligence
    collection posture, I believe that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from
    Afghanistan will impact our ability to collect intelligence and respond
    to threats emanating from Afghanistan, requiring the United States to
    posture for an ``over the horizon'' collection strategy in coordination
    with our allies and partners.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                     chinese counter-intelligence concerns
        27. Senator Hawley. Mr. Moultrie, many of the Department's
    suppliers maintain a presence in China and may employ members of the
    Chinese Communist Party (CCP). When I asked Secretary Lloyd Austin
    about this, he wrote that DOD has ``an interest in knowing whether
    [its] suppliers have employees who are members of the Chinese Communist
    Party.'' Do you agree with Secretary Austin that the Department of
    Defense should know if its suppliers employ members of the CCP?
        Mr. Moultrie. I agree with Secretary Austin. The Department does
    have an interest in knowing whether its suppliers are under the
    influence of the People's Republic of China. If confirmed, I will work
    with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
    address these concerns.

        28. Senator Hawley. Mr. Moultrie, from a counterintelligence
    standpoint, why is it important for the Department to know if its
    suppliers employ members of the CCP?
        Mr. Moultrie. China's intelligence services employ traditional and
    non-traditional collection methods specifically and aggressively
    targeting U.S. technologies and the Defense Industrial Base. Access by
    China to ``cutting edge'' U.S. technologies and other sensitive
    information is of grave concern because it helps China advance its
    strategic goals for comprehensive national power and military
    modernization. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition and Sustainment to protect warfighting technologies and
    their enabling supply chains.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie
    follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    ------

        [The biographical sketch of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie, which
    was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Ronald S.
    Moultrie in connection with his nomination follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                    ------

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    ------

        [The nomination of Mr. Ronald S. Moultrie was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Reed on May 20, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on May 28, 2021.]

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