[Senate Hearing 117-980]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-980
THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL JOHN C.
AQUILINO, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC
COMMAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-872 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
march 23, 2021
Page
The Nomination of Admiral John C. Aquilino, USN, for 1
Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander,
United States Indo-Pacific Command.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Aquilino, Admiral John C., USN................................... 5
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 43
Questions for the Record....................................... 60
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 72
Biographical Sketch............................................ 73
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 77
Signature Page................................................. 80
(iii)
THE NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC
COMMAND
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order, and this
morning the committee meets to consider the nomination of
Admiral John Aquilino to be the next Commander of United States
Indo-Pacific Command, or INDOPACOM. Admiral, we thank you and
your family for your willingness to serve in this important
position. We welcome your wife, Laura, and your daughter,
Jessica, along with your colleagues from the Pacific Fleet.
Thank you very much.
You have most recently served as the Commander of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, an experience that will serve you well.
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the Department of Defense's
priority theater. As Admiral Davidson highlighted at his
posture hearing earlier this month, the region will be home to
two-thirds of the world's population and generate two-thirds of
the global economy in the next 10 years. Maintaining U.S.
leadership in this consequential region will take a concerted,
whole-of-government effort, but the U.S. Military, specifically
INDOPACOM, will play a central role.
Secretary Austin has appropriately labeled China as the
``pacing threat'' for the United States military. I agree with
experts who have stated that China is a long-term challenge
that must be ``managed'' rather than ``solved.'' Part of
managing our strategic competition with China and ensuring a
free and open Indo-Pacific is the need to maintain a strong
presence in the region and a credible conventional deterrent to
military aggression.
For this reason, in last year's National Defense
Authorization Act, the committee created the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative, or PDI. The PDI is intended to better focus Defense
Department resources on key military capabilities, reassure
United States allies and partners, and send a strong signal to
the Chinese Communist Party that we are committed to defending
United States interests in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining
momentum behind the PDI will be a key focus of this committee
as we begin work on this year's National Defense Authorization
Act. Admiral Aquilino, we look forward to hearing your views on
how the PDI can be used to bolster U.S. Military presence and
conventional deterrence in the region.
China and the United States have a shared goal of avoiding
unnecessary and costly armed conflict. Last week's United
States-China diplomatic meeting in Alaska was not without its
challenges, but provided an important opportunity for us to
engage China, express our concern with China's conduct in the
region and around the world, and reiterate our commitment to
the region. We should look to build upon last week's meeting by
establishing more robust means of military-to-military
communication, particularly to avoid miscalculation in a
crisis. We should also seek greater cooperation with China when
it is in our interest, including in areas like climate change,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
counterterrorism.
Effectively managing our competition with China also
requires that we continually invest in our relationship with
allies and partners. The last few weeks have demonstrated just
how central these relationships are to the Biden
administration's approach to the region. On March 12, President
Biden participated in the first-ever leader-level meeting with
other members of the Quad--Japan, Australia, and India. Just
last week, Secretary of Defense Austin and Secretary of State
Blinked held in-person meetings with their counterparts in
Japan and South Korea. Admiral Aquilino, we look forward to
your views on how these alliances and partnerships can be
strengthened and how we can attract new partners across the
region.
Perhaps our most immediate security challenge in the region
is North Korea. We must approach this challenge clear-eyed and
in cooperation with our regional allies and partners, most
notably Japan and South Korea, who are most directly threatened
by Kim Jong-un's belligerent behavior. While we maintain
significant sanctions pressure on North Korea, we must also
pursue diplomacy with the goal of achieving a formal moratorium
on nuclear and missile testing in the near-term. Admiral
Aquilino, I would appreciate your views on the regional threat
posed by North Korea and the prospects for greater trilateral
cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea
on missile defense and other issues.
Admiral, if confirmed, you will lead INDOPACOM at an
incredibly consequential time, and we thank you again for your
willingness to serve.
Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Aquilino,
we are real pleased to have you, and moving into a position
where you are certainly the person most qualified for that
position. With over 1,150 carrier arrested landings and 5,000
hours of flying time, I think that you have spent a lot of time
on the sea but also a lot of time in the air. I have to say
that I may have twice the hours you have, but you have twice
the miles I had.
Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks said China is
the pacing threat for our military, and General Milley said the
Pacific is the number one regional priority. We all understand
this. This administration is saying the right things about
pushing back on Chinese aggression, but the key indicator of
whether or not we are serious about this competition with China
will be what we do with the defense budget top line, the great
growth. The words do not have real meaning.
The top line of the defense budget and the amount of
funding for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will be the Biden
administration's first and most important message to China.
What we do and do not do to deter China in the military domain
will underride and determine the success or failure of
diplomatic, economic, and information efforts as well. Simply
put, if you fail to invest in defense, and as a result fail to
deter China's use of military force in the Indo-Pacific,
nothing you do in those areas will really matter. Admiral
Aquilino, if confirmed as commander of INDOPACOM you would be
on the front lines of the military competition with China.
There must never come a day when the leaders of the Chinese
Communist Party decide today is the day they can achieve their
goal by using military force.
At the beginning of March, General McMaster told us that
since the 1900s China has undertaken the largest peacetime
military buildup in history. This ramp-up in the past decade,
when China increased real purchasing power in the defense
sector by $200 billion. Meanwhile, primarily during the Obama
administration, America cut some $400 billion of purchasing
power from our defense spending. As China was quietly
increasing investments in defense, many United States leaders
naively assumed when China joined the WTO [World Trade
Organization] in 2001, that it was integrated in the global
economy, somehow this would make the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) friendlier and more open to the West. I predicted it
would not, and I was right. The result of that bad assumption
is American military advantage and the credibility of our
deterrence has eroded, and comes to erosion.
So we have got a problem out there, and you are going to be
right in the middle of that, and we are anxious to make some
really good things happen. As General McMaster told us, Taiwan
may represent the most dangerous flash point for war, and when
Admiral Davidson was asked what the most likely target of the
Chinese military action would be in the next 5 to 10 years, he
said, ``I would say Taiwan is the first.'' So we know where our
problems are, we appreciate your service, and look forward to
this hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Now let me
recognize Senator Hirono to introduce the admiral.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
very much appreciate your remarks and Ranking Member Inhofe's
remarks in recognizing the importance of the Indo-Pacific
region.
Our country faces an array of challenges and opportunities
in the Indo-Pacific region, and AORs [area of responsibility]
stretching from the west coast of the United States to the
western border of India, and from the North Pole to Antarctica,
covering about half of the Earth's surface.
At a time when we are confronting an increasingly
aggressive China and looking to deepen our defense ties with
allies in the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative we have an
experienced leader at Indo-Pacific Command capable of meeting
the urgency and sensitivity of the moment. With this in mind, I
would like to introduce and enthusiastically endorse today's
nominee, and, of course, welcome his family, Admiral John C.
Aquilino, to serve as the next Commander of the United States
Indo-Pacific Command.
Admiral Aquilino's 37 years of Navy service, highlighted by
command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command, make him well suited for this new role. Since
assuming command of the Navy's Pacific Fleet in 2018, I have
seen how the admiral and his leadership team at PACFLEET have
worked to ensure the readiness of the fleet to protect the
security of our nation. From his headquarters at Pearl Harbor,
``Lung'' Aquilino, as he is affectionately known to those under
his command, has guided the 140,000 sailors and civilians of
the Pacific Fleet to meet challenges and opportunities
presented.
I have to admit, Lung is such an unusual nickname, and I
had to ask how he got it. It was coined years ago by his
fighter pilot buddies who thought his last name sounded like
Aqualung, and with that the name Lung was born.
Lung's message of, quote, ``deter, assure, compete, and
win,'' end quote, is the right message for INDOPACOM today. I
have gotten to work with Admiral Aquilino during his time in
Hawaii and know first-hand he believes in the power of working
together to find whole-of-government solutions, the importance
of our alliances and partnerships, and the imperative for a
well-trained and postured force.
I have appreciated the interactions Admiral Aquilino and I
have had on issues of importance to Hawaii and the Pacific
region, including the strategically vital Red Hill Bulk Fuel
Storage Facility. In operating the Red Hill Facility, the Navy
has a critical responsibility to protect Oahu's drinking water
and keep the community updated. The admiral knows the
importance of transparent and open community engagement.
Admiral Aquilino also has a personal appreciation of the
significance of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to our community.
The shipyard is our largest industrial employer, with thousands
of military and civilian workers who support our forces and
broader in the Pacific region to advance our strategic
interest. Admiral Aquilino participated in shipyard visits with
Senator Kaine, former Senator Perdue, and me over the past 2
years.
As evidenced throughout his years of service, Admiral
Aquilino has demonstrated a deep understanding of Hawaii's
strategic importance to our national security, and he advocates
for capabilities and nurtures relationships to help Hawaii
fully realize its role in America's continued access and
influence in the Indo-Pacific.
If you speak to those who serve in his command, you will
find Admiral Aquilino has deep and abiding care for his
sailors, civilians, and their families, by working to instill
an environment of dignity and purpose. This skill was evident
in Admiral Aquilino's actions after a gunman took the lives of
Roldan Agustin and Vincent Kapoi Jr., and seriously injured
another man during the horrific shooting at Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard on December 4, 2019. Admiral Aquilino paid special
care to the families of the victims and the shipyard community
during this intense time of grief. A few months ago, he
organized a memorial service marking the 1-year anniversary of
the tragic event, and installed a permanent memorial plaque to
honor the lives and service of Mr. Augustin and Mr. Kapoi Jr.
I am confident that after today's hearing my colleagues
will join me in supporting Admiral Aquilino's nomination to
lead INDOPACOM.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Admiral, you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono, for
that kind introduction. Congratulations on your selection as
the chair of the Seapower Subcommittee. It has been my pleasure
to work with you these past 3 years, and from all the sailors
in the Pacific theater and their families I would like to thank
you for your constant support. Thank you very much, ma'am.
Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
committee members for this opportunity to appear before you
today. I am both honored and humbled to be here as the nominee
to lead U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. It is a great
responsibility. I am honored to President Biden's nominee for
this important position.
I would also like to thank Secretary Austin, General
Milley, Acting Secretary Harker, and Admiral Gilday for their
support and confidence.
I would not be here today without the love and support of
my family. My wife, Laura, and my oldest daughter, Jessica are
here with me today, and my daughter, Lisa, was unable to attend
from Los Angeles. Like every military family, they have endured
many sacrifices and they tirelessly advocate for military
members and their families. They set a tremendous example of
service to our nation, and I am proud of each of them.
Also with me here today are members of my Navy family, and
they are led by Fleet Master Chief Jim Honea. He is my right-
hand man and he personally cares for over 140,000 Navy sailors
and their families in the Pacific Fleet every day.
I would be remiss if I did not highlight my constant
admiration and respect for the men, women, civilians, and
families of our joint force, who faithfully serve, many
deployed as we speak to defend our nation and protect our way
of life. It has been my greatest privilege to have served
alongside them for 37 years.
The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential reason for
America's future and remains the priority theater for the
United States. Residing here are four of the five security
challenges identified in the Department of Defense--China,
Russia, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations. The
Indo-Pacific region also experiences frequent natural and man-
made disasters, the negative impacts of climate change, rapid
population growth, drugs and human trafficking, and, of course,
disease and pandemics.
Of all the threats we face, Secretary Austin was very clear
when he stated, ``China is our pacing threat.'' To meet this
challenge, it will take all elements of national power, working
together and with a sense of urgency. Together with our allies
and partners, our professionally trained and lethal joint
military force, postured forward will provide the deterrence
required while enabling diplomacy from a position of strength
to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity for all in the
region.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative is a strong example of
the effort required to compete and win. I thank the committee
for your leadership and your vision in establishing PDI. These
efforts are foundational to ensuring a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
As the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance points
out, America's fate is intertwined with events beyond our
shores. Global peace and prosperity depend on our presence in
the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed for this great responsibility I
look forward to working with this committee as we advance our
shared national security objectives while continuing to serve
alongside Indo-Pacific's men and women to accomplish this
important mission before us.
Thanks, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and to the
committee. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Let me point out,
for the benefit of my colleagues, that if we get a quorum I
will interrupt. We have thousands of military nominations we
would like to pass out of committee. Also since this is a
hybrid hearing, we will not be following the early bird rule.
Instead, we will handle the order of questions by seniority,
alternating back and forth. This message is getting a little
old but let me reiterate it.
We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to observe the
5 minutes. Then, for everyone to be heard, please mute your
microphones if you are not speaking.
Thank you very much, Admiral, for your testimony, for your
distinguished service, and the service of your family.
One of the most important aspects in any theater is joint
warfighting operations. We fight as a team, not as individual
platforms or individual services. I know the Joint Staff and
INDOPACOM have been working on joint operations, joint
techniques and models. COVID has interrupted that a bit. Can
you give us kind of a status, from your perspective, of how we
are doing in integrating our forces?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Thanks. So there are two
initiatives. Admiral Davidson, along with the Joint Staff, is
working on a joint warfighting concept. Those focus areas are
designed to specifically ensure that the joint force is
integrated, that command and control that is required exists,
and on top of that, from the Indo-Pacific position, it has the
ability to also expand to our allies and partners. It is
extremely important, and if confirmed, Senator, I will continue
those efforts. They are that important.
Chairman Reed. Can you briefly prioritize what are the key
elements? My notion would be if you cannot communicate
effectively then you cannot do much. But your sense of what the
priorities are, and are they budgeted in that order, or do we
have to do some work collectively?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, the Pacific Defense Initiative I
think is kind of the poster child for what the capabilities and
things look like in prioritized order, and again, I thank the
committee for that support. Those capabilities, as I see them,
are force protection, there is the ability to command, control,
and communicate in the mission partner environment, then there
is the ability needed to train both with the joint force and
our allies and partners, and that linkage between the ranges,
from Guam to Hawaii to Alaska to the west coast of the United
States, PMTEC, is absolutely required.
Additionally, there is ISR capabilities needed. There are
long-range joint integrated fires capabilities that are needed,
and underpinning all of that is the need to be able to execute
logistics across that great distance.
Chairman Reed. So we have a ways to go, frankly, to get to
the point where you are satisfied. Is that fair?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, again, I think PDI is
foundational, but it will take a longer-term sustained
investment to be able to generate the deterrence required.
Chairman Reed. A final point on this issue. First of all,
integrating Army, Navy, and Air Force is tough. I would assume
integrating our allies is even more challenging because of
obvious differences in language and other equipment, et cetera.
Is that fair?
Admiral Aquilino. That is absolutely fair, sir, but it is
also extremely important. We operate with our allies and
partners each and every day, so it is certainly not a hurdle we
cannot get over, and it is critically important.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. You mentioned this has to be a
whole-of-government effort, not just a military effort. Within
our partners, particularly the Quad, are there issues that we
can rally around, issues like climate change and other issues
like that? Is that something that your State Department and
colleagues are talking about?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, there are many areas where we
certainly cooperate across a whole-of-government approach--
economic, diplomatic, informational, legal, as well as
military. All of those efforts will be required to do the
deterrence needed, and if confirmed I am certainly interested
in working across the interagency to achieve that goal.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Just a final question
here. I think we have come to realize that we were overly
optimistic about China's role in the world for several decades,
when we saw it as simply an economic power that would come into
the world stage with a benign, not malign, attitude, and that
has changed. The danger today might be overestimating China, of
not seeing some of their vulnerabilities. Can you comment upon
some of the shortcomings you see or some of the weaknesses that
might not be explored?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Certainly we have seen
the largest military buildup by China. That does bring with it
certain vulnerabilities, whether it be training, command and
control and operations across a broader scale. Again, if
confirmed, I will look through that lens to see where we can
really have some effect to deter.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Before I turn
it over to Senator Inhofe I am required to ask questions of the
nominee, and I have been reminded by my staff to do so. Just
like the master chief, I do what I am told.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Aquilino. No, sir.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receives testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
committee when requested?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the administration?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis or any good-faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisals for their testimony at briefings?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Senator
Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me
draw on your experiences as a fighter pilot. It has been
concerning to me for quite some time the criticism of our F-35
that we hear, from a lot of people. I will not even mention the
sources, but it is something that really bothers me, when you
stop and think about what we do not have in terms of fifth-
generation fighters. Admiral Davidson's testimony, and this is
way back in March, to the House Armed Services Committee, he
said that our adversaries are already developing or fielding
fifth-generation fighters, that we know from our own gaming and
emulations that fifth-generation fighters are a game-changer.
Now as a fighter pilot, kind of explain why the F-35, as a
fifth-generation fighter, is so critical to deterring, and, if
necessary, defeating China's uses of military force, and in
your opinion, why it is important to the ability to fight and
win inside the first and second island chains. I can remember
when we had the F-22, and we talked about the fact that it was
a fifth-generation fighter. We started out we were going to
have 700 of them. We ended up getting 200. I remember that very
well and the criticism that I had at that time, and we have had
the same problems now. Yet now we know it is a different game
now, because our competition has fifth-generation fighters.
What are your thoughts on that?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. As you know, the
Chinese Communist Party has generated some capabilities in the
region that are designed to keep us out. Some refer to those as
A2/AD, and when we talk about them we talk about operating in
contested space. Fifth-generation airplanes, and beyond, are
required to be able to generate a lethal force and posture it
in a place where it is needed to generate the deterrence that I
mentioned.
Senator Inhofe. Are your concerns like mine in terms of the
attacks on the F-35 and what our capacity would be if we became
weak in that area?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, I would be concerned if we
lessened our capacity of fifth-generation airplanes. I think
they are needed to win.
Senator Inhofe. Mm-hmm. Okay. As General McMaster told this
committee, and this is a quote, ``Taiwan may represent the most
dangerous flash point for war.'' He went on to say because of
that very real threat, quote, ``it is immensely important to
keep forward-positioned capable forces in the Indo-Pacific.''
So, Admiral, I have been co-chairman of the Taiwan Caucus
for quite a while and I have been concerned that a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan would represent the hardest test from United
States military response time. Can you talk about why the U.S.
forward-positioning forces are so important, and what do you
mean by forward-positioning, and where do the forces need to
be?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I agree with General
McMaster's discussion on the most dangerous concern is that of
a military force against Taiwan. To combat that, the forward
posture west of the International Date Line is how Admiral
Davidson describes it, and I concur with that. Forces
positioned to be able to respond quickly, and not just our
forces, those forces combined with the international community,
with our allies and partners, those nations with common values,
those two things would position us very strongly for the
deterrence required.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Inhofe. Now let me recognize
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral
Aquilino, congratulations on your nomination and thank you very
much for your service to this country.
I am a big supporter of the legislation that was signed
into law in 2017, the Women, Peace, and Security Act. It was
legislation that I sponsored, and I think having a government-
wide strategy to include women in all aspects of our security
decisions is very important.
Implementation at DoD is underway, and, in fact,
USINDOPACOM has played a really important role implementing the
legislation, hosting the first gender insecurity cooperation
course in January of 2020. USINCOPACOM also hosted two
operational gender advisor courses to train personnel to serve
as advisors. Can you talk about why you think it is important
to have this kind of legislation and how you would continue the
work that Admiral Davidson has begun?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Thanks. Again, this is one
of our asymmetric advantages, the Women, Peace, and Security
Initiative. Admiral Davidson took it extremely seriously and he
implemented his own program aligned with the larger program,
that really stepped out in the form of the example you
mentioned. Those have events are even more broad than that. If
I am confirmed, ma'am, I would continue those efforts and work
to expand them. It helps for other nations to understand and
align with the values that we believe in, human rights, and it
is a great initiative. If confirmed, I would certainly continue
that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. When you talk about the
asymmetric advantage that it gives us, can you describe that a
little better?
Admiral Aquilino. I would say it is a focus. When we think
of a member of the military sitting in front of you, that the
entire focus is military, but it is not. There are cultural
aspects. There is sharing of values. There is education,
training, schooling. All those things are resident in the
military lines of effort. So that is why I view them as
asymmetric.
Senator Shaheen. Thanks very much. Much of the discussion
today, and in this committee, when we are talking about
INDOPACOM, has focused on China. But, in fact, Russia continues
to also engage in malign activities in the region. We saw
General Austin, when he was in India last week, talking about
India's planned purchase of Russia's S-400 defense system,
which is a concern for us because of the insights that it gives
Russia into our technology.
Can you talk about how we balance still getting along with
our allies and the efforts that Russia has underway, and in
particular, do you have any thoughts about India and the S-400
and what we can do there to address that?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. As Senator Hirono
identified, half the globe encompassed in the Indo-Pacific.
Seventeen hundred miles of Russian coastline in that region. So
we watch and we will continue to compete with Russia in the
Pacific.
That said, India is really a terrific partner, and as we
have seen from the recent Quad discussions, I think the
importance of India and the rest of the nations in the Quad
will increase.
We are at a balance, however. India has had a long-standing
relationship with the Russians for security cooperation and for
military equipment. So we will have to work through this, and
one of the ways we can do that, again, if confirmed, I would
work to continue to encourage India to look at and consider
United States equipment. Number one, it is the best. Number
two, it generates interoperability and makes it easier to work
together, and I think we should encourage India to do that
through all the elements of national power and see where that
goes.
Senator Shaheen. Should we sanction India if they acquire
the S-400?
Admiral Aquilino. Ma'am, I think I would leave that to the
policymakers to determine if that is a path. I think we
certainly should understand where we are with India, and I
think potentially the encouragement angle in providing
alternatives might be a better approach.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and I am almost out of time,
but I just wanted to raise one other issue with you, and that
is the mysterious brain injuries that have come to be known as
the Havana Syndrome, which have affected our diplomats and
other personnel, not just in Cuba but also in China. Are you
aware of the challenges around these injuries, and can I just
urge you to take the attacks seriously and respond if you have
any personnel that you come in contact with who say that they
have been harmed by these kinds of attacks?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I am aware. I will
certainly treat it seriously, if confirmed, and the care and
welfare of our servicemembers, their families, to include the
diplomatic corps, is certainly of interest, and I will keep an
eye on that, if confirmed, and make recommendations as we see
what the causes might be.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Wicker,
please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, let's
talk about the size of our fleet and the capability. I want to
quote Admiral Davidson earlier this month, before this
Committee, when asked about the gap between the Chinese and
United States naval forces. He said, ``If we don't make changes
in our posture forward, the Chinese will have greater capacity
than us.''
Given what you know about China's rapid naval buildup and
projected growth, do you believe our naval forces still present
a credible deterrent to Chinese aggression in the region today,
and what do you say to that projected 5 years from now, sir?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. From my current seat
I would to highlight that the United States Navy is the most
powerful, greatest navy on the planet, still, despite numbers.
That said, as you have highlighted, the Chinese are increasing
their capability and capacity and closing that gap.
So I would like to thank CNO Gilday for his efforts in
identifying the 30-year shipbuilding plan that identifies the
need for a larger, more lethal, networked and ready force to be
able to compete today, as you have highlighted.
Senator Wicker. Do you support that plan, advanced by
Gilday?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Do you agree with the statement by Admiral
Davidson a few days ago?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Let's ask then about carriers specifically.
What kind of carrier presence is needed in the Western Pacific,
and does the Navy have enough carriers to support those needs?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, currently the Navy is in
alignment with the law of the land of 11 carriers. As you know,
today's carrier strike groups are a tremendous form of
deterrence, and that is globally against all competitors. You
see that by the continued requests for additional carrier
deployments, and I believe we need to have persistent presence
by all of the joint forces, to include carrier strike groups
west of the International Date Line.
Senator Wicker. Well, okay. We have complied with the law
of the land at 11, but is that enough, though? Just tell us. We
need to know. We can change the law of the land if we get up
enough votes.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. I think currently that the size
of that force is correct, unless additional challenges show
themselves.
Senator Wicker. Tell us about the Ford. There have
certainly been some hiccups and slips. But where is that
program now, and what do you think about that vessel going
forward?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I am supportive of the Ford. We
took a lot of great, new technologies. We have put them into
that carrier. It is the first of the class, and if you go back
through history you will find we have challenges when we go
first of a class. I am confident that the Navy will overcome
all of those challenges, and I know my counterpart of the East
Coast is working to get Ford deployed as soon as possible.
Senator Wicker. Have they pretty much already overcome most
of those challenges or are there still--you say ``will.'' I
might have expected you to say that we have overcome those
challenges.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I would argue almost all of
those have been completed. All but two of the weapons elevators
are repaired, as I understand it, and we are certainly through
all those technological challenges. The next thing you should
see will be Ford deployed.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Aquilino. I am providing this insert for the record
respecting my commitment to keep the Committee apprised of
information that impacts the accuracy of testimony. During my
23 March testimony, I stated on page 29 of the attached
transcript that my understanding was that all but two of USS
Gerald R. Ford's weapons elevators were repaired and that the
next thing you should see will be Ford deployed. I should have
said that all but two of the weapons elevators turned over to
Ford's crew were operational. There are four remaining
elevators that have not yet been turned over. The next
scheduled event is Ford's shock trials this summer.
Senator Wicker. Lastly, I joined Senator Inhofe in
stressing the United States' friendship and support for Taiwan.
Would you like to see greater official coordination between our
military and that of Taiwan, and if so, what measures do you
think could be taken in the near future to strengthen this
critical partnership?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I think our operations
and efforts through all of those training exercises are
currently in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the
three communiques and the six assurances, which is the current
policies. Should we choose to change those policies we could
have a conversation on what might be expanded as it applies
today.
Senator Wicker. But you are declining to give your opinion
as to whether you would like to see greater cooperation between
our military and Taiwan.
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, we do many things with Taiwan,
again, under those current policy guidelines. We do exercises.
For the Navy it is called Blue Sea. We do have interactions
that contribute to the defense of Taiwan.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now via Webex,
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I
want to discuss further INDOPACOM's utility with addressing
some of the human rights and humanitarian challenges in the
region. As we all know here, our competition with China will
also include a competition of values, and I believe this is a
great opportunity to connect with our allies in showcasing our
values, to support human rights and human security.
What changes do you foresee making to INDOPACOM's
humanitarian role while also ensuring our work coalesces with
that being done by Australia, New Zealand, and others? While we
have a number of key allies in the region, some more reluctant
in this space than others. How will you use INDOPACOM's
influence in the region to improve coordination with reluctant
allies? Last, in the case of countries like Myanmar where a
democratic backsliding is clearly occurring and where there are
complex security dynamics, how would you work with our allies
to approach this issue, as INDOPACOM's commander?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I think you highlighted,
again, the key advantage that the United States has in the
region, and that is our relationships with our allies and
partners, all of those based on our values. Like-minded nations
continue to work together, and as you described, humanitarian
assistance and then response to natural disasters is something
that we monitor, track, maintain every day, whether they be
earthquakes, eruptions, tsunamis.
There are many examples in history of those things that we
have done. I think back to the tsunami in Banda Aceh, Indonesia
in 2004, when the USS Lincoln showed up on the scene to rescue
and administer support to thousands of Indonesians. We are
prepared to do that every day. As you know, the region hosts
the Ring of Fire, and is prevalent to those events. Continued
engagement with those allies and partners, and as soon as they
need help we are prepared to respond. If confirmed, I will
continue to ensure that we are ready to do that with our allies
and partners.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral, as you mentioned in
your statement prior to the hearing, it is the commander's
responsibility to set a culture that prevents sexual harassment
and sexual assault, and you referenced the array of tools in
the commander's toolkit to carry out this duty.
Wouldn't you agree that a skillful commander should be able
to accomplish this mission without convening authority? After
all, a very small percentage, approximately 3 percent of
commanders ever need to invoke convening authority or have the
responsibility to invoke convening authority and are still
required to create a culture that is inhospitable to harassment
and assault.
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, we rely on our commanders every
day to ensure that they take care of their personnel. The
sanctity of the chain of command is critical to ensure that
military operations can be executed. It is also critical to
ensure that the unit is prepared and ready. There is certainly
no place in our military for sexual harassment, discrimination,
or any other form that makes us ineffective.
I know the Secretary of Defense is executing an independent
study. If confirmed, I would certainly like to see the results
of that study. But I am open to any options that it identifies
that would make us more effective in this role.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, obviously that 90-day commission
will provide some guidance on this issue. But with regard to
your view, given that 97 percent of commanders do not have
convening authority for general court martials, do you agree it
is not necessary to maintain good order and discipline?
Admiral Aquilino. Ma'am--Senator, I would have to look at
that a little more deeply and understand the percentages that
you identified. The convening authority still runs through the
chain of command, as I am aware, but like I said, I would be
certainly open to anything that does more and is more effective
at taking care of our servicemembers and their families.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, just for clarity, convening
authority for general courts martial is for 06's and above, and
obviously you have lower-ranking commanders more junior to 06's
and above, and they have to maintain good order and discipline
within their unit, for each level of command, before you get to
a colonel and above. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand, and
now via Webex, Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral. It is good to see you again today.
One of the issues that you and I spoke about when we met
last week was the evolving dynamic between India and China. The
deadly skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops underscored
the high level of tension along the border, and China has made
no secret of its ambition to encircle India with military and
economic influence.
As INDOPACOM commander, how would you approach this
dynamic, and what do you see as the future of the United
States-India military cooperation?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. The work with India,
the Quad, as well as all the allies and partners in the region
continues to be the strength, and it highlights our ability to
ensure that the entire force, the entire region understands the
cooperation and the alignment with international norms,
standards, rules, and laws.
The work, or the effort that India has taken on to protect
their northern border I think is noteworthy. The fact that the
PRC has decided to instigate that skirmish on the northern
border is noteworthy to all of us. So the strength of
multilateral operations within India and with all allies and
partners is certainly a mechanism to add to our deterrence in
the region.
Senator Fischer. You know, you spoke about the [inaudible]
of international laws by China along the border with that
skirmish. We also see their island-building campaign in the
South China Sea and their use of the debt trap diplomacy that
they have elsewhere.
What do you believe are China's goals with regard to this
border region in India?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. I think the goals are
to supplant United States security leadership in the region,
overall, whether they be in the South China Sea or on the
northern border of India and generate a change to the
international rules beyond what the nations all agree to, under
the 1982 UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea] treaty, and ultimately to change those rules to the
benefit of the PRC.
Ultimately, it would change the view of the region from
those who believe in a free and open Indo-Pacific to those that
might want a more authoritarian might-equals-right closed Indo-
Pacific.
Senator Fischer. If I could ask you more about the islands
in the South China Sea. The President of China, in 2015,
stated, quote, ``Relevant construction activity that China is
undertaking does not target or impact any country, and there is
no intention to militarize,'' end quote. Would you agree that
this is a false statement, that it has been proven false?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, I would. It has certainly
been evident to me that when we listen to the words that come
from the PRC we have to look at not just words, and listen to
words, we have to look at deeds. Your example of the islands in
the South China Sea are probably the best examples. All of
those islands have been militarized, whether it be with
missiles, jammers, but it is in exact opposition to what has
been said.
Senator Fischer. What capabilities and projections of power
has China gained from those facilities that they have
constructed?
Admiral Aquilino. It certainly expands the footprint, and
we talked before about contested space. It makes it easier for
the PRC to be able to operate further from their coast --
Senator Fischer. Do you think the United States should
continue the Freedom of Navigation missions in and around these
disputed territories that they have?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Fischer. I am sorry. Did you say yes, you would
support that?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now via Webex,
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I ask the
following two initial questions of all nominees who come before
any of the committees on which I serve, so here are the
questions.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Admiral Aquilino. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Admiral Aquilino. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Admiral, it was a pleasure and a privilege
to introduce you today to the committee. President Biden and
Secretaries Lincoln and Austin have taken several steps in
recent weeks to engage with our partners and allies in the
Indo-Pacific. In particular, I want to highlight the
President's call with our Quad allies--Australia, Japan, and
India. If confirmed, what steps will you take in your new role
to strengthen our partnerships with the Quad nations?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator, and thanks very much
for the kind introduction again.
As you heard me state many times, the allies and partners
that we have are clearly an asymmetric advantage, as the PRC
has, I would argue, only one ally or partner, and that is North
Korea. So we would continue to work towards increased
multilateral operations, if I am concerned. Again, the Quad we
talked about would be an example of only one of those. We do
many things with the ASEAN nations. We do things with our
Japanese counterparts and our Korean counterparts in the form
of missile defense, and I think, again, if confirmed, we would
continue to expand those efforts and operations to work
together on a broader scale.
Senator Hirono. Admiral, I know that we have a very
important partnership with South Korea, but they are not part
of the Quad. I am a little bit curious and concerned that they
are not, but can you assure me that they are definitely in the
mix of the relationships that you consider very important in
that part of the world?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Certainly one of five
treaty allies in the region. Our relationship with South Korea,
they are a linchpin as part of the alliance. Their
capabilities, the equipment that they have, we are extremely
interoperable. There is currently an exercise that is going on
right now, that we continue to train and build readiness with
the South Koreans. As it applies to the Quad, that would have
to be discussions with the other three members to determine if
they would like to pull those in. If not, there are many other
opportunities to generate additional multilateral events with
the South Koreans.
Senator Hirono. I know that you are aware that many of us
are very concerned about the issue of sexual assault and
harassment in the military, and I just want to note that we
will continue to focus on this, and we are, of course, aware of
the DoD Sexual Assault Commission, and I would certainly hope
that you will pay much attention to the recommendations made by
the commission, because the issue of sexual harassment and
assault continues to plague our military. I know that Senator
Gillibrand also questioned you about that.
Regarding the PDI, Admiral Davidson's new PDI report called
for significant increases in spending across all lines of the
PDI effort. Do you believe the increase in spending proposed in
Admiral Davidson's PDI is sufficient to deter our adversaries
in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. As I have looked at PDI,
Admiral Davidson's strategic, very thoughtful approach, aligned
with this committee, has identified the foundational
capabilities needed to do deterrence, and it would have to be
sustained to ensure that we can execute this on a longer term.
Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson listed the Aegis Guam
Defense System, GDS, as his top priority in the PDI, but
similar Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania and Japan have had
delays and been over budget. With that, do you believe the cost
and time estimates for deploying of GDS are accurate, and will
GDS also be your number one priority in this region?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, it certainly would be a top
priority--170,000 United States citizens on Guam, over 20,000
servicemembers that force protection is absolutely required
for. I am not aware of the different cost comparisons of the
overrun, but if confirmed I will certainly look into that,
ma'am, and determine. It is not the first one we have put in,
so I would hope there would be some learning, and the ability
to stay on cost and schedule would be easier.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, and I realize I think I am
running out of time, but I am very concerned about our missile
defense structure. So I will continue to work with you, should
you be confirmed, of course.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Admiral, thanks for your appearance, thanks
for your service, and congratulations on your nomination. I
want to talk a little bit more about Taiwan, and I want to very
much get your professional military advice. Taiwan is a very
vibrant democracy--a very vibrant democracy--and we respect our
democratic partners like Taiwan.
But I want to hear from you about why Taiwan is so critical
from a military and strategic standpoint. Why would Beijing so
desire to have Taiwan annexed to the mainland, and how would it
complicate your military planning if Beijing did invade and
annex Taiwan? Strictly from a military and strategic
standpoint. I do not want to talk about protecting Taiwanese
democracy. I am clear on that and I know you are as well. From
a military and strategic standpoint, why is it so important to
Beijing that they annex Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. As you know, they view
it as their number one priority. The rejuvenation of the
Chinese Communist Party is at stake, very critical as they look
at the problem. From a military standpoint, the strategic
location of where it is, as it applies to the potential impact
of two-thirds of the world's trade, certainly a critical
concern.
Additionally, the status of the United States as a partner
with our allies and partners also is at stake, should we have a
conflict in Taiwan. So those two reasons are really the
strategic main concerns that I would see.
Senator Cotton. What would it mean for the PLA's [People's
Liberation Army] enhanced capabilities if they were able to
turn Taiwan essentially into a military base, if they were able
to base aircraft and ships on the island if Taiwan, much like
you discussed earlier with those islands they have got in the
South China Sea. What advantage would that give to them?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, certainly it would extend their
reach. It would extend the contested environment. It would
threaten our allies and partners--think the Philippines, and it
extends their reach initially away from their coast and to
challenge the entire region, all allies and partners and
friends.
Senator Cotton. You spoke earlier about continuing Freedom
of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, despite those
militarized, manmade islands. If Taiwan were annexed to the
mainland and the PLA navy were based there, would you be able
to continue Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China
Sea, or is the fact that Taiwan sits right at the top of the
South China Sea significantly impede those operations?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, we would still execute those
operations. It certainly would be at greater risk.
Senator Cotton. Then speaking about the point you made
about our allies, if you were sitting in a treaty partners
capital, conducting military planning, say Tokyo or Seoul, or
for that matter sitting in any Southern Asian capital and
thinking the United States might support you in the face of
Chinese aggression, if we stood idly by while China invaded
Taiwan and annexed it to the mainland, how would you feel?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, that was my second point. It
certainly would impact the credibility of the United States as
a partner in the region.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Last week, Admiral Davidson
testified that he thinks the PLA may have the capability to
effectively invade Taiwan in as soon as 6 years, maybe less. Do
you agree with that view?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, there are many numbers out
there. I know Admiral Davidson said 6 years. You have to ask
him where he made that assessment. There are spans from today
to 2045. My opinion is this problem is much closer to us than
most think, and we have to take this on, put those deterrence
capabilities like PDI in place, in the near term and with
urgency.
Senator Cotton. I share that view. It is not a 2045, it is
not a 2030 problem. I suspect it may not even be a 2026
problem.
From a military planning point of view, what is the best
time of year, given light, weather, and sea conditions, for the
PLA to launch an invasion of Taiwan? Is it the middle part of
the spring?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir, that is certainly a better time
as it applies to sea state and environmentals.
Senator Cotton. Do you recall when the Sochi Winter
Olympics ended in 2014?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. February 23rd. Do you recall when Russia
invaded Crimea?
Admiral Aquilino. I do not have the date, Senator. I
apologize.
Senator Cotton. February 27th, 4 days later. The Beijing
Winter Olympics end February 23rd of next year.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral Aquilino,
congratulations on the nomination. I enjoyed our conversation.
I enjoyed visiting you in Hawaii last year with Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono was asking you questions about the Quad, and
I have been very interested in this since we started to hear
about it at this committee a number of years ago. I was
intrigued that the first-ever head of nation meeting of the
Quad was about vaccines, and even though most of the discussion
about the Quad has been in the armed services hearing, this
first big initiative with the heads of states was about funding
vaccine development in India, that could be used to vaccinate
the Indian population but also could be used to produce
vaccines that could be used throughout the region. That made me
want to get your perspective on, if we are thinking about our
national security challenges in the INDOPACOM, how much of our
thoughts should be about a whole-of-government approach rather
than just an armed services approach?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. We need to engage with
every aspect of national power to be able to compete against
the PLA. So whether it be diplomacy, whether it be scientific,
whether it be informational, every aspect has an ability to
generate deterrence, extend the cooperation with our allies and
partners, and that is one example. From the military
perspective this last year, the Quad, or in the form of India,
Japan, the United States, and Australia, executed Exercise
Malabar. So the cooperation of those nations currently has and
needs to expand across all elements of national power.
Senator Kaine. I have always said to witnesses here about
the Quad is that if the Big 12 can have ten teams, and the Big
10 and A 10 can have 14 teams each, there is no reason a Quad
cannot have more than four nations. So I would encourage us to
always broaden our reach in that way.
Missile attacks on United States Forces in Iraq over the
past year have shown a level of precision that our forces have
not experienced during much of the early years of the global
war on terror, and so the attacks display both accurate and
devastation but also the vulnerabilities of our systems to
defend against them. Any conflict in PACOM is guaranteed to see
a widespread use, in my view, of precision guided missiles
against both bases and ships. Do you think there is adequate
attention paid in current budgeting for medium- and long-range
air defense weapons?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative has identified a need that you just articulated, to
ensure that we can protect our force. It is combined with not
just missiles but the ability to integrate and the ability to
command and control them, as well as tie those with our allies
and partners. It would give us a broad ability to protect and
defend all of our citizens, and sailors, soldiers, airmen,
Coast Guardsman, and Marines.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that. The Navy is in the early
stages of replacing the F-18 Super Hornet with a program called
Next Generation Air Defense, which I guess goes by two
acronyms, NGAD or F/A-XX. Where do you see gaps emerging in our
current fleet structure of F-18s and F-35s that have to be
addressed by a new platform like the NGAD?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. The capabilities that
are needed against this competitor need to be more
technologically advanced. To Senator Inhofe's questions, the
need for fifth-generation aircraft has been identified and is
needed to enter and operate in those contested spaces. NGAD or
F/A-XX I think is our next step to advance the technology and
provide even more capability to be able to operate in those
contested spaces. It is very important, and the Navy is
currently working on the development of the air wing of the
future. So think of those carrier strike groups we talked about
before being even more lethal, being able to enter and operated
in those contested spaces. It is critical to the deterrence
needed.
Senator Kaine. Do you have a sense of the timeline for when
NGAD may come online in the INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I do not have a sense of that
exact date. I think they are looking at IOC in 2030 or 2031.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Now let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, first of
all let me just say thank you very much for your service and
your family's service to our country. I appreciated the
discussion that we had last week and believe that you are the
right person at this time, in this critical position.
A couple of thoughts. Number one, I want to go back and
visit just a second an issue that Senator Hirono brought up,
and that is Guam. We did not really get into it, but would you
talk with us a little bit about just how critical Guam is in
terms of any of our strategies with regard to this AOR. Right
now, part of the discussion has been how do you defend Guam,
what are the options available? I know that Admiral Davidson
had recommended, and Congress did not agree last year, with the
funding for the GDS, the Guam Defense System.
But I would like your thoughts on it as well, because it
seems to me that without that in place we leave, as you
indicated, literally thousands of our own military men and
women at risk.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. Guam, as we all can
agree, I think, is an incredibly strategic location in the
Indo-Pacific. It is west of the International Date Line, the
ability to host over 20,000 of our U.S. Forces to be able to
respond if needed, and the force protection for those
servicemembers, families, as well as the 170,000 U.S. citizens
is critical.
Admiral Davidson highlighted the need for 360-degree
coverage. He also highlighted the need for those systems to be
in place by 2025. It goes back to our point of near term and
with a sense of urgency.
So I certainly believe we need that capability, and if
confirmed I look forward to working with you to ensure we can
get it in place.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I agree, and I think as Senator
Cotton indicated in his remarks most certainly time is of the
essence, and we cannot simply sit back and just say this is
just something that we can put off for another day.
An area that I think is going to continue to be an item of
discussion I think in your AOR, just like in any other place in
the world, the DoD's cyber strategy, which was published in
December of 2018, charges DoD to defend forward, shape the day-
to-day competition, and prepare for war. We have experienced
highly sophisticated attacks within the cyber domain from the
lines of both Russia and China in the past, and most recently
we have seen some other capabilities, with the most recent
attacks on business and some of our governmental entities as
well.
Can you discuss how you view this threat from the
perspective of the INDOPACOM, and how you would approach it
through the lenses of strategy, operations, and exercises? What
exercises are you doing, and how do you fill this in? I mean,
when we talk about the issues of cyber it is the least
expensive part of defense, and yet it impacts all of the other
domains--air, land, sea, and space.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. As we have seen, many of
our competitors are operating at the level short of war through
the cyberspace domain that you identified. It is critically
important. In many cases it is an indicator of follow-on events
that we might see. If confirmed, I think our focus needs to be
on, number one, the strongest defense possible to ensure that
those competitors are unable to take advantage of that space,
and combined with that it is important that we have those same
conversations with our allies and partners so that they are
just as defended and we do not provide an alternative path for
anyone to enter in our cyber domain.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. One last item that I just wanted
to bring up that I think, when we talk about fifth-generation
aircraft and the need for more of them, and particularly right
now we are talking about those that could be used within the
carrier-based fleet that we have got. But we have also got the
B-21 coming online and will probably be operational well before
the next-gen fighter systems will be available. The B-21, which
would be based in safe bases, South Dakota and Texas, is the
knock-down-the-door type of a system which basically will slow
down our adversaries who think that they may very well be safe
from a carrier-based operation because of their land-based
defense systems that they have in place, specifically China.
Could you talk a little bit about the integrated need and
capabilities that the B-21 would bring in the Indo-Pacific
region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I just want to highlight
before it was a specific Navy question that I answered, but
that said it will obviously take the entire joint force to be
able to compete. Again, as it applies to where might be the
best place I would love to see the results of the Secretary's
posture review, that global posture review, and if confirmed,
to see what does that mean and how does it impact the Indo-
Pacific.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Let me recognize,
via Webex, Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up
on Senator Rounds' questions, Admiral. I can guarantee you that
at this very moment, hundreds, if not thousands of very smart
software engineers and hackers are in China, attempting to
figure out how to compromise our command and control systems,
our IRS systems, our force projection software. I cannot stress
more to you the urgency of being prepared for this. All of our
preparations, all of our money, all of our systems are useless
if we cannot communicate with them or, on the other hand, if
they are rendered inert by a cyberattack.
So I hope that you will see this as an extremely high
priority. You should be having people trying to hack your own
systems to determine how safe they really are.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. It truly is important,
and the word ``urgency'' I use frequently as it applies to all
aspects of the missions assigned, additionally in cyberspace.
We actually have cyber aggressor teams that execute the role
that you just described, and I believe it is worthwhile to
ensure we expand those tests, if you will, into all of our
operations and exercises. Sir, and if confirmed, I will
continue to do that.
Senator King. Thank you. One of the things that worries me
are the continuing friction, if you will, in the South China
Sea and the potential for an accident, for an accidental
conflict. Do we have mil-to-mil communications established with
the Chinese, a kind of red phone, where you and your
counterpart in China can have direct communication if there is,
for example, a Chinese fighter jet flies too close or actually
clips a destroyer in the South China Sea on a Freedom of
Navigation mission?
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. I do not have a
direct communication with my counterpart. I know Admiral
Davidson has advocated for that ability at his level, and I
know the chairman does have a connection that he can utilize.
If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for that connection
to ensure there is an ability to de-escalate if there were an
event, and the ability to not let it go out of control. I think
that communication mechanism could be effective if that
connection was with someone who had decision-making authority.
Senator King. I appreciate your interest in pursuing that.
I think it could be critically important.
Law of the Sea, you mentioned what the Chinese are doing in
the South China Sea in terms of planes. The Russians are doing
similar things in the Arctic. Do you believe it is in the
national interest for this country to enter into the Law of the
Sea treaty?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator King. I have asked every flag officer that has
appeared before this committee that question, just pretty much
regularly for the last 8 years, and I have never gotten a
negative answer. Why do you think it is important that we be
part of this treaty structure?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, there are really two main
reasons. Number one, as the group gets together it would be
certainly beneficial if we had a seat at the table when there
were discussions occurring as it applied to potential
adjustments and the interpretations of those international
laws. The second reason, it puts us in an increased position of
credibility. We adhere to the UNCLOS treaty in our operations,
and it would make our position much stronger if we were
signators.
Senator King. I appreciate that, Admiral, and hope to
persuade my colleagues of those arguments, indeed.
I mentioned the urgency of the cyber threat. I think
another urgent concern is vulnerability to hypersonics. Do you
see that as an issue that we really need to be accelerating our
defensive, not only our hypersonic capacity but our ability to
defend against hypersonic attacks, particularly since forward-
deployed carrier strike groups, for example, are part of the
essence of our deterrence.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, absolutely. It is the next
step. It is capabilities that our competitors are pursuing, and
I see we need to pursue both offensive capability in the form
of hypersonics and defensive capabilities.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate your answers
and look forward to voting for your confirmation. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral, thank you
very much for being here today and for your willingness to
continue to serve our great country. To your wife, as well,
Laura, welcome. It is good to have you here, Jessica, as well,
and to your Fleet Master Chief. You always need a battle buddy
when you come to Capitol Hill. So thank you all for what you do
for the men and women that serve within your fleet, and to
those that will be serving upon confirmation in the Indo-
Pacific Command as well.
So we have talked a number of issues today, and my
colleagues have highlighted a lot of issues. All of these are
nesting together quite well. I am going to dive in a little bit
more, just a bit on China. But last week we did discuss some of
the major influencers in the region, of course China, but then
we also see the Russian influence, we see the Iranian
influence, and North Korea as well.
So what are your thoughts on the Iranian influence first,
within INDOPACOM? We are seeing them work alongside North Korea
in logistical areas such as munitions. Is this alarming to you,
and what other threats or concerns might you have with the
Iranians engaging in the INDOPACOM AOR?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Certainly contributions
in the form of energy support that exceed the UN Security
Council resolutions is concerning. Again, providing capability
that we would be concerned about in the form of technology
transfer, whether it be missile technologies, nuclear
capabilities. All those would negatively impact the region and
negatively impact all of the allies and partners.
Senator Ernst. So it is definitely something that we need
to keep an eye on. Correct?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Admiral, and as well, we have
talked about China and why it is important then that we have
interoperability capabilities with our regional partners and
our allies. Some of the things we have mentioned today, Senator
Kaine brought up missile defense. Others have talked about
humanitarian assistance. Are there other capabilities, whether
it is hard infrastructure or munitions, things of that nature,
or other soft capabilities that we can work on as well with our
partners that would enhance our partnership in that region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, and again, the capabilities
are across the spectrum. It is critical that we have allies and
partners to support, whether it be logistics, whether it be
access, whether it be combined interoperability in the form of
operations. Every aspect of it is important. I do not think
there is one piece that you can leave out and be effective and
be able to generate the deterrence needed.
Senator Ernst. One of the soft capabilities that China does
tend to offer, or benefits that China offers to a number of
those countries in that region is training capabilities. They
offer that assistance to many of our partners. Can you stress
to us how important the IMET program is?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Again, it is one of those
additional areas beyond operations and exercises that allow us
to connect and get to that access, training, and improvement of
our allies and partners. General Rudd supports all of the
components currently, and in many cases he is the lead effort
as it applies to being able to get access and get in and train
our allies and partners. So it is extremely important. We have
got to continue IMET, and if confirmed, I will continue to
stress that.
Senator Ernst. Fantastic. As part of those training
opportunities as well and other types of capabilities operating
in the gray zone are our special operations forces. Can you
describe what role you would see our SOF playing in the
INDOPACOM command area of authority, and what role that they
might have in pushing back against China?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, the SOF team plays an important
role across all aspects in the entire spectrum. Currently,
their leading role is in the information space, as a part of
Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific, currently located in Singapore.
So while they touch every aspect of the spectrum, they are
leading a role in a couple of different places.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. My time is expiring so I will
stop there, but Admiral, thanks once again for stepping up to
this nomination, and I look forward to confirming you. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Let me recognize,
via Webex, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral
Aquilino, thank you for being here today. Congratulations on
your nomination.
So the Indo-Pacific represents the most consequential and
challenging region of the world for the United States and our
national security, and as Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command you will be responsible for overseeing U.S. Forces in
the region. One of your top priorities will be contending with
China and its growing influence, both regionally and globally.
Earlier this month, Admiral Philip Davidson, the current
Commander if INDOPACOM, testified that the greatest danger to
the United States is the erosion of conventional deterrence
against China. He warned that without credible, conventional
deterrence, China may be emboldened to take action and supplant
United States interests in the region.
Do you agree with Admiral Davidson that the erosion of
conventional deterrence is the greatest danger to the United
States in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Warren. So Admiral Davidson also warned that China
was on course to double their nuclear stockpile this decade,
and he agreed with a claim by one of my colleagues that if
China quadrupled their nuclear stockpile they could, quote,
``have nuclear overmatch against the United States.'' Now I
want to look into the numbers on this. Last year's report on
China's military power shows that their stockpile of
operational nuclear warheads is only in the low 200s, far fewer
than the approximately 3,800 in the United States' active
stockpile.
So, Admiral, are you aware of any evidence that suggests
that China intends to quadruple its nuclear stockpile in this
decade?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think what I would say is
there are many opinions on what those numbers are. I think the
numbers you quoted are accurate with regard to today. What I
would say is we see China increasing at a rate that is faster
than anyone previously believed, their nuclear stockpile. So
while I cannot directly, at this point, understand their intent
or what their end target is, they are increasing. If you were
to look at what they have done with their conventional force, I
would see no reason why I would expect anything other than to
have them continue to increase their nuclear capabilities and
aspirations.
Senator Warren. So let me just ask that from maybe a
different point of view. I understand what you are saying, and
I appreciate it, but even if they did quadruple their
stockpile, China would still have fewer warheads than the
United States has currently deployed. Is that right?
Admiral Aquilino. If it were to quadruple today, that would
be accurate. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Okay. So from your perspective, as the
Commander of Pacific Fleet and the incoming INDOPACOM
Commander, would you agree that credible, conventional
deterrents are still the best way of protecting United States
interests in the Indo-Pacific region and avoiding a conflict
with China?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. That conventional
deterrents to avoid crisis or conflict is certainly the main
effort, as I would see it, if confirmed.
Senator Warren. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate your
comments on this. China presents the greatest geopolitical
challenge to the United States since the end of World War II,
and it is critical that we face this challenge with clear eyes.
Distorting the threat to justify building more nuclear weapons
at home is not a recipe for success here.
So I look forward to your confirmation and I look forward
to working with you to advance areas of shared interest. Thank
you very much. Thank you for being with us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me recognize
Senator Tillis, please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral,
congratulations to you and to your family and your team for
your nomination. I would like to start just by asking a general
question. About a week ago, maybe a week and a half ago we got
an update from NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] and
SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] on China's
engagement, primarily in Latin and South America. Can you give
me a quick rundown within your area, or your future area of
responsibility in terms of China's relationships, say, today,
as compared to 5 or 10 years ago, ostensibly economic or non-
military engagement, but we all know there is a military
dimension to almost everything that China does. So just a quick
rundown of the areas of greatest concern.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I spoke to Admiral Faller
last week, after he testified. I think the main point that
comes out is China is a global problem. When you talk about
their areas of influence and what does it mean globally, there
are economic efforts that are underway by China across the
globe. There are military efforts underway, and, you know, it
furthers their reach. It would allow access, logistic support
in time of crisis. So all of those things are a bit concerning,
and for allies and partners across the globe, they have to
understand what that means.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. A number of my colleagues have
covered the fifth-generation F-22, F-35, the importance of
those programs. The one question I had, I think with General
Berger, there is some thought in the future of the Marine Corps
force design of reducing squadrons from 16 to 10 aircraft, I
think. What is the rationale behind that, and what impact could
that possibly have in your area of operation?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I think General Berger,
in his former position as the Commander of Marine Forces
Pacific, he got a front-line view of the main concern for the
next generation, if you will. I appreciate his efforts to
restructure, to take on adjusted mission sets, and to ensure
that his forces are contributing to deterrence.
I would like to highlight that all of the service chiefs
are on board with the same set of concerns. So I appreciate and
admire the work done by CNO Gilday, by Chief C.Q. Brown, by
General McConville, and by General Clarke.
Senator Tillis. Actually I may have time for two questions.
The 360 missile defense system in Guam has been raised, as the
top unfunded priority. Do we have our priorities in order? Do
we just simply have the resources to do it? In your opinion,
why is it that we have this unfunded priority, and what should
we do about it?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I think Admiral Davidson
and I highlighted the right priority order as needed to
foundationally begin to identify and show that credible
deterrence that is needed inside, or west of the International
Date Line. There are a variety of opinions that there may be a
better system, that there is an integrated air missile defense
problem vice just a ballistic missile defense problem. So I
think those are the different competition voices.
What I believe is there is a need in the near term to
defend against all of those threats, from a 360-degree
standpoint, and if that answer is Aegis, I am absolutely
supportive. If there is a better answer that can be delivered
in the near term, I would be ready to listen to that, if
confirmed. But that is how I see it.
Senator Tillis. One other question on the F-35 program.
Several of our allies are participating in that program. We
understand the military significance of it. But to what extent
has that engagement been helpful, from a diplomatic
perspective?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, it is always helpful when our
allies and partners are operating with the same stuff we are.
It absolutely makes us more interoperable. It opens up
opportunities for logistic sites, supply cooperation, and other
events like that, that just continue to expand our relationship
and make us more effective in operations.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Chair, if I had
more time I would ask the admiral if the Aqualung nickname was
inspired by the breathing apparatus or the Jethro Tull album,
but I will leave that for the record. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tillis. Let me
now recognize Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you
for your service. Good to see you here with us today.
Admiral, the Marine Corps has been implementing its Force
Design 2030 plan to support operations as a lighter, much more
maneuverable force, as you are well aware. For example, they
have talked about divestment of tanks in favor of joint light
tactical vehicle equipped with some long-range precision
munitions. Have you been monitoring the Marine Corps' progress,
and if so, what are your thoughts about this approach?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. Commandant Berger is
extremely thoughtful, as the former head of the Marine Corps in
the Pacific, he has seen first-hand. I think his structure and
approach is correct. It will really help to generate deterrence
that we continue to talk about today, in the form of whether it
be surface-to-air capability, anti-ship capability, and the
ability to expand the competitive space from a land domain into
a mostly maritime domain.
So his site picture is correct, and hopefully he can keep
that plan on track. It would be better, under the sense of
urgency needed to deliver sooner rather than later.
Senator Peters. Very good, Admiral. Thank you. When Admiral
Davidson appeared here 2 weeks ago, I questioned him on a
strategy focused heavily on conventional deterrence would fare
against China's three-pronged strategy of unrestricted warfare,
given that its efforts are undertaken below the threshold of
armed conflict. I think this also applies to our partnerships.
The type and caliber of security systems we are providing
should certainly reflect our mutual threats that we all have.
So my question is, to what extent do you believe our
security assistance should include cybersecurity assistance or
measures to enhance resiliency against information warfare?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, it should absolutely include it.
First, a strong defense against the cyber problems that exist.
Without a doubt, resiliency--and I would go one step further,
the potential for reconstitution.
Senator Peters. Admiral, on March 4th, Admiral Davidson
introduced his investment plan of needed capabilities for
INDOPACOM, and this plan includes over $2 billion for space-
based radars. As you know, the Chinese are rapidly launching
ISR satellites to better monitor the INDOPACOM, and last week
they launched another trip of Yaogan-31 satellites. I think
this is the third launch since January 29th of this year.
It is clear that we must improve our capability and
capacity to monitor the region from space, and there are
certainly a number of innovative commercial companies out
there, such as Orbital Effects, of Ann Arbor, Michigan, which
is quickly launching radar satellites with the necessary
capabilities, and quite frankly, they are doing it at a
fraction of the cost of traditional government efforts to
address national security threats.
Admiral, do you support the use of these capabilities to
more quickly and cost-effectively address this challenge?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. You highlighted the extreme
build-up in the space domain, and that is certainly concerning.
Any ability to increase capability, capacity, resiliency in the
space domain would be of benefit, and if confirmed, I would
support that.
Senator Peters. Right. Admiral, the Department of Defense
is currently developing a training program to enable
servicemembers and civilian employees to better understand and
better identify foreign malign influence campaigns and cyber
exploitation, generally, as it is targeting members and their
families. So my question to you, sir, is to what extent have
you contended with these issues at the Pacific Fleet, and how
will you inform your approach to INDOPACOM personnel related to
this issue?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, my team reviews my profile in
the cyber domain, and over the past 6 months they have removed
over 250 false sites that are claiming to be me. I think that
gets to the indication that this is a persistent threat, as was
mentioned before, low cost, and we have to be on our game. We
have to understand what it means and continue to defend against
it.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Let me recognize
Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral,
for your service. I had the opportunity to serve in the Navy
and it was a great experience. They did not pay me much,
though. Of course, I was 18 and I had no experience too. They
shouldn't have.
Do you believe that it is clear that we have got to prevent
Communist China from controlling Taiwan, that it would be a
strategic necessity for the United States to make sure Taiwan
remains not controlled by Communist China, and the loss of
Taiwan would devastate our ability to counter the aggressive
actions of Communist China?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Again, the policy
identifies that through the Taiwan Relations Act we support the
defense of Taiwan. Three communiques and six assurances. It
would negatively impact our standing in the region if that were
to happen, and it would challenge the rest of our allies and
partners in the U.S., negatively impacting our ability to
operate freely in that area.
Senator Scott. When you look at what Communist China has
done with Hong Kong, why haven't they been even more aggressive
with Taiwan, do you think?
Admiral Aquilino. I do not know how to answer that one,
Senator, judging from intent. I think what I would articulate
is we have seen aggressive actions earlier than we anticipated,
whether it be on the Indian border or whether it be in Hong
Kong or whether it be against the Uyghurs. We have seen things
that I do not think we expected, and that is why I continue to
talk about a sense of urgency. We ought to be prepared today.
Senator Scott. I introduced the Taiwan Invasion Prevention
Act to end the United States strategic ambiguity about Taiwan.
I believe it is time for the United States to say clearly that
we will not, absolutely not allow Communist China to invade and
subdue Taiwan, and that both Taiwan and the United States need
to invest in the resources, weapons, training, and strategic
dialogue to ensure that Xi understands that he has nothing to
gain from using force against Taiwan.
It is not calling for their independence, only that we need
to meet the threat that Xi has announced through his aggressive
actions. What are your thoughts on this?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, the current policies have been
able to keep the status quo in place now for a number of years.
I would be open to, and hope to be, if confirmed, included in
any conversations should we decide to change or adjust that
policy. We would have to ensure we understand the risk and be
extremely thoughtful if we were to go down that path.
Senator Scott. What else do you think we need to do to make
sure that Xi doesn't decide to invade Taiwan? What should we be
doing that we are not doing right now?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think an increase in our
forward deterrent posture, as identified by Admiral Davidson in
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is a great first start. But
capable, lethal forces west of the Date Line, to be able to
respond on extremely short notice, combined with
synchronization with our allies and partners to ensure that all
understand that that is not within the best interests of anyone
in the theater.
Senator Scott. Do you think we have the right resources so
Taiwan will not get overwhelmed by the coercive acts of
Communist China?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I am really encouraged by the
actions of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Defense Act
with regard to the capabilities that they are purchasing, with
regard to the indigenous capabilities that they are pursuing,
all for the defense of where they live, and that has to
continue.
Senator Scott. Do you think Japan is doing enough to get
prepared for the aggressive actions that Communist China
clearly is threatening for the region, to the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Japan is the cornerstone of
the alliance in the region. I think they have watched all of
the events you and I talked about a few minutes ago, and they
understand what does that translate as it applies to them. If
you were to think of the Senkaku Islands, I believe that they
are concerned. I am extremely happy with the interoperability,
coordination, and relationship we have with the Japanese. I
think it is a strong, as I said, cornerstone to the foundation
in executing deterrence in the region.
Senator Scott. Thanks for your service. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Manchin,
please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, and first of all, thank you for your service, and I
want to thank your family for supporting your service. I know
it is a family event and an affair.
Sir, one of Admiral Davidson's top priorities is a mission
partner environment that would serve as a common platform for
our partners in the Pacific to work collaboratively in a cyber
domain. Do you share the urgency of promoting greater
interoperability of the cyber operations with our allies and
partners in the Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, absolutely. The mission partner
environment generates synchronization, the ability to command
and control beyond just the cyber domain. So think ISR, think
coordination operations of planning, all the way to execution.
It is absolutely critical.
Senator Manchin. Have you had to coordinate with Cyber
Command in your past? Have you worked with them in the past?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, at the Pac Fleet level I have a
support organization in cyber, but I do not personally
coordinate directly with Cyber Command. That is Admiral
Davidson's role. If confirmed, I certainly would.
Senator Manchin. Our current major ballistic missile
defense assets in the INDOPACOM include Thaad in South Korean
and Guam, Aegis systems in service with United States naval
assets in the Pacific and the Japanese navy, and Patriot
missile capability in South Korea and Japan. With Japan's
uncertainty on Aegis Ashore construction, we are at an even
greater disadvantage to sustaining a credible military
deterrence against our competitors.
So where do you assess the greater vulnerability exists
when it comes to missile defense in the Pacific, and how do you
plan to fix these?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, the missile defense concern is
throughout the theater.
Senator Manchin. Sure. I think mostly with Japan pulling
back because of public support, pulling out of the Aegis. Where
do you see--that troubled me, being the great ally that they
have been, all of a sudden public opinion, and they pull out of
the defense that I think is needed for their own country.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Again, I think what they
have done is they decided to relook at whether Aegis Ashore is
the right answer. They certainly are partnered with us in the
form of their Aegis destroyers. I think we have a shared
responsibility and requirement to protect forces in Japan, and
I look forward, if confirmed, to work with the Japanese to try
to get to the right answer for them.
Senator Manchin. Are you aware of any assistance being
offered by INDOPACOM to provide community engagement in Japan
to help relieve or ease the public concerns, at this point in
time? If not, it might be a good position for you to take on
that one.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. I am unaware in my current
seat. If confirmed, I would look to work with the Missile
Defense Agency to ensure--and I would be surprised if Admiral
Davidson was not having those conversations with his
counterparts.
Senator Manchin. Okay, and speaking of Admiral Davidson,
back in 2018, during his confirmation hearing, China was
already capable of controlling the South China Sea and any
scenario short of war with the United States. Here we are 3
years later, and we have heard repeated testimony that China
has increased its naval forces, its coast guard and other
paramilitary forces.
So what is stopping them right now from exercising their
capability whenever they feel like it, of controlling the South
China Sea?
Admiral Aquilino. The U.S. Joint Forces in the region,
Senator, the partner nations?
Senator Manchin. We are strong there. We have not done
anything to deter it. They have taken these little outcrops and
made them into major military bases.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I would somewhat disagree with that
we have not taken any action. I think if you looked at the
events we have executed over the past couple of years--and I
will speak from my role as the Pacific Fleet Commander,
multiple dual-carrier strike group operations in the South
China Sea, the most FONs and Taiwan Strait transits that have
been executed in recent years, multiple bilateral and
multilateral operations with our partners and allies, all in
the South China Sea I think would highlight that we can and
will continue to operate there.
Senator Manchin. I did not mean that in a detrimental way.
I meant that in saying that they have taken small outcrops and
continually enlarge those into a military confine, if you will.
We, or no one else, seem to be able to stop that or prevent
that or took any actions before they got to the size they are
now and to the operability they are.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. We certainly have not
changed their desire nor intent nor ability to execute the
largest military build-up we have seen in a while.
Senator Manchin. So is it safe to say that basically unless
we are going to have a major presence, as you just outlined, in
the South China Sea, then they will have total control of that?
Admiral Aquilino. I think that credible forward presence,
again, not just the United States but with allies and partners,
is the best deterrent option to ensure that we can keep that
space free and open.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your
confirmation and look forward to voting for you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now let me
recognize, via Webex, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so
much for allowing [audio malfunction] for being generous with
your time. We appreciate that and appreciate your service to
our country.
I want to talk with you just a little bit about China and
our Chinese counterparts. You know that some deterrence and the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative, these are things that are
important to me, and our diplomats had a contentious encounter
last week in Alaska. Beijing's Foreign Affairs Chief, Director
Yang, this was his statement: ``The United States does not have
the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a
position of strength.'' If Congress fully funds the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative at the levels proposed in Admiral
Davidson's assessment, and listening to you this morning it
sounds as if you are in complete agreement with that, talk to
us about how we communicate that we believe we hold that
position of strength in communicating with Beijing.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. I think what you
described is what competition looks like in the future. Actions
that we would take to ensure credible deterrence, the desire to
not have conflict by the actions and operations that we execute
and understanding that there are things that we will do that
our competitor will not find very good for them. So I think we
have to be ready and have to understand what does that
competition space look like and continue to execute those
things that will allow us to keep the status quo.
Senator Blackburn. Well, and I think probably, too, that
you would agree that keeping these budgetary top lines that are
going to give you what you need should be a priority as we look
at our INDOPACOM initiatives.
Let me ask you this. Okay, when you look at PDI, combined
command, control networks, and the mission partner environment,
in relation to interoperability and the needs of our regional
security partners, and we look at this through the lens of
cyber, through the lens of technology, tell me what concerns
you about China's aggressiveness in this great power
competition when it comes to technology, to hardware, to
setting standards, to infrastructure, to their cyber
capabilities.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So the key with the
mission partner environment is that it absolutely must be cyber
secure. We would not benefit from allowing the PLA to be able
to infiltrate that network. So all the benefits that it
provides, for interoperability, for command and control, for
resilience and reassurance, the concern would be the
cybersecurity of that environment, and it would have to be top
on the list of priorities as it were developed.
Senator Blackburn. Well, in that regard what about the
vulnerabilities that are associated with cloud computing and
integrated systems?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So those technological
advances, I think while they identify vulnerabilities also have
opportunities. So as we shift and take advantage of those
things, again, we have to make sure that they are cybersecure
and unable to be infiltrated.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Just a quick yes or no from
you. Should we be increasing our bilateral participation in
exercises with Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, we should continue to execute
those things that we do with Taiwan, and should there be a
policy shift, again, if confirmed, I hope to be in those
conversations, we do exercise with Taiwan, we have visits with
Taiwan, we have consultations. All of those are contributing to
Taiwan's defense.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Let me now recognize
Senator Duckworth via Webex.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
Aquilino, I appreciate our call last week and I am glad we were
able to discuss some of the biggest challenges that you face if
you are confirmed, including improving our logistics
capabilities and capacity in the INDOPACOM region.
In addition to agreeing that our logistics enterprise is
absolutely foundational for having a combat-credible deterrent,
I feel that we were very much on the same page about the need
to strengthen our partners with the various nations in the
region. You and I have both heard our regional partners say
that they want a greater United States presence in the Indo-
Pacific so that they have alternatives to the Communist PRC
when it comes to trading and security partners. But the tragic
murders of eight people in Atlanta last week, six of them of
East Asian descent, highlighted a disturbing trend of an
increasing violence and hate towards Asians and Asian Americans
in this country, particularly those of East Asian descent.
Regardless of the stated motive for last week's shooting,
there is no arguing that cities across the country are
reporting a drastic increase in violent crimes and
discrimination targeting members of the AAPI community. It is
also not hard to see a correlation between the stark rise an
anti-Asian bigotry and our former Commander-in-Chief, Donald
Trump, blatantly using hateful and racist language, such as
calling the coronavirus the ``Kung Flu'' or the ``Chinese
virus,'' long after such terminology has been deemed
inappropriate and harmful.
Shockingly, Trump spread such bigotry despite the FBI
producing a report, as early as March 2020, that included a
clear and chilling assessment. I quote, ``Hate crime incidents
against Asian Americans likely will surge across the United
States due to the spread of coronavirus disease, endangering
Asian American communities.'' Just last week, Gallup released a
poll that found, over the past year, the percentage of
Americans who consider China to be the United States' greatest
enemy today rose from 22 percent in February 2020 and 45
percent when measured last month.
Let me be clear. There is a difference between expressing
opposition to the Communist Chinese government's aggressive
economic and military practices, which I absolutely support
opposing them, and ignorantly blaming Asian people, especially
those of East Asian descent, for the coronavirus pandemic.
Blaming the AAPI community for a public health crisis is racist
and wrong, and I am increasingly concerned that it will hurt
our relationship with our partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
Admiral Aquilino, when American leaders make racist
statements about Asians, and American citizens participated in
anti-Asian hate, how does it harm the United States'
credibility and reputation in the Indo-Pacific region? Please
make sure to address how such bigotry and racist violence
undermines our relationships with our allies and partners who
may already be facing challenges in defending our presence in
their respective nation states as views and attitudes towards
the U.S. evolve with the younger generation.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator. To your first point,
and you and I have had this conversation, professionals talk
logistics, so all of our efforts in the region are underpinned,
and the relationships with our partners and allies will
certainly be required to help us set up this enabling network
and support our logistics issues. So thanks for that.
To your second point, what I owe, and what we all owe our
incredibly brave servicemembers is a safe, comfortable place
where they can work and execute the oath that they have taken.
So there is no place in our ranks for any type of
discrimination. Whether it be against Asians, whether it be
race, creed, color, you name it, it is just completely
unacceptable, it degrades from our readiness, and, if
confirmed, I can tell you it will not be tolerated.
Senator Duckworth. So how does the rise in hate crimes
against Asian Americans and hateful rhetoric at the top ranks
of government, and the absolute lack of representation at the
very top ranks of the Biden administration of AAPIs in
secretarial positions or higher levels, affect our
relationships in the INDOPACOM region? I mean, you are going to
be going in there trying to make alliances with folks in the
INDOPACOM region, and yet we have Asians being shot down, and
we have even Members of Congress targeting Asian Americans with
hate rhetoric. How does that affect your job, trying to develop
relationships in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, our relations in the region are
critical. I have and will continue to say that. As a diverse
military, we continue to ensure that our values are understood.
I believe our allies and partners understand that when they
talk with us that we speak from a position of shared values. As
I said, if confirmed, I will do everything possible to ensure
none of that discrimination is a part of how the Indo-Pacific
operates.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I have every confidence in
your commitment to diversity, Admiral, and you have shown that
in your service and you have shown that in your conversations
with me, and I thank you for continuing to be a leader, both in
the military but also when it comes to diversity in that
military that we both love. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator
Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to
see you. I appreciated our conversations, and congratulations
on your nomination.
I want to start by revisiting something that you and I
talked about at some length when we visited, which is the
situation in Taiwan. Both Deputy Secretary Hicks and Admiral
Davidson have testified that the United States should maintain
the ability to defeat a fait accompli scenario in Taiwan. Do
you agree with that?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Do you think the Department should also
prioritize preparations for a Taiwan scenario so that we will
be able to deter China from attacking Taiwan, should they
attempt to do so?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. That credible deterrence
forward is absolutely required with the correct forces, the
right magnitude of forces, and the readiness of those forces.
Senator Hawley. Very good. The Deputy Secretary and Admiral
Davidson have also testified that a strategy of denial is
essential for deterring Chinese aggression. Secretary Austin
said the same thing to me in response to a question that I had
for him for the record. Do you agree with that, that a strategy
of denial is essential for deterring China?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about a question that you
were posed earlier by one of my colleagues. You were asked
about the importance of conventional deterrence in the Indo-
Pacific. But I just want to get clear on your views here. The
necessary of conventional deterrence, which I think we agree
on, does not mean that nuclear deterrence has any less of a
role, doesn't it? I mean, wouldn't you agree that our nuclear
deterrent provides a critical backstop to our conventional
deterrent, and that both are necessary to be able to
effectively deter China?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, absolutely. If I gave that
impression then I apologize.
Senator Hawley. You also said earlier today that the threat
of a Chinese invasion in Taiwan is much closer to us than most
think. You and I talked about this at some length. Is it fair
to say that this threat, what you said earlier, ``much closer
to us than most think,'' is it fair to say that this threat
could materialize well before 2035, or some of those very later
dates that folks have put out there?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, I believe it could.
Senator Hawley. Is it fair to say that we need to act now
if we are going to prevent this threat from materializing in
the future?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator, absolutely. A strong
posture forward, linked with our allies and partners I believe
is the leading path for prevention.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Reports have indicated that
Taiwan's upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review is going to
emphasize the need for Taiwan to adopt an asymmetrical defense
posture. This, again, is something you and I visited about. Can
you just give us a sense, why is it so important for Taiwan to
invest in asymmetrical capabilities, especially those that are
low cost, high impact?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, as we discussed a bit, the
resources they have require them to be spent in the correct
manner to have the most effectiveness against the possible
threat. I am encouraged by some of those capabilities that they
have purchased, and I am encouraged by the capabilities that
they are investing in, in an indigenous fashion, for their
defense. The example I would give you is the harpoon system. I
thought it was very thoughtful and the right capability, for
one example.
Senator Hawley. What can the United States do to help
encourage Taiwan to adopt a more asymmetric defense posture as
quickly as possible?
Admiral Aquilino. I think it is a part of the Taiwan
Relation Act. Offering the right capabilities with the right
support is the best way to ensure that they certainly
understand all of their options, they get to make their own
choices, but by providing credible, realistic options with
recommendations would be helpful.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you about something else we
discussed on the phone. The Guam Defense Act has been
INDOPACOM's top unfunded priority for the last 3 years. Just
generally speaking, give us a sense of why Guam is so
important, from a military operational standpoint.
Admiral Aquilino. It is certainly in a strategic location,
west of the International Date Line, distant enough to be able
to protect our forces, muster our forces, and as you know,
there are over 20,000 servicemembers on Guam. So combined with
the 170,000 American citizens, we certainly are responsible to
protect those people. But the strategic location is critical to
be able to provide forces quickly in the area we need them.
Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, finally, the Quad
appears to be forming the basis for a regional coalition to
stand up to Chinese aggression. How do you see the Quad
contributing to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, now and in the
future?
Admiral Aquilino. I think it is extremely important when
you look at India as the world's largest democracy, combined
with three other nations of shared values and beliefs. When an
organization of that magnitude comes together it would generate
concern for anyone with an opposite opinion.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Oh, excuse me. Senator Rosen via Webex. Excuse me. Senator
Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I
thank you, Ranking Member, and I want to thank you, Admiral,
for your service, for your willingness to continue to serve and
step up and take on this extremely important role in our
national defense. I really appreciate that.
I would like to talk a little bit about maintaining our
technological edge, because at the heart of China's military
modernization efforts of course there is Beijing's investment
in next-generation military capabilities. I know we have talked
about that earlier in the hearing, when I was in the room. We
want to close that technological gap. China is making advances
in critical areas like artificial intelligence, cyber,
robotics, hypersonics, and they are, at the same time, rapidly
procuring commercial technologies that can be used for military
purposes.
So do you believe that China has achieved technological
parity with the United States in its operational systems, and
are there any areas that you are concerned about that they have
outpaced us?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I do not believe they
have achieved parity. I think they have a desire in the
technological world to increase and ultimately to gain an
overmatch. I think it is extremely important that we do not let
that happen.
So one of our competitive advantages is our ability to do
S&T research and keep that technological edge, and we have to
continue to do that.
Senator Rosen. So if you are confirmed, how would you
incorporate this increasingly technological nature of warfare
into our domains of warfare, into joint coalition exercises,
like we do, of course, many of them in the Nevada and, of
course, around the world.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So if confirmed I think
there is a lot of opportunity to be able to do that, as you
highlighted, the efforts that are executed at both the Nellis
ranges and the Fallon ranges are places where we certainly
experiment and try to work to get to those improved
technological advantages. I think that it is applicable across
the entire region to ensure we can develop tests and ultimately
implement those advanced capabilities.
Senator Rosen. Well, I could not agree with you more. I am
proud of all the training that we do in Nevada. But I know that
this training requires improved skill sets--retraining,
improving training, and, of course, new training for young men
and women who are joining our military.
How are you planning to recruit and retain, build up that
workforce that we are going to need within INDOPACOM,
particularly in these areas of technology?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. So the services have
that responsibility as a part of their Title 10 taskings. If I
were confirmed I would highlight to the service chiefs
certainly what is needed in an increased technological
footprint, and if you look from a Navy perspective, currently
the CNO does a great job at recruiting and retaining the best.
It is getting extremely competitive across the workforce to
recruit and retain, and all of the services are doing a really
good job at maintaining that capability and advancement.
Senator Rosen. I am pleased to hear that. I have instituted
a bill that was in the NDAA last year, about adding a cyber
track to our Junior ROTC program, and hopefully that will build
up our force.
But I would like to, in the last remaining minute or so,
talk a little bit about the state partnership program. Of
course, this initiative links our states' National Guards with
the armed forces. We cooperate, it is a mutually beneficial
relationship, and I know that INDOPACOM maintains ten of these
SPP relationships. So in Nevada, our Nevada National Guard, we
have existing partnerships with Fiji and Tonga to support
INDOPACOM's mission in the South Pacific.
Can you talk about how you are going to work with National
Guards and these partnerships, of course, to be sure that they
know what you are planning, going forward, so they can prepare
and plan to complete their mission sets by improving the skill
sets of our National Guard as well?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. It is extremely
important. You know, I have had a chance to work with Ken Hara,
the head of National Guard in Hawaii, and it continues to pay
dividends. As it applies to foreign partners, it is just as
helpful, and if confirmed, I would continue to execute those
ten partner linkups and look for additional opportunities,
because I think there are some there.
Senator Rosen. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Now let me recognize
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to
see you again. I appreciated the opportunity to have another
discussion, and I look forward to more discussion going
forward. Congratulations on your nomination.
I want to just talk a little bit about Alaska and the
Pacific. Have you been to the great state of Alaska?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I have not yet been, but I will
come and visit Alaska at first opportunity.
Senator Sullivan. Good. We need to get on that, and I am
going to talk a little bit of the reason why.
I was just home. I just got back. You know, there was a lot
of fireworks with this United States-China meeting in
Anchorage. I had the opportunity to meet with Secretary
Blinked, National Security Advisor Sullivan, and Kurt Campbell,
who is also doing a really good at the NSC, right after the
meeting. I was glad to see our Alaska-based military on
Thursday. When the Chinese were approaching we were doing some
exercises with F-22 Raptors there, right around the hotel, give
the Chinese delegation a little view of what is in Alaska.
As you know, we are going to have over 100 fifth-generation
fighters, F-22s, F-35s, by the end of this year, and then on
Friday, when the Chinese are still in Alaska, the Air Force
announced four new tankers, KC-135s, going to Alaska.
The previous Secretary of Defense called this combination
tankers, 100 fifth-generation fighters, giving our country
extreme strategic reach. These fighters could be in the Taiwan
Strait, if they are supersonic, within 5 hours.
These forces are actually OPCOM to PACOM, as you know, in
Alaska. What do you see as the role of these combat-credible
forces from Alaska play within the Indo-Pacific, given that you
will be in command of them?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I have to correct a
previous statement. I said I would visit Alaska. I have to say,
if confirmed I would visit Alaska at first opportunity, so
Senator Reed, I apologize.
The forces in Alaska are critical for both the defense of
the homeland, Senator, as you know. They support the different
ACL levels in the event of either Russian bomber flights and
would be critically needed as a surge force in time of either
crisis or conflict, as you clearly identify.
Senator Inhofe identified the capabilities needed in fifth-
generation to be able to enter that contested space, to fight
and win. So I agree with all those comments that you made.
Senator Sullivan. Let me, real quick--and sorry to
interrupt, but I have got a couple more questions. There is
oftentimes, and you have mentioned it already, this kind of
delineation west of the International Date Line as the
delineation for PACOM. But as you know, Admiral, the further
north you get, the International Date Line in some ways does
not matter, just so I am kind of aware of your geography, your
recognition of geography. We have a lot of forces in Alaska, a
lot of forces in Hawaii, a lot of forces in Australia. Which of
these are closer to Korea and Japan--our forces in Hawaii or
our forces in Alaska?
Admiral Aquilino. Well certainly Alaska would be closer to
Korea and Japan.
Senator Sullivan. That is correct. Yes, and how about
Australia versus Alaska, closer to Korea and Japan?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Senator. Alaska is closer.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah. A lot of people do not know that,
believe it or not. So it is not just International Date Line,
it is how north you are and how close you are. So keep that in
mind. You are going to be in charge of these, and you are going
to get confirmed, and I am going to strongly support it.
Your recommendations are going to be important. This, I
believe, is going to certainly be viewed now, going forward, as
the most important combatant command that we have anywhere
around the world.
In 2015, President Obama and President Xi Jinping stood in
the Rose Garden, and President Xi Jinping promised the
President of the United States and the American people not to
militarize the South China Sea. Did President Xi Jinping keep
that promise?
Admiral Aquilino. No, Senator, he did not.
Senator Sullivan. He did not. Not even close. What I refer
to as ``promise fatigue,'' right. The Chinese make promises
over decades. They rarely keep those promises. Promise
fatigue--we are sick of it.
It was widely reported, and this committee followed it
closely, that because of this we said let's do Freedom of
Navigation Operations. As a matter of fact, your predecessor
said we need to do it. John Kerry, then the Secretary of State,
said, ``No, we have a good climate deal in Paris, with the
Chinese no-FONOPS.'' Was that a good idea to exchange FONOPS
[Freedom of Navigation Operations] for a vague promise on the
Paris climate accords?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, just so you know, I am unaware
of that agreement.
Senator Sullivan. Assume that happened, because it did. Was
that a good idea, from Secretary Kerry?
Admiral Aquilino. What I would say is we have continued FON
operations.
Senator Sullivan. No, no, no. We did not then. Trust me.
This committee was pressing for it. We would not do them. Was
that a good idea--vague promises and the Paris climate accords
from John Kerry and the Chinese for no FONOPS in the South
China Sea for at least 2 years?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, Senator, I think FONOPS are
important. They identify our link to the need for international
order through normal rules and standards.
Senator Sullivan. Was that a good idea? Assume that
happened. Assume that could happen one more time. Let's say
John Kerry has got another role, and says, ``I have got a good
commitment from the Chinese. They just want us to not do FONOPS
through the Taiwan Strait.'' Would that be a good idea?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think FONOPS have served us
well over the past 3 years since I have been at the Pacific
Fleet.
Senator Sullivan. So you would not agree with that idea if
Kerry put it forward again.
Admiral Aquilino. I think we----
Senator Sullivan. You are going to be asked.
Admiral Aquilino.--I think we should continue FONOPS,
Senator.
Senator Sullivan. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan
Strait.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Regardless of commitments from China on
vague climate change commitments that they might get from John
Kerry.
Admiral Aquilino. I think that we should continue those
operations to assure our allies and partners and ensure we can
operate anywhere international law allows.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Best for last.
Put a football coach last.
I have been impressed. I have been in all these meetings
for the last 2 months and I am impressed. Thank you for your
service and your family being here. They are very important.
What a job you have got in front of you, just sitting and
listening to all the things going on in our world. Huge job.
You know, I have heard all the questions about Taiwan and
China and all the things that go on. You forgot one, and we
know about it, and we are going to be trusting you for that. It
is important that we fight through the climate change and the
diversity and all the things going on. I believe in that. You
know, I was a football coach. I mean, you have to plug all that
in.
But we need to build a team. You need to build a team,
because we are getting ready to go in waters unknown over the
next few years, with the money that the CCP is putting in, and
the things that we are going to have to prepare for.
One thing I want to know, and I am going to vote for you. I
believe, you know, you are ready to go, to turn it over to you
and protect our world, not just our country. I just want to
know, are you going to be able to stand up and fight, you know,
this administration for more money? We do not need to be
cutting. We need to be adding. Are you willing to say to us
today that you are willing to fight for what you believe in, in
terms of adding on to Guam, for instance.
You know, we have not added anything, hardly, in the last
10 years. We need to recapitalize. Will you promise that you
will fight for that money that we need for our military?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, thanks. So if confirmed I will
provide my best military advice and recommendations to request
those things that are needed, to do the mission that I would
have been assigned. If that is the case, I will give it
absolute straight, with conviction, on what I believe is the
right way forward.
Senator Tuberville. Well, to me our freedom and our liberty
and our families and our kids and grandkids depend on it, that
we make sure that we defend not just this country but our
allies and the world, because these people over there that we
are getting ready to deal with, that you know, that you have
seen, you know, they do not play fair. They steal everything
that we have got. You know, we develop it and they steal it,
and it does not cost them near as much.
Do you think that is fair? We just saw what we went through
with the pandemic. You know, we shipped everything over to
China. They make everything that we do. Now we are scrambling
to try to figure out how to handle the next pandemic. Hopefully
it does not come along. Are we the same way in the military?
Have you seen that? Do we have the capabilities to build what
we need in this country right now?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, I think we do. I think what we
have learned over the past 10 years is we do have to protect
those advantages, technological trade secrets, and advantages
that we have. So we should be aware that competitors will
intend to try to take it, and we have to be able to secure it
and defend it.
Senator Tuberville. You know, as Marines are operating in
smaller units in the Pacific, how do you plan to float medical
support? You know, the Mercy and the Comfort, they are large,
you know, and they are slow to deploy. Would a smaller, Ford-
based hospital ship capable of quicker and faster engagement,
do you think that would be better served for what you all do in
the Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Senator, we have done a lot over the last
3 years on generating a concept of operations, how to ensure we
can provide medical support to our forces in time of crisis and
conflict. It looks a lot different when you look at an area
that covers half the globe and most of it has water on it.
We are looking at all options to be able to quickly pick
up, care for, and return our forces, joint forces, that may
have been wounded. One of those things that is being looked at
is a different form of hospital ship than we are used to, and
if confirmed, will continue to look at those other options and
what might be the best way.
Senator Tuberville. Yeah, I think it is important, because
we are in a different part of the world, and we look at--of
course, I am from Alabama, and we have Huntsville. We build all
the missiles and the rockets and have 800 defense contractors.
We build ships and boats down in Mobile, that hopefully you
have seen some. I think the LCS or whatever, made out of
aluminum, a little different.
But, you know, I am a common-sense guy, and I just want us
prepared, you know. I see you are going to be hit from all
different directions and I just hope when you are confirmed
that you are ready, you are willing. I just hope you are able
to get what you need to protect this country and protect our
kids and our grandkids from future attacks, because they are
coming, and you are going to be the first line of defense.
So again, thank you for your service and thank you for
everything that you have done, and the things that you are
going to do for us in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Sullivan would like to ask one question.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It might be a
series of one questions. No, I am just kidding. It is going to
go back to the PDI. Admiral, I am sure you saw that when
Admiral Davidson was here, just 2 weeks ago, he talked about
the full funding, $4.6 billion of the PDI was something that
would be critical in halting the erosion of our nation's
conventional deterrence in the INDOPACOM region. He actually
said, ``PDI is the foundational approach to advancing
capabilities and capacity while strengthening our allies and
partnership for an integrated joint force west of the
International Date Line.'' I already talked about how the
International Date Line is in some ways an artificial construct
that does not really fully reflect the force posture,
particularly as you go north.
But the question is, given that he has been public about
it, given that you have been public about it, given that this
committee actually passed, in a very strong bipartisan way, the
initiative of the PDI last year, in the NDAA, what message does
it send to China if we have a robust, top-line defense budget
that fully funds the PDI as you and Admiral Davidson have
requested? Alternatively, what message does a declining defense
budget and not funding the PDI send to China?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Senator. I do believe it sends a
strong message that the entirety of government and the United
States is focused on the challenge that we have identified as
it applies to the Western Pacific. I do agree that the initial
funding last year--and I thank the committee for all of their
work, $2.2 billion to start. I think ``foundational'' is the
right word. This is not a one-trick pony. It is going to take
some sustainment to ensure we can generate that credible
deterrence and keep it going.
Senator Sullivan. Again I ask two questions. Alternatively,
if that is not funded, that $4.6 billion, which is what the
Admiral has requested, and you, I believe, support, and this
committee supports, by the way, in a bipartisan way, what kind
of message would that send if we do not do it, we, the Federal
Government, we, the Biden administration, to be frank, if we do
not do it, despite the fact that the PACOM commander has said
we need to do it? What kind of message would that send?
Admiral Aquilino. I think it is the wrong signal, Senator,
a lack of commitment and a lack of ability to follow through on
what we believe is needed.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Admiral, thank
you for your devoted service to the nation and the Navy, and
the profound support of your family and your colleagues from
the fleet. Please convey to all of the men and women of your
command our deepest and profound appreciation for their work.
We look forward to moving forward with this nomination.
With that, the hearing is adjourned, and I will remind my
colleagues that a vote is pending right now. Thank you very
much, Admiral.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Admiral John C. Aquilino,
USN by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)?
Answer. The Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, is responsible
for deterring attacks against the United States and its territories,
possessions, and bases, to protect Americans and American interests
and, if deterrence fails, win our nation's wars. These duties also
include expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners, and
friends across the Indo-Pacific region and being prepared to defend
allies according to mutual defense treaties and agreements.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have been honored to serve my nation for 37 years, and I
believe my command experiences as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet
and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and my duties as U.S. Pacific
Fleet Director of Operations, and the Director of Operations, Plans and
Strategy for the Chief of Naval Operations have prepared me to assume
command of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Multiple global deployments, service in senior Joint Staff and
OPNAV staff billets, and command of a Carrier Strike Group have also
prepared me to work collaboratively across the joint force, in line
with Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, and closely with our allies
and partner nations.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next USINDOPACOM Commander?
Answer. The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for
America's future, and remains the United States' priority theater with
China as our pacing threat as the Chinese Communist Party actively
seeks to displace the established rules-based international order.
Residing here are four of the five priority security challenges
identified by the DOD: China, Russia, North Korea, as well as violent
extremist organizations. The Indo-Pacific Region also experiences
frequent natural and manmade disasters, the negative impacts of climate
change, rapid population growth, drug and human trafficking, and
disease and pandemic.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that forces in USINDOPACOM are
both credible and lethal, and complement the administration's focus on
deterring through diplomatic, development, and economic means, to
ensure our presence and posture defend against China's hegemonic rise.
I believe that the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is the
foundational approach to advancing capabilities and capacity in
lethality, force design and posture, logistics, exercises and
experimentation, while strengthening our allies and partnerships for an
integrated joint force west of the International Date Line (IDL).
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues that must be addressed?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be to execute credible
military deterrence against our competitors to maintain stability,
peace, and prosperity in the region. Fielding an integrated joint force
west of the IDL, interoperability with our regional allies and
partners, and evolving the current exercise and experimentation program
are essential to maintaining our advantages while increasing doubt in
our competitor's ability to meet their objectives through military
means.
chain of command
Question. In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, the President and
Secretary of Defense exercise authority, direction, and control of the
Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command.
One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of
Defense, to the combatant commanders for the execution of missions with
forces assigned to their commands. For purposes of organizing,
training, and equipping forces, the chain of command runs from the
President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments.
Do you believe this dual structure provides for clear and effective
chain of command?
Answer. Yes. I have worked in this dual structure at both Military
Service and Joint commands, and I believe it is effective, practical
and clearly understood throughout the Department.
Question. If confirmed as a Combatant Commander, on what types of
issues and decisions would you coordinate with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and civilian officials within the Department of Defense?
Answer. USINDOPACOM performs his duties under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly
responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the Command's ability to
carry out missions assigned.
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, OSD, as
well as the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure I have the
guidance and achieved the alignment to carry out the mission of the
Indo-Pacific Command. I will maintain a close relationship with the
other functional and geographic combatant commanders to ensure
applicable national and defense strategic guidance execution is
characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive
information exchanges on critical issues.
The successful execution of USINDOPACOM's mission responsibilities
also requires coordination with the Service Chiefs. The Service Chiefs
are valuable sources of judgment and advice for the combatant
commanders. If confirmed, I will provide frank and transparent
explanations of my most pressing warfighting needs through direct
consultation with each Chief as their staff prepare and develop their
budget profiles.
As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, United States
Forces Korea, receives missions and functions from USINDOPACOM. I
recognize his role as Commander, Combined Forces Command, and United
Nations Command and fully support his actions in that sensitive and
demanding role.
Among other notable leaders and organizations within DOD who may
require close coordination on occasion are the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel, and the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
national defense strategy (nds)
Question. Does the NDS accurately assess the current strategic
environment in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR), and if
not, what changes need to be made?
Answer. The 2018 NDS provides a candid assessment of the strategic
environment, the priority it places on preparing for great power
competition, the enduring value of alliances and partnerships, and
readiness and lethality. As the Department reviews its strategy,
adjustments could reinforce U.S. Force design and posture requirements
to improve our qualitative advantage.
Question. From the USINDOPACOM perspective, what capabilities do
you believe the Joint Force needs to prevail in competition with China,
as described by the NDS?
Answer. USINDOPACOM requires a combination of advanced multi-domain
systems that are capable of operating in highly contested environment--
including sensors, weapons, and the requisite Command, Control,
Communications, Computers & Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to support those systems.
These systems must be fully integrated across the joint force, and
where applicable, fully interoperable with coalition partners. This
interoperability provides credible deterrence and maintains a healthy
competition with China.
Question. What does ``expanding the competitive space,'' as
referenced in the NDS, mean for competition with China?
Answer. ``Expanding the competitive space'' describes the United
States' ability to seize the initiative in great power competition by
exploiting areas where we possess advantages over our competitors, and
identifying where we can work with others in the U.S. interagency and
allies and partners to address shared challenges. The United States can
expand the competitive space by investing in next-generation
capabilities (e.g., long-range, ground-based munitions, space and
cyber). Expanding the competitive space also speaks to the need to
develop a global, integrated whole-of-government approach toward
countering malign Chinese influence across all instruments of national
power. This includes working with the U.S. interagency to build
partnerships and identify areas of economic, technological, and
informational opportunities.
Question. Do you believe additional resources or new authorities
for USINDOPACOM are required to support this line of effort associated
with ``expanding the competitive space''?
Answer. PDI, combined with service efforts, provides the initial
resources needed to deliver combat credible deterrence, build partner
capacity, and field an integrated joint force. If confirmed, I will
assess the need for any additional authorities.
Question. In your view, what non-military elements of national
power need to be strengthened to effectively compete with China?
Answer. Competing with China requires all elements of national
power to be strengthened. The Interim National Strategic Security
Guidance asserts that we invest in our people, economy, and democratic
institutions. We must compete in economic, diplomatic, military, legal,
and information spaces to be effective against China.
force posture
Question. In your view, is the current U.S. Force posture in the
Indo-Pacific region sufficient to support our security strategy in the
region? How would you restructure the United States security posture in
the Indo-Pacific best to compete with China, reassure allies and
partners, and deter Chinese aggression? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Increased persistent presence through forward-based and
rotational joint forces inside the first island chain is the most
credible way the military can demonstrate our commitment and resolve to
competitors, deter unwanted aggression, and assure allies and partners.
Forward posture locations should be capable of supporting operations
and exercises and projecting combat power. Distributing a forward-
deployed, joint force across the battlespace, while balancing lethality
and survivability, helps demonstrate the capability, capacity, and
design to rapidly and seamlessly transition from competition to crisis
or conflict.
Question. How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability
of USINDOPACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? What about its
operational contingency plans?
Answer. Sufficient capability, postured forward to deter with the
capacity and readiness to respond should deterrence fail is essential.
The force posture recommendations identified in the Section 1251
Independent Assessment provide the foundation for fielding an
integrated joint force west of the IDL and a sophisticated improvement
in interoperability with our regional allies and partners.
Question. In your assessment, does DOD need to invest in a wider
range of primary bases as well as alternate operating locations
throughout the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. The Indo-Pacific geography is expansive and access
throughout the region is essential, requiring close associations with
our allies and partners. The Department's global posture review
represents an opportunity to focus on a broad range of basing options
and alternatives for persistent presence of forward-based and
rotational joint forces west of the IDL.
Question. In the event of a contingency, do you have any concerns
about the timing and readiness of follow-on forces arriving in
USINDOPACOM to meet operational plans? If yes, what are they, and how
can they be resolved?
Answer. Being ready and on-time are required to respond to any
contingency. I do have concerns about the manning, training, and
equipping of all of our follow-on forces. Credible deterrence is based
on a highly trained, properly equipped, quick-response and surge force.
If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the necessary forward-
deployed forces and the associated readiness to meet our nation's most
pressing needs. I will also continue to advocate for improvements in
strategic sea and airlift to reduce the timeline necessary for surge
forces to arrive in the theater.
Question. How do you view the relative value of permanent versus
rotational forces in the USINDOPACOM AOR?
Answer. Permanent, forward-based forces provide the most visible
sign of U.S. resolve and commitment to supporting regional peace and
stability. Rotational forces allow us to maintain a high level of
readiness without sacrificing the ability to respond quickly and
effectively to contingencies. USINDOPACOM requires a mix of rotational
and permanently stationed forces and a recalibrated force posture to be
able to mass effects without the vulnerabilities associated with fixed
forces' concentration.
Question. How does the planned relocation of United States Forces
from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the Pacific align with
United States security objectives in the USINDOPACOM AOR?
Answer. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) strengthens our
alliance with Japan and maintains the right permanent forces that
enhance our deterrence and interoperability, while ensuring the joint
force is prepared to fight and win should deterrence fail. It allows
the joint force to disperse and enable quicker responses to areas
outside Okinawa. Additionally, the relocation to Guam also provides
increased training opportunities with allies and partners.
joint force requirements
Question. What, if any, are the major United States capability or
capacity gaps you assess in the USINDOPACOM theater that are needed to
enhance deterrence against Chinese aggression?
Answer. To adequately compete and defend American interests, the
most critical are those that address the gaps in force protection,
homeland defense, joint force lethality, long range fires, ISR
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), training, and
logistics enablers. Additionally, we must enable modernized integration
and information sharing across all domains with our allies and
partners.
Question. What capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current
Joint Force present the most significant challenge to addressing the
broader range threats in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. The tyranny of distance from CONUS to forward operating
locations in the western Pacific makes sustainability the biggest
challenge. This requires a sophisticated balance of distribution
capacity to sustain the joint force. Access in the First and Second
Island Chains offer is needed to support crisis and contingency
operations in establishing dispersal locations, airfield repair
capabilities, C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers &
Intelligence), munitions storage, mobility procession, and fuel
storage. We must also improve interactions, coordination, and command
and control with our allies and partners.
Question. Which programs, in your assessment, are the highest
priorities for mitigating current and emerging warfighting capability
and/or capacity shortfalls in the Joint Force?
Answer. If confirmed, and as outlined in the PDI, ensuring the
protection of our force, fielding an integrated joint fires network,
interoperability with allies and partners, as well as improved ISR and
logistics enablers would be my highest priorities.
Question. The NDS specifically mentions challenges posed by robust
anti-access, area-denial capabilities (A2/AD). What would be your
approach to overcoming these challenges in the USINDOPACOM AOR?)
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for investment in
technologies that negate our competitor's A2AD capabilities.
Additionally, adding long-range offensive networked fires would put any
potential adversaries on the defensive. We must be able to operate in
contested space at the time and place of our choosing.
pacific deterrence initiative
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2021 authorized $2.2 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative
(PDI) to support the stability and security of the region and deter
Chinese aggression.
In your view, is PDI a useful tool to improve U.S. posture in the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Yes, PDI investments will improve our posture and it is a
powerful tool in identifying the resources necessary to meet identified
operational requirements in the region.
PDI investments will have an effect on deterring our adversaries'
decision calculus while reassuring our allies and partners that the
United States is a reliable partner, focused on ensuring a free and
open Indo-Pacific. PDI also encourages other like-minded nations to be
net-providers for regional security, working multilaterally to
reinforce the security architecture the region has benefited from for
over 75 years.
Question. In your view, what strategic objectives and specific
areas of investment should be prioritized for funding under the PDI?
Answer. Defending Guam as United States territory, including the
infrastructure to manage an integrated joint force west of the
international date line, should be PDI's number one priority. This
includes establishing a distributed force posture, establishing a
Mission Partner Environment (MPE), and advancing Pacific Multi-Domain
Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) to modernize our
ranges.
Question. Do you believe that continued, dedicated funding for PDI
is required to support implementation of the NDS in the Indo-Pacific?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. The funding profiles provided for FY21 in the 1253
Independent Assessment and the most recent 1251 for FY22 outline the
funding requirements through FY27. Dedicated, sustained resources will
effectively support NDS initiatives to provide credible deterrence.
missile defense
Question. How would you assess the threat to United States Forces
and bases from Chinese and North Korean missile forces and our ability
to address such threats? In your assessment, have U.S. investments,
concepts of operations, and posture shifts sufficiently addressed this
threat?
Answer. Although the ballistic missile threat facing United States
interests in Northeast Asia remains significant, we are well postured
to protect against existing and emerging DPRK threats. Additionally,
United States Forces Korea continues to benefit from the significant
investment and performance enhancements to their current ballistic
missile defense systems.
However, the ballistic and cruise missile systems of China and the
development of hypersonic weapons increase the risk and cause
challenges. Continued investment in integrated air-missile defense is
imperative as we seek to proactively defend against such threats while
simultaneously integrating offensive and defensive fires. Discussions
regarding concepts of operations and posture shift require discussion
at a higher classification level.
Question. Do you assess that rotational missile defense
capabilities such as THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis ships, that need to be
deployed to protect major combat projection platforms such as air bases
are adequate to deter Chinese aggression given anticipated indication
and warning timelines?
Answer. No rotational missile defense capabilities are currently
postured that will adequately address the threats we face from China,
and a more robust defensive posture is the most pressing priority for
the Indo-Pacific. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Forces have a
growing inventory of medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
that can threaten United States bases in the region, including those in
South Korea, Japan, and Guam, as well as naval forces operating inside
the Second Island Chain. Additionally, China is constantly evolving its
missile technology, increasing its range, survivability, accuracy, and
lethality.
Question. What additional steps, if any, would you recommend to
address the emerging threat that highly maneuverable hypersonic glide
vehicles pose to U.S. and allied forces across the region?
Answer. The Hypersonic Glide Vehicle threat poses a serious threat
to the U.S. and Allied forces in the region and we require a near-term
initial defense capability to meet this challenge. If confirmed, my aim
is to work with the DOD to develop capabilities, including survivable
and resilient space-based sensors to detect hypersonic threats and
enable ground and sea-based defenses.
contested logistics
Question. Over the last several years, DOD and USINDOPACOM have
conducted or sponsored several studies on contested mobility and
logistics which have resulted in more than 50 recommendations. However,
the GAO recently found that DOD has failed to implement many of these
recommendations. As a result, DOD and USINDOPACOM may be missing an
opportunity to leverage existing knowledge on mobility challenges in
contested environments and increase resilience for major conflicts as
envisioned in the National Defense Strategy and as part of the Joint
Warfighting Concept. Given the ``tyranny of distance'' in the Pacific,
there are significant challenges specifically related to energy and
munitions requirements in a contested environment, some of which could
be mitigated by making targeted investments and operational energy
improvements to both military platforms and installations.
If confirmed, how will you implement the multitude of
recommendations and take actions necessary to decrease the logistics
vulnerabilities in a contested environment?
Answer. Our efforts to improve our ability to sustain the joint
force must build off our efforts to move toward a more distributed
force posture and increase the locations and availability for naval and
air forces to rearm and refuel during exercises and access these
locations during contingencies. If confirmed, I will work to implement
appropriate recommendations of the report to maximize key logistics
enablers.
Question. How will you implement recommendations to make
significant operational energy improvements throughout USINDOPACOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services, Combatant
Commands, the Joint Staff, and OSD to enhance Indo-Pacific energy
resilience. I support the Secretary of Defense's focus on investing in
energy RDT&E and incorporating energy resilience into emerging joint
operational concepts through exercises, war-games, modeling and
simulation, and other means. An ever-increasing energy demand,
currently based on fossil fuels, is our greatest logistics distribution
challenge and directly impacts force effectiveness. The pressures on
fuel requirements, in particular, are a significant concern and I will
review the operational risks and ongoing planning efforts related to
sustaining the joint force and identify specific actions we must take
to address our shortfalls.
information operations
Question. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China has embarked on a
misinformation campaign to sow confusion over the origins of the virus
and malign the response of the United States and other nations. This
appears to have been done not only to shield China from blame for the
initial outbreak, but also to undermine democratic nations and
institutions.
What is your assessment of the ability of DOD and USINDOPACOM to
conduct effective military operations in the information environment to
defend U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out
by state and non-state actors?
Answer. With coordinated Information Operations across the
Interagency, the information environment can be an asymmetric advantage
for the U.S. I understand the Department is updating the 2016 Strategy
for Operations in the Information Environment. A posture review will
inform this update of capabilities, the current defense strategy, and
an Irregular Warfare Annex designation of information operations as a
joint function. If confirmed, I will support the development and
implementation of this strategy and ensure the Command's efforts are
appropriately coordinated and appropriately aligned with the
Interagency.
Question. Are DOD and USINDOPACOM efforts in this regard
appropriately integrated with other United States Government
organizations and activities?
Answer. DOD efforts throughout the information environment cross
traditional department and agency lines. USINDOPACOM has strong
relationships with the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). If confirmed, I intend
to sustain these relationships and make information operations a force
multiplier.
Question. What organization with the United States Government do
you assess would have the overall lead to integrate information
operations during day-to-day competition below the level of armed
conflict in the Indo-Pacific in order to defend United States interests
against malign influence activities?
Answer. As the United States Government leverages DOD information
operations capabilities in day-to-day competition against malign
influence activities, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
has identified the U.S. State Department as the lead in shaping and
driving information operations across the U.S. Government. My
assessment is DOD information operations require effective interagency
coordination in order to elevate diplomacy and other whole-of-
government approaches to defend U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will
work with DOD to complement civilian departments and agencies with
critical roles and responsibilities to engage the public domain and
protect against malign influence activities.
Question. Does DOD and USINDOPACOM have sufficient authorities and
resources to conduct information operations effectively? If not, what
additional authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?
Answer. At this point in time, I am not currently aware of new
authorities required, but I understand that an Information Operations
posture review is being conducted pursuant to the FY20 NDAA. If
confirmed, I will regularly assess our authorities, resource
availability and allocation, and strategic alignment to prioritize
essential information operations.
china
Question. How would you characterize the current United States
relationship with China?
Answer. The United States and China have different visions for the
future that put us in a competitive relationship. Theirs is in stark
contrast to our free and open vision centered on democratic values, and
while the United States can cooperate with China on issues such as
North Korea, counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief, etc., it is increasingly evident that China wants to shape a
world aligned with its authoritarian model inconsistent with the rules-
based international order.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of United
States-China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should
be the objectives of United States-China military-to-military dialogue?
What are the limitations on this kind of dialogue?
Answer. Consistent with Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance and DOD guidance, I will continue to seek a constructive,
stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the PRC that reduces
the risk of misperception and miscalculation. The limitation to this
type of dialogue is that military-to-military dialogue's effectiveness
depends on both militaries approaching a security dialogue in a candid,
transparent, and genuinely willing manner.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
erosion of United States advantages?
Answer. China's military modernization is a critical component in
China's overall strategy to achieve ``the great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation'' by 2049. While China has clearly articulated this,
there are indications this strategy is being reassessed and may be
accelerated to achieve its ends within this decade. This strategy,
designed to displace United States access and influence, includes
economic, political, social, and military efforts to expand China's
national power, push its governance system, and revise the
international order by changing the value system of international
norms, rules, and laws. PRC leaders have repeatedly stated that
transforming the PLA into a ``world-class'' military is an essential
element of this strategy.
Today, every domain--air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace--is
contested. The pace at which the PRC is fielding advanced capabilities
is accelerating at an alarming rate, and working hard to exploit any
perceived vulnerabilities to gain an economic, diplomatic, and military
advantage while remaining below the threshold of conflict. Our advances
in AI, offensive fires, directed energy, hypersonics, and quantum
computing must keep pace.
Question. What is your assessment of China's militarization and
other aggressive activities in the South and East China Seas? What
challenges do these activities pose to USINDOPACOM's current operations
and operational plans?
Answer. China's militarization in the region and aggressive
activities creates additional contested space, endangering free flow of
trade, limiting freedom of navigation, threatening the sovereignty of
our allies and partners, and undermining regional stability. This
aggressive posturing challenges operations and maneuver, extends their
influence, and ultimately challenges U.S. presence and credibility in
the region.
Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
presence overseas, including such installations as its base in Djibouti
and across Africa as well as other infrastructure projects across the
Indian Ocean?
Answer. China's expansive infrastructure projects are designed to
expand its influence worldwide and establish a more robust overseas
logistics and basing infrastructure for the PLA. Greater access to
foreign ports and airfields enable China to pre-position the logistics
support necessary to sustain military operations abroad, including
naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and the
Atlantic Ocean. A global PLA logistics network will enable Beijing to
project and sustain military power at greater distances from China,
interfere with United States military operations, and provide
flexibility to support offensive operations against the United States.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic and military
implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative? For the United
States? For countries in the USINDOPACOM AOR?
Answer. One Belt, One Road provides the PLA an opportunity to
expand its global reach by gaining access to foreign air and maritime
port facilities and foreign economic markets. The One Belt, One Road
initiative produces only ONE winner - China, in their effort to gain
broader access and influence. For the United States, this means loss of
access, influence and credibility in the region. For our allies and
partners in the region, this means pressuring nations to deny U.S.
Forces basing, transit, or operational and logistical support, thereby
making it more challenging for the United States to preserve
international orders and norms.
Question. The smaller number of nuclear weapons possessed by China
relative to the United States and Russia is often cited as an
impediment to nuclear arms control talks with China. What do you think
could motivate China to participate in nuclear arms control
negotiations in a genuine and meaningful way?
Answer. As China strives to become a nuclear power with parity, I
believe it is increasingly critical that Chinese leaders take the
responsible approach and begin arms control negotiations. Active
participation in arms control negotiations is not simply about placing
limits on nations but gaining more significant insights, removing
ambiguity about potential competitor capabilities, increasing
confidence, and reducing the potential for miscalculation. Pressure
from the international community would motivate China's participation
in arms control talks.
Question. Recent public reports point to updated satellite imagery
which indicates China is increasing the pace of its nuclear force
modernization and expansion.
This acceleration comes less than a year after the Defense
Intelligence Agency assessed China would at least double the size of
its nuclear arsenal by 2030. Do you believe China sees nuclear parity
with the United States as in its interests? What do you believe would
be the impact on regional and strategic stability if China were to
achieve such a goal?
Answer. As China strives to achieve conventional parity, it is
logical to expect China's ambition to become a ``world class'' military
will include a similar approach to its nuclear forces. Three ``at-
parity'' nuclear powers would a complicate global deterrence.
taiwan
Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship
between China and Taiwan, and how can the United States help prevent
miscalculation on either side?
Answer. China continues to pressure Taiwan through increased air
and maritime operations across centerline of the Taiwan Strait. The
United States can help prevent miscalculation by sustaining a forward
deployed, credible deterrence force, demonstrating continued support of
the Taiwan Relations Act, to include military sales, deepening ties
with democratic Taiwan, and advocating for like-minded allies and
partners to inspire Taiwan's confidence in cross-strait relations.
Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
Taiwan Strait?
What do you believe should be the priorities for United States
military assistance to Taiwan? Do you think Taiwan is making
appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities and if not, what
changes would you recommend?
Answer. The military threat to Taiwan is increasing. The PLA
continues to field a broad array of advanced weapons and systems as
part of ongoing force modernization specifically intended to achieve
decisive overmatch against Taiwan. Taiwan is committed to strengthening
its reserve forces, and I am encouraged by its continued funding of
foreign and indigenous acquisition programs, as well as near-term
training and readiness. If confirmed, United States Indo-Pacific
Command will continue to advise Taiwan on the military's capabilities,
interoperability, readiness, and professional development through
security cooperation and foreign military sales in accordance with the
Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan should prioritize acquisition of
asymmetric systems that are highly mobile, distributable and lethal to
enable Taiwan to defend themselves against attack.
Question. Some have argued that the time has come to explicitly
state that the United States would respond militarily to any Chinese
use of force against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your
view, what would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change?
Answer. The United States maintains its longstanding commitments as
outlined in the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the
Six Assurances. We will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a
sufficient self-defense capability.
If confirmed, I would be open to conversations with the Secretary
of Defense to understand the risks and rewards of a potential policy
change to ensure our efforts are supporting Taiwan and contributing to
our ultimate objective to maintain peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait and within the region.
republic of korea
Question. What is your assessment of the United States-South Korea
security relationship? What measures, if any, would you take to improve
this security relationship?
Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea alliance is ironclad
and serves as the linchpin of peace and security on the Korean
peninsula. Our partnership continues to grow by promoting economic
cooperation, mitigating threats to regional stability, and fulfilling
our commitments to other allies and partners in the region. The mutual
benefits derived from this alliance given today's security challenges
are enduring and I believe it important that the United States
facilitates an increased role for the ROK, commensurate with its
economic status and influence, in as many multilateral venues as
possible. If confirmed, I will work hard to maintain close contact with
USFK and ROK military and civilian leadership to further develop this
essential security partnership.
Question. Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational
control from the United States to the Republic of Korea should be
conditions-based? If confirmed, what threshold requirements for
transfer of control would you establish?
Answer. Both the United States and ROK are fully committed to a
conditions-based OPCON transition and continue to work toward that end.
The requirements for transfer are outlined in the 2015 Conditions-based
OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) and the 2018 update to COTP (Change One).
If confirmed, I intend to fully comply with the existing plan and
ensure the alliance is ready and well-prepared for the transition when
that time comes.
Question. In your view, is South Korea carrying an appropriate
share of the burden of the cost of the United States presence in South
Korea?
Answer. The United States and ROK have recently reached an
agreement in principle of a new six-year defense sharing Special
Measures Agreement (SMA). This year, the ROK agreed to contribute over
one billion dollars, the highest increase since 2004, with subsequent
year increases pegged to the annual percent increase in the ROK defense
budget. Overall, I believe this new SMA represents the ROK's pledge to
provide a fair defense sharing of the cost of the United States
presence in South Korea. The contributions to the alliance are not
limited to cost-sharing alone. The ROK forces have served with us in
Iraq and Afghanistan, continue to support the U.N. Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) enforcement mission, and execute counter-piracy
operations near the Strait of Hormuz.
Question. Do you believe South Korea is investing appropriately in
its defensive capabilities?
Answer. The ROK continues to demonstrate its commitment to
enhancing its conventional deterrence through the development and
procurement of modern and interoperable capabilities, some of which are
core capabilities to support the conditions-based wartime operational
control transition. Their defense expenditures remain the highest among
our allies and partners as a percentage of their GDP. Although the ROK
continues to acquire significant United States systems and platforms
worth billions of dollars, it also prioritizes a substantial share of
its resources to develop indigenous defense capabilities, industry, and
export. Even with the introduction of their indigenous capabilities,
both the United States and ROK are committed to maintaining
interoperability, so the indigenous investments contribute to the
combined deterrence and defense posture.
north korea
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic and military
risks of a potential conflict with North Korea?
Answer. There are both enormous strategic and military risks, and
enormous costs associated with a potential conflict on the Korean
Peninsula, despite efforts to lower tensions. The country has taken no
meaningful steps toward denuclearization, despite promising signs of
de-escalation in 2018. Kim Jong Un continues to advance both his
conventional and strategic capabilities, recently parading new tanks,
rockets, and missiles. Risk identification, management, and mitigations
are integral parts of all military planning efforts, and this is no
exception. If confirmed, I will make regular assessments of the risk
and report that risk to the National Command Authority. Internal to
USINDOPACOM, I will simultaneously pursue efforts to reduce the risk to
U.S. strategic objectives and U.S. military forces should deterrence
fail. As a critical element of these objectives, I will also continue
the work of previous commanders on noncombatant evacuation operation
(NEO) planning as the Korean Peninsula situation develops.
Question. In your assessment, what changes, if any, to U.S. force
posture and activity in the USINDOPACOM AOR would improve United States
deterrence against North Korea?
Answer. Our current posture and presence in the ROK provides for
the ROK's mutual defense while deterring North Korean aggression
against the United States and our allies and partners. I support
bilateral efforts to modernize forces, equipment, and enduring
locations to ensure combat credible forces in the ROK, particularly
those that counter the DPRK's asymmetric capabilities. We must also
continue to explore, improve, and resource our missile defense
capabilities. Our airborne ISR allocation is less than what we require
to support the theater's multifaceted problem-set and to enhance
deterrence by detection; furthermore, development of the Combined/Joint
Multi-Purpose Range Complex (CJMPRC) would provide air and maneuver
space for a realistic coalition, joint, live-fire exercises for
alliance armed services. In sum, a modernized, well-trained force
positioned on the Korean Peninsula, paired with a credible, rapid
reinforcement capability assigned and postured forward in the region,
offers the greatest deterrent effect vis-`-vis the DPRK.
Question. What is your assessment of the Joint Force's ability to
secure North Korean weapons of mass destruction sites in the event of a
contingency? What capability and/or capacity shortfalls present the
most significant challenge to executing such an operation?
Answer. Without transparency and clarity into the North Korea's
nuclear program, it is difficult to assess our ability to secure North
Korean weapons of mass destructions sites in the event of a
contingency. If confirmed, I will review the major operational plans,
contingency plans, and associated execution orders outlining the joint
force's ability to counter and secure North Korean weapons of mass
destruction. I will work with our regional partners and allies--
including Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea--as well as with
partners across the Interagency--to include the State Department and
Department of Energy--to forge a comprehensive approach to addressing
the North Korean nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and
proliferation threats.
Question. What is your assessment of the Joint Force's ability to
conduct a noncombatant evacuation of approximately 250,000 United
States citizens from South Korea in the event of a contingency? What
capability and/or capacity shortfalls present the most significant
challenge to executing such an operation?
Answer. Conducting noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
South Korea is highly challenging and dependent on the level of
support, amount of warning and resources from South Korea and Japan.
Inside South Korea, we are dependent upon their transportation assets
to move noncombatant evacuees (NCEs) from assembly points to relocation
centers and to air/seaports of departure from the peninsula. Still, if
there are any delays in movements off the Korean Peninsula, USFK may be
challenged to provide additional support to NCEs awaiting
transportation. In Japan, we are dependent on their capacity and
capability to receive, shelter and support NCEs as a temporary safe
haven. Synchronization and coordination for access and use of these
resources requires constant engagement with our partners in both
countries.
Question. In your opinion, will sanctions alone lead to the
denuclearization of North Korea? If not, what other incentives or
disincentives could help lead to better outcomes?
Answer. I do not believe sanctions alone will lead to the
denuclearization of North Korea. Still, economic sanctions, combined
with diplomacy and UNSCR enforcement, should continue to be applied to
convince the regime to return to meaningful negotiations. I understand
an interagency North Korea policy review is currently underway, and the
discussion of incentives or disincentives will undoubtedly be one
component of the review. I believe that a robust force posture
throughout the region to ensure the United States engages North Korea
from a position of strength would be essential.
japan
Question. How would you characterize the current United States-
Japan security relationship?
Answer. The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of
regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. I view our
military-to-military relationship with Japan as stronger than ever. If
confirmed, I will continue to work to strengthen the United States-
Japan defense relationship.
Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
neighbors--including China, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan--
influence the United States-Japan relationship?
Answer. The United States and the Government of Japan (GoJ) remain
closely aligned on North Korea, long-term strategic competition with
China, and maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Our alignment has
led to closer coordination and cooperation in addressing both current
and future security challenges, while also expanding United States-
Japan security relationship to new domains such as cyber and space.
The Japan-South Korea relationship remains strained due to
historical and cultural issues. While Japan and South Korea must work
through these issues on their own, I am concerned that others may try
to exploit the situation and drive a wedge between the United States
and either ally.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to
improve its capability and capacity to deter and, if necessary, respond
to North Korean aggression? What about Chinese aggression?
Answer. The GoJ, working through its self-defense forces, must
continue to invest in improvements to interoperable air and missile
defense, air dominance, maritime security, and ISR capabilities. As
Japan improves its capability and capacity, we must continue to execute
the Joint Exercise Program and operate together frequently.
Question. Given the buildup of Chinese ballistic and advanced
cruise missiles, how important is it for Japan to be able to defend
itself against such missiles and do you see potential to reinvigorate
United States-Japan cooperative missile defense efforts?
Answer. Japan's ability to defend itself is vital both for its own
security and to enhance maneuver and positional advantages of United
States and allied forces in the region. Cooperation in this critical
capability will inevitably strengthen our deterrence. If confirmed, I
intend to work with my Japanese counterparts to improve discrimination
capabilities, sensors for detection, and the ability to defend against
hypersonic weapons.
Question. Current plans call for the Marine Corps Air Station's
closure on Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement
Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab.
What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful
construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on
Okinawa?
Answer. While the project has experienced delays, I believe both
governments remain committed to completing the FRF and DPRI. Land
returns to Japan remain dependent upon the successful relocation from
Futenma to Camp Schwab.
Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States
and Japan to pay for the relocation of United States Forces from
Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of
United States Forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why
not?
Answer. I believe that Japan is contributing in accordance with our
agreement to relocate forces from Okinawa to Guam. Besides paying a
significant portion of the cost of the realignment of United States
Forces in Japan, the GoJ took the unprecedented step of funding
construction for United States forces on Guam--equaling more than $3
billion. The GoJ is also proceeding with land acquisition in Western
Japan to construct a new installation to support U.S. Field Carrier
Landing Practice operations and has extended the current Host Nation
Support agreement by one year to March 31, 2022.
Question. What is your understanding of the ability of United
States Forces planned to be transferred from Okinawa to Guam to be able
to train for full-spectrum combat, and are there mitigation plans to
address potential training shortfalls?
Answer. It is my understanding that training sites in Guam and its
neighboring islands will be adequate to meet training requirements for
the Marines who will be stationed there. The Marines would also benefit
from training opportunities with implementation of the Pacific Multi-
Domain Test and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC). If confirmed, I
will work to better understand any future needs and plans to address
potential training shortfalls.
australia
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of the
United States-Australia alliance and what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. Australia is a reliable friend and ally with a 100-year
history of supporting the United States in every major global conflict.
The ``unbreakable'' alliance is key to promoting regional and global
security and anchors Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Islands. This
Alliance is key to promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity,
and is vital to advancing multilateral dialogues.
With regard to priorities interoperability between United States
and Australian forces is a top priority for both countries. If
confirmed, USINDOPACOM will have an essential role in building greater
interoperability with Australia through engagements, training and
exercises to ensure combined readiness between our forces.
Question. What is your assessment of Australia's relations with
China? What impact does that relationship have on the United States-
Australia alliance?
Answer. Australia's relationship with China has been strained due
to Australia's opposition to China's illegal and unfounded territorial
and maritime claims in the South China Sea, its investigation into the
COVID-19 outbreak, their ban on the Chinese made 5G network, and
China's crackdowns in Hong Kong. China has exacted economic retribution
against Australia in response. Australia has articulated its belief in
the importance of transparency, the maintenance of a rules-based
international order, and adherence to international norms. Strains in
Australia's economic, trade, and diplomatic relations with China are
unlikely to affect Australia's close and longstanding relationship with
the United States.
india
Question. What is your view of the current state of United States-
India security relations, and what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. The United States-India military relationship is at the
best level in years, and we continue to experience growth in both
bilateral and multilateral engagements and exercises, high profile
joint operations, and an increased number of senior level engagements.
Recent operations by the PRC have helped highlight the threat to
regional security that China's actions pose to all nations, including
India. The conclusion of enabling agreements over the past several
years has allowed us to operate more closely, and we are able to work
together more than ever before to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
If confirmed, my priorities would be to maintain the momentum that has
been generated by my predecessor and build info sharing and security
agreements, support India's defense transformation efforts through
exchanges and exercises, continue to encourage India's acquisition of
United States equipment to promote interoperability, and increase
military-military contacts throughout standing dialogues, senior leader
contacts, and working-level exchanges.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India
and China and how does that relationship impact the security and
stability of the region?
Answer. The mistrust between China and India is at an all-time
high. In addition to the rupture of bilateral relations as a result of
the LAC skirmish, and India is deeply suspicious of PRC activities as a
part of the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR). China's posture
initiatives in both Gwadar, Pakistan, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, also
cause India concern. As is the case across the Indo-Pacific, PRC's lack
of transparency and duplicitous actions in the Indian Ocean region
threaten stability and security in the region.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
ensure the close coordination of United States security policy with
respect to South Asia--much of which is in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to coordinate across the
combatant command boundaries to synchronize and maximize opportunities
for expanded cooperation. Recognizing that security in South Asia is
influenced by events across the Indian Ocean Region--a diverse ethno-
linguistic, political, historic, and economic region with 24 African,
Middle Eastern, and Asian nation-states--my coordination would include
both CENTCOM and AFRICOM.
philippines
Question. What is your current assessment of the United States-
Philippines alliance and the state of our defense cooperation?
Answer. In this 70th year of our Mutual Defense Treaty, the
Republic of the Philippines remains a strategic ally. If confirmed, I
intend to pursue deeper military cooperation and integration as we work
with the Government of the Philippines to seek full reversal of the
Visiting Forces Agreement termination process.
Question. What do you believe the United States goals should be in
the Philippines, and how best can we achieve those goals?
Answer. I believe the United States' primary goals should be to
strengthen the alliance with the Philippines and help build and
maintain the capabilities of its Armed Forces to deter unwanted
aggression against their sovereignty. It is also in the United States'
national interest to encourage the Philippines to develop its
counterterrorism capabilities, improve its maritime domain awareness,
and lead multilateral approaches toward greater peace and stability
across the region.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between the
Philippines and China? What impact does that relationship have on the
United States-Philippines alliance?
Answer. Bilateral relations between the Philippines and China have
increased since 2016 with the implementation of new government policies
intended to diversify the Philippines foreign partners and gain outside
investment to include One Belt One Road initiatives. While the
Philippines continues to seek closer economic ties with China, rival
territorial claims in the South China Sea complicate bilateral
relations. The Philippines' growing economic outreach to China has
complicated its longstanding partnership with the United States That
said, we continue to honor our Mutual Defense Treaty, a key tenant of
our Indo-Pacific strategy.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
United States military assistance being provided to the Philippines
armed forces in its fight against violent extremist groups?
Answer. United States Military Assistance to the Philippine
Security Forces is very effective in directly confronting ISIS in
Southeast Asia. This assistance enhances the Government of the
Philippines' ability to build and maintain internal stability, allowing
for allocation of more resources to counter threats to its national
sovereignty. USSOF assistance specifically to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Counter-Violent Extremist Organization efforts has provided
a high return on a relatively small investment.
Question. What areas, if any, do you see that have potential to
increase defense cooperation with the Philippines armed forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I look to increase the scope and depth of
bilateral exercises to address training and readiness requirements with
a renewed focus on territorial defense, counter-terrorism, and maritime
domain awareness, and cyber engagement opportunities. The Armed Forces
of the Philippines investment in high-quality United States defense
equipment provides additional training opportunities. A General
Security of Military Information Agreement between the United States
and the Philippines will also provide increased opportunities for
information sharing. Continued emphasis on the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement projects will improve U.S. force posture in the
region and better position response time for humanitarian assistance/
disaster recovery (HA/DR) events.
thailand
Question. What is your assessment of United States-Thailand
relations, and what specific priorities would you establish for this
relationship?
Answer. The United States and Thailand alliance is America's oldest
in the Indo-Pacific and has the opportunity to expand as outlined in
the United States Thai co-signed Joint Vision Statement 2020. If
confirmed, I intend to continue pursuing interoperability efforts as
Thailand modernizes its force and to take full advantage of
opportunities provided by the reinstatement of international military
education and training funding.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between
Thailand and China? What impact does that relationship have on the
United States-Thailand relationship?
Answer. Thailand's cooperation with China has notably increased
since the coup of 2014. China pursues influence through military
cooperation and economic investment in Thailand to include OBOR
initiatives. In terms of military cooperation, China continues to lobby
Thailand's Defense Ministry to procure various military equipment--
including main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
submarines. China and Thailand have also broadened bilateral training
and exercises. Thailand is careful to remain neutral amid the
intensifying great power competition in the region and prefers to
maintain a traditional balanced foreign policy approach and remains a
vital United States ally, thanks to its 200-year relationship with the
United States.
vietnam
Question. What is your current assessment of the United States-
Vietnam security relationship, and what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. The United States-Vietnam security relationship has
advanced exponentially since the 2016 lifting of the lethal weapons
ban. The 2018 and 2020 aircraft carrier visits were historic milestones
that were unimaginable just five years ago. Both sides continue to take
progressive steps towards building a sustainable defense partnership
that includes major defense sales and technology transfers. Vietnam has
been vocal in its support for freedom of navigation and overflight, as
well as the development of a legally binding Code of Conduct for the
South China Sea. Vietnam's demonstrated commitment to stand up for the
international order, especially in the face of coercive behavior by
China, deserves our support.
If confirmed, I would prioritize areas of common interests, such as
War Legacy issues, maritime security, maritime domain awareness,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. I would also support new
areas of cooperation, such as cyber, defense trade, and collaboration
between joint forces.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between
Vietnam and China? What impact does that relationship have on the
United States-Vietnam relationship?
Answer. Vietnam balances both economic cooperation with China and
security cooperation with the United States. Vietnam is concerned over
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, increasing People's
Liberation Army influence in Laos and Cambodia, and impacts in the
Mekong Delta region. Due to these concerns, Vietnam is the most vocal
ASEAN country in multilateral forums, supporting rules-based
international order, and Freedom of Navigation, and the binding code of
conduct in alignment with United States values.
indonesia
Question. What is your view of the current state of military-to-
military relations with Indonesia, and what specific priorities would
you establish for this relationship?
Answer. United States-Indonesia mil-to-mil relations continue to
progress and mature. In 2020, the United States and Indonesia agreed to
execute over 220 bilateral activities focused on five areas of
cooperation: maritime defense, institution building, peacekeeping
operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-
transnational threats, making the United States Indonesia's largest
bilateral defense partner. If confirmed, we will continue to prioritize
events that support these five focus areas and look for additional
engagement opportunities by all components.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between
Indonesia and China? What impact does that relationship have on the
United States-Indonesia relationship?
Answer. Indonesia has a significant economic relationship with
China and simultaneously balances its security relationship with the
United States. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Chinese
operations in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and safety
concerns for Indonesian fishermen generate friction between Indonesia
and China. These identified areas of concern have provided
opportunities for cooperation as Indonesia seeks increased engagements
and defense purchases from the United States.
strengthening alliances and attracting new partners
Question. In your view, how can USINDOPACOM more effectively
cultivate multilateral cooperation in the AOR?
Answer. The regional network of alliances and partnerships is a
strategic advantage that our competitors cannot match and critical to
maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.
If confirmed, increased multilateral events will be a priority.
Implementation of PDI, specifically the Mission Partner Environment,
would provide opportunities for increased multilateral collaboration,
planning, information sharing, and operations.
Question. What is your assessment of the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India? How
can such efforts be strengthened, and what do you view as the
challenges to doing so?
Answer. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is an important
venue for four Indo-Pacific democracies with common values to address
shared interests. Addressing political, economic, and development
opportunities will inform security priorities and increase the
likelihood for more collaborative mil-to-mil activity among the four
nations.
Challenges to the Quad could come in information-space activity by
any nation threatened by the Quad's objectives.
Question. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the USINDOPACOM AOR? How
would you prioritize the types of programs or activities that should
receive support under these security assistance authorities?
Answer. The strategic objectives in building the capacities of
partner nations are to build relationships, enable our partners to
promote stability in the region, and ensure access and influence.
If confirmed, I would prioritize building partnership capacity
authorities to support security cooperation initiatives or activities,
and bolstering our partners' land, maritime, and air forces to resist
coercion and protect critical information. Foreign Military Financing
(FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and the
Global Peace Operations Initiative are critical tools to meet these
objectives.
Question. Given the emphasis on strengthening U.S. alliances and
attracting new partners in both the National Security Strategy and
National Defense Strategy, do you believe we need to reevaluate our
security cooperation funding to ensure it properly prioritizes the
Indo-Pacific region?
Answer. Given the critical nature of the region and the global
impact regional instability would generate, continuous reevaluation of
Security Cooperation funding would be helpful in making USINDOPACOM
more competitive for FMF, IMET), and other security cooperation funding
(Title 10 Section 332, Section 333, Maritime Security Initiative, and
Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative).
Question. What is your assessment of the Maritime Security
Initiative (MSI)? How can MSI be leveraged to build shared maritime
domain awareness capabilities and build multilateral cooperation
amongst participating nations?
Answer. The Indo-Pacific MSI has increased maritime security,
improved regional Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), supported the
development of a common regional maritime picture, increased regional
information sharing, and provided reassurance to regional partners
while helping to build and sustain maritime relationships. It has
accomplished this by increasing the scope, scale, complexity, and value
of maritime exercises with MSI recipient nations; assessing capacity
and capability and filling gaps with focused training and security
assistance. MSI has been and will continue to be leveraged to augment
our existing exercises to promote information sharing technologies,
platforms, and procedures that allow our partners to experience first-
hand the benefits of shared maritime awareness while operating in a
coalition with the U.S. and other like-minded nations.
Question. Over the last several years, China has exerted its
influence with our partner nations throughout the USINDOPACOM region
regarding competition over economic resources, fishing areas, access to
water, concerns over rising sea levels, and elsewhere. Often due to a
lack of United States engagement, some of these nations have
voluntarily or involuntarily turned to support from China.
If confirmed, how will USINDOPACOM seek to engage with partner
nations to better support their ability to protect their sovereignty
and natural resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue engagements with allies and
partners to ensure alignment with the rules-based international order
as identified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Speaking with a common voice directly helps to protect the
sovereignty and natural resources of allies and partners.
I will ensure we maintain our military presence in the region,
especially in the South China Sea where we conduct regular combined
maritime operations and exercises with our allies and partners to
enhance MDA capabilities, and improve interoperability to maximize
preparedness of all allies and partners
Question. Respect for human rights has long been a core principle
of United States foreign and security policy.
In your view, what role does U.S. Military engagement, including
efforts to help professionalize foreign partner militaries, play in
encouraging respect for human rights?
Answer. U.S. Military engagement with allies and partners in the
region plays a critical role in the development of professional
military standards and demonstrates our values including respect and
dignity of human rights for all.
law of the sea
Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
If so, why?
Answer. I support U.S. accession to UNCLOS. Accession would
reinforce the customary rights and freedoms reflected in the
Convention, and support the free and open international order.
Accession would not impose any additional constraints on the U.S.
Military's ability to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows, but would give the United States greater credibility when
calling on other states to adhere to the same rules. Protecting freedom
of navigation and overflight world-wide is vital to the defense of our
national security interests, and is necessary to maintain the mobility
of U.S. Forces in all areas of the globe. Accession to the Convention
puts the U.S. in the best position to do so.
Question. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention benefit the United States military's mission in the Asia-
Pacific region? If so, how?
Answer. Accession to UNCLOS directly benefits the military mission
in the Asia-Pacific region. Accession would formally establish the
customary rights and freedoms reflected in the Convention and support a
free and open international order. Accession also directly aligns us
with our allies and partners in the region and provides us the legal
means to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to
incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources
and care for victims of sexual assault.
What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults in USINDOPACOM, including assaults by and against U.S.
civilian and contractor personnel?
Answer. As leaders, we owe all personnel a respectful and inclusive
work environment in which to execute their mission and fulfill their
oath to the Constitution. We must continue our work to eliminate sexual
assault and sexual harassment.
I have seen great focus by DOD on the prevention of incidents and
the immediate response to reported incidents, but despite continued
efforts, sexual assault remains a significant problem and many victims
do not feel supported by their command nor safe reporting crimes. We
need to do more.
I agree with Secretary Austin that the challenges posed by sexual
assault constantly evolve and that our efforts must also continue to
adapt.
I fully support the work of the Secretary's Independent Review
Commission on Sexual Assault (IRC), headed by Lynn Rosenthal, which is
re-evaluating the full spectrum of sexual assault prevention and
response policies and procedures with all options on the table to
making meaningful and lasting progress.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of USINDOPACOM policies
and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation
for reporting the assault?
Answer. I believe that USINDOPACOM has strong policies and
procedures in place to protect victims of sexual assault from
retaliation, and if confirmed I intend to reinforce them. USINDOPACOM
has created its own SAPR Program Manager on staff to improve support
for sexual assault victims and to strengthen the larger SAPR programs
within the theater.
If confirmed, my expectation is that commanders under my cognizance
will create a culture of belonging where every member feels valued and
is treated with dignity and respect and will be intolerant of
retaliation. Setting the right unit climate encourages cohesion and
discourages harmful behaviors. If these behaviors are to occur, the
reporting of any crime or misconduct, and ending retaliation is crucial
to effectively addressing sexual assault in the military.
USINDOPACOM will fully support the 90-day IRC and will benefit from
the review of all current policies and programs.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in place in USINDOPACOM to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. Each of the services has established guidelines for a 24
hour, seven-day-a-week sexual assault response capability in all
locations. Additionally, USINDOPACOM provides oversight for ensuring
that adequate resources are present at deployed locations to maintain
the ability to appropriately respond to incidents. I understand that
the IRC will make further recommendations in this area as the
Department evolves its policies to continue to meet the challenges
posed by sexual assault.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual
misconduct?
Answer. Sexual assault and other forms of sexual misconduct are
crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). I believe
military leaders take their responsibilities under the UCMJ to ensure
good order and discipline seriously. However, we must not relent until
we are able to eliminate sexual assault from our ranks. If confirmed, I
will ensure we not only have a force at USINDOPACOM that embodies our
expectations for good order and discipline, but that we hold our
leaders, at all levels, accountable for these expectations.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
resources and programs in USINDOPACOM to provide victims of sexual
assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. The services have enhanced the availability and
effectiveness of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, Victims' Legal
Counsel (VLC) Programs, and care and treatment for victims of sexual
assault. From my perspective, these high-priority, mission-readiness
support services have been effective, but I welcome any findings and
recommendations of the IRC.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of Command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. Positively engaged commanders are vital to providing the
necessary support to those in their unit who have been harmed. Beyond
this, commanders are responsible for maintaining a climate of
inclusion, respect, and where any form of retaliation or reprisal is
unacceptable. Leaders are accountable to get this right.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of Command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. My view is that the culture of a command is ultimately the
Commander's responsibility. Change starts, and momentum continues, from
the top- but it takes leadership at all levels of an organization to
fully implement and sustain changes in culture.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders
over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
including sexual assault?
Answer. Commanders are accountable to the personnel assigned to
them and responsible for maintaining the welfare, discipline, and
combat readiness of all in their commands. Traditionally, the UCMJ is
the Commander's tool for enforcing standards of expected behavior and
performance.
This important question is being studied as part of the Secretary
of Defense's 90-day Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault. It
would be appropriate to await that commission's results to inform
further analysis of this issue. I personally support and welcome all
efforts to cultivate a safe environment for our DOD professionals to
execute their mission and fulfill their oath to the Constitution.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. Yes. Restricted reporting allows victim care to be a top
priority. Victims of this crime can come forward and receive needed
medical and support services while maintaining confidentiality. Without
restricted reporting, some victims would not have an avenue to access
needed services.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess
current policies, procedures, and programs and to ensure senior level
direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual
assaults in USINDOPACOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure compliance with DOD's policies
and procedures for leaders at all levels to take action to prevent
sexual assault, and protect and support victims. I will set the example
by establishing a command climate in which a victim can report a sexual
assault without fear of retaliation and I will continue the programs
and policies in place at USINDOPACOM which are designed to ensure
necessary visibility and oversight within the theater.
I will monitor the IRC and support the Secretary of Defense's plan
of action to expand the Department's prevention and response
initiatives.
Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
and intend to implement as USINDOPACOM Commander?
Answer. I will emphasize the importance of command climate with
respect to sexual assault to ensure sexual assault response
capabilities continue to be available at all locations in the AOR.
I will not allow sexual assault to injure our personnel, friends,
and families, destroy our professional values, or compromise readiness.
Zero is the only acceptable number for sexual assaults in our military.
I will also monitor the IRC and incorporate guidance from the
President and the Secretary of Defense on the best way forward.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
What are your views on the state of USINDOPACOM's relationship with
the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in
general?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess USINDOPACOM's relationship with
Congress in general and the Senate Armed Services Committee in
particular. My expectation is that these relationships will continue to
be cooperative, productive and respectful of the Congress's oversight
responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
USINDOPACOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will sustain the productive relationship
between Congress and USINDOPACOM by maintaining open communication and
information sharing. I will keep an active legislative affairs program
to facilitate effective interactions and be personally available to
Members of Congress and their staffs.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to appear and testify before this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
communications), and other information as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
submarines
1. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, can you speak to the
importance of the Virginia and future Columbia-class submarines in
United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)?
Admiral Aquilino. The Virginia and Columbia-class submarines ensure
the U.S. maintains our advantage in undersea warfare and strategic
nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. The Virginia-class
incorporates the latest technologies and enables our ability to operate
in contested space. The Columbia provides the most survivable leg of
the nuclear triad and will recapitalize the strategic deterrence
currently provided by the aging Ohio-class submarines.
2. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, what has China been doing,
that you are aware of, to close the technological gap in undersea
capabilities with the United States?
Admiral Aquilino. China has identified undersea warfare as a
priority. China is aggressively invested in a range of platforms,
including quieter submarines armed with increasingly sophisticated
weapons, unmanned underwater vehicles, new sensors, new submarine
hunting aircraft, and improved training. Additionally, the PLA Navy
will add its first guided missile nuclear attack submarine in the
Pacific by the mid-2020s. In combination, these developments provide
the PRC with improved undersea awareness, more lethal anti-submarine
warfare capabilities and capacity, and greater offensive strike
capability.
3. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, do we have the capability
to counter these emerging threats from China?
Admiral Aquilino. From my perspective as the PACFLT Commander,
USINDOPACOM has the capability and is poised to counter China's
emerging undersea threats, but our advantage is shrinking. To combat
this, we should continue funding our current and future undersea
capabilities and increase our capacity. Currently, United States anti-
submarine platforms are more technically advanced and provide the
ability to counter Chinese submarine emerging threats. If confirmed, I
will re-assess our joint force posture to meet these emerging threats.
4. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, if confirmed, do you feel
you will be able to adequately perform the requirements laid out in the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) given the forces you will have
under your command?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, if the capabilities identified in 1251
Report are properly resourced. PDI will enable the current force
structure to establish a forward-deployed defense-in-depth posture that
defends our interests, deters aggression, assures allies and partners,
and provides flexible response options should deterrence fail.
non-traditional national security threats
5. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, what steps would you
recommend the Department of Defense take in the Indo-Pacific to swiftly
respond to emerging nontraditional national security challenges,
including global health and climate change issues?
Admiral Aquilino. If confirmed, USINDOPACOM will continue
interagency coordination in advance of nontraditional challenges or
crises. We will also continue operations and exercises with allies and
partners such as Pacific Partnership and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) to
build interoperability that will enable swift response to
contingencies.
6. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, in your view, are the
installations in your area of responsibility prepared to face non-
traditional threats such as extreme weather due to climate change?
Admiral Aquilino. Installations in the Pacific theater are prepared
to withstand and postured to continue operations in face of traditional
threats of extreme weather, as evidenced by our ability to protect and
sustain the force against hurricanes and typhoons. However, upgrading
our critical infrastructure and the survivability of our installations
and ranges against rising sea levels will better posture us for the
future.
7. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, do you believe that the
forces in INDOPACOM are adequately resourced and postured to respond to
natural disasters and humanitarian crises in the region quickly?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, I believe USINDOPACOM is postured and
resourced to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises.
Access to Overseas Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance and Civic
Action (ODHACA) programs help facilitate our response. If confirmed, I
will maintain strong relationships with the interagency, allies, and
partners to continue to be prepared to respond to natural disasters.
8. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, can you speak to how the
potential reinstatement of a 1st Fleet might impact our response time
in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. The Navy continues to explore the potential stand
up of 1st Fleet, with consideration placed on a range of factors
including location, partner alignment, force distribution, resources
and authorities. Working closely with SECDEF, CJCS, CNO, and CMC, we
will ensure the ability to provide credible deterrence and response in
the Indo-Pacific. If resourced, 1st Fleet could have a positive impact
on response times in the region.
china
9. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, given the recent steps
China has taken to expand their military and increase their influence
in the region, what is the role of our partnership with India in the
Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. The Framework for the United States-India Defense
Relationship includes the designation of India as a major defense
partner and provides the necessary structure to continue our military
collaboration. Cooperation has long been a strength between our
militaries, and information sharing has grown significantly. Our goal
is to increase our bilateral ties while building confidence to work
multi-laterally on greater information sharing, increased mutual access
to resources and facilities, and increasingly complex bilateral and
multilateral operations with like-minded nations to reinforce our
commitment to the rules-based international order.
10. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, what do you assess to be
the likelihood that China attempts to upend the status quo in the
region through military aggression?
Admiral Aquilino. I believe the Chinese Communist Party has
indicated their desire to supplant United States security leadership in
the region and generate change to the rules-based international order
so they favor Chinese interests. PLA actions in the region, such as
militarization of the South China Sea (SCS) and aggressive activities,
whether in the SCS or on the northern border of India, create
additional contested space, endanger free flow of commerce, challenge
freedom of navigation, threaten the sovereignty of our allies and
partners, and undermine regional stability. These efforts ultimately
contest operations and maneuver, extend coercive behavior, and
challenge U.S. presence and credibility in the region. As PLA
capabilities continue to improve and leadership confidence grows, the
risk of more assertive military actions to achieve these goals will
almost certainly increase.
11. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, how can we prepare to
counter the potential threat of Chinese aggression in all domains,
including less kinetic domains such as cyber and disinformation?
Admiral Aquilino. China, as well as other competitors, have
expanded operations at a level below armed conflict through the
cyberspace domain and the use of disinformation to strengthen their
position. Our efforts in these domains are critically important, and in
many cases, it is an indicator of follow-on intent. If confirmed, I
will focus on the strongest defense possible to ensure that those
competitors are unable to take advantage of that space. It is also
important that our allies and partners have tools to defend their
information and cyber domains against the threat.
f-35 and strategic capabilities
12. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, when you look at the
strategic challenges in the INDOPACOM area of responsibilities, is a
5th generation fighter capability like the F-35 is critical to mission
success?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, 5th generation fighters are critical for
USINDOPACOM to deter our adversaries. The integration of stealth with
advanced sensors in the 5th generation fighters is essential for
operating in the contested environment. Additionally, 5th generation
fighters increase interoperability with our allies and partners in
multiple domains.
13. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, can you speak to the
survivability of 4th generation and 5th generation aircraft in a fight
with China or Chinese equipment?
Admiral Aquilino. Forward mix of postured 4th/5th-generation
aircraft and beyond are required to achieve and sustain air supremacy.
Networked together, 4th and 5th generation aircraft are especially
survivable against all known threats. Specifically, the advanced
sensors and stealth of 5th generation aircraft, combined with the
advanced training, lethality, and survivability improvements to 4th
generation aircraft, provides timely and survivable capabilities in a
contingency should deterrence fail.
14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, in your opinion, what has
been the impact of the F-35 program on both military and diplomatic
relations with these key allies?
Admiral Aquilino. The F-35 program demonstrates the positive
impacts of working with allies on common, modern weapon platforms. The
F-35 program allows the United States to increase our level of
collaboration and interoperability with key allies and partners such as
Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore. This level of shared and
protected technology enhances the fidelity of multi-lateral exercises,
training, and operations, which strengthens diplomatic efforts.
15. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, can you explain the
importance of stand-in capabilities, such as 5th generation aircraft,
and what advantages they provide if an engagement with China were to
occur?
Admiral Aquilino. The ability of 5th generation aircraft to operate
in a contested space is one important component of our credible
deterrence. Integrated with our forward postured joint force, 5th
generation stand-in capabilities contribute to force defense, air
superiority, sea control, and power projection and are essential to
fight and win.
16. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Aquilino, do you believe the Joint
All-Domain Command and Control concept is going to be the most
effective way to counter China's emerging technology and enhanced
defense posture?
Admiral Aquilino. To maximize the integration and lethality of the
joint force, there is an urgent need for a common network to enable
command and control, synchronized fires, force protection,
intelligence, and logistics. If confirmed, I will examine the JADC2
concept and requirements and assess whether it can be implemented
within the timeframe needed.
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
missile defense--north korea and china
17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, General Robert Abrams,
Commander of United States Forces Korea, recently testified before the
House Armed Services Committee that there's a ``significant gap''
between North Korea showing off a nuclear sub-launched intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) and having the actual capability to deliver a
weapon. How do you assess North Korea's capabilities in this area?
Admiral Aquilino. I agree with General Abrams. While North Korea
recently displayed what it claims are two new types of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), North Korea's SLBM capabilities
remain limited and we have not yet seen sea-based testing of this class
of missiles.
18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, how do you assess North
Korea's overall threat to our forces in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. North Korea's missile program is a growing threat
to the region, to our allies, to our partners, and to the United States
Homeland, including Guam and Hawaii. They have demonstrated improved
mobile launch tactics, improved missile accuracy, and rapid-fire
capabilities. North Korea maintains modest, but almost certainly
growing inventories of theater-strike missiles. Their intercontinental-
range missile program is still only partially proven, but North Korea
is committed to developing a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of threatening
the United States mainland.
19. Senator Hirono. Admiral Aquilino, if confirmed, what steps will
you take to address the emerging threat posed by China's hypersonic
glide vehicles?
Admiral Aquilino. China's hypersonic glide vehicle poses a serious
threat to the United States and allied forces in the region. We require
a near-term, initial defense capability to meet this challenge. PDI
provides the foundation for the system and networks that will enable
the integration of joint offensive and defensive fires to address the
ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic threats. If confirmed, we will work
with DOD, including the Missile Defense Agency, to develop
capabilities, including survivable and resilient sensors to detect
hypersonic threats and enable ground and sea-based defenses.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
regional data-sharing
20. Senator Rosen. Admiral Aquilino, as part of the Mission Partner
Environment, the United States Indo-Pacific Command seeks to develop an
integrated architecture to expand data-sharing among like-minded
nations through the use of information fusion centers, joint centers
where allies can share information using cloud-based technologies,
integrated systems, and secure access controls. If confirmed, how would
you enhance integration and information sharing across all domains with
our allies and partners in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. If confirmed, I will prioritize implementation of
a cyber-safe Mission Partner Environment (MPE), as outlined in Pacific
Deterrence Initiative (PDI), to enable information sharing and
interoperability, as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises and
operations. Implementation of MPE will provide opportunities for
increased multilateral collaboration, planning, information sharing,
and operations.
21. Senator Rosen. Admiral Aquilino, specifically, how would an
integrated information technology (IT) architecture strengthen our
ability to share information and fight together with our coalition
partners?
Admiral Aquilino. An integrated IT architecture is essential for
interoperability with our allies and partners to include the sharing of
sensitive and classified information. This capability would enable
distributed key leader communication and coordination, training and
exercises, sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),
sharing of intelligence, and facilitating combined mission planning and
execution among coalition partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
f-35 program
22. Senator Wicker. Admiral Aquilino, as you know, many of our key
allies in the Indo-Pacific region are participants in the F-35 program.
In your opinion, has the F-35 program had a positive impact on both
military and diplomatic relations with these key allies?
Admiral Aquilino. The F-35 program demonstrates the positive
impacts of working with allies and partners on modern, common weapon
platforms. The F-35 program allows the United States to increase our
level of collaboration and interoperability with key allies and
partners such as Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore. This level of
shared and protected technology enhances the fidelity of multi-lateral
exercises, training, and operations, which strengthens diplomatic
efforts.
guam dry dock
23. Senator Wicker. Admiral Aquilino, a Department of Defense (DOD)
review and analysis of Navy dry dock capabilities in the Pacific began
in January 2020. The report was to be finalized in spring 2020, but the
results of that effort have not been made public nor shared with
Congress. Does the study point to a shortfall in dry dock capability in
the Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. I am unaware of a 2020 DOD review regarding dry
dock capabilities in the Pacific. My understanding is the most recent
report to Congress on this subject titled ``Western Pacific Ocean Ship
Depot Maintenance Capability and Capacity and Business Case Analysis of
Enhancing Western Pacific Ship Depot Maintenance'' did not identify the
need to increase conventional or nuclear-capable dry dock capacity or
capability. If confirmed, I will review the results of the Secretary of
Defense's Global Posture Review to address any dry dock capacity/
capability issues in the Pacific.
24. Senator Wicker. Admiral Aquilino, if the study does point to a
shortfall in dry dock capability in the Pacific, what are your near and
long term plans or ideas to alleviate this shortage?
Admiral Aquilino. I am unaware of a 2020 DOD review regarding dry
dock capabilities in the Pacific. My understanding is the most recent
report to Congress on this subject titled ``Western Pacific Ocean Ship
Depot Maintenance Capability and Capacity and Business Case Analysis of
Enhancing Western Pacific Ship Depot Maintenance'' did not identify the
need to increase conventional or nuclear-capable dry dock capacity or
capability. If confirmed, I will review the results of the Secretary of
Defense's Global Posture Review to address any dry dock capacity/
capability issues in the Pacific.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
taiwan
25. Senator Cotton. Admiral Aquilino, there is considerable room
for further enhancing our defense ties with Taiwan. We need better
integration between our Forces in support of Taiwan's defense. These
efforts could include individual--and unit-level training, as well as
operational-level exercise programs that build interoperability,
emphasize shared warfighting situational awareness, and culminate in
joint planning. In your military judgment, would enhancing our
bilateral cooperation with Taiwan in these ways be consistent with the
command's goals in the area of responsibility (AOR)?
Admiral Aquilino. I believe enhancing bilateral cooperation with
Taiwan, in alignment with the Taiwan Relations Act and United States
policy, would help improve Taiwan's defensive capabilities and is
consistent with the command's goals. Specific areas for improvement in
their defensive capabilities include interoperability, readiness,
training, and professional development through security cooperation and
foreign military sales.
26. Senator Cotton. Admiral Aquilino, what would be the benefits of
inviting Taiwanese forces to participate in military training
exercises, and would we be better served by multilateral exercises
involving American allies and partners in the United States Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) region?
Admiral Aquilino. Multilateral exercises in the USINDOPACOM region
have the benefit of allowing participants to develop vital tactics,
techniques, and procedures necessary to build interoperable forces. If
confirmed, we will look for opportunities to deepen and broaden our
military interaction with Taiwan forces in exercises, visits, and
exchanges consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan Travel Act,
and current administration policy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
operating in an anti-access/area denial environment
27. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the People's Republic of
China has the capability, capacity, and reach to employ thousands of
missiles within the first island chain and hundreds of missiles in the
second. This vast, asymmetrical arsenal will likely increase over the
next several years. With that in mind, what do you consider to be the
right mix of forward, blunt forces west of the International Date Line
(IDL) and surge forces east of the International Date Line?
Admiral Aquilino. The United States must have operational freedom
of maneuver and persistent, visible, forward presence with sustainable
maritime, air, and ground forces throughout the Indo-Pacific. To
generate the deterrence needed, we need forces with a mix of offensive
capabilities postured in a distributed manner, ISR capabilities to
understand the battle space, and defensive force protection
capabilities supported by sufficient surge forces with same
capabilities, all underpinned by survivable and resilient logistics
support. If confirmed, I will review the results of the Secretary of
Defense's Global Posture Review regarding force posture mix both east
and west of the IDL to ensure we meet current and future security
challenges.
28. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what concerns do you have
regarding our ability to resupply and sustain operations--especially
across a distributed posture--in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
environment?
Admiral Aquilino. Our ability to sustain the joint force in a
contested environment is one of our greatest advantages, and at the
same time a critical challenge. My concerns include capacity of the
logistic force and ensuring the proper force protection for these
forces. The right composition of logistics platforms, nodes, ports, and
supplier networks, along with appropriate protection is critical. The
joint force must also have sufficient access to and interoperability
with our allies and partners to conduct integrated, combined, and
resilient logistics sustainment in every domain.
29. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what recommendations do you
have to mitigate those concerns?
Admiral Aquilino. We must move toward a more distributed force
posture and increase the locations and availability for naval, air, and
ground forces to rearm, refuel, and have access to these locations
during contingencies. If confirmed, I will implement PDI posture
initiatives that maximize key logistics enablers and work with allies
and partners for enhanced posture. For example, aligned with PDI, I
support efforts to enhance logistics capability and capacity with
prepositioned supplies, infrastructure, and investments to store and
re-position fuel in the theater. These investments are key to ensuring
U.S. freedom of action and access to vital waterways, airspace, and
other lines of communication in a contested environment.
30. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what concerns do you have
regarding operational concepts--such as agile combat employment--the
Services are developing to achieve a theory of victory in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. I am encouraged by the operational concepts
developed by the services, but concerned with the ability of the joint
force to integrate the capabilities from each service being brought
online. When completed, I expect the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC)
will better integrate the services' concepts and capabilities.
Implementation of the JWC to integrate the strengths of all of our
services across all domains will help enable the full capability and
capacity of the joint force.
31. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, what risk are we assuming
provided the Services cannot execute those concepts for a sustained
period of time today?
Admiral Aquilino. Unless the services' concepts and capabilities
are integrated and can be quickly employed, synchronized, and
sustained, I see risk in rapidly denying an aggressive adversary's
objectives. Ensuring the effectiveness and resilience of key joint
warfighting functions such as ISR, command and control, fires,
logistics, and information advantage is essential. The United States
must have operational freedom of maneuver throughout the Indo-Pacific
informed by the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC).
alaska-based forces
32. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, Alaska is closer in
proximity to the Indo-Pacific than it is to Washington, DC. In fact,
Alaska is closer to Korea and Japan than Hawaii and Australia. Alaska-
based forces--under the operational control of INDOPACOM which include
the 4-25 Airborne BCT, 1-25 Stryker BCT, and the soon-to-be 100 5th-
Generation combat-coded fighters--are strategic forces that will be
needed in any competition, crisis, or conflict with China. With this in
mind--what do you see as the role of these combat credible forces--
based in Alaska--within the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. The joint force's credible and lethal forward
posture is critical to ensure deterrence, particularly in view of
China's hegemonic rise. Alaska's force structure is essential to
providing persistent homeland defense forces and forces ready to surge
in support of any contingencies in the Pacific. Alaska-based forces
provide support to USINDOPACOM routine operations and are critical
elements in our warfighting readiness in the event of a conflict in the
Indo-Pacific region.
33. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, in your personal opinion,
what force posture and/or capabilities is Alaska missing that INDOPACOM
views as a requirement?
Admiral Aquilino. The joint force must have the capability to fully
exercise synchronized multi-domain operations. Forces in Alaska
continue to provide posture and capability, but can be further enhanced
by linking the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) with other
world-class ranges through Pacific Multi-Domain Test and
Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) which would enable fully
instrumented, live-virtual training areas throughout the Indo-Pacific.
If confirmed, I will review the results of the Secretary's Global
Posture Review for additional potential enhancements.
34. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, during the Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on INDOPACOM posture, Admiral Philip
Davidson stated: `` . . . 5th-Generation fighters . . . are the
backbone of any of our planning for a crisis forward in a theater, and
would need to be at dispersed locations within the first and second
island chain.'' Considering Admiral Davidson's remarks, and with over
100 5th Generation fighter aircraft in Alaska, does it not make sense
to base the next generation--KC-46--tanker in that state to fill the
aerial refueling gap, and serve as an air bridge to rapidly surge those
fighters to the forward edge of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Our 5th Generation fighters provide both homeland
defense and deterrence both at home and abroad. These assets and their
enablers, to include tankers, must be based in the locations that most
efficiently and effectively meet COCOM requirements, provide the
flexibility for contingency operations, and are postured in a way that
ensures force protection. If confirmed, I will review the results of
the Secretary of Defense's Global Posture Review and work with DOD to
ensure our force posture is designed to best meet these priorities.
pacific deterrence initiative
35. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, during the SASC hearing on
INDOPACOM posture, I asked Admiral Davidson if the $4.6 billion needed
to fund the PDI was ``something that can help'' with halting the
erosion of our Nation's conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Admiral Davidson responded by stating: ``[PDI] meets the strategic
vision . . . [for] the theater to present a conventional deterrent that
would give China pause from any maligned military activity that they
would undergo, against any of our allies and partners in the region.''
You--yourself--in your advance policy questions further underscore
that: ``PDI is the foundational approach to advancing capabilities and
capacity . . . while strengthening our allies and partnerships for an
integrated joint force west of the International Date Line.'' At a cost
of seven-tenths of one percent of DOD's budget, PDI seems to come at a
bargain compared to any future military conflict with China should the
balance of power continue to shift unfavorably. Would you agree with
that statement? And, what--in terms relative to magnitude of PDI--would
a conflict with China cost us when considering both money and lives?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, I agree that PDI is both foundational and
cost-effective as it lays the base for our commitment to deterrence in
the Pacific. In particular, sustained investment is required to
generate the posture to deter China, our pacing threat, from acts of
aggression. A key deterrence effort, PDI cost is minimal when compared
to the potential loss of blood and treasure should conflict occur.
taiwan
36. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, Admiral Davidson stated in
the open session of the hearing on INDOPACOM posture that: ``Taiwan is
clearly one of [China's] ambitions . . . and I think the threat is
manifest during this decade, in fact in the next 6 years.'' Do you
share the same view on the threat timeline as Admiral Davidson . . . do
you believe China could seek to overtake Taiwan with a cross-strait
invasion within 6 years?
Admiral Aquilino. Predictive analysis to identify a specific date
for potential action continues to be difficult. However, my opinion is
that this problem is much closer than most think, and our deterrence
actions are needed now to prevent conflict. The PLA continues to field
a broad array of advanced weapons and systems as part of an ongoing
force modernization specifically intended to achieve decisive overmatch
against Taiwan. Additionally, China's political leadership has
publically announced their willingness to coercively pressure Taiwan in
both the information domain and with increased air and maritime
operations across the centerline of the Taiwan Strait. I believe that
we have to have a sense of urgency and take immediate action, such as
implementation of PDI, to deter any potential actions.
37. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, in your personal opinion,
what additional measure--beyond the PDI--does the United States need to
implement to adequately deter a high-cost scenario such as a cross-
strait invasion of Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. Beyond a properly resourced and sustained PDI, I
believe the U.S. needs to continue its efforts to integrate all
elements of national power beyond the military to deter the PRC. This
includes efforts to protect our country's intellectual property, level
the playing field on trade, support allies and partners through
diplomacy, and aggressively provide alternatives for increased
international development consistent with a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, we should continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a
sufficient self-defense capability in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act.
38. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the United States
Government announced $5.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan in 2020--all
in the last 3 months of the year. The weapons sales included:
communications systems, aerial drones, coastal defense systems,
missiles, and artillery among other defense articles. In your personal
opinion, are we selling Taiwan the right types of weapons?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, we
should continue to advise Taiwan to acquire those capabilities that
support their ability to defend itself against an invasion or efforts
to coerce unification. Priorities include asymmetric systems that are
highly mobile, lethal, survivable, and affordable that can be purchased
in large quantities. Coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), short and
medium range air defenses, and sea mines are examples of capabilities
that are critical to the successful defense of Taiwan.
39. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, how can the United States
better position Taiwan to defend itself?
Admiral Aquilino. If confirmed, United States Indo-Pacific Command
will continue to advise Taiwan on capabilities, interoperability,
readiness, training, and professional development through security
cooperation and foreign military sales in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act. We will also coordinate with allies and partners for
their assistance.
defense posture realignment initiative
40. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, Defense Posture Realignment
Initiative (DPRI) is the program of record negotiated with the
Government of Japan, which provided $3.1 billion or about \1/3\ of the
estimated cost, to relocate Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa to Guam.
The executive summary of the INDOPACOM report for section 1251 of the
Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA indicates the force design and posture effort:
``. . . begins with completing the Defense Posture Realignment
Initiative (DPRI) . . .'' From your interaction with our host nation
counterparts, how important is the execution of the DPRI program to the
Government of Japan?
Admiral Aquilino. DPRI is important to both Japan and the United
States. It strengthens our relationship with Japan and postures our
forces for deterrence. The Government of Japan (GoJ) strongly supports
the DPRI program's relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and has
committed significant financial contributions toward this end. The
United States-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of our security
objectives, and GoJ remains committed to the successful completion of
DPRI to ensure our countries are aligned against future challenges to
our mutual security.
41. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, there are some concerns
about the ability of marines to train for full spectrum combat when
they are moved to Guam. Can you outline what shortfalls currently exist
if the move were to occur today?
Admiral Aquilino. Training capabilities located on Guam, coupled
with CNMI Joint Training complex of ranges and facilities, will provide
a combined/joint training capability in the Western Pacific that will
adequately address Marine training requirements. However, linkages with
advanced capabilities between the ranges from Guam to Hawaii to Alaska
to the West Coast of the United States will increase our ability to
provide ready forces for highly contested environments. These linked
ranges will help meet the full spectrum training requirements for
Marines who will be stationed in Guam, as well as enable critical
training with our allies, partners, and the joint force.
42. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, does the current DPRI
program of record adequately address these shortfalls?
Admiral Aquilino. Training capabilities located on Guam, coupled
with CNMI Joint Training complex of ranges and facilities, will provide
a combined/joint training capability in the Western Pacific that will
adequately address Marine training requirements.
43. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, so that I can better
understand some of the tradeoffs involved with respect to: a)
deterrence, b) ability to do full spectrum training, and c) the
confidence of our partners and allies--what would be the impact, in
your opinion, of moving those 5,000 marines and their dependents to
locations east of the International Date Line--say for instance,
Alaska?
Admiral Aquilino. Potential impacts of relocating Marines could be
delayed response times during contingencies and increased un-programmed
infrastructure costs. I believe the relocation of Marines per the DPRI
program of record will correctly posture our forces for deterrence,
allow for required training, and give confidence to our allies and
partners. If confirmed, I will review the results of the Secretary of
Defense's Global Posture Review for force posture both east and west of
the IDL to ensure we meet current and future security challenges.
north korea missile capabilities and cooperation with iran
44. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, in Admiral Davidson's
statement for the record presented to this committee 2 weeks ago, he
highlighted: ``. . . North Korea will remain our most immediate
threat.'' Admiral Davison went on to state: ``Pyongyang maintains a
diverse and growing missile inventory, and North Korea unveiled several
new ballistic systems . . . including two SLBMs [submarine-launched
ballistic missile] and an ICBM.'' Finally, you conclude that:
``Pyongyang's missile research and development efforts . . . are
consistent with the regime's stated objective of being able to strike
the United States Homeland.'' Can you broadly discuss how North Korea's
missile program has advanced over the course of your assignment as the
Commander, United States Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Aquilino. North Korea continues to demonstrate the desire
to improve their missile design, ranges, and launch tactics,
techniques, and procedures. It has conducted multiple launches in the
last three years, focusing on combat readiness and mobility as well as
precision strike and rapid fire capabilities. Additionally, in October
2020 and January 2021, North Korea unveiled new and larger ICBMs, two
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as short range missiles.
45. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, how would you characterize
North Korea's missile program advancement--in terms of risk--to both
our regionally based forces and the United States Homeland?
Admiral Aquilino. North Korea's improved missile design, growing
inventory, and better launch tactics, techniques, and procedures make
it a growing threat to both our regionally based forces and the United
States Homeland. DPRK has taken no meaningful steps toward
denuclearization, despite promising signs of de-escalation in 2018. All
of these factors directly increase risk to the United States, our
regionally based forces, and allies and partners. If confirmed, I will
continue to make risk assessments and report any concerns to the
Secretary of Defense.
46. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, provided you are able to
answer in this forum--how long would you estimate until North Korea's
missile capability and range can reach the continental United States?
Admiral Aquilino. If confirmed, I will provide additional
classified details of North Korea's missile capabilities in an agreed
upon forum/date.
47. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the United Nations provided
a report to the Security Council in February that confirmed North Korea
and Iran resumed cooperation on development of long-range missiles last
year. This reporting followed shortly after North Korea showcased their
largest ICBM, believed capable of carrying a nuclear warhead across the
United States. To me this is exceptionally concerning as both countries
would greatly benefit from the leveraged gained in being able to strike
our Homeland. In your personal opinion, are we doing enough to develop
and field both regional/homeland missile defense systems?
Admiral Aquilino. Missile defense is a central component of the
Department of Defense's responsibility to defend the Homeland. I
believe increased threat capabilities require us to constantly assess
our Homeland defense systems, and I am confident the Missile Defense
Agency is working to ensure our capabilities continue to improve. The
Secretary of Defense has indicated his commitment to review missile
defense concepts, programs, and capabilities in light of the broader
defense strategy. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for missile
defense systems in the region, in Guam, and in Hawaii to support the
Homeland defense mission.
48. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, how would you suggest we
blunt the corrosive cooperation between these rogue nations?
Admiral Aquilino. All forms of national power should continue to be
brought to bear against this issue. UNSCR enforcement, diplomacy, and
economic options should continue to be applied. If confirmed, I will
ensure that forward-deployed and combat-lethal USINDOPACOM forces are
postured to allow diplomacy to engage from a position of strength.
india: high-altitude, cold-weather training
49. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the United States Army will
host Indian forces in Alaska this year to exercise high-altitude, cold-
weather combat skills. A Chinese military expert recently claimed that
the Indian Army: ``has the world's largest and most experienced troops
trained for high-altitude battles''. From my understanding, the same
exercise will occur in the Himalayas in 2022. First, let me commend the
efforts of INDOPACOM and U.S. Army in Alaska (USARAK) for cultivating
this strategic partnership. Second, how can we advance it further to
continue rebuilding robust Arctic capabilities that have atrophied
significantly over the past decade?
Admiral Aquilino. As the largest democracy in the Western Pacific,
India is an important partner sharing common values. If confirmed, we
will continue to advance our relationship with India, build
interoperability, and work with the components to identify potential
options to improve our cold-weather, high-altitude training/
capabilities.
fostering indo-pacific military expertise
50. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, given the Department of
Defense shift in priorities from violent extremist organizations in
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to great power competition in
INDOPACOM--as laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and
expressed by incoming DOD officials in the Biden Administration--do you
think the Service Academies and other DOD educational institutions are
adequately focused on educating our military officers and enlisted
members to best understand and operate in the Indo-Pacific region? If
not, in your personal opinion, how do we get after this knowledge and
expertise shortfall?
Admiral Aquilino. U.S. service academies and DOD education
institutions are known amongst our allies and partners as world-class.
These centers for higher learning have been adjusting and aligning
professional military education and talent management systems to
further develop our military leaders and those of our allies and
partners for 21st century challenges. If confirmed, I will highlight to
the services the need to deliver the knowledge and expertise necessary
to better operate jointly in the Indo-Pacific.
section 1251 report and range upgrades
51. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, the section 1251 report
identified a number of range investments--which included the Pacific
Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC)--with the
objective of creating a fully instrumented, live-virtual constructive
(LVC) training areas throughout the Indo-Pacific. How would upgrading
ranges--like the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex--with a Secure,
Synthetic Inject to Live LVC (SITL LVC) air combat training capability
help INDOPACOM meet its requirement to provide forces capable of
fighting in highly contested environments against technologically
advanced opponents?
Admiral Aquilino. Modernizing our ranges, as our capabilities grow
and as replication of the battlespace becomes more challenging, will
allow the joint force to train against an evolving threat and
technologically advanced opponent with our allies and partners.
Linkages with advanced capabilities between the ranges from Guam to
Hawaii to Alaska to the West Coast of the United States will increase
our ability to provide ready forces for highly contested environments.
For example, Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex range improvements
incorporating PMTEC, to include LVC capabilities, would offer the joint
force more effective, realistic, all-domain training and
experimentation at the tactical and operational level.
52. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Aquilino, how would providing SITL-
LVC at the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, or other ranges, help
increase overall readiness and combat capability of both INDOPACOM and
allied forces?
Admiral Aquilino. Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC) capability
is critical to readiness by enabling large scale, distributed training
that provides our warfighters the opportunity to train in a threat-
representative environment. LVC capability more effectively simulates
the highly contested threat environment in a more cost effective
manner. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex range improvements
incorporating LVC capability would offer the joint force more
effective, realistic, all-domain training and experimentation at the
tactical and operational level.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
intermediate-range nuclear forces
53. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, your predecessor's
independent assessment calls for Ground-Based, Long-Range Fires. No
longer shackled by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, how do
you see the emergence of these weapons systems changing the landscape
in INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. The emergence of these new weapons systems will
offer increased deterrence options and present additional dilemmas to
offset our competitors' capabilities that have been unconstrained by,
or not in compliance with, the treaty. If confirmed, I will continue to
advocate for investments that add new long-range, ground-based weapons
to expand the competitive space and put any potential adversaries on
the defensive.
chinese military-civil fusion
54. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what security challenges
do you see now and anticipate moving forward from the Chinese practice
of Military-Civil Fusion?
Admiral Aquilino. China's practice of military-civil fusion
facilitates the acquisition, diversion, or theft of cutting-edge
technologies that could close the gap to our comparative advantage.
I expect the PLA will continue to focus China's civilian research
and commercial sectors on its military and defense industrial
priorities, including a number of critical technologies, weapons, and
sensors.
55. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, how do we strategically
address Military-Civil Fusion while applying uniquely American
competitive advantages?
Admiral Aquilino. To address Chinese military-civil fusion, we must
expand ongoing efforts to identify and protect key United States/
Western technologies, especially those areas where the PRC lacks
alternatives for acquisition or manufacturing. If confirmed, I will
support DOD's effort to protect sensitive information, platforms, and
infrastructure through mechanisms such as cybersecurity, resiliency in
the supply chain, secure architectures, and export controls.
56. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what linkages do you see
between the Belt and Road Initiative and Military-Civil Fusion?
Admiral Aquilino. One Belt, One Road provides the PLA an
opportunity to expand its global reach by gaining access to foreign air
and maritime port facilities and foreign economic markets. China's
practice of military-civil fusion will enable greater PRC access to
each host nation's critical infrastructure, technologies, and business
architecture and make them vulnerable to further exploitation.
air wing of the future
57. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, during your testimony you
mentioned the Navy's ``Air Wing of the Future'' as enabling carrier
strike groups to be more lethal and capable within currently contested
spaces. Given the joint nature of your nominated billet, how does this
capability enable the joint force within that contested space?
Admiral Aquilino. The future Air Wing, able to operate in contested
space with the advantage of maneuver inherent in a carrier strike
group, will deliver capabilities that enable air superiority and
precision power projection from our carrier strike groups and the joint
force. These capabilities will challenge any adversary's ability to
counter the joint force's capability to mass integrated and
synchronized fires across all domains to confuse, degrade, disrupt and
ultimately deny adversary objectives.
competition in partnering
58. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what is your assessment of
China's bilateral and multilateral training efforts within INDOPACOM?
Admiral Aquilino. The PLA has demonstrated intent to advance
bilateral and multilateral training. The majority of PLA's foreign
training events are relatively small-scale bilateral exercises focused
on issues of mutual interest, such as counter terrorism or maritime
security. However, in recent years, the PLA has deployed forces to
participate in Russia's major annual exercise. China has participated
in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) multi-lateral exercises for
several years, and has recently executed maritime training with ASEAN.
defense technology cooperation
59. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, in which priority areas
should the United States increase defense technology cooperation with
Japan to deter regional adversaries?
Admiral Aquilino. In cooperation with the U.S. and working through
its self-defense forces, the GoJ should continue to invest in
improvements to interoperable air and missile defense, air dominance,
maritime security, and ISR capabilities. As Japan improves its
capability and capacity, we should continue to execute the Joint
Exercise Program and operate together both bilaterally and
multilaterally.
60. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, do you identify additional
opportunities specific to artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, or
dual-use technologies?
Admiral Aquilino. Artificial intelligence and cognitive/quantum
computing are areas we must invest in to deliver near-term warfighting
advantage. These capabilities would enable improved decision making as
well as man-machine teaming in the application of unmanned systems.
These asymmetric capabilities can be used to increase our advantages
operating jointly and with our allies and partners.
61. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Aquilino, what is the importance of
regular, robust funding for regional Fusion Centers such as the Counter
Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF), the Oceania Fusion Center, and
the Indo-Pacific Maritime Coordination Center?
Admiral Aquilino. Fusion centers are critical enablers for
strengthening our alliances, enhancing partnerships, and coordinating
regional understanding of key issues associated with transnational
threats and malign influence. These centers allow us to build trust and
improve understanding of each partner's capabilities for the purpose of
information sharing in a multilateral forum. Fusion centers send an
unambiguous signal to the region of U.S. commitment and support for
issues of common concern.
______
[The nomination reference of Admiral John C. Aquilino, USN
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Admiral John C. Aquilino, USN,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Admiral John
C. Aquilino, USN in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Admiral John C. Aquilino, USN was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on April 15, 2021, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 21, 2021.]
[all]