    [Senate Hearing 117-979]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 117-979

     THE NOMINATION OF DR. COLIN H. KAHL TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                                   FOR POLICY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 4, 2021
                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
                                    ______

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    62-871 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2026

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire       JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York     ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut     DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii             TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                 MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine           JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts     THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia      KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois           RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                 MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee                                                                                                                                                MARK KELLY, Arizona                 JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
                                        TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

                        Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
                     John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S
                                  ___________

                                 march 4, 2021

                                                                       Page

    The Nomination of Dr. Colin H. Kahl to be Under Secretary of          1
      Defense for Policy.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Kahl, Dr. Colin H................................................     7

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    51

      Questions for the Record.......................................    98

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   123

      Biographical Sketch............................................   124

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   127

      Signature Page.................................................   139

                                     (iii)

     THE NOMINATION OF DR. COLIN H. KAHL TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                                   FOR POLICY

                                   ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
    Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets this
    morning to consider the nomination of Dr. Colin Kahl to be
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP). Dr. Kahl has had
    a long and distinguished career in public service, including
    multiple positions at the Department of Defense. In addition,
    he has a close relationship with the White House, having served
    as Vice President Biden's National Security Advisor.
        Dr. Kahl, I want to thank you for your willingness to once
    again serve your country and the Defense Department. I also
    recognize and thank Michele Flournoy, who previously served as
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and who will be
    introducing Dr. Kahl this morning.
        During his nomination hearing before this committee,
    Secretary Austin made clear that the next Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy will play a central role in the Secretary's
    efforts to empower the Department's civilian staff, and ensure
    that strategic and operational decisions are informed by
    policy.
        If confirmed, Dr. Kahl, you will face a wide range of
    challenges to global security. Foremost among these is the re-
    emergence of strategic competition with near-peer rivals, China
    and Russia. We must adapt to a new security environment in
    which our adversaries are rapidly modernizing their military
    capabilities and are increasingly aggressive in challenging
    United States and allied interests. Our Armed Forces must be
    prepared to operate in contested environments if our deterrent
    is to remain credible. This great power rivalry will
    significantly impact our defense policies across the board.
        We must take a long-term approach to the strategic
    competition with China, a challenge Secretary Austin has
    appropriately described as the ``pacing threat'' for the
    Department of Defense (DOD). Competing effectively with China
    requires that we develop new technologies to rival China's
    advancements and new operational concepts to ensure the desired
    deterrent effect against Chinese aggression.
        Russia continues to subvert the rules-based international
    order, including using military force to intimidate and coerce
    its neighbors and other countries. Russia is also engaged in an
    ongoing hybrid warfare campaign just below the threshold that
    would provoke a military response, including disinformation
    campaigns targeting democratic processes, human rights abuses,
    and assassination attempts against Kremlin opponents.
        In addition to these broad strategic challenges, the new
    administration must contend with regional destabilization in
    the Middle East and South Asia, areas in which Dr. Kahl has
    extensive experience. These complex, interlocking challenges
    include deterring threats from Iran, and its proxies, while
    seeking to contain the Iranian nuclear threat; recalibrating
    the relationship with Saudi Arabia; and continuing to mature
    the security relationship with Iraq while keeping pressure on
    ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. In Afghanistan, the
    administration is reviewing adherence to the May 1st troop
    withdrawal timeline in the midst of an uptick in Taliban
    violence across the country.
        The shift to great power competition has been accompanied
    by a call for a more resource-sustained approach to
    counterterrorism. The Biden administration has an opportunity
    to develop a sustainable policy framework for the conduct of
    counterterrorism operations that ensures transparency, seeks to
    enable foreign partners, emphasizes the avoidance of civilian
    harm, and reserves unilateral use of lethal force for only
    those instances where it is absolutely necessary.
        The Department is also confronted with a number of non-
    traditional threats, from disruptive technologies including
    cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced
    digital communications, to the substantial threat climate
    change poses to our force posture and military operations. This
    may require new policies and organizational structures within
    the Department to respond to these emerging threats.
        Addressing these problems will require a comprehensive
    security strategy, one that brings together all national
    elements of power in a whole-of-government approach. The Policy
    Office will have the lead in working with the State Department
    and other civilian agencies to ensure a unified effort on these
    critical national security matters. Dr. Kahl, I hope you will
    share your views on the role of the Department of Defense in
    such a coordinated, interagency approach.
        Finally, another key component of our defense policy going
    forward must be ensuring a unified approach with our allies and
    building strong partnerships globally. Our allies and partner
    nations are force multipliers, providing us a significant
    advantage in the strategic competition. The Biden
    administration has pledged to reinvigorate these relationships,
    which have been badly shaken in recent years, leaving our
    allies and partners wondering whether they can rely on U.S.
    leadership of the international community. I will be interested
    to hear how you see the role of allies and partners in the U.S.
    security strategy, and how, if confirmed, you would rebuild the
    bonds with our defense partners.
        I look forward to your testimony, and let me recognize
    Senator Inhofe.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Kahl, I want to begin by thanking you for your
    willingness to serve. You have been nominated for one of the
    most senior positions at the Pentagon, and you previously
    served in high positions in the Obama administration. But to be
    clear up front, from a policy perspective, I do not think there
    is much we are going to agree on, as we discussed on the phone
    last week.
        Now, in regards to our discussion last week, we had a
    conversation. Apparently someone who was listening went to the
    press and claimed that you and I, and we are quoting you,
    ``said all the right things'' and ``may have flipped Inhofe and
    his concerns.''
        First, I think I was pretty clear that we had significant
    disagreements, so I am not sure how you got that impression, or
    he got that impression, or who it was. Second and most
    importantly, I am disappointed that a slanted view of our
    conversation was shared with the press. There is no reason for
    that.
        On our call, I told you that I would have a hard time
    supporting your nomination because of your previous policy
    positions, unless you have learned from some of the mistakes
    that you have made, which I will point out. But I also told you
    that I can work with people with whom I disagree, and people
    are always talking about that with me and Barbara Boxer. We got
    more stuff done than any other two people who did not agree on
    anything except infrastructure, but it worked.
        I understand that my committee staff has gotten assurances
    that this leak did not come from you, but it did not come from
    me either, so who did it come from?
        Hopefully you can touch on this issue at some point during
    today's testimony. Even if we disagree on policy issues, we
    have to have some trust that we can have frank conversations,
    and that would be necessary.
        So now I want to discuss some of those areas where you and
    I have disagreed.
        Specifically, you had previously been against moving the
    United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, yet my recent
    amendment to the reconciliation bill, which ensures that the
    Embassy will remain in Jerusalem, passed by a vote of 97-3--
    those are Democrats we are talking about, along with
    Republicans--and the Biden administration has already confirmed
    it will remain there also.
        You have also been a vocal supporter of the Obama
    administration's Iran nuclear deal, which gave Iran over $100
    billion in sanctions relief, part of which Iran used to fund
    terrorist groups, the very groups that rocketed American forces
    in Iraq just this week.
        Now, as I have said, my colleagues and I are used to
    disagreeing with senior officials over various policy matters.
    That is not new.
        We had a very good hearing on Tuesday about global security
    challenges and strategy. At this hearing, H.R. McMaster said
    something about our foreign policy that I think is really
    important. He said, and this is a quote, he said, ``We need to
    adopt a nonpartisan, long-term approach to foreign policy
    focused on competitions important to our nation's security,
    prosperity, and influence in the world.'' Great statement.
        What concerns me here is that hyper-partisanship,
    especially in regards to our national security, is
    inappropriate for the position of Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy. We are talking about the number three position.
        We have seen this before, even with the previous
    administration, when this committee rejected a nominee, in
    part, due to his prior statements and hyper-partisanship.
        The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    requires a leader with judicious temperament and sound
    judgment. National security is too important for partisan
    politics.
        Unfortunately, in the past, in many cases, your public
    policy positions have been couched in partisan politics rather
    than fact-based analysis. I will give you just a few examples
    because I expect my colleagues will have other examples. I will
    just give you two here.
        You downplayed the threat of Russia when Mitt Romney
    highlighted it during the 2012 election, and then alleged
    numerous conspiracy theories regarding President Trump's ties
    to Russia following the 2016 election. Next, you appeared to
    promote the fabricated Steele dossier, which contains ludicrous
    and unsubstantiated accusations against President Trump.
        I realize you were not in public service when you made
    these comments, and maybe at the time you thought you would
    never be sitting in front of us as you are today.
        My point is this. We know that there is a new
    administration--we understand that. I did not want it but it is
    here--and that we will have policy disagreements that we will
    all try to work through. But how will you rectify the fact that
    many Americans, including those who work at the Department of
    Defense, know you only through your very partisan comments? How
    can we be confident that you will be a model of nonpartisan
    policy analysis, which is what the job requires, if you are
    confirmed?
        Finally, just to hit on some of your previous policy
    predictions that have proven untrue, you said that ending the
    Iran deal might lead to war, and that did not happen. You said
    the Soleimani strike would force the United States out of Iraq.
    That did not happen. You wrote that it would be ``difficult''
    to prevent a ``massive war'' on the Korean peninsula in 2018.
    That did not happen. You said that moving the United States
    Embassy to Jerusalem would harm relations with Arab states,
    and, in fact, Arab-Israeli relations have never been better.
        So here is what I hope you will address during the hearing.
    What prior assumptions have you reconsidered? Where do you
    stand on these matters now, and how will you comport yourself
    in the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy if you
    are confirmed? Where do you stand on these matters now, and how
    will you comport yourself on these policies? How can you
    reassure this committee that your hyper-partisan advocacy will
    not drive Pentagon decisions?
        We have got a lot to discuss, and I thank you for being
    here today and your willingness. I sounded a little bit upset
    on this, and frankly, I am.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, now let
    me recognize former Secretary of Defense, Michele Flournoy, via
    WebEx, to introduce Dr. Kahl, and then after that I will ask
    the required questions of Dr. Kahl before his testimony.
        Secretary Flournoy, are you ready?
        Ms. Flournoy. Yes, I am.
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished members
    of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is truly an honor
    and a pleasure for me to introduce my dear friend and former
    colleague, Dr. Colin Kahl as President Biden's nominee to be
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Under Secretary
    for Policy is a position I know well, and it plays a critical
    role in the Department of Defense. As you know, it is the
    principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the
    formulation of national security and defense policy and the
    oversight of military plans and operations and the National
    Security Council (NSC) deliberations. The Under Secretary's
    Office oversees the drafting of National Defense Strategy and
    other key guidance documents and often represents the
    Department in engagement overseas, with allies, and the media,
    and before Congress.
        I have known Dr. Kahl for nearly 15 years, and I cannot
    think of anyone who is more qualified and better suited for
    this position, particularly at this consequential moment for
    our country. Dr. Kahl is both a respect policy expert and an
    extraordinary leader and practitioners. Since receiving his BA
    in political science from the University of Michigan and his
    PhD in political science from Columbia University, his career
    has alternated between being a professor at the University of
    Minnesota, Georgetown, and now Stanford, and serving his
    country in the Department of Defense and in the White House.
        During the Obama administration, Dr. Kahl served as Deputy
    Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the
    Vice President. In that position, he advised President Obama
    and Vice President Biden on all matters related to United
    States foreign policy and national security, from China and
    Russia, Ukraine, North Korea, Central America, to cyber,
    climate, Ebola, and the counter-ISIS strategy. He has an
    incredible breadth and depth of both policy and interagency
    experience at the highest levels, all of which will serve him
    very well in the Department.
        Prior to that, Dr. Kahl worked with me as Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for the Middle East at the Pentagon. In
    this capacity, he served as the Senior Policy Advisor to the
    Secretary of Defense for all of the countries in the Levant and
    Gulf region. In this role, he delivered some incredibly
    important outcomes for Secretary of Defense Gates, for
    President Obama, for the U.S., and our allies.
        A few examples. In the summer of 2009, he wrote the initial
    memo that advocated for United States support for Israel's Iron
    Dome rocket defense system, which had been languishing at the
    Pentagon for years. This got the ball rolling at the NSC,
    culminating in hundreds of millions of dollars, thanks to the
    Congress, in support of a system that helped cement our defense
    relationship with Israel and, in fact, saved countless Israeli
    lives since then.
        Dr. Kahl also spearheaded DOD efforts to bolster the
    [inaudible] to counterbalance Iran while, at the same time,
    safeguarding Israel's qualitative military edge, a feat that he
    was able to manage by building extraordinarily close security
    ties with both our JCC partners and his counterparts in Israel.
        At the same time, he helped oversee the contingency
    planning for Iran and worked alongside the interagency and
    United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to enhance and adjust
    our military posture throughout the region to deter Iranian
    aggression and support diplomacy to constrain Iran's nuclear
    program. Throughout, he worked in close partnership with
    CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, modeling the kind of collaborative
    civil-military relationship we need more of today.
        For these and his other extraordinary contributions, Dr.
    Kahl was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding
    Public Service by Secretary Robert Gates in June of 2011.
        Dr. Kahl understands that these positions require not just
    drafting good policy but also actually ensuring that these
    policies are implemented, to deliver real security benefits for
    the nation. He was exceptional in his ability to develop a
    vision and road map for his area of responsibility, to work
    closely with key civilian, military, interagency,
    international, and I would add, congressional on both sides of
    the aisle, stakeholders, to get their buy-in and support, and
    then drive the delivery of outcomes. Dr. Kahl has a record of
    being a leader who gets results.
        He is also a leader who wins the respect and admiration of
    his peers and his subordinates. When I was Under Secretary, we
    launched a human capital strategy and policy to boost the
    morale and enhance the performance of the workforce. I decided
    to pilot the program in the two busiest offices, including Dr.
    Kahl's Middle East office, to demonstrate that it is possible
    to take care of your people even as you maintain high-tempo
    operations.
        The pilot was a stellar success, thanks to Dr. Kahl's gifts
    as a leader and a manager of people. At a time when the policy
    organization needs to be rebuilt and reinvigorated, these
    skills will be critical to the next USDP's success.
        Thanks to his time in academia, and think tanks like the
    Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for New American
    Security, Dr. Kahl will also bring a tremendous reservoir of
    intellectual capital to the position. He has published numerous
    articles on international security and foreign and defense
    policy, and has spent the past few years working on a number of
    projects, ranging from a book on the geopolitical consequences
    of COVID-19, a project on the implications of emerging
    technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine
    learning on strategic stability and the future of deterrence,
    and a project providing a theoretical and historical analysis
    of American grand strategy since 9/11.
        I believe Dr. Kahl has the expertise, the experience, the
    ability to work with all stakeholders, no matter whether they
    agree or disagree with him--the leadership qualities to be an
    exceptional Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I would urge
    you confirm him as quickly as possible, because the Pentagon
    needs his help. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you so much, Madam Secretary, not only
    for your statement but for your dedicated service to the nation
    in so many different ways.
        Dr. Kahl, I will ask you a series of questions before we
    recognize you for your statement.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to resume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Dr. Kahl. No.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibility makes it important that this committee, its
    committees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    committee when requested?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees of Congress and to consult with a request regarding
    the basis of any good-faith delay or denial in providing such
    records?
        Dr. Kahl. I do.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Dr. Kahl. They will.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Kahl, and please go
    ahead.

       STATEMENT OF DR. COLIN H. KAHL, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
                           DEFENSE FOR POLICY

        Dr. Kahl. Well, thank you and good morning, Chairman Reed,
    Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee. It is a
    true honor to appear before you today.
        I would like to thank President Biden for my nomination. I
    would also like to thank Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
    Hicks for their confidence, and of course, to my good friend
    Michele Flournoy for her kind introduction.
        Michele has been a mentor to me and so many others over the
    course of her distinguished career, and I am grateful for her
    years of support and friendship. As Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy, she set a high bar for policy acumen, skillful
    management, unshakeable integrity, and principled, nonpartisan
    leadership, and if confirmed, I aim to emulate her example.
        I would also like to thank my wife Rebecca and my two
    amazing children, our nine-year-old daughter Nora and our six-
    year-old Rylan, for all their love, their support, and frankly,
    their patience through this process. I wish they could be here
    sitting behind me today, but I know they cheering me on back
    home in California, so if you are watching on TV, Daddy says
    hello.
        I was born and raised in OSD Policy, and I could not be
    more humbled by the prospect of leading this great
    organization. I began my government career as an action officer
    in the Pentagon during the Bush administration. I returned to
    serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
    Middle East during the Obama administration, working for both
    Secretary Gates and then Secretary Panetta.
        While the challenges we face as a nation have changed, the
    role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy remains just
    as critical as ever.
        Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have pledged to
    empower the Policy team. If confirmed, I commit to be a strong,
    constructive civilian voice in the Department. I have the
    utmost respect for our military professionals at all levels,
    and I would look forward to working closely with the Joint
    Staff, with the combatant commands, and the military services.
        We have a lot of work to do together. We recently reached
    the devastating milestone of over half a million lives lost to
    COVID-19. That is more Americans than were lost during World
    War II and in all wars since 1945 that America has been
    involved in, combined. I agree with Secretary Austin that the
    pandemic is our most immediate national security threat, and if
    confirmed, I stand ready to support the Department's many
    efforts to beat back COVID-19.
        Beyond the crisis of the moment, the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy, for which this committee deserves a great deal of
    credit, aptly recognized the reality of accelerating great
    power competition, particularly with China. Successfully
    competing with China will requires us to lean into our inherent
    strengths. That means building back better at home, spurring
    technological innovation, leading with our values, and
    reinvigorating our unrivaled network of alliances and partners.
        If confirmed, I would work diligently to further the
    Department's efforts to strengthen deterrents and develop a
    joint force to effectively counter a more assertive China. The
    nuclear triad has been the bedrock of our strategic deterrent
    for decades. In the face of challenges from China, Russia,
    North Korea, and other states, we must ensure that our nuclear
    deterrent remains safe, reliable, and effective, one that is
    credible, not only in the eyes of our adversaries but in the
    eyes of our allies.
        Climate change represents another existential danger, and
    if confirmed, I will champion a comprehensive approach to
    addressing the national security implications of the climate
    crisis.
        We must also tackle growing threats in the cyber realm. The
    SolarWinds intrusion is just the latest example of
    vulnerabilities that have become even more acute as the
    pandemic has forced entire communities and institutions online.
    The Department should adopt a layered approach to respond to
    cyberattacks, defend our networks and improve their resilience,
    and work alongside like-minded nations to constrain malign
    behavior.
        Finally, I recognize that our country and the Department
    faces a moment of reckoning. If confirmed, would do all that I
    can to support efforts to address the scourge of sexual assault
    and end racism and violent extremism within the ranks. You have
    my commitment to help break down systemic barriers and foster a
    diverse and inclusive Department.
        If confirmed, I would look forward to working with members
    of this committee on all of these issues. I am personally
    grateful for your long bipartisan commitment to our national
    defense, thoughtful oversight of our military, and your
    devotion to those who serve our country in uniform and their
    families. If confirmed, I would seek to forge a collaborative
    working relationship with Congress, and I would look forward to
    engaging with this committee regularly to advance our shared
    national security objectives.
        Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Colin Kahl follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Dr. Colin Kahl
        Good morning Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of
    the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today.
        I would like to thank President Biden for my nomination. I would
    also like to thank Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks for
    their confidence, and of course, to Michele Flournoy for her kind
    introduction.
        Michele has been a mentor to me and so many others over the course
    of her distinguished career and I am grateful for her years of
    friendship. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, she set a high
    bar for policy acumen, skillful management, unshakeable integrity, and
    principled, nonpartisan leadership. If confirmed, I aim to emulate her
    example.
        I would also like to thank my wife Rebecca and my two amazing
    children, Nora and Rylan, for their love, support, and patience through
    this process. I wish they could be here today in person, but I know
    they cheering me on back home in California.
        I was born and raised in OSD Policy, and could not be more humbled
    by the prospect of leading this great organization. I began my
    government career as an action officer in the Pentagon 16 years ago,
    during the Bush administration, and I returned to serve as the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East during the first
    term of the Obama administration.
        While the challenges we face as a nation have changed over the
    years, the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--to
    provide forward-thinking and insightful advice to the Secretary on all
    matters related to foreign policy and national security--remains just
    as critical to the defense of the Nation as it ever has been.
        Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have pledged to empower
    the Policy team, and if confirmed, I pledge to be a strong,
    constructive civilian voice in the Department. I have the utmost
    respect for our military professionals at all levels, and if confirmed,
    I would look forward to working closely with the Joint Staff, combatant
    commands, and the Services.
        We recently reached the devastating milestone of over half a
    million lives lost to COVID-19--more Americans than were lost during
    World War II or in all wars since 1945 combined. I agree with Secretary
    Austin that the pandemic is our most immediate national security
    threat, and, again, if confirmed, I stand ready to support the
    Department's many efforts to beat the pandemic.
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy--for which this Committee
    deserves a great deal of credit--aptly recognized the reality of great
    power competition, particularly with China. If confirmed, I would work
    diligently to further the Department's efforts to strengthen deterrence
    and develop a Joint Force to effectively counter the challenge posed by
    a more assertive China.
        Successfully competing with China will requires us to lean into our
    inherent national strengths by building back better at home, leading
    with our values abroad, and reinvigorating our unrivaled network of
    alliances and partners.
        It is also critical that we ensure our nuclear deterrent is safe,
    reliable, and effective--one that is credible in the eyes of our
    adversaries and our allies. The nuclear triad has been the bedrock of
    our strategic deterrent for decades, and modernization efforts are key
    to maintaining our deterrent. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that
    the triad remains an important hedge against the prospect of future
    technological changes that may question the survivability of any given
    leg.
        Climate change represents another existential challenge--one that
    will increasingly shape the operational environment and contingencies
    the Department of Defense will face in the coming years. Energy
    resilience will be a major issue in any scenario for great power
    conflict, and the Department must take steps to make our infrastructure
    and facilities less vulnerable to extreme weather. If confirmed, I will
    champion a comprehensive approach to addressing the national security
    implications of climate change.
        I view the SolarWinds intrusion as the latest example of a cyber-
    vulnerability that has become even more acute as the pandemic has
    forced entire communities and institutions online. True cybersecurity
    requires a whole-of-government effort, working in partnership with the
    private sector. The Department should adopt a layered approach to
    respond to cyberattacks, defend our networks and improve their
    resilience, and work alongside our allies to shape rules of the road
    that constrain malign behavior. If confirmed, I would look forward to
    working with members of this Committee on these issues.
        In all of these areas, I believe our allies and partners must be
    seamlessly integrated into our efforts. If confirmed, I would dedicate
    myself to energizing our bilateral and multilateral defense
    relationships. I also recognize that American is strongest when we are
    leading with diplomacy, and if confirmed, I would closely coordinate
    with my colleagues at the State Department to support their diplomatic
    engagements around the world.
        Finally, I recognize that our nation, and the Department, faces a
    moment of reckoning. If confirmed, I would do all that I can to support
    efforts to address the scourge of sexual assault and end violent
    extremism and systemic racism within the ranks. You have my commitment
    to help break down systemic barriers and foster a diverse and inclusive
    Department.
        I am personally grateful for your long, bipartisan commitment to
    our national defense, thoughtful oversight of our military, and
    devotion to those who serve our country in uniform and their families.
    If confirmed, I would seek to forge a collaborative working
    relationship with Congress, and I would look forward to engaging with
    this Committee regularly to advance our shared national security
    objectives.
        Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Kahl. With some
    Senators attending remotely I want to remind everyone of how
    things will run. Since it is impossible to know exactly when
    our colleagues who will be joining via the computer arrive, we
    will not be following our standard early bird timing rule.
    Instead, we handle the order of questions by seniority,
    alternating sides, until we have gone through everyone. Once we
    reach the end, if there is anyone we missed we will start back
    at the top of the list and continue until everyone has had
    their turn.
        We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
    colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please keep
    an eye on the clock, which you should see on your screens if
    you on the computer and the lights before you. I think I have
    complete concurrence by the ranking member with this, so I will
    reiterate that please.
        Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
    room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute
    your microphone when not speaking. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Kahl, all of us have recognized, and you particularly
    in your pre-hearing policy questions, China is the top priority
    and pacing threat, as you described it, and indeed Secretary
    Austin also called it a pacing threat. In that regard, what
    would be your assessment of our current posture in the Indo-
    Pacific region, particularly the forces and capabilities that
    are west of the International Date Line, and how does it align
    with the emerging threat?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Chairman. There is no question that
    China is the pacing threat, in most areas for the Department.
    The reason for that is clear. China is the only country in the
    world that can challenge the United States systematically, that
    is, in the economic domain, the technological domain, the
    military domain, and frankly, in shaping international order
    more broadly.
        From the Department of Defense perspective, we have to get
    our posture in the Indo-Pacific right. I know, obviously, the
    administration is in the beginning days of a global posture
    review, and if I am confirmed I look forward to participating
    in that.
        But my general sense, and I would commend the committee on
    its support for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in this
    regard, I think our posture has to be distributed, it has to be
    ready and lethal, and it has to be resilient so that we
    consumer counter the most likely scenarios for potential
    conflict with China, and make it clear to Beijing that they
    cannot win a potential conflict with the United States or our
    allies.
        Chairman Reed. Since we are all committed, I believe, to a
    whole-of-government approach to problems, what non-military
    aspects of a strategy do you believe need additional attention?
    That will be one of your responsibilities in the Department, to
    coordinate with State and other agencies, so do you have a
    sense of what other factors that we can contribute to our
    approach?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. I mean, clearly the Department of Defense
    will have the lead in areas of competition, especially where
    deterrence and national defense are essential. But really, the
    Department is a supporting actor to kind of a symphony of
    activities that other agencies are involved.
        You know, China and Russia, a lot of their activities fall
    below the threshold of traditional warfare. You mentioned
    yourself, in your opening remarks, about Russia's hybrid
    warfare. We also see gray zone activities the Chinese have
    engaged in.
        But, you know, across the board energy coercion, weaponized
    corruption, disinformation, cyberattacks, many of these will
    require acts of diplomacy by the State Department, a
    reinvigorated development policy to check back against China's
    influence in the Belt and Road Initiative, for example, a
    global public health policy that really rolls back the pandemic
    and demonstrates American leadership, and a government-wide
    technological policy that keeps us on the cutting edge and
    protects our cyber networks, et cetera.
        So if I am confirmed, a big role of the Under Secretary is
    to work alongside the interagency. I think I have good,
    trusting relationships with Secretary Blinken, with Wendy
    Sherman, if she is confirmed, with many at the White House such
    as Jake Sullivan and obviously the President. So I think I
    could work well with our interagency partners.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Turning now to Iran, President
    Biden has made clear his position that Iran must be prevented
    from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. But he has indicated if
    Iran returns to strict compliance of the JCPOA [Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action], the United States will join the
    agreement and begin to negotiate and extend the provisions, and
    strengthen the provisions of the JCPOA, while also addressing
    other issues of concern, which is malign activities in Iran,
    which have been demonstrated frequently.
        Indeed, just last week, President Biden ordered, as we all
    know, a strike just within the border of Syria on Iranian
    paramilitary groups in response to strikes against the United
    States facilities.
        Do you believe it is possible to conduct this essentially
    two-track approach, getting back into the JCPOA while
    constraining the malign activities of the Iranians?
        Dr. Kahl. I think it is, but it will be difficult. I think
    that it is absolutely essential that we prevent Iran from ever
    acquiring a nuclear weapon. It is also absolutely essential
    that we prioritize the protection of our forces in the Middle
    East and elsewhere, that are threatened by Iran and its
    proxies.
        So even as we pursue diplomacy to put Iran's nuclear
    program back in the box, we have to remain vigilant against the
    other threats that Iran poses, and if diplomacy makes any
    progress on the nuclear front I would hope that that would be a
    platform for us to address the other issues along the lines
    that you suggested.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Dr. Kahl. Let me now recognize
    Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I
    have three questions. Before I come forth with my questions let
    me make a comment about my rather harsh introductory remarks.
        I had two problems. One was that when we had our
    conversation I thought it was confidential. I did not know
    there were other people on the line. The second thing is, the
    report--a conversation like that should not go directly to the
    media, and I do not know why it did, and you do not need to
    respond to why it did.
        But in spite of what you might have heard from me, I have
    one frailty, which I have lived with for a long time, and that
    is in spite of what you think, I love everybody.
        Now here are my three questions, and I structured these,
    Dr. Kahl, to be yes-or-no questions, so it should be easy and I
    ought be able to get all of them in, so you can start the clock
    here.
        Dr. Kahl, you said that--well, under Soleimani's leadership
    the Quds Force was responsible for the murder of hundreds of
    American men and women in uniform. Soleimani also armed,
    trained, and directed funds to terrorist groups across the
    region, which deliberately killed many thousands of innocent
    people in addition to Americans.
        Dr. Kahl, you said that Soleimani's killing in January
    2020, would lead to war. This did not happen. How do you see it
    now? Is the world a better place without Soleimani? Yes or no.
        Dr. Kahl. I did not shed a tear for the death of Qasem
    Soleimani, for all the reasons that you mentioned. Senator
    Inhofe, I was concerned about the escalatory dynamics----
        Senator Inhofe. Is the world in a better position now
    without him?
        Dr. Kahl. I think it probably is a better place without
    him.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. You wrote that President Trump's
    decision to move the Embassy to Jerusalem risked a third
    Palestinian uprising, and that also, as I said in my opening
    statement, did not happen. In fact, the Arab-Israeli
    cooperation has never been better. Do you acknowledge that your
    previous assumption that stronger United States-Israeli
    relations would spark violence and harm relations with Arab
    states, were those statements a mistake? Do you agree with it
    now?
        Dr. Kahl. I think dynamics in the Middle East have changed.
    I support the Abraham Accords and I would not move the Embassy
    back to Jerusalem, and that is the policy, move it away from
    Jerusalem, and that is President Biden's policy, which I
    support.
        Senator Inhofe. Very good. Last Thursday, at Secretary of
    Defense Austin's recommendation, President Biden took lethal
    action against Iranian-backed groups that continue to target
    Americans, and I agreed with that action. Dr. Kahl, do you
    agree and support President Biden's actions against the
    Iranian-backed militias, and do you believe pressure must
    continue to be placed on groups who take their orders from
    Iranian leadership?
        Dr. Kahl. I do.
        Senator Inhofe. Good, and do you agree that so long as
    Iranian-backed groups continue to target Americans for murder,
    any easing of sanctions against Iran should be off the table?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe that we need to get the nuclear program
    in a box, because as troubling as Iran's behavior is, and it is
    very troubling, it would be exponentially more dangerous if
    Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. So there maybe context in which
    nuclear-related sanctions are part of a compliance-for-
    compliance framework, but we should not be loosening sanctions
    on terrorism or human rights or anything else that checks back
    Iran's destabilizing activities.
        Senator Inhofe. If they continue to target Americans for
    murder, would easing the sanctions against Iraq, do you think
    they should be off the table?
        Dr. Kahl. Iran was engaged in those activities before the
    Iran deal, during the Iran deal, and since we have reimpose
    sanctions after leaving the Iran deal. I think we need to check
    back Iran through a whole host of steps, some of which include
    sanctions, but there are many other things we need to be doing
    alongside our allies in the region, to counterbalance Iran.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. I am going to ask you one more time,
    and we are talking about in the event that they continue doing
    what they have been doing. Shouldn't easing sanctions be off
    the table? Yes or no.
        Dr. Kahl. We should not ease sanctions on terrorism or
    their other activities, and we should not ease any sanctions on
    the nuclear front until Iran is in complete compliance with its
    obligations under the JCPOA.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me recognize
    Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    Dr. Kahl for being here and for your willingness to consider
    being nominated to this critical post at this time.
        I appreciated the phone conversation we had yesterday, and
    I just want to ask you to reiterate two of the issues that we
    discussed and what I understood you to say to me. I was very
    pleased to hear you say that on the Havana Syndrome, which has
    affected so many of our public servants who were affected in
    Cuba and China and other parts of the world that you would do
    everything possible to ensure that we get to the bottom of who
    is responsible for those attacks and that we cooperate with
    other agencies to try and ensure we have answers and that
    people who are affected are taken care of.
        Did I understand that correctly?
        Dr. Kahl. You did, Senator. I think there is no higher
    obligation than making sure we are protecting our people who
    serve overseas. That means not just our men and women in
    uniform but our diplomats and other civilians. I know this is
    an issue that you have championed, and I would be happy to work
    with you on this issue, if I am confirmed.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. The other issue that
    we talked about, and you said you thought it was very
    important, was the continued implementation of the Women,
    Peace, and Security Act, to ensure that we are including women
    in all of our actions through the Department of Defense. Again,
    you committed that that is a very important step and the
    Department should continue work in that area. Did I understand
    that correctly?
        Dr. Kahl. You did. The empirical evidence is clear that the
    inclusion of women and girls in society and women in
    negotiations contributes to peaceful outcomes. I understand the
    Department has a Women, Peace, and Security strategic framework
    and implementation plan, and if I was confirmed I would look
    forwa4rd to pushing that forward and working with you on it.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. One of the things
    that you mentioned in your opening statement was the
    effectiveness of Russia's hybrid warfare, and we are looking at
    how we respond and hold Russia accountable for what they have
    been doing, whether it is the SolarWinds hack or efforts to
    harass our troops in parts of Europe, I certainly support the
    sanctions that the administration announced last week, but one
    of the best ways I think we could hold Russia accountable is to
    stop the completion of Nord Stream 2, and to take every action
    possible. I realize that some of those actions need to be taken
    with the Department of State, but can you talk about why it
    would be important for us to shut down Nord Stream 2 and what
    the impact on Russia would be?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, Senator. I share your view that Nord Stream
    2 is extraordinarily troubling. I think it would create a type
    of energy dependence on Russia that would give Russia coercive
    influence over some of our closest allies. When I was in the
    Obama administration, traveling around Europe with then Vice
    President Biden, we repeatedly made the case against Nord
    Stream 2. I am obviously not privy to the ongoing deliberations
    in the administration on this issue, but, if confirmed, this is
    an issue I would continue to push on.
        Senator Shaheen. Great. I hope you will do it with some
    urgency, as we need to act quickly if we are going to shut down
    the final leg of that pipeline.
        Finally, on Syria, there have been calls--well, the
    previous administration withdrew our troops from Syria in a way
    that I thought was particularly detrimental, not just to what
    was happening in Syria but to the impact on our allies, the
    Kurds in that battle, our allies around the world, because of
    what it said about the ability to trust the United States.
        But right now I think one of the biggest challenges we have
    in the world is in Syria. I have been disappointed that we do
    not yet have an envoy to Syria appointed by the administration.
    But can you talk about what you think our strategy towards
    Syria should be and how we develop a comprehensive approach to
    dealing with it? Because I would argue that neither the Obama
    administration nor the Trump administration had a real strategy
    on Syria.
        Dr. Kahl. Yeah. Neither of the administrations cracked the
    code on Syria. That is for sure. I think, you know, our number
    one national security priority in Syria remains the sustained
    defeat of ISIS. The caliphate is down but ISIS is not
    completely out, and so we have to be laser-focused on that.
        But I do think we have some leverage, and if we reengage in
    diplomacy, you know, we are working with partners that control
    about a third of the country. That is real leverage. We can
    work with the international community to provide humanitarian
    and reconstruction assistance, not us directly, from the
    American taxpayer, but the globe. That is real leverage, and
    simply being back at the diplomatic table means that our
    voices, not just the voices in Moscow and Tehran and Ankara,
    will also be head.
        So there is no easy answer here. If there was, this problem
    would have been solved a long time ago. But we need to keep
    after it.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. Dr. Kahl, let's review some of your recent
    foreign policy judgments. In 2017, when the United States
    recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, you wrote that the
    decision helps Iran and further isolated the United States in
    the Middle East. Since then, the United States has brokered
    landmark Mideast peace deals.
        In 2019, when the State Department issued new guidance
    about Israeli settlements, you wrote that the move would be
    dangerous and destabilizing to the Middle East. But no such
    destabilization happened. Indeed, those peace deals happened.
        In 2018, when President Trump warned Iran against
    restarting its nuclear program, you wrote that war drums are
    already sounding, but no war happened.
        Also in 2018, when the Trump administration left the Iran
    nuclear deal, you said war will be all that is left, but no war
    occurred.
        In 2019, when the Lincoln Strike Group was deployed to the
    Persian Gulf you wrote there is growing evidence we are on the
    path toward war, whether Trump realizes it or not. But again,
    no war came.
        Last year, when the United States killed Iran's terrorist
    mastermind, Qasem Soleimani, you claimed now Trump has started
    a war with Iran and Iraq. But once again, no war followed.
        By contrast, in 2010, as coalition forces withdrew from
    Iraq, you dismissed concerns about the security situation as
    exaggerated, and said it was very unlikely to trigger a
    dramatic uptick in violence.
        So, Dr. Kahl, while you spent the last four years warning
    about impending wars that never happened, when Mideast policy
    was your job at the Pentagon, you failed to perceive the rise
    of ISIS, which launched an actual war involving 30,000 Islamic
    insurgents, conquering a quarter of Iraq.
        Dr. Kahl, it seems to me that your judgments about matters
    of war and peace are almost always wrong.
        Now let's turn to some of your other writings. Could I have
    the first poster board, please?
        In 2019, in response to a story about Syria, you wrote that
    the Republican Party has debased itself at the altar of Trump,
    and now it is the party of ethnic cleansing.
        Next poster board, please.
        You further accused all Republican Senators who supported
    foreign military aid to our partners as owning the world's
    worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen. That is 45 Senators, all
    somehow responsible for mass civilian casualties, inflicted, in
    no small part, by Iran's proxies, I would add.
        Could I have the next board, please?
        Just last summer, you approvingly quoted a wild-eyed claim
    that the Republican Party has a death-cult fealty to President
    Trump.
        Dr. Kahl, this is not about mean tweets or insulting
    Senators. We are all used to harsh criticism up here. But this
    is just a small, a very small sample of the many intemperate
    and unbalanced remarks that you have directed at people who
    disagree with you about public policy. But the job you seek
    demands a judicious, even-tempered demeanor. You will face
    disagreements every day, in the Pentagon, across the Executive
    branch, with Congress, but your long record of volatile
    outbursts will have a toxic and detrimental impact on your
    relationship with Congress.
        What is worse, I fear your intemperate manner will create
    an equally toxic environment inside the Pentagon, stifling
    healthy, robust debate. There is the fact that your rants have
    slandered not just a few politicians up here in Congress but
    the millions of troops and veterans who consider themselves
    Republicans.
        So, Dr. Kahl, how you can responsibly execute the duties of
    this position having so deeply poisoned the well?
        Dr. Kahl. I appreciate your candor, Senator. To state the
    obvious, the last few years have been pretty polarizing on
    social media. I am sure there are times that I got swept up in
    that. There were a number of positions that President Trump
    took that I strongly opposed. I think the language that I used
    in opposing those was sometimes disrespectful, and for that I
    apologize.
        I understand that the position of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, while it is a political appointment, is not
    a political job. It is a policy job, one that requires me to be
    nonpartisan in the halls of the Pentagon and bipartisan working
    with this committee and others in Congress, and I know that I
    can comport myself in that way, because I did it the last time
    I was at the Pentagon, working for Secretary Gates. I did it
    when I was at the Pentagon the first time, in the Bush
    administration. I have a long track record of being able to put
    politics aside in public office and put the national interests
    first.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Dr. Kahl. I am glad that you
    recognized that you were swept away in the moment. I would just
    say that some of these tweets happened in the middle of the
    night, when presumably you were sitting at home reading the
    news. The real tense moments are going to happen when you are
    in the Pentagon and Iran hijacks another American ship, or
    China shoots down an aircraft. If this is the way you respond
    to mere policy disagreements when you are sitting at home
    reading the news, I do not think that you are fit to sit in the
    Pentagon and make decisions about life and death. That is one
    reason why I will oppose your nomination.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Now let me
    recognize Senator Gillibrand via WebEx.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kahl,
    Israel remains one of closest allies in the Middle East. What
    is your view on the importance of the United States-Israel
    relationship, and if confirmed, what policies will you develop
    to maintain the ties between the military and civil societies
    with the United States and Israel?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I think that the United
    States-Israel security relationship must remain iron-clad, and
    it serves the vital national interests of both countries. When
    I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle
    East from 2009 to 2011, I traveled to Israel 13 times in 3
    years. I had more than 100 meetings with senior Israeli
    Ministry of Defense and Israeli defense forces officials. I
    think that my colleagues in Israel would speak highly of those
    encounters.
        As Michele Flournoy noted, in the summer of 2009 I was the
    Pentagon official that shook loose the Iron Dome proposal,
    which had been languishing for years, and got the ball rolling
    so that we, working with Congress, could get that money to
    support that vital defense system.
        When I was at the White House, I supported the 10-year, $38
    billion memorandum of understanding with Israel so that we
    could continue to enhance our security relationship.
        If I am confirmed, Senator, I will do what I did before,
    which is to make sure that we are working as closely as
    possible with our Israeli allies, because we have so many
    interests in common.
        Senator Gillibrand. Recent and ongoing regional aggression
    by Iran and the Middle East continue to keep concerns raised
    regarding Israel. What are your thoughts on supporting
    continued United States funding for those programs such as our
    missile defense program, Iron Dome, David's Sling and Arrow,
    and what steps should the Department be taking to address
    Iran's regional aggression? What policy developments would you
    suggest in response to recent rocket attacks on United States
    and coalition forces in Iraq?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I am clear-eyed about the
    threat that Iran poses, not just to our forces in the region
    but to our allies and partners in the region, Israel first and
    foremost. Israel obviously faces direct threats to its
    territory from Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon,
    and from the infrastructure that Iran has been building in
    Syria. I think both the United States and Israel have the right
    to defend themselves. I am supportive of the strikes that
    Israel has taken to defend itself in places like Syria. I also
    support our efforts to defend our forces when they are attacked
    or threatened by Iranian proxies.
        I also think that the United States-Israel defense
    relationship has so many benefits because Israel remains at the
    cutting edge in developing things like Iron Dome and David's
    Sling and the arrow system in missile defense, and that there
    is a two-way street that our defense and technological
    cooperation with Israel not only benefits Israel's security but
    benefits our security. So, if confirmed, I would look forward
    to continue advancing that relationship.
        Senator Gillibrand. With regard to cybersecurity issue, I
    am sure you are aware of the SolarWinds intrusion, and that
    infiltration affected many parts of the United States
    Government, including the Pentagon, without anyone's knowledge
    for months, putting the military, the government, and private
    companies at incalculable risks.
        What policy advice will you be putting forward within the
    DOD to help stop future intrusions? What DOD cyber policies
    towards Russia will you put forward? It is our understanding
    that China piggybacked on the SolarWinds intrusion to
    infiltrate the same systems and steal information. What DOD
    policies will you put forward towards Russia and China, to
    prevent and avert such cyber intrusions in the future?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, Senator. Of course, I am not privy to the
    classified information on SolarWinds. I am aware of the open
    source information on it. My understanding is that DOD
    unclassified systems, some of them were exposed but none were
    compromised. But obviously the extent of the SolarWinds
    intrusion is deeply troubling, and I think it is a reminder of
    just how large the attack surface for cyberattacks is. I fear
    that that attack surface has grown substantially over the last
    year, as so many of our activities have moved online as a
    consequence of the pandemic. So this is an issue of foremost
    importance, not just for the Department but across the U.S.
    Government.
        I tend to align myself with the views of the Cyber Solarium
    Commission report, and I know a number of members on this
    committee have been quite involved in that, in the sense that
    there is no silver bullet on the cyber threat. We need a mix of
    deterrents by punishment, that is, the ability to retaliate in
    cyberspace and other domains against those who attack us. We
    have to be able to defend our networks.
        Almost as important, we have to be able to quickly rebuild
    our networks so that that resilience itself is a deterrent
    against actors who think they gain by taking those networks
    down. We have to work with allies and like-minded states on
    norms and rules of the road around cyberspace so that malign
    actors pay real costs internationally, multilaterally, when
    they engage in harmful activities.
        So, if confirmed, I would look forward to advancing DOD
    efforts in all these areas and working with the interagency on
    a whole-of-government approach.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and just for
    the record I am going to submit a question, since my time has
    expired, about the cyber workforce and what role you can play
    to ensuring that we recruit the highest standard of cyber
    personnel for DOD.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me
    recognize Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Dr.
    Kahl. Dr. Kahl, as you are well aware, the administration is
    considering resuming negotiations with Iran over its nuclear
    program, and while the Department of State would lead those
    efforts the Department of Defense must take into account the
    impact that these negotiations, and any agreement, would have
    on the military balance in the Middle East.
        In your answer to the chairman on the discussion on the
    Iran situation you said it is essential prevent Iran from
    obtaining a nuclear weapon. If that is true, why, in 2015, did
    the Iran deal repeal restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile
    program in a series of ways? First, the U.N. Security Council
    resolution endorsing the JCPOA repealed previous U.N. Security
    Council resolutions prohibiting Iran from ballistic missile
    testing. Then, within the JCPOA itself, restrictions on selling
    Iran missile technology disappeared after eight years.
        Do you have a response to that?
        Dr. Kahl. I do. Senator, I share your view. Iran should
    never be allowed to get a nuclear weapon. When I worked at the
    Pentagon as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense I spent
    countless hours overseeing our military contingency planning to
    hold Iran's nuclear facilities at risk in the event that they
    move towards a nuclear weapon. I also was instrumental in
    helping move additional forces into the theater so that when
    President Obama said all options are the table, the table was
    actually set. So I am clear-eyed about this challenge.
        I do believe, based on my experience, that the most
    enduring solution is a diplomatic one, and I support the Biden
    administration's compliance-for-compliance approach, which is
    that if Iran moves in full compliance with its obligations that
    the United States would reenter the agreement, but as a first
    step towards a stronger and longer agreement in addressing the
    ballistic missile issue and other destabilizing activities that
    Iran is engaged in, because it is very important.
        Senator Fischer. We all know that ballistic missiles
    deliver nuclear warheads. Earlier you said that the nuclear
    program for Iran should be in a box. Are you going to push and
    insist that ballistic missiles research and the ability for
    Iran to obtain ballistic missiles, that is going to be off the
    table in the future in any discussion with Iran?
        Dr. Kahl. No, I do not think so, Senator. I think the goal
    would be to, on a compliance----
        Senator Fischer. Aren't you contradicting yourself when you
    say a nuclear program should be in a box for Iran, but yet you
    are going to allow them to obtain a delivery system? A
    ballistic missile is a delivery system of a nuclear warhead.
        Dr. Kahl. Sorry, Senator. I think you were misunderstanding
    me. I am not supporting Iran's ballistic missile program. I am
    saying that putting Iran's program in a box, in a compliance-
    for-compliance framework, is a vehicle to address Iran's
    ballistic missile program, and I think we should do that.
        Senator Fischer. You know, many of us were surprised when
    the sunsets for these restrictions were included in the deal. A
    week before the deal was struck, then Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of staff, General Dempsey, testified before this
    committee that, quote, ``Under no circumstances should we
    relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile
    capabilities and arms trafficking,'' end quote. So you agree
    with General Dempsey's view?
        Dr. Kahl. I do not believe we should lift sanctions on
    Iran's ballistic missile program. I think we should try to get
    their ballistic missile capabilities reduced through diplomacy,
    and, if confirmed, I will work with the interagency to make
    sure we have a clear-eyed approach which addresses this issue.
        Senator Fischer. In your answers to this committee's
    advance policy questions regarding a no-first-use policy you
    stated, ``I believe the United States should periodically
    examine its nuclear declaratory policy to ensure it is suitable
    for the current and foreseeable security environment and
    supports U.S. strategic objectives. Our declaratory policy
    should support our strategic deterrents and be credible in the
    eyes of both adversaries and allies. As such, I would expect to
    consult closely with allies in the course of reexamining our
    nuclear policy.''
        You know, I do not disagree with on any of that, but it
    does not help us understand what your views are. At this
    moment, is it your personal view that we should adopt a no-
    first-use policy?
        Dr. Kahl. It is not.
        Senator Fischer. That surprises me, because it has been the
    consistent advice that we have received as members of this
    committee, from senior military leadership, that we not adopt
    such a policy. Three members of President Obama's Cabinet--
    Secretary Carter, Secretary Kerry, and Secretary Moniz, also
    reportedly opposed adopting a no-first-use policy. That was in
    2016. More recently, an independent assessment performed by the
    Institute for Defense Analysis concluded that, quote, ``The
    U.S. adoption of a no-first-use policy will not bring about a
    setting that is more conducive to positive behavior by
    adversaries or to strengthen relations with allies. In light of
    already constrained U.S. policy and procedure governing nuclear
    use, the weight of the evidence indicates significant potential
    for no-first-use to impart more harm than good,'' end quote.
        Dr. Kahl. Senator, just to clarify, we are in agreement. I
    said I am not personally in support of a no-first-use policy.
        Senator Fischer. Oh. I am glad you clarified that, sir.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let me recognize
    Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    your public service, Dr. Kahl, and thanks for the conversation
    we had yesterday. I would like to pursue a couple of the topics
    that we covered.
        Would you agree with me that climate change is a national
    security threat?
        Dr. Kahl. It is.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you also agree that we need a new
    vision and new policies to address this threat, around the
    world as well as within the Pentagon?
        Dr. Kahl. We do, and if you will give me a moment to
    expound on that as it relates to the Pentagon. Climate change
    is going to change everything. It will change the operational
    environment for the military in strategically vital areas like
    the Arctic. It will create new contingencies for humanitarian
    emergencies and violent conflict that the Department may be
    called upon to respond to. Extreme weather is already costing
    billions of dollars here at home, to our DOD infrastructure,
    and that will increase in the years ahead, at home and abroad.
    Of course, there are real questions about energy resilience,
    especially in the context of great power competition.
        So for all those reasons I think climate has to be
    integrated into our defense strategy.
        Senator Blumenthal. Better than it is now, and I look
    forward to pursuing all of those areas with you in greater
    detail, because I think it is so vitally important, never has
    been more important, so thank you.
        Would you agree with me that white supremacy and far right
    extremism, lack of sufficient inclusiveness all our continuing
    threats to our national security and readiness?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, I think the recent statements by the FBI
    [Federal Bureau of Investigation] made clear that the various
    threads of domestic terrorism, which are often aligned with
    those view, are a growing threat to the country.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you also agree that military
    sexual assault needs to be combatted more vigorously and
    thoroughly within the military?
        Dr. Kahl. There is no question. All the trend lines on this
    issue are in the wrong direction. I know that the Department
    has tried to address this issue in the past, but whatever it
    has done clearly has not worked, and so I stand firmly behind
    Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks. I know they have a
    new commission looking at this. I know this is an issue that
    the committee is passionate about, and for good reason because
    it is a scourge. If confirmed, I would look forward to working
    with you and with others on this committee as we try to get a
    good answer to this terrible problem.
        Senator Blumenthal. These two topics are very much of
    concern to many of us on this committee, and I welcome your
    willingness to work with us on it.
        I would like to pursue some of our arms sales policies and
    focus first on Saudi Arabia. You and I discussed this issue
    yesterday. My own view is that we need to reset our
    relationship with Saudi Arabia and recalibrate our sales, in
    fact, cut significantly some of our arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
    Can you suggest specifics in that regard, and maybe the
    threshold question is, do you agree that we ought to
    recalibrate and reset that relationship?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, very much. I support President Biden's
    effort to recalibrate the relationship to make sure that it is
    more fully aligned with our interests and with our values. A
    dimension of that, of course, is our arms sales to Saudi Arabia
    and other countries. My understanding is that the
    administration is in the midst of a strategic review, of which
    this is a component, and so if I was confirmed, I would look
    forward to engaging in that review, and as I get more deeply
    briefed on the matter I would gladly come back and speak to you
    and others about it.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Do you think that we ought
    to be similarly reviewing, with close scrutiny, our arms sales
    to other countries, some of them having autocratic regimes and
    some similarly anti-humanitarian policies?
        Dr. Kahl. I do. I think our arms sales need to be aligned
    not just with our national interests but with our values.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you think that there is an urgency
    about this review?
        Dr. Kahl. I hope there is. From everything I know from the
    outside there is, and you have my personal commitment that if I
    am confirmed I will treat the issue urgently, because it is
    important to me.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Let me
    recognize Senator Rounds via WebEx.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kahl, thank
    you for our recent call and the chance to get some of your
    views on defense policy and to discuss some of the criticisms
    that you have already received here today. You were very
    critical of a great number of the Trump administration's
    policies. I want to let you know that there is a lot of concern
    among the minority with some of the statements that have been
    attributed to you. Your tweets have been tough, and in many
    cases, incendiary, something for which many members had issues
    with the previous administration's nominee for this very same
    position.
        I would like to focus on some other issues specifically
    with regard to policy, and I would like to begin--look, I
    believe that a credible, modernized nuclear triad is the better
    outcome on which the nation's defense rests. I believe that the
    ground-based strategic deterrent is critical to maintaining the
    triad.
        Could you please tell the committee where you stand on the
    importance of maintaining the triad into the future, to provide
    a credible nuclear deterrent both for our own defense and for
    the defense of our allies? Also, if you are confirmed, do we
    have your commitment that you would support full funding for
    the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent]? I just add that it
    is not real helpful for one to say that they will study the
    issue, as we have heard from some others. This is one of the
    main defense program issues that we face right now, and it
    would seem reasonable that you would have a position on it
    during a confirmation hearing.
        Dr. Kahl. Well, thank you, Senator, and I too enjoyed our
    conversation. Look, there is nothing more important to our
    national survival than ensuring that we have a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent. I think our modernization
    efforts are essential in that area, not only as it relates to
    the three legs of the triad but to nuclear command and control
    systems.
        I agree with you that the triad has been a bedrock of
    deterrence and stability for many decades, and I think that the
    triad remains--my personal position is that the triad remains a
    critical hedge against the possibility of technological
    modernization by our adversaries could call into question the
    survivability of any one leg of the triad.
        So undoubtedly there will be areas that I am not currently
    privy to, because I do not have access to classified
    information, so I look forward to being more deeply briefed on
    those issues, but that is my position.
        Senator Rounds. So I am just going to clarify this. Today
    your position is you fully support the triad, including the
    GBSD, and you would commit today that at this time you are in
    support of fully funding its modernization.
        Dr. Kahl. My position is that all three legs of the triad
    need to remain viable. What that requires is something that
    will require me to dig into the details of the current
    modernization efforts. I have not been in the government in
    four years. My information is four years out of date. But I
    support modernization efforts to keep the triad viable.
        Senator Rounds. You would see it as a triad and not only
    two of the three but all three.
        Dr. Kahl. Correct.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. As you know, the budget topline
    for the Department of Defense is one of the major issues facing
    our committee. What is your position on it, and what do you
    base the position on?
        Dr. Kahl. My personal position is that we should not start
    with a budget number in mind and work backwards to strategy. We
    should do it the other way around, and, if confirmed, one of my
    principal jobs, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, would
    be to get the strategy right so that we can discern from that
    the policies and capabilities and investments that are
    required, and then the budget flows from that.
        So you have my commitment that if I am confirmed that the
    budget recommendations I make will be matched to the strategy
    that we put forward.
        Senator Rounds. The DOD cyber strategy, published in
    December of 2018, charges the DOD to defend forward, shape the
    day-to-day competition, and prepare for war. United States
    Cyber Command has demonstrated successful instances of defend
    forward, and doing it in securing the 2018 and the 2020
    elections.
        In your role as Under Secretary of Policy, if confirmed,
    you would oversee the development of cyber policy. What are
    your views on the defend forward, shape the day-to-day
    competition, and prepare for war concepts to deter and disrupt
    Russia and China in cyberspace?
        Dr. Kahl. Senator, I support the defend-forward position
    and I agree with you that it generated very impressive results,
    at least as far as I can tell from open source information, in
    the 2018 and 2020 election cycles. I think it needs to be part
    of a layered approach, as I mentioned earlier, that also
    includes better defense of our networks, better resilience, and
    also more concerned diplomacy alongside our allies and partners
    to shape the rules of the road around cyber so that malign
    actors pay a heavier price for their activities.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time
    has expired.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Let me recognize
    Senator Hirono via WebEx.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I note that this
    nominee has been criticized regarding some tweets that he put
    out on the Iran deal, which I consider to be one of the most
    critical agreements that this country has entered into. That
    kind of criticism regarding tweets from folks who did not say
    anything about the kind of lying, racist tweets out of the
    former President I think is pretty rich.
        I would like to say, regarding the Iran deal, it placed
    significant and verifiable constraints on Iran's ability to
    build nuclear weapons. That was the intent of the Iran deal,
    because Iran was maybe one or two months from having developed
    a nuclear weapon. So that was a very critical agreement that we
    got into, and former President Trump's reckless decision to
    unilaterally--unilaterally--withdraw from the Iran deal has
    made the world less safe. Instead of isolating Iran, the
    decision isolated the United States, and now Iran has begun
    ramping up uranium enrichment efforts, which is exactly what
    Dr. Kahl said would happen.
        The criticism of Dr. Kahl's alleged tepid support of Israel
    is unfounded. In 2009, he worked to approve United States
    support for Israel's Iron Dome rocket defense system to protect
    itself from incoming attacks. So with regard to the Middle
    East, I think the criticisms of Dr. Kahl are very much
    misplaced.
        I want to ask you, Dr. Kahl, the following two questions
    that I ask of every nominee who appears before any of the
    committees on which I sit.
        The first question is, since you became a legal adult, have
    you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed
    any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Dr. Kahl. No.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        Dr. Kahl. No.
        Senator Hirono. Dr. Kahl, I applaud Secretary Austin's
    recent announcement that the Pentagon will prioritize climate
    change considerations in its activities, risk assessments, and
    the next National Defense Strategy, and also the recognition in
    your opening statement that climate change represents an
    existential challenge. I have to say that the Department of
    Defense is one of the few departments that has actually,
    through testimony of prior DOD Secretaries and going forward,
    to acknowledge that climate change poses a threat to the world,
    not just to our country. So it is an existential challenge.
        If confirmed, how do you intend to mitigate the risk of
    climate change across the joint force?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I think that climate change
    is a top national security issue. You know, one of the jobs
    that I would have in front of me if I am confirmed is to revise
    the National Defense Strategy. I think as we do so we need to
    build on the 2018 strategy, which I think is an excellent
    document and I think especially we need to get the China
    challenge right.
        But there are some things that were not in the 2018
    document that we need to include, and climate change is one of
    them. So I would see a principal role of mine is to make sure
    that climate change is integrated into the National Defense
    Strategy, and then there will be policies and investments that
    flow from that. As I said to Senator Blumenthal, that means
    that the strategy has to account for the effect that climate
    change will have on DOD operations, on the contingencies the
    Department could be called upon to respond to, on DOD
    infrastructure, and also energy resilience. So I would make
    sure all those areas are covered.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you very much for that kind of
    commitment. I want to turn briefly to the Indo-Pacific AOR. In
    fiscal year 2021, NDAA included $2.2 billion for the Pacific
    Deterrence Initiative, PDI, to bolster our alliances in the
    Indo-Pacific and counter increasingly malign Chinese activities
    in the region. The United States Indo-Pacific Command
    (INDOPACOM) commander, Admiral Davidson, just submitted a
    report asking for an additional $4.7 billion in fiscal year
    2022 for the PDI to continue momentum in this area.
        I would ask that you continue to build on the PDI and
    engage with our allies in the region, especially the freely
    associated states, FAS, like Palau, Micronesia, and the
    Marshall Islands. I hope you will continue that kind of
    engagement and support.
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, Senator. I strongly commit to you and others
    on the committee for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. There
    is a lot of bipartisan support for supporting our allies and
    partners in the region, and you have my commitment to act in
    that regard, if I am confirmed.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I look forward to working with
    you, especially in those areas.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me introduce
    and recognize Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, very much.
        Dr. Kahl, I have a few questions for you today regarding
    some of your previous positions and statements that have caught
    my attention leading up to today's hearings, and you have heard
    from some of my colleagues that had similar concerns.
        Dr. Kahl, you are nominated to an important position, and
    that position is Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. While
    everyone's world outlook and views on national security matter
    when it comes to the Department of Defense, your core beliefs
    and internal working philosophy are central to the position
    that you are seeking, and to be blunt, Dr. Kahl, your social
    media and other commentary over recent years--years, not just a
    handful of months but years--provides a concerning outlook to
    me. This is especially true when it comes to Iran.
        In one tweet you pushed the idea that pushing for more
    inspections of Iran's nuclear sites is just an effort to
    destroy the Iran deal. You further pushed that the Trump
    administration's Iran strategy as efforts to, quote, ``justify
    war,'' end quote, and to, quote, ``bait Iran into restarting
    its nuclear program.''
        So, Mr. Kahl, do you stand by your assessment that the
    Trump administration was baiting Iran into restarting its
    nuclear program?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. My concern with the maximum
    pressure campaign was largely that it would have two
    consequences. One is that it would encourage Iran to re-
    accelerate its nuclear program, and two, that it would
    encourage Iran to try to generate counter-leverage by
    increasing their provocations in the region. Both of those
    things have happened in the last three years. Iran is a lot
    closer to the fissile material required for a nuclear weapon
    than they were at the end of the Obama administration, and we
    see more attacks against our forces in Iraq. We have seen
    attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. We have seen more drone
    attacks and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia.
        So I am clear-eyed about the threat that Iran poses, but it
    was not clear to me that the Trump administration's approach
    was having the effect that President Trump and Secretary Pompeo
    and others were hoping for.
        Senator Ernst. I would counter, as well, that the JCPOA, I
    do not believe, stopped any further development of Iran as it
    made its way to nuclear capabilities.
        Mr. Kahl, do you still stand by your assessment that the
    $100 billion released to Iran for the Iranian deal was being
    used for domestic investment? I think at that time you had said
    that, quote, ``Most of it will go to butter,'' end quote.
        Dr. Kahl. So I am not privy to the classified assessments
    on this. All I know is that the DIA testified in 2017 that the
    majority of the sanctions relief from the JCPOA went to
    domestic purposes. You may be privy to information that
    contradicts that. I am not. I do know that unfortunately, as we
    have re-imposed sanctions as a part of the maximum pressure
    campaign, it has not had the effect of drying up Iranian
    resources for its support for its missile program, its
    conventional weaponry, its support for terrorism.
        So I think we need to do both. I think we need to address
    the nuclear program and address these other destabilizing
    activities.
        Senator Ernst. Well, $100 billion is a lot for butter. Do
    you believe it to be plausible that some of that $100 billion
    could have gone to Iran's proxy terrorist forces that perhaps
    targeted some of our allies as well as American forces?
        Dr. Kahl. It is completely conceivable. I will say that,
    you know, the Trump administration, in 2018, I believe,
    released an estimate that between 2012 and 2018, Iran spent
    about $2 to $3 billion a year supporting its proxies around the
    Middle East. The sad reality is it is just not very expensive
    for them to do it, and so it is a huge problem for us, but one
    that unfortunately does not require a lot of resources for Iran
    to carry out.
        Senator Ernst. Mm-hmm, which is true. That is very true
    that it is very unfortunate.
        So, admittedly, you and I do come from starkly different
    places on Iran. I think the Obama policy on Iran was a naive
    approach and the Iran deal was a failed policy that made us
    more vulnerable, and in recent years I do think those concerns
    have been proven to be legitimate. For more than four decades,
    Iran and the terrorist organizations' funds have targeted
    American civilians and military personnel as well as our
    partners and allies, and we know that they will continue to be
    a prominent state sponsor of terrorism, not just across the
    Middle East but cultivating different operating networks around
    our globe.
        I know my time has expired. I will just make one final
    comment. We have mentioned the tweets. A number of my
    colleagues have. There is one that will demonstrate my thoughts
    today, where you tweeted that if Bolton replaces McMaster we
    are all going to die. I think that this demonstrates that these
    exaggerated views and incendiary remarks are not what we are
    looking for in someone that will serve advising policy within
    the Department of Defense.
        I served in uniform in the Middle East. I have a daughter
    that is on track to serve in our great Army in just a little
    over a year, and I will not be supporting your nomination
    because I believe that my daughter, her colleagues, the other
    young men and women that are choosing to serve in our armed
    forces deserve someone that will take a serious outlook to
    policy and not put this kind of garbage out in front of the
    American public.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Dr. Kahl, thank you for being here today. I
    think your nomination is sort of a proxy for a sharp difference
    of opinion in this committee and in Congress about the wisdom
    of the JCPOA, and that is the core of many of the questions
    today. I believe the JCPOA, although not perfect, was
    dramatically better than the status quo ante. Democrats
    supported it. Republicans did not. But I believe it was
    dramatically better than the status quo ante, and it is not
    just me.
        President Trump's Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, who
    clearly understood Republican legislative opposition to the
    JCPOA, advised him to stay in the deal. President Trump's
    Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, who clearly understood
    Republican legislative opposition to the JCPOA, advised him to
    stay in the deal. Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
    Dunford, who clearly understood Republican opposition to the
    deal, told President Trump to stay in the deal. Instead, he
    backed out of the deal and he shifted the world's attention
    from Iran's behavior to America's good faith, would American
    good faith follow a diplomatic deal. So just some basic facts
    about the deal.
        Didn't the first sentence in the first paragraph of the
    JCPOA say that Iran reaffirms that it will never purchase,
    develop, or acquire nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, it does.
        Senator Kaine. Did that have a sunset provision to it?
        Dr. Kahl. No.
        Senator Kaine. If Iran had ever sought to purchase,
    acquire, or develop a nuclear weapon that would have been a
    violation of the JCPOA. Correct?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes.
        Senator Kaine. That violation would have given the United
    States a legal rationale, if the United States decided it
    needed to take military action to stop Iran's nuclear program.
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, and as I said, I spent my time at the
    Pentagon planning for exactly that contingency.
        Senator Kaine. So the U.S. decision to back out of this
    deal actually takes that iron-clad commitment that the U.S.
    could have used as a legal rationale, should it have been
    necessary, and it now makes that commitment, that provision of
    questionable enforceability, doesn't it?
        Dr. Kahl. I worry that it does, yeah.
        Senator Kaine. The JCPOA gave the United States the
    complete agreement to impose any sanctions we deemed
    appropriate against Iran for human rights violations, bellicose
    activities in the region, ballistic missile programs. We had
    the complete freedom to impose sanctions on any non-nuclear
    activity under the deal, didn't we?
        Dr. Kahl. We do.
        Senator Kaine. The only sanctions relief in the JCPOA was
    sanctions relief that was specifically about Iran's nuclear
    program. Correct?
        Dr. Kahl. Correct.
        Senator Kaine. That sanction relief would only go to Iran
    if they followed the JCPOA. Correct?
        Dr. Kahl. Correct.
        Senator Kaine. There was an additional element--some of my
    colleagues have asked about sunsets--there was an additional
    element of the JCPOA that did not sunset, like the open
    commitment to never purchase, acquire, or develop nuclear
    weapons. The element that did not sunset was there was about 30
    years of enhance inspection and other requirements that Iran
    had to follow, but at the end of year 30, those enhanced
    inspections, many of them, or restrictions on centrifuges,
    progressively expired. By year 30, Iran had pledged,
    henceforth, it would always follow all IAEA inspection
    protocols, including the additional protocol that was developed
    after North Korea cheated on IAEA inspections. That was
    permanent and never sunset. Correct?
        Dr. Kahl. It was the most verifiable arms control or
    nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated.
        Senator Kaine. Those inspections, including the additional
    protocol, gave the United States significant additional insight
    into the Iranian program so that if we ever believed they were
    violating the promise contained in the first sentence, and that
    then justified military action, we would have better intel to
    target the military action to achieve our objective. Correct?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. Our intelligence and military professionals
    consistently made that point.
        Senator Kaine. We have had intel about Iran for a while but
    it has been murky, but what the JCPOA gave us was intel plus
    this enhanced inspection regime to determine their compliance
    but also, if necessary, tragically, to target military activity
    to make sure that they would never purchase, acquire, or
    develop nuclear weapons. Correct?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. If you do not know where something is, it is
    hard to target it.
        Senator Kaine. I really believe that the controversy over
    your nomination is essentially a proxy war. Republicans did not
    like the Iran deal. They were really happy that President Trump
    pulled out of it, over the objections of Secretary Mattis,
    Secretary Tillerson, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dunford.
    I think the activities in the region have demonstrated that the
    pulling out of that deal has had very, very negative
    consequences, and we are living them today. It is a very
    different reality than it was in 2015.
        But I would like to return to a position where we would
    have a clearly enforceable international agreement that Iran
    would never seek to purchase, acquire, or develop a nuclear
    weapon, and I cannot understand why an American President would
    have blown up such a deal.
        Thank you, Dr. Kahl.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. Let me
    recognize Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. Kahl,
    congratulations on your nomination being put forward. I had not
    thought about talking about the JCPOA, but I really do not
    think the discussion we are having here today relates to
    legitimate policy differences on JCPOA. I think it is a series
    of fact patterns and your communications that are reminiscent
    of a Trump nominee who ultimately withdrew because of concerns
    expressed by some of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle
    about temperament and positions that that person took before
    they were set forth as a nomination.
        So, Dr. Kahl, I have been on this committee going into my
    seventh year. I have confirmed the vast majority of nominations
    that have come through, first in the Obama administration,
    Trump administration, and I hope we are going to get to the
    same place there. But you are going to be in a very important
    position, and I feel like that this committee really has a
    history of working on a bipartisan basis. That is why we are
    successful with an NDAA every year that I have been here, and I
    have some concerns that your nomination may not put us in that
    same posture of working with you.
        I have a couple of questions, and I hope you have time to
    go a couple of policy questions. But you appear to have a
    history of making what some believe are bad-faith arguments
    against those with whom you disagree. Why should we believe, if
    you are confirmed, that you are going to listen to members with
    opposing viewpoints, including members of this committee and
    Members of Congress? Why should we believe that we can have
    that working relationship and have an honest disagreement and a
    productive relationship?
        Dr. Kahl. So I appreciate that question. I think you can
    have confidence because the last time I was a senior defense
    official that is how I comported myself. Keep in mind I worked
    for two Republican Secretaries of Defense. I do not think you
    will find anybody I worked with, either in the Bush
    administration or in the Obama administration, when I worked
    for Secretary Gates, who would accuse me of being partisan in
    the halls of the Pentagon. I think I had good relationships
    with the House and Senate committees when I was in office.
        So I believe strongly in public service and I believe that
    the job that I am being considered for is a non-political job.
    It is a policy job, and I am committed to moving forward on
    that basis.
        Senator Tillis. In some of your tweets, I know that Senator
    Cotton and others have covered the landscape, but the one that
    caught my attention was some of the tweets related to
    conspiracy theories involving President Trump and Russia. I
    think in your words you communicated the ``Kushner Kremlin quid
    pro quo and collusion on the DNC hack.'' The Mueller
    investigation did not find anything to substantiate that.
        So, in retrospect, do you feel like you may have misled
    some of your followers in context to these uncorroborated
    allegations?
        Dr. Kahl. So I think the tweets that you reference were in
    response to media reports at the time. I mean, as you know,
    Senator, the overwhelming consensus of our intelligence
    community was that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. The
    Mueller report, which you made reference to, as well as the
    bipartisan Senate Intelligence report found that members of the
    Trump campaign were aware of Russian activities, encouraged
    them, and were eager to benefit from them.
        I think people of good faith can disagree as to whether to
    describe that as collusion or not. That is fair. But I hope we
    would all agree that it was not a right.
        Senator Tillis. Let's talk about something else. At the
    time that Soleimani was talking out I think you were critical
    of that decision. Do you still stand by your position that you
    think taking out one of the worst terrorists and murderers of
    American soldiers in the Middle East was a bad idea, and why?
        Dr. Kahl. I have no moral qualms with the strike against
    Qasem Soleimani. He had the blood of hundreds of Americans on
    his hands, and thousands of people across the region. You know,
    I traveled to Iraq 16 times during the thick of the war. I have
    been on the other side of rocket fire. Some of those were
    probably made in Iran, and so I had no problem with that.
        My chief concern at the time, as I am sure you are aware,
    was with the escalatory dimensions, which is why, of course,
    the Bush administration had also not taken a shot. It was not
    just the Obama administration. We came very close. As you know,
    the Iranians retaliated for the strike with a missile salvo
    against Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq. Fortunately, no
    servicemembers were killed but dozens suffered brain injuries,
    and so we came very close to a major shooting war with Iran,
    and that was my concern.
        Senator Tillis. I apologize that I did not get to some
    policy questions. I will probably submit a couple for the
    record. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Let me now
    recognize Senator King.
        Senator King. First, with regard to your tweets, my mother,
    when I first started dating in high school, gave a piece of
    advice that may have helped you. She said, ``Never put it in
    writing.''
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Kahl. It is a good point.
        Senator King. I want to ask a question that we could take
    an hour or two hours or several days discussing, and I would
    like you to try to give me an answer in about a minute and
    half. What does China want? As we try to develop policy with
    regard to China, I think it is important to understand and
    appreciate what it is they are seeking, what are their goals. I
    asked Henry Kissinger that question and he gave me a very
    thorough answer. Give me a minute of thought of what you think
    the goals of China are which should inform our foreign and
    military policy.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I would think about it in the
    following ways. I mean, obviously, China, under Xi Jinping,
    first and foremost is trying to promote domestic stability and
    regime survival at home. But I think as China's interests
    around the world have become more expansive they want to make
    the world safe for the CCP, and that means shaping the
    international order in a way that is not just compatible with
    China's interests but with the values of the communist party.
    That makes China a much more revisionist actor, and one,
    frankly, at odds with our value system, and our interests, in
    many respects.
        I also think the Xi Jinping envisions China becoming the
    world's preeminent power. I know that the DOD China Power
    Report notes China's ambition to be the world's greatest
    military power by midcentury. So I think for a long time China
    was biding its time, but in the Xi Jinping era has really tried
    to come out on its on in ways that are much more assertive and
    threatening to our interests.
        Senator King. Thank you. You mentioned earlier cyber and
    you mentioned the Solarium Commission. I appreciate that. Many
    of us did a lot of work in that area. One of the points of
    emphasis in our report was the importance of deterrence, the
    importance of imposing costs on our adversaries, on those who
    would intrude in terms of cyber in our country, and also the
    importance of allies.
        Talk to me about deterrence and allies and how those two
    interact.
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, sir. Thank you for your work on the Cyber
    Solarium Commission. I know a lot of its recommendations have
    already been put forward in legislation and I imagine more to
    follow.
        I think we can think of deterrence in two ways. There is
    deterrence by punishment, that is, if an adversary takes an act
    against you, they will know that you will strike back in a way
    that will hurt, so that they will think twice about doing it to
    begin with. So we have to have the cyber equivalent of that.
    That includes action in cyberspace but also elsewhere,
    sanctions, diplomatic isolation, things like that.
        But deterrence can also be deterrence by denial, that is,
    adjusting the cost benefit calculation of the adversary so that
    they just do not think it is worth it. That is a mix, I think,
    of a combination of defense of our networks and resilience of
    those networks, because, frankly, some attacks are always going
    to get through and so you need to be able to reconstitute your
    systems quickly, especially in the military domain where
    seconds matter.
        Senator King. Let me move to the allies piece. My sense is
    that sanctions are much more effective if they are multilateral
    rather than unilateral, number one, and number two, there is
    some utility in trying to develop an international set of norms
    and expectations and guardrails around cyber in order to
    indicate what the rules of the road are. We want an adversary
    who uses cyber as a means of national power to understand that
    they can become a pariah nation.
        Dr. Kahl. I 100 percent agree on both scores, that
    multilateralism gives us more leverage, more power when it
    comes to sanctions, but also in shaping the normative rules of
    the road, that can signal to malign actors they will pay an
    international price for their behavior.
        Final question, in a few seconds left, climate change is
    often discussed in terms of domestic politics and
    environmentalism and protecting the planet. I view it as a
    serious national security threat, in terms of effect on our
    operations. But also, to me, the long-range challenge is
    migration and the stimulation of mass migration because of
    climate change, particularly in the equatorial band. Do you
    agree that this is a serious national security threat as well
    as an environmental threat?
        Dr. Kahl. There is no question it is a national security
    threat for all of the reasons you mentioned. Changing weather
    patterns and rising seas are going to displace hundreds of
    millions of people. You are also likely to see other
    humanitarian and food crises that drive displacement issues. We
    have already seen, just our hemisphere, the displacement by
    recent hurricanes in places like the Northern Triangle and
    Central America. So this problem is not going to go away and it
    is going to continue to get worse.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you for your thoughtful
    testimony this morning.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me recognize
    Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
    hearing. Thank you, Dr. Kahl, and thank you for our discussion
    a couple of weeks ago. I enjoyed it very much, and I look
    forward to more of them.
        I was not going to bring up any of the political issues
    until you responded to Senator Tillis. I just have to address
    the Russian collusion question. I think he asked a pretty
    straightforward question, after Russian collusion has been
    deemed to be basically a lie by the Mueller report and the
    bipartisan Senate committee report. I think you started out
    your response to his question about your tweets pretty good,
    pretty well. You said that they were a reflection of media
    reports at the time. I just wish you would have continued to
    say now that the media have been proven to be liars, I no
    longer believe that, rather than trying to rationalize it by
    changing the definition of collusion.
        But I want to get into some policy things so I am not going
    to spend a lot of time there. You can respond later. But I do
    want to piggyback a little bit on what Senator Rounds was
    asking you, and you and I talked about this, about the
    importance of the triad, not a dyad, but the importance of the
    triad, and I appreciate your personal view that the triad is
    important, both in the past and going forward.
        But I want to be real clear. Do you believe that the
    Minuteman-III can continue to be serviced? As you know, these
    are decades-old weapons systems, and can their life be extended
    without some consequence?
        Dr. Kahl. So my knowledge of the life extension programs on
    the Minuteman-III is four years old, so I do not have the
    classified analysis. I have, of course, seen the public
    statements by the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
    commander. I have no reason to question those statements. So
    obviously this will be an issue that I will dig into more if I
    am confirmed, but I have no reason to disbelieve the STRATCOM
    commander.
        Senator Cramer. Well, if you believe the STRATCOM commander
    then that is pretty good advice, I would say, and I will not
    get further into the funding ramp for GBSD, because we really
    are, I think, at the end of the rope and cannot change that
    trajectory much, so I look forward to you digging into that
    more.
        Part of it is because you said something, I think it was in
    your opening statement or maybe in one of the early questions,
    about deterring China means that China cannot believe they can
    win, or something. That is a paraphrase, a paraphrase of lots
    of statements that are similar. I just think that the deterrent
    that the triad provides, and the modernization that includes
    the LRSOs [Long Range Stand Off Weapons], the re-engineering of
    the bombers that we have at Minot, GBSD that we have at Minot
    are all important parts of that.
        You talked a little bit about the Abraham Accords, and I
    would just ask you, in a more specific way, how have the
    Abraham Accords changed the landscape, if you will? It is
    interesting you said four years ago, like four years is a long
    time, except it is a long time. It is amazing what has happened
    in four years. So maybe you could just elaborate on that a
    little bit.
        Dr. Kahl. Yeah. I think the Abraham Accords, I give the
    Trump administration credit for getting the Abraham Accords
    across the goal line. I think it is the culmination of set of
    trends, frankly, that have been in the region for about a
    decade. One is a common assessment of the Iranian threat, which
    has moved Israel closer to many of its Arab neighbors. Two is a
    concern for various extreme forms of Islamism--al Qaeda, ISIS,
    the Muslim Brotherhood. Another factor, I think, is a
    perception that the region needs to rely more on itself, and so
    that has pushed Israel and its neighbors together.
        So I commend the Trump administration for leaning into
    those strategic trends, and the Abraham Accords are something I
    think we should continue to encourage.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you. Now one more thing, because I
    have really--again, I have enjoyed this very much, this
    discussion today, especially in the honestly policy
    disagreements. I really appreciated your answers to Senator
    Shaheen about Nord Stream 2. We know this is a continuation of
    policies by this government, and we have great concern. But it
    had not occurred to me until just a little bit ago how directly
    connected Nord Stream 2 is to not only national security but to
    climate change. I would like you, if you could, to speak just a
    little bit on a good alternative to Russian oil to our European
    allies, and that might be American LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas],
    which is produced and delivered with about a 46 percent lower
    emissions, greenhouse gas emissions. So it both is, as I said,
    a national security benefit as well as a greenhouse gas
    emissions benefit.
        Dr. Kahl. Well, Senator, obviously I am not an
    environmental expert or an expert on LNG. I do think there is a
    good argument that LNG is an important bridge fuel to a more
    carbon-neutral fuel mix, our energy mix, but I would have to
    look into the issue more to give you a better answer.
        Senator Cramer. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cramer, and now
    via WebEx, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
    Dr. Kahl for being here today and for his willingness to serve.
    I appreciated our conversation the other day, especially about
    University of Minnesota.
        But today I want to focus on Iranian aggression a little
    bit. Last year, Senator Toomey and I co-led a bipartisan
    resolution, co-sponsored by 58 Senators, that called on the
    U.N. to extend the arms embargo on Iran. That embargo, which
    limited the flow of sophisticated weapons to Iran and
    restricted Iran's ability to provide its terrorist proxies with
    arms, it expired last October. The practical effect of this is
    that Iran is now free, under international law, to purchase and
    transfer a wide array of weapons.
        So while the United States arms embargo on Iran remains in
    place, we cannot succeed alone. Dr. Kahl, if you are confirmed,
    how will you work to curb the flow of conventional weapons to
    and from Iran?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I think the U.N. vote is an
    example of the challenges we face when we cannot bring the rest
    of the world to our side, and so I think the Biden
    administration's commitment, and my personal commitment, if I
    am confirmed, to rebuild our alliances and partners will go a
    long way in getting the world closer to our views on Iran.
        I do not think there is a silver bullet to address the very
    real threat that Iran's destabilizing activities, to include
    its conventional arms and its arms supply to its proxies in the
    region, but I think there is a mix of activities, consistent
    with international law. We should support interdiction efforts,
    where those are possible. We should be building up the
    capabilities of our regional allies so that they can
    counterbalance and check Iran. We should be helping vulnerable
    countries like Iraq and Lebanon build institutions that are
    more resilient to Iranian influence. Obviously, when Iran takes
    actions against our own forces we should defend ourselves and
    punch back. So I think there is a mix of policies. No one is
    likely to solve this problem.
        Senator Rosen. Building on that, we do need those partners
    to deter Iranian aggression, and we want to stop the transfers
    of conventional arms to terrorist groups like Hamas and
    Hezbollah, and we want to ensure freedom of navigation in that
    region's waterways. So what can we do in that regard?
        Dr. Kahl. Well, in the first instance I think even as we
    right-size our presence in the Middle East we need to remain
    postured to deter Iranian aggression and to work alongside our
    allies and partners on precisely the issues that you mention.
    You know, the specific requirements for that will probably
    require me to be in the Department and get more deeply briefed
    on the issue.
        But this is important to me. I am clear-eyed about the
    threat that Iran poses, and so if I am confirmed I look forward
    to digging into more specifics and working with you, Senator,
    and others on this committee, on this issue, because I think
    there should be bipartisan agreement on the need to push back
    on Iran in this area.
        Senator Rosen. Also considering all the issues in this
    area, this region of the world, if confirmed, how will the
    Department of Defense work to maintain and enhance Israel's QME
    to ensure their security and safety in the region as we talk
    about the many threats against them?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. Well, Senator, this is an issue that is very
    personal to me. When I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for the Middle East I was heavily focused on ensuring
    Israel's QME, even as we were building up the capabilities of
    other actors in the region to counterbalance Iran. As you know,
    there were large arms sales to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia, and
    others, but as we did that, at least when I was at the
    Pentagon, we were always mindful that anything we did had to
    respect our commitment to Israel, to ensure that they remained
    at the cutting edge and achieved a qualitative military edge
    against any combination of states in the region.
        Senator Rosen. Quickly, I want to just address cyberspace.
    DOD, the cyber strategy is outlined as a defend-forward
    approach. So in the wake of SolarWinds, if you are confirmed,
    how do you plan to alter DOD's cyber strategy to reflect the
    current threats and challenges that we see, particularly in
    cyberspace?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you for that. As I mentioned earlier, I
    support the defend forward position. I am obviously not privy
    to classified operations that have happened in the context of
    that approach, but I support the general approach. I think it
    is only part of the equation. We not only have to be able to
    defend forward, we have to be able to engage in offensive
    action in response to malign activity. We have to be better at
    defending our networks. The SolarWinds incident is a reminder
    of the vulnerability across the U.S. Government in that regard.
    Our networks have to be more resilient so they bounce back
    further, and we have to work, as I discussed with Senator King,
    we have to work alongside our allies on new norms and rules of
    the road to really constrain our adversaries.
        So if I am confirmed, I would look to make sure DOD
    strategy in this area, both the National Defense Strategy and
    the cyber strategy, reflects these different principles, and I
    look forward to working closely with United States Cyber
    Command (CYBERCOM) and others on that issue, as well as members
    of this Committee, who I know are deeply committed to
    cybersecurity.
        Senator Rosen. Well, again, my time has expired. Thank you
    for being here. I look forward to working with you as well.
    Thank you.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Now let me
    recognize Senator Blackburn via WebEx.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kahl, thank
    you for joining us and thank you for your time this past week
    to discuss some of these issues.
        There has been discussion about your inflammatory rhetoric
    and the claims that you have made on Twitter. I think you
    realize that this is of concern to many of us on the committee
    because your language is really not representative the way a
    top policy official at the Pentagon should write about policy,
    and whether it is for a domestic or an international audience.
        So this is something that you have put out there,
    regardless of tone. What is interesting to me, as I have gone
    back and read some of your predictions, is how wrong and off-
    base you were on these predictions. You have talked about being
    there in policy and the ability to participate in the
    interagency discussion. So I want to just ask you some yes-and-
    no questions, for the record.
        Do you still believe that sanctions relief to Tehran will
    go toward the domestic investment and not support terrorism?
        Dr. Kahl. I do not know what the current intelligence
    assessments suggest. My previous statements were based on----
        Senator Blackburn. Yes or no?
        Dr. Kahl. I do not know the answer to that, because I do
    not know the current assessment.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Do you still believe that al Qaeda
    is a bigger threat to Washington than Moscow?
        Dr. Kahl. That al Qaeda is a bigger threat to Washington
    than Moscow?
        Senator Blackburn. Yeah, which is something that you had
    tweeted out on April 23, 2012.
        Dr. Kahl. I think that al Qaeda remains a significant
    threat to the United States.
        Senator Blackburn. You claimed several times that Trump
    administration responses to Iranian aggression would lead
    directly to war. Did they?
        Dr. Kahl. I think that they were part of a cycle of
    provocation on both sides. They brought us really close to war
    on at least two occasions.
        Senator Blackburn. You know they did not. You made a
    similar prediction about the likeliness of a ``massive war,''
    using your word, on the Korean peninsula. Did that happen?
        Dr. Kahl. It did not.
        Senator Blackburn. You claimed that the United States
    strike on Soleimani would get the United States, your words,
    ``kicked out of Iraq.'' Did it?
        Dr. Kahl. The Iraqi Parliament voted to get rid of United
    States Forces, but our forces are still there.
        Senator Blackburn. Yes. You claimed that relocation of the
    United States Embassy to Jerusalem, which is a bill I had when
    I was in the House for a few years, bipartisan, by the way,
    would lead to our provocations there. Did that happen?
        Dr. Kahl. I think it worsened relations with the
    Palestinians but it did not worsen relationships with other
    Arab states.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Let me move on. Strategic
    patience. We talked about this. What does that mean to you?
        Dr. Kahl. I think it probably means different things to
    different people. I am not a subscriber of strategic patience.
    I think that the issues that we have talked about in the
    hearing today, and there are many others, are urgent issues
    that need to be tackled immediately----
        Senator Blackburn. Would you say that applies to North
    Korea?
        Dr. Kahl. I think that North Korea----
        Senator Blackburn. To China?
        Dr. Kahl. I am sorry, Senator. There is a little bit of a
    lag in the technology. I believe that the North Korean threat
    is increasing, both its nuclear and its long-range
    intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the United States.
    It is an issue that needs to be addressed urgently. It is also
    an issue that has built up over decades, so it is not likely to
    be solved overnight. But that does not mean that we should sit
    on our hands and not do anything about it.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Let's talk about Pacific
    deterrence. Current top Pentagon leadership has identified
    China as the ``pacing challenge'' for the Department. If
    confirmed, how would you work with the combatant commands to
    balance the long-term vision of policy against the resources
    that the commanders need right now?
        Dr. Kahl. I think China is an example of where we do not
    have the luxury of choosing between doing things now and also
    planning for the long term. We have to do both, because China
    poses a clear and immediate challenge to United States
    interests and allies in the Indo-Pacific, so we have to make
    sure that right now our forces are ready and lethal, that they
    are as distributed and resilient as possible, that we are as
    integrated with our allies and partners as possible, but we
    also need to be making the investments as a nation and as a
    department in the types of capabilities down the line that will
    determine who wins the competition for the 21st century. That
    means artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other
    cutting-edge technologies.
        So this is an area where we have to do both.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. I have a couple of questions that
    I will submit for QFRs. Thank you for your time.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me
    recognize Senator Warren via WebEx.
        Senator Warren. All right. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman, and, Dr. Kahl, it is good to see you again.
    Congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your
    willingness to take on this important and challenging position.
        So I really enjoyed our conversation last week. As you
    know, I have long been concerned about civilians who are harmed
    as a result of our overseas military operations. I have
    introduced two separate comprehensive bills to improve
    transparency and reporting of civilian casualties, as well as
    strengthen how we investigate and address cases when civilians
    are harmed by U.S. or U.S.-led military operations.
        Now you have written persuasively on the need for stronger
    measures to track and learn from civilian casualties in order
    to prevent unnecessary harm in the future. If you are
    confirmed, will you commit to finding ways to bolster DOD's
    response to civilian casualties, for example, by dedicating
    resources to investigate, address, and understand patterns of
    civilian harm?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, Senator, I am strongly committed on this
    issue. We need to be more transparent. The reporting needs to
    be better. There have to be the right investigations and steps
    in place to address civilian harm, however inadvertent, when
    our military is engaged in operations. So I know there is a DOD
    instruction that is being written as we speak. If I am
    confirmed, I look forward to digging into that and working with
    you and others on this issue to minimize civilian harm, moving
    forward.
        Senator Warren. Good. Well, I really appreciate that. You
    know, over the last several fiscal years Congress has provided
    the DOD with funding to make offers ex gratia of payments to
    civilians harmed in the U.S. and U.S.-led coalition operations,
    and these are cash payments. Yet as I understand it, very few
    payments have been made, and no claims process exists.
        So can you commit to reviewing this issue expeditiously and
    working to find ways to establish an effective claims process
    for families and survivors of military operations?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, I commit to that.
        Senator Warren. Dr. Kahl, some of my colleagues have
    criticized the Iran nuclear deal because it did not address
    Iran's ballistic missile program and because of the sunset
    provisions. They believe that the deal did not put Iran's
    nuclear program in a box. I think it is worth setting the
    record straight on just a few things. So I just want to ask
    you, the Iran nuclear deal placed strict limits on Iran's
    ability to enrich uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. During
    the deal, was Iran complying with those limits?
        Dr. Kahl. According to about a dozen IAEA reports prior to
    President Trump's withdrawal from the agreement, Iran had been
    in compliance.
        Senator Warren. Yes, and since the Trump administration
    pulled out of the deal, has Iran exceeded the limits imposed by
    the deal?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, in a number of areas.
        Senator Warren. Yes. So today, is Iran's breakout time to
    have a nuclear weapon shorter than it was when Trump went
    against our allies and pulled out of the deal?
        Dr. Kahl. According to open source analysis it is currently
    down to three or four months. It was at at least a year at the
    end of the Obama administration.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So Iran's nuclear program was
    actually in a box when the deal was in force, and they are now
    closer to having enough material to make a nuclear weapon today
    than they were under the deal. I guess we can all thank
    President Trump for making Iran even more dangerous today.
    Thank you.
        Thank you, Dr. Kahl, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warren. Let me
    now recognize Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr.
    Kahl, thank you for your service. We had a good phone call the
    other day. I love your statement about this is a nonpolitical
    position. This is a policy position, trying to help our
    military and things in front of us, because we have got
    problems.
        In 2016, three NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    countries, including the United States, they met their defense
    spend. Only three. Now we have got most of them involved in it.
    How do you stand on that?
        Dr. Kahl. I think it is important that all the NATO
    countries live up to their commitments that were made at Wales
    in 2014, the 2 percent threshold that you mentioned, and I am
    glad that more of those countries are turning in that
    direction, but we can do better.
        Senator Tuberville. Will you stay on top of it?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Thanks for answering the nuclear triad
    question earlier, but just a yes-or-no question. Do you support
    the funding of GBSD and LRSO modernization? Will you support
    that funding?
        Dr. Kahl. So I support modernization efforts, as a general
    matter. This is an area where I need to get briefed on the
    details, but I have no reason to question the STRATCOM
    commander's assessment on the needs of modernization. So once I
    get more deeply briefed on this I will come back and talk to
    you, but as I said, I support the triad.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah, thank you. You know, the Houthis
    in Yemen, they are coming after the Saudis pretty good, and
    they are being backed by Iran, and Iran is playing games.
    Houthis are pretty good fighters, and we are going to have some
    problems. So what are your thoughts about that?
        Dr. Kahl. I think that Yemen is one of the more vexing and
    tragic circumstances in the world. The Houthis are not good
    actors, but the war itself has also brought about the greatest
    humanitarian disaster in the world, at least pre-COVID, and
    COVID has actually made it worse. I do not think that our
    support for the Saudi coalition has been very effective in
    pushing back Houthi influence. I think the best strategy for
    reducing Houthi influence is moving towards a peace agreement
    that changes the nature of that government.
        Senator Tuberville. Tell me what you think about Russia's
    economy.
        Dr. Kahl. You know, I am not an expert on Russia's economy.
    I will say, in general, that Russia is very reliant on its
    energy resources. There are a lot of fundamentals of Russia's
    economy and demographics that are not in Moscow's favor. Now
    some people take solace in that. I actually think it makes
    Russia more dangerous in the near term, because I think that
    Putin sees Russia as a country that used to be great and that
    is now on the decline and is trying to make the most of the
    power they have left before they sunset.
        Anyway, I hope that answers your question.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kahl, it is
    good to see you here and congratulations on your nomination.
        I want to pick up on the Yemen issue, if I may. In advanced
    questions you expressed, if I am correct, and correct me if I
    am wrong, you expressed an understanding that the United States
    lacks sufficient insight into civilian casualty rates in Yemen,
    and yet an analysis by Rand reports that 110,000 Yemenis have
    been killed as a direct result of fighting, including 12,000
    civilians. Indirectly, at least 150,000 children, age 5 and
    under, have died from starvation, the result of Houthis
    diverting humanitarian food shipments as well as Saudi-led
    coalition air strikes on food storage and distribution
    infrastructure.
        You responded to a previous question and acknowledged the
    fact that this is a major humanitarian crisis. I could argue
    this is perhaps the largest humanitarian crisis in the world
    today.
        Please explain why you do not have visibility of the
    casualties when they seem to be fairly clear, and given the
    casualties, and given the fact that this is a major
    humanitarian crisis, how would you advise the President and
    folks at the Department of Defense that we need a policy that
    is dealing with this, and we need it now?
        Dr. Kahl. So I agree with you completely, and I am aware of
    the estimates that you mentioned. I think the APQ [advance
    policy question] answer was largely in terms of precision, that
    is, the precise number of civilian casualties may not be known
    to the Department, but I have no reason to question the outside
    assessment. It is not just that tens of thousands have been
    killed and wounded, but millions have been pushed to the brink
    of starvation, or are starving as we speak. I agree with your
    assessment, that it is the worst humanitarian disaster on the
    planet.
        I supported President Biden's decision, as I think there
    was bipartisan support as well, to cut off assistance to the
    Saudi-led campaign and to take other steps to make sure
    humanitarian aid was actually getting into Yemen. But this
    problem is not going to be resolved until there is a peace
    settlement, so I support the Biden administration's efforts to
    reinvigorate that process.
        Senator Peters. As we look at the future of conflict, or I
    should say the conflict we are in right now, it is probably
    best described as a conflict between authoritarian regimes and
    democracy, a classic battle between two ideologies, one that
    has existed through history, but we can see, at least in recent
    times, that conflict escalating, with a number of our
    adversaries that are working to undermine democracy and to
    further autocratic governments across the planet.
        So given that, to what extent should we be thinking
    differently about some of our defense policy, understanding
    that the conflict that we may have with our adversaries may be
    less in the realm of direct combat, although that is certainly
    possible, that we need to be adequately prepared for that. But
    a lot of the conflict is going to be in the realm of gray
    zones. It is going to be in the realm of adversaries trying to
    undermine Western or democracies where they may be, undermine
    democracies from within and also using other activities that
    are less than outright combat. Are we adequately prepared for
    this evolving, serious threat, and if not, what do we need to
    do?
        Dr. Kahl. So I think there is a dawning recognition about
    the challenge that you face. I think the new Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance that the administration released
    yesterday framed the issues very much along the lines that you
    did, that authoritarianism is on the rise. For more than a
    decade now, we have had a global democratic recession, that is
    the number of democracies slipping, and not just over there but
    among advanced industrial democracies.
        My own view is that we have to rally what used to be called
    the free world, that is the other advanced democracies and
    like-minded states, to address issues like cyberattacks,
    disinformation, but also things like weaponized corruption,
    energy coercion, supply chain vulnerabilities. The dawning
    recognition among democracies that they face common challenges
    from Russia, China, and other authoritarian powers is an
    opportunity for us, as the United States, to lead in all of
    those areas.
        Senator Peters. Well, one thing that we must lead, in my
    mind, is in moral leadership, in order to rally those
    democracies as the United States has always been that shining
    city on the hill, that has led in terms of moral issues.
        At what point does our support of Saudi Arabia make moral
    leadership difficult in the world?
        Dr. Kahl. Well, as President Biden often says, it is
    important that we not only lead through the example of our
    power but the power of our example, and I think in recent years
    there has been a greater and greater disconnect between
    American values and the values put forth by the government in
    Saudi Arabia. I support the Administration's efforts to
    recalibrate that relationship and to hold Saudi officials
    accountable, and to relook at every aspect of that relationship
    to make sure it conforms, not just with our interests but our
    values.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Now let me
    recognize Senator Sullivan for the traditional five-minute
    round.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. I hope Senator Inhofe is not timing me on
    this. Sorry about my reputation in that regard.
        Dr. Kahl, thanks for our meeting. I appreciate our
    discussion. If confirmed, can you commit again to come to
    Alaska to see the Arctic and the great power competition that
    the Pentagon often forgets about, up in that part of the world,
    with me?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. There is no question that strategic
    importance of the Arctic is going up.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. So, Dr. Kahl, I think a lot of
    us are trying to figure out a critical issue, that are you a
    balanced, measured, national security professional who can help
    lead the Pentagon, or, to be a little bit more frank, are you a
    political hack who has a history of going off on Twitter,
    attacking those who do not share your politics? This is a free
    country, and you are certainly allowed to do that. But I do
    think it is a critical issue. Senator Tillis stated less than a
    year ago several Senators, Republicans and Democrats, had
    concerns about a nominee for the exact position you are being
    nominated for, that the White House ended up withdrawing the
    nomination.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a letter from several Senate
    Democrats, many of whom are on this committee, who raised
    concerns about this nominee, General Tata, who said, quote,
    ``he was not qualified because of his record of inflammatory
    comments, which disqualify him,'' and including comments
    against Members of Congress.
        I think your comments about all Republicans are now the
    party of ethnic cleansing is pretty strong stuff. Again, free
    country. You can say whatever the heck you want. I believe in
    that, but sometimes these kind of statements have consequences.
        So this is actually more for my colleagues who wrote this
    letter. I think you guys have some explaining to do. It is very
    analogous what is going on here, very analogous. So I will
    leave that to my Armed Services colleagues, many of whom were
    on this letter.
        Senator Kaine, I agree with him a lot. This is a very
    bipartisan committee. He said your nomination is about the
    JCPOA. I would say it is actually broader than that, and I do
    want to correct my friend. The JCPOA was the first agreement in
    U.S. history that passed with a partisan minority in the House
    and Senate. So when Senator Kaine says Republicans were against
    it, Democrats were for it, he is incorrect. A partisan majority
    of Republicans and Democrats were against it in both the House
    and the Senate. But I agree with Senator Kaine that the
    concerns about your record on Iran are a critical element of
    your confirmation.
        So let me just ask a few questions. The JCPOA provided over
    $100 billion in sanctions relief, despite Iran's continuing
    malign activities. Those malign activities increased--$1.8
    billion in cash on an airplane. Do you agree that Iran now is,
    and has remained for the previous two administrations, the
    foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. What I worry about with your policy
    positions is they do not seem to have redlines with Iran, and
    as you know, it is important for the United States to determine
    redlines, and which it is critical to not allow countries to
    cross. When we have taken tough actions against the terrorist
    regime in Iran, you, as my colleagues have mentioned, have
    often cried out that it is going to lead to war.
        So let me ask this. Does the killing and wounding of over
    2,000 Americans constitute a redline that we should take action
    against Iran on?
        Dr. Kahl. I support taking action against Iran and its
    proxies when they threaten our forces. When I was at the
    Pentagon as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense I
    supported our action by, with, and through the Iraqis, to go
    after these proxy networks, to include, in 2011, when we saw a
    very concerning increase in rocket attacks that were causing
    American casualties. I was a strong proponent of hitting back,
    not just with the Iraqis but unilaterally.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, this is a serious question,
    and my final one. It is a sensitive and it is going to take a
    minute, so I do apologize but I want to get it on the record,
    and it is sensitive. It is an important issue. Some might
    criticize me for even asking it, but I am going to ask it.
        In your opening statement, you said you wanted to, quote,
    ``end systemic racism within the ranks of the military.'' Now I
    care deeply about this issue. In fact, I put forward
    legislation last year that passed in the NDAA, that looks at
    elements of this issue. I know you have not served in the ranks
    of the military yourself, but can you break that statement down
    a bit? It is a serious statement to say that there is
    systematic racism within the ranks of the military. The FBI
    director, for example, two days ago, in hearings, was asked
    this question, and he said there was not systemic racism in the
    FBI.
        I have served 26 years in the United States Marine Corps,
    still serving. Very diverse units, racially [inaudible] arms
    units. I have seen one serious incident, just in my personal
    experience of racism, where, as a young marine, I took action
    to stamp that out.
        What data or information are you basing that statement on?
    It is a big statement, and I am curious about that.
        Dr. Kahl. So I spent much of my government service working
    alongside men and women in uniform. I have extraordinary
    respect for all of them. My personal experience is that the
    overwhelming majority of people in the armed services conduct
    themselves with honor and dignity and are tolerant. I think
    there is a small minority that have violent extremist views. I
    think the events of January 6th----
        Senator Sullivan. Do you have data on that, because
    systemic racism----
        Dr. Kahl. I do not think we have credible data on the
    amount.
        Senator Sullivan. It is really important to get data on
    this before you paint with such a broad brush, is my point.
        Dr. Kahl. So I did not mean to imply that there is systemic
    racism among the ranks. I think there is systemic----
        Senator Sullivan. So that is what your statement said.
        Dr. Kahl. What I am saying, Senator, is that I think that
    there is a minority, and I agree with you that we need better
    data on this, that we should not tolerate people who combine
    racist views with violent tendencies, in the military or
    anywhere else.
        Senator Sullivan. I could not agree more with you.
        Dr. Kahl. That there have been barriers to advancement and
    the need for greater diversity, equity, and inclusion in the
    armed services----
        Senator Sullivan. That is what my legislation looks at----
        Dr. Kahl.--looks at.
        Senator Sullivan. But I agree we need more data. It is
    important to get data on this really important issue. I cannot
    agree with you more. It is important, but that data on it,
    before we make those statements.
        Dr. Kahl. So I support the need to get better data on it,
    and, if confirmed, I also look forward to working with you on
    this, because I know it is an issue that is important to you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan.--Senator Inhofe.
        Chairman Reed. No, Senator. You are getting better.
        Senator Sullivan. That was an important issue.
        Chairman Reed. Now I would like to recognize Senator
    Duckworth via WebEx, please.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    this very important hearing, and, Dr. Kahl, good to see you
    again. We had a great conversation yesterday. Today, though, I
    would like to focus on the current pacing threat for the
    Department of Defense, competition with the PRC [People's
    Republic of China]. I know you have already had this discussion
    a little bit today already, and I also thank my colleague from
    Hawaii, Senator Hirono, for bringing this up also.
        I have long been an advocate for increased military-to-
    military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and I think you will
    agree that we are stronger and more secure when we work with
    our allies and partners to confront changes and challenges. In
    particular, I believe we must move quickly to strengthen
    existing relationships in Southeast Asia, in particular, and
    form new ones. These partnership are vital to building our
    presence in the region and providing a check on the PRC
    government, which has shown that unless it is challenged it
    will attempt to single-handedly dictate terms for the entire
    region. Our cooperation cannot be limited to DOD alone, and I
    believe that a whole-of-society approach, that includes greater
    diplomatic and economic engagement, is necessary for success.
        Can you please outline some key policy opportunities you
    see to improve our strategic partnerships in Southeast Asia? In
    your answer, please make sure to address how DOD can support
    agencies' efforts in this critical region.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I think the biggest
    opportunity is the growing concern and recognition that a more
    assertive China has produced. That is, I think that a lot of
    our allies and partners are nervous. Frankly, I think that the
    pandemic and China's early coverup of the pandemic and some of
    its heavy-handed, wolf warrior diplomacy during the pandemic
    has also created opportunities for us to lean in with countries
    who are increasing worried about Beijing.
        I could not agree with you more about the importance of
    emphasizing our alliances and our partnerships. It is one of
    the biggest asymmetric advantages that the United States has.
    No other global power has the network of allies and partners
    that we have, and if I am confirmed, a huge part of my job will
    be in nurturing those relationships. I think we have enormous
    opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. I think that the last
    administration made some important strides in this area, as did
    the Obama administration. I think we have opportunities to work
    not just with our treaty allies, like Japan and South Korea and
    Australia and the Philippines, but with countries like
    Singapore and Vietnam, and others in Asiana, and I think there
    are growing opportunities with India.
        So I actually think this is an area where we have enormous
    possibility.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. If you are confirmed, would
    you commit to working with me to explore innovative ideas to
    improve mil-to-mil partnerships in the region, instead of just
    working with the Department of State to expand the IMET
    [International Military Education and Training] program, or
    perhaps using the Army Corps of Engineers to help flooding or
    other opportunities like that?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. I commit to working with you and to
    everybody else on the committee on those issues, because I do
    think, you know, there is no monopoly on good ideas on either
    side of the aisle or among any of us. So, you know, it needs to
    be one team, one fight.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I want to return to this
    issue of racism within the military. People of color, and
    women, can face significant systemic barriers to maintain
    successful careers in the Department of Defense. I saw it--it
    is why I had two children at the age of 46 and 50--because in
    order to pursue my career I had to postpone pregnancy. So there
    are systemic barriers to women and to people of color. This
    leads to a lack of diversity at the top levels of DOD,
    military, and civilian leadership, and in certain communities,
    like this is especially true like Special Operations.
        If confirmed, how would you personally work to increase
    diversity in the DOD leadership, both civilian and uniform, and
    include people of color and women so they can contribute to the
    mission, and ensure that everyone in the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy has the necessary support to
    succeed professionally?
        Dr. Kahl. I think everybody in the DOD leadership has an
    obligation to break down barriers to the advancement of women
    and people of color. I agree 100 percent that the top ranks,
    both civilian and military, do not reflect the diversity of the
    United States. I think we are stronger, as a country, when our
    workforce, including our national security workforce, reflects
    the full diversity that our country brings to bear. I think
    that is another one of our asymmetric advantages, one that we
    are not taking advantage of enough, because there is not enough
    diversity, equity, and inclusion.
        So you have my commitment, if I am confirmed as the Under
    Secretary, that in the organization that I would lead that I
    would look for opportunities to retain and promote the talent
    that we already have, and as we hire and bring on new folks, to
    make sure that this is a major priority, that we are expanding
    the diversity of our workforce, and then more broadly in the
    Department, working with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
    Hicks on this issue, because I know it is a big priority for
    them as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth. Let
    me recognize Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kahl, let me
    start in the same place as Senator Duckworth did, with our
    pacing theater. Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks, when she was
    here a few weeks ago, agreed that it is essential to strengthen
    our deterrents against China, that we maintain the ability to
    defeat a Chinese fait accompli with regard to Taiwan. Do you
    agree with that.
        Dr. Kahl. I do.
        Senator Hawley. Do you agree with her also that a strategy
    of denial is essential for deterring Chinese aggression?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. Denial both in the sense of building up
    Taiwan's capabilities and our capabilities to prevent the exact
    scenario that you outlined.
        Senator Hawley. Good, and would you also agree that the
    threat from the PRC is an imminent threat, not just a threat in
    10 or 15 or 20 years, but an imminent threat to our security
    now?
        Dr. Kahl. I think it is a growing threat to our security,
    and it is a challenge that is urgent now, and is only going to
    get worse as the years go on.
        Senator Hawley. So let me ask you this. Our pacing theater
    is INDOPACOM. You spent your career focused on the Middle East,
    however. So let me just ask you. I mean, why would we confirm
    another Middle East hand to lead the Department of Defense when
    we are trying to steer the Department's focus towards PACOM?
        Dr. Kahl. Well, as I suspect you know, Senator, I was
    trained as a generalist. I am international security and
    conflict specialist. Like a lot of people with my background,
    our attention focused on the Middle East. I am not a Middle
    East person by training. It was a byproduct of 9/11 and the
    wars that followed, that and the service that I spent after
    that.
        As the National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden, I
    had responsibility for the world. I was a member of the
    Deputies Committee, you know, leading discussions on China,
    Russia, Ukraine, Central America, Ebola, cyber, North Korea,
    and much of my academic work in recent years has been on
    emerging technologies and the geopolitical consequences of the
    pandemic.
        So I think of myself as a generalist who knows a little bit
    about the Middle East, as opposed to a Middle East Expert who
    knows a little bit about the rest of the world.
        Senator Hawley. I know that you previously worked on the
    pivot to Asia during the Obama administration. That is frankly
    part of what concerns me. It was not a successful pivot. Let me
    ask you about some of the challenges we are going to have in
    pivoting now.
        You said that troops in Afghanistan, troop levels should be
    tied to conditions on the ground, and that any withdrawal
    should support diplomatic efforts and be executed in close
    consultation with our NATO resolute support partners. Does that
    mean that you do not support the peace agreement reached by the
    previous administration?
        Dr. Kahl. I think we need a negotiated solution. My concern
    with the United States-Taliban agreement that the previous
    administration negotiated--and I should caveat this by saying I
    am not privy to the intelligence assessments--but based on
    reporting and open source materials, the Taliban does not
    appear to be living up to its commitments, either in the letter
    or the spirit of that agreement. So I would want to make sure
    that we are defending our interests. I do not think that the
    forever war in Afghanistan should go on forever, but I do
    believe that we have vital interests there----
        Senator Hawley. How are we going to end it?
        Dr. Kahl. Well, I think we are going to end it through
    peaceful negotiation. Part of that----
        Senator Hawley. Will we keep thousands of troops there, in
    theater.
        Dr. Kahl. Well, first of all, I need to get briefed on the
    current threat matrix. A lot of my information on ISIS,
    Khorasan, or the Taliban or al Qaeda is four years out of date
    in the classified domain. My belief is that we need to remain
    postured in the region to deal with the residual
    counterterrorism issues that arise from groups like al Qaeda
    and ISIS.
        The exact force mix that that may require in Afghanistan
    versus elsewhere is something I will have to dig into, and, if
    confirmed, I look forward to talking to you about this.
        Senator Hawley. Here is what I am trying to figure out.
    Based on the comments that the President has made, including at
    the Munich Security Conference, and others he made on the
    campaign, and based on the initial steps taken by the
    administration, it looks like this administration foresees
    major engagement across at least three theaters, while, at the
    same time, essentially relieving the pressure on NATO burden-
    sharing. I am trying to figure out how the accounts balance. I
    mean, you also envisioned flat defense spending.
        So how are we going to prioritize the Indo-Pacific, how are
    we going to prioritize the growing and, indeed, imminent
    security threat from China, while also engaging heavily in
    Europe, engaging heavily in CENTCOM, without any rebalancing in
    those places? Can you just give me your--this is, obviously, a
    huge problem. The last administration encountered the same
    problem. What are your thoughts on this?
        Dr. Kahl. So the Interim National Security Strategic
    Guidance that the administration released yesterday racked and
    stacked the regions. You know, we have interests in all the
    regions--we are a global power. We have interests everywhere.
    But there are certain regions where it will need to be more of
    an economy of effort. I think the Indo-Pacific is number one
    with a bullet for security and economic reasons; Europe is
    probably number two, because of the challenge that Russia poses
    to us and the NATO alliance, and because NATO is a force
    multiplier for us, globally. So I would put Indo-Pacific and
    Europe one and two. The Western Hemisphere is always an
    interest of ours, going back to the founding of the republic,
    but more of an economy of effort. I think we need to right-size
    our presence in the Middle East and Central Asia, along the
    lines that we just discussed, precisely because of the
    accelerating pace of great power competition, which I think the
    2018 National Defense Strategy correctly kind of re-centered
    our focus on that. If confirmed, I would look to continue that
    trend.
        Senator Hawley. Could I ask one more question, Mr.
    Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. Quickly.
        Senator Hawley. Quickly. All right. Not to imitate Senator
    Sullivan, but I just want to ask you about Israel. According to
    news reports, Dr. Kahl, you led the effort to remove
    recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel from the 2012
    Democratic Party platform. You also reportedly staffed the
    effort to condemn Israel at the U.N. Security Council in late
    2016, and, of course, you have spoken about against moving the
    embassy to Jerusalem. Do you see Israel as a valued partner? I
    mean, obviously, those positions are in serious tension with
    the interests and positions of our Israeli partners. Do you see
    them as a valued partner, and how are you going to respond to
    their concerns over these positions?
        Dr. Kahl. So absolutely, and I had the opportunity earlier
    to go through my record on supporting Israel, so I will not
    recapitulate that here, but it is long.
        I will just say, in 2012, the platform that I was involved
    in writing simply represented the U.S. official policy at the
    time, which was the same policy as in the Bush administration,
    which was not to formally recognize Jerusalem because it was a
    final status issue. The platform was amended, and I had no
    problem with the amendment. The embassy has been moved. I
    support President Biden's policy on that, not to move it back.
        So I do not imagine this will cause any concerns in Israel
    or elsewhere if I were to be confirmed for this position. Just
    for the record, I had zero involvement in the U.N. Security
    Council resolution, in pushing for it or otherwise, in 2016.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Kelly,
    please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr.
    Kahl, for your testimony today.
        So with the recent SolarWinds hack that is fresh in our
    minds, what is your perspective on how we address the
    vulnerability in our digital architecture, that the U.S.
    Government relies on, including the Department of Defense?
        Dr. Kahl. Yeah. First of all, I could not agree with you
    more about--look, I would not describe SolarWinds as a wake-up
    call, and I know you are not doing that either. I think it is
    just the latest reminder of how vulnerable our networks are. As
    I mentioned earlier, I think this is a vulnerability that has
    only increased as a consequence of the pandemic, because so
    much of our daily lives has migrated online. You know, I have a
    nine-year-old daughter and a six-year-old son, and they are
    doing fourth grade and kindergarten, you know, on Zoom, every
    day. But our enterprises, our institutions--you know, luckily,
    the Department of Defense is unclassified networks. While being
    exposed, we are not compromised. But huge portions of the U.S.
    Government appear to have been compromised by this, at the
    unclassified level.
        So if I am confirmed, it is an issue I need to dig into
    more deeply, but we need to make sure that our networks are
    defended and resilient in the face of this, because these
    attacks by Russia and other countries are not going to go away.
    China, North Korea, Iran, and non-state actors are all looking
    to go after us in the cyber domain.
        Senator Kelly. How did we get here, though? Did we make
    decisions early on and take basically off-the-shelf technology
    and modify it for government and defense purposes? Could we
    have done something different? If we could have, do we want to
    make those changes now?
        Dr. Kahl. So I am not sure about the forensics. You know, I
    think the autopsy has yet to be conducted. But there are few
    things that are more important. I know that the Deputy National
    Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, Anne
    Neuberger, is looking at this issue. I would hope that in
    really digging into the SolarWinds incident we can answer
    precisely the questions you raise, which is how did we get so
    vulnerable, not just our networks but the supply chains, which
    is how this particular attack happened, and what can we do to
    make those networks more resilient in the future.
        So if I am confirmed, I would anticipate participating in
    that interagency conversation, and as I learn more I would hope
    to come back to talk to you about it.
        Senator Kelly. It is critical we figure out a way out of
    this situation, because if we do not, this is going to continue
    to happen.
        So when we spoke yesterday we discussed some technology,
    like artificial intelligence, just briefly, quantum computing,
    that is going to define the next century. So how do we align
    our defense policy to meet the requirements that result from
    the advancements of these technologies?
        Dr. Kahl. Well, as you mentioned, Senator, we are only at
    the very beginning of a whole host of emerging disruptive
    technologies that will, frankly, define the nature of life for
    the rest of this century. We are in the process of the
    digitization of everything. We are literally seeing zeroes and
    ones turned into living beings, and beings turned into zeroes
    and ones through things like synthetic biology. Quantum
    computing is going to revolutionize a whole array of issues
    with implications for national security. Hypersonics, directed
    energy--these are all things.
        So I think as we craft our National Defense Strategy and
    then form a budget around that, we have to be prioritizing
    investments in these areas, because we know that China is. We
    know they are. We know they are committed to spending hundreds
    of billions of dollars precisely to plant the flag on the very
    technologies that they understand will determine the strategic
    competition for the rest of this century.
        So if we are not doing the same--and, by the way, it is not
    just DOD. We need to be investing in STEM [science, technology,
    engineering and mathematics] science and technology education,
    research and development, investing in our research
    institutions. It is a whole-of-government effort, because it is
    a whole-of-government effort in Beijing, so it has to be here.
        Senator Kelly. Yeah, I could not agree more. I mean, it is
    what we have done very well as a country for decades--
    innovation. We know that the Chinese will be following us, and
    the amount of money they spend in research and development now
    is basically the same as we have over the last couple of years.
    We, fortunately, have the one thing that they do not have, and
    that is the creativity, and a democracy that allows people to
    be creative, and, you know, to think outside the box. We have
    got to invest in that. That includes investing in STEM
    education and research and development, and to make sure that
    we have these domestic production capabilities here. That will
    keep us ahead of our competitors.
        Thank you for your testimony.
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Now let me
    recognize the ranking member for his concluding comments.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we
    probably have run out of interest here.
        Let me just make a comment on why this is important. We
    have hearings like that, and we want to know, before someone is
    confirmed, where they stand on these issues, and I think it is
    perfectly appropriate. In my case I had three questions. I got
    two answers, and I did not get an answer on the third one. But
    I am going to remind, in future meetings that we have, what the
    answer was, to test the consistency of the witness, so we can
    anticipate that.
        Then also we had a question that was having to do with
    triad modernization, by Senator Cotton. Two other members asked
    the same question. I did not think the answers were complete
    enough, and if it is all right I would like to recognize
    Senator Cotton to re-ask that question.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, I want
    to be very specific here. You gave evasive answers to Senator
    Rounds, Senator Cramer, and Senator Tuberville on the ground-
    based strategic deterrent, the replacement program for the
    Minuteman missile. We are pleased to hear that you support the
    triad, as you said, as a general matter, pleased to hear that
    you have no reason to question Admiral Richard, the commander
    of Strategic Command, that the Minuteman cannot be extended.
    But the simple and specific question is, do you or do you not
    support the continued full funding of the ground-based
    strategic deterrent as the future of the ground leg of the
    nuclear triad?
        Dr. Kahl. Thank you, Senator. I am not trying to be
    evasive. The truth of the matter is my information on the
    ground-based strategic deterrent, at the classified level, is
    four years out of date. So it is something I will have to get a
    classified assessment on it, including the capabilities, the
    costs, and the life extension program. Based on what I know in
    the public domain, and what the STRATCOM commander has said, I
    have no reason to question those modernization efforts.
        Senator Cotton. Dr. Kahl, we have seen throughout this
    hearing that you have no issue of expressing your strongly held
    opinion on matter of defense policy and foreign policy. You
    were nominated for this position more than two months ago. Is
    it really your answer to this committee that you do not have a
    well-informed opinion about whether the ground-based strategic
    deterrent is the future of the ground leg of the nuclear triad?
        Dr. Kahl. I have a well-grounded opinion that all three
    legs of the triad need to be viable. They need to be effective,
    safe, secure, they need to be credible to our adversaries and
    our allies. As I said, I have no reason to question the
    STRATCOM commander's assessment. But as you know, Senator, on
    nuclear weapons there are issues that are highly classified,
    and details that I am simply not privy to. So, if confirmed, I
    will dig into those details and I would be happy to come back
    to talk to you, or anybody else on this committee, about that,
    if I am confirmed.
        Senator Cotton. Well, it sounds like we are not going to
    get a straight answer. I will take that unwillingness to give a
    straight answer is that you probably do not think that we
    should continue to fund the ground-based strategic deterrent,
    as do many other members of your party, and I suspect that many
    members of this committee will too.
        Chairman Reed. Dr. Kahl, do you have anything further in
    response to the question of the ground-based triad? My sense is
    that you have given an answer which you are in favor of, but
    you want to make sure you understand all the facts at the very
    highest classified levels, because it is critical to not only
    the three legs but also the sequencing of construction
    projects, the status of the development of the platforms. If
    there is a serious issue--and I am not privy the information,
    but if there is a serious issue of a platform, that might cause
    changes within the deployment schedule.
        So those are very practical concerns, and I think your
    answer reflected those practical concerns, and also indicated
    that the triad has to continue to protect the United States.
    Any comment?
        Dr. Kahl. No, I agree with all that. I think that the triad
    has been a tried and true bedrock of our deterrence for
    decades. I think that it is important to modernize the triad
    because our adversaries are modernizing their capabilities, and
    we need a hedge against the possibility that one of the other
    legs of the triad becomes non-viable.
        So I support the triad and our modernization efforts. My
    only reason to be cautious was precisely for the reasons that
    you identified, which is that there is classified material
    which is relevant to these systems that I am not privy to. If
    confirmed, it will be a high priority for me to get more deeply
    briefed on this, and at that time I would be happy to speak
    with this committee on that or any other issue. I think one of
    the things I have enjoyed, frankly, about this hearing is the
    degree of candor and the range of issues that have been raised.
        I will just tell you this, because some of you I know
    better than others. You know, I am an academic by training, but
    I made a decision after 9/11 to value public service. I worked
    in the Bush administration, an administration I did not agree
    with on a lot of stuff. But I worked in the Pentagon because I
    believed in our national security and the patriotic duty of
    public service.
        I returned to the Pentagon under a Republican Secretary of
    Defense, who I think very highly of, Robert Gates, and worked
    in a nonpartisan and bipartisan way, because I believe in
    public service, and that no party has a monopoly on good ideas.
    None of us have cracked the code on some of the toughest
    challenges we face, whether it be Iran or North Korea or China
    or Russia or anything else. So we have to be in this together.
    I know that there are disagreements, but I am also confident
    that I can work with people that I disagree with, both inside
    the Pentagon and here in the halls of Congress.
        So if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, I look forward
    to doing that.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Kahl. It has
    been a very, very thought-provoking and thoughtful discussion
    his morning, and much of that because of your abilities and
    your experience. So we thank you, and at this point I will
    adjourn the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Colin H. Kahl by
    Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                 duties, qualifications, challenges, priorities
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))?
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) serves
    as the Secretary of Defense's principal staff assistant responsible for
    policy development and planning; leads the formulation and coordination
    of national security and defense policy within the Department of
    Defense; and integrates policies and plans to achieve desired
    objectives. The USD(P) also is responsible for efforts to build and
    maintain defense relationships with U.S. allies, partners, competitors,
    and international organizations. As provided by 10 U.S.C. 134, the
    USD(P) assists the Secretary of Defense in the development of written
    policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans,
    and for the review of such plans. Subject to the authority, direction,
    and control of the Secretary of Defense, the USD(P) has responsibility
    for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense
    relating to export controls, as well as for policy oversight, guidance,
    allocation, and use of resources for Department of Defense security
    cooperation and combating terrorism activities.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities
    do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense would have
    me serve as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary
    of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the
    formulation of national security and defense policy. In addition, I
    would establish good relationships with other DOD Components, Defense
    Agencies and DOD Field Activities, the Joint Staff, Military Services,
    and Combatant Commands. I would expect that the Secretary will assign
    me any other duties that he deemed appropriate for the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Policy, including, but not limited to, representing the
    Department of Defense, as directed, in matters involving the National
    Security Council (NSC), Department of State, and other Federal
    departments, agencies, and interagency groups with responsibility for
    national security policy.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that
    qualify you for this position?
        Answer. I was trained as an international security and conflict
    specialist, with a PhD from Columbia University in political science.
    Over the past two decades, I have held professorships at the University
    of Minnesota, Georgetown University, and now Stanford University, where
    I am a tenured Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Center for
    International Security and Cooperation. I have conducted research and
    published on a wide array of foreign policy and defense policy topics,
    including environmental security, the evolution of counterinsurgency,
    post-9/11 Middle East policy, nuclear nonproliferation, the impact of
    emerging technologies on strategic stability, the geopolitical
    implications of COVID-19, and American grand strategy. I also have
    extensive experience as a policy practitioner, working at multiple
    levels of government. From 2005 to 2006, I worked as an action officer
    at the Pentagon in OSD Policy via a fellowship from the Council on
    Foreign Relations, focusing on stability and counterinsurgency
    operations. I returned to OSD Policy from 2009 to 2011 as the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, serving as the
    senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Egypt, Iran,
    Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
    Yemen, and six other countries in the Levant and Gulf region. For my
    work on these issues, I was awarded the Outstanding Public Service
    Medal by Secretary Gates in 2011. From October 2014 to January 2017, I
    served as Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security
    Advisor to Vice President Biden. As a senior aide to the President and
    Vice President, and a standing member of the National Security Council
    Deputies Committee, I worked extensively on China, Central America,
    Iran, the counter-ISIS campaign, North Korea, Russia, Ukraine, cyber,
    climate policy, and other national security matters.
        Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
    assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect that whomever is confirmed as the
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would be my partner and
    right hand on all national security and defense policy matters, as we
    fulfill our roles as principal staff assistants and advisors to the
    Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Regarding
    specifics, if I am confirmed, I will examine the roles and
    responsibilities in consultation with the Office of General Counsel, to
    ensure compliance with the law, and with the Deputy Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy to ensure a full, successful partnership.
        Question. What are the major challenges you would expect to
    confront if confirmed as the USD(P)?
        Answer. The most urgent challenge we face is the coronavirus
    disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. If confirmed, my first priority will
    be to support Secretary Austin's direction to the Department to support
    Federal COVID-19 response efforts. We also must root out extremism in
    the Department, which is contrary to the oath we take to support and
    defend the Constitution. Another major challenge is balancing efforts
    to prepare and strengthen the United States military for a dynamic
    future security landscape and ensuring deterrence against threats from
    China and other strategic competitors, rogue states and terrorist
    organizations; preparing for the effects of climate change that drive
    nation-state fragility and conflict; working to address transnational
    criminal organizations and irregular migration; and accounting for
    budgetary limitations. I would ensure, through the formulation of the
    next National Defense Strategy, that the Department properly outlines
    the strategic and policy objectives that we expect the Joint Force to
    achieve.
        Question. If confirmed, what would your policy priorities be, and
    what areas of policy do you think have not been adequately emphasized
    or addressed by the Department of Defense (DOD)?
        Answer. If confirmed, my first priority will be to support
    Secretary Austin's efforts to combat COVID-19. We need to take care of
    our national security workforce to ensure they have the protections
    necessary to conduct their essential national security missions. I will
    take immediate steps to understand the organizational health and
    structure of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    and take action to ensure the career civilian workforce is
    appropriately sized and resourced. I understand resource-driven
    civilian staff reductions have resulted in a significant decrease in
    staffing as well as marks against budget levels in Policy that threaten
    to undermine the ability of the workforce to meet mission requirements
    as they exercise statutory responsibilities to provide civilian
    guidance and oversight of the military. Policy has to be organized
    effectively to meet our statutory requirements, as well as to meet
    emerging mission requirements in areas such as artificial intelligence,
    quantum computing, and other disruptive technologies, climate change,
    and energy policy. Simultaneously, I will focus on our work to shape
    the next National Defense Strategy to ensure it accounts for changes in
    the strategic environment and reflects the Secretary's and the
    President's priorities. If confirmed, I will work closely with other
    DOD Components and with the Congress to address these challenges and
    support Secretary Austin's priorities for the Department.
        Question. How would you characterize your views regarding the
    appropriate posture of stationing of U.S. Armed Forces overseas and
    their use in overseas operations?
        Answer. I have great respect for all of our forces, regardless of
    where they serve. Overseas military presence contributes to assuring
    allies and partners of U.S. defense commitments and shared values, and
    to ensuring our operational responsiveness. I believe having our forces
    serve in overseas locations is essential to our national security
    interests and to our ability to protect and defend the Homeland and
    interests around the world.
                        civilian control of the military
        Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission report notes,
    ``allocating priority--and allocating forces--across theaters of
    warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an inherently political-
    military task, decision authority for which is the proper competency
    and responsibility of America's civilian leaders.''
        What is your view of the role of DOD civilian leadership, as
    compared to the role of the military, in the formulation of strategy
    and contingency planning?
        Answer. Civilian control of the military is a vital cornerstone of
    our democracy. DOD civilian leadership provides necessary direction and
    oversight of the formulation of military strategy and plans through the
    provision of timely policy guidance, clearly defined objectives and
    end-states, and requirements and guidelines for contingency planning.
    Additionally, the Department's military leadership exercises essential
    roles across the range of DOD's strategic and planning functions,
    providing deep operational expertise and sound military advice; working
    closely with military leaders, therefore, is essential to success in
    these areas. Collectively, these roles ensure a balanced civil-military
    relationship and national defense activities that are in concert with
    American values.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    implement the Commission's recommendation that ``the Secretary of
    Defense and USD(P) . . . fully exercise their responsibilities for
    preparing guidance for and reviewing contingency plans?''
        Answer. If confirmed, I will fully carry out the responsibilities
    of the USD(P) to prepare guidance for and review contingency plans.
    Specifically, I will deepen and expand the interactions between
    civilian and military leadership through an extensive contingency plans
    review process to invigorate the civilian oversight role, integrate new
    capabilities more effectively, and ensure robust civil-military
    dialogue.
        Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
    Fiscal Year 2020 authorized an increase in the number of personnel in
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and ``sunsetted'' the
    reduction of funding mandated in section 346 of the Fiscal Year 2016
    NDAA. It does not appear that the Department has used these additional
    flexibilities to increase the number of civilian billets in OSD,
    however.
        Question. In your view, would an increase in the number of
    personnel assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy (OUSD(P)) enhance civilian control of the military? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand Policy's civilian workforce has shrunk by 25
    percent as a result of mandatory headquarters cuts taken over the past
    decade; and the Fiscal Year 2021 DOD Appropriations Act explanatory
    statement's $3.5 million reduction in operation and maintenance funds
    for Policy for ``excess personnel increase'' will affect the civilian
    workforce further. I am concerned about these cuts, and if confirmed
    will review Policy's missions and current staffing levels to determine
    whether the professional civilian staff is sized appropriately and
    whether it is able to recruit and retain an experienced, talented,
    diverse workforce that can effectively carry out the Secretary's vision
    for meaningful oversight of the military. If necessary, I will seek
    additional personnel to be assigned permanently to Policy so that we
    can effectively pursue these national security missions and improve
    civilian control of the military.
        National Defense Strategy (NDS)
        Question. Does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic
    environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the
    national security of the United States and its allies? If confirmed,
    what changes or adjustments would you recommend in the NDS? What
    changes or adjustments would you recommend in the Department's
    implementation of the NDS?
        Answer. I believe the 2018 NDS accurately identifies strategic
    competition with China and Russia as the primary challenge animating
    the global security environment. The continued erosion of United States
    military advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia, in key strategic areas,
    remains the most significant risk the Department must address. I assess
    China is the top priority and pacing threat for the Department, given
    its increasing scope and scale of military modernization, its
    aggressive behavior, and its potential as a systemic competitor across
    multiple domains.
        The Department should consider geo-political shifts, intensifying
    competition with China, transnational threats (including climate change
    and COVID-19 and other biological threats), and the evolving technology
    landscape in its review and development of the next NDS. Further, the
    2018 NDS assumed sustained defense budget growth and anticipated a
    rebalancing of United States commitments from the Middle East to the
    Indo-Pacific region, though neither has fully materialized. A new
    strategy should consider and highlight the difficult choices DOD faces,
    where fiscal, doctrinal, temporal, or other limitations pose trade-offs
    to addressing strategic priorities.
        I understand DOD's annual NDS assessment identified the need for
    strategy implementation to involve more deliberate planning,
    organization, and prioritization. If confirmed, I will review and
    consider applying forward the insights from NDS implementation, while
    also helping to ensure that future strategy implementation is addressed
    more organically as part of the NDS development process.
        DOD should consider how a number of factors affect NDS
    implementation, including the security and fiscal environments, demands
    on defense-wide and military roles and missions, global force
    management and force planning issues, and the state of our network of
    allies and partners. If confirmed, I would ensure future strategy
    implementation focuses on how DOD efforts can be better integrated with
    other elements of national power, and with key roles exercised by our
    allies and partners.
        The National Defense Strategy Commission recommended an average of
    3 to 5 percent real growth annually in the size of the defense budget
    in future years or ``DOD should alter the expectations of the strategy
    and America's global strategic objectives.''
        Question. Do you believe that DOD requires 3 to 5 percent real
    budgetary growth through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to
    implement the NDS effectively? If confirmed, by what standards would
    you measure the adequacy of DOD funding?
        Answer. The Department must align new operating concepts, focused
    capability investments, and internal reforms with its strategic
    approach to future warfighting, to be able to deter our competitors
    most effectively. The overall level of DOD resourcing is a critical
    factor that must be reconciled with national priorities for our
    military. Appropriate use of available DOD resources will be necessary
    to maximize the strategy's effectiveness and minimize risks to U.S.
    Forces, while at the same time DOD seeks efficiencies through
    innovation.
        If confirmed, I would first ensure, through oversight of and
    participation in the formulation of the next National Defense Strategy,
    that the Department properly outlines the strategic and policy
    objectives that we expect the Joint Force to achieve. Secondly, by
    leveraging and supporting the Department's analytic enterprise, I would
    ensure the Secretary and other senior leaders have a clear
    understanding of the warfighting effectiveness needed for our forces to
    be able to achieve those ends, with acceptable levels of risk. Based on
    this information, I would support the Secretary in clearly
    communicating risks and resourcing priorities to Congress.
                              global force posture
        Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current
    U.S. global defense posture, particularly as it relates to stationing
    U.S. military forces overseas, and where would you look to increase or
    decrease U.S. force posture overseas given current international
    security dynamics?
        Answer. DOD's current global posture provides the United States a
    good baseline for executing operations today. However, there are
    opportunities to improve DOD's global posture so that we are better
    positioned to execute operations tomorrow. With this in mind, DOD will
    be executing a global posture review directed by President Biden to
    assess alignment of DOD's posture with national security priorities.
    Most importantly, DOD will review how to take additional steps toward a
    more resilient and distributed posture in the Indo-Pacific region that
    leverages new capabilities and operational concepts. Elsewhere in the
    world, we need to ensure DOD forces and footprint are scoped
    appropriately for the threat scenarios they face and balanced against
    any tradeoffs with the strategic priority of improving our warfighting
    advantages over near-peer competitors.
        Question. In your view, what role do forward-stationed forces play
    in implementing the NDS and what is the proper balance between forward-
    stationed, rotationally-deployed, and surge forces in executing our
    defense strategy?
        Answer. Forward-stationed forces play a critical role in enabling
    DOD to deter potential adversaries because they decrease crisis
    response times while also reassuring, supporting, and developing
    stronger relationships with allies and partners. The balance between
    forward-stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces varies from
    region to region based upon several factors, including the capabilities
    required to deter particular threats and the availability of access and
    basing in allied and partner countries. However, each of the three
    components is vital to our overall global defense posture.
        Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are
    crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a strategic
    power. If confirmed, what U.S. alliances and partnerships would you
    consider most critical and what new partnerships would you pursue in
    each Combatant Commander's area of responsibility?
        Answer. Our alliances and partnerships are an asymmetric strategic
    advantage over our competitors. The strength of this network of defense
    relations cannot be taken for granted. We must reinvigorate and
    modernize these relationships, where appropriate. If confirmed, I would
    strive to align the Department's priorities and synchronize our tools
    and resources, to help allies and partners develop their defense
    establishments and military forces. I would confer within the
    Department to inform how best to enhance and strengthen defense
    relationships that advance shared objectives. I expect to focus on
    engaging with key allies and partners on priority bilateral and
    multilateral issues, strengthening collaborative planning, and
    increasing interoperability.
        Question. In your view, in the event of a major conflict with a
    strategic competitor such as China or Russia, what component of DOD
    would be responsible for real time management of the resulting impacts
    and necessary adjustments to global force posture? Is that DOD
    component adequately resourced and structured to react at the speed of
    relevance?
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for activating a
    plan for a major conflict with a strategic competitor and subsequent
    global force posture adjustments and associated risk. To facilitate
    these decisions, the Joint Staff provides military options and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy provides its
    recommendations to the Secretary regarding the associated risk to
    strategy and policy.
        All DOD components, but particularly Policy--which directly
    supports and enables the Secretary's civilian control of the military--
    should be properly resourced to provide timely and informed advice. If
    confirmed, I will review whether OSD Policy is adequately resourced and
    structured to react swiftly and appropriately to a major conflict.
             nuclear capabilities and nuclear posture review (npr)
        Question. Do you agree with Secretary Austin that nuclear
    deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing each
    leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear
    weapons complex is a critical national security priority?
        Answer. As both Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks
    testified, I agree that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority
    mission, and I agree that nuclear modernization of the triad is
    critical to U.S. national security.
        Question. What is your understanding of how Russia and China have
    expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force capabilities?
        Answer. I understand that Russia has largely completed
    modernization of its strategic forces and is pursuing new strategic-
    range nuclear systems. I am aware of reporting that Russia is poised to
    increase the size of its theater and tactical nuclear weapons arsenal
    in response to perceived threats; and of the Director, Defense
    Intelligence Agency's (DIA), public statement that China will roughly
    double the size of its nuclear forces. If confirmed, I will request
    briefings on these developments to understand the details of both
    countries' modernization program, why they are modernizing, and the
    implications for U.S. national and international security.
        Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
    threat to the United States and its allies?
        Answer. Improvements to nuclear forces by our two most important
    strategic competitors of course pose a threat to the United States and
    its allies and partners. Maintaining effective nuclear deterrence is
    critical.
        Question. Do you support the U.S. nuclear force structure changes
    recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?
        Answer. I expect the Administration will review the nuclear force
    changes recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to determine if
    they are appropriate given the current and projected security and
    fiscal environment.
        Question. The 2010 NPR called for retaining ``sufficient force
    structure in each leg to allow the ability to hedge effectively by
    shifting weight from one Triad leg to another if necessary due to
    unexpected technological problems or operational vulnerabilities.'' Do
    you agree with that requirement for our nuclear force structure? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. I agree--the three legs of the U.S. nuclear deterrent are
    complementary and mutually supporting capabilities. The Triad allows
    for flexibility in our nuclear deterrence and provides a built-in hedge
    to increase resiliency against unknown technological surprise or
    unpredicted advancements in threat capabilities. .
        Question. The 2010 and 2018 NPRs concluded that the United States
    would maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear forces on
    continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on alert, and
    maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time. Do
    you agree with that conclusion? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Maintaining a portion of U.S. nuclear forces on day-to-day
    alert maximizes decision time and preserves the range of U.S. response
    options. It enhances deterrence by denying potential adversaries the
    capability to destroy our nuclear deterrent forces in a surprise first
    strike. I would expect the appropriate alert levels would be reviewed
    in the course of any posture review.
        Question. In response to conditions set forth in the Senate
    Resolution of Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama
    certified on February 2, 2011, that he intended to ``(a) modernize or
    replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber
    and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered
    ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the
    United States rocket motor industrial base.'' Do you agree with and
    support these objectives for modernizing the triad of strategic nuclear
    delivery systems? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The nuclear Triad has provided a strong deterrence posture
    for decades. The U.S. nuclear deterrent plays a significant role in
    global strategic stability and we must maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear force to maintain that stability. If confirmed, I
    will conduct a review to determine the appropriate pace and scale of
    modernization to support future stability requirements.
        Question. Is the current program of record sufficient to support
    full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems,
    warheads, while supporting National Nuclear Security Administration
    infrastructure?
        Answer. I believe it is intended to be. I anticipate the Department
    of Defense, in partnership with the Department of Energy, will review
    these programs to ensure we are modernizing our forces and supporting
    infrastructure in an effective, affordable, and sustainable manner that
    provides us the necessary capabilities when they are needed.
        Question. Admiral Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
    recently reaffirmed the longstanding assessment of the Department of
    Defense that extending the service life of the Minuteman III (MM III)
    system is no longer a cost-effective option for preserving the nation's
    intercontinental ballistic missile force, and given MM III's age, is
    all but technologically infeasible. Do you agree with the Commander's
    assessment?
        Answer. I agree we cannot life-extend Cold War legacy forces
    indefinitely, and I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the
    Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as the Administration conducts a
    review of our nuclear modernization efforts in support of the nuclear
    posture review. If confirmed, I will work within the Administration to
    begin reviewing our nuclear policy and programs to ensure we are
    modernizing our forces in an effective and affordable manner.
        Question. The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to
    replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)-- Do you support
    the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a replacement for the aging ALCM?
        Answer. I support modernizing our aging nuclear forces and
    maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I
    understand the need to modernize and replace the ALCM. If confirmed, I
    plan to prioritize getting briefed on all our nuclear modernization
    plans.
        Question. If confirmed as USD(P), would you take steps to advocate
    for, and ensure the continued development of, the Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent and Long Range Stand-Off programs? If so, what are
    those steps?
        Answer. I support modernizing our aging nuclear forces and believe
    we must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. If
    confirmed, I plan to prioritize getting briefed on all of our nuclear
    modernization plans, which will include a careful review of the Ground
    Based Strategic Deterrent and Long Range Stand-Off Programs.
        If confirmed, I will request briefings on all our nuclear
    modernization plans to ensure we prioritize and maintain a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
        Question. Do you believe a nuclear ``No First Use'' policy would be
    appropriate for the United States? Please explain your answer,
    including the implications of such a policy for the U.S. extended
    deterrence commitments to our allies.
        Answer. I believe the United States should periodically examine its
    nuclear declaratory policy to ensure it is suitable for the current and
    foreseeable security environment and supports U.S. strategic
    objectives. Our declaratory policy should support our strategic
    deterrence and be credible in the eyes of both adversaries and allies.
    As such, I would expect to consult closely with allies in the course of
    reexamining our nuclear policy.
        Question. By statute, the USD(P) is a member of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. In your view, what are the most significant issues the Council
    should take up in the coming years?
        Answer. The most significant issues facing the Nuclear Weapons
    Council are maintaining our commitment to nuclear modernization to
    ensure that the United States has a credible, flexible, and responsive
    nuclear deterrent and to recapitalize our aging infrastructure to be
    able to respond quickly to an emerging threat environment.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you participate in Nuclear
    Weapons Council matters?
        Answer. If confirmed, as one of six principal members of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council, I will work to ensure that the nation's
    nuclear policies are integral to decisions concerning the current and
    future nuclear stockpile and the recapitalization of the supporting
    infrastructure.
        Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
    parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
    maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
        Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate an early review of our nuclear
    weapons programs. Any impacts on the United Kingdom would be a
    consideration in that review. The United Kingdom's independent
    strategic nuclear forces contribute significantly to the overall
    security of the NATO Alliance, and our close partnership with the UK
    remains a critical facet of United States national security.
        Question. Based on your understanding of the condition of the
    nation's nuclear command, control and communications system, do you
    believe the modernization of the system should be a high priority, and,
    if so, what actions would you take to advocate such steps, if
    confirmed?
        Answer. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) system
    effectiveness is an essential element of deterrence and crisis
    stability. If confirmed, I would use Policy's chair in DOD governing
    and budget processes to advocate for prioritizing the modernization of
    the NC3 system, which underpins our nuclear deterrence capabilities.
        Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced
    his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should
    be taken only within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
    agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions. Do you
    agree with Secretary Austin's views?
        Answer. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin.
        Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling
    current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
    control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
        Answer. With the New START Treaty extension secured, if confirmed,
    I anticipate a review of our arms control objectives and approach. The
    pace and scale of our modernization plans would be an important
    consideration in such a review. Maintaining credible and effective
    nuclear forces and pursuing verifiable reductions both contribute to
    strategic stability.
        Question. In your view, at what threshold condition should future
    nuclear arms control regimes be expanded to include China's arsenal, as
    well as those of the United States and Russia?
        Answer. Although China is actively modernizing and appears to be
    significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces, their
    inventory remains much smaller than those of the United States and
    Russia. That said, the reasons China is expanding its nuclear forces,
    and the implications for strategic and regional stability should be
    addressed. For that reason, as we focus on engaging Russia on further
    arms control negotiations, it is important to bring China into either
    United States-Russian structures or into parallel arms control and
    security discussions.
        Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
    accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
    power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
    China on nuclear weapons' reductions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support a review of missile defense
    policy and capabilities to ensure the Department's policy and strategy
    are fully aligned with the priorities of the Administration. I agree we
    should be careful not to impede our ability to defend ourselves against
    missile threats or attacks originating from rogue states. In
    coordination with the Department of State, I would ensure DOD views
    inform any future nuclear arms control negotiations with either Russia
    or China.
                                missile defense
        Question. What component of the OUSD(P) is responsible for Theater
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and
    in your view, what should be done to improve the protection of deployed
    United States and allied forces from growing missile threats in
    operational theaters, particularly from advanced cruise and hypersonic
    missiles?
        Answer. From a broad policy perspective, Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) plays an important role in deterring and mitigating
    adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. I understand
    that multiple offices within OUSD(P) address different aspects of
    regional IAMD. These include defense relationships with allies and
    partners, agreements, future capability development, and contingency
    planning, among others. The relevant offices within OUSD(P) work
    closely with many stakeholders, including the Joint Staff as well as
    Geographic Combatant Commands--especially United States Indo-Pacific
    Command, United States Central Command, and United States European
    Command--on policy aspects related to theater-specific operational
    plans designed to contend against advanced threats such as cruise and
    hypersonic missiles.
        The Air Force announced in December 2020 a Request for Proposals
    (RFP) seeking potential contractors to operate, maintain and integrate
    sensors, kinetic weapons, directed energy systems, and emerging
    technologies for the Air Base Air Defense program. The program would
    protect multiple air bases in the European and Africa Command areas of
    responsibility through a potential $953 Million contract.
        Question. Do you agree that this effort is necessary to protect key
    bases required to deter, and if necessary, defeat Russia in Europe?
        Answer. Although I am not aware of the details of that program, my
    understanding is that air base defense and resiliency are critical
    areas in need of capability investment and modernization, both for the
    Air Force and the Army, given the Army's designated role in integrated
    air and missile defense. Protecting air bases is key to ensuring the
    Air Force can generate and sustain combat power in support of broader
    joint force operations in the air, on the ground, and at sea.
        Question. Should there be a parallel effort in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. My understanding is that air base defense and resiliency
    are critical priorities in the Indo-Pacific region as well. I cannot
    speak to the specific merits of the Air Base Air Defense program.
    However, the Department must properly address air and missile threats
    to U.S. Forces and bases in the Indo-Pacific theater in order to deter
    aggression credibly and reassure allies and partners.
        Question. If confirmed as USD(P), what would be your priorities for
    U.S. missile defense capabilities for the Homeland?
        Answer. The United States is currently defended from existing
    intercontinental missile threats posed by rogue States by the Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which includes 44 ground-based
    interceptors and a global network of sensors and command and control
    elements. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to
    these components of our Homeland missile defense architecture to
    address evolving rogue State missile threats. We must have an effective
    missile defense that defends the United States and its allies and
    partners.
        Question. Do you support the current plan for modernizing the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GBMD) system, which anticipates the
    deployment of a Next Generation Interceptor in about a decade?
        Answer. Defense of the United States against rogue state threats is
    a DOD priority, and missile defense is a central component of this
    mission. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our
    missile defense architecture. I would review missile defense concepts,
    programs, and capabilities in light of the Administration's broader
    defense strategy. I agree that we should prioritize an effective system
    to improve our limited missile defense capability against rogue States,
    and we should minimize the risks of delay or cost growth.
        Question. In your view, what should we be doing to improve
    protection of the Homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles in the
    interim?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to develop effective and
    affordable solutions responsive to evolving missile threats to the U.S.
    Homeland, including our ongoing modernization efforts to improve the
    current deployed Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. I will
    need to review particular concepts, programs, and capabilities to be
    able to advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on specific courses
    of action to improve the protection of the Homeland.
        Question. What is your assessment of the importance of a space-
    based sensor capability to support both regional and Homeland missile
    defense scenarios?
        Answer. Space-based sensors are a vital component of missile
    defense, enabling a variety of capabilities such as detection,
    tracking, and targeting through all phases of flight for an incoming
    missile. In addition, space-based sensors provide hit and kill
    assessments of engagements. Space-based sensors are key for maintaining
    persistent coverage against a range of threats, including advanced
    threats such as hypersonic missiles.
        Question. Do you support the policy--reiterated by the 2019 Missile
    Defense Review--that the United States should continue to rely on
    nuclear deterrence to defend against large-scale missile attack from
    Russia and China?
        Answer. I support longstanding United States policy to rely on
    nuclear deterrence to safeguard the United States against large-scale
    strategic missile threats from Russia and China.
        Question. In your view, what is the relationship between missile
    defense and nuclear deterrence?
        Answer. The relationship between U.S. missile defense and the U.S.
    nuclear arsenal is complementary--both capabilities are essential to
    deterring an attack against the United States. U.S. nuclear weapons
    present a credible threat of response to a nuclear attack or threat of
    attack, while United States missile defenses provide deterrence and, if
    necessary, damage limitation against a limited nuclear attack by a
    rogue state such as North Korea. Extended deterrence provides assurance
    to our allies and partners who are also critical to contributing to
    nonproliferation goals, and strengthening regional and global security.
                                     space
        Question. The 2020 Defense Space Strategy highlighted that China
    and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and
    fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold United States and allied
    space operations and activities at risk, even as they push for
    international agreements on the non-weaponization of space.
        Answer. In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the
    strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space?
        The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) accurately provides a
    broad overview of the strategic environment as it pertains to the space
    domain. The NDS highlights the growing threats to our national security
    interests arising from strategic competition with China and Russia, as
    well as the importance of working with our allies and partners. The
    2020 Defense Space Strategy provides additional detail on the growing
    space and counterspace threats posed by China and Russia, as well as
    the growth of allied, partner, and commercial space capabilities.
        Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
    the 2018 NDS as it relates to the domain of space and the 2020 Defense
    Space Strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to assess current DOD readiness
    to implement the 2018 National Defense Strategy as it relates to space
    and the 2020 Defense Space Strategy. I would first determine the state
    of readiness of our personnel and the resilience of our space-based
    systems to address current and anticipated challenges. I would work
    across the Department, including with the U.S. Space Command and the
    U.S. Space Force, to ensure the readiness and resilience of our forces
    across all domains in order to protect and secure our Homeland and U.S.
    interests.
        Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
    U.S. national security space satellites?
        Answer. Growing Chinese and Russian counterspace activities present
    the most significant threats to United States national security space
    satellites, as well as to allied and partner space activities. Both
    China and Russia view space as critical to modern warfare and see
    United States reliance on space as a vulnerability to target. They view
    the use of counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. military
    effectiveness and to win future wars. Iran and North Korea also have
    demonstrated some counterspace capabilities that threaten, to a lesser
    extent than those of China and Russia, United States, allied, and
    partner space satellites.
        Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
    commercial space systems owned by U.S. companies? What are the
    Department's responsibilities in defense of U.S commercial assets in
    space? If confirmed, would you support the development of offensive and
    defensive space control capabilities to counter threats against such
    assets?
        Answer. I do not expect adversaries to discriminate in peacetime or
    in the event of conflict between military and commercial satellites
    that support the military. Chinese and Russian counterspace
    capabilities are the most significant threats to both national security
    and United States commercial space systems.
        DOD responsibilities to defend commercial capabilities would be a
    function of the particular circumstances and the law. If confirmed, I
    would seek to understand the extent to which DOD has the capacity and
    the authority to defend U.S. commercial assets in space, and the
    situations in which DOD might be called upon to defend commercial
    capabilities.
        Yes. Other nations are developing space and counterspace
    capabilities that are contesting the ability of the United States and
    our allies and partners to operate freely in the domain. The
    development of both offensive and defensive space capabilities is
    needed for an effective U.S. strategy to deter and counter hostile use
    of space, and to provide freedom of operation in, from, and to the
    space domain.
        The United States is increasingly dependent on space, both
    economically and militarily--from the Global Positioning System on
    which many industrial and military capabilities rely, to the missile
    warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power
    competitors are making concerted efforts to leap ahead of U.S.
    technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting
    domain.
        Question. Do you believe that the creation of the Space Force and
    SPACECOM was warranted? If so, do you recommend changes in the
    structure, authorities, and missions of these organizations?
        Answer. Yes. The creation of the U.S. Space Force and the U.S.
    Space Command was supported by recommendations from numerous
    independent commissions and studies over a number of years and across
    multiple Congresses and Administrations. These commissions and studies
    examined the expanding challenges in the space domain, how to address
    them, and how to adapt our defense space enterprise and grow our
    capacity to secure the Nation's vital interests in space. I understand
    this work led to the bipartisan support for creating the U.S. Space
    Force and the U.S Space Command.
        If confirmed, I would assess whether changes to the structure,
    authorities, and missions of the U.S. Space Force and the U.S. Space
    Command are necessary to advance national security. I would work to
    enhance the integration of the U.S. Space Force and the U.S. Space
    Command with other Military Services and Combatant Commands, and with
    other stakeholders within the Department. The integration of space
    within the national security enterprise would be an important focus
    area.
        Question. Do you believe other services should maintain organic
    space capability or should those capabilities transfer to Space Force?
        Answer. I understand that with the establishment of the U.S. Space
    Force, the majority of DOD space capabilities were transferred to the
    new Military Service. However, I also understand that some organic
    space capabilities remained with the other Military Services to support
    their designated functions and forces. If confirmed, I would review the
    current state of the defense space enterprise and assess if there is a
    need to move any additional capabilities to advance the effectiveness
    and efficiency of the Joint Force in addressing growing security
    challenges in space.
        Question. Do you believe the Dept of the Air Force is adequately
    funded to handle both Space Force and Air Force or should there be a
    TOA increase--if so, where should that come from and how should ``pass
    through'' be handled?
        Answer. As part of strengthening U.S. military advantages, it is
    critical to resource key space capabilities in the face of growing
    threats, particularly to ensure U.S. use of space and to have the
    ability to deny hostile uses of space by competitors and potential
    adversaries whose forces are increasingly enabled from space. Though I
    am not currently privy to the budget details, if confirmed, I would
    ensure Policy exercises its important role in support of overseeing the
    budget process and the development of Secretary-level guidance that
    helps ensure the Military Services' appropriate resourcing levels for
    capability development in space and other domains.
        Question. In your view, how could the U.S. Space Force and SPACECOM
    exploit commercial and small launch options to allow for more rapid
    replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems,
    while minimizing risk of mission failure?
        Answer. The Department of Defense utilizes commercial space launch
    systems in situations where there is a match to mission requirements.
    Responsive launch, which is a small subset of the entire responsive
    space architecture, can enhance threat deterrence against potential
    adversaries and promote space mission assurance. I understand that the
    Department is in the process of developing tactically responsive launch
    requirements that could further capitalize on commercial innovation. If
    confirmed, I would work with the U.S. Space Force and the U.S. Space
    Command to identify how to utilize commercial technology in launch and
    other space applications most effectively to meet warfighting and
    mission assurance requirements.
        Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the
    availability of sufficient frequency spectrum that is becoming scarce.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Military
    Departments and Services, the Joint Staff, and other components of DOD
    to ensure that the Department's frequency spectrum requirements are
    accounted for and protected in interagency discussions about potential
    spectrum auctions?
        Answer. The modern electromagnetic environment is increasingly
    congested, contested, and constrained. Adversary actions, commercial
    development, and regulatory constraints impede U.S. forces' freedom of
    action in the electromagnetic spectrum. Ensuring that freedom of action
    will require policies that balance important U.S. economic development
    objectives, while preserving military capabilities and limiting
    constraints on the use of those capabilities. If confirmed, I would
    work alongside DOD's Chief Information Officer to ensure DOD's access
    to critical spectrum, including by strengthening our commercial,
    interagency, and international partnerships to promote interoperability
    and spectrum access policies that support the U.S. military in
    conducting its full range of global operations.
        The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2020 not only created a new Military
    Service dedicated to the space domain, but also created an Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Space Policy to serve as the senior civilian
    official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense charged with
    oversight of military and interagency space policy and operations.
        Question. Do you believe such a position is needed? If so, and if
    confirmed, what steps would you take to fill this position immediately
    and what qualifications would you require of a nominee?
        Answer. Yes. I understand the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Space Policy is responsible for providing expertise and capacity to
    support the Secretary of Defense in setting defense strategy and policy
    for the space domain and in carrying out other civilian oversight
    functions with respect to both the U.S. Space Force and the U.S. Space
    Command. Additionally, as a direct report to the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, this official has important responsibilities in
    leading the Department's international space cooperation activities
    with allies and partners and in supporting the Department of State's
    diplomatic efforts regarding space security.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would advise the Secretary of Defense that
    he work with the President to select a nominee the Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, who has leadership
    experience in developing and executing national defense policy and
    strategy, who understands space systems and the inter-relationships
    between space operations and total force operations, and who has
    demonstrated success in developing international partnerships with our
    allies and partners. I would ask the acting leadership for a briefing
    on what actions have been taken to establish and organize the ASD for
    Space Policy office and ask for their assessment regarding the
    appropriate resourcing and scope of responsibilities for that office
    regarding space, space-related, and other advanced technology missions,
    taking into account the overall structure of the Policy organization.
                          cyber policy and authorities
        Question. The September 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy charges DOD to
    ``defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for
    war'' to compete, deter, and win in the cyber domain. The NDAA for
    fiscal year explicitly provided that military operations in cyberspace
    may be conducted as traditional military activities as defined in the
    covert action statute. In addition, NSPM-13 streamlined the interagency
    process for reviewing and approving military cyber effects operations.
    These changes have led to increased operations by U.S. Cyber Command,
    including operations to defend the United States from interference in
    the 2018 and 2020 elections.
        Answer. Do you believe that the DOD Cyber Strategy, congressional
    affirmation of traditional military operations in cyberspace, and
    current approval and oversight processes for cyber effects operations
    are appropriate and should be sustained, or if confirmed, would you
    recommend they be altered? Please explain your answer.
        It is my understanding that these policy measures have resulted in
    well-coordinated, risk-managed, and timely DOD cyber operations. If I
    am confirmed, I intend to review these measures, and I will confirm
    that oversight is adequate and that the Department remains fully
    transparent with Congress as we ensure that DOD is able to perform its
    mission effectively in cyberspace.
        The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021 established the position of National
    Cyber Director to improve coordination and integration across the
    government in developing cyberspace strategy, policy, plans, and
    resource allocation.
        Question. How do you envision DOD supporting the National Cyber
    Director?
        Answer. Cyber is inherently a team sport, and I welcome all efforts
    to ensure that our Nation's networks and infrastructure are resilient
    and secure. I look forward to working within the Administration in
    implementing this initiative.
        Question. How do you plan to work with the DOD Principal Cyber
    Advisor and the Military Service Principal Cyber Advisors in the
    coordination of cyber policy and the many cyber initiatives across the
    DOD?
        The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for
    developing and overseeing implementation of DOD's strategy and policy.
    The Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) plays an important role in providing
    independent advice to the SecDef on cyber policy, programs, plans, and
    budgeting as well as in managing the implementation of the DOD Cyber
    Strategy, thus executing a largely internally facing function in
    assessing and coordinating DOD plans, programs, and functions.
        I understand the important role that the PCA plays across the
    Department and in overseeing the implementation of the DOD Cyber
    Strategy. That the PCA is dual-hatted as the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security is important, because
    it ensures close collaboration between those in Policy responsible for
    drafting the DOD Cyber Strategy and those responsible for overseeing
    its implementation. If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, I would work closely with him or her to develop and implement a
    practicable cyber strategy, provide effective oversight of U.S. Cyber
    Command, and ensure that the Department's externally facing functions
    and policy are compatible with its internal plans and programs.
        Recent cyber notifications from the Department for sensitive cyber
    military operations, as required by law, have become increasingly vague
    and do not provide enough information for the committee to perform
    adequate oversight of these operations.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to improve these cyber
    operations notifications?
        Answer. I understand that the Department, in accordance with
    Section 395 of Title 10, U.S. Code, notifies the congressional defense
    committees within 48 hours of completing sensitive military cyber
    operations. If confirmed, I will work with DOD components to improve
    these notifications by providing as much additional information as
    possible when appropriate.
        Question. Are there steps other than improving the written
    notifications that you would take, if confirmed, to help Congress
    perform oversight of these critical operations?
        Answer. I am committed to the principle of congressional oversight
    and, if confirmed, I would work with the Department to deliver
    informative and timely quarterly cyber operations briefings (as
    required by Section 484 of Title 10, U.S. Code) and the annual military
    cyberspace operations reports (as required by Section 1644 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020) so that
    Congress has the information needed to oversee military cyber
    operations effectively.
                   cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
        Question. The CTR Program is widening its aperture to include
    biological weapons and capabilities as well as biological surveillance
    and early warning, and encouraging the development of capabilities to
    reduce proliferation threats.
        Do you support these DOD activities under the CTR program
    generally?
        Answer. I am supportive of the Department of Defense's activities
    under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. I understand that
    the program has delivered significant benefits for U.S. security since
    the early 1990s. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the program's
    efficacy and clear prioritization to address threat reduction
    objectives, consistent with national and Departmental strategy.
        Question. Do you believe the shift in focus to biological programs
    is an effective use of CTR resources? Why or why not?
        Answer. I understand DOD has a process to assess WMD threats
    worldwide and prioritize CTR investments accordingly. If confirmed, I
    look forward to learning more about this process and ensuring CTR
    resources are aligned with DOD and interagency priorities and
    coordinated with our allies and partners.
                               pandemic response
        Question. Based on the Ebola outbreak in Liberia and the current
    COVID-19 outbreak around the world, what attributes do you believe the
    Department of Defense can bring to bear to fight a global pandemic here
    and abroad? Please be specific.
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD capabilities to support the
    response to public health crises include providing transportation and
    logistics; bio-surveillance with associated training; medical
    countermeasures, such as personnel protective equipment (PPE),
    therapeutics, and vaccines; laboratory support, such as diagnostics and
    genetic sequencing; sample-collection training; virtual training of
    healthcare workers to identify symptoms; and training of healthcare
    workers in the proper use of PPE. In the United States, the Department
    is responding to requests from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) by providing support to FEMA- and State-run vaccination centers
    and by providing medical expertise to areas in need, and DOD is
    participating fully in the Department of Health and Human Services
    (HHS)-DOD Task Force. If confirmed, I commit to supporting Secretary
    Austin in his efforts to fight COVID-19 here and abroad.
                                     china
        Question. Is the current posture of U.S. Forces in the Indo-Pacific
    region sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. A more resilient and distributed force posture in the Indo-
    Pacific region is essential to the U.S. military's ability to deter
    and, if necessary, deny adversary aggression against ourselves, allies,
    and partners. If confirmed, I will work with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
    the Military Departments and Services, and other U.S. departments and
    agencies to ensure that our Indo-Pacific region posture is optimized to
    deter aggression, reassure allies and partners, and prevail in
    conflict.
        Question. In your view, is the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI),
    established and authorized at $2.2 billion in the Fiscal Year 2021
    NDAA, a useful tool to improve U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative can be a powerful tool to
    highlight and track the substantial investments that the Department of
    Defense is making to maintain a credible conventional deterrent in the
    Indo-Pacific region. These investments include more lethal and
    survivable capabilities; a more resilient and distributed force
    posture; improved capabilities for allies and partners; and enhanced
    innovation, experimentation, and training for the joint force.
        Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
    could make that would implement the NDS and enable a more favorable
    balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. The development of Joint and Service operational concepts
    help identify needed capability and capacity investments. If confirmed,
    I pledge to examine the Department's work in this area, including the
    development of capabilities such as long range fires, integrated fires
    networks, more robust space and cyber capabilities, and power
    projection in highly contested environments.
        Question. What are your views on potentially increasing the number
    of forces west of the International Date Line and the balance of
    increased risk to the force against the need for more forward stationed
    troops?
        Answer. A combat-credible forward posture is essential to the U.S.
    military's ability to deter and, if necessary, deny adversary
    aggression. However, distributed and resilient forward posture must be
    combined with new warfighting concepts; modernized, highly capable, and
    ready forces; and capable allied and partner forces in order to fulfill
    their strategic role.
        Question. In your view, how should U.S. operational concepts, force
    posture, and investments adapt to counter the shifting maritime balance
    in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. The development of joint operational concepts should help
    identify gaps or shortfalls in force design and posture, which then
    drive investment recommendations to counter the operational challenges
    posed by our most capable adversaries. If confirmed, I will review the
    Department's concept development work to ensure it fully considers
    where changes in force posture and investments may be necessary.
        Question. Do you think the Department needs a Joint Operational
    Concept, that is--a theory of victory for a specific threat in a
    specific geographic region in a specific timeframe--for the Indo-
    Pacific, and if so, what should the Department be doing to develop that
    Operational Concept?
        Answer. Yes, a joint operational concept, and likely supporting
    concepts, are important to describe how the future force may be
    employed during a conflict, and to inform future force development
    priorities. Given strategic competitors' increased military capability
    and stated military objectives, joint concept development should
    initially focus on defeating aggression in the Indo-Pacific region, and
    should be underpinned by analysis of specific operational problems. If
    confirmed, working closely with other Departmental components, I will
    ensure that joint operational concepts align with a theory of victory
    for achieving strategic and political objectives in a potential war in
    the Indo-Pacific theater, to ensure that the Department can more
    effectively link strategic ends, ways, and means for priority, future
    armed conflicts.
        Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
    presence overseas, including its base in Djibouti and other
    infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?
        Answer. China seeks a more robust overseas logistics and basing
    infrastructure to allow the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to project
    and sustain military power at greater distances. Beyond its current
    base in Djibouti, Chinais likely considering additional overseas
    military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces.
    Locations likely considered for PLA military logistics facilities
    include Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
    the UAE, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. PLA
    personnel at the facility in Djibouti have interfered with United
    States flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, and the PRC has
    sought to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base. These
    actions highlight that a global PLA military logistics network could
    interfere with United States and ally and partner military operations
    and eventually support offensive operations by China.
        Question. What non-military activities and resources do you believe
    are necessary to effectively address the challenge posed by China? Do
    you believe these current activities are sufficient?
        Answer. Secretary Austin has identified challenges posed by China
    as the Department's pacing challenge in most areas. The Department of
    Defense has an important role in meeting these challenges, but it
    cannot do so alone. I believe that the United States must use all
    elements of its national power, including the full range of diplomatic,
    economic, and intelligence efforts, as well as activities conducted by
    other departments and agencies, to address the complex challenges posed
    by China. Non-military activities and resources are vital to
    maintaining peace and deterring aggression, strengthening our alliances
    and partnerships, promoting prosperity for the American people, and
    advancing United States national interests in the Indo-Pacific region
    and elsewhere. If confirmed, I will work in close coordination with
    other departments and agencies to help ensure DOD's efforts to address
    the challenges posed by China are conducted within a whole-of-
    government approach.
        Answer. I do not believe that the United States is sufficiently
    leveraging all of the non-military instruments of national power within
    a unified and integrated approach to address the challenges posed by
    China. It is vital that non-DOD departments and agencies have robust
    capabilities and sufficient resources to address the complex, and
    growing, non-military challenges posed by China and other actors.
    Additionally, closer alignment of DOD activities with interagency
    efforts can enhance our engagements with allies and partners and
    improve outcomes for the United States. If confirmed, I will work to
    ensure that DOD conducts its activities in close coordination with
    other departments and agencies, and will advocate for other departments
    and agencies to receive the resources necessary while improving return
    on investment for DOD initiatives to address the challenges our nation
    faces.
        Question. Do you support the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
    (DPRI), including the realignment of some United States Marines from
    Okinawa to Guam and the build-up of facilities at other locations, such
    as Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan?
        Answer. I support the continued implementation of the realignment
    plan known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), as it is the
    bilaterally determined way forward. The realignment of Marine Corps
    forces on Okinawa and the main islands of Japan, including the
    establishment of a strong presence on the United States territory of
    Guam, is fundamental to the Department's effort to achieve an improved
    Indo-Pacific defense posture, contributing to a free and open Indo-
    Pacific region. If confirmed, I will ensure the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy remains regularly engaged with United
    States Indo-Pacific Command, the Military Departments and Services, and
    the Department of State to adapt proactively and adjust U.S. access and
    joint presence to the realities of great power competition, and to
    ensure our posture is optimized for deterrence of adversaries, ally and
    partner assurance, and warfighting, if necessary.
        Question. The United States has sought to clarify and strengthen
    its policy with respect to China's maritime claims in the South China
    Sea. What new steps would you recommend the United States put in place,
    both unilaterally and in coordination with allies and partners, to
    counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the South China Sea
    and Southeast Asia more broadly?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my interagency colleagues,
    and with United States allies and partners, to respond to China's
    coercive and destabilizing behavior in the South China Sea and to
    uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our approach should be
    based on maintaining a strong and stabilizing military presence in the
    region, to deter aggression and coercion and to reassure our allies and
    partners. In addition, I would look at ways to use security cooperation
    more effectively to build partner capacity and reduce vulnerability and
    coercion. Lastly, I would support a whole-of-government effort that
    includes renewed focus on cooperation with our Indo-Pacific region
    allies and partners, including combined military exercises and
    operations, expanded economic engagement, and reinvigorated diplomacy.
        Question. What are the United States' responsibilities under the
    Taiwan Relations Act? What policy recommendations do you have regarding
    United States support to Taiwan?
        Answer. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) sets forth United States
    policy on Taiwan and establishes our unofficial relationship. The TRA
    also makes clear that the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is a
    United States interest and a matter of international concern. In order
    to ensure the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, it is our
    responsibility to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-
    defense capability. We do so through the regular provision of defense
    articles and services to Taiwan. The Department is also responsible for
    maintaining the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
    force, or other forms of coercion, that would jeopardize Taiwan. If
    confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Department in its
    implementation of U.S. policy, in accordance with the TRA.
        For more than 40 years, our policy has been premised on China's
    continued commitment to the peaceful resolution of differences. China's
    military modernization, alongside the coercive and aggressive military
    actions in the vicinity of Taiwan, presents an increasingly urgent
    challenge to our interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan
    Strait. Therefore, our support for Taiwan must be strong, principled,
    and bipartisan--in line with longstanding United States commitments to
    the the Taiwan Relations Act, Three Communiques, and the Six
    Assurances.
        Question. What kinds of capabilities do you think should be
    priorities for Taiwan to acquire to best deter and, if necessary,
    defend against Chinese aggression?
        Answer. Taiwan should prioritize asymmetric capabilities that are
    mobile, stealthy, survivable, and leverage Taiwan's geography to deter
    and defend against aggression from the People's Republic of China. This
    includes coastal defense cruise missiles, short- and medium-range air
    defense, sea mines, Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms, and
    other asymmetric systems that build Taiwan's resilience and enable
    Taiwan to pose a credible deterrent to invading People's Liberation
    Army (PLA) forces. Taiwan must also prioritize the development and
    implementation of joint doctrine, service interoperability, and
    realistic training for the Taiwan Armed Forces. This includes
    developing a professional non-commissioned officer corps and increasing
    Taiwan's overall readiness. DOD should prioritize and be prepared to
    support these efforts.
        Question. Considering the NDS and China's crackdown on Hong Kong,
    how do you view the United States relationship with Taiwan in the
    context of broader United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. Taiwan is an important partner to the United States and a
    contributor to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan
    is now the United States' 9th largest trading partner. With a
    population of 23 million, Taiwan is a shining example of a robust,
    prosperous, free, and orderly democratic society based on principles of
    the rule of law and respect for human rights. The common bonds and
    shared values of the United States-Taiwan relationship are real, and
    the benefit to the region is clear. The United States has played a role
    in Taiwan's success, and the ``unofficial relationship'' continues to
    advance regional peace and prosperity. A secure and confident Taiwan is
    better able to engage the People's Republic of China constructively,
    which supports everyone's interest in cross-Strait peace and stability.
        In cyberspace, China has far greater capabilities than its regional
    neighbors, who may seek to work with the United States to improve their
    security.
        Question. What are your views on the potential benefits of the
    United States offering cyberspace security assistance in the region?
        Answer. Our community of allies and partners is one of the United
    States' greatest comparative advantages and a crucial component of our
    security. The security and resilience of their networks--especially
    those upon which U.S. forces rely, both in peacetime and in crisis--
    should be a key objective for U.S. strategy in cyberspace. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working to ensure that cyberspace security
    assistance has the focus and resources to be successful.
        Question. In your view, should the United States respond in kind in
    the event that China executes destructive cyber attacks on United
    States critical infrastructure, and should the United States make that
    clear as a component of a declaratory deterrence policy?
        Answer. Consistent with President Biden's statements on the topic,
    there must be consequences when norms of responsible state behavior are
    violated--and destructive attacks on critical infrastructure would be a
    particularly grave example of such violations. Determining how to
    respond to any given cyber attack, particularly ones considered
    destructive, would require case-by-case, fact-specific deliberation. I
    understand that to include a consideration of an incident's effects in
    their totality--and those effects could include injury, death, or
    significant property destruction. Any potential response to such a
    destructive incident would not be limited to the cyberspace domain. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department is postured to
    support whole-of-government responses to any such incidents,
    particularly if they are destructive or target our critical
    infrastructure. Effective deterrence requires this credible commitment,
    in coordination with our allies and partners, to respond effectively to
    perpetrators of such irresponsible activity.
        Question. What is your view of China's pursuit of anti-satellite
    capabilities and what do you see as the long-term implications of such
    developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for
    U.S. interests in space?
        Answer. China's pursuit of anti-satellite capabilities is a central
    element in China's strategy of achieving information dominance in the
    electromagnetic spectrum and denying the spectrum's use to China's
    adversaries; this would enable China to seize and maintain strategic
    initiative in a military conflict. China's strategy underscores the
    importance of a United States space posture that achieves mission
    assurance commensurate with our reliance on capabilities delivered from
    space. Given the enduring importance of space for the United States--
    not just in the military and national security realms, but in all
    aspects of modern life--we must continue to transition to space
    architectures that have resilience against emerging and future threats,
    and we must also be prepared to protect, defend, and reconstitute our
    critical space capabilities.
        Question. To what extent do you believe multilateral engagement is
    important for addressing the challenges posed by China? In your view,
    what are the most important multilateral relationships in the region
    and where are the opportunities to improve multilateral coordination?
        Answer. Multilateral engagements are a critical part of our
    strategy to address the diverse and increasing set of challenges posed
    by China. These engagements, especially among likeminded partners,
    amplifies our voices, helps to pool resources, and establishes and
    enforces rules, norms, and standards. We have long recognized that our
    allies and partners are a key advantage against China's coercion and
    subversion of the international rules-based order. Only by continuing
    to strengthen our global relationships and work through multilateral
    formats will we ensure our collective ability to deter aggression and
    meet shared challenges.
        The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense
    Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM+) is the primary forum through which the
    Department coordinates multilaterally and fosters cooperation. Beyond
    our efforts with ASEAN we also work multilaterally with many of our
    allies and partners to enhance coordination, interoperability, and
    responsiveness. Quadrilateral dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan
    is emerging as another important mechanism to advance shared interests,
    including in support of ASEAN centrality. We will also continue to work
    trilaterally with Australia and Japan and trilaterally with the
    Republic of Korea and Japan. If confirmed, I would continue the
    Department's work to improve coordination with allies and partners
    multilaterally by broadening the scope of issues we discuss, as well as
    by considering new and expanded multilateral groupings.
                                  north korea
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. The security and stability of the Korean Peninsula is
    inextricably tied to regional security and stability. The United States
    remains well-postured to deal with the security threat posed by North
    Korea's continuing development of nuclear and conventional weapons. Our
    web of allies and partners in the region gives us a significant
    advantage as compared to our adversaries. In particular, our
    relationships with the Republic of Korea and Japan provide a powerful
    deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I will look to ensure
    that United States forces have what they need to maintain our robust
    deterrent and readiness posture in Northeast Asia, in close
    collaboration with our regional allies.
        Question. In your view, what should be the United States overall
    strategy to mitigate the threat posed by North Korea to our allies in
    the region and to the United States?
        Answer. As I understand it, the administration is currently in the
    midst of a whole-of-government strategy review to determine its way
    ahead on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Although I
    do not want to presuppose the outcome of the review, I believe that it
    is the role of the Department of Defense to maintain a robust defense
    and deterrence posture, and to ensure that the United States is well-
    positioned with forces and assets throughout the region to detect and
    respond to DPRK threats. This strong defense posture must underpin our
    efforts, irrespective of the outcome of the strategy review, to ensure
    that the United States engages the DPRK from a position of strength. We
    must also continue to pursue robust sanctions enforcement to mitigate
    the nuclear proliferation threat posed by North Korea. If confirmed, I
    will work with stakeholders across the Government, as well as our
    regional partners and allies to strengthen our defense posture,
    reassure our allies, and protect the U.S. Homeland.
        Question. What policy recommendations would you make to ensure
    United States and allied forces can secure weapons of mass destruction
    sites in North Korea in the event of a contingency?
        Answer. United States and ROK [Republic Of Korea] forces must
    maintain a ``fight-tonight'' readiness on the Korean peninsula to deter
    North Korean aggression and to be able to respond quickly and
    effectively should deterrence fail. As you noted, one critical
    component is securing nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    sites in order to prevent the further proliferation of these
    capabilities in a contingency. In order to do this effectively, the
    United States and allies must be able to characterize WMD sites
    accurately and be able secure them safely. I understand the Department
    of Defense (DOD) is improving capabilities that will reduce the threat
    posed by WMD and missile sites in North Korea in the event of a
    contingency, and is working closely with the Republic of Korea to
    execute this mission. If confirmed, I will work closely with our
    operational commanders, intelligence specialists, and resource
    providers in this effort. I will also work closely with my counterparts
    from across the Department to provide the Secretary with integrated
    recommendations to maintain our forces' readiness to deter aggression
    and address contingencies.
        Question. In your view, should the United States force posture on
    the Korean peninsula be adjusted, and if so, how?
        Answer. President Biden recently announced a global posture review
    to ensure that United States forces deployed globally are matched with
    the global threat environment. I do not want to presuppose its outcome.
    What I will say is that our security commitment to the Republic of
    Korea is unshakable and consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty. This
    commitment is not tied to a ``magic number'' of forces, or to a
    specific capability, but rather to a 70-year alliance relationship
    based on common values and people-to-people ties. As President Biden
    said, ``Alliances are our greatest asset.'' Our force posture in South
    Korea ensures our ability to ``fight tonight'' alongside our ROK
    allies, and it is critical to regional stability. If confirmed, I look
    forward to reviewing the objectives of the National Defense Strategy
    and the necessary requirements of our major operational plans across
    the region to ensure that our global force is optimally deployed to
    meet emerging challenges, including those on the Korean Peninsula.
                               republic of korea
        Question. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-South Korean
    security relationship?
        Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is a
    linchpin of peace and security in the region. The resilience of our
    partnership is founded on shared interests and values, which have
    endured for more than 70 years. Our alliance is among the most
    combined, interoperable, capable, and dynamic bilateral alliances in
    the world, and it is a robust deterrent to aggression on the Korean
    Peninsula. It also has evolved beyond a purely military alliance to one
    that reflects mutual respect and encompasses support for free markets,
    civic engagement, people-to-people exchanges, and education. Over a few
    decades, South Korea has gone from being a net security recipient to a
    net security provider in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will
    prioritize working with our ROK allies on identifying and addressing
    future security challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula, including
    robust cooperation in response to Chinese malign activities in the
    region, maintaining the rules-based international order, and capacity
    building for other regional partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
        Question. What is the value to U.S. national security of the United
    States-South Korea alliance?
        Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is
    critical not only to the security of the ROK, but also to the stability
    of the Indo-Pacific region--the Department's priority theater. Given
    the unprecedented challenges posed by both the Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea (DPRK) and China, the United States-ROK alliance has
    never been more important. On North Korea, United States and ROK forces
    have been critical to deterring North Korean aggression for more than
    70 years, and these forces have been postured to respond should
    deterrence fail. This posture provides a credible military force to
    underpin any prospective political or diplomatic efforts to achieve
    final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. However, the ROK
    is also a critical partner for our broader priorities in the region,
    and principal among these priorities is upholding the rules-based
    international order that has underpinned unprecedented global
    prosperity since World War II, including that of the ROK.
        Question. What is your understanding of the United States
    obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea,
    and when United States armed forces should be committed to engage North
    Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
        Answer. The United States obligation to the Republic of Korea in
    the event of an attack, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty, is
    to consult on the best appropriate response and act together in the
    defense of the Republic of Korea. If confirmed, I will remain committed
    to building a posture that is robustly capable of deterring, defending,
    and, if necessary, defeating any adversary that threatens our treaty
    ally.
        Question. Under what conditions should wartime operational control
    be transferred from the United States to the Republic of Korea?
        Answer. Operational Control (OPCON) transition remains conditions-
    based, consistent with the bilaterally determined conditions
    articulated in the OPCON Transition Plan (COT-P). Any transfer of
    wartime operational control must fundamentally strengthen our combined
    defense posture. The conditions set forth in the COT-P were designed to
    do just that--strengthen our combined posture. We cannot take
    shortcuts. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
    Republic of Korea (ROK) to ensure all conditions for OPCON transition
    are met, and that our alliance remains the most interoperable, capable,
    and dynamic bilateral alliance in the world.
        Question. In your view, should United States forces on the Korean
    Peninsula remain focused on defense of South Korea or should United
    States forces in Korea also be available for regional or global
    operations?
        Answer. The United States must maintain operational flexibility to
    ensure that our forces are optimized and ready to meet emerging threats
    to U.S. forces and allies and partners in the region and around the
    world. In order to meet the objectives of the National Defense
    Strategy, the Defense Department will continually consider adjustments
    to every command in every theater to ensure the optimization of our
    global force. If confirmed, I will prioritize a continued evolution of
    our strategic alliance with the ROK to ensure that we are well-postured
    to address new and evolving threats, consistent with our respective
    national-level strategies.
                                     japan
        Question. How would you characterize the United States-Japan
    security relationship?
        Answer. The United States-Japan security relationship is strong,
    resolute, and resilient. We have placed emphasis on broadening the
    scope of the alliance, increasing Japan's role in securing a free and
    open Indo-Pacific region, through bilateral and multilateral efforts.
        Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
    neighbors, predominantly China, North Korea and South Korea, influence
    the United States-Japan relationship?
        Answer. Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are two of our most
    important allies in the Indo-Pacific region. In the face of shared
    challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
    and China, it is critical that there are strong and close relationships
    between and among our three countries. Although we recognize the role
    that history plays in the Japan-ROK relationship, we encourage the
    Republic of Korea and Japan to seek ways to cooperate further through
    bilateral and multilateral activities in security matters, such as the
    United Nations Security Council Resolution enforcement operations
    against North Korean ship-to-ship transfers. We support those efforts.
        Question. What steps should Japan take to become a more active
    partner in security activities with the United States and in the
    international security arena?
        Answer. We are engaged in continuous discussion with our Japanese
    allies on ways in which they can increase their support for regional
    and global security efforts, while acknowledging the legacy regional
    and domestic constraints Japan must consider. We are encouraged that
    the Japan Self Defense Forces are a capable and well-equipped component
    of Japan's steadily growing international presence.
        Question. The current plan is to close the Marine Corps Air Station
    on Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility
    (FRF) at Camp Schwab. In your view, what are the prospects for the
    successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp
    Schwab on Okinawa?
        Answer. The Government of Japan has given us its assurance of the
    commitment to complete the construction of the FRF at Camp Schwab, and
    progress continues. Although delays in the construction are
    disappointing, they are neither unexpected nor particularly unusual.
    Both sides have committed to maintaining the capability of MCAS Okinawa
    until such time that the FRF is operational.
        Question. What areas of security cooperation, such as missile
    defense and space, would you recommend the United States and Japan
    prioritize to improve United States-Japanese interoperability and
    capability?
        Answer. We are very encouraged that Japan has placed special
    emphasis on what it calls the ``new domains'' of cyber, space, and
    electromagnetic operations. Additionally, we consider Japan to be a
    premier partner in missile defense cooperation. At the same time, we
    are encouraging Japan to focus on the readiness and sustainability and
    modernization of its regular ground, maritime, and air forces. In
    short, we are cooperating in improving the capabilities of the alliance
    across the entire spectrum of operations.
                                     india
        Question. What would be your strategy, if confirmed, for bolstering
    the overall defense relationship between the United States and India?
    What specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to operationalize India's
    status as a ``Major Defense Partner'' by positioning the United States
    and Indian militaries to cooperate more closely to advance shared
    interests in the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, I would support
    efforts to strengthen interoperability; expand bilateral and
    multilateral security cooperation across the region; and deepen defense
    trade and technology sharing. I also would leverage regular senior-
    level bilateral and multilateral engagements with likeminded partners
    to bolster the relationship.
        To continue elevating the United States-India partnership, I would
    prioritize a few promising areas of cooperation. These include
    deepening information-sharing and mutual logistics operations; growing
    our defense trade and technology relationship; and expanding high-end
    cooperation in the maritime domain, including in the Indian Ocean
    region and in Southeast Asia. Importantly, I also would seek to expand
    multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners in the region,
    including through the Quad, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
    (ASEAN) mechanisms, and other regional engagements.
        Question. In your view, what is the significance of the recent
    China-India border clashes?
        Answer. The India-China border tensions reflect a concerning trend
    of growing aggressiveness and assertiveness by China in the region,
    including toward allies and partners of the United States. We will
    continue to stand by our allies and partners and support their ongoing
    efforts to de-escalate the situation. If confirmed, I will continue to
    monitor the situation closely as both parties work toward peaceful
    resolution.
        Question. What would be your priorities for United States foreign
    military sales to India?
        Answer. The past decade has seen promising trends in the United
    States-India defense trade and technology relationship, and, if
    confirmed, I will work to sustain these trends, including through a
    focus on major procurements and high-end technology.
                          republic of the philippines
        Question. What is your view of U. S.-Philippine military-to-
    military relations?
        Answer. The Philippines is a treaty ally, and we have a long
    history of mutual defense cooperation dating back to World War II. The
    Mutual Defense Treaty and other bilateral defense agreements provide
    the foundation for the defense relationship and enable critical U.S.
    military support, presence, and interoperability. I also understand the
    United States provides important support to combat terrorism in the
    southern Philippines.
        Question. What should be the U. S. security goals in the Republic
    of the Philippines?
        Answer. The United States and the Philippines share the goal of
    upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region that supports peace,
    stability, and economic opportunity. If confirmed, I would continue to
    prioritize partnering with the Philippines on maritime security,
    counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and defense institution
    building. Expanding defense cooperation in these areas would build our
    respective capabilities and increase interoperability between our
    forces.
        Question. Would you recommend steps to promote defense cooperation
    and preserve future geostrategic options despite short-term
    authoritarian government trends in the Philippines? If so, please
    explain.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support continued defense cooperation
    with the Philippines as critical to our shared goals of advancing a
    free and open Indo-Pacific region. In its alliances, the United States
    seeks ways to encourage the Philippines' respect the rule of law and
    human rights.
                                    thailand
        Question. What is your view on the importance of the United States-
    Thai alliance?
        Answer. The United States-Thai alliance is critical to supporting a
    free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our longstanding defense cooperation
    and Thailand's role as a regional transit point facilitate U.S.
    presence in the region.
        Question. What recommendations would you have for strengthening the
    Thai alliance?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to strengthen interoperability,
    professional military education and training, and regional cooperation,
    including in the maritime domain, with Thailand.
                                    vietnam
        Question. What, in your view, are the best opportunities for
    increased defense cooperation with Vietnam?
        Answer. The United States and Vietnam share a common interest in
    upholding a rules-based, free and open order in the Indo-Pacific
    region, including Southeast Asia. If confirmed, I would continue
    efforts to strengthen defense cooperation with Vietnam, particularly in
    the areas of maritime security, cyber security, defense trade,
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping
    operations.
        Question. Do you agree that addressing war legacy issues, including
    through new cooperative arrangements, is essential for United States-
    Vietnam defense relations?
        Answer. The United States' decades-long cooperation with Vietnam on
    legacy-of-war issues and Missing in Action (MIA) accounting is a
    foundation of our defense relationship. If confirmed, I would be open
    to considering ways to expand this engagement so that we can reconcile
    the past and continue building a cooperative future.
                                   indonesia
        Question. What is your view of the current state of military-to-
    military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?
        Answer. Defense relations between the United States and Indonesia
    are strong. Where possible, I understand that we plan to increase the
    scale and complexity of our engagements to bolster our bilateral
    relationship and strengthen the Indonesian military's ability to defend
    its territory. I understand that, in consultation with Congress, the
    Department of Defense is planning for a limited resumption of training
    with KOPASSUS Unit 81, which will include a focus on human rights, in
    an effort to help cultivate the next generation of Indonesian leaders.
        Question. Do you favor more United States-Indonesian military-to-
    military contacts and under what conditions?
        Answer. Yes, I do favor more interactions between the U.S and
    Indonesian militaries, particularly those interactions that contribute
    to a free and open Indo-Pacific region, help Indonesia protect its
    sovereignty, and promote the Indonesian military's respect for human
    rights and its role in Indonesia's democracy.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for
    human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the focus on human rights
    and accountability in interactions with senior Indonesian leaders, and
    would urge the same emphasis in all military engagements.
                                     russia
        Question. What do you believe are the greatest challenges for
    United States-Russia security relations?
        Answer. Relations between the United States and Russia may have
    reached an all-time low since the end of the Cold War. If we are unable
    to re-establish Russia's understanding of and compliance with
    international norms and acceptable behavior in the international arena,
    the relationship will continue to decline. Reconstructing this baseline
    of norms will be challenging, but it is a prerequisite to any
    sustainable normalization of relations between our countries.
        Question. How would you describe the central objectives of United
    States security strategy regarding Russia?
        Answer. I understand that President Biden and the national security
    team are developing an approach to Russia that includes holding them
    accountable for their pattern of malign behavior and actions, including
    the recent SolarWinds intrusion, NotPetya, and other malicious cyber
    activity around the world. I personally think that the Department would
    want to ensure that any approach to Russia should maintain its military
    edge, including investing in the force posture and capabilities
    necessary to continue to deter Russia from attacking our Homeland or
    our allies through military means. In addition to the paramount
    concerns of conventional and nuclear defense, Russia has shown that it
    has the ability and intent to target the sources of American strength.
    We must do more to defend the American way of life, our economy, our
    people, and our democratic institutions from all states that would seek
    to undermine them, including Russia.
        Question. Where do United States and Russian security interests
    align and where do they diverge?
        Answer. Russia behavior indicates it seeks to undermine and
    overturn the rules-based international order established during the
    post-World War II period. From its blatant disregard for the
    sovereignty of its neighbors, to using chemical weapons to murder
    dissidents around the world, persistent cyber attacks against its
    neighbors and Russia's contempt for the international rules of the road
    makes Americans less safe. Over the past four years, it has expanded
    its military footprint abroad, largely by taking advantage of crises.
    This strategic orientation is largely incompatible with the principles
    of democratic societies governed by the rule of law.
        Still, there are a few basic areas where our interests may overlap.
    Russia's foremost security interest is the survival of the Putin
    regime, and so ensuring strategic stability and minimizing the risk of
    unintended escalation across all domains that could lead to
    conventional or nuclear warfare remains a common imperative.
        Question. How do EUCOM and NATO activities fit into a ``whole-of-
    government'' approach to deterring Russian aggression?
        Answer. My understanding is that United States European Command
    (USEUCOM) and NATO continue to provide a powerful deterrent to Russian
    aggression with forward-postured, combat-credible forces, demonstrating
    both capability and capacity to respond decisively to any threat. These
    forces also complement broader whole-of-government initiatives to build
    partner capacity to resist and respond to Russian malign actions. If
    confirmed, I will review Department of Defense authorities, resources,
    and policies to ensure that DOD is optimally positioned to support U.S.
    whole-of-government efforts.
        Question. What do you see as the role of forward-deployed United
    States forces in Europe in deterring Russian aggression against our
    NATO allies and partners?
        Answer. United States forces in Europe are a tangible signal of the
    United States commitment to the collective security of the NATO
    Alliance. Although the United States demonstrates combat-credibility of
    our forces with our force presence and unilateral exercises in the
    region; our support and integration with NATO activities, exercises,
    and security cooperation programs provide the greatest deterrent to
    Russian adventurism and aggression. United States presence and training
    provide lethal, resilient, and agile formations and demonstrate the
    alliance's combat-credible capability and capacity to operate
    throughout Europe.
        Question. What is your view of Russia-China relations?
        Answer. Russia and China collaborate in the economic, diplomatic,
    and military/security arenas. Although they do not agree on everything,
    Russia and China align when it suits them. Each poses different
    challenges to the United States and has different motivations for its
    actions. But both countries seek to shape a world consistent with their
    authoritarian model, gaining leverage over other nations' economic,
    diplomatic, and security decisions. Both nations undermine global
    security and the rules-based order by undercutting such basic values as
    liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. They share a preference for
    a world in which the United States and its allies and partners are
    weaker, less unified, and less influential. Together with allies and
    partners, we must be vigilant and united in opposing their malign
    action and influence.
        Question. In your assessment, does the DOD currently have a mature
    joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
    sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD
    capabilities? If not, what changes should be implemented?
        Answer. My understanding is the Department is developing a Joint
    Warfighting Concept, which aims to address this issue. If confirmed, I
    will review this effort, and provide my assessment and recommendations
    to the Secretary of Defense.
        If confirmed and if required, I will work within the Department to
    assess the need for and then identify how to implement updates to our
    concept of operations and related capabilities.
        Question. In your view, what are the key elements of an effective
    strategy to counter Russian hybrid warfare?
        Answer. Russia has responded to United States and NATO conventional
    capability overmatch by tailoring an asymmetric approach at every point
    across the spectrum from competition to conflict. Russian hybrid
    warfare injects uncertainty and risk into the modern competitive
    landscape. An effective strategy to counter Russian hybrid warfare
    requires that DOD innovate and operationalize our irregular warfare
    toolkit, as part of a broader interagency strategy that integrates all
    elements of United States Government power and authorities, at both the
    strategic and operational levels, to compete with Russia across the
    spectrum.
                      arms control agreements with russia
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of arms
    control in the United States security strategy regarding Russia?
        Answer. If negotiated effectively, arms control agreements can
    enhance U.S. national security. Any future arms control agreement with
    Russia must strengthen deterrence and provide assurance to our allies
    and partners. It should also be verifiable and increase transparency
    and predictability with regard to Russian nuclear forces that are
    currently not subject to any arms control agreement.
        Question. How can DOD mitigate any negative consequences associated
    with U.S. withdrawal from the INF and Open Skies treaties, and reassure
    NATO allies?
        Answer. After consultations with allies, the United States withdrew
    from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the
    Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020 following years of Russian violations.
    The United States should continue to coordinate closely with allies and
    key partners on the intermediate-range systems Russia produced and
    deployed in violation of the INF Treaty, and on increasing military
    transparency in Europe and Eurasia through other important confidence-
    and security-building mechanisms.
        Question. Do you support mutually-agreed reductions in tactical
    nuclear weapons?
        Answer. Addressing the increasing disparity between the United
    States and Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons is a
    national security imperative. One way to do this is through concluding
    an effective and verifiable arms control agreement. The U.S. Senate
    recognized this imperative in a condition to its resolution of
    ratification for the New START Treaty. If confirmed, I commit to
    working to fulfill that condition in a way that enhances the national
    security of the United States and its allies and partners.
        Question. Do you believe that U.S. missile defenses should be
    considered in any future arms control negotiations?
        Answer. This Administration has made clear that it remains
    committed to effective arms control. The extension of the New START
    Treaty increases the national security of the United States and its
    allies and partners. The extension is just the beginning, not the end,
    of President Biden's efforts to engage Russia and other countries to
    reduce threats from Russia and other countries. If confirmed, I will
    work to ensure DOD has a role in any forthcoming reviews of missile
    defense and nuclear arms control.
                   north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
        Question. In your assessment, does the NATO Alliance continue to
    benefit the national security interests of the United States?
        Answer. Yes. NATO is the bedrock of enduring transatlantic security
    and serves as the bulwark of our shared values of democracy, individual
    liberty, and the rule of law.
        Question. How important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S.
    commitment to its obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic
    Treaty?
        Answer. U.S. commitment to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North
    Atlantic Treaty is vital to U.S. strategic interests. This shared
    commitment among NATO Allies is the cornerstone of the NATO's strength
    and has helped safeguard our way of life for decades.
        Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
    the NATO Alliance in the coming years and what do you perceive are the
    greatest challenges?
        Answer. NATO's essential strategic objectives remain its ability to
    deter aggression, defend Allied populations and territory if deterrence
    fails, and project stability beyond NATO's borders. NATO's greatest
    challenges include maintaining unity and ensuring ready forces and
    capabilities.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current levels of Allied
    contributions to burden sharing and should our Allies do more to meet
    their commitments on defense spending and procurement?
        Answer. I am encouraged that the Alliance is entering its seventh
    consecutive year of growth in defense spending. We must continue to
    build on this progress to fulfill the 2014 Wales Summit Defense
    Investment Pledge. Defense spending is essential to ensuring we have
    the ready forces and capabilities to address the challenges facing
    NATO.
        Question. If confirmed how will you encourage NATO Allies to
    maintain a positive trajectory on defense spending even as COVID-19
    continues to strain their economies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance
    of fulfilling the 2014 Wales Summit Defense Investment Pledge. We all
    must do our part to procure, prepare, and provide the ready forces and
    capabilities. Although COVID-19 poses a challenge, we want to see every
    member of the Alliance contribute its fair share.
        The NATO Readiness Initiative commits Allies to the ``Four
    Thirties'' plan--30 battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat
    vessels--ready to use within 30 days.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to ensure
    the readiness and interoperability of these ``Four Thirties'' units?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the plan approved by Allies to
    train, certify, and maintain the units associated with the ``Four
    Thirties.'' Maintaining ready and interoperable forces and capabilities
    will be one of my highest priorities as we rebuild a culture of
    readiness at NATO.
        NATO has taken a number of steps to adapt its Command Structure,
    including the decision to stand up the NATO Joint Force Command for the
    Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the NATO Joint Support and Enabling
    Command in Ulm, Germany.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use for defining
    and measuring the success of these NATO commands in enhancing credible
    deterrence?
        Answer. An adaptive NATO Command Structure greatly improves how the
    Alliance addresses a range of threats. I expect the newly established
    U.S. Second Fleet and Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk increases
    Allied maritime domain awareness and capability; and also that they
    would lead in exercises and operations in the Atlantic to secure our
    sea lines of communication.
        Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for
    deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries?
        Answer. Yes. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a
    nuclear alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear
    capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter
    aggression. The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries for
    the last 60 years has successfully deterred aggression against the
    Alliance, and this cooperation continues to provide an essential
    political and military link between Europe and North America. In my
    view, U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries for as long
    as nuclear weapons remain a threat.
        Question. What is your assessment of the role that the European
    Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has played in increasing combat capability
    in Europe and enhancing deterrence of Russian aggression? What role
    would you foresee for EDI going forward? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. EDI funding has enabled DOD to increase its force presence
    in Europe, improve critical capabilities, establish pre-positioned
    equipment sets, and execute readiness-building exercises, all of which
    have contributed greatly to increasing United States European Command's
    combat capability and enhancing deterrence of Russian aggression.
        If confirmed, I look forward to examining how the EDI can be used
    going forward.
        Question. In your view, should EDI include funding for military
    construction in Europe, and if so, under what circumstances or
    criteria?
        Answer. I understand that military construction has been one of the
    five lines of effort within the EDI since 2017. If confirmed, I will
    examine under what circumstances military construction should continue
    to be a part of the EDI.
        Last year, the U.S. Army was prepared to execute DEFENDER 2020,
    which would have been one of the largest exercises since the Cold War,
    with support of many Allies and partners, but it was largely truncated
    due to COVID-19.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the U.S. Army,
    EUCOM, and NATO to glean lessons learned from this episode and execute
    large future exercises?
        Answer. It is my understanding that because all of the planning and
    much of the personnel movement for DEFENDER 2020 began prior to the
    exercise curtailment due to COVID-19, United States European Command
    (USEUCOM) and NATO were able to identify and catalogue many of the
    strategic, operational, and logistics lessons a full-scale exercise
    would have illuminated. If confirmed, I plan to review the DEFENDER
    2020 after-action report and work with the Joint Staff, USEUCOM, and
    USNATO to ensure those lessons are reflected in future largescale U.S.,
    multilateral, and NATO exercises.
        Question. In what other ways can the Department support efforts to
    deter Russia while strengthening our alliances and partnerships in
    Europe?
        Answer. As Russia increasingly utilizes a whole-of-government
    approach to achieving its geopolitical objectives, the Department of
    Defense continues to organize its resources to compete with Russia
    below the level of armed conflict. Engaging our allies and partners in
    these endeavors is critical to countering Russian influence by
    deterring and defending against all forms of coercion and aggressive
    actions and building partner capacity to resist hybrid threats.
    Additionally, I believe the Department could also support State
    Department and national security council colleagues as they work with
    Allies and partners to collectively denounce Russia's unacceptable
    behavior and develop international consensus to take action in response
    to that behavior.
                                    ukraine
        Question. What is your assessment of the current United States-
    Ukraine security relationship?
        Answer. The United States maintains a robust strategic defense
    partnership with Ukraine. Ukraine continues to contribute to United
    States and transatlantic security by providing forces to NATO
    operations.
        Question. Do you support continued United States security
    assistance to Ukraine, including lethal defensive assistance? Are there
    specific capabilities that in your view should be prioritized to be
    enhanced through the provision of United States security assistance?
        Answer. Yes. Since 2014, the United States has committed more than
    $2 billion in security assistance to help Ukraine's forces preserve the
    country's territorial integrity and progress toward NATO
    interoperability. The Department's security assistance programs,
    including lethal assistance for defensive purposes, are essential
    components of efforts to build the capacity of Ukraine's forces.
        If confirmed, I'll examine the Department's current efforts and
    Ukraine's requirements closely, but continued support to enhance
    Ukraine's defensive lethal capabilities in the maritime domain will
    likely remain a top near-term priority.
        Question. How does the provision of assistance to Ukraine
    contribute to a broader United States security strategy in Europe?
        Answer. U.S. security is enhanced by supporting a strategic partner
    that shares our values and the universal principles of sovereignty and
    territorial integrity. DOD security assistance programs, combined with
    efforts to improve the readiness of United States forces in Europe
    through programs like the European Deterrence Initiative, help to deter
    further aggressive Russian actions in the region.
      united states and nato force posture in southeastern europe and the
                                   black sea
        Question. In your view, is the security and stability of the
    Southeastern European region and the Black Sea in the United States
    national security interest?
        Answer. The security and stability of Southeastern Europe and the
    Black Sea region are in the United States national interest and are
    critical to the security of NATO's eastern flank. This region is
    vulnerable to Russian aggression, evidenced by ongoing actions in
    eastern Ukraine, occupation of parts of Georgia, militarization of the
    Black Sea, and provocative actions in the air and at sea. Russia's
    destabilizing activities in and around the Black Sea reflect its
    ambitions to maintain a dominant position in its so-called near-abroad
    and prevent the realization of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
    Furthermore, Russia is using its purported annexation of Crimea as a
    force projection platform to extend its forces further to the eastern
    Mediterranean and North Africa.
        Question. NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately 650
    United States servicemembers. Do you believe the United States should
    maintain its commitment to KFOR?
        Answer. United States deployment to NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR),
    which helps ensure security and stability both in Kosovo and across the
    Western Balkans, contributes directly to the success of KFOR's mission
    set. The U.S. and NATO presence also provides a vital deterrent to
    malign actors who seek to undermine sovereignty and peace in the
    region. We continue to rely heavily on the efforts of our Allies and
    partners in KFOR, who contribute more than 2,800 military personnel--up
    to 80 percent of the total force. If confirmed, I will ensure
    consultation with NATO Allies and partners is the highest priority when
    discussing the distribution of U.S. forces and capabilities in KFOR.
        NATO has maintained an ``enhanced'' forward presence in the eastern
    part of the Alliance, while deploying a more limited ``tailored''
    forward presence in the southeastern region and the Black Sea.
        Question. Do you support efforts to boost NATO's forward presence
    in the southeast and Black Sea region?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will review our force posture in this
    region and ensure the strength of our deterrence along NATO's Eastern
    and Southern flanks.
        Former Secretary Esper issued a plan, the European Strategic
    Posture Realignment, in 2020. This committee was concerned about some
    elements of that plan, such as the reduction of forces in Germany.
    However, other aspects of it may be worth continued consideration.
        Question. What are your views on former Secretary Esper's
    realignment plan?
        Answer. With the President's lifting of the 25,000 United States
    personnel cap for Germany, DOD will re-examine the realignment plan
    through the Global Posture Review process to determine what elements of
    it are in line with this Administration's national security priorities
    and should be pursued.
                         u.s. central command (centcom)
        Question. To what extent does achieving United States national
    security interests in the Middle East require a continuous United
    States military presence there, in your view? In your opinion, is the
    current United States force presence in the Middle East appropriately
    sized? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. It is important for DOD to review its military posture in
    the Middle East continually to ensure it is sustainable to defend
    against threats to the Homeland and respond to contingencies, while
    maintaining focus on our global strategy. Our presence provides
    opportunities for security cooperation with our partners in the region
    as we seek to cultivate their military capabilities and build
    interoperability to pursue shared objectives. If confirmed, I will
    evaluate the United States force presence in the Middle East, including
    the opportunities and challenges presented, and provide my
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
        I believe that we must right-size our military posture to the level
    required to assist our partners with their security, disrupt
    international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect
    other United States interests. I believe that Secretary Austin's Global
    Force Posture Review will help to shape these choices to ensure they
    are aligned with our strategic objectives, values, and resources. If
    confirmed, I will assess our force presence in the Middle East in the
    broader context of our global posture, and provide my recommendations
    to the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
    with United States regional and European partners to counter threats
    emanating from and affecting the CENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. I think an important element to DOD's approach in the
    Middle East is burden-sharing with allies and partners. The Department
    has included regional partner participation in the International
    Maritime Security Construct and in an expanded NATO mission to advise
    Iraqi security institutions and forces, for example. Our partners are
    increasing investments in their defense capabilities, and if confirmed,
    I will support the exploration of additional opportunities to enhance
    security cooperation.
        Question. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power
    competition? How should DOD consider countering Russia and China in the
    Middle East, in your view? What other elements of national power and
    policy tools might be useful?
        Answer. The Middle East is increasingly a key theater for great
    power competition. I expect it will remain so, and Russian and Chinese
    attempts to build inroads there suggest our rivals believe the same.
        I believe that military force is not the answer to the region's
    challenges. In the face of strategic challenges from China and Russia,
    we will assess the appropriate structure and sizing of the force and
    will develop capabilities to compete with them and deter their gray
    zone actions more effectively. In my view, DOD should continue
    investing in regional partnerships. By supporting regional partners and
    affirming common interests to counter common threats, we can ensure
    that the United States will remain the partner of choice in the Middle
    East.
        The United States retains many advantages, including our formidable
    combination of economic power, innovative dynamism, democratic values,
    military might, and global alliances. If we capitalize on these
    advantages, we can approach both competition and cooperation from a
    position of relative strength. We also must pursue sustained diplomacy
    to advance our interests, de-escalate regional tensions, and create
    space for people throughout the Middle East to realize their
    aspirations.
                                  afghanistan
        Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in
    Afghanistan be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the
    ground? If so, what conditions would you factor into your
    recommendation to the President on troop levels in Afghanistan, if
    confirmed?
        Answer. United States force levels in Afghanistan should be tied to
    conditions on the ground, but also need to be set in the context of
    United States and partner interests in the region. Any change in force
    levels should support diplomatic efforts and should be executed in
    close consultation with our NATO Resolute Support partners. If
    confirmed, I will assess our strategic posture with Office of the
    Secretary of Defense experts, U.S. military leadership, and our allies
    and partners to develop recommendations for potential changes in our
    approach.
        Question. Is it your understanding that the United States military
    presence in Afghanistan is currently ``conditions-based''?
        Answer. United States Forces are in Afghanistan in support of
    United States national security interests. My understanding is that the
    current U.S. military presence of 2,500 forces was reached on January
    15, 2021, pursuant to then-President Trump's direction as announced by
    then-Acting Secretary of Defense Miller on November 17, 2020. The
    administration is currently reviewing policy options for Afghanistan,
    which could impact the number of United States Forces in the country.
        Question. If so, what is your understanding of the conditions
    prerequisite to drawing down the U.S. military presence there?
        Answer. My understanding is that under the United States-Taliban
    Agreement, the Taliban's continued participation in intra-Afghan
    negotiations fulfills a key element of the United States-Taliban
    Agreement. I also understand that the Taliban have made specific
    commitments regarding counterterrorism and reducing violence, although
    press reports indicate that violence in Afghanistan has been above
    seasonal norms throughout the peace process that began in September
    2020.
        Question. If the United States does not fully withdraw its troops
    by May 2021 because the Taliban has not met the conditions under the
    February 2020 United States-Taliban Agreement, how do you expect the
    Taliban to respond?
        Answer. The United States is committed to peace in Afghanistan and
    is actively encouraging all sides to meet their commitments in
    furtherance of a political settlement to the conflict. It is possible
    that the Taliban will resume attacks on United States and Resolute
    Support Coalition forces. My understanding is that the Commander of
    United States Forces in Afghanistan is confident that United States and
    partner forces can defend themselves while continuing their mission,
    although they would be at higher risk if the Taliban resumed attacks.
        Question. What type of adjustments to United States Force posture,
    if any, would you recommend to prepare for the Taliban's possible
    response?
        Answer. Force protection is a top priority for any commander, and
    any adjustments to prepare for a resumption in Taliban attacks should
    be left to the commander on the ground. If confirmed, I would work with
    the Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command to ensure that the Commander
    of United States Forces in Afghanistan has whatever authorities and
    resources he needs to be postured appropriately.
        Question. In your view, will the Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces (ANDSF) continue to require financial support to
    maintain effective operational capacity and capability?
        Answer. Yes. I understand DOD funding provides three-fourths of the
    cost of sustaining Afghan combat operations and developing capabilities
    such as aviation and special forces. Even if a peace agreement is
    achieved, I would anticipate that the ANDSF would still require
    international funding to maintain viability as a stabilizing force.
        Question. Do you support continuing efforts to train and equip the
    ANDSF?
        Answer. My understanding is that DOD's efforts to train and equip
    the ANDSF have mostly been completed and that DOD now focuses primarily
    on sustaining ANDSF combat operations. I understand that the two
    exceptions to this are the Afghan Special Forces and the Afghan Air
    Force, which continue to receive train-and-equip support. The Afghan
    Special Forces and the Afghan Air Force are effective fighting forces.
    If confirmed, I would support continuing to train and equip these
    forces in a manner consistent with the overall strategic approach the
    President chooses.
        Question. Is a capable, well-trained and managed ANDSF critical to
    achieving a successful political settlement and preventing further
    conflict in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The Afghan Army is the most respected institution in the
    country and is an important source of national cohesion. As such, it is
    essential for future stability under any type of political settlement.
        Question. Would it be counterproductive to cut programs designed to
    mature the leadership and management of the Afghan forces?
        Answer. My understanding is that Resolute Support has focused on
    identifying Afghan security leaders with good potential, and then
    investing in them through training and advising. In any military
    organization, leadership is the key to success.
                                    pakistan
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of
    military-to-military relations?
        Answer. Pakistan is an important partner. If confirmed, I will
    focus on taking advantage of shared interests such as counter-
    terrorism, peace in Afghanistan, and regional stability. We should seek
    means to develop relationships with Pakistan's military leaders,
    including through continued use of the International Military Education
    and Training program.
        Question. What additional steps can the United States take with
    Pakistan to ensure that its territory does not continue to be used as a
    sanctuary for militants and violent extremist organizations (VEOs)?
        Answer. Pakistan needs to redouble its efforts to ensure its
    territory is not being used as a sanctuary for militants and violent
    extremist organizations. Pakistan is entitled to security within its
    borders, and the United States can play an important role to help
    promote stability and security across the region.
                                 syria and iraq
        Question. What is your understanding of current United States
    strategy and objectives in Syria?
        Answer. United States national security objectives in Syria include
    preventing the resurgence of ISIS so that it cannot directly threaten
    the United States and its interests; maintaining pressure on al-Qaeda
    and its affiliated groups; preventing a renewal of fighting that
    produces large-scale refugee flows that further destabilize United
    States allies and partners; promoting the provision of life-saving
    humanitarian aid to Syrian civilians in need; securing reforms in Syria
    that improve the welfare of Syrian civilians; and preventing the
    outbreak of broader regional conflict.
        Question. From a DOD standpoint, what must be done to ensure the
    enduring defeat of ISIS, in your view? What non-military efforts are
    necessary to sustain the enduring defeat of ISIS?
        Answer. The enduring defeat of ISIS will require a whole-of-
    government approach and working together with our partners in the
    Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The objective should be to address the
    underlying political, economic, and social grievances that ISIS
    exploits. To this end, it is critical that United States and Coalition
    forces continue to improve the capacity of our local partner forces to
    enable them to conduct counter-ISIS operations independently.
        The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
    play a critical role in countering ISIS. However, as long as underlying
    grievances that facilitated ISIS' rapid expansion remain unaddressed,
    ISIS' ability to reconstitute remains a threat. Our partners face the
    dual challenge of continued counter-ISIS military operations while
    enabling stabilization and recovery efforts in communities liberated
    from ISIS. DOD should support our civilian agencies in providing
    stabilization assistance and non-military support to communities
    recovering from ISIS. Additionally, our local partners and the
    communities seeking to rebuild require the assurance of sustained U.S.
    and Coalition commitment to their recovery. We should ensure the
    commitment of our allies and partners to the Global Coalition to Defeat
    ISIS, both the military and non-military efforts to defeat ISIS. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with the other departments and
    agencies on this effort.
        Question. In your personal view, are there any conditions under
    which Bashar al-Assad should be permitted to remain President of Syria?
        Answer. I support a nationwide ceasefire and efforts to resolve the
    Syrian conflict in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution
    (UNSCR) 2254, which states ``that the only sustainable solution to the
    current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led
    political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian
    people.''
        Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
    Democratic Forces and Iraq Security Forces in countering ISIS, now that
    its caliphate has been eliminated?
        Answer. I understand that the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS has
    made progress in the fight against ISIS, but recent attacks demonstrate
    that ISIS remains a threat. The United States works by, with, and
    through the Iraqi Security Forces and vetted Syrian partner forces,
    such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, to achieve the enduring defeat of
    ISIS. United States and Coalition forces should continue to develop the
    capacity of these groups to counter ISIS and al Qaeda.
        Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
    be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
    and if confirmed, what conditions would you factor into your
    recommendation to the President on future troop levels in Syria?
        Answer. U.S. force levels in any theater should be based on the
    capabilities necessary to perform the directed mission, in line with
    overall U.S. objectives.
        If confirmed, I will review the status of Operation INHERENT
    RESOLVE in Iraq and Syria. I will base my recommendation on future
    force levels in both countries on my assessment of the progress of the
    campaign, the development of our local partners, and the capabilities
    necessary to perform the mission.
        Question. In your view, do United States troops in Syria help
    counter Russian influence in the Middle East?
        Answer. United States Forces are in Syria to enable the enduring
    defeat of ISIS. United States forces operate in a complex operating
    environment and, thus, as I understand it, they deconflict movements
    with Russian counterparts to prevent interactions from escalating.
        Question. In your view, do United States troops in Syria help
    counter Iranian influence in the Middle East?
        Answer. United States Forces are in Syria to enable the enduring
    defeat of ISIS.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
    strategy and objectives in Iraq?
        Answer. The Iraqi people desire a secure, stable, and prosperous
    Iraq, able to defend itself against those who would undermine Iraq's
    security. The United States objective is to support Iraq in achieving
    these goals.
        Question. In your view, should the United States train and equip
    Sunni Islamist groups in Syria?
        Answer. The United States works by, with, and through vetted Syrian
    partner forces to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. If confirmed, I
    will ensure that our Syrian partner forces continue to be appropriately
    vetted.
        Question. With the dissolution of the Defeat-ISIS Task Force in
    December that integrated counterterrorism, multilateral, and regional
    efforts for the Department, how will you ensure continued focus on the
    defeat of ISIS and integration across multiple disciplines in DOD, and
    in collaboration with other federal departments and agencies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD teams, whether
    organized across traditional bureaucratic functions or through
    integrated task forces, will continue to collaborate and maintain focus
    on the Defeat-ISIS mission.
        Iran
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
    posed by Iran?
        Answer. Iran continues to pose a significant conventional and
    unconventional threat to U.S. personnel and regional partners. Iran's
    current conventional threats include ballistic missiles in the region,
    capable of striking regional United States military bases, to naval
    forces that threaten freedom of navigation near the Strait of Hormuz.
    Iran's unconventional threats have evolved to include attacks on
    commercial shipping and oil facilities, global cyber attacks, and the
    proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. Iran also leverages
    regional militia groups to threaten United States Forces and partners
    and undermine regional sovereignty.
        Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
    currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
    necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess our Middle East posture in the
    context of our global posture, and provide my recommendations to the
    Secretary of Defense. In all geographic Combatant Commands, we need to
    review carefully the size, shape, and readiness of the force in dynamic
    security environments, striving for a flexible global posture that
    leverages our unmatched ability to deploy significant forces quickly
    anywhere in the world to deter and respond to threats.
        Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
    United States security strategy with respect to Iran? What is the role
    of the U.S. military in this strategy?
        Answer. I understand the United States strategy aims to prevent
    Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, protect our personnel and
    interests from Iranian threats, and counter Iran's destabilizing
    activities. Diplomacy is the primary tool for achieving these
    objectives. The Department of Defense supports the diplomatic effort by
    deterring and, if necessary, defending against Iranian aggression. More
    broadly, the Department of Defense supports regional stability through
    security cooperation and maintaining freedom of navigation.
        Question. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action entailed
    significant sanctions relief for Iran. Some of that sanctions relief
    was used to fund terrorist groups. In your view, should Iran be
    afforded sanctions relief without any specific carve outs or
    limitations?
        Answer. It is my view that we should continue actively to enforce
    sanctions against Iran's support for terrorism, human rights abuses,
    missile program, and destabilizing activities.
        Question. What danger would increased Iranian funds through
    sanctions relief pose to United States Forces, as well as to partners
    in the region?
        Answer. It is my belief that Iran's attack calculus toward United
    States forces and our partners hinges primarily on its views of the
    broader strategic environment. For instance, the threat posed by the
    Iranian military and its proxies increased in the past few years
    despite the worsening Iranian economy and corresponding budgetary woes.
        Question. According to the New York Times, Iran recently plotted to
    attack UAE embassies in Ethiopia and Sudan. What do you believe are
    Iran's objectives in Africa? What can be done to counter Iran's support
    for terrorism in Africa?
        Answer. Iran has sought to increase its influence in Africa in
    recent years and likely views Africa as a permissive environment to
    plot attacks against its adversaries.
        It is my view that robust cooperation with our partners in Africa,
    especially on shared interests such as intelligence sharing, can be
    effective in constraining Iran's support for terrorism and disrupting
    attack plots.
        Question. If an Iranian-funded group attacks and kills an American
    citizen, should the United States maintain a ``red line'' and respond
    proportionately?
        Answer. The protection of United States forces remains the highest
    priority for the Administration. Iran should know that the United
    States will hold it responsible for such an attack, and we will respond
    decisively at a time and place of our choosing.
                                     yemen
        Question. What are the United States national security interests in
    Yemen?
        Answer. The primary national security interest in Yemen remains
    ensuring that groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
    ISIS--Yemen cannot maintain a safe haven from which to conduct attacks
    against the United States Homeland. Additionally, the aggressive
    actions taken by the Houthis (further empowered by Iran) against our
    partners contribute to instability in the Middle East and threaten
    Saudi Arabia's territorial defense. It is in the United States' best
    interest for the parties in Yemen to reach a cessation of hostilities.
        Question. In your view, has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately
    and proportionately to the threat they face from the Houthis?
        Answer. Saudi Arabia's conduct of its military campaign in Yemen
    continues to raise concerns about the incidence of civilian casualties.
        Question. What are the implications of the Biden Administration's
    decision to cease offensive support operations to the Saudi-led
    coalition?
        Answer. There is no military solution to the war in Yemen. As the
    President stated, the U.S. is ending all United States support to
    Saudi-led offensive operations against the Houthis in Yemen. This
    includes both materiel and restricting United States information
    sharing with Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led Coalition. It is in the
    United States' best interest for the parties in Yemen to reach a
    cessation of hostilities.
        Question. To what extent are the Houthis, supported by Iran, a
    threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea? What policy positions
    would you recommend for the United States to address this threat?
        Answer. The Houthis represent a threat to freedom of navigation in
    the Red Sea due to their offensive actions in the maritime domain.
    Further, the materiel and training support they receive from Iran have
    enhanced their lethal capabilities over time.
        Answer. I support the renewed emphasis that the Biden
    Administration has placed on a two-track approach: diplomacy to end the
    war through a political solution, and enhanced relief efforts to
    address the worsening humanitarian situation.
        Question. What do you assess to be the impact of the recent pause
    in weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, including precision-guided munitions?
        Answer. My understanding is that the pause was to ensure that what
    is being considered advances our strategic and foreign policy
    objectives. As I understand it, the interagency process for working
    through the details of individual arms cases has been re-established,
    with relevant departments and agencies bringing expertise and
    discipline back to our policymaking.
        Question. To what extent do you believe Saudi Arabia and its
    coalition partners have made progress in avoiding civilian casualties
    and ensuring appropriate accountability when allegations of civilian
    casualties arise?
        Answer. My understanding is that the United States lacks sufficient
    insight into civilian casualty rates in Yemen. If confirmed, I will
    review how our partners are making progress in this critical area.
                                     egypt
        Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
    Egypt and the United States-Egypt security relationship?
        Answer. Egypt faces a number of security challenges, such as ISIS-
    Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), the ongoing conflict in Libya, and border
    security threats. United States-Egypt security cooperation is
    increasingly focused on counterterrorism and border security. At the
    strategic level, both countries share an interest in improving regional
    security and stability.
        Question. What role does the Multinational Force and Observers
    (MFO) play in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty? Should the U.S.
    maintain its military deployment to the MFO? What would be the risks of
    reducing this commitment?
        Answer. The MFO has served to provide reassurance to both Israel
    and Egypt for almost 40 years by ensuring both parties adhere to the
    security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace.
        The MFO relies on United States contributions, including personnel,
    equipment, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation, and logistics, to
    support observation and monitoring in the Sinai. U.S. contributions to
    this mission anchor other countries' contributions and bolster U.S.
    credibility as a leader in diplomatic and security initiatives
    globally. The MFO presence and organization provide Egypt and Israel a
    trusted mechanism to resolve disputes, avoid conflict, and foster
    dialogue on shared security concerns in the Sinai Peninsula.
        Any changes to United States support would necessitate interagency
    and partner consultation regarding the potential impacts on the MFO,
    the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, United States obligations under
    applicable international agreements, and regional stability. Risks
    could include potential reduction in support from other international
    MFO contributors and risk to the viability of this security construct.
        Question. In your view, should the United States continue to
    provide defense articles and services purchased by the Egyptian
    military using United States Foreign Military Financing funds?
        Answer. Any changes to the United States FMF program with Egypt
    will require a coordinated interagency review to ensure that U.S.
    national security interests are protected. If confirmed, I look forward
    to reviewing all of our bilateral defense relationships.
        Question. What is your assessment of Egypt's deepening ties with
    Russia? Where do United States and Russian interests converge in Egypt?
    Where do they diverge?
        Answer. Egypt is actively diversifying its military cooperation
    with other foreign partners, including Russia. These deepening ties
    have been demonstrated in recent years through key leader engagements,
    military drills, joint infrastructure projects, and Egypt's pursuit of
    Russian military equipment, such as Su-35 fighter aircraft. The United
    States has an interest in a politically inclusive, economically
    vibrant, and secure Egypt with a professional military force that can
    protect its land and maritime borders and counter terrorism in the
    Sinai, and that respects civilian control of the military and human
    rights. Russia does not share those interests.
                     united states africa command (africom)
        Question. The 2018 NDS makes little reference to Africa and its
    myriad security challenges. In your view, what should be the role of
    AFRICOM in NDS implementation?
        Answer. Africa is a continent with great opportunities to advance
    common values and security interests. A key challenge, however, is the
    threat posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to United States
    interests in both East and West Africa; another involves Chinese and
    Russian strategic competition for access, influence, and values.
    AFRICOM plays a supporting role in advancing U.S. national security
    interests through a whole-of-government effort and simultaneously
    preserves U.S. access and influence to protect our people, partners,
    resources, and interests. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
    Department of Defense works seamlessly with other U.S. departments and
    agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State, to align priorities and
    limited resources accordingly, advancing lasting peace and security on
    the continent. I will also, where appropriate, work closely with our
    allies and partners to achieve our national security objectives.
        Question. What is your assessment of the availability and
    predictability of forces and capabilities to support the AFRICOM
    Theater Campaign Plan and crisis response?
        Answer. Our by, with, and through approach to achieving security
    and stability in Africa largely proven effective with a limited forward
    presence. Often our security cooperation also enhances larger partner
    force operations, which achieve shared strategic objectives and build
    enduring relationships. Key to this approach is the limited forward
    presence on the continent and a focus on building African partner
    nation capabilities while supporting efforts of other international
    partners. If confirmed, I will assess all AFRICOM's requests and
    consider Commander, USAFICOM's requirements and requests for forces,
    and advise the Secretary with a view consistent with changes in the
    strategic environment and the direction provided in our national and
    defense strategies.
        Question. What is your assessment of current United States
    counterterrorism strategies in AFRICOM?
        Answer. We cannot ignore that persistent conflict in Africa will
    continue to generate threats to United States personnel, partners, and
    interests from violent extremist organizations (VEOs). I understand the
    Department's current strategy is to work by, with, and through allies
    and partners across Africa to disrupt and degrade threats from VEOs,
    transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking, and other
    malign influence. Two key elements of the Department's strategies are a
    whole-of-government approach to address the drivers of insecurity and
    instability, and close coordination with allies and partners. If
    confirmed, I will review the counterterrorism strategies to ensure our
    resources are being employed appropriately and effectively toward
    mission success.
        Question. What do you assess to be the strategic objectives of
    Russia and China in Africa?
        Answer. Both Russia and China have expanded their strategic focus
    on Africa and use engagement in Africa to bolster their international
    standing, obtain access to raw materials, undermine Western influence,
    and pursue access agreements to support force projection in the region.
    However, the scale and methods vary widely between the two.
        China has a multidimensional strategy to engage diplomatically,
    economically, culturally, as well as militarily across the Continent.
    China continues improvements to its first overseas military base in
    Djibouti and has expressed interest in opening more bases in Africa to
    expand China's geopolitical influence throughout the continent.
        Russia markets its security services and experience to African
    countries as a means to expand its influence and challenge United
    States interests. While comparatively speaking, Russia's outreach is
    not as wide reaching as China's, Russia remains a key arms supplier for
    many African militaries. Russia's efforts and influence are further
    expanded through the presence of Russian professional military
    companies (PMCs) in several African countries, including supporting
    combat operations in Libya and the Central African Republic.
        Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the current
    United States strategy to compete against Russia and China to be the
    security partner of choice in Africa?
        Answer. I understand the United States strategy takes a practical
    approach to tailoring our outreach in Africa to ensure we are aligned
    not just in countering competitors, but also in meeting broader United
    States goals across the region. Key to our success is focusing on our
    by, with, and through approach and working with partners to meet the
    security challenges they face. The Department's efforts should be
    aligned with our interagency partners to help our African partners
    build capacity, improve transparency, and develop institutions that
    support sustainable security solutions. If confirmed, I look forward to
    continuing to refine and improve these efforts.
        Question. What metrics do you believe should be used to assess
    progress in this regard?
        Answer. I recommend that the Department work closely in
    consultation with other United States departments and agencies to
    develop global metrics rather than regarding this issue as one unique
    to Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to helping shape that effort
    moving forward.
                                    somalia
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in Somalia?
        Answer. Though al-Shabaab has been degraded significantly, we
    recognize that violent extremist organizations (VEOs) remain a threat
    to Somalia and the region. It is important that VEO influence is
    reduced and their operations disrupted so they can no longer threaten
    innocent Somalis, their neighbors, or United States and international
    allies' and partners' interests in the region and at home. Recently,
    Somalia has also faced growing insecurity due to the conflict in
    neighboring Ethiopia and delays in Somalia's domestic electoral
    processes.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
    strategy and objectives in Somalia?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the key to our approach in
    Somalia is to work by, with, and through our partners to achieve
    stability and security. Our support to the African Union Mission in
    Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) focuses on building
    partner nation institutions and capabilities that can provide for long-
    term security. We assist our partners to counter direct terrorist
    threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S. personnel.
        Question. Do you believe the defense lines of effort in the current
    strategy can be successfully achieved with the vast majority of United
    States Forces deployed external to Somalia?
        Answer. I know the Department of Defense routinely reviews its
    military presence globally to ensure alignment with stated priorities.
    If confirmed, I would review United States objectives in Somalia and
    engage in discussions with Departmental leadership regarding whether
    the repositioning of United States personnel and assets in neighboring
    countries is the most appropriate location to meet our objectives.
    Overall, our partner-centric, by, with, and through, strategy has
    always been at the core of the mission, and by helping our partners
    strengthen defensive capabilities to counter shared threats to
    stabilize the region, there may be an opportunity to help create
    political and economic development.
                                     libya
        Question. What is your assessment of current United States national
    security interests in Libya?
        Answer. I understand that United States national security interests
    in Libya include support to the continued political reconciliation in
    Libya for a unified, democratic, and sovereign government; encouraging
    the removal of destabilizing foreign actors from Libya who undermine
    peace and threaten United States and NATO security in the Mediterranean
    and North Africa; and retaining our ability to monitor and disrupt
    violent extremist groups in Libya.
        Question. What is your assessment of external actors operating in
    Libya and where their objectives align and conflict with those of the
    United States?
        Answer. I think the Department has seen how the operations of
    malign external actors, particularly private military companies (PMCs)
    and imported foreign fighters, in Libya threaten peace in the country
    and the region. The use of foreign proxy forces in Libya comes at great
    expense to the Libyan people and regional stability.
                           west africa and the sahel
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in West Africa and the Sahel and its impact on United States security
    interests?
        Answer. Security continues to deteriorate in the Sahel as
    instability spreads and threatens coastal West Africa. Porous borders
    and lack of state legitimacy and presence across large swaths of
    territory provide an enabling environment for violent extremist
    organizations, particularly the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
    (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) groups, and
    transitional criminal networks. The security situation in the Sahel
    also poses a vital national security risk for our European allies and
    partners. If confirmed, I will review the Department's current strategy
    in the Sahel and work closely with other United States departments and
    agencies to nest our counterterrorism efforts within broader
    governance, diplomatic, and development priorities.
        Question. What is your assessment of the utility of support
    provided by the United States to regional and external partners
    operating in the region in supporting U.S. security objectives in the
    region, particularly support provided pursuant to section 331 of title
    10, United States Code?
        Answer. One of the significant contributions to external partners
    in the region is logistical and intelligence support to enable French
    counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. I understand that our support
    in the region is effective and directly enables French operations
    against JNIM and ISIS-GS. This support provides vital capabilities for
    our partners to achieve shared counterterrorism objectives. This
    support complements the Department's bilateral support to African
    partners to train, equip, and professionalize their security forces. If
    confirmed, I will assess support and resourcing to ensure it aligns
    with our national security objectives for the region.
                               western hemisphere
        Question. What should be the Department's strategic priorities in
    the Western Hemisphere?
        Answer. A peaceful and prosperous Western Hemisphere is essential
    to the security of the United States. The Department's priorities will
    be informed by the President's national security strategy. I believe
    these priorities should address the malign influence of China and
    Russia and support cooperative efforts with our partners to mitigate
    insecurity in the region.
        Question. Is the Department appropriately resourced to support
    these priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess and advise the Secretary on the
    resources required to support the Department's priorities in the
    region. If confirmed, I also will seek to ensure these efforts are
    prioritized effectively and reflect the Secretary's broader objectives.
        Question. If not, where do you assess the Department is accepting
    the greatest risk?
        Answer. I expect that limitations on resources available to the
    Department will necessarily require tradeoffs and result in some level
    of risk. In the Western Hemisphere, I would be concerned about
    accepting risks that could result in region-wide instability or
    accepting risks that enable China or Russia to increase their ability
    to threaten the United States or constrain our actions.
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
    President and Secretary of Defense to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese
    influence in the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR and do
    you think these influences threaten hemispheric security and
    prosperity?
        Answer. Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influences do threaten
    hemispheric security and prosperity. If confirmed, I would recommend to
    the President and Secretary that we counter these influences through a
    whole-of-government approach and robust engagements with our partners
    in the region, promoting the values of democracy, respect for human
    rights, and cooperation in a rules-based international order.
                        latin america and the caribbean
        Question. Many of the internal security challenges in Latin America
    are associated with transnational criminal networks.
        What types of United States assistance are appropriate for Latin
    American countries given that these challenges emanate from non-state
    actors?
        Answer. Transnational criminal networks are a cause of insecurity
    in Latin America and contribute to challenges in the United States. The
    Department of Defense can support a whole-of-government effort to
    disrupt these networks' activities and help our partners advance
    defense institution building, military professionalization, respect for
    human rights, and regional cooperation.
                                   venezuela
        Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
    Venezuela?
        Answer. The greatest threat to Venezuela's peace and prosperity is
    the Maduro dictatorship. He and his inner circle have dismantled
    Venezuelan democracy, as they plunder the country's natural resources
    to enrich themselves, and caused the grave humanitarian crisis facing
    the country, which also has destabilized the region.
        Question. What is your assessment of the role and objectives of
    external actors in Venezuela, particularly Russia, Cuba, Iran, and
    China?
        Answer. I believe that external actors in Venezuela have enabled
    the Maduro dictatorship to remain in power by providing diplomatic,
    intelligence, financial, and military support.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your policy recommendations
    on how the Department should address Venezuela?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for a whole-of-government
    (that includes DOD) and multilateral approach to address the problems
    in Venezuela and encourage a peaceful, democratic transition. I would
    expect any DOD actions will be in support of a broader United States
    Government strategy to encourage the Maduro regime to hold free and
    fair elections and transition power peacefully.
                                    colombia
        Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian Government to make
    significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia) and other paramilitary forces in Colombia. Additionally,
    Colombia has become a security exporter in the region due to its
    advances in capabilities and professionalism.
        Question. What are your views regarding: (1) the current military
    and political situation in Colombia; and (2) the effectiveness and
    sustainability of ongoing DOD programs in Colombia?
        Answer. The Colombian military is one of the most willing and
    capable strategic partners in Latin America, and the only country in
    the region that is a NATO Global Partner. Colombia is often held up as
    a model of how DOD's security cooperation programs can most effectively
    help build capacity and professionalize militaries. I believe that DOD
    programs support Colombia's significant investments in its defense
    establishment.
        Question. Does the Department require any additional capabilities
    or legal authorities in Colombia, given developments in disarmament,
    demobilization, and reintegration?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would look into how the Department is
    supporting Department of State-led efforts regarding disarmament,
    demobilization, and reintegration, and make recommendations for any
    required additional capabilities or authorities to the Secretary.
        Question. Are there lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia that
    may be useful in addressing security and governance challenges
    elsewhere in the region and beyond?
        Answer. I believe that the success of Plan Colombia can be
    attributed to four main factors: (1) It had overwhelming bipartisan
    support; (2) it was a whole-of-government effort, and interagency
    partners collaborated effectively to deliver results; (3) it was
    sustained year-over-year with predictable funding; and (4) most
    importantly, the Government of Colombia played a strong leadership
    role, was committed to the plan, and provided the majority of the
    funding.
                                      cuba
        Question. What is your assessment of Cuba's activities and
    objectives in the Western Hemisphere?
        Answer. Cuba continues to seek ways to extend its political,
    economic, and security influence in Latin America and the Caribbean in
    ways that counter the values we share with partners in the region.
        Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend
    modifications to the security relationship between the United States
    and Cuba?
        Answer. I believe the Cuban regime's continued suppression of the
    rights of the Cuban people and its continued support of the Maduro
    regime in Venezuela are factors that must be carefully considered prior
    to modifying this security relationship. It is important that the
    United States military maintain the longstanding limited contact on
    practical and routine issues at the Guantanamo Naval Station and
    between the United States Coast Guard and its counterparts.
                                     arctic
        Question. What changes, if any, are necessary for the United States
    to implement the June 2019 Arctic Strategy and does the United States
    have the appropriate capabilities and assets to meet its goals in the
    Arctic?
        Answer. I understand that the Department has identified capability
    needs associated with implementing the Arctic Strategy, such as
    improved domain awareness and communications capabilities. If
    confirmed, I am committed to helping ensure that DOD has the
    appropriate concepts, capabilities, and relationships to advance
    defense objectives in the Arctic. DOD will continue to balance
    consideration of investments for the Arctic region with broader
    requirements placed upon the Joint Force, as detailed in the National
    Defense Strategy and other strategic guidance documents.
        Question. What threat, if any, do Russian and Chinese activities in
    the Arctic pose to United States interests?
        Answer. The Arctic is a region of increasing competition with China
    and Russia spurred in part by climate change. These competitors pose
    different challenges in the Arctic. Russia approaches the Arctic
    largely from a territorial defense perspective, including by
    restricting freedom of navigation along its coast, recapitalizing its
    Arctic military bases, and establishing a new Northern Fleet Joint
    Strategic Command. It is advancing its interests through an increase in
    Arctic-based forces, which are intended to improve its operational
    capability in northern latitudes and to exert greater control of the
    Northern Sea Route. China is focused on increasing its influence in the
    region, primarily through predatory economic behavior and non-
    transparent research efforts.
        Question. To what extent should our partners in the Arctic share
    the burden of countering Russia and China where those two competitors
    threaten shared security interests?
        Answer. The United States' allies and partners are key to
    maintaining the international rules-based order and competing with
    Russia and China. This remains true in the Arctic, where one of the
    pillars of the DOD Arctic Strategy is strengthening the rules-based
    order through cooperation with allies and partners. DOD maintains
    strong cooperation with allies and partners in the Arctic in areas such
    as maritime surveillance, rotational deployments to Arctic locations,
    and United States-Canada binational defense efforts through the North
    American Aerospace Defense (NORAD). This defense cooperation
    complements broader United States Government efforts to enhance Arctic
    cooperation on shared issues, such as fisheries management, search and
    rescue, and scientific research.
        Question. What, in your view, are United States defense interests
    in the Arctic region?
        Answer. In my view, United States defense interests in the Arctic
    region include: defense of the Homeland; deterring strategic
    competitors from undertaking malign or coercive activities in the
    region; and ensuring that common domains remain free and open in accord
    with international law. If confirmed, I will help ensure DOD supports
    broader U.S. Government efforts and works by, with, and through our
    allies, partners, indigenous communities, and other key stakeholders as
    appropriate.
        Question. Do you believe that United States naval access in partner
    nations' Arctic ports are sufficient to achieve United States defense
    interests in the Arctic region?
        Answer. I understand that DOD is concluding an examination of
    whether there is a need for a strategic port or ports in the Arctic,
    pursuant to Section 1752 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    fiscal year 2020, ``Department of Defense Designation of Strategic
    Arctic Ports.'' If confirmed, I will help ensure that Secretary
    Austin's decision on Arctic ports is informed by a range of strategic,
    political-military, operational, and fiscal considerations, including
    United States naval access to ally and partner nations' Arctic ports.
                    defense support to civilian authorities
        Question. What is the role of the Lead Federal Agency when DOD
    provides support to civilian authorities?
        Answer. My understanding is that, consistent with the law and the
    National Response Framework, lead Federal agencies may request DOD
    support in their areas of responsibility, coordinate the execution of
    DOD support, and reimburse DOD for such support. At all times, however,
    DOD personnel operate under DOD command and control.
        Question. In your view, are the procedures by which other Federal,
    State, and Local agencies request DOD support efficient and effective?
        Answer. To the best of my knowledge, these procedures are well-
    documented and time-tested. Federal, State, and local agencies
    cooperate in developing plans and procedures to respond to incidents
    and protect special events, and they exercise together to test and
    refine these plans and procedures. If confirmed, I will have the
    opportunity to review these plans and procedures, evaluate whether they
    are efficient and effective, and determine how well DOD has
    incorporated lessons learned.
        Question. In your view, are DOD procedures for evaluating and
    approving the provision of support requested by a civil authority
    efficient, effective, and timely?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD's procedures for evaluating
    and approving support requested by a civil authority to ensure these
    contribute to the timeliness and effectiveness of DOD's support.
        Question. What is your understanding of the factors that are
    considered in determining whether DOD will provide support to a civil
    authority?
        Answer. I understand that, consistent with the law and DOD policy,
    DOD considers six factors: 1) does providing the requested support
    comply with law; 2) does the requested support involve the potential
    use of lethal force by or against DOD forces; 3) will providing the
    requested support pose an unacceptable risk to the safety of DOD
    forces; 4) will DOD be reimbursed for the support and what effect will
    providing the support have on the DOD budget; 5) will providing the
    requested support be appropriate and in DOD's interest; and 6) how will
    providing the requested support affect DOD's ability to perform its
    other primary missions.
        Question. Are the procedures DOD employs to secure appropriate
    reimbursement for any support it provides to a civil authority
    efficient and effective, in your view?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD Components providing DOD
    support are responsible for securing appropriate reimbursement for DOD
    support. If confirmed, I will work closely with the relevant DOD
    Components to ensure that the DOD's procedures are efficient,
    effective, and transparent.
        Question. Under what conditions should DOD assist civil authorities
    in securing the southwest border, particularly by providing active duty
    forces?
        Answer. Most importantly, DOD assistance must be consistent with
    the law. For instance, Congress has authorized DOD to provide certain
    types of support, such as the provision, maintenance, and operation of
    equipment, including by active-duty military personnel, for aerial
    reconnaissance and for the detection, monitoring, and communication of
    the movement of surface traffic outside of the geographic boundary of
    the United States and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles
    of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside of the
    boundary. However, Congress also has prohibited DOD from providing
    certain types of support, such as support provided under Chapter 15 of
    Title 10, U.S. Code, that would require the direct participation by a
    member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search,
    seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such
    activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. Also critically
    important is the imperative that providing DOD assistance should not
    expose the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces and the defense of our
    nation to unacceptable risks.
        Question. What types of assistance in this context are
    inappropriate, in your view?
        Answer. In my view, assistance that would be inconsistent with the
    law would be inappropriate. For example, for support provided under
    Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code, Congress has prohibited the direct
    participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps
    in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless
    participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized
    by law. Assistance that would expose the readiness of the U.S. Armed
    Forces and the defense of our nation to unacceptable risks would also
    be inappropriate. Finally, assistance that would be inconsistent with
    DOD policies would be inappropriate.
                                    covid-19
        Question. What is your view of DOD's response to the COVID-19
    pandemic? What aspects of it could be improved? What role do you
    envision for DOD in pandemic response moving forward?
        Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented challenge
    to our nation. In the face of this tremendous challenge, Secretary
    Austin tasked DOD to work to defeat the COVID-19 pandemic and defend
    the force against COVID-19, while protecting our nation. DOD has an
    important but supporting role in our nation's fight against the
    pandemic. I understand DOD has been effective in this role, while also
    executing national defense missions around the world. DOD has provided
    unprecedented support--thousands of military and civilian personnel
    contributing expertise, equipment, and supplies to our nation's fight
    against the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, DOD is providing thousands of
    members of the Armed Forces to support Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA) and State-run vaccination centers. If confirmed, I will
    support DOD's continuing efforts to rise to this challenge.
        From what I understand, DOD has been very effective at providing
    essential support in our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.
    As Secretary Austin made clear in his Day One message to the force, DOD
    must move further and faster to contribute to the Federal Government's
    efforts to counter the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I will do
    everything I can to help DOD provide the most effective support.
        In my view, DOD should remain an important but supporting partner
    in a whole-of-government response to future pandemics. We have vast
    capabilities and resources that can be marshaled to help our nation
    detect, prevent if possible, and, if necessary, fight against the next
    pandemic. In parallel, those same contributions have the corresponding
    benefit of strengthening the health of the Joint Force, which is
    paramount in meeting mission requirements.
        Question. Are there any types of support that the Department of
    Defense should not provide, in your view?
        Answer. I believe DOD should not serve as the lead Federal agency
    or the lead Federal coordinating agency for pandemic response. These
    roles are best carried out by the Department of Health and Human
    Services and FEMA. DOD continues to harness its capabilities,
    resources, and personnel to provide support. Further, DOD should not
    provide support that supplants, rather than supplements, the
    fulfillment of responsibilities that by law belong to the States and
    other Federal departments and agencies.
        Question. Is it advisable, in your view, for DOD to play a
    significant role in the production and distribution of the COVID-19
    vaccines? What, if anything, can be done to enhance DOD's role and
    expedite the distribution and administration of vaccines?
        Answer. I assess that DOD's partnership with the Department of
    Health and Human Services has been effective in accelerating the
    development, production, and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines for our
    nation. DOD's support to this effort was critical.
        From what I understand, DOD continues to work with the Department
    of Health and Human Services to accelerate the manufacture of vaccines;
    is working with FEMA regarding the use of National Guard personnel to
    help States and territories distribute and administer vaccines; and is
    working closely with FEMA and the States to provide direct support to
    existing State-run vaccination centers and new FEMA Federally
    supported, State-run vaccination centers. That collaboration should
    continue as long as DOD is able to execute this and all of its
    missions, and until this pandemic is under control.
        Question. To what extent does providing defense support to civil
    authorities during the coronavirus crisis impact readiness? How should
    DOD think about these tradeoffs?
        Answer. As far as I can tell, DOD has met the demands of
    contingencies abroad and supported civil authorities responding to
    catastrophes at home simultaneously and successfully. I am not in a
    position to assess any impact on readiness, but, if confirmed, I will
    examine this issue to ensure that DOD is managing risks and balancing
    mission commitments effectively.
        First and foremost, DOD's highest priority is, and should remain,
    the protection of our nation and its people. DOD cannot execute its
    mission risk-free, but DOD can mitigate and manage risks to ensure that
    DOD does not compromise the safety and security of our nation.
        China, Russia and other nations are disseminating disinformation
    and false narratives relating to COVID-19, to advance their strategic
    interests.
        Question. What role, if any, should the Department play in
    countering disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19?
        Answer. In support of national efforts, DOD can work with partners
    and allies to counter efforts by foreign adversaries to spread
    disinformation and false narratives. DOD has a responsibility to
    personnel within the Department to communicate effectively to ensure
    its personnel have accurate information about COVID-19, force health
    protection measures, and facility protection measures.
        Question. How has the COVID-19 crisis impacted U.S. plans and
    abilities to conduct joint training exercises with allies and what
    policy steps would you recommend, if confirmed, for mitigating these
    impacts?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the COVID-19 crisis has had an
    impact on U.S. plans and the ability to conduct joint training
    exercises with allies and partners. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness to understand the force health
    protection requirements associated with an exercise environment (and
    mitigation measures) and the impacts of training delays, and to
    identify an appropriate way forward that addresses force health
    protection and mission readiness.
                civilian oversight of special operations forces
        Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included provisions
    designed to enhance the oversight and advocacy of special operations
    forces. Among other things, these reforms established an administrative
    chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
    through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense, mirroring the
    relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments and
    their Service Chiefs.
        What is your understanding of the ``service secretary-like''
    responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) for special operations forces?
        Answer. I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) reports directly to the
    Secretary of Defense on these ``service secretary-like'' matters,
    consistent with Section 167(f) of Title 10. The ASD(SO/LIC) exercises
    authority, direction, and control regarding special operations-peculiar
    administration and support of USSOCOM, including, but not limited to,
    the readiness and organization of special operations forces and
    civilian personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to affirm the
    independent role of the ASD(SOLIC) as the ``service secretary-like''
    civilian for special operations forces?
        Answer. I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) is immediately
    subordinate to the Secretary of Defense for the oversight of special
    operations-peculiar administrative matters. Title 10 is clear that the
    administrative chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense to
    the ASD(SO/LIC) to the Commander, USSOCOM. Also, Section 902 of the
    NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021 states that ``no officer below the Secretary
    may intervene to exercise authority, direction, or control over the
    Assistant Secretary in the discharge of such responsibilities.'' If
    confirmed, I will comply with the law and support the Secretary of
    Defense's organizational decisions.
        Question. In your view, how should these responsibilities be
    balanced with other ASD(SOLIC) responsibilities related to policy and
    operational issues?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) to
    ensure that the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) is appropriately supported
    and empowered to fulfill the ASD(SO/LIC)'s principal responsibilities,
    including the overall supervision of special operations activities,
    administering and leading the special operations administrative chain
    of command, and assisting the USD(Policy) in developing overall policy
    pertaining to special operations, counterterrorism, and irregular
    warfare.
        In a November 18, 2020, memorandum, then-Acting Secretary of
    Defense Miller established the ASD(SOLIC) as a direct report to the
    Secretary for policy responsibilities, as well as for their ``service
    secretary-like'' responsibilities for ``special-operations peculiar
    administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and
    equipping of special operations forces.''
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that policy advice and
    recommendations relating to the employment of special operations forces
    is fully integrated with that provided by the Office of the USD(P)?
        Answer. Title 10 is clear that the ASD(SO/LIC) is a direct report
    to the Secretary of Defense in its ``service secretary-like'' role; it
    is also clear that the ASD(SO/LIC) assists the USD(Policy) in
    developing and supervising overall DOD policy, program planning,
    execution, and allocation and use of resources pertaining to special
    operations activities identified in 10 USC 167(k), combating terrorism,
    and irregular warfare. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary
    Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks to ensure the integration of policy
    advice and recommendations relating to employment of special operations
    forces, and ensure the optimal organizational structure to accomplish
    those goals.
        Question. How do you differentiate the ASD(SOLIC)'s policy
    responsibilities from their ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities
    for ``special-operations peculiar administrative matters relating to
    the organization, training, and equipping of special operations
    forces''?
        Answer. Title 10, Section 138, prescribes distinct roles for
    ASD(SO/LIC), including the overall supervision (including oversight of
    policy and resources) of special operations activities, acting as the
    principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special
    operations matters, and assisting the USD(P) in developing and
    supervising overall DOD policy, program planning, execution, and
    allocation and use of resources pertaining to irregular warfare,
    combating terrorism, and special operations activities identified in 10
    USC 167(k). Under 10 USC 167(f), the ASD(SO/LIC) exercises authority,
    direction, and control with respect to special operations-peculiar
    administrative matters and support of USSOCOM, including, but not
    limited to, the readiness and organization of special operations
    forces, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. The latter is
    akin to the responsibilities of a Military Department Secretary in
    providing civilian oversight of, and civilian leadership and management
    for, the Military Department under the Military Department Secretary's
    cognizance.
                         peacekeeping operations (sha)
        Question. What should be the Department's role and objectives in
    supporting global peacekeeping operations?
        Answer. I understand the United States is the largest overall
    financial contributor to the United Nations' peacekeeping budget in
    support of global peacekeeping operations. DOD provides support to the
    Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai for the
    continued implementation of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and
    Israel and assists the Department of State in execution of its Global
    Peace Operations Initiative. If confirmed, I will review this DOD
    support to global peacekeeping operations to see if any changes should
    be made.
        Question. Should the U.S. contribute military personnel to both
    staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping
    operations?
        Answer. I understand the United States provides military personnel
    in support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations as military
    observers. If confirmed, I will work to understand more about this
    issue and assess whether DOD should consider supporting UN requests for
    U.S. military personnel to serve in peacekeeping operations.
                        violent extremist organizations
        Question. Despite considerable global investment in the
    counterterrorism fight, jihadists in dozens of groups and countries
    continue to pose credible threats to local and regional United States
    interests.
        What is your assessment of the threat to United States interests
    posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates and
    adherents?
        Answer. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates continue
    to pose a threat to United States interests around the globe, even as
    persistent pressure from the United States and our allies and partners
    has helped prevent these groups from attacking the U.S. Homeland. These
    groups continue to present localized and regional insurgent threats to
    our partners; seek to destabilize societies through violence; and will
    continue to threaten U.S. citizens and U.S. interests. As these groups
    and their networks have become more decentralized, they increasingly
    have turned to a strategy of proliferating their radical ideologies
    online, seeking to motivate their adherents to violence from within the
    borders of our allies and partners.
        Question. Which group, in your view, presents the greatest threat
    to the United States?
        Answer. Although al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to harbor
    designs to strike the United States, ISIS has shown itself particularly
    adaptive despite massive international pressure; I would be most
    concerned that a reduction of that pressure would allow ISIS to
    reconstitute its capabilities to strike Americans relatively quickly.
    Should I be confirmed, I will aim to continue to empower our global
    coalition of partners and the whole-of-government approach within the
    U.S. Government and the governments of our partners. These efforts
    collectively have decimated both groups and their associated networks
    and are critical to preventing their resurgence.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in supporting it?
    What condition-based metrics would you apply to measure the
    effectiveness of the strategy?
        Answer. For years, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been an
    effective, whole-of-government approach to integrating military and
    non-military efforts, calibrated to varied threats and the regional
    context in which they exist. DOD has long been a cornerstone of that
    strategy, drawing on kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, and often
    enabling the capabilities of other departments and agencies and foreign
    partners. I am particularly focused on determining how we can continue
    to disrupt threats to the United States and our partners from groups
    like ISIS and al-Qaeda while working to position the United States to
    be successful against other global threats we face. If confirmed, I
    look forward to working across the Department, with my counterparts in
    other departments and agencies, and with our international partners to
    ensure we remain successful in executing our counterterrorism strategy,
    even as we take on additional strategic goals.
        The most important metric identifies whether the security of the
    United States--our people, our Homeland, and our interests--is improved
    by the implementation of our strategy. A key criterion for making such
    an assessment is whether our partners, who increasingly are in the lead
    with our support, are becoming more capable of degrading these threats
    in a sustainable manner.
        Question. Do you believe there needs to be a ``more resource
    sustainable'' approach to counterterrorism, as directed by the 2018
    NDS? If so, and if confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    promote a ``more resource sustainable'' approach and how would you
    assess any risks associated with such an approach?
        Answer. I believe that a ``resource-sustainable'' approach is
    necessary in addressing all our global challenges, including
    counterterrorism, as we confront an increasingly complicated global
    environment requiring the United States to calibrate our resources,
    expenditures, and investments to make progress in addressing the range
    of threats we face.
        If confirmed, I would look to align the Department's efforts with
    broader U.S. policy objectives and desired end-states. To be successful
    in achieving our strategic goals, I intend, if confirmed, to work with
    the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to prioritize how the Department
    applies its resources, expenditures, and investments in an optimal
    combination. To ensure we are striking that right balance, we will need
    to exercise regularly and evaluate the approach to ensure we are
    managing risk in the best possible manner.
        Question. Should the Department focus principally on terrorist
    organizations that pose a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland? If so,
    how would you mitigate risk posed by other terrorist groups that have
    such intent but currently lack the capability to do so?
        Answer. In my opinion, the Department should prioritize our efforts
    and resources in such a way that terrorist organizations, especially
    those that possess the intent and capability to attack the U.S.
    Homeland and our interests, are unable to do so.
        We can mitigate risk through collaboration with partners and allies
    in addressing a wide range of challenges. Intelligence and information
    sharing mechanisms provide an important means to identify issues and
    threats, to share awareness rapidly, and to respond to threats as they
    develop. To that end, the Department should continue to work with
    international and interagency partners to maintain awareness of
    emerging threats from terrorist groups that have the intent, but not
    yet the capability, to attack the U.S. Homeland.
        In May 2013, President Obama gave a speech at the National Defense
    University regarding counterterrorism operations and related legal and
    policy frameworks for the use of force. According to a White House fact
    sheet, the President indicated a ``preference'' that the use of force
    in ``active warzones, and beyond'' should be carried out by the U.S.
    military. Furthermore, in a background briefing with reporters, a
    senior administration official stated ``the United States military is
    the appropriate agency to use force outside of active warzones, given
    their traditional role and given the transparency [that] can be
    associated with actions by the United States military.''
        Question. Do you believe that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
    the military is the appropriate organization to carry out
    counterterrorism operations involving the use of force?
        Answer. I agree that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the U.S.
    military is the appropriate organization to carry out counterterrorism
    operations involving the use of force. The Department of Defense should
    not, however, address terrorist threats unilaterally, and all DOD
    activities must be correlated with and complementary to a U.S.
    Government-wide response. The Department must also work with our allies
    and partners--another key pillar of the current National Defense
    Strategy--to leverage their regional expertise and unique capabilities.
        Question. In your view, how important is public transparency
    regarding counterterrorism operations and issues related to the use of
    force?
        Answer. In my view, public transparency regarding U.S. military
    counterterrorism operations, including those related to the use of
    force, is vitally important. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate
    for transparency in our operations. I am confident we can strike the
    right balance between transparency regarding counterterrorism
    operations and our duty to protect our forces and our partners who
    conduct these operations.
        The Obama Administration publicly released a redacted version of
    its Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) outlining procedures for
    approving direct action against terrorist targets located outside the
    United States and areas of active hostilities.
        Question. Do you believe an appropriately redacted version of
    successor guidance to the PPG should be publicly released?
        Answer. The PPG and any successor guidance are Presidential
    guidance. As such, I would defer such decisions to the National
    Security Advisor and staff. If confirmed, I would advocate for
    transparency in the principles and standards that undergird our
    operations to ensure the American people understand what guides us in
    safeguarding them from terrorist threats outside of the United States.
        Question. Will you commit to releasing this successor guidance
    within 90 days of your confirmation?
        Answer. Because it is Presidential guidance, I would defer such
    decisions on successor guidance to the National Security Advisor and
    staff.
                    section 127e and section 1202 activities
        Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
    special operations forces to provide support (including training,
    funding, and equipment) to forces and individuals supporting or
    facilitating military operations for the purpose of combating
    terrorism.
        Answer. Section 1202 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018 authorizes
    U.S. special operations forces to provide support (including training,
    funding, and equipment) to forces and individuals supporting or
    facilitating irregular warfare operations.
        Question. What is your assessment of the national security utility
    of each of these authorities in the current strategic environment?
        Answer. In my past experience, authorities such as these are cost-
    effective ways for the United States to advance our security interests
    by supporting and enabling partners and allies in pursuing shared
    objectives. If confirmed, I will evaluate these authorities, including
    how they are supporting U.S. strategic goals, and ensure the activities
    conducted under these authorities are in alignment with NDS priorities.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
    proposals for the use of each of these authorities, particularly with
    respect to mitigating the risks associated with conducting irregular
    warfare activities below the level of traditional armed conflict?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the authorities and all
    operations currently ongoing to ensure they meet U.S. national security
    objectives, are aligned with NDS priorities, support Combatant
    Commander needs, are appropriately scoped, and remain good returns on
    investment. I will ensure that all stakeholders are consulted, and I
    look forward to working with Congress, including Congress's oversight
    of these unique authorities and missions.
     counternarcotics and counter-transnational organized crime activities
                                     (cngt)
        Question. What should be the role of the Department in combating
    narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime?
        Answer. I understand that DOD, in support of interagency and
    international law enforcement partners, executes its statutory mission
    to detect and monitor the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs
    bound for the United States. DOD provides expertise and capabilities
    that help law enforcement partners reduce the flow of illicit drugs,
    degrade the ability of drug trafficking organizations, and disrupt
    transnational criminal organizations that threaten U.S. national
    security. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether DOD's resources are
    used appropriately in this area.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize the Department's
    allocation of resources to combat narcotics trafficking and
    transnational organized crime?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD's counterdrug activities,
    resources, and approach to prioritization to determine whether
    adjustments are appropriate.
                         counter threat finance (cngt)
        Question. What should be the Department's role in counter-threat
    finance activities?
        Answer. I understand that DOD provides expertise and analytical
    capabilities that help enable other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies disrupt terrorist and transnational criminal finance
    activities that threaten U.S. national security. I believe counter-
    threat finance is an important capability that helps the U.S.
    Government degrade the capabilities of its adversaries by denying and
    disrupting their revenues. If confirmed, I will review these activities
    to ensure that DOD is fulfilling its statutory responsibilities and
    employing its counter-threat finance resources against priority
    threats.
        Question. In your view, should the Department expand its support to
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
    threat finance activities? If so, how?
        Answer. I do not know the extent of DOD's support to other U.S.
    Government departments and agencies conducting counter-threat finance
    activities. If confirmed, I will review the support DOD provides and
    make adjustments as necessary to execute the USD(P) responsibility to
    develop and oversee DOD counter-threat finance activities and
    capabilities. If confirmed, I will review the support that DOD provides
    and make adjustments as necessary.
                               irregular warfare
        Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
    U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
    below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, commonly referred to
    as irregular warfare or ``gray zone operations.''
        What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
    adversaries in the domain of irregular warfare?
        Answer. I see adversaries increasingly turning to irregular warfare
    tactics to advance their objectives because the United States maintains
    significant conventional military advantages, but has not always been
    as militarily successful in the ``gray zone'' or in applying statecraft
    against adversaries operating in the gray zone. Although the Department
    acts largely in a supporting role to other U.S. Government partners in
    addressing challenges that fall beneath the threshold of traditional
    armed conflict, I assess that DOD cannot depend only on its
    conventional military advantages and deterrent capability as its
    contribution to combating adversaries in the gray zone. If confirmed, I
    would look to ensure the Department is supporting all U.S. Government
    efforts to defeat threats posed by adversaries and to maintain military
    and political advantages.
        Question. What should be the guiding principles of any DOD strategy
    to counter threats in the ``gray zone,'' in your view?
        Answer. I understand the Department has developed an Irregular
    Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy that guides the
    Department in countering ``gray zone'' or irregular threats. I also
    understand that this guidance places particular emphasis on the multi-
    domain environment and on the importance of a unified effort within the
    U.S. Government and with U.S. allies and partners. Gray zone
    competition is complex and multi-faceted, and it requires a proactive
    and creative application of Department capabilities coordinated with
    complementary toolsets of other U.S. departments and agencies.
                             information operations
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to conduct
    effective military operations in the information environment to defend
    U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out by state
    and non-state actors?
        Answer. I understand the Department has a variety of capabilities
    to conduct military operations in the information environment,
    including public affairs (PA), Military Information Support Operations
    (MISO), Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO), and cyberspace
    operations. When these activities are executed effectively and in
    combination with each other and other tools, DOD can achieve its
    mission more affordably, with reduced risk to our operating forces. If
    confirmed, I will strive to integrate these capabilities further into
    Department activities and into our support to our interagency and
    foreign partners.
        Question. Are DOD's efforts in this regard appropriately integrated
    with other U.S. Government organizations and activities?
        Answer. Department efforts throughout the information environment
    should cross traditional department and agency lines. If confirmed, I
    will evaluate the integration of the Department's organization and
    activities in the information environment to ensure we are bolstering
    collective U.S. Government efforts toward meeting our strategic
    national goals.
        Question. Does DOD have sufficient authorities and resources to
    conduct these operations effectively? If not, what additional
    authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?
        Answer. I am not aware of a need for new authorities or resources,
    but will need to evaluate this question with the benefit of experts in
    the Department, if confirmed. I am aware of a requirement for a posture
    review in conjunction with the statutory direction to establish a
    Principal Information Operations Advisor; I expect that review would
    inform my evaluation of authorities, resource availability and
    allocation, and strategic alignment.
        If confirmed, I look forward to understanding our current
    authorities and resources more fully before making an assessment of
    what additional resources and authorities, if any, need to be
    requested.
                department of defense role in election security
        Question. In September 2019, at the annual National Cybersecurity
    Summit, then Secretary of Defense Esper noted that ``our adversaries
    will continue to target our democratic processes'', the Pentagon had
    ``developed our capabilities and increased our capacity to allow us to
    detect, locate, and exploit threats in the cyber domain'', and that
    ``influence operations are at a scope and scale never before
    imagined.'' In that same speech, Secretary Esper declared election
    security ``an enduring mission for the Department of Defense.''
        Do you agree with Secretary Esper's assessment regarding the
    continuing threat to our democratic processes from foreign malign
    influence operations?
        Answer. Our adversaries rightly view our democratic system as a
    source of strength and resilience, and that makes it an attractive
    target for efforts to divide and destabilize us. The FBI leads the U.S.
    Government's efforts to counter malign influence operations, but if
    confirmed, I intend to continue the Department's supporting role as a
    part of a whole-of-government effort to defend our democratic processes
    from those operations.
        Question. Do you envision election security as an enduring mission
    for the Department?
        Answer. Civilian leadership of the electoral process is paramount,
    and within a whole-of-government effort, the Department of Defense has
    a role to play defending those elections from foreign interference. It
    is my understanding that, operating outside the United States, DOD
    generates insights that enable the defense of our elections and, when
    appropriate, conducts cyber operations to that same end. DOD also can
    provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities upon request and in
    accordance with applicable law. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
    Department is postured to continue playing this important role in
    defense of our elections.
        Question. If so, how would OUSD(P) best support the mission of
    defending our democratic processes from interference by Russia and
    other foreign adversaries?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues
    to generate insights that enable defense against foreign interference
    and, when necessary, prepares to act against the malign actors
    conducting such interference.
        Question. Do you assess that our actions to date are deterring
    Russian President Putin or other foreign adversaries that seek to
    interfere in our elections? If not, are there additional policy steps
    that you believe the Department of Defense should take to enhance
    deterrence of foreign election interference?
        Answer. It is impossible to say for certain whether certain actions
    have been successful at changing the decision-making processes of
    President Putin or other malign actors. My understanding is that whole-
    of-government efforts to impose costs on President Putin's government
    for its attempted interference in the 2016 election, and subsequent
    efforts by United States Cyber Command and others to disrupt and
    degrade malicious cyber infrastructure, have been significant. The
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency asserted in November
    that the 2020 elections were the most secure in history, and I have no
    reason to believe otherwise. If confirmed, I intend to continue the
    Department's proactive efforts--as a part of a whole-of-government
    approach--to defend our elections.
                      defense security cooperation (dsca)
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Department's
    security cooperation activities in the implementation of U.S. security
    strategy?
        Answer. The Defense Department's role fits into the whole-of-
    government approach to bolstering our allies and partners. DOD security
    cooperation activities should enhance the capabilities and capacity of
    our partners to provide for their own defense, address regional
    security challenges to advance shared security interests, and
    strengthen relationships that promote U.S. security interests. In
    coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense's
    security cooperation tools are critical to strengthening and leveraging
    the United States' robust network of alliances and partnerships, which
    is foundational to U.S. defense strategic objectives.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you define the fundamental
    objectives of the Department's programs and activities for building the
    capabilities of foreign security forces? What changes, if any, would
    you recommend to the Department's approach?
        Answer. The fundamental objective of DOD security cooperation
    activities is to advance our ally and partner defense postures to
    address shared security threats. Through building partner capacity, our
    partners can operate effectively alongside and in lieu of U.S. Forces
    to address shared security challenges in support of U.S. interests.
        It is my understanding that the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy has made significant progress in recent years to
    align security cooperation activities more closely with National
    Defense Strategy (NDS) objectives. If confirmed, I plan to review the
    strategic prioritization of DOD security cooperation resources and
    existing planning processes to ensure these activities advance defense
    strategic objectives and earn the United States a return on its
    investments.
        Question. Is the OUSD(P) appropriately organized and empowered to
    fulfill its responsibilities for the oversight of strategic policy and
    guidance and the overall allocation of resources for security
    cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense
    pursuant to section 382 of title 10, United States Code? What changes,
    if any, to OUSD(P) structure, authorities, and resourcing for these
    purposes, would you recommend, if confirmed?
        Answer. I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, as delegated by the Secretary of Defense, has the
    responsibility for oversight of strategic policy and guidance and
    responsibility for overall resource allocation for security cooperation
    programs and activities of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I
    will review the Department's current approach to the strategic
    oversight and resource allocation of security cooperation activities
    and assess whether the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy is appropriately organized and empowered to perform its
    strategic oversight role of the security cooperation enterprise.
        If confirmed, I will communicate to the Committee any additional
    organizational, legislative, or resource adjustments that I assess are
    necessary to exercise the responsibility for strategic oversight,
    guidance, and allocation of Department of Defense security cooperation
    resources.
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Department
    of Defense, vis-a-vis the Department of State and other civilian
    departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capabilities of
    foreign security forces? What is your assessment of the current level
    of coordination between the Department of Defense and Department of
    State on security cooperation?
        Answer. The Department of Defense advises the Department of State
    regarding desired partner and ally military requirements, consistent
    with U.S. national security policy. The Department of Defense
    implements the Foreign Military Sales program and certain Department of
    State security assistance programs, consistent with State Department
    guidance; and coordinates with the Department of State regarding
    Department of Defense security sector assistance programs. I
    understand--and if confirmed, would affirm--the importance of ensuring
    DOD activities align with broader U.S. foreign policy, thorough
    coordination, collaboration, and consistent engagement with the State
    Department and other interagency partners.
        I understand that the Department of Defense and the Department of
    State coordinate well on security sector assistance activities through
    formal coordination forums and regular, informal engagements.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the
    Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)? On what
    issues would you expect to consult with the Director?
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible
    for exercising authority, direction, and control over the Director of
    the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). If confirmed, I expect
    to consult with the Director, DSCA, to provide the Secretary with
    advice and recommendations on security cooperation issues facing the
    Department, including partner and ally capability development
    strategies; Foreign Military Sales; DSCA-managed security sector
    assistance programs; and Security Cooperation Workforce development.
                              civilian casualties
        Question. Section 936 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 required the
    Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy for accounting
    for and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from
    U.S. military operations.
        What role do you believe public transparency plays with respect to
    accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian casualties
    resulting from U.S. military operations?
        Answer. Making public information about U.S. military operations,
    including the results of DOD's assessments of civilian casualty
    incidents, helps improve the public's understanding of U.S. military
    operations. Although operational and security necessities constrain
    what can be publicly released, transparency efforts can help the public
    better understand the suffering that results from war as well as the
    U.S. military's efforts to reduce that suffering to the greatest extent
    possible. I understand that the Department currently makes public
    information about its efforts to reduce the risk of civilian
    casualties. I also know that the Combatant Commands that are engaged in
    operations periodically release information about civilian casualty
    incidents and their assessments of reports of civilian casualties, and
    that the Department prepares an annual report on civilian casualties
    that have resulted from U.S. military operations, pursuant to statutory
    requirements. I strongly support such transparency efforts.
        Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense has achieved a
    sufficient level of transparency on such matters? If not, what
    additional steps do you believe are necessary?
        Answer. I understand the Department is continuing to consider ways
    to improve its communications with the public on these issues, even as
    it is developing a new DOD-level policy document on civilian casualty
    mitigation and response. For example, last October, the Department
    established a webpage highlighting how members of the public can
    communicate information about civilian casualties that may have
    resulted from U.S. military operations to relevant Geographic Combatant
    Commands. If confirmed, I will consider ways that the Department can
    improve its communication with the public on these issues, including by
    considering how this instruction can support these transparency
    efforts.
                             use of military force
        Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
    including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),
    enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and
    activities at a necessary and appropriate level?
        Answer. The Department has operated under the current legal
    authorities for nearly 20 years, but the threats we face continue to
    evolve. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Department of
    Defense General Counsel to evaluate current legal authorities to
    determine whether they are sufficient to enable the Department's
    counterterrorism and related missions.
        Question. Is the 2002 AUMF still necessary and useful, in your
    view?
        Answer. Should I be confirmed, I would recommend this authority be
    reassessed in the light of current circumstances, and I would advocate
    for changes or updates if they are deemed necessary.
        Question. In your view, is a ``new'' authorization for the use of
    military force needed at this time? If so, what should be the scope and
    terms of this ``new'' AUMF? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The Department has operated under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
    for nearly 20 years, even as new threat actors have emerged, and others
    have evolved. If confirmed, I believe it would be prudent to review
    these existing authorities and assess whether updated or further
    authorizations are required.
        The scope or terms of any ``new'' authorization should be informed
    by an in-depth review of the current authorities, and by the facts and
    circumstances to which the authorities apply. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working with the Department's General Counsel to conduct
    that evaluation.
        Question. What groups are currently assessed to be associated
    forces of al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 AUMF, and in what countries
    are U.S. military direct action operations against such groups
    authorized?
        Answer. The 2001 AUMF is the legal basis for currently authorized
    operations against the following groups or individuals: al Qaeda; the
    Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent groups affiliated with al
    Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
    (AQIM); al Qaeda in Syria; and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
    (ISIS). I do not have updated information on the countries in which
    U.S. military direct action is currently authorized.
        Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
    recommending to the Secretary of Defense which forces of other nations
    should be eligible for collective self-defense by U.S. military forces,
    and under what conditions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would consider the degree to which
    collective self-defense would help achieve U.S. national security and
    specific mission objectives; bolster the protection of U.S. forces and
    facilities operating abroad; and help maintain the resolve of partners
    that U.S. forces work by, with, and through to address mutual threats,
    including commitments in mutual defense agreements. Also, rules of
    engagement authorizing U.S. forces to defend foreign partner forces
    should clearly identify the particular partners eligible for such
    collective self-defense. Any use of force in defense of foreign partner
    forces must be conducted in accordance with the law of armed conflict.
                             detainee issues (odp)
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014?
        Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
    Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
    2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
    19, 2014. Individuals in the custody and control of the U.S. Government
    may not be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not
    authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.
        Question. What are your views on the long-term use of the detention
    facility at Guantanamo? Should use of the facility be terminated, as
    President Biden has indicated?
        Answer. I believe that it is time to close the DOD detention
    facility at Guantanamo Bay responsibly. If confirmed, I commit to
    working with the Administration to develop a plan for the 40 detainees
    remaining at the facility. Until such time, the Department will
    continue to ensure safe and humane treatment of the detainee
    population.
        Question. If the use of the facility should be terminated, what are
    the available options for disposition of the detainees held at
    Guantanamo and where should the 40 detainees in law of war detention at
    GTMO be detained?
        Answer. It would be premature for me to speculate. If confirmed, I
    commit to working closely with the Administration and Congress to
    ensure the continued safe and humane treatment of the law of war
    detainees in the care of United States Forces at Guantanamo Bay.
        Question. If the use of the facility should be terminated, what
    process would you expect to follow to bring detainee operations at GTMO
    to a close?
        Answer. It would be premature for me to speculate. If confirmed, I
    commit to working closely with the Administration and Congress to
    ensure the continued safe and humane treatment of the law of war
    detainees in the care of United States Forces at Guantanamo Bay.
        Question. If confirmed, would you ever advise the President to
    transfer new detainees to Guantanamo, and if so, under what criteria?
        Answer. I would not advise the Secretary of Defense to transfer new
    detainees to Guantanamo.
        Question. The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process enacted by
    section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA ``to determine whether
    certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing
    significant threat to the security of the United States such that their
    continued detention is warranted'' appears to be stalled. In your view,
    should the PRB process be continued or terminated? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support continuing the Periodic
    Review Board (PRB) process. I understand that the PRB process continues
    to conduct hearings on a regular basis.
        Question. What are your views on the objectives and outcomes of the
    Department's Military Commission process?
        Answer. I support the use of military commissions for the narrow
    purpose of prosecuting those accused of violations of the law of war.
                               sexual harassment
        Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
    and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
    5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced
    sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work''
    in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
    otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
    discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(P)?
        Answer. The safety and security of our workforce are of utmost
    importance. If confirmed, and if I were to receive a complaint of
    sexual harassment or discrimination, I would first ensure that the
    complainant was in a safe place. I would work with the legal office,
    the human resources office, and the employee's supervisory chain to
    support the employees concerned and appropriately resolve the
    complaint. Each member of the Policy workforce deserves a safe,
    healthy, and respectful place to work. If confirmed, I will communicate
    my expectation that this standard of respect be upheld, and that any
    allegations be addressed swiftly.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                                cyber workforce
        1. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Kahl, as cyber-security intrusions
    become more frequent, bolstering our military cyber defenses,
    especially our cyber personnel, must be a priority. It will be one of
    my priorities--along with others on this committee--to ensure that our
    cyber personnel reflect the high standards we need for our Nation's
    cybersecurity in this environment. What role can you play in ensuring
    that we recruit the highest standard of cyber personnel at the
    Department of Defense (DOD), and how do we avoid losing them to the
    private sector?
        Dr. Kahl. The Department's success in cyberspace is inextricably
    linked to its ability to maintain a talented and professional cyber
    workforce. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Military
    Departments and Services to support the recruitment of uniformed
    military cyber professionals and the provision of world-class cyber
    training and education throughout their careers. I look forward to
    partnering with the DOD Chief Information Officer and the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in their efforts to
    grow and strengthen the Department's civilian workforce, including
    through the expansion of the Cyber Excepted Service program, which
    affords the Department greater flexibility in hiring compensating and
    managing the careers of cyber professionals.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                        civilian control of the military
        2. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, what specific steps do you plan to
    take to strengthen civilian control of the military--and enact
    safeguards to ensure civilian voices are elevated within the Pentagon--
    if confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Austin and
    Deputy Secretary Hicks to ensure the Department's civilian personnel
    are directly involved in the strategic, policy, operational,
    programmatic, and budgetary decisions. I will ensure the Policy team,
    with support and input from across the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, maintains an independent channel to the Secretary. I will also
    forge relationships with my military counterparts in the Joint Staff,
    Combatant Commands, and Military Services to ensure close collaboration
    between our organizations, ensuring the Secretary benefits from both
    military advice and civilian expertise.

        3. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, how do you envision your role in
    supporting Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and providing your
    guidance and expertise acquired through a civilian career as balance to
    his military knowledge?
        Dr. Kahl. If I am confirmed, my role is to serve as the principal
    staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for
    all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy.
    I have extensive experience as a policy practitioner, including
    previous positions in the Department of Defense, and have conducted
    research and published on a wide array of foreign policy and defense
    policy topics. I will draw on this experience, as well as the knowledge
    from my staff and counterparts across the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, to provide the best possible advice to our Department's
    leadership.
     environmental policies and climate change as national security threat
        4. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, what steps should the Department
    of Defense (DOD) be taking to swiftly respond to emerging
    nontraditional national security challenges, including global health
    and climate change issues?
        Dr. Kahl. Emerging, ``nontraditional'' security challenges, such as
    global health and climate issues, pose unique risks to the U.S.
    Homeland and the U.S. Military, in addition to our allies and partners.
    As is clear in the interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued
    by President Biden last week, these threats must be met with collective
    action. If confirmed I would ensure the Department of Defense works
    closely with the Intelligence Community, other U.S. departments and
    agencies, and allies and partners to identify and mitigate the risks
    and threats these challenges pose and help ensure they are factored
    into our strategic planning, operations and investments.

        5. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, what specific steps should we take
    to ensure that the Department of Defense and all of our military
    installations--at home and abroad--are more resilient and capable of
    accomplishing their mission with less reliance on the local
    infrastructure?
        Dr. Kahl. Various factors, ranging from the actions of foreign
    actors to climate-driven shocks and stresses, challenge DOD's ability
    to advance defense objectives and complicate the Department's ability
    to operate its installations efficiently and effectively at home and
    abroad. The Department must understand the threats, hazards, and
    vulnerabilities associated with operating its installations (at home
    and abroad) in steady-state and contingency situations; and identify
    ways to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate those factors. If confirmed,
    I will advocate within the Department for investments to protect
    critical infrastructure and installation resilience to ensure we can
    accomplish our missions.
                                  saudi arabia
        6. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, how would you ensure that any
    defense assistance to Saudi Arabia serves our strategic interests, as
    well as humanitarian interests?
        Dr. Kahl. President Biden directed his Administration to prioritize
    U.S. values in the pursuit of protecting our strategic interests,
    including humanitarian interests and human rights. These inform the
    United States relationship with Saudi Arabia, including any United
    States assistance. The United States is prioritizing diplomacy and
    humanitarian assistance in its approach to the Yemen conflict, in which
    the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led Coalition play a key
    role. President Biden already has directed specific policy changes with
    respect to security cooperation and defense assistance to the Kingdom
    of Saudi Arabia that more effectively support United States strategic
    interests and elevate diplomacy as the path to end the conflict in
    Yemen. The Department of Defense will continue to support Saudi
    Arabia's ability to defend its territory and will encourage steps that
    align with United States interests, including deescalating regional
    tensions, promoting security, securing freedom of navigation, and
    countering the development of and proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. If confirmed, I will lead my organization in continuing
    this important recalibration with Saudi Arabia.
                            military sexual assault
        7. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, how will you
    collaborate with and contribute to the new independent review
    commission on sexual assault in the military?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I would do all that I can to support
    efforts to address the scourge of sexual assault in the military,
    including directing my staff to provide the requested support to the
    new independent review commission. I will also direct my staff to
    collaborate with our legal team, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness, the Director of Washington Headquarters
    Services, and senior leaders across the Military Departments and
    Services, to ensure we foster a safe environment for all personnel

        8. Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, what specific steps
    would you take to ensure that all servicemembers and Department of
    Defense civilian employees--regardless of service, rank, or role--
    experience a culture of respect, safety, and equality?
        Dr. Kahl. All Department personnel deserve a safe, healthy, and
    respectful place to work. If confirmed, I will support and uphold all
    diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives from the Secretary. I will
    also clearly communicate my expectations to the Policy workforce that
    no form of unlawful discrimination will be tolerated and that any
    allegations will be addressed swiftly. I would work closely with the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the
    Department's legal team to ensure we are taking all appropriate steps
    to create a culture of respect, safety, and equality across our entire
    work force.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                         homeland defense radar-hawaii
        9. Senator Hirono. Dr. Kahl, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
    identified the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) as a requirement
    for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from
    an increasingly capable North Korea. Congress appropriated $133 million
    for fiscal year 2021 to keep its development on track. Please provide
    your thoughts on HDR-H, particularly the importance of it as part of
    the area of responsibility's (AOR) layered missile defense system to
    protect Hawaii from long range intercontinental ballistic missile
    (ICBMs) from rogue states like North Korea.
        Dr. Kahl. The Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) would provide a
    critical capability to defend against advanced missile threats. More
    importantly, it would ensure we have this capability to defend all 50
    U.S. States against rogue State intercontinental ballistic missiles.
    The defense of Hawaii is important, and, if confirmed, I will work with
    the Department's civilian and military leadership to develop effective
    and affordable systems to enhance our capabilities against these
    evolving threats.
              the united nations convention on the law of the sea
        10. Senator Hirono. Dr. Kahl, I plan to reintroduce a Senate
    resolution calling upon the Senate to ratify the United Nations
    Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which entered into force over
    25 years ago. The United States is still not party to the convention.
    Becoming party to the treaty would give the United States a legal right
    to intervene on international disputes relating to freedom of
    navigation rights. Should the Senate ratify the UNCLOS?
        Dr. Kahl. The United States has treated the navigation and
    overflight provisions of the Convention as binding customary
    international law for more than four decades. Our forces act
    consistently with the Convention in our operations, just as the United
    States expects other nations to act. That said, U.S. accession to the
    Convention would further secure those favorable rules as treaty rights,
    and becoming a State Party would increase the United States'
    credibility and legitimacy when acting to protect the rights, freedoms,
    and lawful uses of the sea reflected in the Convention. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Secretary of Defense and my counterparts in other
    U.S. departments and agencies to assess this issue fully and provide my
    best advice to the Secretary of Defense.

        11. Senator Hirono. Dr. Kahl, will the Biden administration
    continue the recent uptick in freedom of navigation operations in the
    South China Sea?
        Dr. Kahl. If I am confirmed, I will follow Secretary Austin's
    guidance that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate
    wherever international law allows, including in the disputed waters of
    the South China Sea.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                              launch requirements
        12. Senator Peters. Dr. Kahl, in your advance policy questions, you
    state, ``Responsive launch . . . can enhance threat deterrence against
    potential adversaries and promote space mission assurance. I understand
    that the Department is in the process of developing tactically
    responsive launch requirements that could further capitalize on
    commercial innovation. If confirmed, I would work with the U.S. Space
    Force and the U.S. Space Command to identify how to utilize commercial
    technology in launch and other space applications most effectively to
    meet warfighting and mission assurance requirements.'' Can you share
    any information on what those ``tactically responsive launch
    requirements'' are, and, if confirmed, specifically how you will seek
    to ``utilize commercial technology in launch?''
        Dr. Kahl. ``Tactically responsive launch requirements'' focus on,
    for example, meeting the emergent needs of an operational warfighter,
    as distinct from the standing needs of intelligence analysis. The
    changes taking place in commercial space and commercial space launch--
    for example, smaller satellites using commercial off-the-shelf
    technologies, and commercially developed small launch vehicles and
    reusable launch vehicles available on rapid timelines--create new
    possibilities for how the Department uses space to meet emergent
    operational needs. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to ensure
    that DOD strategy capitalizes on such commercial innovations.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                                 cybersecurity
        13. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, allies are essential to enhancing U.S.
    cybersecurity. We rely on our partners to conduct threat hunting,
    enable early warning, and harden our collective defenses. If confirmed,
    how will you leverage our allies' unique cyber capabilities to support
    our military cyber operations?
        Dr. Kahl. I understand that, just like in other domains of
    competition and conflict, our network of allies and partners provides a
    crucial asymmetric advantage in cyberspace. Exchanging information,
    using interoperable communication platforms, and sharing one another's
    unique understanding of the risks to our respective networks and
    infrastructure make us stronger together than we ever could be alone.
    If confirmed, I would also support interagency efforts to work
    alongside allies and partners to establish cyber norms to further deter
    and impose multilateral costs on adversaries engaged in malign cyber
    activities.

        14. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, how will you enhance information-
    sharing and cooperation with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    partners to prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyber attacks?
        Dr. Kahl. The United States commitment to the NATO Alliance
    provides a critical comparative advantage when balancing countries like
    Russia and a focal point for collective action to address pressing
    global security challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to building on
    the robust combined planning, training, information-sharing, and
    exercise infrastructure that is at the heart of NATO, and ensuring that
    preventing, mitigating, and recovering from cyberattacks are at the
    core of that infrastructure.

        15. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber
    Strategy also calls for retaining the current cyber workforce and
    finding talented new people to recruit. If confirmed, what policies
    would you enact to cultivate a qualified cyber workforce to support the
    Department of Defense mission?
        Dr. Kahl. Revitalizing our national security workforce, including
    our cyber workforce, is a top priority of the President and Secretary
    Austin. I understand that it is difficult for the Department to compete
    with the private sector when it comes to salaries for top cyber
    professionals. The Department's hiring advantage stems from its unique
    mission: serving the American people and defending the United States.
    If confirmed, I will work to make sure that we are appropriately
    leveraging all of the available hiring vehicles to recruit cyber
    talent, as well as providing both our uniformed military and civilian
    workforce the opportunity to make vital contributions to national
    security at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
                          white supremacist terrorism
        16. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, do you agree that international white
    supremacist groups increasingly pose a threat to U.S. national
    security?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. When the capability, intent, and motivation of any
    organization, including racially and ethnically motivated groups, work
    against or threaten the interests of the United States, including those
    we share with our allies and partners, then such an organization could
    be a threat to U.S. national security. Like the dangers posed by other
    radical ideologies, the threat of white supremacy and the violence it
    inspires can threaten our interests, and it must be confronted and
    countered.

        17. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, how would you direct the
    Department of Defense intelligence elements to account for the rising
    threat from international white supremacist terrorist organizations?
        Dr. Kahl. Responding to this growing threat will require a
    coordinated effort between law enforcement, our diplomats, the
    Intelligence Community, and the Department. Current Department efforts
    to address extremism in its ranks are important in their own right, and
    also will contribute to engagement with our allies and partners to
    share lessons learned and to increase intelligence collection on
    international white supremacist terrorist organizations and their
    tactics. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary Austin, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, as well as
    with interagency and law enforcement partners to develop a whole-of-
    government approach to address this threat.

        18. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, what tools would you use to deter and
    disrupt these groups?
        Dr. Kahl. The extensive expertise we have developed in
    understanding and disrupting the radicalization cycle and the tactics
    and techniques of groups like al Qaeda and ISIS provides important
    insights and lessons learned toward calibrated approaches to countering
    other violent extremist groups. One of the strengths of
    counterterrorism efforts of the last two decades has been the close
    integration of U.S. efforts and inclusion of our work with allies and
    partners toward our shared goals. This experience provides the
    foundation for information sharing and analysis and combined efforts to
    disrupt groups that threaten our national security.
                        military cooperation with israel
        19. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, Congress authorized in the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 the creation of the
    United States-Israel Operations Technology Working Group. The working
    group will enable United States and Israel to establish ``plans to
    research, develop, procure, and field weapon systems and military
    capabilities as quickly and economically as possible to meet common
    capability requirements.'' If confirmed, how will you implement this
    provision?
        Dr. Kahl. I support the intent of this provision, and if confirmed,
    I would ensure that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy works to advance collaborative defense research, development,
    test, and evaluation with Israel. These efforts are to the mutual
    benefit of both Israel and the United States.

        20. Senator Rosen. Dr. Kahl, are you committed to stand up the
    United States-Israel Operations-Technology Working Group without delay?
        Dr. Kahl. I support the intent of this provision, and if confirmed,
    I would ensure that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy works closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Research and Engineering and the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to advance collaborative
    defense research, development, test, and evaluation with Israel. These
    efforts are to the mutual benefit of both Israel and the United States.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                      authorization use of military force
        21. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, do you believe that rescission of the
    1991 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) will
    diminish or enhance the set of tools that the Department of Defense has
    to address the global threat of terrorism and violent extremist
    organizations? Please explain your answer in detail.
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I intend to work across the Administration
    to review existing authorities and recommend updated authorizations as
    appropriate, in order to ensure we remain able to protect the United
    States from terrorist threats.
                                 climate change
        22. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, do you believe that the Department of
    Defense, with the core traditional mission of defending the Nation
    against foreign external threats, should be the lead agency for
    alternative climate-considered approaches for the country, or should
    some other agency within the Federal Government be the lead agency?
        Dr. Kahl. Climate change is a high priority for this Administration
    and for the Department, as noted in the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance signed by President Biden last week. I believe that
    DOD, in collaboration with U.S. interagency partners, has a critical
    role to play. Pursuant to direction from the President and the
    Secretary, as well as provisions in the National Defense Authorization
    Act for FY21, DOD is considering climate-related factors as an
    essential element of our national security. I understand the Department
    is already taking steps to evaluate the implications of climate-related
    factors for its strategies, operations, and infrastructure--and it will
    take action based upon these assessments, as appropriate. Where
    technologies support defense missions and also provide climate-aligned
    benefits such as fuel savings and increased efficiency, the Department
    can also serve as a platform to advance positive technological
    innovation. If confirmed, I would advocate for these, and other,
    approaches.
                              security assistance
        23. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has
    repeatedly noted that the Indo-Pacific is the priority theater for the
    Department of Defense and that China is the ``pacing threat''. Further,
    President Biden has stated repeatedly that ``our alliances are our
    greatest asset''. Given these administration positions, in your
    opinion, should the percentage of U.S. security assistance provided by
    the Department of Defense to partners and allies in the U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) be going up or
    down as a percentage of the Department's overall security assistance
    budget?
        Dr. Kahl. As the President has articulated, DOD security
    cooperation tools are critical to reinvigorating and modernizing our
    alliances and partnerships around the world, particularly with a focus
    on China. This includes making smart and disciplined choices about the
    allocation of resources. If confirmed, I would review that allocation,
    particularly with a focus on United States Indo-Pacific Command and
    efforts to compete with China globally, to ensure that we are
    maximizing the effective use of taxpayer funding for these programs.
                                      iran
        24. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, in response to a question from
    Senator Tillis at your nomination hearing, you indicated that in your
    extensive travel to Iraq during previous government service you
    experienced firsthand being on the receiving end of rocket attacks by
    Iran and its proxies. You also said in a separate exchange with Senator
    Gillibrand that you ``support our efforts to defend our forces when
    they are attacked or threatened by Iranian proxies.'' I appreciate you
    acknowledging the reality that Iranian-backed militias pose a threat to
    the United States and that we must take action to respond to their
    threats to our forces. Do Iraqi militias such as Kata'ib Hezbollah,
    Asai'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata'ib Sayyid Shuhada
    receive financial support, training, and supplies from Iran?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, it is my understanding that Kata'ib Hezbollah,
    Asai'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata'ib Sayyid Shuhada
    receive financial support, training, and supplies from Iran. This
    support poses a threat to United States and Coalition personnel who are
    in Iraq at the invitation of the Government of Iraq to support the
    defeat-ISIS mission. Iran's lethal support also undermines Iraq's
    stability and threatens innocent Iraqi civilians.

        25. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, during the hearing, I asked whether
    you agreed that as long as Iranian-backed groups target Americans, the
    idea of sanctions relief for Iran should be off the table. You
    responded, in part, ``We should not ease sanctions on terrorism or
    their other activities.'' To be clear, do you agree that the United
    States should not provide Iran any sanctions relief--including through
    the use of waivers or application of licenses--that directly or
    indirectly benefits any entity currently designated for sanctions
    pursuant to Executive Order 13224, including the Central Bank of Iran,
    the National Iranian Oil Company, and National Iranian Tanker Company,
    until Iran ceases its sponsorship of terrorism?
        Dr. Kahl. President Biden is committed to preventing Iran from
    acquiring a nuclear weapon. Given Iran's history of supporting
    terrorism, Iran would be even more dangerous than it currently is if it
    were to acquire a nuclear weapon. Even as we pursue diplomacy with
    respect to Iran's nuclear program, we must remain vigilant against
    Iran's support for terrorism. I believe that the United States should
    continue to designate any Iranian entity that supports terrorist
    activities until that entity ceases its support for terrorism. Iran is
    the largest State sponsor of terrorism, and the United States should
    continue to implement the toughest sanctions possible to deal with
    Iran's support for terrorism.
                                     israel
        26. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, in an October 2014 article by Jeffrey
    Goldberg in The Atlantic, an unnamed senior Obama administration
    official was quoted as saying, ``The good thing about Netanyahu is that
    he's scared to launch wars. . . . The bad thing about him is that he
    won't do anything to reach an accommodation with the Palestinians or
    with the Sunni Arab states. The only thing he's interested in is
    protecting himself from political defeat. He's not [Yitzhak] Rabin,
    he's not [Ariel] Sharon, he's certainly no [Menachem] Begin. He's got
    no guts.'' Were you the unnamed official who made these comments? If
    so, do you regret making these comments? If not, do you agree with
    them?
        Dr. Kahl. I am not the official who made these comments, and I do
    not agree with them. I support the Abraham Accords, and I believe they
    demonstrate the potential for Israel to normalize its relations with
    Arab states. If confirmed, I would work to encourage closer cooperation
    between Israel and its neighbors.
                        u.s. nuclear declaratory policy
        27. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, during your confirmation hearing, you
    indicated that you do not support implementation of a ``no-first-use''
    policy regarding U.S. nuclear weapons. Could you provide your views on
    whether you believe United States adoption of a ``sole-purpose''
    strategy (i.e., U.S. nuclear weapons are only intended to deter the use
    of adversaries' nuclear weapons) would be seen as credible among
    potential adversaries?
        Dr. Kahl. As I testified, I, personally, am not in support of a
    ``no-first-use'' policy, and I would not personally support any shift
    in declaratory policy that undermined the credibility of our nuclear
    deterrent in the eyes of our adversaries or allies. I believe the
    United States should periodically examine its nuclear declaratory
    policy to ensure it supports U.S. strategic objectives and meets
    emerging challenges in the security environment. I anticipate that the
    Department will undertake a set of strategic reviews, including of U.S.
    nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will work
    within the Department and with interagency partners to consider the
    ``no-first-use'' policy and other issues regarding our nuclear policy
    and posture, including how adversaries might view adoption of such a
    ``sole purpose'' policy. Ultimately, any decision on U.S. declaratory
    policy or the adoption of a ``sole purpose'' strategy would be made by
    the President.

        28. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, do you believe adoption of such a
    policy would enhance or undermine the credibility of U.S. extended
    deterrence assurances among our allies?
        Dr. Kahl. The U.S. declaratory policy should support our strategic
    objectives by increasing nuclear deterrence, reducing the risks of
    miscalculation, and credibly assuring U.S. allies as to our continued
    extended deterrence commitments. As such, I would expect to consult
    with our allies closely in the course of any review of our nuclear
    declaratory policy.
                 nuclear modernization and the new start treaty
        29. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, in your responses to the advance
    policy questions you were provided prior to the hearing, you committed,
    without reservation, to fulfilling the Senate's condition in the New
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) resolution of ratification
    relating to engaging Russia in negotiations on its stockpile of
    tactical nuclear weapons. However, when asked a related question
    regarding the Senate's condition on modernizing the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent, you did not offer similar assurances that such a commitment
    would be upheld, only that you would ``conduct a review''. Could you
    clarify why you offered such different responses to these questions?
        Dr. Kahl. As I testified, ``the nuclear triad has been a bedrock of
    our strategic deterrent for decades,'' and ``it is important to
    modernize the triad because our adversaries are modernizing their
    capabilities . . . '' I support nuclear weapons modernization and
    believe all three legs of the triad must remain viable. What I do not
    know at this time are the classified details of the U.S. nuclear
    modernization program. Thus, if confirmed, I am committed to looking
    closely at this issue and conducting a review to determine the
    appropriate pace and scale of modernization to ensure we have a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent consistent with the New START
    Treaty resolution of ratification.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, do you believe that the current
    administration should uphold all of the conditions that the Senate
    established, and President Obama agreed to, in the resolution of
    ratification for the New START Treaty?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I am personally committed to fulfilling the
    conditions set forth in the New START Treaty resolution of
    ratification.

        31. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, do you understand that it will likely
    be more difficult to obtain Senate approval for future arms control
    treaties if the Senate cannot trust that the Executive Branch will
    fulfill the previous commitments it has made during past processes of
    advice and consent?
        Dr. Kahl. The Constitution states that the President has the power
    to make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
    respective roles are critical to ensuring bipartisan support in regard
    to important matters of international security. I understand the
    respective roles played by the executive branch and the Senate and, if
    confirmed, will do my part to ensure adherence to constitutional
    obligations.
                             nuclear modernization
        32. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Kahl, in your responses to the advance
    policy questions (APQ) you were provided earlier, as well as in
    statements you made during your hearing, you expressed a need to obtain
    briefings on classified information relating to the requirement for the
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) before you could take a
    position on the program. However, in regards to a similar question on
    the replacement for the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the Long
    Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), you replied in your APQs that you, `` . .
    . understand the need to modernize and replace the ALCM.''
        Information relating to both of these programs is classified at
    similar levels. As you stated during your hearing, you have been out of
    government for several years and your understanding of relevant
    classified information is, in your words, ``4 years out of date.'' How
    then are you able to reach a conclusion on the need for the LRSO but
    not the GBSD?
        Dr. Kahl. As I testified, ``the nuclear triad has been a bedrock of
    our strategic deterrent for decades,'' and ``it is important to
    modernize the triad because our adversaries are modernizing their
    capabilities.'' Although I believe it is important to modernize the
    entire nuclear Triad, I understand the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
    (GBSD) program to be significantly more expensive and technically more
    challenging than the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) program, based on
    unclassified information. If confirmed I am committed to conducting a
    review to determine the appropriate pace and scale of the entire
    nuclear modernization program, given the complexities of the GBSD
    program. I believe this will require a close examination to ensure it
    meets military needs in an efficient and cost-effective manner. If
    confirmed, I am committed to reviewing and better understanding the
    classified details of both programs, and to assessing how best to
    ensure modernization occurs on budget and on time.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                           iranian ballistic missiles
        33. Senator Cotton. Dr. Kahl, during your nomination hearing, you
    said in response to a question from Senator Fischer regarding Iran's
    ballistic missile threat: ``we should try to get their ballistic
    missile capabilities reduced through diplomacy''. I am aware how
    Iranian officials previously boasted that as part of the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, they got the Obama
    administration to agree to change language in the UN [United Nations]
    resolution to focus on whether missiles were ``designed'' to be nuclear
    capable. I am not asking about that semantic loophole that the Obama
    administration conceded. What I want to know is, whether Iran's
    possession of nuclear-capable missiles--specifically designed as such
    or not--is acceptable to you under United States policy?
        Dr. Kahl. Iran's ballistic missiles pose a grave threat to United
    States forces, allies, and partners, and to U.S. national security
    interests. It is my view that Iran's development of nuclear-capable
    missiles is not acceptable and that we should take a holistic approach
    to constrain Iran's missile capabilities through sanctions and
    diplomatic efforts, in consultation with our allies and partners.

        34. Senator Cotton. Dr. Kahl, I would like you to clarify what you
    mean by the word ``reduced''.
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I would work with other United States
    departments and agencies and with United States allies and partners to
    review the available options for addressing Iran's continued missile
    development and proliferation. I believe that a mix of national
    security tools can slow and degrade Iran's continued missile
    advancements. I also believe that there are diplomatic options to
    encourage Iranian restraint through self-imposed limits on its missile
    force.

        35. Senator Cotton. Dr. Kahl, do you believe that Iran should be
    allowed to retain any ballistic missile--of any size or range--capable
    of delivering nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Kahl. It is my view that Iran's continued development of
    nuclear-capable missiles is not acceptable and that we should continue
    to enforce vigorously United States and international sanctions on
    Iran's ballistic missile activities.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                  indo-pacific
        36. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, through the European Deterrence
    Initiative, major improvements to the posture, readiness, and joint
    force enabling capabilities have been made in the United States
    European Command (EUCOM) area of operations through the smart
    application of over $20 billion since Crimea was invaded and annexed by
    Russia in 2014. No similar improvements have been made in the Indo-
    Pacific despite its status as DOD's ``priority theater''. Do you
    believe we currently have the right forward posture in the Indo-Pacific
    needed to accomplish the objectives of the National Defense Strategy
    (NDS)? If not, what must be done to fix our forward Indo-Pacific
    posture?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe DOD requires modernized, combat-capable, and
    ready forces and a more resilient and distributed force posture in the
    Indo-Pacific region to deter and, if necessary, deny adversary
    aggression against the United States and our allies and partners.
    Although I understand that DOD has undertaken important posture
    initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region since 2014, I agree we should
    continue to ensure that our Indo-Pacific posture is optimized to deter
    aggression, reassure allies and partners, and prevail in conflict. If
    confirmed, I will work with stakeholders across DOD and with
    interagency partners to identify and prioritize executable and cost-
    efficient posture initiatives that ensure DOD maintains a combat-
    credible posture for deterrence and assurance in the Indo-Pacific
    region.

        37. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, how do you assess the relative costs
    and benefits of permanent forces, as compared to rotational forces
    forward stationed overseas, particularly in Europe and the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Dr. Kahl. We must have the right mix of permanent and rotational
    forces overseas, based on our operational needs in each of our
    theaters. If confirmed, I will ensure that we appropriately consider
    whether permanently stationing forces or rotationally deploying them is
    the right option, in consultation with our allies and partners, as we
    determine how best to posture our forces.

        38. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, do you agree that we need forces
    stationed and deployed west of the International Date Line to credibly
    deter China in the Indo-Pacific? If so, how can we better protect these
    forces at fixed sites like Kadena Air Force Base?
        Dr. Kahl. I agree that a combat-credible forward posture is
    critical to the U.S. military's ability to deter and, if necessary,
    deny adversary aggression. I believe that we must develop our forward
    posture alongside new warfighting concepts, modernized, highly capable,
    and ready forces, and capable allied and partner forces in order to
    ensure that the Joint Force can operate effectively in a contested
    environment.

        39. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, what are the key areas in which DOD
    must improve to provide the Joint Force with the capabilities necessary
    to prevail in great power competition and potential conflict with
    China, as well as with Russia?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe the Department must ensure that the Joint Force
    is combat-capable, ready, and postured to deter--and, if necessary,
    deny--aggression from China or Russia. Having this warfighting
    advantage is critical to underwriting deterrence and diplomacy. My
    understanding is the Department is focusing its investments on several
    key capabilities, including nuclear modernization, long-range
    conventional strike, undersea warfare, space, cyber, advanced tactical
    fighters, and a modernized surface fleet. I believe that a continued
    focus on modernizing the force remains warranted and, if confirmed, I
    look forward to maintaining the Department's emphasis on developing the
    capabilities that we need to meet the demands of the future security
    environment.
                                      iran
        40. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, for more than 4 decades, Iran and its
    terrorist proxies have targeted American civilians and military
    personnel--as we are currently seeing in Iraq. According to the latest
    National Strategy for Counterterrorism, ``Iran remains the most
    prominent state sponsor of terrorism, supporting militant and terrorist
    groups across the Middle East and is cultivating a network of
    operatives that pose a threat in the United States and globally.'' What
    steps should the Defense Department be taking to address Iran's
    regional aggression--specifically in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq, in
    Lebanon?
        Dr. Kahl. While serving in my previous position as Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, I saw firsthand Iran's
    regional destabilizing activities and support for terrorism. As the
    Biden Administration prioritizes diplomacy to address Iran's nuclear
    weapons program, we must also remain vigilant against Iran's malign
    activities across the region. If confirmed, I would advocate for a
    whole-of-government approach that employs all elements of national
    power to disrupt and degrade Iranian threats in the region. The United
    States should work with its regional partners to build their capacity
    to restrain and counterbalance Iran. We also should adapt our strategy
    to the unique political dynamics in regional countries where Iran is
    active. In vulnerable countries like Iraq and Lebanon, we should help
    build institutions that are resilient to Iranian influence. In Yemen,
    we should support diplomatic efforts to end the conflict between the
    Houthis and Saudi Arabia that has provided a major opening to Iran to
    increase its influence. In Syria, we should leverage our presence and
    support to regional actors to limit Iran's freedom of operation.

        41. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, how should the United States respond
    when Iranian-proxies target United States forces in the region?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, the protection of U.S. forces would be my
    highest priority. I support defensive action against Iran-backed Shia
    militia groups when necessary to respond to attacks or threats of
    imminent attack. Any U.S. response must be proportionate and reinforced
    by a whole-of-government approach, including diplomatic tools.

        42. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, do you support the long-held position
    of the United States to guarantee the freedom of navigation throughout
    the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the larger waterways throughout
    the Middle East?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, I do. Freedom of navigation is a foundation of the
    rules-based international order. I fully support the Department of
    Defense continuing its important work with allies and partners around
    the world ensure that the navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed
    by international law are maintained and respected. Freedom of
    navigation is under particular threat in the Arabian Gulf, the Strait
    of Hormuz, and the southern Red Sea from Iran and its proxies. The
    Department of Defense should continue working with a broad coalition of
    international allies and partners to deter and expose threats to
    freedom of navigation in the Middle East and to maintain the capability
    to ensure these crucial waterways remain open. If confirmed, I would
    advise the Secretary on how to continue safeguarding the maritime
    environment and the rules-based international order.
                          information/influence domain
        43. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, a recent report by the Global
    Engagement Center at the State Department identified growing
    similarities between disinformation campaigns by China, Russia, and
    Iran aimed at taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to undermine
    the United States. These efforts include spreading outright
    falsehoods--such as that the novel coronavirus is an American
    bioweapon, that the virus did not come from China, and that United
    States troops spread the virus. These lies obviously have no basis in
    reality, but it demonstrates how our adversaries are using influence
    operations and disinformation to try to damage the United States and
    our allies. This committee has used the recent National Defense
    Authorization Acts (NDAA) to push the Department to be more active and
    effective in the information domain, including by clarifying
    authorities and by requiring greater senior-level DOD engagement on the
    issue, but more work needs to be done. How would you characterize the
    use of disinformation by China, Russia, Iran and others to undermine
    United States interests and those of our partners?
        Dr. Kahl. America's adversaries not only seek to hack our critical
    information systems, they also seek to hack our society and our
    politics through the spread of disinformation. As such, disinformation
    poses one of today's greatest challenges to the United States and our
    allies and partners. China, Russia, Iran, and non-state actors
    understand that in today's information environment they have real-time
    access to a global audience and that audiences often are inclined to
    believe the first information they receive, even if the information is
    false. Through ``first mover advantage'' and flooding the information
    environment with falsehoods, even if sprinkled with truth, these actors
    threaten our interests.

        44. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, what do you find most concerning, and
    why?
        Dr. Kahl. Disinformation, especially with a capable sponsor
    spreading it to susceptible audiences, can often drown out truthful
    information and create barriers to fact-based messaging. The United
    States and our allies and partners must continue to counter the sources
    and to refute the content of this disinformation; we also must also
    find ways to work proactively to defeat disinformation campaigns and
    their sponsors.

        45. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, how do you plan to make
    the Department more effective at operating in the information and
    influence domain of warfare?
        Dr. Kahl. We must take a comprehensive and deliberate approach,
    using our agility, capability, and capacity to connect with audiences
    globally in real time and to build a culture of trust. If confirmed, I
    look forward to reviewing the Department's current work in the
    information and influence warfare domain with a view to optimizing
    DOD's efforts--working alongside interagency partners--to counter the
    evolving threats and challenges in the information environment.

        46. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, what are the Department's most
    pressing challenges to operating effectively in the information and
    influence domain?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I intend to review how the Department is
    organized and how it is evolving to take on the challenges to operating
    effectively in the information and influence domain. From my current
    vantage point, however, it is clear to me that we need to deepen
    foundations of reliability and trust with key audiences and to disrupt,
    directly and indirectly, our adversaries' efforts to spread
    disinformation as part of their national security strategies.

        47. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, how will you seek to overcome these
    challenges?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will address the tasks required of the
    Department's Principal Information Operations Advisor (see 10 U.S.C
    397) to improve integration of all relevant considerations--policy,
    strategy, planning, resource management, operational, personnel, and
    technology development--across all of the elements of the Department's
    information operations. I understand that this effort is underway and,
    if confirmed, I commit to keeping Congress fully informed regarding our
    progress.

        48. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, what should be DOD's role in a whole-
    of-government approach to combating disinformation by adversaries like
    China, Russia, and Iran?
        Dr. Kahl. The Department's information capabilities should be
    leveraged to gain and maintain the information advantage, integrated
    with the tools of other departments and agencies as part of a broader
    U.S. Government-wide approach. Our allies and partners also bring
    reinforcing and often unique capabilities to countering adversaries'
    disinformation that we should also integrate into our collective
    approaches.
                         department of defense spending
        49. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, the bipartisan NDS commission report,
    former Secretary James Mattis, and former Secretary Mark Esper all
    assessed that it would take 3 to 5 percent real growth to implement the
    2018 NDS. In terms of real dollars, between 2010 and 2015 our defense
    budget decreased by about 25 percent while China increased their
    defense spending by 83 percent as a part of what General H.R. McMaster
    in his book Battlegrounds characterized as China's ``largest peacetime
    military buildup in history.'' Given the massive increase in Chinese
    defense spending and focus on applying new technologies to their
    military capabilities, do you think a declining defense budget will
    improve or erode our competitive advantages over China?
        Dr. Kahl. Generally, I believe that a declining defense budget will
    have an impact on the Joint Force's deterrent and warfighting ability
    vis-`-vis the China threat. Adequately resourcing the Department is
    important to contend with the growing challenge posed by China.
    However, ensuring competitive advantages over China is not only a
    matter of budgeting; much depends on how the Department prioritizes its
    future force investments, conducts day-to-day operations, and pursues
    reforms--and how these efforts are nested in an integrated, U.S.
    Government approach. Under any resourcing level, the Department must
    continue to focus investments on modernizing the force to deter
    aggression from strategic competitors, find efficiencies through
    reforms, and re-invest savings in the force.

        50. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, in your assessment, how important is
    the Pacific Deterrent Initiative to deterrence of aggression by China
    in the Indo-Pacific and what would your priorities be for its
    application?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe the Pacific Deterrence Initiative serves an
    important purpose in highlighting and tracking the substantial DOD
    investments needed to maintain a credible conventional deterrent in the
    Indo-Pacific region. Priority areas for investment might include more
    lethal and survivable capabilities, a more resilient and distributed
    force posture, improved capabilities for allies and partners, and
    enhanced innovation, experimentation, and training for the joint force.
                             nuclear modernization
        51. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, in one of his final speeches as vice
    president, President Biden argued against modernizing the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent, advocated for unilateral U.S. nuclear weapons reductions--
    regardless of whether Russia would reciprocate--and supported
    unprecedented policy constraints on the United States' ability to deter
    strategic attacks against our country and our allies. At the time the
    then-vice president gave this speech, you were his national security
    advisor. Would you say that you supported the views he expressed?
        Dr. Kahl. I would not characterize then-Vice President Biden's
    remarks in this way. But yes, I supported his perspective that the
    United States should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national
    security strategy, even as we continue to ensure that our nuclear
    deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. I anticipate President
    Biden will direct the relevant U.S. departments and agencies to conduct
    a set of strategic reviews, including of U.S. nuclear posture, that is
    guided by the Administration's recently released Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance, which states that ``we will take steps to
    reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,
    while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure and
    effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies
    remain strong and credible.''

        52. Senator Tillis. Dr. Kahl, given that our adversaries have
    continued to expand and modernize their nuclear forces since the
    President made this speech, do you believe that pursuing such policies
    now is an appropriate response to these increasing threats?
        Dr. Kahl. I am aware that Russia and China are actively modernizing
    and expanding their nuclear arsenals. As I testified, I believe ``it is
    important to modernize the triad because our adversaries are
    modernizing their capabilities.'' At the same time, it is also
    important that we limit the nuclear capabilities of our adversaries,
    reduce the risks of miscalculation, and increase transparency and
    predictability. I support pursuing strategic stability dialogues and
    new arms control treaties to head-off a dangerous and costly arms race,
    re-establish our credibility as a leader on national and international
    security, and reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                          systemic racism in the ranks
        53. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your opening statement you
    state, if confirmed, you will do all you can to ``support efforts to
    address the scourge of sexual assault and end violent extremism and
    systemic racism within the ranks''. I've served in the Marine Corps for
    over 26 years. Throughout my time in the military, I've had the
    privilege to work with some of the most tolerant and inclusive leaders
    this country has to offer. While not perfect, the military has
    historically been one of the most progressive and integrated
    organizations in the U.S. Government, with servicemembers of all
    backgrounds, colors, creeds and genders working towards the same
    mission. There are, however, certainly problems within the military,
    particularly with sexual assault and harassment. With this in mind, can
    you expound upon and clarify your definition of systemic racism within
    the ranks? How do you plan on addressing it within the ranks?
        Dr. Kahl. In my experience working alongside members of the U.S.
    military, the vast majority of men and women in uniform are tolerant,
    respectful, and carry out their duties with honor. However, a small
    minority appear to hold extremist views and there remain systemic
    barriers to advancement for people of color within the military ranks.
    As Chairman Milley testified before this Committee, ``we, as a nation
    and as a military, are still struggling with racism, and we have much
    work to do.'' The Trump administration recognized the need to take
    action, and the Biden administration is committed to tackling this
    challenge head on. In July 2020, then-Secretary Esper commissioned the
    Defense Advisory Committee on Diversity and Inclusion in the Armed
    Services to provide an independent and enduring review and assessment
    of policies, programs and processes to improve diversity, inclusion,
    and equal opportunity for servicemembers. On February 3, 2021,
    Secretary Austin announced a department-wide ``stand-down'' to address
    extremism in the ranks. Secretary Austin recognizes that one of the
    challenges is that we do not know the full depth and breadth of the
    problem. Although Secretary Austin believes the number of
    servicemembers who adhere to such ideologies to be small, they are, in
    his words ``not as small as anyone would like.'' If confirmed, I would
    support the efforts underway by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments and Services, to more
    accurately assess the full scope of the challenges we face and to
    develop concrete mitigation measures for the issues of racism and
    extremism facing the military and civilian workforces.

        54. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, you agreed with me during your
    confirmation hearing that we need more data on the issue of racism and
    extremism in the military to effectively address it. As someone who has
    never served in the military, you cannot draw on personal experience
    within the ranks, making data all the more important. What data did you
    draw on to support your statement of ``systemic racism within the
    ranks'' in your opening statement? Please be specific in the reports or
    surveys that you used to come to this conclusive statement.
        Dr. Kahl. Publicly available information suggests there is
    extremism in the ranks--although Secretary Austin believes the number
    of servicemembers who adhere to such ideologies to be small, they are,
    in his words ``not as small as anyone would like.'' According to the
    Congressional Research Service, while black servicemembers comprise
    nearly 19 percent of the military, less than 8 percent of generals and
    admirals are black. The Center for Naval Analyses' annual report on
    ``Population Representation in the Military Services'' has also
    published data that supports the lack of representation in leadership
    among people of color. Numerous news reports from the Wall Street
    Journal, New York Times, and Reuters point to perceived racism and
    discrimination in the military. Similar to past efforts by the
    Department to lead in integration, I believe DOD can and should be in
    the lead to address this problem. On February 3, 2021, Secretary Austin
    announced a department-wide ``stand-down'' to address extremism in the
    ranks. Secretary Austin recognizes that one of the challenges is that
    we do not know the full depth and breadth of the problem. If confirmed,
    I would support ongoing efforts by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments and Services, to more
    accurately assess the full scope of the challenges we face and to
    develop concrete mitigation measures for the issues of racism and
    extremism facing the military and civilian workforces.

        55. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, if you agree with me that we need
    more data on this issue, how are you able to make the claim that you
    need to address ``systemic racism in the ranks'', when you have not
    defined the problem through data?
        Dr. Kahl. On February 3, 2021, Secretary Austin announced a
    department-wide ``stand-down'' to address extremism in the ranks.
    Secretary Austin recognizes that one of the challenges is that we don't
    know the full depth and breadth of it the problem. If confirmed, I
    would support ongoing efforts by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments and Services, to more
    accurately assess the full scope of the challenges we face and to
    develop concrete mitigation measures for the issues of racism and
    extremism facing the military and civilian workforces.
               past under secretary of defense for policy nominee
        56. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, former-President Donald Trump
    nominated General Anthony Tata to the post of Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy (USD-P), but the nomination was withdrawn before the
    Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) was able to hold a hearing.
    Democrat Senators on SASC wrote a letter to General Tata stating that
    ``your record of offensive and inflammatory comments disqualifies you
    from serving in your current position and the position for which you
    have been nominated.'' During your confirmation hearing, Republicans
    brought up similar comparisons of your inflammatory comments made on
    twitter against the Republican Party, former-President Trump and his
    administration, and members of Congress. Given the Democrat rationale
    for opposition to General Tata, why should you not be disqualified from
    this position as well?
        Dr. Kahl. As I mentioned during my testimony, the last few years
    were polarizing on social media, and there were times that I got swept
    up in that. There were moments where I strongly opposed decisions made
    by President Trump, but it is clear that the language I used in
    opposing some of those decisions was disrespectful, and for that, I
    apologize. I understand the position I am being nominated for, although
    a political appointment, is not a political job--it is a policy job. If
    confirmed, I commit to working in a nonpartisan way within the
    Department and in a bipartisan fashion with this committee and others
    in Congress to do what is in the best interest of our national
    security. I am deeply committed to nonpartisan public service and based
    on my previous experience working in the Pentagon, including my work
    for two Republican Secretaries of Defense, I have a clear record of
    comporting myself in this way while in office.
                     great power competition in the arctic
        57. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, given the National Defense
    Strategy's focus on great power competition and the rapid development
    of Russia and China's capabilities in the Arctic, would you agree that
    the Arctic is an emerging front-line for great power competition and
    rivalry? Please elaborate.
        Dr. Kahl. I agree that Russia and China are increasingly exhibiting
    competing behavior in the Arctic, among other regions. It is important
    to note that the challenges these competitors pose in the Arctic are
    distinct. Russia's approach to the Arctic largely focuses on
    territorial defense and economic development. It is advancing its
    interests through a modest increase in Arctic-based forces, which is
    intended to improve its operational capability in northern latitudes,
    exert greater control of the Northern Sea Route, and exploit the
    resources located in and around the region. China is also active in the
    region, but it is largely focused on increasing its influence and
    securing access to resources, primarily through predatory economic
    behavior.

        58. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the Department of Defense released
    its Arctic Strategy in June 2019, the Air Force followed suit with its
    own in July 2020, the Department of the Navy published their Arctic
    Blueprint in January 2021, and the Army's Arctic Strategy is
    forthcoming. Can I get a commitment from you--like I did from Secretary
    Austin and Secretary Hicks--to ensure these Service-Arctic strategies
    are fully resourced to ensure the Department can successfully defend
    the Homeland along our northern approaches?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I am committed to helping ensure that the
    Department has the appropriate capabilities to advance defense
    objectives, including those related to the Arctic. I believe DOD should
    continue to balance consideration of Arctic investments, including
    those identified in Military Department strategies, with broader,
    global priorities and Joint Force capability and posture needs. If
    confirmed, I would use the Department's 2019 Arctic Strategy as a guide
    to inform Policy's work on defense-related Arctic issues, in the
    context of this Administration's defense strategy.

        59. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in our conversation ahead of your
    confirmation hearing, you mentioned that throughout the meetings and
    briefings you've participated in--up to now--that roles,
    responsibilities, and expertise regarding Arctic-related issues seems
    to be spread across a wide number of offices. And, that no one appears
    to have a complete regional picture to effectively and comprehensively
    inform Arctic policy. With that in mind, would you support establishing
    an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic Policy so that a singular
    person has the responsibility, accountability, and importance to
    establish comprehensive policy and advocate for the increasingly
    competitive region?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will conduct a review of our staffing and
    organization to ensure that the Policy team is best prepared to address
    the myriad threats facing our country today, including the growing
    strategic importance of the Arctic. Although I am confident that the
    Policy team is able to collaborate across regional and functional
    boundaries to provide the Department's senior leadership sound policy
    recommendations, I would work closely within the Administration and
    with Congress on any recommendation of staffing changes at the
    Assistant Secretary level to address emerging needs, such as increasing
    focus on the Arctic.

        60. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, what
    capability gaps presently exist that inhibit our ability to
    effectively: 1) project and sustain power in the Arctic, and 2) compete
    with Russia and China in the northern latitudes? Please elaborate.
        Dr. Kahl. I understand the Department has identified a range of
    capabilities that are necessary to project and sustain power to, and
    in, the Arctic region to compete with Russia and China in the northern
    latitudes. For example, this includes improved domain awareness systems
    and robust communications capabilities. By focusing on these kinds of
    priority capability areas, DOD will be positioned to make significant
    improvements to its ability to operate in the Arctic region, while
    supporting the Joint Force's broader capability priorities. If
    confirmed, I will examine these issues in the context of the National
    Defense Strategy review.

        61. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the nearest Department of Defense
    Strategic Seaport is the Port of Anchorage; which is some 1,500
    nautical miles from the Arctic Circle. That is equivalent to asking
    Boston to cover Miami on the East Coast. In your personal opinion, do
    we have the necessary infrastructure--like Strategic Arctic Ports and
    expeditionary airfields--to project power and effectively compete in
    the region?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe that potential infrastructure gaps in the
    Arctic should be considered in the context of DOD's global mission
    demands and defense priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to
    reviewing DOD's global force posture, including requirements for the
    Arctic, to help ensure that Secretary Austin's decision on Strategic
    Arctic Ports is informed by a detailed understanding of the
    Department's operating requirements, robust analysis, and U.S.
    interagency perspectives.

        62. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, would you agree that our Nation
    needs a Strategic Arctic Port? Please explain.
        Dr. Kahl. My understanding is that DOD's ongoing study regarding
    Strategic Arctic Ports will help inform the Department's overall
    evaluation of Arctic infrastructure and capability needs, in the
    context of DOD's global mission demands and defense priorities. If
    confirmed, I am committed to evaluating DOD's analysis and consulting
    with Congress on this matter carefully to inform my advice to the
    Secretary on posture decisions.

        63. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the port at Nome, Alaska stands out
    for its existing infrastructure including a well utilized runway,
    established port with large ship traffic, and its hospital. Congress
    also recently authorized--in the Omnibus appropriations bill--$500
    million for the ``Nome Deep Draft Port Project.'' Will you commit to
    taking a personal look at Nome--or Port Clarence or Adak--for
    development as a port to support the Department and U.S. Coast Guard
    requirements? Both previous Secretaries of the Navy were strong
    advocates in this effort.
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I am committed to evaluating potential
    Arctic port locations, including Nome, Alaska, as part of the
    requirement in Section 1752 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2020 to evaluate potential sites for one or more
    strategic ports in the Arctic. If confirmed, I look forward to
    reviewing the Department's analysis on the range of strategic,
    political-military, operational, fiscal, and other factors when
    considering this important matter. I believe it is in DOD's interest to
    continue to work closely with U.S. interagency partners, including the
    U.S. Coast Guard, on this issue.

        64. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, do we
    have the right mix of U.S. Navy surface ships to visibly contest
    illegal maritime claims, provide maritime warning and defense, and
    ensure a free and open maritime domain year-round--with surface FONOPs
    [freedom of navigation operations]--in the Arctic?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will closely examine this issue and work
    with the military departments and services regarding force posture and
    force development to ensure the Department meets present and future
    requirements, including those related to the Arctic.

        65. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, do you
    see any strategic value in ice-hardening a select number of Navy ships
    to better project power into the Arctic?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I would defer to the Secretary of Homeland
    Security (DHS) to identify the Department of Homeland Security's
    preferred approach to resourcing its proposed icebreaker capability to
    support its operational requirements most effectively. From a DOD
    perspective, U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard vessels are designed and
    constructed to meet multiple requirements and involve trade-offs to
    achieve the optimum balance of capability. If confirmed, I will ensure
    that DOD works with DHS to continue meeting our respective mission
    requirements. I would use the Department's 2019 Arctic Strategy as a
    guideline to inform DOD's work on defense-related Arctic issues,
    including considering the value of ice-hardening a select number of
    Navy ships in the context of the Joint Force's broader global
    priorities and strategic objectives.

        66. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, what is the risk of not ice-
    hardening a select number of Navy ships and relying predominantly on
    the U.S. Coast Guard alone to project the regional force presence
    needed when surface ice is present?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I believe it is appropriate for the DOD to
    continue to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    on its efforts to bolster its icebreaking capability, which directly
    supports the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaking mission. I would defer to
    the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify DHS's preferred approach
    to meet its operational requirements most effectively. I understand the
    U.S. Navy, and the Joint Force at-large, continue to be able to project
    force and meet their operational requirements at any time or location
    in the world, including in the Arctic region, through a combination of
    submarine, surface, air, and space capabilities, among others.

        67. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, you characterized Moscow's approach
    in the Arctic as: ``largely from a territorial defense perspective.''
    Yet, Russia has increased its incursions of the Alaska Air Defense
    Identification Zone markedly over the last year. In fact, the average
    number of intercepts of Russian aircraft from 2007 to 2019 was six to
    seven. In 2020--through October--there were a total of 14. Further,
    Russia has also increased the frequency and scale of military exercises
    in the region. Last August, the Russian navy conducted a major exercise
    consisting of more than 50 warships and 40 aircraft in the Bering sea;
    which, also encompassed them expelling U.S. fishing fleets from our own
    exclusive economic zone. Do you view these activities as defensive in
    nature?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will review intelligence assessments of
    Russian long-range aviation and naval activity to inform my
    understanding of the situation, and I will respond with an informed
    position at that point.

        68. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, what, in your opinion, would
    constitute military activity in the Arctic that can be characterized as
    offensive?
        Dr. Kahl. In the absence of access to classified information, it
    would not be prudent to speculate on this issue at this time. If
    confirmed, I will review intelligence assessments, and I will reply to
    you with an informed position.
                              energy independence
        69. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, do you
    agree that U.S. energy independence--leveraging an ``all the above''
    approach to include renewables, oil and gas--is a long-standing, vital
    element of our national security?
        Dr. Kahl. The U.S. Government should pursue energy independence and
    diversified energy sources as a vital element of our national security
    and economic interests. It is in our national security interest to
    pursue long-term, sustainable solutions that address climate change and
    ensure continuity of operations for the Department, and to make
    thoughtful investments to decrease our dependence on vulnerable sources
    of energy and fuel supplies.

        70. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, do you
    believe the United States becoming reliant on other countries for oil
    and gas helps or hurts our national security?
        Dr. Kahl. It is in the Department's national security interests to
    pursue diversified and alternative energy resources. Domestic energy
    production, investing in renewable energy, and diversifying energy
    supply sources offer options to address concerns regarding potentially
    destabilizing reliance on other countries, particularly competitor
    nations and potential adversaries.

        71. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, do you believe the United States
    being an exporter of energy help or hurts our national security?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe it helps the United States' national security
    to be an energy exporter.
                                budget/readiness
        72. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission report, the two previous Senate-confirmed Defense
    Secretaries, and the previous and current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff have all stated the need for sustained 3 to 5 percent annual
    real growth to the defense budget to implement the National Defense
    Strategy, increase much-needed readiness, and advance long-overdue
    modernization. In your personal opinion, do you believe this is an
    appropriate target when considering what we ask of Armed Forces today
    and what we will ask of it in the future?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the alignment
    of this Administration's defense priorities with resources in the
    context of a National Defense Strategy review. At any budget level,
    however, I believe that the Department must develop new warfighting
    concepts to inform its capability priorities and pursue reforms to
    harness savings that can be reinvested in the future Joint Force. DOD's
    missions should be nested within integrated U.S. Government approaches
    to global challenges.

        73. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, under a number of different U.S.
    presidential administrations, cuts to defense spending have forced the
    Department of Defense to make tough budget decisions that have led to
    plummeting readiness for the U.S. Armed Forces. For instance, at the
    end of the Obama administration, only 3 of 58 Army Brigade Combat Teams
    (BCTs) were combat-ready, and less than half the Marine Corps aviation
    fleets were flight-ready at the time. With steady defense spending
    under the Trump administration, the Army now reports that half of its
    BCTs are rated at the highest levels of tactical readiness and the
    Marine Corps aviation has reached 80 percent readiness goals. If
    confirmed, will you commit to working to ensure the readiness of our
    forces is improving, not declining, under the Biden administration?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, if confirmed, I will work to ensure the readiness of
    our forces continues to improve, enabling warfighting preparedness of
    the Joint Force.

        74. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, how will you work to accomplish
    this under what may be flat or declining defense budgets?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will exercise my role in advising the
    Secretary on ways the Department should prioritize investments in
    readiness and modernization for high-end conflict and, when necessary,
    in making hard choices not to field additional force structure that the
    Department cannot make ready and capable with proper resourcing. The
    next National Defense Strategy review will inform the development of
    these priorities and choices. Under any budget environment, the
    Department should optimize its resourcing choices by developing new
    warfighting concepts that inform smart investments and continue to
    harness funds from reforms and efficiencies to invest further in the
    Joint Force.

        75. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, I think you would agree that
    diplomacy is always the preferred method of avoiding and/or ending
    conflict; however, diplomacy is only credible if it is fully backed by
    a strong, ready military. In your personal opinion, how important is a
    robust military capability for negotiating diplomatically and
    empowering the United States State Department, particularly with near-
    peer competitors like Russia and China? What about with rogue state
    nations like North Korea and Iran? Please elaborate.
        Dr. Kahl. The United States should lead with diplomacy wherever
    possible, and military force should be the option of last resort. At
    the same time, I believe the United States' diplomatic efforts are
    bolstered by the Department of Defense serving as the ultimate
    guarantor of U.S. security. The Department can best serve this role by
    maintaining a force that can credibly deter aggression and, if
    necessary, fight and win the Nation's wars. DOD maintains close
    relationships with interagency partners--and particularly with the
    Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
    Strong cooperation throughout the executive branch is critical to
    protect the United States from a range of threats, including those
    posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as transnational
    challenges such as climate change and pandemics.
                                missile defense
        76. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, given that Secretary of Defense
    Lloyd Austin has recused himself from issues involving Raytheon, you
    will likely be handling many missile defense-related issues in the
    Department. In your personal opinion, what are your thoughts broadly on
    the U.S. Homeland missile defense system?
        Dr. Kahl. Defense of the homeland is a DOD priority, and missile
    defense is a central component of this mission. In conjunction with
    nuclear deterrence, the Department must ensure we have effective
    missile defenses to safeguard the American people from missile threats
    from rogue nations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor all homeland
    missile defense programs to ensure that they adequately address the
    threat and align with the Administration's policies.

        77. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, which specific capabilities need to
    be improved and which new capabilities need to be prioritized?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I would work to develop reliable, cost-
    effective, sustainable, and scalable solutions to defend against
    missile threats from rogue nations. I support continuing improvements
    to national missile defense, including improving discrimination
    capabilities and sensors, for detection of both ballistic and
    hypersonic missiles. I would support continuing improvements to our
    homeland missile defense architecture, and will review the particular
    concepts, programs, and capabilities as part of our broader defense
    strategy.

        78. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the National Defense Strategy
    articulates the top defense objective as: ``defending the Homeland from
    attack;'' a vital component of meeting this objective is robustly
    investing in our Nation's missile defense capabilities. Unfortunately,
    we are trending in the wrong direction regarding this issue--North
    Korea and Iran continue to expand the quantity, range, and lethality of
    their arsenals, as do our top great power competitors--Russia and
    China--with long-range cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons. Yet, as
    these threats trend upward, the budget allocated to the Missile Defense
    Agency trends flat or downward. It is past time to put our money where
    our mouth is, and invest in this lagging deterrence capability. Will
    you commit--if confirmed--to ensuring adequate resources are allocated
    toward modernizing and fielding a robust missile defense capability--
    commensurate with current and future threats?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. Defending the U.S. Homeland, as well as globally
    deployed U.S. and allied and partner forces, is a priority for DOD, and
    missile defense is a central component of these unique missions. If
    confirmed, I will continue to support improvement of our capabilities
    to address a limited missile attack from rogue nations; and advocate
    for the resources needed to safeguard the American people against rogue
    State missile attacks while also providing credible support to our
    regional allies and partners against advanced missile threats in
    operational theaters. If confirmed, I will work to develop effective
    and affordable solutions to stay ahead of the evolving missile threats
    in these domains.

        79. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, from a national security
    perspective, the planned Next Generator Interceptor (NGI) gives you
    complete capabilities needed to defend against rogue nation threats,
    but not until 2030. I included language in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA--
    which recently passed - mandating that DOD comprehensively look at an
    Interim-GBI [ground-based interceptor] solution to deliver capability
    by 2026. It is my understanding that may not be feasible. If confirmed,
    can I get your commitment to prioritize any effort that delivers much-
    needed capability--whether it's an interim capability or an accelerated
    NGI--to our warfighters to defend America's Homeland?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, defense of the homeland is a DOD priority. The
    Department must provide reliable and cost-effective missile defenses
    and continue to develop more reliable defenses as early as possible. If
    confirmed, I will monitor the Next Generation Interceptor acquisition
    plan closely and ensure that it adequately addresses the threat and
    aligns with the Administration's policies. We should prioritize an
    effective system to improve our limited missile defense capability
    against rogue States, and we should minimize the risks of delay or cost
    growth. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing whether an interim solution
    may be possible and warranted on a relevant timeline and as a cost-
    effective investment. As part of the review of our missile defense
    programs, I will ensure the Department maintains maximum decision space
    to ensure we pursue a program that delivers on cost and on schedule.

        80. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, what are
    the risks of waiting nearly a decade to field NGI?
        Dr. Kahl. The United States is currently defended from existing
    intercontinental missile threats posed by rogue States by the Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. We must continue to have a
    credible missile defense that defends the United States and its allies
    and partners. If confirmed, I will work to develop effective and
    affordable solutions responsive to evolving missile threats to the
    United States, and to deliver those capabilities on a timeline relevant
    to those threats. I support delivering a capability on an early
    timeline and, if confirmed, I review particular concepts and
    capabilities to ensure that we are improving defense of the United
    States as quickly as possible while minimizing risk and maintaining
    strategic stability.

        81. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, how could we accelerate the
    process?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will review the concepts, programs, and
    capabilities related to the next-generation interceptor program and the
    ground-based midcourse defense system to be able to advise the
    Secretary and Deputy Secretary on specific courses of action to improve
    the protection of the homeland more quickly and responsibly.

        82. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the missile capabilities possessed
    by rogue nations--North Korea and Iran--continue to rapidly evolve. The
    New York Times recently reported that North Korea showcased the
    country's ``largest-ever'' ICBM just over a month ago, and revealed a
    new submarine-launched ballistic missile even more recently. Provided
    the presence of these very real and capable threats to our Nation's
    homeland, are the 44 GBIs currently postured enough to present a
    credible defense of the American people. In your personal opinion, do
    we need to expand beyond the additional 20 new GBIs planned (for a
    total of 64 GBIs)--as authorized by Congress in the Fiscal Year 2018
    NDAA?
        Dr. Kahl. The Department of Defense currently defends the United
    States against the growing threat from North Korea by ensuring robust
    nuclear deterrence and limited missile defenses. If confirmed, I will
    work to ensure we sustain reliable nuclear forces and develop effective
    and affordable solutions responsive to evolving missile threats to the
    U.S. Homeland. I will review particular concepts, programs, and
    capabilities in the context of our broader defense strategy and ensure
    they align with the Administration's priorities. As part of this
    review, I will assess whether additional interceptors may be needed
    beyond the current plan of adding another 20 interceptors.

        83. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the United States has consistently
    held that it will accept no limitations on its missile defense systems.
    Any such limitations could constrain or preclude missile defense
    technologies and options necessary in the future to protect the
    American people, its forces, and allies and partners. In your personal
    opinion, would you agree that our missile defense capabilities should
    NOT be limited, especially since they are defensive in nature, as part
    of any future arms control negotiations or agreements? Please
    elaborate.
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will support review of missile defense
    policy and capabilities in the context of a broader defense strategy
    review to ensure our missile defense policy and investments are aligned
    with this Administration's priorities. I believe we should maintain our
    ability to defend ourselves against a limited missile attack from rogue
    states. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that the Department's views
    inform any arms control negotiations.
                                  kc-46 basing
        84. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the previous Senate-confirmed
    Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Mark Esper acknowledged that collocation
    of 100 5th-generation fighters with KC-46 tankers would provide our
    Nation with ``extreme strategic reach''. The current Senate-confirmed
    Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, stated: `` . . . [KC-46s] must be
    beddown in the locations that most efficiently meet steady state and
    COCOM [combatant command] requirements.'' Provided Alaska's
    geostrategic location along the seams of INDOPACOM and EUCOM--the two
    priority theaters of great power competition--what kind of message
    would it send to our allies to base KC-46s alongside our F-22s and F-
    35s in the Arctic region?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will examine this basing issue and ensure
    we are postured to optimize our ability to meet operational
    requirements, including in the Arctic and Indo-Pacific regions.

        85. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, the commander of U.S.
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), General Stephen Lyons, has stated:
    ``The aerial refueling fleet continues to underpin the Joint Force's
    ability to deploy an immediate force across all NDS mission areas . . .
    '' Given Alaska's ongoing beddown of F-35s, existing access to
    expansive training ranges, and my State's proximity to several high-
    priority regions, will you commit--if confirmed, as Secretary Austin
    has done--to take a personal look at KC-46 basing to ensure our Nation
    pursues a long-term, strategy-driven decision, not solely a short-term,
    budget-driven decision?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I will review and consider options for
    basing KC-46 aircraft and advise U.S. Air Force leaders and Secretary
    Austin, where appropriate.

        86. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in the Air Force's force-sizing
    construct--``The Air Force We Need''--it calls for a plus-up to 386
    total squadrons, including a plus-up of 14 tanker squadrons. This
    squadron end-strength was recently codified in the Fiscal Year 2021
    NDAA. Given Congress' recent support of Air Force end-strength
    increases and given the critical shortage of tankers (as highlighted by
    Gen. Lyons), should the Air Force look to beddown additive squadrons of
    KC-46s--like what would occur at Eielson Air Force Base?
        Dr. Kahl. I appreciate the importance of building up the U.S. Air
    Force's tanker fleet. If confirmed, I will work with U.S. Air Force
    leaders, where appropriate, as they consider how best to posture
    additional squadrons.
                       defense posture review initiative
        87. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, it is my view that if we look at
    the United States force posture in the Indo-Pacific, it is a snapshot
    of where U.S. Forces were following World War II and the Korean War. In
    other words, it's stale. Given that, I believe our current force
    posture in the priority theater is insufficient to compete in either
    peacetime or conflict. I continue to have concerns with implementation
    of Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)--and because of that--I
    wrote a provision in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) requiring a review of the current DPRI plan;
    which, has still yet to be submitted to the congressional defense
    committees. Can you discuss--broadly--your opinion of our force posture
    in the Indo-Pacific, and--more narrowly--your opinion of DPRI?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe that a combat-credible, resilient, and
    distributed DOD force posture in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to
    deter and, if necessary, deny adversary aggression against the United
    States and its allies and partners. The Defense Policy Review
    Initiative is an essential part of maintaining a resilient,
    distributed, and combat-credible Joint Force posture that also upholds
    our alliance commitments to Japan and other key allies and partners.

        88. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in addition to the above requests
    for your personal opinion, can I get your commitment to prioritize and
    expedite the completion and submission of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA,
    section 1260(k) report on Marine Corps laydown in the Indo-Pacific
    region--which is almost 9 months past due--to assist the congressional
    defense committees in their oversight responsibilities?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I pledge to prioritize the completion and
    submission of the report required by Section 1260K of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. I will work with
    counterparts from across DOD and with Congress to ensure we provide
    sufficient resources to maintain a combat-credible force posture in the
    Indo-Pacific region in the short, medium, and long term.
                               critical minerals
        89. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in July of last year, numerous news
    outlets, including Forbes magazine and the Wall Street Journal reported
    that ``China is using threats of a rare earth embargo on Lockheed
    Martin following the United States company winning a contract to
    upgrade batteries of Patriot air defense missiles in Taiwan.'' On
    February 16, 2021, the Financial Times reported that China, ``wants to
    know if the United States may have trouble making F-35 fighter jets if
    China imposes an export ban'' on rare earth minerals. This is no longer
    just talk, this deficiency in our critical mineral supply chain is
    actively harming American companies, and more importantly, our national
    security. Do you support increasing domestic mining and processing on
    American soil to strengthen critical mineral supply chains?
        Dr. Kahl. I support ensuring sufficient domestic mining and
    increasing processing of rare earth elements.

        90. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, according to the U.S. Geological
    Survey, the United States imports nearly all rare earth elements from
    Chinese sources and has almost doubled its foreign dependence on
    foreign minerals in the last 2 decades. In 2019, the United States
    imported half of the majority of its nonfuel minerals and is still 100
    percent reliant on foreign sources of 14 minerals deemed critical to
    the economic and national security of the United States by the U.S.
    Geological Survey. DOD uses as much as 750,000 tons of critical
    minerals and metals each year across almost all modern defense
    technologies, ranging from night vision goggles to missile defense
    systems and jet engines. Do you see increasing domestic production of
    minerals critical to the U.S. defense industrial base as a national
    security priority?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes, ensuring sufficient domestic mining and increasing
    processing of minerals critical to the defense industrial base are
    national security priorities.
                                force structure
        91. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, with respect to our force sizing
    construct, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission Report
    states, ``. . . the United States now faces five credible challengers,
    including two major-power competitors, and three distinctly different
    geographic and operational environments. This being the case, a two-war
    force sizing construction makes more strategic sense today than at any
    previous point in the post-Cold war era. Instead, the NDS adopts what
    is functionally a one-war force sizing construct and recommends only
    modest increases in force capacity, an approach that is likely to
    create severe strategic and operational vulnerabilities for the United
    States.'' Provided the security environment has not lessened to any
    notable degree since 2018, do you agree with this statement reported by
    the Commission? If not, please explain your reasoning and the level of
    risk our Nation accepts if we pursue a lesser force sizing construct.
        Dr. Kahl. As I understand it, the 2018 National Defense Strategy
    (NDS), through its force planning construct, made the deliberate
    decision to prioritize modernized capabilities over capacity to ensure
    the Joint Force is fully prepared for the challenges posed by a future
    high-end contingency with a strategic competitor. This necessarily
    required accepting some risk in sizing today's force to develop a more
    lethal, resilient, and combat-credible military for future threats,
    while rebuilding readiness to mitigate near-term risk. Of course, the
    balance between capability and capacity must be periodically reassessed
    and recalibrated as the threats and challenges evolve. If confirmed, I
    look forward to reviewing the force planning construct during
    development of the next NDS to ensure that we are able to meet the
    demands of the future security environment most effectively.
                             commercial space ports
        92. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, both the Air Force and Congress
    have been supportive of evolving non-traditional sub-orbital and
    orbital launch opportunities within the United States including the use
    of State-owned launch facilities. These facilities increase the
    capability and number of launch facilities ensuring our Nation's
    ability to launch priority space assets. Will you continue supporting
    non-traditional opportunities including the use of State-owned launch
    facilities such as the complexes at Kodiak and Wallops Island?
        Dr. Kahl. These non-traditional, State-owned launch facilities add
    capacity and diversification that enable growth in commercial, civil,
    and military uses of space, all to the nation's benefit. I am aware
    that the Department is looking at how to leverage such non-traditional
    launch facilities to help meet its needs, and, if I am confirmed, I
    will support that initiative.

        93. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in your personal opinion, what
    would constitute as acceptable risks associated with launching military
    and classified space assets from facilities outside of the United
    States?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe our most important national security
    capabilities to support military and intelligence needs should be
    launched from secure facilities in the United States. On the other
    hand, there are cases, such as exploratory research and development
    programs where we have a ride-share secondary payload on another
    launch, or programs where an ally or partner's satellite hosts one of
    our payloads, where we might find significant advantage by allowing
    launch from a trustworthy overseas site. Key risk considerations in
    such situations would include ensuring necessary protections for any
    export-controlled technologies, and ensuring we are not harming our own
    industrial base.

        94. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, what is your sense of the current
    resiliency of United States' access to space beyond the Eastern and
    Western Ranges? Where could it be improved?
        Dr. Kahl. Commercial launch is a burgeoning industry that is adding
    capacity and resiliency that support total U.S. space launch needs. The
    same is true of State-sponsored spaceports. The Department of Defense
    and the Nation can benefit from these emerging launch capabilities. If
    confirmed, I would work with the U.S. Space Force and other Federal
    launch stakeholders to leverage these launch capabilities and continue
    improving the resiliency of our access to space.

        95. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, do you see U.S. commercial
    spaceports as an efficient and cost saving option to promote U.S.
    Government access to space? If so, how?
        Dr. Kahl. U.S. commercial spaceports provide opportunities, beyond
    the existing Federal ranges, for increased access to space at reduced
    cost. I am aware that for some missions, the Department is partnering
    with emerging space launch providers that operate from commercial
    spaceports. If confirmed, I would support the work of DOD's space
    launch acquisition community, in partnership with the commercial
    sector, to identify appropriate opportunities to meet DOD mission
    requirements more efficiently by utilizing such capabilities.
                                  iran policy
        96. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, in 2017, Congress passed a bill--
    the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act--by a near-
    unanimous vote in both chambers that required Iran's Islamic
    Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to be designated as terrorists. The
    previous administration followed through on this bipartisan call from
    Congress. Do you agree with this designation and would you support
    keeping terrorism sanctions on the IRGC and all its affiliates until
    they have fully and verifiably ceased their support for terrorism?
        Dr. Kahl. The IRGC and its affiliates are responsible for terrorism
    against the United States and our regional partners, including the
    deaths of U.S. servicemembers. I support keeping terrorism-related
    sanctions on the IRGC and its affiliates until they cease their support
    for terrorism.

        97. Senator Sullivan. Dr. Kahl, would you support not lifting,
    rescinding, or significantly modifying terrorism designations related
    to the Government of Iran unless Iran permanently and verifiably ceases
    its support for international terrorism and these entities meet the
    criteria for removal as Specially Designated Global Terrorists?
        Dr. Kahl. I would not support lifting terrorism-related
    designations on Iranian entities until those entities cease their
    support for terrorism and meet any other criteria as required by United
    States law.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
                                     china
        98. Senator Scott. Dr. Kahl, the National Defense Strategy was a
    good start in our confrontation with Communist China. The modernization
    of our forces for this challenge is very important, but it is also
    important to make it clear that the United States will defend Taiwan
    against Communist China's aggression. Taiwan's independence is key to
    preventing Communist China from controlling the Pacific region. That is
    why I have introduced the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act. Would you
    agree that if Taiwan were to fall into the hands of the Communist
    Chinese regime, the United States, Japan, and South Korea would face an
    almost catastrophic strategic loss in the Pacific?
        Dr. Kahl. As articulated in the Taiwan Relations Act, any effort to
    determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would be
    ``a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific Sea and of
    grave concern to the United States.'' The President's Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance makes clear the United States' commitments
    to Taiwan. These commitments reflect a bipartisan position that the
    United States has maintained over the previous six Administrations.
                                      iran
        99. Senator Scott. Dr. Kahl, when I spoke with Secretary of State
    Antony Blinken and we offered our differing views on the Iran Deal, he
    noted that ``President Donald Trump didn't give the JCPOA enough
    time.'' I've been clear that I believe the Iran Deal was disastrous
    because it wasn't stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, wasn't
    stopping terrorism, and wasn't doing anything about its missile
    program. I and others in the Senate have introduced legislation to
    prevent the United States from joining another bad Iran Deal. What is
    your view now of the deal and what do you think the red lines should be
    before the United States considers another attempt at negotiations with
    the Iranian regime?
        Dr. Kahl. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
    effectively constrained Iran's nuclear program. The comprehensive
    nuclear arrangement we reached with our allies, Russia, and China
    blocked Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon and enabled robust
    international monitoring of all aspects of Iran's nuclear supply chain
    and fuel cycle. In particular, the arrangement blocked a plutonium
    pathway, and its stringent limitations on Iran's uranium enrichment
    program ensured that Iran would need about a year to produce sufficient
    fissile material for a nuclear weapon if it decided to pursue one. The
    JCPOA left available the option to re-impose nuclear-related sanctions
    in the event of Iranian non-compliance. The United States also
    continued to impose sanctions on Iran for its support to terrorism, its
    human rights abuses, and its missile program.
        I support diplomatic efforts to roll back Iran's nuclear
    provocations that have occurred since the last administration's
    decision to exit the JCPOA. Iran is now much closer to having the
    fissile material required for a nuclear weapon than it was under the
    JCPOA.
        I am also clear-eyed about the non-nuclear threats Iran poses
    through its regional activities and missile programs. I support
    President Biden's stated intent to lengthen and strengthen the
    parameters of the JCPOA and pursue diplomatic efforts to address Iran's
    other malign activities. If confirmed, I would work in support of
    President Biden's strategy, coordinating with our allies and partners
    to formulate a strong negotiating position with Iran.
                                     israel
        100. Senator Scott. Dr. Kahl, I understand you have said in the
    past that it was a mistake to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of
    Israel and to move our embassy there. Given that the previous
    administration helped secure several peace deals among Israel and other
    Arab nations, and those countries obviously accepted the embassy move
    and put pressure on Palestinian leadership to stop being the obstacle
    to peace, do you still think it was a mistake?
        Dr. Kahl. My earlier positions reflected longstanding, official
    U.S. policy. I think dynamics in the Middle East have changed in the
    last few years, and I think the Abraham Accords are a product of that
    change. I support the Abraham Accords and President Biden's policy that
    he would not move the United States embassy back to Tel Aviv.
                                     space
        101. Senator Scott. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, to respond to
    increasing threats from great power competitors, what specific policies
    would you seek to implement to ensure that the U.S. Space Force and
    U.S. Space Command continue to have consistent and diverse access to
    the space domain through improved launch capabilities, and also
    effectively leverage commercial space capabilities- in the areas of
    space access, mobility, and logistics?
        Dr. Kahl. If confirmed, I would work with the U.S. Space Force and
    U.S. Space Command to leverage and build on the existing strong
    relationships between the U.S. commercial space industry and the
    Department. For example, I am aware that the U.S. Space Command has
    established a commercial integration cell in its space operations
    center that greatly enhances space situational awareness to support
    space access, mobility, logistics, security, and other activities for
    DOD, as well as for civil and commercial space operations. I support
    such innovative partnering approaches that strengthen our
    competitiveness.

        102. Senator Scott. Dr. Kahl, the space industry is an important
    and iconic part of Florida's history. After President Obama tried to
    kill the space program with massive budget cuts, I worked as governor
    to make critical enhancements and investments to create thousands of
    jobs and improve infrastructure on Florida's Space Coast. We were
    successful in part thanks to private partnerships. How do you see the
    U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command leveraging private
    partnerships?
        Dr. Kahl. I see the longstanding partnerships between the
    Department of Defense and commercial launch service providers and
    commercial space service providers as an integral part of our strategic
    approach to space and emblematic of the kinds of beneficial
    relationships we should foster in the space mission area. If confirmed,
    I would continue to support developing and leveraging such
    partnerships.

        103. Senator Scott. Dr. Kahl, should the Department of Defense
    continue to rely on assumptions that assured access to space only
    requires two launch providers? Please explain.
        Dr. Kahl. Law and policy require at least two families of launch
    vehicles capable of delivering our national security payloads into
    space. That framework has served us well for many years, and I think it
    remains sound. Fortunately, the growth of commercial space capabilities
    is creating new opportunities and adding resiliency, both in terms of
    launch vehicle diversity and reliability and in terms of payload
    designs. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department continues
    to take advantage of such innovations to maximize assured access to
    space.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                      iran
        104. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, do believe that Iran was not
    covertly maintaining a nuclear weapons archive while the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was being negotiated?
        Dr. Kahl. I understand from public information that Iran maintained
    an archive of documents on its pre-2004 nuclear weapon efforts. This
    very troubling information only underscores the importance of working
    with our allies and partners to ensure that verifiable limits are again
    imposed on Iran's nuclear program and that the International Atomic
    Energy Agency maintains its efforts to understand the full scope of
    Iran's past efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon.

        105. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, Iran purchased commercial
    satellite images to inform its ballistic missile strike on United
    States and coalition forces at Ain al-Asad Air Base on January 7, 2020.
    If confirmed, what actions would you recommend to address Iran's use of
    commercial satellite imagery to support its ballistic missile program?
        Dr. Kahl. I am not privy to any classified details on Iran's
    January 2020 ballistic missile strikes against United States and
    Coalition forces in Iraq. If confirmed, I would review Iran's access to
    and use of commercial satellite imagery to support its ballistic
    missile program.

        106. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, during your service in the Obama
    administration, how many times did you meet with members of the
    National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and Members of Congress,
    respectively?
        Dr. Kahl. As part of my White House official duties, I attended
    meetings convened with progressive, nonproliferation, and arms control
    organizations to discuss the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
    (JCPOA). My recollection is that NIAC was one of the many groups that
    attended those meetings. I also attended meetings with many members of
    Congress to discuss the JCPOA.
                               pacific deterrence
        107. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, how specifically
    would you work with combatant commanders to balance short- and long-
    term priorities for resourcing the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe in the importance of working closely with the
    Combatant Commanders to understand their operational requirements,
    which helps to inform our investments. If confirmed, I pledge to work
    closely with the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services,
    and DOD's analytic, programming, and budgeting communities, as well as
    the Combatant Commands, to ensure we fund initiatives that counter
    Chinese aggression and reassure our allies and partners.

        108. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, what do you assess would be the
    specific security implications of not robustly resourcing the PDI?
        Dr. Kahl. I believe that maintaining the robust, combat-credible
    capability, capacity, and infrastructure necessary to deter aggression
    in the Indo-Pacific region will require significant, focused, and
    efficient investments of DOD resources over time. If confirmed, I
    pledge to examine carefully and advocate for the resources necessary to
    uphold our security requirements in the Indo-Pacific region.
                          united states africa command
        109. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, do you assess that reducing the
    number of U.S. troops in United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) would
    weaken DOD's ability to implement the National Defense Strategy (NDS)?
    If so, please specify the specific ways in which such action would
    weaken DOD's ability to implement the NDS.
        Dr. Kahl. The Department of Defense's ``by, with, and through''
    approach to achieving security and stability in Africa, in
    collaboration with regional partners, has proven largely effective with
    a limited forward presence. Security cooperation often enhances larger
    partner force operations, which helps achieve shared objectives and
    build enduring relationships. The Department needs to remain engaged in
    Africa at appropriate levels to meet our security objectives. If
    confirmed, I will consider Commander, United States Africa Command's
    requirements and requests for forces, and will advise the Secretary
    consistent with the direction provided in our national security and
    defense strategies.

        110. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, which of AFRICOM's activities do
    you assess to be critical to United States efforts to counter China in
    Africa? Please specify such activities to counter China's debt trap
    diplomacy, exploitation of resources, and development of relationships
    with young military leaders.
        Dr. Kahl. The Department of Defense's most powerful tool to counter
    China in Africa is to provide security assistance, such as superior
    training and equipment, that meets our partners' security needs. As we
    work alongside African nations to address violent extremism, maritime
    threats, and more, we nurture strong relationships with our
    counterparts and secure our role as their preferred partner. This
    includes professional military education, coordinated with the
    Department of State, which helps develop these relationships with young
    military leaders in the United States and in Africa. Our security
    assistance also enhances the resilience of African nations to counter
    malign activities. For example, the Department of State and DOD work
    with West African Navies and Coast Guards to enhance their capabilities
    against maritime crime, including Chinese illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated fishing that harms local maritime economies in West Africa.
        Through a coordinated, whole-of-government approach, the United
    States can offer African nations a better alternative to China across
    the political, economic, health, and security spectrum. However, we
    must also understand that our partners will seek to diversify their
    partnerships.

        111. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, if confirmed, what new high-
    return-on-investment activities would you recommend to counter China in
    AFRICOM?
        Dr. Kahl. The best action to counter Chinese malign influence in
    Africa is to step up Department of Defense engagement across the
    spectrum of key leader engagements and security assistance. African
    Governments value United States assistance and partnerships, but if we
    do not step up, then they will continue to look to our competitors,
    including China and Russia. We should counter perceptions that the
    Department is disengaging from the continent with strong demonstrations
    of commitment. This means increasing and preserving funding for
    investments that are generally lower cost and offer higher rewards,
    such as key leader engagements, joint exercises, professional military
    education, exchange programs in U.S. military schools, port visits,
    training, and other security sector assistance programs to counter
    violent extremist organizations, improve maritime security, and support
    health and humanitarian response efforts.
                                 nuclear triad
        112. Senator Blackburn. Dr. Kahl, regarding modernization of the
    nuclear triad, I understand your position to be generally supportive of
    triad modernization, but your endorsement of specific modernization
    programs, such as the ground based strategic deterrent (GBSD) and long
    range standoff (LRSO) programs, is contingent on your review of
    classified information. If confirmed, do you commit to immediately
    reviewing relevant information and reporting back to Congress on your
    prioritization of funding of these programs?
        Dr. Kahl. Yes. As I testified, the nuclear Triad has been a bedrock
    of our strategic deterrent for decades, and it is important that we
    modernize it. If confirmed, I am committed to conducting a review of
    the U.S. nuclear modernization program that will include the Ground-
    Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO)
    programs. Based on this review, I will report my recommendations for
    funding priorities through the Department's annual budget request and
    will commit to meeting with Senators and Members of Congress to ensure
    a regular dialogue and to be responsive to your requests.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Dr. Colin H. Kahl follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Dr. Colin H. Kahl, which was
    transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Colin H.
    Kahl in connection with his nomination follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Dr. Colin H. Kahl was discharged from
    Committee on April 21, 2021, with the recommendation that the
    nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the
    Senate on April 27, 2021.]

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