[Senate Hearing 117-977]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-977
TO CONDUCT A CONFIRMATION HEARING ON THE EXPECTED NOMINATION OF LLOYD
J. AUSTIN III TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 19, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-869 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
RICK SCOTT, Florida ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
___________
january 19, 2021
Page
To Conduct a Confirmation Hearing on the Expected Nomination of 1
Lloyd J. Austin III to be Secretary of Defense.
Members Statements
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 7
Witness Statements
Austin, Lloyd J.................................................. 10
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 62
Questions for the Record....................................... 136
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 184
Biographical Sketch............................................ 185
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 189
Signature Page................................................. 196
(iii)
TO CONDUCT A CONFIRMATION HEARING ON THE EXPECTED NOMINATION OF LLOYD
J. AUSTIN III TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 2021
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:01 p.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, and Duckworth.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Since this is my last Committee meeting to
be important, we will start right on time. Got that, Jack? All
right.
The Committee meets today to consider expected nomination
of Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III to be Secretary of Defense of the
United States of America.
Thank all of you guys for being here. It has been a
hardship on many of you, and it was on me, too, and we are able
to get this done.
So, Mr. Austin, we welcome you, and a warm welcome to
Charlene, your wife of more than 41 years. My wife and I were
61 years. Think you will make it?
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. All right. We are very happy--Mr. Austin,
you will be introduced now by Senator Sullivan, a member of our
committee.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The last time we were together as Senators our Capitol was
under siege. America's authoritarian rivals abroad have been
gloating about our disunity. Democracy brings chaos, they tell
their people. Better to have a strong hand that keeps order.
We live in an imperfect democracy, no doubt, and the
American I am proud and honored to introduce, Mr. Lloyd Austin,
understands our imperfections more than many. But on closer
inspection, the world's dictators have little to celebrate.
Congress went back to work on January 6th to count Electoral
College votes. Tomorrow, there will be a transfer of power at
the top of our Government, as there has been since the founding
of our republic.
At some point, Chinese and Russian citizens will ask, ``Why
can we not do that? Why do we not have strong, resilient
institutions that ensure the regular election of new leaders
and, thus, self-government in the people?'' When these
questions are asked, authoritarians like Xi Jinping and Putin
will not be gloating anymore because they do not have answers.
What does this all have to do with Lloyd Austin? A lot. Mr.
Austin has been nominated to lead one of America's most trusted
institutions, the Department of Defense (DOD). Many of us have
worked hard to rebuild our military, and we can all agree that
there has been too much turmoil at the top. As its civilian
leader, I am confident that Mr. Austin will bring steadiness,
leadership, and respect to this indispensable institution.
I got to know Mr. Austin in 2005 and 2006. Serving together
in an Army heavy combatant command, conducting combat
operations throughout the Middle East, we had what might be
described today as an uneven power relationship. He was a two-
star general. I was a major. He had spent decades on Active
Duty. I was a Reservist. He was a soldier. I was a marine.
I was just one of hundreds of field-grade infantry officers
recalled to Active Duty deployed in the region during a
challenging time for our Nation. But when I asked for his help,
Mr. Austin gave it. When I had a problem, he listened, and when
I asked for guidance on an important mission, he provided it.
A critical hallmark of exceptional leadership, especially
for organizations like the Pentagon, is not just how one treats
superiors, but how one treats subordinates. What I saw was
respect, integrity, and someone who gets things done in a
difficult environment. It is clear to me that the core
principles of Mr. Austin's life has been duty, honor, and
country.
That may sound quaint to some, but I think having
individuals of impeccable character at the top of our
Government is more important than ever. Other than integrity,
there is no singular requirement for the difficult job of
Secretary of Defense. But as the former director of the Joint
Staff and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander,
Mr. Austin certainly has insights on critical issues, such as
interagency budget battles, working with our allies, and
congressional oversight.
Mr. Austin is fully committed to the constitutional
principle of civilian control of our military, something that
those who serve in uniform typically understand and revere more
than those who do not. In that regard, I thought some of the
testimony from our recent hearing on this important topic was a
bit simplistic, with discussions about so-called military logic
versus political logic. So let me play devil's advocate.
The very nature of this confirmation hearing is evidence
that civilian control of the military is not at risk in
America. I believe the related, but opposite problem should be
of more concern today--no military experience in the top ranks
of our Government.
With the exception of Mr. Austin, no nominee on the
incoming Biden national security team has ever served in
uniform. With regard to the entire Biden Cabinet, only one
other nominee has any military experience at all. This is not
wise.
If confirmed, I am sure I will not agree with all of Mr.
Austin's decisions. But when the inevitable budget battles
occur, it will be critical for our Nation's security and
military members to have a Secretary of Defense who understands
firsthand the very real morale and readiness problems that
result from drastic cuts to our military.
Let me conclude with this. We are living through difficult
times--a pandemic, racial tensions, riots, turmoil at the top
of the Pentagon, and rising dangers from China, Russia, and
Iran. Mr. Austin's confirmation will not solve all these
problems, but it will help. He represents the best of America,
a man of integrity, humility, and character, with a wealth of
relevant experience.
Our allies will take comfort in his confirmation, and our
adversaries will take pause. As America's first black Secretary
of Defense, he will be an inspiration to millions both in and
out of uniform.
I urge my colleagues to support his confirmation and the
waiver it requires.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. I do agree
with your comments wholeheartedly, and I believe that we are
going to be doing the right thing here.
Now we have another introduction by Secretary Panetta, a
former Secretary of Defense and former--very close friend of
mine, served together in the House together, and it has been
too long, Secretary Panetta. You are recognized for your part
of this introduction.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe, I always enjoyed our friendship, going back
to the House of Representatives.
Ranking Member Reed and distinguished members of this
committee, it is an honor for me to again have the opportunity
to appear before this distinguished committee, this time
alongside Senator Dan Sullivan, to introduce President-Elect
Biden's nominee to be the 28th Secretary of Defense, Lloyd
Austin.
We do meet at a time of great peril for our Nation, but it
is also a time of great promise. We have endured a harrowing
year, dealing with a deadly pandemic and, most recently, the
violent attack on our Capitol, this Congress, and our democracy
itself. Our adversaries are watching very closely. They are
trying to determine whether America will remain the strongest
and most resilient democracy the world has ever known.
It is also a time of great promise. Tomorrow at this time,
our country will have a new President, a man who many of you
know personally from his decades of service as a United States
Senator. A man who I have known for over 40 years and had the
privilege to work with during my years in the Congress, in the
White House, and I was honored to serve him when he was Vice
President as CIA Director and Secretary of Defense.
Joe Biden is absolutely committed to ensuring that we
remain the strongest military power on the face of the Earth.
He believes that we must have the best-trained, best-equipped,
and most capable fighting force in the world, and he believes
that the Department of Defense must be led by someone who not
only knows the issues of war and peace, but also knows the
heart and soul of the women and men who bravely wear the
uniform, put their lives on the line, and fight for our
freedom. That is why he selected Lloyd Austin to serve as
Secretary of Defense.
Lloyd's accomplishments at the Department of Defense are
without peer. He graduated from West Point. He led troops at
almost every level, commanded in combat, served as America's
military commander during the drawdown in Iraq. He served as
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and as commanding general of
the U.S. Central Command. All of you know that that is one of
the key combat commands at the Department of Defense.
I met Lloyd when I came to DOD as Secretary in July of
2011. We had just 6 months to implement the drawdown in Iraq,
and Lloyd was the man on the ground charged with getting it
done. It was a huge logistical task.
He consulted carefully with the President, with the Vice
President, the National Security Adviser, his colleagues at the
State Department, and those in the Intelligence Community. He
carried out with diligence and professionalism the plan that
was set forth by me and other civilian leaders at the Pentagon.
He had to negotiate with the Iraqis, who were not easy to
negotiate with at that time, and ensured that our troops and
all of their equipment could redeploy safely while protecting
America's core national security interests.
I mention this episode because I know that many of you are
wondering whether a former general officer can uphold the
principle of civilian control of the military. I have spoken to
Lloyd, and there is no doubt in my mind that he will uphold the
principle of civilian control. Frankly, the best military
officers that I had the honor to serve with are those who
understand the importance of civilian control, and Lloyd was
one of those.
He will respect the civilian chain of command, enshrined
not only in tradition, but in law. He will ensure there is
transparency and accountability at the Pentagon. He will make
himself and Department leaders available to this committee and
to the Congress for oversight, and he will provide regular
briefings to the American people.
He will support the appointment of civilian leaders across
the Office of the Secretary and the Department. He knows that
while we cannot defend our Nation without our Armed Forces, we
cannot defend our democratic form of government without strong
civilian stewardship of our national security.
Lloyd Austin is a man of uncommon character and decency and
courage. He is a trailblazer, feared by our enemies and admired
by those that he led. He was the first African-American general
officer to lead the Army Corps in combat. He was the first
African American to command an entire theater of war. If
confirmed, he will be the first African American to lead the
Department of Defense.
In sum, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
believe that Lloyd Austin is the right person at the right
time, a man that we need at this moment to lead the Department
of Defense. He is clear-eyed about the threats, and we know
there are a number of threats we are dealing with abroad--
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, cyber attackers, and
terrorists.
He understands the value of alliances and keeping them
strong and supporting them, and he is prepared to shoulder the
awesome burden of sending our best men and women in uniform, if
necessary, into harm's way, the most difficult task we, who
have been Secretary of Defense, had to assume.
As Americans watched the tragic images from the Capitol
Rotunda on January 6th, I was reminded of one painting in that
space that has always represented for me the ideal of service
to country. That is the oil painting of George Washington
resigning his commission as general in the Army so that he
could assume the duties of being the Nation's first President.
It is a statement about our democratic form of government
that has stood the test of time in that hallowed citadel of
liberty. The tradition of military leaders from Washington,
Eisenhower, Marshall, to the large number of veterans who are
serving in Congress today, including my own son, of taking off
our uniforms, returning to civilian life to lead and to serve
again. That tradition is as old as our republic itself and
essential for the quality of leadership we need in order to
protect our Constitution and our national security.
I am absolutely confident that Lloyd Austin will follow in
that tradition. I am honored to introduce him to the committee
and urge his swift confirmation.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Panetta. It is great
to be with you again after all these years, and you have not
lost a thing.
Okay. Mr. Austin, we have our first seven questions, and
you know what they are. So you are ready to answer them, but
answer them audibly, if you would?
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Austin. I have.
Chairman Inhofe. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Austin. I will.
Chairman Inhofe. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Austin. I will.
Chairman Inhofe. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Austin. They will.
Chairman Inhofe. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Austin. I do.
Chairman Inhofe. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Austin. I do.
Chairman Inhofe. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Austin. I have not.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
As Secretary Panetta clearly stated, there is not a time in
the past that we have had more threats than we are facing
today. Throughout my tenure as chairman, this committee has
focused on the ensuring that the DOD has authorities and
resources it needs to implement this, the National Defense
Strategy.
This document is a document that means a lot to all of us
here. It has been our blueprint that we have used since 2018.
It was put together by six knowledgeable Democrats, six
knowledgeable Republicans, and it has served as our blueprint.
I would assume that you would consider and continue to do that.
As the Secretary of Defense, second in the chain of command,
you would be responsible and accountable to the President of
the United States and to the American people for implementing
this strategy.
I look forward to learning how you will drive military
readiness for the strategic competition with China and Russia,
which we have talked about at length here; how you will also
handle some of the provocations from rogue nations like Iran
and North Korea. Even worse is that our military's technology
advantage has eroded. We were used to the old days when we had
the best of everything. That that is not true anymore. We fell
down a little bit.
I know that between the years of 2010 and 2015, we were
dropping our defense in terms of dollars down by about 25
percent, while China was increasing theirs, Mr. Austin, by 83
percent. That is not acceptable. The Nation and the Department
of Defense is going to tackle this problem head on if we hope
to preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do
harm to us.
If confirmed, you would have the honor of leading a team of
Americans who represent everything that is noble and best for
our Nation--our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, the Marines,
and space guardians, our military families.
By the way, on the military families, we always hear from
those who are a little less enthusiastic about a strong
national defense that we spend more than Russia and China put
together, and there is a reason for that. The reason for that
is we care about the families. We care about housing. We care
about--the largest single expense that we have in the military
is for our families, our military families.
Now, in a Communist country, you do not have that. They
just give you a gun and said, ``Go out and shoot people.'' So
that is what we are concerned about, and we will continue to do
that.
Our many defense civil servants also sacrifice day in and
day out for our national security and rarely get the credit
that they deserve. The Department will require strong civilian
leadership. For you to serve as the Secretary of Defense,
Congress must provide an exception to the law that prohibits
individuals from being appointed if they are within 7 years of
their military service.
Last week, this committee held a hearing on civilian
control of the armed services, which I think it was
instructive. I have never been all that concerned about the 7
years, but others have. I hope that you will share with the
committee what actions you will take to ensure your tenure
reflects and protects the principle of civilian control of the
military if you are confirmed.
We look forward to hearing your views on these and other
important issues.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
I join you in welcoming Lloyd Austin to today's hearing.
General, I want to thank you for your four decades of
military service to our country, and I appreciate your
willingness to return to public service, this time in a
civilian capacity.
In addition, I want to welcome your wife, Charlene. I also
want to recognize and thank former Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, who spoke on your behalf, in addition to Senator
Sullivan, for their introductions.
Today's hearing is also very different from previous
Secretary of Defense nomination hearings. Due to recent
security threats, the Acting Secretary of Defense has
authorized the deployment of 25,000 National Guard troops to
Washington, DC. I never thought I would see such a large
display of U.S. military force in the streets of our country.
I thank the servicemembers and the other Federal agencies
for ensuring that the U.S. Capitol and the inauguration is safe
and secure. In addition, the world continues to be engulfed in
a global pandemic that has caused hundreds of thousands of
deaths in the United States and sickened millions more. This
has not only affected the way we conduct our hearings, but it
has become the paramount issue facing the new Administration,
including the Department of Defense.
General Austin, you have a long and distinguished career.
You have served at the highest echelons of the Army and capped
your service as the commander of U.S. Central Command.
If confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense, you will
face a daunting array of current and emerging security threats.
U.S. strategic priorities have shifted in recent years, as
reflected in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, to focus
increasingly on the near-peer competition with China and
Russia. At the same time, the Trump administration, through its
disruptive behavior, has eroded faith in U.S. global leadership
with adverse strategic consequences.
Indeed, our National Defense Strategy must be a component
of an overall national security strategy that embraces all
aspects of soft power as well as military power. As a former
commander of United States. Central Command, you have valuable
experience to addressing security threats in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere in the CENTCOM area of operations.
The incoming Biden administration faces an immediate challenge
with respect to Iran's growing nuclear, ballistic missile, and
proxy capabilities. The Department of Defense will play a key
role in deterring these threats while supporting diplomatic
efforts.
In Iraq and Syria, while the physical ISIS caliphate has
been defeated, the underlying factors that gave rise to ISIS
and al-Qaeda remain largely unaddressed. Defending against
transnational violent extremist groups will require continued
vigilance.
In Afghanistan, our allies and partners need to be
reassured that going forward, they will be consulted up front
on any changes in United States Force posture. The incoming
Administration will need to assess the conditions on the
ground, including whether the Taliban is, in fact, living up to
their commitments and what level of support are required to
protect United States national security interests and
invigorate a diplomatic solution.
In addition to these broad strategic challenges, as
Secretary of Defense, you must also grapple with issues
specific to the management of the Department. The fiscal year
2022 budget will be the first that is unconstrained by the
Budget Control Act, and some view this as an opportunity to
redirect the overall defense budget.
This year will mark an inflection point in how the
Department prioritizes resources it needs to accomplish its
missions. The Department must focus its efforts on critical
technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
biotechnology, and cybersecurity while also emphasizing rapid
delivery of advanced new weapon systems on timelines that keep
pace with technological change.
The Department of Defense must partner with Congress to
find ways to retire legacy systems without incurring too much
risk operationally or economically. The Department also has
management challenges that require investment in great people
to manage the complexities of the Pentagon and its processes
rather than an endless search for budget cuts and workforce
reductions.
Ensuring robust funding for full-spectrum readiness,
including additional home station training, flying hours,
steaming days, depot maintenance, and installation sustainment,
has been a high priority for this committee, and I expect it
will be yours, too. The Department must also hold private
housing companies and their defense chain of command
accountable to ensure families live in the homes they deserve.
Our men and women in uniform and the civilian workforce that
supports them remain this committee's top concern, and they
must be yours as well.
Recruiting and retaining a sufficiently sized, trained, and
equipped military of the necessary quality of character and
talent to meet national defense requirements is always a
paramount goal of the Secretary of Defense and this committee.
Successful recruiting ensuring the health of the force has been
and will continue to be a challenge while we finish the
national fight against COVID.
General Austin, as I have recounted in great detail, if
confirmed, you will manage a Department coping with many
extraordinarily difficult issues that will require strong
civilian leadership to address these challenges and to reverse
the erosion of civil-military relations over the past several
years. However, in order to serve as the Secretary of Defense,
Congress must provide an exception to the statutory requirement
that prohibits individuals from being appointed if they are
within 7 years of their military service.
Last week, this committee heard from expert witnesses on
the state of civilian control in the Armed Forces. Some members
expressed concern that providing an exception for you to serve
as the Secretary of Defense, particularly so soon after
Secretary Mattis, could harm civil-military relations. It is a
valid concern.
But as our witnesses testified, it is possible to mitigate
the effects if you demonstrate your commitment to empowering
civilians in the Department. Further, we must also hear how you
view the role of Secretary of Defense and how that position is
different from your days of honorable service as a military
officer.
This distinction is critical, as the Secretary of Defense
is an inherently political position requiring a skill set for
managing a vast bureaucracy while balancing personalities
within the Department and across our Federal agencies.
Relatedly, an effective Secretary must be transparent with
Congress. Tensions often exist between the executive and
legislative branches, regardless of political party. However,
the Department must keep Congress fully informed on critical
national security developments so that we can conduct
congressional oversight.
General Austin, with these broad categories in mind, I hope
you will candidly share what actions you will take to ensure
your tenure reflects and protects the principle of civilian
control of the military.
Finally, strengthening civil-military relations is not the
sole responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. Congress has a
role, too. This includes expeditiously confirming qualified
civilian nominees to serve in the Pentagon. Furthermore, I
believe Congress should revisit the headquarters reductions
implemented over the past several years. While well
intentioned, these budget cuts have sapped the Department of
experience, expertise, and institutional knowledge, all of
which degrades the Department's ability to oversee the critical
policy issues that are integral for robust civilian oversight.
Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
hearing from our nominee.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed. Excellent,
excellent statement.
With some Senators attending remotely, I want to let
everyone know how we are going to run this thing. Since it is
impossible to know exactly when our colleagues who will be
joining via computer, we will not follow our standard early
bird timing rule. Instead, we will handle the order of
questions by seniority, alternating to each side, Democrat and
Republican, until we have gone through everyone. Then we will
see how much time we have left and what the wish is.
We will do the standard--instead of doing the standard 5
minutes, Senator Reed and I have agreed that 7-minute rounds
might be more appropriate. I ask my colleagues on the computers
to please keep an eye on the clock, which you should see on
your screens, and we will try to adhere to those 7-minute
rounds.
Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
room or on a computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute your
microphone when you are not speaking.
Mr. Austin, we will begin with your opening statement and
be assured that the entirety of your written statement will be
made a part of the record.
General Austin?
STATEMENT OF LLOYD J. AUSTIN III TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Austin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
members of this committee.
I am grateful for your time this afternoon, especially
during these momentous days. It was apparent to me and to all
Americans 2 weeks ago how seriously you take your duties to the
Constitution, and I thank you for that commitment.
I know that you share my gratitude for the commitment of
the men and women of the Department of Defense as well, who
share your devotion to that founding document, our
Constitution. Many of them are serving overseas. Some of them
are serving just outside this room, and all of them are keeping
us safe. We owe much to their selflessness and to that of their
families.
I want to thank Senator Sullivan and Secretary Panetta for
their kind words of introduction. I am truly grateful.
Of course, I want to thank my wonderful wife, Charlene,
who, like today, has stood by my side for more than 40 years,
guiding me, supporting me, and making me a better man.
I am also very grateful to President-Elect Biden for asking
me to serve my country again. I value the strength of my
relationship with him, and I am humbled by the trust and
confidence that he has placed in me. I hope this hearing will
earn me your trust.
Let me say at the outset that I understand and respect the
reservations that some of you have expressed about having
another recently retired general at the head of the Department
of Defense. The safety and security of our democracy demands
competent civilian control of our Armed Forces, the
subordination of military power to the civil.
I spent my entire life committed to that principle. In war
and in peace, I implemented the policies of civilians elected
and appointed over me, leaders like Secretary Panetta. I know
that being a member of the President's Cabinet, a political
appointee, requires a different perspective and unique duties
from a career in uniform.
I intend to surround myself with and empower experienced,
capable civilian leaders who will enable healthy civil-military
relations grounded in meaningful oversight. Indeed, I plan to
include the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in top
decision-making meetings, ensuring strategic and operational
decisions are informed by policy.
I will rebalance collaboration and coordination between the
Joint Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
staff to ensure civilian input is integrated at every level of
the process, and I will make clear my expectation that the
Pentagon work hand-in-glove with the State Department
supporting the work of our diplomats.
Now I know that a large measure of civilian control of our
military lies right here with this body. If you confirm me, I
assure you that the Pentagon under my leadership will respect
your oversight responsibilities, and we will be transparent
with you. I will provide you my best counsel, and I will seek
yours.
Just like you, I will take seriously the many challenges
facing our country, the most immediate of which, in my view, is
the pandemic. If confirmed, I will quickly review the
Department's contributions to coronavirus relief efforts,
ensuring that we are doing everything that we can to help
distribute vaccines across the country and to vaccinate our
troops and preserve readiness.
We will also do everything we can for our military
families. They, too, are educating kids at home and losing
their jobs and trying to stock the pantry. I know this
committee shares my view that we owe them our best efforts to
lighten that load.
We also owe our people a working environment free of
discrimination, hate, and harassment. If confirmed, I will
fight hard to stamp out sexual assault and to rid our ranks of
racists and extremists and to create a climate where everyone
fit and willing has the opportunity to serve this country with
dignity. The job of the Department of Defense is to keep
America safe from our enemies, but we cannot do that if some of
those enemies lie within our own ranks.
For those enemies and adversaries outside the ranks and
around the world, we need resources to match strategy, and
strategy matched to policy, and policy matched to the will of
the American people. Globally, I understand that Asia must be
the focus of our effort, and I see China in particular as a
pacing challenge for the Department. I know I will need your
help in tackling these problems and to give our men and women
in uniform the tools that they need to fight and win.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, while I did not
seek this job, I consider it an honor. If confirmed, I will
carry out the mission of the Department of Defense always with
the goal to deter war and ensure our Nation's security, and I
will uphold the principle of civilian control of the military
as intended. I would not be here asking for your support if I
felt that I was unable or unwilling to question people with
whom I once served in operations that I once led or too afraid
to speak my mind to you or to the President.
I was a general and a soldier, and I am proud of that. But
today, I appear before you as a citizen. The son of a postal
worker and a homemaker from Thomasville, Georgia, and I am
proud of that, too, and if you confirm me, I am prepared to
serve now as a civilian, fully acknowledging the importance of
this distinction.
I thank you again for consideration of my nomination and
for your steadfast support of our men and women in uniform, our
civilians, and their families, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lloyd Austin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lloyd Austin
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, Members of this
Committee.
I'm grateful for your time this afternoon, especially during these
momentous days. It was apparent to me--and to all Americans two weeks
ago--how seriously you take your duties to the constitution. I thank
you for that steadfastness.
I know you share my gratitude for the steadfastness of the men and
women of the Department of Defense as well, who share your devotion to
that founding document.
Many of them are serving overseas. Some of them are just outside
this room. All of them are keeping us safe.
We owe much to their selflessness and that of their families.
I want to thank Senator Sullivan and Secretary Panetta for their
kind words of introduction. I personally owe much to their mentorship
and support.
Of course, I thank my wonderful wife, Charlene, who--like today--
has stood by my side for more than forty years . . . guiding me,
supporting me, making me a better man.
I am also grateful to President-elect Biden for asking me to serve
my country again. I value the strength of my relationship with him, and
I am humbled by the trust and confidence he has placed in me.
I hope this hearing will help me earn your trust.
Let me say at the outset that I understand and respect the
misgivings some of you have expressed about having another recently
retired general at the head of the Defense Department.
The safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian
control of our armed forces . . . the subordination of military power
to the civil.
I spent nearly my entire life committed to that principle. In war
and in peace I implemented the policies of civilians elected and
appointed over me . . . leaders like Secretary Panetta.
I know that being a member of the president's cabinet--a political
appointee--requires a different perspective and unique duties from a
career in uniform.
So, if confirmed, you can expect me to empower my civilian staff.
Indeed, I plan to include the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in
top decision-making meetings ensuring strategic and operational
decisions are informed by policy.
I will rebalance collaboration and coordination between the Joint
Staff and the OSD staff to ensure civilian input is integrated at every
level of the process.
I will make clear my expectation that the Pentagon work hand in
glove with the State Department on all foreign engagements and
activities.
Now, I also know that a large measure of civilian control of our
military lies right here with this body.
If you confirm me, I can assure you the Pentagon under my
leadership will respect your oversight responsibilities. We will be
forthcoming and transparent.
I will provide you my best counsel, and I will seek yours.
Just like you, I will also take seriously the many challenges
facing our country, the most immediate of which, in my view, is the
pandemic.
If confirmed, I will quickly review the Department's contributions
to coronavirus relief efforts, ensuring we are doing everything we can
. . . and then some . . . to help distribute vaccines across the
country and to vaccinate our troops and preserve readiness.
We'll also do everything we can for our military families as well.
They, too, are educating kids at home, losing their jobs, trying to
stock the pantry.
I know this committee shares my view that we owe them our best
efforts to lighten that load.
We also owe our people a working environment free of
discrimination, hate and harassment.
If confirmed, I will fight hard to stamp out sexual assault . . .
to rid our ranks of racists . . . and to create a climate where
everyone fit and willing has the opportunity to serve this country with
pride and with dignity.
The Defense Department's job is to keep America safe from our
enemies. But we can't do that if some of those enemies lie within our
own ranks.
For those enemies and adversaries outside the ranks and around the
world, we need resources matched to strategy, strategy matched to
policy, and policy matched to the will of the American people.
Globally, I understand that Asia must be the focus of our effort,
and I see China, in particular, as the pacing challenge for the
Department.
If confirmed, I know I will need your help to tackle these problems
. . . and to give our men and women in uniform the tools they need to
fight and win.
Thank you for the support this committee has always given our
military and for the support I know you will continue to render.
Mr. Chairman, I did not seek this job. But I consider it an honor.
I consider it my duty.
Throughout my life, subtly or directly, some people believed I
wasn't quite good enough . . . or maybe that I didn't possess the right
qualities to fulfill such duty.
I figured out early on that a kid from rural Georgia was going to
have to work a lot harder, learn a lot faster, and prepare a lot more
to prove myself.
I wouldn't be here with you today if I wasn't ready to prove myself
again.
I certainly wouldn't be here if I believed the last four years of
my life left me too familiar with current operations to change course
when needed . . . too close to scrutinize people with whom I once
served . . . or too afraid to speak my mind to you or to the President.
You see, I am no longer a general. I am no longer a soldier.
I am a citizen . . . the son of a postal worker and a homemaker
from Thomasville, Georgia.
I am a civilian.
If you confirm me, that's exactly how I will lead the Defense
Department.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Austin. Great
statement.
You heard my comments, General Austin, about the document,
the National Defense Strategy. You are familiar with this. I am
sure you have read it many times.
What do you think about its relevance today? Do you see
changes that should be made in this, or what is your feeling
today contemporarily about this statement?
Mr. Austin. I think much of the document is absolutely on
track for today's challenges, Mr. Chairman. As is the case with
all strategies, if confirmed, one of the things that I would
look to do is to work to update the strategy and work within
the confines of the guidance and the policy issued by the
current--the next Administration.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, well, that is right, and the guidance
also from this document I think is still relevant to date.
In this document, the previous two Secretaries of the
Defense--Secretary Mattis, Secretary Esper--both agreed that
that document, it prescribed that we probably need a 3 to 5
percent real growth in defense budget effectively in the coming
years. Do you agree generally with that statement?
Mr. Austin. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said in the opening
statement, I believe that our resources need to match our
strategy, and our strategy needs to match our policy.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, I would assume that would be yes.
Others are going to be asking about the civilian and military
relations, I know that, but let me cover a couple of things
that I think are important.
On the nuclear triad, a lot of people who are at different
ideas on what we should do and the priorities we have in our
defense system, that they try to whittle away at the nuclear
triad, and we have always felt, and the Secretaries of Defense,
that nuclear deterrence, do you agree with them that nuclear--
their assessment that nuclear deterrence is the DOD's highest-
priority mission?
Mr. Austin. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Do you agree that the triad--the land,
air, and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms are still
necessary, even though we do hear a lot of arguments that two
of the three would be adequate? What do you think?
Mr. Austin. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the triad has
served us well in the past, and I certainly believe that it
will continue to do so going forward. I personally support the
triad.
Chairman Inhofe. Good. We have kind of a forgotten
continent for a long period of time in Africa. I can remember
when Africa was in three different commands. It was in the
United States Pacific Command (PACOM), the Central Command, and
the United States European Command (EUCOM). We came along with
AFRICOM, and I think things have really improved since that
time. I think it is a critical theater for implementing this
National Defense Strategy that we have.
We see China, all of our people talk about the South China
Sea, about their building of the islands and all these things
that are going on, but they forget that China has, for the
first time, left their city limits to support a major objective
on their behalf, and that is in Djibouti, and they go not just
in Djibouti, but all throughout China as far south as the
southern part of Tanzania, and so it is very active in that
area.
I would ask you, right now, we have some 6,000 DOD
personnel on the continent. I know there has been an effort,
there was an effort in this last Administration to be reducing
in some areas what our presence, what our resources, how they
should be put out. My feeling was that we had inadequate
resources to start with only 6,000 in the entire continent.
Do you have any thoughts that you have given to that in
terms of the resources that we need to use in that part of the
world?
Mr. Austin. Mr. Chairman, Africa, like some other places in
the world, has been one of those places where we have been able
to gain good effect by--with a small amount of investment by
helping to--helping our partners to increase their ability to
defend their sovereign territory and to protect themselves.
Chairman Inhofe. That is excellent. We have to keep in mind
that many of our closest allies are there right now, and if we
should deteriorate our presence in any way, we would--I have a
feeling they would do the same thing. So I appreciate that very
much.
One last thing I want to touch on because it is a current
issue. Ever since the International Court of Justice ruled way
back in 1975, I believe it was, that we have--in Western
Sahara, we have supported a referendum for self-determination.
Now the United States has done that ever since the 1970s.
The U.N. has done that since the 1970s. The African Union has
done that, and most all of the 52 nations of Africa have all
stated that the Western Sahara should have a referendum for
self-determination. What do you think?
Mr. Austin. Well, that is an issue that I certainly would
want to take a closer look at, Mr. Chairman, before I gave you
a detailed answer. But that is one of the things that I will
look at, if confirmed, right away going into the position.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and I would like to have you keep in
mind that they have been consistent for so many years, and so I
would anticipate that your feelings would be the same.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, General Austin.
One issue that is obvious is the discussion of the erosion
of civilian control, participation, influence on the Department
of Defense. That was highlighted by the National Defense
Security document, which the chairman has displayed. But the
suggestion there was it was not something that was happening in
an instant, that it was taking place over years. Part of that,
I believe, is the lack of competent civilian authorities in
place.
There are many individuals, as I suggest in my statement
that are acting. There are others who are civil servants who
have been pushed up into jobs that normally require
confirmation, and there has been a lack of sometimes candidates
for confirmation.
So I would ask you, if you are confirmed, will you do your
utmost to ensure that every position, civilian position in the
Department is filled, that we get nominees promptly? I know you
have to work through the White House, and that other
individuals will be put in positions where they are both
skilled and qualified?
Mr. Austin. Absolutely, Senator Reed. I will do everything
I can to move as quickly as I can to move to fill those
positions with experienced and competent, qualified civilians.
I will need the help of this body to make sure that we are
moving quickly.
Senator Reed. Yes, I concur. This has to be a collaborative
effort. I think in addition, too, with the civilian members,
and as you suggest in your remarks, you have to ensure that
there is a very appropriate working relationship with uniformed
personnel, particularly on the Joint Staff. From your comments,
I assume that will be one of your priorities, to make sure that
and, indeed, that the civilians have a critical role in that
process. Is that correct?
Mr. Austin. It is absolutely correct, Senator Reed. I think
it is imperative that the OSD staff maintain primacy in terms
of crafting strategy and policy, and I think, you know, we will
need the right civilians in key positions to help us do that.
We have already begun to move down that road. You have seen
Colin Kahl nominated to be the Under Secretary for Policy, a
very talented young man that will do well. You have seen Kath
Hicks nominated to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. So we
are off to a good start, and we will continue to maintain
momentum in filling those positions and making sure that we
rebalance the workload between the Joint Staff and the
Secretariat.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On another subject, the need for strength in alliances
seems to be obvious, but something that you are going to have
to take on immediately. I am thinking of the Pacific Defense
Initiative, which the chairman was the principal author, and it
is based on solidifying our relationships, both diplomatic and
operationally, with our near partners in the Pacific--the
Australians, the Japanese, and the South Koreans--and then
building further with other Pacific nations.
I would presume and hope that you would see that as an
important task also, building up our relationships and
alliances, which, in many respects, has been neglected. Is that
something that you see as important?
Mr. Austin. I think it is critical, Senator Reed, and I
also very much look forward to going out and refurbishing those
alliances and making sure that we build additional capacity
where possible. You can look when we are--when we do begin to
travel again that that region will be one of my first stops.
Senator Reed. Right, and the old saying, there is strength
in numbers, and I think there is some truth to that. So as we
build up our not just in a superficial way, but training
together, conducting exercises together, integrating our
intelligence, integrating our operations at sea, on land, and
in the air, that, I think, it could be the best deterrent we
could think of with respect to the aspirations of China, and I
think you might concur.
Mr. Austin. I agree.
Senator Reed. One of the tasks you are going to have is as
you are trying to deal with all these places around the world,
you also have to transform the Department of Defense. As the
chairman indicated, our technological advantage, which was, we
thought, uncontested in the '50s, '60s, '70s, '80s, et cetera,
is contested. In fact, there are suggestions that we might not
be ahead in many places.
So you are going to have to think very seriously about how
do we elevate science? How do we, more importantly, take our
scientific developments, our prototypes, and get it to the
field, to soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines in the field? If
you have any comments on that, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Austin. I certainly agree with you, Senator Reed that
our acquisition system needs to be more agile and more
responsive to the needs that you just mentioned. We need to get
the capability down to the people who need it, the people who
are going to use it, as quickly as possible.
I would also say that we need to develop the operational
concepts that support those new capabilities to make sure that
we continue to present a credible deterrent. But I absolutely
agree that there is much to be done in terms of working with
the acquisition process to make sure that it becomes more
agile.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you.
Now just as a final point, I think I have to respond to the
challenge that the chairman gave you to reach your 61st wedding
anniversary. Having been married for the first time at the age
of 55, despite my best efforts, I can guarantee the chairman, I
will not reach 61 years.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. I do not believe that.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Senator Reed, you just do it one day at a
time.
Senator Reed. Thank you. That is good advice, Senator
Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, thank you for being with us
today. Thank you for the conversation that we had several weeks
ago over the phone, and thank you for your willingness to serve
in the military and now to serve in a civilian capacity.
You are a West Point graduate. I pointed out to Senator
Reed that I am wearing an Army tie today in your honor, but I
suppose also in honor of Senator Reed and all the distinguished
Army folks. I am an Air Force veteran myself, but I am also a
former chair of the Seapower Subcommittee, and so today, I want
to talk to you at the beginning about seapower.
The 30-year ship building plan was finally released just
last month by the leadership in the Navy, and it calls for 405
manned ships by the year 2051. That is compared to a 355 ship
requirement that we previously had and that we actually placed
into the statute.
Have you read the 30-year ship building plan, Mr. Austin?
Mr. Austin. I have not read the ship--the 30-year plan yet,
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Are you familiar with the fact that the 30-
year ship building plan calls for increasing our requirement?
Actually, it increases our requirement from 355 ships to 405
manned ships by the year 2051.
Mr. Austin. I am familiar with that--with that fact.
Senator Wicker. Do you support that finding?
Mr. Austin. I certainly--I would just say, Senator, our
Navy is the most capable naval force on the face of the planet.
It will remain so if I am confirmed and become Secretary of
Defense.
I think that it is important that we maintain the
capabilities that we will need to be relevant not only today,
but relevant tomorrow. So I look forward to getting on the
ground, if confirmed, and working with the leadership of the
Navy to better understand the requirements and how we are going
to support those requirements.
Also I look forward to working with this body to make sure
that we have the right resources to support that requirement.
Senator Wicker. Well, that does bring me to a point that I
need to make, and that is that within the Administration, it is
not only the White House and it is not only DOD, but also OMB
[Office of Management and Budget] is a mighty big gorilla
sitting in the room there, and they force a lot of constraints
upon us.
Let me just say to you that I hope you will soon become
familiar with the ship building plan and be able to give us a
more definite answer about the need for an increased Navy to do
the things that we have to do. It calls for adding 82 new ships
between 2022 and 2026 at a cost of $147 billion.
Previously, that number was only 44 ships. So the new
requirement, the new plan is 82 new ships in that short 4-year
period, rather than 44 ships, and an extra $45 billion over
that timeframe. So rest assured that we need to have more
conversations there.
The distinguished chairman mentioned China, the fact that
their ambitions not only are in the Pacific, but also extend to
Africa, and he named a few locations there. The DOD report to
Congress on China recently said it is likely China will aim to
develop a military by mid century that is equal to or, in some
cases, superior to the United States military.
Do you agree with that assessment, Mr. Austin?
Mr. Austin. I would agree. I would agree that that is their
goal. My job, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, is to make
sure that we develop the capabilities, the plans, and the
operational concepts to ensure that we maintain a competitive
edge. So, while that may be their goal, I would, again, if I am
confirmed, would intend to make sure that that never happens.
Senator Wicker. Well, it is my contention that the new ship
building plan calling for 405 manned ships by the year 2051 and
additional 82 new ships in the next 5 years is part and parcel
to answering that challenge. What do you say to that, Mr.
Austin?
Mr. Austin. I would certainly say that we need to have the
right kinds of capability to be able to counter the emerging
threat. Again, I look forward to having that conversation with
the Department of the Navy.
If that is the analysis that has been provided by the Navy,
I have every reason to believe that it is accurate. But I
really would like to have that conversation in more depth.
Senator Wicker. Let me quote another Army man, the
distinguished Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Milley, who said just last month, ``Look, I am an Army guy, and
I love the Army, but the fundamental defense of the United
States and the ability to project power forward will always be
for America naval and airspace power.''
I would just commend to you that statement and suggest that
the additional seapower is going to be necessary. I would also
want you to comment, and I will just ask you, because we are
time constrained, to comment about the idea of basing two
additional destroyers at Rota, Spain, to be there to combat
Russian aggression. But, Mr. Chairman, because I only have 2
seconds, I will take that for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Austin.
Mr. Austin. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Austin. Ensuring that USEUCOM has the right capabilities to
effectively deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression will be
one of my primary objectives as Secretary. If confirmed, I will
thoroughly review force posture proposals such as stationing additional
DDGs in Rota with that objective in mind.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, thank you for being willing to be
considered for this important post at this critical time in our
Nation's history.
As you are probably aware, last week this committee
received testimony from outside experts on the issue of the
waiver that will be required for you to serve and the whole
issue of civil-military relations. I know you addressed that
briefly in your opening comments, and Senator Reed followed up
with some specific questions. But one of the interesting things
to me in that hearing last week was one of the people
testifying talked about the concern that during Secretary
Mattis' tenure that there was an over-deference to military
views that were critical to shaping America's military policy
or defense policy.
Can you talk about how you would respond to those concerns
and what you think should be done to ensure that the balance
continues, with the prominence being on civilian control of the
military?
Mr. Austin. Yes, thank you, Senator.
I believe that you need to have the right people in the
right positions that can be in--that are in the decision-making
process, and so I look to have a very experienced Under
Secretary for Policy. I look to have a very experienced Deputy
Secretary of Defense. My Chief of Staff will not--if I am
confirmed will not be a military person, but yet a person that
really understands strategy and policy and also has deep ties
to the Hill, as well as to the White House.
So I think the people in the room and contributing to the
decision-making, it makes all the difference in the world. So
to answer your question, I will make sure that we staff the
positions with the right people who have the right experiences
and who are not afraid to provide their input. I will empower
them to make sure that they have the flexibility to get the job
done, to coordinate with the Joint Staff and coordinate with
the other agencies to ensure that we have a policy--have
significant policy input on every decision.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that,
especially the importance of the empowerment of those
individuals.
When we talked shortly after your nomination was put
forward, we talked about two of New Hampshire's military
installations that we are very proud of, the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, which is shared between New Hampshire and Maine, and
also our 157th Air Refueling Wing at Pease National Guard,
which was the first Air National Guard base to receive the new
KC-46 refueling tanker.
There are two long-term concerns that I have about those
installations. One is the shipyard optimization plan, as we
look at the need to invest in our public shipyards in the
future. That optimization plan is going to be critical to
ensuring that the capacity is there not just at the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, but our other public shipyards to support our
naval fleet. I hope that you will remain committed to that plan
and to moving forward with that plan as we look at the upcoming
years.
Mr. Austin. I will, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. The other is the KC-46 and the continuing
issues with getting that tanker online. As you know, the most
recent one is the remote vision system, which still is not
fixed in a way that allows those tankers to fly and do the
refueling mission that is so critical.
Again, I would hope that you will stay on that issue with
Boeing and make sure we get those planes right so that they can
do the refueling that we are paying for them to do.
Mr. Austin. I will absolutely stay on this--on this issue.
I think it is critical. It is a critical component of our
overall force, and so I think it is important that we continue
to press and get this capability to where it needs to be.
Senator Shaheen. Great, and I hope you will come up to New
Hampshire and visit both of those installations at some point
in your tenure, if confirmed.
I would like to ask you about Afghanistan next because as
we look at where we are in Afghanistan, the treaty or the
agreement--I do not know what we want to call it because,
clearly, the Taliban is not complying with what had been
announced as concessions that were made as part of that
agreement. Also, the failure of that agreement to take into
consideration the role of women and minorities in Afghanistan
that have been so important as they have written a new
constitution.
As we look at ending conflict there, one of the things we
know from the data is that when women are at the table in
negotiations, that there is a 35 percent better chance that
those peace agreements will last 15 years or longer. So this is
not just for the optics, it looks great to have women at the
table. It is about how do we ensure that those negotiations are
long lasting?
I wonder if you can talk about what you would like to see
at this point in Afghanistan as we think about how do we
withdraw there in a way that leaves a country that enshrines
some of the changes that have been made to support a new
constitution and all of the effort that has been put in there
by the United States and so many other countries in the world.
Mr. Austin. Well, Senator, I certainly would like to see
this conflict end with a negotiated settlement, and I think we
are going to make every effort that we can to ensure that that
happens. I would also like to say up front I am truly grateful
for the sacrifices of the thousands of men and women that have
gone through Afghanistan and given so much, sacrificed so much.
To your point, their work has made a difference.
But I think this conflict needs to come to an end, and we
need to see an agreement reached, and in accordance with what
the President-Elect wants to see, I think we want to see an
Afghanistan in the future that does not present a threat to
America. So a focus on some kind of terrorism issues, I think,
in the future I think would be helpful.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen and via Webex,
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
General Austin.
This committee has consistently heard testimony, including
from every United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander
who has appeared before this committee since I have been a
member, recommending against making unilateral reductions to
our nuclear forces. Do you agree that making unilateral
reductions is unwise?
Mr. Austin. Senator, I am having a tough time hearing you.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, the volume seems not to be high
enough. If anyone knows how to adjust that, this is a good time
to do it.
Senator Fischer. Let me see if I do.
Chairman Inhofe. That sounds better.
Senator Fischer. Do you hear me okay?
Chairman Inhofe. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Okay. I was asking, sir, about making
unilateral reductions to our nuclear forces. Do you agree that
making these reductions unilaterally is unwise?
Mr. Austin. I think that we should--I look forward to
getting onboard, if confirmed, and having an ability to kind of
look under the hood and see exactly what we are doing with our
nuclear forces. So once I have had a chance to do that,
Senator, I would love to come back and discuss it with you.
Senator Fischer. In your answer to some questions that were
sent over to you, you said that--you said, ``I believe it is in
the national security interests of the United States and its
allies and partners to pursue formal, verifiable arms control
agreements that reduce the nuclear threats from Russia and
China.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Austin. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Fischer. So reductions should be made through
negotiated, verifiable agreements, not unilaterally. Is that
right?
Mr. Austin. That is correct.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you, sir.
Another fact that has been consistently emphasized by
civilian officials and military leaders in both the Obama and
Trump administrations is that nuclear modernization cannot be
delayed any further. Speaking in 2016, President Obama's
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter put it in the following way,
``The fact is most of our nuclear weapon delivery systems have
already been extended decades beyond their original expected
service lives, so it is not a choice between replacing these
platforms or keeping them. It is really a choice between
replacing them or losing them. That would mean losing
confidence in our ability to deter, which we cannot afford in
today's volatile security environment.''
More recently, Admiral Richard, the current STRATCOM
commander, in his posture statement last year testified that,
``Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary
to ensure the deterrent's viability have zero schedule margin
and are late-to-need.'' He went on to state, ``We cannot afford
more delays and uncertainty in delivering capabilities and must
maintain a focus on revitalizing our nuclear forces and the
associated infrastructure.''
General, is this also your understanding of the
modernization schedule?
Mr. Austin. Well, I again--I misunderstood your first part,
the first part of the question there, when you were--when you
started out. What I wanted to tell you was I really look
forward to getting into the details of the nuclear
modernization program, if confirmed. You know, I really would
like to be able to look at the details of exactly what we are
choosing to invest in and the timelines associated with that,
and I would love to come back to you and discuss that with you.
Senator Fischer. I would have your assurance, though, that
you would, of course, be visiting with the current STRATCOM
combatant commander, as well as previous ones, about the need
to make sure that we have these platforms that we need and
also----
Mr. Austin. That will be a----
Senator Fischer. Go ahead.
Mr. Austin. That will be a top priority, Senator.
Senator Fischer. I guess I am kind of surprised by your
answer, General. When the chairman asked you about the triad,
specifically about maintaining an effective nuclear triad of
land, air, and sea-based platforms, I thought your answer was,
yes, we have to maintain that effective nuclear triad. Is that
correct?
Mr. Austin. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Fischer. I realize that you do have to review where
we currently are in modernization, but I would think having an
understanding that every Administration and every STRATCOM
commander and also our Secretaries of Defense have been adamant
that we cannot fall behind on this, your answer that you would
have to get back on me is somewhat surprising. I understand it
is a complicated topic, but it is a 60-year-old foundational
concept that we have here.
Mr. Austin. Yes, Senator, and I think--I think that we are
in agreement that this is a priority, this needs to remain a
priority. What I was just conveying was the specific timelines
of which pieces are being resourced at what rate, those things
I would really like to get into details and have a further
discussion with you on.
But there is no question that I consider this to be a
priority, and it will remain a priority. I look forward to
getting with the STRATCOM commander and having that discussion
in detail.
Senator Fischer. Well, thank you. I hope also, if you are
confirmed, you will be a strong advocate for the National
Nuclear Security Administration being able to receive
sufficient funding so that they can meet the Department of
Defense's needs.
Mr. Austin. I will be.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Now via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Austin, President-Elect Biden made overturning
President Trump's ban on open transgender military service a
day one priority. Can you confirm your commitment and tell the
committee how you plan to reinstate open service?
Mr. Austin. I support the President's plan or plan to
overturn the ban. I truly believe, Senator, that as I said in
my opening statement, that if you are fit and you are qualified
to serve and you can maintain the standards, you should be
allowed to serve. You can expect that I will support that
throughout.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Austin.
When we met together, we talked at length about the scourge
of military sexual assault in the military. We talked about how
this has been an issue for decades, and in fact, we talked
about all the efforts that the Department of Defense has made
over at least the last decade that I have been on the Armed
Services Committee to try to eradicate it.
Every Secretary of Defense from the last 25 years has said
there is a zero tolerance for sexual assault in the military.
But every time they say there is zero tolerance, we look at the
facts, we look at the evidence, we look at how many sexual
assaults are committed, how many go to trial, how many end in
conviction, and we do not seem to improve at all. In fact, last
year, the Department of Defense announced a record number of
sexual assaults reported by or against servicemembers and the
lowest conviction rate for their assailants on record.
In your opinion, does this reflect good order and
discipline within the military? Does this reflect enhanced
military readiness?
Mr. Austin. Senator, I take the issue of sexual assault
seriously and personally. To your point, Senator, I think we
have put a lot of effort into this, and I am grateful for all
of the effort that you have personally put into this and this
committee has put into this, but we have not gotten better. We
have to get better, and we will get better.
We have to go after the culture. We have to go after the
climate. This is a leadership issue. It is a readiness issue,
and it starts on the top, and we have got to work from the
bottom as well, simultaneously.
Senator Gillibrand. So, therefore, is your answer, yes,
that it does not reflect good order and discipline and does not
reflect the readiness that you would like your service to have?
Mr. Austin. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Furthermore, the most recent Pentagon
survey on the topic found that 64 percent of sexual assault
survivors who reported their crime received some form of
retaliation for reporting that crime, often from the exact
chain of command that is supposed to protect them. This number
is statistically unchanged from 2016.
Does this suggest to you adequate progress on what the top
brass has promised to do year after year? Do you believe that
this is sufficient progress?
Mr. Austin. I absolutely do not believe that it is
progress, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, given the total lack of progress
or accountability within the military justice system, do you
believe that a new approach must be taken? Because as we
discussed the recent events at Fort Hood, a new approach is
clearly warranted. What is your view on that?
Mr. Austin. I certainly believe that we need to do better,
a lot of things better in terms of investigation and
prosecutions, and I think we have to look at this holistically.
I know that you know that the President-Elect has committed to
standing up a 90-day commission to really look at this soup to
nuts. I look forward to the read-out of that commission, but I
will not wait for 90 days to get after this.
As I indicated, this starts with me, and you can count on
me getting after this on day one.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, to be honest, President-Elect
Biden said much more than that. He promised much more than a
commission. He said, in fact, when asked directly by Protect
Our Defenders' Nancy Parrish if he would support ``moving the
military justice system into the 21st century by allowing
military prosecutors to make prosecution decisions for
nonmilitary crimes--serious felonies like rape, murder, and
child abuse,'' and that President-Elect Biden in response said,
``Yes, yes, yes.''
So do you share President-Elect Biden's commitment to move
prosecutorial decisions outside the chain of command and giving
that decision to trained military prosecutors?
Mr. Austin. I would like--if confirmed, I would like to
work with the chain of command and very rapidly assess what
things that there are that need to be--that need to be fixed or
addressed. I would like to make those recommendations and
provide those assessments to the President-Elect.
Senator Gillibrand. But you do agree that we cannot keep
doing the same thing that we have been doing for the past
decade?
Mr. Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator. I
absolutely agree with that.
Senator Gillibrand. Do I have your commitment to be
relentless on this issue until we can end the scourge of sexual
violence in the military?
Mr. Austin. You have my commitment.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. I would now like to move to
civil-military relations.
Mr. Austin, scholars rightly argue that the Secretary of
Defense plays a critical role in maintaining balanced civilian-
military relations by explaining the military's activities to
the public. Secretary Mattis, another recently retired general
who required a waiver to serve, did not embrace this role.
According to Bob Woodward's book Fear, Mattis grew so tired of
being asked to appear on Sunday shows that he threatened to
send Sean Spicer to Afghanistan.
Mr. Austin, can you commit to following in the footsteps of
your predecessors and regularly appearing on TV to explain to
Americans where the Administration has asked servicemembers to
risk their lives and why?
Mr. Austin. I fully understand and appreciate the role that
the Secretary of Defense has in communicating with the American
public, Senator. You have my commitment that I will establish a
good relationship with the media and provide them the access
and the information required to do their job of reporting out
to the American people.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Austin.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Congratulations, General Austin, on your
nomination, and thank you for your appearance today, especially
for your four decades of military service.
Unfortunately, I must announce that I oppose the waiver of
the 7-year cooling-off period. My decision reflects not at all
on you personally or your record, which I respect. Rather, I
believe Congress should no longer grant such waivers at all.
I supported the waiver for General Mattis with reservations
4 years ago, which I quickly came to view as a mistake and I
have since regretted. For that matter, upon further reading of
the historical record, I now believe the waiver for General
Marshall in 1950 was also a mistake. Under no foreseeable
circumstances can I imagine supporting such a waiver again.
Again, General Austin, my reasons for this decision are
distinct and separate from your nomination. Put simply, my
reasons are the same reasons we have a cooling-off period for
recently retired generals in the first place. Some of those
reasons are simply effect, not something that you can address
or about which you can reassurance. Others, you can give
reassurance, and I will give you that opportunity in a moment.
Among those concerns I have that I do not think can be
addressed are the following. First, the perception that these
waivers are now routine, not extraordinary. Senator Reed said
in 2017 that he would not support another waiver, and they
should happen ``once in a generation.'' No matter what we say,
though, if we approve two waivers in just 4 years, our actions
will speak louder than our words.
Second, the perception among flag officers that a four-star
billet is not a career capstone. Some generals and admirals may
begin to think if they play their cards right, they, too, can
become a Secretary in just a few years. I do not think that is
good for the force or for the country.
Three, the perception among the American people that the
military expertise of our general officers is the same as
national security expertise more broadly and that the latter
resides chiefly in the military, which I also believe is
unhealthy for our democracy.
Four, the perception of potential Army favoritism. As a 41-
year officer in the Army, many observers may disbelieve that
you can hang up the Army green, rightly or wrongly. If you make
the right decision for the Army over the other services, then
those services' advocates may say it is because of favoritism.
Make the correct decision for another service against the Army,
and the Army's advocates will say you are protecting your flank
against such charges of favoritism. Neither one of those may be
true in the case, but I believe it is unavoidable.
Those concerns alone are weighty and enough for me to
oppose this waiver, as I should have done 4 years ago. But
there are still more reasons behind the cooling-off period. As
I said, though, you can give reassurances about some of these
concerns, and I want to give you the opportunity to do that.
First, Secretary of Defense is not a partisan job, but it
is very much a political job. Bob Gates is a good example. He
served in a Republican and Democratic Administration with great
political skill. We, of course, expect our generals, like you
and General Mattis, to be apolitical, but our troops deserve a
Secretary with the political skills and willingness to fight
for them, whether within the Pentagon against its bureaucracy,
within the Cabinet in fights over policy and budgetary
resources, or against parochial Members of Congress.
So, General Austin, what can you say to address this
concern? If, for instance, John Kerry wants to sacrifice our
force posture on China's periphery in return for ephemeral
promises from China to reduce emissions in 2070? Or Jennifer
Granholm wants to rob the nuclear security budget to fund pie-
in-the-sky green energy programs? Or simply if the Office of
Management and Budget wants to cut the military's budget, how
would you manage such inherently political disputes?
Mr. Austin. Well, certainly in terms of providing resources
for the military, my goal is to--my job is to defend this
country, if I am confirmed as the Secretary of Defense. I
believe that we need to have the adequate resources to be able
to do that.
In order to help me work the issues and make my points
throughout the interagency, number one, I will develop great
relationships with my partners in State and OMB and other
places. Number two, I will hire the right people to be on my
staff to make sure that they are working with me and crafting
the right language to be able to be successful in this
dialogue.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. If confirmed, I do urge
you to be a forceful political advocate for the Department and
its interests, both inside the Cabinet and with the Congress as
well.
A second concern I would like you to address is that the
Secretary also holds a public office. Bob Gates routinely held
on-camera press briefings about major decisions, new policies,
public controversies, and so forth. Those have been almost
nonexistent for the last 4 years.
General Austin, if confirmed, will you commit to hold
regular, on-camera press briefings?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Will you also commit to appear on
television programs to explain the key issues of the day, as
Senator Gillibrand raised?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
A third and final concern I want you to address is that a
recently retired general is apt to bring with him much of his
former military staff, perhaps re-creating his last command as
a kind of supreme combatant command, also likely to rely too
much on the Joint Staff.
General Austin, could you please discuss, if confirmed, how
many of your former military staff from your various senior
commands you plan to hire and how you will balance the Joint
Staff with civilian appointees, the services, and the combatant
commands?
Mr. Austin. The key billets for my staff, all of those
positions are being--we are looking at filling all those
positions, if I am confirmed, with experienced senior civilians
that, again, I will empower to be able to get their job done.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Again, General Austin, my concerns about these waivers do
not bear at all on your nomination or your record of service to
our Nation, for which I have the highest regard. I thank you
again for answering the call of duty to your country.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, Mr. Austin, thank you for being here today.
Thank you for your extraordinary career of service, which I
deeply respect and admire.
My opposition to the waiver is not personal. It is a matter
of principle, and I want to move on to the merits of the policy
issues that will confront you, if confirmed. In my view, you
have expressed clearly and cogently your commitment to
strengthening civilian control over the military, which you
would implement if confirmed.
First, I have been deeply alarmed, as have been many of my
colleagues, by the rise of white supremacists and extremist
ideology in the military. You and I have discussed it. The
latest signs are, in fact, that two National Guard members have
been removed from their duties regarding the inaugural because
of their potential links to extremist sentiments or
organizations.
Last week, I led 13 of my colleagues in a letter to the
Department of Defense Inspector General asking for an immediate
and intensive investigation of the prevalence of white
supremacy and extremist ideology. I am asking for your
commitment that you will cooperate with and support that
investigation. Shortly after our letter, the Department of
Defense indicated it was going to do an evaluation of this
issue, but I want an intensive investigation and action to
counter it. I look forward, hopefully, to working with you in
countering and combating this very important threat.
Mr. Austin. I certainly look forward to working with you on
this, Senator. I think this is critical. I would share a story
with you from my past where when I was a lieutenant colonel
working in probably the finest, one of the finest organizations
in the Army--the 82nd Airborne Division--we woke up one day and
discovered that we had extremist elements in our ranks, and
they did bad things that we certainly held them accountable
for.
But we discovered that the signs for that activity were
there all along. We just did not know what to look for or what
to pay attention to, but we learned from that. I think this is
one of those things that is important to our military to make
sure that we keep a handle on, to make sure our leaders are
doing the right things. They are taking care of their troops.
They understand, they know their troops.
We can never take our hands off the wheel on this. This has
no place in the military of the United States of America.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I really
appreciate that answer.
You mentioned in your testimony the importance of the
Chinese threat, the need to focus on it. But the most recent
attack on our country was by Russia, which, for months,
literally intruded, interfered, and attacked our Nation in
cyberspace. In part because, as General Nakasone testified to
us, our adversaries do not fear us--that is exactly what he
said--in the cyber domain.
I would like to ask you to commit to conducting a top-down
review of our cyber operations, including DOD's posture and
structure, and to making our adversaries pay a price when they
attack us, as the Russians did, through SolarWinds.
Mr. Austin. You have my commitment that I will conduct that
review. I think that there is a review ongoing now to really
ascertain what transpired. I will join that, if confirmed, in
stride. I really look forward to understanding with clarity
what really happened.
I truly believe that, well, the FBI and the NSA have given
Russia credit for this. They have attributed this activity to
Russia. If that is the case, I think Russia should be held
accountable. That is my personal belief.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Environmental action and climate change are more important
than ever. I know the President-Elect is going to focus on it.
As you and I have discussed in our meeting, the Department of
Defense has an immense role to play. I welcome your comments on
PFAS and the increasing resilience of our military
installations.
I would like to work with you on a total program or plan
for the Department of Defense beyond the magnitude of what is
done now, and I know you have indicated your interest in it. So
I am not going to ask questions about it, but I do think that
the use and procurement of clean energy, the energy efficiency
steps that DOD can take will not only save dollars, it will
save energy and environmental values and provide leadership for
the whole world.
I want to focus on military sexual assault, which my
colleague Senator Gillibrand did so well before, and say that I
am working on legislation that would create liability for
perpetrators and for the Department of Defense for sexual
misconduct in among servicemembers so that the survivors would
have a right of action. They would be empowered to take action.
Will you support that kind of legislation, sir?
Mr. Austin. Well, I certainly look forward to reviewing
what is in the legislation, Senator, and would love to have
that discussion with you once I have had the ability to do
that. I just want to take a moment to thank both you and
Senator Gillibrand for the tremendous work, especially Senator
Gillibrand, for the work that you have both done to counter
sexual assault in our ranks. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with both of you on this issue.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate that point. Let me just
say I welcome and appreciate your focus in your written remarks
in answers to specific questions on the need to focus on our
suppliers, our supply chain, our workforce, our defense
industrial base, which are very important to Connecticut, where
we are the submarine capital of the world at Electric Boat and
where a trained workforce is especially important, but the
supply chain equally so.
I would like you to review, because I am out of time,
legislation that I proposed that would give the Mayor of the
District of Columbia the same powers that Governors have over
the National Guard. Because a lot of the very unfortunate lack
of planning and coordination between Federal and local agencies
that has been on display over recent months, in my view, is
attributable to the lack of that power on the part of, in
effect, locally empowered officials here.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you so much, General, for being here today. We
certainly appreciate your commitment and your service to our
great nation, and thank you for stepping forward with this
nomination.
I just want to briefly touch upon the issue of sexual
harassment, sexual assault, as Senator Gillibrand and Senator
Blumenthal just did. We had a conversation about this last
week. Thank you very much for that. But part of that Fort Hood
report that came forward stated that the military readiness
requirement superseded the need to protect our servicemembers.
What are your feelings as to that statement, and then how
do we move forward and correct that?
Mr. Austin. Senator, I earnestly--I honestly do not believe
that these two issues are mutually exclusive. We absolutely
have to take care of the men and women that are in our ranks. A
failure to do so--I mean, we are about people in the military.
We have the greatest, the best equipment in the world, and I
get that. But this is about people.
If we do not take care of our people, it is really, really
tough to do the job at hand, and that is to defend this
country. I do not see these two issues as being at odds with
each other. I think we have to do both, and we have to do them
both well.
Senator Ernst. I truly appreciate that. I fully agree. Our
military readiness does not have to suffer because of sexual
harassment. We can take care of that issue and also still be
the best fighting force in the world. So I appreciate your
stance there.
I today had such a great honor. I retired from the Iowa
Army National Guard in 2015, and we have a number of those
tremendous men and women serving right outside our doors today.
It was my honor to go out in front of the Capitol and re-enlist
about 15 of our Iowa Army National Guardsmen, a great honor for
me.
But the importance of our National Guard has really been on
display the last year or so, as we have seen numerous trips
deployed in support of fighting forest fires in California, or
deployments and mobilizations supporting COVID-19 activities,
whether it is food distribution to food banks, making sure that
vaccines were distributed to our communities. We have seen tens
of thousands of our soldiers and airmen mobilized. They were
there. They responded, and they did it quite quickly.
I will emphasize that point again, that the National Guard,
they mobilized, and they were there quickly, even beyond the
capacity of their Active counterparts. So whether it was
working for FEMA, helping those local health clinics, you know,
distributing food, as I said, our National Guard members
stepped up. Again, today we witness them out on our Capitol
Mall keeping our Nation safe so that we here in Congress can do
our duties.
So no matter what happens, whether it is response to riots
or violence or other types of activities, they are mobilizing
for us. So what we have learned over the last year is that they
do come to us quickly in response to these domestic missions.
Now what further changes or reforms could be made to make
sure that our National Guard are treated equally because of
their important role for our United States, but treated equally
with their Active Duty counterparts when it comes to training,
when it comes to equipment, when it comes to readiness? What
can we do to make sure that they are on par with their Active
Duty counterparts?
Mr. Austin. Well, there are, as you know, being a--having
been a Guard member for quite some time, there are some
challenges in terms of the amount of days that you have to
actually conduct that training. But quite frankly, over the
last two decades, we have seen our great Guard members work
shoulder to shoulder in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and
we have seen a difference in the quality of equipment early on.
I think we have closed that gap now.
I think we are doing better. There is more that we can do.
But we are going to have to continue to work through these
challenges. There are no easy fixes, but this is one thing that
I will work with the services on to make sure that we are
giving our Guard the very best, finest of equipment. We are
giving them good-quality training opportunities, and we are
recognizing them for the great work that they are doing.
Senator Ernst. No, I thank you for that answer. They mean a
lot to us in defense of our country and certainly short-notice
mobilizations, especially as we see right here in Washington,
DC, today.
So last issue because I know that we are running short on
time, you and I did speak briefly about defense spending and
the audit of our Pentagon and DOD. So we know that our defense
budget has grown significantly to address many threats--Russia
and China, as well as persistent threat coming from Iran, as
well as a number of much smaller terrorist groups around the
world. So the potential for defense spending that is wasteful
has also grown and expanded, and it is used on lower-priority
or even obsolete programs.
So, if confirmed, how will you lead the budget reviews to
reform the Pentagon, and do you see it as a possibility to make
sure that the Department of Defense does obtain a clean audit?
Mr. Austin. That will continue to be our goal. As you and I
talked, we have made some progress, as I understand it. I have
been away from the process for a while, but there is more to be
done. You have my commitment that we will lean into this and
continue to push to make sure that we can get that clean audit
in the not-too-distant future.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, General. My time has
expired. Again, thank you for stepping forward and looking to
serve our Nation again in this capacity.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Now via Webex, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, it was good to have the chance to talk with
you a little while ago. I ask all nominees before any of the
committees that I sit on the following two questions as part of
my responsibility to make sure that nominees are fit for the
appointment to which they are nominated. So I will ask you the
following questions.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Mr. Austin. No.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Austin. No.
Senator Hirono. I want to acknowledge my agreement with the
questions asked--some of the questions asked by my colleague
Senator Blumenthal and your commitment that you will be--you
will counter any white supremacists or extremists within the
ranks of the military. I think that is really important. Also
the questions he asked relating to how important it is to make
sure that we are safe from cyber attacks because these cyber
systems are what the military communications very much depend
on.
By the questions that were asked by several of my
colleagues, including Senators Blumenthal and Gillibrand, a
number of us are very concerned about the continuing scourge of
sexual assault and harassment and retaliation in our military.
It is very clear that the reforms that the Department of
Defense has instituted are not nearly good enough, and much
more action is needed.
I want to express to you last week a very tragic thing
happened. Selena Roth, a 25-year-old Army veteran and military
wife, was found dead in military housing at Schofield Barracks
in Hawaii. A soldier is in custody, and a homicide
investigation is ongoing. My heart goes out to Selena's family.
Violent acts against women within our military community
continue to occur at an alarming rate, and I am committed to
ensuring--to making sure that these perpetrators are held
accountable.
You noted in your statement that you will fight sexual
assault and harassment in the military, including, I hope, that
you will look at the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
which I support, which Senator Gillibrand has been a leader on,
and changing the UCMJ to remove the decision relating to
prosecution of these kind of attacks outside of the chain of
command. I hope you will review that very carefully because all
of your predecessors have not supported that kind of a change.
I also want to mention that I have introduced the I am
Vanessa Guillen Act. This act provides for the creation of a
standalone punitive article for sexual harassment. If
confirmed, would you support the creation of a standalone
punitive article of sexual harassment to be included in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice?
Mr. Austin. Senator, any time we change the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, I would want to approach that with great
deliberation. But I would commit to you that I would certainly
want to take this on and look at it with the right experts to
make sure that we achieve the right effects with doing
something like that.
But I would certainly want to make sure I get the right
experts on hand to really drill into this.
Senator Hirono. Well, sexual harassment can be subsumed
under other charges, but it is not a standalone charge. I think
it is very important, considering that sexual harassment occurs
at an alarming rate in the military. So this is not--and I
would hope that this is not something that requires a great
deal of thinking because, as I said, we can already charge
someone under other articles for sexual harassment.
So when a servicemember is sexually assaulted, they are
given the option of either making a restricted or unrestricted
report, and the I am Vanessa Guillen Act would allow victims of
sexual harassment to also make restricted reports, allowing
them to remain anonymous within their chain of command while
still receiving the support services that they should have.
Would you support the creation of making that so, for
victims of sexual harassment to be able to make a restricted
report?
Mr. Austin. I do not think I heard the end of the question
there, Senator. Would you remind repeating the last piece of
that?
Senator Hirono. Yes. Would you allow victims of sexual
harassment to have the same options that victims of sexual
assault have in making a restricted report?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
I want to turn to the importance of training areas for the
Indo-Pacific area of responsibility. Admiral Davidson, who is
the commander of INDOPACOM, talked recently about the
importance of joint, integrated training in this AOR [area of
responsibility]. Admiral Davidson specifically mentioned the
vital importance of both the Pacific Military Range Facility,
or PMRF, on Kauai and the Army training areas, including
Pohakuloa Training Range on the Big Island.
With Navy, Air Force, and Army leases all up for renewal in
2029, which is really right around the corner, it is incumbent
on DOD to engage with State authorities and the local
stakeholders like the Native Hawaii community early, often, and
openly. Having a clear and transparent process is very critical
to the renewal of these leases, which, needless to say, is
critical for the military's presence in Hawaii.
What are your thoughts on the value of realistic joint
training with our coalition partners in the region and
elsewhere?
Mr. Austin. Well, certainly the value of conducting joint
training with our coalition partners, I mean, it is invaluable.
It is we always work better as a team. I think it ought to be
effective as a team. You have to train to do that day in and
day out, and so----
Senator Hirono. So training is--I am sorry. I am running
out of time. I just want to make sure that I have your
commitment that you will have an open dialogue with the
community with regard to these really important training
facilities in the State of Hawaii?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
I do have some other questions----
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono.--but I believe I am out of time. I will
submit them for the record.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, first of all, I just want to thank you and your
wife and your family for serving our Nation in uniform because
you did it with honor, and you did it for 41 years. I just want
to say thank you for that, sir.
General, you and I have had the opportunity to speak now on
several different occasions, and I have appreciated your
answers to my questions with regard to the waiver. I truly do
believe that the waiver was there for a reason, but I also
think that the President-Elect does have--I think the tie goes
to the President. In this particular case, I believe that he
has nominated you because he believes that you are the right
person at the right time.
I have no misgivings whatsoever about your capabilities and
your competencies. I think in this particular case, it is my
intent to support the waiver so that you can have your--the
presentation of you before the Senate for confirmation.
I think part of the reason that I feel this way is because
of the conversations that you and I had, and I want to go
through them a little bit because, first of all, with regard to
the difference between being the Secretary of Defense and being
a member of the Joint Chiefs, there is a true difference
between the two, the role of the two. Can you share a little
bit your understanding of the differences in the role and yet,
at the same time, the real need for both to be expressed and
your plans with regard to bringing in, as you indicated in your
opening remarks, additional qualified civilians into those top
areas?
Mr. Austin. So I think the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is
required to give his best military advice to the President and
to the Secretary routinely, and it is military advice. The
Secretary has a much broader scope. He has a lot more to take
into consideration. He is focused on strategy and policy, and
he understands he is working within the guidelines provided by
his boss, the President of the United States.
So there is an enormous difference, and I think one of the
key enablers here, as I have said before, is to make sure that
we have the right experts, the right professionals onboard
working with me day in and day out to craft that strategy and
develop that policy. But the Secretary has a much broader
scope, and he is not focused on giving the same type of advice
that the Chairman would provide.
I have seen this done right a number of times. All the
Secretaries, of course, get it right. But the two that come to
mind more than anyone else for me, when I was a three-star
serving as the director of the Joint Staff, Secretary Bob Gates
was the Secretary of Defense, an absolute master at making sure
that he outlined roles and responsibilities and swim lanes,
designated swim lanes for the Joint Staff and the OSD staff.
Later, you know, I served in the Pentagon as a four-staff
as a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and I had a chance to
work with Secretary Panetta, who, once again, was a master at
making sure that those roles remained separate and that he
provided the right kind of advice to the President of the
United States. While he worked arm-in-arm with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, they did not provide the same kind of
perspective.
I fully believe that I understand the difference, and I
look forward to working with the Chairman. But I have no desire
to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and so, if confirmed,
we will make sure that those roles and responsibilities are
clearly outlined.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
We also had a chance to talk a little bit about cyber and
about the work that we have done in the last couple of years
with regard to cyber and the defense of our cyber operations.
It used to be you had air, land, and sea to worry about. Now we
clearly have space, and we have cyberspace. A lot of our
adversaries have decided to take the shortcut, and they are
trying to impact all of the other domains using cyber.
In the last couple of years, particularly with regard to
the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy, we have decided to move forward,
and we have a ``defend forward'' policy. You have indicated
your support, or at least you have seen it, you have observed
it, and so forth. Can you give me very briefly your thoughts
about our cyber and the need to continue to make strides and to
allow for offensive cyber operations to continue?
Mr. Austin. I think that is important. I think having an
offensive capability that we are able to use I think is really
important, and so I applaud the efforts that have been made in
the past. Once again, I have been away from it for a bit, but I
really look forward to kind of getting back, getting under the
hood, understanding how the--how the--how the processes work
now to ensure coordination across the board, across the
agencies.
In this endeavor, speed matters, and so anything that we
can do to facilitate the work of the operators I think is
goodness, but we have got to make sure we are doing it in the
right way.
Senator Rounds. We will continue to remind you about the
need for speed on that, if at all necessary, and I do not think
it will be.
Finally, General, Secretary Mattis implemented a Close
Combat Lethality Task Force in 2018. This is an organization
dedicated to providing resources to the forces who have
accounted historically for nearly 90 percent of the casualties,
yet constitute only 4 percent of the force and receive only 1
percent of the institutional investments.
I am concerned with how this task force has appeared to
have lost its direct report, this relationship with the
Secretary. It appears to have gotten caught in the bureaucracy
over the last year, and I would like to see it back on track. I
have worked on language to strengthen the task force with
Senator Duckworth and other members, and this is more than a
bipartisan effort. This is a nonpartisan issue.
Can you discuss the importance very briefly of a task force
that represents our infantry, Marines, special operators, and
other specialties who closely and directly impact the enemy and
enemy operations, and how that would be channeled through your
office?
Mr. Austin. Yes. I fully understand and appreciate the
importance of making sure that we resource and support our men
and women that are at the tip of the spear. You know, the
squads and platoons are out there actually fighting the enemy.
Everybody else is supporting the fight.
We have to make sure that they have what they need in order
to be successful. This is an evolving effort. It will never
remain static. While I do not know the reasons for things
having--why they have been repositioned and reporting chains
have been redesigned, I would certainly take a look at that as
I go in, if I am confirmed.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Austin, first off, just congratulations on your
nomination, and thank you so much for your willingness to
continue to serve this great country.
One of the things I want to ask you about is, if confirmed
as Secretary, you are going to play a really critical role in
directing defense modernization priorities that have an impact
on our forces for many, many years to come. That modernization,
with critical investments in technologies like directed energy
or hypersonics or artificial intelligence, is what will ensure
that our men and women in uniform will, hopefully, never
experience a fair fight.
But modernization requires really difficult choices with
regard to competing priorities. So I wanted to ask you, how
will you balance investments in personnel and legacy systems
with the critical need to develop capabilities that are going
to give us a qualitative edge over near-peer adversaries like
Russia and China?
Mr. Austin. Well, as you know, personnel costs are--I mean,
they are expensive, and we have to be mindful about that as we
go forward. We have to be willing to make sure that we are
making the right calls, although they may be tough calls from
time to time.
In terms of legacy systems, I think I will have to get in
and work with the services to ascertain what they believe is
relevant and really have a tough discussion with them on
whether or not it makes sense to continue to invest in certain
types of things. But I agree with you. I think we absolutely
have to invest in the capabilities that will make us relevant
not in the last fight, but in the future fight.
We have to be able to understand. We have to be better
faster, we have to be able to decide faster, and we have to be
able to act faster, and that--I mean, we will have to employ
the use of space-based platforms. All the things that you
talked about, the use of AI, and the development of those kinds
of capabilities will not come cheap. But this is not a choice,
in my view. These are things that we must invest in going
forward if we are going to maintain a competitive edge.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you for your thoughts on that.
Mr. Austin, last week in the final days of the current
Administration, the Air Force announced that it had selected
Huntsville, Alabama, to host the new Space Command
headquarters. I believe this process, frankly, was severely
flawed, and it was not in line with what I have seen
historically with regard to a more deliberative approach that
the Air Force has typically taken with regard to basing
decisions of this magnitude.
I know you are not familiar with this decision and its
details, but I would simply ask that, if confirmed, that you
would take a close look at that process to make sure that it
met the historical standards for decisions of that type.
Mr. Austin. I will do that, and I will make sure that we
look at all of our processes going forward so that future
decisions are made within the confines of the policies that
have been laid out.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you. I appreciate that very much.
As you know, DOD has set an initial requirement to produce
30 plutonium pits per year at Los Alamos Labs by 2026. I would
love your views on how important that milestone is to
maintaining our nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Austin. Could you repeat your question, Senator?
Senator Heinrich. The Department of Defense has set an
initial requirement to produce 30 plutonium pits per year at
Los Alamos National Labs by 2026, and I would love your
thoughts on the importance of achieving that milestone on that
timeline.
Mr. Austin. Yes. As we have said earlier in our discussions
here this afternoon, Senator, maintaining a credible, a
reliable, safe, and sustainable nuclear capability is of utmost
importance, of the highest importance. This is a component of
that, and certainly, if we have laid out those goals and
objectives for ourselves, I am very much interesting in making
sure that they are the appropriate goals, but--and I have no
reason to doubt that they are, but making sure that we remain
on time and on target with achieving those goals.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward to working with you on
that front.
One of the last things I want to get to here in my final
couple minutes is PFAS clean-up and remediation. Many
communities across the country continue to suffer from enormous
impacts on their water supplies from PFAS chemicals, in
particular in drinking water, in ground water that is used for
both drinking and, in some cases, agricultural use. One of the
most hard hit of these communities is around Cannon Air Force
Base in New Mexico, a community that has been incredibly
supportive of that facility for decades.
The Air Force and the Department of Defense more broadly
have, frankly, slow-walked the clean-up and the remediation
efforts for a number of years now, despite really clear
evidence that defense activities are the source of that
contamination. If confirmed, I would ask that you make full
PFAS remediation a priority within the Department and ensure
that the Department of Defense takes concrete steps to finally
do right by these communities that have done right by the
Department for literally decades.
Mr. Austin. The safety and the health of our military
members, our family members, our DOD civilians, and our
communities is very, very important to us in DOD. I think you
know that Secretary Esper stood up a PFAS task force a while
back and that their work is ongoing. If I am confirmed, I will
go in and ask that they pick up the pace on the work, and we
will want to push to make sure that we have good solutions for
mitigation of our contribution to this contamination.
PFAS has been used throughout the economy, so I think we
are going to have to work across--you know, across the board
with our partners to ensure that we are working together, we
are doing the right things to mitigate the effects here. So I
look forward to working with my colleague there in the EPA to
make sure that the military is doing its part, and we stay
focused on the right things here.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Tillis? Senator Rounds presiding.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, can you hear me okay?
Mr. Austin. I can.
Senator Tillis. Congratulations to you and to your wife and
your family, and thank you for your decades of service.
I would like to start by--well, also I want to thank you
for spending some quality time down at Fort Bragg at the tip of
the spear with the 82nd Airborne.
I want to associate myself with comments made by Senators
Gillibrand, Ernst, and Blumenthal on military sexual assault. I
do not expect you to respond to it. I heard your responses
earlier. But to me, we will never know what great leaders chose
never to go into the military if we continue to have a
reputation for a culture that is not making progress on
military sexual assault.
I have heard you make commitments to my colleagues, and I
look forward to exploring this issue as a ranking member on the
Personnel Subcommittee. But we have got a lot of work to do. I
have been here for 6 years, and we are not making near enough
progress.
I would like to start, though, by asking you to give me an
idea of the general, a general overview of the threat that you
believe that Iran represents to national security and security
in the Middle East. I would also be curious in your answer what
you think about the recent agreements with Middle East
countries and Israel, whether or not that is a positive step in
the right direction?
Mr. Austin. Iran continues to be a destabilizing element in
the region. You look at its behavior, it clearly--a lot of
activity that is destabilizing. It does not work well with its
neighbors. It, again, does present a threat to our partners in
the region and those forces that we have stationed in the
region.
If Iran were ever to get a nuclear capability, most every
problem that we deal with in the region would be tougher to
deal with because of that. So, to answer your question, I think
Iran's activity continues to be or its behavior is--continues
to be destabilizing.
Senator Tillis. On the recent agreements, do you have any
opinion as to whether or not they are a positive step to try
and check Iran's ambitions in the Middle East?
Mr. Austin. I do. I think that any time that we--you know,
that countries agree to normalize relations, I think that is a
good thing. I think certainly this has put a bit more pressure
on Iran, and I hope it will have good effects.
Senator Tillis. Thanks, General Austin.
General Austin, you wrote in your advance policy responses,
this is a quote from them, ``The continued erosion of United
States military advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia in key
strategic areas remains the most significant risk the
Department must address. If left unchecked, this continued
erosion could fundamentally change our ability to achieve U.S.
national security objectives and limit the DOD's ability to
underpin other U.S. instruments of power.''
Can you talk a little bit about the key strategic areas? We
have long since thought that they had a quantitative advantage,
but that we maintained a qualitative advantage. It seems like
the margins are shrinking. So can you give me a brief expansion
on the responses to the advance policy questions?
Mr. Austin. Thanks, Senator.
They continue to invest in modernization. They have gone to
school on us in terms of how we deploy and how we employ our
forces. So if we would choose to do the same types of things
that we have done in the past, I think that we will clearly be
challenged. So we will have to have capabilities that allow us
to hold--to present a credible threat--credible deterrent,
excuse me, to China in the future.
We will have to make some strides in the use of quantum
computing, the use of AI, the use of--the advent of connected
battlefields, space-based platforms. Those kinds of things I
think can give us the types of capabilities that we will need
to be able to hold a large element, large pieces of Chinese
inventory, military inventory at risk.
I believe that we still have the qualitative edge, have a
competitive edge over China. I think that gap has closed
significantly, and our goal will be to ensure that we expand
that gap going forward.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Because I have limited time, I am going to submit a
question to the record on I think the economic warfare that we
are dealing with on China, the race to 5G and some of the
interagency activities that I do not think the DOD is
prominently up there. We have got the USTR, Commerce
Department, but I feel like that we are losing some ground.
I have a unique perspective on that, looking at all the
intellectual property theft, as the chair of the Intellectual
Property Subcommittee on Judiciary. But I have got a lot of
context I want to add to that. So I want to ask a question
there.
So in my remaining time, if I were in person, I would have
my 600-page request for proposal for the next-generation
handgun with me. It is my favorite prop when we have a
confirmation like this. It just confounds me to think it took
10 years to procure the next-generation handgun, and it is
going to take 10 years to deploy it. To me, it suggests a
fundamental problem with the way we go about acquisitions and
procurements in the Department of Defense.
So I would just seek your commitment, if confirmed, if you
are going to have the kind of resources around you that are
going to drill down across the business of the DOD and figure
out if we are now at a point to where we can go from an
investigational new drug to an approved vaccine in 11 months,
it would seem to me that we could get to a point where we can
specify certain procurements in the DOD in terms of months or
years, not decades.
Do I have your commitment to make sure that you make this a
priority that you have someone there that has the experience
and insight to figure out how we get more productivity and I
think more sanity in our procurement processes?
Mr. Austin. You have my commitment, Senator.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you, General Austin.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Rounds [Presiding]. On behalf of the chairman,
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, congratulations on the nomination.
Ten years after the Civil War finished, at the end of his
second term as President, U.S. Grant gave a speech in Des
Moines, Iowa, September 1875. Here is what he said. He was
talking about the prospect of ever having another civil war.
``If we are to have another contest in the near future of
our national existence, I predict that the dividing line will
not be Masons and Dixons, but between patriotism and
intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition, and
ignorance on the other.''
Those words are very chilling words as we contemplate what
we saw in this Capitol on the 6th of January. We saw ambition.
We saw superstition, if you could say superstition might be
QAnon fantasy or election was stolen or widespread voter fraud.
Ignorance. I do not know that I would use that word. The speech
that U.S. Grant gave was to a group of Civil War veterans, and
it was to promote the idea of more broad public education, the
idea that education would drive out susceptibility to
superstition.
It might be comforting for us to think that what we saw on
January 6th or generally was ignorance, but if you look at the
spectrum of people who were involved, you find a number of very
highly educated people. Sadly, and I know this has been raised
already, you find a lot of people who have connection to our
military, who should be--as part of the enormous training
investment we make in them, be able to spot the difference
between truth and fantasy, between reality and conspiracy
theory.
Military Times did an analysis in 2019, a survey of Active
Duty military, and they found that 36 percent of Active Duty
servicemembers have seen evidence of white supremacist and
racist ideologies in the military. That does not mean 36
percent of military share those, but more than one-third of our
military have seen their colleagues exhibiting either white
supremacist or racist ideologies.
General Austin, if you are confirmed, you will make history
as the first African-American Secretary of Defense, but you
have also lived a life in this country and seen these
challenges. I know some colleagues have asked you about
investigations, but what I would like to ask you about is
training. We invest so much to train a member of our military--
officer, enlisted--what might you suggest to us, as we think
about the training going forward, that would lead us to have a
military that was immune from superstition and not so gullible
as to fall for these false ideologies?
Mr. Austin. Thanks, Senator.
I think that we have to train our leaders to make sure that
they are in touch with the people that they are leading, that
they understand who they are, what they are doing, what they
are reading, that they are looking at their environment that
they are living in and looking for signs of things that could
indicate that something is going in the wrong direction. I
think leadership needs--if leadership is not in touch with the
people they are leading, these kinds of things can happen.
I do not think that this is a thing that you can put a
band-aid on and fix and leave alone. I think that training
needs to go on routinely because things change. The types of
things that you are looking for change.
I think our leaders need to be able to talk to their
subordinates and instill in them the right types of values, the
values that our military embraces, the values that our country
embraces. You know, failure to be able to adhere to those
values means that you should not be a part of our formation,
and our leaders need to be able to sort those things out.
But having had personal experience with this, being in a
unit that had a problem with this long ago when I was a
lieutenant colonel, I can tell you that most of us were
embarrassed that we did not know what to look for, and we did
not really understand that by being engaged more with your
people on these types of issues can pay big dividends. I know
that that unit has probably learned that forever, but I do not
think that you can ever take your hand off the steering wheel
here.
Senator Kaine. Well, because in a way, the enemy within--
disunity--is probably the most destructive force in terms of
our ability to defend ourselves. So if we are divided against
one another, how can we defend the Nation? I view this as an
enormously important task that you will carry, should you be
confirmed.
I want to echo what comments that have been made by
colleagues about military sexual assault. Again, a divider
within the body that makes us less able to externally face and
defeat the threats we face.
I have read much of the Citizen Review Panel that was put
together to look at the tragic murder of Vanessa Guillen at
Fort Hood, and that is a very, very powerful document. I would
encourage all members of the committee to do it.
I spoke to one of the members of that panel, and he relayed
that he was doing one of the interviews--and they did dozens
and dozens of interviews--and was talking to a mid-level
officer on the base who was trying to say that they felt like
they were doing all they could to deal with military sexual
assault. The interviewer said, ``Would you let your daughter
serve in the military?'' He said, ``No way.'' He just Rorschach
answered the question and said, ``No way.''
Whatever the attempt to put a good spin on how we are
doing, if you would worry about your own daughter serving in
the military, we got a long ways to go.
Quality of life issues are enormously important. You have
been asked about a lot of the strategic challenges. We face
this tough one on military housing. I just want to remind my
colleagues, we started--we faced that military housing issue
about 2 years after we did significant reforms to reduce the
size of headquarters staff. What we found is we were kind of
asleep at the switch in monitoring military housing.
An awful lot of the staffs that oversaw military housing
had been dramatically shrunk because of what we did on the
headquarters staff thing. That does not mean that there is not
fat that could be squeezed out of any organization. It just
means that we have to really be careful, thinking if we shrink
the civilian side or the headquarters side, we are going to be
saving some money, which we did. But we ended up compounding a
problem.
I hope you will be attuned to the need to balance
challenges like that so that we can provide the quality of life
that our men and women and their families deserve and that will
keep them re-enlisting if we want them to. If you could just
say a word about that, and I am done.
Mr. Austin. Yes, I will. I will be certainly very attuned
to that, Senator.
I think, in some cases, we have broken trust with our
family members because of the housing issue and other issues. I
think this is critically important. I look forward to being
able to work with the services to really not only get after
this, the immediate problems, but put the fixes in our
contracting efforts so that we are much better at this down the
road.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Rounds. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, General Billy Mitchell, the father of the U.S. Air
Force, in a hearing like this in front of the Armed Services
many years ago, in the, actually, I think it was the 1930s,
called Alaska ``the most strategic place in the world.'' I like
to say Alaska constitutes three pillars of America's military
might.
We are the cornerstone on missile defense. Almost all the
missiles and radar systems protecting the entire country are in
Alaska. We are the hub of air combat power for the Arctic and
Asia-Pacific. We will have over 100 fifth-generation fighters
there. We are building up our tanker capability, an issue that
I think is going to be important. We are a platform for
expeditionary forces like the 4-25, the First Stryker Brigade.
If confirmed, can I get your commitment soon in your tenure
to come to Alaska with me and see this critically important
national defense State and troops for America in my State?
Mr. Austin. Senator, I absolutely agree with you that
Alaska is a national treasure, and it has--it holds some of our
most important military assets and resources. As you know, we
are challenged with travel now, and as the opportunities
present themselves, post trips to the Indo-Pacific where I need
to get to right away, if I am confirmed, I certainly would
accept your invitation at some point in the future.
Senator Sullivan. Well, General, a lot of us think that
Alaska is kind of in the Indo-Pacific. So on your way out, we
can get there early. So I look forward to doing that.
Related to that is the issue of national security in the
Arctic, and that is certainly a new theater of great power
competition. Russia, China being very aggressive in the Arctic
with massive buildups of military forces, infrastructure. To be
honest, for the last several years, I think the Pentagon was
asleep at the switch with regard to our national security
challenges in the Arctic.
This committee, in a bipartisan way, has been very focused
on ensuring that the Pentagon recognizes these challenges with
infrastructure, icebreakers that we need, capabilities. The
Department of Defense released its Arctic Strategy in June
2019, required by this committee. The Air Force followed suit
with its own strategy in July of 2020. The Department of the
Navy just this week published its Arctic Strategic Blueprint,
and the Army will soon be doing this as well.
Can I get your commitment to work with this committee,
where this has been a high priority, to ensure that these
service Arctic strategies are appropriately resourced and that
we can protect our strategic interests in the Arctic?
Mr. Austin. You have my commitment, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
General, the other issue I just wanted to touch on here, in
this hearing that we had last week on civilian control of the
military, in op-eds, you have seen it with some of my
colleagues, there has been this growing conventional wisdom
that somehow because Secretary Mattis had been a previous
CENTCOM commander, that his tenure is a warning really for what
some are considering a failed tenure as Secretary of Defense.
I actually disagree with this quite vehemently. Secretary
Mattis replaced a Secretary of Defense, Secretary Carter, with
no military experience. Matter of fact, he was what many people
are calling for, a political Secretary. I supported both, but
let me just give you a little juxtaposition.
Secretary Carter oversaw a 25 percent cut in military
funding. Readiness plummeted. Secretary Mattis rebuilt this up
and rebuilt readiness with this Congress.
Secretary Carter would not support arming the Ukrainians
with Javelin missile systems, despite the entire committee here
pressing him to do so. Secretary Mattis did that almost
immediately in his tenure.
Secretary Carter watched ISIS grow to be a very lethal
threat. Secretary Mattis brought DOD strategy to crush ISIS.
Secretary Carter, for a whole host of reasons, was very
reluctant to press for any freedom of navigation operations in
the South China Sea. Secretary Mattis made those regular
elements of our strategy in the Asia-Pacific.
Finally, Secretary Mattis put together the National Defense
Strategy, one of the most important and bipartisan documents
that many have seen on national security in a generation. He
often got back to Senators quickly. In terms of oversight, with
all due respect to Secretary Carter, sometime it took weeks
just to schedule a phone call or a meeting.
So, General Austin, do you think Secretary Mattis had a
failed tenure as Secretary of Defense because he had previously
served as CENTCOM commander? I would like your assessment of
that. It is being used right now as somehow a warning for your
confirmation, and I think it is a conventional wisdom that I
personally reject.
Mr. Austin. I do not think he should be considered as a
failed Secretary of Defense because of his work in CENTCOM
earlier. I think Secretary Mattis was a very thoughtful
Secretary, and he did a lot of goodness for the Department.
Certainly I would not want to evaluate his tenure as Secretary.
I have great respect for him.
As you know, I served alongside him. I have worked with him
on a number of tough issues, and I watched from afar as he was
Secretary. So I have no reason to believe that his role or his
tenure at CENTCOM made his tenure at--or diminished his role as
the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Sullivan. That would not be less a reflection on
what you will be able to accomplish in the Department as well?
People are using that as a warning, so to speak.
Mr. Austin. I think it is--I do not think that that is a
fair assessment, and I would say also, Senator, that we are
completely different people----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Austin.--as you know. You know us both, and again, I
will absolutely do the things that we have talked about in this
hearing, get the right civilians in the right positions to help
me exercise civilian control of the military. I will make sure
that we have the very best experts focused on our toughest
issues, like the China issue, the issue of our acquisition
reform, and those kinds of things.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one final
question. General, I just want you to have the opportunity to
answer two other criticisms. One, that you have not had
experience in the Asia-Pacific and, two, that with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs being an Army general, that somehow your
tenure, with General Milley, would be favoring the Army. Can
you quickly address those two criticisms that have come about
your nomination?
Mr. Austin. Well, I will take the last one first, Senator.
If you look at my history, I spent a lot of time in joint
assignments, both in Iraq and Afghanistan as the director of
the Joint Staff, as commander of Central Command. You know, I
have--I know as many sailors and airmen as I do soldiers, I
mean if you look at the folks that I have worked with over the
past.
So in terms of being able to focus adequately on the issue
of China, the reason that I was focused on the Middle East for
quite some time was because that was the most important thing
for our country. So we put our best equipment towards that
effort, our best people, and it was absolutely necessary at the
time.
But if confirmed, you can expect that I will put a laser-
like focus on developing the right capabilities, plans,
operational concepts that will ensure that we maintain a
competitive edge as we look at ourselves with respect to China.
I think we will present a credible deterrent to China and any
other adversary that looks to take us on.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Your time has
expired.
Via Webex, Senator King is recognized.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Austin, thank you very much for your testimony. As you
can see perhaps, I am on the road. You have taken me today from
just south of the George Washington Bridge to the George
Washington Parkway. So I am almost there.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. First, I want to associate myself with two
particular comments by my colleagues, one on the issue of the
Arctic raised by Senator Sullivan. Incredibly strategic area,
an area of enormous importance and developing importance.
One of the things about the Arctic is we have been able to
work cooperatively with Russia on most Arctic matters, and yet
they are moving very rapidly toward militarization. So I
commend that area to you for attention. The Navy just released
a new Arctic strategy. So a very important issue.
The other issue is procurement that Senator Tillis
mentioned. The whole idea of 10 years for a handgun and a 600-
page spec, we just cannot do that. We need to be more agile,
particularly in this day and age where technology is so
important in terms of our ability to defend the country.
So those two things I do commend to your attention, when
and if you are confirmed.
Now at the beginning of the hearing, there was a lot of
talk about civilian control of the military. One of the
problems is, Mr. Austin, that tomorrow, when David Norquist
assumes the title of Acting Secretary, he will be the 10th
Secretary or Acting Secretary in 10 years. The last Secretary
to serve more than 2 years was Bob Gates, and he left in 2011.
So when you have a Joint Staff that has continuity and a
civilian side that manifestly lacks continuity, I think that is
one of the areas where we can try to move to shore up civilian
control of the military. So I guess my question is, are your
bags unpacked, and are you prepared to move your loyalties from
the Falcons and the Braves to the Nationals and the Washington
Football Team? We want you to stay a while, Mr. Austin, if you
are confirmed.
Mr. Austin. You can absolutely count on me staying a while
if I am confirmed, Senator, and by the way, my wife is a native
of this area, of DC. So it did not--I mean, my bags are already
unpacked. But to the point that you are making, I am absolutely
committed to making sure that we are doing the right things for
the long haul.
Senator King. I appreciate that. To change the subject
somewhat, in 2018 you gave an interview where you discussed the
importance of coalitions as being one of the key elements of
modern conflict. Churchill once said the only thing worse than
fighting with allies is fighting without allies. Can you expand
a bit on your views about coalitions and how and what we need
to do to shore up our relationships with our allies?
Mr. Austin. I truly believe, and I believe this in my
heart, that we perform better when we are operating as a part
of a team. Throughout in all of the operations that I
participated in that are major operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the counter-ISIS campaign and so many other
things, our allies brought valuable capability and capacity to
the fight.
I truly believe that you cannot just show up and fight and
be effective. I think that these relationships have to be
developed. You have to train, work, and live together in a lot
of cases in order to have an effective and credible fighting
force.
So I think that fighting as a part of a team, as part of a
coalition is absolutely a part of who we are, something that we
treasure. If confirmed, I will look forward to re-establishing
some of the critical partnerships and alliances that we have
had and working with our allies to make sure that we keep them
onboard as we move forward fast.
Senator King. Well, I think that is absolutely right. The
way I like to put it briefly is that you have to have the
relationship before the ask.
Mr. Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
Senator King. Now we are turning our attention, and have
been for the last several years, to the Asia-Pacific and
particularly to China. I have asked a question of a number of
people that have appeared before this committee. I would like
your thoughts on what does China want? What do you believe
China's strategic goals are?
Are they looking to be the dominant world power or regional
hegemon, an economic power? What is their--what are their
goals? Because it seems to me in order to determine how we best
counter or cooperate, we need to understand where they are
headed.
Mr. Austin. Yes, I think it is all of that. They are
already a regional hegemon, and I think their goal is to be a
dominant world power. They are working across the spectrum to
compete with us in a number of areas, and it will take a whole-
of-government approach to push back on our efforts in a
credible way.
Not to say that we will not see things down the road that
are in our best interest that we can cooperate with China on,
but we do things that are in our best interest. But certainly,
some of the things that we have seen from them in recent past
in terms of coercive behavior in the region and around the
globe tend to make us believe that they really want to be a
dominant world power.
Senator King. Finally, I do not really have time for a long
answer, but I just want to commend to you with the issue of
cyber, 2 years ago this committee led the creation in the
National Defense Act of something called the Cyber Solarium
Commission, which I was honored to serve upon, along with a
bipartisan group from the Congress and the private sector and
the executive. I would commend to you our report, which was
released last March, talks a lot about the issues we have
talked about today.
As you know and as Senator Rounds mentioned, the area of
cyber is not a potential area of conflict, it is a current area
of conflict. I will be sure that we get a copy of the report to
you, and you can take a look at it. Because part of it is
structure, but also part of it is policy, deterrence,
resilience, and I think that this is something that obviously
we need to attend to.
You have General Nakasone, who is crucial in this effort,
and I look forward to working with you on those issues as well.
Thank you very much, Mr. Austin, and congratulations on
your testimony today.
Mr. Austin. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sullivan [Presiding]. On behalf of the chairman,
Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Thank you, General, for your decades of service and your
willingness to continue in this new way. Congratulations to
both you and your wife and your entire family.
First of all, I want to tell you how pleased I was with the
very specific answer of affirming the chairman's question
related to your support for a nuclear triad that includes the
platforms of land, air, and sea as specified in the chairman's
favorite book, the National Defense Strategy. That was very
helpful to me, and I appreciate that. I appreciated the
conversation we had about it and several other things last week
as well.
With that specific answer to that specific question in
mind, I want to drill down a little bit on just one of those
three legs. As you know, as we talked about, Minot has two of
the two three legs. It is the only place in the country that
has two of the three legs of the triad.
You were asked--of course, you did in the qualified
questions, the previous questions, you were asked about the
assessment of past Secretaries of Defense, and you said this.
You said, ``I agree that nuclear deterrence is the Department's
highest-priority mission and that updating and overhauling our
Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security
priority.'' Today, you specified the words ``triad.''
In your advance policy question response, though, you did
in referencing the aging nuclear deterrent, you chose the words
``overhaul'' and ``updating,'' but you never used the word
``replace.'' I do not know if that was simply an error or
omission or if it was strategic. But you did say, ``U.S.
nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond their original
service lives.''
As Senator Fischer--earlier, she quoted Admiral Richard of
STRATCOM, and I am going to quote him now in a different quote
where he said, ``You cannot life extend Minuteman III. It is
getting past the point where it is not cost effective to life
extend the Minuteman III.''
But you are going to get a lot of pressure from
organizations, good folks, some Members of Congress, maybe some
on an Armed Services Committee either here or on the other side
of the Capitol, to delay the ground-based strategic deterrent,
the replacement of Minuteman III, and maybe even shrink it. Do
you think that we can extend the life of Minuteman III, even
that means unilaterally decreasing our nuclear deterrent?
Mr. Austin. I think I may have indicated to you before that
in order to really answer this question, I really need to sit
down with not only the STRATCOM commander, but also sit down
and take a look at where we are in that modernization effort
and what choices are being proposed and the rationale for that.
I have not had the ability to do that to this point, Senator
Cramer. But when I do, I would love to have that discussion
with you.
Senator Cramer. Well, and I would look forward to that. On
your way to INDOPACOM before you get to Alaska, you could just
stop in Minot. We will have a talk right there if it works. But
anyway--Senator Sullivan thinks the Arctic starts and ends in
Alaska, and I just like to remind him every now and then there
is other lands between here and there.
Anyway, I wanted to ask you about the joint comprehensive
plan of action that the Iran nuclear deal, and there have been
some questions about Iran. But under the 2015 agreement, the
restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment sunset are beginning
in 2025, and that is obviously only 4 years from now. So I want
to know, in your view, are the risks of entering an agreement
under the same conditions that would allow Iran to
significantly increase its uranium enrichment only 4 years from
now--I mean, what would some of the risks of that be, do you
think?
Mr. Austin. I would hope, and I think the President-Elect
has been clear, that the preconditions for us considering to
re-enter into that agreement would be that Iran meet the
conditions outlined in the agreement. So back to--back to where
they should have been.
I would hope that as we enter into that agreement, we could
have this discussion about when things sunset and also take a
look at some broader things that may or may not be a part of
this treaty, but certainly things that I think need to be
addressed. One of those things is ballistic missiles.
Senator Cramer. Very good. Thank you. You anticipated or at
least you answered my next question. I appreciate that.
Another area that you and I discussed quite a bit was ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. Of course,
you would know more than a little bit about that, given your
background particularly at CENTCOM, of course. There has been a
lot of cutting of legacy programs recently to help pay for more
advanced programs and technology in the future, and a lot of
times we are confronted with either/or challenges. But
sometimes, we have to do ``all of the above'' as well.
A lot of these cuts have been, of course, to ISR programs
like the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the MQ-9 Reaper that, again, you
depended on a lot at CENTCOM. Do you think we can strategically
afford to cut back ISR to places like the Middle East, Africa,
South America even, and to some degree, even the Pacific while
we save up money for future missions?
Mr. Austin. Well, I think our--to look at our global force
posture is one of the things I really want to have the
opportunity to do and look at our requirements versus where our
forces are postured. Our focus is going to be, as we talked
earlier, in making sure that we have what we need in the Indo-
Pacific.
But in terms of the sentinel forces that are required by
the CENTCOM commander, I really would like to see what he
thinks his requirements are, what the threats are that he needs
to stay abreast of, and that sort of business. But most likely,
there will be some requirements for those types of capabilities
going forward. The Air Force certainly has a strong voice in
this in terms of what they can afford to keep on in light of
the investments that they are making in modernization.
So, again, pretty complex equation that we will have to
tackle, but certainly, I look forward to taking it on.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Chairman. I am out of time, or I would have
asked you about the $40 billion pass through budget at the Air
Force, but we can talk about that another time.
Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you very much. Thank you.
General Austin, I very much appreciate the opportunity to
speak with you a few weeks ago. As I told you when we talked
then, I believe we have to do a lot more to end the cozy
relationship between the Pentagon and the defense industry, and
over the years, I proposed number of legal changes in this
area.
Now since 2016, you have served on the board of Raytheon
Technologies and its predecessor, United Technologies, which is
one of the largest defense contractors in the Nation. I am very
pleased to hear that you have pledged that you will extend your
recusal from matters involving Raytheon for 4 years and that
you are not going to seek a waiver from those recusals. Do I
have that right?
Mr. Austin. Senator, I can make the commitment to you that
I will extend my recusal for Raytheon. I certainly appreciated
the opportunity to discuss these issues with you.
As you are aware, what you have asked goes beyond what is
required by law, and I am making----
Senator Warren. Absolutely.
Mr. Austin. I am making this commitment because I recognize
the unique circumstances here that you have highlighted, and
Raytheon is one of the----
Senator Warren. I am sorry. Go ahead.
Mr. Austin. Raytheon is one of the world's largest defense
contractors, and I am sensitive to the appearance concerns that
you raise in this particular situation. With respect to the
issue of seeking a waiver, I do not expect to do that or to
need one. But if such an unanticipated circumstance were to
arise, I would consider available alternatives to a waiver
before seeking one and would consult very carefully with agency
ethics officials.
Senator Warren. Okay.
Mr. Austin. If I am privileged enough to be confirmed, I
can pledge to you that I will be mindful not only of the legal
requirements that govern my conduct, but also of the
appearances to ensure that the public has no reason to question
my impartiality. I will consult with the DOD career ethics
officials on these issues and will require everyone that serves
with me to ensure that public service is and will remain a
public trust.
Senator Warren. Well, I very much appreciate that. If I
can, let me just ask one more aspect of this. You know, I have
also called for new laws to prevent contractors from hiring
senior Government officials who leave Federal service for a
period of years. Again, to help eliminate the appearance of
trading on Government service to help improve--the idea is to
try to help improve public trust in our leaders.
So let me ask you about that. After you leave, are you
willing to make any commitments on that?
Mr. Austin. Well, I have--I do not intend to seek
employment as a lobbyist or sit on the board of a defense
contractor like Raytheon after my service. Quite frankly, I
will be too old to sit on a board of a defense contractor after
my service. I have--I have no intent to be a lobbyist as well.
Senator Warren. All right. Well, I just want you to know I
really do appreciate that, General. Going above and beyond what
Federal law requires, as you are doing here, sends a powerful
message that you are working on behalf of the American people
and no one else.
Now I want to try to focus, if I can, on defense spending.
But before I do, I just want to say a very quick word about
military housing.
Two years ago, this committee heard horror stories from
military families about mold, termites, lead paint, other
terrible conditions at military houses managed by private, for-
profit companies. The military has a responsibility to oversee
these contracts, and this committee has some sweeping reforms
increasing oversight powers, but I am still hearing from
families who say that their situation is not substantially
improving.
So, General Austin, can I ask for your public commitment on
two things? First, to respond to my request for information
about what is going on and, second, to pledge that you are
going to make fixing this problem a priority.
Mr. Austin. I absolutely will respond to your request for
information, if confirmed. This has been a priority of mine and
will always be a priority of mine. So I look forward to working
with the services on this issue. I think, as I said earlier, in
some cases, we have broken trust with some of our family
members.
Senator Warren. Yes. So thank you very much. I am going to
hold you to that commitment. I really appreciate it, General.
A few weeks ago, Congress passed the annual defense
authorization appropriations bill that allocated over $740
billion to the Department of Defense. Now that is more than
President Reagan spent during the height of the Cold War. It is
more than the Federal Government spends on the rest of the
discretionary budget combined.
In fact, it is more than the next 10 nations combined spend
on defense, and most of those countries are our allies. The
money that Congress appropriated a few weeks ago also comes on
top of what we spent on two decades of endless wars in the
Middle East that cost roughly $6.4 trillion and killed more
than 7,000 American servicemembers and did very little to make
America safer.
Now, General Austin, you have been nominated to lead the
Defense Department. So I am not expecting you to start out your
job by turning down the money that Congress just gave you, but
I want to ask you a different question. Do you agree that
protecting our Nation is not just about how much money our
Nation spends on defense, but also about how we spend it and
what specific challenges we focus on?
Mr. Austin. I do. My view, as the Secretary of Defense, job
one for me is the defense of this country, and we are going to
do what it takes to make sure that we are successful at that.
As we talked earlier, our strategy--our resources ought to
match our strategy, and our strategy ought to match our policy.
So, again, I think I have a requirement to be a good steward of
our resources, but you can count on me always asking for what
we need to accomplish the strategy that has been laid out for
us.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate the approach that looks
at how we are spending that money and exactly what challenges
we are focusing our money on.
I see that I am out of time. So I am not going to get to
ask you about the importance of investing in our diplomatic
corps and making sure that we have adequate funding for the
State Department in order to help you in the defense of our
Nation. I promise, though, I will send you some questions for
the record about that.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Austin. That is an easy answer for me, Senator. I think
it is absolutely important that the State Department be
resourced adequately.
Senator Warren. Good. That is what I like to hear. Thank
you, General.
Chairman Inhofe [Presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Now via Webex, Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Hi, thanks. Chairman, can you hear me all
right?
Chairman Inhofe. Loud and clear.
Senator Scott. Okay, and thank you, Chairman, for holding
this meeting.
First off, I want to thank General Austin for all of his
hard work. We had the opportunity to work together when he was
at CENTCOM, and I just want to thank the general for his
distinguished service as a soldier and commander and just what
a great job he did in the military. So I am very appreciative.
We had the opportunity to talk the other day, and so if you
could talk a little bit about how if you look at the people in
the military just have not spent a whole bunch of time dealing
with the risk of Communist China and how you will get up to
speed. Because we actually do not have the same experience in
dealing with Communist China as we do with people in the--
dealing with the Middle East.
So, General Austin, can you talk a little bit about how you
will get up to speed and how important you think it is to get
up to speed on the risk of Communist China?
Mr. Austin. Well, I think it is absolutely important. As I
outlined in my opening statement, Senator Scott, I think China
is our most challenging--our most significant challenge going
forward. So you can expect that I will continue to focus the
resources of the Department on this issue to make sure that we
are prepared to meet any challenge and that we continue to
present a credible deterrent to China or any other aggressor
who would want to take us on and convince them that that would
be a really bad idea.
The issue of China, though, is very complex, and I fully
recognize that while I have the military component of this
problem set, it is a whole-of-government approach because China
looks to compete with us along a spectrum of activities, you
know, economic and IT and cyber and space and other domains. So
we will have the right experts. We will have the right
capabilities and plans and operational concepts that are
required to make sure that we are effective in our efforts to
deter China and any other aggressor.
Senator Scott. Thank you, General Austin.
So you, in your military career, you did a great job of
building teams. From the people I have heard, including Senator
Sullivan, you built a great team to get the results you wanted.
In this job, in this role, you have to do the exact same thing.
So how are you going to be able to vet the people that will be
working with you to make sure that they share your view on the
importance of holding Communist China accountable and actually
make sure we are a great deterrent to their ambition to
dominate at a minimum the Indo-Pacific region?
Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, I will issue the--I will make
sure that I issue the appropriate guidance to focus the
Department's efforts on this issue. We will make sure that the
right processes and procedures are in place to review our
efforts and to coordinate our efforts to make sure that we are
operating as a joint force.
You mentioned teams, and part of the team effort here is
obviously and certainly with our allies. I think it is really
important to make sure that we continue to reach out to our
allies, we build the capacity necessary to be effective against
China. Those allies include--certainly include the people in
the region, but they also include allies around the rest of the
globe.
So I will issue the right guidance. We will have the right
policies in place and the right mechanisms to make sure that we
are operating as a joint force and that we are focused
appropriately and acquiring the right technologies to make sure
that we are relevant going forward.
Senator Scott. Do you believe that with the Biden
administration, you will have the opportunity to have influence
on the people that will be part of your team internally to make
sure that they share your view on the importance of holding
Communist China accountable?
Mr. Austin. I absolutely believe that, Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Okay, and one thing that Senator Sullivan
brought up to me when I spoke to him yesterday about you was
the fact that with your military background, you will be one of
the few individuals in the Biden administration that will have
the military background. Do you believe you will have the
ability to influence their--influence and convince them of the
importance of having a strong military to be able to be a great
deterrent and a great promoter of world peace?
Mr. Austin. I do, Senator Scott. I also believe that I have
a great relationship with the President-Elect, and I certainly
would like to be able to express my views to him as frequently
as necessary.
Senator Scott. One of the issues we are dealing with is
ambiguity with regard to Taiwan. I think a lot of us believe
that Taiwan is worth making sure that we can continue--help
them continue as a democracy and as an entity independent of
Communist China. Well, how--I personally believe we have got to
quit being ambiguous, and we have got let Communist China know
the importance of Taiwan to us, and how would you do that to
make sure that we are not sitting here down the road having to
make a decision that Communist China has decided to invade
Taiwan?
Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, our efforts will be to ensure
that we do everything to make sure that China does not take
that decision. But our support to Taiwan has been rock solid
over the years, and it has been bipartisan support, and I would
certainly want to thank this committee for their support and
their willingness to work together on this issue.
We have been strong in our commitments, and certainly, if I
am confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will make sure that we
are living up to our commitments to support Taiwan's ability to
defend itself.
Senator Scott. Thank you, General Austin.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General. Appreciate very much your service and
your family's dedication and commitment to our country.
Sir, the 7-year cooling-off period, you have 5 years you
have been in the private sector. What do you think could be
accomplished in 2 more years? What are we missing there? I
mean, I think that you segued pretty well into the private
sector and understand the balance there.
Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, I will be 2 years older, but
certainly, I do not think I will be--I will have any more
commitment----
Senator Manchin. And change.
Mr. Austin.--to serving as a civilian than I have now.
Senator Manchin. Just from history, people know that it
used to be 10 years. Then we changed it to 7 years. We should
be looking at the quality of the person at the time we need
them.
Mr. Austin. Senator Manchin, I absolutely agree. It is
about what is in the mind and the heart of the person that is
being asked to serve, and I certainly agree with you on that.
Senator Manchin. The strength of our military and the
admiration the whole world has for it is because of the
separation and led by the private sector, and have the
knowledge you have and being able to come from the private
sector now, I think it is going to be a great asset.
There are other people in that cooling-off period down the
chain. Do you see any need to have any waivers for those?
Because I think it is a much smaller waiver. Most of it is 180
days. People do not understand that either. It is a very short
period of time, but yet the person that we need to lead it.
Mr. Austin. We have not yet completely fleshed out who
would be serving in key positions. But if there is talent there
that is a China expert or something else that we really need, I
think it is important to--to kind of weigh that out----
Senator Manchin. To have the flexibility.
Mr. Austin.--and make sure that we are focused on the right
thing.
Senator Manchin. Well, I know you will get the right
people. A couple things. The people have been asking me ever
since I just came in today about tomorrow's security. Right
now, there has been 12 Guardsmen that have been relieved from
the detail, and you talked about an experience you had in your
earlier life in the military.
What do you see? I mean, it is a concern that I have now
more so than ever before, and more people, we never realized
it. But now we are seeing that all the conspiracy theories and
all the different people are on the dark web, or wherever they
are, are being recruited that have military experience. What
can we do, and how should we approach this?
Mr. Austin. Well, I think we can do a better job of
screening our--you know, the folks that we bring in, the people
that we bring in. I also think we need to do a better job of
once we have people onboard, that we are paying attention to
them, that we are creating the right kind of environment for
them to live in, and that they are embracing the values that we
think are important in the military and the values that are
important for this country.
I think this is a thing that we have to work at day in and
day out.
Senator Manchin. Knowing the presence of what we have and
what we are dealing with and what happened last week, how do
you feel about the security we have for tomorrow?
Mr. Austin. I do not know the specifics or the moving
parts. The Secret Service is, I think, in charge of the overall
effort. I think I have every reason to believe that they will
do a very credible job and provide for our security.
I have confidence in our Guard. Again, the fact that we are
screening people and making sure that we do not have the wrong
kinds of people in the formation I think is a credit to their
efforts.
Senator Manchin. Well, you know that all the reports, and
we do not have all the evidence yet and all of the--but we will
have that probably during this new trial we have coming up that
the ball was dropped at the Department of Defense, that we did
not get the support we needed or the help we needed or the
protection we needed quick enough.
Mr. Austin. I think that is still under review, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Yes, yes.
Mr. Austin. And you know----
Senator Manchin. I am not accusing until we see the facts--
--
Mr. Austin. Yes.
Senator Manchin.--but that has been the reports coming out.
So I know that you have a lot of work ahead of you trying to
build up that confidence level and the morale.
Mr. Austin. Right.
Senator Manchin. If I can ask you the greatest threat that
we face as a country, if you were going to name one of the
greatest threats or the greatest challenge you think you are
going to have coming into this position, what would it be?
Mr. Austin. I think there are a number of challenges----
Senator Manchin. I know.
Mr. Austin.--as we discussed before, and quite frankly, the
greatest challenge to our country right now, Senator Manchin,
is the pandemic. It has killed over 400,000 of our America
citizens, and that is just an incredible, incredible loss of
life. I think we have to do everything that we can to break the
cycle of transmission and to begin to turn this thing around. I
know that the President-Elect is very, very much focused on
this.
I think DOD can add value to this effort and speed and
scale, and I would certainly hope--again, if I am confirmed,
one of the first things I will do is take a look at how we are
contributing, and if there is more that we can do--and I
believe that there probably will be--that we will lean into
this and help this effort along.
You know, in terms of other challenges, we have talked
about China, we have talked about Russia, we have talked
about----
Senator Manchin. The pandemic is number one, though, you
think from your standpoint?
Mr. Austin. China is the most concerning competitor that we
are facing.
Senator Manchin. Let me ask you this about finances. John
McCain, the late John McCain, my dear friend, and we all knew
John pretty well. If you worked with John, you knew John pretty
well. He made sure of that.
But John and I had a bill that we always worked on,
auditing the Pentagon, auditing the Department of Defense. It
was the only agency in all of Government that was never
audited. But they have been doing a good job, but they are
still a little bit relaxed there. I just would like for your
commitment on that to do everything you can to make sure that
the finances that people know how we are investing their money
and what type of return we are getting on that.
Mr. Austin. You have my commitment, Senator.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say this, sir. I truly believe
with all my heart you are the right person at the right time to
do this job because it is a tremendous undertaking. I think to
restore the confidence back to the American people that our
Defense Department basically is there to defend us and it is
basically run by the civilians, who basically who are not going
to let military be used against us at any time. What we saw
last Wednesday was an anomaly that will never happen again.
Thank you, sir. I look forward to voting for you.
Mr. Austin. I look forward to working with you, Senator, if
I am confirmed. Thank you.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Now via Webex, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
this and the opportunity to talk with General Austin.
I will say, General, I enjoyed our conversation yesterday
so much. Thank you very much for your time, and thank you to
your family for sticking with you as you go through this
process.
I will say, and we discussed this, I am one of those who is
not in favor of waivers. I believe that rules are--and
processes are put in place over time because of specific
reasons. With that said, however, you and I do have mutual
friends, and they have all spoken to your strength of
character, the way that you fulfill your role, the work that
you did with the military, and the leadership that you bring to
different situations. I thank you for that.
I do want to go back to the topic we discussed, the issue
of China. We talked about a quote that is attributed to you
about strategic patience, and you had applied that to China.
You thought it was an attribution or mentioned it was an
attribution in the article, but I went back and looked at this,
and it was a quote from an interview and, thus, later picked up
by Asia Today or Asia Times and other foreign policy articles
and, as you have heard from other members on the Committee,
China.
I think you also believe China and great power competition
is our greatest threat. Whether we are looking at what is
happening on the economic side, and I appreciate you mentioned
that earlier, because we discussed we do not know exactly where
MOFCOM [Ministry of Commerce] ends or where their economic
sector ends and their military sector begins.
So what I would like for you to do is spend a minute and
talk about why you cannot use strategic patience with China and
why it is an imperative that we address the economic and the
military side of that China problem coin, if you will, and how
your budget priorities are going to reflect the desire to deal
with China, to work with Taiwan, to work with Hong Kong? So if
you would take a minute and just address that for us.
Mr. Austin. I think over the last two decades, Senator, as
we have been focused on--necessarily focused on issues in the
Middle East, we have seen China modernize its military. We have
seen its--we have seen it employ aggressive, in some cases
coercive behavior against our allies in the region. We have
seen it do a number of things that tend to make us believe that
China really wants to be the preeminent power in the world in
the not-too-distant future.
I think, again, China looks to compete with us against--
looks to compete with us in a number of areas across a spectrum
that includes, as you pointed out, economics, cyber,
competition in the domain of space. So China, because of its
desires, because of its worldview, is clearly a competitor that
we have to make sure that we begin to check their aggression.
It will require a whole-of-government effort to do that.
The Department of Defense's piece in this is to make sure that
we are presenting a credible deterrent to China so that it will
think twice before it decides to take on the United States of
America, China or any other aggressor.
That requires investment in a number of areas. We have
talked about this a bit before.
Senator Blackburn. Yes.
Mr. Austin. In modernization, things like AI and space-
based platforms and directed energy and just a number of
things. If we are called upon to conduct operations against a
near peer such as China or Russia, it is a different type of
engagement, and we need different capabilities. We need the
operational concepts that can employ those capabilities. Again,
as I said earlier, we will be required to understand what is
going on on the battlefield much better, much faster, be able
to decide very--a lot quicker, and then be able to act a lot
quicker.
Senator Blackburn. Well, I appreciate that, and I think it
is important for the record to reflect that you do not view
dealing with China as a strategic patience. It is a different
approach than we have had with ISIS.
Let me move on. We also talked a little bit about workforce
and utilization of the Guard. As we look at some of the skill
sets that are necessary moving into 5G deployment, a
utilization of artificial intelligence, building out ISR, and
some of those areas. So for the record, make a comment about
Guard recruitment, retention, and how you would interface the
Guard with the Active Duty men and women.
Mr. Austin. Well, we certainly have great talent in our
Guardsmen and that we have seen that on display throughout
these years of conflict that we have been in. Our Guard has
performed very, very well.
Many of our Guardsmen have skills that you do not typically
find in a normal unit or a normal organization, and so I think
in a lot of cases, we can do a better job of leveraging those
skills, those unique skill sets to help our efforts in things
like IT and other things.
Senator Blackburn. Well, thank you for that. We appreciate
your service. We appreciate your time today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Now via Webex, Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Austin, I want to say thank you. Thank you for your
service over many, many years to this country, and thank you
for your willingness to take on this job. Clearly, we are in an
incredibly difficult time in our history, and we are facing
significant challenges, and your willingness to serve your
country once again is commendable. So, thank you.
I want to pick up briefly on some comments made by my
colleague Senator Heinrich, and I think although you answered
his question, I think it is important for you to know that
there are many of us on this committee that are very concerned
about PFAS contamination in military sites across the country.
Clearly, this is a bigger problem than just military sites. We
have got PFAS sites throughout the country.
Michigan has been particularly hard hit with sites
containing this very toxic chemical. In fact, I think of the
700 sites identified around the country, roughly 200 of them
are in Michigan, although we think the reason that number is so
high is just because we have been looking for it more than
other States. It is likely to continue.
But we do have military sites that have been impacted, and
one in particular in Michigan, which is the former Wurtsmith
Air Force Base in Oscoda. The folks in Oscoda and that area
have been dealing with this contamination for many years. They
are, and rightly so, incredibly frustrated by the slowness from
the Air Force and others to deal with it.
We have started to see some pick-up in activity in clean-
up, but they have waited too long. I know you made a commitment
to Senator Heinrich to expedite this, but I want you to know
that this is a major issue for me, for folks in Michigan, folks
around Wurtsmith Air Force Base, as well as other military
sites across the country. I am sure many of my other colleagues
would join in.
I hope that you are, indeed, committed to making sure we do
right by these communities that have hosted these bases for
years and are now suffering the consequences. So I do not know
if you want to add anything to what your response was to
Senator Heinrich, but please know this is a serious issue for
us across the country.
Mr. Austin. No, I am committed, Senator. I think, as I said
earlier, that the health and welfare of our military members,
our families, our DOD civilians, and our communities is very,
very important. Again, Secretary Esper stood up a PFAS task
force. I will check in with them and make sure that I expedite
their work if at all possible.
Certainly, I look forward to working with my EPA
counterpart on this issue. I think it is very, very important
to mitigate the effects of these contaminates as soon as we
can. You can look for us to stay committed to that.
Senator Peters. I appreciate that, General. Thank you so
much.
You mentioned it in a number of questions about the
changing nature of warfare, and we are on the cusp of major
changes as a result of technology. You alluded to some in the
last answer, whether it is AI, automation, directed weapons. We
just know that we are in a technological revolution that will
change the way we live dramatically. When that happens, that
also changes the face of warfare in dramatic ways.
It is not just the complexity of our tools, but as you
mentioned, it is the strategic and operational environment as
well. So it is going to require some really--some creative
thinking outside of normal policies in how we prepare for this
change. I think a lot of that requires changing some of the
culture, particularly when you have a large bureaucratic
organization like the Department of Defense. That is no
different than any other large bureaucratic organization. It is
sometimes difficult to get out of the established mindsets and
understand that things are changing rapidly.
So guidance from the top is incredibly important. That
means in my mind--and love to have your thoughts. That means
placing a premium on digital skills by expanding eligibility
for billets in the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, for
example, Defense Innovation Unit and their service-level
equivalents both inside as well as outside the Department.
So, General, if you can give me a sense of how do you
assess the ability, for example, of defense innovation offices
to develop systems that are going to be able to enhance both
our performance and our effectiveness. As you are thinking of
this and answering this question, try to mention in particular
how this will be helpful as we start operating perhaps more
below the threshold of armed conflict, which may likely be an
emerging pattern that we have to deal with more often than we
would like.
Mr. Austin. Yes. So I think it is really important that we
have the ability to develop the kinds of capabilities that you
just described, Senator. You asked specifically about the
people that we have that are dedicated to and working on these
issues and whether or not it is we are managing them the right
way. Something that I will have to look at.
I will have to go in and talk to the leadership about what
their needs are and how we can improve our efforts right now. I
look forward to that conversation, but I would not want to
speculate on that issue right now.
But I really believe that what you just said is absolutely
important. We have got to be able to develop the ability to
move things with the appropriate speed and focus that will
enable us to be relevant going forward.
Senator Peters. I think part of that speed--and there have
been several questions related to the procurement process--is a
lot of this innovation in the past would take place within the
Department of Defense. Now we are seeing a lot of this
innovation in commercial markets, in the commercial sector. But
as you integrate that and having an era of centers or
innovation centers that work with those commercial centers, I
think they are incredibly important.
I am happy to say in Michigan, we have our Ground Vehicle
Systems Center that takes advantage of the auto industry and
some of the developments we are seeing in automation. Would you
commit to continuing to invest in those kinds of programs that
work in partnership with advanced innovation in the commercial
sector?
Mr. Austin. I think automation is really important to us.
You have heard a number of leaders talk about that, and I think
we are going to--that will be an area of focus for us going
forward.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate it, General. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Via Webex, Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for being here, and congratulations on
your nomination. It is always nice to see a graduate of Webster
University in St. Louis before the committee. So
congratulations on that as well.
Let me come back to something you said at the very
beginning of your testimony, during your statement at the
beginning. You said that China is a pacing threat, ``a pacing
threat.'' I just want to be clear. Are there other pacing
threats, and what would they be?
Mr. Austin. China is the most significant competitor that
we are focused on. It is the pacing threat.
Senator Hawley. Thank you for that. That is a helpful
clarification.
On that same point, you are going to have the opportunity
here to oversee the next National Defense Strategy. You have
said, and other committee members have quoted this today, you
have talked about the competition, strategic competition with
China and Russia. You have also said today, though, several
times, including to me just now that you think that China is
``the pacing threat'' or China is the top priority. So can you
commit to us that as you oversee the next NDS that China will
be unequivocally identified as the top challenge, threat,
competitor of the United States?
Mr. Austin. Yes. Clearly, the strategy will be arrayed
against the threat, and China is--presents the most significant
threat going forward because China is ascending. Russia is also
a threat, but it is in decline. It can still do a great deal of
damage, as we have seen here in recent days, in an area--and it
is a country that we have to remain--maintain some degree of
focus on. But China is the pacing threat.
Senator Hawley. Very good, and you would expect--just to
press my point here, but you would expect to see that
identified--China, that is, identified as the pacing threat in
the next National Defense Strategy? In other words, you do not
see any reason why that would not be the case? Is that correct?
Mr. Austin. That follows. That makes sense, Senator Hawley,
I think. But again, I certainly do not want to try to write the
strategy here. We want to make sure we go through the process
of arraying the threats and identifying what capabilities we
are going to place against them. But it certainly follows it is
the pacing issue, the pacing threat currently, and I fully
expect that it will remain so going forward.
Senator Hawley. Good. Well, I am pressing you on it only
because I think there has been some confusion with the last
National Defense Strategy, the way it has been interpreted in
some quarters to put China and Russia on a plane. What you just
said just a second ago I think is very encouraging, that China
is the pacing threat.
Russia, of course, is a threat. There is no doubt about
that. But to your words, it is in decline, and of course, we
have limited resources and capacities, and we are going to have
to make sure that those limited resources and capacities are
deployed corresponding to the relevant threat. So I am
encouraged by what you said. I am going to hold you to that.
Let me shift to Taiwan, which is obviously closely related.
I would like to follow up on something Senator Scott asked you
about.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has
committed to maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security of the people of Taiwan. Given our obligations under
that statute, General, do you agree that DOD should maintain
the ability to deter a Chinese fait accompli when it comes to
Taiwan?
Mr. Austin. Senator, you came in broken on that last piece
there. If I could ask you to repeat the end of that, please?
Senator Hawley. Yes. When it comes to Taiwan, General, do
you agree that the Department of Defense should clearly
prioritize defeating a fait accompli scenario in Taiwan on the
part of China, the attempt to invade, their pressure that would
put us in a fait accompli scenario. Should that be our top
priority?
Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, I do not want to go down the
road of getting into hypotheticals about what we would do if
certain things happened. I would just say that my job as the
Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, is to present credible
options to the President to ensure that we can protect our
interests and defend ourselves.
You know, one of our interests is to make sure that
Taiwan--and a commitment is to make sure that Taiwan has the
ability to defend itself. We will stay committed to that going
forward.
Senator Hawley. Yes, and I certainly appreciate the fact
that you cannot anticipate all threats going forward. However,
we do have to plan. To go back to points you have made about
husbanding our scarce resources, making sure that we are using
them well, we have got to identify the scenarios that we are
prioritizing to plan for.
I just want to say, ask you one more time, with regard to
the fait accompli scenario in Taiwan, which is identified, of
course, in the current--the 2018 National Defense Strategy, is
that a scenario you think we ought to prioritize in our
planning purposes in order to deter China?
Mr. Austin. Again, we are committed, we have been committed
to the support of Taiwan throughout. Again, it has been
bipartisan support. We will remain committed to supporting
Taiwan, and so we will have the right options available to
protect our interest and to defend ourselves.
Senator Hawley. Let me shift to Afghanistan here briefly,
General, in the time I have got remaining. If the Taliban
violates its part of the peace agreement, there is going to be
significant pressure on the President-Elect to send thousands
of troops back into Afghanistan and perpetuate the cycle that
we have seen there.
How do you think we should respond if the Taliban violates
our peace agreement so that we can achieve our counterterrorism
objectives without increasing the number of troops that we have
there in the region?
Mr. Austin. Senator, you know that we are currently
operating as a part of a coalition effort there in Afghanistan.
What I have heard General Milley and General Miller say
publicly is that they believe they have adequate resources to
accomplish the objectives that they are assigned currently.
If I am confirmed, as I go in, I would like to be able to
assess the situation myself and then make my recommendations to
the President in terms of what is required and what is not
required.
Senator Hawley. I see my time has expired. Thank you again,
General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Finally, we now have, via Webex, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I spoke in this committee last week about my concerns with
making exceptions to allow any person to serve as Secretary of
Defense less than 7 years after leaving regular military
service. Mr. Austin, you and I spoke about this issue on our
recent call as well. I want to reiterate that my concerns are
the same now as they were when we considered Secretary Mattis'
nomination 4 years ago.
My vote against a waiver that would allow you to serve as
Secretary of Defense has everything to do with restoring the
bedrock principle of civilian control of the military and
nothing to do with you, your qualifications, or your character.
Last week, I pledged to my colleagues that if they choose to
pass an exception to the statute, I will consider your
nomination fairly and on its merits. Mr. Austin, I make that
same promise to you today.
Based on our call last week, in fact, I feel we are aligned
in our thoughts on a number of the most urgent national
security issues facing our country. I am pleased to get the
chance now to follow up on a few of those challenges that I
believe the DOD is facing that concerns me the most.
First, I have raised alarms before about President Trump's
total disregard for good order and discipline. Over the last 4
years, he has valorized ruthless killing and pardoned war
criminals like convicted former SEAL Eddie Gallagher. He
directly undermined leaders like former Naval Special Warfare
Commander Admiral Green, who attempted to hold servicemembers
accountable when they violated their oaths and failed to uphold
good order and discipline.
Then some communities, like the SEAL community, were
already struggling with servicemembers drifting from their core
values likely due to the stress of 19 years of war and
deployments. President Trump's rhetoric has damaged attempts to
restore discipline in our Department of Defense. Now in the
fallout of violent insurrection at the Capitol on January 6th,
we are starting to learn the depth of the problem in our
military services.
Veterans, Active Duty troops, members of the National Guard
have already been found to have participated in an actual
attack on elected leaders and our constitutional process in
direct violation of their oaths of office. We have seen
significant reporting on the ways that extremist groups
specifically target military members and veterans, and it is
likely that we will discover more in the coming weeks.
Mr. Austin, it is clear that we are at a crisis point. We
need strong leadership to root out extremists in the military
and reaffirm the core values that have defined military
service. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assert your
leadership, set the example for the service chiefs, and
reinstate good order and discipline?
Mr. Austin. Well, the activity that we have seen recently
in terms of potential racist or extremist behavior within our
ranks is, in my view, absolutely unacceptable. I think you have
heard the chiefs, service chiefs and the Chairman recently
speak to that as well.
I will work with the leaders of the various departments to
make sure that it is absolutely clear to everyone in the
Department, military or civilian, that this is behavior that
does not--does not fit our values, does not comport with our
values. So I will want the leaders of all of the services and
all the Departments to make sure that they are doing the right
things to set the right example and to create the right climate
that discourages and eliminates that type of behavior.
This is not something that we can be passive on. This is
something I think we have to be active on, and we have to lean
into it and make sure that we are doing the right things to
create the right climates.
Senator Duckworth. There needs to be consequences for bad
actors as well?
Mr. Austin. Certainly, if someone is accused and an
investigation determines that that person is guilty of that
type of behavior, then we will take the appropriate actions.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Mr. Austin, you oversaw one of our military's largest and
most complex logistics operations in Iraq. So you understand
better than most, almost anyone else going forward we cannot
rely on the same logistics system and practices that we used in
Iraq and Afghanistan as we look to future potential areas of
conflict.
Great power competition demands that we innovate our
approach to logistics, and so it is critical that we invest in
United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and ensure that
logistics-related planning factors are central to our op plans
and our major exercises. If confirmed, what initiatives will
you prioritize to ensure that confrontation command and the
rest of the DOD's logistics enterprise is modernized and
resourced to support global operations and to withstand threats
from peer competitors, especially when we are talking about in
contested environments?
Mr. Austin. I think, Senator, you are absolutely correct.
Our logistics capabilities really enable us to do the great
work that we have done around the globe. I think we have to
continue to invest in the right things. I look forward to
having a conversation with our senior logistics leaders in all
of the branches and also in the Department as well.
I want to invest in those types of things that can provide
us innovative approaches to delivering the types of logistics
that we will need to sustain ourselves. I agree with you that
we will not be able to do business as we have always done it
going forward, as we are looking to compete with a near-peer
competitor.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
The DOD is also well positioned to lead the way on
developing the kind of clean energy technology that can
accelerate our fight against climate change, one of the biggest
national security threats of our time, and reduce the
military's reliance on fossil fuel, which would shorten that
logistics tail. If confirmed, how would you lead DOD to reduce
its emissions and develop the sort of breakthrough energy
technology that can make forward-deployed troops less reliant
on fuel delivery and other energy-related sustainment?
Mr. Austin. Well, I think while we are no doubt doing some
things on all of our installations now to reduce our energy
consumption and reduce our carbon footprint, I think there is
more that we can do. You know, we consume a lot of energy, and
so I think that we can have a substantial impact if we are
focused on the right things.
You know, this affects us in a lot of ways. I think that if
we look at utilization on installations in other capacity,
utilization of electrical vehicles and reducing the amount of
energy that we are consuming and just a number of other things,
we can make a pretty substantial impact on our overall effort
here. I look forward to working with the Administration and my
colleagues and working with the Department to really improve
our performance thus far.
I will appoint a specific person on my staff to help me
focus on this issue and to coordinate issues within the
Department and within the services as well.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you very much. I am over time, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. All right. I have been told that this
completes our members that were wanting to participate, and we
want to thank you very much, General Austin, for the time you
have given us, and we look forward to working with you.
Senator Reed, did you want to make any further comments?
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, no. I just want to thank you
for conducting this hearing and thank General Austin for
participating, and good luck, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
When we meet again 2 days from now, I think you will be the
chairman, and I will be the ranking member. That transition
will take place very peaceably----
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe.--and I want to tell you how we have
enjoyed working together for a number of years, and we will
continue to do that.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, it has been an honor and a
great pleasure working with you, and I think, with your
leadership, we have accomplished a great deal, and I thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Austin, did you have any other--any questions that
were not asked that you would like to volunteer answers to now?
I think the answer is no.
Mr. Austin. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
thank you and the committee members for allowing me the time
this afternoon to engage with you, and I want to thank you all
also for the tremendous support that you have given to our
military over the years. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with you and doing the same kinds of things that you
have done in the past.
Again, thanks.
Chairman Inhofe. That is good. Thank you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:37 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III by
Chairman Inhofe prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 113 of Title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
Secretary of Defense as the head of the Department of Defense (DOD) and
principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
Department.
What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
qualify you to serve as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. I believe my past experience has provided me the necessary
leadership skills, geo-political acumen and deep understanding of joint
and combined operations to serve this country as Secretary of Defense.
I know how to work collaboratively with interagency partners, and I
know how to lead, plan and operate with allies and partner nations.
Having been to war, I also know well the life and death decisions
any Secretary of Defense has to make. I am prepared to make those
decisions, informed by my own experience. Finally, I believe the
experiences gained in the five years since I retired--with nonprofit
organizations, academia, and private sector businesses--have broadened
my skills and my views.
I have worked extensively with our partners in other agencies
(State, CIA etc.). Also, I have a wealth of experience in working with
our allies and building teams.
Question. Dr. Eliot Cohen, Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies, has written that, `` . . . the
Secretary of Defense represents the Armed Forces to society at large,
and far more important, represents society to the Armed Forces.
Selecting a civilian ensures that civilian perspectives dominate, as
they should.''
Given your significant and recent military experience, if confirmed
as Secretary of Defense, how would you approach your leadership of DOD
to ensure that ``civilian perspectives dominate''?
Answer. I have served in multiple senior military positions,
working closely with civilian superiors and colleagues, and have
appreciated both their perspectives on the difficult challenges
confronting our Nation and the importance of their authority over our
military. If confirmed, I will ensure that the authority and
responsibilities of DOD's senior civilian leadership are clearly
understood throughout the Department of Defense, and I will ensure that
I receive advice and counsel from a diverse team, military and
civilian, with perspectives and experiences from across the spectrum.
Further, if confirmed I will actively ensure in my leadership, words
and actions that civilian leadership of the Department is understood
and is preeminent.
Question. What skills and attributes would you bring to the table
in executing your duties to ``represent the Armed Forces to society at
large, and . . . represent[ ] society to the Armed Forces''?
Answer. I understand that, if confirmed, one of my responsibilities
will be to represent the men and women of the Department of Defense to
the American people and will do that with transparency, integrity and
honesty. Though it is clear the American people support their military,
it is not clear to me that they fully understand the scope of the
sacrifices that military personnel and their families make each day.
My time in uniform, and frankly my time thus far as a civilian,
provide me a unique opportunity to help close this gap in
understanding. I'm certainly aware of the historic nature of my
nomination, and I believe that, too, will help raise awareness of the
diversity in our ranks and the need to keep fielding a military that
itself represents the breadth of American society.
I obviously have extensive knowledge of how the military operates
and what the challenges are. My depth of understanding of the
challenges facing our military members and their families not only
helps me to better address their needs, but it helps me to accurately
tell their stories to the public.
Question. If confirmed, and given your observations and experience,
what innovative ideas would you consider implementing with regard to
the structure and operations of the DOD?
Answer. In my experience, building and leading high performing
teams requires excellent communication, unity of purpose, selfless
service and agility. If confirmed, I will use the first weeks of my
tenure to emphasize these characteristics, and I will look for
opportunities to improve the structure or operations to ensure we are
as effective and efficient as possible.
I believe we need to re-invigorate our alliance participation and
support; that we need to reconsider our investments in technology,
research and development, and that we need to continue to look for ways
to improve the integration of joint capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions would you assign
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense?
Answer. If I am confirmed, the Deputy Secretary of Defense would be
a `full partner' with me in decision-making, setting policy, and
running the Department. If confirmed, I would expect the Deputy to be--
more often than not--the last person in the room with me before I make
an important decision. The traditional focus of the Deputy Secretary is
similar to that of a Chief Operating Officer in managing the day-to-day
business and functions of a large, complicated organization. If
confirmed, I intend to continue this model. This would include, most
notably, driving the programming and budgeting cycle to modernize the
force and reform the Department.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as Secretary of Defense and what
are your plans to address each challenge?
Answer. The most urgent challenge we face is the pandemic. If
confirmed, I will immediately review DOD's support to the broader U.S.
Government effort and increase the speed and scale of our support,
while maintaining military readiness. Globally, I believe the most
significant challenge I will face will be to ensure the Department of
Defense's continued efforts to prepare and strengthen the U.S. military
for a dynamic, future security landscape driven by accelerating
competitions with China and with Russia--with China as our pacing
threat in most areas-- while still ensuring our ability to deter
today's range of threats. DOD, in concert with our interagency and
international partners and allies, will play a crucial role in
deterring Chinese and Russian aggression, while still contending with
threats emanating from Iran and North Korea and countering terrorism.
We must also address risks to the U.S. Homeland, including demands for
defense support to civil authorities.
If confirmed, I pledge to be transparent with the American people
and this Congress about what is necessary to advance the security of
the United States.
civilian control of the military
Question. Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code, provides
that ``[a] person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within
seven years after relief from Active Duty as a commissioned officer of
a regular component of an Armed Force.''
Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate for
Congress to provide an exception to this law?
Answer. I understand and respect the intent of the law. The safety
and security of our democracy demands civilian control of our Armed
Forces, the subordination of military power to the civil. Congress must
determine whether an exception is appropriate. I have served the United
States for over 40 years in uniform, and I respect and appreciate the
fundamental importance of civilian control over the military. I know
first-hand what is expected from our senior military leaders in their
interactions with, and support of, the Department's civilian
leadership. Moreover, through my experiences both in and out of
uniform, I know what is required of the civilians tasked with leading
our military services.
Question. What are your personal views on the principle of civilian
control of the military?
Answer. I believe civilian control of the military is fundamental
to our democracy. I spent 41 years as a military officer swearing an
oath to the Constitution and to the concept of civilian control. I
understand the different roles and responsibilities between military
officers and civilian leadership. If confirmed, I will carry out my
duties as the civilian Secretary.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as Secretary of Defense epitomizes the fundamental
requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the
U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. Since the beginning of my journey in the military as a
cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point almost 50
years ago, to my later service as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army,, and Joint commands in the United States and across the globe, I
have understood the foundational importance of civilian control of the
military; it is one of the things that makes ours the greatest military
in history and is a key guarantor of the freedoms and democracy we
cherish and have sworn to defend. The authorities of the President and,
through the President, the Secretary of Defense are clear in the U.S.
Constitution and laws of our Nation, and in the minds of all who serve,
civilian and military, in the defense of our Nation. I have come to
learn that large organizations will reflect the principles and values
of their senior leaders. The chain of command is clear, and if
confirmed I will actively ensure in my leadership, words, and actions
that civilian control and authority over the Department are understood
and followed.
Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission report
observed, ``there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on
critical issues of strategy development and implementation. Civilian
voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense
and national security policy.''
Do you agree with this assessment? If so, specifically what would
you do to address this issue, if confirmed?
Answer. I believe in the bedrock American principle of civilian
control of the military. Devising the right strategy for our nation's
defense is the very cornerstone of civilian control of the military,
and if confirmed, overseeing development of the next iteration of the
National Defense Strategy and its implementation will be among my very
top priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD's civilian leadership
shepherds this fundamental task, and continues to exercise its
necessary authorities and responsibilities for shaping and overseeing
U.S. defense policy and strategy, while working closely with the
Departments' military leadership, as well as with Congress.
Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission report also
states, `` . . . allocating priority--and allocating forces--across
theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an
inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the
proper competency and responsibility of America's civilian leaders.''
If confirmed, specifically how would you exercise your
responsibilities in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on empowered civilian leaders
across the Office of the Secretary of Defense to advise me on the full
range of strategic and policy considerations related to global force
management. This includes developing our strategic priorities, aligning
resources with these priorities, adjudicating resource tradeoffs
between different Combatant Commands, and when appropriate,
coordinating with the U.S. Department of State and the National
Security Council. This civilian expertise will be critical to informing
my decision making on how best to allocate and assign forces in support
of our national interests.
Question. What civilian officials and organizations, in your
opinion, should participate in decisions regarding allocating priority
and forces across operational theaters? If confirmed, how would you
ensure the participation of these officials and organizations in such
decisions?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--and the team of
civilian appointees and civil servants that support this position--play
a central role in reviewing DOD posture and global force management
decisions to ensure alignment with strategic priorities, policies for
bilateral relationships, and congressional and public affairs
considerations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security also play important roles in reviewing global force management
decisions.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy is fully empowered to coordinate within DOD and helps lead the
implementation of our strategic priorities. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy--or the appropriate official within the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--will review every global
force management issue prior to recommendations coming to me for
decisions, and I will ensure he has the opportunity to provide counsel
directly to me, informed by military assessments.
Question. If confirmed, what lessons would you draw from the
tenures of former Secretaries Mattis and Marshall--also recently
retired general officers who served as the Secretary of Defense--and
how would you apply those lessons to your own service, if confirmed as
Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Secretaries Marshall and Mattis conducted themselves with
integrity and professionalism. They were public servants and honest
leaders. If confirmed, I would conduct myself in the same manner.
I am mindful of the concerns of another retired general leading the
Department, and while I am in no position to judge the details of how
these two predecessors chose to do it, I can assure you that, if
confirmed, I intend to lead in a manner consistent with my belief in
the principle of civilian control.
I will empower the OSD staff to lead the policy-making process. I
will fill all available civilian positions on that staff, and I will
ensure that the orders I give and the decisions I make are properly
formed through a blend of civilian and military perspectives.
Military advice will inform but it will not dominate my thinking.
Finally, knowing that Congress, too, represents an important element of
civilian control, I will consult closely with the Senate and House of
Representatives as you execute your oversight responsibilities. I will
be forthcoming, responsive and transparent with you.
2018 national defense strategy (nds)
Question. The 2018 NDS outlines that the United States faces a
rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue
regimes and global terrorism.
In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest
risk?
Answer. I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identifies strategic
competitions with China and with Russia as the primary challenges
animating the global security environment; however, I believe that
because of its ascent and the scope and scale of its military
modernization, China is the top priority. I am also concerned about
transnational threats as the security landscape evolves (e.g., amid
COVID-19) and believe that our defense strategy must adapt accordingly.
As required by law, if confirmed I will review the NDS and where
necessary revise or update it in the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
The continued erosion of United States military advantage vis-a-vis
China and Russia, in key strategic areas, remains the most significant
risk the Department must address. If left unchecked, this continued
erosion could fundamentally challenge our ability to achieve U.S.
national security objectives--and limit DOD's ability to underpin other
U.S. instruments of power.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
the People's Republic of China?
Answer. I assess that the rapid development and operational focus
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) constitutes a significant and
long-term security threat to the United States and to our allies and
partners. This threat is an outgrowth of nearly two decades of intense
efforts by China to modernize and reform the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) and other forces into an increasingly capable joint force able to
conduct the full range of military operations across every warfighting
domain. In addition to a significant buildup and modernization of its
strategic forces, the PLA is advancing its capabilities and concepts
for conducting information, cyber, space, and counterspace operations.
China has also made it clear that it expects the PLA to be a global
military actor that is able to secure China's growing overseas
interests and advance other PRC objectives abroad. These changes are
coupled with the PRC's aggressive and at times coercive activities
aimed at advancing its military influence through forging closer ties
with foreign militaries, attaining overseas military bases, and
expanding the PLA's presence worldwide.
Question. If confirmed, would you revise or adjust the 2018 NDS as
a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors? If so, in
what ways?
Answer. Yes. Many of the core concepts in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS) are fundamentally sound. At the same time, there are
notable changes occurring in the global security environment that
warrant deeper evaluation, and which should compel DOD to periodically
reexamine and update the strategy and its path to implementation. For
example, the pace of China's military modernization, its increasingly
aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific and its ability to threaten the
United States Homeland are concerning and must be continually
reexamined. The NDS also assumes sustained defense budget growth, but
that has not fully materialized. The NDS anticipated a global
rebalancing of United States commitments, notably from the Middle East
to the Indo-Pacific, but that has proven challenging. In light of these
developments, if confirmed, I plan to undertake a comprehensive
strategic review in consultation with my leadership team to ensure we
can achieve our defense objectives.
If confirmed, I would direct my team to evaluate where changes are
emerging relative to the U.S. security and fiscal environments; demands
on defense-wide and military roles and missions; our military's
approach to future warfighting; the state of our network of allies and
partners; and the ways DOD is implementing the strategy. Examination of
these elements would of course be nested in the broader context of any
change in priorities directed in our National Security Strategy. These
insights would inform how the Department may update the defense
strategy and its implementation.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries) of
the Combatant Commands to implement the 2018 NDS more effectively?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review whether the responsibilities of
the Combatant Commands align with the Department's priority missions in
implementing the defense strategy and, if necessary, work with the
Department's senior leadership to revise. It would be my responsibility
to recommend to the President roles and missions for Combatant
Commanders to ensure there are no seams our adversaries can exploit.
That includes boundaries of the Combatant Commands.
Question. Do you see a need to adjust the size, structure, and
resources of each Military Service to ensure they are optimized to
implement the 2018 NDS and the associated Operation Plans (OPLANs)?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. The size, structure, and resources of each Service must be
informed by strategy-driven analysis and priorities, a joint
understanding of how our military will conduct operations and fight and
win the nation's future wars, and a resource-informed pragmatism. In my
view, each of the Services has taken important steps to align their
force structures and resourcing to 2018 NDS priorities, especially in
shifting away from decades of counter-terrorism operations and toward
great power competition and warfighting preparedness. If confirmed, I
will carefully consider the approaches the Services are taking,
individually and as a Joint Force, and working closely with my senior
civilian leadership team I, will make appropriate determinations about
their preparedness for both today's and future contingencies.
Question. Does DOD have the requisite modeling and simulation
capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, in assessing whether the Combatant Commanders' OPLANs will
achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department uses a number of
modeling and simulation approaches, combined with military exercises,
experiments, and wargames to assess the effectiveness of operational
plans. If confirmed, I will assure these plans are thoroughly assessed
and adjusted if necessary, and that we continue to ensure robust
analytic support to the development of current and future operational
plans.
Question. Does the DOD have the requisite analytic capabilities and
tools to support you, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, in
evaluating the Military Services' force structure and sizing strategies
to ensure that each Service can and will generate forces that are
manned, trained, and equipped to execute the operational plans
associated with the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Effectively executing operational plans requires the right
forces, in sufficient number and with relevant training, arriving in
theater on relevant timelines. If confirmed, I will assess each
Service's force structure to ensure it supports the wide range of
missions required to meet the Nation's defense goals. I will also
ensure we continue to use all analytic tools at our disposal to assess
Service force structure and sizing strategies against the demands of
the defense strategy.
Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
DOD has been unable to leverage, or has leveraged only in part, since
the NDS was published in 2018? If so, how would correct this situation,
if confirmed?
Answer. Our alliances and partnerships globally--including the
defense tools at our disposal to engage them, and more fundamentally
the mutual security commitments and interests we pursue to maintain
them--are an asymmetric strategic advantage that our competitors do not
possess. The strength of this network of defense relations cannot be
taken for granted, though, especially in global competitions with China
and Russia. If confirmed, I would seek ways to build on DOD's alliance
and partnership efforts as a core element of defense strategy.
First and foremost, if confirmed, I will make it a priority to
rebuild strong defense relationships with our allies and partners
around the world, many of whom have felt unsure of U.S. commitments and
insufficiently consulted in recent years. In addition to renewing the
foundations of our defense relationships, I also understand the
Department recently released new guidance to guide efforts to more
strategically engage with its network of allies and partners through
defense relations, security cooperation, force planning, and elsewhere.
If confirmed, I would look to better understand how DOD is framing and
implementing this guidance and ensure it is fundamental to broader DOD
efforts to review and update defense strategy and its implementation.
Question. Secretary Mattis said that the 2018 National Defense
Strategy ``establishes my intent to pursue urgent change at significant
scale.'' Do you share Secretary Mattis' intent for the NDS? In your
opinion, where has DOD succeeded in executing the NDS, where has DOD
fallen short, and what should be done to exploit successes and correct
deficiencies?
Answer. The NDS is the Defense Department's answer to the
President's National Security Strategy (NSS); it details the ways and
means with which our military will implement the larger national
security imperatives our country faces.
My intent, therefore, if confirmed, is to develop an NDS that
supports President-elect Biden's NSS and defines how the U.S. military
will utilize all its resources to defend the American people.
I expect that such a strategy--in this time of geo-political flux,
accelerating competition, transnational threats and extraordinary
technological transformation--will entail change, even urgent change,
but I view the document's purpose in this larger context.
I believe the Department has taken important steps in beginning to
realign Joint Force capabilities and posture to ensure its competitive
military edge against China and Russia, including in key strategic
regions--but there is yet more work to be done. I believe we need to
accelerate the pace and scope of this change, and make tough choices
where fiscal, doctrinal, temporal, or other limitations pose trade-offs
to implementing the strategy. I also think the Department's challenges
in shifting focus from today's global, operational commitments
(especially in the Middle East) to future mission demands must be
reconciled within the strategy, to ensure its feasible and sustainable
implementation. I believe further prioritization, better focus, and
synchronization of defense relations, security cooperation, research
and development, and force planning are important areas to assess and
adjust to advance defense objectives.
Question. In mandating changes to the process and form of the
National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
National Military Strategy, Congress intended that these documents,
through the Defense Planning Guidance, would more rigorously drive
program planning of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and
Combatant Commands.
If confirmed, how would you ensure consistency between the guiding
strategies of the Department and its allocation of resources?
Answer. It is critical to ensure a clear linkage between strategic
priorities, planning guidance, and resourcing across the Department,
including among the Military Services and Combatant Commands. As well,
this linkage must be governed by the core principle of civilian control
of the military. If confirmed, I am fully committed to supporting DOD's
internal strategic guidance processes to ensure that key Departmental
functions--in employing, managing, and developing the Joint Force--are
informed by strategy-driven, resource-informed defense planning. This
planning guidance should apply across the full defense enterprise, and
among the full range of force development and planning functions,
including programming and resourcing, acquisition, requirements,
concept development, and analysis.
dod readiness
Question. The United States now faces two near-peer competitors in
an aggressively militaristic China and revanchist Russia.
Do you believe that our military forces have greater overall combat
potential today than 30 years ago, despite force structure reductions?
If so, please explain.
Answer. Yes. Despite force structure reductions over the past 30
years, the Joint Force has the necessary capacity and capability to
implement National Defense Strategy (NDS) priorities and contend with
today's threats. With congressional support, the Department of Defense
will increase the Joint Forces' combat potential by continued
investments in joint force readiness and force modernization, along
with accelerated investments in artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and other advanced technologies. These investments, combined
with ally and partner cooperation, will enable optimizing our force
structure to generate a combat credible Joint Force capable of
deterring or defeating adversaries.
Question. In your view, how do the readiness challenges facing the
DOD today and over the next 10 years impact the Department's
requirements for force structure investments? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. Increased and stable funding over recent budget years has
improved the Department's ability to restore military readiness. To
sustain our readiness gains, we must balance force structure growth
with the need to train, equip, and modernize the Services. If
confirmed, I expect to review our continued investments in mobility,
logistics, and force protection for Ground Combat Teams; Navy weapons
procurement and fleet maintenance; and increased Air Force Ballistic
Missile Systems and airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, space, cyber and advanced
technologies, to name a few.
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance force structure and
readiness demands, particularly with respect to rotational forces in
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR),
against the imperative to modernize or restructure forces currently in
our inventory to meet NDS requirements?
Answer. I believe we can better calibrate United States military
presence in the Middle East, and its impacts on the military broadly,
to ensure we rebuild the readiness and modernization of the Joint Force
as well as provide opportunities to employ the force in other theaters.
Historical levels of force commitments to the CENTCOM theater, if
sustained over time, will have progressively more negative impacts on
force readiness, recapitalization, and the pace and scale of future
capability development. The United States should draw on all tools, not
just U.S. military force posture, to secure U.S. interests in the
CENTCOM theater. Key to this intent will be working by, with, and
through our partners in the region. If confirmed, I will review U.S.
force presence globally to ensure it is properly balanced with global
mission demands and the health of the Joint Force.
Question. Do you assess that the continuing deployment of
significant capabilities to the CENTCOM AOR has produced or consumed
readiness of U.S. Armed Forces?
Answer. In many cases, yes--the continued deployment of significant
capabilities to the CENTCOM AOR or indeed to any operational area
consumes some readiness of our forces. That is to be expected. As we
build readiness, we must closely monitor the deployment decisions we
make today, to assess the impacts those decisions will have on our
ability to operate effectively in the future.
Question. Anticipating constant or declining defense budgets going
forward, and if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, how would you
prioritize the needs for continued readiness, force structure, and
modernization?
Answer. Under any resourcing level, the Department must balance
readiness, force structure, modernization, and competitive compensation
levels while pursuing efficiencies and savings through organizational
reform and critical reviews of ongoing missions and activities. If the
Department's resourcing levels prove to be relatively ``flat'' in the
coming years, we would need to prioritize modernization of combat-
credible forces and deterrent capability, particularly where leveraging
advanced technology to ensure the U.S. Joint Force maintains a
competitive edge in key domains and warfighting functions, such as in
space, 6th generation air power, cyber, undersea warfare, and long-
range fires. Doing so under flattening budgets may mean accepting some
level of increased risk in the near-term readiness, and greater
divestment of legacy force structure, in order to avoid a larger but
increasingly obsolete future force.
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
components across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and
training to execute OPLANs in support of the 2018 NDS?
Answer. Our Armed Forces are manned, trained, equipped, and ready
to answer the nation's call, as the most capable military in the
history of the world. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Congress to focus on improving readiness in all facets (Personnel,
Equipment/Materiel, and Training) to ensure our forces stand ready to
execute Operation/Contingency plans in support of the priorities of the
NDS.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Military
Departments and Services and the Combatant Commands have accepted in
regard to their readiness to execute OPLANs in furtherance of the 2018
NDS?
Answer. While I do not have access to all the classified
information I would have if confirmed, I believe the Department of
Defense has the necessary capability, capacity, and readiness to
implement the NDS priorities and contend with today's threats, while
minimizing unnecessary risk to our warfighters wherever possible. The
threat environment continues to evolve, particularly with respect to
China's and Russia's growing abilities to contest United States
military advantages. If confirmed, I will assess risk across all
domains in an iterative, collective, and collaborative effort,
supported by the Military Departments, the Services, and the Combatant
Commands.
Question. DOD and Congress have often lacked an adequate
understanding of trends in the readiness of the Armed Forces, owing to
the difficulty of measuring readiness. This makes it particularly
difficult to consider trade-offs among the Military Departments.
If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to improve the
Department's definition of specific readiness metrics and the
overarching assessment and reporting on readiness trends?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue and reinforce the efforts
currently underway to reform how readiness is tracked and reported.
This includes the formulation of metrics to convey complex aggregations
of data in context, consistent with the way forces are actually
employed, that will allow for better management of the current and
future force. I will also seek to employ advances in the fields of data
science to make our data more strategically informative and help us
develop predictive readiness models to anticipate, and ultimately avoid
readiness shortfalls.
national security budget
Question. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy
Commission recommended that Congress increase the defense budget at an
average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Former Secretaries of Defense
Mattis and Esper agreed with that recommendation.
Do you agree with the conclusion of the NDS Commission that
sustained real growth in the defense budget is necessary to achieve the
aims of the current NDS without incurring significant additional risk?
Answer. Resources are an important part of generating the
capability to achieve our national security goals, but that capability
also depends on wise planning, leadership, effective training, and
other factors. My goal will be to use the resources available to the
Department wisely to realize the strategic aims of the Department and
ensure the nation has the military capabilities to compete and win.
Given the likely budget impact of COVID-19, DOD must be fiscally
pragmatic and be prepared for modest growth in the coming years.
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of the defense budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the
Department's funding by our ability to defend this nation--to execute
our chosen strategy, maintain the nation's technological edge, preserve
the health of the joint force, and provide options to the President
that support his foreign policy and defense goals. As part of the
framework to measure the sufficiency of our resourcing I would also
revisit with the Chairman the way we assess, discuss, measure, and
convey risk--a process that is fundamental to informing our
recommendations regarding the adequacy of funding.
Question. Many observers have suggested that that the current level
of defense spending is not sustainable in the long term given the many
priorities the nation faces.
Do you believe the DOD budget request should be based only on
strategic considerations or should it also account for fiscal factors
unrelated to the NDS? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe budgets should match resources to strategic
national priorities and must strive to maximize our capabilities. At
the same time, budgets for any agency, including DOD, are subject to
fiscal realities. That is why it is important to set priorities and
make hard choices to preserve and expand the competitive advantage we
have against our great power adversaries.
Question. The fiscal year 2022 budget will be the first in a decade
debated outside the context of the statutory Budget Control Act (BCA).
Defense spending under the Budget Control Act decreased by less than
half of the $1 trillion that had been projected pre-BCA. However, the
relationship between absolute spending levels and the stability and
certainty of funding availability remains poorly understood.
Acknowledging the need for stable, predictable, and adequate
funding, what are your recommendations, if any, for changing the method
by which the Department of Defense develops its budgets?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to strike an appropriate balance
in the budget request between the current and future health and
requirements of the force. Stability and predictability in funding,
which has been lacking during the Budget Control Act era, would
certainly help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Department in managing its resources.
Question. In your estimation, what do you perceive would be the
effect on the ability of the joint force to achieve its objectives, of
adding back--in the near future--DOD funding reduced under the Budget
Control Act? Could the Department effectively and efficiently execute
such resources?
Answer. Realistically, the lost buying power associated with BCA
reductions is lost. Moving forward, if confirmed, my immediate aim
would be to balance the competing demands of carrying out the strategic
objectives established by the President, while maintaining and
strengthening our military in order to adapt to changing threats.
The Department would always seek to wisely apply additional
resources. If confirmed, my priorities would include increasing the
readiness of our force, and ensuring its effective employment in
accomplishing the missions directed by the Commander-in-Chief. Both the
executive and legislative branches must strive to gain the greatest
possible return to our national security for every tax dollar invested,
whether that is in the Department of Defense or in other elements of
our national power.
Question. Many observers assert that the only way to force DOD
leaders to make the ``hard choices'' to divest of lower priority or
underperforming programs, is to constrain the Department fiscally.
Do you believe that this approach leads to more effective and
efficient decision-making by DOD leaders?
Answer. There will always be fiscal constraints. Given the fragile
state of our economy and the large deficits required to combat the
impact of COVID, I expect fiscal pressure going forward. Despite such
pressures, both the Department and the Congress have struggled at times
with divesting legacy or lower priority programs to make way for
important new investments. Given the scope of the challenges we face,
Congress and the Department will need to work together to make some
hard choices.
Question. In your view, what are the effects of the BCA and
headquarters cuts on the ability of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to make policy for, and oversee policy implementation across,
all components of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The mandatory headquarters cuts undertaken over the past
decade have effectively cut the OSD civilian workforce by 25 percent.
The fiscal year 2021 congressional marks will further shrink OSD's
professional staff. This significant reduction has degraded the
organization's ability to pursue effective policy-implementation for
the expansive national security mission. Sustained cuts have narrowed
OSD's hiring pipeline, weakening the organization's ability to compete
for talented recent graduates. It has also challenged OSD's ability to
bring diverse perspectives to recommended defense policies. If
confirmed, I will direct a review of current staffing levels to
determine the billets and resources we need to maintain a sufficiently
sized professional civilian staff in OSD relative to our national
security mission sets. If I determine that a lack of billets or funding
for civilian pay is hindering the ability of OSD to make policy and
oversee policy implementation across the Department, I will identify to
Congress any additional unfunded requirements identified during my
review.
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process
has remained fundamentally unchanged since its inception more than half
a century ago.
Question. Do you believe the PPBE process results in the proper
allocation of resources according to the strategic priorities at the
Department of Defense?
Answer. It is my understanding that the PPBE process provides an
effective, neutral, and open framework to allow the leadership of the
Department, including the Secretary, to make well-informed choices
about resource allocation in support of the Department's strategic
priorities. I am committed to ensuring this process works effectively
and, if confirmed, will seek to make any necessary adjustments to meet
the nation's defense needs.
Question. What changes would you make, if any, to the PPBE process
to improve both resourcing decisions within DOD and information flow
about those decisions to the Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and other Department leaders to ensure that the
PPBE process is effective in aligning resources to the defense
strategy. This includes identifying analytically-informed strategic
choices about the size and shape of the future force. Effective
communication with Congress is critical to ensuring our nation's
defense needs are met. If confirmed, I will review the Department's
communication process with the intent to ensure information flow to the
Congress is both timely and effective.
I understand the Congress directed the Department, in the newly-
enacted Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021
to enhance the capabilities of the budget liaison offices in the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the services. That
initiative will be an important part of ensuring an effective
communication flow regarding the budget.
Question. In recent years, several observers have asserted that
relative detachment of the combatant commanders from the PPBE process
results in inadequate treatment of combatant commander priorities.
If confirmed, do you believe that the PPBE process could be
improved to more accurately reflect the resourcing requirements of the
combatant commands, especially for joint requirements that are not high
priorities for the individual military departments? If so, how?
Answer. Having served as both a combatant commander and as a
service vice chief, I understand the different needs and perspectives
each brings to the PPBE debates inside the Department. Assessing and
resourcing the requirements of the Combatant Commands is a critical
component of the PPBE process. It is my understanding that these
requirements are currently integrated via multiple channels in the PPBE
process and assessed based on their ability to meet the Department's
defense goals. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that Combatant
Command needs are fully and fairly reviewed as the Department builds
its input to the President's Budget.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring Combatant Command needs
are fully assessed as the Department builds its input to the
President's Budget and will leverage existing PPBE inputs, such as
Integrated Priority Lists to properly understand the resourcing
requirements of the combatant commands. I will also rely on the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice on
the priority of joint requirements.
Question. Former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated, ``If you don't
fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.''
What are your views on the role of the State Department and other
non-DOD departments and agencies in achieving U.S. national security
objectives?
Answer. Based on my 40 years of experience, I firmly believe that
contributions of non-DOD departments and agencies are fundamental to
achieving U.S. national security objectives. I believe there are few
national security issues that can be properly addressed by only one
agency of the government. Most require some level of interagency
cooperation, and in my view, our diplomats should be in the lead for
issues related to America's interests around the world. The Department
of Defense should not and cannot alone address the many complex
security challenges confronting this Nation. The military must at all
times work in concert with all elements of national power--including
diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities--as part of a whole-
of-government effort to address threats to the Homeland, our allies and
partners, and our interests abroad. The Department of Defense should
eagerly support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a peace,
to persuade and convince recalcitrant leaders, and to advance our goals
for regional security and stability. The use of military force should
be a last resort after alternatives have been exhausted. If confirmed,
I will work very closely with my interagency counterparts to ensure the
Department of Defense is always nested within a broader U.S. Government
approach.
Question. Do you believe non-DOD departments and agencies have been
sufficiently resourced to appropriately contribute to U.S. national
security objectives?
Answer. It is imperative that non-DOD departments and agencies
receive sufficient funding to be able to contribute their respective
parts in addressing the complex array of security challenges
confronting this Nation. I do not believe current funding levels for
security assistance and development programs are pacing the challenges
posed by China and others in these areas. The Department of Defense
alone cannot shoulder this burden--the Department's success requires
its interagency partners to be resourced sufficiently. Each department
and agency leader must act with responsible fiscal stewardship as he or
she sets resource requirements for respective missions in the context
of the overall National Security Strategy. If confirmed, I would look
to these leaders to determine the appropriate resource levels for their
departments and agencies and would partner with them to advocate for
sufficient funding.
chain of command
Question. In accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, the President and
Secretary of Defense exercise authority, direction, and control of the
Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One
branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to
the combatant commanders for the execution of missions with forces
assigned to their commands. For purposes of organizing, training, and
equipping forces, the chain of command runs from the President, to the
Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Do you believe this dual structure provides for clear and effective
chain of command?
Answer. Yes, I do. I have worked in this dual structure at both
Military Service and Joint commands, and believe it is both effective
and clearly understood throughout the Department.
Question. How could the effectiveness of each branch of the chain
of command be improved, in your view?
Answer. I have no specific recommendations to offer at this time.
If confirmed, I will continuously consider the need for improvement to
our chains of command, and will recommend them to the President and
Congress as warranted.
the joint chiefs of staff
Question. Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for fiscal year 2017 made changes to Section 151 of Title 10, U.
S. Code, concerning the role of the Joint Chiefs as military advisors
to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
What is your assessment of the authorities and processes by which
the Joint Chiefs provide military advice and opinions to the President,
and the Secretary of Defense? What changes, if any, do you assess are
required?
Answer. I believe the authorities and processes established in 10
U.S.C. Sec. 151, as enhanced by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, are
sufficient because they grant clear authority and responsibility to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice and opinions to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
I don't believe changes are required at this time.
Question. What is your level of confidence that these authorities
and processes will provide you, if confirmed as the Secretary of
Defense, the best military advice, including ``minority opinions'' that
may diverge from those of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the
majority of members of the Joint Chiefs?
Answer. I am highly confident that, if confirmed, the current
process will provide me with military advice. I am equally confident
the authorities and processes in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 151 ensure that when
the advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs differs
from that of the Chairman, the information will be provided to me,
along with the reasoning behind the differences.
Question. If confirmed, both the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would share the experience of
having served as general officers in the U.S. Army. Under these
circumstances, how would you ensure that the President benefits from
the diversity of opinion and expertise required to optimally address
tough national security problems?
Answer. I will work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to ensure
that the opinions and perspectives of the Joint Chiefs--particularly if
they differ from his or my own--are presented to the President and get
a full airing.
Question. Do you commit, if confirmed, to always provide your best
advice to the President, even when your advice and opinions might
differ from those of other members of the Cabinet, the President's
other senior advisors, or from the President's own views?
Answer. I do.
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the joint staff
Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser
to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Pursuant to Section 163(a) of
title 10, the President has directed that communications between the
President or the Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the
combatant commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will respect the independence
of the Chairman, as stipulated in title 10, to provide his military
advice to me and to the Commander-in-Chief. I will, of course, consult
with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs as I develop U.S. defense policy
and issue orders to the Joint Force. This will, I expect, require
constant and frequent personal interaction with them.
Question. If confirmed, would you modify the current duties and
responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in any
way? Are there any other duties and responsibilities you would consider
assigning or delegating to the Chairman?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to lead the policy-making process
through the statutory structure of the OSD staff, and I intend to
execute my duties in the military chain of command--including the
issuance of operational orders--with the full benefit of the advice and
counsel of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant
Commanders. I do not believe that performing these duties requires any
modifications to the current duties and responsibilities of the
Chairman.
I do not envision any such changes at this time.
Question. If confirmed, what timeline would you assess to be
appropriate for the Department's development, programming, and
implementation of the joint operating concepts required by the NDS?
Answer. I understand that the Department is working on development
of a Joint Warfighting Concept, with a first iteration due this spring.
If confirmed, I will review the progress to date on this effort, to
include the independent assessments of it, to determine what follow-on
concept work is needed to ensure a strategy-driven and joint approach
to future warfighting, and identify a timeline that ensures the overall
concept is backed by solid analysis and can usefully inform future
joint and Service capability investments.
Question. In your view, is the Joint Staff appropriately
structured, resourced, and experienced to adjudicate competing
interests among combatant commands if the U.S. became engaged in
significant combat operations against a strategic competitor? If not,
what organization do you believe should make decisions about the
strategic tradeoffs required in such a situation?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff is trained and capable to present what
would be a surge of competing requests before and during significant
combat operations. The process of gathering risk, to both mission and
force, and to present a strategic picture of associated tradeoffs is a
core competency of the Joint Staff.
use of military force
Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
Answer. The decision to use military force is one of the most
consequential decisions a President can make. In evaluating whether to
recommend the use of military force, I would consider a number of
factors, including: the nature of the threat and vital national
interests at stake; whether the United States would be acting alone or
with others; the risk to force and to mission; whether the proposed
action complies with applicable domestic and international law,
including the principles of necessity and proportionality; whether
there is a defined and achievable military end-state; and whether non-
military means that could sufficiently address the threat have been
exhausted.
Question. In your view, is a ``new'' Authorization for the Use of
Military Force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review current congressional
Authorizations for Use of Military Force with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and provide the President with my recommendations.
Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
determining which forces of other nations are eligible for collective
self-defense by U.S. Forces, and under what conditions? What
limitations, if any, would you seek to impose on the provision of
collective self-defense by U.S. Forces?
Answer. It is fundamental that the United States stands by our
partners and allies. When U.S. Forces have the authority to protect our
partners from attack or imminent threat of attack, it can: help achieve
mission objectives; bolster the protection of U.S. Forces and
facilities operating abroad; help maintain the resolve of partners that
U.S. Forces work by, with, and through to address mutual threats; and
ensure the United States furthers important national interests,
including its commitments in mutual defense agreements. If confirmed, I
would consider these and other factors in assessing whether U.S. Forces
should be authorized to defend particular foreign partner forces.
Rules of engagement authorizing U.S. Forces to defend foreign
partner forces should clearly identify the particular partners eligible
for such protection and whether any limits exist on the groups or
individuals against which such force may be used. Any use of force in
defense of foreign partner forces must also be necessary and
proportionate to address the particular hostile act or demonstration of
hostile intent.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it
appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
established under title 10, U.S. Code?
Answer. The Commander-in-Chief always remains at the top of the
chain of command, and the U.S. military operates under U.S. control.
Military capabilities may, at times, need to be made temporarily
available to support an activity of a department or agency other than
the Department of Defense. Under such circumstances it may be
appropriate for the head of another department or agency to direct
operations while working with the Secretary of Defense. Further, U.S.
military personnel are always subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel
to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? If
confirmed, how would you modify these agreements or authorities, if at
all?
Answer. I understand that the necessary framework is in place for
U.S. military personnel to conduct and support the activities of the
Department of Defense and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as
the situation may require. I believe that the current framework is
sufficient.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work within the
Department and with colleagues in other U.S. Government departments and
agencies to adjust existing arrangements as the need arises.
Question. According to the 2018 NDS, Dynamic Force Employment (DFE)
will allow for the more ``flexibl[e] use [of] ready forces to shape
proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to
respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.''
In your view, have past DFE operations had the desired effect in
``shaping the strategic environment''? Please explain your answer.
Answer. By providing a more flexible mechanism to employ forces,
DFE allows Commanders to capitalize on strategic opportunities to
employ forces without a significant loss to readiness. A critical
component of DFE is requiring Combatant Commands to assess how
successfully a past DFE operation impacted the strategic environment.
Question. In your view, have past DFE operations promoted,
strained, or degraded the long-term readiness of U.S. Forces?
Answer. In fiscal year 2020, DFE operations likely promoted, or at
least maintained, overall U.S. Force readiness. Forces that deploy in
support of DFE operations maintain their combat readiness, while
gaining valuable experience, and shape the strategic environment.
Question. If confirmed as the Secretary of Defense, what factors
would you consider in authorizing the use of particular forces to
execute a DFE mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consider the Combatant Command's
justification for the requested unit (if specifically requested) or
capability and how its employment meets national strategic objectives,
as well as the requested unit's readiness, previous recent DFE
operations, and a summary of costs for comparison to other DFE unit
candidates.
alliances and partnerships
Question. The 2018 NDS stresses that mutually beneficial alliances
and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition with,
deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic
competitors.
What is your view of the continuing strength of our current
alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners
have in the willingness of the U.S. to meet its obligations? If
confirmed, how would you enhance that trust?
Answer. The United States' global network of alliances and
partnerships is a strategic advantage our competitors cannot match, but
it is one that has been undermined in recent years due to inconsistent
statements about U.S. commitments, seemingly erratic decision making,
and insufficient consultation on important issues. If we take our
allies for granted, we squander our greatest strategic asset; we must
rebuild and modernize our alliances and partnerships. By working
together with allies and partners and aligning our defense priorities,
the United States has the best chance to protect its security
interests, by maintaining favorable balances of power that deter
aggression, support stability, and favor democratic values and economic
growth. If confirmed, I will take steps to mend and strengthen this
critical advantage.
If confirmed, I will make it a priority to rebuild strong defense
relationships with our allies and partners around the world. I would
direct the Department to pursue tangible, sustainable measures to
strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships in ways that
bolster our ability to deter aggression, and if necessary, fight and
win as interoperable coalitions. More broadly, I would seek to ensure
the Department, in concert with U.S. interagency partners, is able to
engage more comprehensively with ally and partner security
establishments, to act decisively to meet shared security challenges. I
believe the Department should focus on strengthening its defense
relationships based on a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility,
shared priorities, and mutual accountability.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant
commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to focus my attention on engaging
with key allies and partners, focusing DOD efforts on strengthening
collaborative planning, and increasing interoperability. I would strive
to align the Department's priorities and synchronize the employment of
the Department's security cooperation resources to help allies and
partners develop their defense establishments and military forces.
Also, if confirmed, I would confer with my staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and geographic Combatant Commanders on how best to
enhance their efforts to strengthen defense relationships in their
areas of responsibility, consistent with the strategic priorities I
identify.
Question. If confirmed, on which leaders and forums would you focus
your engagement, with a view to advancing most effectively U.S.
national security interests?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize engaging leaders and
forums most relevant to U.S. interests, especially as articulated in
the National Defense Strategy and the Guidance on Development of Allies
and Partners. I would rely on my team in the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy for recommendations on timing and
specifics of these engagements.
u.s. africa command (africom)
Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
required to compete for the vast majority of its U.S. Forces in the
global force management process.
What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
Campaign Plan, the NDS, and other emergency requirements?
Answer. The approach to work by, with, and through United States
partners to achieve security and stability in Africa has been effective
with a limited forward presence. This includes using the full breadth
of our title 10, chapter 16, security cooperation authorities to enable
our African partners. Key to this approach is also DOD's strategic
focus on building African partner nation institutions and capabilities
while supporting efforts of other international partners with an
interest in facilitating security and stability on the continent.
However, I have not seen the full posture laydown, and if confirmed, I
will conduct a global force posture review to ensure our posture is in
line with our strategy. That will include examining the impact of the
Trump Administration's redeployment of forces from Somalia.
Question. Are there any changes you would implement to the
allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?
Answer. DOD assets have been allocated based on the priorities set
out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and my understanding
is that the Department's fiscal year 2021 allocations for AFRICOM are
aligned with that strategy. If confirmed, I will consider the Combatant
Commander's requirements and requests for forces, and assess risk,
based on changes in the strategic environment and the direction
provided in the national security and defense strategies.
Question. What should be the primary objectives of the DOD
specifically, and the United States more broadly, in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. DOD's priorities in Africa are countering 1) violent
extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten the Homeland and United
States national security interests and 2) competitors such as China and
Russia. The Department's activities in the AFRICOM AOR contribute to
the whole-of-government effort to combat transnational threats to U.S.
national security interests. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
Department works closely with other U.S. Departments and agencies to
properly align its efforts with other agencies that are advancing
lasting peace and security on the continent. I will also coordinate, as
appropriate, with our allies and partners to achieve our national
security objectives.
Question. What is your assessment of United States counterterrorism
strategies in the AFRICOM AOR, particularly those in East Africa, North
Africa, and the Sahel? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you
propose to these strategies?
Answer. My understanding is that the current strategy is to disrupt
and degrade priority threats to the U.S. Homeland, our interests, and
our allies and partners. A key element in the Department's approach is
collaborating with our allies and partners on areas of shared interest,
which is an area where we can improve. Across East Africa, the Sahel,
and North Africa, a whole-of-government approach to address the drivers
of extremism will remain a central pillar of our strategy. If
confirmed, I will assess our counterterrorism strategies both in the
AFRICOM AOR and more broadly.
Given the threat posed by terrorist organizations in Africa, the
Department would continue to prioritize degrading and disrupting the al
Qaeda and ISIS affiliates that pose direct threats to the United States
Homeland and U.S. personnel. If confirmed, I will prioritize
collaborating with and enabling partners to combat shared threats so
that, over time, the majority of the effort and resourcing shifts to
partners and/or multilateral efforts.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
Russia and China in Africa? In what areas, if any, do these oppose U.S.
and partner objectives?
Answer. Over the past five years, Russia has increased its
engagement with African nations to bolster global power projection,
access raw materials, expand arms sales, and undermine Western
influence. Russia views investment in Africa as part of its global
influence strategy. China's strategic objectives in Africa include
securing access to economic resources, opening new markets, and gaining
operational military experience through peacekeeping and counter-piracy
operations, while portraying it as a responsible global actor. I am
also concerned about China and Russia's overseas military basing
ambitions and the PLA's expanding global military presence. The PRC has
a well-established air and naval base in Djibouti, which they continue
to expand, and is also looking for other African basing locations
including along the Atlantic coast. China also uses multilateral forums
and international organizations like the Belt and Road Forum to
generate new opportunities to strengthen its political influence,
promote strategic messaging that portrays it as a responsible global
actor, advance its development interests, and limit outside
interference in and criticism of its initiatives.
Given Africa's diverse political, economic, social, and security
landscape, it is difficult to generalize how Russia and China ``oppose
partner objectives.'' However, we have seen how heavy-handed Russian
private military companies' operations in Mozambique, Central African
Republic, and Libya have exacerbated local tensions and alienated
members of the public. These actions undermine our efforts in African
countries to promote civilian control of the Armed Forces,
transparency, and accountability.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the current
United States strategy to compete against Russia and China and to be
the security partner of choice in Africa? What changes, if any, would
you recommend in this strategy, if confirmed?
Answer. The current United States strategy focuses on African
partnerships--building capacity, working toward shared objectives,
operating transparently, and promoting institutions and good governance
for sustainable security--while highlighting and exposing the dangers
associated with dealing with China and Russia. DOD's competitive
security edge lies primarily in (1) the superior quality of the
equipment, training, education, and other security assistance we
provide; and (2) our support to counterterrorism operations. In the
face of motivated and capable competitors, we must work to enhance our
ability not only to compete, but to win. This means continuing our
whole-of-government commitment to stay engaged and develop partnerships
and address mutual security concerns in Africa, which will critically
involve other agencies strengthening their non-military tools.
The Department has made notable progress implementing the National
Defense Strategy to advance our lines of effort to compete with Russia
and China in Africa. This includes enhancing our alliances and
partnerships in Africa through efforts like the signing of the 10-year
Roadmaps for Defense Cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia. If
confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and advancing our strategies to
protect and secure United States interests in Africa.
Question. The redacted report of the Army's investigation into the
2017 incident in Niger found `` . . . several problems with the advise,
assist, and accompany activity. Exercised conservatively, with advisors
remaining far from the fight, advising higher echelon commanders,
[activities] could be executed in accordance with Presidential Policy.
Exercised aggressively, with [accompanying] U.S. advisors . . . the
direct actions of our partners cannot be distinguished from U.S. direct
action. U.S. provision of `advice and assistance' looks more like U.S.
direct combat operations that are not reported that way to Congress . .
. ''
In light of these findings, if confirmed, how would ensure that
advise, assist, and accompany activities are executed in a manner
consistent with Presidential Policy and are reported in a timely manner
to Congress, as mandated by law and policy?
Answer. I understand that over the last year, DOD has reviewed the
training Special Operations Forces Soldiers receive and that they
provide to partner forces, which reinforces their proper roles as
foreign partner advisors during counterterrorism operations. By
incorporating lessons learned from the Niger ambush across all Service
Components, USSOCOM has ensured that SOF operators have an
understanding of the expectations and limitations of working ``by,
with, and through'' partner forces. Furthermore, the Department honors
its congressional reporting requirements and remains committed to
fulfilling the responsibilities and requirements as mandated by law and
policy. If confirmed, I will be committed to providing the committees
with timely, appropriate, and sufficiently detailed information,
consistent with congressional direction.
Question. In light of these findings, if confirmed, how would you
seek to clarify the roles and policies governing U.S. advisory efforts,
particularly in support of partners operating outside areas of active
hostilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that any limitations on
the role of U.S. advisory efforts, particularly in support of partners
in locations where U.S. Forces do not have authority to conduct direct
action, are communicated clearly and implemented in a disciplined
manner, as needed.
u.s. central command (centcom)
Question. In your opinion, to what extent does achieving United
States national security interests in the Middle East require a
continuous United States military presence, and in your view is the
current U.S. Force presence appropriately sized? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. The Middle East remains critical to our national security
interests. It is important for the Department to review its military
posture in the Middle East to ensure we are prepared to defend against
threats to the Homeland and respond to contingencies, without
compromising focus on our global strategy and military readiness. Our
posture also provides opportunities for security cooperation with our
partners in the region, as we seek to strengthen their military
capabilities and build interoperability to meet our shared objectives.
If confirmed, I will review our force posture in the Middle East to
ensure it is properly balanced with global requirements and the health
of the joint force.
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with U.S. partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the
CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Given global threats and the U.S. role in the world,
burden-sharing with our partners and allies must be a central element
in the Department's approach in the Middle East. As our partners
continue to expand their defense capabilities, we should explore
greater opportunities to work by, with, and through them to address
mutual threats. The Department of State and the Department of Defense
should work together in this effort, as we seek more partners who share
our values to bear the collective burden of international security,
while also accounting for good governance and human rights principles
through training and institutional capacity building, There are already
strong examples of this, such as the International Maritime Construct
to secure freedom of navigation in the region, the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS, as well as NATO, which I understand is now assuming a
direct and expanding role in supporting Iraqi Security Forces and
continuing its important role in Afghanistan.
Question. What threat does increased Chinese and Russian
involvement in the Middle East pose to United States operations and
interests and to what extent does a continuous U.S. presence counter
their involvement? In your view, what other policy tools might be
useful in this regard?
Answer. China and Russia seek to expand their influence in the
Middle East and are increasingly using defense sales to try to drive a
wedge between us and our long-time partners. Russia, in particular,
seeks to reshape Middle East security structures and expand its
regional influence by exploiting vacuums of governance and creating
frozen conflicts to increase Russian leverage and influence,
unconstrained by respect for international rules and norms. Chinese
economic activity and technology transfers--coupled with a
corresponding but as yet smaller expansion of its military footprint
and collection capabilities--is growing Chinese influence across the
region. The Chinese seek to apply their economic power to exploit
weakened or failing economies in the Middle East. These actions put
U.S. influence--military, diplomatic, and economic--at risk. If
confirmed, I will review our force presence to ensure it is properly
balanced to address the broad range of challenges in the Middle East--
including from China and Russia--with global requirements and the
health of the joint force.
Afghanistan
Question. What are the current United States national security
objectives in Afghanistan, and what is your understanding of the
current strategy to achieve them?
Answer. President-elect Biden has pledged to bring the war in
Afghanistan to a responsible end. In doing so, the focus will be on
ensuring that terrorist groups--al Qaeda and the Islamic State Khorasan
Province--are not allowed to threaten our Homeland again. The incoming
Administration will support the peace process between the Afghan
Government and the Taliban with a high-level, robust diplomatic effort.
That effort will aim to help the Afghan Government and the Taliban
reach a durable political settlement and a ceasefire. If confirmed, I
will look closely at the current and future United States military
footprint in Afghanistan. In the near-term, if confirmed, I will work
with the President-elect to ensure that our forces have the ability to
continue their core missions of counterterrorism, and support for
Afghan forces effectively and safely.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to the United States military
strategy in Afghanistan would you recommend?
Answer. Before making any recommendations about the United States
military strategy in Afghanistan, if confirmed, I will seek the advice
of Office of the Secretary of Defense experts, United States military
leadership, and our Resolute Support coalition partners to assess the
military campaign in Afghanistan and its role in supporting Department
of State-led efforts to end the war on terms favorable to the United
States. Changes in the U.S. military strategy should complement and
support diplomatic efforts.
Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in
Afghanistan be tied to the achievement of conditions on the ground? If
so, what specific conditions do you believe to be prerequisite to
reducing or eliminating U.S. military presence there?
Answer. I believe troop levels should always be commensurate with
the strategy we are executing and to the achievement of our national
security goals. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of Office of the
Secretary of Defense experts, U.S. military leadership, and our
Resolute Support coalition partners to assess the military campaign in
Afghanistan and its role in supporting Department of State-led efforts
to end the war on terms favorable to the United States. I take
seriously the concerns senior military officials have expressed about
the Taliban and current levels of violence in Afghanistan. I also
understand from discussions during the transition that at current troop
levels, we are able to conduct our core missions of counterterrorism
and support to Afghan security forces.
I believe troop levels should always be commensurate with the
strategy we are executing and to the achievement of our national
security goals. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of Office of the
Secretary of Defense experts, U.S. military leadership, and our
Resolute Support coalition partners to assess the military campaign in
Afghanistan and its role in supporting Department of State-led efforts
to end the war on terms favorable to the United States.
Question. What is your understanding of Taliban fulfillment of
their commitments under the February 2020 United States-Taliban
Agreement to date?
Answer. My understanding is that the Taliban's continued
participation in Afghanistan Peace Negotiations helps to fulfill a key
element of the United States-Taliban Agreement. I understand that the
Taliban have also made specific commitments regarding counterterrorism,
including to break ties with al Qaida, and reducing violence. Violence
levels have been far too high throughout the ongoing peace process. If
confirmed, I intend to consult with interagency stakeholders to review
the Taliban's actions relative to all its commitments.
Question. What changes in United States force posture, if any,
would you recommend to prepare for the potential that the Taliban fail
to meet their commitments by the May 2021 deadline outlined in the
Agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States retains all
options for changes in United States force posture, depending on an
evaluation of the Afghan Peace Negotiations and United States national
security objectives in Afghanistan. I will work with Congress to ensure
that the United States military and our Afghan partners have the
capacity and capability necessary to protect United States personnel,
our allies and partners, and our interests.
Question. Given the failure to meet the authorized force level of
352,000, are current target end strengths for the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) achievable, in your assessment?
Answer. My understanding is that the 352,000 force level is the
maximum number of ANDSF personnel that the international community has
committed to fund. I also understand the ANDSF end strength has
remained between 85 and 90 percent of this ceiling for several years
because of high casualty rates and challenges with recruiting and
retention. I understand that maintaining the authorized force level at
352,000 is important to allow DOD and the Afghan Government the
flexibility to reconfigure forces, such as absorbing personnel from the
recently disbanded Afghan Local Police, which as I recall were not part
of the 352,000 force level. If confirmed, I will review the ANDSF Plan
of Record to ensure the ANDSF force structure is sufficient to meet
shared objectives.
Question. In your view, do current Afghan security forces have the
capability and capacity to project security and stability throughout
Afghanistan in 2021 and beyond? If not, what changes to U.S. efforts to
develop and sustain the ANDSF would you recommend?
Answer. My understanding is that Afghan security forces have the
capability and capacity to project security and stability in
Afghanistan in 2021 and beyond with United States and international
financial and advisory support. The Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special
Security Forces have proven particularly effective but still rely on
certain international assistance.
If confirmed, I will review what adjustments may be required to
develop and sustain the ANDSF through the ANDSF Plan of Record as
conditions evolve.
Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in supporting
intra-Afghan negotiations?
Answer. DOD should continue to support Department of State-led
efforts in support of Afghanistan Peace Negotiations, particularly on
matters related to the security of Afghanistan.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
neighbors--Pakistan, in particular--in this negotiation process?
Answer. Pakistan is an essential partner in any peace process in
Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will encourage a regional approach that
garners support from neighbors like Pakistan, while also deterring
regional actors, from serving as spoilers to the Afghanistan peace
process.
Question. In your opinion, what is the role of the Taliban with
regard to counterterrorism efforts against ISIS? Against al Qaeda?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Taliban committed in the
February 29, 2020 agreement with the United States to prevent any group
from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the
United States and our allies. This includes ISIS-Khorasan, which
maintains a presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban must live up to its
commitments. Regardless of Taliban actions, the United States should
protect itself from terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and
should reserve the right to take any action necessary to ensure its
security.
The Taliban have longstanding ties to al Qaeda. The Taliban have
agreed to take concrete steps to ensure that al Qaeda never again is
able to use Afghanistan's soil to threaten the security of the United
States or our allies. If confirmed, I will review the Taliban's
progress toward implementing their commitments with regard to al Qaeda.
Pakistan
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in regard to
security assistance programs, including International Military
Education and Training?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on our shared interests which
include training future Pakistan military leaders through the use of
International Military Education and Training funds. Pakistan will play
an important role in any political settlement in Afghanistan. We also
need to work with Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda and the Islamic State
Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and to enhance regional stability.
Question. Have you perceived any change in Pakistan's cooperation
with the United States since the United States decision to withhold
security assistance to Pakistan in September 2018?
Answer. I understand Pakistan has taken constructive steps to meet
United States requests in support of the Afghanistan peace process.
Pakistan has also taken steps against anti-Indian groups, such as
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, although this progress is
incomplete. Many factors in addition to the security assistance
suspension may impact Pakistan's cooperation, including Afghanistan
negotiations and the dangerous escalation following the Pulwama
terrorist attack.
Question. In your view, what tools and options are available to the
United States to ensure that Pakistan is not used as a sanctuary for
militants and violent extremist organizations (VEOs)?
Answer. Pakistan is a sovereign nation. If confirmed, I will press
Pakistan to prevent its territory from being used as a sanctuary for
militants and violent extremist organizations. Continuing to build
relationships with Pakistan's military will provide openings for the
United States and Pakistan to cooperate on key issues.
Syria and Iraq
Question. What is your understanding of current United States
strategy and objectives in Syria?
Answer. It is my understanding that the military mission in Syria
is to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and that the broader objective
of United States Government policy is a peaceful resolution to the
Syrian conflict in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
2254.
Question. From a DOD perspective, what must be done to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS? What non-military efforts are needed for the
enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. It is in our interest that local partners have the capacity
and capability to counter ISIS' efforts to regain territory and acquire
resources and revenue. It is also in our interest to enable DOD's
interagency partners to address the underlying political, economic, and
social grievances that ISIS seeks to exploit. If confirmed, I will
review the progress to date, develop options, and provide my
recommendations to the President.
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
play a critical role in countering ISIS and al Qaeda. It is my
understanding that United States and Coalition forces have been working
to develop the capacity of these local partner forces and are now
focused on enabling the ISF and SDF to conduct successful counter-ISIS
operations independently.
Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in countering ISIS and al
Qaeda?
Answer. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) play a critical role in countering ISIS and al Qaeda. It
is my understanding that United States and Coalition forces have been
working to develop the capacity of these local partner forces and are
now focused on enabling the ISF and SDF to conduct successful counter-
ISIS operations independently.
Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
what conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the
President on future troop levels in Syria?
Answer. I understand the Department of Defense mission in Syria is
to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. The capacity of local partner
forces to thwart ISIS's effort to regain territory and acquire
resources and revenue independently over the long term is a critical
condition. If confirmed, I will evaluate our strategy and conditions
for progress in Syria.
U.S. Force levels are determined by the requisite capabilities to
achieve the directed mission, including force protection requirements
based on the threat and risk assessment. With a variety of forces
operating in a complex environment, those threat and risk perceptions
may fluctuate. If confirmed, I will review DOD's strategy,
capabilities, and conditions in Syria, and provide my recommendations
to the President.
Question. In your view, do United States troops in Syria help
``push back'' on Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle East? What
do you perceive to be the risks and benefits, if any, of such U.S.
presence?
Answer. I understand the Department of Defense (DOD) mission in
Syria is to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. With the confluence of
numerous actors in the region, it is important that all militaries
conduct themselves in a professional manner and that we de-conflict our
movements to ensure our forces are protected.
Unless pressure is maintained against ISIS, its re-emergence
remains a real possibility. United States and Coalition forces operate
by, with, and through local partner forces to achieve the enduring
defeat of ISIS. The Defeat-ISIS campaign in Syria is made more complex
by the presence of other threats and destabilizing forces in the region
beyond ISIS and al Qaeda, including Russian, Iranian, and other pro-
Syrian regime forces, as well as the need to balance our relationship
with Turkey.
Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
strategy and objectives in Iraq?
Answer. I remain concerned about the threat ISIS poses inside Iraq
and beyond. I support maintaining a small number of United States
troops to carry out a limited mission focused on advising and assisting
Iraqi counter-terrorism forces to deal with the continuing threat from
ISIS so that it cannot reemerge to again threaten the American people
or our partners. Beyond the safety of our own people, this is our
priority security mission in Iraq. The United States is in Iraq by
invitation, to help Iraqis prevent the reemergence of ISIS. We will
work with the Iraqi Government to ensure that the United States
military presence and its activities are respectful of Iraq's
sovereignty.
Iran
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
United States security strategy with respect to Iran? What is the role
of the U.S. military in this strategy?
Answer. I understand that the United States security strategy for
Iran aims to ensure that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon; protect
our citizens, personnel and interests from Iranian threats; counter
Iran's destabilizing activity through diplomacy and deterrence and by
working closely with our allies and regional partners; and more broadly
preserve unity of effort among allies and partners in the Middle East.
The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in the United
States Iran strategy by focusing on deterring and, if necessary,
defending against the military threats posed by Iran to our personnel
and national interests, while broadly supporting regional stability
through security cooperation and maintaining freedom of navigation.
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran poses a conventional and unconventional threat to the
security of U.S. personnel and partners in the region. Conventional
threats include ballistic missiles capable of hitting U.S. military
facilities in the region and naval forces capable of threatening
freedom of navigation in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Iran also
employs unconventional activities, including cyber-attacks and
intrusions, attacks on civilian shipping and energy infrastructure, and
regional weapons proliferation. Iran also directs, trains, supplies,
and funds militia groups across the region to advance Iran's interests,
threaten United States partners, and undermine regional stability.
Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
Answer. If confirmed, this is an issue that I will assess in more
detail with civilian and military leadership. The United States should
draw on all tools, not just U.S. military force posture, to secure
United States interests in the Middle East. The Department must balance
readiness and force modernization requirements against the security
situation in the region. If confirmed, I will review our force presence
to ensure that it is properly balanced with global requirements and the
health of the joint force.
multinational force & observers (mfo) in egypt
Question. The United States is a significant contributor to the
Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) in Egypt.
In your view, what are the benefits of our participation in the
MFO?
Answer. U.S. participation in the Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO) benefits U.S. security objectives in several ways. First, as a
trusted partner of both Israel and Egypt, the United States military
presence in the MFO provides ironclad reassurance to both parties. Both
Egypt and Israel strongly support United States participation in the
MFO; absent a strong and trusted arbiter capable of convening the two
sides for dispute resolution, either party could choose to remilitarize
along the border, increasing the potential of a miscalculation that
could lead to overt conflict. Second, U.S. participation in the MFO
demonstrates our leadership in the region as a reliable guarantor of
regional stability. Such leadership bolsters U.S. credibility to pursue
major diplomatic and security initiatives in the region and around the
globe. Should the United States diminish its presence in the MFO, it is
likely that other international contributors to the MFO would follow
suit, potentially endangering the continuation of the mission. U.S.
leadership and presence in the region likewise prevents more
opportunistic competitors such as China and Russia from potentially
taking advantage of a diminished United States presence.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate the
advisability of any potential reduction in United States military
participation in or support to the MFO?
Answer. As with all decisions regarding force management levels, we
must carefully consider how deployments affect the readiness of our
military. The MFO relies upon high demand/low density personnel and
equipment, including explosive ordnance disposal, aviation, logistics,
legal, and medical career fields. The Department of Defense recognizes
the need to prioritize investments of personnel and equipment across
all of our vital national interests. Any consideration of changes to
the level of United States support to the MFO would take into account
potential impacts on the MFO, the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, United
States obligations under applicable international agreements, and
broader regional stability, and involve consultation with the United
States Department of State, the governments of Egypt and Israel, and
other international partners who contribute to the MFO.
united states european command (eucom)
Implementation of the 2018 NDS
Question. Do you believe the deterrent posture in Europe is
sufficient to support the 2018 NDS and deter further Russian aggression
in Europe?
Answer. President-elect Biden pledged a comprehensive review of our
global military posture relative to the threats we face and, if
confirmed, I look forward to leading that effort and examining how that
posture should change over time. While I have not yet fully reviewed
our deterrent posture in Europe, I believe it must be a part of this
review. If confirmed, I will also want this review to examine the Trump
Administration decision to withdraw significant numbers of United
States troops from Germany.
Question. In your assessment, which capability and/or capacity
shortfalls in current U.S. posture most adversely affect U.S. ability
to address the threats in EUCOM?
Answer. The U.S. should have a combat-credible forward presence in
EUCOM sufficient to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression in
accordance with U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I will
lead a global military posture review to assess the current U.S.
posture, including in EUCOM.
Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
critical infrastructure in EUCOM? What are the areas of highest risk?
Answer. I have not yet reviewed U.S. military posture in EUCOM. I
understand that U.S. military and Allied capabilities, including
Integrated Air and Missile Defense systems, have improved in recent
years, facilitated in part by the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
and other initiatives. If confirmed, I will review the appropriate mix
of capabilities necessary to meet U.S. national security objectives,
including in EUCOM.
In EUCOM, the highest military risks are Russia's aggressive
behavior to undermine European security coupled with its military
modernization, including investments in long-range cruise missiles,
undersea and cyber capabilities, as well as the development and
fielding of its new, so-called ``novel'' nuclear systems, and the large
and varied arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Question. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make
to other United States capabilities and force posture in Europe to
execute the NDS more effectively?
Answer. If confirmed, I would initiate a global force posture
review relative to the threats we face and examine how that posture
should change over time. That review would, of course, include United
States posture in Europe, particularly given Russia's aggressive
behavior, and I would closely consult our NATO allies in considering
any changes. Finally, I would continue to encourage our allies to
increase their investments in modernization and new defense
capabilities.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA authorized $4.5 billion for the
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to support stability and security,
and to deter Russian aggression.
In your view, has EDI improved United States and allied capability
and capacity to deter Russian aggression in the European theater?
Answer. EDI funding has enabled DOD to increase our force presence
in Europe, improve critical capabilities, establish prepositioned
equipment sets, and execute readiness-building exercises, all of which
have contributed to USEUCOM's warfighting capabilities and deterrence.
Question. Do you believe continued, dedicated funding for EDI is
required to support implementation of the NDS in Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the range of resource
requirements to support our defense objectives in Europe. EDI funding
has helped the Department maintain a combat-credible force in Europe,
which is essential to deterring and, if required, defeating aggression
against the United States and our NATO allies.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure DOD compliance with
statutory requirements and Senate Armed Services Committee requests for
detailed funding information concerning future years' plans for EDI?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure appropriate DOD
compliance with statutory requirements and Senate Armed Services
Committee requests for information concerning funding for future years'
plans for EDI
NATO Alliance
Question. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests
is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty, especially Article 5?
Answer. Vitally important. Our shared commitment to the values
enshrined in the Washington Treaty has made NATO the most successful
alliance in history; helped to keep the United States politically,
economically, and militarily strong; and helped to safeguard our way of
life. Article 5 is the cornerstone of our collective security within
NATO, and I am fully committed to ensuring that the United States
fulfills its obligations under Article 5.
Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance and what do you perceive to be the greatest
challenges in meeting those objectives?
Answer. NATO's top strategic objectives are deterring nuclear and
non-nuclear aggression, defending Allied populations and territory if
deterrence fails, and projecting stability beyond NATO's borders. U.S.
leadership is required to meet these strategic objectives, as is a
shared responsibility among Allies for our common defense. Maintaining
unity in the face of active and continued attempts to fracture the
Alliance and ensuring ready forces and capabilities may be NATO's
greatest challenges.
Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize the development of
a plan to train, certify, and maintain the readiness and
interoperability of NATO's ``Four Thirties'' units, and what would be
the key element of such a plan?
Answer. If confirmed, maintaining ready and interoperable forces
and capabilities will be among my highest priorities. I am aware that
Allies have approved a plan to train, certify, and maintain the units
associated with the ``Four Thirties,'' which I will review with my
counterparts if confirmed. I also understand that the ``Four Thirties''
was the first step of the NATO Readiness Initiative, and I would
consider additional steps to rebuild a culture of readiness at NATO.
Question. In December 2020, NATO reaffirmed the Allies'
longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your view, do you believe this
principle requires the United States to continue to deploy nuclear
weapons in NATO countries?
Answer. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is
to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. The presence
of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries for the last 50 years has
successfully deterred aggression against the Alliance, and they
continue to provide an essential political and military link between
Europe and North America. In my view, they should remain in NATO
countries for as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat.
Question. How would you define and measure the success of the new
NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the
Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, in enhancing credible deterrence in
Europe?
Answer. As the newest headquarters in the NATO Command Structure,
both the Joint Force Command in Norfolk and the Joint Support and
Enabling Command in Ulm must first be certified as fully operationally
capable. At that point, if confirmed, I will measure the extent to
which the headquarters successfully develop and integrate plans to move
forces across the Atlantic and through Europe, defend critical
infrastructure, and secure the multi-domain lines of communication that
will ensure Allied forces in Europe are supported and sustained in
peace and crisis. If confirmed, I will ask to be briefed on the NATO
certification and exercise programs to ensure these headquarters are
appropriately certified, tested, and incorporated into NATO's strategic
exercises.
Question. In your view, how important is it to align the defense
efforts of the European Union (EU) and NATO, and what effect would an
EU decision to exclude the United States from participation in European
Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
projects have on that alignment?
Answer. Continued and enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO
is critical, especially in light of the hybrid threats that require
whole-of-government responses. The EU's efforts to enhance cyber
security and hasten military mobility, for example, are key to
strengthening both societal resilience and military deterrence.
Excluding U.S. participation in EDF and PESCO projects would be
counterproductive to closer EU-NATO cooperation and risks EU
capabilities developing in a manner that produces duplication, non-
interoperable military systems, diversion of scarce defense resources,
and unnecessary competition.
Russia
Question. What are appropriate objectives for United States-Russia
security relations, and what security interests common to the United
States and Russia would you emphasize, if confirmed?
Answer. Russia has used military force and other acts of coercion
and intimidation in pursuit of a geopolitical agenda that is
contradictory and inimical to the rule of law and U.S. national
interests. The primary objective in United States-Russia security
relations must be to deter Russia from acting against vital United
States interests, including by defending our allies from military
aggression, strengthening our partners' capacity to resist coercion,
and imposing appropriate consequences for malign activities. If
confirmed, I will look for ways to prevent a dangerous escalation in
tensions, stand firm in defense of our interests and values, and will
leave the door open to greater cooperation with Russia in areas of
mutual interest. Some potential areas of greater security cooperation
include: strategic arms control, counterterrorism, preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and deconfliction in
areas where our military forces are operating in close proximity to
each other.
Question. In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities most deter
Russia and mitigate the Russian threat to NATO Allies and partners? How
do these activities fit into a whole-of-government approach?
Answer. There is no one activity by itself that can sufficiently
deter Russia and mitigate its threat; rather, it is the complex array
of deterrence activities the United States and its allies in Europe
conduct to deter Russian aggression effectively. In particular, the
combination of consistent United States-NATO deterrent presence and
training exercises demonstrate resolve and combat-credible capability
and capacity to operate throughout Europe.
As Russia increasingly utilizes a whole-of-government approach to
achieving its geopolitical objectives, the Department of Defense
continues to organize its resources to compete with Russia below the
level of armed conflict. DOD currently supports broader United States
Government initiatives to counter Russian influence by deterring and
defending against all forms of aggression, building partner capacity to
resist hybrid threats, and holding Russia accountable for its malign
actions. If confirmed, I will review our authorities, resources, and
policies to ensure that we are optimally positioned to support U.S.
whole-of-government efforts.
Question. What aspects of United States and NATO force posture do
you assess as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?
Answer. Along with our Allies, it is critical that we maintain
combat-credible conventional and nuclear forces to provide the most
effective deterrent against Russian aggression. Our posture must be
credibly lethal, resilient, agile, and ready. If confirmed, I will
undertake a posture review to ensure the right mix of forces and
capabilities sufficient to deter Russia.
Question. What should DOD do to counter Russian influence in
Europe?
Answer. In my view, maintaining combat-credible conventional and
nuclear forces is one of the most effective deterrents against Russian
military aggression. However, the Russian threat continues to evolve in
a direction that combines both hard and soft power through the use of
hybrid tactics. Operations employing such tactics are multilayered and
sophisticated and aimed at building Russian influence across the globe.
Effectively countering Russian influence in Europe demands a
comprehensive approach involving our allies and partners, other United
States Government departments and agencies, and the private sector. For
many aspects of hybrid warfare, the Department of Defense cannot
achieve success without unified and integrated efforts by our
interagency partners and allies, particularly in diplomacy,
development, law enforcement, information, and intelligence.
Question. As exemplified by the Severodvinsk, Russia possesses
advanced submarine capability. What capabilities or capacity should the
U.S. Navy provide to ensure NATO advantage in this regard?
Answer. The Navy is committed to maintaining its decisive advantage
in the air, surface, and undersea domains, and denying any potential
adversaries the same advantage. The commander of our newly established
U.S. Second Fleet is dual-hatted as the commander of NATO's Joint Force
Command in Norfolk and is tasked to ensure both headquarters operate
seamlessly to increase Allied maritime domain awareness and capability.
Both headquarters will also synchronize their exercise programs and
operations in the Atlantic to maintain our sea and air lines of
communication. If confirmed, I will undertake a review to ensure Naval
assets are appropriately resourced and postured to contend with threats
posed by Russia.
Question. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the
Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean? Do you believe that NATO and U.S.
force posture need to improve in those areas? If so, what improvements
would you direct or support, if confirmed?
Answer. Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea include
maintaining access to the Mediterranean Sea and facilitating the
defense of the Russian homeland. In the eastern Mediterranean, Russia
seeks to expand power projection capabilities, demonstrate
expeditionary reach to potential partners, and influence a variety of
ongoing diplomatic and regional issues in its favor. Russia's maritime
activities in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean Sea are also
likely intended to maintain pressure as part of its ongoing campaign to
undermine and destabilize Ukraine and Georgia, challenge United States
and allied operations and freedom of maneuver, and to put in place the
necessary pieces to complicate U.S. warfighting operations.
If confirmed, I will make it a high priority to review our force
posture in this region to ensure the strength of our deterrence along
NATO's Eastern and Southern Flanks and our continued mobility in
response to crises.
United States and NATO force posture in the Black Sea and eastern
Mediterranean regions is key in deterring Russian aggression. Just as
Russia's strategic goals in these regions are not static, U.S. and NATO
force posture must be regularly re-assessed to ensure it is making the
intended impacts. If confirmed, I will ensure our force posture is
reviewed, updated and improved as needed.
Question. In your view, does DOD currently have a mature joint
concept of operations to mitigate the challenge of Russian anti-access,
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities? If not, what is needed to ensure U.S.
Forces have operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?
Answer. I understand that the Department is working on development
of a Joint Warfighting Concept. If confirmed, I will review the
progress to date on this effort, and determine what follow-on concept
work is needed to ensure a strategy-driven, joint approach to future
warfighting, including to address the challenges uniquely posed by
Russian anti-access, area denial capabilities.
If confirmed, I will review the Department's progress to date in
developing a Joint Warfighting Concept that ensures United States
Forces have freedom of maneuver in the challenging operating
environment posed by Russian anti-access, area denial capabilities. My
understanding is that the Department's ongoing concept work is focused
on ensuring the effectiveness and resilience of key joint warfighting
functions such as command and control, fires, logistics, and
information advantage; my review will account for these and other areas
as relevant to joint operations against the Russia threat. The United
States must have operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points.
Question. In September 2019, Secretary Esper noted that ``our
adversaries will continue to target our democratic processes'' and that
``influence operations are at a scope and scale never before
imagined.''
Do you agree with these assessments? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, I do. Russia has threatened United States democratic
processes and exerted its malign influence on the world stage.
Operating below the threshold of armed conflict, Russia continues to
target the United States through a number of sophisticated cyber and
information operations, including infiltration of institutions vital to
our democracy. Russia will likely remain a credible threat for years to
come, exploiting the United States' openness and driving wedges between
the United States and its partners in an effort to weaken U.S. standing
and credibility.
Question. In that same speech, Secretary Esper declared ``election
security an enduring mission for the Department of Defense.'' How would
you envision DOD supporting the mission of defending our democratic
processes from interference by foreign adversaries?
Answer. DOD is part of a whole-of-government effort to defend
elections. The FBI leads the U.S. Government's efforts to counter
foreign influence operations, and DHS leads the U.S. Government's
efforts to support state and local governments' election security
efforts. DOD provides DHS and the FBI with insights into adversary
activities. DOD may also provide defense support of civil authorities,
upon request, should a cyber-incident exceed the capacity of another
department or agency.
Question. Do you assess that our actions to date are currently
deterring Russia and other foreign adversaries who wish to interfere in
our elections?
Answer. I have no reason to doubt the assessment of our
Intelligence Community that our foreign adversaries continue to attempt
interference in our election process. If confirmed, I will work with my
interagency counterparts to review ways to improve our deterrence when
it comes to Russia and other adversarial influence operations. This is
a key challenge and one we must do better in addressing.
Ukraine
Question. The Russian attack on Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea in
November 2018 represented a major escalation in Russia's war on
Ukraine. In fiscal year 2019, for the first time, DOD's Ukraine
Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) was used to provide lethal
assistance to Ukraine.
What do you see as the role of United States security assistance in
building the capabilities and capacity of Ukraine to meet its military
requirements to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity?
Answer. United States security assistance efforts to build the
capacity of Ukraine's forces should remain a priority. If confirmed,
and assuming continued progress on governance and anti-corruption
reforms, I will strongly support efforts to provide training,
equipment, and advisory support to help Ukraine's forces preserve the
country's territorial integrity in the face of Russia's continued
aggression.
Question. In your assessment, should a greater proportion of USAI
be dedicated to lethal assistance? What are the obstacles, if any, to
increasing lethal assistance?
Answer. I support the provision of lethal assistance to ensure
Ukraine has the equipment it needs to defend itself. Ukraine also has
critical non-lethal requirements, such as secure communications
equipment, that is funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative (USAI). There is currently a good balance of lethal and non-
lethal assistance to meet Ukraine's capability needs. If confirmed, I
will continue to actively assess Ukraine's security assistance needs
and make adjustments, as necessary.
Question. Do you believe corruption, including but not limited to
the defense sector, is a national security threat to Ukraine?
Answer. Although the United States is currently able to address
Ukraine's most pressing operational needs, lengthy technology release
processes, contracting, and procurement timelines could limit DOD's
ability to provide a greater proportion of more advanced defensive
lethal capabilities through USAI. This is primarily due to the
statutory requirement to obligate half of the USAI funds before the end
of the fiscal year in which they are appropriated.
NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)
Question. KFOR includes approximately 650 U.S. servicemembers. In
your view, what is KFOR's continuing role in maintaining security and
stability in the Western Balkans?
Answer. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has helped maintain a safe and
secure environment in Kosovo and has bolstered stability more broadly
across the Western Balkans. If confirmed, I will assess our KFOR
contributions--in coordination with NATO and the EU--as part of a
broader posture review aimed at ensuring the most effective
distribution of United States Forces and capabilities globally. Our
goal remains a Europe that is secure, democratic, and undivided,
including in the Western Balkans
Question. Do you believe the United States should maintain its
commitment to KFOR?
Answer. I recognize the important role that KFOR continues to play
in bringing stability to the Western Balkans. U.S. contributions to
KFOR are small relative to their impact. If confirmed, I will assess
our KFOR contributions--in coordination with NATO and the EU--as part
of a broader posture review aimed at ensuring the most effective
distribution of U.S. forces and capabilities globally.
Question. Is Russian and Chinese influence increasing or decreasing
in the Western Balkans? What do you believe DOD's role should be, if
any, in countering such influence?
Answer. Malign actors such as Russia and China increasingly attempt
to exploit ethnic tensions, corruption, and weak rule of law in the
Western Balkans through disinformation, cyberattacks, and economic
manipulation. These tactics represent a strategy designed to undermine
regional stability, hinder Euro-Atlantic integration, and secure
critical infrastructure.
Chinese Influence Activities in Europe
Question. The London Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State in
December 2019 recognized that ``China's growing influence and
international policies present both opportunities and challenges that
we need to address together as an Alliance.''
Do you share security concerns about China's growing influence in
the European area, and if so, what role do you see for NATO in
addressing these concerns?
Answer. Yes, China's growing influence and international policies
present challenges in the European area that NATO needs to address. The
Alliance acknowledged China's growing influence in 2019 and finalized a
comprehensive report on China in December 2020, which are important
steps in understanding and addressing the implications of China's rise.
The next step will be the inclusion of China in the Alliance's
forthcoming strategic concept. Among other things, NATO's role should
include intelligence sharing on the risks posed by China, political and
economic coordination (including with the EU), and continuing to help
increase the resilience of Member States, including their critical
infrastructure and secure communications.
united states indo-pacific command (indo-pacom) and china
China
Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA authorized $2.2 billion for the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) to support the stability and
security of the region and deter further Chinese aggression.
Is the current United States Force posture in the Indo-Pacific
region sufficient to support the NDS? How would you propose to
restructure United States security posture in the Indo-Pacific to
counter Chinese aggression, if confirmed? Please explain your answer.
Answer. There's no question that we need a more resilient and
distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China's
counter-intervention capabilities and approaches, supported by new
operational concepts. If confirmed, I'll review our posture in the
Indo-Pacific including our presence, capabilities, logistics,
exercises, infrastructure, and capacity building and cooperation with
allies and partners.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make to implement the NDS and improve the military balance in the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Department to identify
those programs most critical to increasing our military effectiveness
in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure that those programs are
prioritized appropriately.
Question. In your view, will PDI be a useful tool to improve United
States posture in the Indo-Pacific? In your opinion, how could PDI help
gauge progress in improving the adequacy of the United States posture
as it relates to deterring Chinese aggression?
Answer. Yes, I believe PDI will be a useful tool. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with Congress to ensure its effective
implementation.
I believe PDI will help to focus attention on the progress the
United States is making to establish a more distributed and resilient
posture that deters China's aggression and reassures our allies and
partners.
Question. Do you believe that continued, dedicated funding for PDI
is required to support implementation of the NDS in the Indo-Pacific?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe that PDI is an important step as DOD invests in
the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with Congress
to examine how best to ensure sufficient funding for our shared
priority of a distributed and resilient United States Force posture in
the Indo-Pacific region.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with
statutory requirements and Senate Armed Services Committee requests for
detailed funding information concerning future years' plans for PDI?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department provides
detailed funding information for annual PDI investments and complies
with all other statutory requirements.
Question. The size, diversity, and capabilities of China's cruise,
ballistic, and hypervelocity missile forces create significant
asymmetry in the current balance of forces in the Indo-Pacific theater.
How would you assess the threat to United States Forces, bases, and
mission success from Chinese missile forces? How would you evaluate our
ability to address such threats? In your assessment, what U.S.
investments, concepts of operations, and posture shifts are required to
address this threat?
Answer. China's military modernization--including in cruise,
ballistic, and hypersonic missiles--coupled with its aggressive and
coercive actions, presents an increasingly urgent challenge to our
vital interests in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. We
will need to continue to strengthen our force posture in the region,
making it more resilient, including through investments in capabilities
and new operational concepts. The Biden administration will view China
as our most serious global competitor and, from a defense perspective,
the pacing threat in most areas.
If confirmed, I will further focus the Department on China,
including the growing missile threat. I will begin by taking stock of
the broad range of activities and investments the Department has made
in recent years, include investments to maintain our technological
advantage and the development of new concepts and capabilities to
counter China across the spectrum of conflict; updates to United States
Force posture in the region, including through the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative; and efforts to strengthen our alliances and partnerships.
I'll seek to understand how my predecessors have risen to the China
challenge and then chart a course for the Department's next steps.
If confirmed, I will carefully review the Department's investments,
concept and capability development, force posture, and alliances to
address the threat from China before determining the next phases of the
Department's work in this vital area.
Question. In developing the Joint Multi-Domain Operational Concept
for the Indo-Pacific theater, the INDO-PACOM Commander, the Joint
Chiefs, and Secretary of Defense Esper endorsed a major role for Army
and Marine Corps ground forces operating within the first island chain
as part of the contact and blunt layers.
What are your views at this time on these plans?
Answer. Army and Marine Corps forces are an important component of
United States Force posture in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Joint Staff, Army, and Marine Corps to
continue development of their operating concepts as part of the
Department's overall strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Question. In your assessment, does DOD need to invest in a wider
range of primary bases as well as alternate operating locations
throughout the Indo-Pacific? Do we need a more forward-deployed
military posture in the Indo-Pacific theater?
Answer. There's no question that we need a more resilient and
distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China's
counter-intervention capabilities, supported by new operational
concepts. If confirmed, I'll review our posture in the Indo-Pacific
from all aspects including presence, capabilities, logistics,
exercises, infrastructure, and capacity building and cooperation with
allies and partners.
If confirmed, I'll review our posture in the Indo-Pacific from all
aspects including presence, capabilities, logistics, exercises,
infrastructure, and capacity building and cooperation with allies and
partners.
Question. What is your assessment of the current military balance
across the Taiwan Strait? If confirmed, what would you do to assist
Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the current military
balance across the Taiwan Strait. President-elect Biden has said many
times that United States support for Taiwan must remain strong,
principled, and bipartisan, in line with longstanding American
commitments to the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the
Six Assurances. We will continue to support a peaceful resolution of
cross-strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of
the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will also ensure the United
States meets our commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining a
sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so increases stability both
across the Taiwan Strait and within the region. At the same time, we
will further buttress peace and stability by developing new concepts
and capabilities to strengthen our own deterrent in the region.
Bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress is critical, and I look
forward to working with Members on this crucial issue.
President-elect Biden has said many times that United States
support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in
line with longstanding American commitments to the Three Communiques,
the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to
support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with
the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
will ensure the United States meets our commitment to assist Taiwan in
maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so increases
stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the region. At the
same time, we will further buttress peace and stability by developing
new concepts and capabilities to strengthen our own deterrent in the
region. Bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress is critical, and I
look forward to working with Members on this crucial issue.
Question. Should the United States revisit or change its ``one
China'' policy, in your view?
Answer. President-elect Biden has said many times that United
States support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and
bipartisan, in line with longstanding American commitments to the Three
Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances.
Question. In furtherance of its stated intent to possess almost 100
more ships than the United States Navy by 2030, China has launched a
massive shipbuilding program. Although all of China's Navy will be
focused on the Indo-Pacific, the United States maintains only about 60
percent of its fleet in the Pacific.
In your assessment, how should the United States adapt to this
shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. China's military modernization, coupled with its aggressive
and coercive actions, presents an increasingly urgent challenge to our
vital interests in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. The
Biden administration will view China as our most serious global
competitor and, from a defense perspective, the pacing threat in most
areas. If confirmed, I will further focus the Department on China and
work to identify and prioritize those programs most critical to
maintaining a favorable maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific. That will
include investing to maintain our technological advantage and
developing new concepts and capabilities to counter China across the
spectrum of conflict; updating United States Force posture in the
region, including through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative; and
strengthening our alliances and partnerships
The Korean Peninsula
Question. How would you describe the value to U.S. national
security interests of the United States-South Korea alliance and what
is the significance of resolving the Special Measures Agreement between
the United States and the Republic of Korea?
Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance is the
linchpin of peace and security in the region. It is among the most
combined, interoperable, capable, and dynamic bilateral alliances in
the world, and is a robust deterrent to aggression on the Korean
Peninsula. Strengthening America's alliances will be at the center of
President-elect Biden's foreign policy and national security strategy.
Having built coalitions and fought alongside our allies for decades, I
consider our unparalleled network of allies and partners one of our
greatest strategic advantages--and the foundation of our position as a
Pacific power. If confirmed, I will focus on modernizing our alliances
throughout the Indo-Pacific and will seek the early conclusion of cost
sharing negotiations with South Korea as part of those efforts.
Question. Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational
control from the United States to the Republic of Korea should be
conditions-based? If confirmed, what threshold requirements for
transfer of control would you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the status of Operational
Control (OPCON) transfer from the United States to the Republic of
Korea (ROK), including the bilaterally approved ``Conditions-based
OPCON Transition Plan'' (COT-P) signed in 2015.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD should
take to improve United States and allied defenses against North Korea's
missile capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the full range of current and
proposed activities to enhance United States and allied defenses
against North Korea's missile capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that United States
Forces Korea has the capability to defeat weapons of mass destruction
sites in North Korea and how would you involve the United States
interagency in such actions?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the necessary
military requirements for our major operational plans, including on the
Korean peninsula. I will also work with partners across the
interagency--to include the State Department, Treasury Department, the
Department of Energy and the Intelligence Community--as well as
regional partners and allies--including Japan and the Republic of
Korea--to forge a comprehensive approach to addressing the North Korea
nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and cyber threats.
Question. DOD policy constraining the use of certain cluster
munitions went into effect on December 31, 2018. How will these
constraints affect the ability of the United States military to meet
requirements on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the necessary
military requirements for our major operational plans, including on the
Korean peninsula.
India
Question. If confirmed, how would you enhance the overall defense
relationship between the United States and India? What priorities would
you establish?
Answer. If confirmed, my overarching objective for our defense
relationship with India would be to continue elevating the partnership.
I would further operationalize India's ``Major Defense Partner'' status
and continue to build upon existing strong defense cooperation to
ensure the United States and Indian militaries can collaborate to
address shared interests. I would also seek to deepen and broaden our
defense cooperation through the Quad security dialogue and other
regional multilateral engagements.
united states northern command (northcom)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Question. Civil authorities may request DOD support for domestic
disasters and certain counter-drug operations as well as in managing
the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass
destruction.
In your view, are the procedures by which Federal, State, and local
agencies request DOD support efficient, effective, and timely?
Answer. Yes, I understand these procedures are well-documented and
field-tested. Federal, State, and local agencies plan together to
prepare for and respond to major disasters, emergencies, and security
events and then put these plans and procedures to the test in
exercises. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to review these
plans and procedures and evaluate how well the Department of Defense
has incorporated lessons learned regarding Federal, State, and local
requests for assistance.
Question. What factors should be considered in determining whether
DOD will provide support to a civil authority?
Answer. Consistent with the law and DOD policy, DOD considers six
factors: (1) legality (would providing the requested support comply
with law?); (2) lethality (does the requested support involve the
potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces?); (3) risk
(would providing the requested support pose an unacceptable risk to the
safety of DOD forces?); (4) cost (will DOD be reimbursed for the
support and what effect will providing the support have on the DOD
budget?); (5) appropriateness (would providing the requested support be
appropriate and in DOD's interest?); and (6) readiness (how will
providing the requested support impact DOD's ability to perform its
other primary missions?).
Question. In your view, what missions and tasks are appropriate for
execution by members of the Armed Forces charged to provide support to
civil authorities in countering a civil disturbance or, when directed,
to provide support under sections 251, 252, or 253 of title 10, U.S.
Code?
Answer. I would not want to prejudge potential actions necessary to
support civil authorities. In accordance with sections 251, 252, or 253
of Title 10, U.S. Code, National Guard members called into Federal
service and members of the Armed Forces may be used as the President
considers necessary to: (a) suppress an insurrection (Section 251), (b)
enforce the laws of the United States or to suppress a rebellion
(Section 252); or (c) suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy. The missions and tasks
assigned must be appropriate to the specific circumstances and risks
involved and consistent with the law. If confirmed, I will ensure that
the President receives my best advice and that National Guard members
called into Federal service and members of the Armed Forces carry out
missions and tasks that are appropriate, compliant with the law, and
appropriately respectful of rights and civil liberties.
Question. In your view, what is the efficacy of DOD's response to
the COVID-19 pandemic? How could DOD's response be improved, in your
view, and what role would you envision as appropriate for DOD in
response to future pandemics?
Answer. DOD has an important supporting role in our nation's fight
against the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Health and Human
Services is the lead Federal agency, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency is the lead Federal coordinating agency. DOD has
contributed thousands of military and civilian personnel, equipment,
and supplies to our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. I
consider this mission my most immediate priority. If confirmed, I will
actively review the status of DOD's support and DOD's protection of its
personnel and look for opportunities to make improvements.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's role in producing and
distributing COVID-19 vaccines? Are there particular functions or types
of support that you believe DOD to be uniquely capable of executing?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD has been a major
contributor to Operation Warp Speed's efforts to produce and distribute
COVID-19 vaccines. If confirmed, I will review DOD's support to
identify opportunities to continue or enhance this support.
DOD's major contribution is capacity. For example, medical
personnel are not unique to DOD, but DOD medical capacity filled the
gaps when hospitals were overwhelmed. Additionally, while DOD is not
the only agency that can procure critical equipment and supplies, DOD
logistical capability helped deliver critical equipment and supplies
where they were most needed, including: personal protective equipment
(PPE); medical equipment; ventilators; masks; N95 respirators; medical
gowns; gloves; test kits; test components; hand sanitizer; food; and
fuel
The Arctic
Question. What threat do Russian and Chinese activities in the
Arctic pose to United States interests?
Answer. Climate change is drastically altering the natural
environment of the Arctic--and the strategic balance. This is fast
becoming a region of geopolitical competition, and I have serious
concerns about the Russian military buildup and aggressive behavior in
the Arctic--and around the world. Likewise, I am deeply concerned about
Chinese intentions in the region. If confirmed, I will assess the
situation and consult allies and partners on the strategy, posture, and
equipment required to ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to
protect the Homeland, our economic interests, and deter aggression.
Question. In your view, what are the implications of Russian
infrastructure investments in the Arctic for U.S. and allied security
interests?
Answer. The United States has a long history of cooperation with
Russia in the Arctic region, and it is my hope that can continue. I
have serious concerns, however, about the Russian military buildup in
the region and Russia's aggressive conduct in the Arctic and around the
world, as well as the importance of protecting the global commons and
international law in the region. If confirmed, I pledge to review
United States posture, strategy, and equipment for the full range of
Arctic defense missions, and to ensure that our strategy toward Russia
is coherent and effective.
Question. In your view, are current U.S. and allied ports in the
region sufficient to achieve U.S. defense interests in the Arctic?
Answer. I have not yet reviewed the full U.S. posture in the
Arctic, or that of our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will assess
the situation and consult allies and partners on the strategy and
posture required to ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to
protect the Homeland, our economic interests, and deter aggression.
united states southern command (southcom)
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
President to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the
SOUTHCOM AOR?
Answer. The United States must leverage all instruments of national
power to counter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in SOUTHCOM. DOD
has an important role in demonstrating American values and military
culture in the region. Strong bilateral and multilateral defense
partnerships, enabled by engagements and presence, intelligence and
information exchanges, and educational programs and exercises, are
necessary tools to minimize the influence of malign actors in the
hemisphere.
Question. Do you believe these influences threaten hemispheric
security and prosperity?
Answer. Russia, Cuba, and China are actively seeking opportunities
to deepen their political, economic, and security influence in the
hemisphere. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
for Policy, the SOUTHCOM Commander, and other U.S. Government agencies
to ensure we are able to check and counter the negative influence of
these countries.
Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by Section 1045 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18, 2020), and
required by Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Individuals in the custody or
control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any
interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to
interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field
Manual.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD detainee
operations and interrogations comply strictly with these standards?
Answer. If confirmed, I would exercise leadership to ensure that
DOD detainee operations and interrogations comply strictly with these
standards and are in keeping with our values. I would emphasize the
need for the continued safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of
detainees. I would also work through the Combatant Commanders to ensure
that DOD policies on the humane treatment of detainees continue to be
effectively implemented in military operations, including the
requirements to report, investigate, and, where appropriate, take
corrective action with respect to any suspected or alleged incidents of
detainee maltreatment.
Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
facility at Guantanamo?
Answer. I believe it is time for the detention facility at
Guantanamo to close its doors. If confirmed, I would direct my staff to
work with other Administration officials to develop a path forward for
the remaining 40 detainees at the facility. Until that time, however,
the Department must ensure the continued safe, humane, and legal care
and treatment of detainees through Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-
GTMO).
Question. Do you believe the U.S. Government should be keeping
detainees in long term detention, without charges or prosecution? In
your view, under what circumstances would such long-term detention be
appropriate?
Answer. Guantanamo has provided us the capability to conduct law of
war detention in order to keep our enemies off the battlefield, but I
believe it is time for the detention facility at Guantanamo to close.
My understanding is that the Biden-Harris administration does not
intend to bring new detainees to the facility and will seek to close
it.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
reinvigorate the Periodic Review Board (PRB) process established by
Executive Order 13567, Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I would reinvigorate the review process using
available information to determine whether a detainee no longer poses a
continuing significant threat to the security of the United States and
whether there is a suitable country to which to transfer such a
detainee. The Periodic Review Board Process is currently the best means
available for making such determinations in a systematic manner. If the
PRB process concludes that the threat from individual detainees may be
sufficiently mitigated, then the U.S. Government should identify
options for the transfer of such detainees to other countries that have
provided credible security assurances in accordance with applicable
legal and policy requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
address the cases of detainees already recommended by a PRB for
transfer from Guantanamo to another nation?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the PRB process. If the PRB
process concludes that the threat from individual detainees may be
sufficiently mitigated with appropriate security assurances, then the
U.S. Government should consider the transfer of such detainees to other
countries that have provided credible security assurances in accordance
with applicable legal and policy requirements.
Question. Will you commit to notifying Congress if a decision is
made to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo before any such transfer
occurs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues
to notify Congress as required by law.
Question. In your view, what standard of care should govern the
physical and mental health services provided to detainees at
Guantanamo, particularly as the detainee population ages?
Answer. The health and well-being of the detainees at Guantanamo
are an important part of the mission of JTF-GTMO. Accordingly, U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), through JTF-GTMO, provides adequate and
humane care for the detainees at Guantanamo that complies with the
standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As the
detainee population ages and detainees experience chronic medical
conditions, it will remain Department policy to protect the life and
health of detainees by humane and appropriate clinical means, and in
accordance with all applicable law and DOD policy.
Cuba
Question. Under what conditions would you recommend the
establishment of military-to-military engagement between the United
States and Cuba?
Answer. The United States military maintains only limited contacts
through longstanding, practical meetings regarding routine issues at
the Guantanamo Naval Station and between the United States Coast Guard
and its Cuban counterparts. The limited nature of this engagement is
due in large part to the Cuban regime's continued suppression of the
rights and freedoms of the Cuban people and ongoing efforts in support
of the Venezuelan dictatorship.
Venezuela
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Venezuela and to what degree is the illegitimate Maduro regime
dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?
Answer. President-elect Biden has repeatedly condemned Maduro, who
he described as a ``dictator, pure and simple.'' The dictatorship is
the principal reason for the deep humanitarian crisis facing the
country. External actors have indeed helped prop the regime against the
wishes of the Venezuelan people.
Question. What would be the threshold condition at which you would
recommend United States military action in Venezuela, if confirmed?
Answer. I believe DOD should play a supporting role in a whole-of-
government and multilateral effort to encourage a peaceful transition
of power in Venezuela
Counternarcotics Activities
Question. DOD serves as lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing
toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD expends nearly $1
billion to build the counternarcotics capacity of U.S. Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies and certain foreign governments.
Do you believe that the U.S. broadly, and the U.S. military more
narrowly, have been effective in achieving their counternarcotics
objectives?
Answer. I understand that DOD's main role is supporting interagency
and international partners, and that DOD support has helped in the
interdiction of drugs headed toward the United States, as well as
denied revenue to criminal organizations and others who profit from
drug trafficking. If confirmed, I will review these efforts and
recommend adjustments as appropriate
Question. What changes, if any, should be made to DOD's
counternarcotics strategy and supporting activities?
Answer. It would be premature for me to recommend changes at this
time. If confirmed, I will assess our goals and activities and
recommend adjustments as appropriate.
Question. Corruption and the absence of the rule of law enable the
Northern Triangle narcotics trade that contributes to the flow of
illegal drugs into the United States.
In your view, what should be DOD's role in countering the flow of
narcotics to nations other than the United States?
Answer. Our primary focus should be on the flow of drugs headed to
the United States, including the flow that passes through the Northern
Triangle countries, bringing criminal activity and instability in its
wake. DOD should leverage its military capabilities and expertise as
appropriate to help our partners in the region disrupt drug-trafficking
networks operating in and around their territory.
Question. How, if at all, should U.S. security assistance be scoped
to address factors at the root of counternarcotics trafficking, in your
opinion?
Answer. In coordination with other U.S. Government departments and
agencies, the Department should assist partner nations in developing
capabilities and strengthening defense institutions that respond to
their specific security challenges. Focusing our limited resources on
those countries that are major drug-producing or transit countries
while empowering them to create stable conditions at home and improve
security within their region makes it less likely that drug-trafficking
networks can thrive.
u.s. space force and u.s. space command (spacecom)
Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
both economically and militarily--from the Global Positioning System on
which many industrial and military capabilities rely, to the missile
warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power
competitors are making concerted efforts to leap ahead of U.S.
technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting
domain. Congress created a new Military Service, the Space Force,
within the Department of the Air Force, and a unified Space Command, to
deal with the challenges stemming from the fact that space is now a
contested domain upon which the terrestrial forces of the United States
and peer competitors are highly reliant for support.
Do you believe that the creation of the Space Force and SPACECOM
was warranted? If so, do you recommend changes in the structure,
authorities, and missions of these organizations?
Answer. The decisions to create the U.S. Space Force and the U.S.
Space Command reflect recommendations and advice of multiple
independent commissions and studies regarding how to adapt our defense
space enterprise to the growing security challenges in space. The
House, the Senate, and multiple Administrations have examined these
questions over several years, leading to support for creating the U.S.
Space Force and the U.S. Space Command.
Congress provided in statute that there should be a civilian
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, an Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, and the Space
Force Acquisition Council, among other changes. These officials and
organizations will have an important role in ensuring that we maintain
appropriate civilian oversight with respect to our military activities
in space, and make decisions that enhance innovation and allocate
resources effectively and in a timely manner. If confirmed, I will
assess the current structure to ensure the defense space enterprise is
postured to advance our national security objectives most effectively.
Establishing the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed
Forces and the U.S. Space Command as the eleventh unified combatant
command are significant organizational changes within the Department of
Defense. Looking ahead, the DOD space enterprise is still not well-
integrated with other Services and terrestrial commands, and there are
several other challenges that will need to be addressed, as would be
expected when establishing a brand new military service and new unified
combatant command. If confirmed, I will assess the structure,
authorities, and missions of these organizations, as well as their
relationship with other stakeholders within the Department of Defense
Question. In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the
strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space? If
confirmed, what changes would you make to the NDS regarding the space
domain?
Answer. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) assesses the
strategic environment accurately by highlighting great power
competition with China and Russia and the importance of working with
our allies and partners. The 2020 Defense Space Strategy provides
additional detail on the growing space and counterspace threats posed
by China and Russia and the extent to which our national security and
prosperity require unfettered access to and freedom to operate in the
space domain. Since the NDS was developed, the recognition of the
central role space plays in supporting other services in their
warfighting role continues to grow. If confirmed, I will ensure the
space domain is carefully considered across the range of upcoming
strategic reviews.
The strategic environment continues to evolve rapidly, especially
as it applies to space. If confirmed, I would review changes to the
strategic environment since 2018, and address significant shifts in the
development of the next National Defense Strategy. For space in
particular, I would account for the continued growth of adversary space
and counterspace capabilities, as well as the adequacy of the steps the
United States has taken to improve the DOD space enterprise to address
growing threats and challenges in the domain. I would also emphasize
the role of resilience in improving our warfighting capability, the
role of allies and partners, and space-related information sharing.
Lastly, I would highlight growing commercial activities in space which
can both be threats to and opportunities for the United States.
Question. In your view, what will ``great power competition'' look
like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia's
activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to
United States national security interests?
Answer. Space is already an arena of great power competition.
Chinese and Russian space activities present serious and growing
threats to United States national security interests. Chinese and
Russian military doctrines also indicate that they view space as
critical to modern warfare and consider the use of counterspace
capabilities as both a means of reducing United States military
effectiveness and for winning future wars. Addressing these challenges
in the space domain is central to ``great power competition'' more
generally. While Russia is a key adversary, China is the pacing threat.
Given the importance of space in affecting our economic
competitiveness, it is essential to continue developing best practices,
standards, and international norms of behavior in space. Development of
global norms of behavior in space will also deter threatening behavior,
and uphold the rights of all nations to use space responsibly and
peacefully.
Question. Are other nation-states or actors operating in space that
you perceive as a risk to the United States, or as cause for concern?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. Although not on the same order of magnitude of threat as
Chinese and Russian capabilities, space-related threats from Iran and
North Korea, such as jamming of satellite communications and GPS
signals, are also growing, and hold United States space capabilities at
risk. Both countries also maintain independent space launch
capabilities, which can serve as avenues for testing ballistic missile
technologies. Other countries not considered adversaries or hostile to
United States interests are conducting space activities of concern, and
there are few norms or guidelines to dictate how it should be done.
This lack of transparency in the space domain is a risk to U.S assets
and cause for concern. Last but not least, growing private activities
in space (according to some projections, there will be as many as
54,000 new satellites in orbit in the next decade, mostly privately-
owned and operated) are a risk to the United States in the sense that
the government needs to ensure that they do not collide with expensive
and exquisitely capable government assets.
Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
the 2018 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain
of space?
Answer. If confirmed, I would want to understand, as a first
priority, the state of our military readiness, including space
readiness, in particular resilience, vis-a-vis priority threats, in
light of U.S. strategic objectives. If confirmed, I would seek to
assess whether major DOD space-related investments and ongoing
organizational changes, including the creation of the U.S. Space Force
and the U.S. Space Command, are improving the readiness of forces
across all domains to protect and secure our Homeland and U.S.
interests abroad and are advancing the development and employment of
spacepower for the Nation.
Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
our national security space satellites and commercial space systems
owned by U.S. companies?
Answer. The growth of Chinese and Russian counterspace arsenals
presents the most immediate and serious threats to United States,
allied, and partner space activities. Iran and North Korea have also
demonstrated some counterspace capabilities that could pose a threat to
militaries using space-based services. As with commercial services in
other domains, like airlift, sealift, and cloud computing, we should
not expect adversaries to discriminate between military and commercial
satellites that support the military, whether in peacetime competition
or in the event of a conflict.
Question. Do you support the development of offensive and defensive
space systems to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
Answer. Other nations are contesting the ability of the United
States and its allies to operate in space. A balance of offensive and
defensive capabilities, as well as resilient architectures, are
essential to any credible strategy to deter hostile action and protect
vital U.S. interests should conflict extend to space
Question. If confirmed, what guidance would you give the Commander,
SPACECOM to lead Joint Force operations and activities in the space
warfighting domain?
Answer. If confirmed, I would see that the Commander, U.S. Space
Command, is prepared to protect and defend U.S. interests in space as
the President may direct and in a manner consistent with law, including
our obligations under relevant international law. SPACECOM must have a
deep understanding of Russian and Chinese doctrine, strategy and
tactics. The command must be able to protect and defend U.S. interests,
and in particular be able to manage escalation and crises in space. I
would also direct that DOD space activities contribute actively to
shaping a space domain that is secure, stable, and accessible and to
deterring threatening or irresponsible behavior in space. This would
require that in addition to nurturing technology innovation in-house
for resilience, SPACECOM work within the Department and across the
government to build strong alliances in space, develop norms and
standards of behavior, and increase partnerships with commercial space
entities. Lastly, the commander should emphasize not just wartime roles
of space warfighting, but also peacetime roles of ensuring access to
space for the U.S. and our allies.
Question. What is your vision for including the Reserve Components
as a part of the U.S. Space Force and as contributors to Joint Force
space operations?
Answer. Reserve and National Guard units and personnel provide
strategic and technical depth for U.S. space operations today. If
confirmed, I will review the appropriate organizational structure for
the U.S. Space Force Reserve Component in order to design a flexible
and forward-looking organization able to compete for the best talent
and meet the needs of a twenty-first century military service.
Question. Does the national security space enterprise need a
revised approach to space-related acquisition, in your assessment? How
would you propose to improve and streamline space acquisition, if
confirmed?
Answer. In recent months, there has been guidance on improving the
national security space enterprise. Congress has given DOD authority to
create a single space acquisition executive. New acquisitions
organizations such as the Space Development Agency and the Space Rapid
Capabilities Office, among others, have been established. I believe the
Department's processes, including its acquisition system, must continue
to evolve regardless of domain or mission to become more agile so that
we can strengthen warfighting effectiveness and resilience of current
systems, better leverage technology, innovation, and partnership
opportunities, rapidly deploy future capabilities, and dynamically
adapt to changes in the threat and strategic environment. Together with
civil space agencies with whom the Department shares a common
industrial base, it needs to leverage innovation and cost-effective
investments driven by the private sector, presenting opportunities for
collaboration to develop innovative capabilities with a more
streamlined and responsive acquisition process.
If confirmed, I would continue to work with Congress to refine the
Department's acquisition innovation initiatives, including the Adaptive
Acquisition Framework, to accelerate delivery of operational
capability, effectively reduce program risk, and enhance the nation's
ability to respond to an evolving and ever more capable threat. The
Department needs to give new space acquisition organizations (such as
the Space Development Agency and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office
among others) the opportunity to succeed, and at the same time, review
the performance of and reorganize and improve legacy organization for
management of space acquisitions (such as the Space and Missile Systems
Center). I will also look to models of and best practices for efficient
acquisition outside the Department.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
technology is appropriately incorporated into Space Development Agency
products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels?
Answer. The Department bears an important responsibility to balance
the unique latency, accuracy and reliability needs of the warfighter
with the affordability and flexibility offered by commercial space
technology to efficiently guarantee mission accomplishment on a global
scale. The Space Development Agency is actively pursuing solutions
based on commercially available technology. USSPACECOM incorporates
commercial technology across nearly all elements of its mission set. If
confirmed, I intend to support this and will encourage SDA and SPACECOM
to pursue leveraging commercial technology via commercial services and
by capitalizing on commercial investments and technology advancements
and integrating them into Government-owned and operated systems.
cybersecurity and u.s. cyber command (cybercom)
Question. In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full
operational capability. In September 2018, DOD released its 2018 Cyber
Strategy. The strategy charges DOD to ``defend forward, shape the day-
to-day competition, and prepare for war''.
What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in
defending the nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law enforcement
communities?
Answer. In order to defend the nation from an attack in cyberspace,
the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) conducts ``defend forward'' operations
against attacks in cyberspace to disrupt or halt malicious cyber
activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level
of armed conflict. I believe the Department can effectively defend
forward in three ways: generating insights about the threat based on
our activity outside U.S. networks; enabling better defenses by
leveraging those insights to help its interagency, industry, and
international partners; and, acting when necessary to disrupt adversary
cyber actors. DOD may also provide defense support of civil
authorities, upon request, should a cyber-incident exceed the capacity
of another department or agency.
The Homeland security and law enforcement communities operate under
authorities that are domestically aligned, whereas DOD focuses on
foreign State and non-state actors that threaten the interests of the
United States. DOD is in constant collaboration with the Cybersecurity
& Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation sharing information and threat intelligence that are
critical in this whole-of-government approach to defending the Nation
from an attack in cyberspace.
Question. How will the ``defend forward, shape the day-to-day
competition, and prepare for war'' concepts deter and disrupt Russia
and China in cyberspace?
Answer. China and Russia are conducting persistent malicious cyber
campaigns to erode United States military advantages, threaten our
infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity. I believe the
Department must effectively counter these campaigns by taking proactive
action to: generate insights about the adversary's cyber operations and
capabilities; enable its interagency, industry, and international
partners to create better defenses, and; acting, when necessary, to
disrupt adversary cyber actors and halt malicious activities.
Question. Congress passed legislation recognizing that clandestine
military operations in cyberspace below the threshold of armed conflict
may be conducted as traditional military activities under title 10,
U.S. Code. In addition, the Trump Administration promulgated National
Security Presidential Memorandum-13, which streamlined the process for
proposing, evaluating, and approving cyber operations below the
threshold of armed conflict. These reforms have enabled CYBERCOM to
implement its strategy of persistent engagement and defending forward
in cyberspace.
What are your views on these reforms and their impact?
Answer. These reforms were adopted in response to our adversaries'
rapidly evolving and growing malicious cyber activity. I understand
these reforms have enabled DOD to develop and employ timely, well-
coordinated, and risk-managed cyber-effects operations and have made
positive contributions to our ability to perform our missions in and
through cyberspace effectively. If confirmed I will review these
changes and adjust accordingly if need be.
Question. If confirmed, what role should DOD and the Cyber Mission
Force have in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
conducted via social media?
Answer. The DOD and the Cyber Mission Force play a supporting role
in greater whole-of-government efforts to combat foreign influence
operations. In cooperation and coordination with interagency partners,
the DOD may bring a number of capabilities and authorities to bear--
relative to the circumstances of a particular foreign effort. DOD tools
can include cyber effects operations, military information support
operations, public outreach, and others. Using combinations of these
capabilities in concert with the interagency, I understand the DOD can
combat both foreign technical means and also the foreign narrative
carried over those technical means.
Question. What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force have in
anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on commercial
entities?
Answer. While not centrally a DOD issue, through a series of
partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and sector-specific agencies, DOD supports efforts to anticipate,
prevent, and respond to significant cyber incidents on commercial
entities. For example, as the lead for the Defense Industrial Base
(DIB), DOD helps protect those commercial companies DOD relies on by
fostering a cyber-threat information sharing partnership to enhance
their cybersecurity capabilities. The DOD should continue to look for
ways to better integrate with interagency partners and the private
sector.
Question. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S.
Cyber Command should be dual-hatted? What are the ``pros'' and ``cons''
of this arrangement, in your view? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that in 2016 Secretary Carter and Director
Clapper made the recommendation to split the two organizations, once
U.S. Cyber Command was mature enough to do so, and that the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must certify
that the six conditions stated in the fiscal year 2017 and Fiscal Year
2020 NDAAs must first be met. If confirmed, I would study this question
closely to ensure that any decision concerning the dual-hat leadership
arrangement between the Director of the National Security Agency and
the Commander U.S Cyber Command is fully informed by thorough analysis
and mitigates potential risks to national security and to the
operational effectiveness of U.S. Cyber Command and the National
Security Agency. If confirmed, I will work with General Nakasone and
the Chairman to ensure U.S. Cyber Command has the resources it needs to
ultimately meet these maturity requirements.
My understanding is that past Secretaries of Defense directed
multiple internal and external assessments regarding the future of the
dual hat arrangement. When U.S. Cyber Command was established, the
Department believed the dual hat arrangement enabled more effective
direction and cooperation in cyberspace, in developing intelligence to
support those operations, in sharing capabilities such as the
cryptologic platform, and in sharing expertise. In the ten years since
U.S. Cyber Command was established, operating and intelligence forces
have increased in capability and capacity, and the pace of operations
has steadily increased. I understand there are clear benefits to this
arrangement. For example, one leader controlling both organizations
provides agility and seamless coordination, however, it also may
generate risk to both organizations as that same leader is called on to
balance priorities of each role and respond to multiple chains of
command. If confirmed, I will assess, in coordination with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence,
the pros and cons of this arrangement, in addition to the six
conditions the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA states as needing to be met prior
to any certification of the decoupling of the dual-hat. Only after
making those assessments would I be prepared to fully answer this
question, and make any recommendations on the matter.
Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
improve cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce? How would you
empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD
cybersecurity?
Answer. Cybersecurity is central to military readiness and
underpins the Department's imperative to secure its critical classified
and unclassified information, as well as technologies and programs that
enable the lethality of the joint force. If confirmed, I will do two
key things. 1) I will drive efforts to recruit, train, and retain our
cyber workforce more effectively to better defend our networks. 2) I
will improve cybersecurity training, personal responsibility and
awareness for the entire workforce. My vision also includes achieving a
basic level of digital competency and awareness of artificial
intelligence and machine learning capabilities for the majority of our
workforce to improve the ability of the Department to make data
informed decisions.
The Department has created and implemented a Network Cybersecurity
Accountability Scorecard to show a specific component's progress in
addressing and mitigating key cyber risks to DOD's networks and
information systems. Additionally, the Department is developing and
piloting a weapons cybersecurity accountability scorecard which will
assess selected critical platforms associated with critical defense
missions and the Cyber Risk Mitigation Tool to prioritize and track
vulnerabilities and mitigations of weapon systems and critical
infrastructure. If confirmed, I will ensure these tools meet the
Department's needs for improving our cybersecurity performance and will
hold senior leaders accountable for improvements in cybersecurity for
information systems, critical warfighting platforms, and infrastructure
across each DOD Component.
Question. In your opinion, what characteristics of a cyberattack
would constitute an ``act of war''? Do you consider the recent malware
campaign involving SolarWinds to be an ``act of war or an espionage
operation that falls within de facto norms? In your view, does the
nature and scope of this intrusion operation merit a strong and
tangible response? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Whether a particular cyber activity may be considered an
``act of war'' requires a case-by-case and fact-specific determination.
For example, malicious cyber activities could result in injury, death,
or significant property destruction. These activities would need to be
considered in their totality.
I understand from a joint statement released by FBI, CISA, ODNI,
and NSA that the SolarWinds malware campaign appeared primarily to be
an intelligence gathering effort.
There's still a lot more to learn about this breach, but one thing
is clear--as President-elect Biden has stated, those responsible for
the breach will be held responsible; our adversaries must know that we
will not stand idly by in the face of malicious cyber-attacks on our
nation.
Any intrusion operation is of great concern to the security of our
systems and country. The investigation into the scope of the SolarWinds
compromise is ongoing. This is a whole-of-government effort, and I
would expect the response will reflect that. If confirmed, I will
ensure DOD, in support of the USG-wide effort, takes necessary steps to
understand the full scope of this campaign. President-elect Biden has
stated that the U.S. will impose ``substantial costs'' on those
responsible for such malicious attacks, including actions in
coordination with our allies and partners
While it does not seem yet that DOD was compromised in the
SolarWinds malware campaign, many other critical organizations across
the government were actively compromised for the better part of a year,
and it took a private sector company to detect the intrusion and alert
the government.
Question. What do you conclude from this about the state of our
cyber defenses?
Answer. This is an unfolding incident, but the information
available today is greatly concerning, as it impacts a wide swath of
American public and private networks. Consistent with President-elect
Biden's remarks, I believe we must elevate cybersecurity as an
imperative across the government in order to defend the American people
and U.S. critical infrastructure. Additionally, the government must
continue to strengthen its partnership with the private sector to
foster greater information sharing and collaboration.
u.s. special operations command (socom)
Question. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, successive NDAAs have
empowered the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to serve as a ``service secretary-
like'' civilian official for special operations forces. Among other
reforms, the law defines the administrative chain of command for
USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense
for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special
operations forces.
What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
implementing the ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities of the
ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. I understand that the Department has taken concrete steps
to institutionalize these reforms, to include significant steps in the
past few months. If confirmed, I will review the Department's progress
to ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) has sufficient
authorities to execute his or her Military Department Secretary-like
responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to fully implementing
these reforms?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to implementing fully the reforms
intended to strengthen the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) within the
administrative chain of command for USSOCOM and to provide appropriate
oversight of special operations activities (including oversight of
policy and resources). I strongly support the role of the ASD(SO/LIC)
in providing civilian oversight for special operations activities and
in matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of
special operations forces.
Question. In your view, does the ASD(SOLIC) require additional
authorities and resources, including additional civilian personnel, to
administer oversight of special operations forces?
Answer. I understand that the Department has recently taken steps
to provide the ASD(SO/LIC) with additional delegated authorities and
resources to administer oversight of special operations forces. The
recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act also includes
legislation further strengthening the ASD(SO/LIC)'s authorities in this
area. If confirmed, I will review the authorities and resources of the
office of the ASD(SO/LIC) and recommend any necessary adjustments to
help enable the ASD(SO/LIC) to execute his or her statutory
responsibilities effectively.
Violent Extremist Organizations
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to United States
interests posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates
and adherents? Which group, in your view, presents the greatest threat
to the United States?
Answer. Violent extremist organizations continue to pose a threat
to U.S. interests around the globe through robust networks of
affiliates and adherents. Although continued pressure from the United
States and its Allies and partners has helped prevent these groups from
attacking the U.S. Homeland, these groups present localized and
regional insurgent threats to our partners and direct threats to U.S.
interests. The proliferation of this radical ideology across the
internet has expanded the reach of these fringe groups, threatening the
Homeland and inciting violence within the borders of our closest allies
and partners.
For more than two decades, al Qaeda has been at war with the United
States, continually working to attack, disrupt, and destabilize U.S.
interests and Western influence. Although the al Qaeda brand has
suffered over the past 20 years, due in large part to efforts by DOD,
there remains a dedicated network of al Qaeda and its associated forces
providing a population-centered counter to United States interests
across Africa, the Middle East, and South East Asia. In addition, the
self-proclaimed caliphate of the Islamic State has been destroyed.
However, ISIS's virulent ideology and open hostility towards Western
society remains intact through their adherents across the internet,
remaining leaders, foreign terrorist fighters--some who have returned
home and others who remain in the region, and the indoctrinated
personnel who remain in detention within Syria and Iraq. There is no
question that the Islamic State continues to pose a threat to the
United States despite the end of its so-called caliphate in Iraq and
Syria. The focus of al Qaeda on local conflicts, however, does not mean
they have taken their eye off attacking the U.S. Homeland. In the long-
term, al Qaeda likely represents the greater and more enduring threat
to the United States due to the group's strategic adaptability and
trend of decentralization. Should I be confirmed, I will work to ensure
neither of these organizations presents an enduring threat to the
Homeland or to our allies or partners.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in supporting it?
What metrics would you apply to measure the effectiveness of the
strategy?
Answer. As I understand it, combatting terrorism requires a whole-
of-government approach that reflects an understanding of and takes into
account the root causes of such activities, which are not the same in
all regions. In order to provide recommendations to change DOD's role
in supporting the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, the Department must
perform a systematic, comprehensive, and collaborative assessment of:
terrorist threats; current policy objectives as stated in published
guidance; DOD actions to counter that threat; and acceptable risk
weighed against objectives not yet achieved. Additionally, assisting
partner nations to improve their capability to counter terrorists would
remain a key tenet of our strategy. If confirmed, I will direct a
review of the current strategy to account for regional consideration
and a whole-of-government approach that addresses regional issues
If confirmed, I would work with senior civilian and military
leaders, including where appropriate officials of other agencies, to
assess progress toward achieving our counterterrorism objectives. I
cannot at this time determine the extent to which standard metrics will
be useful such assessments.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
promote a ``more resource sustainable'' approach to counterterrorism,
as directed by the 2018 NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to draw on successes of both the
United States and its partners in developing a counterterrorism
coalition representing all facets of government involved in protecting
the Homeland from threats. The Department likely requires changes in
its plans and processes in order to achieve greater efficiency and
effectiveness and unity of effort with interagency and international
partnerships. Leveraging the lessons learned from past successes, I
look to optimize and, where necessary, expand on these relatively
small-footprint solutions.
An October 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment highlighted the threat
from racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups
engaging in ``outreach and networking opportunities abroad'' that
``might lead to a greater risk of mobilization to violence, including
traveling to conflict zones.''
Question. Do you view the threat from racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremist networks overseas as a national security
threat? If so, what role do you see for DOD in responding to this
threat?
Answer. Terrorist organizations are motivated by a myriad of
ideologies, objectives, and causes, and some are racially and
ethnically motivated. When the capability, intent, and motivation of
any terrorist organization, including racially and ethnically motivated
groups, threaten the vital interests of the United States or the shared
interests of its allies and partners, then this terrorist organization
is a threat to national security.
The Department of Defense (DOD) plays a key supporting role in the
U.S. Government's overall response to terrorist threats. DOD cannot
achieve U.S. policy objectives to address terrorist threats
unilaterally, and all DOD strategies and plans must be correlated with
and complementary to a U.S. Government-wide and international partner-
integrated response. The Department must also work with our allies and
partners--another key pillar of the current National Defense Strategy--
to leverage their regional expertise and unique capabilities. If
confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the enterprise-wide efforts in
reform and sustainable counterterrorism approaches to determine if
additional opportunities exist.
Section 127e and Section 1202 Activities
Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
special operations forces to provide support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to forces and individuals supporting or
facilitating military operations for the purpose of combatting
terrorism.
Section 1202 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 authorizes U.S.
special operations forces to provide support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to forces and individuals supporting or
facilitating irregular warfare operations.
What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
these authorities in the current strategic environment?
Answer. The ability to support foreign irregular forces, groups,
and individuals under this fiscal authority gives U.S. special
operations forces an effective, low-cost option to combat terrorism
while maintaining a minimal U.S. footprint. Geographic Combatant
Commanders continue to express strong support for this authority as it
is a critical component of their counterterrorism efforts. Section 1202
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, as
amended, fills a gap in the Department's ability to provide support to
irregular (non-government) forces, groups, and individuals advancing
U.S. policy and military objectives short of armed conflict. This
authority is particularly helpful in addressing U.S. threats and
objectives in current strategic environments that can be described as
``grey zones''--spaces between amicable peace and outright war.
Authorities such as Section 1202 allow the Department to contribute its
special operations capabilities in support of whole-of-government
objectives in this competitive space. If confirmed, I would ensure that
operations using this authority remain thoroughly coordinated with
relevant Chiefs of Mission and Intelligence Community counterparts, and
remain fully transparent with Congress on how the Department uses this
authority. As the Department prioritizes great power competition, I
could see a need to discuss how these authorities interrelate, and
whether there should be adjustments to one or both of them.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
proposals for the use of each of these authorities, particularly with
respect to mitigating the risks associated with conducting irregular
warfare activities below the level of traditional armed conflict?
Answer. I believe appropriate civilian oversight is an integral
aspect of implementing these authorities. With respect to Section 1202,
if confirmed, I would ensure that all potential uses are suitable,
feasible, and acceptable--``suitable'' denoting alignment with the
Department's strategy, ``feasible'' meaning whether the proposed
resources are useful to accomplish the mission, and ``acceptable'' in
balancing the risk with any potential advantages gained. For both
authorities, if confirmed, I will ensure that selection, screening, and
vetting procedures for partner forces continue to be robust and that
implementation of these authorities is informed by careful analysis of
risks and consistent with U.S. objectives.
military operations in the information environment
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to conduct
effective military operations in the information environment to defend
U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out by state
and non-state actors?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has numerous capabilities
routinely employed to conduct effective military operations in the
information environment, including cyberspace operations, Military
Information Support Operations (MISO), and public affairs (PA). When
these activities are executed correctly, DOD can achieve its mission
more effectively, more affordably, and with reduced risk to our
operating forces. I understand the Department is updating the 2016
Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment and that the
update will be informed by a posture review of capabilities, the
current defense strategy and its Irregular Warfare Annex, designation
of information as a joint function, and statutory requirements in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. If confirmed,
I will support the development and implementation of this strategy.
Question. Are DOD's efforts in this regard appropriately integrated
with other U.S. Government organizations and activities?
Answer. Department of Defense (DOD) efforts throughout the
information environment cross traditional department and agency lines.
In areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where military operations have
been ongoing for some time, the integration is fairly seamless, with
roles and mechanisms well-established. In other parts of the world, the
integration is a bit more complex, and DOD is often not in the lead. If
confirmed, I intend to sustain those relationships.
Question. Does DOD have sufficient authorities and resources to
conduct these operations effectively? If not, what additional
authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?
Answer. I am not aware of any new authorities required. I
understand that the Information Operations posture review being
conducted pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020 will review capabilities and capacities and inform future
integration and resource investments. If confirmed, I will regularly
assess our authorities, resource availability and allocation, and
strategic alignment, and I will prioritize appropriately to support
operations in the information environment.
It is my understanding that the Department is addressing any needs
as it works through the posture review.
u.s. strategic command
Nuclear Policy
Question. United States nuclear forces have served as the bedrock
of our nation's defense, underpinned our most critical alliances, and
deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
years. Unfortunately, long overdue investments in these forces have
left us with systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These
capabilities must be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
What is your understanding of how Russia and China have expanded
and/or modernized their nuclear force capabilities? In your view, do
these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the United States and
its allies?
Answer. I am generally aware of public reporting that both China
and Russia continue to invest in their nuclear weapons capabilities. If
confirmed, I will undertake a deeper review both of United States
nuclear posture as part of the Administration's formulation of our
National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and of the
nuclear weapons capabilities of Russia and China.
Clearly, it is not in the United States interest to see either
Russia or China expand their nuclear arsenals. If confirmed, I will
undertake a deeper review both of United States nuclear posture as part
of the Administration's formulation of our National Security Strategy
and National Defense Strategy and of the nuclear weapons capabilities
of Russia and China and the threat they pose to United States
interests.
Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
coercion as a means of advancing its foreign policy goals?
Answer. Russia regularly engages in a host of actions that
undermine the interests of the United States and its Allies. If
confirmed, I will seek a comprehensive understanding of how Russia is
using all elements of its national power to challenge United States
global interests and domestic stability.
Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
triad of delivery platforms it adheres to the full meaning of ``no
first use''?
Answer. I believe that it is important that we have a complete
understanding of China's intentions and capabilities when accessing the
threat it poses to strategic stability and United States interests in
East Asia. If confirmed, I will request a comprehensive review of
China's nuclear weapons program, including its declaratory policy.
Question. Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of
Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and
that modernizing our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national
security priority? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, I agree that nuclear deterrence is the Department's
highest priority mission and that updating and overhauling our nation's
nuclear forces is a critical national security priority. Our nuclear
deterrent has served a vital purpose in U.S. National Security Strategy
for the past 70 years and continues to be an essential component of our
strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression
against the United States, our allies, and our partners.
Although effective today, U.S. nuclear deterrence remains dependent
on aging weapons, delivery systems, infrastructure, and nuclear
command, control, and communications (NC3) systems originally built
during the Cold War. U.S. nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond
their original service lives, and the tipping point, where we must
simultaneously overhaul these forces, is now here.
Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based
nuclear delivery platforms is consistent with an effective deterrent
posture in an era of great power competition with Russia and China?
Answer. The United States must retain a secure, sustainable and
effective nuclear deterrent for its security and that of its Allies.
The United States has long relied on a range and mix of capabilities.
If confirmed, I will commit to retaining a robust nuclear deterrent.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, including delivery systems, weapons, command and control
systems, and infrastructure?
Answer. I believe that it is critical for the United States to
maintain a secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent. The
overhaul and updating of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a critical
national priority. If confirmed, I intend to review, early on, the
details of the current modernization program to ensure that it is being
executed in a cost effective and judicious manner.
Question. What is your understanding of the condition of the U.S.
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) system and what
aspects of the NC3 system most need recapitalization or replacement, in
your view?
Answer. A robust NC3 system is essential to execute nuclear command
and control functions--the situation monitoring, planning, decision
making, force management, and force direction. If confirmed, reviewing
this system will be a top priority along with addressing critical
shortfalls.
Question. Do you believe the governance reforms of the NC3 system
have improved DOD's management of the global architecture? Please
explain your response.
Answer. I agree that a robust NC3 system is essential to execute
nuclear command and control functions. If confirmed, reviewing this
system, including the governance reforms, will be a top priority along
with addressing critical shortfalls.
Question. Do you believe a major shift in the United States'
nuclear policies, such as adoption of a ``No First Use'' policy, would
be appropriate, given Russia's and China's expanding nuclear arsenals?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
of U.S. nuclear posture. Such a review will certainly need to take into
account the challenging international security environment. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active
role in all strategic reviews.
Question. Do you believe a ``No First Use'' deterrent posture would
be consistent with our extended deterrence commitments to our NATO and
other regional allies around the world?
Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active role in all
strategic reviews
Question. The Minuteman III (MM III) Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile and the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile will be in service
for over 65 and 55 years, respectively, before they are replaced by the
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and the Long Range Stand-Off
(LRSO) weapon. The Air Force has highlighted the pervasive age-related
risks associated with the MM III system.
In your view, are there any circumstances under which delaying or
cancelling the GBSD and/or LRSO programs would be appropriate,
particularly in light of Russia and China's ongoing efforts to
modernize and expand their nuclear forces? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Maintaining a secure, sustainable and effective nuclear
deterrent is imperative and is a top U.S. national security priority.
If confirmed, I plan to request early on a briefing on the U.S. nuclear
modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in a cost
effective and judicious manner. I also intend to request a threat
briefing on Russia and China's nuclear weapons programs.
Question. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations deemed the GBSD
and LRSO programs essential. If confirmed, would you continue to
support and advocate for these programs?
Answer. Maintaining a secure, sustainable and effective nuclear
deterrent is imperative and is a top U.S. national security priority.
If confirmed, I plan to request early on a briefing on the U.S. nuclear
modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in a cost
effective and judicious manner.
Question. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed a
comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to
incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership.
Seven years later, DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) have made significant progress in rehabilitating the nation's
nuclear forces and reestablishing the senior leader focus required in
this mission area.
If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that DOD and the NNSA
continue the investments and senior leader attention needed to
modernize all aspects of the nation's nuclear deterrent and avoid age-
driven unilateral disarmament?
Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent
remains vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If
confirmed, I will review the U.S. nuclear modernization program as a
high priority program and ensure that the program has senior level
attention and management. I understand that the recently enacted
National Defense Authorization Act and Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act called for strong interagency coordination on these
issues, and if confirmed, I will ensure the Department of Defense works
closely with the Department of Energy on these programs.
The NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council
Question. The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear
weapons, which are established through the interagency Nuclear Weapons
Council. NNSA's principal challenge over the next 20 years is to
recapitalize and modernize the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear weapons design
and production infrastructure into a responsive and resilient
enterprise.
Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's capabilities to
design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons
stockpile, including the two-site solution for restarting plutonium pit
production?
Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent is
vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If confirmed, I
will review the U.S. nuclear modernization program as a high priority
program, including the country's capacity to produce plutonium pits and
other stockpile components. The Department of Defense's partnership
with the Department of Energy on this program is critically important.
Question. Do you support the W80-4 and the W87-1 programs?
Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent
remains vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If
confirmed, I will review, early on, the U.S. nuclear modernization
program as a high priority program, including nuclear warhead programs.
The Department of Defense's partnership with the Department of Energy
on this program is critically important.
Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent
remains vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If
confirmed, I will review, early on, the U.S. nuclear modernization
program as a high priority program, including nuclear warhead programs.
The Department of Defense's partnership with the Department of Energy
on this program is critically important.
Question. In your view, does the NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without explosive testing?
If not, what additional authorities and capabilities are needed?
Answer. Yes, the President-elect has committed to maintaining the
moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons testing. It is my understanding
that since 1992, the U.S. has observed a voluntary moratorium on
nuclear testing. Since that time, the investments made in the Stockpile
Stewardship Program have developed the personnel, tools, capabilities,
materials, components, laboratory and flight testing, and supercomputer
modeling and simulation that underpin the annual assessment for safety,
security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without explosive
testing. If confirmed, I will look to the advice and judgment of our
national security laboratory directors to best understand technical
risks in our nuclear stockpile, and recommend adjustments to the
current approach if warranted.
If confirmed, I will monitor the Stockpile Stewardship Program
through the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Secretary
of Defense relative to the Nuclear Weapons Council and NNSA's
responsibility for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile?
How would you execute your duties vis-a-vis this role, if confirmed?
Answer. I am aware that the Nuclear Weapons Council is a critical
interagency body overseeing issues vital to the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
If confirmed, I will request a briefing on the functioning and work of
the council in order to ensure that the U.S. maintains a secure,
sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent.
If confirmed, I would work with the NWC Chairperson, the
Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, to ensure that NWC
decisions are incorporated into Secretary-level reviews, to provide
guidance when needed, and to resolve interagency issues as necessary.
Question. If confirmed, how would you leverage the roles played by
the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the NNSA, and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that annual
budgets adequately support the modernization and sustainment of the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of Energy,
the Administrator of the NNSA, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, through the Nuclear Weapons Council's Planning
Guidance and Budget Certification Process, to assess the adequacy of
annual budgets to support the modernization and sustainment of the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile.
Arms Control
Question. Arms control, when effective and verifiable, has been a
valuable tool for managing competition and international security
concerns. In contrast, unverifiable arms control regimes observed by
only one party can generate great instability. The New START Treaty
will expire in February unless the United States and Russia agree to
extend it.
Do you believe the new strategic-range systems announced by
President Vladimir Putin in February 2018 should be included under the
New START Treaty's central limits?
Answer. I am generally aware of Russia's nuclear modernization
program but am not in a position to speak to the specifics of whether
or not individual systems are in compliance with the New START Treaty.
I believe, however, that nuclear arms control is in the U.S. interest.
If confirmed, I will request an extensive briefing on Russia's nuclear
weapons program and the status of the New START Treaty.
Question. Do you believe it to be in the national security interest
of the United States to extend the New START Treaty?
Answer. Yes, I do and so does President-elect Biden. Nuclear arms
control is in the U.S. national security interest.
Question. What are your views on Russian tactical nuclear forces
not covered by the New START Treaty and whether arms control measures
can adequately address them?
Answer. Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons through arms control
is a very important strategic objective. I know that this perspective
is shared by the Senate as reflected in the resolution of ratification
to the New START Treaty that includes a condition to negotiate an
agreement with Russia to address the disparity in United States and
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Question. Do you support unilateral reductions in United States
nuclear forces or do you believe that further reductions should be
taken only within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
agreement with Russia and other nuclear-armed powers? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. I believe it is in the national security interests of the
United States and its allies and partners to pursue formal, verifiable
arms control agreements that reduce the nuclear threats from Russia and
China.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
Answer. The nuclear modernization program is clearly a critical
national security priority. If confirmed, it will be critical for me to
review the program, begun under the Obama Administration, to ensure
that it is being executed in the most cost effective and judicious
manner.
Question. Despite decades of reductions in the number of nuclear
weapons in the U.S. stockpile, and ongoing efforts to reduce global
nuclear threats, the U.S. currently faces a more complex nuclear
landscape than at any other point in its history.
Do you believe the United States should continue its longstanding
policy of not officially recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power and
pursuing denuclearization of the peninsula over the long term?
Answer. I believe that it is in the United States interest to
pursue a sustained coordinated effort with allies and others, including
China, to advance the shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea.
I fully expect the President-elect to direct the interagency to
undertake strategic reviews, including on United States policy towards
North Korea. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense
participates robustly in all strategic reviews.
Question. If so, and if confirmed, what additional steps would you
take to ensure continued stability and deterrence of North Korean
threats to the United States and its allies in the region until
denuclearization can occur?
Answer. One of the greatest advantages the United States has today
and in the future is its alliances and partnerships with those who
share common national security interests. If confirmed, one of my top
priorities will be ensuring United States Forces have what they need to
maintain a robust readiness posture in Northeast Asia, in close
collaboration with regional allies. Our relationships with important
partners such as the Republic of Korea and Japan are critical to
regional security and stability and provide a powerful deterrent to
North Korean threats.
Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
double the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
Answer. I am generally aware that the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency has publicly stated that over the next decade,
China will likely at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile. If
confirmed, I am committed to being briefed on the specifics of China's
nuclear weapons program and its threat to United States interests.
Question. In your view, at what threshold condition should future
nuclear arms control regimes be expanded to include China's arsenal, as
well as that of the United States and Russia?
Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
one on objectives for nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.
President-elect Biden has pledged publicly to restore American
leadership on arms control and non-proliferation as a central pillar of
U.S. global leadership. If confirmed, I would ask for a briefing on
China's nuclear weapons program to further inform my judgements.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities in order to obtain an agreement with
Russia or China on nuclear weapons reductions?
Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
one on objectives for nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.
President-elect Biden has pledged publicly to restore American
leadership on arms control and non-proliferation as a central pillar of
U.S. global leadership. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
of Defense plays a robust role in all strategic reviews.
Question. Certain groups are urging the new Administration to
rejoin arms control agreements to which the United States is no longer
a party, such as the Open Skies Treaty. To this end, some have advanced
legal theories that would permit the President to circumvent the
Senate, in which the Constitution vests sole power to approve treaties
negotiated by the executive branch.
If confirmed, would you support a decision to circumvent the
Senate's exercise of its constitutional responsibilities through the
advice and consent process?
Answer. I respect the Senate's constitutional role, including in
the treaty-making process. If confirmed, I would work with the State
Department and Congress to help ensure the United States is able to
pursue international agreements that are in our national interest and
are concluded in accordance with the law.
Missile Defense
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against United States Forces, allies, and the U.S.
Homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR)
codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on
actions to improve U.S. capability.
Do you believe the MDR should be updated? If so, in what areas?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that an MDR is considered as
part of the Administration's formulation of our National Security
Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
Question. What are your views on the relationship between missile
defense and nuclear deterrence?
Answer. The relationship between U.S. missile defense and the U.S.
nuclear arsenal is complementary and mutually supportive. Both
capabilities contribute to deterring attack on the Homeland, with U.S.
nuclear weapons presenting a credible threat of retaliation and U.S.
missile defense presenting a credible threat of denying the adversary a
successful attack. In addition, both U.S. nuclear weapons and missile
defenses provide reassurance to our allies and partners--contributing
to our nonproliferation goals while presenting a credible commitment to
regional and global security.
Question. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, what would be your
priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the Homeland?
Answer. The United States is currently defended from existing
intercontinental missile threats posed by countries such as North Korea
by the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
Specifically, there are 44 ground-based missile defense interceptors--
with 40 interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and 4 interceptors
at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. I understand the Department
is also examining an architecture for the defense of the Homeland from
cruise missile threats, and will identify an organization responsible
for development and acquisition of this capability. If confirmed, I
would support continuing improvements to our Homeland missile defense
architecture.
Question. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, what would be your
priorities for U.S. defense capabilities against cruise and hypersonic
missiles?
Answer. As our adversaries have demonstrated through rapid and
repeated flight testing, the lines between ballistic and non-ballistic
missile threats have become increasingly blurred, most clearly
evidenced by the advent of hypersonic missile threats. If confirmed, I
would encourage efforts to address the full spectrum of missile
threats, including the continued development of integrated air and
missile defense architectures for both regional and homeland defense,
as well as the accelerated development of intercept capability for
hypersonic missile defense.
Question. In your view, what should DOD do to improve the
protection of deployed U.S. and allied forces from growing missile
threats in operational theaters, particularly from advanced cruise
missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe and the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. We must continue working together with allies and partners
to enhance our regional missile defense efforts in the Indo-Pacific,
Europe, and the Middle East. Our cooperation strengthens deterrence and
provides assurance essential to the unity of our alliances which are
threatened by missile coercion and attacks. Many of our Allies and
partners are acquiring advanced maritime and shore land-based air and
missile defense systems that will contribute to collective security. If
confirmed, I will encourage them to continue these efforts, while
seeking opportunities to deepen interoperability with the U.S. and
regional partners. These opportunities include joint exercises that
demonstrate both interoperability and our joint resolve to both work
together and fight together.
Question. The MDR described the advantages of space-based sensors.
In your view, is a space-based sensor layer a required ``next step'' in
enabling a variety of missile defense capabilities, including targeting
of advanced threats? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, space-based sensors are an important tool in enabling
a variety of missile defense capabilities. Space-based sensors are
required to provide global boost through burn-out tracking of ballistic
missiles and for the detection, tracking, and targeting of hypersonic
and advanced threats. In addition, space-based sensors support hit and
kill assessment of engagements. I understand the Missile Defense Agency
is collaborating with the Space Development Agency in the deployment of
the National Defense Space Architecture's Tracking Layer to address
hypersonic and advanced threats.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR Program historically focused on accounting for,
securing, and eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction and
materials in the states of the former Soviet Union. As part of its
expansion to other countries, the CTR Program is widening its aperture
to include biological weapons and capabilities as well as biological
surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the development of
capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.
What are your views on the efficacy of the CTR Program?
Answer. I am generally aware that The Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) Program supports DOD and U.S. objectives of reducing weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) threats worldwide. I understand the program has
delivered significant returns on U.S.-funded investments since the
early 1990s. If confirmed, I will work to ensure program efficacy.
Question. How could coordination of the CTR Program across U.S.
Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
Department) be improved?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make clear my expectation--across the
Department and for all programs, including the CTR Program--that we
need to constantly work to improve and maintain communication across
the Federal Government. Constant engagement is invaluable to best-align
resources.
Question. Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical
weapons documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR
resources are allocated to biological programs.
Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
accurately reflects the current threat?
Answer. I understand the Department has a process to assess WMD
threats and prioritize activities and investments accordingly. If
confirmed, I look forward to learning about and advancing the
Department's work with partner nations to reduce the threats posed by
biological weapons and biological agents.
Question. The CTR program is the primary program in the U.S.
Government to work with other countries to build and operate High
Containment Biological Laboratories as well as develop safe operating
and handling practices. Do you agree that this work is of high
importance and if so why?
Answer. I agree fully that safety and security are essential in any
context of working with biological agents. If confirmed, I will ensure
the CTR Program's biological threat reduction activities are aligned
with DOD and interagency priorities.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
the CTR program is capable of meeting the mission of rolling back the
threat of weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure CTR Program efforts are
prioritized, aligned with DOD and interagency priorities to counter
weapons of mass destruction, and are tailored to what partner countries
are able to absorb and carry forward.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the
allocation of CTR resources? If so, how?
Answer. As I understand it, the CTR program has played an impactful
role over the years in mitigating CWMD threats to the Nation. Its
activities and resourcing must be reviewed in light of the defense
strategy and balanced against other resource requirements across the
Department. If confirmed, I will review the current status of the
program and recommend adjustments accordingly.
air force issues
Question. It has been stated the Air Force is too small and too old
to do what the nation asks of it. First, do you agree with this
statement?
Answer. Each Service's portfolio of forces and programs are
assessed as part of program review. I am aware that the Air Force has
several active modernization programs underway which would replace
older aircraft and increase the capability of its force to undertake
current and projected missions. If confirmed, I will seek the most
effective allocation of the Defense Department's resources to include
any Air Force modernization and force structure issues.
Question. Second, if confirmed, where do you see the greatest risk
in capability and capacity for the Air Force and what actions would you
take or direct to mitigate those risks?
Answer. I believe the greatest risk in the Air Force's ability to
perform its key missions is presented by the complex anti-access area
denial capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Air Force
modernization must ensure that the service is able to adapt to these
challenges. The Air Force also has responsibility for large aspects of
nuclear modernization and nuclear command and control, which is an
important priority. If confirmed, I would work with Air Force
leadership to ensure the Air Force's ability to contribute to critical
joint capabilities in line with the defense strategy.
Question. The Air Force is on record as needing to purchase a
minimum of 72 fighter aircraft per year to maintain requisite force
structure. In your opinion, what is the optimum mix of 4th and 5th
generation aircraft required to meet the threat outlined in the 2018
NDS?
Answer. I believe the greatest risk in the Air Force's ability to
perform its key missions is presented by the complex anti-access area
denial capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Air Force
modernization must ensure that the service is able to adapt to these
challenges. The Air Force also has responsibility for large aspects of
nuclear modernization and nuclear command and control, which is an
important priority. If confirmed, I would work with Air Force
leadership to ensure the Air Force's ability to contribute to critical
joint capabilities in line with the defense strategy.
Question. The follow-on modernization of the F-35 is slated to
bring key warfighting capabilities to the Air Force, but the schedule
and budget of this modernization program remain in flux.
Are you confident in the affordability and executability of the
Department's plan for Block 4 Continuous Capability Development and
Delivery (C2D2)?
Answer. I am aware that the F-35 Block 4 modernization effort is
designed to ensure Joint Force can employ airborne systems effectively
in highly contested battle spaces now and in the future. The F-35 joint
program office reports to the Office of Secretary of Defense, so I
understand the program requires a specific focus from the Secretary's
team. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD team and the military
services to ensure the success of the F-35 Block 4 modernization
effort.
Given the importance of extending the range of U.S. aircraft, what
do you believe to be the overall tanker requirement for the Air Force
and at what rate and on what schedule must the Air Force procure the
new KC-46 to be able to meet that requirement?
I am aware of the critical role that Air Force aerial refueling
capabilities play in supporting the joint force. If confirmed I will
work with Air Force leadership and the head of Transportation Command
to ensure that the Department fields and modernizes the aircraft needed
to support the joint force in all operations.
army issues
Army Budget Challenges
Question. While the fiscal year 2022 budget request has not yet
been released, some public reports indicate there could be an effort to
shift funding from the Army toward building a larger Navy to deter
China.
In your view, would this shift of resources make sense from a
strategic perspective? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's fiscal year
2022 budget request to ensure it is aligned with the Administration's
priorities and balanced across the entire Department to meet defense
goals. Competing to win against our adversaries and deterring them from
threatening our critical interests requires the combined effects of the
full joint force, in coordination with our allies and partners. Each
service brings vital and unique capabilities and a shift of resources
away from one particular service may have a negative impact. If
confirmed, I will address the challenge of providing the President and
the American people with a balanced force able to strategically counter
adversary actions in both competition and conflict, and I will seek
Congressional support to provide timely, adequate, and sustained
funding for the Department.
Question. If confirmed, would you support a decrease in Army end-
strength that would accompany any substantial reduction of the Army
budget topline? In your view, what would be the effect of such a
reduction on Army force structure, readiness, and operations tempo?
Answer. I am committed to reviewing the end-strength of all of the
Services and their manpower, equipment, and training, mindful of
national security objectives. End-strength reductions must be subject
to careful analysis and a clear understanding of strategic impacts and
risks. The Army is currently undergoing a major transformation to
modernize its forces while simultaneously maintaining a high OPTEMPO to
support Combatant Command requirements. Army end-strength should
support the Army's efforts to build a modern, lethal force.
Many factors, including end-strength, affect force structure,
readiness, and operational tempo. Reductions of end-strength should be
rigorously assessed to fully understand how it affects Service and
broader Department goals. If confirmed, I am committed to clear
prioritization of missions and operational requirements that would be
associated with any potential force structure changes to any Service.
Army Modernization Priorities
Question. Budget pressure could impact the Army's ongoing
investment in modernizing the force for near-peer competition,
deterrence and, if necessary, conflict.
Do you believe the Army must modernize to effectively fulfill the
requirements of the NDS? If confirmed, what would you do to ensure the
Army is adequately resourced to concurrently maintain readiness,
modernize the force, and take care of its people?
Answer. Yes. Many of the Army's combat platforms were originally
designed over 40 years ago. While the Army has continued to modernize
these platforms, future conflict will likely require capabilities
delivered by new designs. Meanwhile, both China and Russia continue to
aggressively modernize, and the pace of technological change continues
to accelerate. If confirmed, I will work with the Army to assess the
progress made on these elements and to field those capabilities that
offer important advantages to the joint force in future operations.
Each Service must be adequately resourced to meet the demands of
the strategy. If confirmed, I will work with Service leadership to
ensure continued emphasis on internal reforms and I intend to be
transparent with Congress on our budget decision making process.
Question. In your view, which are the most critical Army
modernization priorities, particularly in the context of countering the
rapidly increasing threat posed by China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army and the other
services to determine how the capabilities in the Army's modernization
portfolio can contribute to a joint warfighting concept through
rigorous analysis and robust experimentation so that we field the right
systems on the right timelines. Looking ahead, artificial intelligence
and machine learning, a next-generation synthetic training environment,
robotics, autonomy, and advanced network sensors will all play
increasingly important roles, to include supporting the Army's
contributions to Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
Question. How would you evaluate the importance of Army efforts in
the Indo-Pacific, including the Army's activation of modernized Multi-
Domain Task Forces, to conduct cross-domain operations in support of
air and naval forces, in countering China?
Answer. Army efforts in the Indo-Pacific, as part of the Joint
Force, are absolutely essential to support successful competition with
our adversaries, ensure effective military response to crises, and win
in conflict if necessary. We know that ground defense remains a
priority for our Allies in the region. The Army is critical to building
relationships, establishing logistics footholds and expanding
operational reach for the Joint Force.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA requires the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, to conduct a holistic assessment of current and
emerging air and missile threats and the integrated defensive
capabilities and capacity required to counter them. It also requires
the Secretary of Defense to certify integrated air and missile defense
roles and responsibilities.
In your view, are the roles and responsibilities for IAMD
appropriately assigned across the Military Services and defense
agencies?
Answer. IAMD is inherently a joint endeavor and requires a
synchronized approach across the Department. Emerging adversary air and
missile capabilities continue to fundamentally alter the way future
conflicts will be conducted. Correspondingly the threat requires the
Department to thoughtfully and routinely reassess future organizational
structures in a global context to address threat capabilities that
limit or negate U.S. capabilities to operate and project joint military
forces. If confirmed, I will work with the services, the Joint Staff,
and civilian leadership to ensure that our approach to IAMD is well
integrated and addresses current and future operational needs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Military Services
make the investments required to fulfill their IAMD responsibilities,
including for base defense? How would you ensure effective integration
of the Services' current capabilities, as well as of the capabilities
each is separately developing?
Answer. Each Military Service provides major contributions to the
IAMD mission area, and each must balance those requirements with their
service specific missions and priorities. If confirmed, I will work
with the services, the Joint Staff, and civilian leadership to ensure
that our approach to IAMD, including base defense, is well integrated
and addresses current and future operational needs.
If confirmed, I will work with the services, the Joint Staff, and
civilian leadership to ensure that our approach to IAMD is well
integrated and addresses current and future operational needs as well
as addressing IAMD roles and responsibilities.
Question. During his confirmation hearing before this committee,
the current Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the Army's purchase
of two Iron Dome batteries to address shortfalls in theater base
defense capabilities was a ``good first step.'' However, several months
ago, the Secretary of the Army stated the Army does not intend to
complete the purchase and fielding of two additional batteries by 2023,
as required by the fiscal year 2019 NDAA.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that forward
stationed servicemembers have adequate near-term protection, given the
expanding number of complex threats to United States bases in the
Pacific, Middle East, and Europe?
Answer. I know that our Combatant Commanders work carefully to
refine threat estimates within their areas of responsibility and assess
impacts of those threats to their operational plans and activities. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that these risks are effectively
mitigated through a combination of approaches such as intelligence and
surveillance collection for better awareness and early warning,
deterrence posture, investment in localized force protection, and
active and passive defenses.
Question. Over the last year, the Army was designated as executive
agent for the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO),
and has made progress demonstrating, testing, and advancing effective
counter small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS) capabilities for the
Joint Force.
If confirmed, would you support continuation of the JCO effort? How
would you prioritize and focus efforts across DOD to counter larger
UAS?
Answer. The threat posed by sUAS systems is evolving and expanding.
If confirmed, I will support efforts, such as those JCO efforts
currently underway, that streamline innovation, enhance warfighting
capabilities, and simultaneously minimize unnecessary duplication and
redundancy.
Counter-UAS is a subset of the larger Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) mission area, which is a Joint effort. The Department is
currently addressing the significant UAS threat through Service-
specific capabilities. If confirmed, I will examine ways to prioritize
and focus DOD efforts working with the Service Secretaries to assist in
prioritizing C-UAS efforts across the Department to facilitate greater
synergy between the Services.
Question. If confirmed, do you intend to explore options for
expanding DOD cooperation with other agencies, such as the Departments
of Energy, Justice, and Homeland Security, on C-sUAS capability
development and procurembent?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review C-UAS capability development
and procurement, assess DOD's cooperation with other Federal
departments and agencies, and if necessary explore options for
expanding cooperation to ensure we achieve our objectives.
Question. The current validated requirement for THAAD batteries is
nine, yet only seven batteries are fully manned and equipped, despite
the fact that THAAD and Patriot batteries are some of the highest-
demand, lowest-density assets in the Army. The fiscal year 2021 NDAA
and Defense Appropriations Acts both support procurement of an eighth
battery.
If confirmed, what action would you take to ensure that the Army
expeditiously acquires the eighth THAAD battery and appropriately plans
and budgets for the ninth as soon as feasible?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army works closely with the
Missile Defense Agency to acquire sufficient THAAD capability to
support the joint force and execute the funding Congress has provided.
Soldier Lethality
Question. Last year's realignment of the Close-Combat Lethality
Task Force (CCLTF) from a cross-functional team reporting directly to
the Secretary of Defense to an activity under the Department of the
Army appears to have de-emphasized this effort, which is critical to
the lethality and survivability of formations that traditionally
sustain more than 90 percent of combat casualties.
If confirmed, what would you do to ensure the necessary
prioritization, manning, and resourcing of the CCLTF? How would you
ensure that the CCLTF fulfills its charter to drive materiel and non-
materiel innovations for the soldiers, marines, and special operators
who comprise our close-combat formations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the CCLTF continues to develop,
evaluate, and make recommendations regarding improvements to U.S.
squad-level close combat formations, ensuring overmatch against
potential threats. This effort is important, and if confirmed, I will
ensure that the work of the CCLTF receives appropriate levels of
organizational support and resources.
navy and marine corps issues
Question. What is your assessment of the recently published
Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power? In
your view, how well does this strategy nest within the 2018 NDS?
I commend the Naval Services' for working to develop a maritime
strategy that supports the National Defense Strategy which focuses on
improving joint operations. If confirmed, I will work with the naval
services to assess the effectiveness of this strategy and continue
development of a joint warfighting concept.
My initial sense is that the Naval Service's Strategy is well
aligned with the 2018 NDS's focus on China, and to a lesser degree
Russia, as being the most significant threats to U.S national defense
interests. If confirmed, I would want to engage more closely with the
Naval Services to understand the detailed implications of the strategy.
Question. Do you believe the Departments of the Army and Air Force
should publish similar strategies? If confirmed, what timeline would
you seek for such a publication?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome discussion with all of the
services on strategy development and a joint warfighting concept. I
would also encourage perspectives from civilian and policy oversight,
as well as joint functions in these matters.
If confirmed, I would first want to gain insights from relevant
civilian (OSD) and joint components, as well as the affected Military
Services, about the analytic, strategic planning, and other
prioritization considerations of pursuing similar efforts. I would also
want to ensure that any such follow-on efforts would be well nested
with next steps in reexamining, updating, and refining implementation
of the National Defense Strategy.
Recapitalizing the Fleet
Question. Despite the Navy's requirement for at least 382 ships, it
is currently operating with approximately 297 battle force ships.
Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that
achieving the Navy's fiscal year 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan would
require an average $31 billion per year, one-third more than Navy
estimates, and an increase of more than 50 percent compared with recent
shipbuilding budgets.
Do you consider the Future Naval Force Study and the Fiscal Year
2021 Shipbuilding Plan released in December 2020 to be appropriate
given the current and future strategic environment?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Future Naval Force Study
(FNFS) explored a range of future fleet designs capable of meeting
today's enduring maritime missions and tomorrow's global security
challenges. If confirmed, I will review both the Future Naval Force
Study and shipbuilding plan in detail and work with Navy leadership to
develop a well calibrated shipbuilding plan.
Question. How would you characterize the risks to national security
posed by the current number of battle force ships?
Answer. It is my understanding that the size of the Navy fleet is
currently growing as new ships are delivered to the fleet and that the
Navy plans to continue this growth in future budgets. I am also aware
that the Navy has experienced recent challenges in ensuring that ships
are ready to deploy after maintenance periods and in delivering all
necessary training to ship crews prior to deployment. If confirmed, I
will review the Navy's assessment of current and future risks in
performing its assigned missions, and in supporting the requirements of
the joint force, and work with Navy leadership to address those risks.
Improving Government Technical Control in Shipbuilding
Question. A June 2018 Government Accountability Office report found
that the last eight combatant lead ships cost a total of $8 billion
more than initially budgeted; were delivered at least six months late;
and were marked by dozens of deficiencies. As an example, the first
procurement dollar for the Ford-class was spent in 2001. More than
nineteen years later, procurement dollars continue to be spent to
finish construction on the lead ship, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78),
which is $2.7 billion over the original budget estimate, was partially
delivered 20 months late, and remains incomplete.
Do you believe acquisition performance on recent lead ships has
been satisfactory?
Answer. As I understand it, the lead ship in any class comes with
complex challenges, particularly in the areas of technology development
and integration, design, ship construction, and testing. Even so,
performance on lead ship efforts such as the USS Gerald R. Ford and
others has given cause for concern. If confirmed, I will assess the
Navy's performance on lead ships generally and its plans for upcoming
lead ships, understanding that multiple critical lead ship construction
efforts are currently underway or in the planning process.
Question. What actions do you believe should be taken or explored
to improve on recent lead ship performance, particularly in regard to
improving technical foundations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to improve
performance on lead ships. I anticipate this will require a strong
focus on understanding the technical risks in these ship design efforts
and detailed work to effectively manage and retire that risk in a
manner that can be validated before potential design flaws are baked
in. Having a skilled and trained workforce in our shipyards will also
be critical.
Question. Section 125 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021 directs the
Navy to establish a land based engineering site (LBES) for the complex
propulsion system of the new Constellation-class frigate. This LBES is
essential to provide a firm technical foundation for this program,
including by reducing risk on lead ship construction and systems
integration, facilitating additional shipyard competition, providing
lifecycle in-service support, and training of sailors.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that section
125 mandates are executed as required by law?
Answer. I understand the objective of the language of section 125
is to reduce the technical and schedule risk associated with the new
Constellation-class frigate. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to
ensure a sound risk management approach to the Constellation-class as
well as other shipbuilding programs.
Ford-class Aircraft Carriers
Question. What is your understanding of the current capability and
reliability of each of the key subsystems on the USS Gerald R. Ford
(CVN-78), including the Advanced Arresting Gear, Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System, Dual Band Radar, and Advanced Weapons
Elevators?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy has been working to
develop, test, and evaluate these key subsystems to meet the Navy's
performance requirements. If confirmed, I would assess the Navy's
efforts in these matters as key decisions on the Ford and follow-on
ships in the Ford-class are made.
Question. What is your understanding of the measures being taken to
ensure these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS
John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), and those that follow?
Answer. It is important that the learning on key subsystems in the
Ford-class be applied to the USS John F. Kennedy and other ships in the
class as soon as practicable. If confirmed, I would assess the Navy's
progress on these subsystems as carrier construction issues are brought
forward for decision.
In your view, is it still appropriate for the Department to procure
large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers and large-deck amphibious ships
after CVN-81 and LHA-9? Should the Department conduct a capabilities-
based assessment of the future of ships that embark fixed-wing
aircraft?
It is my understanding that the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as
independent analysts, have conducted studies on capabilities required
for future naval warfare. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy and
Marine Corps to assess how their fleet design and modernization plans
support the National Defense Strategy and the joint warfighting
concept.
The Department should rigorously analyze and assess the
capabilities of the entire joint force in addressing the key
operational challenges inherent in the missions required to support the
National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that this
analysis is carried out.
Columbia-class Submarines
Question. Navy leaders have testified that the Columbia-class
program, the Department of the Navy's top acquisition priority, will
require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions
within the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is
not provided.
What is your understanding of the current cost, schedule, and
performance of the Columbia-class program?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Columbia-class program is
working actively to meet its scheduled fielding date to sustain the
nation's strategic deterrent. In addition to the challenge inherent in
this schedule, there are challenges in the submarine industrial base
based on how long it has been since the nation constructed a new-design
missile submarine as well as the demanding pace of submarine
construction. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to ensure these
challenges are carefully managed.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your recommendation for
funding the Columbia-class program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the requirement for funding for
the Columbia-class program in the fiscal year 2022 budget proposal.
Question. DOD leaders have testified that the Navy needs to procure
12 Columbia-class submarines and avoid schedule delays in the Columbia-
class program in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in
2031.
Question. Do you agree that 12 Columbia-class submarines will be
needed for strategic deterrent patrols to meet requirements of the
Strategic Command?
Answer. I am aware that extensive analysis has been done to develop
the current plans for the Columbia-class program and of the importance
of meeting the fielding schedule associated with the projected
retirement of the Ohio-class in supporting the nation's strategic
deterrent. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to ensure the
effective execution of the Columbia-class program to meet national
security requirements.
Question. What is your understanding of mitigation options DOD is
considering or should consider in the event the Columbia-class program
incurs schedule delays that might prevent the lead ship from deploying
in 2031?
Answer. If confirmed, on-time delivery of the lead ship of the
Columbia program will be a principal objective of the Department. I
will ensure efforts are taken to review all options to help mitigate
risks to Columbia schedules and work with the relevant stakeholders to
manage the risk.
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Recapitalization
Question. DOD has developed a three-pronged recapitalization
strategy for the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and Military Sealift Command
surge fleet. This strategy combines new construction, extending the
service life of certain vessels, and acquiring used vessels.
What is your understanding of the Navy's recapitalization strategy
for the RRF and the affordability of acquiring more than 50 sealift
vessels as outlined in the latest 30-year shipbuilding plan?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy's Sealift
Recapitalization Strategy is outlined in the Navy's 30-year
shipbuilding plan. If confirmed, I will review this strategy and work
with Congress, Navy leadership, and other stakeholders to ensure
sealift requirements are met.
Question. To what extent do you believe the Navy has identified the
appropriate mix of used and new ships to continue to meet sealift and
auxiliary requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Navy's Sealift
Recapitalization Strategy and work with Congress, Navy leadership, and
other stakeholders to ensure sealift requirements are met.
Marine Corps Modernization
Question. The Marine Corps' current concepts for modernization of
its amphibious capabilities includes ships, ship-to-shore connectors--
such as the Landing Craft Air Cushion--and armored amphibious combat
vehicles. Modernization across these systems is complex, technically
challenging, and costly.
What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious
maneuver and assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer. The current set of amphibious capabilities, to include
warships, aircraft, connectors, and amphibious combat vehicles have
served us well, but require modernization to deter peer competitors and
fight decisively if deterrence fails. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Congress, Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure the Navy and Marine
Corps team remains a capable and lethal joint force.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize the
development and acquisition of capabilities required for sea basing,
connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore
to achieve a full spectrum capability in the Marine Corps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy,
along with Marine Corps and Navy leadership to ensure that naval force
have the capabilities they need to fight and win today and in the
future. This includes a review of the current set of priorities to
ensure joint access in an anti-access area denial (A2AD) environment.
Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that
modernization of the amphibious force--ships, connectors, and
vehicles--is achievable and affordable in the near and long term?
Answer. First and foremost, the Department's investment strategy
must be predictable, clear, and aligned with its strategy. Funding that
is timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained provides the Department
the ability to acquire, train with, and employ Naval combat power
across the full spectrum to be successful against threats outlined in
the strategy.
Question. If confirmed, would you support the continued execution
of the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI), including the
realignment of some United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the
build-up of facilities at other locations, such as Marine Corps Air
Station Iwakuni, Japan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the implementation of the
realignment plan known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative,
understanding it is the bilaterally-determined way forward. The
realignment of Marine Corps forces on Okinawa and the main islands of
Japan, including the establishment of a strong presence on the United
States territory of Guam, supports our effort to achieve an improved
Indo-Pacific defense posture. The Department of Defense working with
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the Military Departments and Services, and
the Department of State must proactively adapt and adjust U.S. access
and joint presence to the realities of great power competition to
ensure our posture is optimized for deterrence of adversaries, ally and
partner assurance, and warfighting, if necessary. If confirmed, I will
make it a priority to ensure that our posture plans are consistent with
the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and
other relevant plans, policies, and agreements.
Question. Last year the Commandant of the Marine Corps released a
new strategy reorienting the Marines to be more directly part of the
integrated naval force, with a focus on China.
Do you believe that General Berger's new strategy for the Marine
Corps is correct, and that the divestiture of end-strength and ground
combat capabilities such as tanks and artillery is appropriate? What,
if any, modifications to this strategy would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Marine Corps' strategy and
work with General Berger to ensure his forces are strategically
aligned.
I would not recommend any modifications to the strategy at this
time. If confirmed, I will seek to work with the Secretary of the Navy,
the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Congress to review and
implement the strategy.
reform of dod business operations and decision-making processes
Management Reform
Question. Reform of DOD business operations is the third pillar of
the 2018 NDS.
If confirmed, what specific new actions would you take and what
ongoing actions would you continue to initiate and accelerate the
meaningful reform of DOD business operations, processes, and systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's efforts to
achieve a clean audit opinion on its financial statements. The process
of undergoing an audit drives discovery, transparency, and business
process discipline that yields significant positive results for the
Department. Also, having accurate, actionable business data is
essential to running any large organization. I understand the
Department has developed a single common `data lake' that is used to
provide real time information on financial, HR, security, acquisition
and readiness status, which I will continue to use to manage and reform
the Department. Now that we have the data--no small feat--we need to
use the data to drive and support our decision making. The Department
has too many information technology systems that perform similar
functions. These need to be reduced and rationalized. If confirmed, I
would require the Services and Defense Agencies/Field Activities to
migrate from legacy systems to modern systems that already exist inside
the Department or elsewhere in government wherever possible instead of
developing new capabilities internally. DOD has a long history of not
making optimal investments in business systems, and now is the time to
capitalize on the expertise that exists in the civilian side of
government.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to improve
the governance and performance accountability of the so-called ``Fourth
Estate''?
Answer. The elimination of the Chief Management Officer position by
the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA requires the Department to re-think its
approach on governance generally, including the Fourth Estate. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Deputy Secretary and
other senior leaders across the Department on that, if confirmed. My
goal is a Department that is both effective and efficient.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA eliminated the Chief Management
Officer (CMO) position.
If confirmed, how would you approach the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
tasking to reallocate the responsibilities of the Chief Management
Officer?
Answer. If confirmed, I would approach it in two ways: what has
worked well before, and where we need to do better. For the ``Pentagon
Reservation'' functions in CMO, I would rely on what has worked well
before. For example, I would consider re-establishing the position of
Director of Administration and Management (DA&M). For the business/
management reform functions in CMO, I believe we can do much better
linking budgeting and performance. I believe the business reform duties
at the core of the CMO's portfolio should be performed by existing,
respected, and highly capable staff offices in OSD. These are,
primarily: the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial
Officer; the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and the
DOD Chief Information Officer. Importantly, I would employ well
understood processes that the Pentagon knows and regularly uses--for
example, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution cycle--to
drive a management reform agenda and improve the performance,
efficiency and effectiveness of the Department.
Digital Modernization
Question. The Department expends significant resources on
information technology and related services, yet remains highly reliant
on slow legacy systems and enterprise infrastructure, and on personnel
intensive workarounds for critical operating functions such as
personnel, financial management, logistics, and acquisition. Not
surprisingly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, DOD struggled to enable the
total force to work remotely in a persistent and secure fashion,
incurring health and safety risks that should not have been necessary
had the Department not repeatedly deferred investments in digital
modernization initiatives.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to prioritize and resource
digital modernization initiatives such as secure enterprise-wide cloud,
teamwork, and collaboration tools, as well as senior leader decision
support initiatives like advanced analytic capabilities (ADVANA)?
Answer. The Department has made notable progress toward Digital
Modernization, but much remains to be done. Modernizing the hardware
and software DOD's digital systems rely on will increase its
efficiency, its ability to be resilient in the face of a cyberattack,
be more cost effective over time, and ensure the total force has secure
and resilient access to the information it needs anywhere in the world.
The COVID challenge clearly demonstrated the critical role of modern
cloud-based collaboration tools in allowing the Department to
successfully perform its mission without interruption. Enterprise cloud
is foundational to the Department's ability to rapidly and securely
develop and deploy advanced software. Our weapon systems increasingly
depend upon software to ensure our competitive advantage over near peer
adversaries. If confirmed, I will organize DOD to ensure continued
progress toward Digital Modernization. Analytic capabilities like
ADVANA are empowering senior leaders to use standardized data to inform
policy and make better decisions. If confirmed, I am committed to
continue to use such analytic capabilities to better operate and manage
the Department.
Question. Has your experience with defense industry and private
industry engendered an appreciation for modern management tools and
systems that you would seek to implement at the Department of Defense,
if confirmed?
Answer. Industry managers must be adept at setting clear goals,
measuring value creation in their products and processes, and making
decisions based on objective, data-driven measures of performance. If
confirmed, I would accelerate the progress the Department has made
using data management and executive analytics tools to ensure that
DOD's decisions are driven by relevant and timely access to
standardized data and a shared operational picture.
Question. Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper took a personal
interest in modernizing the DOD CHARRTS software system used to manage
congressionally-required reports.
Given your significant and recent military service, what are your
views on the efficacy of the processes and systems used to manage
congressional reporting requirements?
Answer. I understand that, recently, congressional and DOD staff
have been working to modernize the reporting process, and streamline
both the way Congress identifies items requiring Department reporting,
as well as the reporting process itself. I understand the importance of
the reporting process and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress on this process.
Question. In your view, how can the DOD processes and systems--
including CHARRTS--for managing engagements with, and the flow of
information to Congress writ large, and the congressional defense
committees more specifically, be improved?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Congress and the Department
have begun collaborating on technologies to enhance the flow of
information between the Congressional defense committees and the
Department through an online, cloud-based, exchange portal to track
reporting requirements from inception by the committees, through
assignment and completion by the Department, with a goal of enhancing
the timeliness and transparency of the process for all stakeholders. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on this process.
dod auditability
Question. Since 1995, DOD's financial management has been on the
Government Accountability Office's High-Risk List, identified as
vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Over the past
several years, DOD undertook a department-wide financial audit, despite
not being audit-ready, and has made significant progress toward
auditability. The Department is now targeting 2027 to achieve an
unqualified or clean opinion.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to maintain the significant
momentum achieved in auditability over the past several years at the
Department of Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department has actionable
and achievable plans in place to keep making progress toward an
unmodified audit opinion. All leaders--military and civilian, operator
or supporter--will be held accountable for collaborating and
completing, in a timely manner, these plans and roadmaps. I will expect
my Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and other DOD leaders to
work together to address and reduce the findings from the most recent
audit and to continue the recent progress in the use of data analytics
as an important tool in this effort.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or
direct to achieve better outcomes than have past initiatives intended
to improve DOD auditability?
Answer. The tone set by leadership at the top is critical to
accomplishing goals. There is a history of the Secretary of Defense
establishing priority areas for audit remediation. If confirmed, I
intend to continue that advocacy. I will reinforce leadership's
engagement and focus on these audits. Better outcomes occur when we
leverage our auditor's feedback to prioritize corrective actions that
bring the greatest value to our operations and warfighters. Better
outcomes also occur when leaders are accountable to the results of
these audits, and, if confirmed, I will lead them through this
important task. What gets measured also gets done, so if confirmed, I
will monitor and push for progress by using and emphasizing metrics
that enable the Department to quantify progress throughout the year.
Question. How does the DOD audit contribute to operational
readiness, in your view?
Answer. The value of audit is not so much in DOD being able to say
it has a clean audit opinion, but in the audit recommendations that
bring insight into how the Department can improve its operations. The
audit process can improve the Department's operations on many levels--
in the form of more reliable information for decision-making, improved
inventory management, and cybersecurity. With time, I expect that the
value and contributions that flow from the audit will grow. Our audit
efforts should lead to strengthened internal controls, streamlined
business processes, improved visibility of assets and financial
resources, and increased transparency and accountability. All of this
makes the Department more effective.
acquisition management
Acquisition Reform
Question. Recent NDAAs have enacted sweeping reforms to the
Department's acquisition organizational structures and systems,
including introducing new acquisition flexibilities and delegating
significant acquisition authority to the Services.
In your view, what are the key tenets of the Department's new
Adaptive Acquisition Framework and does it effectively implement the
reforms directed by Congress? If not, what additional changes in the
defense acquisition system are needed?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
Adaptive Acquisition Framework implements the following tenets: (a)
Empower program managers (PMs); (b) Simplify acquisition policy; (c)
Employ tailored acquisition approaches; (d) Conduct data driven
analysis; (e) Actively manage risk; and (f) Emphasize product support
and sustainment. If confirmed, I will work with my staff and the
services to ensure that Department policy is fully aligned with these
tenets and effectively implements the reforms needed in the defense
acquisition system.
It is my understanding that recent reforms have allowed the
Department to engage effectively in rapid prototyping and expand access
to new partners in industry. At the same time, the fielding of new
capabilities continues to proceed at a slower pace than is required to
address the challenges the Department faces and the development of new
entrants in the generation of defense capability is suboptimal.
Acquisition of services and software remain challenging and
implementing sound cybersecurity throughout the acquisition system and
the weapon systems it produces is a major need. If confirmed, I will
work closely with my staff and the services to continue to improve the
defense acquisition system along these fronts and in other areas.
Question. Recognizing that the Adaptive Acquisition Framework
represents a significant change in DOD acquisition policy and process,
what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure it is successfully
adopted throughout the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, and the Military Departments' Senior
Acquisition Executives to ensure that we have the necessary policies in
place to implement and institutionalize reforms in the defense
acquisition system and to ensure its effective operation.
Question. Given the delegation of significant acquisition authority
to the Military Services, what do you believe to be the respective
roles of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Service Acquisition Executives in
ensuring acquisition programs deliver promised capabilities to the end
user on time and on budget? If confirmed, who would you hold
accountable for large-scale acquisition failures?
Answer. I believe the role of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Service
Acquisition Executives, as well as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering is to operate collaboratively, consistent with
their statutory responsibilities, to ensure the effective operation of
the defense acquisition system.
Problems with acquisition can arise from many factors, including
overly ambitious requirements, immature technologies, and poor planning
and/or execution by government or contractor teams. If confirmed, I
would assume ultimate responsibility and accountability for the
stewardship of the resources the American taxpayer invests in the
Department. I expect to work closely with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Military Service or
Component acquisition executives to monitor and improve program
performance. Accepting and managing risks is a necessity to deliver
needed capabilities. When there are failures, we should learn from
them, identify root causes, and move on from the program if a better
alternative can be identified.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant acquisition
and contracting challenges facing the Department today? What additional
acquisition or related reforms would you recommend and implement to
address those challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. Working with defense contractors to protect critical
information and implementing appropriate cybersecurity measures are
significant challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing the
need to protect critical information and implement appropriate
cybersecurity measures, including working with the Congress. This needs
to be a priority for DOD's acquisition and contracting community. In
implementing these important authorities, we must balance the absolute
need to secure our systems, with the impact to cost, schedule and
performance in implementing these measures.
If confirmed, I will work with the OSD staff and the services to
identify improvements to the acquisition system in areas with
continuing challenges. In addition to those areas I previously
identified, developing the acquisition workforce will be a top
priority. I will also ensure that the Department works closely with
Congress on these issues.
Many acquisition experts attribute past failures of defense
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces
unrealistic performance expectations and overly optimistic cost and
schedule estimates.
Question. What is your understanding of the tools available to the
Secretary of Defense to identify and direct appropriate trade-offs
between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early and
regularly throughout the acquisition process?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department of Defense's
policies, including DOD Instruction 5000.02, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, and the use of Other Transaction Authority agreements,
provide the Department with significant flexibility to tailor cost,
schedule, and performance. A key factor in leveraging these tools
successfully is having knowledgeable officials in place on the OSD
staff and in the services as well as across the acquisition workforce.
If confirmed, I would work with the Congress to continue to refine
these policy tools and to ensure that we have the talent we need in the
defense acquisition system.
Question. The rapid pace with which our adversaries field
technological change demands a DOD acquisition system that can
innovate, adapt, and respond to new threats and opportunities.
In your view, how should the Department define and manage concepts
like risk and failure so that program managers can try new technologies
and concepts, learn what does and does not work, and more quickly drive
technological advancement?
Answer. Risk management is a technical and cultural challenge. If
confirmed, I will work with acquisition and sustainment and research
and engineering leadership in OSD and in the military services to
ensure risk is understood and that the acquisition workforce is
encouraged to manage risk effectively. It is my understanding that
effective management of risk is part of the reason the USD(R&E) was
established in the first place: to help foster a culture of innovation.
If confirmed, I would expect USD (R&E)'s efforts, in coordination with
those of the USD (A&S), to complement each other and foster adoption of
new technologies and concepts with appropriate management of risk.
Requirements
Question. One of the challenges facing many acquisition programs--
ranging from weapons systems to business systems--is unrealistic,
unfeasible, unstable, and unaffordable requirements.
What best practices can the Department employ to generate realistic
and feasible requirements, particularly in sophisticated, rapidly-
evolving technical areas, and given that software increasingly defines
the capability?
Answer. Dynamic approaches to requirements generation in a mission
engineering context, as well as insights from prototypes, experiments,
and pilots aligned with the Department's modernization priorities and
the National Defense Strategy should continuously shape requirements
and designs. These approaches that actively engage users, and allow
rapid iterative insertion of emerging technologies. If confirmed, I
will work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others to encourage
these types of approaches.
Question. In your view, how well does the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) draw upon and use input from the systems
engineering; cost analysis; and programming, planning, and budgeting
communities in its requirements deliberations? How would your
experience inform your future oversight of the JROC?
Answer. It is my understanding that the JROC includes
representatives from the engineering, cost estimation, and budgeting
communities in its deliberations. I am also aware that the current Vice
Chairman is working to reshape the JROC's focus around key requirements
of a joint warfighting concept. If confirmed, I will work with the
Joint Staff, the services, and civilian leadership to ensure that our
requirements process supports the development of the capabilities
needed to execute the strategy.
During my time as the Army Vice Chief of Staff from 2012 to 2013, I
was a member of the JROC, so I am fully aware of its strategic and day-
to-day tasks. If confirmed, I will maintain appropriate oversight of
its critical responsibilities for the joint force through the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and work with them to
implement the strategy.
Question. Title 10, U.S. Code establishes the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the Chairman of the JROC, as the
primary adviser to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on
requirements. In this context, the law authorizes the Vice Chairman to
establish requirements without the consensus of the JROC as a whole.
This reform was intended to improve support for joint warfighting
requirements and missions that may not be of sufficient priority for
the Military Services.
What are your views on these reforms?
Answer. I am broadly comfortable with the statutory framework
undergirding the work of the JROC. If confirmed, I will review the
JROC's efforts to better align its approach to the requirements process
around key elements of the joint warfighting concept, and work with the
Joint Staff, the services, and civilian leadership to ensure that our
requirements process supports the development of the capabilities
needed to execute the strategy.
Defense Industrial Base
Question. In recent years, Congress, industry, and DOD have
increasingly expressed concerns about the health of the defense
industrial base and its ability to reliably meet defense needs, coupled
with an interest in ``on-shoring'' industrial activity. The NDAA for
fiscal year 2021 seeks to address these issues, in part, by
establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
Policy.
What do you assess to be the most significant challenges facing the
defense industrial base? How would you address these challenges, if
confirmed?
Answer. A number of weaknesses exist in the defense industrial
base. They include: workforce stability, financial health, cyber
exploitation, a reliance on sole or single source suppliers, reliance
on foreign sources (including adversarial sources), and vulnerabilities
to predatory and adversarial capital investments. COVID-19 has
highlighted previously unknown industrial base risks, created new
risks, and exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. These impacts have
been visible across businesses of all sizes and their supply chains.
A robust defense industrial base is critical to supporting the
Warfighter. If confirmed, I will assess the vulnerabilities in the
defense industrial base and strategically invest in programs such as
Defense Production Act Title III to address them. I will ensure
implementation of statutory authorities, including those related to the
Committee on Foreign investment in the United States, to protect
American technology and know-how from adversarial foreign capital.
Further, if confirmed, I will focus efforts to ensure that all
companies within the defense industrial base have access to tools to
combat cybersecurity threats. I will also work within the DOD to
strengthen activities with small business, and with allies and
partners, to support policies that foster collaboration, competition,
and innovation, to ensure a vibrant defense industrial base.
Question. What steps should the Department take--on its own or as
part of a whole-of-government approach--to increase domestic industrial
capacity and reduce reliance on suppliers in China?
Answer. The President-elect has identified increasing domestic
industrial capacity as a top priority and a priority across U.S.
Government agencies. The Department of Defense has substantial
investments in research, development, production of major weapon
systems, procurement of supplies, and other support efforts related to
national security requirements that spur industrial activity and
private investment. If confirmed, I will support a whole-of-government
approach to ensuring we have the domestic industrial capacity needed to
meet defense requirements and support the economy. DOD can leverage its
authorities and programs to onshore capacity and capability in certain
areas and collaborate with allies and partners to leverage their unique
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what would you establish as the key
priorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
Policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look into this area in more detail.
However, I will focus efforts on a number of critical and timely
challenges. This includes ensuring that the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Base Policy is supporting the critical
industrial base challenges I noted earlier, including the whole-of-
government approach to fighting COVID-19 and its disruptions.
test and evaluation
Question. A natural tension exists between the goals of major
defense acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and
the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--
the objective of the test and evaluation function.
If confirmed, how would you approach your relationship with the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, particularly in light of the
independence and direct reporting relationships and responsibilities
accorded the Director in law?
Answer. The success of the Armed Forces depends upon the objective,
unvarnished information and assessments the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E) provides. If confirmed, I will respect DOT&E's
independence, granted by Congress in statute, and look forward to
working closely with DOT&E to ensure that our warfighters receive the
most capable and safest systems possible.
Question. The Major Range and Test Facilities Base (MRTFB) and
DOD's associated test and evaluation infrastructure are critical
national assets. In recent years it has become clear that digital
engineering and digital modeling and simulation tools and
infrastructure will be critical to achieving the Department's
objectives for optimizing existing legacy weapons systems and
facilitating the delivery of modern software-defined capabilities.
Based on your past experience in DOD and in the defense industry,
are you satisfied with DOD's test and evaluation capabilities,
including the test and evaluation workforces and infrastructure of the
Military Services?
Answer. In my experience, DOD's T&E community has contributed
substantially to producing the world's most effective fighting force,
the U.S. Military. The technology available to us and our adversaries
and the methods of employing that technology are evolving at an
incredible pace. If confirmed, I believe a review of our T&E
infrastructure, tools and workforce is necessary to ensure that they
are ready for the systems we intend to field and the threats we expect
to face.
Question. If confirmed, in which areas, if any would you require
the Department to develop new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe a thorough review of DOD's T&E
capabilities and workforce would be prudent. The results of this review
would inform my decisions regarding T&E investment. DOD must be
prepared to test and evaluate current and emerging systems and
technology. Critical areas to assess include our national space test
and training capability, our capability to test hypersonic weapons,
directed-energy platforms, and autonomous and artificial intelligence-
based systems; and our test and evaluation capabilities for software
systems and cybersecurity.
Question. Under what conditions should other U.S. Government
agencies (Federal, State and local), allied foreign governments, and
defense contractors be permitted to use the MRTFB?
Answer. DOD organizations must have priority for use of the Major
Range and Test Facility Base. If confirmed, I would support robust
interagency cooperation whenever possible and I envision many mutually
beneficial opportunities, particularly in the areas of space,
cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, for partnership with other
government agencies. Strengthening partnerships with our international
allies will be at the top of my agenda. That will include improving
their warfighting capabilities and supporting our forces'
interoperability through opportunities for via testing and training at
U.S. facilities.
defense security cooperation
Question. What should be the primary objectives of Department of
Defense security sector assistance activities, in your view?
Answer. The Department's primary objective for security sector
assistance efforts should be to enhance the capabilities and capacity
of our partners to provide for their own defense and enable partners to
address regional security challenges--to advance shared security
interests. Working with the Department of State, the Department of
Defense's security sector assistance tools are a linchpin in
maintaining and leveraging the United States' robust constellation of
allies and partners, which are vital to achieving U.S. objectives
abroad.
Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
resourced to execute security sector assistance effectively? If not,
what changes would you make or direct, if confirmed?
Answer. Congress has provided the Department sufficient authorities
to address capability and capacity shortfalls among allies and partners
to ensure partners are able to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S.
Forces. It is my understanding that the Department has made significant
strides in recent years through aligning security cooperation
activities with National Defense Strategy (NDS) objectives and
utilizing the full range of available authorities for building partner
capacity. If confirmed, I will build upon this progress and explore
innovative ways to leverage security cooperation resources as a key
element in advancing defense strategic objectives.
I appreciate the Title 10 Chapter 16 tools Congress has provided to
the Department and the continued support toward improving the execution
of security cooperation efforts. If confirmed, I will advise the
Committee of any additional legislative or organizational changes that
I conclude are necessary to execute this mission as effectively and
efficiently as possible.
base realignment and closure (brac)
Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
less money than originally estimated.
Do you believe that another BRAC round is needed? If so, what
changes to law and implementation policy would you recommend to improve
on the outcomes of the 2005 BRAC process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my senior advisors and the
Military Department leaders to determine whether authorization for a
BRAC round is something to consider in the future as we shape
priorities.
The BRAC process is recognized as fair, objective, and a proven
process for closing and realigning installations in the United States.
That said, I understand that Congress has expressed concerns about the
2005 BRAC round. If confirmed, I will assess the need for changes to
law or policy to address congressional concerns with the 2005 BRAC
round. The key will be maintaining the essence of the BRAC process:
treating all installations equally, all or none review by both the
President and Congress, an independent Commission, the priority of
military value, and a clear legal obligation to implement all of the
recommendations in a time certain together with all the authorities
needed to accomplish implementation (specifically the authority to
undertake military construction necessary to implement
recommendations).
Question. If you are confirmed, and were Congress to authorize
another BRAC round, how would you set priorities for infrastructure
reduction and consolidation across DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, and if Congress were to authorize a new BRAC
round, I would work with my civilian and military experts to determine
the priorities to be addressed by that round.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities for
working with local communities with respect to property disposal that
would vest in DOD and the Military Services, were Congress to authorize
another BRAC round?
Answer. If confirmed, and if Congress were to authorize another
BRAC round, I would consult with the Department's experts on this
matter.
operational energy and energy resilience
Question. The Department defines operational energy as the energy
required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and
weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by
tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. As early as
2004, then-General Mattis testified before Congress that DOD must
``unleash us from the tether of fuel'' if U.S. Forces are to sustain
momentum and retain freedom of maneuver. He cautioned that ``units
would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their
dependence on fuel'' and resupply efforts ``made us vulnerable in ways
that would be exploited by the enemy.'' Today, DOD energy requirements
are projected to increase significantly due to technological advances
in weapons systems and distributed operations over longer operating
distances.
If confirmed, what would you do to harness innovations in
operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational
concepts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across OSD, the Joint Staff, the
Services, the Combatant Commands, and industry to enhance the energy
resilience of the Joint force. That includes investing in energy RDT&E
and incorporating energy resilience into emerging joint operational
concepts through exercises, wargames, modeling and simulation, and
other means.
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe DOD needs
to improve the incorporation of energy considerations in its strategic
planning processes?
Answer. DOD must consider the supportability of our energy
requirements in contested and competitive operating environments,
including the Homeland, as well as how changing geopolitical conditions
affect energy supplies. If confirmed, I will review how well the
Department is incorporating energy considerations into all aspects of
the strategic planning process.
Question. How can DOD acquisition systems better address
requirements related to the use of energy in military platforms? In
your view, should energy supportability be a key performance parameter
in the requirements process?
Answer. DOD does not and will not have uncontested access to
unlimited energy, from the Homeland to forward deployed locations. If
confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure the acquisition system
values and enhances the energy supportability of future platforms and
operations.
It is my understanding that energy supportability is already a key
performance parameter, by statute. If confirmed, I will ask the
acquisition and energy experts, in coordination with the Joint Staff,
to update me on the implementation of the energy supportability key
performance parameter, and recommend any necessary improvements.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to
prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DOD, including
acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to
support mission critical functions and address known vulnerabilities?
Answer. In order to achieve their missions, our warfighters must
have assured access to energy that is resilient to all hazards and
threats. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department considers a full
range of resilient, cyber-secure, and sustainable energy solutions,
including renewable energy technologies, to meet the needs of mission
critical functions.
Question. Section 2805 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA accorded the
Secretary of Defense the authority to plan and fund military
construction projects directly related to energy resiliency and energy
security.
If confirmed, for what types of construction projects would you
leverage section 2805 authorities to enhance mission assurance?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD utilizes all
available authorities, including section 2805, in an integrated and
holistic manner to strengthen its mission assurance posture. Solutions
may include microgrids, distributed on-site generation (such as
renewable energy), and battery energy storage systems, among others, to
improve mission assurance at our installations.
environment
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD and the
Military Services comply with environment protection laws, regulations,
and guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Environmental Protection
Agency to ensure the Department of Defense complies with environmental
regulations, laws, Executive Orders, and EPA guidance while meeting its
mission responsibilities.
If confirmed, how would you structure investments in DOD's
Environmental Research Programs?
If confirmed, I will structure the Department's environmental
research programs to address the highest priority issues facing DOD and
to support Administration priorities.
Question. What are your ideas for improving DOD collaboration with
the Department of Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
find cooperative ways to ensure military readiness, while protecting
the environment on and around military installations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with all relevant Federal,
State, Tribal, and local stakeholders, including the Department of
Interior and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, towards conservation
outcomes that support our mission requirements; sustain resilient
landscapes on and around military installations and ranges; and
conserve our nation's natural and cultural heritage now and into the
future.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD and the
Military Services comply with environmental protection laws,
regulations, and guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Services to
ensure the Department has the policy, organization, training,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to comply with all
environmental requirements.
environmental contaminants
Question. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
DOD has identified more than 400 military installations affected by
known or suspected releases of Perflourooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and
Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).
If confirmed, what actions would you take to address PFOS/PFOA
contamination on DOD installations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the DOD PFAS Task Force
proactively addresses PFAS concerns, and aggressively pursues a PFAS-
free firefighting agent.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing
the health concerns of servicemembers and their families regarding
alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on U.S. military
installations and in the context of performing military duties?
Answer. Nothing is more important than the health and well-being of
our people and their families. If confirmed, I will make sure health
concerns that are reported are promptly reviewed, investigated, and
mitigated when necessary. I will direct Department of Defense officials
to work with the EPA and the Department of Veterans Affairs to ensure
we are taking care of servicemembers and their families. I will also
work for a more proactive approach to protecting the environmental
quality of installations for our servicemembers, their families, and
the communities that support them.
readiness and resource impacts from extreme weather
Question. Over the last few years, hurricanes have resulted in more
than $10 billion in damage to military installations across the U.S.
How would you assess the readiness and resource impacts on DOD from
recent extreme weather events?
Answer. Severe weather and other climate change-related disasters
have degraded DOD's ability to operate and train at certain
installations, imposing significant costs. If confirmed, I will work
with Department leadership, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services
to develop a full understanding of the national security implications
of extreme weather and climate change, taking a comprehensive approach
that includes impacts on operations, readiness, installations,
equipment, infrastructure, and force development.
Question. Based on these readiness and resource impacts, do you
believe it necessary to use more resilient designs in DOD
infrastructure?
Answer. Yes. It is common sense, cost effective, and arguably
necessary to promote resilience in DOD infrastructure and supporting
communities. If confirmed, I will work with DOD leadership to ensure
our standards continue to improve.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared. Our competitors are engaging in aggressive military
modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten
key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational
capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed
energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/
machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much
of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for
national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional
defense industry.
If confirmed, would you make any changes or adjustments in current
DOD modernization priorities?
Answer. I understand the current list of modernization priorities
has been drawn directly from the National Defense Strategy, with input
from stakeholders across the DOD enterprise. I would be open to
revisiting these priorities as technology evolves and new challenges
and opportunities are identified.
Question. What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to DOD's development of these
key technologies?
Answer. I believe the Department faces a significant challenge in
accelerating our adoption of new technology in ensuring that new
capabilities make their way quickly from the lab into the hands of
warfighters, while at the same time balancing the sustainment needs of
our legacy systems. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to speed the
transition of new technologies from concept to prototype to fielded
capability.
Question. Are the Department's investments in these technologies
appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized across all Military
Departments and Agencies?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA reestablished and elevated the
USD(R&E) to focus strategically on the integration and synchronization
of technology development programs across the Department. If confirmed,
I will support the USD(R&E) in ensuring that the Department's
technology investments are appropriately focused, integrated, and
synchronized across all military departments and Agencies.
Question. In addition to the technologies identified in the 2018
NDS, are there other technology areas in which you believe DOD must
invest to ensure that the United States maintains its technological
superiority in the long-term?
Answer. Yes, and that is reflected in the fact that the
Department's research portfolio is much broader than the modernization
priorities. The Department invests in a broad portfolio of technologies
to drive future capability improvements and to create technological
advantage. For example, areas such as advanced materials, propulsion,
software engineering, and electronic warfare are now, and will continue
to be, key enablers.
Question. Given your experience in both DOD and the private sector,
is DOD applying appropriate effort to identifying new technologies
developed commercially by the private sector and applying those
technologies to national security and warfighter purposes?
Answer. While we can always do better, I believe DOD contAnswer.
inues to reduce the obstacles associated with bringing commercially
developed technologies to bear in support of the warfighter. The
Department is focused on identifying new technologies developed
commercially and applying those technologies to national security and
warfighter purposes. For example, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), a
component of OUSD (R&E), has made significant strides in bridging the
gap between the commercial technology sector and the military.
The DOD Research and Engineering Enterprise also seeks out
promising technologies/capabilities through outreach via public
engagement, presentations to industry and academic forums, engagement
with technical professional groups, and open solicitations to non-
traditional vendors. If confirmed, I will support these and other
efforts to leverage commercial technology developed by the private
sector to bring advantage to the warfighter.
Question. The Defense Science Board has recommended that DOD adopt
a goal of dedicating 3% of the total defense budget to Science and
Technology (S&T).
If confirmed, would you implement the DSB's recommendation?
Answer. The S&T budget provides critically important funding for
long-term technology needs, and if confirmed, I will direct the
USD(R&E) to develop a strategy for funding the S&T priorities to ensure
that we can maintain and enhance our operational capabilities and work
with Service Secretaries to support funding for the priorities.
Question. If confirmed, by what metric would you assess whether DOD
is investing adequately in S&T programs and whether the DOD enterprise
has achieved the proper balance between near-term research and long-
term S&T?
Answer. S&T is a critical component of the Department's long term
strategy to address the objectives of the National Defense Strategy. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that DOD invests adequately in S&T to
meet our mid and long term strategic needs and properly balances near-
term R&D and longer-term S&T.
Question. In its 2018 report, Foreign Economic Espionage in
Cyberspace, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center warned
that ``foreign economic and industrial espionage against the United
States . . . represent a significant threat to America's prosperity,
security, and competitive advantage.'' The report confirmed that China
and Russia are engaged in campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary
information, and other forms of intellectual property from the United
States, through infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition
of knowledge by foreign students at United States universities, and
other nefarious means--all as part of a strategic technology
acquisition program.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to strengthen National
Security Industrial Base and National Security Innovation Base systems
and processes to ensure that critical information is protected?
Answer. The National Defense Strategy and the Department of Defense
Cyber Strategy highlight the importance of harnessing and protecting
the National Security Innovation Base in order to compete, deter, and
win in an increasingly complex global security environment. The
Department can and should work closely with industry to protect
sensitive information, platforms, and infrastructure through mechanisms
such as cybersecurity assessments, supply chain illumination, and cost-
effective, secure architectures and cybersecurity services. It will
take a whole-of-government effort to ensure that critical information
is protected and ensuring that every relevant agency in the government
is working together to address this problem is a priority for the
President-elect. If confirmed, I will make this area a priority.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Many DOD officials, including previous Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. I support the navigation and overflight provisions
contained in the Law of the Sea Convention. The global mobility of U.S.
Forces relies on these rights and freedoms. I understand the United
States has recognized that these provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention reflect customary international law that is applicable to
all nations, whether or not a nation has ratified the Convention. The
United States consistently respects the law of the sea and exercises
these rights around the globe by flying, sailing, and operating
wherever international law allows. If confirmed, I will support
policies and actions that continue to exercise and safeguard these
interests, as well as the free and open order of which the law of the
sea is a part. I will keep these objectives in mind when providing
recommendations to the President and the Congress.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would United States
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on emerging maritime
disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
Answer. Regardless of accession to the Law of the Sea Convention,
the United States will continue to advocate for the peaceful resolution
of maritime disputes without force or coercion. The United States does
not generally insert itself into territorial or maritime disputes to
which it is not a part. But the United States maintains a strong
position on adherence to the legal regime of the oceans reflected in
the Law of the Sea Convention. This principled stance drives the United
States' commitment to not only a free and open Indo-Pacific region, but
also to a free and open Arctic domain. If confirmed, I will work with
other Federal departments and agencies and our allies and partners to
support the free and open international order and continued access for
all lawful uses of the oceans.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
for victims and hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual
assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
servicemembers aged 17 to 24, remains too high.
Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that DOD and
the Military Services have put in place to prevent and respond to
sexual assault, and to protect servicemembers who report sexual assault
from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. My understanding is that over the last ten years, the
Department has made progress in many areas, but there is much more to
do. Although the current policies and programs are sound, execution of
our approach must be more proactive and oversight of these efforts must
be more timely and responsive. But as with all policies and programs,
if confirmed, I would continue to closely monitor our progress and
identify opportunities to improve and better support our
servicemembers. The challenges posed by sexual assault constantly
evolve; as such, our efforts must also continue to adapt. If confirmed,
I will continue to refine and improve our approach so that every member
can serve in a climate of dignity, respect, and inclusion.
Question. In your view, why hasn't the Department been more
successful in preventing sexual assaults?
Answer. My understanding is that while the Department was able to
see progress in this space between 2006 and 2016, the most recent data
shows an uptick in reports of sexual assault. I also understand that
this uptick was predominantly within our youngest enlisted cadre. This
tells me we must do more to train, educate, and hold accountable
enlisted leaders--our greatest influencers at that level--while
maintaining a vigilant eye at the highest levels of leadership as well.
If confirmed, I will work with Congress to take this on and ensure we
not only have a force that embodies our expectations for good order and
discipline, but that we hold our leaders, at all levels, appropriately
accountable for these expectations.
Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders
over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
including sexual assault?
Answer. While I am very familiar with the current role of military
commanders in the disposition of allegations of Uniform Code of
Military Justice violations, I have not studied the potential impact of
removal of that authority in depth. During the campaign, President-
elect Biden stated his intention to ``appoint a commission of current
and former military leaders, sexual assault survivors and their
advocates, and sexual assault experts, and give them 90 days to make
concrete recommendations to me, including on prosecution decisions.''
If confirmed, I would closely study any such recommendations and confer
with the President on the best way forward.
Question. Why are the number of prosecutions for sexual assault and
retaliation in all Military Services so low? Why are conviction rates
so low?
Answer. I understand that the Defense Advisory Committee on
Investigations, Prosecutions and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed
Forces--a statutorily mandated federal advisory committee--has studied
the issue of preferral of charges alleging sexual assault offenses and
provided preliminary findings in its October 2020 Report on
Investigative Case File Reviews for Military Adult Penetrative Sexual
Offense Cases Closed in fiscal year 2017. If confirmed, I will closely
study the committee's findings and recommendations.
I have not studied conviction rates in the military justice system,
but I understand that the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigations,
Prosecutions, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces is
studying the conviction rate in sexual assault cases and plans to
further examine that issue. If confirmed, I will closely study any
resulting findings and recommendations.
Question. If confirmed, what initiatives will you implement that
focus on the prevention of sexual assaults in the military?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support comprehensive prevention
approaches that are part of a holistic plan to address sexual assault
and other problems that may give rise to the crime, such as sexual
harassment, hazing, and bullying. The Department's policies must
demonstrate an integrated prevention approach that helps all leaders
address command climate issues across the spectrum of problematic
behaviors. If confirmed, I will demand that all leaders and
servicemembers take ownership of their respective roles and execute
them to the fullest of their abilities. President-elect Biden has also
stated his intention to ``appoint a commission of current and former
military leaders, sexual assault survivors and their advocates, and
sexual assault experts, and give them 90 days to make concrete
recommendations to me,'' including on prevention initiatives. If
confirmed, I would closely study any such recommendations for expanding
the Department's prevention initiatives.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you
establish for yourself in DOD's program of preventing and responding to
both sexual harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Department's
proactive approach to prevent and address sexual harassment and
assault, including focusing on helping our young enlisted
servicemembers. We must continue to equip our current and future
leaders with the skills and competencies necessary to foster and
maintain respectful climates. I will ensure that the Department
continues to innovate and adapt its approaches. I also intend to lead
by example and regularly engage with staff and the Military Departments
and Services so everyone understands that mission readiness relies on
taking care of our most valuable asset: Our people.
Question. Given your extensive experience as a military officer, do
you perceive that if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, you would
require additional authority from Congress to improve the Department's
programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assaults?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review existing authorities and work
with the Administration and with Congress if I determine additional
authorities are necessary.
active and reserve component end strength
Question. Since 2016, the Active Force has grown by about 50,000
servicemembers.
Do you believe military end strength should continue to grow? If
yes, where do you believe that growth should occur?
Answer. Our servicemembers are our greatest asset. However, our
people can only be effective if we pair them with the right equipment,
training, and support. If confirmed, I will assess the Department's
military manpower with the goal of ensuring it is properly sized to
create an effective fighting force in line with the strategy.
As previously stated, if confirmed, I will look to ensure any end
strength growth or reduction is paired with associated requirements
with equipment, training, and support. If confirmed, I will focus any
end strength changes on the highest priority national security
challenges.
Question. What aggregate active end strength do you believe is
necessary to meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the
2018 NDS and associated operational plans?
Answer. Each servicemember plays a crucial role in enabling the
Department to defend the nation in line with our strategy. If
confirmed, I will seek to find the right balance between the size of
the force and our ability to keep it ready and modernized to provide
the best protection to our nation.
Question. If active end strength continues to increase, what
specific parameters would you use to determine what the corresponding
Reserve Component end strength should be?
Answer. The mix of Active and Reserve Forces should be assessed by
each service and by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, and as part of the program and budget review
process used to build the annual defense budget request. The best mix
would maximize lethality and readiness and ensure that the range of the
Department's missions are covered by those forces best suited to them,
while minimizing cost.
Question. In your view, do the Reserve components serve as an
operational Reserve, a strategic Reserve, or both? In light of your
answer, do the Reserve Components require increased levels of full-time
support, improved equipment, increased training, and higher levels of
overall resourcing for readiness going forward?
Answer. For the last twenty years, the Reserve Components have
successfully provided both ready operational capabilities and on-call
strategic depth to provide the full spectrum of lethality in support of
the National Defense Strategy (NDS) requirements.
The Reserve Components' resourcing levels in manning, equipping,
training, and readiness must be tailored to meet National Defense
Strategy (NDS) requirements in competition, crisis, and armed conflict.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Reserve Components are
appropriately resourced to execute NDS requirements.
recruiting and retention
Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission asserted
unequivocally that the most critical resource required to produce a
highly capable military is highly capable people, in the quantity
required, and willing to serve. Yet, DOD studies indicate that only
about 29% of today's youth population is eligible for military service.
Further, only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards
are interested in serving.
Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of
American youth eligible, qualified for, and interested in serving in
the Armed Forces poses an existential threat to national security?
Answer. Yes, I agree that the limited population who are eligible
to serve and a low propensity to serve are concerning, as this
challenge impacts our ability to meet our national security objectives.
If confirmed, I will work with the Congress and the Military
Departments and Services on initiatives to increase interest and
eligibility for military service among young Americans to sustain the
All-Volunteer Force.
Question. In your opinion, why are so few individuals in the 17 to
24 age range eligible for service, and what can be done to increase the
pool of individuals qualified for, and interested in military service?
Answer. Medical reasons disqualify most of the youth in this age
group, a third of which are disqualified for being overweight. If
confirmed, I will work with the Congress and the Military Departments
and Services on developing ideas and initiatives to increase the number
of young Americans qualified for military service in order to sustain
the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. What programs, policies, or tools does the Department
need to increase the propensity to serve of today's youth?
Answer. To improve propensity, we must change misperceptions of
what it means to serve in the military. Today, fewer Americans have a
personal connection to the military than at any time in the past
several decades, and the gap between the American people and their
military continues to grow wider. If confirmed, I will support
initiatives that bridge knowledge gaps, correct misperceptions and
reinforce a consistent, positive message in the market that raises the
esteem of joining the military.
Question. If required to choose between maintaining high
recruitment and retention standards and achieving authorized end
strength levels, which would be more important, in your view?
Answer. I believe it equally important to maintain high recruitment
and retention standards and to meet authorized end strength levels.
Despite ongoing recruiting challenges, the Services have been
successful in recruiting both the quality and quantity of recruits
needed to sustain the All-Volunteer Force. If confirmed, I will
continue to support efforts and policies that enable the Services to
meet their recruiting goals.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to increase
diversity and improve inclusion in the military?
Answer. The Department has long identified diversity as a strategic
imperative to maintaining a strong, viable military force. As I
understand it, the Military Departments and Services are exploring new
initiatives to expand and bolster the strategic tools needed to reach a
wide and representative number of youth. Initiatives include reviewing
promotion and command screening procedures and issuing polices that
ensure pregnancy does not impede a servicemember's career. If
confirmed, I remain committed to building on and expanding these
efforts. We must find a way to engage with American youth in all
communities and to help them understand the many benefits of military
service, which they could not attain in the private sector.
diversity and inclusion in the armed forces
Question. One consequence of the relatively low proportion of
American youth who are eligible and interested in military service is
that the military services have increasingly recruited from the same
sources, schools, and geographic locations, and have targeted recruits
from military families. Over time, these practices can decrease
diversity in the Armed Forces, including diversity of background,
experience, and thought that benefit any organization.
Do you believe broadening recruitment efforts and promotion
practices within the Armed Forces, with a goal of ensuring the Armed
Forces reflect the diverse population of the United States eligible to
serve, is a matter of national security, and should be a national
priority?
Answer. Yes, I believe that recruiting a force reflective of the
Nation serves as a critical component of our national security
strategy. I recognize the Department gains a strategic advantage by
leveraging the diversity of all members. If confirmed, I will support
the Armed Forces with ongoing efforts to recruit a Force that reflects
the rich diversity of the Nation they serve, and an equitable approach
to promotion practices.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
support increased diversity and inclusion within the Armed Forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize and strengthen
the Department's commitment to diversity and inclusion--and equal
opportunity--all of which enhance our military readiness. Our force is
stronger when we leverage the strengths of all members. I will reaffirm
that military and civilian leaders at all levels are responsible to
promote and instill these ideals. And I would champion accountability
as the DOD continues with efforts on improving diversity, equity and
inclusion within the Department. Additionally, if confirmed, I would
support the Department's ongoing efforts to implement the
recommendations recently offered by DOD Board on Diversity and
Inclusion and ensure that the Department appropriately prioritizes and
resources these implementation initiatives. Moving forward, if
confirmed, I will seek the independent advice of the Defense Advisory
Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to inform efforts underway and to
provide additional insights.
Question. If confirmed, how would you expand recruiting efforts to
reach every corner of America, including expanding recruiting efforts
and outreach to historically hard-to-recruit locations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support Military
Department and Service initiatives to apply a broad array of strategic
tools and approaches to increase the diversity within their ranks.
Furthermore, I will continue to foster key partnerships with community
leaders and other influencers to generate interest in the military as
an employer of choice for today's youth.
Question. There is a long history of honorable and courageous
immigrant service in the Armed Forces, in all conflicts.
Do you believe that military entrance requirements and testing
practices accurately measure the military potential of non-native
English speakers?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current efforts across the
Department to ensure valid, reliable, and fair criteria and measures
are used to access applicants with highest potential, to include non-
native English Speakers.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that entrance
requirements ensure the Armed Forces are not inadvertently missing out
on talented youth who may be disadvantaged because they are not native
English speakers?
Answer. The Department's overarching goal is to access applicants
with highest potential to perform in the field, while ensuring
diversity and inclusion. It is my understanding that the Department is
in the process of conducting an overarching review of best practices
used by the academia to assess academic achievement for non-native
English speakers. If confirmed, I will review these results and those
of similar efforts, and direct actions that achieve a wider reach to
all populations while maintaining appropriate enlistment standards.
assignment policies for women in the service
Question. Since 2015, all military occupations and units have been
open to the assignment of any servicemember who can meet the
occupational standards, including women.
What challenges still exist with regard to the assignment of women?
What proactive measures would you take or direct to address those
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. The Department has lifted all assignment restrictions
regarding the assignment of women. We must continue oversight of the
integration of women into formerly closed units. We should redouble our
efforts to attract and retain women in the military. Women are less
compelled to join and pursue careers in operational specialties. We
must assure prospective recruits that they can have extremely
successful and rewarding careers in a full range of specialties.
Otherwise, we are missing out on critical talent that is vital to
sustaining the All-volunteer force.
If confirmed, I will ensure DOD is known as an employer of choice
for women and all underrepresented populations. We have become
disconnected from the majority of Americans. They do not understand who
we are and misunderstand what life in the military entails. This lack
of familiarity often results in military service not being considered
when American youth make their career choices.
religious accommodation
Question. On September 1, 2020, the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness released DOD Instruction (DODI)
1300.17, in accordance with Section 533(a)(1) of NDAA for fiscal year
2013, as amended, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. DODI
1300.17 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides
procedures for the accommodation of servicemembers' religious
practices.
Do you believe that DODI 1300.17 appropriately protects
servicemembers' right to observe the tenants of their religion, or to
observe no religion at all?
Answer. Although I have not yet had an opportunity to review how
DODI 1300.17 has been implemented, my understanding is that all
applicable statutory provisions, including recent amendments, are
included in the latest revision to the DODI, thereby ensuring the
rights of our servicemembers are protected.
Question. Do each of the Military Service's policies and processes
appropriately accommodate the religious practices of individual
servicemembers, in your view?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be attentive to the necessity to
ensure the appropriate accommodation of servicemembers' religious
beliefs. The demands of service require individuals who are strong
physically, as well as spiritually.
Question. Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit
to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to
enlisting or accepting a commission in a Military Service?
Answer. Yes. To do otherwise would require an individual to
potentially violate their faith by signing documents committing to
follow all uniform regulations without knowing if an accommodation such
as maintaining a beard will be granted.
Question. Do you support a policy that allows a servicemember's
religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the member throughout
his/her military career--no matter where he/she is stationed or the
nature of his/her specific duties--unless it can be demonstrated that
the accommodation adversely affects military mission accomplishment?
Answer. We should not make individuals choose between faith and
service to our great Nation. Having their accommodation follow them
unless that accommodation adversely affects mission accomplishment is a
means to not placing the servicemember in such an untenable position.
Question. In your view, do existing DOD policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by a military chaplain in both
official and unofficial settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's right to pray in accordance with the tenets of his/her
religious faith and the rights of other servicemembers who may hold
with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs, who may be
present in these settings?
Answer. In my experience, yes. If confirmed, I will direct a review
of our policies to ensure chaplains have the right to pray in
accordance with the tenets of their faith.
military quality of life and family readiness
Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee views military
quality of life and military family readiness as critical factors in
the recruitment and retention of servicemembers. Military families want
access to high quality education for their children, and to high
quality health care and child care services on military installations
and in local communities. Military spouses seek education and
employment opportunities, and military families benefit from modern
morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) services.
If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
consider to be a priority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support quality of life programs that
reinforce a strong military community and focus on those that will help
to build and sustain resilient families. My priorities include spouse
employment, preventing both domestic violence and serious harm to
children, and child care programs. I will base my decisions on programs
that are determined to have the greatest impact on readiness,
retention, and resiliency.
Question. Do you believe that the Department should include
military family readiness considerations, such as the quality of public
education, and the availability of healthcare and childcare, in its
evaluation of basing options in the United States?
Answer. Yes. These considerations, and others such as housing, and
licensure portability for military spouses and other beneficial State-
level legislation and policies, are important as they contribute to the
overall readiness and well-being of the military family.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve the ``base scoring''
process to ensure that local communities are capable of providing
quality services to support military families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department
Secretaries to continue their efforts to develop criteria that will
equitably evaluate State and local community actions to support the
needs of military families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Reserve component
families receive necessary support services while their servicemembers
are mobilized and deployed? How would you ensure that Active component
families who do not reside near a military installation receive support
services?
Answer. The Department's approach must focus on both Active Duty
and Reserve component members and families. It is imperative that the
Department continue to provide support for a geographically-dispersed
population through a coordinated network of care encompassing support
and services provided by the Department and other Federal, State,
local, non-profit and private entities. One example of a DOD-wide
resource for families is Military OneSource--the Department's 24/7/365
solution to providing servicemembers and their families with resources,
tools, and information.
If confirmed, I will explore what needs currently exist, and
determine what is available to families wherever they reside in order
to identify gaps. Innovative solutions, such as web-based delivery
systems, may allow the Department to be more flexible and responsive to
the diverse needs of the population. Military OneSource, for example,
is a virtually accessible program offering support services from
anywhere around the world. The Department should continue to work with
other federal agencies, and those in local governments, businesses, and
non-profit stakeholders, to ensure support for military families
wherever they live and work.
Question. The Committee often hears that Active component military
families have difficulty obtaining child care on the military
installation and that there are thousands of families on waitlists to
receive infant care.
What are your innovative ideas for increasing the availability of
accessible, high-quality childcare, at an appropriate cost, for
military families?
Answer. Child care is a critical issue for military families,
especially in the current environment. If confirmed, I will review the
current efforts of the Department in this vital area and work with the
Military Departments and Services and the Congress to develop a multi-
pronged strategy that addresses identified shortfalls. My understanding
is that the Department is hard at work evaluating the Fiscal Year 2021
NDAA child care legislation including but not limited to:
standardization of child care fee assistance, 24-hour child care, and
assessment of staff pay and benefits to increase capacity.
Question. If confirmed, would you support the consolidation of
commissaries and the Service Exchanges into a single defense resale
system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's original
recommendations on this issue and will evaluate the savings and
efficiencies that can be gained by various service models or
consolidations. It is important that any consolidation or shared
services model maintains or improves the benefit while achieving
desired savings.
non-deployable servicemembers
Question. The Department has published DODI 1332.45, Retention
Determinations for Non-Deployable Servicemembers.
Do you agree that servicemembers who are non-deployable for more
than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation from
service or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?
Answer. As I understand the current policy, individuals who are
non-deployable for more than 12 months are evaluated to determine if
they are able to perform their duties and, if not, evaluated, to
determine whether or not continued Service is appropriate. As every
servicemember contributes to the readiness of the force, I believe such
an individualized review is necessary. If confirmed, I will direct a
review of the existing policy to better understand how it has been
implemented.
Question. DODI 1332.45 provides that the Secretaries of the
Military Departments may ``retain . . . those servicemembers whose
period of non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit . .
. if determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.''
Under what circumstances would the retention of a servicemember who
has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be ``in the best
interest of the Military Service''?
Answer. Each case must be evaluated on its own set of facts. What
is in the best interest of the Service will vary greatly depending on
the skills of the individual when measured against the needs of the
Military Service. Individuals with unique skills that are in short
supply would be an example of when a Service may determine that the
individual's continued Service warrants retention.
Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to
servicemembers with HIV? To servicemembers who identify as transgender?
Answer. My understanding is that medical science is advancing in
the treatment and prevention of HIV. The Department of Defense should
routinely review our policies if medical advances occur for all medical
conditions. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing our policies as
it relates to HIV.
To be credible to our servicemembers, the Department's policies
must apply fairly and equally to all. An individual's gender identity
should not be a factor in such a determination.
military health system reform
Question. In your view, do military medical providers have the
critical wartime medical competencies and experience required to
provide competent combat casualty care?
Answer. Emphasizing the importance of continuously exercising and
improving the knowledge, skills and abilities of our medical force must
be a high priority for the Department, and if confirmed, I will seek to
ensure that medical providers have the necessary medical competencies
and experience.
Question. Section 702 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2017, as modified
by sections 711 and 712 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019, transferred
the administration and management of military hospitals and clinics
from the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), a
Combat Support Agency.
Do you agree with the congressional mandates for military health
system (MHS) reform? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Military Health System should be focused on its core
readiness mission and providing quality health care to all
beneficiaries in accordance with guidance provided by Congress.
Consolidating the administration and management of the military
hospitals and clinics, along with public health and research
activities, under the Defense Health Agency (DHA) as directed by
Congress has the potential to continue improving overall readiness,
effectiveness and efficiency. If confirmed, I will look forward to
working with Congress to ensure effective implementation of Military
Health System reforms.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you ensure the rapid
and efficient transfer of the control, administration, and management
of all military treatment facilities to the DHA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit early in my tenure to being
briefed on the status of the transition and continue to follow the
transition progress to make sure the transfer is completed to best
support the future needs of the National Defense Strategy and the
nation and in full compliance with all legal requirements.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you bring to an end
actions by the Military Services to delay or reverse MHS reform?
Answer. If confirmed, I will listen intently to the Military
Services concerns and work to address any issues they raise if
possible. I will work to facilitate unity of effort across the Military
Services, ensure transparency and cooperation among all stakeholders,
and will make clear decisions to move forward within the timelines set
forth in law to accomplish the Congress' intent.
Question. Do you see value in restructuring the DHA as a new
combatant command--a Unified Medical Command--in the future? In your
view, what would be the pros and cons of such a command?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to fully implement the ongoing
reforms Congress has directed. These ongoing reforms represent major
transformations for the military health system and should serve to
increase operational readiness and improve quality and efficiency in
healthcare delivery. After a reasonable period following completion of
the statutory reforms, I will assess the net effect and determine if
there is a need for further consolidation or potential value to moving
to a Unified Medical Command model.
With regard to pros and cons, if confirmed, I would want to consult
with Congress after I have had time to more fully examine the issue and
assess the impact of the current round of reforms.
If confirmed, I will work to fully implement the ongoing reforms
Congress has directed. After a reasonable period following completion
of the statutory reforms, I will assess the net effect and determine if
there is a need for further consolidation or potential value to moving
to a Unified Medical Command model. With regard to pros and cons, if
confirmed I would want to come back to you after I have had time to
more fully examine the issue and to fully assess the impact of the
current round of reforms.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in each of the Military Services
continues to concern the Committee.
If confirmed, what new initiatives would you implement to prevent
suicides by military personnel and their family members?
Answer. Suicide is a national public health tragedy that affects
people of all ages, from all walks of life. Every suicide is
devastating, and forever changes the lives of families and communities.
I am deeply committed to supporting and protecting those who defend our
country, and it is imperative that we do everything possible to reduce
the risk of suicide and prevent suicidal behaviors. If confirmed, I
will ensure new suicide prevention initiatives continue to be evidence-
based and support efforts target prevention strategies for our
populations of greatest concern, particularly our youngest military
members. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with leaders
across the Military Departments and Services, the Department of
Veterans Affairs, and those in academia and the non-government sector
to evolve our strategies--and identify new, evidence-informed methods
to prevent the national tragedy of suicide.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to stem
higher incidences of suicide at remote installations (like Fort
Wainwright, Alaska) and on ships underway?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
public health approach to suicide prevention focused on our populations
of greatest concern. We must continue to emphasize comprehensive
efforts to help individuals before they may become at risk of harming
themselves and ensure we provide all necessary medical care and
treatment; this includes support initiatives that enhance connectedness
to family, friends, and fellow servicemembers, and promote help-seeking
behavior, particularly for those serving in remote environments.
Additionally, I will ensure that DOD continues to investigate and learn
why there may be higher concentrations of suicides in a particular
area. In accordance with the recently passed National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, I will issue guidance requiring
each suicide involving a servicemember to be reviewed by a
multidisciplinary board to ensure no stone is left unturned.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to enhance
the reporting and tracking of suicide among family members and
dependents of servicemembers across both Active and Reserve Components?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the current processes and
identify opportunities to enhance both the accuracy and timeliness of
collecting, tracking, and reporting suicides among our military
community. I am deeply committed to supporting and protecting those who
defend our country and their families, who also sacrifice for our
Nation.
the dod civilian workforce
Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD civilian personnel
policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S.
Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of
Personnel Management. Although this Committee does not have
jurisdiction over title 5, over the years, it has provided numerous
extraordinary hiring and management authorities tailored to specific
segments of the DOD civilian workforce.
In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the
Department in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian
workforce?
Answer. In my view, one of the biggest challenges the Department
faces is the competition for cutting-edge technical talent. This talent
is essential to implement the defense strategy and is in high-demand in
the private sector. DOD must be innovative in our talent, recruitment,
and retention efforts in order to achieve the DOD mission. DOD must be
an employer of choice for such high-demand professionals. If confirmed,
I look forward to working with Congress in continuing to create the
necessary efficiencies and flexibilities to recruit, retain, and
compensate these in-demand professionals.
Question. Do you advocate the creation of a new ``title 10'' DOD
civilian workforce and a concomitant body of title 10 personnel
authorities applicable only to the DOD civilian workforce? If so, how
should these new authorities improve on title 5, in your view?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to determine if creation of a new
title 10 system for the DOD civilian workforce would be more effective
in meeting the Department's needs.
It is my understanding that the current title 5 civilian personnel
system may not be fully sufficient to outpace our competitors where
needed to attract, hire, and retain a civilian workforce necessary to
support of DOD's national security mission.
Question. Under current law, the civilian pay raise to adjust for
wage inflation is set at the Employment Cost Index (ECI) minus 0.5
percent, or at about a 2.5 percent for fiscal year 2021. Yet, the
Department's budget frequently does not provide funding for a civilian
pay increase.
If confirmed, would you support a pay raise for DOD civilian
employees, consistent with current law?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would support pay raises for civilian
employees. Civilian pay must remain as competitive as possible to
attract and retain a qualified workforce in support of the DOD mission.
Question. Do you agree that the DOD civilian workforce is part of
the total force and serves as a force multiplier for the uniformed
military force?
Answer. Yes. The effective and appropriate use of the DOD civilian
workforce allows the Department to focus its servicemembers on the
tasks and functions that are truly military essential, thereby
enhancing the readiness of our warfighters.
Question. How do you assess the diversity of the DOD civilian
workforce? If confirmed, how would you ensure that diversity and
inclusion within the civilian workforce is sufficiently prioritized?
Answer. If I am confirmed, diversity and inclusion across the
entire Department will be one of my highest priorities. Ensuring the
civilian workforce reflects our nation is critical to DOD's success. If
confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Department's established
surveys and equal employment opportunity (EEO) data assessments to
gauge civilian employee experiences and identify trends involving equal
opportunity and diversity and inclusion. In addition, as the Department
implements the recommendations recently offered by the DOD Board on
Diversity and Inclusion, I will, if confirmed, seek internal and
external inputs and perspectives to strengthen our equal opportunity
and diversity and inclusion programs Department-wide.
DOD civilian employees are vital to our nation's defense and
integral members of the Total Force. If I am confirmed, as part of
DOD's efforts, I will instruct leaders at all levels to prioritize
diversity and inclusion initiatives across the civilian workforce and
identify trends and areas for improvement. Further, I would ensure the
Department appropriately assesses the effectiveness of existing and
newly proposed initiatives, and tailor DOD's diversity and inclusion
policies, programs, and processes to ensure we appropriately leverage
diversity and inclusion initiatives throughout the civilian workforce.
general/flag officers
Question. The fiscal year 2016 and 2017 NDAAs required DOD to
reduce by about 12 percent the number of General/Flag Officer (G/FO)
positions by the end of 2022. As of December 2020, the Department has
achieved only about one-third of the required G/FO reductions, mostly
by cutting vacant positions. DOD currently plans to identify and
implement all remaining non-Joint reductions in 2022.
Do you believe that the Department's decision to delay the
identification and elimination of the remaining G/FO positions is
prudent? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the
Department's decision to delay the identification and elimination of
the remaining G/FO positions. If confirmed, I am committed to ensure
the Department meets the statutorily-required reductions, as mandated
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in
determining whether a G/FO position should be continued in the current
grade, downgraded, or eliminated?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize existing and emerging
senior officer requirements based on the position's scope of
responsibilities and prospective contributions to accomplishing the
National Defense Strategy to ensure the Department meets all statutory
limitations.
Question. If confirmed, and as the U.S. Space Force continues to
grow, how would you propose to transfer the requisite number of general
officer allocations to the Space Force while also meeting the reduction
mandate?
Answer. If I am confirmed, in consultation with the Secretaries of
the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
I would seek to optimize the senior officer corps to best accomplish
the missions assigned to the Department of Defense. At this time, I do
not know enough about the U.S. Space Force requirements to provide an
informed response. However, I commit to providing Congress with a
response at a later date once I have had an opportunity to review the
issue.
national commission on military, national, and public service
Question. Last year's report of the National Commission on
Military, National, and Public Service made a number of recommendations
to increase and facilitate service opportunities in military, national,
and public service. These recommendations included modernizing the
Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) to include the registration of
women, and strengthening the relationship between military and
national/public service recruitment and programmatic efforts.
Do you support amending the MSSA to include the registration of
women? Do you support the Commission's other recommendations intended
to modernize the MSSA? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand that Congress created the National Commission
on Military, National, and Public Service to study and provide a
recommendation on this question as a core task. If confirmed, I would
review the Commission's recommendations and seek the input of experts
within the Department before making an assessment. I am aware that
future wars may have requirements for skills in non-combat fields in
which the percentage of individuals qualified would not be variable by
gender and excluding approximately 50% of the population--the female
half--from availability for the draft in the case of a national
emergency. Having a national conversation on the responsibilities of
citizenship for all Americans would play an important role in
increasing consideration of military service by both women and men,
which is critical to the sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.
If it is determined that the MSSA is an important component of our
National Defense Strategy, then it is logical to modernize the system.
If confirmed, I would work across the government to aid this effort.
Question. Do you agree with the Commission's conclusion that the
Selective Service System is still needed today, but must be updated to
reflect how we fight and breadth of skills needed in today's Armed
Forces?
Answer. Yes, the Selective Service System is useful as it provides
a hedge against the catastrophe we do not yet anticipate. The Selective
Service System is a means to remind our youth that public service is a
valued part of American citizenship. Making the data more useful to the
Department through modern data mining techniques would be a way to
improve the system's effectiveness. Capturing civilian experiences in a
structured way would also aid in managing the talent the Department
seeks to recruit.
Question. What other changes to the MSSA and the Selective Service
System do you believe would be useful and why?
Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review the Commission's
report, consult with experts and seek opportunities to identify other
changes I believe would enhance the value of the SSS to the
Department's mission.
Question. Do you agree that expanding military, national, and
public service opportunities, and encouraging greater service by
America's youth generally, not just in the military but in national and
public service, can, over time, increase propensity to serve among
youth, and increase the likelihood that influencers recommend military
service to the young men and women seeking their guidance?
Answer. Military, national, and public service are an important
component of citizenship. Expanding both the knowledge of and access to
these opportunities would have an overall positive impact on all forms
of service to our country.
defense department and the intelligence community collaboration
Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
and operational--between the Defense Department and the Intelligence
Community has grown increasingly close. On one hand, seamless
collaboration is vital to effective and rapid responses to non-
traditional threats, and bringing together the strengths of the full
spectrum of defense and intelligence capabilities can generate more
effective solutions to complex problems. On the other hand, without
effective management and oversight, such collaboration risks blurring
distinct agency missions, authorities, and funding, as well as creating
redundant lines of effort.
In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between
the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-
examined or modified?
Answer. Yes, we should always be open to examine our procedures and
processes. Close collaboration between the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the Intelligence Community (IC) is vital to national security. I
believe it is particularly important for DOD and IC collaboration to
focus on improved integration of intelligence priorities, equitable
resource management, and enhanced information sharing to include
refined policies, where necessary, and common data standards. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National
Intelligence to achieve unity of effort and the best effect in
employing DOD intelligence elements within the law in support of the
National Security Strategy.
execute orders (exords)
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 requires the Secretary of Defense, upon request by the Chairman or
Ranking Member, to provide the Armed Services Committees with the
ability to access and review EXORDS signed by the Secretary or the
commander of a combatant command.
If confirmed, would you comply with this requirement?
Answer. Yes, consistent with legal exceptions.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
afghanistan
1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your advance policy question
(APQ) responses regarding United States national security objectives in
Afghanistan you wrote that ``President-elect Biden has pledged to bring
the war in Afghanistan to a responsible end.'' How would you define
``responsible end''?
Mr. Austin. A responsible end to the war in Afghanistan will focus
on ensuring that terrorist groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State
Khorasan Province are not allowed to threaten the United States, our
allies, or our interests. To that end, the Administration will continue
supporting a political process between the Afghan Government and the
Taliban with the aim of ending violence plaguing the country and
allowing for an inclusive government that protects its diverse
population and is a responsible member of the international community.
erosion of military advantage
2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your APQ responses you wrote,
``The continued erosion of United States military advantage vis-a-vis
China and Russia, in key strategic areas, remains the most significant
risk the Department must address.'' What are the key strategic areas of
United States military advantage regarding Russia and China that you
feel need to be addressed?
Mr. Austin. Chinese and Russian military modernization, changes in
doctrine, and increasingly aggressive activities across the continuum
of conflict threaten to undermine the security of United States allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific and on NATO's eastern frontier,
regions previously regarded as relatively stable after the Cold War.
More specifically, both competitors have endeavored to develop the
means militarily to blunt the United States' ability to project power
into these regions in support of our allies in periods of potential
crisis. China and Russia pose evolving challenges to our forward
deterrent posture by modernizing their nuclear arsenals; advancing
their capabilities and concepts for conducting information, space, and
counter-space operations; and pursuing a range of malign cyber
activities, in both day-to-day competition and in potential crises,
including ones that could affect the United States Homeland.
dual-hatting national security agency and united states cyber command
3. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, do you think, in the middle of a
cyber-intrusion of the magnitude of SolarWinds, that it would be smart
to separate the dual-hat arrangement of the National Security Agency
(NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) that has worked so effectively
to date and that this committee has debated and strongly endorsed on
numerous occasions?
Mr. Austin. It is important that we take a long term view of what
is best for the missions of both organizations. I believe that it is
best to avoid making decisions on the basis of any one event and focus
on the long term value to national security. The SolarWinds incident is
deeply concerning, and the Government is just starting to understand
the full implications. If confirmed, I plan to assess the state of our
cybersecurity readiness and the roles of the National Security Agency
and U.S. Cyber Command.
movement of israel to united states central command portfolio
4. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, do you agree with the move of Israel
from United States European Command (EUCOM) to United States Central
Command (CENTCOM) and do you think there is a risk that the commander
of CENTCOM will become a primary negotiator between the Arab nations
and Israel?
Mr. Austin. I agree with the move. DOD reviews the Unified Command
Plan every two years and structures boundaries to best mitigate risk
and protect U.S interests and partners. Israel is a leading strategic
partner for the United States, and this move will create additional
opportunities for cooperation with United States Central Command while
maintaining strong cooperation between Israel and our European allies.
This move better aligns our military approach to the region and our
partners.
united states military presence in the middle east
5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your APQ responses you wrote, ``I
believe we can better calibrate United States military presence in the
Middle East . . . '' What kind of calibration do you have in mind? What
would you increase or decrease the military presence?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will carefully review the DOD presence
in the Middle East to ensure balance among operational requirements,
risk, readiness, and global commitments. With the evolution of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have an opportunity to reassess
our current posture in the region and determine what capabilities are
required to deter Iran and support regional stability. This
reassessment will be critical to increasing the Department's focus on
China and rebuilding readiness.
united states troop presence in syria
6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, your APQ response to the question of
``Do United States troops in Syria help ``push back'' on Russian and
Iranian Influence in the Middle East?'' indicated that the Defeat-ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] campaign was made more complex by
other threats in the region, but did not address the impact of United
States presence in Syria on Russian or Iranian influence. Do you think
the United States presence in Syria has any impact on Russian or
Iranian influence in the region and do you feel this is important in
the larger context of long term strategic competition with Russia?
Mr. Austin. My understanding is that the United States presence in
Syria is focused first and foremost on ensuring the lasting defeat of
ISIS. As the partner of choice in the region, our presence also enables
us to have strong relationships with local partners who would otherwise
be vulnerable to Russian or Iranian coercion. These relationships help
us shape outcomes favorable to United States interests, often at the
cost of increased Russian and Iranian influence. Russia, through its
support to the Assad regime and basing agreements in Syria, intends to
support an enduring footprint in the region to undermine strategic
United States and NATO interests, as evidenced during the Syrian civil
war, by its increased naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. More
recently, we see a similar approach its intervention in Libya.
section 127e activities
7. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your APQ response to the question
on section 127e and section 1202 activities, you did not address
section 127e activities. Do you have reservations about the use or
implementation of section 127e authority to support foreign forces or
irregular forces supporting or facilitating authorized U.S. special
forces operations to combat terrorism?
Mr. Austin. The authority under Section 127e provides excellent
strategic value for the money spent on the programs. The ability to
support foreign irregular forces, groups, and individuals under this
fiscal authority gives U.S. special operations forces an effective,
low-cost option to combat terrorism in close coordination with foreign
partners, while maintaining a minimal U.S. footprint. Geographic
combatant commanders continue to express strong support for this
authority as a critical component of their counterterrorism efforts. If
confirmed, I would advocate for continued attention to and support for
this authority, ensuring that operations remain thoroughly coordinated
with relevant Chiefs of Mission and that DOD remains fully transparent
with Congress in executing the authority.
defense budget topline
8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments and the Ronald Reagan Institute hosted two
bipartisan exercises by recognized leaders in their fields of defense
and budget experts, policy makers, and industry executives to assess
consequences of potential cuts to the Department of Defense budget
topline. ``The results of this bipartisan group effort were clear:
defense budget cuts would have devastating consequences of our military
and our national security. A 10 percent cut would leave the United
States with a military that is incapable of carrying out the current
National Defense Strategy.'' Do you agree that a 10 percent cut would
eviscerate force structure and make it impossible to achieve the
objectives of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?
Mr. Austin. Under any resourcing level, the Department must balance
readiness, force structure, and modernization while pursuing
efficiencies and savings through organizational reform and critical
reviews of ongoing missions and activities. If confirmed, I will
continue to push for the best possible balance amongst competing
priorities regardless of the topline. While a budgetary reduction will
pose a challenge, I will emphasize the need to maintain a ready,
technologically advanced force to ensure the Nation's national security
is preserved.
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in an article in Foreign Affairs in
the spring of 2020, Kathleen Hicks argued that through ``reshaping
overall strategy, pursing politically difficult efficiency gains, and
cultivating innovation . . . After some upfront investment, the Defense
Department could expect to reduce its annual costs by some $20 billion
to $30 billion.'' Do you agree, and if so, what is your estimate of the
``upfront investment'' required to achieve these savings?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would consider all ideas to improve the
Nation's national security posture. Savings may be achievable, but I
would want to hear from Dr. Hicks and others to better understand the
trades involved.
sensitive cyber operations
10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, cyber notifications from the
Department for sensitive cyber military operations, as required by law,
have become increasingly vague and do not provide enough information
for the committee to perform adequate oversight of these operations.
What would you do to improve these cyber operations notifications?
Mr. Austin. In accordance with section 395 of Title 10, U.S. Code,
the Department regularly notifies the congressional defense committees
within 48 hours of completing a sensitive military cyber operation. I
am committed to the principle of Congressional oversight of military
operations. If confirmed, I will work with DOD components to provide
the information through these notifications that enable Congressional
oversight
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, are there steps other than
improving the written notifications of sensitive cyber operations that
you would take to help Congress perform oversight of these critical
operations?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will commit to assessing whether the
timely, informative quarterly cyber operations briefings the Department
provides, in accordance with section 484 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and
the annual military cyberspace operations report, as required by
Section 1644 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization
Act, are sufficient to ensure congress has the information it requires
to oversee sensitive military cyber operations.
integrated air and missile defense
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, the Army is responsible for air and
missile defense of forward bases in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific,
and was required by the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) to procure two batteries of an interim missile defense
capability by September 30, 2020, and a second set of two batteries by
September 30, 2023. The Army missed the first deadline and does not
appear poised to meet the second deadline. Do you believe there needs
to be a shift in the air and missile defense roles and responsibilities
to ensure that bases the U.S. Armed Forces rely on to generate the
combat power required for implementation of the NDS are adequately
protected?
Mr. Austin. Air and missile defense of forward bases is inherently
a Joint responsibility and all the services contribute to this mission.
If confirmed, I will review the Air and Missile Defense roles and
responsibilities outlined in DOD Directive 5100.01 to determine if any
adjustments are required in order to ensure effective mitigation of the
risks presented by adversary air and missile, in the context of a new
U.S. defense strategy.
nuclear modernization
13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, I was somewhat reassured when you
indicated your support for the U.S. nuclear triad during your
confirmation hearing. However, it troubles me that while you agreed
that nuclear deterrence is the Department of Defense's highest priority
mission, and acknowledged that we have reached the point where the
entire U.S. deterrent must be updated, you would not commit to
supporting the programs needed to do so.
Mr. Austin. As I stated at my confirmation hearing, I agree with my
four confirmed predecessors going back to Secretary of Defense Hagel
that nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the
Department of Defense. An effective U.S. nuclear deterrent remains
vital to U.S. national security and to the security of our allies. If
confirmed, I will request a comprehensive review of nuclear threats
facing the United States and of the status of our nuclear modernization
and sustainment programs, and will provide the committee my
perspectives based upon this review.
14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, Department of Defense officials
estimate that the total annual cost of operating and modernizing the
U.S. nuclear deterrent is currently about 3.5 percent of the defense
budget, and will not exceed 7 percent even at the peak of planned
investments. Indeed, during testimony before this committee in 2016,
your former boss, then-Secretary Ashton Carter noted the following on
nuclear costs, ``It's not an enormous part of our budget, but it is a
critical part of our budget.'' Do you believe that 7 percent of the
defense budget is an excessive amount to spend on what the past five
Secretaries of Defense and you yourself have called the DOD's highest
priority defense mission?
Mr. Austin. The nuclear deterrence mission is one of the
Department's highest priority missions, and updating and overhauling
our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority.
If confirmed, I plan to request an early briefing on the U.S. nuclear
modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in the most
cost effective and judicious manner.
nuclear policy
15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in his final address as Vice
President, President Biden argued against modernizing the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, advocated for unilateral United States nuclear weapons
reductions regardless of whether Russia would reciprocate, and
supported unprecedented policy constraints on the United States's
ability to deter strategic attacks against our country and our allies.
Given that our nuclear-armed adversaries have continued to expand and
modernize their forces since the President made this speech, do you
believe that unilateral disarmament in the face of increasing threats
would improve the security of the United States and its allies?
Mr. Austin. I am generally aware of public reporting that both
China and Russia continue to invest in and expand their nuclear weapons
capabilities. If confirmed, I will undertake a deeper review both of
United States nuclear posture and of the nuclear weapons capabilities
of Russia and China.
16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, over the past 8 years, China,
Russia, and North Korea have all expanded and modernized their nuclear
arsenals, and are continuing to do so. Given these actions and the
increasing nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, do you
believe it is prudent to significantly alter U.S. policies that have
helped deter nuclear aggression for over 70 years?
Mr. Austin. I am generally aware of public reporting that China,
Russia and North Korea continue to invest in and expand their nuclear
weapons capabilities. If confirmed, I will undertake a deeper review
both of United States nuclear posture and of the nuclear weapons
capabilities of China, Russia and North Korea to determine how the
United States must posture itself to effectively deter aggression
against the United States and its allies and partners.
17. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in November 2020, NATO's [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] Secretary General stated that, ``Simply
giving up our deterrent without any guarantees that others will do the
same is a dangerous option because a world where Russia, China, North
Korea and others have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a
safer world.'' Do you agree with the Secretary General that the world
is a safer place due to the existence of an effective U.S. nuclear
deterrent and the extended deterrence assurances we provide to our
allies?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
18. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you support
robust consultations with U.S. allies prior to considering any changes
in U.S. nuclear posture or policy that could undermine their security?
Mr. Austin. The United States has long committed to extending
nuclear deterrence to a number of treaty allies. Meaningful
consultation is fundamental to any alliance. Given their reliance on
such security guarantees, if confirmed, I expect to work closely with
allies to ensure both their continued security and the continued
security of the United States.
19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in a recently completed report to
Congress by the nonpartisan Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),
researchers assessed that adopting a ``no first use'' (NFU) nuclear
policy would likely undermine allied confidence is U.S. security
guarantees, encourage aggression by adversaries, and have no effect on
international non-proliferation efforts. IDA concluded that, `` . . .
the weight of the evidence indicates significant potential for
[adoption of a] No First Use [policy] to impart more harm than good.''
In your responses to the questions you were provided prior to your
confirmation hearing, you took no position on ``no first use,'' noting
simply that the Department of Defense would participate in a later
review of U.S. policies. While I'm sure this is accurate, the committee
would like to understand your own views on whether as adoption of a
``no first use'' policy, would it be advisable, given the increasing
threat of Russia's, China's, and North Korea's expanding arsenals?
Mr. Austin. I have not had the opportunity to review the referenced
report. As you note, I anticipate that President Biden will direct the
interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active role in this
review, and also that any such review assesses the conclusions in the
referenced report.
20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in a recent opinion, the Washington
Post editorial board endorsed efforts to ``de-alert'' the U.S.
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, invoking the long
discredited myth of the ``hair-trigger alert''. Up to this point, every
U.S. Administration has soundly rejected the idea of de-altering U.S.
ICBMs, noting that such measures are inherently unverifiable, and that
such an action could be extremely destabilizing in a crisis--increasing
the chances of an inadvertent launch. Given the increasing salience of
nuclear weapons and the growing arsenals of China, Russia, and North
Korea, do you believe it is prudent to reduce the United States ability
to respond to nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies
in a timely manner?
Mr. Austin. I strongly support any measure that reduces the chances
of a catastrophic miscalculation between nuclear powers. I believe the
Department of Defense must endeavor to ensure the President has the
maximum possible decision space in a time of crisis. If confirmed, I
look forward to reviewing all opportunities to maximize Presidential
decision time and potential means to minimize the risk of
miscalculation. However, the de-alerting of ICBMs, in and of itself,
does not appear to offer a verifiable and stabilizing means to achieve
these important objectives.
missile defense policy
21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, since the completion of the 2019
Missile Defense Review, a number of changes have occurred in the
interim that could greatly affect the scope and architecture of a
future global U.S. missile defense system. Do you support the conduct
of a new Missile Defense Review? If so, when would you expect such a
review to be completed?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will have the incoming team review
current and projected threats and our missile defense programs and
posture and, where appropriate, adjust our approach. Any potential
updates to this approach would be informed by a new National Security
Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, your former employer, Raytheon
Technologies, is a major manufacturer of the Department of Defense's
array of missile defense systems. With your commitment to recuse
yourself from matters involving your former employer, for possibly the
entirety of this 4 year Administration, you will be largely removed
from discussions on the structure of major missile defense systems. If
confirmed, how will you structure your leadership team to oversee the
development of missile defense policies and manage the associated
programs to ensure effective oversight, while upholding the terms of
your recusal and avoiding the appearance of undue influence?
Mr. Austin. During the period of my recusal, any matters involving
Raytheon will be referred to the Deputy Secretary or other senior
official without my knowledge or involvement. With respect to the issue
of seeking a waiver I do not expect to do that or to need one, but if
such an unanticipated circumstance were to arise I would consider
available alternatives to a waiver before seeking one and would consult
very carefully with agency ethics officials. If I'm privileged enough
to be confirmed, I can pledge to you I will be mindful of not only the
legal requirements that govern my conduct, but also of the appearances
to ensure that the public has no reason to question my impartiality,
and I will consult with the DOD career ethics officials on these issues
and require everyone who serves with me to ensure public service is and
will remain a public trust.
federal communications commission approval of ligado's terrestrial
network
23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, last year, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) approved a license for Ligado to build
a ground terrestrial network in frequencies that traditionally have
been used only for satellites. DOD is on record, and in fact all
affected Federal agencies are on record too, strongly opposing it.
Federal agencies opposed to the Ligado proposal include the Departments
of Defense, Commerce, Interior, Justice, Homeland Security, Energy, and
Transportation, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, National Science Foundation, Coast Guard, Federal
Aviation Administration, and National Executive Committee for Space-
Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing. The Department of Defense
has been opposed for a decade because it poses significant risk to the
national global positioning system (GPS) system and all military users
of it. Are you familiar with this issue? If yes, do think the FCC
license to Ligado in its current form is wise?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
on DOD's GPS system.
24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, our Committee alongside DOD have
been fighting this proposal for a decade, and several previous
Secretaries of Defense have been consistently and strongly opposed to
allowing the Ligado network to go forward. Do you share your
predecessor's views that the Ligado network, if deployed, will be
damaging to the Department's ability to train in peacetime and possibly
could degrade combat operations in wartime as a result, and potentially
poses risks to the safety of soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
on DOD's GPS system.
25. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, if confirmed by the Senate, will
you personally work with the new White House Staff, the National
Security Council, and the new FCC Chairman to temporarily suspend
Ligado's terrestrial authority so that the new Administration can
review the ill-advised FCC decision made by the outgoing Administration
and ensure it is in the best interest of DOD, the Federal Government,
and the hundreds of millions of consumers and businesses that rely on
GPS to allow Ligado to deploy a ground based network that interferes
with the GPS system?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
on DOD's GPS system.
26. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, we worked tirelessly to get
language in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA that requires DOD to engage the
National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct an
independent review of the FCC Ligado Order. Working in tandem, are you
in favor of FCC conducting a new formal, fair, and fully transparent
review of the Ligado's ability to provide terrestrial services that
preserves the mission and safety requirements of all Federal agencies
including Defense, obtains an outcome that does not require the
Department of Defense to incur billions of dollars of unnecessary costs
to change all its GPS receivers on combat vehicles, aircraft,
helicopters, ships, and weapons; and that allows all Federal
Departments and agencies and the American industrial groups adversely
affected by the previous Administration's FCC decision to formally
submit input through the normal process that FCC uses on other
important spectrum decisions?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
on DOD's GPS system.
27. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, do you believe that it is essential
for the FCC to resolve this issue in a manner that assures no risk to
the lives of U.S. soldiers in peacetime training, combat, or emergency
response missions by the National Guard?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I do believe that it is essential for the FCC to
work with the NTIA to resolve this issues in a manner that assures no
risk to lives.
28. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, management of the
radiocommunications spectrum is divided between the FCC, which handles
non-Federal spectrum use, and the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, or NTIA, on behalf of all Federal agencies.
That sounds straightforward, but the use of one spectrum band, for
example for private use, can affect another spectrum, for example for
Federal use. What process should the FCC go through to make sure its
proposed use of spectrum does not negatively affect use of spectrum by
Federal agencies like DOD?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with the current
Administration to ensure our spectrum management processes are
respected and followed.
29. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, the Department manages the global
positioning system, or GPS, which is a critical asset not only for the
Department, but for other Federal agencies and the hundreds of millions
of consumers that rely on it every day. DOD has an obvious role with
respect to the physical components of GPS. But the success of GPS also
rests on the radiofrequency spectrum it uses. And in order for that
spectrum to be able to continue to deliver GPS signals, it must not
receive interference from other spectrum uses--private and Federal.
What steps will you take to ensure that there is no harmful
interference to GPS?
Mr. Austin. I will work with NTIA, FCC and other appropriate
parties by strengthening regulations, policies and laws regarding GPS
to ensure there is no harmful interference to GPS spectrum .
freedom of information act
30. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, unclassified TTPs [tactics,
techniques, and procedures], ROEs [rules of engagement], and RUFs
[requests for use of facility] are not protected from release under the
current Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions, do you see this
as a potential problem?
Mr. Austin. While transparency is critical to public oversight of
government operations, we must balance transparency with the need to
protect certain types of information from release when such release may
impact military operations and could risk the lives of our
servicemembers. The release of TTPs, ROEs, and RUFs, in some
circumstances, may present a risk to operations and the force if such
information is disclosed to the public without adequate safeguards. If
confirmed, I intend to further examine options for protecting such
information from improper release while still maintaining an emphasis
on transparency.
31. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, what options are available to
protect our servicemembers from our adversaries who may request such
documents through FOIA and then use the information released to harm
American servicemembers?
Mr. Austin. Under current law, there are limited options for
withholding such information from release when it is requested pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act. As previously discussed, this may,
in some circumstances, create a risk to military operations and U.S.
forces, especially when such information falls into the hands of an
adversary. Although classification of such information would allow us
to limit release, the threshold for classification may not be met under
applicable authorities and would also limit its application and our
ability to adequately disseminate such information to servicemembers in
the field. If confirmed, I intend to further examine options for
protecting such information from improper release while still
maintaining an emphasis on transparency.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
freedom of navigation operations (fonops) across the taiwan strait
32. Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, last year the United States Navy
conducted 11 transits in the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating our Nation's
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. With Chinese forces
expanding their reach in the Western Pacific, United States military
presence--particularly through freedom of navigation and transit--has
become ever more important to regional stability. Will you continue
these presence missions if confirmed as Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Austin. Presence operations and transits through international
straits like the Taiwan Strait can provide a deterrent effect to
competitors and present opportunities to cooperate with regional
security partners and allies. They can also demonstrate our commitment
to freedom of the seas and, in the case of Taiwan Strait transits, a
free and open Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, this assessment will help
shape my approach to approving operations or providing advice to the
President.
hypersonic missile propulsion suppliers
33. Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, Congress and the National Defense
Strategy have made it a top priority to develop and acquire hypersonic
missile capabilities, given our near-peer competition with Russia and
China. At the same time, Congress has spent billions to strengthen our
fragile industrial base across a range of capabilities. But much of our
industrial base is being consolidated, with large defense firms buying
up small suppliers. For example, news recently emerged that Lockheed
Martin is seeking to acquire Aerojet Rocketdyne, the last remaining
independent missile propulsion company. What are your views on the
consolidation of industrial base capabilities as seen in cases like
this?
Mr. Austin. Consolidation within the defense industrial base is
sometimes necessary to ensure that a particular capability remains
viable. Many defense industrial base suppliers have little to no
commercial business, which would help them remain healthy and resilient
in times where DOD procurement is low. This is especially true in the
missile and missile propulsion industry, which are almost 100 percent
dependent on DOD business. However, too much consolidation can have
negative consequences, including the lack of competition, and reduced
industry investment in research and development necessary to keep DOD
systems technologically superior. DOD should work with stakeholders
within the Services and Agencies to understand the potential impacts of
this particular transaction, and weigh these factors when assessing it.
34. Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, are you concerned about the impact
this kind of acquisition could have on our numerous missile programs
that are not under contract to Lockheed Martin?
Mr. Austin. I will work with our interagency partners to examine
this potential transaction. Diversity and competition within the
industrial base a necessary to ensure the Department remains able to
purchase the greatest technology at fair and reasonable prices.
Consolidation can be disruptive to this goal, so all potential impacts
to the missile and space launch systems involved in this transaction
will be assessed as part of the decision making process.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
covid-19
35. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, you have been involved in
complicated and sophisticated logistics missions during your career.
Does the military use best practices when shipping valuable resources
around the country and the world?
Mr. Austin. The military Services ship valuable and precious cargo
around the country and the world every day. Military logisticians
strive to maximize efficiency and effectiveness recognizing they are
stewards of the taxpayer's dollars. I know the Services have benefitted
from a close relationship with industry that have enabled adoption of
recognized best practices in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. I am
also confident DOD logisticians will continually strive to improve
processes and not be satisfied with current levels of efficiency.
36. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, would you deviate from those best
practices in the midst of a critical mission?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would strive to find the optimal
solution for mission requirements.
37. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, you may know that Operation Warp
Speed utilized a new pharmaceutical distribution system for the COVID
vaccine instead of using the Nation's full end-to-end and time-tested
and trusted distribution system. Can you and your staff commit to
reviewing the vaccine distribution challenges and to recommend how the
full distribution system can be brought in to get vaccines from the
manufacturer to the ``last mile'' for shots to get in arms?
Mr. Austin. Operation Warp Speed is a partnership between the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense.
If confirmed, I will work with our partners at the Department of Health
and Human Services to review any vaccine distribution challenges and
recommend necessary improvements.
semiconductors
38. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, a recent Pentagon report on the
defense industrial base highlighted the importance of semiconductors to
our national security. The report states that microelectronics ``are
critical to producing and maintaining existing military systems, for
advancing emerging technologies like AI, 5G, and quantum computing, and
for sustaining critical infrastructure and indeed, our entire modern
economy'' and that microelectronics ``are in nearly everything,
including the most complex weapons the Department of Defense buys, such
as Aegis warships, the F-35 joint strike fighter, soldier systems, and
our nuclear weapons and their command-and-control--which together form
the backbone of our national defense.'' The Fiscal Year 2021 National
Defense Authorization Act included important provisions to incentivize
domestic semiconductor manufacturing in order to reverse the decline in
U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Do you view it as a priority
to fund incentives for semiconductor manufacturing?
Mr. Austin. I understand that the Department worked very closely
with Congress in developing the landmark microelectronics legislation
included in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA. This provides a foundation from
which DOD, along with our interagency partners, can start the process
of reshoring microelectronics manufacturing, packaging, and testing
capability. This will require a multi-pronged approach, which includes
funding, tax incentives, workforce credits, and other mechanisms that
will make U.S. suppliers be cost competitive.
39. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, how important is it that the United
States grow its share of domestic manufacturing in critical industries
such as semiconductors?
Mr. Austin. The DOD has diversified supply chains by partnering
with allied nations to utilize or develop capability in those
countries. However, growing U.S. capability in certain critical areas
such as semiconductor manufacturing may be necessary to ensure a stable
and secure supply of these items. DOD will make investments in domestic
supply, where appropriate.
40. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, how do you and the Department of
Defense plan on working with Congress to fund these priorities?
Mr. Austin. Continuing to assess the industrial base to determine
areas of highest risk will be a Department priority. Once these risks
are identified, DOD can formulate strategies and roadmaps to mitigate
them. Sharing these strategies and implementation plans with
Congressional members responsible for authorizing and appropriating
funding should assist the Department with obtaining the funding
necessary to execute these strategies.
41. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, what role do you envision your
Department playing in funding research in critical technologies, such
as semiconductors?
Mr. Austin. The U.S. must maintain a competitive edge to enable us
to defeat our adversaries. This requires DOD funding for research in
multiple critical technology areas that will help us maintain the
advantage we need to ensure our national security. We must have a
balanced portfolio that maintains our current systems, while enabling
us to make the technological advances that will ensure that our future
systems are technologically superior.
u.s. green berets fratricide incident
42. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, in 2014 there was an investigation
into the fratricide of five Green Berets on June 9, 2014. Could you
detail the nature of your involvement in this investigation?
Mr. Austin. As the Commanding General of United States Central
Command, I directed an investigation into the airstrike on June 9, 2014
that was alleged to have resulted in the deaths of five United States
soldiers and one Afghan soldier and approved the findings of the Army
15-6 investigation.
43. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, can you explain why you appointed
Air Force Major General Jeffrey L. Harrigian to run this investigation
despite his affiliation with one of the Services involved in the
incident?
Mr. Austin. I appointed Major General Jeffrey Harrigan given his
extensive operational experience. He was appointed to conduct the
investigation with a full investigative team, including three Assisting
Investigating Officers, Administrative Support, and a Legal Advisor.
44. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, the investigation concluded: `` . .
. key members executing the close air support mission collectively
failed to effectively execute the fundamentals, which resulted in poor
situational awareness and improper target identification.'' The report
appears to share blame between the B-1 crew, Ground Force Commander
(GFC), and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). Do you agree with
the conclusion of this investigation?
Mr. Austin. As Commanding General of United States Central Command,
I approved the findings of the investigation.
45. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, could you confirm whether or not
the B-1 was typically used for close air support missions in
Afghanistan during this time period?
Mr. Austin. Although it was not originally designed for close air
support missions, the B-1 was used for those purposes in Afghanistan
during the relevant time period.
46. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, will you commit to ensuring that
you will eradicate any training or assumptions among military personnel
that the sniper targeting system used on the B-1 can be used to see
strobes?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will work to
ensure that our military personnel have the appropriate training and
support for their activities.
47. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, will you commit to educating our
forces on whether there are justifiable cases where the absence of
infrared (IR) strobes can be used as the sole confirmer of enemy
positions?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I commit that I
will work to ensure our military personnel are appropriately trained.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
economic warfare
48. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, many of the national security
challenges we face today cut across the jurisdiction of numerous
Federal agencies. This is particularly true of the nexus between
economic security, industrial policy, and national security. In recent
years, Congress has worked to address cross-cutting challenges like
supply-chain vulnerability, weaponized Chinese capital investments in
strategic United States industries, and the race to 5G. However, on the
whole, the United States Government is not structured in a way that has
one office take the lead on these issues. Instead, these problems are
addressed in various offices across the Department of Defense (DOD),
the Commerce Department, and the United States Trade Representative,
among others. As Secretary of Defense, how will you work within the
existing inter-agency structure to better facilitate cooperation and a
more comprehensive, unified response to what are our largest and most
vexing national security problems?
Mr. Austin. I have extensive experience working collaboratively
within the Interagency and among international partners. If confirmed,
I will use these skills to work cooperatively within existing processes
such as the Defense Production Act Title III and Committee on Foreign
Investment to address the challenges facing the Defense Industrial
Base.
marine corps force structure
49. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, the Marine Corps is currently
undergoing a significant change in their force structure. The changes
are meant to make the Marine Corps a more agile and capable force to
counter adversaries in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.
However, I have concerns, as do others, that the proposed changes will
make the Marine Corps too one-dimensional. I am very concerned about
the proposed changes to the Marine Corps aviation enterprise,
particularly the F-35. Regardless of whether the next conflict is with
a near-peer adversary or something else, the F-35 is going to be one of
the Marine Corps' most effective weapons. Reducing the total number of
F-35s that the Marine Corps will buy or the number of F-35s per
squadron is ill-advised. If you are confirmed, will you commit to doing
a full review of the Marine Corps' force structure changes and make a
determination as to whether these changes are in the best interest of
United States national security?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I am fully committed to reviewing the
Marine Corps' force structure changes and will work with the Secretary
of the Navy and the Marine Corps to ensure the force is best equipped
for deterrence and combat, to include the F35.
50. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, are you aware that the Marine Corps
is the only Service that does not have a special operations aviation
component? The Marine Corps' current plans call for the divestment of
three rotary-wing squadrons and the retiring/re-distribution of these
aircraft. I believe it would be advisable to retain these aircraft and
create a special operation aviation capability. If confirmed, will you
commit to looking at this issue and determining if there is merit in
the Marine Corps creating a special operations aviation capability?
Mr. Austin. I am aware that the Marine Corps is the only Service
that does not have a special operations aviation component; however, am
unaware of any critical shortfall in our existing special operations
aviation capability or capacity that would necessitate the creation of
a new component within the Marine Corps. The Marines do operate
unmanned aviation systems within SOCOM and a select number of their
aviators serve exchange tours with SOCOM'S aviation units. General
Berger's effort to redesign the Marine Corps includes divesting of some
capability and capacity to create opportunities for modernization --
without having to seek additional funding. I commend this cost neutral
approach. Any increase to a services contribution to SOCOM, such as
aviation assets, is borne by that service and must be carefully
considered against the range of other service requirements. In the case
of the Marine Corps this includes conventional deterrence and global
crisis response. If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing SOCOM's
aviation requirements.
department of defense innovation
51. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, for many years now there have been
increasing calls for DOD to chart a bold, new path for modernization
that places great emphasis on emerging technologies and partnering with
the Nation's innovation community, including industry, academia, and
entrepreneurs, to achieve its modernization goals. I support this
effort and can look to my own State of North Carolina, to see how this
type of partnership can be successful. The Research Triangle Park was
founded by visionaries who saw the transformative power of bringing
together universities, government and industry to spark new ideas and
fuel growth. It is an innovation model that has rippled across the
State and Nation, and it is one the Department should embrace. If
confirmed, could you please explain your vision for modernization and
how you would prioritize Department resources to align with that
vision?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, working to ensure that the Department
maximally accesses innovation will be among my highest priorities. This
will require a concerted effort across the Department and will include
universities, private industry, and nonprofit research institutions.
The Department is investing nearly $2 billion annually through the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)/Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR) program. These initiatives provide innovative
technology solutions, and the Department is working to strengthen our
partnerships with small businesses and to streamline the SBIR/STTR
programs to reduce administrative red tape and lower barriers to entry.
The Department also uses the Science, Mathematics, and Research for
Transformation (SMART) program as a workforce recruitment and
development platform, by assigning promising graduates to DOD research
and development facilities to inject fresh talent and to improve the
flow of STEM employees into the Department. If confirmed, I will
endeavor to ensure these programs' success and seek additional ways to
develop partnerships for innovation.
52. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, given your background in the
infantry, and most recently as the former CENTCOM Commander, you have
direct experience in, and understand the real issue of interoperable
communications on the battlefield. The Inspector General (IG) of the
Department of Defense recently put out a report entitled ``Audit of
United States Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation,''
where they studied whether the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
fielded Special Operations-Peculiar (SO-P) equipment that met
performance requirements during test and evaluation (T&E). The IG
Report determined that that the SOCOM purchased and fielded six SO-P
programs, valued at $815.8 million that did not meet user needs.
Mr. Austin. To prevent this same pattern from continuing and
occurring in the broader DOD during modernization, what will you do to
ensure the Services research, evaluate, and field capabilities that are
relevant to the challenges of the future battlefield, meet the demand
of the war fighter and supported by acquisition strategies that allow
for the on-ramp of innovative technologies found in the industrial
base?
I believe it is important that the capabilities fielded by our
military have been thoroughly vetted, tested, and verified against
validated end-user requirements. If I am confirmed as the Secretary of
Defense, I will ensure the Military Department Secretaries, as well as
ASD(SO/LIC) in his or her role exercising authority, direction, and
control over special operations-peculiar administrative matters
relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special
operations forces, work closely with their acquisition colleagues to
ensure that capabilities fielded are well researched, evaluated, and
relevant (including the use of innovative technologies) so that they
meet the challenges of the future battlefield. This will include
requiring the Military Department Secretaries and ASD(SO/LIC) to
provide close and careful oversight of DOD acquisition programs and
projects, throughout the acquisition lifecycle to ensure that programs
meet user needs via acquisition strategies that are well coordinated
with the end-users. I will also require the Service Acquisition
Executives to work with their Military Department Secretaries, the
Defense Acquisition Executive, and the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation to ensure compliance with statutes and regulations, prior to
the fielding or deployment of any capability for the end-user.
53. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, many disruptive technologies have
been and are being developed by our commercial sector using internal
investments in order to rapidly address DOD's most challenging
requirements. However, DOD has a horrible track record of transitioning
small prototype or technology demonstrations into a program of record
in a timely and cost effective manner--a problem our adversaries do not
have. Based on your past experience, what actions does DOD need to take
to ensure its acquisition and budget strategy allows for timely and
scaled funding of these innovative and disruptive technologies?
Mr. Austin. One of the great challenges we face is recognizing and
transitioning opportunistic, emerging technologies that appear outside
the technology development phase of an acquisition program. In these
cases the Department needs to be more effective at assessing the
potential of these technologies and ensuring barriers to entry are low.
If confirmed, I will work with the Services to improve mechanisms for
planned and opportunistic technology transition into DOD systems. I
would also foster a culture of appropriate risk-taking in order to
accelerate the identification and integration of these emerging
technologies.
54. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you commit to
briefing this committee on DOD actions being taken to integrate
disruptive technology and scaling innovation as part of your first
Defense Planning Guidance?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
55. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, Beijing published its latest Five-
Year Plan for China's development in November 2020. For the first time,
the plan calls for the development of disruptive technologies in its
military. The July 17, 2020 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report
on Emerging Military Technologies stated that China and Russia are
making steady progress in developing advance military technologies to
include advanced computing, artificial intelligence, autonomy,
robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology, and quantum
technology. What is your assessment of the impact these disruptive
technologies could have on our national security?
The first military to employ quantum technology, advanced
computing, artificial intelligence and autonomy at scale and in
combination will have a significant asymmetric advantage. If confirmed,
I will work with the entire Defense ecosystem to include laboratories,
universities, non-traditional centers of innovation, and traditional
industry partners to ensure that we are at the cutting edge of
developing these disruptive technologies. I will strive to ensure we
are not merely fielding the next evolutionary system, but can achieve
overmatch with revolutionary combinations of technology.
56. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, how do the efforts to develop these
technologies in the United States compare to China and Russia?
Mr. Austin. While details are limited in an unclassified setting,
the United States is behind Russia and China in certain technology
areas. For example, in Hypersonics, China and Russia are focused on
fielding operational systems, while the United States is currently
demonstrating prototypes with leave-behind capabilities. If confirmed,
I will review intelligence briefings on all the technology areas and
commit to sharing details on our progress versus our adversaries with
the committee upon request.
57. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what priority would
you place on the investment and development of disruptive technologies
to maintain technological superiority over China and Russia?
Mr. Austin. The current list of modernization priorities has been
drawn directly from the 2018 National Defense Strategy, with input from
stakeholders across the DOD enterprise. DOD has identified eleven key
areas in which investment to develop next generation operational
capabilities is imperative: 5G, hypersonics; fully networked C3;
directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence
(AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology.
The Department also invests in a broad portfolio of technologies to
drive future capability improvements and to create technological
advantage. If confirmed, I will ensure investment and development of
disruptive technologies remains a top priority.
58. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, how would you scale
innovation and disruptive technology development across the Services?
Mr. Austin. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA reestablished and elevated
the USD(R&E) to focus strategically on the integration and
synchronization of technology development programs across the
Department. If confirmed, I will support the USD(R&E) in ensuring that
the Department's technology investments are appropriately focused,
integrated, and synchronized across all military departments and
Agencies.
north carolina
59. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, a little over a year ago, the
United States killed Major General Qasem Soleimani. This triggered
several events, one of which was deployment of the entire Global
Response Force (GRF) from Fort Bragg, NC. This marked the first time
the entire brigade from the 82nd Airborne was deployed since Panama in
1989. To facilitate such deployments, Pope Army Airfield (AAF),
specifically, the Green Ramp, is used. However, this airfield has not
been well cared for since being transferred to the Army. The deployment
in January 2020 of the GRF highlighted many of the deficiencies at Pope
AAF from deferred maintenance to neglect. The GRF and various other
units at Fort Bragg are national level assets. They need proper
infrastructure to deploy rapidly and project force. If you are
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, will you commit that the defense
budget will contain adequate funding to repair and properly maintain
Pope AAF?
Mr. Austin. The Army remains committed to ensuring Pope Army
Airfield can support all deployment missions. In fiscal year 2021, the
Army is funding a $90 million project to make critical improvements to
the primary runway and lighting system. The Army has also identified
future requirements to improve the airfield, totaling $224 million in
Military Construction, as well as in Restoration and Modernization
funding. These requirements will be a priority for funding within the
Army's Facility Investment Plan.
60. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, will you also commit to investment
in lengthening the runway at Pope AAF to accommodate a fully loaded C-
17?
Mr. Austin. The Army recognizes the requirement to extend the Pope
AAF runway to accommodate strategic airlift for the unique military
units stationed there. This requirement will be assessed against other
infrastructure needs across the Army enterprise within the Army's
Facility Investment Plan.
China
61. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, in June 2020, DOD released a list
of 20 companies it says are controlled by the Chinese military. One of
these companies is the Chinese Rail Rollingstock Corporation (CRRC).
Over the past 5 years, CRRC has made alarming inroads into the United
States market. This state-owned and directed company has made
aggressive advances into the United States by using state-backed
financing, below-market pricing, and other anti-competitive tactics to
decimate domestic railcar manufacturing with the single end goal of
producing all railcars in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Currently, CRRC also secured more than $2.6 billion in United States
taxpayer-supported transit contracts to provide passenger railcars for
the cities of Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. As
Secretary, what will you do to ensure the DOD's infrastructure is
secure from a Chinese state-owned enterprise, such as CRRC, that has a
significant and troubling footprint in the United States?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Department's efforts to
ensure the integrity of DOD supply chains, support the ability of
American businesses to withstand PRC coercion, protect American
intellectual property, and invest in the research and development of
emerging technologies.
62. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, China provides a competitive
advantage to its state-owned enterprises through generous, below-market
government financing for their own ventures, as well as for their
customers. This gives Chinese businesses--that are extensions of their
own government--a tremendous unfair advantage, and the potential to
decimate United States competitors, often in highly sensitive
industries like the rail sector. Given the potentially dire
implications for United States jobs, our manufacturing base and our
national security interests of this trend, are you open to working to
address this challenge?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I am absolutely open to working with Congress and
my interagency counterparts to address this challenge.
taiwan relations
63. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, the bipartisan Pacific Deterrence
Initiative (PDI), which was an important part in the latest Fiscal Year
2021 NDAA, reconfirms the United States' commitment to a free and open
Indo-Pacific region by significantly strengthening the military
capabilities to deter adversaries across the region. How do you
envision the PDI be implemented to fully defend United States interests
and those of our allies such as Taiwan?
Mr. Austin. I believe the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will help
focus attention on the progress the United States is making to
establish a more distributed and resilient posture that deters China's
aggression and reassures our allies and partners, including Taiwan. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure its
effective implementation.
64. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
stipulates that the United States makes available necessary defensive
articles and services for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. This is one of America's most important commitments to the
security of Taiwan and to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The
Trump administration over the last 4 years has adopted a regularized
Taiwan arms sales process and sold Taiwan over $15 billion worth of
weaponry. As the Secretary of Defense, how do you evaluate this policy
and do you intend to continue the policy of regularized arms sales to
Taiwan?
Mr. Austin. President Biden has said many times that United States
support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in
line with longstanding American commitments to the Three Communiques,
the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to
support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with
the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
will also ensure the United States meets our commitment to assist
Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.
georgia
65. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, will you support and work with
Georgia, a key United States ally, during your tenure to counter Russia
aggression and advance Georgia's goal of membership in Euro-Atlantic
institutions such as NATO?
Mr. Austin. I intend to support the ongoing United States and NATO
efforts focused on improving Georgia's ability to deter aggression,
defend its territory, contribute to regional security, and build
resilience against Russian malign influence. I fully agree with the
2008 NATO Summit declaration that states Georgia will one day become a
member of NATO, and I will ensure that DOD continues to support the
implementation of reforms that advance Georgia's Euro-Atlantic
integration.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
south china sea freedom of navigation operations
66. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in 2015, I worked with then-
Chairman John McCain to pressure the Department of Defense to restore
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to the South China Sea, which
had been halted due to only tangentially-related political issues. In
fact, through reporting and oversight at the time, it was revealed that
Secretary of State John Kerry effectively worked to minimize desires of
the Department of Defense to conduct these FONOPs in favor of using
that as leverage against China in climate change negotiations. As a
direct result, China reclaimed and militarized several ``islands'' in
the South China Sea. If confirmed, Mr. Austin, if a similar situation
presents itself, how would you confront this problem and effectively
advocate for the Department of Defense's priorities broadly, and
specifically as it relates to these FONOPs? What is your personal view
on this situation?
Mr. Austin. Use of FONOPs is in the national interest. Upholding
the law of the sea, as part of the rules-based international order,
benefits the United States, and our allies and partners. The United
States' national interest in freedom of the seas and freedom of
navigation dates back to the very founding of our country. Upholding
the law of the sea is a fundamental strategic interest on which the
global mobility of U.S. forces depends.
67. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, can you commit
that--if recommended by your military and civilian subordinates--you
will continue routine and regular FONOPs both in the South China Sea
and around the world?
Mr. Austin. I will, of course, commit to listening to the military
and civilian policy professionals in the Department, as well as the
geographic combatant commanders who have direct control over operations
in their areas of responsibility. The United States challenges
excessive maritime claims around the world and I can assure you that,
if confirmed, the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate
wherever international law allows.
kc-46 basing
68. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the previous Senate-confirmed
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Mark Esper acknowledged that collocation
of 100 5th-Generation Fighters with KC-46 tankers would provide our
Nation with ``extreme strategic reach''. The commander of U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), General Stephen Lyons, USA, has
stated: ``The aerial refueling fleet continues to underpin the Joint
Force's ability to deploy an immediate force across all NDS mission
areas . . . '' Given Alaska's beddown of F-35s, access to expansive
training ranges, and proximity to several high-priority regions, will
you commit--if confirmed--to take a personal look at tanker basing in
Alaska--specifically as it relates to the KC-46--to ensure our Nation
pursues a strategy-driven decision rather than a budget-driven one?
Mr. Austin. Yes. Department decisions, to include the Department of
the Air Force tanker decisions, should be strategy-driven, budget-
informed decisions. I will work with the DAF and DOD experts to ensure
the tanker beddowns best meet all national priorities.
69. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, would
you agree with former SECDEF Mark Esper that collocation of 100 5th-
Generation Fighters with KC-46 tankers in Alaska would provide extreme
strategic reach to the United States? Please elaborate on how that kind
of air power could affect our power projection posture, strengthen our
alliances, and message to our adversaries.
Mr. Austin. Our 5th Generation fighter fleet provides strategic
advantages across the whole national defense spectrum providing a
deterrence to potential aggressors and security to our allies. These
assets and their support systems, to include tankers, must be beddown
in the locations that most efficiently meet steady state and COCOM
requirements, and provide the flexibility for contingency operations. I
will work with the DAF and DOD experts to ensure our force structure is
designed to best meet these priorities.
great power competition in the arctic
70. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, given the National Defense
Strategy's focus on great power competition and the rapid development
of Russia and China's capabilities in the Arctic, in your personal
opinion, would you agree that the Arctic is an emerging front-line for
great power competition and rivalry? Please elaborate on the threats
the United States faces from our great power competitors--Russia and
China--in this region.
Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree that the Arctic is a region of increasing
competitive activity among great powers, including China and Russia.
The challenges these competitors pose in the Arctic are discrete.
Russia approaches the Arctic largely from a territorial defense
perspective. It is advancing its interests through a modest increase in
Arctic-based forces, which are intended to improve its operational
capability in northern latitudes and to exert greater control of the
Northern Sea Route. China is also focused on increasing its influence
in the region, primarily through predatory economic behavior.
71. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
makes Alaska an important strategic region for the United States, and
why would our adversaries want to limit our presence and power
projection capabilities in the Arctic region? Please elaborate.
Mr. Austin. Alaska's proximity to the Arctic, Russia, East Asia,
and the Bering Strait makes the state a strategically important region
for our country. I believe this importance will continue to increase
given that melting sea ice is allowing increased Chinese and Russian
presence in the region--particularly passage through the Arctic between
the narrow Bering Strait and Atlantic Ocean--access that could alter
the strategic balance of the region.
If confirmed, I will assess Chinese and Russian designs further and
consult allies and partners on the strategy, posture, and capabilities
required to ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to protect the
Homeland, support efforts to protect our economic interests, and deter
any competitor aggression.
72. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
specific capability gaps presently exist that inhibit our ability to
effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic and compete with
Russia and China in the northern latitudes? Please elaborate on what
these gaps are and how you would attempt to address them.
Mr. Austin. I understand the Department has identified a range of
capability needs, including: improved domain awareness systems; more
robust communications capabilities; increased Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and improved environmental modelling.
In addressing these capability needs, if confirmed as Secretary, I will
assess how DOD can continue to balance consideration of investments for
the Arctic region with broader capability needs of the Joint Force as
outlined in an updated National Defense Strategy.
73. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, do we
have the necessary infrastructure--like Strategic Arctic Ports and
expeditionary airfields--to meet our Nation's strategies, to
effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic, and to compete
with Russia and China in the northern latitudes?
Mr. Austin. I understand that DOD is concluding an examination of
the need for a strategic port(s) in the Arctic, pursuant to Section
1752 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, ``Department of Defense Designation
of Strategic Arctic Ports.'' If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing
the Department's analysis and making the necessary infrastructure
decisions based on the range of strategic, political-military,
operational, fiscal, and other factors involved.
74. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, as you may be aware the Arctic
has the need for some type of functional port infrastructure to help
support Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard requirements. The
nearest Department of Defense Strategic Seaport is the Port of
Anchorage; which is some 1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle.
That is equivalent to asking Boston to cover Miami on the East Coast.
Would you agree that our Nation needs a Strategic Arctic Port? Please
explain.
Mr. Austin. Based on my understanding of ongoing Departmental
analysis as required by statute, the results of the Section 1752 study
on the `designation of strategic Arctic ports' will help identify the
Department's overall Arctic infrastructure and capability needs. I
believe that potential infrastructure gaps in the Arctic (which
includes, but are not limited to, Alaska) would need to be considered
in the context of DOD's global mission demands and defense priorities.
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Department's analysis,
informed by U.S. interagency perspectives, on strategic Arctic ports to
determine if any adjustments are appropriate.
75. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in President Donald Trump's June
9, 2020 ``Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the
Arctic and Antarctic Regions,'' President Trump directed the
development and execution of ``a polar security icebreaking fleet
acquisition program that supports our national interests in the Arctic
and Antarctic regions.'' The memo also directed a look at two U.S.
bases for their ships. If confirmed, what specifically will you do to
advocate to President Biden for the strategic needs outlined in the
President Trump's memo and continue the positive direction outline in
this document?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I believe it would be appropriate to
support DHS' efforts to bolster its icebreaking capability, which
directly supports the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaking mission. I would
defer to the Secretary of Homeland Defense to identify the best means
to resource DHS's proposed icebreaker capability, to include which
bases it believes would best support its operational requirements. If
confirmed, I will assess these requirements in the context of a new
National Defense Strategy to inform DOD's support of defense-related
Arctic issues.
ice-hardening navy ships for arctic freedom of navigation operations
76. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, do we
have the right mix of Navy surface ships to visibly contest illegal
maritime claims and guarantee a free and open maritime domain year-
round in the Arctic? If yes, please explain how this will be executed
with the current inventory.
Mr. Austin. I have not yet reviewed the full U.S. posture and
capabilities, including Navy surface ships, in the Arctic, or that of
our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will assess the situation and
consult allies and partners on the strategy and posture required to
ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to protect the Homeland,
our economic interests, and deter aggression.
77. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
are the risks associated with relying on the United States Coast Guard
alone to project the force presence we need in the Arctic; especially,
given their limited kinetic capability?
Mr. Austin. I have serious concerns about the Russian military
buildup and aggressive behavior in the Arctic, as well as Chinese
intentions in the region. Ice operations is one of the Coast Guard's 11
official missions and they provide United States-flagged icebreakers
capable of providing year-round access to the Polar Regions. The Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are an integrated naval service and we
need to apply naval power in the Arctic Region with joint forces,
interagency teammates, allies, and partners. If confirmed, I will
assess the situation and challenge the Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard
team to evolve and expand the range of integrated capabilities to
achieve enduring national interests in the region, region, in support
of interagency partners and in concert with our allies.
78. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the previous Senate-confirmed
Secretary of Defense said in response to a question for the record:
``The Arctic is strategic terrain and is a potential strategic corridor
between the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the United States
Homeland.'' Do you agree with this statement, and if Russia were to
deny access to vital United States/international shipping in the Arctic
region, could the Department and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
provide the President the option of conducting a surface FONOP to
challenge the act?
Mr. Austin. I agree that the Arctic is strategic terrain and is a
potential strategic corridor between the Indo-Pacific region, Europe,
and the United States Homeland. If confirmed, I plan to assess and
review the full range of Arctic defense missions, in the context of
other global defense priorities and the new defense strategy.
missile defense
79. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the National Defense Strategy
articulates the top Defense objective as: ``defending the Homeland from
attack''; a vital component of meeting that objective is our Nation's
missile defense capabilities. Unfortunately, we are trending in the
wrong direction regarding this issue--North Korea and Iran continue to
expand the quantity, range and lethality of their arsenals. As do our
top great power competitors--Russia and China. Yet, as these threats
trend upward, the budget allocated to the Missile Defense Agency trends
downward. Will you commit--if confirmed--to work with this committee to
ensure adequate resources are allocated toward modernizing and fielding
a robust missile defense capability--commensurate with current and
future threats?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess our missile defense
capabilities and investments in the context of a new National Defense
Strategy and work with Congress to maintain transparency about any
planned improvements or adjustments.
80. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the United States has
consistently held that it will accept no limitations on its missile
defense systems. Any such limitations could constrain or preclude
missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to
protect the American people, its forces, and allies and partners. Would
you agree that our missile defense capabilities should NOT be limited,
especially since they are defensive in nature, as part of any future
arms control negotiations or agreements? Please elaborate.
Mr. Austin. If confirmed I will work to align U.S. missile defenses
with our new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy
in an effort to continue to provide critical protection to U.S.
interests. As far as arms control, I defer to the incoming Secretary of
State and the Administration for the details of how these negotiations
may be conducted.
81. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, from a national security
perspective, the planned Next Generator Interceptor (NGI) gives you
complete capabilities needed to defend against rogue nation threats,
but not until 2030. I included language in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA--
which recently passed--mandating that DOD comprehensively look at an
Interim-Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) solution to deliver capability
by 2026. In your personal opinion, in addition to fielding NGI, would
the Department prefer to see an interim solution--fielded years ahead
of NGI--in order to boost our limited Homeland missile defense
capability?
Mr. Austin. In my opinion, the Department should forego an interim
solution and proceed directly with NGI. The Department will be awarding
up to two contracts for NGI by the second quarter of fiscal year 2021.
The fastest path for delivery of capability to protect the Homeland are
those contracts for the NGI.
82. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, can I get your
commitment to prioritize the effort--either an interim capability or
NGI--to as rapidly as possible deliver additional and much-needed
missile defense capability and capacity to defend of America's
Homeland?
Mr. Austin. Yes. The Department will be awarding up to two
contracts for NGI within the next several weeks. The fastest path for
delivery of capability to protect the Homeland are those contracts for
the NGI. Carrying two prime contractors on this effort will create an
environment with competition, where early delivery is incentivized.
83. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the missile capabilities
possessed by rogue nations--North Korea and Iran--continue to rapidly
evolve. The New York Times recently reported that North Korea showcased
the country's ``largest-ever'' Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) a month ago, and revealed a new submarine-launched ballistic
missile just last week. Provided the presence of these very real and
capable threats to our Nation's Homeland, how quickly should the 44
GBIs currently postured be expanded--as authorized by Congress--to
present a more credible defense of the American people?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work to develop effective and
affordable solutions responsive to evolving missile threats to the U.S.
Homeland. I know that Congress has authorized the Next Generation
Interceptor program, which I understand will begin fielding additional
interceptors in 2028, but I will need to review particular concepts,
programs and capabilities in light of our broader defense strategy.
84. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
will you specially advocate for support this effort?
Mr. Austin. Defense of the Homeland is a key priority for DOD and
missile defense is a central component of this mission. If confirmed, I
will work with you to ensure our troops and the American people are
protected and that the Department implements the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
requirements.
defense posture review initiative
85. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, it is my view that if we look at
the United States force posture in the Indo-Pacific, it is a snapshot
of where United States forces were following World War II and the
Korean War. In other words, it's stale. Given that, I believe our
current force posture in the priority theater is insufficient to
compete in either peacetime or conflict. I continue to have concerns
with implementation of Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)--and
because of that--I wrote a provision in the Fiscal Year 2020 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requiring a review of the current DPRI
plan; which, is still ongoing. In your personal opinion, can you
address more broadly your opinion of our force posture in the Indo-
Pacific, and more narrowly about your opinion of DPRI?
Mr. Austin. There's no question we need a more resilient and
distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will
review our posture in the region, including the implementation of the
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), and will work with U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command, the Military Departments and Services, and the
Department of State to seek a posture that is optimized to deter
aggression, reassure allies and partners, and prevail in a warfight, if
necessary.
86. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, how specifically will you ensure
that the DPRI review is adequately taking into consideration the
criteria of strategic presence, training opportunities, host-nation
support, cost, and potential for growth?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review posture in the Indo-Pacific
from all aspects including presence, capabilities, cost, logistics,
training and exercises, infrastructure, and capacity building and
cooperation with allies and partners.
development of disruptive technologies
87. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, China and Russia are making
steady progress in developing advance military disruptive technologies
to include advanced computing, artificial intelligence, autonomy,
robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology, and quantum
technology. What does the Department of Defense need to do to rapidly
develop and field disruptive technologies to maintain technological
superiority over China and Russia?
Mr. Austin. I believe the Department faces a significant challenge
in accelerating our adoption of new technology in ensuring that new
capabilities make their way quickly from the lab into the hands of
warfighters, while at the same time balancing the sustainment needs of
our legacy systems. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to speed the
transition of new technologies from concept to prototype to fielded
capability.
readiness
88. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the 25 percent budget cuts from
2010 to 2015, including a reduction of close to 50,000 Army Active Duty
troops, caused our military readiness to plummet. If confirmed, will
you commit to working with this committee to ensure our military
readiness levels remain high and at a level the American people expect?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
energy independence
89. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, from oil and gas to renewables,
the United States is largely energy independent. In your personal
opinion, how does this American energy independence enhance our
national security?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with civilian and
uniformed leaders to understand better the relationship between
American energy independence and national security.
90. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific
actions will you take to further enhance American energy independence?
Mr. Austin. Energy is of strategic importance to the Department. If
confirmed, I will support investments in technologies that enhance the
energy resilience of DOD installations and forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
operation warp speed
91. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, in your APQ answers, you mentioned
that DOD has been a major contributor to Operation Warp Speed's (OWS)
efforts to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines, and that if
confirmed, you will review DOD's support to identify opportunities to
continue or enhance this support. We have seen first-hand through one
of our constituents that there is American production capacity that
isn't currently being utilized to produce the vaccines we need. As
Secretary of Defense, what steps will you take to guarantee that
leading American manufacturers such as the one in North Dakota will be
approached by Operation Warp Speed to ensure that our Nation's vaccine
manufacturing capacity and supply chain can meet expected demands and
that Americans have timely access to a vaccine?
Mr. Austin. As I noted in the hearing, taking on COVID-19 is our
most immediate national challenge, and DOD has a role to play in
support of civilian agencies. I will review that support and examine
ways to increase. Operation Warp Speed is a partnership between the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
Defense. It is my understanding that HHS's Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority (BARDA) established a submission portal on
its website to facilitate companies wishing to do business with the
United States Government for the COVID-19 response to submit their
proposals. If confirmed, we will work with our partners at the
Department of Health and Human Services to review the measures that
have been taken to harness the great capabilities of American
manufacturers and explore additional opportunities to improve them. I
also fully support President Biden's emphasis on domestic manufacturing
and its critical importance to Homeland defense and national security
92. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, as Secretary of Defense, what steps
will you take to guarantee that leading American manufacturers,
including Aldevron in North Dakota, will be approached by Operation
Warp Speed to ensure that our Nation's vaccine manufacturing capacity
is diversified and supply chain can meet expected demands and that
Americans have timely access to a vaccine?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
Defense works closely with our partners at the Department of Health and
Human Services to review and improve on the measures that have been
taken to harness the great capabilities of American manufacturers to
meet our nation's needs for timely access to a vaccine.
93. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, will it be your and the
Department's intention to sustain those relationships and engagement
strategies post the COVID-19 pandemic to make certain we have rapid
vaccine manufacturing capabilities for potential future pandemics and
other global health challenges?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, the Department will work closely with its
Federal partners and the National Security Council Directorate for
Global Health Security and Biodefense as the Federal Government
considers how to ensure our nation is postured more effectively for
future pandemics and other global health challenges. I would expect
this consideration to include how to sustain relationships and
engagement strategies with commercial enterprises that have proven
reliable, effective, and cost efficient during the COVID-19 pandemic
response.
94. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, as you know, OWS is a multi-pronged
effort of public-private partnerships to develop vaccines and
therapeutics in response to the COVID-19 virus. Many of the private
companies involved have various facilities overseas. Would you agree
that it should be a priority of U.S. Government/OWS to engage with any
and all onshore, American companies to ensure vaccine developers have
the necessary manufacturing capacity to ramp up vaccine supply?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
95. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, according a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Report from November, 2020, officials at a
COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing facility stated they have experienced
challenges obtaining materials, including disposable reactor bags,
reagents, and certain chemicals. They also state that due to global
demand, they sometimes must wait 4-12 weeks for items that, before the
pandemic, were typically available for shipment within 1 week. Given
these claims, in addition to other public reports of disruptions to the
manufacturing supply chains (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pfizer-
vaccine-supply-chain-target-slashed-1.5827779) and challenges of
scaling up production of hundreds of millions of vaccine doses, how
would you, if confirmed, propose and prioritize that OWS work with
domestic companies to expand manufacturing capacity in the United
States?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
Defense supports its Federal partners and the National Security Council
Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense to evaluate how
the Federal Government can best partner with domestic companies to
expand manufacturing capacity in the United States.
96. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, additionally, this report
highlights the difficulties surrounding new technologies such as the
mRNA vaccines. It is my understanding that the mRNA vaccines use raw
materials developed by companies such as Aldevron, headquartered in my
home State of North Dakota, which has the largest DNA plasmid
manufacturing capacity in the world. If confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, will you instruct OWS to work with American industry partners
to engage them in the effort of ensuring that vaccine manufacturing
capacity and supply chain can meet expected demands and that Americans
have timely access to a vaccine?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
Defense works closely with our partners at the Department of Health and
Human Services to review and improve on the measures that have been
taken to ensure that the vaccine manufacturing capacity and the supply
chain can meet the needs of the United States.
97. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, given the crucial role the
Department of Defense has played by coordinating with the Department of
Health and Human Services in responding to this virus on all fronts,
what is your strategy to sustain the relationships forged during this
time and the engagements in these partnerships post the COVID-19
pandemic to ensure the United States has rapid vaccine manufacturing
capabilities for potential future pandemics and other global health
challenges?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
Defense maintains relationships with its partners at the Department of
Health and Human Services to meet the current and future needs of the
United States.
vietnam veterans memorial wall
98. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, on June 3rd, 1969, we lost 74
Vietnam Veterans when the USS Frank E Evans sank. The House has passed
legislation, and the Senate has strong supporters (including Sen
Schumer and 6 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee) for this
effort, but the few Senators who want to prevent this effort use the
Defense Department and it's DODI 1300.18 rules as their crutch. But
regulations have been waived, precedents have changed . . . ultimately
you, as Secretary of Defense, have the power to make them eligible for
the wall. Do you think those who lost their lives on the USS Frank E
Evans belong on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall?
Mr. Austin. The crew members of the USS Frank E Evans died in a
tragic accident while participating in a routine training exercise
outside of the Vietnam Combat Zone. The Department is responsible for
determining criteria for and validating service in a combat zone.
Multiple previous Secretaries of Defense have carefully reviewed this
matter, and have unanimously concluded that the crew of the USS Frank
E. Evans does not meet the criteria of a Vietnam War casualty and they
are therefore not eligible for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
99. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate that
the Defense Department is responsible for determining who is eligible
to be on the Vietnam Wall?
Mr. Austin. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund built The Wall with
private funding to honor servicemembers who were casualties of the
Vietnam War. The Department of Defense worked the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial Fund to establish the criteria and provide the initial list of
names for the Memorial. As with all conflicts, it is the Department's
responsibility to define and account for all casualties, these policies
are established in DOD Instruction 1300.18, ``Personnel Casualty
Matters, Policies, and Procedures.''
100. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate
that within DODI 1300.18 there are two separate sets of criteria for
who is considered a casualty of the Vietnam War and who is a casualty
for the purposes of being eligible to have their name on the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial Wall? (6.1.2.3.4.3. Died/wounded while on a combat/
combat support mission to/from a defined combat zone) vs (6.5.2.4. Died
while participating in, or providing direct support to, a combat
mission immediately en route to or returning from a target within the
defined combat zone)?
Mr. Austin. Yes, this is appropriate because the second provision
(6.5.2.4) was developed to clarify combat related casualties that may
occur outside a defined combat zone, for example Navy aircraft
returning from a combat mission is lost en route to the aircraft
carrier. The second provision (6.5.2.4) represents a clarification to
the Department's Casualty Procedures, as also reflected in DODI
1300.18, paragraph 6.1.2.2.4.3.
dakota access pipeline lawsuit against army corps of engineers
101. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, North Dakota is currently involved
with a $38 million claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) illegally fostered protesters
on Federal land. Army Under Secretary James McPherson sent a letter to
the Department of Justice (DOJ): ``To avoid protracted and costly
litigation, particularly in light of the harm that occurred in this
case, I request that you consider engaging in settlement discussions
with North Dakota to determine whether a reasonable resolution is
within reach.'' The case has not been appealed yet by DOJ, but the
expectation is this will happen. It is currently in the discovery stage
and DOJ is currently only providing USACE staff for interviews and not
the broader Federal Government. Do you agree with the Army's assessment
that there were multiple missed opportunities to settle with North
Dakota and do you also agree with Mr. McPherson's position to DOJ that
the case should be settled?
Mr. Austin. My understanding is that this claim under the Federal
Torts Claim Act (FTCA) is now within the domain of the Department of
Justice. Should the Department of Justice elect to pursue settlement of
this claim, I would ensure that legal counsel within the Department of
Defense provide any and all support requested by the Department of
Justice.
arctic situational awareness
102. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, as the arctic region becomes more
militarized by Russia and China, the Midwestern United States becomes
more vulnerable to an attack from the North. Currently this area is
protected by an early warning radar located in North Dakota, but that
radar is over 45 years old. With the increasing threat, do you think we
need to improve our situational awareness over the arctic region?
Mr. Austin. I understand DOD has previously identified challenges
with domain awareness at high latitudes. I have not yet reviewed the
full U.S. posture in the Arctic, including defense capabilities
associated with the region. If confirmed, I pledge to assess the
situation, in the context of other global defense priorities, and
mitigate accordingly to protect the Homeland effectively.
intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
103. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, there has been a lot of cutting of
legacy programs to pay for technological advances, and a lot of these
cuts are to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
programs like the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the MQ-9 Reaper. You depended a
lot on ISR as the CENTCOM commander, and most of the combatant
commanders say they don't get enough ISR. Do you think we can
strategically afford to cut back ISR to places like the Middle East,
Africa, South America and even to some degree the Pacific?
Mr. Austin. There is always a balance between meeting the ISR needs
of today and investing in the ISR capabilities required to maintain
this nation's technological edge against current and future
adversaries. Based on my experience while USCENTCOM Commander, the
combatant command requirements for ISR have always been greater than
the Department's ability to meet that demand. The Joint Staff carefully
weighs all the ISR requirements of combatant commanders and does its
level best to support the Secretary of Defense in allocating ISR
resources against the highest priority requirements of commanders. If
confirmed, I am committed to reviewing our ISR requirements,
allocations, and future program investments to ensure the nation has
the ISR capabilities necessary to compete and win.
pass through
104. Senator Cramer. [Deleted.]
Mr. Austin. I will provide a response in a classified forum at a
future agreed upon date.
commercial access to existing dod facilities
105. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, American commercial space
companies are increasingly in need of access to unused or under-
utilized infrastructure and facilities on U.S. military installations,
including those at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Space
Force Station. How will the Pentagon continue to work in a fair and
transparent manner to maximize opportunities for private entities to
utilize real property and access infrastructure, particularly new
entrants? It is important that the DOD is not disadvantaging new
entrants, but is working to facilitate diversity in the commercial
space industry and its ability to service U.S. Government customers and
become increasingly competitive in the international market.
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with the Air Force and
other DOD Components as necessary to gain insight into this specific
question.
chinese state owned companies
106. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, in June 2020, the Department of
Defense released a list of 20 companies it says are controlled by the
Chinese military. One of these companies is the Chinese Rail
Rollingstock Corporation (CRRC). Over the past 5 years, CRRC has made
alarming inroads into the United States market. This state-owned and
directed company has made aggressive advances into the United States by
using state-backed financing, below-market pricing, and other anti-
competitive tactics to decimate domestic railcar manufacturing with the
single end goal of producing all railcars in the PRC. Currently, CRRC
also secured more than $2.6 billion in U.S. taxpayer-supported transit
contracts to provide passenger railcars for the cities of Boston,
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. As Secretary, what will you do
to ensure the Department of Defense's infrastructure is secure from a
Chinese state-owned enterprise, such as CRRC, that has a significant
and troubling footprint in the United States?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Department's efforts to
ensure the integrity of DOD supply chains, support the ability of
American businesses to withstand PRC coercion, protect American
intellectual property, and invest in the research and development of
emerging technologies.
107. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, China provides a competitive
advantage to its state-owned enterprises through generous, below-market
government financing for their own ventures, as well as for their
customers. This gives Chinese businesses--that are extensions of their
own government--a tremendous unfair advantage, and the potential to
decimate United States competitors, often in highly sensitive
industries like the rail sector. Given the potentially dire
implications for U.S. jobs, our manufacturing base, and our national
security interests of this trend, are you open to working to address
this challenge?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I am absolutely open to working Congress
and my interagency partners to address this challenge.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
taiwan arms sales
108. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, the Trump administration
adopted a policy of regularized, non-bundled arms sales to Taiwan and
sold Taiwan over $15 billion worth of arms. If confirmed, do you intend
to support continuation of this policy?
Mr. Austin. President Biden has said many times that United States
support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in
line with longstanding American commitments to the Three Communiques,
the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to
support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with
the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
will also ensure the United States meets our commitment to assist
Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.
intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty
109. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, in August 2019, the United
States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. If confirmed, as Secretary of Defense and a member of the
National Security Council, would you support a renegotiated INF Treaty
with our peer and near-peer allies and adversaries?
Mr. Austin. I believe arms control is in the U.S. national security
interest and would support efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements
that are effectively verifiable and that make the United States and its
allies and partners more safe and secure.
moral integrity
110. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what would be
your first priorities to address ethics and culture within the Special
Operations community?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with the ASD(SOLIC) and
Commander, USSOCOM, to obtain their views on the state of ethics and
culture in the Special Operations community; I will determine what
measures they have thus far taken to address any identified ethics and
culture problems or challenges; and I will also confirm that they have
a reasonable and appropriate plan for remedying problems and challenges
in the near and long terms.
allies and partners
111. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, where do you see opportunities
to expand and/or integrate programs within DOD to promote international
stability and to advance U.S. interests around the globe?
Mr. Austin. I understand that the Department has made significant
strides in recent years through aligning security cooperation
activities with National Defense Strategy (NDS) objectives and
utilizing the full range of available authorities for building partner
capacity. If confirmed, I will review the Department's recently issued
Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships and assess what
additional steps may be necessary to ensure the proper level of
integration of DOD efforts to strengthen alliances and attract new
partners in line with the new defense strategy.
joint warfighting concept
112. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, while each of the Services has
developed its own operating concept, DOD lacks a completed Joint
Warfighting Concept (JWC) that converges each of the Services from an
operational perspective. Why is a JWC important for how the Services
operate interdependently, especially in contested environments with
demand for artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled technologies that
intersect human and machine?
Mr. Austin. The JWC will advance the Joint Force's unity of effort
by better integrating the Services' concepts and capabilities.
Implementation of the JWC and integrating the strengths of all of our
Services across all domains, will force adversaries to face the full
range and depth of the Joint Force. For example, the C2 of global all-
domain operations utilizing AI enabled technology is beyond the scope
of a single Service and requires a joint solution.
113. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, what specific initiatives would
you implement to ensure the appropriate development of the JWC--
specifically, as it relates to the United States Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) theater of operations?
Mr. Austin. In order to ensure development of the JWC, the Joint
Force needs to enhance capability and capacity for advanced war gaming
and emulations led by the Joint Staff and INDOPACOM, make changes in
Joint Professional Military Education to emphasize classified work
focused on adversaries at the operational level of war, add an annual
Large Scale Global Exercise to experiment, test and advance the JWC,
and coordinate with allies and partners in design and development of
our forces. Additionally, JWC Concept Required Capabilities (I.e.,
capability gaps), along with INDOPACOM's Integrated Priority List
(IPL), must be submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) for establishment of joint requirements that Services will
fulfill.
workforce development
114. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific
practices would you implement to leverage the talents of our National
Guard and Reserve Components to create robust and competitive hiring
pipelines for high-skilled professionals relevant to 5G, space, and
high-skilled manufacturing?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess how the Department can
employ the National Guard and Reserves in both unit and individual
based approaches. I will assess ways to improve the Department's
ability in identifying desired military and civilian skillsets, as well
as the need for more flexible application of existing duty statuses to
include leveraging the performance of duty from remote locations as we
have seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, I will assess current
authorities and resources available to the Department to attract and
retain specialized talent.
115. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what would be
your priorities to improve DOD's implementation of public-private
talent exchanges?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, my priorities would be to implement the
enhancements to DOD's public-private talent exchange programs provided
in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021, including expanding existing programs
to private sector entities that are working DOD's modernization
priorities. I understand that public-private talent exchanges have been
a success in the DOD acquisition Community, and I would make it a
priority to expand such programs to different functional communities
and DOD organizations.
nuclear policy
116. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, do you believe the current
program of record is sufficient to support the modernization of the
U.S. nuclear deterrent, including delivery systems, weapons, command
and control systems, and infrastructure?
Mr. Austin. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority
mission and updating and overhauling our nation's nuclear forces is a
critical national security priority. Our nuclear deterrent has served a
vital purpose in U.S. National Security Strategy for the past 70 years
and continues to be an essential component of our strategy to preserve
peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States,
our allies, and our partners. The nuclear triad has served us well in
the past and will do so going forward, and I personally support the
triad. And while effective today, U.S. nuclear deterrence remains
dependent on aging weapons, delivery systems, infrastructure, and
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems originally
built during the Cold War. These systems have been extended far beyond
their original service lives, and the tipping point, where we must
simultaneously overhaul these forces, is now here. If confirmed, I will
review, early on, the status of our nuclear modernization and
sustainment programs, including those at the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
117. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, do you believe that 7 percent
of the defense budget is a sufficient amount to spend on what the past
five Secretaries of Defense have called the DOD's highest priority
defense mission? Please explain your answer.
Mr. Austin. Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of
the Department of Defense. It must be modernized to remain credible. If
confirmed, providing the necessary resources to recapitalize the
nuclear platforms and delivery systems will receive my highest
attention.
national nuclear security administration infrastructure
118. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you seek to
resource the ongoing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
infrastructure requirements at the levels needed to complete them on
schedule?
Mr. Austin. I understand that much of NNSA's nuclear security
enterprise infrastructure is very old, and in particular many
facilities related to production of nuclear weapons date back to the
early Cold War. This infrastructure, and the NNSA workforce, are at the
very heart of our nuclear deterrent. NNSA's infrastructure must be
modernized and appropriate resources must be provided to do so. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Energy and the
Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure NNSA's infrastructure is modernized.
119. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what actions
would you take to permanently eliminate the NNSA's deferred maintenance
backlog?
Mr. Austin. Decades of underinvestment in maintenance and
sustainment of NNSA's nuclear infrastructure has resulted in
unacceptable fragility in key capabilities. More than 60 percent of
NNSA facilities are beyond their 40-year life expectancy and nearly 40
percent are in poor condition. Addressing this problem requires close
collaboration between the Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA and
continued advocacy from DOD that our partners in NNSA require robust
resources to modernize their infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council to
ensure NNSA's deferred maintenance challenges are addressed.
great power competition
120. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific,
high-return-on-investment activities would you recommend to counter
China and Russia in United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work closely with interagency
partners to assess in what ways the Department can contribute to
advancing our goals in United States Africa Command. The best action we
can take to counter Chinese and Russian malign influence in Africa is
to step up our engagement across the continent. This means ensuring
robust key leader engagements, partnering with like-minded global
partners, and continuing our joint exercises, professional military
education (PME), port visits, peacekeeping training, and other security
sector assistance programs. These efforts counter violent extremist
organizations, improve maritime security, and support health and
humanitarian response efforts, such as our shared COVID-19 fight. This
means ensuring sufficient low-cost, high-return resourcing investments
must be preserved including PME, which is funded by the Department of
State. If confirmed, I will prioritize these efforts, and challenge the
Department to find ways to increase our military interoperability with
certain African partners, while simultaneously demonstrating American
values and professionalism--aspects that set us apart from China and
Russia.
united states central command
121. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if the United States reduced
sanctions on Iran, would you anticipate that a portion of that relief
would be used to fund terrorist organizations?
Mr. Austin. I would defer to the Intelligence Community for its
assessment. It is important that the United States, in concert with its
partners and allies, addresses Iran's financial and material support
for terrorist and militant groups that destabilizes the region and
threatens United States interests.
122. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, do United States troops in
Syria help to diminish Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle
East?
Mr. Austin. We are in a period of competition with Russia globally,
and in particular in the Middle East. While we conduct our Defeat ISIS
mission, our presence in Syria does enable us to have a strong
relationship with local partners to defend United States interests
against Russian and Iranian influence. I believe that our presence in
Syria does help to diminish Russian influence and complicate Russian
planning in Syria. Our relationships with local partners and our troop
presence serve as an indication to the members of the Global Coalition
to Defeat ISIS and our partners in the region of our resolve to defeat
terrorism and maintain the forces necessary to defend ourselves while
doing so.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
the threat of a fait accompli
123. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the Pentagon's 2019 Indo-Pacific
Strategy Report assessed that ``the most stressing potential scenarios
will occur along our competitors' peripheries'' where ``they are likely
to enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict.'' It went
on to warn of a fait accompli scenario in which ``competitors would
seek to employ their capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives
and forestall a response from the United States, and its allies and
partners.'' Do you agree with the Pentagon's assessment in the Indo-
Pacific Strategy Report that ``DOD initiatives on force employment,
crisis response, force and concept development, and collaboration with
allies and partners'' should be ``aimed to help address this critical
challenge'' of a potential fait accompli scenario involving China?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree with this assessment detailed in the
Department's 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.
124. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the National Defense Strategy
Commission found that ``successfully competing in Europe and the Indo-
Pacific region, while also managing escalation dynamics, requires
positioning substantial capability forward . . . to deter and prevent a
fait accompli by an agile, opportunistic adversary.'' Do you agree with
the National Defense Strategy Commission's assessment that the United
States military should be postured ``to deter and prevent a fait
accompli by an agile opportunistic adversary''?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree with the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
Commission's finding. A combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is
instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter, and if necessary,
deny a fait accompli scenario. A new defense strategy will require a
comprehensive approach to addressing this challenge, including not only
forward positioning and posture of U.S. Forces, but also new
warfighting concepts, modernized and high-end ready forces, and capable
allies and partners proficient in their warfighting roles in such
scenarios.
125. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the Taiwan Relations Act (22
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) establishes the policy of the United States ``to
maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.'' Do you agree
that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) therefore
requires the United States to maintain the ability to defend Taiwan
against a Chinese fait accompli operation?
Mr. Austin. The Taiwan Relations Act makes clear that the United
States must maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or
forms of coercion that could jeopardize the security of Taiwan. The
Taiwan Relations Act also states that the President and Congress will
determine appropriate action by the United States in response to
actions that threaten Taiwan's security or United States interests. If
confirmed, I will ensure that our President has credible options for
responding to threats to the security of the people of Taiwan and any
related danger to the interests of the United States.
supply chain security
126. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, in 2018, Under Secretary Ellen
Lord said at least 45 percent of the printed circuit boards used by the
United States military are produced in China. Many of these printed
circuit boards, in turn, are used in weapon, information, and other
systems that our forces rely on to achieve their missions and come home
safely to their families. This creates significant risk for our
military. Not only can the Chinese Government work with Chinese
manufacturers and assemblers in order to sabotage those printed circuit
boards, including through malicious insertion. The Chinese Government
can also direct Chinese companies to cut off the Department of
Defense's access to these components altogether, with significant
implications for U.S. military modernization and operations. Are you
concerned by the Department's overreliance on Chinese printed circuit
boards?
Mr. Austin. As with all components in DOD systems, the desire is
that they are sourced from U.S. suppliers or from our allied and
partner nations. However, in some industrial base sectors, our U.S.
production capability has eroded. To combat this, DOD will need to work
with Congress and inter-agency partners to identify opportunities to
reshore capability such as printed circuit board manufacturing.
127. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, in view of the risks associated
with the Department's current overreliance on Chinese printed circuit
boards, do you think Department of Defense contractors should disclose
if they are using Chinese printed circuit boards inside weapon or other
systems that our forces will rely on during combat operations?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with acquisition officials
within the Department to address these concerns.
128. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the Chinese Communist Party poses
a clear threat to the economic and national security of the United
States. At the same time, there is reason to believe certain companies
who either hold or are pursuing contracts with the Department of
Defense also maintain a physical presence in China and may employ
members of the Chinese Communist Party. Does the Department of Defense
have an interest in knowing whether a company employs members of the
Chinese Communist Party when the Department makes contracting decisions
involving that company?
Mr. Austin. The Department does have an interest in knowing whether
our suppliers have employees who are members of the Chinese Communist
Party. If confirmed I will work with acquisition officials within the
Department to address these concerns.
129. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, there are reports that some
companies doing work for the Department of Defense have previously
worked--or may in fact still do work--for the Chinese Government or
Chinese state-owned enterprises. Do you find it concerning that the
Department of Defense may be doing business with companies who
simultaneously work for the Chinese Government or Chinese state-owned
enterprises?
Mr. Austin. DOD's industrial base analysis should include
visibility into which companies are associated with China's Government
or state-owned enterprises. If confirmed I will work with acquisition
officials within the Department to address these concerns.
army end strength
130. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, do you believe the Army's current
authorized end-strength is sufficient to support its current and
anticipated role in deterring--or if necessary, defeating--Chinese
aggression in the Indo-Pacific region?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with Army leaders to ensure
Army's end strength and capabilities are sufficient to support the
global strategy and demands, to include the Indo-Pacific region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
military lending act
131. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, by enacting the Military Lending Act
(MLA) as part of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007, Congress sent a clear bipartisan message that
protecting servicemembers and their families from predatory and high
cost lending was of paramount importance to their financial security
and military readiness. This law capped the annual interest rates for
consumer credit to servicemembers and their dependents at 36 percent
while giving DOD the authority to define what loans should be covered.
Unfortunately, DOD's 2007 implementing regulations narrowly included
only a handful of loans and were full of loopholes that did not
sufficiently protect servicemembers. DOD finalized updated MLA rules
closing these loopholes and strengthening MLA protections for our
servicemembers. Can I have your personal assurance that you will
support and protect these updated MLA rules, if and when confirmed?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
office of servicemember affairs at the consumer financial protection
bureau
132. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, then Senator Scott Brown of
Massachusetts and I created the Office of Servicemember Affairs at the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This Office, during the Obama
administration, worked with DOD on strengthening MLA protections. Can I
have your personal assurance that you, if and when confirmed, will
support and work with the Office of Servicemember Affairs at the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
counterterrorism policy
133. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, in May 2013, President Obama made a
significant speech at the National Defense University regarding
counterterrorism operations and related legal and policy frameworks for
the use of force. According to a White House fact sheet regarding the
President's speech, ``the President has indicated a preference that the
U.S. military should carry out the use of force in active warzones, and
beyond.'' Furthermore, in a background briefing with reporters, a
senior Administration official stated ``the United States military is
the appropriate agency to use force outside of active warzones, given
their traditional role and given the transparency they can be
associated with actions by the United States military.'' Do you believe
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the military is the
appropriate organization to carry out counterterrorism operations
involving the use of force?
Mr. Austin. I do believe the U.S. military is often the most
appropriate organization to carry out counterterrorism operations
involving the use of force. However, the Department of Defense should
not address terrorist threats unilaterally, and all DOD activities must
be coordinated within a U.S. Government-wide and international partner-
integrated response.
134. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, in your view, how important is
public transparency regarding counterterrorism operations and issues
related to the use of force?
Mr. Austin. Public transparency regarding U.S. military
counterterrorism operations, including those related to the use of
force, is vitally important, and will be a core principle of DOD
counterterrorism efforts if I am confirmed. I see continued close
coordination with Congress on these issues as essential and my team and
I would seek to continue to deepen that partnership. Combatant Commands
do post timely unclassified press releases when counterterrorism
operations are conducted, and if confirmed, I will plan to review the
process that balances operational security and public transparency.
135. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, the Obama administration publicly
released a redacted version of its Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG)
outlining procedures for approving direct action against terrorist
targets located outside the United States and areas of active
hostilities. Do you believe an appropriately redacted version of
successor guidance to the PPG should be publicly released?
Mr. Austin. It is important that the U.S. public understand the
general principles and standards guiding the approval of direct action
by the United States against terrorist targets and if confirmed I
commit to review our current approach to transparency on those
principles.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
vietnam veterans memorial and uss i89frank e evans inclusion
136. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, on June 3, 1969, we lost 74
Vietnam Veterans when the USS Frank E Evans (DD 754) was struck by
Royal New Zealand Navy aircraft carrier, and immediately sank.
Ultimately you, as Secretary of Defense, have the power to make these
74 sailors eligible for inclusion in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The
House has passed legislation, and the Senate has strong supporters. The
few Senators who would like to inhibit inclusion of the USS Frank E
Evans crew, utilize the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DOD
Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures Instruction (DODI
1300.18), as their reasoning. Do you think those who lost their lives
on the USS Frank E Evans should be included in the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial?
Mr. Austin. The crew members of the USS Frank E Evans died in a
tragic accident while participating in a routine training exercise
outside of the Vietnam Combat Zone. The Department of Defense is
responsible for determining criteria for and validating service in a
combat zone. Multiple previous Secretaries of Defense have carefully
reviewed this matter, and have unanimously concluded that the crew of
the USS Frank E. Evans does not meet the criteria of a Vietnam War
casualty and they are therefore not eligible for the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial.
137. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate
that the Department of Defense is responsible for determining who is
eligible for inclusion in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial?
Mr. Austin. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund built The Wall with
private funding to honor servicemembers who were casualties of the
Vietnam War. The Department of Defense worked the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial Fund to establish the criteria and provide the initial list of
names for the Memorial. As with all conflicts, it is the Department's
responsibility to define and account for all casualties, these policies
are established in DOD Instruction 1300.18, ``Personnel Casualty
Matters, Policies, and Procedures.''
138. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate
that within DODI 1300.18 (see below reference) there are two separate
sets of criteria for who may be considered a casualty of the Vietnam
War and who is deemed a casualty for the purposes of being eligible to
have their name included on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall?
Mr. Austin. -6.1.2.3.4.3. Died/wounded while on a combat/combat
support mission to/from a defined combat zone -6.5.2.4. Died while
participating in, or providing direct support to a combat mission
immediately en route to or returning from a target within the defined
combat zone.
Yes, this is appropriate because the second provision (6.5.2.4) was
developed to clarify combat related casualties that may occur outside a
defined combat zone, for example Navy aircraft returning from a combat
mission is lost en route to the aircraft carrier. The second provision
(6.5.2.4) represents a clarification to the Department's Casualty
Procedures, as also reflected in DODI 1300.18, paragraph 6.1.2.2.4.3.
military covid-19 readiness
139. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, as we consider troop readiness
and the health of our military men and women during an ongoing
pandemic, how is the Department of Defense protecting personnel
awaiting the vaccine, and those who may not be eligible for the SARS-
CoV-2 vaccine because of underlying health conditions?
Mr. Austin. I understand that the Department instituted multiple
measures to safeguard the health of its people from SARS-CoV-2 without
sacrificing its critical missions, including travel restrictions,
telework, mask wear, social distancing, screening and testing, and
other force health protection measures. If confirmed, I will make the
health of the Department's people my top priority, review all measures
instituted to protect their health immediately, and direct additional
measures, if necessary.
140. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, there are two ways to assess a
body's immune response to a virus-antibodies and T cells. DOD has made
antibody testing available to troops, yet studies indicate that 10-30
percent of the population do not produce antibodies. Additionally,
there is emerging data to suggest T cells are protective against SARS-
CoV-2, even in the absence of antibodies. In order to fully understand
the cell mediated immunity against COVID-19 and gain a full view of the
natural or vaccinated immunity among our troops, how will DOD make
available both antibody and T cell testing to best ensure our fighting
force remains ready and protected against COVID-19?
Mr. Austin. I understand the Department continues to test based on
clinical indication and in accordance with its screening and
surveillance guidance; consistent with CDC and FDA guidance. If
confirmed, I will review how the Department is testing its people for
SARS-CoV-2 and ensure that the best diagnostic tests are available. It
is absolutely critical that a full view of COVID immunity in the
military be achieved responsibly, utilizing all safe and available
tests. I commit to a review of existing policies and procedures.
pfas prioritization
141. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, when you and I met last month we
had the opportunity to discuss the challenges associated with PFAS
[per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances] contamination. As you know, there
is ongoing PFAS remediation at more than 600 military installations
across the country including at the former Pease Air Force Base in New
Hampshire. We have made progress on this issue, but more must be done
to ensure the health and well-being of our servicemembers, their
families, and others impacted by the contamination.
During the hearing you testified, ``The PFAS Task Force stood up by
Secretary Esper is ongoing'' and you intend to pick up the pace for
good solutions for mitigations and military contribution to the
solutions while working across the board with partners and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to ensure that the military is
doing its part.
With that, I would encourage that DOD does more to ensure that
State standards are more protective than EPA's 70 parts per trillion
health advisory for drinking water. I would also like you to consider
providing blood testing for servicemembers and their families who have
served at bases with contamination and ensure that a PFAS free foam is
developed and fielded by 2023.
As you think about taking on this new role, please share your
thoughts on the PFAS contamination issue and how might DOD take more
aggressive action to address this issue?
Mr. Austin. We must take care of our men and women in uniform,
their families, and the communities that do so much to support the
armed forces. If confirmed, I will energize the pace of the DOD PFAS
Task Force to ensure DOD proactively addresses its PFAS releases, and
aggressively pursues a PFAS-free firefighting agent. I also plan to
increase communications to Congress and the public, as well as work
with our federal and State agency partners to remediate drinking water.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
presumptions of upgrade in cases of trauma
142. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, veterans who receive less-
than-Honorable discharges are uniquely stigmatized by their military
records. They can have difficulty securing jobs and housing and they
are frequently barred from receiving VA benefits, including medical
care. To make matters worse, the number of less-than-Honorable
discharges has increased in recent years. These veterans may apply for
a discharge upgrade through either a Board for Correction of Military
Records or a Discharge Review Board. With the help of this committee,
past Secretaries of Defense have recognized that these adjudicatory
bodies have failed to live up to their mandate. The Department has
issued guidance memos requiring the Boards to provide special
consideration to applicants who have a history of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), or an experience of
Military Sexual Trauma. Still, the Boards have refused to meaningfully
apply this guidance, resulting in low discharge upgrade rates. Instead,
for the past 3 years the Army and the Navy have been litigating class
action lawsuits brought by bad paper veterans suffering from PTSD and
related conditions. Do you agree that there should be a presumption of
upgrade in cases of PTSD, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual
Trauma, and that applicants should have the opportunity for a
videoconference hearing if they cannot travel to Washington in person?
Mr. Austin. The Department continues its efforts to ensure veterans
are aware of their opportunities to request review of their discharges
and other military records. The Military Departments Discharge Review
Boards (DRB) and Boards for Correction of Military Records and Naval
Records (BCMR/NR) continue to explore ways to seek input from
applicants in modern and convenient ways while also affording all
applicants an opportunity for timely review. If confirmed, I will
review this issue to ensure the Military Departments are applying the
appropriate standards under the law and Servicemembers receive just and
fair consideration.
143. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, what types of training would
you provide to the adjudicatory Boards to ensure the presumption of
upgrade in cases of PTSD, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual
Trauma is followed?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Departments
to ensure that the Discharge Review Boards (DRBs) and Boards for
Correction of Military Records/Naval Records (BCMR/NR) are providing
appropriate training to adjudicators on the applicable standards under
the law.
144. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, would you perform a
comprehensive review of the causes of the increased rate of bad paper
discharges across the military and publish a report outlining the steps
you are taking to reverse this increase?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess whether there is an
increase in the rate of bad paper discharges across the military and,
if necessary, what the contributing factors may be.
diversity and anti-racism
145. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, as you are likely aware, the
military justice and discharge systems are not immune from systemic
racism. Black servicemembers are more likely to have an action taken
against them in the military justice system than their white peers.
Black and Latinx servicemembers are twice as likely as their white
counterparts to receive other-than-Honorable discharges, which lead to
stigma and closes off access to important benefits. Though these
disparities have been well-documented for years, little has been done
about it. Will you work to address these discrepancies by empowering
legally trained military prosecutors, instead of the commander of the
accused, to determine whether to refer a case to court-martial, and to
require each Service branch to collect and regularly publish racial and
ethnic data regarding military justice involvement and outcomes?
Mr. Austin. I will ensure that we consider every option when
addressing this critical issue and will work with our experts in the
DOD and our Congressional partners to determine the most effective way
forward. This includes leveraging the newly established Defense
Advisory Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to understand best
practices in this area and to identify actions the Department can take
to improve its systems, policies, and programs.
146. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, the military Service Academies
play an integral role in developing our Nation's officer corps, but
fail to reflect the diversity of the enlisted ranks of our United
States as a whole. Women and Black and Hispanic cadets in particular
are underrepresented among congressional nominees to the academies.
Last year, in the NDAA, Congress required the Department of Defense to
publish annual data detailing the demographics of applicants, nominees,
and appointees to the academies in aggregate. The academies have this
same data disaggregated by Member of Congress, and in the past, they
have disclosed it in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests and lawsuits. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that
the Service Academies voluntarily disclose the racial, ethnic, and
gender demographics of each Member's nominees, without need for FOIA
requests and lawsuits?
Mr. Austin. I agree that this is an important issue and I will work
with the Service Academies to release information regarding the
demographics of the Members' nominees.
147. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, in the position of Secretary
of Defense, to your knowledge, what unique challenges and
considerations will you face when ensuring a fair hiring process and
workplace environment for women and underrepresented groups?
Mr. Austin. We know barriers to increasing diversity are often
complex and not always easily visible. I was heartened by the recently
released Diversity and Inclusion Board Report which recommended actions
to increase diversity from initial hire through to retention. I commit
to continue the good work of the Board to ensure equal opportunity for
all who look to join the DOD.
148. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, President-Elect Biden has
pledged that, as president, he will ``strive for gender parity in
senior national security and foreign policy appointments.'' Are you
committed to implementing this pledge?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I am committed to ensuring that all members of our
workforce have opportunity regardless of their gender.
149. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, President Trump's DOD recently
released a 2017 survey on racial and gender discrimination in the
military. It showed 24.4 percent of minority servicemembers experienced
discrimination. Yet, only 26 percent reported their experience to the
Equal Opportunity program. Only 16 percent of reports led to punishment
of the perpetrator and, even more shocking, in 10 percent of the
reports, the command punished the reporter. Do you agree that the equal
opportunity system has fundamentally failed to guarantee civil rights
for servicemembers?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will closely examine this issue to
ensure the Department is taking every step possible to prevent and
address discrimination, and ensure that we provide all appropriate
support to those who experience problematic behaviors. Our equal
opportunity programs are critical to demonstrate to our workforce that
they are valued, and we must do everything possible to ensure an
appropriate work environment for our Total Force.
civil service politicization
150. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, President Trump issued an
executive order that would convert positions in the competitive civil
service into roles similar to political appointees, without any of the
protections from political interference afforded to title V service
appointments. I am concerned over the harassment of and retaliation
against civil servants, such as Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman,
USA at the National Security Council, and Sahar Nowrouzzadeh at the
State Department. I am also concerned about the installation of clear
political partisans to civil service roles, such as the placement of
Michael Ellis to the role of General Counsel of the National Security
Agency. The politicization of our civil service has unquestionably
damaged our workforce that is critical to our national security. What
is your plan to repair the damage done by these executive orders and
efforts to politicize the civil service?
Mr. Austin. To recruit and retain the most talented Servicemembers
and civilian employees, leaders must foster a workplace which rewards
competence and integrity and ensures equal opportunity for all. If
confirmed, I will emphasize and strengthen the Department's commitment
to merit system principles and will work with senior civilian and
military leaders to safeguard against political influence in military
and civilian personnel matters.
israel
151. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, Israel is and will remain a
strategic ally and crucial partner for our Defense Department.
President Trump's shortsighted regional policies have facilitated a
resurgence of Iran's nuclear program while Hezbollah continues to
threaten Israel's northern border and build a larger and more
sophisticated arsenal of missiles. How will you continue to strengthen
our defense partnership with Israel to counter these persistent
threats?
Mr. Austin. The United States has a close and enduring relationship
with the State of Israel, and Israel's security is very important for
our strategic interests in the region. If confirmed, the Department of
Defense under my leadership will remain committed to assisting Israel
in being able to defend itself and in maintaining Israel's qualitative
military edge. In general terms, this means ensuring that Israel has
the capability to defend itself against threats from regional
adversaries, to include Iran and Hezbollah, by providing Israel with
the most advanced technology available to counter these threats and to
ensure that Israel's overall suite of military capabilities in the
region is unparalleled.
china
152. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, under the Trump
administration, China has increased its global power and influence. The
President's rash unilateral actions have allowed China to continue to
rise while alienating the allies and partners we will need to contain
and shape China's negative behaviors. Where can we right size our force
and divest to free up assets to bolster our posture in the Pacific?
Mr. Austin. I understand the Department has taken important steps
to improve our posture in the Indo-Pacific and focus on the priority of
China. If confirmed, I will assess and redouble these efforts and
carefully review our posture in the region. Improving our posture in
the Pacific also requires working with allies and partners and, if
confirmed, I will prioritize strengthening these alliances and
partnerships to address our mutual interest of regional stability.
153. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, how will you make our presence
more resilient in the face of China's missile capabilities?
Mr. Austin. China's missile capabilities--and its broader military
modernization efforts--present growing risks to our forces. If
confirmed, I will review efforts to mitigate these risks and strengthen
the resiliency of our force posture.
cybersecurity
154. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, last month it came to light
that Russia had created a backdoor into the computers of, at least, 250
agencies. For 9 months, and possibly still, they have been able to
monitor computer activity and steal data. This hack came to light, not
because of our cyber operations, but because a private company,
FireEye, brought the attack to our attention. In your written response
you mention elevating cybersecurity and strengthening partnerships with
the private sector. I have proposed increasing the role of the National
Guard, so cyber security experts could maintain their private sector
jobs while also servicing their country. Do you think that is one tool
we can use to solve this problem?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I believe cyber security experts from the private
sector serving as National Guardsmen could help address the cyber
security challenges the Department faces. The leading-edge talent,
skills and knowledge these industry experts could bring to the fight
could help us defend the Department of Defense networks and information
systems. I understand that Reservists are already successfully employed
in a similar capacity throughout the Department for cyber security-
related missions.
pfas
155. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, Air National Guard Bases in
New York, specifically Stewart and Gabreski, have faced significant
water contamination issues, and unfortunately, the Department has still
not taken full responsibility for clean up at these sites.
Contamination there was caused by DOD's mandated use of firefighting
foam containing PFAS chemicals, and its clean-up must be a Federal
responsibility. If left unaddressed, the contamination has the
potential to significantly harm public health. While we have passed
legislation enabling National Guard installations to receive Federal
funds to clean up PFAS contamination, States are still receiving
pushback and delays from DOD as they attempt to advance formal
agreements to fully remediate these sites. What actions do you plan to
take in order to ensure this issue is addressed?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will energize the pace of the DOD PFAS
Task Force to ensure DOD proactively addresses its PFAS releases. I
also plan to increase communications to Congress and the public, as
well as work with our federal and State agency partners to remediate
drinking water. I will work closely with my EPA counterparts as well.
156. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, in particular how soon will
the Office of the Secretary of Defense will authorize the Military
Services to conclude cooperative agreements with impacted States to
mitigate PFAS contamination, as authorized in section 332 of the Fiscal
Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act?
Mr. Austin. DOD and the Military Services are already authorized to
enter into or amend existing cooperative agreements with the States to
address PFAS, and DOD will quickly evaluate all cooperative agreement
requests as authorized in section 332 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National
Defense Authorization Act.
157. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, can I have your assurances you
will work with us set a clear pay way for DOD to fully remediate these
sites in New York and across the Nation?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assure the Department works
aggressively to address PFAS at DOD sites in New York and across the
nation under the federal cleanup law.
lc-130h aircraft
158. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, the LC-130H model aircraft
flown by the 109th Airlift Wing at Stratton Air National Guard Base are
aging and will eventually need to be replaced. The fiscal year 2021
appropriations legislation includes the requirement for a report on the
LC-130H mission and the potential need to replace the aircraft to
support the Pentagon's Arctic strategy, which is of increasing
importance due to climate change and a more emboldened Russia. What is
your view on the need to replace these aircraft with the modern J Model
of the LC-130?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess the capabilities needed for
the challenges in the Arctic in the context of a new defense strategy.
new start
159. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, as you know the 2010 New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is slated to expire just 16
days after Inauguration Day on February 5, 2021, but can be extended by
up to 5 years. If the treaty expires with nothing to replace it, there
will be no negotiated limits on the United States and Russian nuclear
arsenals for the first time in 50 years. The U.S. military has long
recognized the benefits of well-constructed arms control treaties like
New START. Do you agree with President-elect Biden that New START
should be extended?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
160. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, from a military planning
perspective, do you agree that a full 5-year extension of the New START
treaty would be preferable to a shorter extension?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed I would seek to implement the President's
plan to seek a 5-year extension of New START.
u.s. nuclear policy & arsenal
161. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, the Trump administration
proposed to expand the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
including by pursuing additional low-yield nuclear weapons. The cost of
this approach is staggering and it is growing. The United States is
currently slated to spend at least $1.5 trillion to sustain and upgrade
its nuclear arsenal over the next 20-25 years. In a 2019 candidate
survey, President-elect Biden said that the United States ``does not
need new nuclear weapons'' and that his ``Administration will work to
maintain a strong, credible deterrent while reducing our reliance and
excessive expenditure on nuclear weapons.'' Do you agree with the
President-elect's goal to pursue a nuclear deterrent that is more
stabilizing and affordable?
Mr. Austin. The nuclear deterrence mission is one of the
Department's highest priority missions, and updating and overhauling
our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority.
If confirmed, I plan to request early a briefing on the U.S. nuclear
modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in the most
cost effective and judicious manner and will make recommendations to
President Biden accordingly, in the context of a new defense strategy.
162. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, given the likelihood of flat
defense budgets at best in the near-term, if not longer, should the
Biden administration evaluate the feasibility of more cost-effective
options to sustain a credible nuclear deterrent, and if not, what non-
nuclear missions and programs do you believe should pay the bills to
keep the nuclear modernization program on track?
Mr. Austin. Maintaining the nuclear deterrent is a cornerstone of
the Nation's security. If confirmed, I am committed to a careful
examination of the current status of the triad and options to preserve
the capability moving forward.
163. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, three former Secretaries of
Defense, the former Commander of Strategic Command, the former Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous high-ranking
military and civilian leaders have openly questioned the need and
rationale for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program. Many
argue that the price tag is too high amid a plethora of other budgetary
pressures. Many also say that alternative--and more stabilizing--
deterrence options are available at a much lower cost, specifically the
prospect of life-extending the current Minuteman III force. According
to the Congressional Budget Office, doing this would be significantly
cheaper than proceeding as planned with GBSD. With that in mind, can
you explain why we are planning to spend $264 billion on brand-new
ICBMs over the next 60 years?
Mr. Austin. Clearly, maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent is
critical to our Nation's defense. If confirmed, I will thoroughly study
all alternatives to ensure we are on the most cost effective path.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
transparency in national security
164. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, will you commit to greater
Pentagon transparency about our military operations, adversaries, and
budget investments?
Mr. Austin. Yes. I believe that public transparency regarding
military operations and the civilian leadership's decision making on
defense matters is critical to ensuring our defense policies are
accountable to the American people.
165. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, will you commit to ensuring
the Pentagon holds regular, on-camera briefings for the Pentagon press
corps?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
166. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, will you commit to
declassifying--and making publicly available--as much national security
information as possible without compromising sources and methods?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would fulfill all of the
responsibilities assigned in Executive Order (EO) 13526, ``Classified
National Security Information,'' to classify, safeguard, and declassify
national security information. Declassification of information should
receive equal attention as the classification of information. As
required by EO 13526, information shall be declassified as soon as it
no longer meets the standards for classification, which ensures that it
remains classified only as long as its unauthorized disclosure could be
expected to cause damage to the national security.
167. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you commit
to following the law and restoring the regular reporting of top-line
troop numbers to the American public?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
environmental policies & climate change as national security threat
168. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, would you commit to pursuing
the procurement of clean energy technologies to increase the energy
efficiency of our defense installations and reduce reliance on the
local infrastructure?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with the Department's
subject matter experts in this area and encourage the use of clean
technologies to increase energy efficiency where these technologies
enhance the energy resilience and mission assurance of DOD
installations.
169. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, how will you
ensure that the Pentagon plays a leading role in addressing the
national security threat of climate change?
Mr. Austin. Climate is a national security challenge we must
consider as we take actions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the
Department of Defense plays an appropriate role within a whole-of-
government response to the impacts of a changing climate.
defense industrial base
170. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, how will you
ensure that the defense industrial base--and particularly our small
suppliers--are healthy?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would leverage DOD's existing programs
to ensure small firms are able to compete for contracts and receive
Defense business. I would work with Congress and within the DOD to
improve the predictability of funding to allow smaller firms to more
effectively plan for future workload and recapitalization.
171. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, with the reprioritization of
U.S. national security interests in a new National Defense Strategy
(NDS), are you willing to advocate for the additional funding required
to support the Defense Industrial Base and ensure we maintain our
critical investment in capabilities that support new concepts of
warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would support the continued investment
in research, development, and production of our major weapon systems
and emerging capabilities. I would work with Congress to secure
predictable and stable funding to make competing for defense contracts
more attractive to industry. If confirmed, I would leverage existing
authorities, such as the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment
program, to make key investments to improve the resiliency of the
Defense Industrial Base.
172. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, do you view our 5th generation
fighter aircraft programs as trade space to fund other priority NDS
requirements?
Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, I
believe the greatest risk to the Department of Defense's ability to
perform its key missions is presented by the complex anti-access area
denial capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Fighter
modernization must ensure that the services are able to adapt to these
challenges. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, CAPE,
OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) to review the requirements for 4th, 5th and 6th
generation fighters.
173. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, what's your vision for
keeping/making the Fighter Force Structure relevant within this context
across the Department of Defense?
Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, I
believe the greatest risk in the Air Force's ability to perform its key
missions is presented by the complex anti-access area denial
capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Fighter
modernization must ensure that the Services are able to adapt to these
challenges. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, CAPE,
OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) to review the requirements for 4th, 5th and 6th
generation fighters
military sexual assault
174. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, how can the Department better
target issues with specific garrison installations and deployed units--
such as those embarked on Navy ships--known to have higher rates of
sexual assault?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department is
absolutely focused on efforts to take every step we can to prevent
sexual assault and support victims. It is my understanding that over
the last several years, the Department has continued to refine its use
of data to take more targeted approaches to prevention, with a focus on
those local-level installations and units. These issues must also be
leadership issues, and we need our commanders at all levels--and at
every installation and in every unit, on deployment or at home--to be
aware of command climate problems and take appropriate swift action. If
confirmed, I will closely examine how we can target our prevention and
response efforts as much as possible and ensure we keep our commitment
to our Servicemembers.
175. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific
steps would you take to ensure that all servicemembers--regardless of
Service, rank, or role--experience a culture of respect, safety, and
equality?
Mr. Austin. I firmly believe that we have to address culture and
leadership. Our commanders are responsible to set the tone in every
command, ensure an appropriate climate, and hold everyone appropriately
accountable for good order and discipline. My understanding is that the
Department has recently taken the initiative to redesign the command
climate surveys to get at leading indicators of problematic behaviors,
including sexual assault, and is also working to provide commanders
better access to this data and tools to address it. I look forward to
hearing more about these initiatives aimed at addressing these on-the-
ground issues.
character of military discharges
176. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, what steps would you take to
ensure that mitigating factors such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual Trauma are taken into
account when servicemembers may receive Other-Than-Honorable
discharges?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Department's separation
and corrective board policies to ensure these factors continue to be
carefully considered by the Military Departments' separation
authorities as well as the Military Departments' corrective boards and
I will clarify and update Department policies if necessary.
humanitarian demining
177. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, what role do you anticipate
the Department of Defense playing in supporting the reintegration of
combatants, including elements formerly funded by the United States
Government such as the Afghan Local Police Forces?
Mr. Austin. The integration of former combatants will primarily be
the responsibility of the Afghan Government, but the international
community can play a supporting role. The State Department would be the
lead for any United States efforts to reintegrate Taliban into Afghan
society. The most important role for the Department of Defense in this
effort would be to continue, with Congressional support, the train-
advise-assist mission with the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF), and to continue funding the salaries and key support
operations of those forces. If a peace settlement among Afghans
includes integrating some demobilized Taliban into the ANDSF, the
Department of Defense would work with Congress to determine what
funding is required. It is possible that some former combatants may
integrate into the ANDSF that we help support. When the Afghan Local
Police were disbanded in late 2020, most members transitioned to either
the Afghan National Police or the Afghan National Army Territorial
Force. The rest were given a severance payment. Without an overall
security architecture, which currently depends on U.S. support, this
type of reform as well as any other steps to deal with former
combatants, will not be possible.
178. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, would the Department consider
exploring partnerships with the humanitarian demining sector to employ
former combatants and support other goals, such as the clearance of
unexploded ordnance from U.S. firing ranges?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review existing policies and
programs for the clearance of unexploded ordnance, including from U.S
firing ranges. Subsequently, I will work with Congress, the Department
of State, non-governmental organizations, and partner nations to
explore further opportunities to mitigate the adverse effects of
unexploded ordnance.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
shipyard modernization
179. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, like
the three other public shipyards, is in dire need of new infrastructure
investments that will better serve the workforce and the Navy's ship
repair and maintenance needs. Investments in a submarine dry-dock
replacement and a waterfront production facility are long overdue and
need to be pulled forward into DOD's 5-year budget plan. Will you work
with President-elect Biden to ensure his nominee to serve as Secretary
of the Navy supports the critical shipyard investments as outlined in
the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work to gain a deeper
understanding of the SIOP plan and will support the President's nominee
for Secretary of the Navy who is committed to improving our critical
infrastructure.
``solar winds'' cyberattack
180. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, on January 5, 2021, U.S.
intelligence agencies issued a joint statement indicating the recent
``Solar Winds'' cyberattack affecting multiple departments in the
Federal Government was likely orchestrated by Russia. The ``Solar
Winds'' hack is the most significant cyberattack in recent years and
executive branch officials are still trying to determine the extent of
the breach. The intrusion was only made known to U.S. Government
officials when a private cybersecurity company was itself hacked, and
alerted the Federal Government. What needs to be done to protect our
critical space and cyber capabilities to address the growing threat
from Russia and China?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess the impact of the ``solar
winds'' cyber attack and determine what steps need to be taken to
protect our critical space and cyber capabilities.
181. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, what threats to United States
cybersecurity do North Korea and Iran pose?
Mr. Austin. While China and Russia are our pacing threats in
cyberspace, North Korea and Iran are investing in formidable cyber
capabilities to threaten United States interests. If confirmed, I
pledge to be transparent with the American people and this Congress
about the threat posed by these and other malign actors in cyberspace.
182. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, how confident are you that U.S.
command and control systems remain uncompromised?
Mr. Austin. Defending U.S. command and control systems is one of
the Department's highest priorities. Any further details regarding the
security of the Department's command and control systems would need to
be provided at a higher classification level.
183. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, if confirmed as Secretary of
Defense, how will you ensure these systems remain reliable and
resilient to future attacks?
Mr. Austin. I will continue to make defending U.S. command and
control systems one of my highest priorities, stressing the enforcement
of cyber hygiene and accountability. I will ensure the Department
focuses its resources to ensuring existing systems remain reliable and
resilient to attack through modernized encryption, rigorous assessments
and aggressive remediation activities. Furthermore, I will ensure newly
acquired systems will have the necessary reliability and resiliency
inserted during the acquisition lifecycle.
importance of diplomacy
184. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, the more we invest in diplomacy
and strengthening partnerships around the world, the less we have to
spend on our military. Do you share this view that by doing the
difficult and essential work of diplomacy around the world, we put less
strain on our military to keep us and our allies safe?
Mr. Austin. I believe the work of our partners at the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development are absolutely
critical to our national security. The Department of Defense
relationship with both organizations is strong. If confirmed, I intend
to further strengthen those connections and align DOD efforts in
support of civilian agencies' missions abroad. In addition, our network
of allies and partners remains a competitive advantage in securing our
nation.
red hill bulk fuel storage facility
185. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, the Navy and the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) are currently in on-going negotiations with the EPA and
the Hawaii Department of Health regarding their plan to improve the Red
Hill Fuel Storage Tanks on Oahu in accordance with the Administrative
Order on Consent all parties agreed to following a 2014 fuel release
from the facility. I'm also committed to ensuring the improvements
sufficiently address the public health and environmental concerns of my
constituents. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the Navy and
DLA act in good faith regarding their Red Hill improvement plan,
including the continued partnership with the University of Hawaii's
Applied Research Lab to develop further means to safeguard operation of
the Facility?
Mr. Austin. I understand the significance of Red Hill both to U.S.
operations in the Indo-Pacific region and the local community on Oahu.
However, I am not aware of the details and ongoing negotiations
regarding the Red Hill improvement plan. If confirmed, I will ensure I
receive a briefing from the Navy and DLA to understand the Department's
approach to safe operations at Red Hill.
homeland defense radar--hawaii
186. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
identified the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-H) as a requirement
for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from
an increasingly capable North Korea. President Trump zeroed out funding
for the radar in the fiscal year 2021 budget, but my colleagues and I
recognize the critical need for this project in defending Hawaii and we
included authorization language and appropriated $133 million for
fiscal year 2021 to keep its development on track. If confirmed, will
you commit to being upfront and transparent as the Biden administration
undertakes their review of budget priorities in the coming year,
especially when it comes to HDR-H?
Mr. Austin. Yes, if confirmed, we will be upfront and transparent
as we review budget priorities.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
187. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, with tensions high in the Strait
of Hormuz and the South China Sea, we see on a daily basis the
importance of preserving and defending freedom of navigation. I plan to
reintroduce a Senate Resolution calling upon the Senate to ratify the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which entered
into force over 25 years ago--in 1994. Becoming party to the treaty
would give the United States a legal right to intervene con
international disputes relating to freedom of navigation rights. Do you
agree that threats to international freedom of navigation require an
international solution?
Mr. Austin. I agree. Global security depends upon a partnership of
maritime nations sharing common goals and values. One of the most
important of those values is respect for the rule of law. The United
States and its partners have long advocated for the freedom of
navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, free from threats or
coercion.
188. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in April 2018, Admiral Philip
Davidson, USN, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command,
stated to this very committee, ``our accession to UNCLOS would help our
position legally across the globe and would do nothing to limit our
military operations in the manner in which we're conducting them now.''
Do you agree with Admiral Davidson's assessment?
Mr. Austin. I agree that accession to UNCLOS would not limit our
military operations. The United States has long treated UNCLOS's
provisions related to navigation and overflight as reflective of
longstanding and customary international law. Our forces already act in
a manner consistent with these rights and freedoms. Regardless of
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, I assess that the United
States will continue to advocate for the peaceful resolution of
maritime disputes without force or coercion. Whether or not the United
States accedes to UNCLOS, if confirmed, I will work with other U.S.
Government stakeholders, and our allies and partners, to support the
free and open international order and continued access for all lawful
uses of the oceans.
189. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, will the Biden administration
continue the recent uptick in freedom of navigation operations in the
South China Sea?
Mr. Austin. The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program and its FONOPs
are key to challenging unlawful maritime claims and preserving the
global mobility of United States Forces, including and particularly in
the South China Sea. If confirmed, I will carefully review our current
operations in the South China Sea to ensure they are sufficient to meet
the challenge to United States interests.
190. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, should the Senate move to ratify
UNCLOS?
Mr. Austin. I agree. The United States has long treated UNCLOS's
provisions related to navigation and overflight as reflective of
longstanding and customary international law. Our military already acts
in a manner consistent with these rights and freedoms, so accession to
the Convention will not impact the manner in which we conduct our
operations.
relationship with the chairman of the joint chiefs
191. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, former Secretary James Mattis
relied heavily on one of his former military subordinates, then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, a four-
star Marine Corps general, for policy implementation to the exclusion
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the civilian side of the
Pentagon. As a retired four-star Army infantry officer, if confirmed as
Secretary, you will be providing advice alongside the current Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, another four-star Army infantry officer,
General Mark Milley. It is a matter of common knowledge that our
experiences can shape our frames of reference. Is there a danger of
``group think'', having views and perspectives that are ``too similar''
coming from the President's top two advisors on defense?
Mr. Austin. I would not have accepted this nomination if I believed
that to be a legitimate concern. I strongly believe in the value of
diverse and inclusive teams, and understand the importance of
surrounding myself with capable civilian appointees and career civil
servants whose experiences complement, rather than mirror, my own. If
confirmed, I will bring to this role a different perspective and
different responsibilities than I did to my previous career as a
soldier.
I know that the military serves policy objectives that require a
broader, deeply civilian vantage point. Our military wants and needs
civilian leadership that actively and responsibly leads all aspects of
the Defense Department, including exercising oversight over plans,
policies, and operations. Without quality civilian guidance, they
cannot do their jobs effectively.
192. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in terms of advising the
President, what do you see as your role relative to General Milley?
Mr. Austin. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to give
his best military advice to the President and to the Secretary. If
confirmed as an appointee in the President's cabinet, the scope of my
duties would be broader, focusing on strategy and policy, within the
President's guidelines. I fully believe that I understand the
difference.
My experiences throughout my career imbued me with a deep
understanding of what ``right'' civil-military relations look like.
Secretaries of Defense Gates and Panetta demonstrated it each day as
they led the Department of Defense. They ensured that senior civilian
and military leaders understood their own roles and responsibilities--
and one another's as well. They made sure we collaborated, setting an
approach and establishing a process that provided forums to tackle
tricky issues and to air differing views. They exerted meaningful
civilian control like setting defense strategy and policy, overseeing
war planning and operations, and ensuring the defense budget made the
best use of American taxpayer dollars while safeguarding our national
security. They sought to be transparent with Members of Congress, the
press, and the public and to productively engage stakeholders on
critical issues. They ensured that everyone understood who ultimately
must make the hard calls-- the Secretary of Defense and the President
of the United States. If confirmed, I will model healthy civil-military
relations not only because it would be my responsibility, but because
it is the very best thing for achieving our national security
interests.
navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan
193. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, last month, the outgoing
Administration finally submitted its annual 30-year Navy shipbuilding
plan which proposes a significant increase in the fleet's size, calling
for 355 battle force ships in 10 years and nearly 400 ships in 20
years, up from 296 ships today. Furthermore, the plan calls for an
additional 143 unmanned vessels by 2045, for a total fleet size of
nearly 550 ships in 25 years. I've been a proponent of increasing the
fleet's size, but I'm concerned about whether the significant
additional spending required to achieve this goal is realistic--the
proposed budget offers to pay for the additional ships through extra
budgetary account savings we're currently using to fund our troops on
the battlefield in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria--and shifts in funds
from the other Services. Does the Biden administration intend to
resubmit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan in the coming months alongside
the President Elect's budget?
Mr. Austin. My understanding is that the 30-year shipbuilding plan
is an annual reporting requirement for the Secretary of Defense to
include with the defense budget materials, per section 231 of Title 10,
United States Code. If confirmed, I will comply with the reporting
requirement directed by Congress.
194. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, what is the new Administration's
plan to efficiently and effectively increase the size of the Fleet to
deter near peer competitors like China and Russia without doing so on
the backs of our servicemen and women in harm's way?
Mr. Austin. It is my understanding that the size of the Navy fleet
is currently growing as new ships are delivered to the fleet and that
the Navy plans to continue this growth in future budgets. Increased and
stable funding over recent budget years has also improved the Navy's
ability to restore military readiness. To sustain our readiness gains,
we must balance force structure growth with the need to train, equip,
and modernize the Services. If confirmed, I will review both the Future
Naval Force Study and shipbuilding plan in detail and work with the
Secretary of the Navy leadership to develop a well calibrated
shipbuilding plan that is balanced with readiness requirements.
confronting discrimination, prejudice, and bias within dod
195. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, I was pleased to see your historic
nomination by President-elect Biden as the presumptive first African
American Defense Secretary, a milestone long overdue. Our collective
efforts to make the Armed Forces more closely mirror the U.S.
population at large, especially in the senior ranks, however, is still
a work in progress. Congress passed, over the current President's veto,
a host of reforms to combat discrimination, prejudice, and bias in the
Armed Forces in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA. Do you pledge to faithfully
carry out the provisions in the recently passed NDAA to eradicate
discrimination, prejudice, and bias within the armed services?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
196. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in light of news reports
indicating participation by Active, Retired, Reserve, and former
members of the Armed Forces in the deadly Capitol riot, I recently sent
a letter with many of my Senate colleagues to the Acting DOD IG urging
his office to investigate instances of white supremacist and violent
fringe extremist activity within the ranks--and I just received
confirmation they were planning to do just that--will you pledge to
ensure that IG investigation is thorough, completed in a timely manner,
and the results shared with this committee?
Mr. Austin. Yes.
197. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, why is diversity of experience and
thought an important part of any successful team?
Mr. Austin. My belief is that diversity is not only a moral
imperative that reflects who we are as Americans, but very clearly from
a military readiness perspective, we are stronger and more capable when
we leverage all the expertise, experience, and problem solving
capability that exists among our Total Force. As we move forward in one
of the most complex national security environments in generations, the
ability to adapt quickly, think outside the box, and use all our
strengths will make us better on the battlefield. And as a result, we
will be able to better achieve our defense mission and live up to the
expectations of the Nation we swear an oath to protect.
indo-pacific area of responsibility
198. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, you've spent much of your career
overseeing and leading military operations in the Middle East. I look
forward to having a close working relationship with you on all defense
related issues, but especially those decisions that impact force
structure in Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and throughout the Indo-Pacific. As
you know, there is strong bipartisan support for sustained investment
in the area of responsibility (AOR), and the recently enacted NDAA
included $2.2 billion in authorized funding for the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative (PDI) in the current fiscal year. It's my sincere hope that
if you're confirmed as Secretary, you'll continue to build on the PDI
and engage with our allies in the region, especially the Freely
Associated States (FAS) like Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall
Islands. Will you pledge to consult and work with me and my staff as
you round out your senior level team, especially for positions like the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I pledge to consult and work with you and
your staff.
transgender policy
199. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in 2016, former Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter lifted the prohibition on transgender service in
the military. The current Administration did an about face on the
issue, announcing in 2019 a highly restrictive policy which the
nonpartisan Palm Center characterized as ``insidious in operation but
designed to be as comprehensive a ban [on transgender service] as
possible.'' In an era of great power competition with China and Russia,
and the armed services all struggling to meet recruiting metrics, now
is not the time to place unreasonable restrictions on classes of
individuals who just want to serve their country. Do you support
overturning the current Administration's de facto ban on transgender
servicemembers?
Mr. Austin. Yes. I support amending the policy to ensure all
members who are qualified to serve have the opportunity.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
pfas cleanup and remediation
200. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Austin, during your testimony I asked
for your commitment to take concrete steps to address the presence of
PFAS chemicals in drinking and agricultural water. You stated that you
would work to find good solutions to ``our [DOD's] contribution to this
contamination'' and went on to state that PFAS ``has been used
throughout the economy, so I think we're going to have to work across
the board . . . '' with partners to mitigate the impact of PFAS. I'm
concerned that these statements fail to recognize strong evidence
linking defense activities as the source of PFAS contamination in hard
hit communities like Clovis, New Mexico. Can you clarify your views on
DOD's responsibility for PFAS contamination in and around Clovis, New
Mexico?
Mr. Austin. The health and safety of DOD personnel, their families,
and the communities in which we serve, is very important to me. I am
committed to DOD proactively addressing its PFAS releases under the
federal cleanup law, and will work with the Air Force to energize the
pace of cleanup in Clovis, NM.
201. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Austin, given the strong evidence
linking contamination to DOD activities, what concrete steps will you
take as secretary to finally do right by our communities?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will energize the pace of the DOD PFAS
Task Force to ensure DOD proactively addresses its PFAS releases, and
aggressively pursues a PFAS-free firefighting agent. I also plan to
increase communications to Congress and the public, as well as work
with our Federal and State agency partners to remediate drinking water.
202. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Austin, you mentioned the need to work
with the Environmental Protection Agency to address PFAS contamination.
What does that collaborative approach look like and what will it
entail?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work towards national solutions to
address PFAS in collaboration with other Federal agencies, such as the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These
interagency efforts should include coordinating on Administration-wide
positions concerning proposed PFAS regulations, and monitoring and
supporting other Federal agency regulatory and scientific research
activities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
civilian casualties
203. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, human rights organizations have
reported that witnesses and survivors of civilian casualty incidents
have had difficulty communicating with the military about potential
reports of civilian casualties, and others have noted that the military
does not actively seek to interview witnesses or meet with claimants
during assessments or investigations. Are you willing to explore ways
in which the military can ensure that those who wish to provide
information are able to do so?
Mr. Austin. The Department has recently established a website where
survivors or other personnel can submit information about allegations
of civilian casualties. As we work to complete the DOD Instruction on
Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response we will address these issues
and include appropriate guidance to the Department.
204. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, will your staff address this in
the forthcoming DOD policy on civilian casualties?
Mr. Austin. Yes, my understanding is that the Department is nearing
completion on a Department of Defense Instruction on Civilian Casualty
Mitigation and Response that will address these issues.
205. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, how do you think DOD could improve
how it investigates, publicly reports on, and responds to credible
reports of civilian harm from journalists, civilians, and non-
governmental organizations (NGO)?
Mr. Austin. Currently the Department looks into all allegations of
civilian harm, from both NGOs and journalists, and will continue to do
so. I understand this will also be addressed in our DOD Instruction on
Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response that is currently being
finalized.
206. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, in particular, how can DOD better
utilize outside reporting on civilian harm, as well as information from
witnesses, survivors, and civil society groups that collect such
information?
Mr. Austin. DOD is committed to addressing any allegation of
civilian harm that is presented to it, including information from
witnesses, survivors, and civil society groups. We have recently
established a website where survivors or other personnel can submit
information about allegations of civilian casualties. The forthcoming
DOD Instruction on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response will
address collaboration with NGOs, as well as information gathering
during assessments of possible civilian casualty incidents. Our policy
will establish uniform approaches among Combatant Commands to address
these issues.
207. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you support making targeted
payments (ex gratia, or condolence, payments), based on credible
evidence, to civilians for damage to civilian objects, civilian
personal injury, or civilian deaths that reasonably result from United
States combat operations in Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,
and Libya?
Mr. Austin. Yes, the Department has done this for many years, and
recently published detailed formal guidance for providing ex gratia
payments for damage, personal injury, or death that is incident to the
use of force. Through collaboration with the State Department, the
Department has provided assessments of local culture and prevailing
economic conditions to Combatant Commands to support determination of
appropriate payment amounts.
208. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, in response to statutory
requirements, former Secretary of Defense James Mattis initiated a
process for developing Department-wide guidance on preventing,
tracking, and responding to civilian harm across the combatant
commands. The outcome of this process, a forthcoming DOD Instruction
(DOD-I), presents a unique opportunity to rectify shortcomings in
current policies and operations and strengthen the U.S. military's
commitment to minimize and account for civilian harm. Do you agree that
an effective civilian harm mitigation framework should have an explicit
objective of minimizing civilian harm, including direct harm resulting
from hostilities, as well as direct and indirect harm arising from
damage to civilian property and assets, public services, and critical
infrastructure?
Mr. Austin. The Department is currently working on a DOD
Instruction on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response and agrees
that our civilian harm framework should have the objective of
minimizing civilian harm, including direct harm resulting from
hostilities, as well as direct and indirect harm arising from damage to
civilian property and assets, public services, and critical
infrastructure. It is my understanding that all of these topics will be
addressed in the DODI.
209. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you agree that an effective
civilian harm mitigation framework should address civilian harm arising
from partnered operations and security assistance?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree that partnered operations and security
assistance should be part of our civilian harm framework and will
address this in the upcoming DOD Instruction.
210. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you agree that an effective
civilian harm mitigation framework should facilitate information
exchanges with third parties, including affected citizens, local civil
society, non-governmental organizations, and the media?
Mr. Austin. I agree that the Department should work with all
available partners to address allegations of civilian harm. This
includes the media, NGOs, and affected citizens.
211. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you agree that an effective
civilian harm mitigation framework should prioritize redress where
possible, and condolence payments where redress is not granted,
including by establishing an effective claims process, requiring a full
acknowledgment of harm and contextually appropriate and culturally
sensitive payments for those who are harmed?
Mr. Austin. DOD recently published detailed formal guidance for
providing ex gratia payments for damage, personal injury, or death that
is incident to the use of force by U.S. Forces. DOD also recently
established a website where survivors or other personnel can submit
information about allegations of civilian casualties. We are
considering further improvements to improve information flow with
regard to civilian casualties. It is my understanding that the
forthcoming DODI on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response will
establish uniform standards for addressing these issues.
guantanamo bay
212. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you support President-elect
Biden's position that Guantanamo should be closed?
Mr. Austin. I support the President's Policy to close the detention
facilities at Guantanamo, Bay Cuba. If confirmed, I would direct my
staff to work with other Administration officials and Congress to
develop a path forward for the remaining 40 detainees at the facility.
Until that time, however, the Department must ensure the continued
safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of detainees through Joint
Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
213. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to ensuring that the Administration acts expeditiously to close
it?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would direct my staff to work with
other Administration officials and Congress to develop a path forward
for the remaining 40 detainees at the facility with all due dispatch.
214. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, section 1026 of the Fiscal Year
2020 NDAA requires DOD to establish a ``Chief Medical Officer'' at
Guantanamo to ``oversee the provision of medical care to individuals
detained at Guantanamo.'' The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA became law on
December 20, 2019. Now, more than a year later, there is still no Chief
Medical Officer at Guantanamo. If confirmed, will you commit to
fulfilling this statutory requirement without any further delay by
appointing an appropriate independent medical expert to serve as Chief
Medical Officer at Guantanamo?
Mr. Austin. In August 2020, a Navy Captain Medical Corps officer
board certified in Critical Care and Anesthesiology was selected to
serve as the Chief Medical Officer at Guantanamo Bay in accordance with
section 1026 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. He arrived at Guantanamo in
October 2020 and reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that the
statutory requirement continues to be met during my tenure as Secretary
of Defense.
ending endless wars and war powers
215. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, for nearly 20 years, successive
Administrations have adopted a costly war-based approach to national
security and counterterrorism policy with no clear endgame. This
strategy has had to a great number of deleterious effects. During his
campaign, President-elect Biden pledged to end America's endless wars.
Do you agree that we need to end these endless wars?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I believe in ending endless wars in a manner that
protects U.S. interests and preserves the gains made after nearly two
decades of investment and sacrifice.
racism in the military
216. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, a 2019 Military Times survey
showed that 36 percent of respondents saw evidence of white supremacy
and racist ideologies in the military. Former Defense Secretary Mark
Esper addressed this matter by issuing a July 15, 2020, guidance
effectively banning white supremacist symbols in the military. This
guidance could be improved by explicitly prohibiting public displays of
white supremacist symbols from all military bases, installations,
ships, and facilities, and from all DOD workplaces and common access
areas. This would include commemorations of the Confederacy, as they
are racist and undermine national unity, harm military readiness, and
affront servicemembers of color who serve the United States. Will you
commit to prohibiting the public display of white supremacist symbols,
including flags, posters, and the like, on all military bases,
installations, ships, facilities, and DOD workspaces and common areas?
Mr. Austin. The Department places the highest emphasis on ensuring
that all Department personnel are treated with dignity and respect, in
an inclusive environment. In order to promote morale, cohesion, and
readiness in the military it is essential that our ranks reflect and
are inclusive of the American people that Servicemembers have sworn to
protect and defend. If confirmed, I will review current policies and
reports to determine what policies need to be put in place to ensure
all Servicemembers are allowed to serve with dignity and respect.
217. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
established a commission to develop a plan to remove the names that
honor or commemorate the Confederacy from all military assets. The
legislation, however, does nothing to abrogate your inherent authority
as Secretary of Defense to direct this review and the renaming of these
assets independent of the commission. Would you commit to invoking this
authority?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Commission's completed
report and consult with senior leaders to assess the appropriate next
steps.
218. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, the outgoing acting Secretary of
Defense has named four individuals to the Commission, all of who were
political appointees in the Trump administration. Do you intend to
allow these appointees to remain on the commission?
Mr. Austin. I will closely review the membership of this important
commission and ensure the appropriate individuals are participating.
219. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, are you willing to review these
appointments and replace them if you deem it necessary?
Mr. Austin. Yes, I will closely review the membership of this
commission and ensure the appropriate individuals are participating.
climate change
220. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, climate disruption is a core
security vulnerability. In 2015, DOD released a National Security
Strategy, which outlined the security risks from climate change and
labeled climate change as a threat multiplier. Pursuant to this
finding, how do you plan to integrate climate considerations into the
national defense strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review?
Mr. Austin. Climate and environmental security risks pose unique
challenges to the U.S. Homeland and DOD missions and operations, in
addition to the security of our allies and partners. They must be
factored into our strategic planning efforts. If confirmed, I will
bring increased focus to the effects of climate change, as a top
priority of the Biden Administration. I believe it is imperative that
the Department work closely with the Intelligence Community, others in
the U.S. interagency, and our allies and partners to identify and
mitigate acute risks that a changing climate poses to the Department's
ability to advance it priority defense missions.
221. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you acknowledge that climate
change represents one of the greatest, if not the greatest, threats to
human security?
Mr. Austin. In the near and medium term, environmental security
challenges are likely to threaten U.S. national security interests
through a combination of acute physical shocks and more gradual
disruptions to natural systems, increasing the frequency, scale, and
complexity of military missions. Shortages of food, water, and other
critical resources may contribute to large-scale instability and
migration. Increased instability expands opportunities for extremist
groups and strategic rivals to gain influence. With the reemergence of
long-term, strategic competition as the central challenge to U.S.
prosperity and security, DOD must understand and prepare for the ways
environmental security affects competition for influence and access as
well as the ways it influences and challenges the capabilities of our
partners and allies. Over the long term, these threats to U.S. national
security may equal or even exceed those posed by adversarial great
powers. This issue is a priority for the Department. Our Resource
Competition, Environmental Security, and Stabilization (RECESS) team is
currently assessing the security impacts of climate change through a
series of exercises.
222. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, DOD's annual domestic procurement
budget is the largest in the Federal Government. This money can and
should be used to kick start a national clean energy mobilization. What
opportunities do you see to leverage DOD's considerable purchasing
power to advance clean and resilient energy technologies?
Mr. Austin. The generation and use of energy is of strategic
importance to the Department. If confirmed, I will support investments
in clean energy technologies where these technologies enhance the
resilience of DOD installations and missions.
223. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, section 328 of the Fiscal Year
2020 National Defense Authorization Act (Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA)
contains a requirement that the Secretary of Defense, in his annual
budget submission to Congress, shall include ``a dedicated budget line
item for adaptation to, and mitigation of, effects of extreme weather
on military networks, systems, installations, facilities, and other
assets and capabilities of the Department of Defense; and an estimate
of the anticipated adverse impacts to the readiness of the Department
and the financial costs to the Department during the year covered by
the budget of the loss of, or damage to, military networks, systems,
installations, facilities, and other assets and capabilities of the
Department, including loss of or obstructed access to training ranges,
as a result extreme weather events.'' Do you commit to including this
line item in the first budget you submit to Congress?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will examine this complex issue and
ensure that the Department complies with the statutory requirement to
include a dedicated budget line item in the next budget submission to
Congress.
landmines
224. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, 164 countries, representing over
80 percent of the world's states, including all of our NATO allies,
have banned the use of landmines. If confirmed, will you commit to
reversing current DOD policy and ban the use, production, sale, and
transfer of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions by the U.S.
military?
Mr. Austin. The current DOD Landmine policy and the current DOD
Cluster Munition policy were arrived at after significant study and
consideration and resulted from requests by Combatant Commanders for
reviews of the previous landmine and cluster munition policies. It is
important for these policies to appropriately balance operational risks
and considerations with humanitarian risks and considerations. It would
be premature for me to commit to reversing those policies at this time
until I have had time to review the policies.
225. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, will you lay out an accelerated
timeline for the destruction of stockpiled landmines and cluster
munitions, providing concrete plans and mechanisms for public reporting
on progress?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will plan to provide the Congress with
an update on the plans and timelines for the destruction of those
landmines and cluster munitions that are no longer in DOD's operational
inventory.
nuclear weapons
226. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, President-elect Biden has
expressed his belief that ``the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal should be deterring--and, if necessary, retaliating against--a
nuclear attack'' against the United States and its allies and that he
will ``work to put that belief into practice.'' He has also said that
``it's hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of
nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary. Or make
sense.'' Do you agree with the President-elect's assessment? If not, in
what specific scenario or scenarios do you believe the benefits of the
first use of nuclear weapons by the United States against another
nuclear-armed state would outweigh the costs?
Mr. Austin. In keeping with past practice for incoming
Administrations, I anticipate that President Biden will direct the
interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active role in this
review.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
climate change
227. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, how would you position the
Department to make early investments in climate change adaptation,
mitigation, and resiliency strategies in order to reduce the financial
burden on taxpayers and ensure national security preparedness?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will develop comprehensive investment
strategies that address extreme weather adaptation, mitigation and
resiliency that impacts operations, readiness, installations,
equipment, infrastructure, and force development.
microelectronics
228. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what is your plan to develop
requirements that mitigate counterfeit microelectronics and reduce risk
to microelectronics that have been manufactured by or have a tie to
adversaries?
Mr. Austin. DOD should work with its industrial base partners to
understand the risks in the microelectronics supply chain, including
sourcing from adversarial countries, which increases the risk of
counterfeit parts. The Department should continue to develop and
implement measures that strengthen secure microelectronics supply
chains, ensuring that our DOD systems are reliable and safe.
229. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, do you plan to follow through on
the reshoring of our industrial base, specifically with
microelectronics?
Mr. Austin. DOD should continue to engage with Congress on this
critical issue. The Department requires a holistic microelectronics
strategy and roadmap, which includes reshoring of microelectronics
capability.
future warfare
230. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, in your view what do you expect to
be the most relevant form of warfare in the near future and what
changes does the Department need to make to optimize for this most-
relevant form of warfare?
Mr. Austin. Joint Doctrine identifies three forms of warfare;
conventional, irregular and nuclear. Given the military strength and
breadth of capacity our potential adversaries have achieved, the Joint
Force must be capable and ready to employ all three forms, across all
domains, to achieve our military objectives. At the same time, we must
maintain the defense of our Homeland and manage the risk of strategic
deterrence failure. Additionally, the Joint Force must not only be
effective in armed conflict but also in day-to-day competition to deter
and prevent our adversaries from resorting to warfare in the first
place.
231. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, as Secretary of Defense, how will
you create sustainable and durable processes to ensure long-term
success for the Department of Defense in identifying, developing,
acquiring, and deploying next-generation technology?
Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, it
is my understanding that the Department of Defense Adaptive Acquisition
Framework implements the following tenets to ensure long-term success
for the Department of Defense in identifying, developing, acquiring,
and deploying next-generation technology: (a) Empower program managers
(PMs); (b) Simplify acquisition policy; (c) Employ tailored acquisition
approaches; (d) Conduct data driven analysis; (e) Actively manage risk;
and (f) Emphasize product support and sustainment. If confirmed, I will
work with my staff and the services to ensure that Department policy is
fully aligned with these tenets and effectively implements the reforms
needed in the defense acquisition system.
232. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what steps will you take to create
a comprehensive approach to developing the necessary workforce, both
civilian and uniformed, to operate new technologies?
Mr. Austin. The National Defense Strategy calls for an innovative
approach to talent recruitment, development, and retention to achieve
the DOD mission. If confirmed, I will work with Congress in continuing
to create the necessary authorities and flexibilities to attract and
retain the highest quality technical talent, and I will undertake an
assessment of the relevant training and education needed for continuous
development of the civilian workforce. On the uniform side, I intend to
work with the private sector to create opportunities to transfer
individuals with unique technical skills into and out of the Department
to solve the complex issues facing our Military Services. This exchange
of personnel will enable a more rapid integration of the latest
technologies throughout DOD.
technology acquisition
233. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, how will you best position the
Department of Defense to be able to bridge the ``valley of death''
between small-scale experimentation and programs of record?
Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, it
is my understanding that recent reforms have allowed the Department to
engage effectively in rapid prototyping and expand access to new
partners in industry. At the same time, the fielding of new
capabilities continues to proceed at a slower pace than is required to
address the challenges the Department faces and the development of new
entrants in the generation of defense capability is suboptimal.
Acquisition of services and software remain challenging and
implementing sound cybersecurity throughout the acquisition system and
the weapon systems it produces is a major need. If confirmed, I will
work closely with my staff and the services to continue to improve the
defense acquisition system along these fronts and in other areas.
234. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, how will you position the
Department to best be able to introduce new technology at scale?
Mr. Austin. The Department needs to be more effective at assessing
the potential of emerging technologies and ensuring barriers to entry
are low. One of the great challenges we face is recognizing and
transitioning opportunistic, emerging technologies that appear outside
the technology development phase of an acquisition program. If
confirmed, I will work with the Services to improve mechanisms for
planned and opportunistic technology transition into DOD systems. I
would also foster a culture of appropriate risk-taking in order to
accelerate the identification and integration of these emerging
technologies.
diversity
235. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what will you do to build a force
which accurately represents, in every branch and at every rank, the
diversity of the Nation it serves?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure we fully commit the
Department of Defense to developing and maintaining a Total Force that
proudly represents and reflects all our incredible diversity as
Americans. That means we have to be comprehensive, not only from
recruitment to mentoring and career development, but we also must
ensure that our recruitment efforts reach a wide cross section of
America. If confirmed, I will look at what's working, what we might
need to adjust, and how we can build sustainable personnel practices
that reflect our commitment to diversity for every civilian and every
Servicemember at every rank and in every Service.
236. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what do you see as the main
obstacle towards the increase in the number of minorities and women
serving as the military's most senior leaders?
Mr. Austin. DOD needs to improve recruiting and retaining
minorities into occupational specialties that lead to senior leadership
roles, such as operational specialties where the bulk of our senior
leader requirements exist. We must have minority role models leading
our operational units visible to a wide range of communities and work
harder to make these opportunities available to all minority
Servicemembers, both officer and enlisted.
michigan
237. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, Exercise Northern Strike, which we
host at the National All-Domain Warfighting Center, provides a premier
venue for joint service training and an opportunity to work with NATO
partners. This exercise is so unique and large scale, more similar to
Pacific Pathways or a CTC rotation, that I believe it is more efficient
to invest in it. Can you commit that the Department will critically
examine the cost-effectiveness, and benefit to the warfighter, of
investing in Exercise Northern Strike?
Mr. Austin. The Department regularly reviews the cost-effectiveness
of its training programs, including Exercise Northern Strike. If
confirmed, I will continue the Department's work to evaluate routinely
the returns on our investments to ensure we are optimizing cost and
mission effectiveness.
israel
238. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, Congress recently authorized the
creation of the United States-Israel Operations Technology Working
Group, that I championed, which is focused on cooperation in research
and development in early stage defense technologies. Will you support
the implementation of this group and support expanding our cooperation
in emerging defense technologies?
Mr. Austin. Yes. We will establish this working group under the
existing United States-Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory Group that
is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment to promote cooperation, including in emerging technologies.
bad paper discharge
239. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, for the past 3 years the Army and
the Navy have been litigating class action lawsuits brought by bad
paper veterans suffering from PTSD and related conditions. Do you agree
that there should be a presumption of upgrade in cases of PTSD,
Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual Trauma?
Mr. Austin. The Department continues its efforts to ensure veterans
are aware of their opportunities to request review of their discharges
and other military records. If confirmed, I will review this issue to
ensure the Military Departments Discharge Review Boards (DRB) and
Boards for Correction of Military Records and Naval Records (BCMR/
NR).are applying the appropriate standards under the law and
Servicemembers receive just and fair consideration.
240. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, would you perform a comprehensive
review of the causes of the increased rate of bad paper discharges
across the military and publish a report outlining the steps you are
taking to reverse this increase?
Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess whether there is an
increase in the rate of bad paper discharges across the military and,
if necessary, what the contributing factors may be.
sustainment and readiness
241. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, the National Commission on
Military Aviation Safety published a report on December 1, 2020,
attributing a lack of parts as a concern for aircraft sustainment and
aviation safety. Furthermore, the Comptroller General of the United
States has published reports describing how parts shortages can be a
concern for sustaining older DOD platforms. As the Department of
Defense struggles with diminishing manufacturing sources and material
shortage (DMSMS) issues across the industrial base, how is the
Department of Defense working to incorporate advanced manufacturing
into solving this critical issue and has DOD considered using automated
software-based manufacturing to address this readiness concern?
Mr. Austin. The Department is incorporating advanced manufacturing
capabilities within the organic industrial complexes and research and
engineering labs of the Services. It collaborates routinely through
Department-level forums such as the Joint Defense Manufacturing Council
and the Joint Additive Manufacturing Working Group to share best
practices. Capabilities in use today include technologies such as cold-
spray and 3D printers for both plastics and metals which use automated
software-based control that assures accuracy, quality and
reproducibility.
human capital
242. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, in 2017, the Army moved to a
Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) system, focused on physical training,
nutrition and sustaining both the mental and spiritual health of Army
soldiers. As the Army continues to adopt this system and appropriately
implement the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT), has it considered
characterizing Army soldiers as ``human weapon systems''--which done by
the Air Force has led it to invest in and improve its human capital
management practices--to improve the military lifecycle of individual
servicemembers and properly acquire and sustain the equipment essential
to supporting the creation and maintenance of this weapon system?
Mr. Austin. The Army's most important weapons system is the
soldier. Soldiers must remain the most flexible and lethal force on the
battlefield. The Army is investing in soldier lethality on three
fronts. First, the Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) system is the
Army's primary investment in soldier readiness and lethality focusing
on physical and non-physical performance, reducing injury rates, and
increased overall effectiveness. Second, the Army's soldier lethality
cross-functional team has focused on materiel enhancements that
soldiers and squads need as the foundation of the decisive force.
Third, the Army is committed to soldier intellectual development
through world class Professional Military Education, training, and
developmental experiences.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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[The biographical sketch of Lloyd J. Austin III, which was
transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Lloyd J.
Austin III in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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[The nomination of Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Inhofe on January 21, 2021, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on January 22, 2021.]
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