    [Senate Hearing 117-977]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 117-977

     TO CONDUCT A CONFIRMATION HEARING ON THE EXPECTED NOMINATION OF LLOYD
                    J. AUSTIN III TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 19, 2021
                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
                                    ______

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    62-869 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2026

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                      JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         JACK REED, Rhode Island
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina          TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota           MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                  ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
                                         TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

                         John Bonsell, Staff Director
                   Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S
                                  ___________

                                january 19, 2021

                                                                       Page

    To Conduct a Confirmation Hearing on the Expected Nomination of       1
      Lloyd J. Austin III to be Secretary of Defense.

                               Members Statements

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     1

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     7

                               Witness Statements

    Austin, Lloyd J..................................................    10

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    62

      Questions for the Record.......................................   136

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   184

      Biographical Sketch............................................   185

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   189

      Signature Page.................................................   196

                                     (iii)

     TO CONDUCT A CONFIRMATION HEARING ON THE EXPECTED NOMINATION OF LLOYD
                    J. AUSTIN III TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:01 p.m., in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
    Inhofe (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, and Duckworth.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Chairman Inhofe. Since this is my last Committee meeting to
    be important, we will start right on time. Got that, Jack? All
    right.
        The Committee meets today to consider expected nomination
    of Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III to be Secretary of Defense of the
    United States of America.
        Thank all of you guys for being here. It has been a
    hardship on many of you, and it was on me, too, and we are able
    to get this done.
        So, Mr. Austin, we welcome you, and a warm welcome to
    Charlene, your wife of more than 41 years. My wife and I were
    61 years. Think you will make it?
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe. All right. We are very happy--Mr. Austin,
    you will be introduced now by Senator Sullivan, a member of our
    committee.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The last time we were together as Senators our Capitol was
    under siege. America's authoritarian rivals abroad have been
    gloating about our disunity. Democracy brings chaos, they tell
    their people. Better to have a strong hand that keeps order.
        We live in an imperfect democracy, no doubt, and the
    American I am proud and honored to introduce, Mr. Lloyd Austin,
    understands our imperfections more than many. But on closer
    inspection, the world's dictators have little to celebrate.
    Congress went back to work on January 6th to count Electoral
    College votes. Tomorrow, there will be a transfer of power at
    the top of our Government, as there has been since the founding
    of our republic.
        At some point, Chinese and Russian citizens will ask, ``Why
    can we not do that? Why do we not have strong, resilient
    institutions that ensure the regular election of new leaders
    and, thus, self-government in the people?'' When these
    questions are asked, authoritarians like Xi Jinping and Putin
    will not be gloating anymore because they do not have answers.
        What does this all have to do with Lloyd Austin? A lot. Mr.
    Austin has been nominated to lead one of America's most trusted
    institutions, the Department of Defense (DOD). Many of us have
    worked hard to rebuild our military, and we can all agree that
    there has been too much turmoil at the top. As its civilian
    leader, I am confident that Mr. Austin will bring steadiness,
    leadership, and respect to this indispensable institution.
        I got to know Mr. Austin in 2005 and 2006. Serving together
    in an Army heavy combatant command, conducting combat
    operations throughout the Middle East, we had what might be
    described today as an uneven power relationship. He was a two-
    star general. I was a major. He had spent decades on Active
    Duty. I was a Reservist. He was a soldier. I was a marine.
        I was just one of hundreds of field-grade infantry officers
    recalled to Active Duty deployed in the region during a
    challenging time for our Nation. But when I asked for his help,
    Mr. Austin gave it. When I had a problem, he listened, and when
    I asked for guidance on an important mission, he provided it.
        A critical hallmark of exceptional leadership, especially
    for organizations like the Pentagon, is not just how one treats
    superiors, but how one treats subordinates. What I saw was
    respect, integrity, and someone who gets things done in a
    difficult environment. It is clear to me that the core
    principles of Mr. Austin's life has been duty, honor, and
    country.
        That may sound quaint to some, but I think having
    individuals of impeccable character at the top of our
    Government is more important than ever. Other than integrity,
    there is no singular requirement for the difficult job of
    Secretary of Defense. But as the former director of the Joint
    Staff and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander,
    Mr. Austin certainly has insights on critical issues, such as
    interagency budget battles, working with our allies, and
    congressional oversight.
        Mr. Austin is fully committed to the constitutional
    principle of civilian control of our military, something that
    those who serve in uniform typically understand and revere more
    than those who do not. In that regard, I thought some of the
    testimony from our recent hearing on this important topic was a
    bit simplistic, with discussions about so-called military logic
    versus political logic. So let me play devil's advocate.
        The very nature of this confirmation hearing is evidence
    that civilian control of the military is not at risk in
    America. I believe the related, but opposite problem should be
    of more concern today--no military experience in the top ranks
    of our Government.
        With the exception of Mr. Austin, no nominee on the
    incoming Biden national security team has ever served in
    uniform. With regard to the entire Biden Cabinet, only one
    other nominee has any military experience at all. This is not
    wise.
        If confirmed, I am sure I will not agree with all of Mr.
    Austin's decisions. But when the inevitable budget battles
    occur, it will be critical for our Nation's security and
    military members to have a Secretary of Defense who understands
    firsthand the very real morale and readiness problems that
    result from drastic cuts to our military.
        Let me conclude with this. We are living through difficult
    times--a pandemic, racial tensions, riots, turmoil at the top
    of the Pentagon, and rising dangers from China, Russia, and
    Iran. Mr. Austin's confirmation will not solve all these
    problems, but it will help. He represents the best of America,
    a man of integrity, humility, and character, with a wealth of
    relevant experience.
        Our allies will take comfort in his confirmation, and our
    adversaries will take pause. As America's first black Secretary
    of Defense, he will be an inspiration to millions both in and
    out of uniform.
        I urge my colleagues to support his confirmation and the
    waiver it requires.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. I do agree
    with your comments wholeheartedly, and I believe that we are
    going to be doing the right thing here.
        Now we have another introduction by Secretary Panetta, a
    former Secretary of Defense and former--very close friend of
    mine, served together in the House together, and it has been
    too long, Secretary Panetta. You are recognized for your part
    of this introduction.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe, I always enjoyed our friendship, going back
    to the House of Representatives.
        Ranking Member Reed and distinguished members of this
    committee, it is an honor for me to again have the opportunity
    to appear before this distinguished committee, this time
    alongside Senator Dan Sullivan, to introduce President-Elect
    Biden's nominee to be the 28th Secretary of Defense, Lloyd
    Austin.
        We do meet at a time of great peril for our Nation, but it
    is also a time of great promise. We have endured a harrowing
    year, dealing with a deadly pandemic and, most recently, the
    violent attack on our Capitol, this Congress, and our democracy
    itself. Our adversaries are watching very closely. They are
    trying to determine whether America will remain the strongest
    and most resilient democracy the world has ever known.
        It is also a time of great promise. Tomorrow at this time,
    our country will have a new President, a man who many of you
    know personally from his decades of service as a United States
    Senator. A man who I have known for over 40 years and had the
    privilege to work with during my years in the Congress, in the
    White House, and I was honored to serve him when he was Vice
    President as CIA Director and Secretary of Defense.
        Joe Biden is absolutely committed to ensuring that we
    remain the strongest military power on the face of the Earth.
    He believes that we must have the best-trained, best-equipped,
    and most capable fighting force in the world, and he believes
    that the Department of Defense must be led by someone who not
    only knows the issues of war and peace, but also knows the
    heart and soul of the women and men who bravely wear the
    uniform, put their lives on the line, and fight for our
    freedom. That is why he selected Lloyd Austin to serve as
    Secretary of Defense.
        Lloyd's accomplishments at the Department of Defense are
    without peer. He graduated from West Point. He led troops at
    almost every level, commanded in combat, served as America's
    military commander during the drawdown in Iraq. He served as
    Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and as commanding general of
    the U.S. Central Command. All of you know that that is one of
    the key combat commands at the Department of Defense.
        I met Lloyd when I came to DOD as Secretary in July of
    2011. We had just 6 months to implement the drawdown in Iraq,
    and Lloyd was the man on the ground charged with getting it
    done. It was a huge logistical task.
        He consulted carefully with the President, with the Vice
    President, the National Security Adviser, his colleagues at the
    State Department, and those in the Intelligence Community. He
    carried out with diligence and professionalism the plan that
    was set forth by me and other civilian leaders at the Pentagon.
    He had to negotiate with the Iraqis, who were not easy to
    negotiate with at that time, and ensured that our troops and
    all of their equipment could redeploy safely while protecting
    America's core national security interests.
        I mention this episode because I know that many of you are
    wondering whether a former general officer can uphold the
    principle of civilian control of the military. I have spoken to
    Lloyd, and there is no doubt in my mind that he will uphold the
    principle of civilian control. Frankly, the best military
    officers that I had the honor to serve with are those who
    understand the importance of civilian control, and Lloyd was
    one of those.
        He will respect the civilian chain of command, enshrined
    not only in tradition, but in law. He will ensure there is
    transparency and accountability at the Pentagon. He will make
    himself and Department leaders available to this committee and
    to the Congress for oversight, and he will provide regular
    briefings to the American people.
        He will support the appointment of civilian leaders across
    the Office of the Secretary and the Department. He knows that
    while we cannot defend our Nation without our Armed Forces, we
    cannot defend our democratic form of government without strong
    civilian stewardship of our national security.
        Lloyd Austin is a man of uncommon character and decency and
    courage. He is a trailblazer, feared by our enemies and admired
    by those that he led. He was the first African-American general
    officer to lead the Army Corps in combat. He was the first
    African American to command an entire theater of war. If
    confirmed, he will be the first African American to lead the
    Department of Defense.
        In sum, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
    believe that Lloyd Austin is the right person at the right
    time, a man that we need at this moment to lead the Department
    of Defense. He is clear-eyed about the threats, and we know
    there are a number of threats we are dealing with abroad--
    China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, cyber attackers, and
    terrorists.
        He understands the value of alliances and keeping them
    strong and supporting them, and he is prepared to shoulder the
    awesome burden of sending our best men and women in uniform, if
    necessary, into harm's way, the most difficult task we, who
    have been Secretary of Defense, had to assume.
        As Americans watched the tragic images from the Capitol
    Rotunda on January 6th, I was reminded of one painting in that
    space that has always represented for me the ideal of service
    to country. That is the oil painting of George Washington
    resigning his commission as general in the Army so that he
    could assume the duties of being the Nation's first President.
        It is a statement about our democratic form of government
    that has stood the test of time in that hallowed citadel of
    liberty. The tradition of military leaders from Washington,
    Eisenhower, Marshall, to the large number of veterans who are
    serving in Congress today, including my own son, of taking off
    our uniforms, returning to civilian life to lead and to serve
    again. That tradition is as old as our republic itself and
    essential for the quality of leadership we need in order to
    protect our Constitution and our national security.
        I am absolutely confident that Lloyd Austin will follow in
    that tradition. I am honored to introduce him to the committee
    and urge his swift confirmation.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Panetta. It is great
    to be with you again after all these years, and you have not
    lost a thing.
        Okay. Mr. Austin, we have our first seven questions, and
    you know what they are. So you are ready to answer them, but
    answer them audibly, if you would?
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Mr. Austin. I have.
        Chairman Inhofe. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established for requested communications,
    including questions for the record in hearings?
        Mr. Austin. I will.
        Chairman Inhofe. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Mr. Austin. I will.
        Chairman Inhofe. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Mr. Austin. They will.
        Chairman Inhofe. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Mr. Austin. I do.
        Chairman Inhofe. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Mr. Austin. I do.
        Chairman Inhofe. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Mr. Austin. I have not.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        As Secretary Panetta clearly stated, there is not a time in
    the past that we have had more threats than we are facing
    today. Throughout my tenure as chairman, this committee has
    focused on the ensuring that the DOD has authorities and
    resources it needs to implement this, the National Defense
    Strategy.
        This document is a document that means a lot to all of us
    here. It has been our blueprint that we have used since 2018.
    It was put together by six knowledgeable Democrats, six
    knowledgeable Republicans, and it has served as our blueprint.
    I would assume that you would consider and continue to do that.
    As the Secretary of Defense, second in the chain of command,
    you would be responsible and accountable to the President of
    the United States and to the American people for implementing
    this strategy.
        I look forward to learning how you will drive military
    readiness for the strategic competition with China and Russia,
    which we have talked about at length here; how you will also
    handle some of the provocations from rogue nations like Iran
    and North Korea. Even worse is that our military's technology
    advantage has eroded. We were used to the old days when we had
    the best of everything. That that is not true anymore. We fell
    down a little bit.
        I know that between the years of 2010 and 2015, we were
    dropping our defense in terms of dollars down by about 25
    percent, while China was increasing theirs, Mr. Austin, by 83
    percent. That is not acceptable. The Nation and the Department
    of Defense is going to tackle this problem head on if we hope
    to preserve and defend our way of life from those who would do
    harm to us.
        If confirmed, you would have the honor of leading a team of
    Americans who represent everything that is noble and best for
    our Nation--our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, the Marines,
    and space guardians, our military families.
        By the way, on the military families, we always hear from
    those who are a little less enthusiastic about a strong
    national defense that we spend more than Russia and China put
    together, and there is a reason for that. The reason for that
    is we care about the families. We care about housing. We care
    about--the largest single expense that we have in the military
    is for our families, our military families.
        Now, in a Communist country, you do not have that. They
    just give you a gun and said, ``Go out and shoot people.'' So
    that is what we are concerned about, and we will continue to do
    that.
        Our many defense civil servants also sacrifice day in and
    day out for our national security and rarely get the credit
    that they deserve. The Department will require strong civilian
    leadership. For you to serve as the Secretary of Defense,
    Congress must provide an exception to the law that prohibits
    individuals from being appointed if they are within 7 years of
    their military service.
        Last week, this committee held a hearing on civilian
    control of the armed services, which I think it was
    instructive. I have never been all that concerned about the 7
    years, but others have. I hope that you will share with the
    committee what actions you will take to ensure your tenure
    reflects and protects the principle of civilian control of the
    military if you are confirmed.
        We look forward to hearing your views on these and other
    important issues.
        Senator Reed?

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    I join you in welcoming Lloyd Austin to today's hearing.
        General, I want to thank you for your four decades of
    military service to our country, and I appreciate your
    willingness to return to public service, this time in a
    civilian capacity.
        In addition, I want to welcome your wife, Charlene. I also
    want to recognize and thank former Secretary of Defense Leon
    Panetta, who spoke on your behalf, in addition to Senator
    Sullivan, for their introductions.
        Today's hearing is also very different from previous
    Secretary of Defense nomination hearings. Due to recent
    security threats, the Acting Secretary of Defense has
    authorized the deployment of 25,000 National Guard troops to
    Washington, DC. I never thought I would see such a large
    display of U.S. military force in the streets of our country.
        I thank the servicemembers and the other Federal agencies
    for ensuring that the U.S. Capitol and the inauguration is safe
    and secure. In addition, the world continues to be engulfed in
    a global pandemic that has caused hundreds of thousands of
    deaths in the United States and sickened millions more. This
    has not only affected the way we conduct our hearings, but it
    has become the paramount issue facing the new Administration,
    including the Department of Defense.
        General Austin, you have a long and distinguished career.
    You have served at the highest echelons of the Army and capped
    your service as the commander of U.S. Central Command.
        If confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense, you will
    face a daunting array of current and emerging security threats.
    U.S. strategic priorities have shifted in recent years, as
    reflected in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, to focus
    increasingly on the near-peer competition with China and
    Russia. At the same time, the Trump administration, through its
    disruptive behavior, has eroded faith in U.S. global leadership
    with adverse strategic consequences.
        Indeed, our National Defense Strategy must be a component
    of an overall national security strategy that embraces all
    aspects of soft power as well as military power. As a former
    commander of United States. Central Command, you have valuable
    experience to addressing security threats in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere in the CENTCOM area of operations.
    The incoming Biden administration faces an immediate challenge
    with respect to Iran's growing nuclear, ballistic missile, and
    proxy capabilities. The Department of Defense will play a key
    role in deterring these threats while supporting diplomatic
    efforts.
        In Iraq and Syria, while the physical ISIS caliphate has
    been defeated, the underlying factors that gave rise to ISIS
    and al-Qaeda remain largely unaddressed. Defending against
    transnational violent extremist groups will require continued
    vigilance.
        In Afghanistan, our allies and partners need to be
    reassured that going forward, they will be consulted up front
    on any changes in United States Force posture. The incoming
    Administration will need to assess the conditions on the
    ground, including whether the Taliban is, in fact, living up to
    their commitments and what level of support are required to
    protect United States national security interests and
    invigorate a diplomatic solution.
        In addition to these broad strategic challenges, as
    Secretary of Defense, you must also grapple with issues
    specific to the management of the Department. The fiscal year
    2022 budget will be the first that is unconstrained by the
    Budget Control Act, and some view this as an opportunity to
    redirect the overall defense budget.
        This year will mark an inflection point in how the
    Department prioritizes resources it needs to accomplish its
    missions. The Department must focus its efforts on critical
    technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
    biotechnology, and cybersecurity while also emphasizing rapid
    delivery of advanced new weapon systems on timelines that keep
    pace with technological change.
        The Department of Defense must partner with Congress to
    find ways to retire legacy systems without incurring too much
    risk operationally or economically. The Department also has
    management challenges that require investment in great people
    to manage the complexities of the Pentagon and its processes
    rather than an endless search for budget cuts and workforce
    reductions.
        Ensuring robust funding for full-spectrum readiness,
    including additional home station training, flying hours,
    steaming days, depot maintenance, and installation sustainment,
    has been a high priority for this committee, and I expect it
    will be yours, too. The Department must also hold private
    housing companies and their defense chain of command
    accountable to ensure families live in the homes they deserve.
    Our men and women in uniform and the civilian workforce that
    supports them remain this committee's top concern, and they
    must be yours as well.
        Recruiting and retaining a sufficiently sized, trained, and
    equipped military of the necessary quality of character and
    talent to meet national defense requirements is always a
    paramount goal of the Secretary of Defense and this committee.
    Successful recruiting ensuring the health of the force has been
    and will continue to be a challenge while we finish the
    national fight against COVID.
        General Austin, as I have recounted in great detail, if
    confirmed, you will manage a Department coping with many
    extraordinarily difficult issues that will require strong
    civilian leadership to address these challenges and to reverse
    the erosion of civil-military relations over the past several
    years. However, in order to serve as the Secretary of Defense,
    Congress must provide an exception to the statutory requirement
    that prohibits individuals from being appointed if they are
    within 7 years of their military service.
        Last week, this committee heard from expert witnesses on
    the state of civilian control in the Armed Forces. Some members
    expressed concern that providing an exception for you to serve
    as the Secretary of Defense, particularly so soon after
    Secretary Mattis, could harm civil-military relations. It is a
    valid concern.
        But as our witnesses testified, it is possible to mitigate
    the effects if you demonstrate your commitment to empowering
    civilians in the Department. Further, we must also hear how you
    view the role of Secretary of Defense and how that position is
    different from your days of honorable service as a military
    officer.
        This distinction is critical, as the Secretary of Defense
    is an inherently political position requiring a skill set for
    managing a vast bureaucracy while balancing personalities
    within the Department and across our Federal agencies.
    Relatedly, an effective Secretary must be transparent with
    Congress. Tensions often exist between the executive and
    legislative branches, regardless of political party. However,
    the Department must keep Congress fully informed on critical
    national security developments so that we can conduct
    congressional oversight.
        General Austin, with these broad categories in mind, I hope
    you will candidly share what actions you will take to ensure
    your tenure reflects and protects the principle of civilian
    control of the military.
        Finally, strengthening civil-military relations is not the
    sole responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. Congress has a
    role, too. This includes expeditiously confirming qualified
    civilian nominees to serve in the Pentagon. Furthermore, I
    believe Congress should revisit the headquarters reductions
    implemented over the past several years. While well
    intentioned, these budget cuts have sapped the Department of
    experience, expertise, and institutional knowledge, all of
    which degrades the Department's ability to oversee the critical
    policy issues that are integral for robust civilian oversight.
        Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
    hearing from our nominee.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed. Excellent,
    excellent statement.
        With some Senators attending remotely, I want to let
    everyone know how we are going to run this thing. Since it is
    impossible to know exactly when our colleagues who will be
    joining via computer, we will not follow our standard early
    bird timing rule. Instead, we will handle the order of
    questions by seniority, alternating to each side, Democrat and
    Republican, until we have gone through everyone. Then we will
    see how much time we have left and what the wish is.
        We will do the standard--instead of doing the standard 5
    minutes, Senator Reed and I have agreed that 7-minute rounds
    might be more appropriate. I ask my colleagues on the computers
    to please keep an eye on the clock, which you should see on
    your screens, and we will try to adhere to those 7-minute
    rounds.
        Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
    room or on a computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute your
    microphone when you are not speaking.
        Mr. Austin, we will begin with your opening statement and
    be assured that the entirety of your written statement will be
    made a part of the record.
        General Austin?

      STATEMENT OF LLOYD J. AUSTIN III TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Austin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
    members of this committee.
        I am grateful for your time this afternoon, especially
    during these momentous days. It was apparent to me and to all
    Americans 2 weeks ago how seriously you take your duties to the
    Constitution, and I thank you for that commitment.
        I know that you share my gratitude for the commitment of
    the men and women of the Department of Defense as well, who
    share your devotion to that founding document, our
    Constitution. Many of them are serving overseas. Some of them
    are serving just outside this room, and all of them are keeping
    us safe. We owe much to their selflessness and to that of their
    families.
        I want to thank Senator Sullivan and Secretary Panetta for
    their kind words of introduction. I am truly grateful.
        Of course, I want to thank my wonderful wife, Charlene,
    who, like today, has stood by my side for more than 40 years,
    guiding me, supporting me, and making me a better man.
        I am also very grateful to President-Elect Biden for asking
    me to serve my country again. I value the strength of my
    relationship with him, and I am humbled by the trust and
    confidence that he has placed in me. I hope this hearing will
    earn me your trust.
        Let me say at the outset that I understand and respect the
    reservations that some of you have expressed about having
    another recently retired general at the head of the Department
    of Defense. The safety and security of our democracy demands
    competent civilian control of our Armed Forces, the
    subordination of military power to the civil.
        I spent my entire life committed to that principle. In war
    and in peace, I implemented the policies of civilians elected
    and appointed over me, leaders like Secretary Panetta. I know
    that being a member of the President's Cabinet, a political
    appointee, requires a different perspective and unique duties
    from a career in uniform.
        I intend to surround myself with and empower experienced,
    capable civilian leaders who will enable healthy civil-military
    relations grounded in meaningful oversight. Indeed, I plan to
    include the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in top
    decision-making meetings, ensuring strategic and operational
    decisions are informed by policy.
        I will rebalance collaboration and coordination between the
    Joint Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
    staff to ensure civilian input is integrated at every level of
    the process, and I will make clear my expectation that the
    Pentagon work hand-in-glove with the State Department
    supporting the work of our diplomats.
        Now I know that a large measure of civilian control of our
    military lies right here with this body. If you confirm me, I
    assure you that the Pentagon under my leadership will respect
    your oversight responsibilities, and we will be transparent
    with you. I will provide you my best counsel, and I will seek
    yours.
        Just like you, I will take seriously the many challenges
    facing our country, the most immediate of which, in my view, is
    the pandemic. If confirmed, I will quickly review the
    Department's contributions to coronavirus relief efforts,
    ensuring that we are doing everything that we can to help
    distribute vaccines across the country and to vaccinate our
    troops and preserve readiness.
        We will also do everything we can for our military
    families. They, too, are educating kids at home and losing
    their jobs and trying to stock the pantry. I know this
    committee shares my view that we owe them our best efforts to
    lighten that load.
        We also owe our people a working environment free of
    discrimination, hate, and harassment. If confirmed, I will
    fight hard to stamp out sexual assault and to rid our ranks of
    racists and extremists and to create a climate where everyone
    fit and willing has the opportunity to serve this country with
    dignity. The job of the Department of Defense is to keep
    America safe from our enemies, but we cannot do that if some of
    those enemies lie within our own ranks.
        For those enemies and adversaries outside the ranks and
    around the world, we need resources to match strategy, and
    strategy matched to policy, and policy matched to the will of
    the American people. Globally, I understand that Asia must be
    the focus of our effort, and I see China in particular as a
    pacing challenge for the Department. I know I will need your
    help in tackling these problems and to give our men and women
    in uniform the tools that they need to fight and win.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, while I did not
    seek this job, I consider it an honor. If confirmed, I will
    carry out the mission of the Department of Defense always with
    the goal to deter war and ensure our Nation's security, and I
    will uphold the principle of civilian control of the military
    as intended. I would not be here asking for your support if I
    felt that I was unable or unwilling to question people with
    whom I once served in operations that I once led or too afraid
    to speak my mind to you or to the President.
        I was a general and a soldier, and I am proud of that. But
    today, I appear before you as a citizen. The son of a postal
    worker and a homemaker from Thomasville, Georgia, and I am
    proud of that, too, and if you confirm me, I am prepared to
    serve now as a civilian, fully acknowledging the importance of
    this distinction.
        I thank you again for consideration of my nomination and
    for your steadfast support of our men and women in uniform, our
    civilians, and their families, and I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lloyd Austin follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Lloyd Austin
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, Members of this
    Committee.
        I'm grateful for your time this afternoon, especially during these
    momentous days. It was apparent to me--and to all Americans two weeks
    ago--how seriously you take your duties to the constitution. I thank
    you for that steadfastness.
        I know you share my gratitude for the steadfastness of the men and
    women of the Department of Defense as well, who share your devotion to
    that founding document.
        Many of them are serving overseas. Some of them are just outside
    this room. All of them are keeping us safe.
        We owe much to their selflessness and that of their families.
        I want to thank Senator Sullivan and Secretary Panetta for their
    kind words of introduction. I personally owe much to their mentorship
    and support.
        Of course, I thank my wonderful wife, Charlene, who--like today--
    has stood by my side for more than forty years . . . guiding me,
    supporting me, making me a better man.
        I am also grateful to President-elect Biden for asking me to serve
    my country again. I value the strength of my relationship with him, and
    I am humbled by the trust and confidence he has placed in me.
        I hope this hearing will help me earn your trust.
        Let me say at the outset that I understand and respect the
    misgivings some of you have expressed about having another recently
    retired general at the head of the Defense Department.
        The safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian
    control of our armed forces . . . the subordination of military power
    to the civil.
        I spent nearly my entire life committed to that principle. In war
    and in peace I implemented the policies of civilians elected and
    appointed over me . . . leaders like Secretary Panetta.
        I know that being a member of the president's cabinet--a political
    appointee--requires a different perspective and unique duties from a
    career in uniform.
        So, if confirmed, you can expect me to empower my civilian staff.
    Indeed, I plan to include the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in
    top decision-making meetings ensuring strategic and operational
    decisions are informed by policy.
        I will rebalance collaboration and coordination between the Joint
    Staff and the OSD staff to ensure civilian input is integrated at every
    level of the process.
        I will make clear my expectation that the Pentagon work hand in
    glove with the State Department on all foreign engagements and
    activities.
        Now, I also know that a large measure of civilian control of our
    military lies right here with this body.
        If you confirm me, I can assure you the Pentagon under my
    leadership will respect your oversight responsibilities. We will be
    forthcoming and transparent.
        I will provide you my best counsel, and I will seek yours.
        Just like you, I will also take seriously the many challenges
    facing our country, the most immediate of which, in my view, is the
    pandemic.
        If confirmed, I will quickly review the Department's contributions
    to coronavirus relief efforts, ensuring we are doing everything we can
    . . . and then some . . . to help distribute vaccines across the
    country and to vaccinate our troops and preserve readiness.
        We'll also do everything we can for our military families as well.
    They, too, are educating kids at home, losing their jobs, trying to
    stock the pantry.
        I know this committee shares my view that we owe them our best
    efforts to lighten that load.
        We also owe our people a working environment free of
    discrimination, hate and harassment.
        If confirmed, I will fight hard to stamp out sexual assault . . .
    to rid our ranks of racists . . . and to create a climate where
    everyone fit and willing has the opportunity to serve this country with
    pride and with dignity.
        The Defense Department's job is to keep America safe from our
    enemies. But we can't do that if some of those enemies lie within our
    own ranks.
        For those enemies and adversaries outside the ranks and around the
    world, we need resources matched to strategy, strategy matched to
    policy, and policy matched to the will of the American people.
        Globally, I understand that Asia must be the focus of our effort,
    and I see China, in particular, as the pacing challenge for the
    Department.
        If confirmed, I know I will need your help to tackle these problems
    . . . and to give our men and women in uniform the tools they need to
    fight and win.
        Thank you for the support this committee has always given our
    military and for the support I know you will continue to render.
        Mr. Chairman, I did not seek this job. But I consider it an honor.
    I consider it my duty.
        Throughout my life, subtly or directly, some people believed I
    wasn't quite good enough . . . or maybe that I didn't possess the right
    qualities to fulfill such duty.
        I figured out early on that a kid from rural Georgia was going to
    have to work a lot harder, learn a lot faster, and prepare a lot more
    to prove myself.
        I wouldn't be here with you today if I wasn't ready to prove myself
    again.
        I certainly wouldn't be here if I believed the last four years of
    my life left me too familiar with current operations to change course
    when needed . . . too close to scrutinize people with whom I once
    served . . . or too afraid to speak my mind to you or to the President.
        You see, I am no longer a general. I am no longer a soldier.
        I am a citizen . . . the son of a postal worker and a homemaker
    from Thomasville, Georgia.
        I am a civilian.
        If you confirm me, that's exactly how I will lead the Defense
    Department.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Austin. Great
    statement.
        You heard my comments, General Austin, about the document,
    the National Defense Strategy. You are familiar with this. I am
    sure you have read it many times.
        What do you think about its relevance today? Do you see
    changes that should be made in this, or what is your feeling
    today contemporarily about this statement?
        Mr. Austin. I think much of the document is absolutely on
    track for today's challenges, Mr. Chairman. As is the case with
    all strategies, if confirmed, one of the things that I would
    look to do is to work to update the strategy and work within
    the confines of the guidance and the policy issued by the
    current--the next Administration.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, well, that is right, and the guidance
    also from this document I think is still relevant to date.
        In this document, the previous two Secretaries of the
    Defense--Secretary Mattis, Secretary Esper--both agreed that
    that document, it prescribed that we probably need a 3 to 5
    percent real growth in defense budget effectively in the coming
    years. Do you agree generally with that statement?
        Mr. Austin. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said in the opening
    statement, I believe that our resources need to match our
    strategy, and our strategy needs to match our policy.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, I would assume that would be yes.
    Others are going to be asking about the civilian and military
    relations, I know that, but let me cover a couple of things
    that I think are important.
        On the nuclear triad, a lot of people who are at different
    ideas on what we should do and the priorities we have in our
    defense system, that they try to whittle away at the nuclear
    triad, and we have always felt, and the Secretaries of Defense,
    that nuclear deterrence, do you agree with them that nuclear--
    their assessment that nuclear deterrence is the DOD's highest-
    priority mission?
        Mr. Austin. I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Do you agree that the triad--the land,
    air, and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms are still
    necessary, even though we do hear a lot of arguments that two
    of the three would be adequate? What do you think?
        Mr. Austin. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the triad has
    served us well in the past, and I certainly believe that it
    will continue to do so going forward. I personally support the
    triad.
        Chairman Inhofe. Good. We have kind of a forgotten
    continent for a long period of time in Africa. I can remember
    when Africa was in three different commands. It was in the
    United States Pacific Command (PACOM), the Central Command, and
    the United States European Command (EUCOM). We came along with
    AFRICOM, and I think things have really improved since that
    time. I think it is a critical theater for implementing this
    National Defense Strategy that we have.
        We see China, all of our people talk about the South China
    Sea, about their building of the islands and all these things
    that are going on, but they forget that China has, for the
    first time, left their city limits to support a major objective
    on their behalf, and that is in Djibouti, and they go not just
    in Djibouti, but all throughout China as far south as the
    southern part of Tanzania, and so it is very active in that
    area.
        I would ask you, right now, we have some 6,000 DOD
    personnel on the continent. I know there has been an effort,
    there was an effort in this last Administration to be reducing
    in some areas what our presence, what our resources, how they
    should be put out. My feeling was that we had inadequate
    resources to start with only 6,000 in the entire continent.
        Do you have any thoughts that you have given to that in
    terms of the resources that we need to use in that part of the
    world?
        Mr. Austin. Mr. Chairman, Africa, like some other places in
    the world, has been one of those places where we have been able
    to gain good effect by--with a small amount of investment by
    helping to--helping our partners to increase their ability to
    defend their sovereign territory and to protect themselves.
        Chairman Inhofe. That is excellent. We have to keep in mind
    that many of our closest allies are there right now, and if we
    should deteriorate our presence in any way, we would--I have a
    feeling they would do the same thing. So I appreciate that very
    much.
        One last thing I want to touch on because it is a current
    issue. Ever since the International Court of Justice ruled way
    back in 1975, I believe it was, that we have--in Western
    Sahara, we have supported a referendum for self-determination.
        Now the United States has done that ever since the 1970s.
    The U.N. has done that since the 1970s. The African Union has
    done that, and most all of the 52 nations of Africa have all
    stated that the Western Sahara should have a referendum for
    self-determination. What do you think?
        Mr. Austin. Well, that is an issue that I certainly would
    want to take a closer look at, Mr. Chairman, before I gave you
    a detailed answer. But that is one of the things that I will
    look at, if confirmed, right away going into the position.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and I would like to have you keep in
    mind that they have been consistent for so many years, and so I
    would anticipate that your feelings would be the same.
        Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you, General Austin.
        One issue that is obvious is the discussion of the erosion
    of civilian control, participation, influence on the Department
    of Defense. That was highlighted by the National Defense
    Security document, which the chairman has displayed. But the
    suggestion there was it was not something that was happening in
    an instant, that it was taking place over years. Part of that,
    I believe, is the lack of competent civilian authorities in
    place.
        There are many individuals, as I suggest in my statement
    that are acting. There are others who are civil servants who
    have been pushed up into jobs that normally require
    confirmation, and there has been a lack of sometimes candidates
    for confirmation.
        So I would ask you, if you are confirmed, will you do your
    utmost to ensure that every position, civilian position in the
    Department is filled, that we get nominees promptly? I know you
    have to work through the White House, and that other
    individuals will be put in positions where they are both
    skilled and qualified?
        Mr. Austin. Absolutely, Senator Reed. I will do everything
    I can to move as quickly as I can to move to fill those
    positions with experienced and competent, qualified civilians.
    I will need the help of this body to make sure that we are
    moving quickly.
        Senator Reed. Yes, I concur. This has to be a collaborative
    effort. I think in addition, too, with the civilian members,
    and as you suggest in your remarks, you have to ensure that
    there is a very appropriate working relationship with uniformed
    personnel, particularly on the Joint Staff. From your comments,
    I assume that will be one of your priorities, to make sure that
    and, indeed, that the civilians have a critical role in that
    process. Is that correct?
        Mr. Austin. It is absolutely correct, Senator Reed. I think
    it is imperative that the OSD staff maintain primacy in terms
    of crafting strategy and policy, and I think, you know, we will
    need the right civilians in key positions to help us do that.
        We have already begun to move down that road. You have seen
    Colin Kahl nominated to be the Under Secretary for Policy, a
    very talented young man that will do well. You have seen Kath
    Hicks nominated to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. So we
    are off to a good start, and we will continue to maintain
    momentum in filling those positions and making sure that we
    rebalance the workload between the Joint Staff and the
    Secretariat.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        On another subject, the need for strength in alliances
    seems to be obvious, but something that you are going to have
    to take on immediately. I am thinking of the Pacific Defense
    Initiative, which the chairman was the principal author, and it
    is based on solidifying our relationships, both diplomatic and
    operationally, with our near partners in the Pacific--the
    Australians, the Japanese, and the South Koreans--and then
    building further with other Pacific nations.
        I would presume and hope that you would see that as an
    important task also, building up our relationships and
    alliances, which, in many respects, has been neglected. Is that
    something that you see as important?
        Mr. Austin. I think it is critical, Senator Reed, and I
    also very much look forward to going out and refurbishing those
    alliances and making sure that we build additional capacity
    where possible. You can look when we are--when we do begin to
    travel again that that region will be one of my first stops.
        Senator Reed. Right, and the old saying, there is strength
    in numbers, and I think there is some truth to that. So as we
    build up our not just in a superficial way, but training
    together, conducting exercises together, integrating our
    intelligence, integrating our operations at sea, on land, and
    in the air, that, I think, it could be the best deterrent we
    could think of with respect to the aspirations of China, and I
    think you might concur.
        Mr. Austin. I agree.
        Senator Reed. One of the tasks you are going to have is as
    you are trying to deal with all these places around the world,
    you also have to transform the Department of Defense. As the
    chairman indicated, our technological advantage, which was, we
    thought, uncontested in the '50s, '60s, '70s, '80s, et cetera,
    is contested. In fact, there are suggestions that we might not
    be ahead in many places.
        So you are going to have to think very seriously about how
    do we elevate science? How do we, more importantly, take our
    scientific developments, our prototypes, and get it to the
    field, to soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines in the field? If
    you have any comments on that, I would appreciate it.
        Mr. Austin. I certainly agree with you, Senator Reed that
    our acquisition system needs to be more agile and more
    responsive to the needs that you just mentioned. We need to get
    the capability down to the people who need it, the people who
    are going to use it, as quickly as possible.
        I would also say that we need to develop the operational
    concepts that support those new capabilities to make sure that
    we continue to present a credible deterrent. But I absolutely
    agree that there is much to be done in terms of working with
    the acquisition process to make sure that it becomes more
    agile.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you.
        Now just as a final point, I think I have to respond to the
    challenge that the chairman gave you to reach your 61st wedding
    anniversary. Having been married for the first time at the age
    of 55, despite my best efforts, I can guarantee the chairman, I
    will not reach 61 years.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. I do not believe that.
        Senator Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Senator Reed, you just do it one day at a
    time.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. That is good advice, Senator
    Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, thank you for being with us
    today. Thank you for the conversation that we had several weeks
    ago over the phone, and thank you for your willingness to serve
    in the military and now to serve in a civilian capacity.
        You are a West Point graduate. I pointed out to Senator
    Reed that I am wearing an Army tie today in your honor, but I
    suppose also in honor of Senator Reed and all the distinguished
    Army folks. I am an Air Force veteran myself, but I am also a
    former chair of the Seapower Subcommittee, and so today, I want
    to talk to you at the beginning about seapower.
        The 30-year ship building plan was finally released just
    last month by the leadership in the Navy, and it calls for 405
    manned ships by the year 2051. That is compared to a 355 ship
    requirement that we previously had and that we actually placed
    into the statute.
        Have you read the 30-year ship building plan, Mr. Austin?
        Mr. Austin. I have not read the ship--the 30-year plan yet,
    Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Are you familiar with the fact that the 30-
    year ship building plan calls for increasing our requirement?
    Actually, it increases our requirement from 355 ships to 405
    manned ships by the year 2051.
        Mr. Austin. I am familiar with that--with that fact.
        Senator Wicker. Do you support that finding?
        Mr. Austin. I certainly--I would just say, Senator, our
    Navy is the most capable naval force on the face of the planet.
    It will remain so if I am confirmed and become Secretary of
    Defense.
        I think that it is important that we maintain the
    capabilities that we will need to be relevant not only today,
    but relevant tomorrow. So I look forward to getting on the
    ground, if confirmed, and working with the leadership of the
    Navy to better understand the requirements and how we are going
    to support those requirements.
        Also I look forward to working with this body to make sure
    that we have the right resources to support that requirement.
        Senator Wicker. Well, that does bring me to a point that I
    need to make, and that is that within the Administration, it is
    not only the White House and it is not only DOD, but also OMB
    [Office of Management and Budget] is a mighty big gorilla
    sitting in the room there, and they force a lot of constraints
    upon us.
        Let me just say to you that I hope you will soon become
    familiar with the ship building plan and be able to give us a
    more definite answer about the need for an increased Navy to do
    the things that we have to do. It calls for adding 82 new ships
    between 2022 and 2026 at a cost of $147 billion.
        Previously, that number was only 44 ships. So the new
    requirement, the new plan is 82 new ships in that short 4-year
    period, rather than 44 ships, and an extra $45 billion over
    that timeframe. So rest assured that we need to have more
    conversations there.
        The distinguished chairman mentioned China, the fact that
    their ambitions not only are in the Pacific, but also extend to
    Africa, and he named a few locations there. The DOD report to
    Congress on China recently said it is likely China will aim to
    develop a military by mid century that is equal to or, in some
    cases, superior to the United States military.
        Do you agree with that assessment, Mr. Austin?
        Mr. Austin. I would agree. I would agree that that is their
    goal. My job, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, is to make
    sure that we develop the capabilities, the plans, and the
    operational concepts to ensure that we maintain a competitive
    edge. So, while that may be their goal, I would, again, if I am
    confirmed, would intend to make sure that that never happens.
        Senator Wicker. Well, it is my contention that the new ship
    building plan calling for 405 manned ships by the year 2051 and
    additional 82 new ships in the next 5 years is part and parcel
    to answering that challenge. What do you say to that, Mr.
    Austin?
        Mr. Austin. I would certainly say that we need to have the
    right kinds of capability to be able to counter the emerging
    threat. Again, I look forward to having that conversation with
    the Department of the Navy.
        If that is the analysis that has been provided by the Navy,
    I have every reason to believe that it is accurate. But I
    really would like to have that conversation in more depth.
        Senator Wicker. Let me quote another Army man, the
    distinguished Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
    Milley, who said just last month, ``Look, I am an Army guy, and
    I love the Army, but the fundamental defense of the United
    States and the ability to project power forward will always be
    for America naval and airspace power.''
        I would just commend to you that statement and suggest that
    the additional seapower is going to be necessary. I would also
    want you to comment, and I will just ask you, because we are
    time constrained, to comment about the idea of basing two
    additional destroyers at Rota, Spain, to be there to combat
    Russian aggression. But, Mr. Chairman, because I only have 2
    seconds, I will take that for the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Austin.
        Mr. Austin. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Austin. Ensuring that USEUCOM has the right capabilities to
    effectively deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression will be
    one of my primary objectives as Secretary. If confirmed, I will
    thoroughly review force posture proposals such as stationing additional
    DDGs in Rota with that objective in mind.

        Senator Shaheen?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, thank you for being willing to be
    considered for this important post at this critical time in our
    Nation's history.
        As you are probably aware, last week this committee
    received testimony from outside experts on the issue of the
    waiver that will be required for you to serve and the whole
    issue of civil-military relations. I know you addressed that
    briefly in your opening comments, and Senator Reed followed up
    with some specific questions. But one of the interesting things
    to me in that hearing last week was one of the people
    testifying talked about the concern that during Secretary
    Mattis' tenure that there was an over-deference to military
    views that were critical to shaping America's military policy
    or defense policy.
        Can you talk about how you would respond to those concerns
    and what you think should be done to ensure that the balance
    continues, with the prominence being on civilian control of the
    military?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        I believe that you need to have the right people in the
    right positions that can be in--that are in the decision-making
    process, and so I look to have a very experienced Under
    Secretary for Policy. I look to have a very experienced Deputy
    Secretary of Defense. My Chief of Staff will not--if I am
    confirmed will not be a military person, but yet a person that
    really understands strategy and policy and also has deep ties
    to the Hill, as well as to the White House.
        So I think the people in the room and contributing to the
    decision-making, it makes all the difference in the world. So
    to answer your question, I will make sure that we staff the
    positions with the right people who have the right experiences
    and who are not afraid to provide their input. I will empower
    them to make sure that they have the flexibility to get the job
    done, to coordinate with the Joint Staff and coordinate with
    the other agencies to ensure that we have a policy--have
    significant policy input on every decision.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that,
    especially the importance of the empowerment of those
    individuals.
        When we talked shortly after your nomination was put
    forward, we talked about two of New Hampshire's military
    installations that we are very proud of, the Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard, which is shared between New Hampshire and Maine, and
    also our 157th Air Refueling Wing at Pease National Guard,
    which was the first Air National Guard base to receive the new
    KC-46 refueling tanker.
        There are two long-term concerns that I have about those
    installations. One is the shipyard optimization plan, as we
    look at the need to invest in our public shipyards in the
    future. That optimization plan is going to be critical to
    ensuring that the capacity is there not just at the Portsmouth
    Naval Shipyard, but our other public shipyards to support our
    naval fleet. I hope that you will remain committed to that plan
    and to moving forward with that plan as we look at the upcoming
    years.
        Mr. Austin. I will, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. The other is the KC-46 and the continuing
    issues with getting that tanker online. As you know, the most
    recent one is the remote vision system, which still is not
    fixed in a way that allows those tankers to fly and do the
    refueling mission that is so critical.
        Again, I would hope that you will stay on that issue with
    Boeing and make sure we get those planes right so that they can
    do the refueling that we are paying for them to do.
        Mr. Austin. I will absolutely stay on this--on this issue.
    I think it is critical. It is a critical component of our
    overall force, and so I think it is important that we continue
    to press and get this capability to where it needs to be.
        Senator Shaheen. Great, and I hope you will come up to New
    Hampshire and visit both of those installations at some point
    in your tenure, if confirmed.
        I would like to ask you about Afghanistan next because as
    we look at where we are in Afghanistan, the treaty or the
    agreement--I do not know what we want to call it because,
    clearly, the Taliban is not complying with what had been
    announced as concessions that were made as part of that
    agreement. Also, the failure of that agreement to take into
    consideration the role of women and minorities in Afghanistan
    that have been so important as they have written a new
    constitution.
        As we look at ending conflict there, one of the things we
    know from the data is that when women are at the table in
    negotiations, that there is a 35 percent better chance that
    those peace agreements will last 15 years or longer. So this is
    not just for the optics, it looks great to have women at the
    table. It is about how do we ensure that those negotiations are
    long lasting?
        I wonder if you can talk about what you would like to see
    at this point in Afghanistan as we think about how do we
    withdraw there in a way that leaves a country that enshrines
    some of the changes that have been made to support a new
    constitution and all of the effort that has been put in there
    by the United States and so many other countries in the world.
        Mr. Austin. Well, Senator, I certainly would like to see
    this conflict end with a negotiated settlement, and I think we
    are going to make every effort that we can to ensure that that
    happens. I would also like to say up front I am truly grateful
    for the sacrifices of the thousands of men and women that have
    gone through Afghanistan and given so much, sacrificed so much.
    To your point, their work has made a difference.
        But I think this conflict needs to come to an end, and we
    need to see an agreement reached, and in accordance with what
    the President-Elect wants to see, I think we want to see an
    Afghanistan in the future that does not present a threat to
    America. So a focus on some kind of terrorism issues, I think,
    in the future I think would be helpful.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen and via Webex,
    Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
    General Austin.
        This committee has consistently heard testimony, including
    from every United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander
    who has appeared before this committee since I have been a
    member, recommending against making unilateral reductions to
    our nuclear forces. Do you agree that making unilateral
    reductions is unwise?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, I am having a tough time hearing you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes, the volume seems not to be high
    enough. If anyone knows how to adjust that, this is a good time
    to do it.
        Senator Fischer. Let me see if I do.
        Chairman Inhofe. That sounds better.
        Senator Fischer. Do you hear me okay?
        Chairman Inhofe. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. I was asking, sir, about making
    unilateral reductions to our nuclear forces. Do you agree that
    making these reductions unilaterally is unwise?
        Mr. Austin. I think that we should--I look forward to
    getting onboard, if confirmed, and having an ability to kind of
    look under the hood and see exactly what we are doing with our
    nuclear forces. So once I have had a chance to do that,
    Senator, I would love to come back and discuss it with you.
        Senator Fischer. In your answer to some questions that were
    sent over to you, you said that--you said, ``I believe it is in
    the national security interests of the United States and its
    allies and partners to pursue formal, verifiable arms control
    agreements that reduce the nuclear threats from Russia and
    China.'' Is that correct?
        Mr. Austin. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. So reductions should be made through
    negotiated, verifiable agreements, not unilaterally. Is that
    right?
        Mr. Austin. That is correct.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you, sir.
        Another fact that has been consistently emphasized by
    civilian officials and military leaders in both the Obama and
    Trump administrations is that nuclear modernization cannot be
    delayed any further. Speaking in 2016, President Obama's
    Secretary of Defense Ash Carter put it in the following way,
    ``The fact is most of our nuclear weapon delivery systems have
    already been extended decades beyond their original expected
    service lives, so it is not a choice between replacing these
    platforms or keeping them. It is really a choice between
    replacing them or losing them. That would mean losing
    confidence in our ability to deter, which we cannot afford in
    today's volatile security environment.''
        More recently, Admiral Richard, the current STRATCOM
    commander, in his posture statement last year testified that,
    ``Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary
    to ensure the deterrent's viability have zero schedule margin
    and are late-to-need.'' He went on to state, ``We cannot afford
    more delays and uncertainty in delivering capabilities and must
    maintain a focus on revitalizing our nuclear forces and the
    associated infrastructure.''
        General, is this also your understanding of the
    modernization schedule?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I again--I misunderstood your first part,
    the first part of the question there, when you were--when you
    started out. What I wanted to tell you was I really look
    forward to getting into the details of the nuclear
    modernization program, if confirmed. You know, I really would
    like to be able to look at the details of exactly what we are
    choosing to invest in and the timelines associated with that,
    and I would love to come back to you and discuss that with you.
        Senator Fischer. I would have your assurance, though, that
    you would, of course, be visiting with the current STRATCOM
    combatant commander, as well as previous ones, about the need
    to make sure that we have these platforms that we need and
    also----
        Mr. Austin. That will be a----
        Senator Fischer. Go ahead.
        Mr. Austin. That will be a top priority, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. I guess I am kind of surprised by your
    answer, General. When the chairman asked you about the triad,
    specifically about maintaining an effective nuclear triad of
    land, air, and sea-based platforms, I thought your answer was,
    yes, we have to maintain that effective nuclear triad. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Austin. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. I realize that you do have to review where
    we currently are in modernization, but I would think having an
    understanding that every Administration and every STRATCOM
    commander and also our Secretaries of Defense have been adamant
    that we cannot fall behind on this, your answer that you would
    have to get back on me is somewhat surprising. I understand it
    is a complicated topic, but it is a 60-year-old foundational
    concept that we have here.
        Mr. Austin. Yes, Senator, and I think--I think that we are
    in agreement that this is a priority, this needs to remain a
    priority. What I was just conveying was the specific timelines
    of which pieces are being resourced at what rate, those things
    I would really like to get into details and have a further
    discussion with you on.
        But there is no question that I consider this to be a
    priority, and it will remain a priority. I look forward to
    getting with the STRATCOM commander and having that discussion
    in detail.
        Senator Fischer. Well, thank you. I hope also, if you are
    confirmed, you will be a strong advocate for the National
    Nuclear Security Administration being able to receive
    sufficient funding so that they can meet the Department of
    Defense's needs.
        Mr. Austin. I will be.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Now via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Austin, President-Elect Biden made overturning
    President Trump's ban on open transgender military service a
    day one priority. Can you confirm your commitment and tell the
    committee how you plan to reinstate open service?
        Mr. Austin. I support the President's plan or plan to
    overturn the ban. I truly believe, Senator, that as I said in
    my opening statement, that if you are fit and you are qualified
    to serve and you can maintain the standards, you should be
    allowed to serve. You can expect that I will support that
    throughout.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Austin.
        When we met together, we talked at length about the scourge
    of military sexual assault in the military. We talked about how
    this has been an issue for decades, and in fact, we talked
    about all the efforts that the Department of Defense has made
    over at least the last decade that I have been on the Armed
    Services Committee to try to eradicate it.
        Every Secretary of Defense from the last 25 years has said
    there is a zero tolerance for sexual assault in the military.
    But every time they say there is zero tolerance, we look at the
    facts, we look at the evidence, we look at how many sexual
    assaults are committed, how many go to trial, how many end in
    conviction, and we do not seem to improve at all. In fact, last
    year, the Department of Defense announced a record number of
    sexual assaults reported by or against servicemembers and the
    lowest conviction rate for their assailants on record.
        In your opinion, does this reflect good order and
    discipline within the military? Does this reflect enhanced
    military readiness?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, I take the issue of sexual assault
    seriously and personally. To your point, Senator, I think we
    have put a lot of effort into this, and I am grateful for all
    of the effort that you have personally put into this and this
    committee has put into this, but we have not gotten better. We
    have to get better, and we will get better.
        We have to go after the culture. We have to go after the
    climate. This is a leadership issue. It is a readiness issue,
    and it starts on the top, and we have got to work from the
    bottom as well, simultaneously.
        Senator Gillibrand. So, therefore, is your answer, yes,
    that it does not reflect good order and discipline and does not
    reflect the readiness that you would like your service to have?
        Mr. Austin. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Gillibrand. Furthermore, the most recent Pentagon
    survey on the topic found that 64 percent of sexual assault
    survivors who reported their crime received some form of
    retaliation for reporting that crime, often from the exact
    chain of command that is supposed to protect them. This number
    is statistically unchanged from 2016.
        Does this suggest to you adequate progress on what the top
    brass has promised to do year after year? Do you believe that
    this is sufficient progress?
        Mr. Austin. I absolutely do not believe that it is
    progress, Senator.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, given the total lack of progress
    or accountability within the military justice system, do you
    believe that a new approach must be taken? Because as we
    discussed the recent events at Fort Hood, a new approach is
    clearly warranted. What is your view on that?
        Mr. Austin. I certainly believe that we need to do better,
    a lot of things better in terms of investigation and
    prosecutions, and I think we have to look at this holistically.
    I know that you know that the President-Elect has committed to
    standing up a 90-day commission to really look at this soup to
    nuts. I look forward to the read-out of that commission, but I
    will not wait for 90 days to get after this.
        As I indicated, this starts with me, and you can count on
    me getting after this on day one.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, to be honest, President-Elect
    Biden said much more than that. He promised much more than a
    commission. He said, in fact, when asked directly by Protect
    Our Defenders' Nancy Parrish if he would support ``moving the
    military justice system into the 21st century by allowing
    military prosecutors to make prosecution decisions for
    nonmilitary crimes--serious felonies like rape, murder, and
    child abuse,'' and that President-Elect Biden in response said,
    ``Yes, yes, yes.''
        So do you share President-Elect Biden's commitment to move
    prosecutorial decisions outside the chain of command and giving
    that decision to trained military prosecutors?
        Mr. Austin. I would like--if confirmed, I would like to
    work with the chain of command and very rapidly assess what
    things that there are that need to be--that need to be fixed or
    addressed. I would like to make those recommendations and
    provide those assessments to the President-Elect.
        Senator Gillibrand. But you do agree that we cannot keep
    doing the same thing that we have been doing for the past
    decade?
        Mr. Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator. I
    absolutely agree with that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Do I have your commitment to be
    relentless on this issue until we can end the scourge of sexual
    violence in the military?
        Mr. Austin. You have my commitment.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay. I would now like to move to
    civil-military relations.
        Mr. Austin, scholars rightly argue that the Secretary of
    Defense plays a critical role in maintaining balanced civilian-
    military relations by explaining the military's activities to
    the public. Secretary Mattis, another recently retired general
    who required a waiver to serve, did not embrace this role.
    According to Bob Woodward's book Fear, Mattis grew so tired of
    being asked to appear on Sunday shows that he threatened to
    send Sean Spicer to Afghanistan.
        Mr. Austin, can you commit to following in the footsteps of
    your predecessors and regularly appearing on TV to explain to
    Americans where the Administration has asked servicemembers to
    risk their lives and why?
        Mr. Austin. I fully understand and appreciate the role that
    the Secretary of Defense has in communicating with the American
    public, Senator. You have my commitment that I will establish a
    good relationship with the media and provide them the access
    and the information required to do their job of reporting out
    to the American people.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Austin.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Congratulations, General Austin, on your
    nomination, and thank you for your appearance today, especially
    for your four decades of military service.
        Unfortunately, I must announce that I oppose the waiver of
    the 7-year cooling-off period. My decision reflects not at all
    on you personally or your record, which I respect. Rather, I
    believe Congress should no longer grant such waivers at all.
        I supported the waiver for General Mattis with reservations
    4 years ago, which I quickly came to view as a mistake and I
    have since regretted. For that matter, upon further reading of
    the historical record, I now believe the waiver for General
    Marshall in 1950 was also a mistake. Under no foreseeable
    circumstances can I imagine supporting such a waiver again.
        Again, General Austin, my reasons for this decision are
    distinct and separate from your nomination. Put simply, my
    reasons are the same reasons we have a cooling-off period for
    recently retired generals in the first place. Some of those
    reasons are simply effect, not something that you can address
    or about which you can reassurance. Others, you can give
    reassurance, and I will give you that opportunity in a moment.
        Among those concerns I have that I do not think can be
    addressed are the following. First, the perception that these
    waivers are now routine, not extraordinary. Senator Reed said
    in 2017 that he would not support another waiver, and they
    should happen ``once in a generation.'' No matter what we say,
    though, if we approve two waivers in just 4 years, our actions
    will speak louder than our words.
        Second, the perception among flag officers that a four-star
    billet is not a career capstone. Some generals and admirals may
    begin to think if they play their cards right, they, too, can
    become a Secretary in just a few years. I do not think that is
    good for the force or for the country.
        Three, the perception among the American people that the
    military expertise of our general officers is the same as
    national security expertise more broadly and that the latter
    resides chiefly in the military, which I also believe is
    unhealthy for our democracy.
        Four, the perception of potential Army favoritism. As a 41-
    year officer in the Army, many observers may disbelieve that
    you can hang up the Army green, rightly or wrongly. If you make
    the right decision for the Army over the other services, then
    those services' advocates may say it is because of favoritism.
    Make the correct decision for another service against the Army,
    and the Army's advocates will say you are protecting your flank
    against such charges of favoritism. Neither one of those may be
    true in the case, but I believe it is unavoidable.
        Those concerns alone are weighty and enough for me to
    oppose this waiver, as I should have done 4 years ago. But
    there are still more reasons behind the cooling-off period. As
    I said, though, you can give reassurances about some of these
    concerns, and I want to give you the opportunity to do that.
        First, Secretary of Defense is not a partisan job, but it
    is very much a political job. Bob Gates is a good example. He
    served in a Republican and Democratic Administration with great
    political skill. We, of course, expect our generals, like you
    and General Mattis, to be apolitical, but our troops deserve a
    Secretary with the political skills and willingness to fight
    for them, whether within the Pentagon against its bureaucracy,
    within the Cabinet in fights over policy and budgetary
    resources, or against parochial Members of Congress.
        So, General Austin, what can you say to address this
    concern? If, for instance, John Kerry wants to sacrifice our
    force posture on China's periphery in return for ephemeral
    promises from China to reduce emissions in 2070? Or Jennifer
    Granholm wants to rob the nuclear security budget to fund pie-
    in-the-sky green energy programs? Or simply if the Office of
    Management and Budget wants to cut the military's budget, how
    would you manage such inherently political disputes?
        Mr. Austin. Well, certainly in terms of providing resources
    for the military, my goal is to--my job is to defend this
    country, if I am confirmed as the Secretary of Defense. I
    believe that we need to have the adequate resources to be able
    to do that.
        In order to help me work the issues and make my points
    throughout the interagency, number one, I will develop great
    relationships with my partners in State and OMB and other
    places. Number two, I will hire the right people to be on my
    staff to make sure that they are working with me and crafting
    the right language to be able to be successful in this
    dialogue.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. If confirmed, I do urge
    you to be a forceful political advocate for the Department and
    its interests, both inside the Cabinet and with the Congress as
    well.
        A second concern I would like you to address is that the
    Secretary also holds a public office. Bob Gates routinely held
    on-camera press briefings about major decisions, new policies,
    public controversies, and so forth. Those have been almost
    nonexistent for the last 4 years.
        General Austin, if confirmed, will you commit to hold
    regular, on-camera press briefings?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. Will you also commit to appear on
    television programs to explain the key issues of the day, as
    Senator Gillibrand raised?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        A third and final concern I want you to address is that a
    recently retired general is apt to bring with him much of his
    former military staff, perhaps re-creating his last command as
    a kind of supreme combatant command, also likely to rely too
    much on the Joint Staff.
        General Austin, could you please discuss, if confirmed, how
    many of your former military staff from your various senior
    commands you plan to hire and how you will balance the Joint
    Staff with civilian appointees, the services, and the combatant
    commands?
        Mr. Austin. The key billets for my staff, all of those
    positions are being--we are looking at filling all those
    positions, if I am confirmed, with experienced senior civilians
    that, again, I will empower to be able to get their job done.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Again, General Austin, my concerns about these waivers do
    not bear at all on your nomination or your record of service to
    our Nation, for which I have the highest regard. I thank you
    again for answering the call of duty to your country.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, Mr. Austin, thank you for being here today.
    Thank you for your extraordinary career of service, which I
    deeply respect and admire.
        My opposition to the waiver is not personal. It is a matter
    of principle, and I want to move on to the merits of the policy
    issues that will confront you, if confirmed. In my view, you
    have expressed clearly and cogently your commitment to
    strengthening civilian control over the military, which you
    would implement if confirmed.
        First, I have been deeply alarmed, as have been many of my
    colleagues, by the rise of white supremacists and extremist
    ideology in the military. You and I have discussed it. The
    latest signs are, in fact, that two National Guard members have
    been removed from their duties regarding the inaugural because
    of their potential links to extremist sentiments or
    organizations.
        Last week, I led 13 of my colleagues in a letter to the
    Department of Defense Inspector General asking for an immediate
    and intensive investigation of the prevalence of white
    supremacy and extremist ideology. I am asking for your
    commitment that you will cooperate with and support that
    investigation. Shortly after our letter, the Department of
    Defense indicated it was going to do an evaluation of this
    issue, but I want an intensive investigation and action to
    counter it. I look forward, hopefully, to working with you in
    countering and combating this very important threat.
        Mr. Austin. I certainly look forward to working with you on
    this, Senator. I think this is critical. I would share a story
    with you from my past where when I was a lieutenant colonel
    working in probably the finest, one of the finest organizations
    in the Army--the 82nd Airborne Division--we woke up one day and
    discovered that we had extremist elements in our ranks, and
    they did bad things that we certainly held them accountable
    for.
        But we discovered that the signs for that activity were
    there all along. We just did not know what to look for or what
    to pay attention to, but we learned from that. I think this is
    one of those things that is important to our military to make
    sure that we keep a handle on, to make sure our leaders are
    doing the right things. They are taking care of their troops.
    They understand, they know their troops.
        We can never take our hands off the wheel on this. This has
    no place in the military of the United States of America.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I really
    appreciate that answer.
        You mentioned in your testimony the importance of the
    Chinese threat, the need to focus on it. But the most recent
    attack on our country was by Russia, which, for months,
    literally intruded, interfered, and attacked our Nation in
    cyberspace. In part because, as General Nakasone testified to
    us, our adversaries do not fear us--that is exactly what he
    said--in the cyber domain.
        I would like to ask you to commit to conducting a top-down
    review of our cyber operations, including DOD's posture and
    structure, and to making our adversaries pay a price when they
    attack us, as the Russians did, through SolarWinds.
        Mr. Austin. You have my commitment that I will conduct that
    review. I think that there is a review ongoing now to really
    ascertain what transpired. I will join that, if confirmed, in
    stride. I really look forward to understanding with clarity
    what really happened.
        I truly believe that, well, the FBI and the NSA have given
    Russia credit for this. They have attributed this activity to
    Russia. If that is the case, I think Russia should be held
    accountable. That is my personal belief.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Environmental action and climate change are more important
    than ever. I know the President-Elect is going to focus on it.
    As you and I have discussed in our meeting, the Department of
    Defense has an immense role to play. I welcome your comments on
    PFAS and the increasing resilience of our military
    installations.
        I would like to work with you on a total program or plan
    for the Department of Defense beyond the magnitude of what is
    done now, and I know you have indicated your interest in it. So
    I am not going to ask questions about it, but I do think that
    the use and procurement of clean energy, the energy efficiency
    steps that DOD can take will not only save dollars, it will
    save energy and environmental values and provide leadership for
    the whole world.
        I want to focus on military sexual assault, which my
    colleague Senator Gillibrand did so well before, and say that I
    am working on legislation that would create liability for
    perpetrators and for the Department of Defense for sexual
    misconduct in among servicemembers so that the survivors would
    have a right of action. They would be empowered to take action.
        Will you support that kind of legislation, sir?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I certainly look forward to reviewing
    what is in the legislation, Senator, and would love to have
    that discussion with you once I have had the ability to do
    that. I just want to take a moment to thank both you and
    Senator Gillibrand for the tremendous work, especially Senator
    Gillibrand, for the work that you have both done to counter
    sexual assault in our ranks. If confirmed, I look forward to
    working with both of you on this issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate that point. Let me just
    say I welcome and appreciate your focus in your written remarks
    in answers to specific questions on the need to focus on our
    suppliers, our supply chain, our workforce, our defense
    industrial base, which are very important to Connecticut, where
    we are the submarine capital of the world at Electric Boat and
    where a trained workforce is especially important, but the
    supply chain equally so.
        I would like you to review, because I am out of time,
    legislation that I proposed that would give the Mayor of the
    District of Columbia the same powers that Governors have over
    the National Guard. Because a lot of the very unfortunate lack
    of planning and coordination between Federal and local agencies
    that has been on display over recent months, in my view, is
    attributable to the lack of that power on the part of, in
    effect, locally empowered officials here.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Ernst?
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you so much, General, for being here today. We
    certainly appreciate your commitment and your service to our
    great nation, and thank you for stepping forward with this
    nomination.
        I just want to briefly touch upon the issue of sexual
    harassment, sexual assault, as Senator Gillibrand and Senator
    Blumenthal just did. We had a conversation about this last
    week. Thank you very much for that. But part of that Fort Hood
    report that came forward stated that the military readiness
    requirement superseded the need to protect our servicemembers.
        What are your feelings as to that statement, and then how
    do we move forward and correct that?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, I earnestly--I honestly do not believe
    that these two issues are mutually exclusive. We absolutely
    have to take care of the men and women that are in our ranks. A
    failure to do so--I mean, we are about people in the military.
    We have the greatest, the best equipment in the world, and I
    get that. But this is about people.
        If we do not take care of our people, it is really, really
    tough to do the job at hand, and that is to defend this
    country. I do not see these two issues as being at odds with
    each other. I think we have to do both, and we have to do them
    both well.
        Senator Ernst. I truly appreciate that. I fully agree. Our
    military readiness does not have to suffer because of sexual
    harassment. We can take care of that issue and also still be
    the best fighting force in the world. So I appreciate your
    stance there.
        I today had such a great honor. I retired from the Iowa
    Army National Guard in 2015, and we have a number of those
    tremendous men and women serving right outside our doors today.
    It was my honor to go out in front of the Capitol and re-enlist
    about 15 of our Iowa Army National Guardsmen, a great honor for
    me.
        But the importance of our National Guard has really been on
    display the last year or so, as we have seen numerous trips
    deployed in support of fighting forest fires in California, or
    deployments and mobilizations supporting COVID-19 activities,
    whether it is food distribution to food banks, making sure that
    vaccines were distributed to our communities. We have seen tens
    of thousands of our soldiers and airmen mobilized. They were
    there. They responded, and they did it quite quickly.
        I will emphasize that point again, that the National Guard,
    they mobilized, and they were there quickly, even beyond the
    capacity of their Active counterparts. So whether it was
    working for FEMA, helping those local health clinics, you know,
    distributing food, as I said, our National Guard members
    stepped up. Again, today we witness them out on our Capitol
    Mall keeping our Nation safe so that we here in Congress can do
    our duties.
        So no matter what happens, whether it is response to riots
    or violence or other types of activities, they are mobilizing
    for us. So what we have learned over the last year is that they
    do come to us quickly in response to these domestic missions.
        Now what further changes or reforms could be made to make
    sure that our National Guard are treated equally because of
    their important role for our United States, but treated equally
    with their Active Duty counterparts when it comes to training,
    when it comes to equipment, when it comes to readiness? What
    can we do to make sure that they are on par with their Active
    Duty counterparts?
        Mr. Austin. Well, there are, as you know, being a--having
    been a Guard member for quite some time, there are some
    challenges in terms of the amount of days that you have to
    actually conduct that training. But quite frankly, over the
    last two decades, we have seen our great Guard members work
    shoulder to shoulder in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and
    we have seen a difference in the quality of equipment early on.
    I think we have closed that gap now.
        I think we are doing better. There is more that we can do.
    But we are going to have to continue to work through these
    challenges. There are no easy fixes, but this is one thing that
    I will work with the services on to make sure that we are
    giving our Guard the very best, finest of equipment. We are
    giving them good-quality training opportunities, and we are
    recognizing them for the great work that they are doing.
        Senator Ernst. No, I thank you for that answer. They mean a
    lot to us in defense of our country and certainly short-notice
    mobilizations, especially as we see right here in Washington,
    DC, today.
        So last issue because I know that we are running short on
    time, you and I did speak briefly about defense spending and
    the audit of our Pentagon and DOD. So we know that our defense
    budget has grown significantly to address many threats--Russia
    and China, as well as persistent threat coming from Iran, as
    well as a number of much smaller terrorist groups around the
    world. So the potential for defense spending that is wasteful
    has also grown and expanded, and it is used on lower-priority
    or even obsolete programs.
        So, if confirmed, how will you lead the budget reviews to
    reform the Pentagon, and do you see it as a possibility to make
    sure that the Department of Defense does obtain a clean audit?
        Mr. Austin. That will continue to be our goal. As you and I
    talked, we have made some progress, as I understand it. I have
    been away from the process for a while, but there is more to be
    done. You have my commitment that we will lean into this and
    continue to push to make sure that we can get that clean audit
    in the not-too-distant future.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, General. My time has
    expired. Again, thank you for stepping forward and looking to
    serve our Nation again in this capacity.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Now via Webex, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, it was good to have the chance to talk with
    you a little while ago. I ask all nominees before any of the
    committees that I sit on the following two questions as part of
    my responsibility to make sure that nominees are fit for the
    appointment to which they are nominated. So I will ask you the
    following questions.
        Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
    requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
    harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        Mr. Austin. No.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
        Mr. Austin. No.
        Senator Hirono. I want to acknowledge my agreement with the
    questions asked--some of the questions asked by my colleague
    Senator Blumenthal and your commitment that you will be--you
    will counter any white supremacists or extremists within the
    ranks of the military. I think that is really important. Also
    the questions he asked relating to how important it is to make
    sure that we are safe from cyber attacks because these cyber
    systems are what the military communications very much depend
    on.
        By the questions that were asked by several of my
    colleagues, including Senators Blumenthal and Gillibrand, a
    number of us are very concerned about the continuing scourge of
    sexual assault and harassment and retaliation in our military.
    It is very clear that the reforms that the Department of
    Defense has instituted are not nearly good enough, and much
    more action is needed.
        I want to express to you last week a very tragic thing
    happened. Selena Roth, a 25-year-old Army veteran and military
    wife, was found dead in military housing at Schofield Barracks
    in Hawaii. A soldier is in custody, and a homicide
    investigation is ongoing. My heart goes out to Selena's family.
    Violent acts against women within our military community
    continue to occur at an alarming rate, and I am committed to
    ensuring--to making sure that these perpetrators are held
    accountable.
        You noted in your statement that you will fight sexual
    assault and harassment in the military, including, I hope, that
    you will look at the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
    which I support, which Senator Gillibrand has been a leader on,
    and changing the UCMJ to remove the decision relating to
    prosecution of these kind of attacks outside of the chain of
    command. I hope you will review that very carefully because all
    of your predecessors have not supported that kind of a change.
        I also want to mention that I have introduced the I am
    Vanessa Guillen Act. This act provides for the creation of a
    standalone punitive article for sexual harassment. If
    confirmed, would you support the creation of a standalone
    punitive article of sexual harassment to be included in the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, any time we change the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice, I would want to approach that with great
    deliberation. But I would commit to you that I would certainly
    want to take this on and look at it with the right experts to
    make sure that we achieve the right effects with doing
    something like that.
        But I would certainly want to make sure I get the right
    experts on hand to really drill into this.
        Senator Hirono. Well, sexual harassment can be subsumed
    under other charges, but it is not a standalone charge. I think
    it is very important, considering that sexual harassment occurs
    at an alarming rate in the military. So this is not--and I
    would hope that this is not something that requires a great
    deal of thinking because, as I said, we can already charge
    someone under other articles for sexual harassment.
        So when a servicemember is sexually assaulted, they are
    given the option of either making a restricted or unrestricted
    report, and the I am Vanessa Guillen Act would allow victims of
    sexual harassment to also make restricted reports, allowing
    them to remain anonymous within their chain of command while
    still receiving the support services that they should have.
        Would you support the creation of making that so, for
    victims of sexual harassment to be able to make a restricted
    report?
        Mr. Austin. I do not think I heard the end of the question
    there, Senator. Would you remind repeating the last piece of
    that?
        Senator Hirono. Yes. Would you allow victims of sexual
    harassment to have the same options that victims of sexual
    assault have in making a restricted report?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        I want to turn to the importance of training areas for the
    Indo-Pacific area of responsibility. Admiral Davidson, who is
    the commander of INDOPACOM, talked recently about the
    importance of joint, integrated training in this AOR [area of
    responsibility]. Admiral Davidson specifically mentioned the
    vital importance of both the Pacific Military Range Facility,
    or PMRF, on Kauai and the Army training areas, including
    Pohakuloa Training Range on the Big Island.
        With Navy, Air Force, and Army leases all up for renewal in
    2029, which is really right around the corner, it is incumbent
    on DOD to engage with State authorities and the local
    stakeholders like the Native Hawaii community early, often, and
    openly. Having a clear and transparent process is very critical
    to the renewal of these leases, which, needless to say, is
    critical for the military's presence in Hawaii.
        What are your thoughts on the value of realistic joint
    training with our coalition partners in the region and
    elsewhere?
        Mr. Austin. Well, certainly the value of conducting joint
    training with our coalition partners, I mean, it is invaluable.
    It is we always work better as a team. I think it ought to be
    effective as a team. You have to train to do that day in and
    day out, and so----
        Senator Hirono. So training is--I am sorry. I am running
    out of time. I just want to make sure that I have your
    commitment that you will have an open dialogue with the
    community with regard to these really important training
    facilities in the State of Hawaii?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        I do have some other questions----
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono.--but I believe I am out of time. I will
    submit them for the record.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, first of all, I just want to thank you and your
    wife and your family for serving our Nation in uniform because
    you did it with honor, and you did it for 41 years. I just want
    to say thank you for that, sir.
        General, you and I have had the opportunity to speak now on
    several different occasions, and I have appreciated your
    answers to my questions with regard to the waiver. I truly do
    believe that the waiver was there for a reason, but I also
    think that the President-Elect does have--I think the tie goes
    to the President. In this particular case, I believe that he
    has nominated you because he believes that you are the right
    person at the right time.
        I have no misgivings whatsoever about your capabilities and
    your competencies. I think in this particular case, it is my
    intent to support the waiver so that you can have your--the
    presentation of you before the Senate for confirmation.
        I think part of the reason that I feel this way is because
    of the conversations that you and I had, and I want to go
    through them a little bit because, first of all, with regard to
    the difference between being the Secretary of Defense and being
    a member of the Joint Chiefs, there is a true difference
    between the two, the role of the two. Can you share a little
    bit your understanding of the differences in the role and yet,
    at the same time, the real need for both to be expressed and
    your plans with regard to bringing in, as you indicated in your
    opening remarks, additional qualified civilians into those top
    areas?
        Mr. Austin. So I think the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is
    required to give his best military advice to the President and
    to the Secretary routinely, and it is military advice. The
    Secretary has a much broader scope. He has a lot more to take
    into consideration. He is focused on strategy and policy, and
    he understands he is working within the guidelines provided by
    his boss, the President of the United States.
        So there is an enormous difference, and I think one of the
    key enablers here, as I have said before, is to make sure that
    we have the right experts, the right professionals onboard
    working with me day in and day out to craft that strategy and
    develop that policy. But the Secretary has a much broader
    scope, and he is not focused on giving the same type of advice
    that the Chairman would provide.
        I have seen this done right a number of times. All the
    Secretaries, of course, get it right. But the two that come to
    mind more than anyone else for me, when I was a three-star
    serving as the director of the Joint Staff, Secretary Bob Gates
    was the Secretary of Defense, an absolute master at making sure
    that he outlined roles and responsibilities and swim lanes,
    designated swim lanes for the Joint Staff and the OSD staff.
        Later, you know, I served in the Pentagon as a four-staff
    as a Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and I had a chance to
    work with Secretary Panetta, who, once again, was a master at
    making sure that those roles remained separate and that he
    provided the right kind of advice to the President of the
    United States. While he worked arm-in-arm with the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs, they did not provide the same kind of
    perspective.
        I fully believe that I understand the difference, and I
    look forward to working with the Chairman. But I have no desire
    to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and so, if confirmed,
    we will make sure that those roles and responsibilities are
    clearly outlined.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        We also had a chance to talk a little bit about cyber and
    about the work that we have done in the last couple of years
    with regard to cyber and the defense of our cyber operations.
    It used to be you had air, land, and sea to worry about. Now we
    clearly have space, and we have cyberspace. A lot of our
    adversaries have decided to take the shortcut, and they are
    trying to impact all of the other domains using cyber.
        In the last couple of years, particularly with regard to
    the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy, we have decided to move forward,
    and we have a ``defend forward'' policy. You have indicated
    your support, or at least you have seen it, you have observed
    it, and so forth. Can you give me very briefly your thoughts
    about our cyber and the need to continue to make strides and to
    allow for offensive cyber operations to continue?
        Mr. Austin. I think that is important. I think having an
    offensive capability that we are able to use I think is really
    important, and so I applaud the efforts that have been made in
    the past. Once again, I have been away from it for a bit, but I
    really look forward to kind of getting back, getting under the
    hood, understanding how the--how the--how the processes work
    now to ensure coordination across the board, across the
    agencies.
        In this endeavor, speed matters, and so anything that we
    can do to facilitate the work of the operators I think is
    goodness, but we have got to make sure we are doing it in the
    right way.
        Senator Rounds. We will continue to remind you about the
    need for speed on that, if at all necessary, and I do not think
    it will be.
        Finally, General, Secretary Mattis implemented a Close
    Combat Lethality Task Force in 2018. This is an organization
    dedicated to providing resources to the forces who have
    accounted historically for nearly 90 percent of the casualties,
    yet constitute only 4 percent of the force and receive only 1
    percent of the institutional investments.
        I am concerned with how this task force has appeared to
    have lost its direct report, this relationship with the
    Secretary. It appears to have gotten caught in the bureaucracy
    over the last year, and I would like to see it back on track. I
    have worked on language to strengthen the task force with
    Senator Duckworth and other members, and this is more than a
    bipartisan effort. This is a nonpartisan issue.
        Can you discuss the importance very briefly of a task force
    that represents our infantry, Marines, special operators, and
    other specialties who closely and directly impact the enemy and
    enemy operations, and how that would be channeled through your
    office?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. I fully understand and appreciate the
    importance of making sure that we resource and support our men
    and women that are at the tip of the spear. You know, the
    squads and platoons are out there actually fighting the enemy.
    Everybody else is supporting the fight.
        We have to make sure that they have what they need in order
    to be successful. This is an evolving effort. It will never
    remain static. While I do not know the reasons for things
    having--why they have been repositioned and reporting chains
    have been redesigned, I would certainly take a look at that as
    I go in, if I am confirmed.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Austin, first off, just congratulations on your
    nomination, and thank you so much for your willingness to
    continue to serve this great country.
        One of the things I want to ask you about is, if confirmed
    as Secretary, you are going to play a really critical role in
    directing defense modernization priorities that have an impact
    on our forces for many, many years to come. That modernization,
    with critical investments in technologies like directed energy
    or hypersonics or artificial intelligence, is what will ensure
    that our men and women in uniform will, hopefully, never
    experience a fair fight.
        But modernization requires really difficult choices with
    regard to competing priorities. So I wanted to ask you, how
    will you balance investments in personnel and legacy systems
    with the critical need to develop capabilities that are going
    to give us a qualitative edge over near-peer adversaries like
    Russia and China?
        Mr. Austin. Well, as you know, personnel costs are--I mean,
    they are expensive, and we have to be mindful about that as we
    go forward. We have to be willing to make sure that we are
    making the right calls, although they may be tough calls from
    time to time.
        In terms of legacy systems, I think I will have to get in
    and work with the services to ascertain what they believe is
    relevant and really have a tough discussion with them on
    whether or not it makes sense to continue to invest in certain
    types of things. But I agree with you. I think we absolutely
    have to invest in the capabilities that will make us relevant
    not in the last fight, but in the future fight.
        We have to be able to understand. We have to be better
    faster, we have to be able to decide faster, and we have to be
    able to act faster, and that--I mean, we will have to employ
    the use of space-based platforms. All the things that you
    talked about, the use of AI, and the development of those kinds
    of capabilities will not come cheap. But this is not a choice,
    in my view. These are things that we must invest in going
    forward if we are going to maintain a competitive edge.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you for your thoughts on that.
        Mr. Austin, last week in the final days of the current
    Administration, the Air Force announced that it had selected
    Huntsville, Alabama, to host the new Space Command
    headquarters. I believe this process, frankly, was severely
    flawed, and it was not in line with what I have seen
    historically with regard to a more deliberative approach that
    the Air Force has typically taken with regard to basing
    decisions of this magnitude.
        I know you are not familiar with this decision and its
    details, but I would simply ask that, if confirmed, that you
    would take a close look at that process to make sure that it
    met the historical standards for decisions of that type.
        Mr. Austin. I will do that, and I will make sure that we
    look at all of our processes going forward so that future
    decisions are made within the confines of the policies that
    have been laid out.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you. I appreciate that very much.
        As you know, DOD has set an initial requirement to produce
    30 plutonium pits per year at Los Alamos Labs by 2026. I would
    love your views on how important that milestone is to
    maintaining our nuclear deterrent.
        Mr. Austin. Could you repeat your question, Senator?
        Senator Heinrich. The Department of Defense has set an
    initial requirement to produce 30 plutonium pits per year at
    Los Alamos National Labs by 2026, and I would love your
    thoughts on the importance of achieving that milestone on that
    timeline.
        Mr. Austin. Yes. As we have said earlier in our discussions
    here this afternoon, Senator, maintaining a credible, a
    reliable, safe, and sustainable nuclear capability is of utmost
    importance, of the highest importance. This is a component of
    that, and certainly, if we have laid out those goals and
    objectives for ourselves, I am very much interesting in making
    sure that they are the appropriate goals, but--and I have no
    reason to doubt that they are, but making sure that we remain
    on time and on target with achieving those goals.
        Senator Heinrich. I look forward to working with you on
    that front.
        One of the last things I want to get to here in my final
    couple minutes is PFAS clean-up and remediation. Many
    communities across the country continue to suffer from enormous
    impacts on their water supplies from PFAS chemicals, in
    particular in drinking water, in ground water that is used for
    both drinking and, in some cases, agricultural use. One of the
    most hard hit of these communities is around Cannon Air Force
    Base in New Mexico, a community that has been incredibly
    supportive of that facility for decades.
        The Air Force and the Department of Defense more broadly
    have, frankly, slow-walked the clean-up and the remediation
    efforts for a number of years now, despite really clear
    evidence that defense activities are the source of that
    contamination. If confirmed, I would ask that you make full
    PFAS remediation a priority within the Department and ensure
    that the Department of Defense takes concrete steps to finally
    do right by these communities that have done right by the
    Department for literally decades.
        Mr. Austin. The safety and the health of our military
    members, our family members, our DOD civilians, and our
    communities is very, very important to us in DOD. I think you
    know that Secretary Esper stood up a PFAS task force a while
    back and that their work is ongoing. If I am confirmed, I will
    go in and ask that they pick up the pace on the work, and we
    will want to push to make sure that we have good solutions for
    mitigation of our contribution to this contamination.
        PFAS has been used throughout the economy, so I think we
    are going to have to work across--you know, across the board
    with our partners to ensure that we are working together, we
    are doing the right things to mitigate the effects here. So I
    look forward to working with my colleague there in the EPA to
    make sure that the military is doing its part, and we stay
    focused on the right things here.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Tillis? Senator Rounds presiding.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, can you hear me okay?
        Mr. Austin. I can.
        Senator Tillis. Congratulations to you and to your wife and
    your family, and thank you for your decades of service.
        I would like to start by--well, also I want to thank you
    for spending some quality time down at Fort Bragg at the tip of
    the spear with the 82nd Airborne.
        I want to associate myself with comments made by Senators
    Gillibrand, Ernst, and Blumenthal on military sexual assault. I
    do not expect you to respond to it. I heard your responses
    earlier. But to me, we will never know what great leaders chose
    never to go into the military if we continue to have a
    reputation for a culture that is not making progress on
    military sexual assault.
        I have heard you make commitments to my colleagues, and I
    look forward to exploring this issue as a ranking member on the
    Personnel Subcommittee. But we have got a lot of work to do. I
    have been here for 6 years, and we are not making near enough
    progress.
        I would like to start, though, by asking you to give me an
    idea of the general, a general overview of the threat that you
    believe that Iran represents to national security and security
    in the Middle East. I would also be curious in your answer what
    you think about the recent agreements with Middle East
    countries and Israel, whether or not that is a positive step in
    the right direction?
        Mr. Austin. Iran continues to be a destabilizing element in
    the region. You look at its behavior, it clearly--a lot of
    activity that is destabilizing. It does not work well with its
    neighbors. It, again, does present a threat to our partners in
    the region and those forces that we have stationed in the
    region.
        If Iran were ever to get a nuclear capability, most every
    problem that we deal with in the region would be tougher to
    deal with because of that. So, to answer your question, I think
    Iran's activity continues to be or its behavior is--continues
    to be destabilizing.
        Senator Tillis. On the recent agreements, do you have any
    opinion as to whether or not they are a positive step to try
    and check Iran's ambitions in the Middle East?
        Mr. Austin. I do. I think that any time that we--you know,
    that countries agree to normalize relations, I think that is a
    good thing. I think certainly this has put a bit more pressure
    on Iran, and I hope it will have good effects.
        Senator Tillis. Thanks, General Austin.
        General Austin, you wrote in your advance policy responses,
    this is a quote from them, ``The continued erosion of United
    States military advantage vis-a-vis China and Russia in key
    strategic areas remains the most significant risk the
    Department must address. If left unchecked, this continued
    erosion could fundamentally change our ability to achieve U.S.
    national security objectives and limit the DOD's ability to
    underpin other U.S. instruments of power.''
        Can you talk a little bit about the key strategic areas? We
    have long since thought that they had a quantitative advantage,
    but that we maintained a qualitative advantage. It seems like
    the margins are shrinking. So can you give me a brief expansion
    on the responses to the advance policy questions?
        Mr. Austin. Thanks, Senator.
        They continue to invest in modernization. They have gone to
    school on us in terms of how we deploy and how we employ our
    forces. So if we would choose to do the same types of things
    that we have done in the past, I think that we will clearly be
    challenged. So we will have to have capabilities that allow us
    to hold--to present a credible threat--credible deterrent,
    excuse me, to China in the future.
        We will have to make some strides in the use of quantum
    computing, the use of AI, the use of--the advent of connected
    battlefields, space-based platforms. Those kinds of things I
    think can give us the types of capabilities that we will need
    to be able to hold a large element, large pieces of Chinese
    inventory, military inventory at risk.
        I believe that we still have the qualitative edge, have a
    competitive edge over China. I think that gap has closed
    significantly, and our goal will be to ensure that we expand
    that gap going forward.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Because I have limited time, I am going to submit a
    question to the record on I think the economic warfare that we
    are dealing with on China, the race to 5G and some of the
    interagency activities that I do not think the DOD is
    prominently up there. We have got the USTR, Commerce
    Department, but I feel like that we are losing some ground.
        I have a unique perspective on that, looking at all the
    intellectual property theft, as the chair of the Intellectual
    Property Subcommittee on Judiciary. But I have got a lot of
    context I want to add to that. So I want to ask a question
    there.
        So in my remaining time, if I were in person, I would have
    my 600-page request for proposal for the next-generation
    handgun with me. It is my favorite prop when we have a
    confirmation like this. It just confounds me to think it took
    10 years to procure the next-generation handgun, and it is
    going to take 10 years to deploy it. To me, it suggests a
    fundamental problem with the way we go about acquisitions and
    procurements in the Department of Defense.
        So I would just seek your commitment, if confirmed, if you
    are going to have the kind of resources around you that are
    going to drill down across the business of the DOD and figure
    out if we are now at a point to where we can go from an
    investigational new drug to an approved vaccine in 11 months,
    it would seem to me that we could get to a point where we can
    specify certain procurements in the DOD in terms of months or
    years, not decades.
        Do I have your commitment to make sure that you make this a
    priority that you have someone there that has the experience
    and insight to figure out how we get more productivity and I
    think more sanity in our procurement processes?
        Mr. Austin. You have my commitment, Senator.
        Senator Tillis. Well, thank you, General Austin.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Rounds [Presiding]. On behalf of the chairman,
    Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, congratulations on the nomination.
        Ten years after the Civil War finished, at the end of his
    second term as President, U.S. Grant gave a speech in Des
    Moines, Iowa, September 1875. Here is what he said. He was
    talking about the prospect of ever having another civil war.
        ``If we are to have another contest in the near future of
    our national existence, I predict that the dividing line will
    not be Masons and Dixons, but between patriotism and
    intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition, and
    ignorance on the other.''
        Those words are very chilling words as we contemplate what
    we saw in this Capitol on the 6th of January. We saw ambition.
    We saw superstition, if you could say superstition might be
    QAnon fantasy or election was stolen or widespread voter fraud.
    Ignorance. I do not know that I would use that word. The speech
    that U.S. Grant gave was to a group of Civil War veterans, and
    it was to promote the idea of more broad public education, the
    idea that education would drive out susceptibility to
    superstition.
        It might be comforting for us to think that what we saw on
    January 6th or generally was ignorance, but if you look at the
    spectrum of people who were involved, you find a number of very
    highly educated people. Sadly, and I know this has been raised
    already, you find a lot of people who have connection to our
    military, who should be--as part of the enormous training
    investment we make in them, be able to spot the difference
    between truth and fantasy, between reality and conspiracy
    theory.
        Military Times did an analysis in 2019, a survey of Active
    Duty military, and they found that 36 percent of Active Duty
    servicemembers have seen evidence of white supremacist and
    racist ideologies in the military. That does not mean 36
    percent of military share those, but more than one-third of our
    military have seen their colleagues exhibiting either white
    supremacist or racist ideologies.
        General Austin, if you are confirmed, you will make history
    as the first African-American Secretary of Defense, but you
    have also lived a life in this country and seen these
    challenges. I know some colleagues have asked you about
    investigations, but what I would like to ask you about is
    training. We invest so much to train a member of our military--
    officer, enlisted--what might you suggest to us, as we think
    about the training going forward, that would lead us to have a
    military that was immune from superstition and not so gullible
    as to fall for these false ideologies?
        Mr. Austin. Thanks, Senator.
        I think that we have to train our leaders to make sure that
    they are in touch with the people that they are leading, that
    they understand who they are, what they are doing, what they
    are reading, that they are looking at their environment that
    they are living in and looking for signs of things that could
    indicate that something is going in the wrong direction. I
    think leadership needs--if leadership is not in touch with the
    people they are leading, these kinds of things can happen.
        I do not think that this is a thing that you can put a
    band-aid on and fix and leave alone. I think that training
    needs to go on routinely because things change. The types of
    things that you are looking for change.
        I think our leaders need to be able to talk to their
    subordinates and instill in them the right types of values, the
    values that our military embraces, the values that our country
    embraces. You know, failure to be able to adhere to those
    values means that you should not be a part of our formation,
    and our leaders need to be able to sort those things out.
        But having had personal experience with this, being in a
    unit that had a problem with this long ago when I was a
    lieutenant colonel, I can tell you that most of us were
    embarrassed that we did not know what to look for, and we did
    not really understand that by being engaged more with your
    people on these types of issues can pay big dividends. I know
    that that unit has probably learned that forever, but I do not
    think that you can ever take your hand off the steering wheel
    here.
        Senator Kaine. Well, because in a way, the enemy within--
    disunity--is probably the most destructive force in terms of
    our ability to defend ourselves. So if we are divided against
    one another, how can we defend the Nation? I view this as an
    enormously important task that you will carry, should you be
    confirmed.
        I want to echo what comments that have been made by
    colleagues about military sexual assault. Again, a divider
    within the body that makes us less able to externally face and
    defeat the threats we face.
        I have read much of the Citizen Review Panel that was put
    together to look at the tragic murder of Vanessa Guillen at
    Fort Hood, and that is a very, very powerful document. I would
    encourage all members of the committee to do it.
        I spoke to one of the members of that panel, and he relayed
    that he was doing one of the interviews--and they did dozens
    and dozens of interviews--and was talking to a mid-level
    officer on the base who was trying to say that they felt like
    they were doing all they could to deal with military sexual
    assault. The interviewer said, ``Would you let your daughter
    serve in the military?'' He said, ``No way.'' He just Rorschach
    answered the question and said, ``No way.''
        Whatever the attempt to put a good spin on how we are
    doing, if you would worry about your own daughter serving in
    the military, we got a long ways to go.
        Quality of life issues are enormously important. You have
    been asked about a lot of the strategic challenges. We face
    this tough one on military housing. I just want to remind my
    colleagues, we started--we faced that military housing issue
    about 2 years after we did significant reforms to reduce the
    size of headquarters staff. What we found is we were kind of
    asleep at the switch in monitoring military housing.
        An awful lot of the staffs that oversaw military housing
    had been dramatically shrunk because of what we did on the
    headquarters staff thing. That does not mean that there is not
    fat that could be squeezed out of any organization. It just
    means that we have to really be careful, thinking if we shrink
    the civilian side or the headquarters side, we are going to be
    saving some money, which we did. But we ended up compounding a
    problem.
        I hope you will be attuned to the need to balance
    challenges like that so that we can provide the quality of life
    that our men and women and their families deserve and that will
    keep them re-enlisting if we want them to. If you could just
    say a word about that, and I am done.
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I will. I will be certainly very attuned
    to that, Senator.
        I think, in some cases, we have broken trust with our
    family members because of the housing issue and other issues. I
    think this is critically important. I look forward to being
    able to work with the services to really not only get after
    this, the immediate problems, but put the fixes in our
    contracting efforts so that we are much better at this down the
    road.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Rounds. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
    Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, General Billy Mitchell, the father of the U.S. Air
    Force, in a hearing like this in front of the Armed Services
    many years ago, in the, actually, I think it was the 1930s,
    called Alaska ``the most strategic place in the world.'' I like
    to say Alaska constitutes three pillars of America's military
    might.
        We are the cornerstone on missile defense. Almost all the
    missiles and radar systems protecting the entire country are in
    Alaska. We are the hub of air combat power for the Arctic and
    Asia-Pacific. We will have over 100 fifth-generation fighters
    there. We are building up our tanker capability, an issue that
    I think is going to be important. We are a platform for
    expeditionary forces like the 4-25, the First Stryker Brigade.
        If confirmed, can I get your commitment soon in your tenure
    to come to Alaska with me and see this critically important
    national defense State and troops for America in my State?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, I absolutely agree with you that
    Alaska is a national treasure, and it has--it holds some of our
    most important military assets and resources. As you know, we
    are challenged with travel now, and as the opportunities
    present themselves, post trips to the Indo-Pacific where I need
    to get to right away, if I am confirmed, I certainly would
    accept your invitation at some point in the future.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, General, a lot of us think that
    Alaska is kind of in the Indo-Pacific. So on your way out, we
    can get there early. So I look forward to doing that.
        Related to that is the issue of national security in the
    Arctic, and that is certainly a new theater of great power
    competition. Russia, China being very aggressive in the Arctic
    with massive buildups of military forces, infrastructure. To be
    honest, for the last several years, I think the Pentagon was
    asleep at the switch with regard to our national security
    challenges in the Arctic.
        This committee, in a bipartisan way, has been very focused
    on ensuring that the Pentagon recognizes these challenges with
    infrastructure, icebreakers that we need, capabilities. The
    Department of Defense released its Arctic Strategy in June
    2019, required by this committee. The Air Force followed suit
    with its own strategy in July of 2020. The Department of the
    Navy just this week published its Arctic Strategic Blueprint,
    and the Army will soon be doing this as well.
        Can I get your commitment to work with this committee,
    where this has been a high priority, to ensure that these
    service Arctic strategies are appropriately resourced and that
    we can protect our strategic interests in the Arctic?
        Mr. Austin. You have my commitment, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        General, the other issue I just wanted to touch on here, in
    this hearing that we had last week on civilian control of the
    military, in op-eds, you have seen it with some of my
    colleagues, there has been this growing conventional wisdom
    that somehow because Secretary Mattis had been a previous
    CENTCOM commander, that his tenure is a warning really for what
    some are considering a failed tenure as Secretary of Defense.
        I actually disagree with this quite vehemently. Secretary
    Mattis replaced a Secretary of Defense, Secretary Carter, with
    no military experience. Matter of fact, he was what many people
    are calling for, a political Secretary. I supported both, but
    let me just give you a little juxtaposition.
        Secretary Carter oversaw a 25 percent cut in military
    funding. Readiness plummeted. Secretary Mattis rebuilt this up
    and rebuilt readiness with this Congress.
        Secretary Carter would not support arming the Ukrainians
    with Javelin missile systems, despite the entire committee here
    pressing him to do so. Secretary Mattis did that almost
    immediately in his tenure.
        Secretary Carter watched ISIS grow to be a very lethal
    threat. Secretary Mattis brought DOD strategy to crush ISIS.
        Secretary Carter, for a whole host of reasons, was very
    reluctant to press for any freedom of navigation operations in
    the South China Sea. Secretary Mattis made those regular
    elements of our strategy in the Asia-Pacific.
        Finally, Secretary Mattis put together the National Defense
    Strategy, one of the most important and bipartisan documents
    that many have seen on national security in a generation. He
    often got back to Senators quickly. In terms of oversight, with
    all due respect to Secretary Carter, sometime it took weeks
    just to schedule a phone call or a meeting.
        So, General Austin, do you think Secretary Mattis had a
    failed tenure as Secretary of Defense because he had previously
    served as CENTCOM commander? I would like your assessment of
    that. It is being used right now as somehow a warning for your
    confirmation, and I think it is a conventional wisdom that I
    personally reject.
        Mr. Austin. I do not think he should be considered as a
    failed Secretary of Defense because of his work in CENTCOM
    earlier. I think Secretary Mattis was a very thoughtful
    Secretary, and he did a lot of goodness for the Department.
    Certainly I would not want to evaluate his tenure as Secretary.
    I have great respect for him.
        As you know, I served alongside him. I have worked with him
    on a number of tough issues, and I watched from afar as he was
    Secretary. So I have no reason to believe that his role or his
    tenure at CENTCOM made his tenure at--or diminished his role as
    the Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Sullivan. That would not be less a reflection on
    what you will be able to accomplish in the Department as well?
    People are using that as a warning, so to speak.
        Mr. Austin. I think it is--I do not think that that is a
    fair assessment, and I would say also, Senator, that we are
    completely different people----
        Senator Sullivan. Yes.
        Mr. Austin.--as you know. You know us both, and again, I
    will absolutely do the things that we have talked about in this
    hearing, get the right civilians in the right positions to help
    me exercise civilian control of the military. I will make sure
    that we have the very best experts focused on our toughest
    issues, like the China issue, the issue of our acquisition
    reform, and those kinds of things.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one final
    question. General, I just want you to have the opportunity to
    answer two other criticisms. One, that you have not had
    experience in the Asia-Pacific and, two, that with the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs being an Army general, that somehow your
    tenure, with General Milley, would be favoring the Army. Can
    you quickly address those two criticisms that have come about
    your nomination?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I will take the last one first, Senator.
    If you look at my history, I spent a lot of time in joint
    assignments, both in Iraq and Afghanistan as the director of
    the Joint Staff, as commander of Central Command. You know, I
    have--I know as many sailors and airmen as I do soldiers, I
    mean if you look at the folks that I have worked with over the
    past.
        So in terms of being able to focus adequately on the issue
    of China, the reason that I was focused on the Middle East for
    quite some time was because that was the most important thing
    for our country. So we put our best equipment towards that
    effort, our best people, and it was absolutely necessary at the
    time.
        But if confirmed, you can expect that I will put a laser-
    like focus on developing the right capabilities, plans,
    operational concepts that will ensure that we maintain a
    competitive edge as we look at ourselves with respect to China.
    I think we will present a credible deterrent to China and any
    other adversary that looks to take us on.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Your time has
    expired.
        Via Webex, Senator King is recognized.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Austin, thank you very much for your testimony. As you
    can see perhaps, I am on the road. You have taken me today from
    just south of the George Washington Bridge to the George
    Washington Parkway. So I am almost there.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. First, I want to associate myself with two
    particular comments by my colleagues, one on the issue of the
    Arctic raised by Senator Sullivan. Incredibly strategic area,
    an area of enormous importance and developing importance.
        One of the things about the Arctic is we have been able to
    work cooperatively with Russia on most Arctic matters, and yet
    they are moving very rapidly toward militarization. So I
    commend that area to you for attention. The Navy just released
    a new Arctic strategy. So a very important issue.
        The other issue is procurement that Senator Tillis
    mentioned. The whole idea of 10 years for a handgun and a 600-
    page spec, we just cannot do that. We need to be more agile,
    particularly in this day and age where technology is so
    important in terms of our ability to defend the country.
        So those two things I do commend to your attention, when
    and if you are confirmed.
        Now at the beginning of the hearing, there was a lot of
    talk about civilian control of the military. One of the
    problems is, Mr. Austin, that tomorrow, when David Norquist
    assumes the title of Acting Secretary, he will be the 10th
    Secretary or Acting Secretary in 10 years. The last Secretary
    to serve more than 2 years was Bob Gates, and he left in 2011.
        So when you have a Joint Staff that has continuity and a
    civilian side that manifestly lacks continuity, I think that is
    one of the areas where we can try to move to shore up civilian
    control of the military. So I guess my question is, are your
    bags unpacked, and are you prepared to move your loyalties from
    the Falcons and the Braves to the Nationals and the Washington
    Football Team? We want you to stay a while, Mr. Austin, if you
    are confirmed.
        Mr. Austin. You can absolutely count on me staying a while
    if I am confirmed, Senator, and by the way, my wife is a native
    of this area, of DC. So it did not--I mean, my bags are already
    unpacked. But to the point that you are making, I am absolutely
    committed to making sure that we are doing the right things for
    the long haul.
        Senator King. I appreciate that. To change the subject
    somewhat, in 2018 you gave an interview where you discussed the
    importance of coalitions as being one of the key elements of
    modern conflict. Churchill once said the only thing worse than
    fighting with allies is fighting without allies. Can you expand
    a bit on your views about coalitions and how and what we need
    to do to shore up our relationships with our allies?
        Mr. Austin. I truly believe, and I believe this in my
    heart, that we perform better when we are operating as a part
    of a team. Throughout in all of the operations that I
    participated in that are major operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and the counter-ISIS campaign and so many other
    things, our allies brought valuable capability and capacity to
    the fight.
        I truly believe that you cannot just show up and fight and
    be effective. I think that these relationships have to be
    developed. You have to train, work, and live together in a lot
    of cases in order to have an effective and credible fighting
    force.
        So I think that fighting as a part of a team, as part of a
    coalition is absolutely a part of who we are, something that we
    treasure. If confirmed, I will look forward to re-establishing
    some of the critical partnerships and alliances that we have
    had and working with our allies to make sure that we keep them
    onboard as we move forward fast.
        Senator King. Well, I think that is absolutely right. The
    way I like to put it briefly is that you have to have the
    relationship before the ask.
        Mr. Austin. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
        Senator King. Now we are turning our attention, and have
    been for the last several years, to the Asia-Pacific and
    particularly to China. I have asked a question of a number of
    people that have appeared before this committee. I would like
    your thoughts on what does China want? What do you believe
    China's strategic goals are?
        Are they looking to be the dominant world power or regional
    hegemon, an economic power? What is their--what are their
    goals? Because it seems to me in order to determine how we best
    counter or cooperate, we need to understand where they are
    headed.
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I think it is all of that. They are
    already a regional hegemon, and I think their goal is to be a
    dominant world power. They are working across the spectrum to
    compete with us in a number of areas, and it will take a whole-
    of-government approach to push back on our efforts in a
    credible way.
        Not to say that we will not see things down the road that
    are in our best interest that we can cooperate with China on,
    but we do things that are in our best interest. But certainly,
    some of the things that we have seen from them in recent past
    in terms of coercive behavior in the region and around the
    globe tend to make us believe that they really want to be a
    dominant world power.
        Senator King. Finally, I do not really have time for a long
    answer, but I just want to commend to you with the issue of
    cyber, 2 years ago this committee led the creation in the
    National Defense Act of something called the Cyber Solarium
    Commission, which I was honored to serve upon, along with a
    bipartisan group from the Congress and the private sector and
    the executive. I would commend to you our report, which was
    released last March, talks a lot about the issues we have
    talked about today.
        As you know and as Senator Rounds mentioned, the area of
    cyber is not a potential area of conflict, it is a current area
    of conflict. I will be sure that we get a copy of the report to
    you, and you can take a look at it. Because part of it is
    structure, but also part of it is policy, deterrence,
    resilience, and I think that this is something that obviously
    we need to attend to.
        You have General Nakasone, who is crucial in this effort,
    and I look forward to working with you on those issues as well.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Austin, and congratulations on
    your testimony today.
        Mr. Austin. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sullivan [Presiding]. On behalf of the chairman,
    Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Thank you, General, for your decades of service and your
    willingness to continue in this new way. Congratulations to
    both you and your wife and your entire family.
        First of all, I want to tell you how pleased I was with the
    very specific answer of affirming the chairman's question
    related to your support for a nuclear triad that includes the
    platforms of land, air, and sea as specified in the chairman's
    favorite book, the National Defense Strategy. That was very
    helpful to me, and I appreciate that. I appreciated the
    conversation we had about it and several other things last week
    as well.
        With that specific answer to that specific question in
    mind, I want to drill down a little bit on just one of those
    three legs. As you know, as we talked about, Minot has two of
    the two three legs. It is the only place in the country that
    has two of the three legs of the triad.
        You were asked--of course, you did in the qualified
    questions, the previous questions, you were asked about the
    assessment of past Secretaries of Defense, and you said this.
    You said, ``I agree that nuclear deterrence is the Department's
    highest-priority mission and that updating and overhauling our
    Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security
    priority.'' Today, you specified the words ``triad.''
        In your advance policy question response, though, you did
    in referencing the aging nuclear deterrent, you chose the words
    ``overhaul'' and ``updating,'' but you never used the word
    ``replace.'' I do not know if that was simply an error or
    omission or if it was strategic. But you did say, ``U.S.
    nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond their original
    service lives.''
        As Senator Fischer--earlier, she quoted Admiral Richard of
    STRATCOM, and I am going to quote him now in a different quote
    where he said, ``You cannot life extend Minuteman III. It is
    getting past the point where it is not cost effective to life
    extend the Minuteman III.''
        But you are going to get a lot of pressure from
    organizations, good folks, some Members of Congress, maybe some
    on an Armed Services Committee either here or on the other side
    of the Capitol, to delay the ground-based strategic deterrent,
    the replacement of Minuteman III, and maybe even shrink it. Do
    you think that we can extend the life of Minuteman III, even
    that means unilaterally decreasing our nuclear deterrent?
        Mr. Austin. I think I may have indicated to you before that
    in order to really answer this question, I really need to sit
    down with not only the STRATCOM commander, but also sit down
    and take a look at where we are in that modernization effort
    and what choices are being proposed and the rationale for that.
    I have not had the ability to do that to this point, Senator
    Cramer. But when I do, I would love to have that discussion
    with you.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and I would look forward to that. On
    your way to INDOPACOM before you get to Alaska, you could just
    stop in Minot. We will have a talk right there if it works. But
    anyway--Senator Sullivan thinks the Arctic starts and ends in
    Alaska, and I just like to remind him every now and then there
    is other lands between here and there.
        Anyway, I wanted to ask you about the joint comprehensive
    plan of action that the Iran nuclear deal, and there have been
    some questions about Iran. But under the 2015 agreement, the
    restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment sunset are beginning
    in 2025, and that is obviously only 4 years from now. So I want
    to know, in your view, are the risks of entering an agreement
    under the same conditions that would allow Iran to
    significantly increase its uranium enrichment only 4 years from
    now--I mean, what would some of the risks of that be, do you
    think?
        Mr. Austin. I would hope, and I think the President-Elect
    has been clear, that the preconditions for us considering to
    re-enter into that agreement would be that Iran meet the
    conditions outlined in the agreement. So back to--back to where
    they should have been.
        I would hope that as we enter into that agreement, we could
    have this discussion about when things sunset and also take a
    look at some broader things that may or may not be a part of
    this treaty, but certainly things that I think need to be
    addressed. One of those things is ballistic missiles.
        Senator Cramer. Very good. Thank you. You anticipated or at
    least you answered my next question. I appreciate that.
        Another area that you and I discussed quite a bit was ISR
    [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. Of course,
    you would know more than a little bit about that, given your
    background particularly at CENTCOM, of course. There has been a
    lot of cutting of legacy programs recently to help pay for more
    advanced programs and technology in the future, and a lot of
    times we are confronted with either/or challenges. But
    sometimes, we have to do ``all of the above'' as well.
        A lot of these cuts have been, of course, to ISR programs
    like the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the MQ-9 Reaper that, again, you
    depended on a lot at CENTCOM. Do you think we can strategically
    afford to cut back ISR to places like the Middle East, Africa,
    South America even, and to some degree, even the Pacific while
    we save up money for future missions?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I think our--to look at our global force
    posture is one of the things I really want to have the
    opportunity to do and look at our requirements versus where our
    forces are postured. Our focus is going to be, as we talked
    earlier, in making sure that we have what we need in the Indo-
    Pacific.
        But in terms of the sentinel forces that are required by
    the CENTCOM commander, I really would like to see what he
    thinks his requirements are, what the threats are that he needs
    to stay abreast of, and that sort of business. But most likely,
    there will be some requirements for those types of capabilities
    going forward. The Air Force certainly has a strong voice in
    this in terms of what they can afford to keep on in light of
    the investments that they are making in modernization.
        So, again, pretty complex equation that we will have to
    tackle, but certainly, I look forward to taking it on.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Chairman. I am out of time, or I would have
    asked you about the $40 billion pass through budget at the Air
    Force, but we can talk about that another time.
        Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. On behalf of the chairman, Senator
    Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        General Austin, I very much appreciate the opportunity to
    speak with you a few weeks ago. As I told you when we talked
    then, I believe we have to do a lot more to end the cozy
    relationship between the Pentagon and the defense industry, and
    over the years, I proposed number of legal changes in this
    area.
        Now since 2016, you have served on the board of Raytheon
    Technologies and its predecessor, United Technologies, which is
    one of the largest defense contractors in the Nation. I am very
    pleased to hear that you have pledged that you will extend your
    recusal from matters involving Raytheon for 4 years and that
    you are not going to seek a waiver from those recusals. Do I
    have that right?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, I can make the commitment to you that
    I will extend my recusal for Raytheon. I certainly appreciated
    the opportunity to discuss these issues with you.
        As you are aware, what you have asked goes beyond what is
    required by law, and I am making----
        Senator Warren. Absolutely.
        Mr. Austin. I am making this commitment because I recognize
    the unique circumstances here that you have highlighted, and
    Raytheon is one of the----
        Senator Warren. I am sorry. Go ahead.
        Mr. Austin. Raytheon is one of the world's largest defense
    contractors, and I am sensitive to the appearance concerns that
    you raise in this particular situation. With respect to the
    issue of seeking a waiver, I do not expect to do that or to
    need one. But if such an unanticipated circumstance were to
    arise, I would consider available alternatives to a waiver
    before seeking one and would consult very carefully with agency
    ethics officials.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        Mr. Austin. If I am privileged enough to be confirmed, I
    can pledge to you that I will be mindful not only of the legal
    requirements that govern my conduct, but also of the
    appearances to ensure that the public has no reason to question
    my impartiality. I will consult with the DOD career ethics
    officials on these issues and will require everyone that serves
    with me to ensure that public service is and will remain a
    public trust.
        Senator Warren. Well, I very much appreciate that. If I
    can, let me just ask one more aspect of this. You know, I have
    also called for new laws to prevent contractors from hiring
    senior Government officials who leave Federal service for a
    period of years. Again, to help eliminate the appearance of
    trading on Government service to help improve--the idea is to
    try to help improve public trust in our leaders.
        So let me ask you about that. After you leave, are you
    willing to make any commitments on that?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I have--I do not intend to seek
    employment as a lobbyist or sit on the board of a defense
    contractor like Raytheon after my service. Quite frankly, I
    will be too old to sit on a board of a defense contractor after
    my service. I have--I have no intent to be a lobbyist as well.
        Senator Warren. All right. Well, I just want you to know I
    really do appreciate that, General. Going above and beyond what
    Federal law requires, as you are doing here, sends a powerful
    message that you are working on behalf of the American people
    and no one else.
        Now I want to try to focus, if I can, on defense spending.
    But before I do, I just want to say a very quick word about
    military housing.
        Two years ago, this committee heard horror stories from
    military families about mold, termites, lead paint, other
    terrible conditions at military houses managed by private, for-
    profit companies. The military has a responsibility to oversee
    these contracts, and this committee has some sweeping reforms
    increasing oversight powers, but I am still hearing from
    families who say that their situation is not substantially
    improving.
        So, General Austin, can I ask for your public commitment on
    two things? First, to respond to my request for information
    about what is going on and, second, to pledge that you are
    going to make fixing this problem a priority.
        Mr. Austin. I absolutely will respond to your request for
    information, if confirmed. This has been a priority of mine and
    will always be a priority of mine. So I look forward to working
    with the services on this issue. I think, as I said earlier, in
    some cases, we have broken trust with some of our family
    members.
        Senator Warren. Yes. So thank you very much. I am going to
    hold you to that commitment. I really appreciate it, General.
        A few weeks ago, Congress passed the annual defense
    authorization appropriations bill that allocated over $740
    billion to the Department of Defense. Now that is more than
    President Reagan spent during the height of the Cold War. It is
    more than the Federal Government spends on the rest of the
    discretionary budget combined.
        In fact, it is more than the next 10 nations combined spend
    on defense, and most of those countries are our allies. The
    money that Congress appropriated a few weeks ago also comes on
    top of what we spent on two decades of endless wars in the
    Middle East that cost roughly $6.4 trillion and killed more
    than 7,000 American servicemembers and did very little to make
    America safer.
        Now, General Austin, you have been nominated to lead the
    Defense Department. So I am not expecting you to start out your
    job by turning down the money that Congress just gave you, but
    I want to ask you a different question. Do you agree that
    protecting our Nation is not just about how much money our
    Nation spends on defense, but also about how we spend it and
    what specific challenges we focus on?
        Mr. Austin. I do. My view, as the Secretary of Defense, job
    one for me is the defense of this country, and we are going to
    do what it takes to make sure that we are successful at that.
    As we talked earlier, our strategy--our resources ought to
    match our strategy, and our strategy ought to match our policy.
    So, again, I think I have a requirement to be a good steward of
    our resources, but you can count on me always asking for what
    we need to accomplish the strategy that has been laid out for
    us.
        Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate the approach that looks
    at how we are spending that money and exactly what challenges
    we are focusing our money on.
        I see that I am out of time. So I am not going to get to
    ask you about the importance of investing in our diplomatic
    corps and making sure that we have adequate funding for the
    State Department in order to help you in the defense of our
    Nation. I promise, though, I will send you some questions for
    the record about that.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Austin. That is an easy answer for me, Senator. I think
    it is absolutely important that the State Department be
    resourced adequately.
        Senator Warren. Good. That is what I like to hear. Thank
    you, General.
        Chairman Inhofe [Presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Now via Webex, Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Hi, thanks. Chairman, can you hear me all
    right?
        Chairman Inhofe. Loud and clear.
        Senator Scott. Okay, and thank you, Chairman, for holding
    this meeting.
        First off, I want to thank General Austin for all of his
    hard work. We had the opportunity to work together when he was
    at CENTCOM, and I just want to thank the general for his
    distinguished service as a soldier and commander and just what
    a great job he did in the military. So I am very appreciative.
        We had the opportunity to talk the other day, and so if you
    could talk a little bit about how if you look at the people in
    the military just have not spent a whole bunch of time dealing
    with the risk of Communist China and how you will get up to
    speed. Because we actually do not have the same experience in
    dealing with Communist China as we do with people in the--
    dealing with the Middle East.
        So, General Austin, can you talk a little bit about how you
    will get up to speed and how important you think it is to get
    up to speed on the risk of Communist China?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I think it is absolutely important. As I
    outlined in my opening statement, Senator Scott, I think China
    is our most challenging--our most significant challenge going
    forward. So you can expect that I will continue to focus the
    resources of the Department on this issue to make sure that we
    are prepared to meet any challenge and that we continue to
    present a credible deterrent to China or any other aggressor
    who would want to take us on and convince them that that would
    be a really bad idea.
        The issue of China, though, is very complex, and I fully
    recognize that while I have the military component of this
    problem set, it is a whole-of-government approach because China
    looks to compete with us along a spectrum of activities, you
    know, economic and IT and cyber and space and other domains. So
    we will have the right experts. We will have the right
    capabilities and plans and operational concepts that are
    required to make sure that we are effective in our efforts to
    deter China and any other aggressor.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, General Austin.
        So you, in your military career, you did a great job of
    building teams. From the people I have heard, including Senator
    Sullivan, you built a great team to get the results you wanted.
    In this job, in this role, you have to do the exact same thing.
    So how are you going to be able to vet the people that will be
    working with you to make sure that they share your view on the
    importance of holding Communist China accountable and actually
    make sure we are a great deterrent to their ambition to
    dominate at a minimum the Indo-Pacific region?
        Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, I will issue the--I will make
    sure that I issue the appropriate guidance to focus the
    Department's efforts on this issue. We will make sure that the
    right processes and procedures are in place to review our
    efforts and to coordinate our efforts to make sure that we are
    operating as a joint force.
        You mentioned teams, and part of the team effort here is
    obviously and certainly with our allies. I think it is really
    important to make sure that we continue to reach out to our
    allies, we build the capacity necessary to be effective against
    China. Those allies include--certainly include the people in
    the region, but they also include allies around the rest of the
    globe.
        So I will issue the right guidance. We will have the right
    policies in place and the right mechanisms to make sure that we
    are operating as a joint force and that we are focused
    appropriately and acquiring the right technologies to make sure
    that we are relevant going forward.
        Senator Scott. Do you believe that with the Biden
    administration, you will have the opportunity to have influence
    on the people that will be part of your team internally to make
    sure that they share your view on the importance of holding
    Communist China accountable?
        Mr. Austin. I absolutely believe that, Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Okay, and one thing that Senator Sullivan
    brought up to me when I spoke to him yesterday about you was
    the fact that with your military background, you will be one of
    the few individuals in the Biden administration that will have
    the military background. Do you believe you will have the
    ability to influence their--influence and convince them of the
    importance of having a strong military to be able to be a great
    deterrent and a great promoter of world peace?
        Mr. Austin. I do, Senator Scott. I also believe that I have
    a great relationship with the President-Elect, and I certainly
    would like to be able to express my views to him as frequently
    as necessary.
        Senator Scott. One of the issues we are dealing with is
    ambiguity with regard to Taiwan. I think a lot of us believe
    that Taiwan is worth making sure that we can continue--help
    them continue as a democracy and as an entity independent of
    Communist China. Well, how--I personally believe we have got to
    quit being ambiguous, and we have got let Communist China know
    the importance of Taiwan to us, and how would you do that to
    make sure that we are not sitting here down the road having to
    make a decision that Communist China has decided to invade
    Taiwan?
        Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, our efforts will be to ensure
    that we do everything to make sure that China does not take
    that decision. But our support to Taiwan has been rock solid
    over the years, and it has been bipartisan support, and I would
    certainly want to thank this committee for their support and
    their willingness to work together on this issue.
        We have been strong in our commitments, and certainly, if I
    am confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will make sure that we
    are living up to our commitments to support Taiwan's ability to
    defend itself.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, General Austin.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Manchin?
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General. Appreciate very much your service and
    your family's dedication and commitment to our country.
        Sir, the 7-year cooling-off period, you have 5 years you
    have been in the private sector. What do you think could be
    accomplished in 2 more years? What are we missing there? I
    mean, I think that you segued pretty well into the private
    sector and understand the balance there.
        Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, I will be 2 years older, but
    certainly, I do not think I will be--I will have any more
    commitment----
        Senator Manchin. And change.
        Mr. Austin.--to serving as a civilian than I have now.
        Senator Manchin. Just from history, people know that it
    used to be 10 years. Then we changed it to 7 years. We should
    be looking at the quality of the person at the time we need
    them.
        Mr. Austin. Senator Manchin, I absolutely agree. It is
    about what is in the mind and the heart of the person that is
    being asked to serve, and I certainly agree with you on that.
        Senator Manchin. The strength of our military and the
    admiration the whole world has for it is because of the
    separation and led by the private sector, and have the
    knowledge you have and being able to come from the private
    sector now, I think it is going to be a great asset.
        There are other people in that cooling-off period down the
    chain. Do you see any need to have any waivers for those?
    Because I think it is a much smaller waiver. Most of it is 180
    days. People do not understand that either. It is a very short
    period of time, but yet the person that we need to lead it.
        Mr. Austin. We have not yet completely fleshed out who
    would be serving in key positions. But if there is talent there
    that is a China expert or something else that we really need, I
    think it is important to--to kind of weigh that out----
        Senator Manchin. To have the flexibility.
        Mr. Austin.--and make sure that we are focused on the right
    thing.
        Senator Manchin. Well, I know you will get the right
    people. A couple things. The people have been asking me ever
    since I just came in today about tomorrow's security. Right
    now, there has been 12 Guardsmen that have been relieved from
    the detail, and you talked about an experience you had in your
    earlier life in the military.
        What do you see? I mean, it is a concern that I have now
    more so than ever before, and more people, we never realized
    it. But now we are seeing that all the conspiracy theories and
    all the different people are on the dark web, or wherever they
    are, are being recruited that have military experience. What
    can we do, and how should we approach this?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I think we can do a better job of
    screening our--you know, the folks that we bring in, the people
    that we bring in. I also think we need to do a better job of
    once we have people onboard, that we are paying attention to
    them, that we are creating the right kind of environment for
    them to live in, and that they are embracing the values that we
    think are important in the military and the values that are
    important for this country.
        I think this is a thing that we have to work at day in and
    day out.
        Senator Manchin. Knowing the presence of what we have and
    what we are dealing with and what happened last week, how do
    you feel about the security we have for tomorrow?
        Mr. Austin. I do not know the specifics or the moving
    parts. The Secret Service is, I think, in charge of the overall
    effort. I think I have every reason to believe that they will
    do a very credible job and provide for our security.
        I have confidence in our Guard. Again, the fact that we are
    screening people and making sure that we do not have the wrong
    kinds of people in the formation I think is a credit to their
    efforts.
        Senator Manchin. Well, you know that all the reports, and
    we do not have all the evidence yet and all of the--but we will
    have that probably during this new trial we have coming up that
    the ball was dropped at the Department of Defense, that we did
    not get the support we needed or the help we needed or the
    protection we needed quick enough.
        Mr. Austin. I think that is still under review, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Yes, yes.
        Mr. Austin. And you know----
        Senator Manchin. I am not accusing until we see the facts--
    --
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
        Senator Manchin.--but that has been the reports coming out.
    So I know that you have a lot of work ahead of you trying to
    build up that confidence level and the morale.
        Mr. Austin. Right.
        Senator Manchin. If I can ask you the greatest threat that
    we face as a country, if you were going to name one of the
    greatest threats or the greatest challenge you think you are
    going to have coming into this position, what would it be?
        Mr. Austin. I think there are a number of challenges----
        Senator Manchin. I know.
        Mr. Austin.--as we discussed before, and quite frankly, the
    greatest challenge to our country right now, Senator Manchin,
    is the pandemic. It has killed over 400,000 of our America
    citizens, and that is just an incredible, incredible loss of
    life. I think we have to do everything that we can to break the
    cycle of transmission and to begin to turn this thing around. I
    know that the President-Elect is very, very much focused on
    this.
        I think DOD can add value to this effort and speed and
    scale, and I would certainly hope--again, if I am confirmed,
    one of the first things I will do is take a look at how we are
    contributing, and if there is more that we can do--and I
    believe that there probably will be--that we will lean into
    this and help this effort along.
        You know, in terms of other challenges, we have talked
    about China, we have talked about Russia, we have talked
    about----
        Senator Manchin. The pandemic is number one, though, you
    think from your standpoint?
        Mr. Austin. China is the most concerning competitor that we
    are facing.
        Senator Manchin. Let me ask you this about finances. John
    McCain, the late John McCain, my dear friend, and we all knew
    John pretty well. If you worked with John, you knew John pretty
    well. He made sure of that.
        But John and I had a bill that we always worked on,
    auditing the Pentagon, auditing the Department of Defense. It
    was the only agency in all of Government that was never
    audited. But they have been doing a good job, but they are
    still a little bit relaxed there. I just would like for your
    commitment on that to do everything you can to make sure that
    the finances that people know how we are investing their money
    and what type of return we are getting on that.
        Mr. Austin. You have my commitment, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Let me just say this, sir. I truly believe
    with all my heart you are the right person at the right time to
    do this job because it is a tremendous undertaking. I think to
    restore the confidence back to the American people that our
    Defense Department basically is there to defend us and it is
    basically run by the civilians, who basically who are not going
    to let military be used against us at any time. What we saw
    last Wednesday was an anomaly that will never happen again.
        Thank you, sir. I look forward to voting for you.
        Mr. Austin. I look forward to working with you, Senator, if
    I am confirmed. Thank you.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Now via Webex, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
    this and the opportunity to talk with General Austin.
        I will say, General, I enjoyed our conversation yesterday
    so much. Thank you very much for your time, and thank you to
    your family for sticking with you as you go through this
    process.
        I will say, and we discussed this, I am one of those who is
    not in favor of waivers. I believe that rules are--and
    processes are put in place over time because of specific
    reasons. With that said, however, you and I do have mutual
    friends, and they have all spoken to your strength of
    character, the way that you fulfill your role, the work that
    you did with the military, and the leadership that you bring to
    different situations. I thank you for that.
        I do want to go back to the topic we discussed, the issue
    of China. We talked about a quote that is attributed to you
    about strategic patience, and you had applied that to China.
    You thought it was an attribution or mentioned it was an
    attribution in the article, but I went back and looked at this,
    and it was a quote from an interview and, thus, later picked up
    by Asia Today or Asia Times and other foreign policy articles
    and, as you have heard from other members on the Committee,
    China.
        I think you also believe China and great power competition
    is our greatest threat. Whether we are looking at what is
    happening on the economic side, and I appreciate you mentioned
    that earlier, because we discussed we do not know exactly where
    MOFCOM [Ministry of Commerce] ends or where their economic
    sector ends and their military sector begins.
        So what I would like for you to do is spend a minute and
    talk about why you cannot use strategic patience with China and
    why it is an imperative that we address the economic and the
    military side of that China problem coin, if you will, and how
    your budget priorities are going to reflect the desire to deal
    with China, to work with Taiwan, to work with Hong Kong? So if
    you would take a minute and just address that for us.
        Mr. Austin. I think over the last two decades, Senator, as
    we have been focused on--necessarily focused on issues in the
    Middle East, we have seen China modernize its military. We have
    seen its--we have seen it employ aggressive, in some cases
    coercive behavior against our allies in the region. We have
    seen it do a number of things that tend to make us believe that
    China really wants to be the preeminent power in the world in
    the not-too-distant future.
        I think, again, China looks to compete with us against--
    looks to compete with us in a number of areas across a spectrum
    that includes, as you pointed out, economics, cyber,
    competition in the domain of space. So China, because of its
    desires, because of its worldview, is clearly a competitor that
    we have to make sure that we begin to check their aggression.
        It will require a whole-of-government effort to do that.
    The Department of Defense's piece in this is to make sure that
    we are presenting a credible deterrent to China so that it will
    think twice before it decides to take on the United States of
    America, China or any other aggressor.
        That requires investment in a number of areas. We have
    talked about this a bit before.
        Senator Blackburn. Yes.
        Mr. Austin. In modernization, things like AI and space-
    based platforms and directed energy and just a number of
    things. If we are called upon to conduct operations against a
    near peer such as China or Russia, it is a different type of
    engagement, and we need different capabilities. We need the
    operational concepts that can employ those capabilities. Again,
    as I said earlier, we will be required to understand what is
    going on on the battlefield much better, much faster, be able
    to decide very--a lot quicker, and then be able to act a lot
    quicker.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I appreciate that, and I think it
    is important for the record to reflect that you do not view
    dealing with China as a strategic patience. It is a different
    approach than we have had with ISIS.
        Let me move on. We also talked a little bit about workforce
    and utilization of the Guard. As we look at some of the skill
    sets that are necessary moving into 5G deployment, a
    utilization of artificial intelligence, building out ISR, and
    some of those areas. So for the record, make a comment about
    Guard recruitment, retention, and how you would interface the
    Guard with the Active Duty men and women.
        Mr. Austin. Well, we certainly have great talent in our
    Guardsmen and that we have seen that on display throughout
    these years of conflict that we have been in. Our Guard has
    performed very, very well.
        Many of our Guardsmen have skills that you do not typically
    find in a normal unit or a normal organization, and so I think
    in a lot of cases, we can do a better job of leveraging those
    skills, those unique skill sets to help our efforts in things
    like IT and other things.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, thank you for that. We appreciate
    your service. We appreciate your time today.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Now via Webex, Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Austin, I want to say thank you. Thank you for your
    service over many, many years to this country, and thank you
    for your willingness to take on this job. Clearly, we are in an
    incredibly difficult time in our history, and we are facing
    significant challenges, and your willingness to serve your
    country once again is commendable. So, thank you.
        I want to pick up briefly on some comments made by my
    colleague Senator Heinrich, and I think although you answered
    his question, I think it is important for you to know that
    there are many of us on this committee that are very concerned
    about PFAS contamination in military sites across the country.
    Clearly, this is a bigger problem than just military sites. We
    have got PFAS sites throughout the country.
        Michigan has been particularly hard hit with sites
    containing this very toxic chemical. In fact, I think of the
    700 sites identified around the country, roughly 200 of them
    are in Michigan, although we think the reason that number is so
    high is just because we have been looking for it more than
    other States. It is likely to continue.
        But we do have military sites that have been impacted, and
    one in particular in Michigan, which is the former Wurtsmith
    Air Force Base in Oscoda. The folks in Oscoda and that area
    have been dealing with this contamination for many years. They
    are, and rightly so, incredibly frustrated by the slowness from
    the Air Force and others to deal with it.
        We have started to see some pick-up in activity in clean-
    up, but they have waited too long. I know you made a commitment
    to Senator Heinrich to expedite this, but I want you to know
    that this is a major issue for me, for folks in Michigan, folks
    around Wurtsmith Air Force Base, as well as other military
    sites across the country. I am sure many of my other colleagues
    would join in.
        I hope that you are, indeed, committed to making sure we do
    right by these communities that have hosted these bases for
    years and are now suffering the consequences. So I do not know
    if you want to add anything to what your response was to
    Senator Heinrich, but please know this is a serious issue for
    us across the country.
        Mr. Austin. No, I am committed, Senator. I think, as I said
    earlier, that the health and welfare of our military members,
    our families, our DOD civilians, and our communities is very,
    very important. Again, Secretary Esper stood up a PFAS task
    force. I will check in with them and make sure that I expedite
    their work if at all possible.
        Certainly, I look forward to working with my EPA
    counterpart on this issue. I think it is very, very important
    to mitigate the effects of these contaminates as soon as we
    can. You can look for us to stay committed to that.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that, General. Thank you so
    much.
        You mentioned it in a number of questions about the
    changing nature of warfare, and we are on the cusp of major
    changes as a result of technology. You alluded to some in the
    last answer, whether it is AI, automation, directed weapons. We
    just know that we are in a technological revolution that will
    change the way we live dramatically. When that happens, that
    also changes the face of warfare in dramatic ways.
        It is not just the complexity of our tools, but as you
    mentioned, it is the strategic and operational environment as
    well. So it is going to require some really--some creative
    thinking outside of normal policies in how we prepare for this
    change. I think a lot of that requires changing some of the
    culture, particularly when you have a large bureaucratic
    organization like the Department of Defense. That is no
    different than any other large bureaucratic organization. It is
    sometimes difficult to get out of the established mindsets and
    understand that things are changing rapidly.
        So guidance from the top is incredibly important. That
    means in my mind--and love to have your thoughts. That means
    placing a premium on digital skills by expanding eligibility
    for billets in the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, for
    example, Defense Innovation Unit and their service-level
    equivalents both inside as well as outside the Department.
        So, General, if you can give me a sense of how do you
    assess the ability, for example, of defense innovation offices
    to develop systems that are going to be able to enhance both
    our performance and our effectiveness. As you are thinking of
    this and answering this question, try to mention in particular
    how this will be helpful as we start operating perhaps more
    below the threshold of armed conflict, which may likely be an
    emerging pattern that we have to deal with more often than we
    would like.
        Mr. Austin. Yes. So I think it is really important that we
    have the ability to develop the kinds of capabilities that you
    just described, Senator. You asked specifically about the
    people that we have that are dedicated to and working on these
    issues and whether or not it is we are managing them the right
    way. Something that I will have to look at.
        I will have to go in and talk to the leadership about what
    their needs are and how we can improve our efforts right now. I
    look forward to that conversation, but I would not want to
    speculate on that issue right now.
        But I really believe that what you just said is absolutely
    important. We have got to be able to develop the ability to
    move things with the appropriate speed and focus that will
    enable us to be relevant going forward.
        Senator Peters. I think part of that speed--and there have
    been several questions related to the procurement process--is a
    lot of this innovation in the past would take place within the
    Department of Defense. Now we are seeing a lot of this
    innovation in commercial markets, in the commercial sector. But
    as you integrate that and having an era of centers or
    innovation centers that work with those commercial centers, I
    think they are incredibly important.
        I am happy to say in Michigan, we have our Ground Vehicle
    Systems Center that takes advantage of the auto industry and
    some of the developments we are seeing in automation. Would you
    commit to continuing to invest in those kinds of programs that
    work in partnership with advanced innovation in the commercial
    sector?
        Mr. Austin. I think automation is really important to us.
    You have heard a number of leaders talk about that, and I think
    we are going to--that will be an area of focus for us going
    forward.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate it, General. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Via Webex, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General, for being here, and congratulations on
    your nomination. It is always nice to see a graduate of Webster
    University in St. Louis before the committee. So
    congratulations on that as well.
        Let me come back to something you said at the very
    beginning of your testimony, during your statement at the
    beginning. You said that China is a pacing threat, ``a pacing
    threat.'' I just want to be clear. Are there other pacing
    threats, and what would they be?
        Mr. Austin. China is the most significant competitor that
    we are focused on. It is the pacing threat.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you for that. That is a helpful
    clarification.
        On that same point, you are going to have the opportunity
    here to oversee the next National Defense Strategy. You have
    said, and other committee members have quoted this today, you
    have talked about the competition, strategic competition with
    China and Russia. You have also said today, though, several
    times, including to me just now that you think that China is
    ``the pacing threat'' or China is the top priority. So can you
    commit to us that as you oversee the next NDS that China will
    be unequivocally identified as the top challenge, threat,
    competitor of the United States?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. Clearly, the strategy will be arrayed
    against the threat, and China is--presents the most significant
    threat going forward because China is ascending. Russia is also
    a threat, but it is in decline. It can still do a great deal of
    damage, as we have seen here in recent days, in an area--and it
    is a country that we have to remain--maintain some degree of
    focus on. But China is the pacing threat.
        Senator Hawley. Very good, and you would expect--just to
    press my point here, but you would expect to see that
    identified--China, that is, identified as the pacing threat in
    the next National Defense Strategy? In other words, you do not
    see any reason why that would not be the case? Is that correct?
        Mr. Austin. That follows. That makes sense, Senator Hawley,
    I think. But again, I certainly do not want to try to write the
    strategy here. We want to make sure we go through the process
    of arraying the threats and identifying what capabilities we
    are going to place against them. But it certainly follows it is
    the pacing issue, the pacing threat currently, and I fully
    expect that it will remain so going forward.
        Senator Hawley. Good. Well, I am pressing you on it only
    because I think there has been some confusion with the last
    National Defense Strategy, the way it has been interpreted in
    some quarters to put China and Russia on a plane. What you just
    said just a second ago I think is very encouraging, that China
    is the pacing threat.
        Russia, of course, is a threat. There is no doubt about
    that. But to your words, it is in decline, and of course, we
    have limited resources and capacities, and we are going to have
    to make sure that those limited resources and capacities are
    deployed corresponding to the relevant threat. So I am
    encouraged by what you said. I am going to hold you to that.
        Let me shift to Taiwan, which is obviously closely related.
    I would like to follow up on something Senator Scott asked you
    about.
        Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has
    committed to maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to
    force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
    security of the people of Taiwan. Given our obligations under
    that statute, General, do you agree that DOD should maintain
    the ability to deter a Chinese fait accompli when it comes to
    Taiwan?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, you came in broken on that last piece
    there. If I could ask you to repeat the end of that, please?
        Senator Hawley. Yes. When it comes to Taiwan, General, do
    you agree that the Department of Defense should clearly
    prioritize defeating a fait accompli scenario in Taiwan on the
    part of China, the attempt to invade, their pressure that would
    put us in a fait accompli scenario. Should that be our top
    priority?
        Mr. Austin. Well, certainly, I do not want to go down the
    road of getting into hypotheticals about what we would do if
    certain things happened. I would just say that my job as the
    Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, is to present credible
    options to the President to ensure that we can protect our
    interests and defend ourselves.
        You know, one of our interests is to make sure that
    Taiwan--and a commitment is to make sure that Taiwan has the
    ability to defend itself. We will stay committed to that going
    forward.
        Senator Hawley. Yes, and I certainly appreciate the fact
    that you cannot anticipate all threats going forward. However,
    we do have to plan. To go back to points you have made about
    husbanding our scarce resources, making sure that we are using
    them well, we have got to identify the scenarios that we are
    prioritizing to plan for.
        I just want to say, ask you one more time, with regard to
    the fait accompli scenario in Taiwan, which is identified, of
    course, in the current--the 2018 National Defense Strategy, is
    that a scenario you think we ought to prioritize in our
    planning purposes in order to deter China?
        Mr. Austin. Again, we are committed, we have been committed
    to the support of Taiwan throughout. Again, it has been
    bipartisan support. We will remain committed to supporting
    Taiwan, and so we will have the right options available to
    protect our interest and to defend ourselves.
        Senator Hawley. Let me shift to Afghanistan here briefly,
    General, in the time I have got remaining. If the Taliban
    violates its part of the peace agreement, there is going to be
    significant pressure on the President-Elect to send thousands
    of troops back into Afghanistan and perpetuate the cycle that
    we have seen there.
        How do you think we should respond if the Taliban violates
    our peace agreement so that we can achieve our counterterrorism
    objectives without increasing the number of troops that we have
    there in the region?
        Mr. Austin. Senator, you know that we are currently
    operating as a part of a coalition effort there in Afghanistan.
    What I have heard General Milley and General Miller say
    publicly is that they believe they have adequate resources to
    accomplish the objectives that they are assigned currently.
        If I am confirmed, as I go in, I would like to be able to
    assess the situation myself and then make my recommendations to
    the President in terms of what is required and what is not
    required.
        Senator Hawley. I see my time has expired. Thank you again,
    General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Finally, we now have, via Webex, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I spoke in this committee last week about my concerns with
    making exceptions to allow any person to serve as Secretary of
    Defense less than 7 years after leaving regular military
    service. Mr. Austin, you and I spoke about this issue on our
    recent call as well. I want to reiterate that my concerns are
    the same now as they were when we considered Secretary Mattis'
    nomination 4 years ago.
        My vote against a waiver that would allow you to serve as
    Secretary of Defense has everything to do with restoring the
    bedrock principle of civilian control of the military and
    nothing to do with you, your qualifications, or your character.
    Last week, I pledged to my colleagues that if they choose to
    pass an exception to the statute, I will consider your
    nomination fairly and on its merits. Mr. Austin, I make that
    same promise to you today.
        Based on our call last week, in fact, I feel we are aligned
    in our thoughts on a number of the most urgent national
    security issues facing our country. I am pleased to get the
    chance now to follow up on a few of those challenges that I
    believe the DOD is facing that concerns me the most.
        First, I have raised alarms before about President Trump's
    total disregard for good order and discipline. Over the last 4
    years, he has valorized ruthless killing and pardoned war
    criminals like convicted former SEAL Eddie Gallagher. He
    directly undermined leaders like former Naval Special Warfare
    Commander Admiral Green, who attempted to hold servicemembers
    accountable when they violated their oaths and failed to uphold
    good order and discipline.
        Then some communities, like the SEAL community, were
    already struggling with servicemembers drifting from their core
    values likely due to the stress of 19 years of war and
    deployments. President Trump's rhetoric has damaged attempts to
    restore discipline in our Department of Defense. Now in the
    fallout of violent insurrection at the Capitol on January 6th,
    we are starting to learn the depth of the problem in our
    military services.
        Veterans, Active Duty troops, members of the National Guard
    have already been found to have participated in an actual
    attack on elected leaders and our constitutional process in
    direct violation of their oaths of office. We have seen
    significant reporting on the ways that extremist groups
    specifically target military members and veterans, and it is
    likely that we will discover more in the coming weeks.
        Mr. Austin, it is clear that we are at a crisis point. We
    need strong leadership to root out extremists in the military
    and reaffirm the core values that have defined military
    service. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assert your
    leadership, set the example for the service chiefs, and
    reinstate good order and discipline?
        Mr. Austin. Well, the activity that we have seen recently
    in terms of potential racist or extremist behavior within our
    ranks is, in my view, absolutely unacceptable. I think you have
    heard the chiefs, service chiefs and the Chairman recently
    speak to that as well.
        I will work with the leaders of the various departments to
    make sure that it is absolutely clear to everyone in the
    Department, military or civilian, that this is behavior that
    does not--does not fit our values, does not comport with our
    values. So I will want the leaders of all of the services and
    all the Departments to make sure that they are doing the right
    things to set the right example and to create the right climate
    that discourages and eliminates that type of behavior.
        This is not something that we can be passive on. This is
    something I think we have to be active on, and we have to lean
    into it and make sure that we are doing the right things to
    create the right climates.
        Senator Duckworth. There needs to be consequences for bad
    actors as well?
        Mr. Austin. Certainly, if someone is accused and an
    investigation determines that that person is guilty of that
    type of behavior, then we will take the appropriate actions.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        Mr. Austin, you oversaw one of our military's largest and
    most complex logistics operations in Iraq. So you understand
    better than most, almost anyone else going forward we cannot
    rely on the same logistics system and practices that we used in
    Iraq and Afghanistan as we look to future potential areas of
    conflict.
        Great power competition demands that we innovate our
    approach to logistics, and so it is critical that we invest in
    United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and ensure that
    logistics-related planning factors are central to our op plans
    and our major exercises. If confirmed, what initiatives will
    you prioritize to ensure that confrontation command and the
    rest of the DOD's logistics enterprise is modernized and
    resourced to support global operations and to withstand threats
    from peer competitors, especially when we are talking about in
    contested environments?
        Mr. Austin. I think, Senator, you are absolutely correct.
    Our logistics capabilities really enable us to do the great
    work that we have done around the globe. I think we have to
    continue to invest in the right things. I look forward to
    having a conversation with our senior logistics leaders in all
    of the branches and also in the Department as well.
        I want to invest in those types of things that can provide
    us innovative approaches to delivering the types of logistics
    that we will need to sustain ourselves. I agree with you that
    we will not be able to do business as we have always done it
    going forward, as we are looking to compete with a near-peer
    competitor.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        The DOD is also well positioned to lead the way on
    developing the kind of clean energy technology that can
    accelerate our fight against climate change, one of the biggest
    national security threats of our time, and reduce the
    military's reliance on fossil fuel, which would shorten that
    logistics tail. If confirmed, how would you lead DOD to reduce
    its emissions and develop the sort of breakthrough energy
    technology that can make forward-deployed troops less reliant
    on fuel delivery and other energy-related sustainment?
        Mr. Austin. Well, I think while we are no doubt doing some
    things on all of our installations now to reduce our energy
    consumption and reduce our carbon footprint, I think there is
    more that we can do. You know, we consume a lot of energy, and
    so I think that we can have a substantial impact if we are
    focused on the right things.
        You know, this affects us in a lot of ways. I think that if
    we look at utilization on installations in other capacity,
    utilization of electrical vehicles and reducing the amount of
    energy that we are consuming and just a number of other things,
    we can make a pretty substantial impact on our overall effort
    here. I look forward to working with the Administration and my
    colleagues and working with the Department to really improve
    our performance thus far.
        I will appoint a specific person on my staff to help me
    focus on this issue and to coordinate issues within the
    Department and within the services as well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you very much. I am over time, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Inhofe. All right. I have been told that this
    completes our members that were wanting to participate, and we
    want to thank you very much, General Austin, for the time you
    have given us, and we look forward to working with you.
        Senator Reed, did you want to make any further comments?
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, no. I just want to thank you
    for conducting this hearing and thank General Austin for
    participating, and good luck, sir.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        When we meet again 2 days from now, I think you will be the
    chairman, and I will be the ranking member. That transition
    will take place very peaceably----
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Inhofe.--and I want to tell you how we have
    enjoyed working together for a number of years, and we will
    continue to do that.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, it has been an honor and a
    great pleasure working with you, and I think, with your
    leadership, we have accomplished a great deal, and I thank you.
        Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        General Austin, did you have any other--any questions that
    were not asked that you would like to volunteer answers to now?
    I think the answer is no.
        Mr. Austin. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
    thank you and the committee members for allowing me the time
    this afternoon to engage with you, and I want to thank you all
    also for the tremendous support that you have given to our
    military over the years. If confirmed, I look forward to
    working with you and doing the same kinds of things that you
    have done in the past.
        Again, thanks.
        Chairman Inhofe. That is good. Thank you very much.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:37 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III by
    Chairman Inhofe prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. Section 113 of Title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the
    Secretary of Defense as the head of the Department of Defense (DOD) and
    principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
    Department.
        What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
    qualify you to serve as Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. I believe my past experience has provided me the necessary
    leadership skills, geo-political acumen and deep understanding of joint
    and combined operations to serve this country as Secretary of Defense.
    I know how to work collaboratively with interagency partners, and I
    know how to lead, plan and operate with allies and partner nations.
        Having been to war, I also know well the life and death decisions
    any Secretary of Defense has to make. I am prepared to make those
    decisions, informed by my own experience. Finally, I believe the
    experiences gained in the five years since I retired--with nonprofit
    organizations, academia, and private sector businesses--have broadened
    my skills and my views.
        I have worked extensively with our partners in other agencies
    (State, CIA etc.). Also, I have a wealth of experience in working with
    our allies and building teams.
        Question. Dr. Eliot Cohen, Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of
    Advanced International Studies, has written that, `` . . . the
    Secretary of Defense represents the Armed Forces to society at large,
    and far more important, represents society to the Armed Forces.
    Selecting a civilian ensures that civilian perspectives dominate, as
    they should.''
        Given your significant and recent military experience, if confirmed
    as Secretary of Defense, how would you approach your leadership of DOD
    to ensure that ``civilian perspectives dominate''?
        Answer. I have served in multiple senior military positions,
    working closely with civilian superiors and colleagues, and have
    appreciated both their perspectives on the difficult challenges
    confronting our Nation and the importance of their authority over our
    military. If confirmed, I will ensure that the authority and
    responsibilities of DOD's senior civilian leadership are clearly
    understood throughout the Department of Defense, and I will ensure that
    I receive advice and counsel from a diverse team, military and
    civilian, with perspectives and experiences from across the spectrum.
    Further, if confirmed I will actively ensure in my leadership, words
    and actions that civilian leadership of the Department is understood
    and is preeminent.
        Question. What skills and attributes would you bring to the table
    in executing your duties to ``represent the Armed Forces to society at
    large, and . . . represent[ ] society to the Armed Forces''?
        Answer. I understand that, if confirmed, one of my responsibilities
    will be to represent the men and women of the Department of Defense to
    the American people and will do that with transparency, integrity and
    honesty. Though it is clear the American people support their military,
    it is not clear to me that they fully understand the scope of the
    sacrifices that military personnel and their families make each day.
        My time in uniform, and frankly my time thus far as a civilian,
    provide me a unique opportunity to help close this gap in
    understanding. I'm certainly aware of the historic nature of my
    nomination, and I believe that, too, will help raise awareness of the
    diversity in our ranks and the need to keep fielding a military that
    itself represents the breadth of American society.
        I obviously have extensive knowledge of how the military operates
    and what the challenges are. My depth of understanding of the
    challenges facing our military members and their families not only
    helps me to better address their needs, but it helps me to accurately
    tell their stories to the public.
        Question. If confirmed, and given your observations and experience,
    what innovative ideas would you consider implementing with regard to
    the structure and operations of the DOD?
        Answer. In my experience, building and leading high performing
    teams requires excellent communication, unity of purpose, selfless
    service and agility. If confirmed, I will use the first weeks of my
    tenure to emphasize these characteristics, and I will look for
    opportunities to improve the structure or operations to ensure we are
    as effective and efficient as possible.
        I believe we need to re-invigorate our alliance participation and
    support; that we need to reconsider our investments in technology,
    research and development, and that we need to continue to look for ways
    to improve the integration of joint capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions would you assign
    to the Deputy Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, the Deputy Secretary of Defense would be
    a `full partner' with me in decision-making, setting policy, and
    running the Department. If confirmed, I would expect the Deputy to be--
    more often than not--the last person in the room with me before I make
    an important decision. The traditional focus of the Deputy Secretary is
    similar to that of a Chief Operating Officer in managing the day-to-day
    business and functions of a large, complicated organization. If
    confirmed, I intend to continue this model. This would include, most
    notably, driving the programming and budgeting cycle to modernize the
    force and reform the Department.
                       major challenges and opportunities
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you will face if confirmed as Secretary of Defense and what
    are your plans to address each challenge?
        Answer. The most urgent challenge we face is the pandemic. If
    confirmed, I will immediately review DOD's support to the broader U.S.
    Government effort and increase the speed and scale of our support,
    while maintaining military readiness. Globally, I believe the most
    significant challenge I will face will be to ensure the Department of
    Defense's continued efforts to prepare and strengthen the U.S. military
    for a dynamic, future security landscape driven by accelerating
    competitions with China and with Russia--with China as our pacing
    threat in most areas-- while still ensuring our ability to deter
    today's range of threats. DOD, in concert with our interagency and
    international partners and allies, will play a crucial role in
    deterring Chinese and Russian aggression, while still contending with
    threats emanating from Iran and North Korea and countering terrorism.
    We must also address risks to the U.S. Homeland, including demands for
    defense support to civil authorities.
        If confirmed, I pledge to be transparent with the American people
    and this Congress about what is necessary to advance the security of
    the United States.
                        civilian control of the military
        Question. Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code, provides
    that ``[a] person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within
    seven years after relief from Active Duty as a commissioned officer of
    a regular component of an Armed Force.''
        Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate for
    Congress to provide an exception to this law?
        Answer. I understand and respect the intent of the law. The safety
    and security of our democracy demands civilian control of our Armed
    Forces, the subordination of military power to the civil. Congress must
    determine whether an exception is appropriate. I have served the United
    States for over 40 years in uniform, and I respect and appreciate the
    fundamental importance of civilian control over the military. I know
    first-hand what is expected from our senior military leaders in their
    interactions with, and support of, the Department's civilian
    leadership. Moreover, through my experiences both in and out of
    uniform, I know what is required of the civilians tasked with leading
    our military services.
        Question. What are your personal views on the principle of civilian
    control of the military?
        Answer. I believe civilian control of the military is fundamental
    to our democracy. I spent 41 years as a military officer swearing an
    oath to the Constitution and to the concept of civilian control. I
    understand the different roles and responsibilities between military
    officers and civilian leadership. If confirmed, I will carry out my
    duties as the civilian Secretary.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that your tenure as Secretary of Defense epitomizes the fundamental
    requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the
    U.S. Constitution and other laws?
        Answer. Since the beginning of my journey in the military as a
    cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point almost 50
    years ago, to my later service as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S.
    Army,, and Joint commands in the United States and across the globe, I
    have understood the foundational importance of civilian control of the
    military; it is one of the things that makes ours the greatest military
    in history and is a key guarantor of the freedoms and democracy we
    cherish and have sworn to defend. The authorities of the President and,
    through the President, the Secretary of Defense are clear in the U.S.
    Constitution and laws of our Nation, and in the minds of all who serve,
    civilian and military, in the defense of our Nation. I have come to
    learn that large organizations will reflect the principles and values
    of their senior leaders. The chain of command is clear, and if
    confirmed I will actively ensure in my leadership, words, and actions
    that civilian control and authority over the Department are understood
    and followed.
        Question. The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission report
    observed, ``there is an imbalance in civil-military relations on
    critical issues of strategy development and implementation. Civilian
    voices appear relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense
    and national security policy.''
        Do you agree with this assessment? If so, specifically what would
    you do to address this issue, if confirmed?
        Answer. I believe in the bedrock American principle of civilian
    control of the military. Devising the right strategy for our nation's
    defense is the very cornerstone of civilian control of the military,
    and if confirmed, overseeing development of the next iteration of the
    National Defense Strategy and its implementation will be among my very
    top priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD's civilian leadership
    shepherds this fundamental task, and continues to exercise its
    necessary authorities and responsibilities for shaping and overseeing
    U.S. defense policy and strategy, while working closely with the
    Departments' military leadership, as well as with Congress.
        Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission report also
    states, `` . . . allocating priority--and allocating forces--across
    theaters of warfare is not solely a military matter. It is an
    inherently political-military task, decision authority for which is the
    proper competency and responsibility of America's civilian leaders.''
        If confirmed, specifically how would you exercise your
    responsibilities in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on empowered civilian leaders
    across the Office of the Secretary of Defense to advise me on the full
    range of strategic and policy considerations related to global force
    management. This includes developing our strategic priorities, aligning
    resources with these priorities, adjudicating resource tradeoffs
    between different Combatant Commands, and when appropriate,
    coordinating with the U.S. Department of State and the National
    Security Council. This civilian expertise will be critical to informing
    my decision making on how best to allocate and assign forces in support
    of our national interests.
        Question. What civilian officials and organizations, in your
    opinion, should participate in decisions regarding allocating priority
    and forces across operational theaters? If confirmed, how would you
    ensure the participation of these officials and organizations in such
    decisions?
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--and the team of
    civilian appointees and civil servants that support this position--play
    a central role in reviewing DOD posture and global force management
    decisions to ensure alignment with strategic priorities, policies for
    bilateral relationships, and congressional and public affairs
    considerations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
    Security also play important roles in reviewing global force management
    decisions.
        If confirmed, I will ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy is fully empowered to coordinate within DOD and helps lead the
    implementation of our strategic priorities. The Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy--or the appropriate official within the Office of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--will review every global
    force management issue prior to recommendations coming to me for
    decisions, and I will ensure he has the opportunity to provide counsel
    directly to me, informed by military assessments.
        Question. If confirmed, what lessons would you draw from the
    tenures of former Secretaries Mattis and Marshall--also recently
    retired general officers who served as the Secretary of Defense--and
    how would you apply those lessons to your own service, if confirmed as
    Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. Secretaries Marshall and Mattis conducted themselves with
    integrity and professionalism. They were public servants and honest
    leaders. If confirmed, I would conduct myself in the same manner.
        I am mindful of the concerns of another retired general leading the
    Department, and while I am in no position to judge the details of how
    these two predecessors chose to do it, I can assure you that, if
    confirmed, I intend to lead in a manner consistent with my belief in
    the principle of civilian control.
        I will empower the OSD staff to lead the policy-making process. I
    will fill all available civilian positions on that staff, and I will
    ensure that the orders I give and the decisions I make are properly
    formed through a blend of civilian and military perspectives.
        Military advice will inform but it will not dominate my thinking.
    Finally, knowing that Congress, too, represents an important element of
    civilian control, I will consult closely with the Senate and House of
    Representatives as you execute your oversight responsibilities. I will
    be forthcoming, responsive and transparent with you.
                      2018 national defense strategy (nds)
        Question. The 2018 NDS outlines that the United States faces a
    rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue
    regimes and global terrorism.
        In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current
    strategic environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest
    risk?
        Answer. I believe the 2018 NDS correctly identifies strategic
    competitions with China and with Russia as the primary challenges
    animating the global security environment; however, I believe that
    because of its ascent and the scope and scale of its military
    modernization, China is the top priority. I am also concerned about
    transnational threats as the security landscape evolves (e.g., amid
    COVID-19) and believe that our defense strategy must adapt accordingly.
    As required by law, if confirmed I will review the NDS and where
    necessary revise or update it in the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
        The continued erosion of United States military advantage vis-a-vis
    China and Russia, in key strategic areas, remains the most significant
    risk the Department must address. If left unchecked, this continued
    erosion could fundamentally challenge our ability to achieve U.S.
    national security objectives--and limit DOD's ability to underpin other
    U.S. instruments of power.
        Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
    the People's Republic of China?
        Answer. I assess that the rapid development and operational focus
    of the People's Republic of China (PRC) constitutes a significant and
    long-term security threat to the United States and to our allies and
    partners. This threat is an outgrowth of nearly two decades of intense
    efforts by China to modernize and reform the People's Liberation Army
    (PLA) and other forces into an increasingly capable joint force able to
    conduct the full range of military operations across every warfighting
    domain. In addition to a significant buildup and modernization of its
    strategic forces, the PLA is advancing its capabilities and concepts
    for conducting information, cyber, space, and counterspace operations.
    China has also made it clear that it expects the PLA to be a global
    military actor that is able to secure China's growing overseas
    interests and advance other PRC objectives abroad. These changes are
    coupled with the PRC's aggressive and at times coercive activities
    aimed at advancing its military influence through forging closer ties
    with foreign militaries, attaining overseas military bases, and
    expanding the PLA's presence worldwide.
        Question. If confirmed, would you revise or adjust the 2018 NDS as
    a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors? If so, in
    what ways?
        Answer. Yes. Many of the core concepts in the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) are fundamentally sound. At the same time, there are
    notable changes occurring in the global security environment that
    warrant deeper evaluation, and which should compel DOD to periodically
    reexamine and update the strategy and its path to implementation. For
    example, the pace of China's military modernization, its increasingly
    aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific and its ability to threaten the
    United States Homeland are concerning and must be continually
    reexamined. The NDS also assumes sustained defense budget growth, but
    that has not fully materialized. The NDS anticipated a global
    rebalancing of United States commitments, notably from the Middle East
    to the Indo-Pacific, but that has proven challenging. In light of these
    developments, if confirmed, I plan to undertake a comprehensive
    strategic review in consultation with my leadership team to ensure we
    can achieve our defense objectives.
        If confirmed, I would direct my team to evaluate where changes are
    emerging relative to the U.S. security and fiscal environments; demands
    on defense-wide and military roles and missions; our military's
    approach to future warfighting; the state of our network of allies and
    partners; and the ways DOD is implementing the strategy. Examination of
    these elements would of course be nested in the broader context of any
    change in priorities directed in our National Security Strategy. These
    insights would inform how the Department may update the defense
    strategy and its implementation.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    the missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries) of
    the Combatant Commands to implement the 2018 NDS more effectively?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review whether the responsibilities of
    the Combatant Commands align with the Department's priority missions in
    implementing the defense strategy and, if necessary, work with the
    Department's senior leadership to revise. It would be my responsibility
    to recommend to the President roles and missions for Combatant
    Commanders to ensure there are no seams our adversaries can exploit.
    That includes boundaries of the Combatant Commands.
        Question. Do you see a need to adjust the size, structure, and
    resources of each Military Service to ensure they are optimized to
    implement the 2018 NDS and the associated Operation Plans (OPLANs)?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The size, structure, and resources of each Service must be
    informed by strategy-driven analysis and priorities, a joint
    understanding of how our military will conduct operations and fight and
    win the nation's future wars, and a resource-informed pragmatism. In my
    view, each of the Services has taken important steps to align their
    force structures and resourcing to 2018 NDS priorities, especially in
    shifting away from decades of counter-terrorism operations and toward
    great power competition and warfighting preparedness. If confirmed, I
    will carefully consider the approaches the Services are taking,
    individually and as a Joint Force, and working closely with my senior
    civilian leadership team I, will make appropriate determinations about
    their preparedness for both today's and future contingencies.
        Question. Does DOD have the requisite modeling and simulation
    capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as Secretary of
    Defense, in assessing whether the Combatant Commanders' OPLANs will
    achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department uses a number of
    modeling and simulation approaches, combined with military exercises,
    experiments, and wargames to assess the effectiveness of operational
    plans. If confirmed, I will assure these plans are thoroughly assessed
    and adjusted if necessary, and that we continue to ensure robust
    analytic support to the development of current and future operational
    plans.
        Question. Does the DOD have the requisite analytic capabilities and
    tools to support you, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, in
    evaluating the Military Services' force structure and sizing strategies
    to ensure that each Service can and will generate forces that are
    manned, trained, and equipped to execute the operational plans
    associated with the 2018 NDS? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Effectively executing operational plans requires the right
    forces, in sufficient number and with relevant training, arriving in
    theater on relevant timelines. If confirmed, I will assess each
    Service's force structure to ensure it supports the wide range of
    missions required to meet the Nation's defense goals. I will also
    ensure we continue to use all analytic tools at our disposal to assess
    Service force structure and sizing strategies against the demands of
    the defense strategy.
        Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
    DOD has been unable to leverage, or has leveraged only in part, since
    the NDS was published in 2018? If so, how would correct this situation,
    if confirmed?
        Answer. Our alliances and partnerships globally--including the
    defense tools at our disposal to engage them, and more fundamentally
    the mutual security commitments and interests we pursue to maintain
    them--are an asymmetric strategic advantage that our competitors do not
    possess. The strength of this network of defense relations cannot be
    taken for granted, though, especially in global competitions with China
    and Russia. If confirmed, I would seek ways to build on DOD's alliance
    and partnership efforts as a core element of defense strategy.
        First and foremost, if confirmed, I will make it a priority to
    rebuild strong defense relationships with our allies and partners
    around the world, many of whom have felt unsure of U.S. commitments and
    insufficiently consulted in recent years. In addition to renewing the
    foundations of our defense relationships, I also understand the
    Department recently released new guidance to guide efforts to more
    strategically engage with its network of allies and partners through
    defense relations, security cooperation, force planning, and elsewhere.
    If confirmed, I would look to better understand how DOD is framing and
    implementing this guidance and ensure it is fundamental to broader DOD
    efforts to review and update defense strategy and its implementation.
        Question. Secretary Mattis said that the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy ``establishes my intent to pursue urgent change at significant
    scale.'' Do you share Secretary Mattis' intent for the NDS? In your
    opinion, where has DOD succeeded in executing the NDS, where has DOD
    fallen short, and what should be done to exploit successes and correct
    deficiencies?
        Answer. The NDS is the Defense Department's answer to the
    President's National Security Strategy (NSS); it details the ways and
    means with which our military will implement the larger national
    security imperatives our country faces.
        My intent, therefore, if confirmed, is to develop an NDS that
    supports President-elect Biden's NSS and defines how the U.S. military
    will utilize all its resources to defend the American people.
        I expect that such a strategy--in this time of geo-political flux,
    accelerating competition, transnational threats and extraordinary
    technological transformation--will entail change, even urgent change,
    but I view the document's purpose in this larger context.
        I believe the Department has taken important steps in beginning to
    realign Joint Force capabilities and posture to ensure its competitive
    military edge against China and Russia, including in key strategic
    regions--but there is yet more work to be done. I believe we need to
    accelerate the pace and scope of this change, and make tough choices
    where fiscal, doctrinal, temporal, or other limitations pose trade-offs
    to implementing the strategy. I also think the Department's challenges
    in shifting focus from today's global, operational commitments
    (especially in the Middle East) to future mission demands must be
    reconciled within the strategy, to ensure its feasible and sustainable
    implementation. I believe further prioritization, better focus, and
    synchronization of defense relations, security cooperation, research
    and development, and force planning are important areas to assess and
    adjust to advance defense objectives.
        Question. In mandating changes to the process and form of the
    National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
    National Military Strategy, Congress intended that these documents,
    through the Defense Planning Guidance, would more rigorously drive
    program planning of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and
    Combatant Commands.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure consistency between the guiding
    strategies of the Department and its allocation of resources?
        Answer. It is critical to ensure a clear linkage between strategic
    priorities, planning guidance, and resourcing across the Department,
    including among the Military Services and Combatant Commands. As well,
    this linkage must be governed by the core principle of civilian control
    of the military. If confirmed, I am fully committed to supporting DOD's
    internal strategic guidance processes to ensure that key Departmental
    functions--in employing, managing, and developing the Joint Force--are
    informed by strategy-driven, resource-informed defense planning. This
    planning guidance should apply across the full defense enterprise, and
    among the full range of force development and planning functions,
    including programming and resourcing, acquisition, requirements,
    concept development, and analysis.
                                 dod readiness
        Question. The United States now faces two near-peer competitors in
    an aggressively militaristic China and revanchist Russia.
        Do you believe that our military forces have greater overall combat
    potential today than 30 years ago, despite force structure reductions?
    If so, please explain.
        Answer. Yes. Despite force structure reductions over the past 30
    years, the Joint Force has the necessary capacity and capability to
    implement National Defense Strategy (NDS) priorities and contend with
    today's threats. With congressional support, the Department of Defense
    will increase the Joint Forces' combat potential by continued
    investments in joint force readiness and force modernization, along
    with accelerated investments in artificial intelligence, machine
    learning, and other advanced technologies. These investments, combined
    with ally and partner cooperation, will enable optimizing our force
    structure to generate a combat credible Joint Force capable of
    deterring or defeating adversaries.
        Question. In your view, how do the readiness challenges facing the
    DOD today and over the next 10 years impact the Department's
    requirements for force structure investments? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. Increased and stable funding over recent budget years has
    improved the Department's ability to restore military readiness. To
    sustain our readiness gains, we must balance force structure growth
    with the need to train, equip, and modernize the Services. If
    confirmed, I expect to review our continued investments in mobility,
    logistics, and force protection for Ground Combat Teams; Navy weapons
    procurement and fleet maintenance; and increased Air Force Ballistic
    Missile Systems and airborne intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, space, cyber and advanced
    technologies, to name a few.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you balance force structure and
    readiness demands, particularly with respect to rotational forces in
    the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR),
    against the imperative to modernize or restructure forces currently in
    our inventory to meet NDS requirements?
        Answer. I believe we can better calibrate United States military
    presence in the Middle East, and its impacts on the military broadly,
    to ensure we rebuild the readiness and modernization of the Joint Force
    as well as provide opportunities to employ the force in other theaters.
    Historical levels of force commitments to the CENTCOM theater, if
    sustained over time, will have progressively more negative impacts on
    force readiness, recapitalization, and the pace and scale of future
    capability development. The United States should draw on all tools, not
    just U.S. military force posture, to secure U.S. interests in the
    CENTCOM theater. Key to this intent will be working by, with, and
    through our partners in the region. If confirmed, I will review U.S.
    force presence globally to ensure it is properly balanced with global
    mission demands and the health of the Joint Force.
        Question. Do you assess that the continuing deployment of
    significant capabilities to the CENTCOM AOR has produced or consumed
    readiness of U.S. Armed Forces?
        Answer. In many cases, yes--the continued deployment of significant
    capabilities to the CENTCOM AOR or indeed to any operational area
    consumes some readiness of our forces. That is to be expected. As we
    build readiness, we must closely monitor the deployment decisions we
    make today, to assess the impacts those decisions will have on our
    ability to operate effectively in the future.
        Question. Anticipating constant or declining defense budgets going
    forward, and if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, how would you
    prioritize the needs for continued readiness, force structure, and
    modernization?
        Answer. Under any resourcing level, the Department must balance
    readiness, force structure, modernization, and competitive compensation
    levels while pursuing efficiencies and savings through organizational
    reform and critical reviews of ongoing missions and activities. If the
    Department's resourcing levels prove to be relatively ``flat'' in the
    coming years, we would need to prioritize modernization of combat-
    credible forces and deterrent capability, particularly where leveraging
    advanced technology to ensure the U.S. Joint Force maintains a
    competitive edge in key domains and warfighting functions, such as in
    space, 6th generation air power, cyber, undersea warfare, and long-
    range fires. Doing so under flattening budgets may mean accepting some
    level of increased risk in the near-term readiness, and greater
    divestment of legacy force structure, in order to avoid a larger but
    increasingly obsolete future force.
        Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
    components across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and
    training to execute OPLANs in support of the 2018 NDS?
        Answer. Our Armed Forces are manned, trained, equipped, and ready
    to answer the nation's call, as the most capable military in the
    history of the world. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Congress to focus on improving readiness in all facets (Personnel,
    Equipment/Materiel, and Training) to ensure our forces stand ready to
    execute Operation/Contingency plans in support of the priorities of the
    NDS.
        Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Military
    Departments and Services and the Combatant Commands have accepted in
    regard to their readiness to execute OPLANs in furtherance of the 2018
    NDS?
        Answer. While I do not have access to all the classified
    information I would have if confirmed, I believe the Department of
    Defense has the necessary capability, capacity, and readiness to
    implement the NDS priorities and contend with today's threats, while
    minimizing unnecessary risk to our warfighters wherever possible. The
    threat environment continues to evolve, particularly with respect to
    China's and Russia's growing abilities to contest United States
    military advantages. If confirmed, I will assess risk across all
    domains in an iterative, collective, and collaborative effort,
    supported by the Military Departments, the Services, and the Combatant
    Commands.
        Question. DOD and Congress have often lacked an adequate
    understanding of trends in the readiness of the Armed Forces, owing to
    the difficulty of measuring readiness. This makes it particularly
    difficult to consider trade-offs among the Military Departments.
        If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to improve the
    Department's definition of specific readiness metrics and the
    overarching assessment and reporting on readiness trends?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue and reinforce the efforts
    currently underway to reform how readiness is tracked and reported.
    This includes the formulation of metrics to convey complex aggregations
    of data in context, consistent with the way forces are actually
    employed, that will allow for better management of the current and
    future force. I will also seek to employ advances in the fields of data
    science to make our data more strategically informative and help us
    develop predictive readiness models to anticipate, and ultimately avoid
    readiness shortfalls.
                            national security budget
        Question. In its 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission recommended that Congress increase the defense budget at an
    average rate of three to five percent above inflation through the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Former Secretaries of Defense
    Mattis and Esper agreed with that recommendation.
        Do you agree with the conclusion of the NDS Commission that
    sustained real growth in the defense budget is necessary to achieve the
    aims of the current NDS without incurring significant additional risk?
        Answer. Resources are an important part of generating the
    capability to achieve our national security goals, but that capability
    also depends on wise planning, leadership, effective training, and
    other factors. My goal will be to use the resources available to the
    Department wisely to realize the strategic aims of the Department and
    ensure the nation has the military capabilities to compete and win.
    Given the likely budget impact of COVID-19, DOD must be fiscally
    pragmatic and be prepared for modest growth in the coming years.
        Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
    adequacy of the defense budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would measure the adequacy of the
    Department's funding by our ability to defend this nation--to execute
    our chosen strategy, maintain the nation's technological edge, preserve
    the health of the joint force, and provide options to the President
    that support his foreign policy and defense goals. As part of the
    framework to measure the sufficiency of our resourcing I would also
    revisit with the Chairman the way we assess, discuss, measure, and
    convey risk--a process that is fundamental to informing our
    recommendations regarding the adequacy of funding.
        Question. Many observers have suggested that that the current level
    of defense spending is not sustainable in the long term given the many
    priorities the nation faces.
        Do you believe the DOD budget request should be based only on
    strategic considerations or should it also account for fiscal factors
    unrelated to the NDS? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe budgets should match resources to strategic
    national priorities and must strive to maximize our capabilities. At
    the same time, budgets for any agency, including DOD, are subject to
    fiscal realities. That is why it is important to set priorities and
    make hard choices to preserve and expand the competitive advantage we
    have against our great power adversaries.
        Question. The fiscal year 2022 budget will be the first in a decade
    debated outside the context of the statutory Budget Control Act (BCA).
    Defense spending under the Budget Control Act decreased by less than
    half of the $1 trillion that had been projected pre-BCA. However, the
    relationship between absolute spending levels and the stability and
    certainty of funding availability remains poorly understood.
        Acknowledging the need for stable, predictable, and adequate
    funding, what are your recommendations, if any, for changing the method
    by which the Department of Defense develops its budgets?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to strike an appropriate balance
    in the budget request between the current and future health and
    requirements of the force. Stability and predictability in funding,
    which has been lacking during the Budget Control Act era, would
    certainly help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
    Department in managing its resources.
        Question. In your estimation, what do you perceive would be the
    effect on the ability of the joint force to achieve its objectives, of
    adding back--in the near future--DOD funding reduced under the Budget
    Control Act? Could the Department effectively and efficiently execute
    such resources?
        Answer. Realistically, the lost buying power associated with BCA
    reductions is lost. Moving forward, if confirmed, my immediate aim
    would be to balance the competing demands of carrying out the strategic
    objectives established by the President, while maintaining and
    strengthening our military in order to adapt to changing threats.
        The Department would always seek to wisely apply additional
    resources. If confirmed, my priorities would include increasing the
    readiness of our force, and ensuring its effective employment in
    accomplishing the missions directed by the Commander-in-Chief. Both the
    executive and legislative branches must strive to gain the greatest
    possible return to our national security for every tax dollar invested,
    whether that is in the Department of Defense or in other elements of
    our national power.
        Question. Many observers assert that the only way to force DOD
    leaders to make the ``hard choices'' to divest of lower priority or
    underperforming programs, is to constrain the Department fiscally.
        Do you believe that this approach leads to more effective and
    efficient decision-making by DOD leaders?
        Answer. There will always be fiscal constraints. Given the fragile
    state of our economy and the large deficits required to combat the
    impact of COVID, I expect fiscal pressure going forward. Despite such
    pressures, both the Department and the Congress have struggled at times
    with divesting legacy or lower priority programs to make way for
    important new investments. Given the scope of the challenges we face,
    Congress and the Department will need to work together to make some
    hard choices.
        Question. In your view, what are the effects of the BCA and
    headquarters cuts on the ability of the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense to make policy for, and oversee policy implementation across,
    all components of the Department of Defense?
        Answer. The mandatory headquarters cuts undertaken over the past
    decade have effectively cut the OSD civilian workforce by 25 percent.
    The fiscal year 2021 congressional marks will further shrink OSD's
    professional staff. This significant reduction has degraded the
    organization's ability to pursue effective policy-implementation for
    the expansive national security mission. Sustained cuts have narrowed
    OSD's hiring pipeline, weakening the organization's ability to compete
    for talented recent graduates. It has also challenged OSD's ability to
    bring diverse perspectives to recommended defense policies. If
    confirmed, I will direct a review of current staffing levels to
    determine the billets and resources we need to maintain a sufficiently
    sized professional civilian staff in OSD relative to our national
    security mission sets. If I determine that a lack of billets or funding
    for civilian pay is hindering the ability of OSD to make policy and
    oversee policy implementation across the Department, I will identify to
    Congress any additional unfunded requirements identified during my
    review.
        The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process
    has remained fundamentally unchanged since its inception more than half
    a century ago.
        Question. Do you believe the PPBE process results in the proper
    allocation of resources according to the strategic priorities at the
    Department of Defense?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the PPBE process provides an
    effective, neutral, and open framework to allow the leadership of the
    Department, including the Secretary, to make well-informed choices
    about resource allocation in support of the Department's strategic
    priorities. I am committed to ensuring this process works effectively
    and, if confirmed, will seek to make any necessary adjustments to meet
    the nation's defense needs.
        Question. What changes would you make, if any, to the PPBE process
    to improve both resourcing decisions within DOD and information flow
    about those decisions to the Congress?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work in partnership with the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense and other Department leaders to ensure that the
    PPBE process is effective in aligning resources to the defense
    strategy. This includes identifying analytically-informed strategic
    choices about the size and shape of the future force. Effective
    communication with Congress is critical to ensuring our nation's
    defense needs are met. If confirmed, I will review the Department's
    communication process with the intent to ensure information flow to the
    Congress is both timely and effective.
        I understand the Congress directed the Department, in the newly-
    enacted Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021
    to enhance the capabilities of the budget liaison offices in the Office
    of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the services. That
    initiative will be an important part of ensuring an effective
    communication flow regarding the budget.
        Question. In recent years, several observers have asserted that
    relative detachment of the combatant commanders from the PPBE process
    results in inadequate treatment of combatant commander priorities.
        If confirmed, do you believe that the PPBE process could be
    improved to more accurately reflect the resourcing requirements of the
    combatant commands, especially for joint requirements that are not high
    priorities for the individual military departments? If so, how?
        Answer. Having served as both a combatant commander and as a
    service vice chief, I understand the different needs and perspectives
    each brings to the PPBE debates inside the Department. Assessing and
    resourcing the requirements of the Combatant Commands is a critical
    component of the PPBE process. It is my understanding that these
    requirements are currently integrated via multiple channels in the PPBE
    process and assessed based on their ability to meet the Department's
    defense goals. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that Combatant
    Command needs are fully and fairly reviewed as the Department builds
    its input to the President's Budget.
        If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring Combatant Command needs
    are fully assessed as the Department builds its input to the
    President's Budget and will leverage existing PPBE inputs, such as
    Integrated Priority Lists to properly understand the resourcing
    requirements of the combatant commands. I will also rely on the
    Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice on
    the priority of joint requirements.
        Question. Former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated, ``If you don't
    fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.''
        What are your views on the role of the State Department and other
    non-DOD departments and agencies in achieving U.S. national security
    objectives?
        Answer. Based on my 40 years of experience, I firmly believe that
    contributions of non-DOD departments and agencies are fundamental to
    achieving U.S. national security objectives. I believe there are few
    national security issues that can be properly addressed by only one
    agency of the government. Most require some level of interagency
    cooperation, and in my view, our diplomats should be in the lead for
    issues related to America's interests around the world. The Department
    of Defense should not and cannot alone address the many complex
    security challenges confronting this Nation. The military must at all
    times work in concert with all elements of national power--including
    diplomatic, economic, and intelligence activities--as part of a whole-
    of-government effort to address threats to the Homeland, our allies and
    partners, and our interests abroad. The Department of Defense should
    eagerly support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a peace,
    to persuade and convince recalcitrant leaders, and to advance our goals
    for regional security and stability. The use of military force should
    be a last resort after alternatives have been exhausted. If confirmed,
    I will work very closely with my interagency counterparts to ensure the
    Department of Defense is always nested within a broader U.S. Government
    approach.
        Question. Do you believe non-DOD departments and agencies have been
    sufficiently resourced to appropriately contribute to U.S. national
    security objectives?
        Answer. It is imperative that non-DOD departments and agencies
    receive sufficient funding to be able to contribute their respective
    parts in addressing the complex array of security challenges
    confronting this Nation. I do not believe current funding levels for
    security assistance and development programs are pacing the challenges
    posed by China and others in these areas. The Department of Defense
    alone cannot shoulder this burden--the Department's success requires
    its interagency partners to be resourced sufficiently. Each department
    and agency leader must act with responsible fiscal stewardship as he or
    she sets resource requirements for respective missions in the context
    of the overall National Security Strategy. If confirmed, I would look
    to these leaders to determine the appropriate resource levels for their
    departments and agencies and would partner with them to advocate for
    sufficient funding.
                                chain of command
        Question. In accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, the President and
    Secretary of Defense exercise authority, direction, and control of the
    Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One
    branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to
    the combatant commanders for the execution of missions with forces
    assigned to their commands. For purposes of organizing, training, and
    equipping forces, the chain of command runs from the President, to the
    Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Do you believe this dual structure provides for clear and effective
    chain of command?
        Answer. Yes, I do. I have worked in this dual structure at both
    Military Service and Joint commands, and believe it is both effective
    and clearly understood throughout the Department.
        Question. How could the effectiveness of each branch of the chain
    of command be improved, in your view?
        Answer. I have no specific recommendations to offer at this time.
    If confirmed, I will continuously consider the need for improvement to
    our chains of command, and will recommend them to the President and
    Congress as warranted.
                           the joint chiefs of staff
        Question. Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for fiscal year 2017 made changes to Section 151 of Title 10, U.
    S. Code, concerning the role of the Joint Chiefs as military advisors
    to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
        What is your assessment of the authorities and processes by which
    the Joint Chiefs provide military advice and opinions to the President,
    and the Secretary of Defense? What changes, if any, do you assess are
    required?
        Answer. I believe the authorities and processes established in 10
    U.S.C. Sec.  151, as enhanced by the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, are
    sufficient because they grant clear authority and responsibility to the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice and opinions to the
    President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
        I don't believe changes are required at this time.
        Question. What is your level of confidence that these authorities
    and processes will provide you, if confirmed as the Secretary of
    Defense, the best military advice, including ``minority opinions'' that
    may diverge from those of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the
    majority of members of the Joint Chiefs?
        Answer. I am highly confident that, if confirmed, the current
    process will provide me with military advice. I am equally confident
    the authorities and processes in 10 U.S.C. Sec.  151 ensure that when
    the advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs differs
    from that of the Chairman, the information will be provided to me,
    along with the reasoning behind the differences.
        Question. If confirmed, both the Secretary of Defense and the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would share the experience of
    having served as general officers in the U.S. Army. Under these
    circumstances, how would you ensure that the President benefits from
    the diversity of opinion and expertise required to optimally address
    tough national security problems?
        Answer. I will work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to ensure
    that the opinions and perspectives of the Joint Chiefs--particularly if
    they differ from his or my own--are presented to the President and get
    a full airing.
        Question. Do you commit, if confirmed, to always provide your best
    advice to the President, even when your advice and opinions might
    differ from those of other members of the Cabinet, the President's
    other senior advisors, or from the President's own views?
        Answer. I do.
           chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the joint staff
        Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser
    to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Pursuant to Section 163(a) of
    title 10, the President has directed that communications between the
    President or the Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the
    combatant commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff.
        If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will respect the independence
    of the Chairman, as stipulated in title 10, to provide his military
    advice to me and to the Commander-in-Chief. I will, of course, consult
    with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs as I develop U.S. defense policy
    and issue orders to the Joint Force. This will, I expect, require
    constant and frequent personal interaction with them.
        Question. If confirmed, would you modify the current duties and
    responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in any
    way? Are there any other duties and responsibilities you would consider
    assigning or delegating to the Chairman?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to lead the policy-making process
    through the statutory structure of the OSD staff, and I intend to
    execute my duties in the military chain of command--including the
    issuance of operational orders--with the full benefit of the advice and
    counsel of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant
    Commanders. I do not believe that performing these duties requires any
    modifications to the current duties and responsibilities of the
    Chairman.
        I do not envision any such changes at this time.
        Question. If confirmed, what timeline would you assess to be
    appropriate for the Department's development, programming, and
    implementation of the joint operating concepts required by the NDS?
        Answer. I understand that the Department is working on development
    of a Joint Warfighting Concept, with a first iteration due this spring.
    If confirmed, I will review the progress to date on this effort, to
    include the independent assessments of it, to determine what follow-on
    concept work is needed to ensure a strategy-driven and joint approach
    to future warfighting, and identify a timeline that ensures the overall
    concept is backed by solid analysis and can usefully inform future
    joint and Service capability investments.
        Question. In your view, is the Joint Staff appropriately
    structured, resourced, and experienced to adjudicate competing
    interests among combatant commands if the U.S. became engaged in
    significant combat operations against a strategic competitor? If not,
    what organization do you believe should make decisions about the
    strategic tradeoffs required in such a situation?
        Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff is trained and capable to present what
    would be a surge of competing requests before and during significant
    combat operations. The process of gathering risk, to both mission and
    force, and to present a strategic picture of associated tradeoffs is a
    core competency of the Joint Staff.
                             use of military force
        Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
    recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
        Answer. The decision to use military force is one of the most
    consequential decisions a President can make. In evaluating whether to
    recommend the use of military force, I would consider a number of
    factors, including: the nature of the threat and vital national
    interests at stake; whether the United States would be acting alone or
    with others; the risk to force and to mission; whether the proposed
    action complies with applicable domestic and international law,
    including the principles of necessity and proportionality; whether
    there is a defined and achievable military end-state; and whether non-
    military means that could sufficiently address the threat have been
    exhausted.
        Question. In your view, is a ``new'' Authorization for the Use of
    Military Force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review current congressional
    Authorizations for Use of Military Force with the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff and provide the President with my recommendations.
        Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
    determining which forces of other nations are eligible for collective
    self-defense by U.S. Forces, and under what conditions? What
    limitations, if any, would you seek to impose on the provision of
    collective self-defense by U.S. Forces?
        Answer. It is fundamental that the United States stands by our
    partners and allies. When U.S. Forces have the authority to protect our
    partners from attack or imminent threat of attack, it can: help achieve
    mission objectives; bolster the protection of U.S. Forces and
    facilities operating abroad; help maintain the resolve of partners that
    U.S. Forces work by, with, and through to address mutual threats; and
    ensure the United States furthers important national interests,
    including its commitments in mutual defense agreements. If confirmed, I
    would consider these and other factors in assessing whether U.S. Forces
    should be authorized to defend particular foreign partner forces.
        Rules of engagement authorizing U.S. Forces to defend foreign
    partner forces should clearly identify the particular partners eligible
    for such protection and whether any limits exist on the groups or
    individuals against which such force may be used. Any use of force in
    defense of foreign partner forces must also be necessary and
    proportionate to address the particular hostile act or demonstration of
    hostile intent.
        Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it
    appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational
    command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
    established under title 10, U.S. Code?
        Answer. The Commander-in-Chief always remains at the top of the
    chain of command, and the U.S. military operates under U.S. control.
    Military capabilities may, at times, need to be made temporarily
    available to support an activity of a department or agency other than
    the Department of Defense. Under such circumstances it may be
    appropriate for the head of another department or agency to direct
    operations while working with the Secretary of Defense. Further, U.S.
    military personnel are always subject to the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel
    to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? If
    confirmed, how would you modify these agreements or authorities, if at
    all?
        Answer. I understand that the necessary framework is in place for
    U.S. military personnel to conduct and support the activities of the
    Department of Defense and other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as
    the situation may require. I believe that the current framework is
    sufficient.
        If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work within the
    Department and with colleagues in other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies to adjust existing arrangements as the need arises.
        Question. According to the 2018 NDS, Dynamic Force Employment (DFE)
    will allow for the more ``flexibl[e] use [of] ready forces to shape
    proactively the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to
    respond to contingencies and ensure long-term warfighting readiness.''
        In your view, have past DFE operations had the desired effect in
    ``shaping the strategic environment''? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. By providing a more flexible mechanism to employ forces,
    DFE allows Commanders to capitalize on strategic opportunities to
    employ forces without a significant loss to readiness. A critical
    component of DFE is requiring Combatant Commands to assess how
    successfully a past DFE operation impacted the strategic environment.
        Question. In your view, have past DFE operations promoted,
    strained, or degraded the long-term readiness of U.S. Forces?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2020, DFE operations likely promoted, or at
    least maintained, overall U.S. Force readiness. Forces that deploy in
    support of DFE operations maintain their combat readiness, while
    gaining valuable experience, and shape the strategic environment.
        Question. If confirmed as the Secretary of Defense, what factors
    would you consider in authorizing the use of particular forces to
    execute a DFE mission?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would consider the Combatant Command's
    justification for the requested unit (if specifically requested) or
    capability and how its employment meets national strategic objectives,
    as well as the requested unit's readiness, previous recent DFE
    operations, and a summary of costs for comparison to other DFE unit
    candidates.
                           alliances and partnerships
        Question. The 2018 NDS stresses that mutually beneficial alliances
    and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition with,
    deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic
    competitors.
        What is your view of the continuing strength of our current
    alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners
    have in the willingness of the U.S. to meet its obligations? If
    confirmed, how would you enhance that trust?
        Answer. The United States' global network of alliances and
    partnerships is a strategic advantage our competitors cannot match, but
    it is one that has been undermined in recent years due to inconsistent
    statements about U.S. commitments, seemingly erratic decision making,
    and insufficient consultation on important issues. If we take our
    allies for granted, we squander our greatest strategic asset; we must
    rebuild and modernize our alliances and partnerships. By working
    together with allies and partners and aligning our defense priorities,
    the United States has the best chance to protect its security
    interests, by maintaining favorable balances of power that deter
    aggression, support stability, and favor democratic values and economic
    growth. If confirmed, I will take steps to mend and strengthen this
    critical advantage.
        If confirmed, I will make it a priority to rebuild strong defense
    relationships with our allies and partners around the world. I would
    direct the Department to pursue tangible, sustainable measures to
    strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships in ways that
    bolster our ability to deter aggression, and if necessary, fight and
    win as interoperable coalitions. More broadly, I would seek to ensure
    the Department, in concert with U.S. interagency partners, is able to
    engage more comprehensively with ally and partner security
    establishments, to act decisively to meet shared security challenges. I
    believe the Department should focus on strengthening its defense
    relationships based on a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility,
    shared priorities, and mutual accountability.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant
    commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to focus my attention on engaging
    with key allies and partners, focusing DOD efforts on strengthening
    collaborative planning, and increasing interoperability. I would strive
    to align the Department's priorities and synchronize the employment of
    the Department's security cooperation resources to help allies and
    partners develop their defense establishments and military forces.
    Also, if confirmed, I would confer with my staff in the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense and geographic Combatant Commanders on how best to
    enhance their efforts to strengthen defense relationships in their
    areas of responsibility, consistent with the strategic priorities I
    identify.
        Question. If confirmed, on which leaders and forums would you focus
    your engagement, with a view to advancing most effectively U.S.
    national security interests?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize engaging leaders and
    forums most relevant to U.S. interests, especially as articulated in
    the National Defense Strategy and the Guidance on Development of Allies
    and Partners. I would rely on my team in the Office of the
    Undersecretary of Defense for Policy for recommendations on timing and
    specifics of these engagements.
                         u.s. africa command (africom)
        Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
    required to compete for the vast majority of its U.S. Forces in the
    global force management process.
        What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
    forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
    Campaign Plan, the NDS, and other emergency requirements?
        Answer. The approach to work by, with, and through United States
    partners to achieve security and stability in Africa has been effective
    with a limited forward presence. This includes using the full breadth
    of our title 10, chapter 16, security cooperation authorities to enable
    our African partners. Key to this approach is also DOD's strategic
    focus on building African partner nation institutions and capabilities
    while supporting efforts of other international partners with an
    interest in facilitating security and stability on the continent.
    However, I have not seen the full posture laydown, and if confirmed, I
    will conduct a global force posture review to ensure our posture is in
    line with our strategy. That will include examining the impact of the
    Trump Administration's redeployment of forces from Somalia.
        Question. Are there any changes you would implement to the
    allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?
        Answer. DOD assets have been allocated based on the priorities set
    out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and my understanding
    is that the Department's fiscal year 2021 allocations for AFRICOM are
    aligned with that strategy. If confirmed, I will consider the Combatant
    Commander's requirements and requests for forces, and assess risk,
    based on changes in the strategic environment and the direction
    provided in the national security and defense strategies.
        Question. What should be the primary objectives of the DOD
    specifically, and the United States more broadly, in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. DOD's priorities in Africa are countering 1) violent
    extremist organizations (VEOs) that threaten the Homeland and United
    States national security interests and 2) competitors such as China and
    Russia. The Department's activities in the AFRICOM AOR contribute to
    the whole-of-government effort to combat transnational threats to U.S.
    national security interests. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
    Department works closely with other U.S. Departments and agencies to
    properly align its efforts with other agencies that are advancing
    lasting peace and security on the continent. I will also coordinate, as
    appropriate, with our allies and partners to achieve our national
    security objectives.
        Question. What is your assessment of United States counterterrorism
    strategies in the AFRICOM AOR, particularly those in East Africa, North
    Africa, and the Sahel? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you
    propose to these strategies?
        Answer. My understanding is that the current strategy is to disrupt
    and degrade priority threats to the U.S. Homeland, our interests, and
    our allies and partners. A key element in the Department's approach is
    collaborating with our allies and partners on areas of shared interest,
    which is an area where we can improve. Across East Africa, the Sahel,
    and North Africa, a whole-of-government approach to address the drivers
    of extremism will remain a central pillar of our strategy. If
    confirmed, I will assess our counterterrorism strategies both in the
    AFRICOM AOR and more broadly.
        Given the threat posed by terrorist organizations in Africa, the
    Department would continue to prioritize degrading and disrupting the al
    Qaeda and ISIS affiliates that pose direct threats to the United States
    Homeland and U.S. personnel. If confirmed, I will prioritize
    collaborating with and enabling partners to combat shared threats so
    that, over time, the majority of the effort and resourcing shifts to
    partners and/or multilateral efforts.
        Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
    Russia and China in Africa? In what areas, if any, do these oppose U.S.
    and partner objectives?
        Answer. Over the past five years, Russia has increased its
    engagement with African nations to bolster global power projection,
    access raw materials, expand arms sales, and undermine Western
    influence. Russia views investment in Africa as part of its global
    influence strategy. China's strategic objectives in Africa include
    securing access to economic resources, opening new markets, and gaining
    operational military experience through peacekeeping and counter-piracy
    operations, while portraying it as a responsible global actor. I am
    also concerned about China and Russia's overseas military basing
    ambitions and the PLA's expanding global military presence. The PRC has
    a well-established air and naval base in Djibouti, which they continue
    to expand, and is also looking for other African basing locations
    including along the Atlantic coast. China also uses multilateral forums
    and international organizations like the Belt and Road Forum to
    generate new opportunities to strengthen its political influence,
    promote strategic messaging that portrays it as a responsible global
    actor, advance its development interests, and limit outside
    interference in and criticism of its initiatives.
        Given Africa's diverse political, economic, social, and security
    landscape, it is difficult to generalize how Russia and China ``oppose
    partner objectives.'' However, we have seen how heavy-handed Russian
    private military companies' operations in Mozambique, Central African
    Republic, and Libya have exacerbated local tensions and alienated
    members of the public. These actions undermine our efforts in African
    countries to promote civilian control of the Armed Forces,
    transparency, and accountability.
        Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the current
    United States strategy to compete against Russia and China and to be
    the security partner of choice in Africa? What changes, if any, would
    you recommend in this strategy, if confirmed?
        Answer. The current United States strategy focuses on African
    partnerships--building capacity, working toward shared objectives,
    operating transparently, and promoting institutions and good governance
    for sustainable security--while highlighting and exposing the dangers
    associated with dealing with China and Russia. DOD's competitive
    security edge lies primarily in (1) the superior quality of the
    equipment, training, education, and other security assistance we
    provide; and (2) our support to counterterrorism operations. In the
    face of motivated and capable competitors, we must work to enhance our
    ability not only to compete, but to win. This means continuing our
    whole-of-government commitment to stay engaged and develop partnerships
    and address mutual security concerns in Africa, which will critically
    involve other agencies strengthening their non-military tools.
        The Department has made notable progress implementing the National
    Defense Strategy to advance our lines of effort to compete with Russia
    and China in Africa. This includes enhancing our alliances and
    partnerships in Africa through efforts like the signing of the 10-year
    Roadmaps for Defense Cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia. If
    confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and advancing our strategies to
    protect and secure United States interests in Africa.
        Question. The redacted report of the Army's investigation into the
    2017 incident in Niger found `` . . . several problems with the advise,
    assist, and accompany activity. Exercised conservatively, with advisors
    remaining far from the fight, advising higher echelon commanders,
    [activities] could be executed in accordance with Presidential Policy.
    Exercised aggressively, with [accompanying] U.S. advisors . . . the
    direct actions of our partners cannot be distinguished from U.S. direct
    action. U.S. provision of `advice and assistance' looks more like U.S.
    direct combat operations that are not reported that way to Congress . .
    . ''
        In light of these findings, if confirmed, how would ensure that
    advise, assist, and accompany activities are executed in a manner
    consistent with Presidential Policy and are reported in a timely manner
    to Congress, as mandated by law and policy?
        Answer. I understand that over the last year, DOD has reviewed the
    training Special Operations Forces Soldiers receive and that they
    provide to partner forces, which reinforces their proper roles as
    foreign partner advisors during counterterrorism operations. By
    incorporating lessons learned from the Niger ambush across all Service
    Components, USSOCOM has ensured that SOF operators have an
    understanding of the expectations and limitations of working ``by,
    with, and through'' partner forces. Furthermore, the Department honors
    its congressional reporting requirements and remains committed to
    fulfilling the responsibilities and requirements as mandated by law and
    policy. If confirmed, I will be committed to providing the committees
    with timely, appropriate, and sufficiently detailed information,
    consistent with congressional direction.
        Question. In light of these findings, if confirmed, how would you
    seek to clarify the roles and policies governing U.S. advisory efforts,
    particularly in support of partners operating outside areas of active
    hostilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that any limitations on
    the role of U.S. advisory efforts, particularly in support of partners
    in locations where U.S. Forces do not have authority to conduct direct
    action, are communicated clearly and implemented in a disciplined
    manner, as needed.
                         u.s. central command (centcom)
        Question. In your opinion, to what extent does achieving United
    States national security interests in the Middle East require a
    continuous United States military presence, and in your view is the
    current U.S. Force presence appropriately sized? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. The Middle East remains critical to our national security
    interests. It is important for the Department to review its military
    posture in the Middle East to ensure we are prepared to defend against
    threats to the Homeland and respond to contingencies, without
    compromising focus on our global strategy and military readiness. Our
    posture also provides opportunities for security cooperation with our
    partners in the region, as we seek to strengthen their military
    capabilities and build interoperability to meet our shared objectives.
    If confirmed, I will review our force posture in the Middle East to
    ensure it is properly balanced with global requirements and the health
    of the joint force.
        Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
    with U.S. partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the
    CENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. Given global threats and the U.S. role in the world,
    burden-sharing with our partners and allies must be a central element
    in the Department's approach in the Middle East. As our partners
    continue to expand their defense capabilities, we should explore
    greater opportunities to work by, with, and through them to address
    mutual threats. The Department of State and the Department of Defense
    should work together in this effort, as we seek more partners who share
    our values to bear the collective burden of international security,
    while also accounting for good governance and human rights principles
    through training and institutional capacity building, There are already
    strong examples of this, such as the International Maritime Construct
    to secure freedom of navigation in the region, the Global Coalition to
    Defeat ISIS, as well as NATO, which I understand is now assuming a
    direct and expanding role in supporting Iraqi Security Forces and
    continuing its important role in Afghanistan.
        Question. What threat does increased Chinese and Russian
    involvement in the Middle East pose to United States operations and
    interests and to what extent does a continuous U.S. presence counter
    their involvement? In your view, what other policy tools might be
    useful in this regard?
        Answer. China and Russia seek to expand their influence in the
    Middle East and are increasingly using defense sales to try to drive a
    wedge between us and our long-time partners. Russia, in particular,
    seeks to reshape Middle East security structures and expand its
    regional influence by exploiting vacuums of governance and creating
    frozen conflicts to increase Russian leverage and influence,
    unconstrained by respect for international rules and norms. Chinese
    economic activity and technology transfers--coupled with a
    corresponding but as yet smaller expansion of its military footprint
    and collection capabilities--is growing Chinese influence across the
    region. The Chinese seek to apply their economic power to exploit
    weakened or failing economies in the Middle East. These actions put
    U.S. influence--military, diplomatic, and economic--at risk. If
    confirmed, I will review our force presence to ensure it is properly
    balanced to address the broad range of challenges in the Middle East--
    including from China and Russia--with global requirements and the
    health of the joint force.
    Afghanistan
        Question. What are the current United States national security
    objectives in Afghanistan, and what is your understanding of the
    current strategy to achieve them?
        Answer. President-elect Biden has pledged to bring the war in
    Afghanistan to a responsible end. In doing so, the focus will be on
    ensuring that terrorist groups--al Qaeda and the Islamic State Khorasan
    Province--are not allowed to threaten our Homeland again. The incoming
    Administration will support the peace process between the Afghan
    Government and the Taliban with a high-level, robust diplomatic effort.
    That effort will aim to help the Afghan Government and the Taliban
    reach a durable political settlement and a ceasefire. If confirmed, I
    will look closely at the current and future United States military
    footprint in Afghanistan. In the near-term, if confirmed, I will work
    with the President-elect to ensure that our forces have the ability to
    continue their core missions of counterterrorism, and support for
    Afghan forces effectively and safely.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes to the United States military
    strategy in Afghanistan would you recommend?
        Answer. Before making any recommendations about the United States
    military strategy in Afghanistan, if confirmed, I will seek the advice
    of Office of the Secretary of Defense experts, United States military
    leadership, and our Resolute Support coalition partners to assess the
    military campaign in Afghanistan and its role in supporting Department
    of State-led efforts to end the war on terms favorable to the United
    States. Changes in the U.S. military strategy should complement and
    support diplomatic efforts.
        Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in
    Afghanistan be tied to the achievement of conditions on the ground? If
    so, what specific conditions do you believe to be prerequisite to
    reducing or eliminating U.S. military presence there?
        Answer. I believe troop levels should always be commensurate with
    the strategy we are executing and to the achievement of our national
    security goals. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of Office of the
    Secretary of Defense experts, U.S. military leadership, and our
    Resolute Support coalition partners to assess the military campaign in
    Afghanistan and its role in supporting Department of State-led efforts
    to end the war on terms favorable to the United States. I take
    seriously the concerns senior military officials have expressed about
    the Taliban and current levels of violence in Afghanistan. I also
    understand from discussions during the transition that at current troop
    levels, we are able to conduct our core missions of counterterrorism
    and support to Afghan security forces.
        I believe troop levels should always be commensurate with the
    strategy we are executing and to the achievement of our national
    security goals. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of Office of the
    Secretary of Defense experts, U.S. military leadership, and our
    Resolute Support coalition partners to assess the military campaign in
    Afghanistan and its role in supporting Department of State-led efforts
    to end the war on terms favorable to the United States.
        Question. What is your understanding of Taliban fulfillment of
    their commitments under the February 2020 United States-Taliban
    Agreement to date?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Taliban's continued
    participation in Afghanistan Peace Negotiations helps to fulfill a key
    element of the United States-Taliban Agreement. I understand that the
    Taliban have also made specific commitments regarding counterterrorism,
    including to break ties with al Qaida, and reducing violence. Violence
    levels have been far too high throughout the ongoing peace process. If
    confirmed, I intend to consult with interagency stakeholders to review
    the Taliban's actions relative to all its commitments.
        Question. What changes in United States force posture, if any,
    would you recommend to prepare for the potential that the Taliban fail
    to meet their commitments by the May 2021 deadline outlined in the
    Agreement?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States retains all
    options for changes in United States force posture, depending on an
    evaluation of the Afghan Peace Negotiations and United States national
    security objectives in Afghanistan. I will work with Congress to ensure
    that the United States military and our Afghan partners have the
    capacity and capability necessary to protect United States personnel,
    our allies and partners, and our interests.
        Question. Given the failure to meet the authorized force level of
    352,000, are current target end strengths for the Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) achievable, in your assessment?
        Answer. My understanding is that the 352,000 force level is the
    maximum number of ANDSF personnel that the international community has
    committed to fund. I also understand the ANDSF end strength has
    remained between 85 and 90 percent of this ceiling for several years
    because of high casualty rates and challenges with recruiting and
    retention. I understand that maintaining the authorized force level at
    352,000 is important to allow DOD and the Afghan Government the
    flexibility to reconfigure forces, such as absorbing personnel from the
    recently disbanded Afghan Local Police, which as I recall were not part
    of the 352,000 force level. If confirmed, I will review the ANDSF Plan
    of Record to ensure the ANDSF force structure is sufficient to meet
    shared objectives.
        Question. In your view, do current Afghan security forces have the
    capability and capacity to project security and stability throughout
    Afghanistan in 2021 and beyond? If not, what changes to U.S. efforts to
    develop and sustain the ANDSF would you recommend?
        Answer. My understanding is that Afghan security forces have the
    capability and capacity to project security and stability in
    Afghanistan in 2021 and beyond with United States and international
    financial and advisory support. The Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special
    Security Forces have proven particularly effective but still rely on
    certain international assistance.
        If confirmed, I will review what adjustments may be required to
    develop and sustain the ANDSF through the ANDSF Plan of Record as
    conditions evolve.
        Question. In your view, what role should DOD play in supporting
    intra-Afghan negotiations?
        Answer. DOD should continue to support Department of State-led
    efforts in support of Afghanistan Peace Negotiations, particularly on
    matters related to the security of Afghanistan.
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of Afghanistan's
    neighbors--Pakistan, in particular--in this negotiation process?
        Answer. Pakistan is an essential partner in any peace process in
    Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will encourage a regional approach that
    garners support from neighbors like Pakistan, while also deterring
    regional actors, from serving as spoilers to the Afghanistan peace
    process.
        Question. In your opinion, what is the role of the Taliban with
    regard to counterterrorism efforts against ISIS? Against al Qaeda?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Taliban committed in the
    February 29, 2020 agreement with the United States to prevent any group
    from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the
    United States and our allies. This includes ISIS-Khorasan, which
    maintains a presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban must live up to its
    commitments. Regardless of Taliban actions, the United States should
    protect itself from terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and
    should reserve the right to take any action necessary to ensure its
    security.
        The Taliban have longstanding ties to al Qaeda. The Taliban have
    agreed to take concrete steps to ensure that al Qaeda never again is
    able to use Afghanistan's soil to threaten the security of the United
    States or our allies. If confirmed, I will review the Taliban's
    progress toward implementing their commitments with regard to al Qaeda.
    Pakistan
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in regard to
    security assistance programs, including International Military
    Education and Training?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on our shared interests which
    include training future Pakistan military leaders through the use of
    International Military Education and Training funds. Pakistan will play
    an important role in any political settlement in Afghanistan. We also
    need to work with Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda and the Islamic State
    Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and to enhance regional stability.
        Question. Have you perceived any change in Pakistan's cooperation
    with the United States since the United States decision to withhold
    security assistance to Pakistan in September 2018?
        Answer. I understand Pakistan has taken constructive steps to meet
    United States requests in support of the Afghanistan peace process.
    Pakistan has also taken steps against anti-Indian groups, such as
    Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, although this progress is
    incomplete. Many factors in addition to the security assistance
    suspension may impact Pakistan's cooperation, including Afghanistan
    negotiations and the dangerous escalation following the Pulwama
    terrorist attack.
        Question. In your view, what tools and options are available to the
    United States to ensure that Pakistan is not used as a sanctuary for
    militants and violent extremist organizations (VEOs)?
        Answer. Pakistan is a sovereign nation. If confirmed, I will press
    Pakistan to prevent its territory from being used as a sanctuary for
    militants and violent extremist organizations. Continuing to build
    relationships with Pakistan's military will provide openings for the
    United States and Pakistan to cooperate on key issues.
    Syria and Iraq
        Question. What is your understanding of current United States
    strategy and objectives in Syria?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the military mission in Syria
    is to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and that the broader objective
    of United States Government policy is a peaceful resolution to the
    Syrian conflict in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
    2254.
        Question. From a DOD perspective, what must be done to ensure the
    enduring defeat of ISIS? What non-military efforts are needed for the
    enduring defeat of ISIS?
        Answer. It is in our interest that local partners have the capacity
    and capability to counter ISIS' efforts to regain territory and acquire
    resources and revenue. It is also in our interest to enable DOD's
    interagency partners to address the underlying political, economic, and
    social grievances that ISIS seeks to exploit. If confirmed, I will
    review the progress to date, develop options, and provide my
    recommendations to the President.
        The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
    play a critical role in countering ISIS and al Qaeda. It is my
    understanding that United States and Coalition forces have been working
    to develop the capacity of these local partner forces and are now
    focused on enabling the ISF and SDF to conduct successful counter-ISIS
    operations independently.
        Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
    Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in countering ISIS and al
    Qaeda?
        Answer. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic
    Forces (SDF) play a critical role in countering ISIS and al Qaeda. It
    is my understanding that United States and Coalition forces have been
    working to develop the capacity of these local partner forces and are
    now focused on enabling the ISF and SDF to conduct successful counter-
    ISIS operations independently.
        Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
    be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
    what conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the
    President on future troop levels in Syria?
        Answer. I understand the Department of Defense mission in Syria is
    to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. The capacity of local partner
    forces to thwart ISIS's effort to regain territory and acquire
    resources and revenue independently over the long term is a critical
    condition. If confirmed, I will evaluate our strategy and conditions
    for progress in Syria.
        U.S. Force levels are determined by the requisite capabilities to
    achieve the directed mission, including force protection requirements
    based on the threat and risk assessment. With a variety of forces
    operating in a complex environment, those threat and risk perceptions
    may fluctuate. If confirmed, I will review DOD's strategy,
    capabilities, and conditions in Syria, and provide my recommendations
    to the President.
        Question. In your view, do United States troops in Syria help
    ``push back'' on Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle East? What
    do you perceive to be the risks and benefits, if any, of such U.S.
    presence?
        Answer. I understand the Department of Defense (DOD) mission in
    Syria is to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS. With the confluence of
    numerous actors in the region, it is important that all militaries
    conduct themselves in a professional manner and that we de-conflict our
    movements to ensure our forces are protected.
        Unless pressure is maintained against ISIS, its re-emergence
    remains a real possibility. United States and Coalition forces operate
    by, with, and through local partner forces to achieve the enduring
    defeat of ISIS. The Defeat-ISIS campaign in Syria is made more complex
    by the presence of other threats and destabilizing forces in the region
    beyond ISIS and al Qaeda, including Russian, Iranian, and other pro-
    Syrian regime forces, as well as the need to balance our relationship
    with Turkey.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
    strategy and objectives in Iraq?
        Answer. I remain concerned about the threat ISIS poses inside Iraq
    and beyond. I support maintaining a small number of United States
    troops to carry out a limited mission focused on advising and assisting
    Iraqi counter-terrorism forces to deal with the continuing threat from
    ISIS so that it cannot reemerge to again threaten the American people
    or our partners. Beyond the safety of our own people, this is our
    priority security mission in Iraq. The United States is in Iraq by
    invitation, to help Iraqis prevent the reemergence of ISIS. We will
    work with the Iraqi Government to ensure that the United States
    military presence and its activities are respectful of Iraq's
    sovereignty.
    Iran
        Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
    United States security strategy with respect to Iran? What is the role
    of the U.S. military in this strategy?
        Answer. I understand that the United States security strategy for
    Iran aims to ensure that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon; protect
    our citizens, personnel and interests from Iranian threats; counter
    Iran's destabilizing activity through diplomacy and deterrence and by
    working closely with our allies and regional partners; and more broadly
    preserve unity of effort among allies and partners in the Middle East.
        The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in the United
    States Iran strategy by focusing on deterring and, if necessary,
    defending against the military threats posed by Iran to our personnel
    and national interests, while broadly supporting regional stability
    through security cooperation and maintaining freedom of navigation.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
    posed by Iran?
        Answer. Iran poses a conventional and unconventional threat to the
    security of U.S. personnel and partners in the region. Conventional
    threats include ballistic missiles capable of hitting U.S. military
    facilities in the region and naval forces capable of threatening
    freedom of navigation in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Iran also
    employs unconventional activities, including cyber-attacks and
    intrusions, attacks on civilian shipping and energy infrastructure, and
    regional weapons proliferation. Iran also directs, trains, supplies,
    and funds militia groups across the region to advance Iran's interests,
    threaten United States partners, and undermine regional stability.
        Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
    currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
    necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
        Answer. If confirmed, this is an issue that I will assess in more
    detail with civilian and military leadership. The United States should
    draw on all tools, not just U.S. military force posture, to secure
    United States interests in the Middle East. The Department must balance
    readiness and force modernization requirements against the security
    situation in the region. If confirmed, I will review our force presence
    to ensure that it is properly balanced with global requirements and the
    health of the joint force.
                 multinational force & observers (mfo) in egypt
        Question. The United States is a significant contributor to the
    Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) in Egypt.
        In your view, what are the benefits of our participation in the
    MFO?
        Answer. U.S. participation in the Multinational Force and Observers
    (MFO) benefits U.S. security objectives in several ways. First, as a
    trusted partner of both Israel and Egypt, the United States military
    presence in the MFO provides ironclad reassurance to both parties. Both
    Egypt and Israel strongly support United States participation in the
    MFO; absent a strong and trusted arbiter capable of convening the two
    sides for dispute resolution, either party could choose to remilitarize
    along the border, increasing the potential of a miscalculation that
    could lead to overt conflict. Second, U.S. participation in the MFO
    demonstrates our leadership in the region as a reliable guarantor of
    regional stability. Such leadership bolsters U.S. credibility to pursue
    major diplomatic and security initiatives in the region and around the
    globe. Should the United States diminish its presence in the MFO, it is
    likely that other international contributors to the MFO would follow
    suit, potentially endangering the continuation of the mission. U.S.
    leadership and presence in the region likewise prevents more
    opportunistic competitors such as China and Russia from potentially
    taking advantage of a diminished United States presence.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate the
    advisability of any potential reduction in United States military
    participation in or support to the MFO?
        Answer. As with all decisions regarding force management levels, we
    must carefully consider how deployments affect the readiness of our
    military. The MFO relies upon high demand/low density personnel and
    equipment, including explosive ordnance disposal, aviation, logistics,
    legal, and medical career fields. The Department of Defense recognizes
    the need to prioritize investments of personnel and equipment across
    all of our vital national interests. Any consideration of changes to
    the level of United States support to the MFO would take into account
    potential impacts on the MFO, the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, United
    States obligations under applicable international agreements, and
    broader regional stability, and involve consultation with the United
    States Department of State, the governments of Egypt and Israel, and
    other international partners who contribute to the MFO.
                     united states european command (eucom)
    Implementation of the 2018 NDS
        Question. Do you believe the deterrent posture in Europe is
    sufficient to support the 2018 NDS and deter further Russian aggression
    in Europe?
        Answer. President-elect Biden pledged a comprehensive review of our
    global military posture relative to the threats we face and, if
    confirmed, I look forward to leading that effort and examining how that
    posture should change over time. While I have not yet fully reviewed
    our deterrent posture in Europe, I believe it must be a part of this
    review. If confirmed, I will also want this review to examine the Trump
    Administration decision to withdraw significant numbers of United
    States troops from Germany.
        Question. In your assessment, which capability and/or capacity
    shortfalls in current U.S. posture most adversely affect U.S. ability
    to address the threats in EUCOM?
        Answer. The U.S. should have a combat-credible forward presence in
    EUCOM sufficient to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression in
    accordance with U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I will
    lead a global military posture review to assess the current U.S.
    posture, including in EUCOM.
        Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
    sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
    critical infrastructure in EUCOM? What are the areas of highest risk?
        Answer. I have not yet reviewed U.S. military posture in EUCOM. I
    understand that U.S. military and Allied capabilities, including
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense systems, have improved in recent
    years, facilitated in part by the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
    and other initiatives. If confirmed, I will review the appropriate mix
    of capabilities necessary to meet U.S. national security objectives,
    including in EUCOM.
        In EUCOM, the highest military risks are Russia's aggressive
    behavior to undermine European security coupled with its military
    modernization, including investments in long-range cruise missiles,
    undersea and cyber capabilities, as well as the development and
    fielding of its new, so-called ``novel'' nuclear systems, and the large
    and varied arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make
    to other United States capabilities and force posture in Europe to
    execute the NDS more effectively?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would initiate a global force posture
    review relative to the threats we face and examine how that posture
    should change over time. That review would, of course, include United
    States posture in Europe, particularly given Russia's aggressive
    behavior, and I would closely consult our NATO allies in considering
    any changes. Finally, I would continue to encourage our allies to
    increase their investments in modernization and new defense
    capabilities.
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA authorized $4.5 billion for the
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to support stability and security,
    and to deter Russian aggression.
        In your view, has EDI improved United States and allied capability
    and capacity to deter Russian aggression in the European theater?
        Answer. EDI funding has enabled DOD to increase our force presence
    in Europe, improve critical capabilities, establish prepositioned
    equipment sets, and execute readiness-building exercises, all of which
    have contributed to USEUCOM's warfighting capabilities and deterrence.
        Question. Do you believe continued, dedicated funding for EDI is
    required to support implementation of the NDS in Europe?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the range of resource
    requirements to support our defense objectives in Europe. EDI funding
    has helped the Department maintain a combat-credible force in Europe,
    which is essential to deterring and, if required, defeating aggression
    against the United States and our NATO allies.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure DOD compliance with
    statutory requirements and Senate Armed Services Committee requests for
    detailed funding information concerning future years' plans for EDI?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure appropriate DOD
    compliance with statutory requirements and Senate Armed Services
    Committee requests for information concerning funding for future years'
    plans for EDI
    NATO Alliance
        Question. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests
    is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under the North Atlantic
    Treaty, especially Article 5?
        Answer. Vitally important. Our shared commitment to the values
    enshrined in the Washington Treaty has made NATO the most successful
    alliance in history; helped to keep the United States politically,
    economically, and militarily strong; and helped to safeguard our way of
    life. Article 5 is the cornerstone of our collective security within
    NATO, and I am fully committed to ensuring that the United States
    fulfills its obligations under Article 5.
        Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
    the NATO Alliance and what do you perceive to be the greatest
    challenges in meeting those objectives?
        Answer. NATO's top strategic objectives are deterring nuclear and
    non-nuclear aggression, defending Allied populations and territory if
    deterrence fails, and projecting stability beyond NATO's borders. U.S.
    leadership is required to meet these strategic objectives, as is a
    shared responsibility among Allies for our common defense. Maintaining
    unity in the face of active and continued attempts to fracture the
    Alliance and ensuring ready forces and capabilities may be NATO's
    greatest challenges.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize the development of
    a plan to train, certify, and maintain the readiness and
    interoperability of NATO's ``Four Thirties'' units, and what would be
    the key element of such a plan?
        Answer. If confirmed, maintaining ready and interoperable forces
    and capabilities will be among my highest priorities. I am aware that
    Allies have approved a plan to train, certify, and maintain the units
    associated with the ``Four Thirties,'' which I will review with my
    counterparts if confirmed. I also understand that the ``Four Thirties''
    was the first step of the NATO Readiness Initiative, and I would
    consider additional steps to rebuild a culture of readiness at NATO.
        Question. In December 2020, NATO reaffirmed the Allies'
    longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
    will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your view, do you believe this
    principle requires the United States to continue to deploy nuclear
    weapons in NATO countries?
        Answer. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is
    to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. The presence
    of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries for the last 50 years has
    successfully deterred aggression against the Alliance, and they
    continue to provide an essential political and military link between
    Europe and North America. In my view, they should remain in NATO
    countries for as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat.
        Question. How would you define and measure the success of the new
    NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the
    Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, in enhancing credible deterrence in
    Europe?
        Answer. As the newest headquarters in the NATO Command Structure,
    both the Joint Force Command in Norfolk and the Joint Support and
    Enabling Command in Ulm must first be certified as fully operationally
    capable. At that point, if confirmed, I will measure the extent to
    which the headquarters successfully develop and integrate plans to move
    forces across the Atlantic and through Europe, defend critical
    infrastructure, and secure the multi-domain lines of communication that
    will ensure Allied forces in Europe are supported and sustained in
    peace and crisis. If confirmed, I will ask to be briefed on the NATO
    certification and exercise programs to ensure these headquarters are
    appropriately certified, tested, and incorporated into NATO's strategic
    exercises.
        Question. In your view, how important is it to align the defense
    efforts of the European Union (EU) and NATO, and what effect would an
    EU decision to exclude the United States from participation in European
    Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
    projects have on that alignment?
        Answer. Continued and enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO
    is critical, especially in light of the hybrid threats that require
    whole-of-government responses. The EU's efforts to enhance cyber
    security and hasten military mobility, for example, are key to
    strengthening both societal resilience and military deterrence.
    Excluding U.S. participation in EDF and PESCO projects would be
    counterproductive to closer EU-NATO cooperation and risks EU
    capabilities developing in a manner that produces duplication, non-
    interoperable military systems, diversion of scarce defense resources,
    and unnecessary competition.
    Russia
        Question. What are appropriate objectives for United States-Russia
    security relations, and what security interests common to the United
    States and Russia would you emphasize, if confirmed?
        Answer. Russia has used military force and other acts of coercion
    and intimidation in pursuit of a geopolitical agenda that is
    contradictory and inimical to the rule of law and U.S. national
    interests. The primary objective in United States-Russia security
    relations must be to deter Russia from acting against vital United
    States interests, including by defending our allies from military
    aggression, strengthening our partners' capacity to resist coercion,
    and imposing appropriate consequences for malign activities. If
    confirmed, I will look for ways to prevent a dangerous escalation in
    tensions, stand firm in defense of our interests and values, and will
    leave the door open to greater cooperation with Russia in areas of
    mutual interest. Some potential areas of greater security cooperation
    include: strategic arms control, counterterrorism, preventing the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and deconfliction in
    areas where our military forces are operating in close proximity to
    each other.
        Question. In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities most deter
    Russia and mitigate the Russian threat to NATO Allies and partners? How
    do these activities fit into a whole-of-government approach?
        Answer. There is no one activity by itself that can sufficiently
    deter Russia and mitigate its threat; rather, it is the complex array
    of deterrence activities the United States and its allies in Europe
    conduct to deter Russian aggression effectively. In particular, the
    combination of consistent United States-NATO deterrent presence and
    training exercises demonstrate resolve and combat-credible capability
    and capacity to operate throughout Europe.
        As Russia increasingly utilizes a whole-of-government approach to
    achieving its geopolitical objectives, the Department of Defense
    continues to organize its resources to compete with Russia below the
    level of armed conflict. DOD currently supports broader United States
    Government initiatives to counter Russian influence by deterring and
    defending against all forms of aggression, building partner capacity to
    resist hybrid threats, and holding Russia accountable for its malign
    actions. If confirmed, I will review our authorities, resources, and
    policies to ensure that we are optimally positioned to support U.S.
    whole-of-government efforts.
        Question. What aspects of United States and NATO force posture do
    you assess as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?
        Answer. Along with our Allies, it is critical that we maintain
    combat-credible conventional and nuclear forces to provide the most
    effective deterrent against Russian aggression. Our posture must be
    credibly lethal, resilient, agile, and ready. If confirmed, I will
    undertake a posture review to ensure the right mix of forces and
    capabilities sufficient to deter Russia.
        Question. What should DOD do to counter Russian influence in
    Europe?
        Answer. In my view, maintaining combat-credible conventional and
    nuclear forces is one of the most effective deterrents against Russian
    military aggression. However, the Russian threat continues to evolve in
    a direction that combines both hard and soft power through the use of
    hybrid tactics. Operations employing such tactics are multilayered and
    sophisticated and aimed at building Russian influence across the globe.
    Effectively countering Russian influence in Europe demands a
    comprehensive approach involving our allies and partners, other United
    States Government departments and agencies, and the private sector. For
    many aspects of hybrid warfare, the Department of Defense cannot
    achieve success without unified and integrated efforts by our
    interagency partners and allies, particularly in diplomacy,
    development, law enforcement, information, and intelligence.
        Question. As exemplified by the Severodvinsk, Russia possesses
    advanced submarine capability. What capabilities or capacity should the
    U.S. Navy provide to ensure NATO advantage in this regard?
        Answer. The Navy is committed to maintaining its decisive advantage
    in the air, surface, and undersea domains, and denying any potential
    adversaries the same advantage. The commander of our newly established
    U.S. Second Fleet is dual-hatted as the commander of NATO's Joint Force
    Command in Norfolk and is tasked to ensure both headquarters operate
    seamlessly to increase Allied maritime domain awareness and capability.
    Both headquarters will also synchronize their exercise programs and
    operations in the Atlantic to maintain our sea and air lines of
    communication. If confirmed, I will undertake a review to ensure Naval
    assets are appropriately resourced and postured to contend with threats
    posed by Russia.
        Question. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the
    Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean? Do you believe that NATO and U.S.
    force posture need to improve in those areas? If so, what improvements
    would you direct or support, if confirmed?
        Answer. Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea include
    maintaining access to the Mediterranean Sea and facilitating the
    defense of the Russian homeland. In the eastern Mediterranean, Russia
    seeks to expand power projection capabilities, demonstrate
    expeditionary reach to potential partners, and influence a variety of
    ongoing diplomatic and regional issues in its favor. Russia's maritime
    activities in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean Sea are also
    likely intended to maintain pressure as part of its ongoing campaign to
    undermine and destabilize Ukraine and Georgia, challenge United States
    and allied operations and freedom of maneuver, and to put in place the
    necessary pieces to complicate U.S. warfighting operations.
        If confirmed, I will make it a high priority to review our force
    posture in this region to ensure the strength of our deterrence along
    NATO's Eastern and Southern Flanks and our continued mobility in
    response to crises.
        United States and NATO force posture in the Black Sea and eastern
    Mediterranean regions is key in deterring Russian aggression. Just as
    Russia's strategic goals in these regions are not static, U.S. and NATO
    force posture must be regularly re-assessed to ensure it is making the
    intended impacts. If confirmed, I will ensure our force posture is
    reviewed, updated and improved as needed.
        Question. In your view, does DOD currently have a mature joint
    concept of operations to mitigate the challenge of Russian anti-access,
    area denial (A2/AD) capabilities? If not, what is needed to ensure U.S.
    Forces have operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?
        Answer. I understand that the Department is working on development
    of a Joint Warfighting Concept. If confirmed, I will review the
    progress to date on this effort, and determine what follow-on concept
    work is needed to ensure a strategy-driven, joint approach to future
    warfighting, including to address the challenges uniquely posed by
    Russian anti-access, area denial capabilities.
        If confirmed, I will review the Department's progress to date in
    developing a Joint Warfighting Concept that ensures United States
    Forces have freedom of maneuver in the challenging operating
    environment posed by Russian anti-access, area denial capabilities. My
    understanding is that the Department's ongoing concept work is focused
    on ensuring the effectiveness and resilience of key joint warfighting
    functions such as command and control, fires, logistics, and
    information advantage; my review will account for these and other areas
    as relevant to joint operations against the Russia threat. The United
    States must have operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points.
        Question. In September 2019, Secretary Esper noted that ``our
    adversaries will continue to target our democratic processes'' and that
    ``influence operations are at a scope and scale never before
    imagined.''
        Do you agree with these assessments? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, I do. Russia has threatened United States democratic
    processes and exerted its malign influence on the world stage.
    Operating below the threshold of armed conflict, Russia continues to
    target the United States through a number of sophisticated cyber and
    information operations, including infiltration of institutions vital to
    our democracy. Russia will likely remain a credible threat for years to
    come, exploiting the United States' openness and driving wedges between
    the United States and its partners in an effort to weaken U.S. standing
    and credibility.
        Question. In that same speech, Secretary Esper declared ``election
    security an enduring mission for the Department of Defense.'' How would
    you envision DOD supporting the mission of defending our democratic
    processes from interference by foreign adversaries?
        Answer. DOD is part of a whole-of-government effort to defend
    elections. The FBI leads the U.S. Government's efforts to counter
    foreign influence operations, and DHS leads the U.S. Government's
    efforts to support state and local governments' election security
    efforts. DOD provides DHS and the FBI with insights into adversary
    activities. DOD may also provide defense support of civil authorities,
    upon request, should a cyber-incident exceed the capacity of another
    department or agency.
        Question. Do you assess that our actions to date are currently
    deterring Russia and other foreign adversaries who wish to interfere in
    our elections?
        Answer. I have no reason to doubt the assessment of our
    Intelligence Community that our foreign adversaries continue to attempt
    interference in our election process. If confirmed, I will work with my
    interagency counterparts to review ways to improve our deterrence when
    it comes to Russia and other adversarial influence operations. This is
    a key challenge and one we must do better in addressing.
    Ukraine
        Question. The Russian attack on Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea in
    November 2018 represented a major escalation in Russia's war on
    Ukraine. In fiscal year 2019, for the first time, DOD's Ukraine
    Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) was used to provide lethal
    assistance to Ukraine.
        What do you see as the role of United States security assistance in
    building the capabilities and capacity of Ukraine to meet its military
    requirements to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity?
        Answer. United States security assistance efforts to build the
    capacity of Ukraine's forces should remain a priority. If confirmed,
    and assuming continued progress on governance and anti-corruption
    reforms, I will strongly support efforts to provide training,
    equipment, and advisory support to help Ukraine's forces preserve the
    country's territorial integrity in the face of Russia's continued
    aggression.
        Question. In your assessment, should a greater proportion of USAI
    be dedicated to lethal assistance? What are the obstacles, if any, to
    increasing lethal assistance?
        Answer. I support the provision of lethal assistance to ensure
    Ukraine has the equipment it needs to defend itself. Ukraine also has
    critical non-lethal requirements, such as secure communications
    equipment, that is funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance
    Initiative (USAI). There is currently a good balance of lethal and non-
    lethal assistance to meet Ukraine's capability needs. If confirmed, I
    will continue to actively assess Ukraine's security assistance needs
    and make adjustments, as necessary.
        Question. Do you believe corruption, including but not limited to
    the defense sector, is a national security threat to Ukraine?
        Answer. Although the United States is currently able to address
    Ukraine's most pressing operational needs, lengthy technology release
    processes, contracting, and procurement timelines could limit DOD's
    ability to provide a greater proportion of more advanced defensive
    lethal capabilities through USAI. This is primarily due to the
    statutory requirement to obligate half of the USAI funds before the end
    of the fiscal year in which they are appropriated.
    NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)
        Question. KFOR includes approximately 650 U.S. servicemembers. In
    your view, what is KFOR's continuing role in maintaining security and
    stability in the Western Balkans?
        Answer. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has helped maintain a safe and
    secure environment in Kosovo and has bolstered stability more broadly
    across the Western Balkans. If confirmed, I will assess our KFOR
    contributions--in coordination with NATO and the EU--as part of a
    broader posture review aimed at ensuring the most effective
    distribution of United States Forces and capabilities globally. Our
    goal remains a Europe that is secure, democratic, and undivided,
    including in the Western Balkans
        Question. Do you believe the United States should maintain its
    commitment to KFOR?
        Answer. I recognize the important role that KFOR continues to play
    in bringing stability to the Western Balkans. U.S. contributions to
    KFOR are small relative to their impact. If confirmed, I will assess
    our KFOR contributions--in coordination with NATO and the EU--as part
    of a broader posture review aimed at ensuring the most effective
    distribution of U.S. forces and capabilities globally.
        Question. Is Russian and Chinese influence increasing or decreasing
    in the Western Balkans? What do you believe DOD's role should be, if
    any, in countering such influence?
        Answer. Malign actors such as Russia and China increasingly attempt
    to exploit ethnic tensions, corruption, and weak rule of law in the
    Western Balkans through disinformation, cyberattacks, and economic
    manipulation. These tactics represent a strategy designed to undermine
    regional stability, hinder Euro-Atlantic integration, and secure
    critical infrastructure.
    Chinese Influence Activities in Europe
        Question. The London Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State in
    December 2019 recognized that ``China's growing influence and
    international policies present both opportunities and challenges that
    we need to address together as an Alliance.''
        Do you share security concerns about China's growing influence in
    the European area, and if so, what role do you see for NATO in
    addressing these concerns?
        Answer. Yes, China's growing influence and international policies
    present challenges in the European area that NATO needs to address. The
    Alliance acknowledged China's growing influence in 2019 and finalized a
    comprehensive report on China in December 2020, which are important
    steps in understanding and addressing the implications of China's rise.
    The next step will be the inclusion of China in the Alliance's
    forthcoming strategic concept. Among other things, NATO's role should
    include intelligence sharing on the risks posed by China, political and
    economic coordination (including with the EU), and continuing to help
    increase the resilience of Member States, including their critical
    infrastructure and secure communications.
           united states indo-pacific command (indo-pacom) and china
    China
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA authorized $2.2 billion for the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) to support the stability and
    security of the region and deter further Chinese aggression.
        Is the current United States Force posture in the Indo-Pacific
    region sufficient to support the NDS? How would you propose to
    restructure United States security posture in the Indo-Pacific to
    counter Chinese aggression, if confirmed? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. There's no question that we need a more resilient and
    distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China's
    counter-intervention capabilities and approaches, supported by new
    operational concepts. If confirmed, I'll review our posture in the
    Indo-Pacific including our presence, capabilities, logistics,
    exercises, infrastructure, and capacity building and cooperation with
    allies and partners.
        Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
    could make to implement the NDS and improve the military balance in the
    Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Department to identify
    those programs most critical to increasing our military effectiveness
    in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure that those programs are
    prioritized appropriately.
        Question. In your view, will PDI be a useful tool to improve United
    States posture in the Indo-Pacific? In your opinion, how could PDI help
    gauge progress in improving the adequacy of the United States posture
    as it relates to deterring Chinese aggression?
        Answer. Yes, I believe PDI will be a useful tool. If confirmed, I
    look forward to working with Congress to ensure its effective
    implementation.
        I believe PDI will help to focus attention on the progress the
    United States is making to establish a more distributed and resilient
    posture that deters China's aggression and reassures our allies and
    partners.
        Question. Do you believe that continued, dedicated funding for PDI
    is required to support implementation of the NDS in the Indo-Pacific?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I believe that PDI is an important step as DOD invests in
    the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with Congress
    to examine how best to ensure sufficient funding for our shared
    priority of a distributed and resilient United States Force posture in
    the Indo-Pacific region.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure compliance with
    statutory requirements and Senate Armed Services Committee requests for
    detailed funding information concerning future years' plans for PDI?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department provides
    detailed funding information for annual PDI investments and complies
    with all other statutory requirements.
        Question. The size, diversity, and capabilities of China's cruise,
    ballistic, and hypervelocity missile forces create significant
    asymmetry in the current balance of forces in the Indo-Pacific theater.
        How would you assess the threat to United States Forces, bases, and
    mission success from Chinese missile forces? How would you evaluate our
    ability to address such threats? In your assessment, what U.S.
    investments, concepts of operations, and posture shifts are required to
    address this threat?
        Answer. China's military modernization--including in cruise,
    ballistic, and hypersonic missiles--coupled with its aggressive and
    coercive actions, presents an increasingly urgent challenge to our
    vital interests in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. We
    will need to continue to strengthen our force posture in the region,
    making it more resilient, including through investments in capabilities
    and new operational concepts. The Biden administration will view China
    as our most serious global competitor and, from a defense perspective,
    the pacing threat in most areas.
        If confirmed, I will further focus the Department on China,
    including the growing missile threat. I will begin by taking stock of
    the broad range of activities and investments the Department has made
    in recent years, include investments to maintain our technological
    advantage and the development of new concepts and capabilities to
    counter China across the spectrum of conflict; updates to United States
    Force posture in the region, including through the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative; and efforts to strengthen our alliances and partnerships.
    I'll seek to understand how my predecessors have risen to the China
    challenge and then chart a course for the Department's next steps.
        If confirmed, I will carefully review the Department's investments,
    concept and capability development, force posture, and alliances to
    address the threat from China before determining the next phases of the
    Department's work in this vital area.
        Question. In developing the Joint Multi-Domain Operational Concept
    for the Indo-Pacific theater, the INDO-PACOM Commander, the Joint
    Chiefs, and Secretary of Defense Esper endorsed a major role for Army
    and Marine Corps ground forces operating within the first island chain
    as part of the contact and blunt layers.
        What are your views at this time on these plans?
        Answer. Army and Marine Corps forces are an important component of
    United States Force posture in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working with the Joint Staff, Army, and Marine Corps to
    continue development of their operating concepts as part of the
    Department's overall strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
        Question. In your assessment, does DOD need to invest in a wider
    range of primary bases as well as alternate operating locations
    throughout the Indo-Pacific? Do we need a more forward-deployed
    military posture in the Indo-Pacific theater?
        Answer. There's no question that we need a more resilient and
    distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China's
    counter-intervention capabilities, supported by new operational
    concepts. If confirmed, I'll review our posture in the Indo-Pacific
    from all aspects including presence, capabilities, logistics,
    exercises, infrastructure, and capacity building and cooperation with
    allies and partners.
        If confirmed, I'll review our posture in the Indo-Pacific from all
    aspects including presence, capabilities, logistics, exercises,
    infrastructure, and capacity building and cooperation with allies and
    partners.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military balance
    across the Taiwan Strait? If confirmed, what would you do to assist
    Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the current military
    balance across the Taiwan Strait. President-elect Biden has said many
    times that United States support for Taiwan must remain strong,
    principled, and bipartisan, in line with longstanding American
    commitments to the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the
    Six Assurances. We will continue to support a peaceful resolution of
    cross-strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of
    the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I will also ensure the United
    States meets our commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining a
    sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so increases stability both
    across the Taiwan Strait and within the region. At the same time, we
    will further buttress peace and stability by developing new concepts
    and capabilities to strengthen our own deterrent in the region.
    Bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress is critical, and I look
    forward to working with Members on this crucial issue.
        President-elect Biden has said many times that United States
    support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in
    line with longstanding American commitments to the Three Communiques,
    the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to
    support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with
    the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
    will ensure the United States meets our commitment to assist Taiwan in
    maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so increases
    stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the region. At the
    same time, we will further buttress peace and stability by developing
    new concepts and capabilities to strengthen our own deterrent in the
    region. Bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress is critical, and I
    look forward to working with Members on this crucial issue.
        Question. Should the United States revisit or change its ``one
    China'' policy, in your view?
        Answer. President-elect Biden has said many times that United
    States support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and
    bipartisan, in line with longstanding American commitments to the Three
    Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances.
        Question. In furtherance of its stated intent to possess almost 100
    more ships than the United States Navy by 2030, China has launched a
    massive shipbuilding program. Although all of China's Navy will be
    focused on the Indo-Pacific, the United States maintains only about 60
    percent of its fleet in the Pacific.
        In your assessment, how should the United States adapt to this
    shifting maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. China's military modernization, coupled with its aggressive
    and coercive actions, presents an increasingly urgent challenge to our
    vital interests in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. The
    Biden administration will view China as our most serious global
    competitor and, from a defense perspective, the pacing threat in most
    areas. If confirmed, I will further focus the Department on China and
    work to identify and prioritize those programs most critical to
    maintaining a favorable maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific. That will
    include investing to maintain our technological advantage and
    developing new concepts and capabilities to counter China across the
    spectrum of conflict; updating United States Force posture in the
    region, including through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative; and
    strengthening our alliances and partnerships
    The Korean Peninsula
        Question. How would you describe the value to U.S. national
    security interests of the United States-South Korea alliance and what
    is the significance of resolving the Special Measures Agreement between
    the United States and the Republic of Korea?
        Answer. The United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance is the
    linchpin of peace and security in the region. It is among the most
    combined, interoperable, capable, and dynamic bilateral alliances in
    the world, and is a robust deterrent to aggression on the Korean
    Peninsula. Strengthening America's alliances will be at the center of
    President-elect Biden's foreign policy and national security strategy.
    Having built coalitions and fought alongside our allies for decades, I
    consider our unparalleled network of allies and partners one of our
    greatest strategic advantages--and the foundation of our position as a
    Pacific power. If confirmed, I will focus on modernizing our alliances
    throughout the Indo-Pacific and will seek the early conclusion of cost
    sharing negotiations with South Korea as part of those efforts.
        Question. Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational
    control from the United States to the Republic of Korea should be
    conditions-based? If confirmed, what threshold requirements for
    transfer of control would you establish?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the status of Operational
    Control (OPCON) transfer from the United States to the Republic of
    Korea (ROK), including the bilaterally approved ``Conditions-based
    OPCON Transition Plan'' (COT-P) signed in 2015.
        Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD should
    take to improve United States and allied defenses against North Korea's
    missile capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the full range of current and
    proposed activities to enhance United States and allied defenses
    against North Korea's missile capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that United States
    Forces Korea has the capability to defeat weapons of mass destruction
    sites in North Korea and how would you involve the United States
    interagency in such actions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the necessary
    military requirements for our major operational plans, including on the
    Korean peninsula. I will also work with partners across the
    interagency--to include the State Department, Treasury Department, the
    Department of Energy and the Intelligence Community--as well as
    regional partners and allies--including Japan and the Republic of
    Korea--to forge a comprehensive approach to addressing the North Korea
    nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and cyber threats.
        Question. DOD policy constraining the use of certain cluster
    munitions went into effect on December 31, 2018. How will these
    constraints affect the ability of the United States military to meet
    requirements on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the necessary
    military requirements for our major operational plans, including on the
    Korean peninsula.
    India
        Question. If confirmed, how would you enhance the overall defense
    relationship between the United States and India? What priorities would
    you establish?
        Answer. If confirmed, my overarching objective for our defense
    relationship with India would be to continue elevating the partnership.
    I would further operationalize India's ``Major Defense Partner'' status
    and continue to build upon existing strong defense cooperation to
    ensure the United States and Indian militaries can collaborate to
    address shared interests. I would also seek to deepen and broaden our
    defense cooperation through the Quad security dialogue and other
    regional multilateral engagements.
                   united states northern command (northcom)
    Defense Support to Civil Authorities
        Question. Civil authorities may request DOD support for domestic
    disasters and certain counter-drug operations as well as in managing
    the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass
    destruction.
        In your view, are the procedures by which Federal, State, and local
    agencies request DOD support efficient, effective, and timely?
        Answer. Yes, I understand these procedures are well-documented and
    field-tested. Federal, State, and local agencies plan together to
    prepare for and respond to major disasters, emergencies, and security
    events and then put these plans and procedures to the test in
    exercises. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to review these
    plans and procedures and evaluate how well the Department of Defense
    has incorporated lessons learned regarding Federal, State, and local
    requests for assistance.
        Question. What factors should be considered in determining whether
    DOD will provide support to a civil authority?
        Answer. Consistent with the law and DOD policy, DOD considers six
    factors: (1) legality (would providing the requested support comply
    with law?); (2) lethality (does the requested support involve the
    potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces?); (3) risk
    (would providing the requested support pose an unacceptable risk to the
    safety of DOD forces?); (4) cost (will DOD be reimbursed for the
    support and what effect will providing the support have on the DOD
    budget?); (5) appropriateness (would providing the requested support be
    appropriate and in DOD's interest?); and (6) readiness (how will
    providing the requested support impact DOD's ability to perform its
    other primary missions?).
        Question. In your view, what missions and tasks are appropriate for
    execution by members of the Armed Forces charged to provide support to
    civil authorities in countering a civil disturbance or, when directed,
    to provide support under sections 251, 252, or 253 of title 10, U.S.
    Code?
        Answer. I would not want to prejudge potential actions necessary to
    support civil authorities. In accordance with sections 251, 252, or 253
    of Title 10, U.S. Code, National Guard members called into Federal
    service and members of the Armed Forces may be used as the President
    considers necessary to: (a) suppress an insurrection (Section 251), (b)
    enforce the laws of the United States or to suppress a rebellion
    (Section 252); or (c) suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic
    violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy. The missions and tasks
    assigned must be appropriate to the specific circumstances and risks
    involved and consistent with the law. If confirmed, I will ensure that
    the President receives my best advice and that National Guard members
    called into Federal service and members of the Armed Forces carry out
    missions and tasks that are appropriate, compliant with the law, and
    appropriately respectful of rights and civil liberties.
        Question. In your view, what is the efficacy of DOD's response to
    the COVID-19 pandemic? How could DOD's response be improved, in your
    view, and what role would you envision as appropriate for DOD in
    response to future pandemics?
        Answer. DOD has an important supporting role in our nation's fight
    against the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Health and Human
    Services is the lead Federal agency, and the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency is the lead Federal coordinating agency. DOD has
    contributed thousands of military and civilian personnel, equipment,
    and supplies to our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. I
    consider this mission my most immediate priority. If confirmed, I will
    actively review the status of DOD's support and DOD's protection of its
    personnel and look for opportunities to make improvements.
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's role in producing and
    distributing COVID-19 vaccines? Are there particular functions or types
    of support that you believe DOD to be uniquely capable of executing?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD has been a major
    contributor to Operation Warp Speed's efforts to produce and distribute
    COVID-19 vaccines. If confirmed, I will review DOD's support to
    identify opportunities to continue or enhance this support.
        DOD's major contribution is capacity. For example, medical
    personnel are not unique to DOD, but DOD medical capacity filled the
    gaps when hospitals were overwhelmed. Additionally, while DOD is not
    the only agency that can procure critical equipment and supplies, DOD
    logistical capability helped deliver critical equipment and supplies
    where they were most needed, including: personal protective equipment
    (PPE); medical equipment; ventilators; masks; N95 respirators; medical
    gowns; gloves; test kits; test components; hand sanitizer; food; and
    fuel
    The Arctic
        Question. What threat do Russian and Chinese activities in the
    Arctic pose to United States interests?
        Answer. Climate change is drastically altering the natural
    environment of the Arctic--and the strategic balance. This is fast
    becoming a region of geopolitical competition, and I have serious
    concerns about the Russian military buildup and aggressive behavior in
    the Arctic--and around the world. Likewise, I am deeply concerned about
    Chinese intentions in the region. If confirmed, I will assess the
    situation and consult allies and partners on the strategy, posture, and
    equipment required to ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to
    protect the Homeland, our economic interests, and deter aggression.
        Question. In your view, what are the implications of Russian
    infrastructure investments in the Arctic for U.S. and allied security
    interests?
        Answer. The United States has a long history of cooperation with
    Russia in the Arctic region, and it is my hope that can continue. I
    have serious concerns, however, about the Russian military buildup in
    the region and Russia's aggressive conduct in the Arctic and around the
    world, as well as the importance of protecting the global commons and
    international law in the region. If confirmed, I pledge to review
    United States posture, strategy, and equipment for the full range of
    Arctic defense missions, and to ensure that our strategy toward Russia
    is coherent and effective.
        Question. In your view, are current U.S. and allied ports in the
    region sufficient to achieve U.S. defense interests in the Arctic?
        Answer. I have not yet reviewed the full U.S. posture in the
    Arctic, or that of our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will assess
    the situation and consult allies and partners on the strategy and
    posture required to ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to
    protect the Homeland, our economic interests, and deter aggression.
                   united states southern command (southcom)
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
    President to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the
    SOUTHCOM AOR?
        Answer. The United States must leverage all instruments of national
    power to counter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in SOUTHCOM. DOD
    has an important role in demonstrating American values and military
    culture in the region. Strong bilateral and multilateral defense
    partnerships, enabled by engagements and presence, intelligence and
    information exchanges, and educational programs and exercises, are
    necessary tools to minimize the influence of malign actors in the
    hemisphere.
        Question. Do you believe these influences threaten hemispheric
    security and prosperity?
        Answer. Russia, Cuba, and China are actively seeking opportunities
    to deepen their political, economic, and security influence in the
    hemisphere. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
    for Policy, the SOUTHCOM Commander, and other U.S. Government agencies
    to ensure we are able to check and counter the negative influence of
    these countries.
    Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
    Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
    required by Section 1045 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?
        Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
    Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
    2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
    19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18, 2020), and
    required by Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Individuals in the custody or
    control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any
    interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to
    interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field
    Manual.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD detainee
    operations and interrogations comply strictly with these standards?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would exercise leadership to ensure that
    DOD detainee operations and interrogations comply strictly with these
    standards and are in keeping with our values. I would emphasize the
    need for the continued safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of
    detainees. I would also work through the Combatant Commanders to ensure
    that DOD policies on the humane treatment of detainees continue to be
    effectively implemented in military operations, including the
    requirements to report, investigate, and, where appropriate, take
    corrective action with respect to any suspected or alleged incidents of
    detainee maltreatment.
        Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
    facility at Guantanamo?
        Answer. I believe it is time for the detention facility at
    Guantanamo to close its doors. If confirmed, I would direct my staff to
    work with other Administration officials to develop a path forward for
    the remaining 40 detainees at the facility. Until that time, however,
    the Department must ensure the continued safe, humane, and legal care
    and treatment of detainees through Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-
    GTMO).
        Question. Do you believe the U.S. Government should be keeping
    detainees in long term detention, without charges or prosecution? In
    your view, under what circumstances would such long-term detention be
    appropriate?
        Answer. Guantanamo has provided us the capability to conduct law of
    war detention in order to keep our enemies off the battlefield, but I
    believe it is time for the detention facility at Guantanamo to close.
    My understanding is that the Biden-Harris administration does not
    intend to bring new detainees to the facility and will seek to close
    it.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    reinvigorate the Periodic Review Board (PRB) process established by
    Executive Order 13567, Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at
    Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of
    Military Force?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would reinvigorate the review process using
    available information to determine whether a detainee no longer poses a
    continuing significant threat to the security of the United States and
    whether there is a suitable country to which to transfer such a
    detainee. The Periodic Review Board Process is currently the best means
    available for making such determinations in a systematic manner. If the
    PRB process concludes that the threat from individual detainees may be
    sufficiently mitigated, then the U.S. Government should identify
    options for the transfer of such detainees to other countries that have
    provided credible security assurances in accordance with applicable
    legal and policy requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    address the cases of detainees already recommended by a PRB for
    transfer from Guantanamo to another nation?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the PRB process. If the PRB
    process concludes that the threat from individual detainees may be
    sufficiently mitigated with appropriate security assurances, then the
    U.S. Government should consider the transfer of such detainees to other
    countries that have provided credible security assurances in accordance
    with applicable legal and policy requirements.
        Question. Will you commit to notifying Congress if a decision is
    made to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo before any such transfer
    occurs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues
    to notify Congress as required by law.
        Question. In your view, what standard of care should govern the
    physical and mental health services provided to detainees at
    Guantanamo, particularly as the detainee population ages?
        Answer. The health and well-being of the detainees at Guantanamo
    are an important part of the mission of JTF-GTMO. Accordingly, U.S.
    Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), through JTF-GTMO, provides adequate and
    humane care for the detainees at Guantanamo that complies with the
    standards of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As the
    detainee population ages and detainees experience chronic medical
    conditions, it will remain Department policy to protect the life and
    health of detainees by humane and appropriate clinical means, and in
    accordance with all applicable law and DOD policy.
    Cuba
        Question. Under what conditions would you recommend the
    establishment of military-to-military engagement between the United
    States and Cuba?
        Answer. The United States military maintains only limited contacts
    through longstanding, practical meetings regarding routine issues at
    the Guantanamo Naval Station and between the United States Coast Guard
    and its Cuban counterparts. The limited nature of this engagement is
    due in large part to the Cuban regime's continued suppression of the
    rights and freedoms of the Cuban people and ongoing efforts in support
    of the Venezuelan dictatorship.
    Venezuela
        Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
    Venezuela and to what degree is the illegitimate Maduro regime
    dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?
        Answer. President-elect Biden has repeatedly condemned Maduro, who
    he described as a ``dictator, pure and simple.'' The dictatorship is
    the principal reason for the deep humanitarian crisis facing the
    country. External actors have indeed helped prop the regime against the
    wishes of the Venezuelan people.
        Question. What would be the threshold condition at which you would
    recommend United States military action in Venezuela, if confirmed?
        Answer. I believe DOD should play a supporting role in a whole-of-
    government and multilateral effort to encourage a peaceful transition
    of power in Venezuela
    Counternarcotics Activities
        Question. DOD serves as lead agency for the detection and
    monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing
    toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD expends nearly $1
    billion to build the counternarcotics capacity of U.S. Federal, State,
    and local law enforcement agencies and certain foreign governments.
        Do you believe that the U.S. broadly, and the U.S. military more
    narrowly, have been effective in achieving their counternarcotics
    objectives?
        Answer. I understand that DOD's main role is supporting interagency
    and international partners, and that DOD support has helped in the
    interdiction of drugs headed toward the United States, as well as
    denied revenue to criminal organizations and others who profit from
    drug trafficking. If confirmed, I will review these efforts and
    recommend adjustments as appropriate
        Question. What changes, if any, should be made to DOD's
    counternarcotics strategy and supporting activities?
        Answer. It would be premature for me to recommend changes at this
    time. If confirmed, I will assess our goals and activities and
    recommend adjustments as appropriate.
        Question. Corruption and the absence of the rule of law enable the
    Northern Triangle narcotics trade that contributes to the flow of
    illegal drugs into the United States.
        In your view, what should be DOD's role in countering the flow of
    narcotics to nations other than the United States?
        Answer. Our primary focus should be on the flow of drugs headed to
    the United States, including the flow that passes through the Northern
    Triangle countries, bringing criminal activity and instability in its
    wake. DOD should leverage its military capabilities and expertise as
    appropriate to help our partners in the region disrupt drug-trafficking
    networks operating in and around their territory.
        Question. How, if at all, should U.S. security assistance be scoped
    to address factors at the root of counternarcotics trafficking, in your
    opinion?
        Answer. In coordination with other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies, the Department should assist partner nations in developing
    capabilities and strengthening defense institutions that respond to
    their specific security challenges. Focusing our limited resources on
    those countries that are major drug-producing or transit countries
    while empowering them to create stable conditions at home and improve
    security within their region makes it less likely that drug-trafficking
    networks can thrive.
               u.s. space force and u.s. space command (spacecom)
        Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
    both economically and militarily--from the Global Positioning System on
    which many industrial and military capabilities rely, to the missile
    warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power
    competitors are making concerted efforts to leap ahead of U.S.
    technology and impact U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting
    domain. Congress created a new Military Service, the Space Force,
    within the Department of the Air Force, and a unified Space Command, to
    deal with the challenges stemming from the fact that space is now a
    contested domain upon which the terrestrial forces of the United States
    and peer competitors are highly reliant for support.
        Do you believe that the creation of the Space Force and SPACECOM
    was warranted? If so, do you recommend changes in the structure,
    authorities, and missions of these organizations?
        Answer. The decisions to create the U.S. Space Force and the U.S.
    Space Command reflect recommendations and advice of multiple
    independent commissions and studies regarding how to adapt our defense
    space enterprise to the growing security challenges in space. The
    House, the Senate, and multiple Administrations have examined these
    questions over several years, leading to support for creating the U.S.
    Space Force and the U.S. Space Command.
        Congress provided in statute that there should be a civilian
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, an Assistant Secretary
    of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, and the Space
    Force Acquisition Council, among other changes. These officials and
    organizations will have an important role in ensuring that we maintain
    appropriate civilian oversight with respect to our military activities
    in space, and make decisions that enhance innovation and allocate
    resources effectively and in a timely manner. If confirmed, I will
    assess the current structure to ensure the defense space enterprise is
    postured to advance our national security objectives most effectively.
        Establishing the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed
    Forces and the U.S. Space Command as the eleventh unified combatant
    command are significant organizational changes within the Department of
    Defense. Looking ahead, the DOD space enterprise is still not well-
    integrated with other Services and terrestrial commands, and there are
    several other challenges that will need to be addressed, as would be
    expected when establishing a brand new military service and new unified
    combatant command. If confirmed, I will assess the structure,
    authorities, and missions of these organizations, as well as their
    relationship with other stakeholders within the Department of Defense
        Question. In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the
    strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space? If
    confirmed, what changes would you make to the NDS regarding the space
    domain?
        Answer. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) assesses the
    strategic environment accurately by highlighting great power
    competition with China and Russia and the importance of working with
    our allies and partners. The 2020 Defense Space Strategy provides
    additional detail on the growing space and counterspace threats posed
    by China and Russia and the extent to which our national security and
    prosperity require unfettered access to and freedom to operate in the
    space domain. Since the NDS was developed, the recognition of the
    central role space plays in supporting other services in their
    warfighting role continues to grow. If confirmed, I will ensure the
    space domain is carefully considered across the range of upcoming
    strategic reviews.
        The strategic environment continues to evolve rapidly, especially
    as it applies to space. If confirmed, I would review changes to the
    strategic environment since 2018, and address significant shifts in the
    development of the next National Defense Strategy. For space in
    particular, I would account for the continued growth of adversary space
    and counterspace capabilities, as well as the adequacy of the steps the
    United States has taken to improve the DOD space enterprise to address
    growing threats and challenges in the domain. I would also emphasize
    the role of resilience in improving our warfighting capability, the
    role of allies and partners, and space-related information sharing.
    Lastly, I would highlight growing commercial activities in space which
    can both be threats to and opportunities for the United States.
        Question. In your view, what will ``great power competition'' look
    like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia's
    activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to
    United States national security interests?
        Answer. Space is already an arena of great power competition.
    Chinese and Russian space activities present serious and growing
    threats to United States national security interests. Chinese and
    Russian military doctrines also indicate that they view space as
    critical to modern warfare and consider the use of counterspace
    capabilities as both a means of reducing United States military
    effectiveness and for winning future wars. Addressing these challenges
    in the space domain is central to ``great power competition'' more
    generally. While Russia is a key adversary, China is the pacing threat.
    Given the importance of space in affecting our economic
    competitiveness, it is essential to continue developing best practices,
    standards, and international norms of behavior in space. Development of
    global norms of behavior in space will also deter threatening behavior,
    and uphold the rights of all nations to use space responsibly and
    peacefully.
        Question. Are other nation-states or actors operating in space that
    you perceive as a risk to the United States, or as cause for concern?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Although not on the same order of magnitude of threat as
    Chinese and Russian capabilities, space-related threats from Iran and
    North Korea, such as jamming of satellite communications and GPS
    signals, are also growing, and hold United States space capabilities at
    risk. Both countries also maintain independent space launch
    capabilities, which can serve as avenues for testing ballistic missile
    technologies. Other countries not considered adversaries or hostile to
    United States interests are conducting space activities of concern, and
    there are few norms or guidelines to dictate how it should be done.
    This lack of transparency in the space domain is a risk to U.S assets
    and cause for concern. Last but not least, growing private activities
    in space (according to some projections, there will be as many as
    54,000 new satellites in orbit in the next decade, mostly privately-
    owned and operated) are a risk to the United States in the sense that
    the government needs to ensure that they do not collide with expensive
    and exquisitely capable government assets.
        Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
    the 2018 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain
    of space?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would want to understand, as a first
    priority, the state of our military readiness, including space
    readiness, in particular resilience, vis-a-vis priority threats, in
    light of U.S. strategic objectives. If confirmed, I would seek to
    assess whether major DOD space-related investments and ongoing
    organizational changes, including the creation of the U.S. Space Force
    and the U.S. Space Command, are improving the readiness of forces
    across all domains to protect and secure our Homeland and U.S.
    interests abroad and are advancing the development and employment of
    spacepower for the Nation.
        Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
    our national security space satellites and commercial space systems
    owned by U.S. companies?
        Answer. The growth of Chinese and Russian counterspace arsenals
    presents the most immediate and serious threats to United States,
    allied, and partner space activities. Iran and North Korea have also
    demonstrated some counterspace capabilities that could pose a threat to
    militaries using space-based services. As with commercial services in
    other domains, like airlift, sealift, and cloud computing, we should
    not expect adversaries to discriminate between military and commercial
    satellites that support the military, whether in peacetime competition
    or in the event of a conflict.
        Question. Do you support the development of offensive and defensive
    space systems to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
        Answer. Other nations are contesting the ability of the United
    States and its allies to operate in space. A balance of offensive and
    defensive capabilities, as well as resilient architectures, are
    essential to any credible strategy to deter hostile action and protect
    vital U.S. interests should conflict extend to space
        Question. If confirmed, what guidance would you give the Commander,
    SPACECOM to lead Joint Force operations and activities in the space
    warfighting domain?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would see that the Commander, U.S. Space
    Command, is prepared to protect and defend U.S. interests in space as
    the President may direct and in a manner consistent with law, including
    our obligations under relevant international law. SPACECOM must have a
    deep understanding of Russian and Chinese doctrine, strategy and
    tactics. The command must be able to protect and defend U.S. interests,
    and in particular be able to manage escalation and crises in space. I
    would also direct that DOD space activities contribute actively to
    shaping a space domain that is secure, stable, and accessible and to
    deterring threatening or irresponsible behavior in space. This would
    require that in addition to nurturing technology innovation in-house
    for resilience, SPACECOM work within the Department and across the
    government to build strong alliances in space, develop norms and
    standards of behavior, and increase partnerships with commercial space
    entities. Lastly, the commander should emphasize not just wartime roles
    of space warfighting, but also peacetime roles of ensuring access to
    space for the U.S. and our allies.
        Question. What is your vision for including the Reserve Components
    as a part of the U.S. Space Force and as contributors to Joint Force
    space operations?
        Answer. Reserve and National Guard units and personnel provide
    strategic and technical depth for U.S. space operations today. If
    confirmed, I will review the appropriate organizational structure for
    the U.S. Space Force Reserve Component in order to design a flexible
    and forward-looking organization able to compete for the best talent
    and meet the needs of a twenty-first century military service.
        Question. Does the national security space enterprise need a
    revised approach to space-related acquisition, in your assessment? How
    would you propose to improve and streamline space acquisition, if
    confirmed?
        Answer. In recent months, there has been guidance on improving the
    national security space enterprise. Congress has given DOD authority to
    create a single space acquisition executive. New acquisitions
    organizations such as the Space Development Agency and the Space Rapid
    Capabilities Office, among others, have been established. I believe the
    Department's processes, including its acquisition system, must continue
    to evolve regardless of domain or mission to become more agile so that
    we can strengthen warfighting effectiveness and resilience of current
    systems, better leverage technology, innovation, and partnership
    opportunities, rapidly deploy future capabilities, and dynamically
    adapt to changes in the threat and strategic environment. Together with
    civil space agencies with whom the Department shares a common
    industrial base, it needs to leverage innovation and cost-effective
    investments driven by the private sector, presenting opportunities for
    collaboration to develop innovative capabilities with a more
    streamlined and responsive acquisition process.
        If confirmed, I would continue to work with Congress to refine the
    Department's acquisition innovation initiatives, including the Adaptive
    Acquisition Framework, to accelerate delivery of operational
    capability, effectively reduce program risk, and enhance the nation's
    ability to respond to an evolving and ever more capable threat. The
    Department needs to give new space acquisition organizations (such as
    the Space Development Agency and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office
    among others) the opportunity to succeed, and at the same time, review
    the performance of and reorganize and improve legacy organization for
    management of space acquisitions (such as the Space and Missile Systems
    Center). I will also look to models of and best practices for efficient
    acquisition outside the Department.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
    technology is appropriately incorporated into Space Development Agency
    products and SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels?
        Answer. The Department bears an important responsibility to balance
    the unique latency, accuracy and reliability needs of the warfighter
    with the affordability and flexibility offered by commercial space
    technology to efficiently guarantee mission accomplishment on a global
    scale. The Space Development Agency is actively pursuing solutions
    based on commercially available technology. USSPACECOM incorporates
    commercial technology across nearly all elements of its mission set. If
    confirmed, I intend to support this and will encourage SDA and SPACECOM
    to pursue leveraging commercial technology via commercial services and
    by capitalizing on commercial investments and technology advancements
    and integrating them into Government-owned and operated systems.
                cybersecurity and u.s. cyber command (cybercom)
        Question. In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full
    operational capability. In September 2018, DOD released its 2018 Cyber
    Strategy. The strategy charges DOD to ``defend forward, shape the day-
    to-day competition, and prepare for war''.
        What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in
    defending the nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
    role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law enforcement
    communities?
        Answer. In order to defend the nation from an attack in cyberspace,
    the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) conducts ``defend forward'' operations
    against attacks in cyberspace to disrupt or halt malicious cyber
    activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level
    of armed conflict. I believe the Department can effectively defend
    forward in three ways: generating insights about the threat based on
    our activity outside U.S. networks; enabling better defenses by
    leveraging those insights to help its interagency, industry, and
    international partners; and, acting when necessary to disrupt adversary
    cyber actors. DOD may also provide defense support of civil
    authorities, upon request, should a cyber-incident exceed the capacity
    of another department or agency.
        The Homeland security and law enforcement communities operate under
    authorities that are domestically aligned, whereas DOD focuses on
    foreign State and non-state actors that threaten the interests of the
    United States. DOD is in constant collaboration with the Cybersecurity
    & Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation sharing information and threat intelligence that are
    critical in this whole-of-government approach to defending the Nation
    from an attack in cyberspace.
        Question. How will the ``defend forward, shape the day-to-day
    competition, and prepare for war'' concepts deter and disrupt Russia
    and China in cyberspace?
        Answer. China and Russia are conducting persistent malicious cyber
    campaigns to erode United States military advantages, threaten our
    infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity. I believe the
    Department must effectively counter these campaigns by taking proactive
    action to: generate insights about the adversary's cyber operations and
    capabilities; enable its interagency, industry, and international
    partners to create better defenses, and; acting, when necessary, to
    disrupt adversary cyber actors and halt malicious activities.
        Question. Congress passed legislation recognizing that clandestine
    military operations in cyberspace below the threshold of armed conflict
    may be conducted as traditional military activities under title 10,
    U.S. Code. In addition, the Trump Administration promulgated National
    Security Presidential Memorandum-13, which streamlined the process for
    proposing, evaluating, and approving cyber operations below the
    threshold of armed conflict. These reforms have enabled CYBERCOM to
    implement its strategy of persistent engagement and defending forward
    in cyberspace.
        What are your views on these reforms and their impact?
        Answer. These reforms were adopted in response to our adversaries'
    rapidly evolving and growing malicious cyber activity. I understand
    these reforms have enabled DOD to develop and employ timely, well-
    coordinated, and risk-managed cyber-effects operations and have made
    positive contributions to our ability to perform our missions in and
    through cyberspace effectively. If confirmed I will review these
    changes and adjust accordingly if need be.
        Question. If confirmed, what role should DOD and the Cyber Mission
    Force have in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
    conducted via social media?
        Answer. The DOD and the Cyber Mission Force play a supporting role
    in greater whole-of-government efforts to combat foreign influence
    operations. In cooperation and coordination with interagency partners,
    the DOD may bring a number of capabilities and authorities to bear--
    relative to the circumstances of a particular foreign effort. DOD tools
    can include cyber effects operations, military information support
    operations, public outreach, and others. Using combinations of these
    capabilities in concert with the interagency, I understand the DOD can
    combat both foreign technical means and also the foreign narrative
    carried over those technical means.
        Question. What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force have in
    anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on commercial
    entities?
        Answer. While not centrally a DOD issue, through a series of
    partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity &
    Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    and sector-specific agencies, DOD supports efforts to anticipate,
    prevent, and respond to significant cyber incidents on commercial
    entities. For example, as the lead for the Defense Industrial Base
    (DIB), DOD helps protect those commercial companies DOD relies on by
    fostering a cyber-threat information sharing partnership to enhance
    their cybersecurity capabilities. The DOD should continue to look for
    ways to better integrate with interagency partners and the private
    sector.
        Question. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S.
    Cyber Command should be dual-hatted? What are the ``pros'' and ``cons''
    of this arrangement, in your view? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that in 2016 Secretary Carter and Director
    Clapper made the recommendation to split the two organizations, once
    U.S. Cyber Command was mature enough to do so, and that the Secretary
    of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must certify
    that the six conditions stated in the fiscal year 2017 and Fiscal Year
    2020 NDAAs must first be met. If confirmed, I would study this question
    closely to ensure that any decision concerning the dual-hat leadership
    arrangement between the Director of the National Security Agency and
    the Commander U.S Cyber Command is fully informed by thorough analysis
    and mitigates potential risks to national security and to the
    operational effectiveness of U.S. Cyber Command and the National
    Security Agency. If confirmed, I will work with General Nakasone and
    the Chairman to ensure U.S. Cyber Command has the resources it needs to
    ultimately meet these maturity requirements.
        My understanding is that past Secretaries of Defense directed
    multiple internal and external assessments regarding the future of the
    dual hat arrangement. When U.S. Cyber Command was established, the
    Department believed the dual hat arrangement enabled more effective
    direction and cooperation in cyberspace, in developing intelligence to
    support those operations, in sharing capabilities such as the
    cryptologic platform, and in sharing expertise. In the ten years since
    U.S. Cyber Command was established, operating and intelligence forces
    have increased in capability and capacity, and the pace of operations
    has steadily increased. I understand there are clear benefits to this
    arrangement. For example, one leader controlling both organizations
    provides agility and seamless coordination, however, it also may
    generate risk to both organizations as that same leader is called on to
    balance priorities of each role and respond to multiple chains of
    command. If confirmed, I will assess, in coordination with the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence,
    the pros and cons of this arrangement, in addition to the six
    conditions the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA states as needing to be met prior
    to any certification of the decoupling of the dual-hat. Only after
    making those assessments would I be prepared to fully answer this
    question, and make any recommendations on the matter.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
    improve cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce? How would you
    empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD
    cybersecurity?
        Answer. Cybersecurity is central to military readiness and
    underpins the Department's imperative to secure its critical classified
    and unclassified information, as well as technologies and programs that
    enable the lethality of the joint force. If confirmed, I will do two
    key things. 1) I will drive efforts to recruit, train, and retain our
    cyber workforce more effectively to better defend our networks. 2) I
    will improve cybersecurity training, personal responsibility and
    awareness for the entire workforce. My vision also includes achieving a
    basic level of digital competency and awareness of artificial
    intelligence and machine learning capabilities for the majority of our
    workforce to improve the ability of the Department to make data
    informed decisions.
        The Department has created and implemented a Network Cybersecurity
    Accountability Scorecard to show a specific component's progress in
    addressing and mitigating key cyber risks to DOD's networks and
    information systems. Additionally, the Department is developing and
    piloting a weapons cybersecurity accountability scorecard which will
    assess selected critical platforms associated with critical defense
    missions and the Cyber Risk Mitigation Tool to prioritize and track
    vulnerabilities and mitigations of weapon systems and critical
    infrastructure. If confirmed, I will ensure these tools meet the
    Department's needs for improving our cybersecurity performance and will
    hold senior leaders accountable for improvements in cybersecurity for
    information systems, critical warfighting platforms, and infrastructure
    across each DOD Component.
        Question. In your opinion, what characteristics of a cyberattack
    would constitute an ``act of war''? Do you consider the recent malware
    campaign involving SolarWinds to be an ``act of war or an espionage
    operation that falls within de facto norms? In your view, does the
    nature and scope of this intrusion operation merit a strong and
    tangible response? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Whether a particular cyber activity may be considered an
    ``act of war'' requires a case-by-case and fact-specific determination.
    For example, malicious cyber activities could result in injury, death,
    or significant property destruction. These activities would need to be
    considered in their totality.
        I understand from a joint statement released by FBI, CISA, ODNI,
    and NSA that the SolarWinds malware campaign appeared primarily to be
    an intelligence gathering effort.
        There's still a lot more to learn about this breach, but one thing
    is clear--as President-elect Biden has stated, those responsible for
    the breach will be held responsible; our adversaries must know that we
    will not stand idly by in the face of malicious cyber-attacks on our
    nation.
        Any intrusion operation is of great concern to the security of our
    systems and country. The investigation into the scope of the SolarWinds
    compromise is ongoing. This is a whole-of-government effort, and I
    would expect the response will reflect that. If confirmed, I will
    ensure DOD, in support of the USG-wide effort, takes necessary steps to
    understand the full scope of this campaign. President-elect Biden has
    stated that the U.S. will impose ``substantial costs'' on those
    responsible for such malicious attacks, including actions in
    coordination with our allies and partners
        While it does not seem yet that DOD was compromised in the
    SolarWinds malware campaign, many other critical organizations across
    the government were actively compromised for the better part of a year,
    and it took a private sector company to detect the intrusion and alert
    the government.
        Question. What do you conclude from this about the state of our
    cyber defenses?
        Answer. This is an unfolding incident, but the information
    available today is greatly concerning, as it impacts a wide swath of
    American public and private networks. Consistent with President-elect
    Biden's remarks, I believe we must elevate cybersecurity as an
    imperative across the government in order to defend the American people
    and U.S. critical infrastructure. Additionally, the government must
    continue to strengthen its partnership with the private sector to
    foster greater information sharing and collaboration.
                    u.s. special operations command (socom)
        Question. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, successive NDAAs have
    empowered the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
    Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to serve as a ``service secretary-
    like'' civilian official for special operations forces. Among other
    reforms, the law defines the administrative chain of command for
    USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense
    for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special
    operations forces.
        What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
    implementing the ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities of the
    ASD(SOLIC)?
        Answer. I understand that the Department has taken concrete steps
    to institutionalize these reforms, to include significant steps in the
    past few months. If confirmed, I will review the Department's progress
    to ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) has sufficient
    authorities to execute his or her Military Department Secretary-like
    responsibilities.
        Question. If confirmed, would you commit to fully implementing
    these reforms?
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to implementing fully the reforms
    intended to strengthen the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) within the
    administrative chain of command for USSOCOM and to provide appropriate
    oversight of special operations activities (including oversight of
    policy and resources). I strongly support the role of the ASD(SO/LIC)
    in providing civilian oversight for special operations activities and
    in matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of
    special operations forces.
        Question. In your view, does the ASD(SOLIC) require additional
    authorities and resources, including additional civilian personnel, to
    administer oversight of special operations forces?
        Answer. I understand that the Department has recently taken steps
    to provide the ASD(SO/LIC) with additional delegated authorities and
    resources to administer oversight of special operations forces. The
    recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act also includes
    legislation further strengthening the ASD(SO/LIC)'s authorities in this
    area. If confirmed, I will review the authorities and resources of the
    office of the ASD(SO/LIC) and recommend any necessary adjustments to
    help enable the ASD(SO/LIC) to execute his or her statutory
    responsibilities effectively.
    Violent Extremist Organizations
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat to United States
    interests posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates
    and adherents? Which group, in your view, presents the greatest threat
    to the United States?
        Answer. Violent extremist organizations continue to pose a threat
    to U.S. interests around the globe through robust networks of
    affiliates and adherents. Although continued pressure from the United
    States and its Allies and partners has helped prevent these groups from
    attacking the U.S. Homeland, these groups present localized and
    regional insurgent threats to our partners and direct threats to U.S.
    interests. The proliferation of this radical ideology across the
    internet has expanded the reach of these fringe groups, threatening the
    Homeland and inciting violence within the borders of our closest allies
    and partners.
        For more than two decades, al Qaeda has been at war with the United
    States, continually working to attack, disrupt, and destabilize U.S.
    interests and Western influence. Although the al Qaeda brand has
    suffered over the past 20 years, due in large part to efforts by DOD,
    there remains a dedicated network of al Qaeda and its associated forces
    providing a population-centered counter to United States interests
    across Africa, the Middle East, and South East Asia. In addition, the
    self-proclaimed caliphate of the Islamic State has been destroyed.
    However, ISIS's virulent ideology and open hostility towards Western
    society remains intact through their adherents across the internet,
    remaining leaders, foreign terrorist fighters--some who have returned
    home and others who remain in the region, and the indoctrinated
    personnel who remain in detention within Syria and Iraq. There is no
    question that the Islamic State continues to pose a threat to the
    United States despite the end of its so-called caliphate in Iraq and
    Syria. The focus of al Qaeda on local conflicts, however, does not mean
    they have taken their eye off attacking the U.S. Homeland. In the long-
    term, al Qaeda likely represents the greater and more enduring threat
    to the United States due to the group's strategic adaptability and
    trend of decentralization. Should I be confirmed, I will work to ensure
    neither of these organizations presents an enduring threat to the
    Homeland or to our allies or partners.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in supporting it?
    What metrics would you apply to measure the effectiveness of the
    strategy?
        Answer. As I understand it, combatting terrorism requires a whole-
    of-government approach that reflects an understanding of and takes into
    account the root causes of such activities, which are not the same in
    all regions. In order to provide recommendations to change DOD's role
    in supporting the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, the Department must
    perform a systematic, comprehensive, and collaborative assessment of:
    terrorist threats; current policy objectives as stated in published
    guidance; DOD actions to counter that threat; and acceptable risk
    weighed against objectives not yet achieved. Additionally, assisting
    partner nations to improve their capability to counter terrorists would
    remain a key tenet of our strategy. If confirmed, I will direct a
    review of the current strategy to account for regional consideration
    and a whole-of-government approach that addresses regional issues
        If confirmed, I would work with senior civilian and military
    leaders, including where appropriate officials of other agencies, to
    assess progress toward achieving our counterterrorism objectives. I
    cannot at this time determine the extent to which standard metrics will
    be useful such assessments.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    promote a ``more resource sustainable'' approach to counterterrorism,
    as directed by the 2018 NDS?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to draw on successes of both the
    United States and its partners in developing a counterterrorism
    coalition representing all facets of government involved in protecting
    the Homeland from threats. The Department likely requires changes in
    its plans and processes in order to achieve greater efficiency and
    effectiveness and unity of effort with interagency and international
    partnerships. Leveraging the lessons learned from past successes, I
    look to optimize and, where necessary, expand on these relatively
    small-footprint solutions.
        An October 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment highlighted the threat
    from racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups
    engaging in ``outreach and networking opportunities abroad'' that
    ``might lead to a greater risk of mobilization to violence, including
    traveling to conflict zones.''
        Question. Do you view the threat from racially and ethnically
    motivated violent extremist networks overseas as a national security
    threat? If so, what role do you see for DOD in responding to this
    threat?
        Answer. Terrorist organizations are motivated by a myriad of
    ideologies, objectives, and causes, and some are racially and
    ethnically motivated. When the capability, intent, and motivation of
    any terrorist organization, including racially and ethnically motivated
    groups, threaten the vital interests of the United States or the shared
    interests of its allies and partners, then this terrorist organization
    is a threat to national security.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) plays a key supporting role in the
    U.S. Government's overall response to terrorist threats. DOD cannot
    achieve U.S. policy objectives to address terrorist threats
    unilaterally, and all DOD strategies and plans must be correlated with
    and complementary to a U.S. Government-wide and international partner-
    integrated response. The Department must also work with our allies and
    partners--another key pillar of the current National Defense Strategy--
    to leverage their regional expertise and unique capabilities. If
    confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the enterprise-wide efforts in
    reform and sustainable counterterrorism approaches to determine if
    additional opportunities exist.
    Section 127e and Section 1202 Activities
        Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
    special operations forces to provide support (including training,
    funding, and equipment) to forces and individuals supporting or
    facilitating military operations for the purpose of combatting
    terrorism.
        Section 1202 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 authorizes U.S.
    special operations forces to provide support (including training,
    funding, and equipment) to forces and individuals supporting or
    facilitating irregular warfare operations.
        What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
    these authorities in the current strategic environment?
        Answer. The ability to support foreign irregular forces, groups,
    and individuals under this fiscal authority gives U.S. special
    operations forces an effective, low-cost option to combat terrorism
    while maintaining a minimal U.S. footprint. Geographic Combatant
    Commanders continue to express strong support for this authority as it
    is a critical component of their counterterrorism efforts. Section 1202
    of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, as
    amended, fills a gap in the Department's ability to provide support to
    irregular (non-government) forces, groups, and individuals advancing
    U.S. policy and military objectives short of armed conflict. This
    authority is particularly helpful in addressing U.S. threats and
    objectives in current strategic environments that can be described as
    ``grey zones''--spaces between amicable peace and outright war.
    Authorities such as Section 1202 allow the Department to contribute its
    special operations capabilities in support of whole-of-government
    objectives in this competitive space. If confirmed, I would ensure that
    operations using this authority remain thoroughly coordinated with
    relevant Chiefs of Mission and Intelligence Community counterparts, and
    remain fully transparent with Congress on how the Department uses this
    authority. As the Department prioritizes great power competition, I
    could see a need to discuss how these authorities interrelate, and
    whether there should be adjustments to one or both of them.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
    proposals for the use of each of these authorities, particularly with
    respect to mitigating the risks associated with conducting irregular
    warfare activities below the level of traditional armed conflict?
        Answer. I believe appropriate civilian oversight is an integral
    aspect of implementing these authorities. With respect to Section 1202,
    if confirmed, I would ensure that all potential uses are suitable,
    feasible, and acceptable--``suitable'' denoting alignment with the
    Department's strategy, ``feasible'' meaning whether the proposed
    resources are useful to accomplish the mission, and ``acceptable'' in
    balancing the risk with any potential advantages gained. For both
    authorities, if confirmed, I will ensure that selection, screening, and
    vetting procedures for partner forces continue to be robust and that
    implementation of these authorities is informed by careful analysis of
    risks and consistent with U.S. objectives.
               military operations in the information environment
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to conduct
    effective military operations in the information environment to defend
    U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out by state
    and non-state actors?
        Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) has numerous capabilities
    routinely employed to conduct effective military operations in the
    information environment, including cyberspace operations, Military
    Information Support Operations (MISO), and public affairs (PA). When
    these activities are executed correctly, DOD can achieve its mission
    more effectively, more affordably, and with reduced risk to our
    operating forces. I understand the Department is updating the 2016
    Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment and that the
    update will be informed by a posture review of capabilities, the
    current defense strategy and its Irregular Warfare Annex, designation
    of information as a joint function, and statutory requirements in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. If confirmed,
    I will support the development and implementation of this strategy.
        Question. Are DOD's efforts in this regard appropriately integrated
    with other U.S. Government organizations and activities?
        Answer. Department of Defense (DOD) efforts throughout the
    information environment cross traditional department and agency lines.
    In areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where military operations have
    been ongoing for some time, the integration is fairly seamless, with
    roles and mechanisms well-established. In other parts of the world, the
    integration is a bit more complex, and DOD is often not in the lead. If
    confirmed, I intend to sustain those relationships.
        Question. Does DOD have sufficient authorities and resources to
    conduct these operations effectively? If not, what additional
    authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?
        Answer. I am not aware of any new authorities required. I
    understand that the Information Operations posture review being
    conducted pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2020 will review capabilities and capacities and inform future
    integration and resource investments. If confirmed, I will regularly
    assess our authorities, resource availability and allocation, and
    strategic alignment, and I will prioritize appropriately to support
    operations in the information environment.
        It is my understanding that the Department is addressing any needs
    as it works through the posture review.
                             u.s. strategic command
    Nuclear Policy
        Question. United States nuclear forces have served as the bedrock
    of our nation's defense, underpinned our most critical alliances, and
    deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
    years. Unfortunately, long overdue investments in these forces have
    left us with systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These
    capabilities must be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
        What is your understanding of how Russia and China have expanded
    and/or modernized their nuclear force capabilities? In your view, do
    these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the United States and
    its allies?
        Answer. I am generally aware of public reporting that both China
    and Russia continue to invest in their nuclear weapons capabilities. If
    confirmed, I will undertake a deeper review both of United States
    nuclear posture as part of the Administration's formulation of our
    National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and of the
    nuclear weapons capabilities of Russia and China.
        Clearly, it is not in the United States interest to see either
    Russia or China expand their nuclear arsenals. If confirmed, I will
    undertake a deeper review both of United States nuclear posture as part
    of the Administration's formulation of our National Security Strategy
    and National Defense Strategy and of the nuclear weapons capabilities
    of Russia and China and the threat they pose to United States
    interests.
        Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
    coercion as a means of advancing its foreign policy goals?
        Answer. Russia regularly engages in a host of actions that
    undermine the interests of the United States and its Allies. If
    confirmed, I will seek a comprehensive understanding of how Russia is
    using all elements of its national power to challenge United States
    global interests and domestic stability.
        Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
    triad of delivery platforms it adheres to the full meaning of ``no
    first use''?
        Answer. I believe that it is important that we have a complete
    understanding of China's intentions and capabilities when accessing the
    threat it poses to strategic stability and United States interests in
    East Asia. If confirmed, I will request a comprehensive review of
    China's nuclear weapons program, including its declaratory policy.
        Question. Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of
    Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and
    that modernizing our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national
    security priority? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, I agree that nuclear deterrence is the Department's
    highest priority mission and that updating and overhauling our nation's
    nuclear forces is a critical national security priority. Our nuclear
    deterrent has served a vital purpose in U.S. National Security Strategy
    for the past 70 years and continues to be an essential component of our
    strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression
    against the United States, our allies, and our partners.
        Although effective today, U.S. nuclear deterrence remains dependent
    on aging weapons, delivery systems, infrastructure, and nuclear
    command, control, and communications (NC3) systems originally built
    during the Cold War. U.S. nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond
    their original service lives, and the tipping point, where we must
    simultaneously overhaul these forces, is now here.
        Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based
    nuclear delivery platforms is consistent with an effective deterrent
    posture in an era of great power competition with Russia and China?
        Answer. The United States must retain a secure, sustainable and
    effective nuclear deterrent for its security and that of its Allies.
    The United States has long relied on a range and mix of capabilities.
    If confirmed, I will commit to retaining a robust nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
    sufficient to support the full modernization of the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent, including delivery systems, weapons, command and control
    systems, and infrastructure?
        Answer. I believe that it is critical for the United States to
    maintain a secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent. The
    overhaul and updating of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a critical
    national priority. If confirmed, I intend to review, early on, the
    details of the current modernization program to ensure that it is being
    executed in a cost effective and judicious manner.
        Question. What is your understanding of the condition of the U.S.
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) system and what
    aspects of the NC3 system most need recapitalization or replacement, in
    your view?
        Answer. A robust NC3 system is essential to execute nuclear command
    and control functions--the situation monitoring, planning, decision
    making, force management, and force direction. If confirmed, reviewing
    this system will be a top priority along with addressing critical
    shortfalls.
        Question. Do you believe the governance reforms of the NC3 system
    have improved DOD's management of the global architecture? Please
    explain your response.
        Answer. I agree that a robust NC3 system is essential to execute
    nuclear command and control functions. If confirmed, reviewing this
    system, including the governance reforms, will be a top priority along
    with addressing critical shortfalls.
        Question. Do you believe a major shift in the United States'
    nuclear policies, such as adoption of a ``No First Use'' policy, would
    be appropriate, given Russia's and China's expanding nuclear arsenals?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
    I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
    interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
    of U.S. nuclear posture. Such a review will certainly need to take into
    account the challenging international security environment. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active
    role in all strategic reviews.
        Question. Do you believe a ``No First Use'' deterrent posture would
    be consistent with our extended deterrence commitments to our NATO and
    other regional allies around the world?
        Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
    I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
    interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
    of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active role in all
    strategic reviews
        Question. The Minuteman III (MM III) Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile and the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile will be in service
    for over 65 and 55 years, respectively, before they are replaced by the
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and the Long Range Stand-Off
    (LRSO) weapon. The Air Force has highlighted the pervasive age-related
    risks associated with the MM III system.
        In your view, are there any circumstances under which delaying or
    cancelling the GBSD and/or LRSO programs would be appropriate,
    particularly in light of Russia and China's ongoing efforts to
    modernize and expand their nuclear forces? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Maintaining a secure, sustainable and effective nuclear
    deterrent is imperative and is a top U.S. national security priority.
    If confirmed, I plan to request early on a briefing on the U.S. nuclear
    modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in a cost
    effective and judicious manner. I also intend to request a threat
    briefing on Russia and China's nuclear weapons programs.
        Question. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations deemed the GBSD
    and LRSO programs essential. If confirmed, would you continue to
    support and advocate for these programs?
        Answer. Maintaining a secure, sustainable and effective nuclear
    deterrent is imperative and is a top U.S. national security priority.
    If confirmed, I plan to request early on a briefing on the U.S. nuclear
    modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in a cost
    effective and judicious manner.
        Question. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed a
    comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to
    incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership.
    Seven years later, DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) have made significant progress in rehabilitating the nation's
    nuclear forces and reestablishing the senior leader focus required in
    this mission area.
        If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that DOD and the NNSA
    continue the investments and senior leader attention needed to
    modernize all aspects of the nation's nuclear deterrent and avoid age-
    driven unilateral disarmament?
        Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent
    remains vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If
    confirmed, I will review the U.S. nuclear modernization program as a
    high priority program and ensure that the program has senior level
    attention and management. I understand that the recently enacted
    National Defense Authorization Act and Energy and Water Development
    Appropriations Act called for strong interagency coordination on these
    issues, and if confirmed, I will ensure the Department of Defense works
    closely with the Department of Energy on these programs.
    The NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council
        Question. The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the nation's
    nuclear weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear
    weapons, which are established through the interagency Nuclear Weapons
    Council. NNSA's principal challenge over the next 20 years is to
    recapitalize and modernize the Cold War-era U.S. nuclear weapons design
    and production infrastructure into a responsive and resilient
    enterprise.
        Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's capabilities to
    design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons
    stockpile, including the two-site solution for restarting plutonium pit
    production?
        Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent is
    vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If confirmed, I
    will review the U.S. nuclear modernization program as a high priority
    program, including the country's capacity to produce plutonium pits and
    other stockpile components. The Department of Defense's partnership
    with the Department of Energy on this program is critically important.
        Question. Do you support the W80-4 and the W87-1 programs?
        Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent
    remains vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If
    confirmed, I will review, early on, the U.S. nuclear modernization
    program as a high priority program, including nuclear warhead programs.
    The Department of Defense's partnership with the Department of Energy
    on this program is critically important.
        Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
    parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
    maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
        Answer. A secure, sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent
    remains vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies. If
    confirmed, I will review, early on, the U.S. nuclear modernization
    program as a high priority program, including nuclear warhead programs.
    The Department of Defense's partnership with the Department of Energy
    on this program is critically important.
        Question. In your view, does the NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
    Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and
    reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without explosive testing?
    If not, what additional authorities and capabilities are needed?
        Answer. Yes, the President-elect has committed to maintaining the
    moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons testing. It is my understanding
    that since 1992, the U.S. has observed a voluntary moratorium on
    nuclear testing. Since that time, the investments made in the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program have developed the personnel, tools, capabilities,
    materials, components, laboratory and flight testing, and supercomputer
    modeling and simulation that underpin the annual assessment for safety,
    security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without explosive
    testing. If confirmed, I will look to the advice and judgment of our
    national security laboratory directors to best understand technical
    risks in our nuclear stockpile, and recommend adjustments to the
    current approach if warranted.
        If confirmed, I will monitor the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    through the Nuclear Weapons Council.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Secretary
    of Defense relative to the Nuclear Weapons Council and NNSA's
    responsibility for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile?
    How would you execute your duties vis-a-vis this role, if confirmed?
        Answer. I am aware that the Nuclear Weapons Council is a critical
    interagency body overseeing issues vital to the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
    If confirmed, I will request a briefing on the functioning and work of
    the council in order to ensure that the U.S. maintains a secure,
    sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent.
        If confirmed, I would work with the NWC Chairperson, the
    Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, to ensure that NWC
    decisions are incorporated into Secretary-level reviews, to provide
    guidance when needed, and to resolve interagency issues as necessary.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you leverage the roles played by
    the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the NNSA, and the
    Director of the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that annual
    budgets adequately support the modernization and sustainment of the
    U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of Energy,
    the Administrator of the NNSA, and the Director of the Office of
    Management and Budget, through the Nuclear Weapons Council's Planning
    Guidance and Budget Certification Process, to assess the adequacy of
    annual budgets to support the modernization and sustainment of the U.S.
    nuclear weapons stockpile.
    Arms Control
        Question. Arms control, when effective and verifiable, has been a
    valuable tool for managing competition and international security
    concerns. In contrast, unverifiable arms control regimes observed by
    only one party can generate great instability. The New START Treaty
    will expire in February unless the United States and Russia agree to
    extend it.
        Do you believe the new strategic-range systems announced by
    President Vladimir Putin in February 2018 should be included under the
    New START Treaty's central limits?
        Answer. I am generally aware of Russia's nuclear modernization
    program but am not in a position to speak to the specifics of whether
    or not individual systems are in compliance with the New START Treaty.
    I believe, however, that nuclear arms control is in the U.S. interest.
    If confirmed, I will request an extensive briefing on Russia's nuclear
    weapons program and the status of the New START Treaty.
        Question. Do you believe it to be in the national security interest
    of the United States to extend the New START Treaty?
        Answer. Yes, I do and so does President-elect Biden. Nuclear arms
    control is in the U.S. national security interest.
        Question. What are your views on Russian tactical nuclear forces
    not covered by the New START Treaty and whether arms control measures
    can adequately address them?
        Answer. Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons through arms control
    is a very important strategic objective. I know that this perspective
    is shared by the Senate as reflected in the resolution of ratification
    to the New START Treaty that includes a condition to negotiate an
    agreement with Russia to address the disparity in United States and
    Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.
        Question. Do you support unilateral reductions in United States
    nuclear forces or do you believe that further reductions should be
    taken only within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control
    agreement with Russia and other nuclear-armed powers? Please explain
    your answer.
        Answer. I believe it is in the national security interests of the
    United States and its allies and partners to pursue formal, verifiable
    arms control agreements that reduce the nuclear threats from Russia and
    China.
        Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling
    current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
    control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
        Answer. The nuclear modernization program is clearly a critical
    national security priority. If confirmed, it will be critical for me to
    review the program, begun under the Obama Administration, to ensure
    that it is being executed in the most cost effective and judicious
    manner.
        Question. Despite decades of reductions in the number of nuclear
    weapons in the U.S. stockpile, and ongoing efforts to reduce global
    nuclear threats, the U.S. currently faces a more complex nuclear
    landscape than at any other point in its history.
        Do you believe the United States should continue its longstanding
    policy of not officially recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power and
    pursuing denuclearization of the peninsula over the long term?
        Answer. I believe that it is in the United States interest to
    pursue a sustained coordinated effort with allies and others, including
    China, to advance the shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea.
    I fully expect the President-elect to direct the interagency to
    undertake strategic reviews, including on United States policy towards
    North Korea. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense
    participates robustly in all strategic reviews.
        Question. If so, and if confirmed, what additional steps would you
    take to ensure continued stability and deterrence of North Korean
    threats to the United States and its allies in the region until
    denuclearization can occur?
        Answer. One of the greatest advantages the United States has today
    and in the future is its alliances and partnerships with those who
    share common national security interests. If confirmed, one of my top
    priorities will be ensuring United States Forces have what they need to
    maintain a robust readiness posture in Northeast Asia, in close
    collaboration with regional allies. Our relationships with important
    partners such as the Republic of Korea and Japan are critical to
    regional security and stability and provide a powerful deterrent to
    North Korean threats.
        Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
    double the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
        Answer. I am generally aware that the Director of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency has publicly stated that over the next decade,
    China will likely at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile. If
    confirmed, I am committed to being briefed on the specifics of China's
    nuclear weapons program and its threat to United States interests.
        Question. In your view, at what threshold condition should future
    nuclear arms control regimes be expanded to include China's arsenal, as
    well as that of the United States and Russia?
        Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
    I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
    interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
    one on objectives for nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.
    President-elect Biden has pledged publicly to restore American
    leadership on arms control and non-proliferation as a central pillar of
    U.S. global leadership. If confirmed, I would ask for a briefing on
    China's nuclear weapons program to further inform my judgements.
        Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
    accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
    power projection capabilities in order to obtain an agreement with
    Russia or China on nuclear weapons reductions?
        Answer. In keeping with past practice for incoming Administrations,
    I would anticipate that President-elect Biden will direct the
    interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
    one on objectives for nuclear arms control and non-proliferation.
    President-elect Biden has pledged publicly to restore American
    leadership on arms control and non-proliferation as a central pillar of
    U.S. global leadership. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
    of Defense plays a robust role in all strategic reviews.
        Question. Certain groups are urging the new Administration to
    rejoin arms control agreements to which the United States is no longer
    a party, such as the Open Skies Treaty. To this end, some have advanced
    legal theories that would permit the President to circumvent the
    Senate, in which the Constitution vests sole power to approve treaties
    negotiated by the executive branch.
        If confirmed, would you support a decision to circumvent the
    Senate's exercise of its constitutional responsibilities through the
    advice and consent process?
        Answer. I respect the Senate's constitutional role, including in
    the treaty-making process. If confirmed, I would work with the State
    Department and Congress to help ensure the United States is able to
    pursue international agreements that are in our national interest and
    are concluded in accordance with the law.
    Missile Defense
        Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
    ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
    but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic missiles against United States Forces, allies, and the U.S.
    Homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR)
    codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on
    actions to improve U.S. capability.
        Do you believe the MDR should be updated? If so, in what areas?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that an MDR is considered as
    part of the Administration's formulation of our National Security
    Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
        Question. What are your views on the relationship between missile
    defense and nuclear deterrence?
        Answer. The relationship between U.S. missile defense and the U.S.
    nuclear arsenal is complementary and mutually supportive. Both
    capabilities contribute to deterring attack on the Homeland, with U.S.
    nuclear weapons presenting a credible threat of retaliation and U.S.
    missile defense presenting a credible threat of denying the adversary a
    successful attack. In addition, both U.S. nuclear weapons and missile
    defenses provide reassurance to our allies and partners--contributing
    to our nonproliferation goals while presenting a credible commitment to
    regional and global security.
        Question. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, what would be your
    priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the Homeland?
        Answer. The United States is currently defended from existing
    intercontinental missile threats posed by countries such as North Korea
    by the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
    Specifically, there are 44 ground-based missile defense interceptors--
    with 40 interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and 4 interceptors
    at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. I understand the Department
    is also examining an architecture for the defense of the Homeland from
    cruise missile threats, and will identify an organization responsible
    for development and acquisition of this capability. If confirmed, I
    would support continuing improvements to our Homeland missile defense
    architecture.
        Question. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, what would be your
    priorities for U.S. defense capabilities against cruise and hypersonic
    missiles?
        Answer. As our adversaries have demonstrated through rapid and
    repeated flight testing, the lines between ballistic and non-ballistic
    missile threats have become increasingly blurred, most clearly
    evidenced by the advent of hypersonic missile threats. If confirmed, I
    would encourage efforts to address the full spectrum of missile
    threats, including the continued development of integrated air and
    missile defense architectures for both regional and homeland defense,
    as well as the accelerated development of intercept capability for
    hypersonic missile defense.
        Question. In your view, what should DOD do to improve the
    protection of deployed U.S. and allied forces from growing missile
    threats in operational theaters, particularly from advanced cruise
    missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe and the
    Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. We must continue working together with allies and partners
    to enhance our regional missile defense efforts in the Indo-Pacific,
    Europe, and the Middle East. Our cooperation strengthens deterrence and
    provides assurance essential to the unity of our alliances which are
    threatened by missile coercion and attacks. Many of our Allies and
    partners are acquiring advanced maritime and shore land-based air and
    missile defense systems that will contribute to collective security. If
    confirmed, I will encourage them to continue these efforts, while
    seeking opportunities to deepen interoperability with the U.S. and
    regional partners. These opportunities include joint exercises that
    demonstrate both interoperability and our joint resolve to both work
    together and fight together.
        Question. The MDR described the advantages of space-based sensors.
    In your view, is a space-based sensor layer a required ``next step'' in
    enabling a variety of missile defense capabilities, including targeting
    of advanced threats? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, space-based sensors are an important tool in enabling
    a variety of missile defense capabilities. Space-based sensors are
    required to provide global boost through burn-out tracking of ballistic
    missiles and for the detection, tracking, and targeting of hypersonic
    and advanced threats. In addition, space-based sensors support hit and
    kill assessment of engagements. I understand the Missile Defense Agency
    is collaborating with the Space Development Agency in the deployment of
    the National Defense Space Architecture's Tracking Layer to address
    hypersonic and advanced threats.
                   cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
        Question. The CTR Program historically focused on accounting for,
    securing, and eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction and
    materials in the states of the former Soviet Union. As part of its
    expansion to other countries, the CTR Program is widening its aperture
    to include biological weapons and capabilities as well as biological
    surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the development of
    capabilities to reduce proliferation threats.
        What are your views on the efficacy of the CTR Program?
        Answer. I am generally aware that The Cooperative Threat Reduction
    (CTR) Program supports DOD and U.S. objectives of reducing weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) threats worldwide. I understand the program has
    delivered significant returns on U.S.-funded investments since the
    early 1990s. If confirmed, I will work to ensure program efficacy.
        Question. How could coordination of the CTR Program across U.S.
    Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the
    Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
    Department) be improved?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will make clear my expectation--across the
    Department and for all programs, including the CTR Program--that we
    need to constantly work to improve and maintain communication across
    the Federal Government. Constant engagement is invaluable to best-align
    resources.
        Question. Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical
    weapons documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60% of CTR
    resources are allocated to biological programs.
        Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
    accurately reflects the current threat?
        Answer. I understand the Department has a process to assess WMD
    threats and prioritize activities and investments accordingly. If
    confirmed, I look forward to learning about and advancing the
    Department's work with partner nations to reduce the threats posed by
    biological weapons and biological agents.
        Question. The CTR program is the primary program in the U.S.
    Government to work with other countries to build and operate High
    Containment Biological Laboratories as well as develop safe operating
    and handling practices. Do you agree that this work is of high
    importance and if so why?
        Answer. I agree fully that safety and security are essential in any
    context of working with biological agents. If confirmed, I will ensure
    the CTR Program's biological threat reduction activities are aligned
    with DOD and interagency priorities.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    the CTR program is capable of meeting the mission of rolling back the
    threat of weapons of mass destruction?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure CTR Program efforts are
    prioritized, aligned with DOD and interagency priorities to counter
    weapons of mass destruction, and are tailored to what partner countries
    are able to absorb and carry forward.
        Question. If confirmed, would you recommend adjustment in the
    allocation of CTR resources? If so, how?
        Answer. As I understand it, the CTR program has played an impactful
    role over the years in mitigating CWMD threats to the Nation. Its
    activities and resourcing must be reviewed in light of the defense
    strategy and balanced against other resource requirements across the
    Department. If confirmed, I will review the current status of the
    program and recommend adjustments accordingly.
                                air force issues
        Question. It has been stated the Air Force is too small and too old
    to do what the nation asks of it. First, do you agree with this
    statement?
        Answer. Each Service's portfolio of forces and programs are
    assessed as part of program review. I am aware that the Air Force has
    several active modernization programs underway which would replace
    older aircraft and increase the capability of its force to undertake
    current and projected missions. If confirmed, I will seek the most
    effective allocation of the Defense Department's resources to include
    any Air Force modernization and force structure issues.
        Question. Second, if confirmed, where do you see the greatest risk
    in capability and capacity for the Air Force and what actions would you
    take or direct to mitigate those risks?
        Answer. I believe the greatest risk in the Air Force's ability to
    perform its key missions is presented by the complex anti-access area
    denial capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Air Force
    modernization must ensure that the service is able to adapt to these
    challenges. The Air Force also has responsibility for large aspects of
    nuclear modernization and nuclear command and control, which is an
    important priority. If confirmed, I would work with Air Force
    leadership to ensure the Air Force's ability to contribute to critical
    joint capabilities in line with the defense strategy.
        Question. The Air Force is on record as needing to purchase a
    minimum of 72 fighter aircraft per year to maintain requisite force
    structure. In your opinion, what is the optimum mix of 4th and 5th
    generation aircraft required to meet the threat outlined in the 2018
    NDS?
        Answer. I believe the greatest risk in the Air Force's ability to
    perform its key missions is presented by the complex anti-access area
    denial capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Air Force
    modernization must ensure that the service is able to adapt to these
    challenges. The Air Force also has responsibility for large aspects of
    nuclear modernization and nuclear command and control, which is an
    important priority. If confirmed, I would work with Air Force
    leadership to ensure the Air Force's ability to contribute to critical
    joint capabilities in line with the defense strategy.
        Question. The follow-on modernization of the F-35 is slated to
    bring key warfighting capabilities to the Air Force, but the schedule
    and budget of this modernization program remain in flux.
        Are you confident in the affordability and executability of the
    Department's plan for Block 4 Continuous Capability Development and
    Delivery (C2D2)?
        Answer. I am aware that the F-35 Block 4 modernization effort is
    designed to ensure Joint Force can employ airborne systems effectively
    in highly contested battle spaces now and in the future. The F-35 joint
    program office reports to the Office of Secretary of Defense, so I
    understand the program requires a specific focus from the Secretary's
    team. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD team and the military
    services to ensure the success of the F-35 Block 4 modernization
    effort.
        Given the importance of extending the range of U.S. aircraft, what
    do you believe to be the overall tanker requirement for the Air Force
    and at what rate and on what schedule must the Air Force procure the
    new KC-46 to be able to meet that requirement?
        I am aware of the critical role that Air Force aerial refueling
    capabilities play in supporting the joint force. If confirmed I will
    work with Air Force leadership and the head of Transportation Command
    to ensure that the Department fields and modernizes the aircraft needed
    to support the joint force in all operations.
                                  army issues
    Army Budget Challenges
        Question. While the fiscal year 2022 budget request has not yet
    been released, some public reports indicate there could be an effort to
    shift funding from the Army toward building a larger Navy to deter
    China.
        In your view, would this shift of resources make sense from a
    strategic perspective? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's fiscal year
    2022 budget request to ensure it is aligned with the Administration's
    priorities and balanced across the entire Department to meet defense
    goals. Competing to win against our adversaries and deterring them from
    threatening our critical interests requires the combined effects of the
    full joint force, in coordination with our allies and partners. Each
    service brings vital and unique capabilities and a shift of resources
    away from one particular service may have a negative impact. If
    confirmed, I will address the challenge of providing the President and
    the American people with a balanced force able to strategically counter
    adversary actions in both competition and conflict, and I will seek
    Congressional support to provide timely, adequate, and sustained
    funding for the Department.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support a decrease in Army end-
    strength that would accompany any substantial reduction of the Army
    budget topline? In your view, what would be the effect of such a
    reduction on Army force structure, readiness, and operations tempo?
        Answer. I am committed to reviewing the end-strength of all of the
    Services and their manpower, equipment, and training, mindful of
    national security objectives. End-strength reductions must be subject
    to careful analysis and a clear understanding of strategic impacts and
    risks. The Army is currently undergoing a major transformation to
    modernize its forces while simultaneously maintaining a high OPTEMPO to
    support Combatant Command requirements. Army end-strength should
    support the Army's efforts to build a modern, lethal force.
        Many factors, including end-strength, affect force structure,
    readiness, and operational tempo. Reductions of end-strength should be
    rigorously assessed to fully understand how it affects Service and
    broader Department goals. If confirmed, I am committed to clear
    prioritization of missions and operational requirements that would be
    associated with any potential force structure changes to any Service.
    Army Modernization Priorities
        Question. Budget pressure could impact the Army's ongoing
    investment in modernizing the force for near-peer competition,
    deterrence and, if necessary, conflict.
        Do you believe the Army must modernize to effectively fulfill the
    requirements of the NDS? If confirmed, what would you do to ensure the
    Army is adequately resourced to concurrently maintain readiness,
    modernize the force, and take care of its people?
        Answer. Yes. Many of the Army's combat platforms were originally
    designed over 40 years ago. While the Army has continued to modernize
    these platforms, future conflict will likely require capabilities
    delivered by new designs. Meanwhile, both China and Russia continue to
    aggressively modernize, and the pace of technological change continues
    to accelerate. If confirmed, I will work with the Army to assess the
    progress made on these elements and to field those capabilities that
    offer important advantages to the joint force in future operations.
        Each Service must be adequately resourced to meet the demands of
    the strategy. If confirmed, I will work with Service leadership to
    ensure continued emphasis on internal reforms and I intend to be
    transparent with Congress on our budget decision making process.
        Question. In your view, which are the most critical Army
    modernization priorities, particularly in the context of countering the
    rapidly increasing threat posed by China?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army and the other
    services to determine how the capabilities in the Army's modernization
    portfolio can contribute to a joint warfighting concept through
    rigorous analysis and robust experimentation so that we field the right
    systems on the right timelines. Looking ahead, artificial intelligence
    and machine learning, a next-generation synthetic training environment,
    robotics, autonomy, and advanced network sensors will all play
    increasingly important roles, to include supporting the Army's
    contributions to Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
        Question. How would you evaluate the importance of Army efforts in
    the Indo-Pacific, including the Army's activation of modernized Multi-
    Domain Task Forces, to conduct cross-domain operations in support of
    air and naval forces, in countering China?
        Answer. Army efforts in the Indo-Pacific, as part of the Joint
    Force, are absolutely essential to support successful competition with
    our adversaries, ensure effective military response to crises, and win
    in conflict if necessary. We know that ground defense remains a
    priority for our Allies in the region. The Army is critical to building
    relationships, establishing logistics footholds and expanding
    operational reach for the Joint Force.
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA requires the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Secretaries of the
    Military Departments, to conduct a holistic assessment of current and
    emerging air and missile threats and the integrated defensive
    capabilities and capacity required to counter them. It also requires
    the Secretary of Defense to certify integrated air and missile defense
    roles and responsibilities.
        In your view, are the roles and responsibilities for IAMD
    appropriately assigned across the Military Services and defense
    agencies?
        Answer. IAMD is inherently a joint endeavor and requires a
    synchronized approach across the Department. Emerging adversary air and
    missile capabilities continue to fundamentally alter the way future
    conflicts will be conducted. Correspondingly the threat requires the
    Department to thoughtfully and routinely reassess future organizational
    structures in a global context to address threat capabilities that
    limit or negate U.S. capabilities to operate and project joint military
    forces. If confirmed, I will work with the services, the Joint Staff,
    and civilian leadership to ensure that our approach to IAMD is well
    integrated and addresses current and future operational needs.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Military Services
    make the investments required to fulfill their IAMD responsibilities,
    including for base defense? How would you ensure effective integration
    of the Services' current capabilities, as well as of the capabilities
    each is separately developing?
        Answer. Each Military Service provides major contributions to the
    IAMD mission area, and each must balance those requirements with their
    service specific missions and priorities. If confirmed, I will work
    with the services, the Joint Staff, and civilian leadership to ensure
    that our approach to IAMD, including base defense, is well integrated
    and addresses current and future operational needs.
        If confirmed, I will work with the services, the Joint Staff, and
    civilian leadership to ensure that our approach to IAMD is well
    integrated and addresses current and future operational needs as well
    as addressing IAMD roles and responsibilities.
        Question. During his confirmation hearing before this committee,
    the current Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the Army's purchase
    of two Iron Dome batteries to address shortfalls in theater base
    defense capabilities was a ``good first step.'' However, several months
    ago, the Secretary of the Army stated the Army does not intend to
    complete the purchase and fielding of two additional batteries by 2023,
    as required by the fiscal year 2019 NDAA.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that forward
    stationed servicemembers have adequate near-term protection, given the
    expanding number of complex threats to United States bases in the
    Pacific, Middle East, and Europe?
        Answer. I know that our Combatant Commanders work carefully to
    refine threat estimates within their areas of responsibility and assess
    impacts of those threats to their operational plans and activities. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure that these risks are effectively
    mitigated through a combination of approaches such as intelligence and
    surveillance collection for better awareness and early warning,
    deterrence posture, investment in localized force protection, and
    active and passive defenses.
        Question. Over the last year, the Army was designated as executive
    agent for the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO),
    and has made progress demonstrating, testing, and advancing effective
    counter small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS) capabilities for the
    Joint Force.
        If confirmed, would you support continuation of the JCO effort? How
    would you prioritize and focus efforts across DOD to counter larger
    UAS?
        Answer. The threat posed by sUAS systems is evolving and expanding.
    If confirmed, I will support efforts, such as those JCO efforts
    currently underway, that streamline innovation, enhance warfighting
    capabilities, and simultaneously minimize unnecessary duplication and
    redundancy.
        Counter-UAS is a subset of the larger Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) mission area, which is a Joint effort. The Department is
    currently addressing the significant UAS threat through Service-
    specific capabilities. If confirmed, I will examine ways to prioritize
    and focus DOD efforts working with the Service Secretaries to assist in
    prioritizing C-UAS efforts across the Department to facilitate greater
    synergy between the Services.
        Question. If confirmed, do you intend to explore options for
    expanding DOD cooperation with other agencies, such as the Departments
    of Energy, Justice, and Homeland Security, on C-sUAS capability
    development and procurembent?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review C-UAS capability development
    and procurement, assess DOD's cooperation with other Federal
    departments and agencies, and if necessary explore options for
    expanding cooperation to ensure we achieve our objectives.
        Question. The current validated requirement for THAAD batteries is
    nine, yet only seven batteries are fully manned and equipped, despite
    the fact that THAAD and Patriot batteries are some of the highest-
    demand, lowest-density assets in the Army. The fiscal year 2021 NDAA
    and Defense Appropriations Acts both support procurement of an eighth
    battery.
        If confirmed, what action would you take to ensure that the Army
    expeditiously acquires the eighth THAAD battery and appropriately plans
    and budgets for the ninth as soon as feasible?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army works closely with the
    Missile Defense Agency to acquire sufficient THAAD capability to
    support the joint force and execute the funding Congress has provided.
    Soldier Lethality
        Question. Last year's realignment of the Close-Combat Lethality
    Task Force (CCLTF) from a cross-functional team reporting directly to
    the Secretary of Defense to an activity under the Department of the
    Army appears to have de-emphasized this effort, which is critical to
    the lethality and survivability of formations that traditionally
    sustain more than 90 percent of combat casualties.
        If confirmed, what would you do to ensure the necessary
    prioritization, manning, and resourcing of the CCLTF? How would you
    ensure that the CCLTF fulfills its charter to drive materiel and non-
    materiel innovations for the soldiers, marines, and special operators
    who comprise our close-combat formations?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the CCLTF continues to develop,
    evaluate, and make recommendations regarding improvements to U.S.
    squad-level close combat formations, ensuring overmatch against
    potential threats. This effort is important, and if confirmed, I will
    ensure that the work of the CCLTF receives appropriate levels of
    organizational support and resources.
                          navy and marine corps issues
        Question. What is your assessment of the recently published
    Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power? In
    your view, how well does this strategy nest within the 2018 NDS?
        I commend the Naval Services' for working to develop a maritime
    strategy that supports the National Defense Strategy which focuses on
    improving joint operations. If confirmed, I will work with the naval
    services to assess the effectiveness of this strategy and continue
    development of a joint warfighting concept.
        My initial sense is that the Naval Service's Strategy is well
    aligned with the 2018 NDS's focus on China, and to a lesser degree
    Russia, as being the most significant threats to U.S national defense
    interests. If confirmed, I would want to engage more closely with the
    Naval Services to understand the detailed implications of the strategy.
        Question. Do you believe the Departments of the Army and Air Force
    should publish similar strategies? If confirmed, what timeline would
    you seek for such a publication?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome discussion with all of the
    services on strategy development and a joint warfighting concept. I
    would also encourage perspectives from civilian and policy oversight,
    as well as joint functions in these matters.
        If confirmed, I would first want to gain insights from relevant
    civilian (OSD) and joint components, as well as the affected Military
    Services, about the analytic, strategic planning, and other
    prioritization considerations of pursuing similar efforts. I would also
    want to ensure that any such follow-on efforts would be well nested
    with next steps in reexamining, updating, and refining implementation
    of the National Defense Strategy.
    Recapitalizing the Fleet
        Question. Despite the Navy's requirement for at least 382 ships, it
    is currently operating with approximately 297 battle force ships.
    Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that
    achieving the Navy's fiscal year 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan would
    require an average $31 billion per year, one-third more than Navy
    estimates, and an increase of more than 50 percent compared with recent
    shipbuilding budgets.
        Do you consider the Future Naval Force Study and the Fiscal Year
    2021 Shipbuilding Plan released in December 2020 to be appropriate
    given the current and future strategic environment?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Future Naval Force Study
    (FNFS) explored a range of future fleet designs capable of meeting
    today's enduring maritime missions and tomorrow's global security
    challenges. If confirmed, I will review both the Future Naval Force
    Study and shipbuilding plan in detail and work with Navy leadership to
    develop a well calibrated shipbuilding plan.
        Question. How would you characterize the risks to national security
    posed by the current number of battle force ships?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the size of the Navy fleet is
    currently growing as new ships are delivered to the fleet and that the
    Navy plans to continue this growth in future budgets. I am also aware
    that the Navy has experienced recent challenges in ensuring that ships
    are ready to deploy after maintenance periods and in delivering all
    necessary training to ship crews prior to deployment. If confirmed, I
    will review the Navy's assessment of current and future risks in
    performing its assigned missions, and in supporting the requirements of
    the joint force, and work with Navy leadership to address those risks.
    Improving Government Technical Control in Shipbuilding
        Question. A June 2018 Government Accountability Office report found
    that the last eight combatant lead ships cost a total of $8 billion
    more than initially budgeted; were delivered at least six months late;
    and were marked by dozens of deficiencies. As an example, the first
    procurement dollar for the Ford-class was spent in 2001. More than
    nineteen years later, procurement dollars continue to be spent to
    finish construction on the lead ship, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78),
    which is $2.7 billion over the original budget estimate, was partially
    delivered 20 months late, and remains incomplete.
        Do you believe acquisition performance on recent lead ships has
    been satisfactory?
        Answer. As I understand it, the lead ship in any class comes with
    complex challenges, particularly in the areas of technology development
    and integration, design, ship construction, and testing. Even so,
    performance on lead ship efforts such as the USS Gerald R. Ford and
    others has given cause for concern. If confirmed, I will assess the
    Navy's performance on lead ships generally and its plans for upcoming
    lead ships, understanding that multiple critical lead ship construction
    efforts are currently underway or in the planning process.
        Question. What actions do you believe should be taken or explored
    to improve on recent lead ship performance, particularly in regard to
    improving technical foundations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to improve
    performance on lead ships. I anticipate this will require a strong
    focus on understanding the technical risks in these ship design efforts
    and detailed work to effectively manage and retire that risk in a
    manner that can be validated before potential design flaws are baked
    in. Having a skilled and trained workforce in our shipyards will also
    be critical.
        Question. Section 125 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2021 directs the
    Navy to establish a land based engineering site (LBES) for the complex
    propulsion system of the new Constellation-class frigate. This LBES is
    essential to provide a firm technical foundation for this program,
    including by reducing risk on lead ship construction and systems
    integration, facilitating additional shipyard competition, providing
    lifecycle in-service support, and training of sailors.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that section
    125 mandates are executed as required by law?
        Answer. I understand the objective of the language of section 125
    is to reduce the technical and schedule risk associated with the new
    Constellation-class frigate. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to
    ensure a sound risk management approach to the Constellation-class as
    well as other shipbuilding programs.
    Ford-class Aircraft Carriers
        Question. What is your understanding of the current capability and
    reliability of each of the key subsystems on the USS Gerald R. Ford
    (CVN-78), including the Advanced Arresting Gear, Electromagnetic
    Aircraft Launch System, Dual Band Radar, and Advanced Weapons
    Elevators?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy has been working to
    develop, test, and evaluate these key subsystems to meet the Navy's
    performance requirements. If confirmed, I would assess the Navy's
    efforts in these matters as key decisions on the Ford and follow-on
    ships in the Ford-class are made.
        Question. What is your understanding of the measures being taken to
    ensure these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS
    John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), and those that follow?
        Answer. It is important that the learning on key subsystems in the
    Ford-class be applied to the USS John F. Kennedy and other ships in the
    class as soon as practicable. If confirmed, I would assess the Navy's
    progress on these subsystems as carrier construction issues are brought
    forward for decision.
        In your view, is it still appropriate for the Department to procure
    large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers and large-deck amphibious ships
    after CVN-81 and LHA-9? Should the Department conduct a capabilities-
    based assessment of the future of ships that embark fixed-wing
    aircraft?
        It is my understanding that the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as
    independent analysts, have conducted studies on capabilities required
    for future naval warfare. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy and
    Marine Corps to assess how their fleet design and modernization plans
    support the National Defense Strategy and the joint warfighting
    concept.
        The Department should rigorously analyze and assess the
    capabilities of the entire joint force in addressing the key
    operational challenges inherent in the missions required to support the
    National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that this
    analysis is carried out.
    Columbia-class Submarines
        Question. Navy leaders have testified that the Columbia-class
    program, the Department of the Navy's top acquisition priority, will
    require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions
    within the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is
    not provided.
        What is your understanding of the current cost, schedule, and
    performance of the Columbia-class program?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Columbia-class program is
    working actively to meet its scheduled fielding date to sustain the
    nation's strategic deterrent. In addition to the challenge inherent in
    this schedule, there are challenges in the submarine industrial base
    based on how long it has been since the nation constructed a new-design
    missile submarine as well as the demanding pace of submarine
    construction. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to ensure these
    challenges are carefully managed.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your recommendation for
    funding the Columbia-class program?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the requirement for funding for
    the Columbia-class program in the fiscal year 2022 budget proposal.
        Question. DOD leaders have testified that the Navy needs to procure
    12 Columbia-class submarines and avoid schedule delays in the Columbia-
    class program in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in
    2031.
        Question. Do you agree that 12 Columbia-class submarines will be
    needed for strategic deterrent patrols to meet requirements of the
    Strategic Command?
        Answer. I am aware that extensive analysis has been done to develop
    the current plans for the Columbia-class program and of the importance
    of meeting the fielding schedule associated with the projected
    retirement of the Ohio-class in supporting the nation's strategic
    deterrent. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to ensure the
    effective execution of the Columbia-class program to meet national
    security requirements.
        Question. What is your understanding of mitigation options DOD is
    considering or should consider in the event the Columbia-class program
    incurs schedule delays that might prevent the lead ship from deploying
    in 2031?
        Answer. If confirmed, on-time delivery of the lead ship of the
    Columbia program will be a principal objective of the Department. I
    will ensure efforts are taken to review all options to help mitigate
    risks to Columbia schedules and work with the relevant stakeholders to
    manage the risk.
    Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Recapitalization
        Question. DOD has developed a three-pronged recapitalization
    strategy for the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and Military Sealift Command
    surge fleet. This strategy combines new construction, extending the
    service life of certain vessels, and acquiring used vessels.
        What is your understanding of the Navy's recapitalization strategy
    for the RRF and the affordability of acquiring more than 50 sealift
    vessels as outlined in the latest 30-year shipbuilding plan?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Navy's Sealift
    Recapitalization Strategy is outlined in the Navy's 30-year
    shipbuilding plan. If confirmed, I will review this strategy and work
    with Congress, Navy leadership, and other stakeholders to ensure
    sealift requirements are met.
        Question. To what extent do you believe the Navy has identified the
    appropriate mix of used and new ships to continue to meet sealift and
    auxiliary requirements?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Navy's Sealift
    Recapitalization Strategy and work with Congress, Navy leadership, and
    other stakeholders to ensure sealift requirements are met.
    Marine Corps Modernization
        Question. The Marine Corps' current concepts for modernization of
    its amphibious capabilities includes ships, ship-to-shore connectors--
    such as the Landing Craft Air Cushion--and armored amphibious combat
    vehicles. Modernization across these systems is complex, technically
    challenging, and costly.
        What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious
    maneuver and assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps?
        Answer. The current set of amphibious capabilities, to include
    warships, aircraft, connectors, and amphibious combat vehicles have
    served us well, but require modernization to deter peer competitors and
    fight decisively if deterrence fails. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Congress, Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
    and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure the Navy and Marine
    Corps team remains a capable and lethal joint force.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize the
    development and acquisition of capabilities required for sea basing,
    connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore
    to achieve a full spectrum capability in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy,
    along with Marine Corps and Navy leadership to ensure that naval force
    have the capabilities they need to fight and win today and in the
    future. This includes a review of the current set of priorities to
    ensure joint access in an anti-access area denial (A2AD) environment.
        Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that
    modernization of the amphibious force--ships, connectors, and
    vehicles--is achievable and affordable in the near and long term?
        Answer. First and foremost, the Department's investment strategy
    must be predictable, clear, and aligned with its strategy. Funding that
    is timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained provides the Department
    the ability to acquire, train with, and employ Naval combat power
    across the full spectrum to be successful against threats outlined in
    the strategy.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support the continued execution
    of the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI), including the
    realignment of some United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the
    build-up of facilities at other locations, such as Marine Corps Air
    Station Iwakuni, Japan?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the implementation of the
    realignment plan known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative,
    understanding it is the bilaterally-determined way forward. The
    realignment of Marine Corps forces on Okinawa and the main islands of
    Japan, including the establishment of a strong presence on the United
    States territory of Guam, supports our effort to achieve an improved
    Indo-Pacific defense posture. The Department of Defense working with
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the Military Departments and Services, and
    the Department of State must proactively adapt and adjust U.S. access
    and joint presence to the realities of great power competition to
    ensure our posture is optimized for deterrence of adversaries, ally and
    partner assurance, and warfighting, if necessary. If confirmed, I will
    make it a priority to ensure that our posture plans are consistent with
    the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and
    other relevant plans, policies, and agreements.
        Question. Last year the Commandant of the Marine Corps released a
    new strategy reorienting the Marines to be more directly part of the
    integrated naval force, with a focus on China.
        Do you believe that General Berger's new strategy for the Marine
    Corps is correct, and that the divestiture of end-strength and ground
    combat capabilities such as tanks and artillery is appropriate? What,
    if any, modifications to this strategy would you recommend?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Marine Corps' strategy and
    work with General Berger to ensure his forces are strategically
    aligned.
        I would not recommend any modifications to the strategy at this
    time. If confirmed, I will seek to work with the Secretary of the Navy,
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Congress to review and
    implement the strategy.
        reform of dod business operations and decision-making processes
    Management Reform
        Question. Reform of DOD business operations is the third pillar of
    the 2018 NDS.
        If confirmed, what specific new actions would you take and what
    ongoing actions would you continue to initiate and accelerate the
    meaningful reform of DOD business operations, processes, and systems?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's efforts to
    achieve a clean audit opinion on its financial statements. The process
    of undergoing an audit drives discovery, transparency, and business
    process discipline that yields significant positive results for the
    Department. Also, having accurate, actionable business data is
    essential to running any large organization. I understand the
    Department has developed a single common `data lake' that is used to
    provide real time information on financial, HR, security, acquisition
    and readiness status, which I will continue to use to manage and reform
    the Department. Now that we have the data--no small feat--we need to
    use the data to drive and support our decision making. The Department
    has too many information technology systems that perform similar
    functions. These need to be reduced and rationalized. If confirmed, I
    would require the Services and Defense Agencies/Field Activities to
    migrate from legacy systems to modern systems that already exist inside
    the Department or elsewhere in government wherever possible instead of
    developing new capabilities internally. DOD has a long history of not
    making optimal investments in business systems, and now is the time to
    capitalize on the expertise that exists in the civilian side of
    government.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to improve
    the governance and performance accountability of the so-called ``Fourth
    Estate''?
        Answer. The elimination of the Chief Management Officer position by
    the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA requires the Department to re-think its
    approach on governance generally, including the Fourth Estate. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with the Deputy Secretary and
    other senior leaders across the Department on that, if confirmed. My
    goal is a Department that is both effective and efficient.
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA eliminated the Chief Management
    Officer (CMO) position.
        If confirmed, how would you approach the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
    tasking to reallocate the responsibilities of the Chief Management
    Officer?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would approach it in two ways: what has
    worked well before, and where we need to do better. For the ``Pentagon
    Reservation'' functions in CMO, I would rely on what has worked well
    before. For example, I would consider re-establishing the position of
    Director of Administration and Management (DA&M). For the business/
    management reform functions in CMO, I believe we can do much better
    linking budgeting and performance. I believe the business reform duties
    at the core of the CMO's portfolio should be performed by existing,
    respected, and highly capable staff offices in OSD. These are,
    primarily: the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial
    Officer; the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and the
    DOD Chief Information Officer. Importantly, I would employ well
    understood processes that the Pentagon knows and regularly uses--for
    example, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution cycle--to
    drive a management reform agenda and improve the performance,
    efficiency and effectiveness of the Department.
    Digital Modernization
        Question. The Department expends significant resources on
    information technology and related services, yet remains highly reliant
    on slow legacy systems and enterprise infrastructure, and on personnel
    intensive workarounds for critical operating functions such as
    personnel, financial management, logistics, and acquisition. Not
    surprisingly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, DOD struggled to enable the
    total force to work remotely in a persistent and secure fashion,
    incurring health and safety risks that should not have been necessary
    had the Department not repeatedly deferred investments in digital
    modernization initiatives.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to prioritize and resource
    digital modernization initiatives such as secure enterprise-wide cloud,
    teamwork, and collaboration tools, as well as senior leader decision
    support initiatives like advanced analytic capabilities (ADVANA)?
        Answer. The Department has made notable progress toward Digital
    Modernization, but much remains to be done. Modernizing the hardware
    and software DOD's digital systems rely on will increase its
    efficiency, its ability to be resilient in the face of a cyberattack,
    be more cost effective over time, and ensure the total force has secure
    and resilient access to the information it needs anywhere in the world.
    The COVID challenge clearly demonstrated the critical role of modern
    cloud-based collaboration tools in allowing the Department to
    successfully perform its mission without interruption. Enterprise cloud
    is foundational to the Department's ability to rapidly and securely
    develop and deploy advanced software. Our weapon systems increasingly
    depend upon software to ensure our competitive advantage over near peer
    adversaries. If confirmed, I will organize DOD to ensure continued
    progress toward Digital Modernization. Analytic capabilities like
    ADVANA are empowering senior leaders to use standardized data to inform
    policy and make better decisions. If confirmed, I am committed to
    continue to use such analytic capabilities to better operate and manage
    the Department.
        Question. Has your experience with defense industry and private
    industry engendered an appreciation for modern management tools and
    systems that you would seek to implement at the Department of Defense,
    if confirmed?
        Answer. Industry managers must be adept at setting clear goals,
    measuring value creation in their products and processes, and making
    decisions based on objective, data-driven measures of performance. If
    confirmed, I would accelerate the progress the Department has made
    using data management and executive analytics tools to ensure that
    DOD's decisions are driven by relevant and timely access to
    standardized data and a shared operational picture.
        Question. Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper took a personal
    interest in modernizing the DOD CHARRTS software system used to manage
    congressionally-required reports.
        Given your significant and recent military service, what are your
    views on the efficacy of the processes and systems used to manage
    congressional reporting requirements?
        Answer. I understand that, recently, congressional and DOD staff
    have been working to modernize the reporting process, and streamline
    both the way Congress identifies items requiring Department reporting,
    as well as the reporting process itself. I understand the importance of
    the reporting process and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with
    Congress on this process.
        Question. In your view, how can the DOD processes and systems--
    including CHARRTS--for managing engagements with, and the flow of
    information to Congress writ large, and the congressional defense
    committees more specifically, be improved?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Congress and the Department
    have begun collaborating on technologies to enhance the flow of
    information between the Congressional defense committees and the
    Department through an online, cloud-based, exchange portal to track
    reporting requirements from inception by the committees, through
    assignment and completion by the Department, with a goal of enhancing
    the timeliness and transparency of the process for all stakeholders. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on this process.
                                dod auditability
        Question. Since 1995, DOD's financial management has been on the
    Government Accountability Office's High-Risk List, identified as
    vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Over the past
    several years, DOD undertook a department-wide financial audit, despite
    not being audit-ready, and has made significant progress toward
    auditability. The Department is now targeting 2027 to achieve an
    unqualified or clean opinion.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to maintain the significant
    momentum achieved in auditability over the past several years at the
    Department of Defense?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department has actionable
    and achievable plans in place to keep making progress toward an
    unmodified audit opinion. All leaders--military and civilian, operator
    or supporter--will be held accountable for collaborating and
    completing, in a timely manner, these plans and roadmaps. I will expect
    my Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and other DOD leaders to
    work together to address and reduce the findings from the most recent
    audit and to continue the recent progress in the use of data analytics
    as an important tool in this effort.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or
    direct to achieve better outcomes than have past initiatives intended
    to improve DOD auditability?
        Answer. The tone set by leadership at the top is critical to
    accomplishing goals. There is a history of the Secretary of Defense
    establishing priority areas for audit remediation. If confirmed, I
    intend to continue that advocacy. I will reinforce leadership's
    engagement and focus on these audits. Better outcomes occur when we
    leverage our auditor's feedback to prioritize corrective actions that
    bring the greatest value to our operations and warfighters. Better
    outcomes also occur when leaders are accountable to the results of
    these audits, and, if confirmed, I will lead them through this
    important task. What gets measured also gets done, so if confirmed, I
    will monitor and push for progress by using and emphasizing metrics
    that enable the Department to quantify progress throughout the year.
        Question. How does the DOD audit contribute to operational
    readiness, in your view?
        Answer. The value of audit is not so much in DOD being able to say
    it has a clean audit opinion, but in the audit recommendations that
    bring insight into how the Department can improve its operations. The
    audit process can improve the Department's operations on many levels--
    in the form of more reliable information for decision-making, improved
    inventory management, and cybersecurity. With time, I expect that the
    value and contributions that flow from the audit will grow. Our audit
    efforts should lead to strengthened internal controls, streamlined
    business processes, improved visibility of assets and financial
    resources, and increased transparency and accountability. All of this
    makes the Department more effective.
                             acquisition management
    Acquisition Reform
        Question. Recent NDAAs have enacted sweeping reforms to the
    Department's acquisition organizational structures and systems,
    including introducing new acquisition flexibilities and delegating
    significant acquisition authority to the Services.
        In your view, what are the key tenets of the Department's new
    Adaptive Acquisition Framework and does it effectively implement the
    reforms directed by Congress? If not, what additional changes in the
    defense acquisition system are needed?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
    Adaptive Acquisition Framework implements the following tenets: (a)
    Empower program managers (PMs); (b) Simplify acquisition policy; (c)
    Employ tailored acquisition approaches; (d) Conduct data driven
    analysis; (e) Actively manage risk; and (f) Emphasize product support
    and sustainment. If confirmed, I will work with my staff and the
    services to ensure that Department policy is fully aligned with these
    tenets and effectively implements the reforms needed in the defense
    acquisition system.
        It is my understanding that recent reforms have allowed the
    Department to engage effectively in rapid prototyping and expand access
    to new partners in industry. At the same time, the fielding of new
    capabilities continues to proceed at a slower pace than is required to
    address the challenges the Department faces and the development of new
    entrants in the generation of defense capability is suboptimal.
    Acquisition of services and software remain challenging and
    implementing sound cybersecurity throughout the acquisition system and
    the weapon systems it produces is a major need. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with my staff and the services to continue to improve the
    defense acquisition system along these fronts and in other areas.
        Question. Recognizing that the Adaptive Acquisition Framework
    represents a significant change in DOD acquisition policy and process,
    what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure it is successfully
    adopted throughout the Department?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Research and Engineering, and the Military Departments' Senior
    Acquisition Executives to ensure that we have the necessary policies in
    place to implement and institutionalize reforms in the defense
    acquisition system and to ensure its effective operation.
        Question. Given the delegation of significant acquisition authority
    to the Military Services, what do you believe to be the respective
    roles of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Service Acquisition Executives in
    ensuring acquisition programs deliver promised capabilities to the end
    user on time and on budget? If confirmed, who would you hold
    accountable for large-scale acquisition failures?
        Answer. I believe the role of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Service
    Acquisition Executives, as well as the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Research and Engineering is to operate collaboratively, consistent with
    their statutory responsibilities, to ensure the effective operation of
    the defense acquisition system.
        Problems with acquisition can arise from many factors, including
    overly ambitious requirements, immature technologies, and poor planning
    and/or execution by government or contractor teams. If confirmed, I
    would assume ultimate responsibility and accountability for the
    stewardship of the resources the American taxpayer invests in the
    Department. I expect to work closely with the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Military Service or
    Component acquisition executives to monitor and improve program
    performance. Accepting and managing risks is a necessity to deliver
    needed capabilities. When there are failures, we should learn from
    them, identify root causes, and move on from the program if a better
    alternative can be identified.
        Question. In your view, what are the most significant acquisition
    and contracting challenges facing the Department today? What additional
    acquisition or related reforms would you recommend and implement to
    address those challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. Working with defense contractors to protect critical
    information and implementing appropriate cybersecurity measures are
    significant challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to addressing the
    need to protect critical information and implement appropriate
    cybersecurity measures, including working with the Congress. This needs
    to be a priority for DOD's acquisition and contracting community. In
    implementing these important authorities, we must balance the absolute
    need to secure our systems, with the impact to cost, schedule and
    performance in implementing these measures.
        If confirmed, I will work with the OSD staff and the services to
    identify improvements to the acquisition system in areas with
    continuing challenges. In addition to those areas I previously
    identified, developing the acquisition workforce will be a top
    priority. I will also ensure that the Department works closely with
    Congress on these issues.
        Many acquisition experts attribute past failures of defense
    acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces
    unrealistic performance expectations and overly optimistic cost and
    schedule estimates.
        Question. What is your understanding of the tools available to the
    Secretary of Defense to identify and direct appropriate trade-offs
    between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early and
    regularly throughout the acquisition process?
        Answer. It is my understanding the Department of Defense's
    policies, including DOD Instruction 5000.02, the Federal Acquisition
    Regulation, and the use of Other Transaction Authority agreements,
    provide the Department with significant flexibility to tailor cost,
    schedule, and performance. A key factor in leveraging these tools
    successfully is having knowledgeable officials in place on the OSD
    staff and in the services as well as across the acquisition workforce.
    If confirmed, I would work with the Congress to continue to refine
    these policy tools and to ensure that we have the talent we need in the
    defense acquisition system.
        Question. The rapid pace with which our adversaries field
    technological change demands a DOD acquisition system that can
    innovate, adapt, and respond to new threats and opportunities.
        In your view, how should the Department define and manage concepts
    like risk and failure so that program managers can try new technologies
    and concepts, learn what does and does not work, and more quickly drive
    technological advancement?
        Answer. Risk management is a technical and cultural challenge. If
    confirmed, I will work with acquisition and sustainment and research
    and engineering leadership in OSD and in the military services to
    ensure risk is understood and that the acquisition workforce is
    encouraged to manage risk effectively. It is my understanding that
    effective management of risk is part of the reason the USD(R&E) was
    established in the first place: to help foster a culture of innovation.
    If confirmed, I would expect USD (R&E)'s efforts, in coordination with
    those of the USD (A&S), to complement each other and foster adoption of
    new technologies and concepts with appropriate management of risk.
    Requirements
        Question. One of the challenges facing many acquisition programs--
    ranging from weapons systems to business systems--is unrealistic,
    unfeasible, unstable, and unaffordable requirements.
        What best practices can the Department employ to generate realistic
    and feasible requirements, particularly in sophisticated, rapidly-
    evolving technical areas, and given that software increasingly defines
    the capability?
        Answer. Dynamic approaches to requirements generation in a mission
    engineering context, as well as insights from prototypes, experiments,
    and pilots aligned with the Department's modernization priorities and
    the National Defense Strategy should continuously shape requirements
    and designs. These approaches that actively engage users, and allow
    rapid iterative insertion of emerging technologies. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others to encourage
    these types of approaches.
        Question. In your view, how well does the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) draw upon and use input from the systems
    engineering; cost analysis; and programming, planning, and budgeting
    communities in its requirements deliberations? How would your
    experience inform your future oversight of the JROC?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the JROC includes
    representatives from the engineering, cost estimation, and budgeting
    communities in its deliberations. I am also aware that the current Vice
    Chairman is working to reshape the JROC's focus around key requirements
    of a joint warfighting concept. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Joint Staff, the services, and civilian leadership to ensure that our
    requirements process supports the development of the capabilities
    needed to execute the strategy.
        During my time as the Army Vice Chief of Staff from 2012 to 2013, I
    was a member of the JROC, so I am fully aware of its strategic and day-
    to-day tasks. If confirmed, I will maintain appropriate oversight of
    its critical responsibilities for the joint force through the Chairman
    and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and work with them to
    implement the strategy.
        Question. Title 10, U.S. Code establishes the Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the Chairman of the JROC, as the
    primary adviser to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on
    requirements. In this context, the law authorizes the Vice Chairman to
    establish requirements without the consensus of the JROC as a whole.
    This reform was intended to improve support for joint warfighting
    requirements and missions that may not be of sufficient priority for
    the Military Services.
        What are your views on these reforms?
        Answer. I am broadly comfortable with the statutory framework
    undergirding the work of the JROC. If confirmed, I will review the
    JROC's efforts to better align its approach to the requirements process
    around key elements of the joint warfighting concept, and work with the
    Joint Staff, the services, and civilian leadership to ensure that our
    requirements process supports the development of the capabilities
    needed to execute the strategy.
    Defense Industrial Base
        Question. In recent years, Congress, industry, and DOD have
    increasingly expressed concerns about the health of the defense
    industrial base and its ability to reliably meet defense needs, coupled
    with an interest in ``on-shoring'' industrial activity. The NDAA for
    fiscal year 2021 seeks to address these issues, in part, by
    establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
    Policy.
        What do you assess to be the most significant challenges facing the
    defense industrial base? How would you address these challenges, if
    confirmed?
        Answer. A number of weaknesses exist in the defense industrial
    base. They include: workforce stability, financial health, cyber
    exploitation, a reliance on sole or single source suppliers, reliance
    on foreign sources (including adversarial sources), and vulnerabilities
    to predatory and adversarial capital investments. COVID-19 has
    highlighted previously unknown industrial base risks, created new
    risks, and exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. These impacts have
    been visible across businesses of all sizes and their supply chains.
        A robust defense industrial base is critical to supporting the
    Warfighter. If confirmed, I will assess the vulnerabilities in the
    defense industrial base and strategically invest in programs such as
    Defense Production Act Title III to address them. I will ensure
    implementation of statutory authorities, including those related to the
    Committee on Foreign investment in the United States, to protect
    American technology and know-how from adversarial foreign capital.
    Further, if confirmed, I will focus efforts to ensure that all
    companies within the defense industrial base have access to tools to
    combat cybersecurity threats. I will also work within the DOD to
    strengthen activities with small business, and with allies and
    partners, to support policies that foster collaboration, competition,
    and innovation, to ensure a vibrant defense industrial base.
        Question. What steps should the Department take--on its own or as
    part of a whole-of-government approach--to increase domestic industrial
    capacity and reduce reliance on suppliers in China?
        Answer. The President-elect has identified increasing domestic
    industrial capacity as a top priority and a priority across U.S.
    Government agencies. The Department of Defense has substantial
    investments in research, development, production of major weapon
    systems, procurement of supplies, and other support efforts related to
    national security requirements that spur industrial activity and
    private investment. If confirmed, I will support a whole-of-government
    approach to ensuring we have the domestic industrial capacity needed to
    meet defense requirements and support the economy. DOD can leverage its
    authorities and programs to onshore capacity and capability in certain
    areas and collaborate with allies and partners to leverage their unique
    capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you establish as the key
    priorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
    Policy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will look into this area in more detail.
    However, I will focus efforts on a number of critical and timely
    challenges. This includes ensuring that the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Industrial Base Policy is supporting the critical
    industrial base challenges I noted earlier, including the whole-of-
    government approach to fighting COVID-19 and its disruptions.
                              test and evaluation
        Question. A natural tension exists between the goals of major
    defense acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and
    the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--
    the objective of the test and evaluation function.
        If confirmed, how would you approach your relationship with the
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, particularly in light of the
    independence and direct reporting relationships and responsibilities
    accorded the Director in law?
        Answer. The success of the Armed Forces depends upon the objective,
    unvarnished information and assessments the Director, Operational Test
    and Evaluation (DOT&E) provides. If confirmed, I will respect DOT&E's
    independence, granted by Congress in statute, and look forward to
    working closely with DOT&E to ensure that our warfighters receive the
    most capable and safest systems possible.
        Question. The Major Range and Test Facilities Base (MRTFB) and
    DOD's associated test and evaluation infrastructure are critical
    national assets. In recent years it has become clear that digital
    engineering and digital modeling and simulation tools and
    infrastructure will be critical to achieving the Department's
    objectives for optimizing existing legacy weapons systems and
    facilitating the delivery of modern software-defined capabilities.
        Based on your past experience in DOD and in the defense industry,
    are you satisfied with DOD's test and evaluation capabilities,
    including the test and evaluation workforces and infrastructure of the
    Military Services?
        Answer. In my experience, DOD's T&E community has contributed
    substantially to producing the world's most effective fighting force,
    the U.S. Military. The technology available to us and our adversaries
    and the methods of employing that technology are evolving at an
    incredible pace. If confirmed, I believe a review of our T&E
    infrastructure, tools and workforce is necessary to ensure that they
    are ready for the systems we intend to field and the threats we expect
    to face.
        Question. If confirmed, in which areas, if any would you require
    the Department to develop new test and evaluation capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I believe a thorough review of DOD's T&E
    capabilities and workforce would be prudent. The results of this review
    would inform my decisions regarding T&E investment. DOD must be
    prepared to test and evaluate current and emerging systems and
    technology. Critical areas to assess include our national space test
    and training capability, our capability to test hypersonic weapons,
    directed-energy platforms, and autonomous and artificial intelligence-
    based systems; and our test and evaluation capabilities for software
    systems and cybersecurity.
        Question. Under what conditions should other U.S. Government
    agencies (Federal, State and local), allied foreign governments, and
    defense contractors be permitted to use the MRTFB?
        Answer. DOD organizations must have priority for use of the Major
    Range and Test Facility Base. If confirmed, I would support robust
    interagency cooperation whenever possible and I envision many mutually
    beneficial opportunities, particularly in the areas of space,
    cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, for partnership with other
    government agencies. Strengthening partnerships with our international
    allies will be at the top of my agenda. That will include improving
    their warfighting capabilities and supporting our forces'
    interoperability through opportunities for via testing and training at
    U.S. facilities.
                          defense security cooperation
        Question. What should be the primary objectives of Department of
    Defense security sector assistance activities, in your view?
        Answer. The Department's primary objective for security sector
    assistance efforts should be to enhance the capabilities and capacity
    of our partners to provide for their own defense and enable partners to
    address regional security challenges--to advance shared security
    interests. Working with the Department of State, the Department of
    Defense's security sector assistance tools are a linchpin in
    maintaining and leveraging the United States' robust constellation of
    allies and partners, which are vital to achieving U.S. objectives
    abroad.
        Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
    resourced to execute security sector assistance effectively? If not,
    what changes would you make or direct, if confirmed?
        Answer. Congress has provided the Department sufficient authorities
    to address capability and capacity shortfalls among allies and partners
    to ensure partners are able to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S.
    Forces. It is my understanding that the Department has made significant
    strides in recent years through aligning security cooperation
    activities with National Defense Strategy (NDS) objectives and
    utilizing the full range of available authorities for building partner
    capacity. If confirmed, I will build upon this progress and explore
    innovative ways to leverage security cooperation resources as a key
    element in advancing defense strategic objectives.
        I appreciate the Title 10 Chapter 16 tools Congress has provided to
    the Department and the continued support toward improving the execution
    of security cooperation efforts. If confirmed, I will advise the
    Committee of any additional legislative or organizational changes that
    I conclude are necessary to execute this mission as effectively and
    efficiently as possible.
                      base realignment and closure (brac)
        Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
    resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
    less money than originally estimated.
        Do you believe that another BRAC round is needed? If so, what
    changes to law and implementation policy would you recommend to improve
    on the outcomes of the 2005 BRAC process?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my senior advisors and the
    Military Department leaders to determine whether authorization for a
    BRAC round is something to consider in the future as we shape
    priorities.
        The BRAC process is recognized as fair, objective, and a proven
    process for closing and realigning installations in the United States.
    That said, I understand that Congress has expressed concerns about the
    2005 BRAC round. If confirmed, I will assess the need for changes to
    law or policy to address congressional concerns with the 2005 BRAC
    round. The key will be maintaining the essence of the BRAC process:
    treating all installations equally, all or none review by both the
    President and Congress, an independent Commission, the priority of
    military value, and a clear legal obligation to implement all of the
    recommendations in a time certain together with all the authorities
    needed to accomplish implementation (specifically the authority to
    undertake military construction necessary to implement
    recommendations).
        Question. If you are confirmed, and were Congress to authorize
    another BRAC round, how would you set priorities for infrastructure
    reduction and consolidation across DOD?
        Answer. If confirmed, and if Congress were to authorize a new BRAC
    round, I would work with my civilian and military experts to determine
    the priorities to be addressed by that round.
        Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities for
    working with local communities with respect to property disposal that
    would vest in DOD and the Military Services, were Congress to authorize
    another BRAC round?
        Answer. If confirmed, and if Congress were to authorize another
    BRAC round, I would consult with the Department's experts on this
    matter.
                    operational energy and energy resilience
        Question. The Department defines operational energy as the energy
    required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and
    weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by
    tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. As early as
    2004, then-General Mattis testified before Congress that DOD must
    ``unleash us from the tether of fuel'' if U.S. Forces are to sustain
    momentum and retain freedom of maneuver. He cautioned that ``units
    would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their
    dependence on fuel'' and resupply efforts ``made us vulnerable in ways
    that would be exploited by the enemy.'' Today, DOD energy requirements
    are projected to increase significantly due to technological advances
    in weapons systems and distributed operations over longer operating
    distances.
        If confirmed, what would you do to harness innovations in
    operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational
    concepts?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work across OSD, the Joint Staff, the
    Services, the Combatant Commands, and industry to enhance the energy
    resilience of the Joint force. That includes investing in energy RDT&E
    and incorporating energy resilience into emerging joint operational
    concepts through exercises, wargames, modeling and simulation, and
    other means.
        Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe DOD needs
    to improve the incorporation of energy considerations in its strategic
    planning processes?
        Answer. DOD must consider the supportability of our energy
    requirements in contested and competitive operating environments,
    including the Homeland, as well as how changing geopolitical conditions
    affect energy supplies. If confirmed, I will review how well the
    Department is incorporating energy considerations into all aspects of
    the strategic planning process.
        Question. How can DOD acquisition systems better address
    requirements related to the use of energy in military platforms? In
    your view, should energy supportability be a key performance parameter
    in the requirements process?
        Answer. DOD does not and will not have uncontested access to
    unlimited energy, from the Homeland to forward deployed locations. If
    confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure the acquisition system
    values and enhances the energy supportability of future platforms and
    operations.
        It is my understanding that energy supportability is already a key
    performance parameter, by statute. If confirmed, I will ask the
    acquisition and energy experts, in coordination with the Joint Staff,
    to update me on the implementation of the energy supportability key
    performance parameter, and recommend any necessary improvements.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to
    prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DOD, including
    acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to
    support mission critical functions and address known vulnerabilities?
        Answer. In order to achieve their missions, our warfighters must
    have assured access to energy that is resilient to all hazards and
    threats. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department considers a full
    range of resilient, cyber-secure, and sustainable energy solutions,
    including renewable energy technologies, to meet the needs of mission
    critical functions.
        Question. Section 2805 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA accorded the
    Secretary of Defense the authority to plan and fund military
    construction projects directly related to energy resiliency and energy
    security.
        If confirmed, for what types of construction projects would you
    leverage section 2805 authorities to enhance mission assurance?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD utilizes all
    available authorities, including section 2805, in an integrated and
    holistic manner to strengthen its mission assurance posture. Solutions
    may include microgrids, distributed on-site generation (such as
    renewable energy), and battery energy storage systems, among others, to
    improve mission assurance at our installations.
                                  environment
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD and the
    Military Services comply with environment protection laws, regulations,
    and guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Environmental Protection
    Agency to ensure the Department of Defense complies with environmental
    regulations, laws, Executive Orders, and EPA guidance while meeting its
    mission responsibilities.
        If confirmed, how would you structure investments in DOD's
    Environmental Research Programs?
        If confirmed, I will structure the Department's environmental
    research programs to address the highest priority issues facing DOD and
    to support Administration priorities.
        Question. What are your ideas for improving DOD collaboration with
    the Department of Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
    find cooperative ways to ensure military readiness, while protecting
    the environment on and around military installations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with all relevant Federal,
    State, Tribal, and local stakeholders, including the Department of
    Interior and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, towards conservation
    outcomes that support our mission requirements; sustain resilient
    landscapes on and around military installations and ranges; and
    conserve our nation's natural and cultural heritage now and into the
    future.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD and the
    Military Services comply with environmental protection laws,
    regulations, and guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Services to
    ensure the Department has the policy, organization, training,
    leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to comply with all
    environmental requirements.
                           environmental contaminants
        Question. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
    DOD has identified more than 400 military installations affected by
    known or suspected releases of Perflourooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and
    Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA).
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to address PFOS/PFOA
    contamination on DOD installations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the DOD PFAS Task Force
    proactively addresses PFAS concerns, and aggressively pursues a PFAS-
    free firefighting agent.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing
    the health concerns of servicemembers and their families regarding
    alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on U.S. military
    installations and in the context of performing military duties?
        Answer. Nothing is more important than the health and well-being of
    our people and their families. If confirmed, I will make sure health
    concerns that are reported are promptly reviewed, investigated, and
    mitigated when necessary. I will direct Department of Defense officials
    to work with the EPA and the Department of Veterans Affairs to ensure
    we are taking care of servicemembers and their families. I will also
    work for a more proactive approach to protecting the environmental
    quality of installations for our servicemembers, their families, and
    the communities that support them.
              readiness and resource impacts from extreme weather
        Question. Over the last few years, hurricanes have resulted in more
    than $10 billion in damage to military installations across the U.S.
        How would you assess the readiness and resource impacts on DOD from
    recent extreme weather events?
        Answer. Severe weather and other climate change-related disasters
    have degraded DOD's ability to operate and train at certain
    installations, imposing significant costs. If confirmed, I will work
    with Department leadership, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services
    to develop a full understanding of the national security implications
    of extreme weather and climate change, taking a comprehensive approach
    that includes impacts on operations, readiness, installations,
    equipment, infrastructure, and force development.
        Question. Based on these readiness and resource impacts, do you
    believe it necessary to use more resilient designs in DOD
    infrastructure?
        Answer. Yes. It is common sense, cost effective, and arguably
    necessary to promote resilience in DOD infrastructure and supporting
    communities. If confirmed, I will work with DOD leadership to ensure
    our standards continue to improve.
                      science, technology, and innovation
        Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
    or has disappeared. Our competitors are engaging in aggressive military
    modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten
    key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational
    capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed
    energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/
    machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology. Much
    of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for
    national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional
    defense industry.
        If confirmed, would you make any changes or adjustments in current
    DOD modernization priorities?
        Answer. I understand the current list of modernization priorities
    has been drawn directly from the National Defense Strategy, with input
    from stakeholders across the DOD enterprise. I would be open to
    revisiting these priorities as technology evolves and new challenges
    and opportunities are identified.
        Question. What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
    technical, organizational, or cultural) to DOD's development of these
    key technologies?
        Answer. I believe the Department faces a significant challenge in
    accelerating our adoption of new technology in ensuring that new
    capabilities make their way quickly from the lab into the hands of
    warfighters, while at the same time balancing the sustainment needs of
    our legacy systems. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to speed the
    transition of new technologies from concept to prototype to fielded
    capability.
        Question. Are the Department's investments in these technologies
    appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized across all Military
    Departments and Agencies?
        Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA reestablished and elevated the
    USD(R&E) to focus strategically on the integration and synchronization
    of technology development programs across the Department. If confirmed,
    I will support the USD(R&E) in ensuring that the Department's
    technology investments are appropriately focused, integrated, and
    synchronized across all military departments and Agencies.
        Question. In addition to the technologies identified in the 2018
    NDS, are there other technology areas in which you believe DOD must
    invest to ensure that the United States maintains its technological
    superiority in the long-term?
        Answer. Yes, and that is reflected in the fact that the
    Department's research portfolio is much broader than the modernization
    priorities. The Department invests in a broad portfolio of technologies
    to drive future capability improvements and to create technological
    advantage. For example, areas such as advanced materials, propulsion,
    software engineering, and electronic warfare are now, and will continue
    to be, key enablers.
        Question. Given your experience in both DOD and the private sector,
    is DOD applying appropriate effort to identifying new technologies
    developed commercially by the private sector and applying those
    technologies to national security and warfighter purposes?
        Answer. While we can always do better, I believe DOD contAnswer.
    inues to reduce the obstacles associated with bringing commercially
    developed technologies to bear in support of the warfighter. The
    Department is focused on identifying new technologies developed
    commercially and applying those technologies to national security and
    warfighter purposes. For example, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), a
    component of OUSD (R&E), has made significant strides in bridging the
    gap between the commercial technology sector and the military.
        The DOD Research and Engineering Enterprise also seeks out
    promising technologies/capabilities through outreach via public
    engagement, presentations to industry and academic forums, engagement
    with technical professional groups, and open solicitations to non-
    traditional vendors. If confirmed, I will support these and other
    efforts to leverage commercial technology developed by the private
    sector to bring advantage to the warfighter.
        Question. The Defense Science Board has recommended that DOD adopt
    a goal of dedicating 3% of the total defense budget to Science and
    Technology (S&T).
        If confirmed, would you implement the DSB's recommendation?
        Answer. The S&T budget provides critically important funding for
    long-term technology needs, and if confirmed, I will direct the
    USD(R&E) to develop a strategy for funding the S&T priorities to ensure
    that we can maintain and enhance our operational capabilities and work
    with Service Secretaries to support funding for the priorities.
        Question. If confirmed, by what metric would you assess whether DOD
    is investing adequately in S&T programs and whether the DOD enterprise
    has achieved the proper balance between near-term research and long-
    term S&T?
        Answer. S&T is a critical component of the Department's long term
    strategy to address the objectives of the National Defense Strategy. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure that DOD invests adequately in S&T to
    meet our mid and long term strategic needs and properly balances near-
    term R&D and longer-term S&T.
        Question. In its 2018 report, Foreign Economic Espionage in
    Cyberspace, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center warned
    that ``foreign economic and industrial espionage against the United
    States . . . represent a significant threat to America's prosperity,
    security, and competitive advantage.'' The report confirmed that China
    and Russia are engaged in campaigns to steal trade secrets, proprietary
    information, and other forms of intellectual property from the United
    States, through infiltration of the software supply chain, acquisition
    of knowledge by foreign students at United States universities, and
    other nefarious means--all as part of a strategic technology
    acquisition program.
        What steps would you take, if confirmed, to strengthen National
    Security Industrial Base and National Security Innovation Base systems
    and processes to ensure that critical information is protected?
        Answer. The National Defense Strategy and the Department of Defense
    Cyber Strategy highlight the importance of harnessing and protecting
    the National Security Innovation Base in order to compete, deter, and
    win in an increasingly complex global security environment. The
    Department can and should work closely with industry to protect
    sensitive information, platforms, and infrastructure through mechanisms
    such as cybersecurity assessments, supply chain illumination, and cost-
    effective, secure architectures and cybersecurity services. It will
    take a whole-of-government effort to ensure that critical information
    is protected and ensuring that every relevant agency in the government
    is working together to address this problem is a priority for the
    President-elect. If confirmed, I will make this area a priority.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        Question. Many DOD officials, including previous Chairmen of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the
    Sea Convention.
        Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
    Convention on the Law of the Sea?
        Answer. I support the navigation and overflight provisions
    contained in the Law of the Sea Convention. The global mobility of U.S.
    Forces relies on these rights and freedoms. I understand the United
    States has recognized that these provisions of the Law of the Sea
    Convention reflect customary international law that is applicable to
    all nations, whether or not a nation has ratified the Convention. The
    United States consistently respects the law of the sea and exercises
    these rights around the globe by flying, sailing, and operating
    wherever international law allows. If confirmed, I will support
    policies and actions that continue to exercise and safeguard these
    interests, as well as the free and open order of which the law of the
    sea is a part. I will keep these objectives in mind when providing
    recommendations to the President and the Congress.
        Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would United States
    accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on emerging maritime
    disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
        Answer. Regardless of accession to the Law of the Sea Convention,
    the United States will continue to advocate for the peaceful resolution
    of maritime disputes without force or coercion. The United States does
    not generally insert itself into territorial or maritime disputes to
    which it is not a part. But the United States maintains a strong
    position on adherence to the legal regime of the oceans reflected in
    the Law of the Sea Convention. This principled stance drives the United
    States' commitment to not only a free and open Indo-Pacific region, but
    also to a free and open Arctic domain. If confirmed, I will work with
    other Federal departments and agencies and our allies and partners to
    support the free and open international order and continued access for
    all lawful uses of the oceans.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
    enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
    for victims and hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual
    assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
    servicemembers aged 17 to 24, remains too high.
        Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that DOD and
    the Military Services have put in place to prevent and respond to
    sexual assault, and to protect servicemembers who report sexual assault
    from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
        Answer. My understanding is that over the last ten years, the
    Department has made progress in many areas, but there is much more to
    do. Although the current policies and programs are sound, execution of
    our approach must be more proactive and oversight of these efforts must
    be more timely and responsive. But as with all policies and programs,
    if confirmed, I would continue to closely monitor our progress and
    identify opportunities to improve and better support our
    servicemembers. The challenges posed by sexual assault constantly
    evolve; as such, our efforts must also continue to adapt. If confirmed,
    I will continue to refine and improve our approach so that every member
    can serve in a climate of dignity, respect, and inclusion.
        Question. In your view, why hasn't the Department been more
    successful in preventing sexual assaults?
        Answer. My understanding is that while the Department was able to
    see progress in this space between 2006 and 2016, the most recent data
    shows an uptick in reports of sexual assault. I also understand that
    this uptick was predominantly within our youngest enlisted cadre. This
    tells me we must do more to train, educate, and hold accountable
    enlisted leaders--our greatest influencers at that level--while
    maintaining a vigilant eye at the highest levels of leadership as well.
    If confirmed, I will work with Congress to take this on and ensure we
    not only have a force that embodies our expectations for good order and
    discipline, but that we hold our leaders, at all levels, appropriately
    accountable for these expectations.
        Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any,
    of proposals to remove disposition authority from military commanders
    over felony-level violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
    including sexual assault?
        Answer. While I am very familiar with the current role of military
    commanders in the disposition of allegations of Uniform Code of
    Military Justice violations, I have not studied the potential impact of
    removal of that authority in depth. During the campaign, President-
    elect Biden stated his intention to ``appoint a commission of current
    and former military leaders, sexual assault survivors and their
    advocates, and sexual assault experts, and give them 90 days to make
    concrete recommendations to me, including on prosecution decisions.''
    If confirmed, I would closely study any such recommendations and confer
    with the President on the best way forward.
        Question. Why are the number of prosecutions for sexual assault and
    retaliation in all Military Services so low? Why are conviction rates
    so low?
        Answer. I understand that the Defense Advisory Committee on
    Investigations, Prosecutions and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed
    Forces--a statutorily mandated federal advisory committee--has studied
    the issue of preferral of charges alleging sexual assault offenses and
    provided preliminary findings in its October 2020 Report on
    Investigative Case File Reviews for Military Adult Penetrative Sexual
    Offense Cases Closed in fiscal year 2017. If confirmed, I will closely
    study the committee's findings and recommendations.
        I have not studied conviction rates in the military justice system,
    but I understand that the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigations,
    Prosecutions, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces is
    studying the conviction rate in sexual assault cases and plans to
    further examine that issue. If confirmed, I will closely study any
    resulting findings and recommendations.
        Question. If confirmed, what initiatives will you implement that
    focus on the prevention of sexual assaults in the military?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support comprehensive prevention
    approaches that are part of a holistic plan to address sexual assault
    and other problems that may give rise to the crime, such as sexual
    harassment, hazing, and bullying. The Department's policies must
    demonstrate an integrated prevention approach that helps all leaders
    address command climate issues across the spectrum of problematic
    behaviors. If confirmed, I will demand that all leaders and
    servicemembers take ownership of their respective roles and execute
    them to the fullest of their abilities. President-elect Biden has also
    stated his intention to ``appoint a commission of current and former
    military leaders, sexual assault survivors and their advocates, and
    sexual assault experts, and give them 90 days to make concrete
    recommendations to me,'' including on prevention initiatives. If
    confirmed, I would closely study any such recommendations for expanding
    the Department's prevention initiatives.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you
    establish for yourself in DOD's program of preventing and responding to
    both sexual harassment and sexual assault?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Department's
    proactive approach to prevent and address sexual harassment and
    assault, including focusing on helping our young enlisted
    servicemembers. We must continue to equip our current and future
    leaders with the skills and competencies necessary to foster and
    maintain respectful climates. I will ensure that the Department
    continues to innovate and adapt its approaches. I also intend to lead
    by example and regularly engage with staff and the Military Departments
    and Services so everyone understands that mission readiness relies on
    taking care of our most valuable asset: Our people.
        Question. Given your extensive experience as a military officer, do
    you perceive that if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, you would
    require additional authority from Congress to improve the Department's
    programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assaults?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review existing authorities and work
    with the Administration and with Congress if I determine additional
    authorities are necessary.
                   active and reserve component end strength
        Question. Since 2016, the Active Force has grown by about 50,000
    servicemembers.
        Do you believe military end strength should continue to grow? If
    yes, where do you believe that growth should occur?
        Answer. Our servicemembers are our greatest asset. However, our
    people can only be effective if we pair them with the right equipment,
    training, and support. If confirmed, I will assess the Department's
    military manpower with the goal of ensuring it is properly sized to
    create an effective fighting force in line with the strategy.
        As previously stated, if confirmed, I will look to ensure any end
    strength growth or reduction is paired with associated requirements
    with equipment, training, and support. If confirmed, I will focus any
    end strength changes on the highest priority national security
    challenges.
        Question. What aggregate active end strength do you believe is
    necessary to meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the
    2018 NDS and associated operational plans?
        Answer. Each servicemember plays a crucial role in enabling the
    Department to defend the nation in line with our strategy. If
    confirmed, I will seek to find the right balance between the size of
    the force and our ability to keep it ready and modernized to provide
    the best protection to our nation.
        Question. If active end strength continues to increase, what
    specific parameters would you use to determine what the corresponding
    Reserve Component end strength should be?
        Answer. The mix of Active and Reserve Forces should be assessed by
    each service and by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness, and as part of the program and budget review
    process used to build the annual defense budget request. The best mix
    would maximize lethality and readiness and ensure that the range of the
    Department's missions are covered by those forces best suited to them,
    while minimizing cost.
        Question. In your view, do the Reserve components serve as an
    operational Reserve, a strategic Reserve, or both? In light of your
    answer, do the Reserve Components require increased levels of full-time
    support, improved equipment, increased training, and higher levels of
    overall resourcing for readiness going forward?
        Answer. For the last twenty years, the Reserve Components have
    successfully provided both ready operational capabilities and on-call
    strategic depth to provide the full spectrum of lethality in support of
    the National Defense Strategy (NDS) requirements.
        The Reserve Components' resourcing levels in manning, equipping,
    training, and readiness must be tailored to meet National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) requirements in competition, crisis, and armed conflict.
    If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Reserve Components are
    appropriately resourced to execute NDS requirements.
                            recruiting and retention
        Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission asserted
    unequivocally that the most critical resource required to produce a
    highly capable military is highly capable people, in the quantity
    required, and willing to serve. Yet, DOD studies indicate that only
    about 29% of today's youth population is eligible for military service.
    Further, only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards
    are interested in serving.
        Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of
    American youth eligible, qualified for, and interested in serving in
    the Armed Forces poses an existential threat to national security?
        Answer. Yes, I agree that the limited population who are eligible
    to serve and a low propensity to serve are concerning, as this
    challenge impacts our ability to meet our national security objectives.
    If confirmed, I will work with the Congress and the Military
    Departments and Services on initiatives to increase interest and
    eligibility for military service among young Americans to sustain the
    All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. In your opinion, why are so few individuals in the 17 to
    24 age range eligible for service, and what can be done to increase the
    pool of individuals qualified for, and interested in military service?
        Answer. Medical reasons disqualify most of the youth in this age
    group, a third of which are disqualified for being overweight. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Congress and the Military Departments
    and Services on developing ideas and initiatives to increase the number
    of young Americans qualified for military service in order to sustain
    the All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. What programs, policies, or tools does the Department
    need to increase the propensity to serve of today's youth?
        Answer. To improve propensity, we must change misperceptions of
    what it means to serve in the military. Today, fewer Americans have a
    personal connection to the military than at any time in the past
    several decades, and the gap between the American people and their
    military continues to grow wider. If confirmed, I will support
    initiatives that bridge knowledge gaps, correct misperceptions and
    reinforce a consistent, positive message in the market that raises the
    esteem of joining the military.
        Question. If required to choose between maintaining high
    recruitment and retention standards and achieving authorized end
    strength levels, which would be more important, in your view?
        Answer. I believe it equally important to maintain high recruitment
    and retention standards and to meet authorized end strength levels.
    Despite ongoing recruiting challenges, the Services have been
    successful in recruiting both the quality and quantity of recruits
    needed to sustain the All-Volunteer Force. If confirmed, I will
    continue to support efforts and policies that enable the Services to
    meet their recruiting goals.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to increase
    diversity and improve inclusion in the military?
        Answer. The Department has long identified diversity as a strategic
    imperative to maintaining a strong, viable military force. As I
    understand it, the Military Departments and Services are exploring new
    initiatives to expand and bolster the strategic tools needed to reach a
    wide and representative number of youth. Initiatives include reviewing
    promotion and command screening procedures and issuing polices that
    ensure pregnancy does not impede a servicemember's career. If
    confirmed, I remain committed to building on and expanding these
    efforts. We must find a way to engage with American youth in all
    communities and to help them understand the many benefits of military
    service, which they could not attain in the private sector.
                  diversity and inclusion in the armed forces
        Question. One consequence of the relatively low proportion of
    American youth who are eligible and interested in military service is
    that the military services have increasingly recruited from the same
    sources, schools, and geographic locations, and have targeted recruits
    from military families. Over time, these practices can decrease
    diversity in the Armed Forces, including diversity of background,
    experience, and thought that benefit any organization.
        Do you believe broadening recruitment efforts and promotion
    practices within the Armed Forces, with a goal of ensuring the Armed
    Forces reflect the diverse population of the United States eligible to
    serve, is a matter of national security, and should be a national
    priority?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that recruiting a force reflective of the
    Nation serves as a critical component of our national security
    strategy. I recognize the Department gains a strategic advantage by
    leveraging the diversity of all members. If confirmed, I will support
    the Armed Forces with ongoing efforts to recruit a Force that reflects
    the rich diversity of the Nation they serve, and an equitable approach
    to promotion practices.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
    support increased diversity and inclusion within the Armed Forces?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize and strengthen
    the Department's commitment to diversity and inclusion--and equal
    opportunity--all of which enhance our military readiness. Our force is
    stronger when we leverage the strengths of all members. I will reaffirm
    that military and civilian leaders at all levels are responsible to
    promote and instill these ideals. And I would champion accountability
    as the DOD continues with efforts on improving diversity, equity and
    inclusion within the Department. Additionally, if confirmed, I would
    support the Department's ongoing efforts to implement the
    recommendations recently offered by DOD Board on Diversity and
    Inclusion and ensure that the Department appropriately prioritizes and
    resources these implementation initiatives. Moving forward, if
    confirmed, I will seek the independent advice of the Defense Advisory
    Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to inform efforts underway and to
    provide additional insights.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you expand recruiting efforts to
    reach every corner of America, including expanding recruiting efforts
    and outreach to historically hard-to-recruit locations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support Military
    Department and Service initiatives to apply a broad array of strategic
    tools and approaches to increase the diversity within their ranks.
    Furthermore, I will continue to foster key partnerships with community
    leaders and other influencers to generate interest in the military as
    an employer of choice for today's youth.
        Question. There is a long history of honorable and courageous
    immigrant service in the Armed Forces, in all conflicts.
        Do you believe that military entrance requirements and testing
    practices accurately measure the military potential of non-native
    English speakers?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current efforts across the
    Department to ensure valid, reliable, and fair criteria and measures
    are used to access applicants with highest potential, to include non-
    native English Speakers.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that entrance
    requirements ensure the Armed Forces are not inadvertently missing out
    on talented youth who may be disadvantaged because they are not native
    English speakers?
        Answer. The Department's overarching goal is to access applicants
    with highest potential to perform in the field, while ensuring
    diversity and inclusion. It is my understanding that the Department is
    in the process of conducting an overarching review of best practices
    used by the academia to assess academic achievement for non-native
    English speakers. If confirmed, I will review these results and those
    of similar efforts, and direct actions that achieve a wider reach to
    all populations while maintaining appropriate enlistment standards.
                  assignment policies for women in the service
        Question. Since 2015, all military occupations and units have been
    open to the assignment of any servicemember who can meet the
    occupational standards, including women.
        What challenges still exist with regard to the assignment of women?
    What proactive measures would you take or direct to address those
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. The Department has lifted all assignment restrictions
    regarding the assignment of women. We must continue oversight of the
    integration of women into formerly closed units. We should redouble our
    efforts to attract and retain women in the military. Women are less
    compelled to join and pursue careers in operational specialties. We
    must assure prospective recruits that they can have extremely
    successful and rewarding careers in a full range of specialties.
    Otherwise, we are missing out on critical talent that is vital to
    sustaining the All-volunteer force.
        If confirmed, I will ensure DOD is known as an employer of choice
    for women and all underrepresented populations. We have become
    disconnected from the majority of Americans. They do not understand who
    we are and misunderstand what life in the military entails. This lack
    of familiarity often results in military service not being considered
    when American youth make their career choices.
                            religious accommodation
        Question. On September 1, 2020, the Office of the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Personnel and Readiness released DOD Instruction (DODI)
    1300.17, in accordance with Section 533(a)(1) of NDAA for fiscal year
    2013, as amended, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. DODI
    1300.17 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides
    procedures for the accommodation of servicemembers' religious
    practices.
        Do you believe that DODI 1300.17 appropriately protects
    servicemembers' right to observe the tenants of their religion, or to
    observe no religion at all?
        Answer. Although I have not yet had an opportunity to review how
    DODI 1300.17 has been implemented, my understanding is that all
    applicable statutory provisions, including recent amendments, are
    included in the latest revision to the DODI, thereby ensuring the
    rights of our servicemembers are protected.
        Question. Do each of the Military Service's policies and processes
    appropriately accommodate the religious practices of individual
    servicemembers, in your view?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be attentive to the necessity to
    ensure the appropriate accommodation of servicemembers' religious
    beliefs. The demands of service require individuals who are strong
    physically, as well as spiritually.
        Question. Do you support a policy that allows a prospective recruit
    to request and receive an accommodation of religious practices prior to
    enlisting or accepting a commission in a Military Service?
        Answer. Yes. To do otherwise would require an individual to
    potentially violate their faith by signing documents committing to
    follow all uniform regulations without knowing if an accommodation such
    as maintaining a beard will be granted.
        Question. Do you support a policy that allows a servicemember's
    religious accommodation, once granted, to follow the member throughout
    his/her military career--no matter where he/she is stationed or the
    nature of his/her specific duties--unless it can be demonstrated that
    the accommodation adversely affects military mission accomplishment?
        Answer. We should not make individuals choose between faith and
    service to our great Nation. Having their accommodation follow them
    unless that accommodation adversely affects mission accomplishment is a
    means to not placing the servicemember in such an untenable position.
        Question. In your view, do existing DOD policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by a military chaplain in both
    official and unofficial settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's right to pray in accordance with the tenets of his/her
    religious faith and the rights of other servicemembers who may hold
    with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs, who may be
    present in these settings?
        Answer. In my experience, yes. If confirmed, I will direct a review
    of our policies to ensure chaplains have the right to pray in
    accordance with the tenets of their faith.
                 military quality of life and family readiness
        Question. The Senate Armed Services Committee views military
    quality of life and military family readiness as critical factors in
    the recruitment and retention of servicemembers. Military families want
    access to high quality education for their children, and to high
    quality health care and child care services on military installations
    and in local communities. Military spouses seek education and
    employment opportunities, and military families benefit from modern
    morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) services.
        If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
    consider to be a priority?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support quality of life programs that
    reinforce a strong military community and focus on those that will help
    to build and sustain resilient families. My priorities include spouse
    employment, preventing both domestic violence and serious harm to
    children, and child care programs. I will base my decisions on programs
    that are determined to have the greatest impact on readiness,
    retention, and resiliency.
        Question. Do you believe that the Department should include
    military family readiness considerations, such as the quality of public
    education, and the availability of healthcare and childcare, in its
    evaluation of basing options in the United States?
        Answer. Yes. These considerations, and others such as housing, and
    licensure portability for military spouses and other beneficial State-
    level legislation and policies, are important as they contribute to the
    overall readiness and well-being of the military family.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve the ``base scoring''
    process to ensure that local communities are capable of providing
    quality services to support military families?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department
    Secretaries to continue their efforts to develop criteria that will
    equitably evaluate State and local community actions to support the
    needs of military families.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Reserve component
    families receive necessary support services while their servicemembers
    are mobilized and deployed? How would you ensure that Active component
    families who do not reside near a military installation receive support
    services?
        Answer. The Department's approach must focus on both Active Duty
    and Reserve component members and families. It is imperative that the
    Department continue to provide support for a geographically-dispersed
    population through a coordinated network of care encompassing support
    and services provided by the Department and other Federal, State,
    local, non-profit and private entities. One example of a DOD-wide
    resource for families is Military OneSource--the Department's 24/7/365
    solution to providing servicemembers and their families with resources,
    tools, and information.
        If confirmed, I will explore what needs currently exist, and
    determine what is available to families wherever they reside in order
    to identify gaps. Innovative solutions, such as web-based delivery
    systems, may allow the Department to be more flexible and responsive to
    the diverse needs of the population. Military OneSource, for example,
    is a virtually accessible program offering support services from
    anywhere around the world. The Department should continue to work with
    other federal agencies, and those in local governments, businesses, and
    non-profit stakeholders, to ensure support for military families
    wherever they live and work.
        Question. The Committee often hears that Active component military
    families have difficulty obtaining child care on the military
    installation and that there are thousands of families on waitlists to
    receive infant care.
        What are your innovative ideas for increasing the availability of
    accessible, high-quality childcare, at an appropriate cost, for
    military families?
        Answer. Child care is a critical issue for military families,
    especially in the current environment. If confirmed, I will review the
    current efforts of the Department in this vital area and work with the
    Military Departments and Services and the Congress to develop a multi-
    pronged strategy that addresses identified shortfalls. My understanding
    is that the Department is hard at work evaluating the Fiscal Year 2021
    NDAA child care legislation including but not limited to:
    standardization of child care fee assistance, 24-hour child care, and
    assessment of staff pay and benefits to increase capacity.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support the consolidation of
    commissaries and the Service Exchanges into a single defense resale
    system?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's original
    recommendations on this issue and will evaluate the savings and
    efficiencies that can be gained by various service models or
    consolidations. It is important that any consolidation or shared
    services model maintains or improves the benefit while achieving
    desired savings.
                         non-deployable servicemembers
        Question. The Department has published DODI 1332.45, Retention
    Determinations for Non-Deployable Servicemembers.
        Do you agree that servicemembers who are non-deployable for more
    than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation from
    service or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?
        Answer. As I understand the current policy, individuals who are
    non-deployable for more than 12 months are evaluated to determine if
    they are able to perform their duties and, if not, evaluated, to
    determine whether or not continued Service is appropriate. As every
    servicemember contributes to the readiness of the force, I believe such
    an individualized review is necessary. If confirmed, I will direct a
    review of the existing policy to better understand how it has been
    implemented.
        Question. DODI 1332.45 provides that the Secretaries of the
    Military Departments may ``retain . . . those servicemembers whose
    period of non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit . .
    . if determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.''
        Under what circumstances would the retention of a servicemember who
    has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be ``in the best
    interest of the Military Service''?
        Answer. Each case must be evaluated on its own set of facts. What
    is in the best interest of the Service will vary greatly depending on
    the skills of the individual when measured against the needs of the
    Military Service. Individuals with unique skills that are in short
    supply would be an example of when a Service may determine that the
    individual's continued Service warrants retention.
        Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to
    servicemembers with HIV? To servicemembers who identify as transgender?
        Answer. My understanding is that medical science is advancing in
    the treatment and prevention of HIV. The Department of Defense should
    routinely review our policies if medical advances occur for all medical
    conditions. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing our policies as
    it relates to HIV.
        To be credible to our servicemembers, the Department's policies
    must apply fairly and equally to all. An individual's gender identity
    should not be a factor in such a determination.
                         military health system reform
        Question. In your view, do military medical providers have the
    critical wartime medical competencies and experience required to
    provide competent combat casualty care?
        Answer. Emphasizing the importance of continuously exercising and
    improving the knowledge, skills and abilities of our medical force must
    be a high priority for the Department, and if confirmed, I will seek to
    ensure that medical providers have the necessary medical competencies
    and experience.
        Question. Section 702 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2017, as modified
    by sections 711 and 712 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019, transferred
    the administration and management of military hospitals and clinics
    from the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), a
    Combat Support Agency.
        Do you agree with the congressional mandates for military health
    system (MHS) reform? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The Military Health System should be focused on its core
    readiness mission and providing quality health care to all
    beneficiaries in accordance with guidance provided by Congress.
    Consolidating the administration and management of the military
    hospitals and clinics, along with public health and research
    activities, under the Defense Health Agency (DHA) as directed by
    Congress has the potential to continue improving overall readiness,
    effectiveness and efficiency. If confirmed, I will look forward to
    working with Congress to ensure effective implementation of Military
    Health System reforms.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you ensure the rapid
    and efficient transfer of the control, administration, and management
    of all military treatment facilities to the DHA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will commit early in my tenure to being
    briefed on the status of the transition and continue to follow the
    transition progress to make sure the transfer is completed to best
    support the future needs of the National Defense Strategy and the
    nation and in full compliance with all legal requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you bring to an end
    actions by the Military Services to delay or reverse MHS reform?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will listen intently to the Military
    Services concerns and work to address any issues they raise if
    possible. I will work to facilitate unity of effort across the Military
    Services, ensure transparency and cooperation among all stakeholders,
    and will make clear decisions to move forward within the timelines set
    forth in law to accomplish the Congress' intent.
        Question. Do you see value in restructuring the DHA as a new
    combatant command--a Unified Medical Command--in the future? In your
    view, what would be the pros and cons of such a command?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to fully implement the ongoing
    reforms Congress has directed. These ongoing reforms represent major
    transformations for the military health system and should serve to
    increase operational readiness and improve quality and efficiency in
    healthcare delivery. After a reasonable period following completion of
    the statutory reforms, I will assess the net effect and determine if
    there is a need for further consolidation or potential value to moving
    to a Unified Medical Command model.
        With regard to pros and cons, if confirmed, I would want to consult
    with Congress after I have had time to more fully examine the issue and
    assess the impact of the current round of reforms.
        If confirmed, I will work to fully implement the ongoing reforms
    Congress has directed. After a reasonable period following completion
    of the statutory reforms, I will assess the net effect and determine if
    there is a need for further consolidation or potential value to moving
    to a Unified Medical Command model. With regard to pros and cons, if
    confirmed I would want to come back to you after I have had time to
    more fully examine the issue and to fully assess the impact of the
    current round of reforms.
                               suicide prevention
        Question. The number of suicides in each of the Military Services
    continues to concern the Committee.
        If confirmed, what new initiatives would you implement to prevent
    suicides by military personnel and their family members?
        Answer. Suicide is a national public health tragedy that affects
    people of all ages, from all walks of life. Every suicide is
    devastating, and forever changes the lives of families and communities.
    I am deeply committed to supporting and protecting those who defend our
    country, and it is imperative that we do everything possible to reduce
    the risk of suicide and prevent suicidal behaviors. If confirmed, I
    will ensure new suicide prevention initiatives continue to be evidence-
    based and support efforts target prevention strategies for our
    populations of greatest concern, particularly our youngest military
    members. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with leaders
    across the Military Departments and Services, the Department of
    Veterans Affairs, and those in academia and the non-government sector
    to evolve our strategies--and identify new, evidence-informed methods
    to prevent the national tragedy of suicide.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to stem
    higher incidences of suicide at remote installations (like Fort
    Wainwright, Alaska) and on ships underway?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
    public health approach to suicide prevention focused on our populations
    of greatest concern. We must continue to emphasize comprehensive
    efforts to help individuals before they may become at risk of harming
    themselves and ensure we provide all necessary medical care and
    treatment; this includes support initiatives that enhance connectedness
    to family, friends, and fellow servicemembers, and promote help-seeking
    behavior, particularly for those serving in remote environments.
    Additionally, I will ensure that DOD continues to investigate and learn
    why there may be higher concentrations of suicides in a particular
    area. In accordance with the recently passed National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, I will issue guidance requiring
    each suicide involving a servicemember to be reviewed by a
    multidisciplinary board to ensure no stone is left unturned.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to enhance
    the reporting and tracking of suicide among family members and
    dependents of servicemembers across both Active and Reserve Components?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the current processes and
    identify opportunities to enhance both the accuracy and timeliness of
    collecting, tracking, and reporting suicides among our military
    community. I am deeply committed to supporting and protecting those who
    defend our country and their families, who also sacrifice for our
    Nation.
                           the dod civilian workforce
        Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
    civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD civilian personnel
    policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S.
    Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of
    Personnel Management. Although this Committee does not have
    jurisdiction over title 5, over the years, it has provided numerous
    extraordinary hiring and management authorities tailored to specific
    segments of the DOD civilian workforce.
        In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the
    Department in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian
    workforce?
        Answer. In my view, one of the biggest challenges the Department
    faces is the competition for cutting-edge technical talent. This talent
    is essential to implement the defense strategy and is in high-demand in
    the private sector. DOD must be innovative in our talent, recruitment,
    and retention efforts in order to achieve the DOD mission. DOD must be
    an employer of choice for such high-demand professionals. If confirmed,
    I look forward to working with Congress in continuing to create the
    necessary efficiencies and flexibilities to recruit, retain, and
    compensate these in-demand professionals.
        Question. Do you advocate the creation of a new ``title 10'' DOD
    civilian workforce and a concomitant body of title 10 personnel
    authorities applicable only to the DOD civilian workforce? If so, how
    should these new authorities improve on title 5, in your view?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to determine if creation of a new
    title 10 system for the DOD civilian workforce would be more effective
    in meeting the Department's needs.
        It is my understanding that the current title 5 civilian personnel
    system may not be fully sufficient to outpace our competitors where
    needed to attract, hire, and retain a civilian workforce necessary to
    support of DOD's national security mission.
        Question. Under current law, the civilian pay raise to adjust for
    wage inflation is set at the Employment Cost Index (ECI) minus 0.5
    percent, or at about a 2.5 percent for fiscal year 2021. Yet, the
    Department's budget frequently does not provide funding for a civilian
    pay increase.
        If confirmed, would you support a pay raise for DOD civilian
    employees, consistent with current law?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would support pay raises for civilian
    employees. Civilian pay must remain as competitive as possible to
    attract and retain a qualified workforce in support of the DOD mission.
        Question. Do you agree that the DOD civilian workforce is part of
    the total force and serves as a force multiplier for the uniformed
    military force?
        Answer. Yes. The effective and appropriate use of the DOD civilian
    workforce allows the Department to focus its servicemembers on the
    tasks and functions that are truly military essential, thereby
    enhancing the readiness of our warfighters.
        Question. How do you assess the diversity of the DOD civilian
    workforce? If confirmed, how would you ensure that diversity and
    inclusion within the civilian workforce is sufficiently prioritized?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, diversity and inclusion across the
    entire Department will be one of my highest priorities. Ensuring the
    civilian workforce reflects our nation is critical to DOD's success. If
    confirmed, I will continue to leverage the Department's established
    surveys and equal employment opportunity (EEO) data assessments to
    gauge civilian employee experiences and identify trends involving equal
    opportunity and diversity and inclusion. In addition, as the Department
    implements the recommendations recently offered by the DOD Board on
    Diversity and Inclusion, I will, if confirmed, seek internal and
    external inputs and perspectives to strengthen our equal opportunity
    and diversity and inclusion programs Department-wide.
        DOD civilian employees are vital to our nation's defense and
    integral members of the Total Force. If I am confirmed, as part of
    DOD's efforts, I will instruct leaders at all levels to prioritize
    diversity and inclusion initiatives across the civilian workforce and
    identify trends and areas for improvement. Further, I would ensure the
    Department appropriately assesses the effectiveness of existing and
    newly proposed initiatives, and tailor DOD's diversity and inclusion
    policies, programs, and processes to ensure we appropriately leverage
    diversity and inclusion initiatives throughout the civilian workforce.
                             general/flag officers
        Question. The fiscal year 2016 and 2017 NDAAs required DOD to
    reduce by about 12 percent the number of General/Flag Officer (G/FO)
    positions by the end of 2022. As of December 2020, the Department has
    achieved only about one-third of the required G/FO reductions, mostly
    by cutting vacant positions. DOD currently plans to identify and
    implement all remaining non-Joint reductions in 2022.
        Do you believe that the Department's decision to delay the
    identification and elimination of the remaining G/FO positions is
    prudent? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the
    Department's decision to delay the identification and elimination of
    the remaining G/FO positions. If confirmed, I am committed to ensure
    the Department meets the statutorily-required reductions, as mandated
    by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
        Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in
    determining whether a G/FO position should be continued in the current
    grade, downgraded, or eliminated?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize existing and emerging
    senior officer requirements based on the position's scope of
    responsibilities and prospective contributions to accomplishing the
    National Defense Strategy to ensure the Department meets all statutory
    limitations.
        Question. If confirmed, and as the U.S. Space Force continues to
    grow, how would you propose to transfer the requisite number of general
    officer allocations to the Space Force while also meeting the reduction
    mandate?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, in consultation with the Secretaries of
    the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    I would seek to optimize the senior officer corps to best accomplish
    the missions assigned to the Department of Defense. At this time, I do
    not know enough about the U.S. Space Force requirements to provide an
    informed response. However, I commit to providing Congress with a
    response at a later date once I have had an opportunity to review the
    issue.
         national commission on military, national, and public service
        Question. Last year's report of the National Commission on
    Military, National, and Public Service made a number of recommendations
    to increase and facilitate service opportunities in military, national,
    and public service. These recommendations included modernizing the
    Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) to include the registration of
    women, and strengthening the relationship between military and
    national/public service recruitment and programmatic efforts.
        Do you support amending the MSSA to include the registration of
    women? Do you support the Commission's other recommendations intended
    to modernize the MSSA? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I understand that Congress created the National Commission
    on Military, National, and Public Service to study and provide a
    recommendation on this question as a core task. If confirmed, I would
    review the Commission's recommendations and seek the input of experts
    within the Department before making an assessment. I am aware that
    future wars may have requirements for skills in non-combat fields in
    which the percentage of individuals qualified would not be variable by
    gender and excluding approximately 50% of the population--the female
    half--from availability for the draft in the case of a national
    emergency. Having a national conversation on the responsibilities of
    citizenship for all Americans would play an important role in
    increasing consideration of military service by both women and men,
    which is critical to the sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.
        If it is determined that the MSSA is an important component of our
    National Defense Strategy, then it is logical to modernize the system.
    If confirmed, I would work across the government to aid this effort.
        Question. Do you agree with the Commission's conclusion that the
    Selective Service System is still needed today, but must be updated to
    reflect how we fight and breadth of skills needed in today's Armed
    Forces?
        Answer. Yes, the Selective Service System is useful as it provides
    a hedge against the catastrophe we do not yet anticipate. The Selective
    Service System is a means to remind our youth that public service is a
    valued part of American citizenship. Making the data more useful to the
    Department through modern data mining techniques would be a way to
    improve the system's effectiveness. Capturing civilian experiences in a
    structured way would also aid in managing the talent the Department
    seeks to recruit.
        Question. What other changes to the MSSA and the Selective Service
    System do you believe would be useful and why?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly review the Commission's
    report, consult with experts and seek opportunities to identify other
    changes I believe would enhance the value of the SSS to the
    Department's mission.
        Question. Do you agree that expanding military, national, and
    public service opportunities, and encouraging greater service by
    America's youth generally, not just in the military but in national and
    public service, can, over time, increase propensity to serve among
    youth, and increase the likelihood that influencers recommend military
    service to the young men and women seeking their guidance?
        Answer. Military, national, and public service are an important
    component of citizenship. Expanding both the knowledge of and access to
    these opportunities would have an overall positive impact on all forms
    of service to our country.
        defense department and the intelligence community collaboration
        Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
    and operational--between the Defense Department and the Intelligence
    Community has grown increasingly close. On one hand, seamless
    collaboration is vital to effective and rapid responses to non-
    traditional threats, and bringing together the strengths of the full
    spectrum of defense and intelligence capabilities can generate more
    effective solutions to complex problems. On the other hand, without
    effective management and oversight, such collaboration risks blurring
    distinct agency missions, authorities, and funding, as well as creating
    redundant lines of effort.
        In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between
    the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-
    examined or modified?
        Answer. Yes, we should always be open to examine our procedures and
    processes. Close collaboration between the Department of Defense (DOD)
    and the Intelligence Community (IC) is vital to national security. I
    believe it is particularly important for DOD and IC collaboration to
    focus on improved integration of intelligence priorities, equitable
    resource management, and enhanced information sharing to include
    refined policies, where necessary, and common data standards. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National
    Intelligence to achieve unity of effort and the best effect in
    employing DOD intelligence elements within the law in support of the
    National Security Strategy.
                            execute orders (exords)
        Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2020 requires the Secretary of Defense, upon request by the Chairman or
    Ranking Member, to provide the Armed Services Committees with the
    ability to access and review EXORDS signed by the Secretary or the
    commander of a combatant command.
        If confirmed, would you comply with this requirement?
        Answer. Yes, consistent with legal exceptions.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
    or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                  afghanistan
        1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your advance policy question
    (APQ) responses regarding United States national security objectives in
    Afghanistan you wrote that ``President-elect Biden has pledged to bring
    the war in Afghanistan to a responsible end.'' How would you define
    ``responsible end''?
        Mr. Austin. A responsible end to the war in Afghanistan will focus
    on ensuring that terrorist groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State
    Khorasan Province are not allowed to threaten the United States, our
    allies, or our interests. To that end, the Administration will continue
    supporting a political process between the Afghan Government and the
    Taliban with the aim of ending violence plaguing the country and
    allowing for an inclusive government that protects its diverse
    population and is a responsible member of the international community.
                         erosion of military advantage
        2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your APQ responses you wrote,
    ``The continued erosion of United States military advantage vis-a-vis
    China and Russia, in key strategic areas, remains the most significant
    risk the Department must address.'' What are the key strategic areas of
    United States military advantage regarding Russia and China that you
    feel need to be addressed?
        Mr. Austin. Chinese and Russian military modernization, changes in
    doctrine, and increasingly aggressive activities across the continuum
    of conflict threaten to undermine the security of United States allies
    and partners in the Indo-Pacific and on NATO's eastern frontier,
    regions previously regarded as relatively stable after the Cold War.
    More specifically, both competitors have endeavored to develop the
    means militarily to blunt the United States' ability to project power
    into these regions in support of our allies in periods of potential
    crisis. China and Russia pose evolving challenges to our forward
    deterrent posture by modernizing their nuclear arsenals; advancing
    their capabilities and concepts for conducting information, space, and
    counter-space operations; and pursuing a range of malign cyber
    activities, in both day-to-day competition and in potential crises,
    including ones that could affect the United States Homeland.
     dual-hatting national security agency and united states cyber command
        3. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, do you think, in the middle of a
    cyber-intrusion of the magnitude of SolarWinds, that it would be smart
    to separate the dual-hat arrangement of the National Security Agency
    (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) that has worked so effectively
    to date and that this committee has debated and strongly endorsed on
    numerous occasions?
        Mr. Austin. It is important that we take a long term view of what
    is best for the missions of both organizations. I believe that it is
    best to avoid making decisions on the basis of any one event and focus
    on the long term value to national security. The SolarWinds incident is
    deeply concerning, and the Government is just starting to understand
    the full implications. If confirmed, I plan to assess the state of our
    cybersecurity readiness and the roles of the National Security Agency
    and U.S. Cyber Command.
         movement of israel to united states central command portfolio
        4. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, do you agree with the move of Israel
    from United States European Command (EUCOM) to United States Central
    Command (CENTCOM) and do you think there is a risk that the commander
    of CENTCOM will become a primary negotiator between the Arab nations
    and Israel?
        Mr. Austin. I agree with the move. DOD reviews the Unified Command
    Plan every two years and structures boundaries to best mitigate risk
    and protect U.S interests and partners. Israel is a leading strategic
    partner for the United States, and this move will create additional
    opportunities for cooperation with United States Central Command while
    maintaining strong cooperation between Israel and our European allies.
    This move better aligns our military approach to the region and our
    partners.
               united states military presence in the middle east
        5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your APQ responses you wrote, ``I
    believe we can better calibrate United States military presence in the
    Middle East . . . '' What kind of calibration do you have in mind? What
    would you increase or decrease the military presence?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will carefully review the DOD presence
    in the Middle East to ensure balance among operational requirements,
    risk, readiness, and global commitments. With the evolution of
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have an opportunity to reassess
    our current posture in the region and determine what capabilities are
    required to deter Iran and support regional stability. This
    reassessment will be critical to increasing the Department's focus on
    China and rebuilding readiness.
                     united states troop presence in syria
        6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, your APQ response to the question of
    ``Do United States troops in Syria help ``push back'' on Russian and
    Iranian Influence in the Middle East?'' indicated that the Defeat-ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] campaign was made more complex by
    other threats in the region, but did not address the impact of United
    States presence in Syria on Russian or Iranian influence. Do you think
    the United States presence in Syria has any impact on Russian or
    Iranian influence in the region and do you feel this is important in
    the larger context of long term strategic competition with Russia?
        Mr. Austin. My understanding is that the United States presence in
    Syria is focused first and foremost on ensuring the lasting defeat of
    ISIS. As the partner of choice in the region, our presence also enables
    us to have strong relationships with local partners who would otherwise
    be vulnerable to Russian or Iranian coercion. These relationships help
    us shape outcomes favorable to United States interests, often at the
    cost of increased Russian and Iranian influence. Russia, through its
    support to the Assad regime and basing agreements in Syria, intends to
    support an enduring footprint in the region to undermine strategic
    United States and NATO interests, as evidenced during the Syrian civil
    war, by its increased naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. More
    recently, we see a similar approach its intervention in Libya.
                            section 127e activities
        7. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in your APQ response to the question
    on section 127e and section 1202 activities, you did not address
    section 127e activities. Do you have reservations about the use or
    implementation of section 127e authority to support foreign forces or
    irregular forces supporting or facilitating authorized U.S. special
    forces operations to combat terrorism?
        Mr. Austin. The authority under Section 127e provides excellent
    strategic value for the money spent on the programs. The ability to
    support foreign irregular forces, groups, and individuals under this
    fiscal authority gives U.S. special operations forces an effective,
    low-cost option to combat terrorism in close coordination with foreign
    partners, while maintaining a minimal U.S. footprint. Geographic
    combatant commanders continue to express strong support for this
    authority as a critical component of their counterterrorism efforts. If
    confirmed, I would advocate for continued attention to and support for
    this authority, ensuring that operations remain thoroughly coordinated
    with relevant Chiefs of Mission and that DOD remains fully transparent
    with Congress in executing the authority.
                             defense budget topline
        8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, the Center for Strategic and
    Budgetary Assessments and the Ronald Reagan Institute hosted two
    bipartisan exercises by recognized leaders in their fields of defense
    and budget experts, policy makers, and industry executives to assess
    consequences of potential cuts to the Department of Defense budget
    topline. ``The results of this bipartisan group effort were clear:
    defense budget cuts would have devastating consequences of our military
    and our national security. A 10 percent cut would leave the United
    States with a military that is incapable of carrying out the current
    National Defense Strategy.'' Do you agree that a 10 percent cut would
    eviscerate force structure and make it impossible to achieve the
    objectives of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)?
        Mr. Austin. Under any resourcing level, the Department must balance
    readiness, force structure, and modernization while pursuing
    efficiencies and savings through organizational reform and critical
    reviews of ongoing missions and activities. If confirmed, I will
    continue to push for the best possible balance amongst competing
    priorities regardless of the topline. While a budgetary reduction will
    pose a challenge, I will emphasize the need to maintain a ready,
    technologically advanced force to ensure the Nation's national security
    is preserved.

        9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in an article in Foreign Affairs in
    the spring of 2020, Kathleen Hicks argued that through ``reshaping
    overall strategy, pursing politically difficult efficiency gains, and
    cultivating innovation . . . After some upfront investment, the Defense
    Department could expect to reduce its annual costs by some $20 billion
    to $30 billion.'' Do you agree, and if so, what is your estimate of the
    ``upfront investment'' required to achieve these savings?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would consider all ideas to improve the
    Nation's national security posture. Savings may be achievable, but I
    would want to hear from Dr. Hicks and others to better understand the
    trades involved.
                           sensitive cyber operations
        10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, cyber notifications from the
    Department for sensitive cyber military operations, as required by law,
    have become increasingly vague and do not provide enough information
    for the committee to perform adequate oversight of these operations.
    What would you do to improve these cyber operations notifications?
        Mr. Austin. In accordance with section 395 of Title 10, U.S. Code,
    the Department regularly notifies the congressional defense committees
    within 48 hours of completing a sensitive military cyber operation. I
    am committed to the principle of Congressional oversight of military
    operations. If confirmed, I will work with DOD components to provide
    the information through these notifications that enable Congressional
    oversight

        11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, are there steps other than
    improving the written notifications of sensitive cyber operations that
    you would take to help Congress perform oversight of these critical
    operations?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will commit to assessing whether the
    timely, informative quarterly cyber operations briefings the Department
    provides, in accordance with section 484 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and
    the annual military cyberspace operations report, as required by
    Section 1644 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization
    Act, are sufficient to ensure congress has the information it requires
    to oversee sensitive military cyber operations.
                       integrated air and missile defense
        12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, the Army is responsible for air and
    missile defense of forward bases in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific,
    and was required by the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) to procure two batteries of an interim missile defense
    capability by September 30, 2020, and a second set of two batteries by
    September 30, 2023. The Army missed the first deadline and does not
    appear poised to meet the second deadline. Do you believe there needs
    to be a shift in the air and missile defense roles and responsibilities
    to ensure that bases the U.S. Armed Forces rely on to generate the
    combat power required for implementation of the NDS are adequately
    protected?
        Mr. Austin. Air and missile defense of forward bases is inherently
    a Joint responsibility and all the services contribute to this mission.
    If confirmed, I will review the Air and Missile Defense roles and
    responsibilities outlined in DOD Directive 5100.01 to determine if any
    adjustments are required in order to ensure effective mitigation of the
    risks presented by adversary air and missile, in the context of a new
    U.S. defense strategy.
                             nuclear modernization
        13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, I was somewhat reassured when you
    indicated your support for the U.S. nuclear triad during your
    confirmation hearing. However, it troubles me that while you agreed
    that nuclear deterrence is the Department of Defense's highest priority
    mission, and acknowledged that we have reached the point where the
    entire U.S. deterrent must be updated, you would not commit to
    supporting the programs needed to do so.
        Mr. Austin. As I stated at my confirmation hearing, I agree with my
    four confirmed predecessors going back to Secretary of Defense Hagel
    that nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the
    Department of Defense. An effective U.S. nuclear deterrent remains
    vital to U.S. national security and to the security of our allies. If
    confirmed, I will request a comprehensive review of nuclear threats
    facing the United States and of the status of our nuclear modernization
    and sustainment programs, and will provide the committee my
    perspectives based upon this review.

        14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, Department of Defense officials
    estimate that the total annual cost of operating and modernizing the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent is currently about 3.5 percent of the defense
    budget, and will not exceed 7 percent even at the peak of planned
    investments. Indeed, during testimony before this committee in 2016,
    your former boss, then-Secretary Ashton Carter noted the following on
    nuclear costs, ``It's not an enormous part of our budget, but it is a
    critical part of our budget.'' Do you believe that 7 percent of the
    defense budget is an excessive amount to spend on what the past five
    Secretaries of Defense and you yourself have called the DOD's highest
    priority defense mission?
        Mr. Austin. The nuclear deterrence mission is one of the
    Department's highest priority missions, and updating and overhauling
    our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority.
    If confirmed, I plan to request an early briefing on the U.S. nuclear
    modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in the most
    cost effective and judicious manner.
                                 nuclear policy
        15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in his final address as Vice
    President, President Biden argued against modernizing the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent, advocated for unilateral United States nuclear weapons
    reductions regardless of whether Russia would reciprocate, and
    supported unprecedented policy constraints on the United States's
    ability to deter strategic attacks against our country and our allies.
    Given that our nuclear-armed adversaries have continued to expand and
    modernize their forces since the President made this speech, do you
    believe that unilateral disarmament in the face of increasing threats
    would improve the security of the United States and its allies?
        Mr. Austin. I am generally aware of public reporting that both
    China and Russia continue to invest in and expand their nuclear weapons
    capabilities. If confirmed, I will undertake a deeper review both of
    United States nuclear posture and of the nuclear weapons capabilities
    of Russia and China.

        16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, over the past 8 years, China,
    Russia, and North Korea have all expanded and modernized their nuclear
    arsenals, and are continuing to do so. Given these actions and the
    increasing nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, do you
    believe it is prudent to significantly alter U.S. policies that have
    helped deter nuclear aggression for over 70 years?
        Mr. Austin. I am generally aware of public reporting that China,
    Russia and North Korea continue to invest in and expand their nuclear
    weapons capabilities. If confirmed, I will undertake a deeper review
    both of United States nuclear posture and of the nuclear weapons
    capabilities of China, Russia and North Korea to determine how the
    United States must posture itself to effectively deter aggression
    against the United States and its allies and partners.

        17. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in November 2020, NATO's [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] Secretary General stated that, ``Simply
    giving up our deterrent without any guarantees that others will do the
    same is a dangerous option because a world where Russia, China, North
    Korea and others have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a
    safer world.'' Do you agree with the Secretary General that the world
    is a safer place due to the existence of an effective U.S. nuclear
    deterrent and the extended deterrence assurances we provide to our
    allies?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        18. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you support
    robust consultations with U.S. allies prior to considering any changes
    in U.S. nuclear posture or policy that could undermine their security?
        Mr. Austin. The United States has long committed to extending
    nuclear deterrence to a number of treaty allies. Meaningful
    consultation is fundamental to any alliance. Given their reliance on
    such security guarantees, if confirmed, I expect to work closely with
    allies to ensure both their continued security and the continued
    security of the United States.

        19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in a recently completed report to
    Congress by the nonpartisan Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA),
    researchers assessed that adopting a ``no first use'' (NFU) nuclear
    policy would likely undermine allied confidence is U.S. security
    guarantees, encourage aggression by adversaries, and have no effect on
    international non-proliferation efforts. IDA concluded that, `` . . .
    the weight of the evidence indicates significant potential for
    [adoption of a] No First Use [policy] to impart more harm than good.''
    In your responses to the questions you were provided prior to your
    confirmation hearing, you took no position on ``no first use,'' noting
    simply that the Department of Defense would participate in a later
    review of U.S. policies. While I'm sure this is accurate, the committee
    would like to understand your own views on whether as adoption of a
    ``no first use'' policy, would it be advisable, given the increasing
    threat of Russia's, China's, and North Korea's expanding arsenals?
        Mr. Austin. I have not had the opportunity to review the referenced
    report. As you note, I anticipate that President Biden will direct the
    interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
    of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active role in this
    review, and also that any such review assesses the conclusions in the
    referenced report.

        20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, in a recent opinion, the Washington
    Post editorial board endorsed efforts to ``de-alert'' the U.S.
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, invoking the long
    discredited myth of the ``hair-trigger alert''. Up to this point, every
    U.S. Administration has soundly rejected the idea of de-altering U.S.
    ICBMs, noting that such measures are inherently unverifiable, and that
    such an action could be extremely destabilizing in a crisis--increasing
    the chances of an inadvertent launch. Given the increasing salience of
    nuclear weapons and the growing arsenals of China, Russia, and North
    Korea, do you believe it is prudent to reduce the United States ability
    to respond to nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies
    in a timely manner?
        Mr. Austin. I strongly support any measure that reduces the chances
    of a catastrophic miscalculation between nuclear powers. I believe the
    Department of Defense must endeavor to ensure the President has the
    maximum possible decision space in a time of crisis. If confirmed, I
    look forward to reviewing all opportunities to maximize Presidential
    decision time and potential means to minimize the risk of
    miscalculation. However, the de-alerting of ICBMs, in and of itself,
    does not appear to offer a verifiable and stabilizing means to achieve
    these important objectives.
                             missile defense policy
        21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, since the completion of the 2019
    Missile Defense Review, a number of changes have occurred in the
    interim that could greatly affect the scope and architecture of a
    future global U.S. missile defense system. Do you support the conduct
    of a new Missile Defense Review? If so, when would you expect such a
    review to be completed?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will have the incoming team review
    current and projected threats and our missile defense programs and
    posture and, where appropriate, adjust our approach. Any potential
    updates to this approach would be informed by a new National Security
    Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

        22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, your former employer, Raytheon
    Technologies, is a major manufacturer of the Department of Defense's
    array of missile defense systems. With your commitment to recuse
    yourself from matters involving your former employer, for possibly the
    entirety of this 4 year Administration, you will be largely removed
    from discussions on the structure of major missile defense systems. If
    confirmed, how will you structure your leadership team to oversee the
    development of missile defense policies and manage the associated
    programs to ensure effective oversight, while upholding the terms of
    your recusal and avoiding the appearance of undue influence?
        Mr. Austin. During the period of my recusal, any matters involving
    Raytheon will be referred to the Deputy Secretary or other senior
    official without my knowledge or involvement. With respect to the issue
    of seeking a waiver I do not expect to do that or to need one, but if
    such an unanticipated circumstance were to arise I would consider
    available alternatives to a waiver before seeking one and would consult
    very carefully with agency ethics officials. If I'm privileged enough
    to be confirmed, I can pledge to you I will be mindful of not only the
    legal requirements that govern my conduct, but also of the appearances
    to ensure that the public has no reason to question my impartiality,
    and I will consult with the DOD career ethics officials on these issues
    and require everyone who serves with me to ensure public service is and
    will remain a public trust.
      federal communications commission approval of ligado's terrestrial
                                    network
        23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, last year, the Federal
    Communications Commission (FCC) approved a license for Ligado to build
    a ground terrestrial network in frequencies that traditionally have
    been used only for satellites. DOD is on record, and in fact all
    affected Federal agencies are on record too, strongly opposing it.
    Federal agencies opposed to the Ligado proposal include the Departments
    of Defense, Commerce, Interior, Justice, Homeland Security, Energy, and
    Transportation, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration, National Science Foundation, Coast Guard, Federal
    Aviation Administration, and National Executive Committee for Space-
    Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing. The Department of Defense
    has been opposed for a decade because it poses significant risk to the
    national global positioning system (GPS) system and all military users
    of it. Are you familiar with this issue? If yes, do think the FCC
    license to Ligado in its current form is wise?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
    on DOD's GPS system.

        24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, our Committee alongside DOD have
    been fighting this proposal for a decade, and several previous
    Secretaries of Defense have been consistently and strongly opposed to
    allowing the Ligado network to go forward. Do you share your
    predecessor's views that the Ligado network, if deployed, will be
    damaging to the Department's ability to train in peacetime and possibly
    could degrade combat operations in wartime as a result, and potentially
    poses risks to the safety of soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
    on DOD's GPS system.

        25. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, if confirmed by the Senate, will
    you personally work with the new White House Staff, the National
    Security Council, and the new FCC Chairman to temporarily suspend
    Ligado's terrestrial authority so that the new Administration can
    review the ill-advised FCC decision made by the outgoing Administration
    and ensure it is in the best interest of DOD, the Federal Government,
    and the hundreds of millions of consumers and businesses that rely on
    GPS to allow Ligado to deploy a ground based network that interferes
    with the GPS system?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
    on DOD's GPS system.

        26. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, we worked tirelessly to get
    language in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA that requires DOD to engage the
    National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct an
    independent review of the FCC Ligado Order. Working in tandem, are you
    in favor of FCC conducting a new formal, fair, and fully transparent
    review of the Ligado's ability to provide terrestrial services that
    preserves the mission and safety requirements of all Federal agencies
    including Defense, obtains an outcome that does not require the
    Department of Defense to incur billions of dollars of unnecessary costs
    to change all its GPS receivers on combat vehicles, aircraft,
    helicopters, ships, and weapons; and that allows all Federal
    Departments and agencies and the American industrial groups adversely
    affected by the previous Administration's FCC decision to formally
    submit input through the normal process that FCC uses on other
    important spectrum decisions?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess this issue and its impact
    on DOD's GPS system.

        27. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, do you believe that it is essential
    for the FCC to resolve this issue in a manner that assures no risk to
    the lives of U.S. soldiers in peacetime training, combat, or emergency
    response missions by the National Guard?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I do believe that it is essential for the FCC to
    work with the NTIA to resolve this issues in a manner that assures no
    risk to lives.

        28. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, management of the
    radiocommunications spectrum is divided between the FCC, which handles
    non-Federal spectrum use, and the National Telecommunications and
    Information Administration, or NTIA, on behalf of all Federal agencies.
    That sounds straightforward, but the use of one spectrum band, for
    example for private use, can affect another spectrum, for example for
    Federal use. What process should the FCC go through to make sure its
    proposed use of spectrum does not negatively affect use of spectrum by
    Federal agencies like DOD?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with the current
    Administration to ensure our spectrum management processes are
    respected and followed.

        29. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, the Department manages the global
    positioning system, or GPS, which is a critical asset not only for the
    Department, but for other Federal agencies and the hundreds of millions
    of consumers that rely on it every day. DOD has an obvious role with
    respect to the physical components of GPS. But the success of GPS also
    rests on the radiofrequency spectrum it uses. And in order for that
    spectrum to be able to continue to deliver GPS signals, it must not
    receive interference from other spectrum uses--private and Federal.
    What steps will you take to ensure that there is no harmful
    interference to GPS?
        Mr. Austin. I will work with NTIA, FCC and other appropriate
    parties by strengthening regulations, policies and laws regarding GPS
    to ensure there is no harmful interference to GPS spectrum .
                           freedom of information act
        30. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, unclassified TTPs [tactics,
    techniques, and procedures], ROEs [rules of engagement], and RUFs
    [requests for use of facility] are not protected from release under the
    current Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions, do you see this
    as a potential problem?
        Mr. Austin. While transparency is critical to public oversight of
    government operations, we must balance transparency with the need to
    protect certain types of information from release when such release may
    impact military operations and could risk the lives of our
    servicemembers. The release of TTPs, ROEs, and RUFs, in some
    circumstances, may present a risk to operations and the force if such
    information is disclosed to the public without adequate safeguards. If
    confirmed, I intend to further examine options for protecting such
    information from improper release while still maintaining an emphasis
    on transparency.

        31. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Austin, what options are available to
    protect our servicemembers from our adversaries who may request such
    documents through FOIA and then use the information released to harm
    American servicemembers?
        Mr. Austin. Under current law, there are limited options for
    withholding such information from release when it is requested pursuant
    to the Freedom of Information Act. As previously discussed, this may,
    in some circumstances, create a risk to military operations and U.S.
    forces, especially when such information falls into the hands of an
    adversary. Although classification of such information would allow us
    to limit release, the threshold for classification may not be met under
    applicable authorities and would also limit its application and our
    ability to adequately disseminate such information to servicemembers in
    the field. If confirmed, I intend to further examine options for
    protecting such information from improper release while still
    maintaining an emphasis on transparency.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
       freedom of navigation operations (fonops) across the taiwan strait
        32. Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, last year the United States Navy
    conducted 11 transits in the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating our Nation's
    commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. With Chinese forces
    expanding their reach in the Western Pacific, United States military
    presence--particularly through freedom of navigation and transit--has
    become ever more important to regional stability. Will you continue
    these presence missions if confirmed as Secretary of Defense?
        Mr. Austin. Presence operations and transits through international
    straits like the Taiwan Strait can provide a deterrent effect to
    competitors and present opportunities to cooperate with regional
    security partners and allies. They can also demonstrate our commitment
    to freedom of the seas and, in the case of Taiwan Strait transits, a
    free and open Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, this assessment will help
    shape my approach to approving operations or providing advice to the
    President.
                    hypersonic missile propulsion suppliers
        33. Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, Congress and the National Defense
    Strategy have made it a top priority to develop and acquire hypersonic
    missile capabilities, given our near-peer competition with Russia and
    China. At the same time, Congress has spent billions to strengthen our
    fragile industrial base across a range of capabilities. But much of our
    industrial base is being consolidated, with large defense firms buying
    up small suppliers. For example, news recently emerged that Lockheed
    Martin is seeking to acquire Aerojet Rocketdyne, the last remaining
    independent missile propulsion company. What are your views on the
    consolidation of industrial base capabilities as seen in cases like
    this?
        Mr. Austin. Consolidation within the defense industrial base is
    sometimes necessary to ensure that a particular capability remains
    viable. Many defense industrial base suppliers have little to no
    commercial business, which would help them remain healthy and resilient
    in times where DOD procurement is low. This is especially true in the
    missile and missile propulsion industry, which are almost 100 percent
    dependent on DOD business. However, too much consolidation can have
    negative consequences, including the lack of competition, and reduced
    industry investment in research and development necessary to keep DOD
    systems technologically superior. DOD should work with stakeholders
    within the Services and Agencies to understand the potential impacts of
    this particular transaction, and weigh these factors when assessing it.

        34. Senator Wicker. Mr. Austin, are you concerned about the impact
    this kind of acquisition could have on our numerous missile programs
    that are not under contract to Lockheed Martin?
        Mr. Austin. I will work with our interagency partners to examine
    this potential transaction. Diversity and competition within the
    industrial base a necessary to ensure the Department remains able to
    purchase the greatest technology at fair and reasonable prices.
    Consolidation can be disruptive to this goal, so all potential impacts
    to the missile and space launch systems involved in this transaction
    will be assessed as part of the decision making process.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                    covid-19
        35. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, you have been involved in
    complicated and sophisticated logistics missions during your career.
    Does the military use best practices when shipping valuable resources
    around the country and the world?
        Mr. Austin. The military Services ship valuable and precious cargo
    around the country and the world every day. Military logisticians
    strive to maximize efficiency and effectiveness recognizing they are
    stewards of the taxpayer's dollars. I know the Services have benefitted
    from a close relationship with industry that have enabled adoption of
    recognized best practices in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. I am
    also confident DOD logisticians will continually strive to improve
    processes and not be satisfied with current levels of efficiency.

        36. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, would you deviate from those best
    practices in the midst of a critical mission?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would strive to find the optimal
    solution for mission requirements.

        37. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, you may know that Operation Warp
    Speed utilized a new pharmaceutical distribution system for the COVID
    vaccine instead of using the Nation's full end-to-end and time-tested
    and trusted distribution system. Can you and your staff commit to
    reviewing the vaccine distribution challenges and to recommend how the
    full distribution system can be brought in to get vaccines from the
    manufacturer to the ``last mile'' for shots to get in arms?
        Mr. Austin. Operation Warp Speed is a partnership between the
    Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense.
    If confirmed, I will work with our partners at the Department of Health
    and Human Services to review any vaccine distribution challenges and
    recommend necessary improvements.
                                 semiconductors
        38. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, a recent Pentagon report on the
    defense industrial base highlighted the importance of semiconductors to
    our national security. The report states that microelectronics ``are
    critical to producing and maintaining existing military systems, for
    advancing emerging technologies like AI, 5G, and quantum computing, and
    for sustaining critical infrastructure and indeed, our entire modern
    economy'' and that microelectronics ``are in nearly everything,
    including the most complex weapons the Department of Defense buys, such
    as Aegis warships, the F-35 joint strike fighter, soldier systems, and
    our nuclear weapons and their command-and-control--which together form
    the backbone of our national defense.'' The Fiscal Year 2021 National
    Defense Authorization Act included important provisions to incentivize
    domestic semiconductor manufacturing in order to reverse the decline in
    U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Do you view it as a priority
    to fund incentives for semiconductor manufacturing?
        Mr. Austin. I understand that the Department worked very closely
    with Congress in developing the landmark microelectronics legislation
    included in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA. This provides a foundation from
    which DOD, along with our interagency partners, can start the process
    of reshoring microelectronics manufacturing, packaging, and testing
    capability. This will require a multi-pronged approach, which includes
    funding, tax incentives, workforce credits, and other mechanisms that
    will make U.S. suppliers be cost competitive.

        39. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, how important is it that the United
    States grow its share of domestic manufacturing in critical industries
    such as semiconductors?
        Mr. Austin. The DOD has diversified supply chains by partnering
    with allied nations to utilize or develop capability in those
    countries. However, growing U.S. capability in certain critical areas
    such as semiconductor manufacturing may be necessary to ensure a stable
    and secure supply of these items. DOD will make investments in domestic
    supply, where appropriate.

        40. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, how do you and the Department of
    Defense plan on working with Congress to fund these priorities?
        Mr. Austin. Continuing to assess the industrial base to determine
    areas of highest risk will be a Department priority. Once these risks
    are identified, DOD can formulate strategies and roadmaps to mitigate
    them. Sharing these strategies and implementation plans with
    Congressional members responsible for authorizing and appropriating
    funding should assist the Department with obtaining the funding
    necessary to execute these strategies.

        41. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, what role do you envision your
    Department playing in funding research in critical technologies, such
    as semiconductors?
        Mr. Austin. The U.S. must maintain a competitive edge to enable us
    to defeat our adversaries. This requires DOD funding for research in
    multiple critical technology areas that will help us maintain the
    advantage we need to ensure our national security. We must have a
    balanced portfolio that maintains our current systems, while enabling
    us to make the technological advances that will ensure that our future
    systems are technologically superior.
                     u.s. green berets fratricide incident
        42. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, in 2014 there was an investigation
    into the fratricide of five Green Berets on June 9, 2014. Could you
    detail the nature of your involvement in this investigation?
        Mr. Austin. As the Commanding General of United States Central
    Command, I directed an investigation into the airstrike on June 9, 2014
    that was alleged to have resulted in the deaths of five United States
    soldiers and one Afghan soldier and approved the findings of the Army
    15-6 investigation.

        43. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, can you explain why you appointed
    Air Force Major General Jeffrey L. Harrigian to run this investigation
    despite his affiliation with one of the Services involved in the
    incident?
        Mr. Austin. I appointed Major General Jeffrey Harrigan given his
    extensive operational experience. He was appointed to conduct the
    investigation with a full investigative team, including three Assisting
    Investigating Officers, Administrative Support, and a Legal Advisor.

        44. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, the investigation concluded: `` . .
    . key members executing the close air support mission collectively
    failed to effectively execute the fundamentals, which resulted in poor
    situational awareness and improper target identification.'' The report
    appears to share blame between the B-1 crew, Ground Force Commander
    (GFC), and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). Do you agree with
    the conclusion of this investigation?
        Mr. Austin. As Commanding General of United States Central Command,
    I approved the findings of the investigation.

        45. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, could you confirm whether or not
    the B-1 was typically used for close air support missions in
    Afghanistan during this time period?
        Mr. Austin. Although it was not originally designed for close air
    support missions, the B-1 was used for those purposes in Afghanistan
    during the relevant time period.

        46. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, will you commit to ensuring that
    you will eradicate any training or assumptions among military personnel
    that the sniper targeting system used on the B-1 can be used to see
    strobes?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will work to
    ensure that our military personnel have the appropriate training and
    support for their activities.

        47. Senator Cotton. Mr. Austin, will you commit to educating our
    forces on whether there are justifiable cases where the absence of
    infrared (IR) strobes can be used as the sole confirmer of enemy
    positions?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I commit that I
    will work to ensure our military personnel are appropriately trained.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                economic warfare
        48. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, many of the national security
    challenges we face today cut across the jurisdiction of numerous
    Federal agencies. This is particularly true of the nexus between
    economic security, industrial policy, and national security. In recent
    years, Congress has worked to address cross-cutting challenges like
    supply-chain vulnerability, weaponized Chinese capital investments in
    strategic United States industries, and the race to 5G. However, on the
    whole, the United States Government is not structured in a way that has
    one office take the lead on these issues. Instead, these problems are
    addressed in various offices across the Department of Defense (DOD),
    the Commerce Department, and the United States Trade Representative,
    among others. As Secretary of Defense, how will you work within the
    existing inter-agency structure to better facilitate cooperation and a
    more comprehensive, unified response to what are our largest and most
    vexing national security problems?
        Mr. Austin. I have extensive experience working collaboratively
    within the Interagency and among international partners. If confirmed,
    I will use these skills to work cooperatively within existing processes
    such as the Defense Production Act Title III and Committee on Foreign
    Investment to address the challenges facing the Defense Industrial
    Base.
                          marine corps force structure
        49. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, the Marine Corps is currently
    undergoing a significant change in their force structure. The changes
    are meant to make the Marine Corps a more agile and capable force to
    counter adversaries in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.
    However, I have concerns, as do others, that the proposed changes will
    make the Marine Corps too one-dimensional. I am very concerned about
    the proposed changes to the Marine Corps aviation enterprise,
    particularly the F-35. Regardless of whether the next conflict is with
    a near-peer adversary or something else, the F-35 is going to be one of
    the Marine Corps' most effective weapons. Reducing the total number of
    F-35s that the Marine Corps will buy or the number of F-35s per
    squadron is ill-advised. If you are confirmed, will you commit to doing
    a full review of the Marine Corps' force structure changes and make a
    determination as to whether these changes are in the best interest of
    United States national security?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I am fully committed to reviewing the
    Marine Corps' force structure changes and will work with the Secretary
    of the Navy and the Marine Corps to ensure the force is best equipped
    for deterrence and combat, to include the F35.

        50. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, are you aware that the Marine Corps
    is the only Service that does not have a special operations aviation
    component? The Marine Corps' current plans call for the divestment of
    three rotary-wing squadrons and the retiring/re-distribution of these
    aircraft. I believe it would be advisable to retain these aircraft and
    create a special operation aviation capability. If confirmed, will you
    commit to looking at this issue and determining if there is merit in
    the Marine Corps creating a special operations aviation capability?
        Mr. Austin. I am aware that the Marine Corps is the only Service
    that does not have a special operations aviation component; however, am
    unaware of any critical shortfall in our existing special operations
    aviation capability or capacity that would necessitate the creation of
    a new component within the Marine Corps. The Marines do operate
    unmanned aviation systems within SOCOM and a select number of their
    aviators serve exchange tours with SOCOM'S aviation units. General
    Berger's effort to redesign the Marine Corps includes divesting of some
    capability and capacity to create opportunities for modernization --
    without having to seek additional funding. I commend this cost neutral
    approach. Any increase to a services contribution to SOCOM, such as
    aviation assets, is borne by that service and must be carefully
    considered against the range of other service requirements. In the case
    of the Marine Corps this includes conventional deterrence and global
    crisis response. If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing SOCOM's
    aviation requirements.
                        department of defense innovation
        51. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, for many years now there have been
    increasing calls for DOD to chart a bold, new path for modernization
    that places great emphasis on emerging technologies and partnering with
    the Nation's innovation community, including industry, academia, and
    entrepreneurs, to achieve its modernization goals. I support this
    effort and can look to my own State of North Carolina, to see how this
    type of partnership can be successful. The Research Triangle Park was
    founded by visionaries who saw the transformative power of bringing
    together universities, government and industry to spark new ideas and
    fuel growth. It is an innovation model that has rippled across the
    State and Nation, and it is one the Department should embrace. If
    confirmed, could you please explain your vision for modernization and
    how you would prioritize Department resources to align with that
    vision?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, working to ensure that the Department
    maximally accesses innovation will be among my highest priorities. This
    will require a concerted effort across the Department and will include
    universities, private industry, and nonprofit research institutions.
    The Department is investing nearly $2 billion annually through the
    Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)/Small Business Technology
    Transfer (STTR) program. These initiatives provide innovative
    technology solutions, and the Department is working to strengthen our
    partnerships with small businesses and to streamline the SBIR/STTR
    programs to reduce administrative red tape and lower barriers to entry.
    The Department also uses the Science, Mathematics, and Research for
    Transformation (SMART) program as a workforce recruitment and
    development platform, by assigning promising graduates to DOD research
    and development facilities to inject fresh talent and to improve the
    flow of STEM employees into the Department. If confirmed, I will
    endeavor to ensure these programs' success and seek additional ways to
    develop partnerships for innovation.

        52. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, given your background in the
    infantry, and most recently as the former CENTCOM Commander, you have
    direct experience in, and understand the real issue of interoperable
    communications on the battlefield. The Inspector General (IG) of the
    Department of Defense recently put out a report entitled ``Audit of
    United States Special Operations Command Testing and Evaluation,''
    where they studied whether the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    fielded Special Operations-Peculiar (SO-P) equipment that met
    performance requirements during test and evaluation (T&E). The IG
    Report determined that that the SOCOM purchased and fielded six SO-P
    programs, valued at $815.8 million that did not meet user needs.
        Mr. Austin. To prevent this same pattern from continuing and
    occurring in the broader DOD during modernization, what will you do to
    ensure the Services research, evaluate, and field capabilities that are
    relevant to the challenges of the future battlefield, meet the demand
    of the war fighter and supported by acquisition strategies that allow
    for the on-ramp of innovative technologies found in the industrial
    base?
        I believe it is important that the capabilities fielded by our
    military have been thoroughly vetted, tested, and verified against
    validated end-user requirements. If I am confirmed as the Secretary of
    Defense, I will ensure the Military Department Secretaries, as well as
    ASD(SO/LIC) in his or her role exercising authority, direction, and
    control over special operations-peculiar administrative matters
    relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special
    operations forces, work closely with their acquisition colleagues to
    ensure that capabilities fielded are well researched, evaluated, and
    relevant (including the use of innovative technologies) so that they
    meet the challenges of the future battlefield. This will include
    requiring the Military Department Secretaries and ASD(SO/LIC) to
    provide close and careful oversight of DOD acquisition programs and
    projects, throughout the acquisition lifecycle to ensure that programs
    meet user needs via acquisition strategies that are well coordinated
    with the end-users. I will also require the Service Acquisition
    Executives to work with their Military Department Secretaries, the
    Defense Acquisition Executive, and the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation to ensure compliance with statutes and regulations, prior to
    the fielding or deployment of any capability for the end-user.

        53. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, many disruptive technologies have
    been and are being developed by our commercial sector using internal
    investments in order to rapidly address DOD's most challenging
    requirements. However, DOD has a horrible track record of transitioning
    small prototype or technology demonstrations into a program of record
    in a timely and cost effective manner--a problem our adversaries do not
    have. Based on your past experience, what actions does DOD need to take
    to ensure its acquisition and budget strategy allows for timely and
    scaled funding of these innovative and disruptive technologies?
        Mr. Austin. One of the great challenges we face is recognizing and
    transitioning opportunistic, emerging technologies that appear outside
    the technology development phase of an acquisition program. In these
    cases the Department needs to be more effective at assessing the
    potential of these technologies and ensuring barriers to entry are low.
    If confirmed, I will work with the Services to improve mechanisms for
    planned and opportunistic technology transition into DOD systems. I
    would also foster a culture of appropriate risk-taking in order to
    accelerate the identification and integration of these emerging
    technologies.

        54. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you commit to
    briefing this committee on DOD actions being taken to integrate
    disruptive technology and scaling innovation as part of your first
    Defense Planning Guidance?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        55. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, Beijing published its latest Five-
    Year Plan for China's development in November 2020. For the first time,
    the plan calls for the development of disruptive technologies in its
    military. The July 17, 2020 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report
    on Emerging Military Technologies stated that China and Russia are
    making steady progress in developing advance military technologies to
    include advanced computing, artificial intelligence, autonomy,
    robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology, and quantum
    technology. What is your assessment of the impact these disruptive
    technologies could have on our national security?
        The first military to employ quantum technology, advanced
    computing, artificial intelligence and autonomy at scale and in
    combination will have a significant asymmetric advantage. If confirmed,
    I will work with the entire Defense ecosystem to include laboratories,
    universities, non-traditional centers of innovation, and traditional
    industry partners to ensure that we are at the cutting edge of
    developing these disruptive technologies. I will strive to ensure we
    are not merely fielding the next evolutionary system, but can achieve
    overmatch with revolutionary combinations of technology.

        56. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, how do the efforts to develop these
    technologies in the United States compare to China and Russia?
        Mr. Austin. While details are limited in an unclassified setting,
    the United States is behind Russia and China in certain technology
    areas. For example, in Hypersonics, China and Russia are focused on
    fielding operational systems, while the United States is currently
    demonstrating prototypes with leave-behind capabilities. If confirmed,
    I will review intelligence briefings on all the technology areas and
    commit to sharing details on our progress versus our adversaries with
    the committee upon request.

        57. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what priority would
    you place on the investment and development of disruptive technologies
    to maintain technological superiority over China and Russia?
        Mr. Austin. The current list of modernization priorities has been
    drawn directly from the 2018 National Defense Strategy, with input from
    stakeholders across the DOD enterprise. DOD has identified eleven key
    areas in which investment to develop next generation operational
    capabilities is imperative: 5G, hypersonics; fully networked C3;
    directed energy; cyber; space; quantum science; artificial intelligence
    (AI)/machine learning; microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology.
    The Department also invests in a broad portfolio of technologies to
    drive future capability improvements and to create technological
    advantage. If confirmed, I will ensure investment and development of
    disruptive technologies remains a top priority.

        58. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, how would you scale
    innovation and disruptive technology development across the Services?
        Mr. Austin. The Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA reestablished and elevated
    the USD(R&E) to focus strategically on the integration and
    synchronization of technology development programs across the
    Department. If confirmed, I will support the USD(R&E) in ensuring that
    the Department's technology investments are appropriately focused,
    integrated, and synchronized across all military departments and
    Agencies.
                                 north carolina
        59. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, a little over a year ago, the
    United States killed Major General Qasem Soleimani. This triggered
    several events, one of which was deployment of the entire Global
    Response Force (GRF) from Fort Bragg, NC. This marked the first time
    the entire brigade from the 82nd Airborne was deployed since Panama in
    1989. To facilitate such deployments, Pope Army Airfield (AAF),
    specifically, the Green Ramp, is used. However, this airfield has not
    been well cared for since being transferred to the Army. The deployment
    in January 2020 of the GRF highlighted many of the deficiencies at Pope
    AAF from deferred maintenance to neglect. The GRF and various other
    units at Fort Bragg are national level assets. They need proper
    infrastructure to deploy rapidly and project force. If you are
    confirmed as Secretary of Defense, will you commit that the defense
    budget will contain adequate funding to repair and properly maintain
    Pope AAF?
        Mr. Austin. The Army remains committed to ensuring Pope Army
    Airfield can support all deployment missions. In fiscal year 2021, the
    Army is funding a $90 million project to make critical improvements to
    the primary runway and lighting system. The Army has also identified
    future requirements to improve the airfield, totaling $224 million in
    Military Construction, as well as in Restoration and Modernization
    funding. These requirements will be a priority for funding within the
    Army's Facility Investment Plan.

        60. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, will you also commit to investment
    in lengthening the runway at Pope AAF to accommodate a fully loaded C-
    17?
        Mr. Austin. The Army recognizes the requirement to extend the Pope
    AAF runway to accommodate strategic airlift for the unique military
    units stationed there. This requirement will be assessed against other
    infrastructure needs across the Army enterprise within the Army's
    Facility Investment Plan.
        China
        61. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, in June 2020, DOD released a list
    of 20 companies it says are controlled by the Chinese military. One of
    these companies is the Chinese Rail Rollingstock Corporation (CRRC).
    Over the past 5 years, CRRC has made alarming inroads into the United
    States market. This state-owned and directed company has made
    aggressive advances into the United States by using state-backed
    financing, below-market pricing, and other anti-competitive tactics to
    decimate domestic railcar manufacturing with the single end goal of
    producing all railcars in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    Currently, CRRC also secured more than $2.6 billion in United States
    taxpayer-supported transit contracts to provide passenger railcars for
    the cities of Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. As
    Secretary, what will you do to ensure the DOD's infrastructure is
    secure from a Chinese state-owned enterprise, such as CRRC, that has a
    significant and troubling footprint in the United States?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Department's efforts to
    ensure the integrity of DOD supply chains, support the ability of
    American businesses to withstand PRC coercion, protect American
    intellectual property, and invest in the research and development of
    emerging technologies.

        62. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, China provides a competitive
    advantage to its state-owned enterprises through generous, below-market
    government financing for their own ventures, as well as for their
    customers. This gives Chinese businesses--that are extensions of their
    own government--a tremendous unfair advantage, and the potential to
    decimate United States competitors, often in highly sensitive
    industries like the rail sector. Given the potentially dire
    implications for United States jobs, our manufacturing base and our
    national security interests of this trend, are you open to working to
    address this challenge?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I am absolutely open to working with Congress and
    my interagency counterparts to address this challenge.
                                taiwan relations
        63. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, the bipartisan Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative (PDI), which was an important part in the latest Fiscal Year
    2021 NDAA, reconfirms the United States' commitment to a free and open
    Indo-Pacific region by significantly strengthening the military
    capabilities to deter adversaries across the region. How do you
    envision the PDI be implemented to fully defend United States interests
    and those of our allies such as Taiwan?
        Mr. Austin. I believe the Pacific Deterrence Initiative will help
    focus attention on the progress the United States is making to
    establish a more distributed and resilient posture that deters China's
    aggression and reassures our allies and partners, including Taiwan. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure its
    effective implementation.

        64. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
    stipulates that the United States makes available necessary defensive
    articles and services for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
    capability. This is one of America's most important commitments to the
    security of Taiwan and to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The
    Trump administration over the last 4 years has adopted a regularized
    Taiwan arms sales process and sold Taiwan over $15 billion worth of
    weaponry. As the Secretary of Defense, how do you evaluate this policy
    and do you intend to continue the policy of regularized arms sales to
    Taiwan?
        Mr. Austin. President Biden has said many times that United States
    support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in
    line with longstanding American commitments to the Three Communiques,
    the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to
    support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with
    the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
    will also ensure the United States meets our commitment to assist
    Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.
                                    georgia
        65. Senator Tillis. Mr. Austin, will you support and work with
    Georgia, a key United States ally, during your tenure to counter Russia
    aggression and advance Georgia's goal of membership in Euro-Atlantic
    institutions such as NATO?
        Mr. Austin. I intend to support the ongoing United States and NATO
    efforts focused on improving Georgia's ability to deter aggression,
    defend its territory, contribute to regional security, and build
    resilience against Russian malign influence. I fully agree with the
    2008 NATO Summit declaration that states Georgia will one day become a
    member of NATO, and I will ensure that DOD continues to support the
    implementation of reforms that advance Georgia's Euro-Atlantic
    integration.
                                   __________

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                south china sea freedom of navigation operations
        66. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in 2015, I worked with then-
    Chairman John McCain to pressure the Department of Defense to restore
    Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to the South China Sea, which
    had been halted due to only tangentially-related political issues. In
    fact, through reporting and oversight at the time, it was revealed that
    Secretary of State John Kerry effectively worked to minimize desires of
    the Department of Defense to conduct these FONOPs in favor of using
    that as leverage against China in climate change negotiations. As a
    direct result, China reclaimed and militarized several ``islands'' in
    the South China Sea. If confirmed, Mr. Austin, if a similar situation
    presents itself, how would you confront this problem and effectively
    advocate for the Department of Defense's priorities broadly, and
    specifically as it relates to these FONOPs? What is your personal view
    on this situation?
        Mr. Austin. Use of FONOPs is in the national interest. Upholding
    the law of the sea, as part of the rules-based international order,
    benefits the United States, and our allies and partners. The United
    States' national interest in freedom of the seas and freedom of
    navigation dates back to the very founding of our country. Upholding
    the law of the sea is a fundamental strategic interest on which the
    global mobility of U.S. forces depends.

        67. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, can you commit
    that--if recommended by your military and civilian subordinates--you
    will continue routine and regular FONOPs both in the South China Sea
    and around the world?
        Mr. Austin. I will, of course, commit to listening to the military
    and civilian policy professionals in the Department, as well as the
    geographic combatant commanders who have direct control over operations
    in their areas of responsibility. The United States challenges
    excessive maritime claims around the world and I can assure you that,
    if confirmed, the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate
    wherever international law allows.
                                  kc-46 basing
        68. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the previous Senate-confirmed
    Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Mark Esper acknowledged that collocation
    of 100 5th-Generation Fighters with KC-46 tankers would provide our
    Nation with ``extreme strategic reach''. The commander of U.S.
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), General Stephen Lyons, USA, has
    stated: ``The aerial refueling fleet continues to underpin the Joint
    Force's ability to deploy an immediate force across all NDS mission
    areas . . . '' Given Alaska's beddown of F-35s, access to expansive
    training ranges, and proximity to several high-priority regions, will
    you commit--if confirmed--to take a personal look at tanker basing in
    Alaska--specifically as it relates to the KC-46--to ensure our Nation
    pursues a strategy-driven decision rather than a budget-driven one?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. Department decisions, to include the Department of
    the Air Force tanker decisions, should be strategy-driven, budget-
    informed decisions. I will work with the DAF and DOD experts to ensure
    the tanker beddowns best meet all national priorities.

        69. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, would
    you agree with former SECDEF Mark Esper that collocation of 100 5th-
    Generation Fighters with KC-46 tankers in Alaska would provide extreme
    strategic reach to the United States? Please elaborate on how that kind
    of air power could affect our power projection posture, strengthen our
    alliances, and message to our adversaries.
        Mr. Austin. Our 5th Generation fighter fleet provides strategic
    advantages across the whole national defense spectrum providing a
    deterrence to potential aggressors and security to our allies. These
    assets and their support systems, to include tankers, must be beddown
    in the locations that most efficiently meet steady state and COCOM
    requirements, and provide the flexibility for contingency operations. I
    will work with the DAF and DOD experts to ensure our force structure is
    designed to best meet these priorities.
                     great power competition in the arctic
        70. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, given the National Defense
    Strategy's focus on great power competition and the rapid development
    of Russia and China's capabilities in the Arctic, in your personal
    opinion, would you agree that the Arctic is an emerging front-line for
    great power competition and rivalry? Please elaborate on the threats
    the United States faces from our great power competitors--Russia and
    China--in this region.
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree that the Arctic is a region of increasing
    competitive activity among great powers, including China and Russia.
    The challenges these competitors pose in the Arctic are discrete.
    Russia approaches the Arctic largely from a territorial defense
    perspective. It is advancing its interests through a modest increase in
    Arctic-based forces, which are intended to improve its operational
    capability in northern latitudes and to exert greater control of the
    Northern Sea Route. China is also focused on increasing its influence
    in the region, primarily through predatory economic behavior.

        71. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
    makes Alaska an important strategic region for the United States, and
    why would our adversaries want to limit our presence and power
    projection capabilities in the Arctic region? Please elaborate.
        Mr. Austin. Alaska's proximity to the Arctic, Russia, East Asia,
    and the Bering Strait makes the state a strategically important region
    for our country. I believe this importance will continue to increase
    given that melting sea ice is allowing increased Chinese and Russian
    presence in the region--particularly passage through the Arctic between
    the narrow Bering Strait and Atlantic Ocean--access that could alter
    the strategic balance of the region.
        If confirmed, I will assess Chinese and Russian designs further and
    consult allies and partners on the strategy, posture, and capabilities
    required to ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to protect the
    Homeland, support efforts to protect our economic interests, and deter
    any competitor aggression.

        72. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
    specific capability gaps presently exist that inhibit our ability to
    effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic and compete with
    Russia and China in the northern latitudes? Please elaborate on what
    these gaps are and how you would attempt to address them.
        Mr. Austin. I understand the Department has identified a range of
    capability needs, including: improved domain awareness systems; more
    robust communications capabilities; increased Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and improved environmental modelling.
    In addressing these capability needs, if confirmed as Secretary, I will
    assess how DOD can continue to balance consideration of investments for
    the Arctic region with broader capability needs of the Joint Force as
    outlined in an updated National Defense Strategy.

        73. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, do we
    have the necessary infrastructure--like Strategic Arctic Ports and
    expeditionary airfields--to meet our Nation's strategies, to
    effectively project and sustain power in the Arctic, and to compete
    with Russia and China in the northern latitudes?
        Mr. Austin. I understand that DOD is concluding an examination of
    the need for a strategic port(s) in the Arctic, pursuant to Section
    1752 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, ``Department of Defense Designation
    of Strategic Arctic Ports.'' If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing
    the Department's analysis and making the necessary infrastructure
    decisions based on the range of strategic, political-military,
    operational, fiscal, and other factors involved.

        74. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, as you may be aware the Arctic
    has the need for some type of functional port infrastructure to help
    support Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard requirements. The
    nearest Department of Defense Strategic Seaport is the Port of
    Anchorage; which is some 1,500 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle.
    That is equivalent to asking Boston to cover Miami on the East Coast.
    Would you agree that our Nation needs a Strategic Arctic Port? Please
    explain.
        Mr. Austin. Based on my understanding of ongoing Departmental
    analysis as required by statute, the results of the Section 1752 study
    on the `designation of strategic Arctic ports' will help identify the
    Department's overall Arctic infrastructure and capability needs. I
    believe that potential infrastructure gaps in the Arctic (which
    includes, but are not limited to, Alaska) would need to be considered
    in the context of DOD's global mission demands and defense priorities.
    If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Department's analysis,
    informed by U.S. interagency perspectives, on strategic Arctic ports to
    determine if any adjustments are appropriate.

        75. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in President Donald Trump's June
    9, 2020 ``Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the
    Arctic and Antarctic Regions,'' President Trump directed the
    development and execution of ``a polar security icebreaking fleet
    acquisition program that supports our national interests in the Arctic
    and Antarctic regions.'' The memo also directed a look at two U.S.
    bases for their ships. If confirmed, what specifically will you do to
    advocate to President Biden for the strategic needs outlined in the
    President Trump's memo and continue the positive direction outline in
    this document?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I believe it would be appropriate to
    support DHS' efforts to bolster its icebreaking capability, which
    directly supports the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaking mission. I would
    defer to the Secretary of Homeland Defense to identify the best means
    to resource DHS's proposed icebreaker capability, to include which
    bases it believes would best support its operational requirements. If
    confirmed, I will assess these requirements in the context of a new
    National Defense Strategy to inform DOD's support of defense-related
    Arctic issues.
      ice-hardening navy ships for arctic freedom of navigation operations
        76. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, do we
    have the right mix of Navy surface ships to visibly contest illegal
    maritime claims and guarantee a free and open maritime domain year-
    round in the Arctic? If yes, please explain how this will be executed
    with the current inventory.
        Mr. Austin. I have not yet reviewed the full U.S. posture and
    capabilities, including Navy surface ships, in the Arctic, or that of
    our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will assess the situation and
    consult allies and partners on the strategy and posture required to
    ensure a stable and open Arctic, as well as to protect the Homeland,
    our economic interests, and deter aggression.

        77. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
    are the risks associated with relying on the United States Coast Guard
    alone to project the force presence we need in the Arctic; especially,
    given their limited kinetic capability?
        Mr. Austin. I have serious concerns about the Russian military
    buildup and aggressive behavior in the Arctic, as well as Chinese
    intentions in the region. Ice operations is one of the Coast Guard's 11
    official missions and they provide United States-flagged icebreakers
    capable of providing year-round access to the Polar Regions. The Navy,
    Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are an integrated naval service and we
    need to apply naval power in the Arctic Region with joint forces,
    interagency teammates, allies, and partners. If confirmed, I will
    assess the situation and challenge the Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard
    team to evolve and expand the range of integrated capabilities to
    achieve enduring national interests in the region, region, in support
    of interagency partners and in concert with our allies.

        78. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the previous Senate-confirmed
    Secretary of Defense said in response to a question for the record:
    ``The Arctic is strategic terrain and is a potential strategic corridor
    between the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the United States
    Homeland.'' Do you agree with this statement, and if Russia were to
    deny access to vital United States/international shipping in the Arctic
    region, could the Department and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
    provide the President the option of conducting a surface FONOP to
    challenge the act?
        Mr. Austin. I agree that the Arctic is strategic terrain and is a
    potential strategic corridor between the Indo-Pacific region, Europe,
    and the United States Homeland. If confirmed, I plan to assess and
    review the full range of Arctic defense missions, in the context of
    other global defense priorities and the new defense strategy.
                                missile defense
        79. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the National Defense Strategy
    articulates the top Defense objective as: ``defending the Homeland from
    attack''; a vital component of meeting that objective is our Nation's
    missile defense capabilities. Unfortunately, we are trending in the
    wrong direction regarding this issue--North Korea and Iran continue to
    expand the quantity, range and lethality of their arsenals. As do our
    top great power competitors--Russia and China. Yet, as these threats
    trend upward, the budget allocated to the Missile Defense Agency trends
    downward. Will you commit--if confirmed--to work with this committee to
    ensure adequate resources are allocated toward modernizing and fielding
    a robust missile defense capability--commensurate with current and
    future threats?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess our missile defense
    capabilities and investments in the context of a new National Defense
    Strategy and work with Congress to maintain transparency about any
    planned improvements or adjustments.

        80. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the United States has
    consistently held that it will accept no limitations on its missile
    defense systems. Any such limitations could constrain or preclude
    missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to
    protect the American people, its forces, and allies and partners. Would
    you agree that our missile defense capabilities should NOT be limited,
    especially since they are defensive in nature, as part of any future
    arms control negotiations or agreements? Please elaborate.
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed I will work to align U.S. missile defenses
    with our new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy
    in an effort to continue to provide critical protection to U.S.
    interests. As far as arms control, I defer to the incoming Secretary of
    State and the Administration for the details of how these negotiations
    may be conducted.

        81. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, from a national security
    perspective, the planned Next Generator Interceptor (NGI) gives you
    complete capabilities needed to defend against rogue nation threats,
    but not until 2030. I included language in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA--
    which recently passed--mandating that DOD comprehensively look at an
    Interim-Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) solution to deliver capability
    by 2026. In your personal opinion, in addition to fielding NGI, would
    the Department prefer to see an interim solution--fielded years ahead
    of NGI--in order to boost our limited Homeland missile defense
    capability?
        Mr. Austin. In my opinion, the Department should forego an interim
    solution and proceed directly with NGI. The Department will be awarding
    up to two contracts for NGI by the second quarter of fiscal year 2021.
    The fastest path for delivery of capability to protect the Homeland are
    those contracts for the NGI.

        82. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, can I get your
    commitment to prioritize the effort--either an interim capability or
    NGI--to as rapidly as possible deliver additional and much-needed
    missile defense capability and capacity to defend of America's
    Homeland?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. The Department will be awarding up to two
    contracts for NGI within the next several weeks. The fastest path for
    delivery of capability to protect the Homeland are those contracts for
    the NGI. Carrying two prime contractors on this effort will create an
    environment with competition, where early delivery is incentivized.

        83. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the missile capabilities
    possessed by rogue nations--North Korea and Iran--continue to rapidly
    evolve. The New York Times recently reported that North Korea showcased
    the country's ``largest-ever'' Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    (ICBM) a month ago, and revealed a new submarine-launched ballistic
    missile just last week. Provided the presence of these very real and
    capable threats to our Nation's Homeland, how quickly should the 44
    GBIs currently postured be expanded--as authorized by Congress--to
    present a more credible defense of the American people?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work to develop effective and
    affordable solutions responsive to evolving missile threats to the U.S.
    Homeland. I know that Congress has authorized the Next Generation
    Interceptor program, which I understand will begin fielding additional
    interceptors in 2028, but I will need to review particular concepts,
    programs and capabilities in light of our broader defense strategy.

        84. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, in your personal opinion, what
    will you specially advocate for support this effort?
        Mr. Austin. Defense of the Homeland is a key priority for DOD and
    missile defense is a central component of this mission. If confirmed, I
    will work with you to ensure our troops and the American people are
    protected and that the Department implements the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
    requirements.
                       defense posture review initiative
        85. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, it is my view that if we look at
    the United States force posture in the Indo-Pacific, it is a snapshot
    of where United States forces were following World War II and the
    Korean War. In other words, it's stale. Given that, I believe our
    current force posture in the priority theater is insufficient to
    compete in either peacetime or conflict. I continue to have concerns
    with implementation of Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)--and
    because of that--I wrote a provision in the Fiscal Year 2020 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requiring a review of the current DPRI
    plan; which, is still ongoing. In your personal opinion, can you
    address more broadly your opinion of our force posture in the Indo-
    Pacific, and more narrowly about your opinion of DPRI?
        Mr. Austin. There's no question we need a more resilient and
    distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will
    review our posture in the region, including the implementation of the
    Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), and will work with U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command, the Military Departments and Services, and the
    Department of State to seek a posture that is optimized to deter
    aggression, reassure allies and partners, and prevail in a warfight, if
    necessary.

        86. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, how specifically will you ensure
    that the DPRI review is adequately taking into consideration the
    criteria of strategic presence, training opportunities, host-nation
    support, cost, and potential for growth?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review posture in the Indo-Pacific
    from all aspects including presence, capabilities, cost, logistics,
    training and exercises, infrastructure, and capacity building and
    cooperation with allies and partners.
                     development of disruptive technologies
        87. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, China and Russia are making
    steady progress in developing advance military disruptive technologies
    to include advanced computing, artificial intelligence, autonomy,
    robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology, and quantum
    technology. What does the Department of Defense need to do to rapidly
    develop and field disruptive technologies to maintain technological
    superiority over China and Russia?
        Mr. Austin. I believe the Department faces a significant challenge
    in accelerating our adoption of new technology in ensuring that new
    capabilities make their way quickly from the lab into the hands of
    warfighters, while at the same time balancing the sustainment needs of
    our legacy systems. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to speed the
    transition of new technologies from concept to prototype to fielded
    capability.
                                   readiness
        88. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, the 25 percent budget cuts from
    2010 to 2015, including a reduction of close to 50,000 Army Active Duty
    troops, caused our military readiness to plummet. If confirmed, will
    you commit to working with this committee to ensure our military
    readiness levels remain high and at a level the American people expect?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
                              energy independence
        89. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, from oil and gas to renewables,
    the United States is largely energy independent. In your personal
    opinion, how does this American energy independence enhance our
    national security?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with civilian and
    uniformed leaders to understand better the relationship between
    American energy independence and national security.

        90. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific
    actions will you take to further enhance American energy independence?
        Mr. Austin. Energy is of strategic importance to the Department. If
    confirmed, I will support investments in technologies that enhance the
    energy resilience of DOD installations and forces.
                                   __________

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
                              operation warp speed
        91. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, in your APQ answers, you mentioned
    that DOD has been a major contributor to Operation Warp Speed's (OWS)
    efforts to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines, and that if
    confirmed, you will review DOD's support to identify opportunities to
    continue or enhance this support. We have seen first-hand through one
    of our constituents that there is American production capacity that
    isn't currently being utilized to produce the vaccines we need. As
    Secretary of Defense, what steps will you take to guarantee that
    leading American manufacturers such as the one in North Dakota will be
    approached by Operation Warp Speed to ensure that our Nation's vaccine
    manufacturing capacity and supply chain can meet expected demands and
    that Americans have timely access to a vaccine?
        Mr. Austin. As I noted in the hearing, taking on COVID-19 is our
    most immediate national challenge, and DOD has a role to play in
    support of civilian agencies. I will review that support and examine
    ways to increase. Operation Warp Speed is a partnership between the
    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
    Defense. It is my understanding that HHS's Biomedical Advanced Research
    and Development Authority (BARDA) established a submission portal on
    its website to facilitate companies wishing to do business with the
    United States Government for the COVID-19 response to submit their
    proposals. If confirmed, we will work with our partners at the
    Department of Health and Human Services to review the measures that
    have been taken to harness the great capabilities of American
    manufacturers and explore additional opportunities to improve them. I
    also fully support President Biden's emphasis on domestic manufacturing
    and its critical importance to Homeland defense and national security

        92. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, as Secretary of Defense, what steps
    will you take to guarantee that leading American manufacturers,
    including Aldevron in North Dakota, will be approached by Operation
    Warp Speed to ensure that our Nation's vaccine manufacturing capacity
    is diversified and supply chain can meet expected demands and that
    Americans have timely access to a vaccine?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
    Defense works closely with our partners at the Department of Health and
    Human Services to review and improve on the measures that have been
    taken to harness the great capabilities of American manufacturers to
    meet our nation's needs for timely access to a vaccine.

        93. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, will it be your and the
    Department's intention to sustain those relationships and engagement
    strategies post the COVID-19 pandemic to make certain we have rapid
    vaccine manufacturing capabilities for potential future pandemics and
    other global health challenges?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, the Department will work closely with its
    Federal partners and the National Security Council Directorate for
    Global Health Security and Biodefense as the Federal Government
    considers how to ensure our nation is postured more effectively for
    future pandemics and other global health challenges. I would expect
    this consideration to include how to sustain relationships and
    engagement strategies with commercial enterprises that have proven
    reliable, effective, and cost efficient during the COVID-19 pandemic
    response.

        94. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, as you know, OWS is a multi-pronged
    effort of public-private partnerships to develop vaccines and
    therapeutics in response to the COVID-19 virus. Many of the private
    companies involved have various facilities overseas. Would you agree
    that it should be a priority of U.S. Government/OWS to engage with any
    and all onshore, American companies to ensure vaccine developers have
    the necessary manufacturing capacity to ramp up vaccine supply?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        95. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, according a Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) Report from November, 2020, officials at a
    COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing facility stated they have experienced
    challenges obtaining materials, including disposable reactor bags,
    reagents, and certain chemicals. They also state that due to global
    demand, they sometimes must wait 4-12 weeks for items that, before the
    pandemic, were typically available for shipment within 1 week. Given
    these claims, in addition to other public reports of disruptions to the
    manufacturing supply chains (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pfizer-
    vaccine-supply-chain-target-slashed-1.5827779) and challenges of
    scaling up production of hundreds of millions of vaccine doses, how
    would you, if confirmed, propose and prioritize that OWS work with
    domestic companies to expand manufacturing capacity in the United
    States?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
    Defense supports its Federal partners and the National Security Council
    Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense to evaluate how
    the Federal Government can best partner with domestic companies to
    expand manufacturing capacity in the United States.

        96. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, additionally, this report
    highlights the difficulties surrounding new technologies such as the
    mRNA vaccines. It is my understanding that the mRNA vaccines use raw
    materials developed by companies such as Aldevron, headquartered in my
    home State of North Dakota, which has the largest DNA plasmid
    manufacturing capacity in the world. If confirmed as Secretary of
    Defense, will you instruct OWS to work with American industry partners
    to engage them in the effort of ensuring that vaccine manufacturing
    capacity and supply chain can meet expected demands and that Americans
    have timely access to a vaccine?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
    Defense works closely with our partners at the Department of Health and
    Human Services to review and improve on the measures that have been
    taken to ensure that the vaccine manufacturing capacity and the supply
    chain can meet the needs of the United States.

        97. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, given the crucial role the
    Department of Defense has played by coordinating with the Department of
    Health and Human Services in responding to this virus on all fronts,
    what is your strategy to sustain the relationships forged during this
    time and the engagements in these partnerships post the COVID-19
    pandemic to ensure the United States has rapid vaccine manufacturing
    capabilities for potential future pandemics and other global health
    challenges?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of
    Defense maintains relationships with its partners at the Department of
    Health and Human Services to meet the current and future needs of the
    United States.
                         vietnam veterans memorial wall
        98. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, on June 3rd, 1969, we lost 74
    Vietnam Veterans when the USS Frank E Evans sank. The House has passed
    legislation, and the Senate has strong supporters (including Sen
    Schumer and 6 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee) for this
    effort, but the few Senators who want to prevent this effort use the
    Defense Department and it's DODI 1300.18 rules as their crutch. But
    regulations have been waived, precedents have changed . . . ultimately
    you, as Secretary of Defense, have the power to make them eligible for
    the wall. Do you think those who lost their lives on the USS Frank E
    Evans belong on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall?
        Mr. Austin. The crew members of the USS Frank E Evans died in a
    tragic accident while participating in a routine training exercise
    outside of the Vietnam Combat Zone. The Department is responsible for
    determining criteria for and validating service in a combat zone.
    Multiple previous Secretaries of Defense have carefully reviewed this
    matter, and have unanimously concluded that the crew of the USS Frank
    E. Evans does not meet the criteria of a Vietnam War casualty and they
    are therefore not eligible for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

        99. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate that
    the Defense Department is responsible for determining who is eligible
    to be on the Vietnam Wall?
        Mr. Austin. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund built The Wall with
    private funding to honor servicemembers who were casualties of the
    Vietnam War. The Department of Defense worked the Vietnam Veterans
    Memorial Fund to establish the criteria and provide the initial list of
    names for the Memorial. As with all conflicts, it is the Department's
    responsibility to define and account for all casualties, these policies
    are established in DOD Instruction 1300.18, ``Personnel Casualty
    Matters, Policies, and Procedures.''

        100. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate
    that within DODI 1300.18 there are two separate sets of criteria for
    who is considered a casualty of the Vietnam War and who is a casualty
    for the purposes of being eligible to have their name on the Vietnam
    Veterans Memorial Wall? (6.1.2.3.4.3. Died/wounded while on a combat/
    combat support mission to/from a defined combat zone) vs (6.5.2.4. Died
    while participating in, or providing direct support to, a combat
    mission immediately en route to or returning from a target within the
    defined combat zone)?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, this is appropriate because the second provision
    (6.5.2.4) was developed to clarify combat related casualties that may
    occur outside a defined combat zone, for example Navy aircraft
    returning from a combat mission is lost en route to the aircraft
    carrier. The second provision (6.5.2.4) represents a clarification to
    the Department's Casualty Procedures, as also reflected in DODI
    1300.18, paragraph 6.1.2.2.4.3.
         dakota access pipeline lawsuit against army corps of engineers
        101. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, North Dakota is currently involved
    with a $38 million claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that
    the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) illegally fostered protesters
    on Federal land. Army Under Secretary James McPherson sent a letter to
    the Department of Justice (DOJ): ``To avoid protracted and costly
    litigation, particularly in light of the harm that occurred in this
    case, I request that you consider engaging in settlement discussions
    with North Dakota to determine whether a reasonable resolution is
    within reach.'' The case has not been appealed yet by DOJ, but the
    expectation is this will happen. It is currently in the discovery stage
    and DOJ is currently only providing USACE staff for interviews and not
    the broader Federal Government. Do you agree with the Army's assessment
    that there were multiple missed opportunities to settle with North
    Dakota and do you also agree with Mr. McPherson's position to DOJ that
    the case should be settled?
        Mr. Austin. My understanding is that this claim under the Federal
    Torts Claim Act (FTCA) is now within the domain of the Department of
    Justice. Should the Department of Justice elect to pursue settlement of
    this claim, I would ensure that legal counsel within the Department of
    Defense provide any and all support requested by the Department of
    Justice.
                          arctic situational awareness
        102. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, as the arctic region becomes more
    militarized by Russia and China, the Midwestern United States becomes
    more vulnerable to an attack from the North. Currently this area is
    protected by an early warning radar located in North Dakota, but that
    radar is over 45 years old. With the increasing threat, do you think we
    need to improve our situational awareness over the arctic region?
        Mr. Austin. I understand DOD has previously identified challenges
    with domain awareness at high latitudes. I have not yet reviewed the
    full U.S. posture in the Arctic, including defense capabilities
    associated with the region. If confirmed, I pledge to assess the
    situation, in the context of other global defense priorities, and
    mitigate accordingly to protect the Homeland effectively.
                  intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
        103. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, there has been a lot of cutting of
    legacy programs to pay for technological advances, and a lot of these
    cuts are to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    programs like the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the MQ-9 Reaper. You depended a
    lot on ISR as the CENTCOM commander, and most of the combatant
    commanders say they don't get enough ISR. Do you think we can
    strategically afford to cut back ISR to places like the Middle East,
    Africa, South America and even to some degree the Pacific?
        Mr. Austin. There is always a balance between meeting the ISR needs
    of today and investing in the ISR capabilities required to maintain
    this nation's technological edge against current and future
    adversaries. Based on my experience while USCENTCOM Commander, the
    combatant command requirements for ISR have always been greater than
    the Department's ability to meet that demand. The Joint Staff carefully
    weighs all the ISR requirements of combatant commanders and does its
    level best to support the Secretary of Defense in allocating ISR
    resources against the highest priority requirements of commanders. If
    confirmed, I am committed to reviewing our ISR requirements,
    allocations, and future program investments to ensure the nation has
    the ISR capabilities necessary to compete and win.
                                  pass through
        104. Senator Cramer. [Deleted.]
        Mr. Austin. I will provide a response in a classified forum at a
    future agreed upon date.
                  commercial access to existing dod facilities
        105. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, American commercial space
    companies are increasingly in need of access to unused or under-
    utilized infrastructure and facilities on U.S. military installations,
    including those at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Space
    Force Station. How will the Pentagon continue to work in a fair and
    transparent manner to maximize opportunities for private entities to
    utilize real property and access infrastructure, particularly new
    entrants? It is important that the DOD is not disadvantaging new
    entrants, but is working to facilitate diversity in the commercial
    space industry and its ability to service U.S. Government customers and
    become increasingly competitive in the international market.
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with the Air Force and
    other DOD Components as necessary to gain insight into this specific
    question.
                         chinese state owned companies
        106. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, in June 2020, the Department of
    Defense released a list of 20 companies it says are controlled by the
    Chinese military. One of these companies is the Chinese Rail
    Rollingstock Corporation (CRRC). Over the past 5 years, CRRC has made
    alarming inroads into the United States market. This state-owned and
    directed company has made aggressive advances into the United States by
    using state-backed financing, below-market pricing, and other anti-
    competitive tactics to decimate domestic railcar manufacturing with the
    single end goal of producing all railcars in the PRC. Currently, CRRC
    also secured more than $2.6 billion in U.S. taxpayer-supported transit
    contracts to provide passenger railcars for the cities of Boston,
    Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. As Secretary, what will you do
    to ensure the Department of Defense's infrastructure is secure from a
    Chinese state-owned enterprise, such as CRRC, that has a significant
    and troubling footprint in the United States?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Department's efforts to
    ensure the integrity of DOD supply chains, support the ability of
    American businesses to withstand PRC coercion, protect American
    intellectual property, and invest in the research and development of
    emerging technologies.

        107. Senator Cramer. Mr. Austin, China provides a competitive
    advantage to its state-owned enterprises through generous, below-market
    government financing for their own ventures, as well as for their
    customers. This gives Chinese businesses--that are extensions of their
    own government--a tremendous unfair advantage, and the potential to
    decimate United States competitors, often in highly sensitive
    industries like the rail sector. Given the potentially dire
    implications for U.S. jobs, our manufacturing base, and our national
    security interests of this trend, are you open to working to address
    this challenge?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I am absolutely open to working Congress
    and my interagency partners to address this challenge.
                                   __________

                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                               taiwan arms sales
        108. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, the Trump administration
    adopted a policy of regularized, non-bundled arms sales to Taiwan and
    sold Taiwan over $15 billion worth of arms. If confirmed, do you intend
    to support continuation of this policy?
        Mr. Austin. President Biden has said many times that United States
    support for Taiwan must remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in
    line with longstanding American commitments to the Three Communiques,
    the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. We will continue to
    support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with
    the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
    will also ensure the United States meets our commitment to assist
    Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.
                    intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty
        109. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, in August 2019, the United
    States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    (INF) Treaty. If confirmed, as Secretary of Defense and a member of the
    National Security Council, would you support a renegotiated INF Treaty
    with our peer and near-peer allies and adversaries?
        Mr. Austin. I believe arms control is in the U.S. national security
    interest and would support efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements
    that are effectively verifiable and that make the United States and its
    allies and partners more safe and secure.
                                moral integrity
        110. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what would be
    your first priorities to address ethics and culture within the Special
    Operations community?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with the ASD(SOLIC) and
    Commander, USSOCOM, to obtain their views on the state of ethics and
    culture in the Special Operations community; I will determine what
    measures they have thus far taken to address any identified ethics and
    culture problems or challenges; and I will also confirm that they have
    a reasonable and appropriate plan for remedying problems and challenges
    in the near and long terms.
                              allies and partners
        111. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, where do you see opportunities
    to expand and/or integrate programs within DOD to promote international
    stability and to advance U.S. interests around the globe?
        Mr. Austin. I understand that the Department has made significant
    strides in recent years through aligning security cooperation
    activities with National Defense Strategy (NDS) objectives and
    utilizing the full range of available authorities for building partner
    capacity. If confirmed, I will review the Department's recently issued
    Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships and assess what
    additional steps may be necessary to ensure the proper level of
    integration of DOD efforts to strengthen alliances and attract new
    partners in line with the new defense strategy.
                           joint warfighting concept
        112. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, while each of the Services has
    developed its own operating concept, DOD lacks a completed Joint
    Warfighting Concept (JWC) that converges each of the Services from an
    operational perspective. Why is a JWC important for how the Services
    operate interdependently, especially in contested environments with
    demand for artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled technologies that
    intersect human and machine?
        Mr. Austin. The JWC will advance the Joint Force's unity of effort
    by better integrating the Services' concepts and capabilities.
    Implementation of the JWC and integrating the strengths of all of our
    Services across all domains, will force adversaries to face the full
    range and depth of the Joint Force. For example, the C2 of global all-
    domain operations utilizing AI enabled technology is beyond the scope
    of a single Service and requires a joint solution.

        113. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, what specific initiatives would
    you implement to ensure the appropriate development of the JWC--
    specifically, as it relates to the United States Indo-Pacific Command
    (INDOPACOM) theater of operations?
        Mr. Austin. In order to ensure development of the JWC, the Joint
    Force needs to enhance capability and capacity for advanced war gaming
    and emulations led by the Joint Staff and INDOPACOM, make changes in
    Joint Professional Military Education to emphasize classified work
    focused on adversaries at the operational level of war, add an annual
    Large Scale Global Exercise to experiment, test and advance the JWC,
    and coordinate with allies and partners in design and development of
    our forces. Additionally, JWC Concept Required Capabilities (I.e.,
    capability gaps), along with INDOPACOM's Integrated Priority List
    (IPL), must be submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    (JROC) for establishment of joint requirements that Services will
    fulfill.
                             workforce development
        114. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific
    practices would you implement to leverage the talents of our National
    Guard and Reserve Components to create robust and competitive hiring
    pipelines for high-skilled professionals relevant to 5G, space, and
    high-skilled manufacturing?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess how the Department can
    employ the National Guard and Reserves in both unit and individual
    based approaches. I will assess ways to improve the Department's
    ability in identifying desired military and civilian skillsets, as well
    as the need for more flexible application of existing duty statuses to
    include leveraging the performance of duty from remote locations as we
    have seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, I will assess current
    authorities and resources available to the Department to attract and
    retain specialized talent.

        115. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what would be
    your priorities to improve DOD's implementation of public-private
    talent exchanges?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, my priorities would be to implement the
    enhancements to DOD's public-private talent exchange programs provided
    in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021, including expanding existing programs
    to private sector entities that are working DOD's modernization
    priorities. I understand that public-private talent exchanges have been
    a success in the DOD acquisition Community, and I would make it a
    priority to expand such programs to different functional communities
    and DOD organizations.
                                 nuclear policy
        116. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, do you believe the current
    program of record is sufficient to support the modernization of the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent, including delivery systems, weapons, command
    and control systems, and infrastructure?
        Mr. Austin. Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority
    mission and updating and overhauling our nation's nuclear forces is a
    critical national security priority. Our nuclear deterrent has served a
    vital purpose in U.S. National Security Strategy for the past 70 years
    and continues to be an essential component of our strategy to preserve
    peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States,
    our allies, and our partners. The nuclear triad has served us well in
    the past and will do so going forward, and I personally support the
    triad. And while effective today, U.S. nuclear deterrence remains
    dependent on aging weapons, delivery systems, infrastructure, and
    nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems originally
    built during the Cold War. These systems have been extended far beyond
    their original service lives, and the tipping point, where we must
    simultaneously overhaul these forces, is now here. If confirmed, I will
    review, early on, the status of our nuclear modernization and
    sustainment programs, including those at the National Nuclear Security
    Administration.

        117. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, do you believe that 7 percent
    of the defense budget is a sufficient amount to spend on what the past
    five Secretaries of Defense have called the DOD's highest priority
    defense mission? Please explain your answer.
        Mr. Austin. Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of
    the Department of Defense. It must be modernized to remain credible. If
    confirmed, providing the necessary resources to recapitalize the
    nuclear platforms and delivery systems will receive my highest
    attention.
            national nuclear security administration infrastructure
        118. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you seek to
    resource the ongoing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    infrastructure requirements at the levels needed to complete them on
    schedule?
        Mr. Austin. I understand that much of NNSA's nuclear security
    enterprise infrastructure is very old, and in particular many
    facilities related to production of nuclear weapons date back to the
    early Cold War. This infrastructure, and the NNSA workforce, are at the
    very heart of our nuclear deterrent. NNSA's infrastructure must be
    modernized and appropriate resources must be provided to do so. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Energy and the
    Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure NNSA's infrastructure is modernized.

        119. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what actions
    would you take to permanently eliminate the NNSA's deferred maintenance
    backlog?
        Mr. Austin. Decades of underinvestment in maintenance and
    sustainment of NNSA's nuclear infrastructure has resulted in
    unacceptable fragility in key capabilities. More than 60 percent of
    NNSA facilities are beyond their 40-year life expectancy and nearly 40
    percent are in poor condition. Addressing this problem requires close
    collaboration between the Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA and
    continued advocacy from DOD that our partners in NNSA require robust
    resources to modernize their infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Weapons Council to
    ensure NNSA's deferred maintenance challenges are addressed.
                            great power competition
        120. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific,
    high-return-on-investment activities would you recommend to counter
    China and Russia in United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work closely with interagency
    partners to assess in what ways the Department can contribute to
    advancing our goals in United States Africa Command. The best action we
    can take to counter Chinese and Russian malign influence in Africa is
    to step up our engagement across the continent. This means ensuring
    robust key leader engagements, partnering with like-minded global
    partners, and continuing our joint exercises, professional military
    education (PME), port visits, peacekeeping training, and other security
    sector assistance programs. These efforts counter violent extremist
    organizations, improve maritime security, and support health and
    humanitarian response efforts, such as our shared COVID-19 fight. This
    means ensuring sufficient low-cost, high-return resourcing investments
    must be preserved including PME, which is funded by the Department of
    State. If confirmed, I will prioritize these efforts, and challenge the
    Department to find ways to increase our military interoperability with
    certain African partners, while simultaneously demonstrating American
    values and professionalism--aspects that set us apart from China and
    Russia.
                         united states central command
        121. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, if the United States reduced
    sanctions on Iran, would you anticipate that a portion of that relief
    would be used to fund terrorist organizations?
        Mr. Austin. I would defer to the Intelligence Community for its
    assessment. It is important that the United States, in concert with its
    partners and allies, addresses Iran's financial and material support
    for terrorist and militant groups that destabilizes the region and
    threatens United States interests.

        122. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Austin, do United States troops in
    Syria help to diminish Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle
    East?
        Mr. Austin. We are in a period of competition with Russia globally,
    and in particular in the Middle East. While we conduct our Defeat ISIS
    mission, our presence in Syria does enable us to have a strong
    relationship with local partners to defend United States interests
    against Russian and Iranian influence. I believe that our presence in
    Syria does help to diminish Russian influence and complicate Russian
    planning in Syria. Our relationships with local partners and our troop
    presence serve as an indication to the members of the Global Coalition
    to Defeat ISIS and our partners in the region of our resolve to defeat
    terrorism and maintain the forces necessary to defend ourselves while
    doing so.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                         the threat of a fait accompli
        123. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the Pentagon's 2019 Indo-Pacific
    Strategy Report assessed that ``the most stressing potential scenarios
    will occur along our competitors' peripheries'' where ``they are likely
    to enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict.'' It went
    on to warn of a fait accompli scenario in which ``competitors would
    seek to employ their capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives
    and forestall a response from the United States, and its allies and
    partners.'' Do you agree with the Pentagon's assessment in the Indo-
    Pacific Strategy Report that ``DOD initiatives on force employment,
    crisis response, force and concept development, and collaboration with
    allies and partners'' should be ``aimed to help address this critical
    challenge'' of a potential fait accompli scenario involving China?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree with this assessment detailed in the
    Department's 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.

        124. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission found that ``successfully competing in Europe and the Indo-
    Pacific region, while also managing escalation dynamics, requires
    positioning substantial capability forward . . . to deter and prevent a
    fait accompli by an agile, opportunistic adversary.'' Do you agree with
    the National Defense Strategy Commission's assessment that the United
    States military should be postured ``to deter and prevent a fait
    accompli by an agile opportunistic adversary''?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree with the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
    Commission's finding. A combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is
    instrumental to the U.S. military's ability to deter, and if necessary,
    deny a fait accompli scenario. A new defense strategy will require a
    comprehensive approach to addressing this challenge, including not only
    forward positioning and posture of U.S. Forces, but also new
    warfighting concepts, modernized and high-end ready forces, and capable
    allies and partners proficient in their warfighting roles in such
    scenarios.

        125. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the Taiwan Relations Act (22
    U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) establishes the policy of the United States ``to
    maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
    force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
    the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.'' Do you agree
    that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) therefore
    requires the United States to maintain the ability to defend Taiwan
    against a Chinese fait accompli operation?
        Mr. Austin. The Taiwan Relations Act makes clear that the United
    States must maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or
    forms of coercion that could jeopardize the security of Taiwan. The
    Taiwan Relations Act also states that the President and Congress will
    determine appropriate action by the United States in response to
    actions that threaten Taiwan's security or United States interests. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that our President has credible options for
    responding to threats to the security of the people of Taiwan and any
    related danger to the interests of the United States.
                             supply chain security
        126. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, in 2018, Under Secretary Ellen
    Lord said at least 45 percent of the printed circuit boards used by the
    United States military are produced in China. Many of these printed
    circuit boards, in turn, are used in weapon, information, and other
    systems that our forces rely on to achieve their missions and come home
    safely to their families. This creates significant risk for our
    military. Not only can the Chinese Government work with Chinese
    manufacturers and assemblers in order to sabotage those printed circuit
    boards, including through malicious insertion. The Chinese Government
    can also direct Chinese companies to cut off the Department of
    Defense's access to these components altogether, with significant
    implications for U.S. military modernization and operations. Are you
    concerned by the Department's overreliance on Chinese printed circuit
    boards?
        Mr. Austin. As with all components in DOD systems, the desire is
    that they are sourced from U.S. suppliers or from our allied and
    partner nations. However, in some industrial base sectors, our U.S.
    production capability has eroded. To combat this, DOD will need to work
    with Congress and inter-agency partners to identify opportunities to
    reshore capability such as printed circuit board manufacturing.

        127. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, in view of the risks associated
    with the Department's current overreliance on Chinese printed circuit
    boards, do you think Department of Defense contractors should disclose
    if they are using Chinese printed circuit boards inside weapon or other
    systems that our forces will rely on during combat operations?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with acquisition officials
    within the Department to address these concerns.

        128. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, the Chinese Communist Party poses
    a clear threat to the economic and national security of the United
    States. At the same time, there is reason to believe certain companies
    who either hold or are pursuing contracts with the Department of
    Defense also maintain a physical presence in China and may employ
    members of the Chinese Communist Party. Does the Department of Defense
    have an interest in knowing whether a company employs members of the
    Chinese Communist Party when the Department makes contracting decisions
    involving that company?
        Mr. Austin. The Department does have an interest in knowing whether
    our suppliers have employees who are members of the Chinese Communist
    Party. If confirmed I will work with acquisition officials within the
    Department to address these concerns.

        129. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, there are reports that some
    companies doing work for the Department of Defense have previously
    worked--or may in fact still do work--for the Chinese Government or
    Chinese state-owned enterprises. Do you find it concerning that the
    Department of Defense may be doing business with companies who
    simultaneously work for the Chinese Government or Chinese state-owned
    enterprises?
        Mr. Austin. DOD's industrial base analysis should include
    visibility into which companies are associated with China's Government
    or state-owned enterprises. If confirmed I will work with acquisition
    officials within the Department to address these concerns.
                               army end strength
        130. Senator Hawley. Mr. Austin, do you believe the Army's current
    authorized end-strength is sufficient to support its current and
    anticipated role in deterring--or if necessary, defeating--Chinese
    aggression in the Indo-Pacific region?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with Army leaders to ensure
    Army's end strength and capabilities are sufficient to support the
    global strategy and demands, to include the Indo-Pacific region.
                                   __________

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                              military lending act
        131. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, by enacting the Military Lending Act
    (MLA) as part of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2007, Congress sent a clear bipartisan message that
    protecting servicemembers and their families from predatory and high
    cost lending was of paramount importance to their financial security
    and military readiness. This law capped the annual interest rates for
    consumer credit to servicemembers and their dependents at 36 percent
    while giving DOD the authority to define what loans should be covered.
    Unfortunately, DOD's 2007 implementing regulations narrowly included
    only a handful of loans and were full of loopholes that did not
    sufficiently protect servicemembers. DOD finalized updated MLA rules
    closing these loopholes and strengthening MLA protections for our
    servicemembers. Can I have your personal assurance that you will
    support and protect these updated MLA rules, if and when confirmed?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
     office of servicemember affairs at the consumer financial protection
                                     bureau
        132. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
    Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, then Senator Scott Brown of
    Massachusetts and I created the Office of Servicemember Affairs at the
    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This Office, during the Obama
    administration, worked with DOD on strengthening MLA protections. Can I
    have your personal assurance that you, if and when confirmed, will
    support and work with the Office of Servicemember Affairs at the
    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
                            counterterrorism policy
        133. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, in May 2013, President Obama made a
    significant speech at the National Defense University regarding
    counterterrorism operations and related legal and policy frameworks for
    the use of force. According to a White House fact sheet regarding the
    President's speech, ``the President has indicated a preference that the
    U.S. military should carry out the use of force in active warzones, and
    beyond.'' Furthermore, in a background briefing with reporters, a
    senior Administration official stated ``the United States military is
    the appropriate agency to use force outside of active warzones, given
    their traditional role and given the transparency they can be
    associated with actions by the United States military.'' Do you believe
    that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the military is the
    appropriate organization to carry out counterterrorism operations
    involving the use of force?
        Mr. Austin. I do believe the U.S. military is often the most
    appropriate organization to carry out counterterrorism operations
    involving the use of force. However, the Department of Defense should
    not address terrorist threats unilaterally, and all DOD activities must
    be coordinated within a U.S. Government-wide and international partner-
    integrated response.

        134. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, in your view, how important is
    public transparency regarding counterterrorism operations and issues
    related to the use of force?
        Mr. Austin. Public transparency regarding U.S. military
    counterterrorism operations, including those related to the use of
    force, is vitally important, and will be a core principle of DOD
    counterterrorism efforts if I am confirmed. I see continued close
    coordination with Congress on these issues as essential and my team and
    I would seek to continue to deepen that partnership. Combatant Commands
    do post timely unclassified press releases when counterterrorism
    operations are conducted, and if confirmed, I will plan to review the
    process that balances operational security and public transparency.

        135. Senator Reed. Mr. Austin, the Obama administration publicly
    released a redacted version of its Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG)
    outlining procedures for approving direct action against terrorist
    targets located outside the United States and areas of active
    hostilities. Do you believe an appropriately redacted version of
    successor guidance to the PPG should be publicly released?
        Mr. Austin. It is important that the U.S. public understand the
    general principles and standards guiding the approval of direct action
    by the United States against terrorist targets and if confirmed I
    commit to review our current approach to transparency on those
    principles.
                                   __________

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
          vietnam veterans memorial and uss i89frank e evans inclusion
        136. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, on June 3, 1969, we lost 74
    Vietnam Veterans when the USS Frank E Evans (DD 754) was struck by
    Royal New Zealand Navy aircraft carrier, and immediately sank.
    Ultimately you, as Secretary of Defense, have the power to make these
    74 sailors eligible for inclusion in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The
    House has passed legislation, and the Senate has strong supporters. The
    few Senators who would like to inhibit inclusion of the USS Frank E
    Evans crew, utilize the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DOD
    Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures Instruction (DODI
    1300.18), as their reasoning. Do you think those who lost their lives
    on the USS Frank E Evans should be included in the Vietnam Veterans
    Memorial?
        Mr. Austin. The crew members of the USS Frank E Evans died in a
    tragic accident while participating in a routine training exercise
    outside of the Vietnam Combat Zone. The Department of Defense is
    responsible for determining criteria for and validating service in a
    combat zone. Multiple previous Secretaries of Defense have carefully
    reviewed this matter, and have unanimously concluded that the crew of
    the USS Frank E. Evans does not meet the criteria of a Vietnam War
    casualty and they are therefore not eligible for the Vietnam Veterans
    Memorial.

        137. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate
    that the Department of Defense is responsible for determining who is
    eligible for inclusion in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial?
        Mr. Austin. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund built The Wall with
    private funding to honor servicemembers who were casualties of the
    Vietnam War. The Department of Defense worked the Vietnam Veterans
    Memorial Fund to establish the criteria and provide the initial list of
    names for the Memorial. As with all conflicts, it is the Department's
    responsibility to define and account for all casualties, these policies
    are established in DOD Instruction 1300.18, ``Personnel Casualty
    Matters, Policies, and Procedures.''

        138. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, do you think it is appropriate
    that within DODI 1300.18 (see below reference) there are two separate
    sets of criteria for who may be considered a casualty of the Vietnam
    War and who is deemed a casualty for the purposes of being eligible to
    have their name included on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall?
        Mr. Austin. -6.1.2.3.4.3. Died/wounded while on a combat/combat
    support mission to/from a defined combat zone -6.5.2.4. Died while
    participating in, or providing direct support to a combat mission
    immediately en route to or returning from a target within the defined
    combat zone.
        Yes, this is appropriate because the second provision (6.5.2.4) was
    developed to clarify combat related casualties that may occur outside a
    defined combat zone, for example Navy aircraft returning from a combat
    mission is lost en route to the aircraft carrier. The second provision
    (6.5.2.4) represents a clarification to the Department's Casualty
    Procedures, as also reflected in DODI 1300.18, paragraph 6.1.2.2.4.3.
                          military covid-19 readiness
        139. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, as we consider troop readiness
    and the health of our military men and women during an ongoing
    pandemic, how is the Department of Defense protecting personnel
    awaiting the vaccine, and those who may not be eligible for the SARS-
    CoV-2 vaccine because of underlying health conditions?
        Mr. Austin. I understand that the Department instituted multiple
    measures to safeguard the health of its people from SARS-CoV-2 without
    sacrificing its critical missions, including travel restrictions,
    telework, mask wear, social distancing, screening and testing, and
    other force health protection measures. If confirmed, I will make the
    health of the Department's people my top priority, review all measures
    instituted to protect their health immediately, and direct additional
    measures, if necessary.

        140. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, there are two ways to assess a
    body's immune response to a virus-antibodies and T cells. DOD has made
    antibody testing available to troops, yet studies indicate that 10-30
    percent of the population do not produce antibodies. Additionally,
    there is emerging data to suggest T cells are protective against SARS-
    CoV-2, even in the absence of antibodies. In order to fully understand
    the cell mediated immunity against COVID-19 and gain a full view of the
    natural or vaccinated immunity among our troops, how will DOD make
    available both antibody and T cell testing to best ensure our fighting
    force remains ready and protected against COVID-19?
        Mr. Austin. I understand the Department continues to test based on
    clinical indication and in accordance with its screening and
    surveillance guidance; consistent with CDC and FDA guidance. If
    confirmed, I will review how the Department is testing its people for
    SARS-CoV-2 and ensure that the best diagnostic tests are available. It
    is absolutely critical that a full view of COVID immunity in the
    military be achieved responsibly, utilizing all safe and available
    tests. I commit to a review of existing policies and procedures.
                              pfas prioritization
        141. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Austin, when you and I met last month we
    had the opportunity to discuss the challenges associated with PFAS
    [per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances] contamination. As you know, there
    is ongoing PFAS remediation at more than 600 military installations
    across the country including at the former Pease Air Force Base in New
    Hampshire. We have made progress on this issue, but more must be done
    to ensure the health and well-being of our servicemembers, their
    families, and others impacted by the contamination.
        During the hearing you testified, ``The PFAS Task Force stood up by
    Secretary Esper is ongoing'' and you intend to pick up the pace for
    good solutions for mitigations and military contribution to the
    solutions while working across the board with partners and the
    Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to ensure that the military is
    doing its part.
        With that, I would encourage that DOD does more to ensure that
    State standards are more protective than EPA's 70 parts per trillion
    health advisory for drinking water. I would also like you to consider
    providing blood testing for servicemembers and their families who have
    served at bases with contamination and ensure that a PFAS free foam is
    developed and fielded by 2023.
        As you think about taking on this new role, please share your
    thoughts on the PFAS contamination issue and how might DOD take more
    aggressive action to address this issue?
        Mr. Austin. We must take care of our men and women in uniform,
    their families, and the communities that do so much to support the
    armed forces. If confirmed, I will energize the pace of the DOD PFAS
    Task Force to ensure DOD proactively addresses its PFAS releases, and
    aggressively pursues a PFAS-free firefighting agent. I also plan to
    increase communications to Congress and the public, as well as work
    with our federal and State agency partners to remediate drinking water.
                                   __________

               Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
                   presumptions of upgrade in cases of trauma
        142. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, veterans who receive less-
    than-Honorable discharges are uniquely stigmatized by their military
    records. They can have difficulty securing jobs and housing and they
    are frequently barred from receiving VA benefits, including medical
    care. To make matters worse, the number of less-than-Honorable
    discharges has increased in recent years. These veterans may apply for
    a discharge upgrade through either a Board for Correction of Military
    Records or a Discharge Review Board. With the help of this committee,
    past Secretaries of Defense have recognized that these adjudicatory
    bodies have failed to live up to their mandate. The Department has
    issued guidance memos requiring the Boards to provide special
    consideration to applicants who have a history of post-traumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), or an experience of
    Military Sexual Trauma. Still, the Boards have refused to meaningfully
    apply this guidance, resulting in low discharge upgrade rates. Instead,
    for the past 3 years the Army and the Navy have been litigating class
    action lawsuits brought by bad paper veterans suffering from PTSD and
    related conditions. Do you agree that there should be a presumption of
    upgrade in cases of PTSD, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual
    Trauma, and that applicants should have the opportunity for a
    videoconference hearing if they cannot travel to Washington in person?
        Mr. Austin. The Department continues its efforts to ensure veterans
    are aware of their opportunities to request review of their discharges
    and other military records. The Military Departments Discharge Review
    Boards (DRB) and Boards for Correction of Military Records and Naval
    Records (BCMR/NR) continue to explore ways to seek input from
    applicants in modern and convenient ways while also affording all
    applicants an opportunity for timely review. If confirmed, I will
    review this issue to ensure the Military Departments are applying the
    appropriate standards under the law and Servicemembers receive just and
    fair consideration.

        143. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, what types of training would
    you provide to the adjudicatory Boards to ensure the presumption of
    upgrade in cases of PTSD, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual
    Trauma is followed?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Departments
    to ensure that the Discharge Review Boards (DRBs) and Boards for
    Correction of Military Records/Naval Records (BCMR/NR) are providing
    appropriate training to adjudicators on the applicable standards under
    the law.

        144. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, would you perform a
    comprehensive review of the causes of the increased rate of bad paper
    discharges across the military and publish a report outlining the steps
    you are taking to reverse this increase?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess whether there is an
    increase in the rate of bad paper discharges across the military and,
    if necessary, what the contributing factors may be.
                           diversity and anti-racism
        145. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, as you are likely aware, the
    military justice and discharge systems are not immune from systemic
    racism. Black servicemembers are more likely to have an action taken
    against them in the military justice system than their white peers.
    Black and Latinx servicemembers are twice as likely as their white
    counterparts to receive other-than-Honorable discharges, which lead to
    stigma and closes off access to important benefits. Though these
    disparities have been well-documented for years, little has been done
    about it. Will you work to address these discrepancies by empowering
    legally trained military prosecutors, instead of the commander of the
    accused, to determine whether to refer a case to court-martial, and to
    require each Service branch to collect and regularly publish racial and
    ethnic data regarding military justice involvement and outcomes?
        Mr. Austin. I will ensure that we consider every option when
    addressing this critical issue and will work with our experts in the
    DOD and our Congressional partners to determine the most effective way
    forward. This includes leveraging the newly established Defense
    Advisory Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to understand best
    practices in this area and to identify actions the Department can take
    to improve its systems, policies, and programs.

        146. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, the military Service Academies
    play an integral role in developing our Nation's officer corps, but
    fail to reflect the diversity of the enlisted ranks of our United
    States as a whole. Women and Black and Hispanic cadets in particular
    are underrepresented among congressional nominees to the academies.
    Last year, in the NDAA, Congress required the Department of Defense to
    publish annual data detailing the demographics of applicants, nominees,
    and appointees to the academies in aggregate. The academies have this
    same data disaggregated by Member of Congress, and in the past, they
    have disclosed it in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
    requests and lawsuits. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that
    the Service Academies voluntarily disclose the racial, ethnic, and
    gender demographics of each Member's nominees, without need for FOIA
    requests and lawsuits?
        Mr. Austin. I agree that this is an important issue and I will work
    with the Service Academies to release information regarding the
    demographics of the Members' nominees.

        147. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, in the position of Secretary
    of Defense, to your knowledge, what unique challenges and
    considerations will you face when ensuring a fair hiring process and
    workplace environment for women and underrepresented groups?
        Mr. Austin. We know barriers to increasing diversity are often
    complex and not always easily visible. I was heartened by the recently
    released Diversity and Inclusion Board Report which recommended actions
    to increase diversity from initial hire through to retention. I commit
    to continue the good work of the Board to ensure equal opportunity for
    all who look to join the DOD.

        148. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, President-Elect Biden has
    pledged that, as president, he will ``strive for gender parity in
    senior national security and foreign policy appointments.'' Are you
    committed to implementing this pledge?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I am committed to ensuring that all members of our
    workforce have opportunity regardless of their gender.

        149. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, President Trump's DOD recently
    released a 2017 survey on racial and gender discrimination in the
    military. It showed 24.4 percent of minority servicemembers experienced
    discrimination. Yet, only 26 percent reported their experience to the
    Equal Opportunity program. Only 16 percent of reports led to punishment
    of the perpetrator and, even more shocking, in 10 percent of the
    reports, the command punished the reporter. Do you agree that the equal
    opportunity system has fundamentally failed to guarantee civil rights
    for servicemembers?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will closely examine this issue to
    ensure the Department is taking every step possible to prevent and
    address discrimination, and ensure that we provide all appropriate
    support to those who experience problematic behaviors. Our equal
    opportunity programs are critical to demonstrate to our workforce that
    they are valued, and we must do everything possible to ensure an
    appropriate work environment for our Total Force.
                          civil service politicization
        150. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, President Trump issued an
    executive order that would convert positions in the competitive civil
    service into roles similar to political appointees, without any of the
    protections from political interference afforded to title V service
    appointments. I am concerned over the harassment of and retaliation
    against civil servants, such as Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman,
    USA at the National Security Council, and Sahar Nowrouzzadeh at the
    State Department. I am also concerned about the installation of clear
    political partisans to civil service roles, such as the placement of
    Michael Ellis to the role of General Counsel of the National Security
    Agency. The politicization of our civil service has unquestionably
    damaged our workforce that is critical to our national security. What
    is your plan to repair the damage done by these executive orders and
    efforts to politicize the civil service?
        Mr. Austin. To recruit and retain the most talented Servicemembers
    and civilian employees, leaders must foster a workplace which rewards
    competence and integrity and ensures equal opportunity for all. If
    confirmed, I will emphasize and strengthen the Department's commitment
    to merit system principles and will work with senior civilian and
    military leaders to safeguard against political influence in military
    and civilian personnel matters.
                                     israel
        151. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, Israel is and will remain a
    strategic ally and crucial partner for our Defense Department.
    President Trump's shortsighted regional policies have facilitated a
    resurgence of Iran's nuclear program while Hezbollah continues to
    threaten Israel's northern border and build a larger and more
    sophisticated arsenal of missiles. How will you continue to strengthen
    our defense partnership with Israel to counter these persistent
    threats?
        Mr. Austin. The United States has a close and enduring relationship
    with the State of Israel, and Israel's security is very important for
    our strategic interests in the region. If confirmed, the Department of
    Defense under my leadership will remain committed to assisting Israel
    in being able to defend itself and in maintaining Israel's qualitative
    military edge. In general terms, this means ensuring that Israel has
    the capability to defend itself against threats from regional
    adversaries, to include Iran and Hezbollah, by providing Israel with
    the most advanced technology available to counter these threats and to
    ensure that Israel's overall suite of military capabilities in the
    region is unparalleled.
                                     china
        152. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, under the Trump
    administration, China has increased its global power and influence. The
    President's rash unilateral actions have allowed China to continue to
    rise while alienating the allies and partners we will need to contain
    and shape China's negative behaviors. Where can we right size our force
    and divest to free up assets to bolster our posture in the Pacific?
        Mr. Austin. I understand the Department has taken important steps
    to improve our posture in the Indo-Pacific and focus on the priority of
    China. If confirmed, I will assess and redouble these efforts and
    carefully review our posture in the region. Improving our posture in
    the Pacific also requires working with allies and partners and, if
    confirmed, I will prioritize strengthening these alliances and
    partnerships to address our mutual interest of regional stability.

        153. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, how will you make our presence
    more resilient in the face of China's missile capabilities?
        Mr. Austin. China's missile capabilities--and its broader military
    modernization efforts--present growing risks to our forces. If
    confirmed, I will review efforts to mitigate these risks and strengthen
    the resiliency of our force posture.
                                 cybersecurity
        154. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, last month it came to light
    that Russia had created a backdoor into the computers of, at least, 250
    agencies. For 9 months, and possibly still, they have been able to
    monitor computer activity and steal data. This hack came to light, not
    because of our cyber operations, but because a private company,
    FireEye, brought the attack to our attention. In your written response
    you mention elevating cybersecurity and strengthening partnerships with
    the private sector. I have proposed increasing the role of the National
    Guard, so cyber security experts could maintain their private sector
    jobs while also servicing their country. Do you think that is one tool
    we can use to solve this problem?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I believe cyber security experts from the private
    sector serving as National Guardsmen could help address the cyber
    security challenges the Department faces. The leading-edge talent,
    skills and knowledge these industry experts could bring to the fight
    could help us defend the Department of Defense networks and information
    systems. I understand that Reservists are already successfully employed
    in a similar capacity throughout the Department for cyber security-
    related missions.
                                      pfas
        155. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, Air National Guard Bases in
    New York, specifically Stewart and Gabreski, have faced significant
    water contamination issues, and unfortunately, the Department has still
    not taken full responsibility for clean up at these sites.
    Contamination there was caused by DOD's mandated use of firefighting
    foam containing PFAS chemicals, and its clean-up must be a Federal
    responsibility. If left unaddressed, the contamination has the
    potential to significantly harm public health. While we have passed
    legislation enabling National Guard installations to receive Federal
    funds to clean up PFAS contamination, States are still receiving
    pushback and delays from DOD as they attempt to advance formal
    agreements to fully remediate these sites. What actions do you plan to
    take in order to ensure this issue is addressed?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will energize the pace of the DOD PFAS
    Task Force to ensure DOD proactively addresses its PFAS releases. I
    also plan to increase communications to Congress and the public, as
    well as work with our federal and State agency partners to remediate
    drinking water. I will work closely with my EPA counterparts as well.

        156. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, in particular how soon will
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense will authorize the Military
    Services to conclude cooperative agreements with impacted States to
    mitigate PFAS contamination, as authorized in section 332 of the Fiscal
    Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act?
        Mr. Austin. DOD and the Military Services are already authorized to
    enter into or amend existing cooperative agreements with the States to
    address PFAS, and DOD will quickly evaluate all cooperative agreement
    requests as authorized in section 332 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National
    Defense Authorization Act.

        157. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, can I have your assurances you
    will work with us set a clear pay way for DOD to fully remediate these
    sites in New York and across the Nation?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assure the Department works
    aggressively to address PFAS at DOD sites in New York and across the
    nation under the federal cleanup law.
                                lc-130h aircraft
        158. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, the LC-130H model aircraft
    flown by the 109th Airlift Wing at Stratton Air National Guard Base are
    aging and will eventually need to be replaced. The fiscal year 2021
    appropriations legislation includes the requirement for a report on the
    LC-130H mission and the potential need to replace the aircraft to
    support the Pentagon's Arctic strategy, which is of increasing
    importance due to climate change and a more emboldened Russia. What is
    your view on the need to replace these aircraft with the modern J Model
    of the LC-130?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess the capabilities needed for
    the challenges in the Arctic in the context of a new defense strategy.
                                   new start
        159. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, as you know the 2010 New
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is slated to expire just 16
    days after Inauguration Day on February 5, 2021, but can be extended by
    up to 5 years. If the treaty expires with nothing to replace it, there
    will be no negotiated limits on the United States and Russian nuclear
    arsenals for the first time in 50 years. The U.S. military has long
    recognized the benefits of well-constructed arms control treaties like
    New START. Do you agree with President-elect Biden that New START
    should be extended?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        160. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, from a military planning
    perspective, do you agree that a full 5-year extension of the New START
    treaty would be preferable to a shorter extension?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed I would seek to implement the President's
    plan to seek a 5-year extension of New START.
                         u.s. nuclear policy & arsenal
        161. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, the Trump administration
    proposed to expand the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
    including by pursuing additional low-yield nuclear weapons. The cost of
    this approach is staggering and it is growing. The United States is
    currently slated to spend at least $1.5 trillion to sustain and upgrade
    its nuclear arsenal over the next 20-25 years. In a 2019 candidate
    survey, President-elect Biden said that the United States ``does not
    need new nuclear weapons'' and that his ``Administration will work to
    maintain a strong, credible deterrent while reducing our reliance and
    excessive expenditure on nuclear weapons.'' Do you agree with the
    President-elect's goal to pursue a nuclear deterrent that is more
    stabilizing and affordable?
        Mr. Austin. The nuclear deterrence mission is one of the
    Department's highest priority missions, and updating and overhauling
    our nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security priority.
    If confirmed, I plan to request early a briefing on the U.S. nuclear
    modernization program to ensure that it is being executed in the most
    cost effective and judicious manner and will make recommendations to
    President Biden accordingly, in the context of a new defense strategy.

        162. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, given the likelihood of flat
    defense budgets at best in the near-term, if not longer, should the
    Biden administration evaluate the feasibility of more cost-effective
    options to sustain a credible nuclear deterrent, and if not, what non-
    nuclear missions and programs do you believe should pay the bills to
    keep the nuclear modernization program on track?
        Mr. Austin. Maintaining the nuclear deterrent is a cornerstone of
    the Nation's security. If confirmed, I am committed to a careful
    examination of the current status of the triad and options to preserve
    the capability moving forward.

        163. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Austin, three former Secretaries of
    Defense, the former Commander of Strategic Command, the former Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous high-ranking
    military and civilian leaders have openly questioned the need and
    rationale for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program. Many
    argue that the price tag is too high amid a plethora of other budgetary
    pressures. Many also say that alternative--and more stabilizing--
    deterrence options are available at a much lower cost, specifically the
    prospect of life-extending the current Minuteman III force. According
    to the Congressional Budget Office, doing this would be significantly
    cheaper than proceeding as planned with GBSD. With that in mind, can
    you explain why we are planning to spend $264 billion on brand-new
    ICBMs over the next 60 years?
        Mr. Austin. Clearly, maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent is
    critical to our Nation's defense. If confirmed, I will thoroughly study
    all alternatives to ensure we are on the most cost effective path.
                                   __________

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                       transparency in national security
        164. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, will you commit to greater
    Pentagon transparency about our military operations, adversaries, and
    budget investments?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. I believe that public transparency regarding
    military operations and the civilian leadership's decision making on
    defense matters is critical to ensuring our defense policies are
    accountable to the American people.

        165. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, will you commit to ensuring
    the Pentagon holds regular, on-camera briefings for the Pentagon press
    corps?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        166. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, will you commit to
    declassifying--and making publicly available--as much national security
    information as possible without compromising sources and methods?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would fulfill all of the
    responsibilities assigned in Executive Order (EO) 13526, ``Classified
    National Security Information,'' to classify, safeguard, and declassify
    national security information. Declassification of information should
    receive equal attention as the classification of information. As
    required by EO 13526, information shall be declassified as soon as it
    no longer meets the standards for classification, which ensures that it
    remains classified only as long as its unauthorized disclosure could be
    expected to cause damage to the national security.

        167. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, will you commit
    to following the law and restoring the regular reporting of top-line
    troop numbers to the American public?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.
      environmental policies & climate change as national security threat
        168. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, would you commit to pursuing
    the procurement of clean energy technologies to increase the energy
    efficiency of our defense installations and reduce reliance on the
    local infrastructure?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will consult with the Department's
    subject matter experts in this area and encourage the use of clean
    technologies to increase energy efficiency where these technologies
    enhance the energy resilience and mission assurance of DOD
    installations.

        169. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, how will you
    ensure that the Pentagon plays a leading role in addressing the
    national security threat of climate change?
        Mr. Austin. Climate is a national security challenge we must
    consider as we take actions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the
    Department of Defense plays an appropriate role within a whole-of-
    government response to the impacts of a changing climate.
                            defense industrial base
        170. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, how will you
    ensure that the defense industrial base--and particularly our small
    suppliers--are healthy?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would leverage DOD's existing programs
    to ensure small firms are able to compete for contracts and receive
    Defense business. I would work with Congress and within the DOD to
    improve the predictability of funding to allow smaller firms to more
    effectively plan for future workload and recapitalization.

        171. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, with the reprioritization of
    U.S. national security interests in a new National Defense Strategy
    (NDS), are you willing to advocate for the additional funding required
    to support the Defense Industrial Base and ensure we maintain our
    critical investment in capabilities that support new concepts of
    warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would support the continued investment
    in research, development, and production of our major weapon systems
    and emerging capabilities. I would work with Congress to secure
    predictable and stable funding to make competing for defense contracts
    more attractive to industry. If confirmed, I would leverage existing
    authorities, such as the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment
    program, to make key investments to improve the resiliency of the
    Defense Industrial Base.

        172. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, do you view our 5th generation
    fighter aircraft programs as trade space to fund other priority NDS
    requirements?
        Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, I
    believe the greatest risk to the Department of Defense's ability to
    perform its key missions is presented by the complex anti-access area
    denial capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Fighter
    modernization must ensure that the services are able to adapt to these
    challenges. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, CAPE,
    OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) to review the requirements for 4th, 5th and 6th
    generation fighters.

        173. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, what's your vision for
    keeping/making the Fighter Force Structure relevant within this context
    across the Department of Defense?
        Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, I
    believe the greatest risk in the Air Force's ability to perform its key
    missions is presented by the complex anti-access area denial
    capabilities of competitors such as China and Russia. Fighter
    modernization must ensure that the Services are able to adapt to these
    challenges. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, CAPE,
    OUSD(R&E) and OUSD(A&S) to review the requirements for 4th, 5th and 6th
    generation fighters
                            military sexual assault
        174. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, how can the Department better
    target issues with specific garrison installations and deployed units--
    such as those embarked on Navy ships--known to have higher rates of
    sexual assault?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department is
    absolutely focused on efforts to take every step we can to prevent
    sexual assault and support victims. It is my understanding that over
    the last several years, the Department has continued to refine its use
    of data to take more targeted approaches to prevention, with a focus on
    those local-level installations and units. These issues must also be
    leadership issues, and we need our commanders at all levels--and at
    every installation and in every unit, on deployment or at home--to be
    aware of command climate problems and take appropriate swift action. If
    confirmed, I will closely examine how we can target our prevention and
    response efforts as much as possible and ensure we keep our commitment
    to our Servicemembers.

        175. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, if confirmed, what specific
    steps would you take to ensure that all servicemembers--regardless of
    Service, rank, or role--experience a culture of respect, safety, and
    equality?
        Mr. Austin. I firmly believe that we have to address culture and
    leadership. Our commanders are responsible to set the tone in every
    command, ensure an appropriate climate, and hold everyone appropriately
    accountable for good order and discipline. My understanding is that the
    Department has recently taken the initiative to redesign the command
    climate surveys to get at leading indicators of problematic behaviors,
    including sexual assault, and is also working to provide commanders
    better access to this data and tools to address it. I look forward to
    hearing more about these initiatives aimed at addressing these on-the-
    ground issues.
                        character of military discharges
        176. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, what steps would you take to
    ensure that mitigating factors such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
    Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual Trauma are taken into
    account when servicemembers may receive Other-Than-Honorable
    discharges?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Department's separation
    and corrective board policies to ensure these factors continue to be
    carefully considered by the Military Departments' separation
    authorities as well as the Military Departments' corrective boards and
    I will clarify and update Department policies if necessary.
                             humanitarian demining
        177. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, what role do you anticipate
    the Department of Defense playing in supporting the reintegration of
    combatants, including elements formerly funded by the United States
    Government such as the Afghan Local Police Forces?
        Mr. Austin. The integration of former combatants will primarily be
    the responsibility of the Afghan Government, but the international
    community can play a supporting role. The State Department would be the
    lead for any United States efforts to reintegrate Taliban into Afghan
    society. The most important role for the Department of Defense in this
    effort would be to continue, with Congressional support, the train-
    advise-assist mission with the Afghan National Defense and Security
    Forces (ANDSF), and to continue funding the salaries and key support
    operations of those forces. If a peace settlement among Afghans
    includes integrating some demobilized Taliban into the ANDSF, the
    Department of Defense would work with Congress to determine what
    funding is required. It is possible that some former combatants may
    integrate into the ANDSF that we help support. When the Afghan Local
    Police were disbanded in late 2020, most members transitioned to either
    the Afghan National Police or the Afghan National Army Territorial
    Force. The rest were given a severance payment. Without an overall
    security architecture, which currently depends on U.S. support, this
    type of reform as well as any other steps to deal with former
    combatants, will not be possible.

        178. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Austin, would the Department consider
    exploring partnerships with the humanitarian demining sector to employ
    former combatants and support other goals, such as the clearance of
    unexploded ordnance from U.S. firing ranges?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review existing policies and
    programs for the clearance of unexploded ordnance, including from U.S
    firing ranges. Subsequently, I will work with Congress, the Department
    of State, non-governmental organizations, and partner nations to
    explore further opportunities to mitigate the adverse effects of
    unexploded ordnance.
                                   __________

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                             shipyard modernization
        179. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, like
    the three other public shipyards, is in dire need of new infrastructure
    investments that will better serve the workforce and the Navy's ship
    repair and maintenance needs. Investments in a submarine dry-dock
    replacement and a waterfront production facility are long overdue and
    need to be pulled forward into DOD's 5-year budget plan. Will you work
    with President-elect Biden to ensure his nominee to serve as Secretary
    of the Navy supports the critical shipyard investments as outlined in
    the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work to gain a deeper
    understanding of the SIOP plan and will support the President's nominee
    for Secretary of the Navy who is committed to improving our critical
    infrastructure.
                          ``solar winds'' cyberattack
        180. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, on January 5, 2021, U.S.
    intelligence agencies issued a joint statement indicating the recent
    ``Solar Winds'' cyberattack affecting multiple departments in the
    Federal Government was likely orchestrated by Russia. The ``Solar
    Winds'' hack is the most significant cyberattack in recent years and
    executive branch officials are still trying to determine the extent of
    the breach. The intrusion was only made known to U.S. Government
    officials when a private cybersecurity company was itself hacked, and
    alerted the Federal Government. What needs to be done to protect our
    critical space and cyber capabilities to address the growing threat
    from Russia and China?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess the impact of the ``solar
    winds'' cyber attack and determine what steps need to be taken to
    protect our critical space and cyber capabilities.

        181. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, what threats to United States
    cybersecurity do North Korea and Iran pose?
        Mr. Austin. While China and Russia are our pacing threats in
    cyberspace, North Korea and Iran are investing in formidable cyber
    capabilities to threaten United States interests. If confirmed, I
    pledge to be transparent with the American people and this Congress
    about the threat posed by these and other malign actors in cyberspace.

        182. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, how confident are you that U.S.
    command and control systems remain uncompromised?
        Mr. Austin. Defending U.S. command and control systems is one of
    the Department's highest priorities. Any further details regarding the
    security of the Department's command and control systems would need to
    be provided at a higher classification level.

        183. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, if confirmed as Secretary of
    Defense, how will you ensure these systems remain reliable and
    resilient to future attacks?
        Mr. Austin. I will continue to make defending U.S. command and
    control systems one of my highest priorities, stressing the enforcement
    of cyber hygiene and accountability. I will ensure the Department
    focuses its resources to ensuring existing systems remain reliable and
    resilient to attack through modernized encryption, rigorous assessments
    and aggressive remediation activities. Furthermore, I will ensure newly
    acquired systems will have the necessary reliability and resiliency
    inserted during the acquisition lifecycle.
                            importance of diplomacy
        184. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, the more we invest in diplomacy
    and strengthening partnerships around the world, the less we have to
    spend on our military. Do you share this view that by doing the
    difficult and essential work of diplomacy around the world, we put less
    strain on our military to keep us and our allies safe?
        Mr. Austin. I believe the work of our partners at the Department of
    State and the U.S. Agency for International Development are absolutely
    critical to our national security. The Department of Defense
    relationship with both organizations is strong. If confirmed, I intend
    to further strengthen those connections and align DOD efforts in
    support of civilian agencies' missions abroad. In addition, our network
    of allies and partners remains a competitive advantage in securing our
    nation.
                      red hill bulk fuel storage facility
        185. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, the Navy and the Defense Logistics
    Agency (DLA) are currently in on-going negotiations with the EPA and
    the Hawaii Department of Health regarding their plan to improve the Red
    Hill Fuel Storage Tanks on Oahu in accordance with the Administrative
    Order on Consent all parties agreed to following a 2014 fuel release
    from the facility. I'm also committed to ensuring the improvements
    sufficiently address the public health and environmental concerns of my
    constituents. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the Navy and
    DLA act in good faith regarding their Red Hill improvement plan,
    including the continued partnership with the University of Hawaii's
    Applied Research Lab to develop further means to safeguard operation of
    the Facility?
        Mr. Austin. I understand the significance of Red Hill both to U.S.
    operations in the Indo-Pacific region and the local community on Oahu.
    However, I am not aware of the details and ongoing negotiations
    regarding the Red Hill improvement plan. If confirmed, I will ensure I
    receive a briefing from the Navy and DLA to understand the Department's
    approach to safe operations at Red Hill.
                         homeland defense radar--hawaii
        186. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
    identified the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-H) as a requirement
    for detecting and discriminating against inbound missile threats from
    an increasingly capable North Korea. President Trump zeroed out funding
    for the radar in the fiscal year 2021 budget, but my colleagues and I
    recognize the critical need for this project in defending Hawaii and we
    included authorization language and appropriated $133 million for
    fiscal year 2021 to keep its development on track. If confirmed, will
    you commit to being upfront and transparent as the Biden administration
    undertakes their review of budget priorities in the coming year,
    especially when it comes to HDR-H?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, if confirmed, we will be upfront and transparent
    as we review budget priorities.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        187. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, with tensions high in the Strait
    of Hormuz and the South China Sea, we see on a daily basis the
    importance of preserving and defending freedom of navigation. I plan to
    reintroduce a Senate Resolution calling upon the Senate to ratify the
    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which entered
    into force over 25 years ago--in 1994. Becoming party to the treaty
    would give the United States a legal right to intervene con
    international disputes relating to freedom of navigation rights. Do you
    agree that threats to international freedom of navigation require an
    international solution?
        Mr. Austin. I agree. Global security depends upon a partnership of
    maritime nations sharing common goals and values. One of the most
    important of those values is respect for the rule of law. The United
    States and its partners have long advocated for the freedom of
    navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, free from threats or
    coercion.

        188. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in April 2018, Admiral Philip
    Davidson, USN, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command,
    stated to this very committee, ``our accession to UNCLOS would help our
    position legally across the globe and would do nothing to limit our
    military operations in the manner in which we're conducting them now.''
    Do you agree with Admiral Davidson's assessment?
        Mr. Austin. I agree that accession to UNCLOS would not limit our
    military operations. The United States has long treated UNCLOS's
    provisions related to navigation and overflight as reflective of
    longstanding and customary international law. Our forces already act in
    a manner consistent with these rights and freedoms. Regardless of
    accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, I assess that the United
    States will continue to advocate for the peaceful resolution of
    maritime disputes without force or coercion. Whether or not the United
    States accedes to UNCLOS, if confirmed, I will work with other U.S.
    Government stakeholders, and our allies and partners, to support the
    free and open international order and continued access for all lawful
    uses of the oceans.

        189. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, will the Biden administration
    continue the recent uptick in freedom of navigation operations in the
    South China Sea?
        Mr. Austin. The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program and its FONOPs
    are key to challenging unlawful maritime claims and preserving the
    global mobility of United States Forces, including and particularly in
    the South China Sea. If confirmed, I will carefully review our current
    operations in the South China Sea to ensure they are sufficient to meet
    the challenge to United States interests.

        190. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, should the Senate move to ratify
    UNCLOS?
        Mr. Austin. I agree. The United States has long treated UNCLOS's
    provisions related to navigation and overflight as reflective of
    longstanding and customary international law. Our military already acts
    in a manner consistent with these rights and freedoms, so accession to
    the Convention will not impact the manner in which we conduct our
    operations.
               relationship with the chairman of the joint chiefs
        191. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, former Secretary James Mattis
    relied heavily on one of his former military subordinates, then
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, a four-
    star Marine Corps general, for policy implementation to the exclusion
    of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the civilian side of the
    Pentagon. As a retired four-star Army infantry officer, if confirmed as
    Secretary, you will be providing advice alongside the current Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, another four-star Army infantry officer,
    General Mark Milley. It is a matter of common knowledge that our
    experiences can shape our frames of reference. Is there a danger of
    ``group think'', having views and perspectives that are ``too similar''
    coming from the President's top two advisors on defense?
        Mr. Austin. I would not have accepted this nomination if I believed
    that to be a legitimate concern. I strongly believe in the value of
    diverse and inclusive teams, and understand the importance of
    surrounding myself with capable civilian appointees and career civil
    servants whose experiences complement, rather than mirror, my own. If
    confirmed, I will bring to this role a different perspective and
    different responsibilities than I did to my previous career as a
    soldier.
        I know that the military serves policy objectives that require a
    broader, deeply civilian vantage point. Our military wants and needs
    civilian leadership that actively and responsibly leads all aspects of
    the Defense Department, including exercising oversight over plans,
    policies, and operations. Without quality civilian guidance, they
    cannot do their jobs effectively.

        192. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in terms of advising the
    President, what do you see as your role relative to General Milley?
        Mr. Austin. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to give
    his best military advice to the President and to the Secretary. If
    confirmed as an appointee in the President's cabinet, the scope of my
    duties would be broader, focusing on strategy and policy, within the
    President's guidelines. I fully believe that I understand the
    difference.
        My experiences throughout my career imbued me with a deep
    understanding of what ``right'' civil-military relations look like.
    Secretaries of Defense Gates and Panetta demonstrated it each day as
    they led the Department of Defense. They ensured that senior civilian
    and military leaders understood their own roles and responsibilities--
    and one another's as well. They made sure we collaborated, setting an
    approach and establishing a process that provided forums to tackle
    tricky issues and to air differing views. They exerted meaningful
    civilian control like setting defense strategy and policy, overseeing
    war planning and operations, and ensuring the defense budget made the
    best use of American taxpayer dollars while safeguarding our national
    security. They sought to be transparent with Members of Congress, the
    press, and the public and to productively engage stakeholders on
    critical issues. They ensured that everyone understood who ultimately
    must make the hard calls-- the Secretary of Defense and the President
    of the United States. If confirmed, I will model healthy civil-military
    relations not only because it would be my responsibility, but because
    it is the very best thing for achieving our national security
    interests.
                        navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan
        193. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, last month, the outgoing
    Administration finally submitted its annual 30-year Navy shipbuilding
    plan which proposes a significant increase in the fleet's size, calling
    for 355 battle force ships in 10 years and nearly 400 ships in 20
    years, up from 296 ships today. Furthermore, the plan calls for an
    additional 143 unmanned vessels by 2045, for a total fleet size of
    nearly 550 ships in 25 years. I've been a proponent of increasing the
    fleet's size, but I'm concerned about whether the significant
    additional spending required to achieve this goal is realistic--the
    proposed budget offers to pay for the additional ships through extra
    budgetary account savings we're currently using to fund our troops on
    the battlefield in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria--and shifts in funds
    from the other Services. Does the Biden administration intend to
    resubmit a new 30-year shipbuilding plan in the coming months alongside
    the President Elect's budget?
        Mr. Austin. My understanding is that the 30-year shipbuilding plan
    is an annual reporting requirement for the Secretary of Defense to
    include with the defense budget materials, per section 231 of Title 10,
    United States Code. If confirmed, I will comply with the reporting
    requirement directed by Congress.

        194. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, what is the new Administration's
    plan to efficiently and effectively increase the size of the Fleet to
    deter near peer competitors like China and Russia without doing so on
    the backs of our servicemen and women in harm's way?
        Mr. Austin. It is my understanding that the size of the Navy fleet
    is currently growing as new ships are delivered to the fleet and that
    the Navy plans to continue this growth in future budgets. Increased and
    stable funding over recent budget years has also improved the Navy's
    ability to restore military readiness. To sustain our readiness gains,
    we must balance force structure growth with the need to train, equip,
    and modernize the Services. If confirmed, I will review both the Future
    Naval Force Study and shipbuilding plan in detail and work with the
    Secretary of the Navy leadership to develop a well calibrated
    shipbuilding plan that is balanced with readiness requirements.
           confronting discrimination, prejudice, and bias within dod
        195. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, I was pleased to see your historic
    nomination by President-elect Biden as the presumptive first African
    American Defense Secretary, a milestone long overdue. Our collective
    efforts to make the Armed Forces more closely mirror the U.S.
    population at large, especially in the senior ranks, however, is still
    a work in progress. Congress passed, over the current President's veto,
    a host of reforms to combat discrimination, prejudice, and bias in the
    Armed Forces in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA. Do you pledge to faithfully
    carry out the provisions in the recently passed NDAA to eradicate
    discrimination, prejudice, and bias within the armed services?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        196. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in light of news reports
    indicating participation by Active, Retired, Reserve, and former
    members of the Armed Forces in the deadly Capitol riot, I recently sent
    a letter with many of my Senate colleagues to the Acting DOD IG urging
    his office to investigate instances of white supremacist and violent
    fringe extremist activity within the ranks--and I just received
    confirmation they were planning to do just that--will you pledge to
    ensure that IG investigation is thorough, completed in a timely manner,
    and the results shared with this committee?
        Mr. Austin. Yes.

        197. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, why is diversity of experience and
    thought an important part of any successful team?
        Mr. Austin. My belief is that diversity is not only a moral
    imperative that reflects who we are as Americans, but very clearly from
    a military readiness perspective, we are stronger and more capable when
    we leverage all the expertise, experience, and problem solving
    capability that exists among our Total Force. As we move forward in one
    of the most complex national security environments in generations, the
    ability to adapt quickly, think outside the box, and use all our
    strengths will make us better on the battlefield. And as a result, we
    will be able to better achieve our defense mission and live up to the
    expectations of the Nation we swear an oath to protect.
                      indo-pacific area of responsibility
        198. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, you've spent much of your career
    overseeing and leading military operations in the Middle East. I look
    forward to having a close working relationship with you on all defense
    related issues, but especially those decisions that impact force
    structure in Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and throughout the Indo-Pacific. As
    you know, there is strong bipartisan support for sustained investment
    in the area of responsibility (AOR), and the recently enacted NDAA
    included $2.2 billion in authorized funding for the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative (PDI) in the current fiscal year. It's my sincere hope that
    if you're confirmed as Secretary, you'll continue to build on the PDI
    and engage with our allies in the region, especially the Freely
    Associated States (FAS) like Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall
    Islands. Will you pledge to consult and work with me and my staff as
    you round out your senior level team, especially for positions like the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I pledge to consult and work with you and
    your staff.
                               transgender policy
        199. Senator Hirono. Mr. Austin, in 2016, former Secretary of
    Defense Ashton Carter lifted the prohibition on transgender service in
    the military. The current Administration did an about face on the
    issue, announcing in 2019 a highly restrictive policy which the
    nonpartisan Palm Center characterized as ``insidious in operation but
    designed to be as comprehensive a ban [on transgender service] as
    possible.'' In an era of great power competition with China and Russia,
    and the armed services all struggling to meet recruiting metrics, now
    is not the time to place unreasonable restrictions on classes of
    individuals who just want to serve their country. Do you support
    overturning the current Administration's de facto ban on transgender
    servicemembers?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. I support amending the policy to ensure all
    members who are qualified to serve have the opportunity.
                                   __________

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                          pfas cleanup and remediation
        200. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Austin, during your testimony I asked
    for your commitment to take concrete steps to address the presence of
    PFAS chemicals in drinking and agricultural water. You stated that you
    would work to find good solutions to ``our [DOD's] contribution to this
    contamination'' and went on to state that PFAS ``has been used
    throughout the economy, so I think we're going to have to work across
    the board . . . '' with partners to mitigate the impact of PFAS. I'm
    concerned that these statements fail to recognize strong evidence
    linking defense activities as the source of PFAS contamination in hard
    hit communities like Clovis, New Mexico. Can you clarify your views on
    DOD's responsibility for PFAS contamination in and around Clovis, New
    Mexico?
        Mr. Austin. The health and safety of DOD personnel, their families,
    and the communities in which we serve, is very important to me. I am
    committed to DOD proactively addressing its PFAS releases under the
    federal cleanup law, and will work with the Air Force to energize the
    pace of cleanup in Clovis, NM.

        201. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Austin, given the strong evidence
    linking contamination to DOD activities, what concrete steps will you
    take as secretary to finally do right by our communities?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will energize the pace of the DOD PFAS
    Task Force to ensure DOD proactively addresses its PFAS releases, and
    aggressively pursues a PFAS-free firefighting agent. I also plan to
    increase communications to Congress and the public, as well as work
    with our Federal and State agency partners to remediate drinking water.

        202. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Austin, you mentioned the need to work
    with the Environmental Protection Agency to address PFAS contamination.
    What does that collaborative approach look like and what will it
    entail?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will work towards national solutions to
    address PFAS in collaboration with other Federal agencies, such as the
    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and
    Human Services, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These
    interagency efforts should include coordinating on Administration-wide
    positions concerning proposed PFAS regulations, and monitoring and
    supporting other Federal agency regulatory and scientific research
    activities.
                                   __________

                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                              civilian casualties
        203. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, human rights organizations have
    reported that witnesses and survivors of civilian casualty incidents
    have had difficulty communicating with the military about potential
    reports of civilian casualties, and others have noted that the military
    does not actively seek to interview witnesses or meet with claimants
    during assessments or investigations. Are you willing to explore ways
    in which the military can ensure that those who wish to provide
    information are able to do so?
        Mr. Austin. The Department has recently established a website where
    survivors or other personnel can submit information about allegations
    of civilian casualties. As we work to complete the DOD Instruction on
    Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response we will address these issues
    and include appropriate guidance to the Department.

        204. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, will your staff address this in
    the forthcoming DOD policy on civilian casualties?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, my understanding is that the Department is nearing
    completion on a Department of Defense Instruction on Civilian Casualty
    Mitigation and Response that will address these issues.

        205. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, how do you think DOD could improve
    how it investigates, publicly reports on, and responds to credible
    reports of civilian harm from journalists, civilians, and non-
    governmental organizations (NGO)?
        Mr. Austin. Currently the Department looks into all allegations of
    civilian harm, from both NGOs and journalists, and will continue to do
    so. I understand this will also be addressed in our DOD Instruction on
    Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response that is currently being
    finalized.

        206. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, in particular, how can DOD better
    utilize outside reporting on civilian harm, as well as information from
    witnesses, survivors, and civil society groups that collect such
    information?
        Mr. Austin. DOD is committed to addressing any allegation of
    civilian harm that is presented to it, including information from
    witnesses, survivors, and civil society groups. We have recently
    established a website where survivors or other personnel can submit
    information about allegations of civilian casualties. The forthcoming
    DOD Instruction on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response will
    address collaboration with NGOs, as well as information gathering
    during assessments of possible civilian casualty incidents. Our policy
    will establish uniform approaches among Combatant Commands to address
    these issues.

        207. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you support making targeted
    payments (ex gratia, or condolence, payments), based on credible
    evidence, to civilians for damage to civilian objects, civilian
    personal injury, or civilian deaths that reasonably result from United
    States combat operations in Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,
    and Libya?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, the Department has done this for many years, and
    recently published detailed formal guidance for providing ex gratia
    payments for damage, personal injury, or death that is incident to the
    use of force. Through collaboration with the State Department, the
    Department has provided assessments of local culture and prevailing
    economic conditions to Combatant Commands to support determination of
    appropriate payment amounts.

        208. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, in response to statutory
    requirements, former Secretary of Defense James Mattis initiated a
    process for developing Department-wide guidance on preventing,
    tracking, and responding to civilian harm across the combatant
    commands. The outcome of this process, a forthcoming DOD Instruction
    (DOD-I), presents a unique opportunity to rectify shortcomings in
    current policies and operations and strengthen the U.S. military's
    commitment to minimize and account for civilian harm. Do you agree that
    an effective civilian harm mitigation framework should have an explicit
    objective of minimizing civilian harm, including direct harm resulting
    from hostilities, as well as direct and indirect harm arising from
    damage to civilian property and assets, public services, and critical
    infrastructure?
        Mr. Austin. The Department is currently working on a DOD
    Instruction on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response and agrees
    that our civilian harm framework should have the objective of
    minimizing civilian harm, including direct harm resulting from
    hostilities, as well as direct and indirect harm arising from damage to
    civilian property and assets, public services, and critical
    infrastructure. It is my understanding that all of these topics will be
    addressed in the DODI.

        209. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you agree that an effective
    civilian harm mitigation framework should address civilian harm arising
    from partnered operations and security assistance?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I agree that partnered operations and security
    assistance should be part of our civilian harm framework and will
    address this in the upcoming DOD Instruction.

        210. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you agree that an effective
    civilian harm mitigation framework should facilitate information
    exchanges with third parties, including affected citizens, local civil
    society, non-governmental organizations, and the media?
        Mr. Austin. I agree that the Department should work with all
    available partners to address allegations of civilian harm. This
    includes the media, NGOs, and affected citizens.

        211. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you agree that an effective
    civilian harm mitigation framework should prioritize redress where
    possible, and condolence payments where redress is not granted,
    including by establishing an effective claims process, requiring a full
    acknowledgment of harm and contextually appropriate and culturally
    sensitive payments for those who are harmed?
        Mr. Austin. DOD recently published detailed formal guidance for
    providing ex gratia payments for damage, personal injury, or death that
    is incident to the use of force by U.S. Forces. DOD also recently
    established a website where survivors or other personnel can submit
    information about allegations of civilian casualties. We are
    considering further improvements to improve information flow with
    regard to civilian casualties. It is my understanding that the
    forthcoming DODI on Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Response will
    establish uniform standards for addressing these issues.
                                 guantanamo bay
        212. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you support President-elect
    Biden's position that Guantanamo should be closed?
        Mr. Austin. I support the President's Policy to close the detention
    facilities at Guantanamo, Bay Cuba. If confirmed, I would direct my
    staff to work with other Administration officials and Congress to
    develop a path forward for the remaining 40 detainees at the facility.
    Until that time, however, the Department must ensure the continued
    safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of detainees through Joint
    Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).

        213. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to ensuring that the Administration acts expeditiously to close
    it?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I would direct my staff to work with
    other Administration officials and Congress to develop a path forward
    for the remaining 40 detainees at the facility with all due dispatch.

        214. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, section 1026 of the Fiscal Year
    2020 NDAA requires DOD to establish a ``Chief Medical Officer'' at
    Guantanamo to ``oversee the provision of medical care to individuals
    detained at Guantanamo.'' The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA became law on
    December 20, 2019. Now, more than a year later, there is still no Chief
    Medical Officer at Guantanamo. If confirmed, will you commit to
    fulfilling this statutory requirement without any further delay by
    appointing an appropriate independent medical expert to serve as Chief
    Medical Officer at Guantanamo?
        Mr. Austin. In August 2020, a Navy Captain Medical Corps officer
    board certified in Critical Care and Anesthesiology was selected to
    serve as the Chief Medical Officer at Guantanamo Bay in accordance with
    section 1026 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. He arrived at Guantanamo in
    October 2020 and reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Health Affairs. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that the
    statutory requirement continues to be met during my tenure as Secretary
    of Defense.
                       ending endless wars and war powers
        215. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, for nearly 20 years, successive
    Administrations have adopted a costly war-based approach to national
    security and counterterrorism policy with no clear endgame. This
    strategy has had to a great number of deleterious effects. During his
    campaign, President-elect Biden pledged to end America's endless wars.
    Do you agree that we need to end these endless wars?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I believe in ending endless wars in a manner that
    protects U.S. interests and preserves the gains made after nearly two
    decades of investment and sacrifice.
                             racism in the military
        216. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, a 2019 Military Times survey
    showed that 36 percent of respondents saw evidence of white supremacy
    and racist ideologies in the military. Former Defense Secretary Mark
    Esper addressed this matter by issuing a July 15, 2020, guidance
    effectively banning white supremacist symbols in the military. This
    guidance could be improved by explicitly prohibiting public displays of
    white supremacist symbols from all military bases, installations,
    ships, and facilities, and from all DOD workplaces and common access
    areas. This would include commemorations of the Confederacy, as they
    are racist and undermine national unity, harm military readiness, and
    affront servicemembers of color who serve the United States. Will you
    commit to prohibiting the public display of white supremacist symbols,
    including flags, posters, and the like, on all military bases,
    installations, ships, facilities, and DOD workspaces and common areas?
        Mr. Austin. The Department places the highest emphasis on ensuring
    that all Department personnel are treated with dignity and respect, in
    an inclusive environment. In order to promote morale, cohesion, and
    readiness in the military it is essential that our ranks reflect and
    are inclusive of the American people that Servicemembers have sworn to
    protect and defend. If confirmed, I will review current policies and
    reports to determine what policies need to be put in place to ensure
    all Servicemembers are allowed to serve with dignity and respect.

        217. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
    established a commission to develop a plan to remove the names that
    honor or commemorate the Confederacy from all military assets. The
    legislation, however, does nothing to abrogate your inherent authority
    as Secretary of Defense to direct this review and the renaming of these
    assets independent of the commission. Would you commit to invoking this
    authority?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will review the Commission's completed
    report and consult with senior leaders to assess the appropriate next
    steps.

        218. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, the outgoing acting Secretary of
    Defense has named four individuals to the Commission, all of who were
    political appointees in the Trump administration. Do you intend to
    allow these appointees to remain on the commission?
        Mr. Austin. I will closely review the membership of this important
    commission and ensure the appropriate individuals are participating.

        219. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, are you willing to review these
    appointments and replace them if you deem it necessary?
        Mr. Austin. Yes, I will closely review the membership of this
    commission and ensure the appropriate individuals are participating.
                                 climate change
        220. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, climate disruption is a core
    security vulnerability. In 2015, DOD released a National Security
    Strategy, which outlined the security risks from climate change and
    labeled climate change as a threat multiplier. Pursuant to this
    finding, how do you plan to integrate climate considerations into the
    national defense strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review?
        Mr. Austin. Climate and environmental security risks pose unique
    challenges to the U.S. Homeland and DOD missions and operations, in
    addition to the security of our allies and partners. They must be
    factored into our strategic planning efforts. If confirmed, I will
    bring increased focus to the effects of climate change, as a top
    priority of the Biden Administration. I believe it is imperative that
    the Department work closely with the Intelligence Community, others in
    the U.S. interagency, and our allies and partners to identify and
    mitigate acute risks that a changing climate poses to the Department's
    ability to advance it priority defense missions.

        221. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, do you acknowledge that climate
    change represents one of the greatest, if not the greatest, threats to
    human security?
        Mr. Austin. In the near and medium term, environmental security
    challenges are likely to threaten U.S. national security interests
    through a combination of acute physical shocks and more gradual
    disruptions to natural systems, increasing the frequency, scale, and
    complexity of military missions. Shortages of food, water, and other
    critical resources may contribute to large-scale instability and
    migration. Increased instability expands opportunities for extremist
    groups and strategic rivals to gain influence. With the reemergence of
    long-term, strategic competition as the central challenge to U.S.
    prosperity and security, DOD must understand and prepare for the ways
    environmental security affects competition for influence and access as
    well as the ways it influences and challenges the capabilities of our
    partners and allies. Over the long term, these threats to U.S. national
    security may equal or even exceed those posed by adversarial great
    powers. This issue is a priority for the Department. Our Resource
    Competition, Environmental Security, and Stabilization (RECESS) team is
    currently assessing the security impacts of climate change through a
    series of exercises.

        222. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, DOD's annual domestic procurement
    budget is the largest in the Federal Government. This money can and
    should be used to kick start a national clean energy mobilization. What
    opportunities do you see to leverage DOD's considerable purchasing
    power to advance clean and resilient energy technologies?
        Mr. Austin. The generation and use of energy is of strategic
    importance to the Department. If confirmed, I will support investments
    in clean energy technologies where these technologies enhance the
    resilience of DOD installations and missions.

        223. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, section 328 of the Fiscal Year
    2020 National Defense Authorization Act (Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA)
    contains a requirement that the Secretary of Defense, in his annual
    budget submission to Congress, shall include ``a dedicated budget line
    item for adaptation to, and mitigation of, effects of extreme weather
    on military networks, systems, installations, facilities, and other
    assets and capabilities of the Department of Defense; and an estimate
    of the anticipated adverse impacts to the readiness of the Department
    and the financial costs to the Department during the year covered by
    the budget of the loss of, or damage to, military networks, systems,
    installations, facilities, and other assets and capabilities of the
    Department, including loss of or obstructed access to training ranges,
    as a result extreme weather events.'' Do you commit to including this
    line item in the first budget you submit to Congress?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will examine this complex issue and
    ensure that the Department complies with the statutory requirement to
    include a dedicated budget line item in the next budget submission to
    Congress.
                                   landmines
        224. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, 164 countries, representing over
    80 percent of the world's states, including all of our NATO allies,
    have banned the use of landmines. If confirmed, will you commit to
    reversing current DOD policy and ban the use, production, sale, and
    transfer of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions by the U.S.
    military?
        Mr. Austin. The current DOD Landmine policy and the current DOD
    Cluster Munition policy were arrived at after significant study and
    consideration and resulted from requests by Combatant Commanders for
    reviews of the previous landmine and cluster munition policies. It is
    important for these policies to appropriately balance operational risks
    and considerations with humanitarian risks and considerations. It would
    be premature for me to commit to reversing those policies at this time
    until I have had time to review the policies.

        225. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, will you lay out an accelerated
    timeline for the destruction of stockpiled landmines and cluster
    munitions, providing concrete plans and mechanisms for public reporting
    on progress?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will plan to provide the Congress with
    an update on the plans and timelines for the destruction of those
    landmines and cluster munitions that are no longer in DOD's operational
    inventory.
                                nuclear weapons
        226. Senator Warren. Mr. Austin, President-elect Biden has
    expressed his belief that ``the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear
    arsenal should be deterring--and, if necessary, retaliating against--a
    nuclear attack'' against the United States and its allies and that he
    will ``work to put that belief into practice.'' He has also said that
    ``it's hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of
    nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary. Or make
    sense.'' Do you agree with the President-elect's assessment? If not, in
    what specific scenario or scenarios do you believe the benefits of the
    first use of nuclear weapons by the United States against another
    nuclear-armed state would outweigh the costs?
        Mr. Austin. In keeping with past practice for incoming
    Administrations, I anticipate that President Biden will direct the
    interagency to conduct a thorough set of strategic reviews, including
    of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that the Department of Defense plays an active role in this
    review.
                                   __________

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                                 climate change
        227. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, how would you position the
    Department to make early investments in climate change adaptation,
    mitigation, and resiliency strategies in order to reduce the financial
    burden on taxpayers and ensure national security preparedness?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will develop comprehensive investment
    strategies that address extreme weather adaptation, mitigation and
    resiliency that impacts operations, readiness, installations,
    equipment, infrastructure, and force development.
                                microelectronics
        228. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what is your plan to develop
    requirements that mitigate counterfeit microelectronics and reduce risk
    to microelectronics that have been manufactured by or have a tie to
    adversaries?
        Mr. Austin. DOD should work with its industrial base partners to
    understand the risks in the microelectronics supply chain, including
    sourcing from adversarial countries, which increases the risk of
    counterfeit parts. The Department should continue to develop and
    implement measures that strengthen secure microelectronics supply
    chains, ensuring that our DOD systems are reliable and safe.

        229. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, do you plan to follow through on
    the reshoring of our industrial base, specifically with
    microelectronics?
        Mr. Austin. DOD should continue to engage with Congress on this
    critical issue. The Department requires a holistic microelectronics
    strategy and roadmap, which includes reshoring of microelectronics
    capability.
                                 future warfare
        230. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, in your view what do you expect to
    be the most relevant form of warfare in the near future and what
    changes does the Department need to make to optimize for this most-
    relevant form of warfare?
        Mr. Austin. Joint Doctrine identifies three forms of warfare;
    conventional, irregular and nuclear. Given the military strength and
    breadth of capacity our potential adversaries have achieved, the Joint
    Force must be capable and ready to employ all three forms, across all
    domains, to achieve our military objectives. At the same time, we must
    maintain the defense of our Homeland and manage the risk of strategic
    deterrence failure. Additionally, the Joint Force must not only be
    effective in armed conflict but also in day-to-day competition to deter
    and prevent our adversaries from resorting to warfare in the first
    place.

        231. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, as Secretary of Defense, how will
    you create sustainable and durable processes to ensure long-term
    success for the Department of Defense in identifying, developing,
    acquiring, and deploying next-generation technology?
        Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, it
    is my understanding that the Department of Defense Adaptive Acquisition
    Framework implements the following tenets to ensure long-term success
    for the Department of Defense in identifying, developing, acquiring,
    and deploying next-generation technology: (a) Empower program managers
    (PMs); (b) Simplify acquisition policy; (c) Employ tailored acquisition
    approaches; (d) Conduct data driven analysis; (e) Actively manage risk;
    and (f) Emphasize product support and sustainment. If confirmed, I will
    work with my staff and the services to ensure that Department policy is
    fully aligned with these tenets and effectively implements the reforms
    needed in the defense acquisition system.

        232. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what steps will you take to create
    a comprehensive approach to developing the necessary workforce, both
    civilian and uniformed, to operate new technologies?
        Mr. Austin. The National Defense Strategy calls for an innovative
    approach to talent recruitment, development, and retention to achieve
    the DOD mission. If confirmed, I will work with Congress in continuing
    to create the necessary authorities and flexibilities to attract and
    retain the highest quality technical talent, and I will undertake an
    assessment of the relevant training and education needed for continuous
    development of the civilian workforce. On the uniform side, I intend to
    work with the private sector to create opportunities to transfer
    individuals with unique technical skills into and out of the Department
    to solve the complex issues facing our Military Services. This exchange
    of personnel will enable a more rapid integration of the latest
    technologies throughout DOD.
                             technology acquisition
        233. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, how will you best position the
    Department of Defense to be able to bridge the ``valley of death''
    between small-scale experimentation and programs of record?
        Mr. Austin. As I answered in my confirmation hearing questions, it
    is my understanding that recent reforms have allowed the Department to
    engage effectively in rapid prototyping and expand access to new
    partners in industry. At the same time, the fielding of new
    capabilities continues to proceed at a slower pace than is required to
    address the challenges the Department faces and the development of new
    entrants in the generation of defense capability is suboptimal.
    Acquisition of services and software remain challenging and
    implementing sound cybersecurity throughout the acquisition system and
    the weapon systems it produces is a major need. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with my staff and the services to continue to improve the
    defense acquisition system along these fronts and in other areas.

        234. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, how will you position the
    Department to best be able to introduce new technology at scale?
        Mr. Austin. The Department needs to be more effective at assessing
    the potential of emerging technologies and ensuring barriers to entry
    are low. One of the great challenges we face is recognizing and
    transitioning opportunistic, emerging technologies that appear outside
    the technology development phase of an acquisition program. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Services to improve mechanisms for
    planned and opportunistic technology transition into DOD systems. I
    would also foster a culture of appropriate risk-taking in order to
    accelerate the identification and integration of these emerging
    technologies.
                                   diversity
        235. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what will you do to build a force
    which accurately represents, in every branch and at every rank, the
    diversity of the Nation it serves?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will ensure we fully commit the
    Department of Defense to developing and maintaining a Total Force that
    proudly represents and reflects all our incredible diversity as
    Americans. That means we have to be comprehensive, not only from
    recruitment to mentoring and career development, but we also must
    ensure that our recruitment efforts reach a wide cross section of
    America. If confirmed, I will look at what's working, what we might
    need to adjust, and how we can build sustainable personnel practices
    that reflect our commitment to diversity for every civilian and every
    Servicemember at every rank and in every Service.

        236. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, what do you see as the main
    obstacle towards the increase in the number of minorities and women
    serving as the military's most senior leaders?
        Mr. Austin. DOD needs to improve recruiting and retaining
    minorities into occupational specialties that lead to senior leadership
    roles, such as operational specialties where the bulk of our senior
    leader requirements exist. We must have minority role models leading
    our operational units visible to a wide range of communities and work
    harder to make these opportunities available to all minority
    Servicemembers, both officer and enlisted.
                                    michigan
        237. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, Exercise Northern Strike, which we
    host at the National All-Domain Warfighting Center, provides a premier
    venue for joint service training and an opportunity to work with NATO
    partners. This exercise is so unique and large scale, more similar to
    Pacific Pathways or a CTC rotation, that I believe it is more efficient
    to invest in it. Can you commit that the Department will critically
    examine the cost-effectiveness, and benefit to the warfighter, of
    investing in Exercise Northern Strike?
        Mr. Austin. The Department regularly reviews the cost-effectiveness
    of its training programs, including Exercise Northern Strike. If
    confirmed, I will continue the Department's work to evaluate routinely
    the returns on our investments to ensure we are optimizing cost and
    mission effectiveness.
                                     israel
        238. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, Congress recently authorized the
    creation of the United States-Israel Operations Technology Working
    Group, that I championed, which is focused on cooperation in research
    and development in early stage defense technologies. Will you support
    the implementation of this group and support expanding our cooperation
    in emerging defense technologies?
        Mr. Austin. Yes. We will establish this working group under the
    existing United States-Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory Group that
    is co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Sustainment to promote cooperation, including in emerging technologies.
                              bad paper discharge
        239. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, for the past 3 years the Army and
    the Navy have been litigating class action lawsuits brought by bad
    paper veterans suffering from PTSD and related conditions. Do you agree
    that there should be a presumption of upgrade in cases of PTSD,
    Traumatic Brain Injury, and Military Sexual Trauma?
        Mr. Austin. The Department continues its efforts to ensure veterans
    are aware of their opportunities to request review of their discharges
    and other military records. If confirmed, I will review this issue to
    ensure the Military Departments Discharge Review Boards (DRB) and
    Boards for Correction of Military Records and Naval Records (BCMR/
    NR).are applying the appropriate standards under the law and
    Servicemembers receive just and fair consideration.

        240. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, would you perform a comprehensive
    review of the causes of the increased rate of bad paper discharges
    across the military and publish a report outlining the steps you are
    taking to reverse this increase?
        Mr. Austin. If confirmed, I will assess whether there is an
    increase in the rate of bad paper discharges across the military and,
    if necessary, what the contributing factors may be.
                           sustainment and readiness
        241. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, the National Commission on
    Military Aviation Safety published a report on December 1, 2020,
    attributing a lack of parts as a concern for aircraft sustainment and
    aviation safety. Furthermore, the Comptroller General of the United
    States has published reports describing how parts shortages can be a
    concern for sustaining older DOD platforms. As the Department of
    Defense struggles with diminishing manufacturing sources and material
    shortage (DMSMS) issues across the industrial base, how is the
    Department of Defense working to incorporate advanced manufacturing
    into solving this critical issue and has DOD considered using automated
    software-based manufacturing to address this readiness concern?
        Mr. Austin. The Department is incorporating advanced manufacturing
    capabilities within the organic industrial complexes and research and
    engineering labs of the Services. It collaborates routinely through
    Department-level forums such as the Joint Defense Manufacturing Council
    and the Joint Additive Manufacturing Working Group to share best
    practices. Capabilities in use today include technologies such as cold-
    spray and 3D printers for both plastics and metals which use automated
    software-based control that assures accuracy, quality and
    reproducibility.
                                 human capital
        242. Senator Peters. Mr. Austin, in 2017, the Army moved to a
    Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) system, focused on physical training,
    nutrition and sustaining both the mental and spiritual health of Army
    soldiers. As the Army continues to adopt this system and appropriately
    implement the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT), has it considered
    characterizing Army soldiers as ``human weapon systems''--which done by
    the Air Force has led it to invest in and improve its human capital
    management practices--to improve the military lifecycle of individual
    servicemembers and properly acquire and sustain the equipment essential
    to supporting the creation and maintenance of this weapon system?
        Mr. Austin. The Army's most important weapons system is the
    soldier. Soldiers must remain the most flexible and lethal force on the
    battlefield. The Army is investing in soldier lethality on three
    fronts. First, the Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) system is the
    Army's primary investment in soldier readiness and lethality focusing
    on physical and non-physical performance, reducing injury rates, and
    increased overall effectiveness. Second, the Army's soldier lethality
    cross-functional team has focused on materiel enhancements that
    soldiers and squads need as the foundation of the decisive force.
    Third, the Army is committed to soldier intellectual development
    through world class Professional Military Education, training, and
    developmental experiences.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III
    follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    ------

        [The biographical sketch of Lloyd J. Austin III, which was
    transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Lloyd J.
    Austin III in connection with his nomination follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Mr. Lloyd J. Austin III was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Inhofe on January 21, 2021, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on January 22, 2021.]

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